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United States Department of State

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Foreign  
Relations  
of the  
United  
States



1943

Volume I

GENERAL

Department of State  
Washington







Foreign Relations  
of the  
United States  
Diplomatic Papers  
1943

Volume I  
General



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## PREFACE

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.



1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

The responsibilities of the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, for the preparation of this *Foreign Relations* volume were entrusted, under the general supervision of the Director of the Office, William M. Franklin, to the Foreign Relations Division under the direction of the Chief of that Division (Editor of *Foreign Relations*), E. R. Perkins. The compilers of *Foreign Relations*, 1943, Volume I, General were the late Gustave A. Nueremberger, N. O. Sappington, Velma H. Cassidy, and former staff members Irving L. Thomson, Matilda F. Axton, and Shirley Phillips.

The Division of Publishing Services is responsible with respect to *Foreign Relations* for the editing of copy, proofreading, and preparation of indexes. Under the general direction of the Chief of the Division, Jerome H. Perlmutter, the editorial functions mentioned above are performed by the Foreign Relations Section in charge of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

For 1943, the arrangement of volumes is as follows: Volume I, General; Volume II, Europe; Volume III, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East; Volume IV, The Near East and Africa; Volumes V and VI, The American Republics. The *Foreign Relations* series for 1943 also includes the unnumbered volume on 1943, China, and that on the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, already published. Documentation on the Casablanca, Third Washington, and First Quebec Conferences, held in 1943, is scheduled for publication in subsequent volumes of *Foreign Relations*.

E. R. PERKINS  
*Editor of Foreign Relations*

APRIL 16, 1963.

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## WARTIME CONFERENCES BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DURING 1943

[Because of the decision to publish a special series of *Foreign Relations* volumes on top-level World War II conferences, documentation on such conferences has been omitted for the most part in the regular annual *Foreign Relations* volumes. During 1943 such conferences were held between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, at Casablanca (January 14-24), Washington (May 12-25), and Quebec (August 17-24). Documentation on these conferences is scheduled for publication in subsequent volumes of *Foreign Relations* in the series on wartime conferences.

Conferences were held by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, at Cairo with President Chiang Kai-shek of China and his top military leaders (November 22-26), and at Tehran with Marshal Stalin and other Soviet officials (November 28-December 1). The American and British conferees met again at Cairo (December 2-7) and were joined for consultation December 4-7 by President İnönü of Turkey and other Turkish officials. Documentation on these conferences is published in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.*]

## NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE REESTABLISHMENT OF TRADE BETWEEN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/412a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1942—9 p. m.

1482. Your 1964 of December 4.<sup>1</sup>

1. The Department approves in principle the continuation of economic exchanges between French North Africa and the Peninsula and agrees that such exchanges should be related to our supply-purchase programs with the Peninsula.

2. The principal objectives to be sought from such exchanges are:

(a) The removal from the Peninsula for consumption in North Africa of materials which might go to the enemy.

(b) The removal from the Peninsula to French North Africa for transshipment to the US or UK of materials purchased by the US or UK or for their account and which cannot otherwise be lifted.

(c) To cause goods manufactured in the Peninsula to be shipped to North Africa in an effort to relieve as much as possible demands on shipping from United Nations sources.

(d) To employ our control over French North African produce to the best advantage in bargaining with Spain and Portugal in connection with the supply-purchase programs.

3. Although definite plans for accomplishing the above objectives have not been developed here as yet, it would seem definitely desirable that no separate negotiations be carried on either by Spain or Portugal with French authorities. Any such negotiations should preferably be with the US and UK representatives, following the pattern of the supply-purchase negotiations. Please telegraph your views on this point but do not discuss the matter with the Spanish or Portuguese authorities.

4. With respect to materials to go to the Peninsula, we are presently considering possibility of the US and UK undertaking to purchase entire exportable surplus of French North African produce. In such event, resales could be made to Spain and Portugal of such quantities of materials as the Combined Boards would allocate to

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

them, subject of course to clearance with BEW<sup>2</sup> and MEW<sup>3</sup> on Economic Warfare grounds. If it is decided not to undertake the purchase of the exportable surpluses, it might possibly be arranged for either US or UK representatives to act as purchasing agents for the Spaniards and Portuguese. Please telegraph your views on this point, but do not discuss with the Spanish or Portuguese authorities.

5. In any event, the amounts of materials to go to the Peninsula would be subject to approval by the interested agencies here. So that the matter may be considered more fully, please telegraph us the following information:

- (a) What commodities the Spaniards have been obtaining from North Africa and in what quantities.
- (b) What commodities they wish to obtain in increased volume, and amounts.
- (c) What commodities and amounts Spain can supply to North Africa.

You will doubtless need to consult Spanish authorities to obtain certain of this information. Please do so, but do not make any commitments.

6. Reply to your queries on such items as rock phosphates, cereals and other products will be postponed until we receive a reply to this telegram. Please discuss this telegram with your British colleagues so that in your reply you can express your joint views and recommendations.

7. Please repeat this telegram and your 1964 to Lisbon, requesting Legation to take corresponding action and telegraph its views. Please also repeat to Murphy<sup>4</sup> asking that he telegraph his comments.

Repeated to London from here.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/408 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 2, 1943—8 p. m.  
[Received January 3—4: 08 p. m.]

14. Your 1482, December 24, 9 p. m. I consider our purposes can best be served by having Spaniards negotiate with French North African representation in Madrid and the promise of North African goods is the only bait sufficiently attractive to induce Spain to rec-

<sup>2</sup> Board of Economic Warfare.

<sup>3</sup> British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

<sup>4</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; United States Political Adviser on staff of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.

ognize French representation here. Eventually French representatives could take over French refugee problem using funds derived from such commercial transactions. They could also assist the Giraud<sup>5</sup> Government in other ways and would be a valuable channel to us for military information from France. In the absence of at least informal recognition French now here working for us may become subject to persecution. Spaniards may insist on subterfuge that French representatives are acting for the Sherifian Government.<sup>6</sup>

2. The French should be supported in their efforts to acquire materials from Spain for the needs of North Africa; this might be extended into a triangular arrangement by which some of our own Lease Lend civilian supplies can come from Spain.

3. By proper control we could attain the desired objectives for our own purchase supply program. British would continue to exercise navicert control but we believe acquisition of entire exportable surplus of French North African commodities would increase our control and provide reason for British and ourselves to participate in French-Spanish negotiations. Such quantities of French material as we may wish to allocate to Spain in return for Spanish merchandise should be earmarked.

4. Unlikely Spaniards would agree to our acting as purchasing agents for them; they have in mind using private Spanish sources to conduct negotiations with Rabat thus side-stepping the question of recognition. This should be resisted by the French with our support.

5. The British Embassy agrees in principle to above with reservation that French negotiations [*negotiators?*] should be acceptable to us. We disagree with this reservation as we believe French should be free to select their own negotiators so long as we have veto power.

6. The Rabat commercial agreements services recently authorized Pettit, former Commercial Counselor, (see my 2132, December 26, 2 p. m.<sup>7</sup>) provisionally to open discussions with Spaniards to supply the quantities of materials set forth in the above mentioned desiderata. Apparently Algiers concurred. The British do not favor Pettit but we consider him satisfactory.

7. If you concur that French representation desirable I suggest Murphy be requested to inform Algiers Government that we must participate in discussions here and that their program should be integrated with ours.

From preliminary material available to us we understand that under the 1941 agreement the Spaniards obtained from North Africa 1,200 tons wheat of 6,000 promised; 2,100 tons barley of 5,000 prom-

<sup>5</sup> Henri Giraud, High Commissioner of French North Africa.

<sup>6</sup> Government of the Sultan of Morocco.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

ised; 250 tons antimony; 500,000 tons phosphates of 520,000 promised in that and supplementary agreement; manganese none; small quantities of beans; sorghum; millet and fodder; cattle and approximately 3,000,000 francs sundries. Spain supplied a small tonnage of potash; 4,500 tons of pyrites; 525 tons chemicals including turpentine and rosin; 21 tons batteries; 30,000,000 francs wool textiles; 27,300,000 francs rayon textiles; 3,600 tons salt, small quantities of matches; beer bottles; sandals and 1,700,000 francs sundries. In a new agreement under consideration when invasion occurred Spain desired 200,000 tons of phosphates (in addition to 200,000 advanced under supplementary agreement); 400 tons antimony; 2,000 tons broad beans; 5,000 tons of chick peas; 2,000 tons linseed; 2,000 tons canary seed; 12,000 boxes eggs; 4,000 tons of smoked and salted fish; 3,000 tons clay; 10,000 tons alfalfa and, (to be applied against textile exports): 250 tons of cotton; 1,000 tons of wool; 500 tons of wool waste. Spain also desires as much barley as can be supplied.

HAYES

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653.8131/7 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 11, 1943—3 p. m.  
[Received January 12—2: 28 a. m.]

51. Department's 1482, December 24. Legation has given careful study to the question raised in this telegram and wishes to make the following observations:

(1) Since Portuguese trade with Algerian ports has recently been of slight importance compared to Portuguese trade with ports in Morocco and since Portuguese-Moroccan trade is already covered by a barter agreement still nominally valid which could conceivably provide a basis for resumption of exchanges we suggest for purposes of simplicity and clarity that direct peninsular trade with Algeria be considered only in connection with Spain and that our problem here be restricted to trade in and out of Moroccan ports. Following points are drafted on the assumption that this principle will be accepted.

(2) It would probably be possible without much difficulty or formality to reactivate and implement the original Moroccan-Portuguese agreement of August 23, 1941 (see Legation's despatch no. 156, August 29, 1941, and no. 569, August 22, 1942<sup>s</sup>) as a legal framework for the resumption of commercial exchanges. Noguès in his capacity as Commissioner Resident General of the Republic of France in Morocco has already directed to the Portuguese Consul

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<sup>s</sup> Neither printed.



at Rabat a written communication dated December 16 inquiring whether the Portuguese Government would be prepared to resume trade under the existing agreement and to permit the use in this connection of the funds now on deposit in the Bank of Portugal to the credit of the State Bank of Morocco (text submitted with despatch no. 9552 [1202], December 23, from Tangier<sup>9</sup> which has presumably not yet reached Department). I have not heard that the Portuguese have replied to this inquiry and do not intend to discuss the matter with them unless so instructed. I believe, however, that they might be more inclined to assent to the proposal of the Residency General (assuming that they have not already done so) if this Legation and the British Embassy here were able to assure the Portuguese Government that such resumption of trade within the framework of the existing agreement met with our wishes and would receive our practical support and that we stood prepared to extend our good offices in behalf of the Sultan in further discussions of all details pertaining to this matter. The Portuguese, as the Department is aware, are much in need of Moroccan phosphates and would have every reason to accept such a solution.

(3) Doubtless as a result of this need for phosphates Castro Caldas<sup>10</sup> has already suggested informally that we might purchase some Moroccan phosphates and send a ship to bring them to Portugal for resale here which he intimated [apparent omission] for free escudos. Castro Caldas stated at that time that the Portuguese Government might be willing to conclude a new agreement to cover this phosphate trade if we considered this necessary.

(4) The British seem inclined to feel that since the Portuguese are apparently agreed to a reopening of the trade on an informal basis there would be little merit in attempting to implement the old agreement at this time. They point out that implementation of the old agreement is complicated by the fact that the funds on deposit in Portugal as referred to by Noguès include funds arising from the operation of certain French tankers which had nothing to do with North Africa and that the Bank of France may lay claim to these funds (believed to be some 5 or 6 million francs out of a rough total of 17,500,000 francs) as not arising from Moroccan trade. It is not [*sic*] possible, however, that the views of the British here on this question are somewhat colored by apprehension about the political situation in North Africa and by unwillingness to do anything which might involve the direct cooperation of the French authorities there.

(5) We feel that while it would be advisable as a starter to under-

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<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Vice president of the Portuguese Technical Corporative Council for Commerce and Industry.

take a few provisional shipments probably pit props against phosphates through the USCC<sup>11</sup> and the UKCC<sup>12</sup> it would also do no harm to pursue the reactivation of the old singles as outlined above. This might make it possible in the first place for us to use for purchases in Portugal at least some 10 million escudos if not all of the sum deposited here to the account of the State Bank of Morocco. Secondly, by virtue of the fact that proceeds arising here from trade agreement are deposited to the Moroccan accounts it would avoid the creation of the impression in Lisbon that we were ourselves profiting commercially from the exploitation of French Morocco. Thirdly, if at some future date we should wish to turn these matters over to the representatives of a new French Government it would be much easier if the Portuguese-Moroccan agreement were regarded as in effect. Fourthly, the Portuguese-Moroccan agreement committed both parties to "examine with sympathy" requests for alterations or increases in the categories and amounts of goods to be exchanged and there is no apparent reason why we could not develop trade within the framework of the agreement in such a way as to serve the objectives outlined in paragraph no. 2 of the Department's telegram under reference.

We feel therefore that it might be advisable if (a) the USCC were to be authorized to join with the UKCC as a provisional measure in undertaking a few shipments of Portuguese products to Morocco in return for phosphates and if (b) the Department were to explore the possibility of having this mission and the British Embassy in Lisbon instructed to encourage the [apparent omission] Noguès approach as suggested above and to proceed to work out an extension of the trade on the basis of the old agreement.

Regardless of the bases on which this trade is resumed the following are the products which we think might be moved from Portugal to North Africa with a view to serving the objectives listed in the Department's telegram.

(a) Cotton textiles to the value of 80,000,000 escudos (the existing agreement calls for only 30,000,000; the increase would be subject to the availability of raw cotton supplies).

(b) Colonial products including coffee, cocoa, tea and haricot beans to a total value of 25,000,000 escudos.

(c) Sisal binder twine to the amount of 1500 tons provided that sisal would be made available by us from Portuguese colonial sources.

(d) Cement to the value of 7,000,000 escudos.

(e) Most important of all the 400 odd tons of tin metal which we shall be obliged to deliver to the Metals Commission under recently government control and which are above [over?] and above the export allocation under the supply purchase program.

<sup>11</sup> United States Commercial Company.

<sup>12</sup> United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

(f) Any other products which we are now buying preclusively and which might be of military use or vital to the other objectives listed in the Department's telegram.

With respect to (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. The Portuguese authorities have given the British to understand that these amounts would probably be available for export to Morocco if the exchanges were to be renewed.

As far as shipments from Morocco are concerned in addition to the phosphates which could apparently be absorbed in Portugal to the amount of 138,000 tons per annum the following schedule of annual amounts might be suggested:

- (a) Broad beans (5,000 tons) as provided under the Supply Purchase Agreement valued at 5,000,000 escudos;
- (b) gypsum, valued at 500,000 escudos;
- (c) tanning bark 2,500 valued at 1,000,000 escudos;
- (d) grease wool 1,500 tons (to substitute the quantity which under the Supply Purchase Agreement was to be obtained from South Africa) valued at 22,000,000 escudos;
- (e) 10,000 tons of oats, 20,000 tons of wheat and various other cereals with a combined value of 30,000,000 escudos which we understand might be available for this purpose.

(7) [*sic*] Before this Legation and the British Embassy could undertake any conversations directed to the resumption of trade on any large scale either under the existing agreement or independently of it we would need precise and authoritative information regarding the exact possibility of deliveries of products from Morocco and of absorption in Morocco of Portuguese commodities. We should in other words be in a position to speak for all parties in Morocco including private French commercial interests as well as our own military authorities whose cooperation would be necessary to effect the commercial transfers and movement of goods in question. In order that this might be achieved we feel that there ought first to be direct consultation between on the one hand British and American officials familiar with our supply purchase arrangements and preemptive program on the Peninsula and on the other similar officials in North Africa qualified to speak authoritatively with respect to Moroccan foreign trade possibilities.

(8) The British have called attention to the possibility of using our present control over Moroccan phosphates to impress the Portuguese with the seriousness of our views in the coming wolfram conversations. If discussions looking to the reopening of Moroccan trade were to be held simultaneously with the new wolfram negotiations we believe that this might be accomplished.

Repeated to London and Algiers telegraphically and Tangier and Madrid by mail.

651R.5331/b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)*

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1943—10 p. m.

163. Department and interested agencies have studied with interest the observations contained in Lisbon's 51 of January 11 and Madrid's no. 14 of January 2 concerning trade with French North Africa. On the basis of these observations, the Department is telegraphing its views concerning trade between the Peninsula and French North Africa to Algiers, asking for comments.<sup>13</sup> The Department's telegram as well as Algiers' comments will be sent to Lisbon and to Madrid direct from Algiers.

The Department and interested agencies here feel that, in the final analysis, this trade must be controlled through Algiers and consequently it is important that any procedure to be adopted should first be approved there. However, in its telegram to Algiers, the Department has stressed the fact that in any negotiations for trade between the Peninsula and French North Africa, it must be borne in mind that the US and British Governments have in effect assured Spain and Portugal that the occupation of French North Africa will not interfere with ordinary commercial agreements as regards goods for their own internal use.

It is hoped that Algiers' comments on this matter will be forthcoming promptly and that it will be possible to undertake the formal negotiations concerning the trade within the near future.

Further instructions will be sent shortly.

Please repeat to Madrid as Department's no. 212, 9 p. m.

HULL

651R.5331/a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1943—2 p. m.

205. For Murphy. The following are the views of the Department and other interested agencies concerning trade between the Peninsula and French North Africa. Preliminary views on this matter were discussed in Department's no. 1482 of December 24 to Madrid, repeated by Madrid to Lisbon and Algiers. Views set forth below take into consideration Madrid's no. 14 of January 2, 8 p. m., and Lisbon's no. 51 of January 11, 3 p. m. Department has also noted certain telegraphic exchanges between Madrid and Algiers relative to Malaise<sup>14</sup> and Pettit.

<sup>13</sup> See telegram No. 205, *infra*.

<sup>14</sup> Colonel Malaise, General Giraud's representative in Spain.

1. In view of limited facilities available at French North African ports for civilian trade and of necessity of coordinating all French North African trade through one center, final decisions as to the volume and character of trade with the Peninsula should be made in Algiers. It is therefore suggested that final negotiations be conducted in Algiers on a tripartite basis between NAEB,<sup>15</sup> the Spaniards and the French. Similar negotiations could be carried on in Algiers with the Portuguese.

2. To lighten as much as possible this additional burden to be cast on Algiers, preliminary discussions should be held in Madrid and Lisbon. In Madrid these discussions should be between representatives of the US and British Embassies, the Spanish Government and French authorities approved by the French High Commission in Algiers. If the French High Commission has approved representatives in Lisbon, similar procedure could be followed there. Otherwise, preliminary discussions in Lisbon should be between Anglo-American representatives and the Portuguese Government.

3. Instructions will be sent promptly to the Anglo-American representatives in Madrid and Lisbon (and repeated to Algiers) as to the character and volume of possible trade objectives to be sought. These will be based on studies being made here with representatives of the British Embassy and will take into consideration our supply-purchase agreements with Spain and Portugal as well as the most recent advices as to trade under existing agreements between Spain and Portugal and French North Africa.

4. One of the governing factors to be borne in mind in the course of the various negotiations is the fact that the US and British Governments have in effect assured Spain and Portugal that the occupation of French North Africa will not interfere with ordinary commercial agreements in products for their own consumption. In view of these assurances, it would appear that (a) it is desirable to discuss further trade as much as possible within the framework or along the lines of the existing agreements; (b) our control over French North African products cannot be employed for the time being to the full in bargaining with Spain and Portugal, as existing limitations on port facilities will make it impossible for Spain and Portugal to obtain the full amount of phosphates and other products provided for under existing agreements.

5. The suggestion in Department's 1482 of December 24 that US and UK might purchase exportable surpluses of North African produce does not appear practical. However, interested agencies here are agreed that for reasons of military necessity absolute control of disposition of North African produce must remain in Anglo-Ameri-

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<sup>15</sup> North African Economic Board.

can hands. Consequently, it is suggested that one of the following alternatives be adopted:

(a) Have all purchases of French North African products as well as all imports into North Africa of materials purchased in the Peninsula made by such persons or agencies as from time to time may be designated by the NAEB, and under the supervision of the NAEB. This alternative differs from that set forth in (d) below in that this one is based on the theory that the NAEB would give its approval in advance of each specific transaction or group of transactions. Under alternative (d) there would be no attempt to designate in advance purchasers or importers.

(b) Have all commerce between the Peninsula and French North Africa handled by USCC and UKCC. This would require building up of large staffs by those organizations and would take considerable time. Moreover, it might lead to friction with the Spanish and Portuguese Governments if all their transactions must be handled through US or British commercial companies.

(c) Have only purchases in French North Africa for export to the Peninsula handled as suggested in (a) or (b), leaving exports from the Peninsula to French North Africa to be carried on as provided in (d) below.

(d) Allow private commercial interests to conduct the entire trade both from and to French North Africa, but maintain very close supervision through navicerts and export license system. Although this course would be much the simpler, it is the least desirable, because it would permit Spanish and Portuguese interests to enter the French North African markets freely and possibly disrupt those markets, and also weaken control over distribution of supplies in North Africa.

In the event either the Spaniards or Portuguese should object to dealing through USCC or UKCC, it could be pointed out that there is today no private commercial trading between French North Africa and the US or the UK, and that for military reasons, it is necessary that the trade be centered in Anglo-American Governmental agencies.

6. Whatever system is agreed upon for implementing the agreed trade exchanges, it will still be necessary to maintain some procedure to limit trade to agreed commodities and amounts. The following is suggested:

(a) All shipments from the Peninsula to French North Africa continue to be subject to navicert;

(b) Shipments from French North Africa to the Peninsula be controlled by some form of export licensing system and port control;

(c) Before issuance in any case, all applications for navicerts or licenses be passed upon and recommended or rejected by NAEB;

(d) To secure consignee, consignor and blockade control generally, all navicerts and export licenses be referred for quota control to Blockade Control, London.

In view of the acknowledged US interest in North Africa, all matters of policy incident to trade between North Africa and the Penin-

sula, including types of necessary controls to be set up in practice, must be cleared through Washington. Once the controls are set up, it is felt that the routine administration should be through the Blockade Control in London, as above suggested.

7. Please telegraph your full comments on foregoing and then repeat this telegram and your comments to Madrid and Lisbon.

Repeated to London from here.

HULL.

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651R.5331/1: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, February 24, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received February 26—2:38 a. m.]

274. From Murphy. Department's 205, February 6 [5], 2 p. m. We have learned from the Economic Secretariat that the French are going forward with Portuguese and Spanish negotiations on the basis of the accords in force prior to November 8.<sup>16</sup> The situation is not, however, too clear because of the uncertainty in the minds of the Spanish and the Portuguese with regard to Axis reaction to negotiations with this area. Apparently, according to the French, they prefer to let the matter ride for the moment and to have the Portuguese go forward. Once an agreement is reached with the Portuguese the Spanish would then be in a position to explain to the Axis that the maintenance of peninsular economy made it necessary for Spain to conclude an agreement. There is likewise the question of whether they will negotiate with the Sherifian Government or with the High Command.

Presumably on the surface the arrangements would be concluded as with the Protectorate authorities. Bataille, of the Foreign Trade secretariat, however, takes the position that that is a detail of no importance so long as an agreement can be reached and trade reestablished and maintains that the negotiations will in fact be controlled by the High Command. Bataille proposes to proceed to Lisbon about the first of March in order to get the negotiations under way. He will have with him an expert representing the Protectorate and one representing Algeria. From Lisbon they will proceed to Madrid and later to London.

Pettit's position in Madrid is of course established and the French feel that the present Chargé in Lisbon can be relied on. Bataille, however, seems to appreciate that any negotiations will necessarily be closely coordinated with our Missions in Lisbon and Madrid.

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<sup>16</sup> Allied Forces invaded North Africa on November 8, 1942.

He met Ackerman<sup>17</sup> when the latter was here last month. We will have from Bataille before he leaves texts of the proposed agreements and a list of the commodities involved along with tentative amounts.

Number 1. I agree that it would be necessary for us to coordinate and determine, always in consultation with the military, the volume and character of any trade which may be established. Port facilities, et cetera, can take care of this trade provided it is properly coordinated as to time and character with other shipping and port problems. Final negotiations should be concluded here in Algiers on a tripartite basis provided of course that the Spanish and Portuguese send qualified persons here for such purpose.

Number 2. We shall of course wish to be kept currently informed as negotiation[s] proceed in Lisbon and Madrid.

Pettit is of course the proper French representative in Madrid and the present Chargé at Lisbon seems to have the confidence of the High Command.

Number 4. The French are proceeding on a basis of negotiating within the framework of the agreements in force prior to November 8.

Number 5. The French authorities propose to maintain entire control over the trade between North Africa and the Peninsula. There will, according to Bataille, be no private imports or exports. The High Command will deal with the private North African traders. In view of this fact it is our feeling that it would be preferable to let the French carry on this trade in their own way, always subject, of course, to close supervision or control by our Mission in Lisbon and Madrid and by NAEB here. We believe this is possible without interference with such programs of purchase and supply as we and the British may develop. In this way it would not be necessary to inject the UKCC and the USCC into the picture and unless there are particular reasons for bringing these organizations in it seems better to keep all these matters purely within the NAEB organizations. I am sure that if all trade were to be carried on through the UKCC the French would object most strenuously. If we can permit the French a fair degree of independence within certain limitations and proper navicert control, it would be better all around.

6. All of the points made in this paragraph strike us as logical and therefore we have no additional comment.

Repeated to Lisbon and Madrid. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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<sup>17</sup> Ralph H. Ackerman, Commercial Attaché in Spain.



811.20 Defense (M) Spain/412a Suppl.: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers*  
(Wiley)<sup>18</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1943—10 a. m.

402. Department's 205 of February 5 to Algiers, repeated to Madrid and Lisbon, and Department's no. 1482, December 24 to Madrid, repeated by Madrid to Algiers and Lisbon.

1. There are being sent you by airmail courier comprehensive instructions embodying over-all trade program between French North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula which has been formulated by the Department and Board of Economic Warfare after consultation with British Embassy here. Although it is clear that certain of the North African goods listed in the over-all program may interest Spain and Portugal, phosphates are the key to the situation. This comprehensive program is being submitted to you with the view of utilizing phosphates to the utmost effect in accomplishing the long-range and complete objectives set forth in the airmail instruction which is being sent you. It is realized, however, that lengthy negotiations are likely to be necessary for the acceptance of the long-range program. In order, therefore, that the resumption of trade may be expedited pending the conclusion of such negotiations, we suggest to you within the framework of the larger program the following proposals on which immediate action should be taken.

2. An offer to the Spaniards and Portuguese, it is thought, of the minimum amounts of phosphates which the program sets forth, that is from 200,000 and 100,000 tons respectively per annum, starting in April on a monthly basis of 17,000 and 8,500 tons respectively, will furnish both countries an incentive to conclude the over-all program. It is suggested, on our part, that a start be made with the commodities contained in the following short list, a miscellaneous category being added within which the USCC and UKCC in Madrid and Lisbon could place on an *ad hoc* basis other desired orders. Effective assurances that North African products thus secured would not be reexported would of course be obtained from Spain and Portugal. In substance we suggest that the initial agreements looking to immediate trade resumption be limited to an exchange of phosphates and miscellaneous items on a monthly basis against the following:

*Spain*

850 tons	Cotton textiles
850 "	Potash
850 "	Pyrites
	Miscellaneous, e. g., matches, bottles, lead manufactures, etc.

<sup>18</sup> Repeated to Lisbon (No. 352), Madrid (No. 510), and London (No. 1421).

*Portugal*

100 tons	Cotton textiles
600 "	Timber
350 "	Cement
	Miscellaneous, e. g., colonial products such as coffee and cocoa, glass, shoes, etc.

If the demand for a special compensating import quota should be waived by the Spanish, woolen goods could be added to the list for Spain, but otherwise not.

It is also our desire and intention to draw into the trade between the Peninsula and North Africa, to the greatest extent possible, goods which may now be finding their way to Axis destinations, such as woolen piece goods.

3. We anticipate that there would be an accumulation of balances of escudos and pesetas on the part of French North Africa as a result of the resumption of trade between that area and the Peninsula on the basis of the program herein suggested. We naturally desire to make sure that such net balances should come into the possession of the British and ourselves to be used to further our preemptive and supply programs both in Portugal and Spain. We therefore recommend that the UKCC and the USCC on joint account should conduct the trade interchanges between Spain and Portugal and French North Africa. The two commercial companies would thus act as procurement agencies in both French North Africa and on the Peninsula. Goods purchased on the Peninsula would be consigned to NAEB, Lend-Lease, or if NAEB should so desire, to the commercial companies themselves. We further recommend that the trade itself between French North Africa and the Peninsula should be expressed in the respective local currency involved, i.e. imports would be quoted in the currency of the importing country.

4. The commercial companies would make purchases of phosphates and other North African products either directly against sterling and dollars in equal proportion or they would do so in French francs which the French North African fiscal authorities might release in return for dollars and sterling in equal proportions.

5. We recognize that an attempt may be made by the French to secure for their phosphates and other products higher prices than it has hitherto been the custom of the Spanish and Portuguese to pay. Both the Spanish and Portuguese must therefore be clearly advised that we shall indulge in no price raising on our part and that such products will be quoted to them at cost to us.

6. The foregoing short term program (and the over-all program which you should receive shortly by airmail) is presented to you for your urgent consideration. Please advise us of your reaction as soon as possible after consultation with your British colleagues.

7. Since the drafting of the foregoing paragraphs, Algiers telegram No. 274 of February 24, repeated to you, has been received. This telegram is now being carefully studied and appropriate instructions will be sent you at the earliest possible moment in the light of its content.

Repeated to Lisbon, Madrid and London.

WELLES

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/412a: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers  
(Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1943—11 a. m.

403. For Murphy. Your 274, February 24 and 308, March 1.<sup>19</sup> Department is strongly of the opinion that Bataille should be requested to delay his departure until we have had an opportunity to consider the lists contained in your 308 and you have had an opportunity to consider the lists and proposals set forth in the Department's 402, March 6. For Bataille to commence negotiations before there is a common US-Anglo-French understanding on objectives and procedures might well be injurious both to the economic warfare operations which we have been conducting over a long period in the Iberian peninsula and to the program of economic assistance to North Africa which we are endeavoring to carry out. You are requested to urge upon Bataille the great importance to the joint war effort of the French coordinating their commercial operations in neutral countries with the analagous operations being conducted by the US and UK.

With reference to your 274 we do not feel that arrangements for joint negotiations in Algiers, Madrid and Lisbon and for supervision of the trade by NAEB are clearly enough stated. Please discuss these aspects more fully with the French. On the other hand, while the USCC and UKCC are from our point of view the most satisfactory means of handling the trade, we would not wish to insist, if the French object to such an arrangement, that the trade between the peninsula and North Africa be channeled exclusively through these corporations. The essential point is that the proposed commercial exchanges be coordinated at all times with the activities of the NAEB and the US and British missions in Madrid and Lisbon and that, like the US and British operations in these areas, they be considered as combined Allied operations rather than as those of a single Ally acting independently.

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<sup>19</sup> Latter not printed.

A further message will be sent as soon as study of your 308 has been completed.

WELLES

651R.5331/3 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 7, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 8—10:39 a. m.]

542. Department's 205 to Algiers and Algiers' 274.

1. British Embassy has received from London lengthy instruction concerning French North African trade. We do not know its full content. Spaniards informed us British asked whether they would be agreeable to handling French North African trade through United Kingdom Commercial Corporation to which they answered affirmatively. We believe Spaniards' favorable reaction determined by fact that it would remove the need for dealing through French North African representatives thus permitting them to acquiesce to Vichy's expressed wishes. British did not inform us previously their intention to discuss this with Spaniards although they had mentioned that exchange of products between Spain and North Africa would be determined in London and not through NAEB.

2. We persist in our conviction that French North Africa should be permitted to conduct negotiations for exchange of products with Spain and that we should not offer to Spaniards a formula to bypass French.

(a) Most effective control of these negotiations could be exercised through tripartite agreement in Algiers. Preliminary negotiations should be conducted in Madrid and French North African representatives should be supported by both British and United States Embassies, preferably by actual participation in discussions. This evidence of unity would be an effective counter to Vichy and Axis.

(b) It is immaterial whether the instrument of agreement with Spaniards is signed in Algiers or Madrid.

(c) The movement of goods should be closely controlled. The quantities of materials to be included in the French part of the program and the goods and services desired from Spain should be determined in Algiers. Control should be exercised so as to insure that Spanish supplies move in harmony with French North African supplies.

3. Although French can most effectively use the supply of goods to obtain needed supplies from Spain and other advantages we do not need to use French North African products as bargaining weapons for our program with Spain. By our participation in discussions the Spaniards will know that these goods are being made available

by common consent; they also are aware of the fact that we exercise additional control through navicerts and port facilities.

4. We can perceive no advantages to us from having United States Commercial Corporation and United Kingdom Commercial Corporation act as purchasers or suppliers of goods falling within the French North African-Spanish agreement. After negotiations have been concluded if the services of the companies are requested by all interested parties to facilitate the movement of goods we would not object. However, activities of the companies should be limited to such services as we may desire to have them perform in connection with any arrangements which may be concluded by British and American Embassies with Spaniards for our acquisition of Spanish goods for North Africa.

Repeated to Algiers and London.

HAYES

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/578: Telegram

*The Chargé in Spain (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 11, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 12—11:30 a. m.]

594. (1) Although we shall discuss with the British Embassy the proposal outlined in your 510 March 6,<sup>20</sup> we shall not approach the Spaniards until we receive your further instructions after studying Algiers' 274, February 24 and my 542, March 7 in which my views are fully expressed.

(2) We interpret Murphy's telegram under reference to mean that exclusion of the French from a voice in the disposition of French North Africa products is undesirable. We agree.

(3) If we are to begin discussions with the Spaniards without French North African participation this would be interpreted as indication that we do not deem it necessary to consider French views in relation to this economic program. As phosphates have the greatest interest for the Spaniards by removing them from a French program and applying them to a British-American program we weaken the power of the French North African representatives here to combat Vichy and Axis influence. In effect we deny the French the right to negotiate on important economic matters and thereby impair their effectiveness to handle their political matters hence it is not improbable that the burden of negotiations to clear up irritating political matters would fall on us. We consider this wholly undesirable.

(4) There are two clear indications that the High Commission considers it should have a voice in economic negotiations with Spain

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<sup>20</sup> See footnote 18, p. 14.

(a) recently instructions were sent to Malaise relating French refugee problem to the release of phosphates, (b) we understand Bataille is due to arrive in Spain shortly for the purpose of discussing economic affairs.

Repeated to London, Lisbon and Algiers for Murphy.

BEAULAC

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/408

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

No. 323

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1943.

SIR: The following program is suggested by the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare, after consultation with the British Embassy, as an overall trade program between French North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula.

In formulating this program, consideration has been given to your telegrams no. 1964 of December 4, 11 p. m.<sup>21</sup> and no. 14 of January 2, 8 p. m.; and Lisbon's telegram no. 51 of January 11, 2 [3] p. m. Your attention is also directed to earlier discussions relating to this matter contained in the Department's telegram no. 1482 of December 24 to you, repeated by you to Algiers and Lisbon, and the Department's telegram no. 205 of February 5 to Algiers repeated to you and Lisbon.

#### SECTION I

1. For your guidance, it is thought desirable to recapitulate the views of the Department and BEW concerning the underlying postulates and objectives that have guided us in the formulation of this program. We have been guided by:

A. Past trade relations as indicated by recent barter agreements between Spain, Portugal and North Africa and negotiations under way in November, 1942 between Spain and French Morocco. In this connection, your attention is directed to paragraph 4 (a) of the Department's no. 205 of February 5 to Algiers. It is our intention that present trade agreements should be followed as far as possible, but this intention should be interpreted in the light of the objectives hereinafter described.

B. The desire to increase the preemptive effect of United Nations activities in the Peninsula and thereby damage the Axis by using our control over French North African commodities to procure additional quantities of strategic and preclusive materials over and above the quantities available to us under our supply-purchase program. Thus, we are desirous of procuring the additional quantities of wolfram, zinc, and tin from the Iberian Peninsula indicated in the program below. Additional tonnages of phosphate rock and foodstuffs which

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<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

might eventually become available in North Africa can be offered to accomplish this purpose. It will be noted that the program set forth below indicates a proposed maximum of 300,000 tons of phosphate rock for Spain and 140,000 tons of phosphate rock for Portugal. As an inducement to the procurement of the indicated quantities of wolfram and zinc, we would be willing to offer a total maximum of 250,000 tons and 550,000 tons of phosphate rock to Portugal and Spain, respectively.

C. The desire to provide necessary supplies for French North Africa from the Peninsula to minimize the strain on United Nations productive and shipping facilities. In connection with the former, where exports from Spain or Portugal are conditioned upon supplies of raw materials from the US-UK (such as raw cotton for cotton textiles) it is not our present intention to supply machinery or equipment beyond the normal supply of replacement parts now being made available to maintain their present productive capacity. It is rather our intention that French North African purchases in Spain and Portugal will utilize to the fullest extent the existing facilities and materials of those countries. With reference to the desire to decrease the strain on United Nations' shipping facilities, reference is made to the necessity of removing preclusive purchases acquired under US-UK Supply-Purchase Agreement from the Peninsula for consumption or storage in North Africa and subsequent shipment to the US-UK. Since it appears that the tonnage to be lifted from French North Africa to the Peninsula will be considerably greater than that to be carried from the Peninsula, we are hopeful that arrangements can be made to effectuate this objective. In this connection, reference is made to the Department's no. 258 of February 5<sup>22</sup> to you which stated that, according to competent authorities here, small neutral vessels, including Spanish, may be permitted to enter secondary North African ports in the near future. Upon receipt of advice from you relative to this information, we shall cable you further. If a satisfactory solution is presented in response to this latter cable, this may ease the difficulty resulting from the apparent lack of port facilities as referred to in the Department's no. 205 of February 5 to Algiers, paragraph 4 (b). It is also our understanding that all Iberian-North African trade will be carried in Spanish and Portuguese bottoms, and possibly in small coastwise French vessels not now nominated to United Nations' use.

D. The desire to facilitate the export of surplus commodities from French North Africa in order to support and stabilize the economic life of that area. In this connection, however, it should be understood that shipments from North Africa will count against the respective world quotas for Spain and Portugal where such quotas exist. Where no specific quotas exist, as in the case of *crin vegetal* and esparto grass, such shipments will be debited against existing quotas of similar goods at ratios to be determined in advance.

2. It is our definite intention that any net peseta or escudo balance accruing to French North Africa will be made available for US-UK purchases in Spain and Portugal although it appears unlikely that

<sup>22</sup> Not printed.

any favorable balance will result from the proposed program, as now formulated.

3. The determination of prices to be charged for North African commodities will be left to the NAEB after prior consultation with Washington and London.

4. Finally, assurances must be given by all parties concerned that under no circumstances will re-export to the enemy be permitted of any commodities made available by virtue of this program.

5. The following paragraphs set forth the trade proposals. Figures are in metric tons unless otherwise specified and each paragraph carries its own explanation of the various statistical columns. A dash in the tables following indicates that no figures are available.

[Here follow paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 containing tables regarding proposed exports between the Iberian Peninsula and French North Africa.]

## SECTION II

1. It is clear that although certain of the North African goods listed in the program set forth above may interest Spain and Portugal, phosphates are the key to the situation. The foregoing program is submitted with the view of utilizing this item to its utmost effect in accomplishing the objectives set forth in paragraph no. 1 of Section I. Hence, the program is long range and as complete as possible. However, it is realized that the negotiations preceding its acceptance are apt to be lengthy. Therefore, in order to expedite the immediate resumption of trade pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the following proposals are suggested to you for immediate action within the framework of the above-mentioned program.

2. It is thought that by offering the Spanish and Portuguese the minimum amounts of phosphate set forth in the program (200,000 tons and 100,000 tons annually, respectively) on a monthly basis starting in April of 17,000 tons and 8,500 tons respectively, there will be more incentive on their part to conclude the over-all program. On our part, it is suggested that we start with the short list of the following commodities adding a miscellaneous category within which other desired orders could be placed by the USCC in Lisbon and Madrid on an *ad hoc* basis. It is therefore suggested that the initial agreements for the immediate resumption of trade be confined to a monthly exchange basis of phosphates and miscellaneous items against the following:

### *Portugal.*

Cotton textiles	—	100 tons
Timber	—	600 tons
Cement	—	350 tons

Miscellaneous, e. g., glass, shoes, colonial products such as coffee and cocoa.



*Spain.*

Cotton textiles	—	850 tons
Potash	—	850 tons
Pyrites	—	850 tons
Miscellaneous, e. g., lead manufactures, matches, bottles, etc.		

Woolen goods could be added to the Spanish list if the Spanish would waive their demand for a special compensating import quota, but not otherwise.

We also desire and intend to draw into the Iberian Peninsula-North African trade to the greatest possible extent, items such as woolen piece goods which may now be finding their way to Axis destinations.

3. It is expected that this trade between French North Africa and the Peninsula will result in the accumulation of balances of pesetas and escudos on the part of French North Africa. It is desired, naturally, to assure that the British and we shall come into possession of such net balances for the furtherance of our preemptive and supply programs in both Spain and Portugal. It is recommended, therefore, that the trade interchanges between Spain and French North Africa and Portugal and French North Africa should be conducted by the UKCC and the USCC on joint account. This would involve the two commercial companies acting as procurement agencies on both the Peninsula and French North Africa. Consignment of goods purchased on the Peninsula would be to NAEB, Lend-Lease or the commercial companies themselves as NAEB might decide. It is further recommended that the trade itself between the Peninsula and French North Africa should be expressed in the local currency concerned.

4. The purchase of phosphates and other North African products would be made by the commercial companies either directly against dollars and sterling in equal proportion or for French francs previously secured from the French North African fiscal authorities in return for sterling and dollars in equal proportion.

5. It is recognized that the French may attempt to secure higher prices for phosphates and their other products than the Spanish and Portuguese have hitherto been accustomed to pay. It must, therefore, be made clear to both the Spanish and Portuguese that no price raising will be indulged in on our part and that we will quote such products at cost to us.

## SECTION III

1. The foregoing programs are presented to you for your urgent consideration. Please consult with your British colleagues and telegraph your views as promptly as possible.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
DEAN ACHESON

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/578 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1943—11 a. m.

485. For Murphy and Williams. Reference 274 of February 24 from Algiers, 308 of March 1 from Algiers,<sup>23</sup> 403 March 6 to Algiers, 510 March 6 to Madrid,<sup>24</sup> 542 March 7 and 594 March 11 from Madrid.

1. A preliminary review of your 308 indicates that the proposed program is incomplete in that it ignores the underlying objectives of the program developed here, namely, (a) the desire to increase the pre-emptive effect of the United Nations activities in the Iberian Peninsula by utilizing French North African commodities to procure additional quantities of strategic materials over and above the quantities available to us under our supply-purchase programs; (b) the desire to secure certain commodities from the Iberian Peninsula for North Africa in order to relieve the strain on United Nations shipping and productive facilities. These objectives are more fully discussed in the Department's instruction 323 of March 16.<sup>25</sup>

2. For these reasons, we requested in our 403 March 6 that Bataille not commence negotiations prior to a common US-Anglo-French understanding on the objectives and procedures which we have previously indicated as essential. Since it is apparent that the phosphate supplies of North Africa are the chief trading weapon of the French in dealing with the Iberian Peninsula, it is of the utmost importance that no commitments be made regarding phosphates without careful study of our program of reciprocal trade between the Peninsula and North Africa and that no commitments be made which would result in this most important bargaining weapon being sacrificed without an appropriate *quid pro quo*. In this connection, your attention is directed to the United States Army interest in purchasing a large quantity of lumber from Portugal and the fact that neither shipping nor supply facilities exist here to meet these needs. In cable no. 21 of March 8, from Lisbon to Algiers, the following sentence appeared: "We consider it important to be in a position to offer phosphates in return for lumber and other Portugal supplies that our armed forces in North Africa urgently require."

3. As stated in our 403 March 6 we believe that a preliminary understanding with the French in Algiers including their assent to joint negotiations in Madrid and Lisbon and to supervision of the trade by NAEB is of the utmost importance. There is not and has never been any intention of submitting a formula which would by-pass the French. As a matter of the mechanism of operation rather than as a matter

<sup>23</sup> No. 308 not printed.

<sup>24</sup> Regarding telegram No. 510, see footnote 18, p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> To the Ambassador in Spain, *supra*.

of substance, the most satisfactory means of handling the trade is through the USCC and the UKCC. The use of the companies would provide an effective mechanical control over the movement of goods. They would, of course, only act by direction, and not independently. If the French object to such an arrangement, it should be pointed out that this would not conflict with their desire to channel private export or import trade through the High Command. The use of USCC and UKCC merely means that we would be utilizing an already established mechanism for moving goods to and from the Iberian Peninsula. The utilization of such a mechanism in North Africa would serve to continue a tried and orderly procedure. When the goods arrive in North Africa, the USCC and UKCC would channel them through the High Command to the trade. In other words, by utilizing the USCC and the UKCC in the first instance as original consignees and consignors, we would be effecting the type of control we desire in the Iberian Peninsula and in North Africa. This would make possible our essential purpose of coordinating the proposed commercial exchanges at all times with the activities of the NAEB and the US and British missions in Madrid and Lisbon. Like the US and British operations in these areas, they would be considered as combined Allied operations rather than those of a single ally acting independently. The Department and BEW cannot agree to this one segment of what is in effect a joint supply and economic warfare program being handled independently by the French without reference to us.

4. In regard to paragraph 2 of Madrid's 542, we are in agreement that all negotiations should be joint in character and that the French should participate as equals. Our suggestion was and is that meetings be had in Lisbon and Madrid among representatives of the British and our Embassy, those French authorities sanctioned by the French High Command and the Spanish Government. The same procedure should be followed in Lisbon, though we should not wish that anyone still attached to the Vichy Legation participate in the negotiations there. It is our belief that if the French participate in the negotiations on a basis of full equality with their U.S. and British Allies, the political aims which our Embassy in Madrid has in mind will be achieved. The exact form of the joint negotiations can of course be best decided on the spot.

5. It is recognized that it might well be unwise to insist upon utilization of the USCC and the UKCC in the face of objections from the French. While we would be decidedly reluctant to abandon the mechanism of the USCC and the UKCC for the reasons stated in paragraph 3, any alternative arrangement must obviously operate under the same safeguards and detailed supervision by the NAEB as the USCC and the UKCC would provide in their capacity of original consignors and consignees. Further, it would be the NAEB who

would then be responsible for the mechanical integration of the North African trade program with the Anglo-American supply-purchase program on the Peninsula. Finally there should be a clear and unequivocal understanding with the French that they will submit for our approval any proposed program prior to undertaking discussions with the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, and that the French unconditionally agree to the supervision and direction of the NAEB. In the event the French insist on the alternative presented in this paragraph, it is necessary that we know the mechanism and type of control you have in mind; thus, do the French contemplate a commercial company of their own similar to the USCC and the UKCC? If they do not contemplate such an organization, what mechanism will they use and how will they meet deficits or dispose of credits in their balance of trade? Satisfactory answers to these questions should be obtained from Bataille and from the Haut Commissariat.

6. A further message will be sent as soon as study of your 308 has been completed. In the meantime, in conjunction with the British please discuss the matter with the French and report fully but take no final decision without consulting the Department.

Repeated to Madrid, Lisbon and London.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M). Spain/687d : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1943—11 a. m.

850. USCCO 1373. Department's 1924 of March 27 (USCCO 3064) to London.<sup>26</sup> Subcommittee of IPOC<sup>27</sup> on finance has considered London's 1524, 1963 and 2079<sup>28</sup> on financial position in Spain. Representatives of the British Embassy attended and the following action was agreed:

1. Immediate steps should be taken by USCC in Madrid to secure as large balances of internal pesetas as quickly as possible by the several means at your disposal. Whether or not black market operations, which presumably would figure as one method, should be cleared informally by the Instituto is left to your decision. It is assumed that the British also will proceed promptly in their efforts to secure internal funds.

2. Careful consideration has been given to London's 2079, and it is now requested that you seek from the Instituto the purchase of four million dollars worth of pesetas against dollars.

<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

<sup>27</sup> Iberian Peninsular Operating Committee.

<sup>28</sup> Telegrams dated March 2, March 20, and March 24, respectively; none printed.

3. It is believed here that in the course of the negotiations on the supply purchase agreement every effort should be made to secure from the Spaniards effective assurances regarding the prompt issuance of export licenses for our purchases.

The conviction existing here that under no circumstances should we risk curtailment of our preclusive program because of a peseta shortage led to the above conclusions. It was further believed that our negotiating position would be stronger if we were in possession of substantial peseta working balances, and the decision was taken in full recognition of the fact that the action to be taken under 2 above may impress on the Spaniards the rate at which their dollar balances are increasing and in turn invite their attention to the difficulty of the utilization of such balances for the purchase of goods here. There is also full recognition that this action is a safeguard for the maintenance of the program and does not apply a basic correction to the problem. Increased cotton purchases in this country, however, should tend to correct the problem of redundant Spanish dollar deposits.

Every consideration will be given by IPOC to any suggestion you may make for constructive action designed to balance the trade position. We are studying your suggestion to increase supplies to Spain. As you are aware, the supply position in this respect must be controlling.

It was pointed out in the penultimate paragraph of London's 1963 that the Instituto could not hold large balances of foreign currency because it lacks sufficient capital for this purpose. In your opinion do means exist whereby the Bank of Spain could be persuaded to acquire certain dollar balances from the Instituto and in accordance with existing U. S. Treasury regulations convert them into earmarked gold in this country. Your views in detail, with particular attention to the difficulties which might bar such action, would be appreciated on this point. According to information here, the Bank of Spain from time to time has acquired gold directly or indirectly from Germany, but its gold holdings are still believed to be relatively small. Repeated to London.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/671 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 14, 1943—5 p. m.  
[Received April 15—10: 50 a. m.]

910. Embassy's 899, April 14, 10 a. m.<sup>29</sup> At a meeting of Anglo-American Committee to consider resumption of trade between Penin-

<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

sula and North Africa the following unanimous recommendations were made and are submitted for urgent consideration :

(1) That a special committee of NAEB to handle peninsular trade be set up on which French should be represented. In Madrid questions relating to North African trade should be under direction of the Anglo-American Committee to which French representative should be added for that purpose. These two committees would handle policy and supervise trade.

(2) That the UKCC and USCC should jointly act as consignors and consignees and should collect payments and make disbursements at each end. All shipments to North Africa whether for civil population or the Anglo-American forces would be handled in this way for the present. This is acceptable to the Spanish authorities.

(3) That negotiations with Spanish authorities be undertaken by Madrid committee through its representatives. A formal agreement is not contemplated. First objective of negotiations with the Spaniards will be to effect resumption of North African trade as soon as possible by arranging a program of phosphate shipments to Spain and return cargoes of Spanish goods now available (e. g. pyrites) in Spanish ships. Other goods to be added later.

(4) That the pesetas derived from exports from North Africa to Spain should be used exclusively for payment of exports from Spain to North Africa and transportation charges. But to provide funds for relief and other purposes the Madrid committee would endeavor to obtain the release to the representatives of the French North African authorities of the peseta balance due the Sherifian Government under the last French Moroccan-Spanish agreement representing about 8 million pesetas.

(5) Token shipment of 10,000 tons of phosphates. In view of undertakings given to Spanish Government and the promise that those phosphate shipments would be resumed at the beginning of April Anglo-American Committee also recommended that in order to avoid further delay token shipments should be dealt with outside the proposals outlined in the previous paragraphs.

(6) The foregoing recommendations have been made by the committee with the following factors in mind :

It fully recognizes desirability of French representation. At the same time it seems more than likely that the balance of payments of trade between Spain and North Africa will in due course run heavily against the latter and the deficit will have to be made up by pesetas derived from exports from the sterling and dollar areas. In this and other ways this trade is inexorably joined to the supply purchase arrangements and therefore must be controlled in connection with it. Accordingly the recommendations set out in this telegram seem to

the committee best means of effecting this control, having regard to French susceptibilities.

Repeated Algiers, London and Lisbon.

HAYES

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/683: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 17, 1943—midnight.

[Received April 20—5:05 a. m.]

642. From Murphy. My 567, April 6, 7 [2] p. m.<sup>30</sup> We have received an informal memorandum from Bataille as a result of preliminary conversations with him and Couve de Murville<sup>31</sup> on North African-Iberian trade in which the French position is explained as follows.

(1) Our desire both for uniting in a common policy of Allied economic warfare with regard to the Iberian Peninsula and for bringing into the framework of this policy North African-Iberian trade is fully shared by them.

(2) In the future French agreements with the Portuguese and Spanish these ends can be safeguarded if the French and the Allies can agree in advance as to the bases of such agreements, the lists of products and the methods of transfer.

(3) It is thought preferable to have the lists of products from Iberia in open form, i. e., specifying broad classes of goods, in order to allow the French and the Allies opportunity for maneuvering.

(4) French representatives insist upon carrying on alone the negotiations with Spain and Portugal once an agreement has been reached with the Allies. The American and British Embassies will be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations. An attempt would be made to bring outstanding balance due the French from old agreements into the new agreement.

(5) It is considered indispensable by the French that at no time should the governments involved and likewise French merchants be given reason to feel that the French cannot guarantee independently their interests with Spain and Portugal. If we wish to use the commercial corporations, therefore, it is their suggestion that an *office commerciale* be organized by them which could work in close liaison with the USCC and UKCC. They would effect purchases in Iberia through their *office commerciale*.

(6) As a result of existing stocks of French African agencies and merchants in Spain and Portugal, differences in price levels and previous existence of French African credits in Madrid and Lisbon, the general commercial agreements should be concluded before any movement of goods takes place. If exchanges are begun on a ship to ship basis they fear that they will no longer have the power to

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<sup>30</sup> Not printed.

<sup>31</sup> Former French Treasury official.

conclude a long term formal agreement and also the chance to pick up arrears due them on agreements made previously.

(7) Outstanding credits are as follows: (a) From Portugal approximately escudos 30 million worth of goods chiefly telegraph poles and pit-props which had been bought and licensed for export last November when trade was brought to a standstill. Only five or ten thousand tons of phosphates are owed. (b) From Spain a special credit of escudos 19 million was created by the French for the purchase of cotton fabrics, tea and sugar. In addition a credit of francs 70 million had been raised on their phosphate exchanges up to June 1942, expiration date of agreement. Shipments were continued after July 1942 pending new formal agreement which created an additional credit of francs 20 million. In addition they owe nothing to Spain.

(8) Conversations were taking place in November to set off French North African credits against the debit of metropolitan France notwithstanding the debits of the former. These credits are considered intact by Bataille inasmuch as a mission from the *Metropole* has been sent to Spain since that date to purchase foodstuffs and to arrange as a separate item the amortization of their debits.

We consider it imperative that an early start should be made with this trade as lumber and other supplies are desired by the armies. If only the remaining balance of five or ten thousand tons of phosphates were shipped, we do not think as Bataille does that the bargaining position would be prejudiced; however, if Portugal were offered many such shiploads as an inducement to ship lumber here such action would definitely impair the bargaining power of phosphates. This would not obviously be to our interest either. We recommend that the Bataille lists be immediately screened at both Washington and London from the economic warfare standpoint concerning which we are not fully informed here. Afterwards we will screen them ourselves and secure final agreement from the French in order to make an early start possible.

London is being sent a similar telegram by Herbert.<sup>32</sup>

Repeated to Madrid and Lisbon. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/695: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 21, 1943—noon.

[Received April 22—7:59 a. m.]

671. From Murphy. My 642, April 17, midnight. The program for trade between French North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula as

<sup>32</sup> Roscoe Herbert of the Civil Affairs Section of the Allied Force Headquarters in French North Africa and member of the North African Economic Board.



outlined in Department's instruction 323, March 16 to Madrid and Madrid's reply No. 910 of April 14, 5 p. m., seems to be based on the following conditions:

- (a) "Our control over French North African commodities."
- (b) Entire control of the trade by UKCC and USCC.
- (c) Need for fulfilment of our commitments to Spain and Portugal in respect of trade with North Africa.
- (d) The use of North African products in furthering our economic warfare plans in the Iberian Peninsula.
- (e) The export to North Africa of commodities needed here and also certain commodities which are not needed in this area and for which no warehouse facilities are available (any merchandise coming here must go immediately into military or trade channels: furthermore, port facilities are now being used at their maximum).
- (f) Any peseta and escudo balances in favor of North Africa would be exclusively controlled by the UKCC and USCC.
- (g) Some undefined French representation is envisaged.

It would be difficult to obtain wholehearted French acceptance of this program. The regime here is sensitive as to its position, is resentful of any approach which tends to treat this as an occupied area or denies it a position of respect. We feel we have gotten the French to come quite near what we want, their position being outlined in my 642, April 17, midnight. They feel strongly about their position in the actual negotiations with Spain and Portugal not only insofar as those two countries are concerned but also the French people in this area. If as outlined in my telegram the French have large escudo, franc and peseta balances in Spain and Portugal which have arisen from prior trade, the program does not seem to take this factor into consideration. In Portugal the French maintain that the lumber for which they have used their escudo credits [apparent omission]. If this be true and we guarantee return phosphate shipments for any lumber sent to this area we permit the Portuguese to get away with double bargaining.

We do not consider that any of the direct instructions to us have involved a specific detailed commodity program which we could discuss with the French. We wonder, therefore, whether we should consider the Department's mail instruction 323, March 16 to Madrid as the final detailed list to be used in our negotiations with the French, or whether we may expect to receive a screening of Bataille's list submitted in our 308, March 1, midnight.<sup>33</sup>

Repeated to Lisbon and Madrid. [Murphy.]

WILEY

<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/711c: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1943—10 a. m.

766. For Murphy. Your 308, March 1<sup>34</sup> and Department's instruction 323 to Madrid of March 16. Your proposals have been studied by us. We have meant to indicate the maximum possibilities of trade between North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula in the program covered by our airmail instructions. The attainment of all of these maximum figures, we recognize, is not possible, but such figures are offered as a basis on which to negotiate. The program outlined in your 308 apparently bears close relation to trade arrangements in the past. In our opinion, the basis for initiating negotiations is not contained in such a program unless you have available information which indicates that our suggested quantities are not available or are not likely in the near future to become available. In the negotiations the figures contained in our airmail instructions should be used, although an agreement may eventually be reached for smaller quantities. North Africa is treated as one unit in our airmail instruction proposal. You have set up a separate basis in your 308 for Morocco, Algeria and French West Africa. No separate negotiations for trade program should be carried on with either Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco or West Africa, but rather you should consider the entire area as one entity. French West Africa is included in your 308, but our airmail instructions omitted this area. The inclusion of West Africa is agreeable to us, but has not been approved by the British as yet.

The inclusion of West Africa does not mean that we wish to add new items to the imports of French North Africa indicated in our airmail instructions, since all estimated quantities available of imports we desire are comprised in the imports there shown. The French West African exports to be added to our airmail instruction program are as follows:

<i>To Spain:</i>	<i>To Portugal:</i>
400 tons gum arabic	100 tons gum arabic
70 tons gum copal	20 tons colanuts
80 tons colanuts	

With respect to specific commodities mentioned in your 308, please note the following comments:

[Here follows comment on the numerous commodities mentioned in telegram No. 308.]

In order that final instructions can be prepared, it is urged that you comment as quickly as possible on the proposals submitted to you. Please call this telegram to Butterworth's<sup>35</sup> attention upon his arrival.

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

<sup>35</sup> W. Walton Butterworth, First Secretary of Embassy in Spain and of Legation in Portugal. On May 1, 1943, he was ordered to Algiers to serve as a member of the NAEB staff.

Though a few changes in our airmail instructions will be forwarded to you shortly, these do not alter the facts to any great extent.

Please reply to Lisbon, Madrid, Dakar and London as Department's 700, 919, 126 and 2554 respectively.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/837: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)*

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943—5 p. m.

710. Your 701, March 30 and 755, April 4 [3] re trade with French North Africa.<sup>36</sup>

1. Department and Board of Economic Warfare are anxious to get Iberian-French North African trade on regular basis as soon as possible and consequently do not favor protracted period of *ad hoc* exchanges. However, it will take considerable time to negotiate a long-term program along the lines suggested in Department's instruction of March 16, and there may also be delays in the negotiation of the interim program referred to in that instruction. Accordingly, we approve trade on a ship-for-ship basis pending further developments in the general negotiations.

2. These ship-for-ship exchanges should be permitted up to a maximum of 10,000 tons of phosphates. This would probably take from 2 to 4 ships. If the interim program has not been agreed upon by the time 10,000 tons of phosphates have been moved, consideration will be given to authorizing additional shipments of phosphates on a ship-for-ship basis. We agree that the top limit not be divulged to the Portuguese. However, it should be impressed upon Portuguese that this *ad hoc* trade is considered to be only a temporary expedient and that it is expected that a comprehensive program can be worked out in the future.

3. As for south-bound cargoes, we understand that you have made or are making arrangements to ship the coffee, beans and the sleepers requested by the Army. As to other south-bound cargo, you must, of course, clear with the NAEB to make sure that the materials to be lifted are wanted in North Africa. Please also clear with the Department by telegraph all proposed movements, including quantities, values and proposed means of financing.

4. We hope that these ship-for-ship exchanges can be arranged through the USCC and the UKCC, in line with the suggestions in your 755 of April 3. This should permit you to utilize the escudo exchange realized through the phosphate sales. Please endeavor to work this out through NAEB.

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<sup>36</sup> Neither printed.

5. We understand from your no. 45 of April 12, 2 p. m., to Algiers,<sup>37</sup> that NAEB proposes leaving in suspense the question of phosphate prices subject to later adjustment. This is satisfactory, but it is not clear to the Department exactly how this will be accomplished. We believe that arrangements should be made whereby the Portuguese agree to pay a price to be fixed in relation to the prices which will ultimately be agreed upon for purchases by the British. In any event, it is important that the Commercial companies obtain a sufficient guarantee from the Portuguese to save them harmless against any loss on the transactions.

Please advise Butterworth of foregoing, and please repeat to Madrid, Algiers and London for their information.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/671 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943—5 p. m.

927. Your 899, April 14, 10 a. m.,<sup>38</sup> and paragraph 5 of your 910, April 14, 5 p. m.

1. It is believed that the cross trade between the Peninsula and French North Africa should be considered in three phases: (a) a long-term program along the lines set forth in the Department's instruction of March 16, (b) an interim program also along the lines set forth in that instruction, and (c) the *ad hoc* phase to cover the period until the interim program is negotiated. This latter phase envisages token shipments of phosphates, coupled with shipments of materials from the Peninsula to French North Africa unless it should prove impossible to obtain south-bound cargo suitable to the NAEB in Algiers. The following comments relate to the *ad hoc* phase.

2. You are authorized to make offer to the Spaniards of a token shipment of 10,000 tons of phosphates jointly with the British. Reference your 767, March 30,<sup>38</sup> you may invite the French representatives in Madrid to participate in this offer, if you believe it possible to do so. However, every effort should be made to obtain from the Spaniards assurances that they will permit certain limited shipments to French North Africa when and if desired by NAEB.

3. It is our strong desire that the sale of this 10,000 tons be made through the Commercial companies so that they will derive the benefit of the peseta exchange. It is hoped that you can arrange this through NAEB.

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<sup>37</sup> Not printed; it was repeated to the Department as an unnumbered telegram, April 12.

<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

4. We understand from Lisbon's No. 45 of April 12, 2 p. m., to Algiers,<sup>39</sup> that NAEB proposed leaving in suspense the question of phosphates prices subject to later adjustment. This is satisfactory, but it is not clear to the Department exactly how this will be accomplished. We believe that arrangements should be made whereby the Spaniards agree to pay prices to be fixed in relation to the prices which will ultimately be agreed upon for purchases by the British. In any event, it is important that the Commercial companies obtain a sufficient guarantee from the Spaniards to save them harmless against loss on the transaction.

5. With respect to possible south-bound cargoes, you should, of course, clear with Algiers to ascertain what materials, if any, are desired. Please also clear with the Department by telegraph all proposed movements including quantities, values and proposed means of financing. It is hoped that any such south-bound movements can be carried on through the USCC and the UKCC. We consider this important, at least until the interim program has been negotiated. In the event NAEB approves any purchases by the Commercial companies in Spain for shipment to North Africa, appropriate arrangements should be made for full reimbursement to those companies, either in pesetas, dollars or sterling.

6. A later telegram will be sent commenting further on the recommendations contained in your No. 910 of April 14.

Please advise Butterworth of foregoing, and please repeat this telegram to Algiers, Lisbon and London for their information.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/671 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1943—4 p. m.

848. For Murphy. Reference Department's 927, April 23, 5 p. m., to Madrid, and 710, April 23, 5 p. m., to Lisbon. The reference telegrams gave general instructions concerning the *ad hoc* trade. It is not desired to interfere with any arrangements that may have been made by US or British representatives for expediting the immediate shipments of phosphates as authorized in the reference telegrams, but BEW submits the following suggestions as to possibly desirable mechanism for handling the ship-for-ship exchanges.

1. *Army purchases in Portugal and Spain:*

(a) The U. S. Commercial Company would purchase for pesetas or escudos in Spain and Portugal such items as from time to time might be directed by the Army.

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<sup>39</sup> See footnote 37, p. 33.

(b) Such goods would be shipped in Portuguese or Spanish vessels to ports designated for lifting phosphates.

(c) Instructions would be sent through NAEB to Madrid or Lisbon (and repeated to Washington), as to consignee of goods in North Africa.

(d) The Army would pay full landed costs to the USCC in dollars either in Washington or in Algiers.

2. *Civilian goods to be purchased in Iberian Peninsula:*

(a) The USCC and UKCC, subject in each case to confirmation by Washington, would purchase such items as might be directed from time to time by NAEB. Goods would be shipped as set forth in paragraph 1 (b) above.

(b) Such purchases would be made c. i. f. North African port, war risk and marine insurance for seller's account, both to be satisfactory to the commercial companies.

(c) The goods would be disposed of by the commercial companies in North Africa for full landed cost.

3. *Phosphate purchases in North Africa for the Iberian Peninsula.*

(a) These would be purchased by the commercial companies, f. o. b. vessel North African port, under direction of the Procurement and Development Division, NAEB.

(b) Payment would be made in dollars or sterling as the case may be to the *Commandant en Chef*, or at its order, when the phosphate prices are fixed.

(c) The commercial companies would in turn sell the phosphates, f. o. b. vessel North African port, to the Portuguese or Spanish governments, or to such agencies as these should designate, for escudos or pesetas on the basis of the full cost to the commercial companies.

(d) The foregoing paragraph indicates desirability of early agreement with French for fixed prices for phosphates. It should, of course, be understood by all that prices determined for *ad hoc* trade should not be considered as precedent for prices to be established for long-range program.

4. It appears most desirable that the Spaniards and Portuguese pre-determine shipping rates, so that the use of Iberian freight rates as a means of inflating export prices on commodities purchased in the Peninsula may be avoided.

5. It would doubtless be impracticable for the USCC and UKCC to handle the business on a straight 50-50 basis. Accordingly, the two companies would decide between themselves which one would handle a particular item, having in mind the desirability of a total participation on an approximate 50-50 basis.

Please repeat to Madrid and Lisbon, as Department's 992 and 776 respectively.

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/692: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1943—5 p. m.

849. For Murphy. Following are views of Department and BEW concerning Iberian cross trade, having in mind BOC 315 of April 3; Algiers' 642 of April 17, 671 of April 21, 700 of April 24 and 733 of April 28; Madrid's 910 of April 14; and Lisbon's 755, April 3 and 875, April 20.<sup>40</sup>

1. Every effort should be made to carry on the *ad hoc* trade referred to in Department's no. 710 to Lisbon and 927 to Madrid (both of April 23), pending negotiation of the interim and long-range programs. Lisbon's no. 875 emphasizes importance of this. This will not however be prolonged to a point where it might jeopardize the conclusion of formal commercial agreements.

2. Final approval of the commodities to be included in the long-term program cannot be given until

(a) receipt of Algiers' reply to comments on Bataille proposal contained in Department's 766 of April 22. As soon as reply is received, steps will be taken here to reconcile Bataille proposal with program outlined in Department's airmail instructions of March 16 and you will then be advised.

(b) Agreement is reached with British here as to desirability of including shipments from French West Africa to the Peninsula in the proposed program.

3. Department and BEW consider that with one or two exceptions, Madrid's no. 910 sets forth very desirable system for handling trade. However, in view of Algiers' numbers 642 and 671, it does not appear that this system will be entirely acceptable to the French. The following paragraphs attempt to reconcile the various views as seen from here and to set forth our recommendations re procedure for negotiations and system for handling interim and long-range programs.

4. A. *Type of goods to be included in programs.* Department's airgram instructions of March 16 suggested goods for interim program. Final views re goods to be included in long-term program will be sent as stated in paragraph 2 above.

B. *Parties to and situs of negotiations.* We understand that there are no objections to continuation of negotiations in Algiers between US, British and French representatives to the end that general agreement may be reached there as to scope of trade and means of implementation, having in mind the underlying objectives outlined in paragraph 1 of Department's no. 485<sup>41</sup> and in the airmail instructions of March 16. In this connection, Butterworth is being instructed to

<sup>40</sup> Telegrams Nos. BOC 315, 700, 733, 755 and 875 not printed.

<sup>41</sup> Dated March 18, 11 a. m., p. 23.

proceed immediately to Algiers with Wyndham White.<sup>42</sup> We understand that both are now in Madrid. In accordance with request contained in Algiers' no. 733, Butterworth is being advised by separate telegram that he shall be a member of the staff of NAEB while in Algiers.

Following general agreement in Algiers, negotiations with Spanish and Portuguese should be held in Madrid and Lisbon respectively. Department considers it essential that US and British representatives participate with the French in those discussions. Only in this manner can we be assured of properly correlating our joint supply-purchase programs in Spain and Portugal with the cross trade and coordinating the movement of goods through the blockade. Will Algiers please emphasize these points in course of negotiations with the French, pointing out that we have no desire to interfere with French prerogatives nor to deny French a position of respect and also pointing out that neither Americans nor British negotiate independently with the Spanish and Portuguese on matters of joint interest. It is not at all a matter of subordinating the French negotiators to ours but simply of attaining common Allied objectives through joint Allied negotiations, all of the parties thereto being equal partners.

With respect to the personality of Pettit, the solution proposed in Algiers' no. 700 would appear to be satisfactory.

C. *Vehicle for carrying on trade.* We should much prefer to have the trade handled by the USCC and UKCC, but in light of views expressed in Algiers' no. 642, it would be satisfactory if it is handled through an official French corporation provided it acts in close liaison with the UKCC and USCC. If it should be decided that the USCC and UKCC shall handle the trade, further consideration will have to be given to the mechanics of their operations.

D. *Supervision of trade.* Regardless of the vehicle decided upon for actually carrying on the trade, we consider it important that the suggestion made in paragraph 1 of Madrid's no. 910 for its general direction be followed. That is, the Anglo-American Committees in Madrid and Lisbon should have sub-committees composed of US, British and French representatives, through whom all questions arising in connection with cross trade can be cleared and NAEB should establish some method of clearing such questions in Algiers with the French.

E. *Finance.* It will presumably be necessary to set up escudo-franc and peseta-franc accounts. In all probability the balances will run in favor of Spain and Portugal. However, if the balances should

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<sup>42</sup>E. Wyndham White, First Secretary of British Embassy and British representative to NAEB.



in fact be in favor of French North Africa, it is hoped that some informal understanding can be reached with the French to the effect that, subject to provision being made for prior purchases of agreed lists of civilian supplies for North Africa, the French might place orders on US and UK account at the request of NAEB. These orders could be placed either through the Commercial Companies or through the French Corporation, if that is used. It would doubtless be necessary to assure the French that no such request would be pressed by us or the British if by so doing pesetas or escudos will be absorbed beyond the resources of the cross trade accounts or to an extent which would jeopardize the procurement of the agreed list of French civilian purchases in the Peninsula. If it should develop that the US and UK authorities in North Africa should wish to make purchases in the Peninsula which could not be cared for by the escudo and peseta balances in the cross trade accounts, then we should like to have the French agree that purchases could be made if we should provide the necessary pesetas or escudos. If the French would agree to some such formula it would have the advantage (a) of providing a means of mopping up any surplus pesetas or escudos in the cross trade accounts and (b) of cloaking Army purchases.

It is assumed that in setting up cross trade accounts, every effort will be made to utilize to the greatest extent possible the peseta and escudo balances presently standing to the credit of the French.

F. *Army supplies.* In addition to the possible use of the cross trade accounts for army purchases, you may wish to consider desirability of seeking agreements with Spaniards and Portuguese to permit army purchases against dollars or sterling entirely outside of our cross trade framework. Possible objection to this course, however, is set forth in Lisbon's no. 875.

G. *Form of agreement.* Madrid's no. 910 and Lisbon's no. 755 indicate that no formal agreements should be sought. We do not consider it necessary that there be a signed agreement, but we think it essential that a long-range program be agreed upon. The continuation of an *ad hoc* arrangement will result in the dissipation of our basic trading weapon, phosphates, which, if we are to obtain maximum success in our economic warfare objectives, can best be employed by coming to a definite understanding as promptly as possible.

5. It is of course impossible from this distance to assess all of the many factors to be considered in the negotiations of the cross trade agreements, and consequently we do not wish to attempt to give particularized instructions. Our negotiators will be generally familiar with the views in Washington and should be governed accordingly. The foregoing views are intended to highlight the points which we consider important and to express our views as to the most desirable

solutions. Various modifications will be necessary and many details will have to be agreed upon which we have not attempted to cover. The negotiators are not expected to clear all minor modifications or questions of detail with Washington. However, if substantial problems are raised which are counter to the views held here, it is expected that they will be cleared with Washington before any commitments are made. In any event, before final commitments are made, you should of course clear entire program with Washington.

Please repeat to Madrid and Lisbon as Department's nos. 993 and 777 respectively.

Repeated to London from here as Department's no. 2777.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/732 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 4, 1943—9 a. m.  
[Received May 5—10:40 p. m.]

786. Following from Murphy for Department, Treasury and BEW. Your 766, April 22 evidently crossed our 64, April 21.<sup>43</sup> We propose with the British to submit proposals to the French in the following sense if you concur. The British are cabling London in parallel terms. Your No. 938 of April 24 to Madrid<sup>44</sup> has just been received. We believe it confirms the approach suggested in this telegram which attempts to recapitulate and apply in detail the substance of previous communications. We feel, however, that we shall meet difficulties with the French particularly on consignment of goods to North Africa.

1. Negotiations looking to a resumption of trade between North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula should be undertaken in Madrid and Lisbon between the representatives of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments respectively on the one hand and representatives in each city of an inter-Allied committee on Iberian trade with North Africa on the other. These special committees will consist of British, French and American members in view of the inter-relations of all Allied commerce with Spain and Portugal directly reflecting common problems and policies of supply, shipping and economic warfare.

2. The objective of the negotiations will not be a formal agreement but a memorandum statement of the proposed trade program to be signed by British, American and French representatives.

3. The commodity lists, which are to be the basis of the program are being reviewed here in the light of the North African supply problem.

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<sup>43</sup> Telegram No. 64 not found in Department files.

<sup>44</sup> Not printed.

We assume that they have already been cleared by Washington from the economic warfare point of view but we await London's views which may be brought here by Wyndham White who is expected soon.

4. The management and administration of the program when established should conform closely to the arrangements made for United States purchases in the Iberian Peninsula which, as we understand them, utilize UKCC as agent for USCC in the interests of efficient, simplified and coordinated purchasing and handling with US representatives protecting USA interests on the Administrative Committee. Consignment outward from North Africa would thus be to the UKCC as agent for the appropriate French agency and transfer would take place in Portugal or Spain. We should prefer the consignment of goods to North Africa to correspond to the consignment of other imports controlled by NAEB for ultimate transfer to our forces or the French authorities as the case may be. If, however, the French propose to create a commercial company of their own we would propose consignment to the three commercial companies, the executive agent however to be UKCC whose representatives are on the staff of NAEB thus facilitating the integration of all imports into a single program.

5. We assume that neutral ships would be used, but permission for each sailing must first be obtained from C. Inc. [*C. in C.*] here.

6. Prices will necessarily be the subject of extended negotiation here and in Madrid and Lisbon in the light of circumstances referred to in previous telegrams on this subject.

7. It will be understood that any balances resulting from the trade in favor of French North Africa will be available for the Allied program of economic warfare in Iberian Peninsula. Different assumptions about prices to be established and the volume of trade to be realized have given rise to differing estimates as to nature of the trade balance which will result. We are continuing to study means of meeting a balance of trade against North Africa in this connection. We are inquiring further as to the size and nature of French North African balances which may be available in Spain and in Portugal. We should like instructions on the possibility, suggested in Madrid's 910, April 14, that such deficits be met if necessary out of our supply of pesetas and escudos, resulting from our exports to the Iberian Peninsula, presumably with reimbursement to us out of French North African dollar funds.

8. Preliminary ship-by-ship exchanges of phosphates and supplies urgently needed here should be undertaken if the shipping situation permits. There is French reluctance to allow this but we should emphasize that in the interests of the war it is essential to obtain Iberian supplies and to employ their ships in carrying them. Such trade will almost certainly be negligible for some time to come for

urgent shipping reasons. We shall endeavor to have it agreed that pending ultimate agreement this trade will be conducted by the commercial companies.

9. We had assumed that the negotiations with Portugal would be undertaken first. Your 927 to Madrid April 23 implies, however, that trade with Spain is the more urgent. We shall not comment to the French on this point until further instructed.

10. This telegram has also been approved by Treasury and BEW members of NAEB.

To the Department; repeated to London, Madrid and Lisbon. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/783: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 18, 1943—2 p. m.  
[Received May 19—5:22 a. m.]

911. From Murphy.

1. Butterworth and Wyndham White in consultation with officials of NAEB have completed a series of conversations with the French regarding resumption of French North African-Iberian trade which have resulted in agreement. The arrangements agreed upon with the French authorities are embodied in a memorandum<sup>45</sup> which they initialed yesterday but of course subject to final approval being given by Washington and London. Also this settlement with the French embodies the desiderata which the American and British missions in Madrid and Lisbon have put forward.

2. To avoid duplication and to lighten the burden on our coding staff which is some days behind on incoming messages I am not telegraphing the text of the memorandum or the lists of products which constitute appendices A and B thereto but the British Embassy in Washington is being requested to give copies to you and likewise the British Embassies in Madrid and Lisbon to our Missions there.

3. The following are Butterworth's comments on the settlement reached:

(a) It provides a degree of flexibility which will give us freedom to maneuver as the circumstances in the Mediterranean and in French North Africa change. In so doing it also meets the recommendations of the American and British Missions in Madrid and Lisbon which attach great importance to flexibility from point of view of dealing with Spaniards and Portuguese. Furthermore, the realization that under this arrangement the continued flow of phosphates would be de-

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<sup>45</sup> See enclosure to despatch No. 162, May 21, from the Chief Civil Administrator in French North Africa, p. 43.

pendent on shipment of supplies from Iberia to French North Africa helped considerably in obtaining French concurrence to token shipments.

(b) Through the mechanism of the Tripartite Committees in Madrid and Lisbon and Algiers we should be able both to keep the trade under adequate control and at the same time to satisfy the strong French desire to take the lead in the trade discussions. Our control is reinforced by the French [apparent omission] employ the UKCC as their final contracting agents even if and when a *bureau commerciale* is in operation.

(c) Royce<sup>47</sup> and Herbert approved the formula in paragraph No. 7 of the memorandum which they feel should give them sufficient control to coordinate distribution of Iberian imports with those from other sources.

(d) It has been made quite clear to Owns [*sic*] that the lists must be regarded as tentative and are subject not only to such reasonable changes as you and London may recommend but also to variation from time to time. In this connection please refer to last sentence of appendices A and B.

(e) A Monsieur Drouin<sup>48</sup> is expected to leave shortly for Madrid where he will contact British and American Embassies with a view to arranging for an initial meeting of the Tripartite Committee. A similar procedure will be followed in Lisbon.

Butterworth is returning the Peninsula but Wyndham-White who has other matters to attend to in Algiers will remain here for at least 10 days and will therefore be in a position to handle any details which may arise.

Sent to Department, Liberia, Lisbon and Madrid. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/755: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1943—10 a. m.

965. For Butterworth.

1. Lisbon's no. 1015 of May 9, midnight<sup>49</sup> (repeated to you) indicates that, because of German pressure, Portuguese may refuse to carry many materials in their own bottoms to French North Africa. We deem it important that a strong line be taken with Portuguese on this point and should like to request the Legation in Lisbon to advise the Portuguese authorities along the lines of paragraph 2 below, if you see no objection.

2. The Portuguese should be informed that the resumption of shipments of phosphates from French North Africa to Portugal is de-

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<sup>47</sup> Alexander B. Royce, Director of Economic Operations of the Civil Affairs Office, Allied Forces Headquarters, North Africa.

<sup>48</sup> Roger Drouin, representative in Spain of the French Committee in Algiers.

<sup>49</sup> Not printed.

pendent upon the Portuguese ability and willingness to carry to North Africa in Portuguese bottoms materials which fall within the normal limits of previous trade between the two areas. This applies equally to the *ad hoc* trade as well as to the long-range program.

3. In the event the Portuguese indicate they will not carry certain types of goods, will Lisbon please ascertain what they are, telegraphing both Algiers and Washington.

4. Department understands from previous telegrams from Algiers that French would concur in position set forth in paragraph 2 above. If so, and if you agree, please telegraph Lisbon approving Legation approaching the Portuguese along those lines.

5. In the event Lisbon telegraphs list responsive to paragraph 3, will Algiers please telegraph whether satisfactory arrangements can be made to lift the materials in United Nations bottoms.

Repeated to Lisbon, Madrid and London as Department's nos. 891, 1144 and 3193 respectively.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Cross Trade/8

*The Chief Civil Administrator in French North Africa (Murphy)*  
to the Secretary of State

No. 162

[ALGIERS,] May 21, 1943.

[Received June 9.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose for the Department's information five (5) mimeographed copies of a memorandum dated May 16, 1943, setting forth a proposed procedure for resuming trade exchanges between French North Africa and Spain and Portugal.

It is suggested that copies of this memorandum will be of interest to the Board of Economic Warfare and to the Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chief Civil Administrator:

ALEXANDER B. ROYCE

*Director of Economic Operations*

[Enclosure—Memorandum]

The British, American and French representatives agree on the following procedure for resuming trade exchanges between French North Africa, which expression in this memorandum is understood to include French West Africa, and Spain and Portugal:

1. Having regard to:

- a. the desirability of avoiding lengthy technical negotiations and
- b. the desirability at a time when the war situation is moving in

favor of the Allies of avoiding long term commitments, no formal agreements on this subject should be negotiated with the Governments of Spain and Portugal.

2. It is proposed, therefore, to proceed as follows—

*a.* The French authorities will immediately send to Madrid and Lisbon one or more representatives to take part in discussions with their British and American colleagues and to represent the French authorities in negotiations with the Spanish and the Portuguese.

*b.* In order to facilitate regular inter-allied consultation and collaboration, informal Franco-British-American Committees shall be set up in Madrid and Lisbon to supervise the operation of French North African-Iberian trade. At the same time, a sub-committee of the Joint Economic Commission in Algiers will be constituted in order to co-ordinate action from Algiers.

3. As soon as possible after the arrival in the Peninsula of the French representative or representatives he/they (in association with his/their British and American colleagues) will inform the Spanish/Portuguese Governments that French authorities are prepared, subject to the exigencies of the military situation, to make available for transport by Spanish/Portuguese vessels from French North African ports to be specified from time to time, a list of French North African commodities (of which phosphates will be the principal item). These goods will, however, only be available provided that Spanish/Portuguese Governments are prepared to give facilities to French North African authorities for purchasing and exporting on the Spanish/Portuguese vessels engaged in the trade an agreed list of Spanish/Portuguese goods.

4. In their discretion, the allied negotiators (British, American and French) may inform the Spanish/Portuguese Governments that they expect the Spanish/Portuguese authorities to give facilities for export and carriage on vessels engaged in the French North African-Iberian trade of materials of Spanish/Portuguese origin required by the British/American military authorities in French North Africa (which materials required for military purposes may, on occasion, have to take precedence over other supplies). These military goods will, of course, be bought and financed by British/American Governments out of their own resources.

5. As soon as Spanish/Portuguese Governments signify their desire to commence exchanges on the above basis, they will be required to inform the Allied authorities of the shipping program they have in mind sufficiently far in advance (1) to permit voyages to be cleared with appropriate naval and military authorities and (2) to enable French authorities to indicate what Iberian produce they will require to export during the same period.

It is recognized that owing to the relative bulk of phosphate shipments (which will constitute the larger part of shipments to be made from French North Africa) a high proportion of vessels sailing from the Iberian Peninsula will necessarily proceed in ballast.

6. Owing to the complexity of the economic operations being conducted in the Peninsula by the Allies, it is essential that all economic activities should be closely coordinated. It is agreed, therefore, that the considerable resources of the U.S. and U.K. Corporations should for this purpose be placed at the disposal of the French authorities for the purpose of acquiring and contracting for goods in the Peninsula and to act in appropriate cases as consignees and consignors of the goods to be exchanged.

The French authorities are considering the formation of a *Bureau Commerciale* to coordinate any orders that French North Africa importers wish to place in the Peninsula and for acquiring and moving to accessible ports goods to be exported to the Peninsula from French North Africa. The Bureau, or other official purchasing agent of the French authorities, will negotiate, in full collaboration with USCC and UKCC, the necessary contracts and will employ the UKCC as its agent to sign the final contracts in the same way as the UKCC at present acts for the USCC.

7. Imports from the Peninsula to French North Africa shall be coordinated with the over-all arrangements existing from time to time for distribution of imports from other sources. Distribution will be the subject of recommendation by the Franco-British-American subcommittee of the Joint Economic Commission. It is contemplated that Spanish and Portuguese goods should be consigned to the *Bureau Commerciale* if and when such an organization is set up by the French North African authorities, and in the meantime that shipments be consigned to UKCC as agent for the French authorities.

8. It is important that the above arrangements should be brought into operation as soon as possible and it is therefore agreed that the allied authorities will take all possible measures on their part to the end that the arrangements described above shall be operative as from June 15.

9. In the meantime, it is recognized that the immediate resumption of phosphate shipments to the Iberian Peninsula is a matter of allied concern from two standpoints—

*a.* to maintain the allied economic position in the Peninsula which depends upon the flow into those countries of essential supplies from allied sources and

*b.* in order to create an atmosphere favorable to the successful negotiation of the arrangements set out above.



It is therefore agreed that, subject to the concurrence of the Commander in Chief, Spanish/Portuguese authorities be informed that they may forthwith nominate vessels to load phosphates up to a total of 10,000 tons for each country. As an interim measure, pending settlement of the arrangements to be operative from June 15, it is agreed that phosphates should be offered by UKCC as agent for Comptoir des Phosphates at prices to be determined later.

ALGIERS, ALGERIA, May 16, 1943.

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/755: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)*

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1943—3 p. m.

908. References Lisbon's 1015 May 9,<sup>51</sup> Department's 965 of May 19 [20] to Algiers. Lisbon 79 and 80 of May 18 and 19 to Algiers and Algiers' 885 of May 15 to Department.<sup>52</sup>

1. We believe it highly desirable to start some movement of the cross-trade and understand that Algiers has agreed with the French that no consideration for the token shipment of 10,000 tons of phosphates should be asked. For these reasons we conclude that in the case of the token shipments an exception should be made to the principle that the resumption of phosphate shipments is dependent upon Portuguese willingness and ability to carry to North Africa in Portuguese bottoms, materials within the normal limits of the previous trade, and that the Portuguese vessels nominated for the token shipments may go south in ballast. However, since Madrid 1201 of May 9<sup>51</sup> indicates that the Spanish have agreed that one vessel should carry cargo south-bound, we believe that the Portuguese should be asked to do the same. To this extent the instructions in Department's 965 of May 19 [20] are modified as a result of the subsequent receipt of the other telegrams under reference.

2. At the same time that the Portuguese are informed of the approval of the token shipments even though all or all but one vessel move south in ballast, a strong line should be taken and the Portuguese should be informed that future shipments, whether as part of the *ad hoc* trade or as part of the long range program, are dependent entirely upon their ability and willingness to carry to North Africa in Portuguese bottoms, materials within the normal limits of previous trade between the two areas.

3. We assume from Algiers' no. 885 of May 15 that it is understood that British and American representatives will be associated with

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<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

<sup>52</sup> None printed; telegrams Nos. 79 and 80 were repeated to the Department as unnumbered telegrams.

Theodore <sup>53</sup> when the Portuguese are informed of the offer of a token shipment of 10,000 tons of phosphates.

Repeated to Algiers, Madrid and London as Department's Nos. 993, 1177 and 3262, respectively.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/806: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, May 26, 1943—12 p. m.  
[Received May 27—3:17 p. m.]

1399. 1. Monsieur Drouin is scheduled to arrive here Friday.

2. The terms of the memorandum intailed [*initialed*] in Algiers on May 16 were given the full approval of the Anglo-American Committee today and the British and American Missions have appointed their representatives on the French North African Trade Committee which will be formally set up as soon as Drouin arrives.

3. The Spanish have now nominated three vessels to pick up the 10,000 ton token shipment of rock phosphates and the appropriate data are being telegraphed NAEB. In the course of discussing these arrangements, Taberna <sup>54</sup> inquired whether the French North African authorities had instructed Drouin to attempt to negotiate a formal, detailed, and long term arrangement, and expressed great satisfaction and relief when he learned that a procedure not dissimilar to that employed in the Anglo-American supply purchase arrangements would be followed.

Repeated to Algiers, London, Lisbon.

HAYES

851R.01/588: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)* <sup>55</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1943—midnight.

937. The First Secretary of the Portuguese Legation called on May 21 under instructions from his Government to urge the early resumption of commercial exchanges between Portugal and French North Africa and particularly immediate authorization for Portugal to obtain phosphates. Recognizing the connection of this question with that of representation of the North African regime in Lisbon, he said that his Government, while maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy,

<sup>53</sup> Ernest Théodore, General Giraud's representative in Portugal.

<sup>54</sup> Vicente Taberna, Director General of Economic Policy in the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>55</sup> The same to the Consul General at Algiers as No. 1012, to the Ambassador in Spain as No. 1203, and to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as No. 3349.

was quite prepared to consider the possibility of receiving in Lisbon a representative of the North African regime who would be authorized to concern himself not only with commercial matters but also with visas, refugees and related questions. He added, as you indicated in your number 1114, May 20,<sup>56</sup> that the Portuguese Consul General in Rabat had been instructed to proceed to Algiers to negotiate on these points.

The First Secretary was informed that, in addition to military considerations, the lack of accepted representation of the North African regime in Lisbon had undoubtedly been one of the factors which had delayed the resumption of commercial exchanges. He was told that the expression of his Government's willingness to accept such representation would presumably facilitate the opening of commercial negotiations concerning which our representatives have for some time been conferring with the French in Algiers and that it was our understanding that a token shipment of 10,000 tons of phosphates to Portugal would be authorized without awaiting the commencement of negotiations.

HULL

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<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

CONCERTED NEGOTIATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM RESPECTING EXCHANGE  
OF SICK AND WOUNDED WAR PRISONERS WITH THE  
AXIS

740.00114 European War 1939/3551

*The Swiss Chargé (Feer) to the Secretary of State*

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit the translation of a cable which, at the request of the Italian Government, the Italian Legation at Bern sent to the Federal Political Department:

"The Italian Legation has the honor to bring to the knowledge of the Political Department the eager desire of the Royal Government to obtain the immediate repatriation of the wounded and the seriously sick who remained in Tunisia after the battle and the military actions which have taken place there. This would refer in substance to those cases in which, in the opinion of the British and North American military physicians, it appears probable that an ensuing invalidity in the future will result to such an extent as to justify repatriation, according to Article 68 of the Geneva Convention.<sup>1</sup>

The Royal Italian Government warmly requests the Swiss Government to point out in the best possible way to the British and North American Governments the fact that the proposal is based on purely humanitarian considerations and that, if accepted, it will not only relieve the task of the British and American medical Service, but will alleviate also the grave hardships and the ensuing danger to which the Italian wounded and gravely sick are exposed because of the torrid climate and of the necessarily reduced aid facilities.

In case the proposal is accepted, as the Royal Italian Government hopes it will be, the Italian authorities would send, according to circumstances, one or more hospital ships to a port of North Africa which may be designated by the above mentioned governments. Should the British and American authorities deem it preferable that the transport should take place on British or American ships, the latter could put in at a neutral port, for instance, Barcelona.

The Royal Government declares itself ready to repatriate in exchange all the invalid British and North American prisoners of war who might be submitted to a further examination by the Mixed

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<sup>1</sup>International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 336, 352.

Medical Commission and for whom instead the Commission could order that a special urgent examination take place.

A similar proposal will be presented by the German Government".<sup>2</sup>

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim would be grateful to the Honorable the Secretary of State for letting him know as soon as possible the United States Government's answer to this proposal.

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1943.

740.00114 European War 1939/3625

*The Swiss Chargé (Feer) to the Secretary of State*

Reference: VIII-12

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland in charge of German Interests presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to submit the following text, in its translation, of a cable just received from abroad regarding an agreement to be reached in complement to Title IV, Section I, Article 70 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention dealing with the appointment and activity of a mixed medical commission:

"The German Legation requests that the proposal be made to the American Government regarding an agreement of the following wording concerning the examination of Prisoners of War by a mixed medical commission:

*Primo:* Opportunity shall be granted to each prisoner of war to submit himself to the examination by a mixed medical commission within 6 months from the date of his capture.

*Secundo:* Prisoners of war who have neglected to apply for examination according to *Primo* are to be presented, upon respective application, for examination within 6 months from the date of such application. Those prisoners of war who have already been examined by the mixed medical commission, but whose justification for repatriation has, however, been denied, can apply for additional examination at the earliest 3 months after the last one.

*Tercio:* Prisoners of war recognized as justified repatriation cases by the mixed medical commission are to be repatriated as soon as means are available for such a purpose, and this without taking into consideration the amelioration of their state of health which eventually has occurred in the time between the examination and the repatriation.

*Quarto:* Lists with the results of the examinations by the mixed medical commission have to be handed to the Protecting Power if possible within one month for forwarding to the Government of the country of which the prisoners of war are nationals.'

"The same agreement was concluded some time ago between Germany and Great Britain. The German Government is prepared to act according to these provisions provided the U.S. Government confirms that the German prisoners of war are treated according to the same rules."

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

740.00114 European War 1939/3839

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

Ref. 1749/11/43

No. 371

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have lately received proposals from the German and Italian Governments, which they understand have also been sent to the State Department, for the immediate repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded Axis prisoners from North Africa, those eligible to be selected by British and American doctors, in return for the repatriation of all British and American seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners in German and Italian hands, in accordance with the Prisoners of War Convention.

2. His Majesty's Government would like to concert their replies with the United States Government and to have their views on the most convenient and rapid method of conducting negotiations with the Axis Governments and of issuing the necessary instructions to the military and naval authorities to implement any agreement reached.

3. The provisional views of His Majesty's Government are as follows:

A. In order to co-ordinate the approach by the two Governments to these proposals, and the necessary administrative arrangements for carrying out any agreement which may be reached, it is suggested that both the negotiations with the enemy governments and the administrative planning should be conducted by a small central organization in London on which the United States would be represented by military and diplomatic officers with authority to take rapid decisions on their own responsibility where no major issues are involved. The British members would include representatives of the Admiralty, War Office and Foreign Office. The organization would not exceed six in number and would be set up without delay. This arrangement appears to His Majesty's Government to offer the best prospect of rapid and efficient treatment of the problem, and they are confident that Anglo-American co-operation in this instance would be as cordial and effective as it has been in the operations in North Africa.

B. The German proposals offer an opportunity to recover all seriously sick and seriously wounded British prisoners of war from Germany, many of whom have waited nearly three years, and would also relieve the North African Command of a heavy burden in the way of hospital accommodation, medical services, etc. From the point of view of His Majesty's Government the Italian case, while requiring a simultaneous reply on the same lines, is less urgent since His Majesty's Government are now in the process of recovering by means of normal repatriation arrangements under the Convention most of their sick and wounded from Italy.

C. His Majesty's Government are strongly in favour of accepting the German proposals as a basis of agreement subject to the following conditions:—

(1) That the Germans should give an assurance that the repatriation of all British and American prisoners captured before the ending of the campaign and now in German hands shall, without prejudice to their right to subsequent examination by a mixed Medical Commission, be determined forthwith by German doctors who will certify for repatriation those covered by both schedules "A" and "B" of the model draft agreement of the Red Cross Convention.<sup>3</sup> All British and American seriously sick and seriously wounded passed by the mixed Medical Commission or certified as above shall be included.

(2) That the Germans should accept such safeguards against breach of faith as may be considered necessary by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government.

D. His Majesty's Government are prepared to repatriate forthwith all eligible Germans seriously sick and seriously wounded held in the British Commonwealth whose right has already been established. They would also accept the German proposal for the examination of Germans in North Africa.

E. His Majesty's Government would propose the repatriation from both sides under the projected agreement of general protecting personnel, less those required to care for their remaining compatriots. While, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the seriously ill and seriously wounded should come first, such personnel is entitled to repatriation under the Red Cross Convention.

4. The combined Chiefs of Staffs have been asked to obtain information regarding the number of seriously sick and seriously wounded Germans in North Africa likely to be assessed as repatriable, the suitability or otherwise of Barcelona as a delivery port for German repatriables (on the assumption that access to any North African port by Axis ships is unacceptable) and the time necessary to complete the examination of German prisoners. If necessary, His Majesty's Government could assist by providing British doctors with experience of the Convention.

5. His Majesty's Government would be grateful for an early expression of the views of the United States Government on the above-mentioned points, and in particular on the suggestion that the necessary negotiations and administrative arrangements should be entrusted to a small Anglo-American organisation to be set up in London.

6. In conclusion His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government will agree that all public discussions of this matter should be avoided until agreement with the Axis has not only been reached but has actually begun to operate. It will be recalled that the

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<sup>3</sup> See Annex to the Convention of July 27, 1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 336, 363.

failure of similar negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the German Government in October 1941 was in some measure due to premature publicity.

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1943.

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740.00114 European War 1939/3906 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 10, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

3928. The following letter dated June 6 from Mr. Eden <sup>4</sup> has been received:

"Once more I must ask for your help. This time it is a question of our disabled prisoners of war in German and Italian hands.

On May 16th we received through the Swiss Minister proposals from Germany and Italy for the repatriation of disabled prisoners of war. Both Governments asked that their disabled men who had been captured in Tunisia should be repatriated and in return they offered to release all our disabled prisoners of war in their hands, who are entitled to repatriation under the Prisoners of War Convention of 1929. They offered to send hospital ships to a North African port and suggested that Barcelona should be used as the port of exchange. The Swiss Legation reported that an identical proposal has simultaneously been made to your Government.

It was obvious that we had to concert with the United States Government as soon as possible the most effective method of dealing with these proposals. After consultation between the Departments concerned I accordingly telegraphed on May 22 to Halifax indicating our provisional views and asking for those of the State Department, both with regard to the conduct of the negotiations with the Axis governments and also to the issue of the necessary instructions to military and naval authorities for carrying out the agreement as soon as it is reached.

So far we have received no reply from the State Department. I fully realize that there are a great many points about this matter which need very careful consideration. It was indeed with the idea of saving time that in a further telegram sent to our Embassy on May 27th we suggested that both the negotiations with the enemy governments and the administrative plan should be conducted by a small central organization in London, on which the United States would be represented by military and diplomatic officers with authority to take rapid decisions on their own responsibility where no major issues are involved. The British members would include representatives of the Admiralty, War Office and Foreign Office, and we suggested that this organization, which would not exceed six members in number,

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<sup>4</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.



should be set up without delay. The German proposal is of special importance to us. We have already got most of our disabled men out of Italy, but (*not one man has been repatriated from Germany*). I do not know how many American disabled prisoners there may be, but the number of British is over 3000. Many of these men have now been there since the time of Dunkirk. The recovery of the blind and the permanently crippled cannot be carried any further until they leave Germany, and the reports of their mental and physical deterioration which I have received are extremely bad. Our attempt to get them all out in 1941 failed. A great many families in this country are concerned and they have shown a great patience and understanding of our difficulties. These arose from the fact that the Germans held more prisoners than we did. Now for the first time the balance is redressed, and we have a real chance of getting our men out. I am most anxious that our two Governments shall seize this opportunity and press it home. I shall accordingly be very grateful for anything that you can do to impress upon your Government the need for early action."

WINANT

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740.00114 European War 1939/3625

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé (Feer)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland in charge of German interests in the United States and acknowledges the receipt of the Legation's note of May 27, 1943, the Legation's reference VIII-12, transmitting a text in its translation, of a cable received from abroad in which is set forth the terms of an agreement which the German Government proposes shall be reached in complement to Title IV, Section 1, Article 70, of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929, concerning the appointment and activity of a mixed medical commission. It is stated that the German Government is prepared to act according to the provisions of the proposed agreement provided that the Government of the United States confirms that German prisoners of war are treated according to the same rules.

This matter is receiving consideration. When a decision shall have been reached, the Secretary of State will again communicate with the Legation of Switzerland.

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1943.

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740.00114 European War 1939/3985

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1943—9 p. m.

3866. Your 3928, June 10th. The following note has today been dispatched to the British Embassy in Washington:

"The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer again to His Excellency's notes dated May 31 and June 9, 1943,<sup>5</sup> relative to the proposals made by the Italian and German Governments to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain for the immediate repatriation of the seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war taken by the allied forces in North Africa in return for the repatriation of British and American seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners in German and Italian hands.

It is the view of the Government of the United States that it should forthwith be agreed with the enemy, as a basic policy for the duration of the war, that seriously sick and seriously injured prisoners of war shall be promptly and mutually repatriated, regardless of the operation in which they were taken and of their rank or number, as provided in and required by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. The repatriation of prisoners already taken, whom the respective Governments concede to be eligible for repatriation under the Model Draft Agreement attached to the Geneva Convention or otherwise, should in the opinion of the American Government proceed without delay. The prompt inspection of all other cases by Mixed Medical Commissions, and their repatriation without delay if found eligible therefor, should also be arranged.

The Government of the United States perceives no objection to concerting its reply to the Italian and German proposals with that of the British Government or to setting up the small central organization suggested by the British Government, provided that it is clearly understood that both Governments will pursue the same basic policy of immediate agreement with the enemy outlined in the preceding paragraph, and that the charter of the proposed central organization will not allow deviation from such basic policy but will limit the actions and negotiations of the central organization to the making of administrative arrangements for the speedy carrying out of this policy. Within the ambit described, the Government of the United States would have no objection to authorizing the members of the central organization to take rapid decisions on their own responsibility where no major issues are involved. The Government of the United States is of the opinion, however, that such an organization should be set up in Washington where coordination with the combined Chiefs of Staff and similar combined groups will be most readily possible and where there will be the least occasion for burdening the theater commanders with the problem.

The Government of the United States does not understand the precise implications of the British Government's suggestion that the Germans shall be required to accept safeguards against breach of faith. The Government of the United States seriously doubts the feasibility of devising effective safeguards to that end and is not inclined to believe that the enemy would be under any special temptation to break

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<sup>5</sup> Note No. 389 of June 9 not printed; in it the British Ambassador inquired as to whether he might soon expect a reply to the questions raised in his note No. 371 of May 31. In reply the Department informed the Ambassador by a note of June 19 that the matter was receiving urgent consideration and that a further communication would be made at the earliest opportunity (740.00114 EW 1939/3909).

faith in the context under discussion, where to do so would promise him no apparent advantage. The Government of the United States believes that the best advance assurances would lie in the prompt making of the agreement and the unconditional and inclusive nature of its terms, and indeed would deplore any other approach to the situation lest it delay or endanger the carrying out of this humane and necessary project.

The Government of the United States is not favorably inclined to raising at this time the question of repatriating the sanitary personnel and chaplains protected under Articles 9 to 13 inclusive of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick of Armies in the Field (Red Cross Convention),<sup>6</sup> described in paragraph 3E of the British Embassy's note as general protecting personnel. The introduction of this issue might cause differences and delays, especially as the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to protected personnel are not identical with those with respect to the sick and wounded.

The Government of the United States fully agrees with the suggestion of the British Government that all public discussions of this matter should be avoided until agreement with the Italian and German Governments has been reached and has actually begun to operate.

The Government of the United States would be grateful for an early expression of the views of the British Government on the matters treated in this communication."

HULL

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711.02114 Sick/2

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

No. 446

Ref: 1749/53/43

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, with reference to the Department's note No. 740.00114 (European War 1939/3985) of June 24th last,<sup>7</sup> relative to the proposals made by the German and Italian Governments for the exchange of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war, has the honour, upon instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to transmit the following reply to the observations contained in the Department's note.

2. His Majesty's Government agree with the aim of reaching an immediate agreement with the German and Italian Governments as a basic policy for the duration of the war, for the prompt and mutual repatriation of seriously ill and seriously wounded prisoners of war regardless of the operations in which they were captured and of their rank or number.

<sup>6</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, p. 321.

<sup>7</sup> See telegram No. 3866, June 24, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *supra*.

3. They also agree on further consideration that the Axis proposal for selecting repatriables by Allied doctors in North Africa should be replaced by the normal procedure of examination by Mixed Medical Commission provided by the Prisoner of War Convention, which shall also apply to British and American prisoners in Axis hands. In order to save time and in agreement with General Eisenhower,<sup>8</sup> arrangements are being made for an immediate visit to North West Africa of the existing Mixed Medical Commission from the Middle East, the members of which have already been accepted by both Axis governments.

4. His Majesty's Government on reflection are prepared to forego the demand for safeguards as such. The plan outlined below provides for simultaneous sailings from each side under safe conducts and this it is hoped will be sufficient.

5. His Majesty's Government have carefully considered the comments of the United States Government on the inclusion of protected personnel but consider that, so far from causing differences or delays, their inclusion should for the following reasons undoubtedly increase the chances of early agreement :

(a) They are convinced that the German Government will only carry out an agreement provided that it is satisfied that there is a material advantage in doing so. According to their proposal they expect to recover thousands of sick and wounded from North Africa. In fact there will not be more than 400, including Italians. In addition the Germans will recover 602 already passed by Mixed Medical Commissions in the British Empire. The number of British prisoners of war so far notified as having passed the German Mixed Medical Commission is 2,952; to this number must be added any American and British passed during the examinations now in progress. The Allies therefore stand to gain heavily in point of numbers. In 1941, His Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the German Government to repatriate sick and wounded under the Prisoner of War Convention. The Germans then learned that they stood to lose on numbers and, on the personal intervention of Ribbentrop,<sup>9</sup> went back on the agreement and have ever since declined to negotiate on any basis but that of numerical equality. The present German offer to return to the Convention is clearly prompted by the expectation that German repatriables in North Africa will amount to several thousands. His Majesty's Government feel that there is a grave danger that the German Government on learning the actual numbers may act as before, and in the interests of the sick and wounded consider that everything possible should be done to obviate this risk. The inclusion of protected personnel should go far to overcome this difficulty, since the number captured in North Africa must exceed those held by the Germans.

(b) The Head of special division of the Swiss Legation in London, who has recently discussed prisoner of war questions in Berne with

<sup>8</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General, European Theater of Operations; Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, North Africa.

<sup>9</sup> Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

representatives of the German High Command and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, believes that the inclusion of protected personnel would be welcomed in Berlin.

(c) From the Administrative point of view there are obvious advantages in disposing of all repatriables at once. Separate operations would be wasteful of shipping, accommodation and manpower.

(d) While it is true that protected personnel's rights are founded on a separate convention, the obligation to repatriate is the same under both conventions,<sup>10</sup> and is equally clear and binding.

(e) Protected personnel are entitled to repatriation as soon as a route for their return shall be open and military considerations permit (Article 12 of Red Cross Convention). To retain them while returning sick and wounded would be a breach of this article.

6. His Majesty's Government welcome the readiness of the United States Government to concert its reply to the German and Italian Governments with their own. They suggest that, subject to agreement on the inclusion of personnel protected under the Geneva Red Cross Convention, the exchange of views which has now taken place provides a sufficient common basis for such replies.

7. After examination of the shipping position, the following movements are proposed—

(1) An exchange at Smyrna involving Germans now being concentrated in the Middle East and Indian, Australian, New Zealand and African personnel in Germany, whose ultimate destination will be eastward.

(2) An exchange at Gothenburg involving Germans concentrated in the United Kingdom and half the remaining repatriables from Germany whose ultimate destination is the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States of America.

(3) Simultaneously with (2) the evacuation in Axis ships of half the German repatriables in North Africa from an African port to an Axis port in the Mediterranean.

(4) The simultaneous removal from Gothenburg and a North African port of the remainder on each side.

8. His Majesty's Government would propose to include the details of the above programme in their reply to the German Government and hope that the United States Government will notify their agreement at an early date.

9. It is hoped, if the German Government accepts, to carry out this programme in August–September.

10. So far as the Italian proposals are concerned, while His Majesty's Government are disposed to agree to a further repatriation, this proposed agreement with the German Government must be on the basis of the Prisoner of War Convention. Since, however, in the

<sup>10</sup> Conventions signed at Geneva July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 321 and 336.

course of recent repatriation a considerable number of British repatriables were withheld by the Italians in breach of the Convention and of the assurances they had given, His Majesty's Government would propose to insist on certain safeguards at present under consideration for preventing this in future.

Lord Halifax would be glad to learn Mr. Hull's views on these proposals as soon as may be possible.

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1943.

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711.62114 Sick/3

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

No. 447

Ref: 1749/54/43

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, with reference to the Embassy's note No. 446 of July 10th, has the honour, upon instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to transmit the following additional communication on this subject.

2. His Majesty's Government hope that, as a result of the exchange of views now in progress, complete agreement will shortly be reached in regard to policy. It seems to follow that the role of the proposed central organisation will be limited to the preparation of administrative arrangements on the basis of the policy agreed upon between the United States and British Commonwealth and to the carrying out of any agreement reached with Axis governments.

3. A permanent organisation for coordinating policy and executive action within the British Commonwealth regarding prisoners of war exists in London. The shipping arrangements required on the allied side for carrying out the proposed agreement will have to be made in London. It would therefore be most convenient to His Majesty's Government if the proposed central organisation could be set up in London. If, however, the United States Government is unable to accept this suggestion, His Majesty's Government will most probably agree that the working out of details shall be effected in London so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, and in so far as instructions require to be given A. F. H. Q.,<sup>11</sup> Algiers, these shall be submitted to Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington, for communication when approved to General Eisenhower.

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1943.

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<sup>11</sup> Allied Force Headquarters.

711.62114 Sick/11

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On May 31st last, His Majesty's Embassy addressed a note No. 371 to the State Department, stating that certain proposals had been received from the German and Italian Governments for the immediate repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded Axis prisoners from North Africa, in return for the repatriation of all British and American seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war in German and Italian hands. In this note it was stated that His Majesty's Government would like to concert their reply with the United States Government and to have the latter's views on the most convenient and rapid method of conducting negotiations with the Axis Governments and of issuing the necessary instructions to the military and naval authorities to implement any agreement reached. The note went on to give the provisional views of His Majesty's Government.

In view of the urgency attached by the Foreign Office to an early decision on this matter, a further note No. 389 was addressed to the State Department on June 9th,<sup>12</sup> enquiring whether the Embassy might soon expect to receive an intimation of the Department's attitude to the questions raised in the Embassy's first note, referred to above. On June 19th, in its note No. 740.00114, European War 1939/3909,<sup>12</sup> the Department acknowledged receipt of the two above notes and stated that the matter was receiving urgent consideration and that a further communication would be addressed to the Ambassador at the earliest opportunity.

On June 24th this communication was received, in the shape of the Department's note of that date<sup>12a</sup> (bearing the same reference number as the Department's note of June 19th) transmitting the reactions of the United States Government to the suggestions contained in the Embassy's note of May 31st. The contents of this note were immediately telegraphed by the Embassy to the Foreign Office, who replied with certain observations and counter-proposals. These were embodied in the Embassy's notes Nos. 446 and 447, both of July 10th, to the State Department.

These two notes were acknowledged by the Department in its note No. 711.62114 Sick/4 of July 15th,<sup>13</sup> in which it was further stated that the matter was receiving consideration by the appropriate agencies of the American Government and that a further communication

<sup>12</sup> See footnote 5, p. 55.

<sup>12a</sup> See telegram No. 3866, June 24, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 54.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

would be addressed to the Ambassador as soon as a decision should have been reached.

Since that date a number of conversations have taken place between members of the Embassy staff and the Department, and also between members of the British Joint Staff Mission and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. As yet, however, no reply has been received to the Embassy's two notes of July 10th.

His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the complexity of the question under discussion and the need for consultation between the various agencies, both military and civilian, of the United States Government, including the need for reference to North Africa. They are, however, most disturbed at the lack of progress in these negotiations and greatly fear that this may produce a most adverse effect on their final outcome. Ten weeks have now passed since the enemy's proposals were received, and His Majesty's Government are most anxious to avoid any further loss of time in replying to them.

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1943.

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711.62114 Sick/7

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor again to refer to the Ambassador's notes nos. 446 and 447 of July 10, 1943, with reference to the proposals made by the German and Italian Governments for the exchange of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war.

The various agencies of the American Government concerned with the matter treated in the British Embassy's notes under reference have given careful consideration to the notes and have come to the conclusion that the Government of the United States can agree to concerted action with the British Government only on the basis of an early and unqualified acceptance of the following policy:

Seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners shall be promptly mutually repatriated, regardless of the operation in which taken or of rank and number, as required by the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1929, without demands for safeguards or the inclusion of protected personnel in the projected agreement.

At the earliest feasible date after an agreement for the repatriation of the sick and wounded is actually in operation, the Government of the United States will join the British Government in concerted proposals for action on the repatriation of protected personnel.

The Government of the United States will agree to a small central organization as proposed by the British Government provided the



charter of the organization will not allow deviation from the basic policy set forth above but will limit the actions of the organization to the making of administrative arrangements for the carrying out of this policy.

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1943.

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711.62114 Sick/40  $\frac{1}{2}$

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. E. T. Bailey of the  
Special Division*

[WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1943.

**Participants:** General Gepp of the British War Office; Mr. John Russell of the British Embassy, Washington; General White, Chief of G-1 of the United States Army; Major Bernays of G-1; Mr. Bernard Gufler and Mr. Bailey of the Special Division.

At Major Bernay's request Mr. Gufler and Mr. Bailey attended a meeting at the War Department concerning the repatriation from Germany of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war and of surplus protected personnel. The results of this conference were embodied in a message drafted to be sent by the British Embassy at Washington to the British Foreign Office reporting an agreement between the British and American military authorities and quoting that text of the similar notes which it was recommended should be transmitted to the German Government by the British and American Governments through the protecting Power. It was decided that copies of this document would be forwarded to General Eisenhower in North Africa for his information with the explanation that similar replies would not be made to the Italian proposals regarding the repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war and of surplus sanitary personnel until General Eisenhower had given his opinion as to whether it would be well advised to forward such replies in view of the present political and military situation in Italy.

During the conference the problem of who was to report the names of (a) seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war and (b) the surplus protected personnel now in North Africa was discussed. It was decided to inform General Eisenhower that the names of approximately half of the persons in each category should be forwarded by him to each Government so that both the British and American Governments would be able to report names in each category.

The date on which the prospective exchange could take place was discussed. Because of the technical difficulties that must still be solved and the feeling that an earlier attempt by the British and German Governments to exchange seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war was unsuccessful due partly at least to a time limitation. It was decided that neither the British nor American Governments would suggest any date for the proposed exchange in the replies which are to be made to the German Government's proposal.

General Gepp pointed out that the arrangements which are being made were to cover the possible repatriation of all British and American prisoners of war in German and Italian hands and all German and Italian prisoners of war in British and American hands. He went on to state that there was one little uncompleted matter with Italy, however, which the British Government desired to pursue outside the scope of the arrangements which he was making with the American Government.

While Mr. Guffer and Major Bernays were out of the room discussing another matter, General Gepp expressed the hope that the American and British Governments would be able to convince the Latin-American Governments which have declared war upon the Axis Governments that the Latin-American Governments should take some of the prisoners of war who it is expected will fall into the custody of the United Nations in the near future. Mr. Bailey explained that the Government of the United States had removed many civilian internees from Latin-American countries because it was not satisfied that these persons would remain interned if they were left in the custody of the Latin-American authorities. He also stated that he understood that negotiations were going on with Brazil with a view to the internment in Brazil of Axis prisoners of war taken at sea. He stated that he did not, however, know how far these negotiations had progressed.

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711.62114 Sick/40 †

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 2 August, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Subsequent to Admiral Leahy's letter to you on 27 July 1943<sup>14</sup> on the subject of concerted action by the British and American Governments with respect to the repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war, representa-

<sup>14</sup> Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; letter not printed.

tives of the British Army and of the United States Army have conferred and reached an agreement for concerted action by the two governments with respect to the German proposal. It is proposed that the agreement be implemented by parallel replies to Germany as set forth in the attached draft.<sup>15</sup> A representative of your department and a representative of the British Embassy were present and were consulted in arriving at this agreement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that if the action proposed in the enclosure herewith has the approval of the State Department, appropriate reply now be made to the proposal of the German Government, and that the British Government be informed of the action taken.

As soon as the reply to the German Government is prepared, the War Department proposes to inform General Eisenhower of the action taken and to request that, after consultation with Admiral Cunningham,<sup>16</sup> he notify the British Foreign Office what port in Northwest Africa shall be designated for the return of repatriable German prisoners held in that area.

It has also been agreed that the small central organization proposed by the British and recommended in Admiral Leahy's letter of 27 July be established in London to complete the administrative arrangements necessary to accomplish the proposed repatriation. The War Department intends to make available two officers for duty with the London group. The completion of the arrangements will require some correspondence through diplomatic channels, and it will therefore be helpful if an official of the American Embassy in London can be designated to serve with the group. Instructions to our joint representatives with the London organization will be prepared by the War Department and coordinated with the State Department prior to transmittal.

Both British and United States representatives have agreed that no reply should be made at this time to the similar proposal received from the Italian Government, but that the question of the advisability of such reply at this time should be submitted to Allied Force Headquarters in North Africa and their recommendations obtained before any further action is taken with respect to Italians.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JOHN R. DEANE

*Brigadier General, GSC*  
*Secretary*

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<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

<sup>16</sup> Adm. Andrew Cunningham, British Naval Commander of Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa.

711.62114 Sick/13

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland in charge of German interests in the United States and refers to the Legation's note dated May 17, 1943,<sup>17</sup> transmitting the proposal made by the German Government with regard to the repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war captured in Tunisia.

The Government of the United States has considered the proposal of the German Government for the repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war, and is agreeable to same on the basis of the adoption by both Governments, as a basic policy for the duration of hostilities, that seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war shall be promptly mutually repatriated, regardless of the operation in which they were taken and of their rank or number, as provided in and required by the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.

The Government of the United States agrees, as proposed by the German Government, that, first of all, the qualifications for the repatriation of the seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war shall be examined by the medical doctors of the Medical Corps of the detaining Power, without prejudice to the right of any prisoner not found so qualified to appeal to a neutral medical commission created and functioning as provided in the Geneva Convention.

The United States Government proposes that, if agreeable to the Swedish Government, American prisoners of war to be repatriated shall be delivered to the United States authorities at Göteborg, at which point there will be delivered to the German authorities the German repatriables presently held in the United States and the United Kingdom by the American Forces.

With respect to the German prisoners held in Northwest Africa, the Government of the United States will concentrate those to be repatriated at a Northwest African port to be designated, where they will be delivered to the ships which the German Government has offered to send.

The Government of the United States will make available for delivery at one time, at Göteborg and at the Northwest African port to be designated, all the prisoners of war to be delivered there, and will expect the German Government to do likewise with respect to the American prisoners of war to be delivered at Göteborg. The Government of the United States intends to send to Göteborg enough ship-

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<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

ping to take delivery at one time of all the personnel being returned to it there.

The Government of the United States understands that a proposal along similar lines is being made simultaneously to Germany by the British Government, in order that the German Government and the British Government shall carry out their agreement at the same time and with the same means as the Government of the United States.

If the German Government is agreeable, the Government of the United States would be willing to arrange for the mutual repatriation at the same time and by the same means of surplus German and American protected personnel, in conformity with the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field. The Government of the United States would be agreeable to defining surplus protected personnel as including all in excess of two medical doctors, six enlisted sanitary personnel, one dentist, and one chaplain, per one thousand prisoners.

The Government of the United States is presently ascertaining the names and number of German prisoners of war to be repatriated, and will be glad to receive similar information from the German Government with such expedition as is possible. In preparation for the possibility that the German Government may be agreeable to include the repatriation of surplus protected personnel, the Government of the United States is also ascertaining their names and number at this time, for communication to the German Government, and would be glad, in the eventuality of German agreement for such repatriation, to receive similar information from the German Government. The Government of the United States desires to make it clear, however, that its suggestion with respect to the repatriation of protected personnel is not a condition upon or a qualification of its agreement for the immediate repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war.

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1943.

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711.62114 Sick/13: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1943—8 p. m.

861. United States and British are now negotiating with Germany for the mutual repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war under Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. It has been proposed to Germany that, if agreeable to the Swedish Government, American prisoners of war to be repatriated shall be delivered to the United States authorities at Göteborg at which point there will be

delivered to the German authorities the German repatriables presently held in the United States and United Kingdom by the American armed forces.

The United States Government will make available for delivery at one time at Göteborg the prisoners of war being delivered there by it and will expect the German Government to do likewise with regard to the American prisoners of war to be delivered at Göteborg. The United States Government intends to send to Göteborg enough shipping to take delivery at one time of all prisoners being returned to it there.

Inform the Swedish Government in the strictest confidence of these negotiations and ask if the port of Göteborg can be utilized as proposed by the United States Government to deliver and exchange the prisoners of war to be repatriated. The Swedish Government should also be informed that the United States Government is particularly anxious that this matter be given no publicity whatsoever.

HULL

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711.62114 Sick/14 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 10, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received August 11—2:10 a. m.]

2504. Subject matter Department's 861, August 6, 8 p. m., and 862, August 6, 9 p. m.<sup>18</sup> has been taken up with Foreign Office. Secretary General informed me today that he has authorization from Prime Minister to say that Swedish Government not only has no objection to use of port of Göteborg for purposes planned but will be glad to be of any possible assistance in effecting exchange of wounded war prisoners.

JOHNSON

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711.62114 Sick/18

*The Acting Secretary of War (Lovett) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to your letter of July 29, 1943, SD 711.62114 Sick/7,<sup>19</sup> in which you request information necessary to answer the Canadian Legation's memorandum of June 24, 1943,<sup>19</sup> a copy of which was forwarded to the War Department with your letter of July 2.<sup>19</sup> By letter dated July 17,<sup>19</sup> the War Department answered

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<sup>18</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

your letter under reference and furnished the then available information regarding the Canadian Legation's memorandum.

Since that time, with the cooperation of representatives of your Department, it has been agreed that the United States and British Governments, the latter acting for the Dominion Governments and the Government of India as well as for itself, should concert, and they are now actively concerting, their replies to the enemy proposals under consideration. The procedure which the United States and British Governments have proposed to Germany, and with which your Department is familiar, contemplates, among other things, that the United States and British Governments shall carry out their projected agreements with Germany at the same time and with the same means. This will include the transport of German repatriables held in Canada and the United States to Great Britain for delivery at the point of exchange with the Germans, presumably Gothenburg, and the receipt of United States and British repatriables (including Canadian) from the Germans at that point. It is the intention of the War Department that if the proposals referred to are accepted by Germany, the United States and Canada shall coordinate with each other both the shipment of the German repatriables from their respective custodies to the United Kingdom, and the return to the United States and Canada of their respective nationals who have been picked up at Gothenburg. The foregoing meets the Canadian Legation's memorandum as far as is presently feasible. The working out of further details as to actual shipping arrangements must await receipt of Germany's replies.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

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711.62114 Sick/29

*The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State*<sup>20</sup>

#### Ref. No. VIII-N

The Minister of Switzerland in charge of German interests presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to his note of August 6 transmitting a reply from the American Government to the proposal made by the German Government with regard to the repatriation of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war.

The text of a new note from the German Government has just been received by urgent cable and reads in translation as follows:

*Primo:* The German Government agrees that the proposal contained in the German note of May 13 (i. e. note of May 17 from the

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<sup>20</sup> Similar note was presented by the Swiss Legation in the United Kingdom to the British Foreign Office on September 10.

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim <sup>21</sup>) with respect to the mutual repatriation of seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war be extended to the protected personnel, in conformity with Chapter 3 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. It is likewise agreeable, in accordance with the British and American proposal, to increase to ten per one thousand prisoners the number of such protected personnel which may be retained for the purpose of medical attention and care for the prisoners of war.

*Secundo:* The American prisoners of war have not up to now been brought before the mixed medical commission. Until such time as the mixed medical commission can act, they will be examined by German physicians concerning their qualifications for the repatriation.

*Tertio:* The German Government desires assurance that seriously wounded and seriously sick Germans in North Africa, who are qualified for the repatriation, will be included in the exchange without exception, even if they should not be in British or United States custody.

*Quarto:* The German Government agrees that the exchange take place at Göteborg and Smyrna, and that the seriously wounded Germans from Northwest Africa be removed from there on hospital ships of the Axis Powers.

*Quinto:* Prior to the repatriation, the German Government is desirous of obtaining a list of names of Germans who qualify for the repatriation, said list to show in each case the nature of the wounding, illness or other reason on the strength of which repatriation is taking place.

*Sexto:* The technical preparations can be advanced in such a manner that the exchange movements can take place in September. The German Government may give further information concerning the above-mentioned date, the number of persons qualified for repatriation, as well as concerning the ports from which the ships are to sail for Northwest Africa.

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1943.

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711.62114 Sick/30 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1943—7 p. m.

5702. Repatriation sick and wounded—Europe. Your 6070, September 13, 8 p. m.<sup>21</sup> Department has received in a note dated September 11 from Swiss Legation, Washington, a similar response from German Government to this Government's reply to German proposals regarding repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

War Department has transmitted substance of German Government's reply to Commanding Generals in North African and Euro-

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<sup>21</sup> Not printed.



pean Theaters of Operations and has asked Commanding General in North Africa to compile a list, of the nature requested by the German Government, mentioned in point D of your telegram, of the German prisoners of war and protected personnel in North Africa to be repatriated by the United States and to forward it to the Combined Repatriation Committee at London. A similar list of the German repatriables held in the United States will be transmitted to Committee by War Department, Washington. War Department has recommended to Commanding General, European Theater<sup>23</sup> that Committee consolidate these lists for transmission by you to American Legation at Bern for forwarding to German Government.

Department is requesting Swiss Minister, Washington, to ask his Government to request from German Government a similar list of American prisoners of war and protected personnel to be repatriated and to have his Government give a copy of this list when received to American Legation at Bern which has been requested to transmit it to you for Committee.

British Chargé d'Affaires Washington who has not as yet been informed that a reply has been received from German Government in this regard is recommending to British Foreign Office that British Government take similar action so that action can be taken by British and United States Governments simultaneously.

With regard to the assurance requested by the German Government, mentioned in point C of your telegram, concerning which the British Foreign Office telegraphed General Eisenhower, Department has been informed by War Department that British authorities in North Africa have telegraphed British War Office to the effect that the French authorities have agreed to the inclusion in this proposed exchange of German prisoners of war and protected personnel in their custody who are eligible for repatriation and that the British authorities in North Africa have stated that the German Government can be assured that seriously sick and seriously wounded German prisoners of war and protected personnel in North Africa who are qualified for repatriation will include as well those persons not held by the British or United States authorities. The Swiss Minister Washington has been informed that the German Government can be assured accordingly.

It is stated in penultimate paragraph of your telegram that British War Office, in its telegram to General Eisenhower, has stated that the Combined Repatriation Committee had pointed out that, when negotiations were initiated, all prisoners of war taken in Tunisia were to be considered as prisoners of the American armed forces and that negotiations have been carried out on that basis. Department and War De-

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<sup>23</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

partment have no knowledge of such an arrangement and would appreciate clarification of this statement.

Department notes in last paragraph Committee has selected tentative date of October 9 for the exchange. Since it is impossible at this time to determine how soon the German repatriables held by this Government in the United States and North Africa can be concentrated and embarked you should notify Committee not to commit itself to this date or any other date pending further instructions from War Department.

Department and War Department are coordinating with the Canadian Government with regard to the repatriation and shipping of German repatriables from United States and Canada to United Kingdom, and the return of Canadian and American nationals to United States and Canada.

Other matters set forth in German Government's reply are receiving consideration and a reply with regard to them will be made to the Swiss Minister at the earliest opportunity. Department will keep you informed of any action taken.

HULL

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711.62114 Sick/29

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland in charge of German interests in the United States and has the honor to refer to the Minister's note, Ref. No. VIII-N, dated September 11, 1943, with reference to the mutual repatriation by the American and German Governments of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war.

The United States Government is compiling a list, of the nature requested under *quinto* in the German Government's note, of the German prisoners of war and protected personnel held by the American armed forces in the United States and North Africa who are eligible for repatriation. This list when completed will be forwarded to the Combined Repatriation Committee, which has been established at London by this Government and the British Government to facilitate coordination of arrangements for the proposed exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and will be transmitted by telegraph by the American Embassy at London to the American Legation at Bern for transmission to the German Government through the Swiss Government.

The Secretary of State would be grateful if the Minister of Switzerland would ask his Government to request from the German Government a similar list of the American prisoners of war and protected

personnel whom the German Government considers eligible for repatriation and to forward a copy of this list to the American Legation at Bern which will transmit it to the American Embassy at London for the Combined Repatriation Committee. The Secretary of State would also appreciate it if the Minister of Switzerland would ask that a copy of this list be transmitted to Washington for communication to the Department of State.

With regard to the request made under *tertio* of the German Government's note, the German Government may be assured that German prisoners of war and protected personnel in North Africa who are eligible for repatriation will also include those persons not held by the British or American authorities.

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1943.

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711.62114 Sick/70

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland in charge of German interests in the United States and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Minister's note dated September 20, 1943,<sup>24</sup> in which the receipt is acknowledged of the Secretary of State's note of September 17 regarding the mutual repatriation by the United States and German Governments of seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war and protected personnel.

The Minister is informed that lists of German prisoners of war and protected personnel to be repatriated by the United States Government from the United States and North Africa have been given by the Combined Repatriation Committee, which has been established at London, to the Swiss Legation at London for communication to the German Government. As requested in the Minister's note there is enclosed a list of the German prisoners of war who will be repatriated from the United States. There is no surplus protected personnel among the Germans to be repatriated from the United States.

It would be appreciated if the Minister of Switzerland would forward to the Secretary of State a copy of the list of the American prisoners of war and protected personnel to be repatriated by the German Government as soon as the Minister shall have received this list from the Swiss Government at Bern.

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1943.

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<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

## AGREEMENTS WITH ENEMY COUNTRIES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF OFFICIALS AND NON-OFFICIALS <sup>1</sup>

125.0051/258 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1943.

35. Your 5723, December 7<sup>2</sup> and other correspondence regarding exchange of United States officials and persons of assimilated categories who were in unoccupied zone of France. By two notes dated today<sup>3</sup> Department has informed Swiss Legation in charge of German and Italian interests of safety of German and Italian members of Armistice Commission in North Africa who are reported to be in hands of United States authorities.

United States Government desires to proceed immediately with exchange of French and United States officials. Some of French officials in United States have been assembled at Hershey, Pennsylvania, some have been released while others have remained fully at liberty. United States Government proposes to release them all and permit French officials to depart for such points in French territory as they may voluntarily choose. The French Ambassador and the members of his suite who wish to accompany him will be transported to Lisbon by airplane at the expense of the United States Government. United States Government would be grateful if Swiss Government would suggest a date for simultaneous exchange at Lisbon of French group from United States and of United States group from Lourdes.

Please stress to Swiss Government that United States Government desires to proceed with this exchange at earliest possible date.

United States Government will of course facilitate exchange of French officials and persons in assimilated categories in other American Republics for officials and persons in assimilated categories of those republics now in France. The former French representative at Caracas has already been permitted to proceed unmolested on a vessel destined for Europe.

HULL

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<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 285-449.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Long, December 16, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 374.

<sup>3</sup> Neither printed.

125.0051/279a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1942 [1943]—3 p. m.

77. Your 202, January 11.<sup>4</sup> Please deliver following urgently to Swiss Foreign Office referring to Department's 35 of January 5 and previous on subject of exchange of French and American officials:

"The United States Government has on various occasions indicated to the Swiss Government through the American Legation at Bern its desire to proceed promptly to an exchange of French diplomatic and consular personnel in the United States who wish to return to French territory for American diplomatic and consular personnel and assimilated categories previously stationed in France. The French personnel are in the United States and can be immediately freed for exchange. This Government, however, has learned with surprise that it is proposed to remove the entire American group at Lourdes to Germany on January 13. As this removal is undoubtedly to be undertaken by the German authorities, this Government requests that an energetic protest in its name be made by the Swiss Government to the German Government for this unjustifiable action.

This Government still stands ready and willing to proceed with the exchange now and would be grateful to the Swiss Government if it would immediately proceed to effect it."

Please inform the Swiss Foreign Office that this Government is ready to include in the exchange all German and Italian civilian non-military personnel captured by our forces in French North Africa totaling 24 Germans and 13 Italians. This Government with regard to its personnel expects that Vice Consul Orebaugh and his two clerks taken by the Italians in Monaco and Mrs. Springs, wife of the Vice Consul at Tunis, and other American civilian personnel from French North Africa who may be held by the Germans and Italians will be included with the American personnel from France in the exchange.

HULL

125.0051/280a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1943—7 p. m.

111. Your 294, January 14<sup>5</sup> and previous. Please request Swiss Government urgently to deliver to German Government in name of United States Government following verbatim communication:

<sup>4</sup> Not printed; it transmitted a report from the Swiss Legation at Vichy that the entire American group at Lourdes was to be transported to Germany on January 13 (125.0051/269).

<sup>5</sup> Not printed; it reported that the transfer of American officials at Lourdes to Germany could be stopped only if the United States agreed to the exchange of Americans for German officials of the North African Armistice Commission and of the German Consulate General at Algiers (125.0040/1370).

"United States Government is informed by the Swiss Government that the German Government proposes to remove to Germany the group of United States official personnel and assimilated categories of United States nationals who have been detained in Lourdes, unless United States Government clearly declares willingness exchange group against members German Consulate, Algiers and German members North African Armistice Commission.

In accordance with international practice United States Government is prepared to exchange for its personnel the former French Ambassador in the United States together with such members of his staff as may wish to accompany him to metropolitan France. Since the severance of diplomatic relations the United States Government has been negotiating through the Swiss Government for an exchange.

The United States Government does not consider the exchange of German personnel captured in French North Africa has any relation to the question of the exchange of French and American personnel. However, it is willing to deliver the German consular officials taken in North Africa and members of their households, at Lisbon along with the French Ambassador and accompanying French personnel, provided the German Government will deliver all of the American personnel in question at Lisbon, under guarantee of the Portuguese Government for the exchange of both groups. The German personnel referred to are Peter H. Pfeiffer, Consul General; Dr. Hans Schwarzmann, Vice Consul; Walter Gohl, First Secretary; Oskar Mehle, Secretary; Otto Riedel, Secretary; Heinz Kehr, Secretary, and 18 (eighteen) dependents and employees, totalling 24 (twenty-four) persons.

However, the German military members of the German Armistice Commission are in a different category and the United States Government is not prepared to release them."

HULL

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740.00115 European War 1939/5727a Supplement

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland in charge of German interests and has the honor to refer to the Department's note of January 5, 1943<sup>6</sup> regarding the German personnel of the Armistice Commission in North Africa in which it was stated that these persons were receiving considerate treatment.

The Department is now informed that the consular officers included among the personnel in question are comfortably accommodated in three houses which are adequately heated and have satisfactory sanitary and other arrangements. The accommodations have been inspected by representatives of the Department of State who during a previous period of service inspected the accommodations afforded by the German Government to detained consular personnel of an

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<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

enemy power and have been determined to be superior in every way. The rations given these persons are identical with those given to officers of the United States forces to which are added extra rations of milk and fruit juices for the children. Exercise and religious worship are provided for and the question of additional clothing for certain of the women is being given attention. Provision has been made for the possibility of a visit by the nearest Swiss representative.

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1943.

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125.0051/286 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, January 23, 1943.

[Received January 23—9: 15 p. m.]

530. American interests—Germany. Legation's 393 January 17<sup>7</sup> official group Baden Baden. Foreign Office's notes January 20 and 21 transmit reports from De Montenach and Soldati Swiss representatives Baden Baden regarding voyage official group from Lourdes and conditions Baden Baden. Both state voyage satisfactory and comfortable no complaints.

De Montenach states officials permitted take all baggage desired (see Legation's 216 January 11<sup>8</sup>) and only 25 sacks containing archives and 16 bicycles left Lourdes. These will be taken Vichy and stored Swiss Legation there.

Problems arose regarding money but after intervention Swiss Legation each member group allowed take 20,000 French francs plus any foreign currency possessed.

De Montenach states he and Tuck<sup>9</sup> agreed on following points regarding transfer American group Baden Baden.

(1) Regrettable American Government did not agree immediately representation Vichy interests United States by Switzerland<sup>10</sup> this weakened French and Swiss position in exchange diplomatic missions.

(2) Notwithstanding reasons compelling transfer German Consular and Armistice Commission North Africa unfortunate no news given regarding whereabouts.

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<sup>7</sup> Not printed; it reported safe arrival in Baden Baden on January 16 of American group from Lourdes totaling 134 (125.0051/278).

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> S. Pinkney Tuck, former Chargé of Embassy at Vichy.

<sup>10</sup> With regard to Swiss representation of Vichy interests in the United States, see Department of State publication No. 2693, *Protection of Foreign Interests: A Study in Diplomatic and Consular Practice*, by William McHenry Franklin (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 151-152.

(3) All proposals made for exchange French and American groups based on erroneous though justified assumption that only French Government came into consideration in negotiations. This attitude ignored real fact that French Government did not have free hand as result German intervention which French were forced accept. Resulting delays constitute cause transfer Baden Baden. Although formally protesting German decision Tuck accepts it with resignation. Understands that his repatriation now is based on exchange and he is ready to be last to benefit from any agreement. Therefore he approves any effort made with his Government's agreement to hasten repatriation certain elements in group as for instance Red Cross members.

Soldati's report states trip from Lourdes uneventful. No inspection at demarcation line or German frontier. Group in Brenners Park Hotel better off than Lourdes each room running water most with bath hotel heated and more comfortable than Bad Nauheim. Garden available till 5 p. m. and walks allowed adjacent park. Persons permitted attend Protestant and Catholic services Baden Baden. Regarding King's<sup>11</sup> escape German authorities stated lost all extritorial rights and if caught would probably be placed concentration camp end war.

German authorities informed group in case infractions discipline by individual members of group privileges would be cancelled. Escapees would henceforth have no claim exchange or diplomatic treatment.

Group expressed desire exercise place Germans stated such authorization could not be granted prior receipt reports regarding facilities accorded German group.

All mail to be handed representative Foreign Office and subject censorship. Tuck can telephone Swiss representative Berlin. According German Foreign Office official further treatment of group depends treatment French diplomats and Germans arrested North Africa.

German Foreign Office representative Counselor of Legation Schlemann discharging duties with tact and endeavoring make stay as pleasant possible.

Germans constantly emphasize present treatment only provisional pending reports regarding treatment German Consular group North Africa and members Armistice Commission. Soldati points out German authorities unaware present whereabouts these groups and treatment accorded them. Believed possible members Armistice Commission detained prisoners of war camp. Germans consider members Armistice Commission Consulate represent similar Ameri-

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<sup>11</sup> Roger D. King, unofficial secretary to the Consul General at Marseille for a short period.



cans Baden Baden and accordingly if reports detention Germans prisoners war camps true, high officials German Foreign Office will take reprisals treatment Baden Baden group. Future position therefore depends reports received regarding internment Germans.

According present information Dupont representative Vichy Foreign Office will be replaced by colleague remaining Baden Baden permanently. Soldati states French representative most reserved. Frey proceeding shortly Bern where verbal report will be made Swiss Foreign Office. Soldati leaving Baden Baden soon being replaced Caillat Bordier who will be permanent Swiss representative.

Translation both reports follows airmail.

HARRISON

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340.1115A/3080 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1943—7 p. m.

245. American interests France. Your 55, January 5.<sup>12</sup> The Department contemplates no special arrangements for repatriation of non-official Americans in the former unoccupied zone of France. However, should any Americans in the former unoccupied zone obtain with or without Swiss assistance exit permits for their individual travel to a neutral country en route to the United States, Department would be pleased to be informed thereof and would wish to be informed of their names.

Lists of persons applying for repatriation as well as of those refusing repatriation are of course desired because of their bearing upon question of financial assistance to such individuals.

You may inform Swiss of substance of foregoing in confidence.

HULL

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740.00114 European War 1939/3015 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1943—10 p. m.

267. Confidential for Legation's information only and not for communication to Swiss Government. In view of various reports received from Legation dealt with in separate telegrams today regarding relationship between treatment accorded American official group Baden Baden and Italian and German officers of North African Armistice Commission following statement is provided Legation for its background information.

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<sup>12</sup> Not printed; it concerned inquiry by Swiss Legation, Vichy, with respect to repatriation of non-official Americans from former unoccupied zone in France.

1. There are detained under United States military auspices in Great Britain 61 Germans and 212 Italians taken in North Africa. There are included in this number 24 German civilians and 13 Italian civilians. The civilians are accommodated in three comfortable private residences with facilities surpassing in every way those available at Bad Neuenahr. They were visited on January 22 by Preiswerk of the Swiss Legation. The military personnel are detained as prisoners of war. It is expected to transfer the entire group to United States in the immediate future where the civilians will be accommodated in a very comfortable but small resort hotel and the military personnel will be placed in prisoners of war camps. Consideration is being given to the possibility of furnishing exceptionally comfortable accommodations for military personnel but it is not considered probable that such accommodations will be provided.

2. There are in the United States 10 German military members of the Armistice Commission who are accommodated in prisoners of war camps. These persons are receiving and will receive same treatment as the military personnel referred to above.

3. 36 Italians and two German members of the Armistice Commission are in French custody in North Africa. It is not yet known whether these persons will be transferred to United States custody. The Italians include 11 persons believed to be civilians. No information regarding the treatment of these persons is available but the French authorities wish to try two of the Italians for espionage.

4. From the available information there are probably at large in North Africa or in military custody, but not yet reported to the Department's representatives, other German and Italian members of the Armistice Commission.

As previously stated the military members of the Armistice Commission are not available for exchange.

HULL

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125.0051/303b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1943—11 p. m.

268. American interests, official group Baden Baden. Embassy London reports receipt letter from Swiss Legation in charge German interests stating German Government will move Tuck and party to inferior quarters on February 10 provided accommodations afforded German consular personnel temporarily in England are not improved by that date.

Department is authorizing Embassy to take necessary steps with request that Swiss Legation be informed immediately of action taken in order to forestall retaliatory measures. You may inform Swiss Foreign Office.

HULL

740.00114 European War 1939/3070

*The Department of State to the Swiss Legation*

## MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to its memorandum of February 4, 1943<sup>13</sup> to the Legation of Switzerland in charge of German interests regarding the transfer of the German consular officials from North Africa, who are in Great Britain, from the quarters which they were occupying in January to quarters that will compare favorably with the Legation's description of the quarters occupied by the United States officials at Baden Baden.

The Department is informed that arrangements were completed on February 6 to transfer the German consular officials to a first-class hotel on the afternoon of that day. The Legation of Switzerland will be informed when confirmation of that transfer is received.<sup>14</sup>

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1943.

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125.0051/319 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, February 12, 1943—6 p. m.  
[Received February 13—7:37 a. m.]

994. American interests Baden Baden group. Your 318, February 6, Legation's 902, February 9.<sup>15</sup> Foreign Office note dated today advises Federal Political Department agrees carriage mail to and from Baden Baden by diplomatic pouch between Lisbon and Berlin. Will similarly accept and transport mail to and from German group England.

Arrangement contemplates acceptance mail Swiss Legation Lisbon transportation Bern then transportation Swiss Legation Berlin for delivery German Foreign Office which in turn will transport after censorship to Baden Baden and vice versa.

Similarly mail from German group will be delivered Swiss Legation Lisbon for transmission via Bern to Germany and vice versa.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

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<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

<sup>14</sup> On February 9 the Department of State informed the Swiss Legation that it had received confirmation that the German officials had been transferred on February 6 to a first-class hotel at Cheltenham Spa (740.00114 European War 1939/3079).

<sup>15</sup> Neither printed. The Department's telegram No. 318 (125.0051/269) requested that arrangements for transmission of mail to American prisoners at Baden Baden be expedited. Telegram No. 902 from Bern (125.0051/309) stated that arrangements were being made for the Swiss to transmit the mail.

740.00115 European War 1939/6449

*The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State*

The Minister of Switzerland in charge of German and Italian Interests presents his compliments to the Honorable, the Secretary of State and has the honor to draw his attention to the text in its translation of a note from the German Government transmitted by cable:

*Primo:* In agreement with the French Government, the United States diplomats, consuls, and journalists, as well as Red Cross representatives, Quakers, and members of the Secours Mennonites aux Enfants, previously held in France together with their families, have been transferred to Germany and put up in hotels in Baden-Baden under suitable conditions. Complete lists of names of these persons shall follow in the near future.

*Secundo:* The German Government proposes to exchange these United States nationals against persons of equal status together with their families now in the hands of the United States, to wit: *first*, members of the former German Consulate General in Algiers, together with their families and domestics; *second*, those 13 German nationals who have been brought to the United States from Colombia under the original exchange agreement and to whom the Colombian and United States Governments have granted a status of a diplomatic character but who are, now as before, being held in the United States in spite of numerous representations by the German Government; *third*, the remaining German nationals from Central and South America held in the United States and brought to that country under the provisions of the original exchange agreement; *fourth*, the Italian nationals brought to the United States from Central and South American countries under the provisions of the original exchange agreement, which should include approximately 23 persons; and, *fifth*, French diplomats and persons equal to them in status together with their families.

The negotiations for the exchange as far as the groups listed 'first' to 'fourth' are concerned shall be handled by the German Government and the Italian Government, respectively, through the intermediary of their Protecting Power. As far as arrangements regarding an exchange of French diplomats in the United States are concerned, the interests of these persons shall be safeguarded by the French Government itself.

*Tertio: First*, names of the members of the former German Consulate General, including their families and domestics, are: Consul General Peter Pfeiffer; Vice Consul Dr. Hans Schwarzmann, together with wife and 2 children; Consular Secretary Walter Gohl with wife and 4 children; Staff Member Otto Riedel and wife; Clerk Oskar Mehle and wife; Stenographer Mrs. Martha Pappert-Ackermann; Stenographer Miss Ottilie Humpert; Stenographer Miss Eva Kowalski; Clerk Willi Maith; Repatriation Official Heinz Kehr; Nursemaid Miss Anni Wisse; Housekeeper Miss Maria Singer; and Cook Miss Katja Mueller.

*Second*, names of the 13 Germans from Colombia brought to the United States under the provisions of the original exchange agreement, and to whom the Colombian and the United States Govern-

ments have granted a status of a diplomatic character and who, in spite of that, have been held back in the United States, are as follows: Rudolph Bethke, Hanna Bethke, and children Klara, Gisela, and Wolfgang Bethke; Gustav Dobe; Theodor Funck; Ernst Kaiser; William Lange; Joachim Marggraf; Helmuth Schmidt, Gerda Schmidt, and son Klaus Schmidt.

*Quarto:* The German Government is furthermore desirous of including in the exchange the members of the former Armistice Commission in North Africa (Deutsche Kontrollinspektion Afrika). As an explanation of why the exchange of the Armistice Commission is being requested by the German Government, reference is made to the fact that they had an extraterritorial status duly recognized by the French Government and they therefore belonged to the group of persons with a status of a diplomatic and consular character. These persons have not maintained any activity directed against the United States or Great Britain, but have merely developed a control activity based on the terms of the Armistice agreement with France. The German Government hopes that the United States Government will pay heed to the foregoing arguments and agree to the inclusion of the members of the Armistice Commission in the exchange.

*Quinto:* The German Government proposes as place of exchange Lisbon, as last year. The exchange would take place under the same assumptions and conditions as during the German-American diplomatic exchange last year. The United States exchange group now in Germany would consequently be released from German territory as soon as (a) the listed members of the former German Consulate General in Algiers, including their families and domestics, and (b) the groups of German, French, and Italian nationals mentioned under 'Secundo' and more clearly defined under 'second,' 'third,' 'fourth,' and 'fifth,' have arrived in Lisbon complete. Should there be no possibility that all groups arrive at the same time in Portugal, it should be arranged that the groups first arrived there remain on Portuguese territory under the guarantee of the Portuguese Government until all exchange groups of both parties to the arrangement have completely assembled in Portugal. Only when the participating governments, which means the German, Italian, French, and United States, have declared to the Portuguese Government that their groups have completely arrived on Portuguese territory, these various groups of all participating powers should be released from that territory. The Portuguese Government is to be asked by all participating governments to accept the guarantee for this exchange.

*Sexto:* As soon as the United States Government has agreed to the German proposals as to principle, the German Government shall get in touch with the Portuguese Government regarding the execution of the exchange and inform the Italian and French Governments accordingly.

*Septimo:* In the interest of a speedy fulfillment of the exchange, the German Government now makes the following detailed proposals:

*First,* the boats which shall be considered by the American Government for the transport of the members of the German-Italian exchange group partly in Great Britain and partly in the United States, and vice versa for the transport of the United States diplomats and persons similar in status from Lisbon to the United States, will have to be

furnished with safe-conducts by all the warring nations provided that the boats shall not be armed and shall not travel in a convoy. The assurances of safe-conduct include that these ships, on their trip to Lisbon and back, shall be exempt from any stopping, searching, or other action on the part of a warring power. In order to enable the German Government to advise the German sea unit, as well as Germany's allied nations, the following will have to be communicated to the German Government ten days before the beginning of the trip: (a) Name of ships; (b) nationality of ships; (c) shipping line; (d) home port; (e) identification marks of the ships (exact description of size and tonnage); (f) speed of the ships; (g) course of the ships; and (h) time of departure and time of arrival in the various ports which will have to be touched by the vessels.

The name of the ship as well as the flag will have to be painted so that they are clearly visible on both sides of the ships. Also, the rear deck must bear a reproduction of the flag and, finally, both sides have to bear the name 'Diplomat.'

The ships will also have to travel fully illuminated at night and the recognition marks stipulated in the foregoing paragraph will have to be clearly and sufficiently visible at night.

*Second*, the German Government stresses that the members of the German and Italian exchange group be, if possible, brought jointly from the United States and Great Britain respectively to Lisbon and that the French diplomats together with their relatives in the United States be included in the transport of German and Italian nationals.

*Third*, the German Government is prepared under the condition of reciprocity to permit that, besides the luggage of the American exchange group which has been brought to their present place of confinement, all their household goods (with the exception of furniture) also may be taken along—but on the other hand, the German Government must ask that the property left behind in North Africa by the members of the former German Consulates General in Algiers and Casablanca be transported to Lisbon and received there at the latest upon the arrival of the German exchange groups. [”]

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1943.

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125.0051/347: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, March 12, 1943.

[Received March 12—5:47 p. m.]

1666. American interests France. French Embassy Bern sent following March 11 Swiss Foreign Office for communication American Government.

“French Government has no responsibility whatsoever for departure for Germany American diplomatic Mission formerly accredited France and wishes inform authorities Washington its desire repatriate French diplomatic and consular personnel detained United States.”

HARRISON

740.00115 European War 1939/6214 : Airgram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Peru (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1943—7:30 p. m.

A-504. Embassies Bogotá and Quito have reported that Colombian and Ecuatoran Governments are informed by German Government that detention in Germany of their respective diplomatic missions formerly accredited to Vichy is attributable to detention in United States of Germans from those countries who should have been repatriated under the exchange agreement.

If such a communication is made to the Peruvian Government, you may explain the situation in the following terms:

The termination by the unilateral action of the German Government of the exchange agreement with Germany<sup>16</sup> interrupted the repatriation of Germans from this country and of Germans from the other American Republics who were sent here with a view to repatriation. Furthermore, the German Government, in addition to terminating the agreement, defaulted on specific obligations to repatriate nationals of the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Colombia who were to have been exchanged for Germans from those three countries already repatriated by way of the United States. In view of these aspects of the situation United States Government could not do otherwise than continue to retain here the 712 Germans from the other American Republics who had been brought here with a view to their repatriation and had not yet been repatriated on the exchange vessels.

It should be noted that of the 712 Germans referred to no less than 120 expressed unwillingness to be repatriated. Among the remaining 592 Germans there are included individuals concerning whom we have in the meanwhile developed information indicating that their return to Germany would on grounds of security be dangerous to hemisphere security. Furthermore, the entire aspect of the war situation has changed since these persons arrived in this country and such considerations as the present shortage of manpower in Germany must inevitably be taken into consideration.

We have recently received from the German Government a proposal linking the release of the Germans referred to with the repatriation of our officials and assimilated categories of nationals who were seized on French territory. This proposal reopens the question of the repatriation of these individuals and we are now considering the case in the light of all the facts available to us. Considerations of security and other considerations bearing on the war effort cannot be

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<sup>16</sup> See telegram No. 1672, July 1, 1942, to the Minister in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 371, and telegram No. 3217, July 9, 1942, from the Minister in Switzerland, *ibid.*, p. 372.

overlooked and it is possible that we may be unable to agree to the repatriation of some individuals even if that refusal prevents us from obtaining the release of official groups of the American Republics now in Germany.

Although the Germans have no less than 151 United States official personnel in their hands we will in our considerations and negotiations give our group no more consideration than the smaller group of Peruvians whom the Germans are holding since it is our desire in this matter to deal with all the interested American Republics on a basis of absolute equality. If you agree, please inquire of the Foreign Office whether it feels it could develop a formula for the release of its officials which would not bring into play the question of the Germans held here nor put the Peruvians, as the Germans undoubtedly intend, in a position where they add to the German pressure on us to release persons whose return to Europe may be very injurious to the safety of the hemisphere and the war effort of the United Nations. It should be noted that the Bolivian and Honduran officials in France were released by the Germans without regard to the fact that numerous Germans from those two countries have been held in this country under conditions similar to those existing in the case of the Germans from Peru.

For our part if we are able to reach some agreement with the Germans for the release of our own officials we will no less insist upon the simultaneous release of the Peruvian officials. In other words we are considering this entire problem on a basis of hemispheric solidarity and will deal with the interests of the other American Republics on the basis of equality with our own interests.

WELLES

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740.00115 European War (1939)/6406 ½

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. George L. Brandt,  
Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1943.

Dr. Feer of the Swiss Legation telephoned me at 10 o'clock this morning to tell me that the following message has been received by the Legation from the Swiss Foreign Office at Bern :

“Swiss Legation, Berlin, informs that German Government has made all necessary preparation for exchange of American Tuck group Baden Baden. Therefore German Government anxious to know American reaction to exchange proposed.”



368.1115/3633 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 1, 1943.

[Received April 1—11:59 p. m.]

2040. American interests—Germany. Department's 2895, December 23<sup>19</sup> communicated German Government by Swiss Legation Berlin. Foreign Office replied March 15 following with request communicate American Government:

"German Government after beginning war informed American Government prepared give all American citizens Germany occupied territories opportunity safe conduct home under condition reciprocal treatment German citizens America. German Government considers agreement reached this basis which American Government for some time no longer carries out as still binding. It therefore depends on decision of American Government how long American citizens must remain interned Germany."

HARRISON

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740.00115 European War 1939/6345

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland in charge of Italian interests in the United States and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Legation's note no. It. D. 2 of March 18, 1943<sup>19</sup> raising certain questions regarding the repatriation of Italian nationals and of nationals of some of the other American Republics.

The German Government is being informed, as indicated in the Department's note of this date to the Legation of Switzerland in charge of German interests in the United States in regard to a German stipulation regarding the repatriation of certain Italian nationals, that the United States Government is willing to permit the repatriation of the Italian nationals named in the attached list<sup>19</sup> subject to the concurrence of the governments of the other American Republics which sent them to the United States and subject to such terms as those American Republics may stipulate and subject further to the release of the United States and other American officials and assimilated categories of nationals who may be held by the German Government.

The United States Government is willing to consider on its merits any request for safe conduct for Italian nationals which may be made of the American Embassy at Mexico by the Mexican Foreign Office.

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<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

The United States Government would not undertake to grant safe conduct to Italian nationals in Mexico unless the Mexican Government should advise it that it desired such safe conduct issued.

The United States Government is agreeable to the repatriation with the Italian nationals named in the attached list of the thirteen Italian consular and civilian members of the Armistice Commission in North Africa who are now detained at Ingleside, near Staunton, Virginia, provided that the Italian Government simultaneously releases the United States officials who were taken from Monaco to Italian territory.

The United States Government desires that the Italian Government permit the United States official group from Monaco to be accompanied upon leaving Italy by the following individuals:

William Frank Doublet, who was a member of the American Consulate at Tunisia.

Mr. Larry Allen, a newspaper correspondent who was taken at Tobruk on the British destroyer *Sikh*, the crew members of which have been repatriated.

Mr. John Antoniadis, the husband of an official of the American Legation at Athens, who was by error not allowed to depart from Athens with the American official party.

It is understood that the exchange of any or all of the above persons is to take place on Portuguese territory under the guarantee of the Portuguese Government in accordance with the terms discussed in full detail in the exchange arrangement to be effected between the United States and German Governments.

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1943.

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740.00115 European War 1939/6449

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*<sup>20</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland in charge of German and Italian interests and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Legation's note of February 23, 1943 transmitting a translation of a note from the German Government regarding the possibility of repatriation of the officials and assimilated categories of nationals of the United States who were removed by the German Government from French to German territory.

The following observations are made on the proposal made by the German Government:

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<sup>20</sup> The Department informed the Legation in Switzerland by telegram No. 842, April 6, 7 p. m., that this note had been delivered, and instructed that Tuck be informed concerning it (740.00115A European War 1939/690a).

1. The German communication contemplates parallel communications through other channels regarding the Italian nationals mentioned fourth in the second part of the German proposal and the French nationals mentioned fifth in the same paragraph. The United States Government, which has received the former but not the latter of such parallel communications, deems it advisable to deal fully with the subject in the present communication.

2. The United States Government is agreeable to the repatriation of the members of the former German Consulate General at Algiers together with their families and domestics. There is excluded, however, Sergeant Herbert Pappert who has requested of his own accord that he be considered as one of the military members of the Armistice Commission.

3. The United States Government is agreeable to the repatriation of those members of the special group of thirteen German nationals from Colombia who are named in the attached list A.<sup>21</sup>

4. The United States Government is agreeable to the repatriation at this time of the other German nationals from the other American Republics who are named in the attached list B.<sup>21</sup>

5. The United States Government is agreeable to the repatriation at this time of the Italian nationals from the other American Republics who are named in the attached list C.<sup>21</sup>

6. The United States Government was in November 1942 and remains willing to repatriate without delay those officials of the French Government who desire to return to France. These persons may be repatriated as soon as satisfactory assurance is received that the corresponding United States officials will be repatriated.

7. The United States Government is willing that the exchange of the groups being repatriated shall take place at Lisbon under the same conditions as the exchange effected in 1942.<sup>22</sup> The United States Government expects that the departure of any group being repatriated from the United States will be attended simultaneously with the departure from territory under the control of the German Government of at least a corresponding proportion of the United States group at Baden Baden. The United States Government is agreeable that no member of any of the exchange groups shall be released from Portuguese territory until all participating governments in Europe and in the Americas have expressed to the Portuguese Government their satisfaction with the accomplishment of the exchange. The United States Government is willing at the appropriate

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

<sup>22</sup> The U.S. proposals for the exchange of diplomatic, consular, and other official personnel were transmitted to the Chargé in Switzerland in the Department's telegram No. 338, December 19, 1941, for communication to the German and Italian Governments by the Swiss Government, *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. 1, p. 239.

moment to request the Portuguese Government to accept the guarantee for the exchange and will recommend to the other American Republics that they make a similar request.

8. The United States Government will arrange the transportation to Lisbon and return on one vessel if possible of the persons agreed upon for inclusion in the exchange. Particulars regarding the vessel in question will be communicated at a later date and safe conduct of all the belligerents will be required. The United States Government is agreeable to having the vessel or vessels marked in the supplemental fashion described in the German communication in order to facilitate ready identification by fleet units.

9. In view of the transfer to the United States of the personnel of the German Consulate General at Algiers, there exists no problem of the transfer to Lisbon from Great Britain of any persons to be included in the proposed exchange.

10. The United States Government is willing in principle and on the condition of reciprocity (*a*) to permit the personnel of the former German Consulate General at Algiers to take with them all their possessions brought to the United States and furthermore, to the extent that may be possible and that conditions may permit (*b*) to transfer to Spanish or Portuguese territory during the period of the exchange the effects other than furniture of the personnel of the former German Consulates General at Algiers and Casablanca. It should be noted, however, (1) that the United States Government has information indicating that some of the property in question may have been destroyed as a consequence of military operations in which German forces have participated and (2) that no responsibility can be accepted by the United States Government for disposition of such property made when it is not under the control of the United States authorities.

11. There must be considered as parties to the proposed exchange in addition to the governments mentioned in the German communication, (1) all the governments of the American Republics whose officials have been taken by the German Government from French to German territory and are being held hostage there and (2) the government of any other of the American Republics which sent to the United States persons named in the attached lists A, B, and C. It is expected that all such officials will be included by the German Government in the exchange.

12. The German Government is notified that despite the complete willingness of the United States Government to repatriate the persons named in lists A, B, and C attached, such repatriation can be effected only if it is concurred in for each group by the government which originally sent that group to the United States. It is furthermore the intention of the United States Government not to proceed to the

exchange of any of the persons referred to in the communication from the German Government until word is received that satisfactory arrangements have been made for the exchange of the Brazilian and Chilean officials concerning whom separate negotiations are understood to be in progress.

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1943.

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702.6281/53

*The Department of State to the Swiss Legation*

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to its note of April 3, 1943 to the Legation of Switzerland in charge of German interests regarding the possible repatriation of the American officials seized by the German Government on French territory together with their household effects.

In paragraph 10 of the aforementioned note reference is made to the proposal of the German Government for the exchange of household effects other than furniture of the American group in German hands against the household effects of the German consular officers who were at Casablanca and Algiers.

The Department is informed that the personal and household effects of the German consular officers at Casablanca were taken over by the Spanish Consul at that city and that a portion thereof has been sent away by that official. The balance of the effects are now under his custody and permission may be granted him to ship them abroad when the negotiations with the German Government warrant such action.

It is pointed out that the effects of the German consular officers at Casablanca have not been in the custody of United States authorities and that the United States Government can accept no responsibility for them.

The subject of the effects of the German consular officers who were at Algiers will be dealt with separately when additional information is received.

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1943.

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811.2222 (1940)/3764

*The Secretary of State to the Attorney General (Biddle)*

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I refer to a communication dated March 20, 1943,<sup>23</sup> addressed by Mr. Edward J. Ennis, Director, Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice, to Mr. Joseph C. Green, Chief, Special Division, Department of State, regarding the problem

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

of dealing with alien enemy nationals who are unacceptable for induction into the armed forces of the United States, in which it is proposed that all such persons presently classified 4-C shall be reclassified and that those who emerge in class 1-A will then be offered the choice either of accepting induction for unqualified military service or of being sent to special camps to be supervised by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The German Government through Swiss channels has suggested to this Government the renewal of the general exchange of nationals.<sup>24</sup> The German Government stated that it is prepared to give to all American citizens in Germany and German-occupied territory an opportunity to return home under safe conduct on the condition that reciprocal treatment be given German citizens in the United States. The German communication ended with the statement that it depends on the decision of the United States Government how long American citizens must remain interned in Germany. The Department of State, which does not deem it in the public interest to reply to the German Government, notes that this final statement contains an implied threat of the German Government in its reminder that United States citizens are in its power.

Since this Government has not accepted the proposal of the German Government with regard to the general exchange of nationals, American citizens in German and German-occupied territory must continue to remain under the control of the German Government. An increasing proportion of them are being interned but the German Government has not, so far as the Department is informed, forced them against their will to join combatant units in the German armed forces as an alternative to internment.

The German Government has shown that it is closely watching the actions of this Government with regard to German nationals in the United States and has given evidence of an intention to reflect in its treatment of Americans subject to German control the treatment received by Germans in the United States. For example, shortly after this Government communicated to the Protecting Power for German Interests in the United States and to the Delegate in the United States of the International Red Cross Committee its intention to establish family camps for internees, the German Government communicated a like intention as respects American internees under its control to the International Red Cross Committee. Although this Government has not received from the German Government any direct threats of reprisal for alleged mistreatment of German nationals in this country, the experience of the British Government indicates that the German Government is quick to apply to enemy nationals in its hands what

<sup>24</sup> See telegram No. 2040, April 1, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 86.

it describes as "equal treatment" in retaliation for measures by opposing belligerents that in its opinion justify reprisal action.

This Department concurs in the view that enemy aliens in the United States who have declared their unwillingness to serve in our armed forces should not be forced against their will to perform such service. This Department furthermore perceives no objection to the internment of such enemy aliens who, upon examination or reexamination under the procedure presently established, are determined to be potentially dangerous to the internal security of this country. This Department, however, cannot concur in that part of the proposal which contemplates that every enemy alien called for military service must either serve in the American military forces or suffer what is in effect internment regardless of what term may be applied to it.

If such a procedure should be adopted, this Government would be in the position of using the threat of internment to force alien enemies to serve in its armed forces against their will, and might reasonably expect that the German Government would adopt strong measures of reprisal against those American citizens who may now be in its hands or who may later fall within its power. Such an expectation seems the more to be anticipated in view of the implied threat of the German Government referred to above indicating its disposition to make use of the Americans in its power as pawns to attain its own ends.

With regard to the induction into the American Army of alien enemy nationals, I refer to Article 23 of the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of war on Land annexed to the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907.<sup>25</sup> That article in part provides that "a belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war". In view of Article 2 of the Hague Convention, these provisions do not apply in the present war since all of the belligerents are not parties to the Convention. They embody, however, a principle which was accepted by all the parties to the Hague Convention as a proper rule of conduct with regard to civilian alien enemies and which should, in the opinion of this Department, be observed, especially since there is nothing to indicate that the enemy countries are not observing them with respect to American citizens.

Following the declarations of war by the United States the American Government promptly declared its attitude with regard to the internment of civilian alien enemies within this country. A tele-

<sup>25</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1155.

graphic instruction dated January 12, 1943, to the American Legation at Bern,<sup>26</sup> the contents of which the Legation was directed to make known to the German Government through Swiss channels, stated in part that the Government of the United States was itself applying to civilian enemy aliens in this country as liberal a regime as is consistent with the safety of the United States; that there had been no mass internment of such aliens, and that of the comparative few apprehended, those individuals whose liberty was found not to be contrary to the safety of the United States would be unconditionally released or paroled. The internment of civilian alien enemies who are not potentially dangerous to the internal security of this country would appear to be inconsistent with the attitude of this Government as expressed in the foregoing instruction to the American Legation at Bern. Unless the security of the United States should be involved, the Department does not deem it advisable at this time to reexamine the position taken in the instruction to the American Legation at Bern with regard to the internment of civilian alien enemies in the United States.

I recognize that in some localities the presence of enemy aliens who have been rejected for military duty may be a disturbing factor. I believe, however, that adequate police measures, short of internment, may be adopted which will take care of such situations as they may arise.

I am addressing similar letters to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/29338

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the  
Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

MR. WELLES: The status of our diplomatic officers in Germany and the exchange negotiations in regard to them is:

We offered to send Germany 299 persons in exchange for 265. Of the 265, 151 are American personnel and 114 are South American personnel. An offer was made to Germany April 3.

There has been no response as yet. Other than the official personnel there are according to our records technical American citizens in Axis hands throughout the entire occupied area to the number of 4,913. Of these, 3,054 are in Germany or France. A great majority of them are in France. Almost all of this last group have

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<sup>26</sup> Not found in Department files.



lived in France for many years and practically all of them refused repatriation.

The telegram attached<sup>27</sup> is disturbing. There is an intimation of the same in Woods' no. 111 of May 11 from Zurich,<sup>28</sup> where it is stated that the Nazi officials will not hesitate in taking steps which would result in destruction on a very large scale. He is not specifically referring to persons but the program attributed from Stockholm might be part of the general destruction.

It is constantly on our minds to obtain the return of the American officials in Germany. We are able to increase the offer we made to Germany to the number of 221 persons in addition to those we proposed to them. They ask specifically for 757 persons, many of whom we could not offer because of the objections of the security agencies.

More than a month has elapsed since we sent our reply to their last communication. While no word has been received it is not considered the better [part] of wisdom at this time to manifest anxiety. While the telegram from Stockholm is disturbing I can hardly believe that even those people would resort to the practices indicated.

We hold in our hands approximately 300,000 German civilians as opposed to the 4,913 Americans in areas under German control.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

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740.00115 European War 1939/6872: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 14, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 7:37 p. m.]

3570. American interests Baden Baden group. Legation's 3490, June 10.<sup>29</sup> Following is translation of note June 10 received Swiss Foreign Office from German Legation which Foreign Office official informally handed officer my staff:

The American Government in its reply to the German proposals concerning the German-American exchange did not accede to the wish of the German Government to include in the exchange the members of the former Armistice Commission (*kontroll inspektion*) in Africa. It is therefore requested that the American Government also express its position on this point of the German exchange proposals and attention is again called to the fact that the members of the former Armistice Commission in Africa:

<sup>27</sup> Telegram No. 1515, May 10, 4 p. m., from the Minister in Sweden, not printed; it quoted reports by a Swedish observer, recently returned from a visit to Berlin, of rumors that Nazi officials were contemplating inhuman treatment of United States nationals in German hands.

<sup>28</sup> Not printed.

<sup>29</sup> Not printed; it reported promise of German Legation to request information from Berlin (740.00115 European War 1939/6849).

1, possessed an exterritorial status acknowledged by the French Government and therefore belonged to the group of personalities of diplomatic or consular character.

2, did not engage in activities against North America or Great Britain but merely developed activities of control based on the regulations of the armistice agreement with France.

HARRISON

125.0051/388

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of War  
(Stimson)*<sup>30</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1943.

The Department of State is very much concerned about the prospects of the United States diplomatic officers and their families who are at present held in confinement in Germany.

I am in agreement that every practicable effort to obtain their early release should be made.

The German Government has refused to consider an exchange unless the sixty-seven members of the German Armistice Commissions captured in North Africa be included in the number of German prisoners to be released.

It is my desire that the War Department take such action as is necessary toward the release of members of the German Armistice Commissions which will make it possible for the Department of State to arrange for the exchange of German prisoners for American Nationals now held by Germany.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.00115 European War 1939/6345: Circular airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the  
American Republics*

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1943—7: 50 p. m.

On April 15, 1943 the Department sent to the diplomatic missions in the other American Republics a series of instructions<sup>31</sup> transmitting copies of correspondence with the Swiss Legation at Washington in charge of German and Italian interests regarding the repatriation of United States officials and nationals assimilated to officials seized by the Germans and Italians on French territory.

The Department has received from the Italian Government a response<sup>31</sup> to its communication of April 3 which may be interpreted

<sup>30</sup> Copy received in the Department of State June 18.

<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

as an invitation to renew the general exchange of nationals which was terminated last June by the act of the German Government.

It was not the intention of the Department in writing its communication of April 3 to the German and Italian Governments to reopen the question of the general exchange of nationals since such a general exchange is not now feasible. It was however the Department's intention to obtain the release of the various officials of the American Republics who are held by the enemy in Europe and to discharge certain obligations to certain of the other American Republics to repatriate enemy nationals deported from those Republics for repatriation prior to the collapse of the exchange. The Department's proposal was drawn up in a manner to permit any collateral negotiations by other of the American Republics within the general framework of its proposal which would satisfy their requirements without reopening the question of a general exchange.

United States Government for its part is not seeking from the German Government repatriation of United States nationals who were left in German-controlled territory when the general exchange collapsed nor of United States nationals without claim to official or semi-official status who were in French territory. It is assumed that the other American Republics will similarly wish in connection with this particular exchange to limit their requirements of the Germans except in so far as the German Government may be in default in regard to specific commitments made before the exchange collapsed. There are not believed to be more than twenty or thirty individuals from two or three of the other American Republics who are covered by such defaulted commitments.

HULL

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740.00115 European War (1939)/6923

*The Swiss Chargé (Feer) to the Secretary of State*

Ref. No. VIII-F-1

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland in charge of German, Italian and French interests presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to his note of April 3, transmitting the observations of the American Government on the proposed exchange of the officials and assimilated categories of nationals of the United States who were removed from French to German territory against persons of equal status, together with their families, now in the hands of the United States.

Attention is now drawn to a cable just received expressing the attitude of the German Government to the note under reference, which reads in translation as follows:

*Primo:* The German Government is not prepared to agree to the exclusion from repatriation of the German nationals listed in the German repatriation proposals under the Colombia group:

Rudolf Bethke  
Hellmuth Schmidt  
Gustav Dobe, Sr.

Wilhelm Lange  
Joachim Marggraff

Although in List A the members of the families of the two first named German nationals are mentioned, they themselves, i. e. Rudolf Bethke and Hellmuth Schmidt, are not listed. The German Government insists on repatriation of the complete Colombia group, particularly in view of the fact that a status of a diplomatic character has been granted to this group.

*Secundo:* List B submitted by the United States Government is incomplete. Among the Germans from San Domingo mentioned therein for exchange is listed Oskar Bechstaedt, although he has died. On the other hand, there are missing on List B 20 Germans from Colombia, 18 from San Domingo, 8 from Ecuador, 1 (Niklaus) from Mexico, 83 from Nicaragua and 39 from Peru, who are being held in United States camps. In addition, there are interned in the United States 14 German nationals from Bolivia, 270 from Costa Rica, 158 from Guatemala, 10 from Haiti, 37 from Honduras, 100 from Panama and 27 from San Salvador, who must also be included in List B. Inasmuch as available information indicates that almost all of them desire to return to Germany, the German Government expresses its definite expectation that the United States Government will complete List B accordingly and consent to include in the exchange all Germans who are willing to return.

*Tertio:* The German Government assumes that the Italian Government will approach the Protecting Power with special proposals regarding repatriation of its nationals in America, including those given in List C.

*Quarto:* It is noted from the United States repatriation proposals that the Government of the United States of America wishes to include in the German-American exchange the South and Central American diplomats from France who are on German territory. The German Government, in principle, is prepared to extend the exchange also to the diplomatic and consular members of the former representations in France from Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, San Salvador and San Domingo, who were brought to Germany. It is pointed out, however, that negotiations regarding the repatriation of German nationals from those countries, which would have to be concluded within the total exchange proposed by the United States Government, are pending between the Protecting Power of the German Reich and most of the governments concerned. There is involved a number of German nationals who are curtailed in their freedom in Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and San Salvador. As soon as these German nationals are also included in the total exchange (*Gesamtaustausch*), the former diplomatic and consular representatives of the countries named can be added to the United States exchange group. With this provision, the German Government is prepared to agree to the total exchange suggested by the United States Government. In view of the large number of governments involved

and of persons to be repatriated, it may be necessary, however, to create, under the provisions of the exchange, several exchange groups which are independent of one another, because conclusion of the total exchange in one action would meet with insurmountable technical difficulties. Therefore, the German Government proposes the following procedure: *First*—that the groups who are now in the United States, consisting of

- a) the members of the former German Consulate General in Algiers, including their families and domestics,
- b) the persons given in Lists A and B which are still to be completed,
- c) the French diplomatic and consular representatives

be exchanged against the United States diplomatic group held in Baden-Baden. The German Government will see to it that the United States diplomats who are in Baden-Baden will arrive in Lisbon at the same time as the persons given under A to C. It should be endeavored that the groups of persons to be repatriated from the United States arrive, in their entirety, at the same time in Lisbon, in order that delays of parts of the United States diplomatic group in Baden-Baden can be avoided so far as possible. Should the United States Government transport to Portugal only parts of the groups from the categories of persons to be brought to Lisbon, the German Government would, of course, also transport only corresponding parts of groups of the United States diplomatic exchange group to Lisbon. Both groups may continue their journeys as soon as the German and the United States Governments have given their consent thereto to the Portuguese Government. The German Government holds the view that the exchange of the named groups of persons of both sides is an internal matter between the German and the United States Governments and that, therefore, the exchange is not to be made dependent upon declarations of other governments. *Second*—that the German nationals who are held in Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and San Salvador be exchanged against the diplomatic and consular representatives of those countries who are in Germany. The individual diplomatic groups of these South and Central American countries who are held in Germany will be transported to Lisbon always in time as to arrive in Lisbon at the same time as the German nationals to be repatriated from those countries. The corresponding exchange groups, upon arrival in Lisbon, may continue their journeys as soon as the German and the United States Governments, as well as the government of the country whence the particular German exchange group came, have given their consent thereto to the Portuguese Government.

*Quinto*: The conclusion of the exchange contemplated with Chile and Brazil with respect to official, semi-official and private persons has been delayed due to the new conditions which the United States and the British Governments have made with respect to the granting of safe conduct for the German nationals to be repatriated, as well as the examination of baggage and the docking of steamers with German exchange groups in British ports. These conditions, which were not brought up at the time of previous exchanges, have not only created considerable difficulties in the negotiations with respect to the German-

Chilean and the German-Brazilian exchange, but they have even made impossible the repatriation of entire groups of persons and the members of their families. If, as it appears from the last sentence of its observations, the United States Government is striving for an early conclusion of the exchange negotiations pending with the countries mentioned, it is likely that the necessary could be brought about through its intermediary.

*Sevto*: The German Government desires that the United States Government permit, without any reservations, the personnel of the former German Consulate General in Algiers to take along its entire possessions in the United States of America, with the exception of furniture. The same authorization will be given to the members of the United States diplomatic group from the Vichy Zone in Baden-Baden.

The German Government further expects that the entire possessions left behind in French North Africa by the personnel of the former German Consulate General in Algiers and Casablanca, with the exception of furniture, will be transported to Lisbon without any reservations by the United States Government, in accord with the local Protecting Power, and that these belongings arrive there, at the latest, with the German exchange group."

It is further stated that the German Government wishes to particularly emphasize the conditions mentioned under *Quinto* regarding examination of baggage, especially so far as the German-Chilean exchange is concerned. Intervention on the part of the American Government, particularly with the British Government, is said to be desired in this matter, as the German Government is adhering to the basic condition that no baggage or passenger control be conducted during the total exchange.

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1943.

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740.00115 European War 1939/6927

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé (Feer)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland in charge of German interests and acknowledges the receipt of the Legation's note no. VIII-F-1 of June 23, 1943 referring to the Department's note of April 3, 1943 respecting the proposed repatriation of officials and assimilated categories of nationals of the United States and of other American republics, who were removed by the German Government from French to German territory, in exchange for persons of equivalent status in the United States and in the other American republics concerned.

The German Government's counterproposal deviates from the principle of its proposal as set forth in the Swiss Legation's note of February 23 and the communication made by the Department of

State on April 3 in that it makes new and far-reaching demands involving large numbers of German civilians in the United States and in certain of the other American republics having no similar status and whose inclusion in the exchange has at no time been envisaged by the Government of the United States.

As the Swiss Legation in charge of German interests is aware, the Government of the United States is prepared to give consideration to requests made by the other American republics for safe conducts for German women and children, and in appropriate cases other German nationals, whom those republics are willing to repatriate as a result of direct negotiations which they have conducted with the German Government. In this connection the Government of the United States has already given its safe conduct for those German nationals who by separate agreements between the Governments concerned are being repatriated from Chile and Brazil in exchange for nationals of those countries.

When the German Government first indicated its desire to broaden the scope of the official exchange, the Government of the United States made an earnest attempt to reach an agreement by offering a reasonable compromise contained in its reply of April 3. The German Government, instead of accepting that compromise in the light in which it was offered, has seen fit to broaden its demands still further to include all manner of persons whose repatriation is entirely outside the scope of an exchange of diplomatic and consular officials and assimilated personnel.

In the circumstances, the United States Government can only reiterate its willingness to conduct an exchange on the basis of the very generous provisions of its note of April 3.

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1943.

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740.00115 European War 1939/6923 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1943—8 p. m.

1609. American interests—Baden Baden group—repatriation. Department has received from Swiss Legation at Washington in charge of German interests a note dated June 23 communicating a proposal in response to Department's note of April 3 regarding repatriation of United States and German officials. The German Government's proposal makes new and sweeping demands envisaging the repatriation of thousands of German civilians from the Western Hemisphere having no similar status in return for Tuck and his party and his colleagues who represented other American countries at Vichy. The

German Government must know that this Government could not accept such a proposal. The Swiss Legation is being requested to inform the German Government of the unacceptability of its demands.

When the German Government first indicated its desire to broaden the scope of the official exchange the Department made an earnest attempt to reach an agreement by offering a reasonable compromise contained in its reply of April 3. As the German Government instead of accepting that compromise in the light in which it was offered has seen fit to broaden its demands still further to include all manner of persons in greatly disproportionate numbers, it seems that the American group at Baden Baden should be advised of the situation.

Please request the Swiss Foreign Office to inform Tuck of the nature of the latest German communication and of the Department's reply. Despite its sympathy for the group at Baden Baden the Department is unable to perceive their early release by exchange unless the German Government agrees to accept the reasonable terms already offered by the Department on April 3.

HULL

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125.0051/395a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1943—9 p. m.

1352. For Murphy.<sup>32</sup> Department received last month from Swiss Legation in charge of German interests exorbitant demands from German Government for exchange of Tuck and the rest of the official party at Baden Baden. Department informed German Government through the same channels that these demands are unacceptable and that it stands ready to resume negotiations when the German Government is ready to negotiate on the basis of the Department's compromise proposal of April 3.

The chances of effecting the release of Tuck and his party would be materially increased if the Department should be able to obtain custody of important German civilian officials, preferably possessing consular or diplomatic status. Department already has custody of sufficient Italian officials to effect exchange of American officials captured by Italians at Monte Carlo. It is accordingly hoped that the armed forces will miss no opportunity to obtain custody of accredited civilian German officials who might be used in strengthening Department's hand for release of Tuck and his party.

HULL

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<sup>32</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; U.S. Political Adviser, staff of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.



125.0051/396 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 26, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 5:28 p. m.]

1314. This is from Murphy. Your 1352, July 22, 9 p. m. I wish to assure the Department that every effort will be made to obtain custody of accredited civilian German officials. I am bringing this matter to the personal attention of General Eisenhower and other members of the Allied Staff. It might be mentioned that we had this matter very much in mind at the time of the Allied landings in November when we hoped to seize person of the German Consul General in Casablanca Theodore Auer. Due to the delay, however, in the landing of our forces and the aid Auer received from a French official he succeeded in escaping by motor car over the Spanish Moroccan frontier. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.00115 European War 1939/7127

*The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State*

Ref. No. VIII-F-1

The Minister of Switzerland in charge of German, Italian and French interests presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to his note of July 7 and to the previous exchange of notes, concerning the proposed repatriation of officials and assimilated categories of nationals of the United States and of other American republics, who were removed from French to German territory in exchange for persons of equal status, together with their families, now in the hands of the United States.

The Minister begs to draw attention to a new note from the German Government, transmitted by cable, which reads in translation as follows:

“It appears from the American note of July 7 that the basic principles of the German proposals were misjudged. The German Government wishes to effect the diplomatic-consular exchange but—in view of previous promises on the part of the American Government—expects the simultaneous repatriation of the group of German nationals designated hereafter:

There are in American internment camps more than 900 German nationals who came to the United States from Central and South American countries in preparation for their repatriation and on the strength of the corresponding official promises from the American Government. As an example, the American Government explicitly recognized the obligation assumed by the American Legation in Bogotá

to grant safe conduct to the German nationals from Colombia. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Department of State dated March 3, 1942<sup>33</sup> (regarding the status of 56 non-official Germans who were sent to the United States from Colombia in anticipation of the exchange of diplomatic, consular and other official personnel between the United States, certain other republics, and Germany). The American Government has explicitly maintained to the Swiss Legation its previous promise to permit the departure of German nationals from Central and South America on private and neutral vessels when the opportunity arises. In reply to later repatriation proposals, the American Government merely pointed out that there are no possibilities of returning at the present time.

The request of the German Government that this group be repatriated now does not, therefore, represent a new demand which had not, up to now, been taken into consideration by the American Government, but rather deals with the settlement of a matter which can absolutely be expected in view of the declarations of the American Government.

The list submitted with the American note of April 3 contains only a part of the German nationals who belong to that group. It would seem that the list was compiled without the knowledge of the persons affected, since it not only contains persons who had died or had returned to Germany in the meantime, but also—especially in the group from San Domingo—persons who, without doubt, do not wish to return to Germany. Furthermore, it contains cases involving the separation of families which are jointly interned.

The German Government considers itself justified in requesting the inclusion in the present repatriation of all the German nationals from Central and South American countries who were removed to United States camps and who have not declared in writing to the Protecting Power that they refuse to return to Germany. The German Government agrees to the departure, to the extent previously designated, of the officials of the representations maintained in France by the United States, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, San Domingo and San Salvador, who were removed to Germany, in exchange for the repatriation of the group of Consul General Pfeiffer, as well as the French diplomats held in the United States. In the event that its request for repatriation of all the German nationals from Central and South American countries who are held in the United States and who are willing to return is granted, the German Government is prepared, in order to simplify and expedite the repatriation, to exclude in this connection those German nationals who are still in the countries mentioned. The mutual exchange of civilians relating to the Central and South American countries would then be dependent upon the direct negotiations with the governments of these countries, in the manner outlined in the American note under reference."

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1943.

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<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

740.00115 European War 1939/7127

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943.

**MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:** As you are aware, we have been negotiating with the Germans for the better part of a year in our effort to obtain the liberation of the diplomatic officers of this Government, our other citizens who have been assimilated into official groups such as newspapermen and relief workers, and the officials of the other American republics who were all seized by the Germans on French territory. The total number of such individuals is 266. We received in June a communication from the German Government demanding in exchange for these few individuals some thousands of Germans in this country and in other countries of this hemisphere. As I have informed you, we rejected the German proposal.

The German Government under date of July 28, 1943 has again approached us with an offer in which its demands are less exorbitant. Briefly it proposes to release our officials and the others if we release the 26 German officials captured in North Africa and all the German nationals from the other American republics who were brought to the United States from those republics in 1941 and 1942 with a view to their repatriation. After that our exchange agreement with Germany collapsed by the withdrawal of German safe conduct for further voyages of the exchange vessel over a route acceptable to us. According to the German figures, the number of Germans concerned in this demand is 900. According to our figures it is approximately 750. We would also have to repatriate those few former officials of the French Government and their families who may wish to return to Europe and the very small number of Italian nationals whose position corresponds to that of the German nationals in question.

The question of the repatriation of the non-official Germans covered by the latest demands of the German Government has been discussed in some detail with the investigative agencies. In February of this year we placed before them the names of 586 German nationals from the other American republics, who had indicated a desire to go back to Germany. The agencies agreed to the repatriation of 469 of these individuals, indicated that they did not favor but were not strongly opposed to the repatriation of 39 others and stated that they could not in any circumstances agree to the repatriation of 78. There have also been objections by the British Government to the repatriation of great numbers of these individuals, including many of those whose repatriation is approved by our own agencies.

I am impelled to place this matter before you because of the fact that the Department is in receipt of most confidential information,

received from a source in which I have great confidence, leading us to believe that unless their demands are met the German authorities intend to hold as hostages for captured Germans whom we might prosecute under the war criminal procedure our officials and the officials of the other American republics whom they seized in France. It is my view that if we are to obtain the release of our officials before the time when we can actually liberate them by force of arms, we must do so on the basis of the present German proposal; otherwise negotiations regarding their release will probably continue indefinitely without favorable issue until the Germans are finally defeated. What the Germans might do to our officers in a final moment of desperation I am unable to say but the worst must be envisaged. They might even use them as a shield to prevent our bombing of military objectives.

I enclose for your signature, if you approve, letters to the Attorney General, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy<sup>34</sup> requesting them to report to you whether there is any insuperable reason why German nationals who have been made by the German Government the *quid pro quo* for the release of our officials should not be released if we find it necessary to repatriate any or all of them in exchange for our officials and assimilated nationals.

If our own agencies agree to give the Department of State a free hand in negotiating this exchange, we shall also have to get the British Government's agreement.

While we hope that it will not be necessary to release the military members of the former German and Italian Armistice Commissions captured in North Africa, I feel it advisable that the Department of State have a free hand to use these people if necessary. In this connection I refer to your letter of June 17, 1943 to the Secretary of War.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

701.6211/17573

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

General Strong<sup>35</sup> spoke to me today on the telephone on the subject of the communication which had been made by the President to the Secretary of War about the exchange of German persons in this country for American personnel in Germany. The letter from the President enclosed to the Secretary of War a copy of the letter addressed by the Secretary of State to the President.

General Strong stated that the matter had been referred in the War Department to a group consisting of the chiefs of a number of agen-

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

<sup>35</sup> Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), U. S. Army.

cies which he mentioned and had not been submitted to him. He thought that the position taken by the group to which it had been submitted and which was now before the Secretary in the form of a draft letter in reply to the President was too drastic and unamalleable. He did say, however, he was very much concerned about the exchange of certain members of the Armistice Commission whom they had actually treated as prisoners of war and had processed. He said that there were only 17 or 18 in that category but he could not view their exchange without having serious doubts as to the repercussions upon the best interests both from the military point of view and from the intelligence point of view. He felt that their return to Germany would cause a loss of thousands of lives.

I explained to General Strong the reasons for the original letter from the Secretary of State to the President and for our concern about the fate of our officers in German hands, alluding to a conversation had between Mr. Brandt<sup>36</sup> and the Minister of Switzerland. He said that he fully understood and that he would be willing to go to great length to cooperate with us.

As a formula I suggested to him that we simply wanted a free hand. We did not want and were not now obligated to exchange any members of the Armistice Commission except the civilian members. We hoped not to have to exchange any. We also had a desire to exchange the persons brought here from South America whom we held really as trustees for those governments for the purpose of exchanging them for the South American citizens held by Germany. We had not committed ourselves to anybody. We did want to feel that we had a free hand and that we would not agree to exchange anybody from the Armistice Commission category without the entire consent and approval of the military authorities; that what we really wanted was an open-minded approach and a generous attitude on the part of the military authorities in cooperation with us in getting back our own people whose fate would be serious unless they were rescued, and to collaborate to the end that we would give just as little to Germany as we had to give to get our people back, but that the War Department and the protective agencies would not assume an adamant position and say that because a man was in a certain category he should not be exchanged.

General Strong said that he was in thorough sympathy and expected to talk with the Secretary of War on the basis of the letter now in front of him with the hope that he would be able to modify that letter and to have it read along the lines of our conversation.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

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<sup>36</sup> George Lewis Brandt, executive assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Long. No record of this conversation has been found in Department files.

125.0051/411a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1943—7 p. m.

2254. American interests—Italy. In order to respond to a communication from German Government regarding the repatriation of the United States official group at Baden Baden it is necessary for the Department to know what becomes of the official group at Perugia. Please request Swiss Foreign Office to ascertain urgently disposition of this group, pointing out however that it is most essential that attention of German Government or German officials be not drawn to this group unless it is definitely known that they are already in German hands. Department relies upon the Swiss in dealing with this question not to compromise any efforts which the Italians may be making to honor their commitments to release this group.

HULL

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740.00115 European War 1939/7127

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé (Feer)*<sup>37</sup>

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum of July 28, 1943, Ref. No. VIII-F-1, from the Legation of Switzerland in charge of German and French interests, referring to the Department of State's memorandum of July 7 and to preceding correspondence concerning the proposed repatriation of officials and assimilated categories of nationals of the United States and other American republics and transmitting a new communication on the subject from the German Government.

The new communication of the German Government has been carefully examined by the Department of State and it now appears that an exchange can be effected on the following basis:

In return for the release for repatriation of the American official groups at Baden Baden and Godesberg including all persons even though elsewhere resident or detained who should be assimilated to these groups totaling about 270 persons (a list of whom is attached),<sup>38</sup> the United States Government will release for repatriation the 25 German officials from Algeria now at Ingleside, the 17 members of the French official group at Hershey who wish to return to France and all the German nationals from the other American republics who

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<sup>37</sup> The Department informed the Minister in Switzerland of the contents of this memorandum in telegram No. 2366, September 27.

<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

were brought to the United States before July 1942 with a view to repatriation with the exception of 201 individuals who have communicated to the United States Government their unwillingness to be repatriated and 37 individuals who are not available for repatriation. A list of those available for repatriation is enclosed.<sup>40</sup>

If the German Government is agreeable to an exchange in accordance with the principles set forth above, it is expected that the exchange can forthwith proceed subject only to settlement of the matter dealt with in the following two paragraphs.

All the Germans from Panama who are detained in the United States are present in this country by virtue of a special agreement between the United States and Panamanian Governments whereby they are kept here as internees in behalf of the Panamanian Government which retains the right to determine their disposition. The United States Government requested the Panamanian Government to agree to the repatriation of the 64 Germans from Panama named in the attached list and the Panamanian Government replied that having no other German nationals to offer in exchange for its own nationals it will consent to the repatriation of these Germans only if it receives satisfactory assurances that the German Government will simultaneously permit the repatriation of any of the Panamanians in areas under the control of the German Government who may wish repatriation. A partial list of such Panamanians is attached.<sup>40</sup>

It is believed from the Swiss Legation's note of December 28, 1942<sup>40</sup> that the German Government is willing to repatriate the non-official Panamanian nationals now under its control. However, if the German Government prefers, the United States Government is willing that the question of the repatriation of the Germans from Panama now in the United States and of the Panamanian nationals in German hands be made the subject of separate negotiations between the German and Panamanian Governments apart from the present exchange.

It is the desire of the United States Government that the exchange of officials shall forthwith proceed no matter which solution of the problem regarding the Germans from Panama is adopted by the German Government.

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1943.

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<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

740.00115 European War 1939/7127 : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics*<sup>41</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1943—6 p. m.

Following is from Department's secret instruction of September 20, 6 p. m., to Panamá, Bogotá, San José and Ciudad Trujillo.

"The Department is glad to state that the negotiations with the German Government for the release of the officials of Colombia, El Salvador, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Dominican Republic and of the United States who were seized by the Germans on French territory and taken to Germany as hostages have now reached a point where it appears that an agreement will be quickly reached if the Department is in a position to offer the German Government, in return for the officials referred to, the handful of German and Vichy French officials now in our hands, together with those of the non-official Germans brought to the United States for repatriation before the exchange agreement collapsed who are still willing to go to Germany.

Before the Department delivers to the German Government this Government's reply in this matter, it desires to obtain from four of the American republics their consent to deliver to the Germans if necessary certain German nationals whom they deported to the United States for repatriation or internment. The Department is seeking the consent of the governments in question and confidently expects that in the interest of hemisphere solidarity it will shortly be forthcoming."

All the four countries concerned have now given the United States Government full authority to include in the exchange the German nationals they deported to the United States with the exception of Panama, which, having no officials in Germany and no other German non-officials available to exchange for its non-official nationals in German hands, has expressed the desire that a corresponding number of the Germans it sent here be held against the repatriation of the few Panamanians in question.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

740.00115 European War 1939/7558 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, October 29, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 7 : 37 p. m.]

6769. American interests, Germany. Your 2366, September 27.<sup>42</sup> Foreign Office official informally gave Tait<sup>43</sup> following received from

<sup>41</sup> Sent to the Ambassadors in Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru.

<sup>42</sup> See footnote 37, p. 107.

<sup>43</sup> George Tait, Secretary of Legation in Switzerland.



Secretary Soldati, Swiss Legation, Berlin, by telephone October 27, which is considered sufficiently important immediate communication to the Department.

Germans attach great importance in possible exchange to 37 individuals mentioned in second paragraph of your 2366. Soldati believes, if possible, include these persons in exchange will greatly facilitate satisfactory conclusion exchange negotiations.

HARRISON

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740.00115 European War (1939)/7558 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland  
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943—6 p. m.

2748. Department appreciates the thoughtfulness of Soldati in providing information relayed by your 6769, October 29, 5 p. m. The United States Government had serious reasons for making the 37 exceptions referred to in Department's 2366. The terms of the exchange as now proposed by this Government would, if the rank of the persons to be exchanged were not considered, present an appearance of disproportionate advantage in favor of the German Government. For your strictly confidential information the Department obtained from a confidential source a very strong indication that the German Government at the end of September, just prior to the receipt of the Department's last proposal, was on the point of acceding to this Government's earlier proposal which afforded the Germans far less in the way of an exchange. Each concession on our part has resulted in increased German demands. Consequently the Department believes that even if it were feasible to include in the exchange at this time the 37 individuals referred to it would merely expose itself to further German demands and the exchange would be no nearer than it is today.

STETTINIUS

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125.9543/205 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland  
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943—8 p. m.

2753. American interests Germany—Baden Baden. In full knowledge of contents of your 5101, August 20<sup>44</sup> Department's communication of September 25 to Swiss Legation Washington deliberately included names of three persons referred to in your 6778 October 29<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Not printed.

without offering the *quid pro quo* demanded, since in the Department's opinion the three persons in question who when captured were official employees of this Government stationed at Tunis are entitled to repatriation with the rest of the official group because of their official status. The three persons whose repatriation the Germans attempted to exact as a *quid pro quo* have no similar status and consequently there is no ground for demanding their repatriation on a reciprocal basis.

For your strictly confidential information the Department believes that Mrs. Graff does not wish to be repatriated and it would be reluctant to see either of the other two persons named repatriated because of possible services which they might render to the enemy.

STETTINIUS

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740.00115 European War 1939/7127 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1943—8 p. m.

2826. Approximately two months have elapsed since Department replied to communication dated July 28 from Swiss Legation Washington concerning German Government's counter proposal for exchange of American official groups at Baden Baden and Godesberg as set forth in Department's 2366 of September 27.<sup>45</sup> While various bits of information reaching the Department indicate that a favorable German reply may be in the making, other circumstances lead the Department to believe that the Germans may not wish to effect an exchange and are purposely resorting to delaying tactics.

Naturally, the Department wishes to do everything possible to expedite this exchange, but as each concession in the past has resulted in further German exactions (Department's 2748, November 8, 6 p. m.), the Department fears that even a show of anxiety on its part regarding the slowness of the German reply might be interpreted by the Germans as an indication that if they hold out we will eventually meet even more disproportionate demands. The Department would accordingly be grateful for any suggestions that you can give it concerning what it might do to hasten matters. You are authorized in your discretion to discuss the situation confidentially with the appropriate official of the Swiss Foreign Office.

An urgent reply by telegraph will be appreciated.

HULL

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<sup>45</sup> See footnote 37, p. 107.

740.00115 European War 1939/7690 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, November 20, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received November 21—3:17 a. m.]

7307. American interests Germany, Baden Baden and Godesberg groups. Your 2826, November 16. Existing situation discussed confidentially with De Pury and Bisang<sup>46</sup> who stated that Soldati just returned to Bern from Berlin advised by German Foreign Office official immediately prior his departure whole exchange question now being examined and reply in preparation.

D[e Pury] and B[isang] believe matters might possibly be expedited if Department communicated some reply to the German memorandum of July 31 (see Department's 2753, November 8) regarding exchange of three German civilians for three former employees of our Consulate at Tunis. They also said Soldati had been asked orally by German Foreign Office official shortly before he left Berlin regarding identity and why not includable in exchange of 37 Germans mentioned your 2748, November 8.

(Department?) [De Pury] and B[isang] declared that according Swiss Legation, Berlin, all exchange proposals require final approval Von Ribbentrop and Hitler and they believe this may have delayed matters. They nevertheless express personal view German reply may be anticipated relatively near future, and exchange may be consummated at least end February since they believe Germans anxious complete exchange.

In view foregoing I have nothing to suggest to hasten matters except possibly an answer to German memorandum July 31 affecting employees Tunis Consulate and 37 Germans mentioned your 2748.

HARRISON

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740.00115 European War 1939/7874

*The Swiss Chargé (Feer) to the Secretary of State*

Ref. No. VIII-F-1

The Chargé d'Affaires ad Interim of Switzerland in charge of German and French interests presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the Secretary's note of September 25 and to preceding correspondence concerning the proposed exchange of certain nationals between the United States and Germany.

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<sup>46</sup> Arthur De Pury and Emile Bisang, officials in the Swiss Federal Political Department.

The Chargé d'Affaires ad Interim now begs to draw attention to a new note from the German Government, transmitted by cable, which reads in translation as follows:

*Primo:* The German Government agrees to the repatriation proposed by the United States Government of the members of the American groups interned in Baden-Baden and Bad Godesberg, in exchange for

- a) the members of the former German Consulate General in Algiers,
- b) the 687 German nationals individually named by the United States Government who were brought to the United States from other American republics before July 1942.
- c) the members of the French group interned in Hershey who are willing to return,

along the following lines:

*First:* The German Government is prepared to include the Brazilian diplomatic groups in the German-United States diplomatic exchange, provided that the possibility of safe repatriation to a neutral European port is accorded to all the German nationals in Brazil willing to return, whose repatriation was already agreed upon by the Brazilian Government and whose safe-conduct only was not yet on hand.

If for certain reasons, such as saving of time, the United States Government prefers, however, the German Government is also prepared to pursue the negotiations with the Brazilian Government which were discontinued at the recommendation of the United States Government, concerning a mutual exchange of nationals, and to carry out the German-Brazilian exchange apart from the German-United States diplomatic exchange.

*Second:* In accordance with the request of the United States Government, the following persons who are not in Baden-Baden shall also, so far as possible, be allowed to participate in the exchange:

- a) Bentley T. Mott
- b) Jeanette Marie Barlerin
- c) Carmel Joseph Doublet
- d) William Frank Doublet
- e) Mohy Eddine Jeneid
- f) Francis Vicovari

Whereas the inclusion in the exchange of the United States national named under *f*), Francis *Vicovari*, can be assured already at this time, a corresponding assurance by the German Government with respect to the participation in the exchange of the persons listed under *a*) and *b*) is not yet possible because the inquiries concerning them have not been concluded.

As outlined in the memorandum from the Foreign Office to the Legation of Switzerland in Berlin (this communication was transmitted to the American Legation in Bern with note of August 18, 1943), the inclusion in the exchange of the former

members of the United States Consulate in Tunis listed under *c)* to *e)*, the British nationals

Carmel Joseph Doublet  
William Frank Doublet and  
Mohy Eddine Jeneid,

must be made subject to the possibility for repatriation being offered likewise to the following German nationals in the United States, who are official, respectively semi-official, persons:

- a)* Mrs. Lina Graff  
153 Franklin Street  
Torrington, Connecticut  
Former employee of the Library of Information and  
wife of an employee of the Foreign Office
- b)* Dr. Ernst Kohlschuetter  
Stringtown Internment Camp  
Stringtown, Oklahoma  
(According to the Legation's records, he is now at the  
Alien Detention Camp, Kenedy, Texas)  
Stipendiary of the German Research Society (*Stipendi-  
diat der deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft*) who  
last served at the Institute of Tropical Medicine and  
Hygiene, Columbia University, San Juan, Porto  
Rico
- c)* Professor Adolf Kappus  
Crystal City Internment Camp  
Crystal City, Texas  
Served at the Department of Biology, Fordham Univer-  
sity, New York, delegated by the German Research  
Society

*Third:* The German Government desires that the former German Honorary Consul in Bari, Friedrich *Thiesson* and his wife, who were recently brought to Staunton, Virginia, for internment with the German group at the Hotel Ingleside, be included in the exchange.

*Fourth:* The number of non-official German nationals to be repatriated under the provisions of the exchange may not be lower than the 687 indicated by the United States Government. If this number should be decreased for any reason, particularly, however, because German nationals proposed for the exchange may suddenly not wish to be repatriated any longer, the exchange group is to be completed correspondingly with other German nationals held in the United States.

*Fifth:* Since there are older persons among the groups detained in the United States, particularly from Costa Rica and Guatemala, the members of whose families have already been repatriated to Germany, it is expected that these additional persons be offered the possibility, for humane reasons, to return under the provisions of the exchange, thereby reuniting them with the members of their families.

*Sixth:* The French Government desires that, besides the members of the French diplomatic group interned in Hershey already

named by the United States Government, French Vice Consul *Priculet*, who has been in St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington since 1942, be included in the exchange, provided that the state of his health permits his repatriation.

*Secundo:* In accordance with the consent previously given, the German Government agrees to the departure, together with the United States diplomatic group, of the Panamanian nationals who are in the areas under German control and who are willing to return.

*Tertio:* In the event that the United States Government concurs with the above-mentioned German wishes, the German Government, likewise, would welcome the immediate carrying out of the exchange."

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1943.

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740.00115 European War 1939/7874

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*<sup>47</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland in charge of German and certain French interests in the United States and has the honor to make the following reply to the Legation's note of December 9, 1943 in reference to the Secretary's note of September 25 concerning the proposed exchange of certain persons between the United States and Germany.

From an examination of the Legation's note it would appear that agreement has now been reached between the Government of the United States and the German Government in all important respects to such an extent that definite arrangements for the contemplated exchange may now safely be made by both Governments concerned.

In return for the delivery in Portugal for repatriation of the American official groups at Baden Baden and Godesberg, including the Brazilian officials, listed in the enclosure with the Secretary's note of September 25 numbering in all 271 persons, the United States Government will deliver in Portugal for repatriation the 26 German officials from Algeria now at Ingleside, the former German Honorary Consul at Bari, Friedrich Thiesson and his wife, the 687 German nationals already named by the United States Government or substitutes therefor as suggested by the German Government in the case of any of these individuals who decline the opportunity of repatriation, and those members of the French official group now at Cascades Inn, Hot Springs, Virginia who wish to return to France.

In consideration of the inclusion of the Brazilian officials in the exchange, the United States Government further agrees to accord its safe conduct for the repatriation to a neutral European port of 132 German nationals in Brazil which the Brazilian Government

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<sup>47</sup> The text of this note was transmitted by the Department to the Minister in Switzerland in telegram No. 3169, December 18.

has informed the United States Government is the extent of its commitment to the German Government to which the latter refers in the Swiss Legation's note under acknowledgment. The United States Government has already granted its safe conduct to 83 of these individuals and has informed the Brazilian Government of its willingness to grant safe conduct to an additional 49 individuals to be selected by the Brazilian Government in consultation with the Government of the United States, making 132 in all.

As the German Government has already been informed, the United States Government can perceive no analogy between the German Government's request for the repatriation of Mrs. Lina Graff, Dr. Ernest Kholschuetter and Professor Adolf Kappus, persons of no official status, and the American Government's request for the repatriation of Carmel Joseph Doublet, William Frank Doublet, and Mohy Eddine Jeneid, who were members of the official staff of the United States Consulate at Tunis and as such are automatically includable in the official exchange as in the case of Friedrich Thiesson and wife. The United States Government must therefore insist upon the inclusion in the exchange of the three official employees above-mentioned without any engagement on its part to include in the exchange the three non-official Germans above-mentioned. The United States Government is, however, examining the possibility of extending to the three non-official Germans an opportunity to be included in the exchange if they wish to be repatriated.

The United States Government is likewise willing, as requested by the German Government, to offer within the framework of the exchange an opportunity of repatriation for humane reasons to certain other German nationals among those detained in the United States, particularly from Costa Rica and Guatemala, the members of whose families have already been repatriated to Germany.

As the Swiss Legation has already informed the Department that former French Vice Consul Priaulet's condition of health cannot permit of his repatriation, it is requested that the German Government be so informed so that his exclusion from the exchange may not serve as a pretext for delay.

The Government of the United States notes the German Government's agreement to the departure, together with the diplomatic group at Baden Baden and Godesberg of the Panamanian nationals who are in the area under German control and who are willing to return.

Since the German Government has stated that if the United States Government concurs with the German Government's wishes as set forth in the Swiss Legation's note under acknowledgment and since the United States Government believes that its reply meets the German Government's conditions in all important respects, the Govern-

ment of the United States is proceeding to make preliminary arrangements for the early embarkation of the persons which it has agreed to deliver in Portugal. It would be appreciated if the Swiss Government would urgently confirm that the German Government is also in agreement on the above and is proceeding with arrangements to deliver in Portugal the persons agreed upon. It is understood that upon arrival on Portuguese territory of the persons to be exchanged the actual exchange will take place in Portugal under the guarantee of the Portuguese Government as soon as the Portuguese Government receives from the Government of the United States and German Government assurances that each has complied with the exchange agreement.

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1943.

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740.00115 European War 1939/7127 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics* <sup>48</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1943—8 p. m.

Reference is made to the Department's airmail instructions of October 6, 1943 <sup>49</sup> and previous regarding repatriation of officials and assimilated nationals of the American Republics held by the German Government.

1. As will have been noted from the above-mentioned correspondence the German non-officials now interned in the United States considered for exchange are those who arrived in the United States prior to July 1942 and whose repatriation was interrupted by the withdrawal by the German Government of safe conduct for the exchange vessel. Among this group may be a very few wives and children who are native-born citizens of the other American Republics and who presumably came to this country with full intent to accompany the head of the family to Germany. The Department assumes that the other American Republics would have no objection to any of their nationals voluntarily proceeding to Germany with the head of the family.

2. The Department proposes in cases where a man or woman of German birth is in possession of both a German passport and a passport of one of the American Republics to seize the latter passport for return to the Government concerned.

The Department would appreciate immediate confirmation of the concurrence of the other American Republics with regard to paragraphs 1 and 2 above together with an indication regarding the type

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<sup>48</sup> Sent to the Ambassadors in Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

<sup>49</sup> Not printed.



of documents which they would wish withheld from their nationals (among the women and children) at the time of their departure for Germany. For your information, security measures and censorship regulations limit the documents which persons proceeding to enemy-occupied territories may take with them. Accordingly Department is permitting the German nationals to take only passports, identification documents in lieu of passports and birth certificates.

HULL

## EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR THE WELFARE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN ENEMY AND ENEMY-OCCUPIED COUNTRIES<sup>1</sup>

702.5451/3 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1943.

162. American interests. Your 5919, December 16.<sup>2</sup> Subject to conditions hereinafter stated, please transmit following communication to Swiss Government for presentation verbatim to German Government:

"The concern which the United States Government has long felt over the German Government's practice of restricting the staffs of Swiss consular offices charged with the representation of American interests in Germany and German-occupied areas which has increasingly interfered with the efficiency with which those offices have been able to discharge their responsibilities has been greatly increased by the recent action of the German Government in requiring the closing of the Swiss Consulates at Salonika and Amsterdam. The United States Government is of the opinion that such restrictions upon the representation of belligerent interests by neutral powers are warranted only if temporary in character and if dictated by military necessity in areas where active military operations are in progress. The German Government should be fully cognizant of the fact that the United States Government has in no way restricted the representation by the Swiss Government of German interests in the United States or in territory under its control. The German Government should be aware, furthermore, that the maintenance of such an attitude on the part of the United States Government cannot but be a matter of importance to the German Government, in view of the extent of German interests in areas under the control of the United States. Unless, however, the German Government will henceforth assure the observance of its obligations in respect to the representation of the interests of the United States in areas under German control and will give prompt evidence of its intention to do so, the United States Government will be constrained reciprocally to reconsider the position which it has hitherto maintained in this respect."

Foregoing was quoted in Department's 6523 of December 22, 1942 to Embassy London,<sup>2</sup> which also stated:

<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 243 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

"In view of implications regarding North Africa and any other areas that might be occupied by forces of the United Nations please ascertain whether British Government concurs in foregoing statement of policy and wishes to address a similar communication to German Government."

Embassy London's 321 of January 13, 1943<sup>4</sup> stated:

"Letter dated January 9 from Foreign Office official reads as follows:

"In reply to your letter of the 24th December last enclosing a document about the representation of British and United States interests in the Netherlands, I am writing to say that we are agreeable to instructing our Minister at Berne<sup>5</sup> to address a communication to the Swiss Government on similar lines to that which the United States Government propose to send.

I enclose the draft of the note which we intend to ask Mr. Norton to deliver, and we should be grateful to know if you have any comments on its terms. Mr. Norton would be asked to concert with his United States colleague as to the time and manner of delivery.

As Talbot<sup>6</sup> has already mentioned to you on the telephone, we have made no reference to Salonika as we ourselves have received no official news yet about the closure of the Swiss Consulate there. But we would propose to ask Mr. Norton to insert a reference to it if he has received such information.'"

Embassy's 321 concluded with quotation of text of proposed British note for transmission to German Government, which will doubtless be communicated to you by British Minister Bern.

Please communicate to British Minister the text of this Government's note and concert with him with view to delivery of notes at approximately the same time.

Report by telegraph date of delivery to Swiss Government and, subsequently, date of delivery to German Government.<sup>7</sup>

Embassy London is being appropriately informed.

HULL

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811.711/3693a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*<sup>8</sup>

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1943.

195. American interests, transmission of documents and messages.

1. The United States Government does not intend to permit, by open mail, diplomatic channels, or otherwise, directly or indirectly, the transmission from the United States to enemy territory or from

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Clifford John Norton.

<sup>6</sup> M. J. T. Talbot, General Department, British Foreign Office.

<sup>7</sup> January 26 was the date of delivery to the Swiss Government and February 6 to the German Foreign Office at Berlin, according to telegrams No. 618, January 26, and No. 1085, February 16, from the Minister in Switzerland (neither printed).

<sup>8</sup> The substance of this Government's policy regarding communications to and from enemy territory was also communicated to the foreign diplomatic missions in Washington in a circular note of February 12 (811.711/3690a).

enemy territory to the United States of documents intended for private use, such as birth, marriage, or death certificates; divorce decrees; legal notices concerning estates, lawsuits, et cetera; powers of attorney; affidavits; deeds to real property; miscellaneous legal documents concerning property or litigation; commissions to take testimony or other documents pertaining to depositions; subpoenas, citations, complaints, or other forms of legal process; or forms submitted in connection with claims for pensions, disability allowances, insurance benefits, et cetera.

2. With the exceptions hereinafter stated, the United States Government does not intend to permit, by open mail, telephone, telegraph, diplomatic channels, or otherwise, directly or indirectly, the transmission from the United States to enemy territory or from enemy territory to the United States of private messages such as those pertaining to private property, business, estates, or the discharge of financial obligations.

3. Subject to censorship, brief paraphrased messages of a personal nature, including welfare and whereabouts inquiries, may be transmitted by telegraph or, where possible, by mail to or from enemy territory through the facilities of the International Red Cross, the American Red Cross, and other national Red Cross societies, or those of other organizations or societies licensed by the Director of Censorship.

4. Only where efforts to communicate through Red Cross facilities are unsuccessful or in other exceptional circumstances will the United States Government permit, subject to censorship, the transmission to or from enemy territory, by official telegrams in plain language, of brief paraphrased messages of a personal nature.

5. The foregoing statements of policy are not to be construed as modifying or limiting the provisions of section IV of the convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929.<sup>9</sup>

6. The term "enemy territory" as used in this instruction shall be understood to mean enemy territory as defined in General Ruling No. 11, issued on March 18, 1942 by the Treasury Department pursuant to Executive Order No. 8389, as amended.<sup>10</sup>

7. While the Red Cross facilities mentioned in paragraph 3 are available to all persons regardless of nationality, the utilization by the United States Government of official channels in those instances mentioned in paragraph 4 will be restricted to messages transmitted in behalf of nationals of the United States.

<sup>9</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

<sup>10</sup> United States Treasury Department, *Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds Control* (Washington, March 30, 1944), p. 5.

8. In connection with its responsibility for the protection of nationals of the United States abroad, the Department will on occasion undertake through diplomatic channels official inquiries (as distinguished from the personal messages mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4) concerning the welfare and whereabouts of nationals of the United States in enemy territory.

9. The Department wishes to continue to receive for its records and use in connection with the protection of nationals of the United States in enemy territory all possible information concerning the births, marriages, divorces, and deaths of such nationals. Swiss representatives charged with the representation of the interests of the United States should be asked particularly to continue to forward all such information, supported when possible by transcripts of the official records.

10. The Department would also be pleased to receive for its records and use in the protection of private American interests in enemy territory reports concerning the status of private American property, real or personal, including American business and commercial interests; estates of, or bequeathed fully or partially to, nationals of the United States; and semi-public American institutions of an educational, religious, or philanthropic character. The United States Government hopes that the Swiss Government may find it possible to authorize its representatives charged with the representation of the interests of the United States in enemy territory to forward such reports so far as their heavy wartime responsibilities permit.

HULL

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702.5451/8 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, May 4, 1943.

[Received May 4—11:48 p. m.]

2740. American interests—Germany—Greece. Department's 162, January 20, Legation's 1085, February 16.<sup>11</sup> Legation Berlin transmits following reply from German Foreign Office in note dated April 8, 1943.

"Foreign Office informs Swiss Legation answer its notes February 4, and 24, 1943, question closing of Swiss Consulates Salonika and Amsterdam carefully investigated. Result investigation following:

Closing Swiss Consulates Salonika and Amsterdam result program carried out last autumn closing foreign consulates in coastal regions of territories occupied by Germany a program with exception some specially situated consulates carried out in case all foreign consulates subject territories. Protective functions carried out by Swiss Con-

<sup>11</sup> Latter not printed.

ulates Salonika [and] Amsterdam up to then transferred after closing Consulates to Swiss Legations Athens and Berlin. Because comparatively short distances duties mainly administrative two closed Consulates could be conducted without special difficulty by two Legations *especially because fact permitted to Foreign Interests Sections two Legations periodically send representative conduct official business temporarily Salonika and Amsterdam*. Therefore no question of essential limitation or diminution protective functions as result closing Consulates as claimed by Governments United States, Great Britain, Canada.

Similarly it cannot be recognized that closing two Consulates is against international practice. No justification on basis international law that consulates in military-occupied territory should be maintained because protective functions whose closing military occupying power considers desirable. Apparently American Government (paragraph 2 communication January 25, 1942 [1943]) and British Government (paragraph 2 communication January 26, 1942 [1943]) consider such limitations justified when dictated by military necessities.<sup>12</sup> For application this principle not necessary as premise that military operations *are actually taking place* but sufficient when zones military operations enter into consideration and measures in question seem desirable for military reasons.

German Government therefore regrets not position make further investigation question closing foreign consulates is [*in*] coastal regions occupied territory including Swiss Consulates Salonika, Amsterdam."

HARRISON

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702.5468/3 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1943.

1299. American interests—Germany and Greece. Your despatch No. 4969, May 7.<sup>13</sup> Department wishes to be informed regarding:

1. Frequency of periodic visits by Swiss representatives to Salonika and Amsterdam which German Government states are being permitted,

2. Whether Swiss Government considers present facilities for protection of Americans in those districts adequate,

3. Whether free access to American nationals is permitted for the payment of subsistence funds under Department's instruction 1202, February 14, 1942,<sup>14</sup> and for other purposes, and

4. Whether during such visits examination is made of official property, including archives, for purpose of ascertaining their condition.

HULL

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<sup>12</sup> Reference is made, apparently, to message in telegram No. 162, January 20, p. 119.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed; it enclosed a copy and translation of the German note of April 8 (see *supra*).

<sup>14</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.

740.00113 European War 1939/929 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 28, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 2 p. m.]

3833. American interests Germany. Legation's 5525, November 30.<sup>15</sup> Legation, Berlin, forwards second part report dated June 11, German treatment American property. Semi-official estimate total value American property Germany 1,700,000,000 reichmarks. Report lists names American companies for which administrators [have been] appointed [in] Germany 24 banks 35 companies, Belgium 3 companies, France 7 companies, Norway 2 companies, total 71. Administrators appointed all branches American banks Germany without exception. Report confirms [that] to date no case liquidation forced sale amalgamation American company.

Proposed requisition by German authorities furniture American citizens [and] forced sale property for payment taxes rent due in most cases [was] prevented by intervention Swiss representatives.

Text of report follows by air mail.<sup>16</sup>

HARRISON

340.1115A/3302b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943.

2179. Financial assistance in captured territory. Inform Foreign Office that as a provisional measure and to mitigate human suffering in areas where abnormal conditions obtain, United States Government would be grateful if Swiss Government would authorize its representatives in areas captured from the enemy to continue until further notice to extend from funds for representation of United States interests financial assistance to qualified American nationals in accordance with Department's instruction 1202 of February 14, 1942,<sup>17</sup> as

<sup>15</sup> Not printed; it stated that the Swiss Legation at Berlin had prepared a lengthy report on German treatment of American property, the first part of which covered the legal position of private property after the effective date of various decrees regarding enemy property. In transmitting the first part the Swiss Minister stated that the decrees expressly provided that enemy property in Germany should not be seized, and contained regulations especially intended to guarantee the safety and security of enemy property until the end of the war. The Swiss Legation was unaware of a single case of liquidation, forced sale, or expropriation of American property in Germany, and the Minister expressed the belief that the German authorities did not intend to change their attitude unless measures were taken by American authorities against German property in the United States. (740.00113 European War 1939/566)

<sup>16</sup> Despatch No. 5517, July 1, not printed.

<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. I, p. 262.

amended. Swiss representatives in such areas would, of course, reduce financial assistance to such extent as it might be supplanted by United Nations' or other general relief measures applicable to inhabitants of such areas. Moreover, it is contemplated that financial assistance will terminate upon reestablishment of normal channels of communication and commercial banking facilities for transactions in foreign exchange. If financial assistance is still being extended when Swiss representative relinquishes representation of United States interests to American diplomatic or consular officers, the latter will be authorized to continue such assistance on similar basis. It would be helpful in such instances if Swiss representative might deliver to American representatives lists of American nationals qualified to receive financial assistance, records of payments, receipt forms, et cetera.

HULL

380.1115/17b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Tunis (Doolittle)*

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943.

11. 1. As a provisional measure and to mitigate human suffering in areas where abnormal conditions obtain, you are authorized effective September 1, 1943, to extend financial assistance to American nationals within your district able to qualify under the terms of Department's instruction 1202 to Legation Bern<sup>18</sup> (see Diplomatic Serial 3451, February 17, 1942 copy of which Consulate General Algiers is being requested by telegraph to send you). You should follow that instruction so far as it is adaptable to territory within your district no longer in enemy hands.

6. You should, of course, reduce financial assistance to such extent as it may be supplanted by United Nations' or other general relief measures applicable to inhabitants of your district. Moreover, it is contemplated that financial assistance will terminate upon reestablishment of normal channels of communication and commercial banking facilities for transactions in foreign exchange. You should advise Department periodically with respect to continued necessity of financial assistance.

HULL

<sup>18</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. I, p. 262.



702.5468/6 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, October 19, 1943.

[Received October 19—10:20 p. m.]

6562. American interests Greece. Foreign Office note October 13 states Department's 1299, May 31 forwarded Swiss Legations Berlin and Athens. Swiss Legation Athens reports September 30.

[1.] German authorities authorize member Swiss Legation Athens proceed Salonika once monthly.

2. Closing Swiss Consulate causes inconveniences due poor postal communication Salonika, Athens. Swiss Legation nevertheless assisted by Inter[national] Croix Rouge delegate Salonika who transmits protected nationals forms for documentation and relief thereby reducing delays.

3. Swiss Legation able pay subsistence protected nationals via bank or German Legation Athens. This method not yet used behalf Americans as no payments Americans Salonika yet approved.

4. During recent visit Salonika member Swiss Legation Athens visited official property, verified archives unmolested. Had free contact protected nationals.

Swiss Foreign Office concludes Swiss Legation Berlin without reply German authorities questions raised Department's 1299. Considering above report reply German authorities apparently little importance.

HARRISON

800.142/224a

*Memorandum Prepared in the Special Division*<sup>19</sup>

[WASHINGTON, October 21, 1943.]

It has been observed by the United States Government that the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva has offered its services to various National Red Cross societies of the Western Hemisphere, as

<sup>19</sup> The Department transmitted this memorandum to the Minister in Switzerland in instruction No. 1934, October 21, and directed him to address a communication in the sense of the memorandum to the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva. The instruction read, in part: "It is understood that the British Minister at Bern will be authorized similarly to communicate to the International Red Cross Committee the views of the British Government on the use of the facilities of the International Red Cross for the transmission of funds to or from enemy territory. You may communicate to the British Minister the text of the enclosed memorandum and concert with him with a view to approaching the Committee at approximately the same time." The Legation in Switzerland reported on December 2, in despatch No. 6754, that after consultation with the British Legation it had addressed a letter on November 29 to the International Red Cross Committee, a copy of which was enclosed; also enclosed was a copy of a similar letter addressed to the Committee by the British Legation on November 30 (800.142/255).

well as to individual nationals of the American Republics, for the transmission of funds from the Western Hemisphere to enemy territory. In one instance, for example, the International Red Cross Committee is understood to have informed the Costa Rican Red Cross by a letter dated April 15, 1942 that payments might be effected from Costa Rica to enemy territory by means of checks on Swiss banks, payable in Swiss currency and to the order of the International Red Cross Committee.

It has also been brought to this Government's attention that the International Red Cross Committee wishes to transmit from enemy territory funds to be used in the extension of financial assistance to certain persons in the Western Hemisphere.

The position of the United States Government and of the Governments of the other American Republics in this regard is indicated by the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control, held at Washington from June 30 to July 10, 1942,<sup>20</sup> the following excerpts from which are pertinent:

*Recommendation I (b):* "To prevent any . . . person . . . from engaging in any financial . . . transaction which involves . . . the remittance of any funds . . . to persons under the jurisdiction of aggressor nations or those dominated by them . . . directly or indirectly."

*Exceptions:* "There shall be excepted remittances (i) for living expenses of citizens of such American Republic residing within the aggressor nations or in the territories dominated by them . . . The said payments can only be made [directly] by the Government of the respective American Republic, or through the Government representing its interests in such aggressor nations, or in the territories dominated by them."

*Recommendation I (c):* "To prevent any . . . person . . . from engaging in any financial . . . transaction which involves . . . the receipt of any funds . . . from any person within the jurisdiction of the aggressor nations or nations dominated by them . . . directly or indirectly.["]

*Exceptions:* "There shall be excepted the remittances which each Government in its discretion may authorize (i) for living expenses of citizens of such aggressor nations or nations dominated by them, residing within the American Republics . . .

". . . Remittances . . . shall be received only directly by the Government of the respective American Republic, or through the intermediary of the Government which represents in such American Republic the interests of said aggressor nations or of nations dominated by them."

In the circumstances, the United States Government suggests that the International Red Cross Committee, to avoid any contravention

<sup>20</sup> Pan-American Union, Congress and Conference Series No. 39: *Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control* (Washington, 1942).

of the aforementioned principles by which the American Republics are guided, take the following steps as soon as possible:

1. Withdraw all offers of its facilities for the transmission of funds either from the Western Hemisphere to the aggressor nations and territories dominated by them or from such aggressor nations and territories to the Western Hemisphere.

2. Except as hereinafter indicated, refrain from permitting the further use of its facilities for such purposes and so inform all other Red Cross societies.

It is not intended that the International Red Cross Committee should refrain from permitting the use of its facilities for approved transfers of funds in behalf and at the request of governments. In certain instances, for example, it has not proved possible for governments to effect the transmission of funds to their nationals in the territory of the opposing belligerents through the medium of protecting Powers. In several such instances, the transmission of funds through the facilities of the International Red Cross has been authorized, subject to suitable safeguards including the limitation of payments to amounts essential for minimum subsistence needs and satisfactory assurance that funds are actually received by the persons for whom they are intended. Illustrative of such arrangements is the plan of the Belgian Government, approved by the United States Government and by the British Government, which provides for the transmission of funds to certain Belgian nationals in the territory of aggressor nations or in territory, other than Belgian, dominated by them. International Red Cross facilities are also being utilized to effect payments to certain prisoners of war and civilian internees in the Far East, detained in areas where the representatives of the protecting Powers have not been permitted to function effectively.

The United States Government's policy with respect to the transmission to or from enemy territory of private messages or of documents intended for private use will be made the subject of a separate communication.<sup>21</sup>

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300.113/368

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

No. 6533

BERN, November 11, 1943.

[Received December 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram No. 1215 of May 21, 1943 and to its airgram No. A-315 of August 27,<sup>22</sup> on

<sup>21</sup> Not found in Department files, but see telegram No. 195 to the Minister in Switzerland, January 23, p. 120.

<sup>22</sup> Neither printed.

the subject of estates of American nationals leaving property within the jurisdiction of Swiss representatives, charged with the representation of American interests in enemy territory.

There is now enclosed, for the Department's information and records, a copy of a memorandum dated October 1, 1943, which has been prepared by the Division of Foreign Interests of the Swiss Foreign Office and forwarded to all Swiss representatives in enemy and enemy-controlled territory who are charged with the protection of American interests. The enclosure was handed on November 11, 1943 to an officer of the Legation by an official of the Division of Foreign Interests.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister :  
 GEORGE TAIT  
*First Secretary*

[Enclosure—Extracts]

*Memorandum by the Division of Foreign Interests of the Swiss  
 Federal Political Department*

[BERN,] October 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE SAFEGUARDING OF ESTATES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAVING PROPERTY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF SWISS REPRESENTATIVES CHARGED WITH THE REPRESENTATION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS

1) In connection with the estates of American citizens the Department of State's basic instructions of October 3, 1941<sup>23</sup> are summarized as follows for the guidance of Swiss representatives :

2) In the absence of special provisions by treaty, the devolution and transfer of real property are governed by the law of the place where the property is situated. When real property is left by the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Swiss representative, the Swiss representative shall if feasible informally observe the proceedings and report to the American Government through established channels any apparent irregularity or unnecessary delay in settling the estate. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the exercise of good offices when necessary in places where the local law requires the participation of the Swiss representative in the observance of certain minor formalities connected with the settlement of the estate.

3) If the decedent has left locally a legal representative, partner in trade, or trustee by him appointed to take care of his personal property, the Swiss representative shall record such circumstances in issu-

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

ing the report of death of the decedent (according to numbered paragraph 3 of the Department of State's telegram of September 16, 1940,<sup>24</sup>) and shall not take the property under his immediate protection.

4) Otherwise, the Swiss representative shall act as provisional conservator of the personal property (if authorized by treaty provisions, local laws or authorities, or established usage so to act). . . .

5) The Swiss representative is not empowered to administer or distribute the estate. He may, however, sell perishable articles for cash, following the procedure established for American estates by Section XIII-13, "Foreign Service Regulations", as amended by Footnote 7 thereto. His function as provisional conservator shall cease when the American Government indicates the specific disposition to be made of the property, and its wishes have been given effect. If, however, the local authorities assume jurisdiction over the personal property, the Swiss representative shall if feasible informally observe the proceedings and report to the American Government through the established channels any apparent irregularity or unnecessary delay in settling the estate. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the exercise of good offices when necessary in places where the local law requires the participation of the Swiss representative in the observance of certain minor formalities connected with the settlement of the estate.

8) . . .

e) This instruction is not to be construed as modifying or limiting the provisions of the Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929, affecting the wills or estates of *prisoners of war* and by extension of *civilian internees*.

340.1115A/2402 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

[Extracts]

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1943—midnight.

2188. For Murphy<sup>25</sup> 1. Those charged with the extension of financial assistance to qualified American nationals in liberated areas

<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

<sup>25</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; U.S. Political Adviser, staff of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

should be guided by instruction 1202 of February 14, 1942 to Legation Bern <sup>26</sup> (See Diplomatic Serial 3451). Department is preparing and will as soon as possible send you supply of 1202, as amended by subsequent instructions.

5. To such extent as United Nations or other general relief measures applicable in liberated areas provide for needs of American nationals there, financial assistance shall be reduced or discontinued. Moreover, Department contemplates terminating financial assistance upon re-establishment of normal channels of communication and commercial banking facilities for transactions in foreign exchange and desires you to keep it informed of developments in this respect and of your opinion concerning continued necessity of financial assistance.

HULL

340.1115A/3344a

*The Secretary of State to the American Member, Advisory Council, Allied Control Commission for Italy (Murphy)*

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1943.

The Secretary of State transmits herewith for the guidance of the officer of the American Foreign Service in charge at Palermo a copy of a memorandum entitled "Steps to be Taken in Connection with the Relinquishment by Swiss Representatives to American Representatives of the Representation of American Interests in Areas Liberated from the Enemy".<sup>27</sup>

Mr. Murphy is requested to forward to the Officer in charge at Palermo a copy of the memorandum and also to furnish copies of it to such other officers of the American Foreign Service as may be assigned to the liberated areas for the purpose of undertaking American Foreign Service representation.

Also transmitted herewith is a copy of the Department's instruction to the Legation at Bern <sup>28</sup> concerning the Department's desire that the Swiss Government authorize Swiss consular officers in liberated areas to continue to perform upon a provisional basis certain consular services related to American interests, pending the reestablishment of American Foreign Service representation in liberated areas. A copy of the Department's telegram of September 4, 1943 to the Legation at Bern, mentioned therein, is also enclosed.<sup>29</sup>

Mr. Murphy is requested to ascertain from the military authorities and to report to the Department by telegraph whether appropriate

<sup>26</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. I, p. 262.

<sup>27</sup> A copy of this memorandum was also transmitted to the Minister in Switzerland in instruction No. 1999, December 27, not printed.

<sup>28</sup> Not printed.

<sup>29</sup> Telegram No. 2179 to the Minister in Switzerland, September 4, p. 124.

mail and telegraph facilities are being made available to Swiss consular representatives in liberated areas for the purpose of assuring communications between them and their Government.

The receipt of this instruction should be acknowledged by telegraph.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum Regarding Steps To Be Taken in Connection With the Relinquishment by Swiss Representatives to American Representatives of the Representation of American Interests in Areas Liberated From the Enemy*

*One.* As American Foreign Service representation is reestablished in the liberated areas, Swiss representatives will relinquish to their American colleagues the representation of American interests. It is not required that the American representative assume such representation immediately upon arrival at the place concerned. That might be possible where a former American diplomatic or consular office has been maintained and used by the Swiss representative in connection with the representation of American interests. Otherwise the American representative may prefer to defer the assumption of representation until he has established the necessary quarters, et cetera, whereupon he should so inform the Swiss representative and proceed with the transfer of representation.

*Two.* A memorandum of transfer of representation (*protocole de remise*) should be drawn up and signed by the Swiss and American representatives. A sufficient number of copies of the memorandum and of the inventories, receipts, et cetera, that form a part of it should be prepared to permit the American representative to retain one for the files of his office and to transmit two to the Department of State at Washington for the archives of the United States Government and to permit the Swiss representative to retain or forward to his Government the number that he considers to be appropriate.

*Three.* The Swiss representative will turn over to the American representative, against receipt, such American property of the following categories as may remain in his custody :

(a) Official United States Government property, including: archives; such official funds as may be in the possession of the Swiss representative for use in connection with the representation of American interests; et cetera.

(b) Property of American diplomatic or consular personnel.

(c) Private American property (to the limited extent that it may have been placed in the custody of the Swiss representative), including the assets of private American estates of which he may have served as provisional conservator.

All property should be verified against previous inventories, when they are available, and any variations, either in content or condition, should be noted. To the extent that inventories do not exist, new inventories should be prepared and signed by both the Swiss and the American representatives. As indicated above, copies of all relevant inventories, receipts, et cetera, should form a part of the memorandum of transfer of representation.

*Four.* The archives transferred to the American representative should include such records of the former American diplomatic or consular office as still exist and are available and such current records concerning the representation by Switzerland of American interests as the Swiss representative may be authorized to relinquish. It is particularly hoped that the Swiss representative's records of the following categories may be relinquished to the American representative:

(a) Lists of or records pertaining to American nationals residing in the district;

(b) Lists of or records pertaining to American nationals receiving financial assistance under the Department's instruction no. 1202 of February 14, 1942 to the Legation at Bern;<sup>30</sup>

(c) Records pertaining to special cases involving the protection of American nationals;

(d) Records pertaining to the protection of private American property, including American estates.

If the Swiss representative does not feel free to relinquish the custody of certain original documents, such as official communications with the local authorities or true readings of telegrams from his own Government, it might be possible for him to furnish copies or paraphrases of them.

*Five.* The American representative should inform the Department by telegraph of the date on which the Swiss representative relinquishes the representation of American interests and of the date of the American representative's notification to the local authorities of his assumption of such representation. Copies of all relevant communications should be forwarded to the Department by air mail as soon as feasible.

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1943.

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<sup>30</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.



# BERMUDA CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, APRIL 19–28, 1943, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN OF THE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS<sup>1</sup>

840.48 Refugees/3633

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

### REFUGEES FROM NAZI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY

Many thousands of refugees continue to crowd into neutral countries in Europe, and the situation is developing with such rapidity and in such proportions that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have become impressed with the necessity for consultation and joint effort in dealing with the problem. Certain complicating factors which accompany this development appear to His Majesty's Government to emphasize this necessity.

(a) The refugee problem cannot be treated as though it were a wholly Jewish problem which could be handled by Jewish agencies or by machinery only adapted for assisting Jews. There are so many non-Jewish refugees and there is so much acute suffering among non-Jews in Allied countries that Allied criticism would probably result if any marked preference were shown in removing Jews from territories in enemy occupation. There is also the distinct danger of stimulating anti-semitism in areas where an excessive number of foreign Jews are introduced.

(b) There is at present always a danger of raising false hopes among refugees by suggesting or announcing alternative possible destinations in excess of shipping probabilities.

(c) There is a possibility that the Germans or their satellites may change over from the policy of extermination to one of extrusion, and aim as they did before the war at embarrassing other countries by flooding them with alien immigrants.

2. His Majesty's Government, while aware of these complicating factors, find it impossible to make a merely negative response to a growing international problem, disturbing the public conscience and involving the rescue of people threatened by Germany's extermination policy. It is physically impossible on the score of shipping limitations

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<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence regarding governmental assistance to refugees, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 450 ff. For additional correspondence, see *post*, pp. 250 ff.

alone for the United Kingdom or even for the United Nations as a whole, to contemplate meeting in full what may prove to be an unlimited demand. A great part of the refugees who leave German-occupied Europe will have to continue to be received in neutral countries whom His Majesty's Government wish to encourage not only by material help but by assurances (which the Swiss Government has in fact requested) that the refugee problem will be brought within the United Nations rehabilitation plans at the end of the war.

The absorptive capacity of accessible neutral countries in Europe seems however to be approaching its limit, and the Allied Governments cannot very well go on exhorting those countries not to turn any refugees back without offering co-operation in accommodating a proportion of them.

3. A detailed statement of the contributions by the United Kingdom and the Colonial Empire to the refugee problem will be found in the attached statement.<sup>2</sup> It should be noticed that Great Britain, in spite of the prevailing stringency of food and housing under war conditions, is accommodating, besides Allied Forces or Merchant Seamen, nearly 100,000 refugees, while the Colonies are straining their resources of food, labour and accommodation in housing many scores of thousands of refugees in addition to civilian internees, British and Allied evacuees, and prisoners of war; East Africa alone has taken in more than two and a half times its white population. Despite the substantial contribution already made by Palestine and the considerable difficulties of food, labour and accommodation which exists there, His Majesty's Government have within the last few weeks offered to take 4,500 children accompanied by 300 women from Bulgaria. Owing to the acute security problem in Palestine, the authorities are not prepared, except possibly in individual cases, to accept male adults from enemy or enemy-occupied countries; but His Majesty's Government will continue to do everything possible to facilitate the admission of children within the limits imposed by the 1939 White Paper. (A copy of the White Paper in question is enclosed for the convenience of the Department of State.)<sup>3</sup>

4. His Majesty's Government are aware of the generous reception by the United States accorded to many thousands of refugees and of the action taken by the United States in finding other outlets, in particular San Domingo, after the establishment of the Evian Committee<sup>3a</sup> on the initiative of the President. They also appreciate that for security reasons the United States Government now scrutinizes

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> British Cmd. 6019: *Palestine, Statement of Policy*, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament, May, 1939.

<sup>3a</sup> For correspondence on the meeting at Evian, France, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 740 ff.

new entrants into the country with the greatest care and that, in addition, the question of accommodation and food is influenced by the prevailing war conditions. His Majesty's Government understand, however, that the United States Government have offered to take large numbers of refugee children from France, and they enquire therefore whether, taking all factors into consideration, food potentialities, housing accommodation and the absorptive capacity of the United States on the one hand and the margin for free action within the immigration quotas on the other, the United States Government would still find it possible to offer, as part of an international effort, homes for a proportion of the adult refugees now reaching neutral countries.

5. Considering the matter in further detail, His Majesty's Government would mention that reception in the United States has at least one vital advantage over reception in the United Kingdom, namely that all additional persons received in the British Isles not only require shipping to transport them thither but start new shipping demands for their maintenance as long as they are there. In spite of this, however, and notwithstanding the other obvious difficulties referred to at the beginning of paragraph 3 above, His Majesty's Government are prepared to consider the possibility of further effort, as part of a general endeavour by the United Nations to cope with this problem. In particular, over and above the large part already played by the Colonial Territories, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to examine the question whether there is any scope,—even though it is now bound to be very limited—, for further admissions into the Colonies. It is unlikely for reasons already indicated that any but a very limited number of refugees could in future be accepted into the United Kingdom and, if it proved practical to accept here any further refugees as part of a comprehensive inter-Allied solution, His Majesty's Government would have to reserve to themselves the right to accommodate them in the Isle of Man, possibly under conditions of detention, and could give no guarantee at this stage as to their ultimate disposal.

6. If an understanding could be reached between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in regard to such a cooperative offer, the way would be open for approaching the other Governments of the United Nations, for example the Latin American countries (except Mexico which has made a very considerable offer of assistance in regard to Poles from Persia), the British Dominions or even neutrals to ascertain what they would be prepared to contribute towards the solution of the most immediate problem. This would have to be done with the minimum of publicity over details, and for this reason His Majesty's Government would be in-

clined to deprecate any kind of formal international meeting; but some kind of private conference of Allied representatives would appear to be the most expeditious and practical procedure, and if its main result was to elicit full statements of what the various Governments were doing and any difficulties in the way of their doing more this in itself would be of great value.

7. His Majesty's Government are gratified to learn of the despatch by the State Department of officials to North Africa, and would be interested to learn the views of these officials as to the capacity of North Africa to accommodate a substantial proportion of the refugees from Spain and Portugal and the possibilities of a civil administration taking responsibility for this problem, in which administration His Majesty's Government would be ready to take their share. His Majesty's Government are also aware that cooperation between the United States and British Governments and the Embassies of the two countries in Madrid have already produced useful local results. There is, however, still danger of unfavourable action by or an appeal from the Spanish Government in connexion with the situation in Spain, and His Majesty's Government therefore feel that consideration of the general problem of refugees is too pressing to be deferred any longer and in particular they consider that it is now necessary to get to grips with the question of alternative destinations. This is their reason for the present approach to the United States Government, on the basis that the time for unilateral and piecemeal action is passed and that combined practical measures must be taken.

8. His Majesty's Government will accordingly be grateful for the observations of the United States Government on the above considerations and, in particular—

(a) Whether the United States Government agree that combined action by the United Nations is now called for.

(b) Whether the United States Government would be prepared as part of this action to admit to the United States further adult refugees from Nazi-controlled areas and, if so, in what numbers.

(c) Whether the United States Government would be able to arrange for the further reception of refugees in San Domingo and, if so, in what numbers.

(d) What assistance in the matter of shipping would be available from the United States.

(e) Whether the United States Government agree as to the expediency of a private and informal United Nations conference and, if so, any views they may hold as to its composition, etc.

(f) Whether the United States Government consider that assurances could now be given to neutral countries that the refugee problem will be brought within the scope of rehabilitation plans of the United Nations at the end of the war.

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1943.

840.48 Refugees/3609 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, February 20, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received February 21—1 : 30 a. m.]

1309. Richard Law<sup>4</sup> asked me to call at the Foreign Office yesterday afternoon. He discussed the question of what steps might be taken looking toward some concerted action by the United Nations on behalf of such Jews on the continent of Europe as are able to escape Hitler's policy of extermination. He said that while much to his regret he was not sure that much practical help could be given these unfortunate people, public opinion in Great Britain has been rising to such a degree that the British Government can no longer remain dead to it. The temper of the House of Commons is such that the Government will be unable to postpone beyond next week some reply to the persistent demands to know what it is doing to help the Jews. With the foregoing explanation and assuring me that he was aware of the many difficulties involved in any attempt to improve the lot of the Jews, he handed me the following memorandum :

"The United States Embassy will be aware of the intense public interest shown in the United Kingdom over refugees from German oppression and in particular over the fate of the Jews. This has grown since the Allied declaration of December 17<sup>5</sup> which revealed the extent of Germany's policy of extermination. Distinguished public men, for example the Archbishop of Canterbury, members of Parliament of all parties and innumerable responsible public bodies have made intensive representation to His Majesty's Government that every effort should be made to meet the extermination policy by rescuing such Jews as are able to escape into neutral countries, and facilitate the reception of more. His Majesty's Government and various colonial governments have already received very large numbers of refugees, and war exigencies, pressure on food and housing, now make further action on any substantial scale quite impracticable, except in Palestine where independently His Majesty's Government have announced their arrangements for taking many thousands of Jews from Southeastern Europe, provided the necessary transport can be secured.

On the main problem, which is so much agitating the public conscience in this country, His Majesty's Government feel sure that the United States Government will agree that it is one for common consideration, and action where possible, on the part of all the governments who participated in the Allied declaration of December 17th. Accordingly His Majesty's Government on January 12<sup>6</sup> addressed themselves, through His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington, to the United States Government to secure that Government's views and if

<sup>4</sup> British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>5</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1942, p. 1009.

<sup>6</sup> Presumably the British *aide-mémoire* of January 20, *supra*.

possible its cooperation on the most pressing aspects of the problem. On receipt of a definite answer from Washington it was suggested that an approach could then be made to the other Allied Governments. Up to the present no statement of the views of the United States Government has been received which could form an agreed joint basis of approach to those Governments, and His Majesty's Government are under the necessity of answering public representations vaguely and of avoiding, naturally, any reference to the American share in finding a solution to the pressing general problem.

His Majesty's Government gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the United States authorities in Spain and North Africa over the local refugee problems in those territories; this, although of undoubted importance, does not meet the main problem, and His Majesty's Government are therefore anxious to enlist the help of the United States Embassy in London in explaining to the appropriate authorities in Washington the precise urgency and scope of the question as seen in London.

Responsible British opinion will no doubt accept the position that measures of rescue and relief on any great scale are impracticable in the present stage of the war. But there are three steps which, it appears to His Majesty's Government, might be taken without prejudice to vital war needs, and would, in addition to what is already being done in regard to Palestine and elsewhere, go far to meet the legitimate public anxiety over this humanitarian issue. They are: (1) That the United States Government should associate themselves with His Majesty's Government in convening in London a meeting of the Allied Governments to examine the problem and its possible solutions. (2) That both Governments should agree on a number of special visas for refugees, and with this contribution invite similar assistance from countries with the necessary territorial facilities. (3) That the United States Government should associate themselves with His Majesty's Government in promoting an international guarantee to the various neutral governments now, with increasing difficulty and apprehension, receiving refugees, that they would not be left alone to carry this burden at the end of the war.

It appears to His Majesty's Government that if these three steps could be taken at an early date, this would be an effective reply to the agitation aroused in the conscience of the civilized world; it would also demonstrate the practical limitations to which the Allied Governments with all their intense sympathy for the victims of Germany's policy, must at present be inexorably subjected."

I told him that I would be pleased to communicate the memorandum to my Government and that he could rest assured that we fully shared the British Government's desire to do what little may be feasible to help the tragic lot of these poor people insofar it is in our power to do so. I said that I did not know the Department's views as to the proper approach to this question and with regard to point 2 of the Foreign Office memo it occurred to me that Congressional action might be required and that this might present some difficulties.

I asked specifically what the Foreign Office had in mind with regard to assurances that neutral governments receiving Jewish refugees

now "would not be left alone to carry this burden at the end of the war". He said it meant in part that we should exert our influence to see that when the war is over the Jewish nationals of various countries who have sought and been given a haven of refuge by various neutral governments could be repatriated to their native lands. He said, for instance, Sikorski <sup>7</sup> has already declared that after the war all Polish Jews would be welcomed back to Poland. He felt that similar assurances might be obtained with regard to other areas.

I recalled that some thought had once been given before the war to finding a home for oppressed Jews in Madagascar, and asked whether this thought had recently been pursued. Randall,<sup>8</sup> who was with Law, replied that the area did not seem climatically well suited, that it was planned to send other refugee groups there, if possible, and that transport presented outstanding difficulties.

I should appreciate receiving the Department's early instructions as to the reply I should make to the foregoing memo.

MATTHEWS

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840.48 Refugees/3633

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of January 20, 1943, relating to the situation of persons fleeing from persecution for religious, racial and political reasons and to the necessity for intergovernmental relief action in their behalf.

It is evident that the problem of the refugees in question cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner by any one of the Governments of the United Nations group nor of the neutral countries. It has been, and is, the traditional policy of this country to seek every available means by which to extend to oppressed and persecuted peoples such assistance as may be found to be feasible and possible under the laws of the United States. In pursuance of that policy, this Government has been and is taking steps to extend assistance in a large measure to those European people who have been subjected to oppression and persecution under the Hitler regime. The measures of assistance afforded have assumed several forms, as follows:

1. Joint and several declarations of official attitude of condemnation of the policies and acts of the Axis Governments and their satellites in oppression or persecution of religious, racial and political minorities;

<sup>7</sup> Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister and Commander in Chief.

<sup>8</sup> Alec Randall, Counsellor in the British Foreign Office.

2. The appropriation and expenditure of large amounts of public and private funds for the relief of persons in need as a result of oppression and persecution because of their racial origin or religious or political beliefs;

3. The application of the immigration laws of the United States in the utmost liberal and humane spirit of those laws;

4. The calling by the President of the United States of the first Intergovernmental Conference at Evian-London in 1938 for the purpose of seeking a solution of refugee problems.<sup>9</sup> There may be repeated here the statement made in that Conference by the Honorable Myron Taylor<sup>10</sup> on behalf of this Government, as follows:

“In conclusion, I need not emphasize that the discrimination and pressure against minority groups and the disregard of elementary human rights are contrary to the principles of what we have come to regard as the accepted standards of civilization. We have heard from time to time of the disruptive consequences of the dumping of merchandise upon the world's economy. How much more disturbing is the forced and chaotic dumping of unfortunate peoples in large numbers. Racial and religious problems are, in consequence, rendered more acute in all parts of the world. Economic retaliation against the countries which are responsible for this condition is encouraged. The sentiment of international mistrust and suspicion is heightened and fear, which is an important obstacle to general appeasement between nations, is accentuated.

“The problem is no longer one of purely private concern. It is a problem for intergovernmental action. If the present currents of migration are permitted to continue to push anarchically upon the receiving States and if some Governments are to continue to toss large sections of their populations lightly upon a distressed and unprepared world, then there is catastrophic human suffering ahead which can only result in general unrest and in general international strain which will not be conducive to the permanent appeasement to which all peoples earnestly aspire.”

At the Evian-London Conference and through the Intergovernmental Committee which grew out of that Conference, this Government exerted its most earnest efforts to persuade the various countries represented to provide asylum for as many refugees from the Axis countries as the laws of the several countries would permit. This Government has also approached other countries for the purpose of finding places of settlement for refugees with funds of the United States origin being made available.

5. As shown by the records of the Department of State, from the advent of the Hitler regime in 1933 until June 30, 1942, 547,775 visas were issued by American diplomatic and consular officers to natives or nationals of the various countries now dominated by the Axis powers, the great majority of which persons were refugees from Nazi persecution. Of this number 228,964 were issued in the war years 1939-1942. Many more than that number of visas were authorized during this latter period, the aliens in whose behalf such authorizations were

<sup>9</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 740 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Chairman of the American delegation.



given having been unable to depart from their places of foreign residence to reach the United States. Yet, of the number actually issued, practically all of the aliens who received them during the war years 1939-1942 have actually arrived in the United States and have remained here, many of them having entered in a temporary status and not yet having departed.

6. Over 5,000 visas were authorized for the admission into the United States and permanent residence here of refugee children coming from France, Spain and Portugal under arrangements with certain private persons and organizations in the United States for their care. Visas were also authorized for the parents accompanying them, in certain cases. This Government has sought the friendly assistance of the Government of Switzerland to effect the release from France of such of these children who have not been permitted to leave France, for entry into Spain where visas may be issued to them by the American consular officers.

7. Since the entry of the United States into the war, there have been no new restrictions placed by the Government of the United States upon the number of aliens of any nationality permitted to proceed to this country under existing laws, except for the more intensive examination of aliens required for security reasons.

8. Considerable sums of money have been made available by the American Red Cross and from other American sources to the American Ambassador at Madrid for the care of refugees now in Spain pending their evacuation. A number of these refugees have already been removed to North Africa. The continuation of this movement and its extent are dependent upon military considerations.

9. The American Red Cross and other American organizations have provided assistance for refugees who have been able to reach other neutral countries, such as Iran, and have undertaken extended feeding among children, including refugee children, in France.

10. In evacuating refugees to neutral areas, the full influence of the United States diplomatic and consular representatives has been from time to time invoked, not only with the oppressor nations but with any Government concerned, on behalf of the refugees.

This Government understands that, in addition to the refugee classes under immediate consideration, the British Government has certain undertakings for the care of British evacuees and of prisoners of war. Likewise, the Government of the United States has certain similar undertakings, as follows:

1. For the successful prosecution of the war and for Hemispheric safety, the Government of the United States has offered to receive dangerous Axis nationals from a number of the American Republics where facilities for the internment or close safeguarding of such Axis nationals do not exist. A considerable number of such Axis nationals have thus been brought to the United States and arrangements are being made for the receipt of more of them.

2. This Government has a number of camps in the United States and more camps are under construction or planned for the internment or detention of civilian enemy aliens. There are being maintained in these camps thousands of such aliens.

3. This Government has also established other camps for prisoners of war which are now in use and in which, by arrangement, there will also be placed large numbers of United Nations prisoners. The accommodation of these prisoners in the United States will leave available abroad considerable quantities of food, clothing, etc., for refugees there which would otherwise be used by those prisoners abroad, while on the other hand, the maintenance of the prisoners in the United States will result in a considerable reduction of supplies available here.

4. There have been set up in the United States a number of relocation centers where approximately 110,000 persons of the Japanese race are being housed and maintained at public expense after removal from vital military areas.

The Government of the United States fully shares the concern expressed by the British Government for the situation of the refugees. It feels, in view of the facts set forth above, that it has been and is making every endeavor to relieve the oppressed and persecuted peoples. In affording asylum to refugees, however, it is and must be bound by legislation enacted by Congress determining the immigration policy of the United States.

The United States is of the opinion that further efforts to solve the problem may best be undertaken through the instrumentality already existing, the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. To this end it may be considered advisable in order to facilitate action by the Committee that a preliminary exploration of ways and means be undertaken informally by representatives designated by the Government of the United States and the British Government. Such exploration might be undertaken along the following lines:

A. The refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race or faith. Nazi measures against minorities have caused the flight of persons of various races and faiths, as well as of other persons because of their political beliefs.

B. Wheresoever practicable, intergovernmental collaboration should be sought in these times of transportation difficulty, shipping shortage, and submarine menace, to the end that arrangements may be determined for temporary asylum for refugees as near as possible to the areas in which those people find themselves at the present time and from which they may be returned to their homelands with the greatest expediency on the termination of hostilities.

C. There should accordingly be considered plans for the maintenance in neutral countries in Europe of those refugees for whose removal provision may not be made. Their maintenance in neutral countries may involve the giving of assurances for their support until they can be repatriated, which support will necessarily come from the United Nations augmented by funds from private sources. It may also involve the giving of assurances in all possible cases by their

Governments in exile for their prompt return to their native countries upon the termination of hostilities.

D. The possibilities for the temporary asylum of the refugees, with a view to their repatriation upon the termination of hostilities, in countries other than neutral, and their dependencies, should be explored, together with the question of the availability of shipping to effect their movement from Europe.

It is suggested that the British and United States representatives might meet at Ottawa for this preliminary exploration.

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1943.

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840.48 Refugees/3609 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom*  
(Matthews)

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1943—10 p. m.

1241. Your 1309, February 20, 3 p. m. Department has today dispatched to British Embassy *aide-mémoire* responsive to one received January 20, 1943 from British Embassy concerning the subject matter of the telegram under reference.

You may reply to the memorandum you received from the Foreign Office February 19 the text of which is in yours under reference by delivering to the Foreign Office the text of Department's *aide-mémoire* this date to the British Embassy, which reads as follows:

[Here follows text of *aide-mémoire* to the British Embassy, dated February 25, 1943, printed *supra*.]

HULL

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548.G1/64 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom*  
(Matthews)

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1943.

1443. Sir Ronald Campbell<sup>11</sup> telephoned me on the evening of March 3 to protest against publication of our note to the British Embassy on the refugee question (radio bulletins 53 and 54<sup>12</sup>) on the ground that the consent of the British Government had not been obtained before publication, nor had it been received in its entirety by the Foreign Office.

At Lord Halifax's request he called on me on March 4 to say that the action taken had seriously embarrassed the British Government in

<sup>11</sup> British Minister in the United States.

<sup>12</sup> The text of the Secretary's note of February 25 had been released to the press on March 3.

as much as it made it appear that this Government had taken the initiative whereas the British Government had actually done so and because Mr. Eden,<sup>13</sup> although under considerable pressure in the House of Commons to state British policy on this question, had delayed doing so because of the lack of a final reply from us, and was now confronted by a publication of our views before Mr. Eden had had a chance to make a statement.

I reiterated in the first place what I had told him by telephone, namely, that I would feel at complete liberty at any time to make public for the information of American public opinion any communication addressed by this Government to a Foreign Government provided it had received the text before publication. Our note had been delivered to the British Embassy on February 25. I continued that the question he had raised involved a much more important and far-reaching matter than any question of diplomatic procedure. I said I had been regretfully forced to the conclusion for some time past by many incidents that the British Government was permitting the impression to be created that it was the great outstanding champion of the Jewish people and the sole defender of the rights of freedom of religion and individual liberty and that it was being held back in its desire to undertake practical steps to protect the Jews in Europe and elsewhere and to safe-guard individual rights and liberties by the unwillingness of this Government to take any action for the relief of these unfortunates beyond words and gestures. Under the circumstances I could not admit any valid reason for the British Government to complain of the natural, logical, and justified desire of this Government to let the American people and the world know its record in assisting Jewish refugees and in endeavoring to safe-guard the individual rights of oppressed people.

I said further that while I would not for a moment assert that such actions were due to or favored by responsible officials of the British Government, it was well-known to us that such a campaign of undermining our foreign policy had been pursued by certain elements in the British Government for a long time. I said he must be fully aware of the complaints which the Secretary had repeatedly made during the last 2 years to the British Government concerning the continuing and insidious and propagandist efforts of certain elements in the British Government against our policy with respect to Vichy and later with respect to our policy in connection with North Africa. I added that while the reply had often been made that the responsible British officials could not control press reaction in England, I could only point out that within the past few days the British Government

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<sup>13</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

had very effectively caused the cessation of objectionable comment in the British press on Soviet-Polish relations.

I reiterated that this Government would take such steps as it saw fit to inform public opinion here and abroad of its policies and its record, and that in the present instance I naturally regretted any embarrassment that might have been occasioned Mr. Eden and the British Government but that I considered the step which had been taken not only justified but completely necessary.

Sir Ronald said that he would advise Lord Halifax who would doubtless wish to talk with me personally.

The foregoing is for your information should Mr. Eden or any one else in the Foreign Office discuss the matter with you.

WELLES

548.G1/16

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>14</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: One of the very important matters engaging the attention of the Department is that of the refugees in Europe. As you know, a very large meeting was held in New York recently under the auspices of the World Jewish Congress. Various other meetings have been held in other parts of the United States. These meetings are manifestations of a deep sentiment on the part of the Jewish elements of our population. There is also a deep-lying sympathy for the plight of these unfortunate people in the other elements of our population.

The British Government is also interested in the problem.

There has recently been an exchange of notes between the American and British Governments in which it was agreed to discuss the matter between ourselves to ascertain possible ways and means which might be recommended to the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, which in turn was the product of the Evian Conference and which seems an instrumentality already at hand and which might attempt to give effect to practical steps to be of aid to these oppressed people.

While it was contemplated that the preliminary meeting between this Government and Great Britain should be held at Ottawa it has since been decided to hold the meeting in another place, possibly Bermuda, but not in either Washington or London.

It will be proper to designate representatives on the part of the United States to meet with the British and to consider the recom-

<sup>14</sup> Marginal note: "CH OK FDR".

mendations which will be made to the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

Considering the intense and widespread feeling on this subject it would seem that an outstanding person with an eminent reputation for vigorous and honest mentality be selected to head the delegation and it seems equally reasonable to suggest that a member of the Senate and a member of the House be named as delegates. The reason for the latter is that the question of expense in dealing with some of these problems may be presented and that the Congressional responsibility in those matters might be party to the decision.

For these reasons I have to suggest for your consideration to represent the United States

Mr. Justice Roberts as head of the American delegation, to be supported by  
Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois and  
Mr. Sol Bloom of New York.

Mr. Robert Borden Reams, a Foreign Service officer presently acting as Secretary to the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees is indicated as Secretary of the Delegation.

It may be advisable to name one or more additional delegates whom you would probably care to choose from those who have not been heretofore active in this particular matter but who might lend weight to calm, deliberate councils and be helpful in a solution of the problem.

I had hoped to suggest the name of Mr. Myron Taylor,<sup>15</sup> but he is so engaged in other matters of great importance in connection with the post-war work and with some other important matters that it hardly seems practical for him to be absent from the scene of his present duties.

I would be glad to be advised of your pleasure.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

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548.G1/13a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1943—10 p. m.

58. Your 88, April 6.<sup>16</sup> For your confidential information, it has been the policy for this Government not to accept gratuitous accommodations and transportation services for delegates to meetings abroad. Please telegraph urgently whether The Horizons is a gov-

<sup>15</sup> Member of President Roosevelt's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, and Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII.

<sup>16</sup> Not printed; it indicated that the Bermuda House of Assembly unanimously voted to assume cost of accommodation and transportation (inland) of delegates to forthcoming refugee conference and that the guest house, The Horizons, on south shore was to be assigned for office and living quarters (548.G1/9).

ernment operated building or a commercial hostelry at which direct arrangements could be made for accommodation of United States group. Also whether other suitable hotel facilities are available in the immediate vicinity. Department will appreciate your views on whether application of the above policy in this instance may prove embarrassing. Definite instructions will be telegraphed upon receipt of your reply.

Composition of delegation which may total 10 or 12 including advisers and stenographers not yet announced.

You will be informed of exact opening date as soon as determined.

HULL

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548.G1/14 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 8, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 7:25 p. m.]

92. Department's 58 April 7, 10 p. m. The Horizons is a privately owned and operated guest house, ideally situated, well managed and comfortable. Rate quoted Bermuda Government on per capita basis at 35 shillings per day if more than 12 persons, 40 if less than 12. Price includes food, lodging, transportation by carriage and use of beach. Building reserved exclusively for both delegations. No other suitable accommodations close by.

Offer of hospitality on part both houses of Legislature was unanimous, to mark in special manner first international conference here. I feel that refusal on our part would cause much disappointment and some embarrassment.

Understand privately Governor today asked Secretary of State for Colonies to extend formal invitation to both delegations.

BECK

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548.G1/14 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943—10 p. m.

60. Your 92, April 8. In view of special circumstances, please inform appropriate authorities that this Government accepts with appreciation the gracious offer of facilities for the delegates to the forthcoming meeting.

It is tentatively planned for delegation to arrive by air Friday, April 16. Composition of group will be telegraphed as soon as possible.

Please arrange for four typewriters to be installed in delegation office. Mimeograph facilities also should be available for possible use in connection with press relations.

Five newspaper correspondents will arrive with the delegation. Please make suitable hotel reservations on their behalf and telegraph Department.

HULL

548.G1/23

*The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter) to Mr. George L. Brandt, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943.

DEAR MR. BRANDT: I enclose an official note<sup>17</sup> conveying an invitation from the Government of Bermuda to the United States Delegation to the Refugee Conference to be their guests during the Conference. A similar invitation has been sent to the British Delegation. I understand that this invitation covers the meeting, the cost of accommodation and inland transportation, and that the Bermuda Government have booked accommodation at a hotel which the Delegates will have to themselves and where they will be able to have their meetings. We should be glad if you would let us know as soon as possible how you feel about this, so that we could inform the Bermuda Government. We naturally hope that you will accept this invitation; the British Delegation intends to do so. I take this opportunity of giving you the full list of the British Delegation. It is as follows:

*Delegates*

The Right Honourable Richard Law, P. C., M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Osbert Peake, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State of the Home Office.

Mr. George Hall, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Admiralty.

*Experts*

Sir Bernard Reilly, Colonial Office

Sir Frank Newsam, Home Office

Mr. Randall, Foreign Office

Mr. Picknett, Ministry of War Transport

Mr. Hayter, British Embassy in Washington.

Yours sincerely,

W. G. HAYTER

<sup>17</sup> *Infra.*



548.G1/23

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

No. 239

Ref: 523/49/43

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and with reference to the previous correspondence on the subject of the Refugee Conference to be held in Bermuda, has the honour to inform Mr. Hull that the Legislative Council and House of Assembly of Bermuda, in order to mark in a special manner the holding of the first International Conference to meet in the Colony, have informed the Governor that they cordially invite both the British and American representatives at the Conference to be the guest of the Bermuda Government.<sup>18</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943.

852.48/1506c: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943—10 p. m.

2359. For Lehman.<sup>19</sup> Gore-Booth, British Embassy, has inquired status offer British Government contained in letter to Jackson<sup>20</sup> March 12, 1943 to contribute generously to fund of two and a half million dollars then envisaged for refugee relief in Spain. Inquiry precipitated by cable from British Foreign Office asking clarification of situation for British representatives at Bermuda conference to be held immediately. British Foreign Office may consult you London. Gore-Booth was advised of present relief situation Spain and requested to ask his Government to hold offer open until your return. He replied view present relief situation Spain doubtful offer will be held open.

HULL

<sup>18</sup> In a note to the British Ambassador dated April 14, the Secretary of State indicated that the United States Government, on behalf of its delegation to the forthcoming meeting, accepted the invitation of the Government of Bermuda (548.G1/14).

<sup>19</sup> Herbert H. Lehman, Director, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Department of State.

<sup>20</sup> Hugh R. Jackson, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

548.G1/20c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1943—1 p. m.

70. Department's 60, April 10 and previous. The following will comprise the United States Delegation to the Refugee Conference:

*Delegates:*

Harold Willis Dodds, Ph.D., President, Princeton University; *Chairman*.

The Honorable Scott W. Lucas, President Pro Tempore of the United States Senate.

The Honorable Sol Bloom, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.

*Secretary of the Delegation:*

Mr. R. Borden Reams, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State.

*Press Officer:*

Mr. Howard Bucknell, Jr., Assistant Chief, Division of Current Information, Department of State.

*Technical Assistants:*

Mr. Robert C. Alexander, Assistant Chief, Visa Division, Department of State.

Mr. George Backer, of New York, 21 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.

Mr. Julian B. Foster, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State.

Mr. Lloyd Lewis, of Chicago.

Mr. George Warren, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Department of State.

*Stenographers and Clerks (from the Department of State):*

Miss Nancy C. White;

Miss Theresa M. Takacs;

Miss Jane F. Finn;

Miss Mary Louise Meyer.

*Code Clerks: (Two from the Department of State).*

Mr. John W. Burnette;

Mr. H. C. Roser.

*Important.* Please give no publicity to the name, title, or Delegation function of anyone except the three Delegates and Secretary Reams. If necessary you may state however that "The Delegates will be accompanied by several Technical Assistants". All names of course may be given in confidence to the appropriate Bermudan authorities for their information and to facilitate landing.

Delegation scheduled to leave La Guardia Airport Friday, April 16 at 10 a. m. arriving about 2:30 p. m.

The following newspaper correspondents will arrive on the above flight:

Robert Edward Vivain, Reuters;  
H. O. Thompson, United Press;  
Richard Massock, Associated Press;  
Mrs. Ida Landau, Overseas News Agency;  
Miss Lee Carson, International News Service.

HULL

852.48/1500: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 15, 1943—4 p. m.  
[Received April 15—11:25 a. m.]

2646. For Sayre<sup>21</sup> from Lehman. Jackson advised Gore-Booth that proposed \$2,500,000 fund was assumed by us to be used for the movement of refugees from Spain to other countries. This proposal was originally put forth by Long<sup>22</sup> and Gore-Booth was advised to consult Brandt, since question of movement of refugees being handled by that office instead of O.F.R.R.O.<sup>23</sup> We believe that consideration of the establishment of any such fund should be discussed by Bermuda Conference. [Lehman.]

WINANT

548.G1/30: Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 18, 1943—9 p. m.  
[Received April 19—12:26 a. m.]

113. From Dodds for Long and Atherton.<sup>24</sup> Congressman Bloom believes that the question of Polish-Jewish refugees in Russia should be brought up but not determined sometime before end of Conference. He feels that delegation should be able to reply in the affirmative if query made on this point by press or interested parties upon conclusion of Conference. Please instruct. [Dodds.]

BECK

<sup>21</sup> Francis B. Sayre, Deputy Director, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>22</sup> Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

<sup>23</sup> Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>24</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

548.G1/37 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 19, 1943—6 p. m.  
 [Received 9 : 50 p. m.]

119. From preliminary conversations with Mr. Law it is apparent that the British will demand changes in the structure of the Inter-governmental Committee before they agree to its use in connection with refugee problems. He states the mandate of the committee originally applied to Germany and Austria and must be extended. The French delegate on the Executive Committee [omission] and felt some hesitancy about Argentina since it would be embarrassing for the Government to negotiate with that country about the shipping question. Finally Mr. Law feels that Sir Herbert Emerson, the present director, must be replaced since he is stated to be unable to adequately perform the many duties which would fall upon him. The Department's comments upon the points involved will be appreciated.

It is my belief that any necessary changes in the membership of the Executive Committee should be accomplished by the committee as it is now constituted. This would also [be] true in the selection of a new director in the event that a change is considered necessary or advisable.

Above for Long from Dodds.

BECK

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[Dr. Dodds' opening address at the Bermuda Conference was delivered on April 19; for text of the address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 24, 1943, p. 351.]

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548.G1/30 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1943—6 p. m.

82. From Long and Atherton for Dodds. Your 113, April 18, 9 p. m. The general plight of refugees was within the full competence of your conference and would include those mentioned or certainly some sections of them, with specific reference to those who were permitted to pass through the Caucasus into Iran. However, the main purpose of the conference was twofold: (a) To consider the plight of those unfortunate persons still within the jurisdiction of Nazi authority and subject to their terrors, and (b) those who had escaped or might escape from territory under their authority but still remaining

subject to the danger of being overtaken by Germany and subjected again to persecution.

The particular persons mentioned in your telegram as a matter of fact are not now subject to Nazi persecution and those who continued to evade the Nazi armies are not now subject to Nazi oppression. Consideration of this last mentioned category is closely linked up with political and boundary disputes between the Soviet and Polish Governments<sup>25</sup> and is so entwined with those questions that it would not appear that an effective solution of this particular problem can be reached until the political issues involved have been settled.

In this connection it should be borne in mind that the Soviet Government informed the Polish Government on December 1, 1941<sup>26</sup> that it did not recognize as Polish citizens persons of Ukrainian, White Russian, and Jewish race who resided in eastern Poland up to November 1, 1939, and that the Soviet Government has not only maintained its position in this regard but in a note dated January 16, 1943<sup>27</sup> informed the Polish Government that since the Poles had put forward a demand in conflict to the sovereign rights of the Soviets in regard to the territories of eastern Poland the Soviet Government no longer recognized the right of persons of Polish race from this area to claim Polish citizenship.

Consequently, a discussion of this question in the conference could hardly lead to a clear recommendation devoid of political implications. And if a discussion is had before the conference and if the delegation will be asked for an affirmative response to an inquiry on that point by the press or interested parties upon the conclusion of the conference, the reply should be very carefully drafted and as brief as possible and reduced to writing. [Long and Atherton.]

HULL

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548.G1/75a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1943—7 p. m.

83. Your 119, April 19, 6 p. m. Last paragraph of yours under reference: Department accepts your statement as a correct expression of its views and hereby confirms your statement. Department will take note of your telegram for future consideration. There is no doubt of the fact that the British Government agreed to the use of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee and

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<sup>25</sup> See vol. III, pp. 314 ff.

<sup>26</sup> For text of communication, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, issued by the Polish Embassy in Washington by authority of the Government of the Republic of Poland, p. 165.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

subsequently of the organization of the Intergovernmental Committee itself for the purposes under discussion and that at the time of Mr. Eden's visit to Washington<sup>28</sup> this was expressly confirmed.

HULL

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548.G1/40 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 20, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received April 21—1: 19 a. m.]

123. For Long. Conference met today in morning and afternoon sessions. The morning session was devoted to a general discussion of some of the more radical proposals made by interested organizations. These specifically included the proposal for negotiations with Germany for the release of the Jewish population, the proposal for the exchange of German nationals for Jews and the proposal to lift the blockade for the persecuted people of Europe. It was agreed that these subjects were both impossible and outside of the scope of the Conference.

The shipping question was then considered in complete agreement as the fact that there is at present no possibilities of releasing or diverting any United Nation shipping for the transportation of refugees. The question of the possible charter or use of neutral shipping particularly Portuguese and Spanish was then explored. It was agreed that the possibilities in this connection were very limited but that every effort should be made by the Intergovernmental Committee to secure such ships as may be available.

The afternoon session was devoted to the consideration of the problems presented by the Polish refugees in Iran and the Greek refugees mainly centered in Cyprus. It appears that, after present programs for the evacuation of the Polish refugees from Iran are completed, there will be a balance of approximately 5,000 refugees. The question of these refugees will be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee. In answer to a question as to the availability of Madagascar for these Polish refugees the British delegation raised the point that any approach by the Intergovernmental Committee to General de Gaulle<sup>29</sup> would immediately raise the question of France's representation upon the Committee. De Gaulle has so far agreed to accept 200 Polish families.

It was stated that the problem of Greek refugees at Cyprus was not immediately pressing because of the changed military situation, but

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<sup>28</sup> March 12-30, 1943; see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French National Committee.

that if possible at least 1,000 of the 5,000 now there should be removed in order provide for future contingencies and to make room for further refugees. The British delegation state that the military authorities object to the idea of bringing these people to Cyrenaica. However, Mr. Law agreed that the matter might be investigated by the Committee. It will also be recommended to the Committee that the possibilities of settlement near Dire Dawa in Abyssinia be investigated.

Tomorrow the Spanish situation will be surveyed at length.

BECK

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548.G1/80a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1943—2 p. m.

2. For Dodds, Lucas, Blum [*Bloom*]. Reference Department's 83, April 20, 7 p. m. Department has been of the opinion that the Executive Committee and the body of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees is the ready-made logical and natural instrument through which the United Nations and the neutral nations could cooperate for the purposes of refugee relief. There are several reasons for Department's opinion:

First, governments which are already members of this Committee, and there are 32 such members, may not now escape the fact of their membership in that Intergovernmental Committee nor escape the assumption of partial responsibility for reaching the objectives. In case it should be attempted to organize a new committee some governments might find a valid reason for declining membership on it or for assuming further responsibility for the work to be undertaken as a result of the recommendations which the Bermuda conferees will make. Department feels further that it may not be blithely assumed that a new committee may be created overnight or even in a reasonable length of time to undertake a work which is of emergent importance if it is to be performed—and we think it should be performed. Consequently, it seems only reasonable to use the organization at hand rather than try to fashion a new one.

Second, it is very desirable to have the cooperation of the neutral states for we will have to rely upon some of them to help us achieve some of the objectives. It seems illusory to hope for the collaboration of any neutral states in a new movement headed by two important members of the United Nations if those neutral states will be required to align themselves with that new movement under the leadership of the United States and Great Britain on one side and against Germany and Italy on the other side. Consequently, it seems to the

Department infinitely preferable to continue to use the organization with which the neutral nations are already associated.

Third, the Intergovernmental Committee is the result of President Roosevelt's thought and a development out of his original policy and it seems appropriate that in view of his present and continuing interest in the same objective that this product of his thought should be used as the agency.

While the Department is convinced of the soundness of its views in this respect and while it feels that these considerations outweigh arguments which may be made in support of the plan to create another agency, the Department does not desire to be dogmatic or obstructive and would be glad to consider any plan which you may care to present which would seem to you to embody any better hope of attaining the objective, which is our principal concern.

HULL

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548.G1/43: Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 21, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 10:37 p. m.]

126. Following is for Long from Dodds. Conference convened morning April 21, with question refugees in Spain on agenda. Problem was defined and separated into four sections; (1), relief to those awaiting evacuation; (2), French nationals; (3), Allied nationals accepted for military service; and (4), the balance of approximately 5,000 Central European refugees. It was agreed that the relief of people in category 1 was proceeding on a satisfactory basis and American contribution was recognized. It was also agreed that an adequate machinery for dealing with categories 2 and 3 already existed. However, it should be recommended to the Intergovernmental Committee that continued interest be shown in these people and that their departure should be expedited. The delegates agreed that diplomatic pressure which was agreed to be essential should continue.

Category 4 occasioned considerable discussion ending in partial disagreement between the two delegations. It was first agreed that these refugees should be evacuated in order to increase the possibility of refuge for others. Agreement in principle was reached that the settlement area should be as close as possible to Spain and that the settlement should be temporary with provision for eventual repatriation. The British Delegation then proposed the use of the concentration camps in North Africa for at least transit use. These camps could be administered by the British. This was opposed by the American



delegation on the grounds that North Africa was a field of present and possible future military operations. Security and supply considerations make it impossible to recommend this proposal to the military authorities. In addition the Arab danger was factor to be considered. There was also the belief that public opinion within the United States would not consent to the establishment of concentration camps in an area under control of American arms. The American delegation would be unwilling even to recommend to the Committee that the question be raised at some future date when military considerations permitted unless the matter had the prior approval of the Department. They would prefer that a recommendation be made for the investigation of Angola as a place of refuge. It was finally agreed that the British delegation would submit a written proposal for transmission to the American Government, text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. [Dodds.]

BECK

548.G1/44 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 21, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received April 22—1: 22 a. m.]

127. For Long from Dodds. Following is the text of the British proposal. Would appreciate early instruction.

“The British delegation fully appreciate the very forcible objections which it is understood are felt by the United States military authorities to a proposal that several thousand refugees, mainly of German origin and Jewish race, should be transported to and set at liberty in North Africa, on the lines of communication of the Allied forces.

The British delegation are impressed with the fact, however, that Spain is the only effective channel of escape remaining in Western Europe for refugees of all nationalities. It is of supreme importance that this channel not be blocked as the consequences would be:

- (1) That the admission of further refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government.
- (2) The Allies would be deprived of useful personnel.
- (3) Public opinion throughout the world would come to the conclusion that the Allies were not making any serious endeavor to deal with the refugee problem.

It is understood that the refugees in Spain amount to approximately 21,000, of whom 14,000 are French nationals mainly of military age, for whose removal administrative arrangements are already completed. As regards the remainder, a considerable number—approximately 3000—mainly Poles and Czechs of military age, can be removed under similar arrangements to join the Allied forces. The remaining 4-5 thousand consisting of men, women and children, are largely Jewish and of enemy nationality or stateless. If all or part of these could

be removed to a temporary home, the Conference would have led to some definite practical result, and moreover, the clearing of the channel in Spain would enable the Spanish authorities to permit a further inflow of refugees and thereby give an opportunity of ascertaining whether the Axis Powers would permit any potential refugees in countries now under their control to escape. If they took steps to prevent further emigration, it would be clear to the advocates of relief measures, (such as a direct approach to Hitler to release refugees) that their proposals were useless.

The main difficulty in removing refugees from Spain and Portugal is one of transport. One of the United States proposals for the Conference was that destinations should be sought as near as possible to the present location of the refugees. Any shipping that may be available will be very limited in passenger capacity and if the refugees are to be removed from Spain within any measurable distance of time, the length of the voyage becomes a governing factor.

Whilst as already stated, the British delegation feel that there is great force in the objections both political and military, to liberating 4-5 thousand refugees in North Africa, they hope that more favorable considerations may be given to a new proposal which they now desire to formulate. In order to relieve the U. S. military authorities of administrative responsibility and the U. S. authorities of any repercussions in the political field they propose that a temporary rest camp under British administration should be formed at some point in North Africa to be selected by the American authorities as far as possible from the scene of military operations and removed from the lines of communication. Possibly the existing internment camps which have been, it is understood, used only for male internees, would be unsuitable for the purpose of a mixed body of men, women and children. The British authorities referred to in my note have had experience of conducting camps of a mixed character for male internees in the Isle of Man where a considerable area was isolated encompassing two villages, where accommodations for holiday makers and tourists was available and where male internees enjoyed a considerable measure of liberty and amenity. If a similarly suitable site could be found in North Africa the British authorities would be prepared to supply the necessary staff for the Administration. It is suggested that the cost might be equally shared for the time being between U. S. and British Governments. Such security arrangements as were satisfactory to the U. S. Military Administration would be complied with. Such a rest camp might accommodate—say 3,000 persons and could be made use of to house refugees pending arrangements which could be considered by the Intergovernmental Committee for their transfer when shipping is available to more distant places of refuge. It is understood that certificates of admission for Palestine for approximately 1500 families, or say 2500 persons, are available at the present time, but that existing transport arrangements do not permit of them proceeding beyond Portuguese Southwest Africa. As regards supplies of food-stuffs, et cetera, so far as the requirements could not be met by local purchase, the necessary arrangements would have to be worked out as part of the problem of supplying the Allied forces in North Africa.

The British delegation feel strongly that world opinion will be bitterly disappointed by the results of the Conference if all future

action is relegated to the Intergovernmental Committee. They would therefore like to obtain the views of the U. S. Government upon this new proposal."

[Dodds]  
BECK

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548.G1/46 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 22, 1943—7 p. m.  
[Received April 23—12: 29 a. m.]

128. For Long from Dodds. On the afternoon of April 21 the question of the Balkans [*Balkan refugees*] in Palestine was considered. The British referred to the difficulty of transporting Jewish refugees from the Balkan States to Palestine but stated that they were prepared to fulfill the conditions of the White Paper.<sup>30</sup> Turkish rail transport rendered this accomplishment virtually impossible of fulfillment but there are definite plans for the chartering of two Rumanian vessels which could easily handle the number involved. Mr. Law asked whether it would be possible for the American delegation to recommend that the American Government share the cost of these vessels. They were informed that it was not possible for the delegates to pledge in advance that the Congress would make available funds for any stated purpose. However, it might be possible to recommend favorable consideration of this British suggestion to the appropriate branch of the Government. [Dodds.]

BECK

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548.G1/47 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 22, 1943—8 p. m.  
[Received April 23—12: 55 a. m.]

129. The following observations are submitted in connection with the British proposal regarding the establishment of temporary places of refuge in North Africa. The objections made then by the American delegates to this proposal have already been transmitted to the Department in a previous telegram. It is believed that these objections represent the point of view of the American military authorities. However, there are other factors which must be given earnest attention.

Concrete action in regard to the refugee situation in Spain would constitute one of the few definitely affirmative steps possible for

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<sup>30</sup> Presumably British Cmd. 6019: *Palestine, Statement of Policy*, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament, May, 1939.

this Conference. It would appear to be essential to empty Spain as rapidly as possible. This would allay some of the criticism presently directed against the British and American Governments for their inability to handle a situation which is not unreasonably difficult. It would also be of direct assistance to the refugees in occupied Europe since it would create vacancies which they could fill and would encourage attempts on their part to escape from German rule.

The American position is dependent entirely [apparent omission] considerations. Otherwise North Africa is one logical step towards the solution of this problem. The British proposal takes cognizance of this fact and places the British in an advantageous position so far as the record is concerned.

The American delegation believes that the favorable considerations outweigh the unfavorable and recommends affirmative action. Immediate reply desired.

Above from Dodds for Long.

BECK

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548.G1/50 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 23, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received April 24—4:08 a. m.]

136. For Long from Dodds. Following is text of the first American draft proposal submitted to the British delegation tonight. It is hoped that this draft will afford a basis for discussion tomorrow and that it will be in general acceptable to the British. It follows closely various conclusions reached in conference to date:

“Recommendations arising out of the proposed utilization of the Intergovernmental Committee in connection with the solution of the problems presented by the refugees.

The American and British delegates to the Conference held at Bermuda have agreed to the submission of the following recommendations. These recommendations concern the role to be played by the Intergovernmental Committee in the solution of the pressing problems created by the existence of large masses of persons displaced by the present war. It is mutually recognized that this problem as it is now constituted can only be solved by the community of civilized nations. The problem is so great that it must not be permitted to become the sole burden of the United States and Great Britain.

Various means of obtaining concerted action between the nations interested in this problem have been considered and it is the unanimous convictions of the delegates to this Conference that the problem should be entrusted into the hands of the Intergovernmental Committee. It is hardly necessary at this time to discuss the factors which led the Conference to this conclusion. It is apparent, however, that as a result of this decision the future welfare of these ref-

ugees will be dependent upon the successful prosecution of the duties which may be entrusted to the Committee. Special care, therefore, must be taken to accurately define the scope of these duties and to extend wherever necessary the powers and responsibilities of the Committee. No lack of effort or interest may be permitted to stand in the way of the efficient prosecution of the various measures planned for the alleviation of the unhappy plight of these people.

A number of positive recommendations will be presented by the Bermuda Conference through the two Governments here represented to the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee. These proposals envisage the necessity for negotiations with neutral and Allied Governments. These negotiations will include, among other things, approaches in regard to the chartering of neutral shipping, the procurement of places of refuge and in some cases the intercession with neutral governments for the furtherance of humanitarian proposals. This last function would not involve negotiations, direct or indirect, with an enemy government. The area of primary interest to the work of the Intergovernmental Committee should be confined to those countries and peoples from which the refugees come as a result of the war in Europe or to which they may be sent. It would be necessary for the Intergovernmental Committee to dispose of funds both public and private. Otherwise the activities and the possibilities for positive and beneficial action would be limited.

The Intergovernmental Committee is now acting under a very narrow mandate. The limitations imposed upon the work of the Intergovernmental Committee by this mandate are evident; its activities are now restricted to refugees from Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland. It acts under the stipulation that the maintenance and transport of refugees is not to be at the cost of member Governments. In addition, the Intergovernmental Committee as it now exists is free to negotiate with the German Government on refugees matters. The Committee suffers from a further disability in that its membership does not include some of the United Nations and neutrals whose assistance is of particular value. The physical organization of the Committee is not conducive to efficient operation. The Executive Committee is composed of a chairman and four vice chairmen, who sit as representatives of their governments and act in an honorary and advisory capacity. There is an unpaid director and a secretary.

It is obvious that all these conditions must be altered. It is of the utmost importance that the scope of the activities of the Intergovernmental Committee be broadened so as to permit its efficient and energetic operation. The following measures are proposed by the delegates to the Refugees Conference at Bermuda.

The mandate of the Committee should be revised. In order to effect this purpose it is suggested that the mandate should read as follows:

"The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or Allied states or organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion or their political beliefs. The operation of the Committee shall extend to all countries from which such persons may have been displaced

by the European war or to which they may be sent in an effort to secure for them a place of refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse for the purposes enumerated above funds, both public and private.'

It is further recommended by the delegates to the Conference at Bermuda that the membership of the Intergovernmental Committee be broadened. Specifically, invitations might be extended to the U. S. S. R., Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia, and possibly, to Spain and Portugal. It must be assumed that France's place on the Executive Committee must now be considered vacant. However, the interests of the citizens of France will be protected by the Committee with the utmost care and the hope that France may soon be able to take her place on the Committee will be constantly borne in mind.

It is recommended that provisions be made for the procurement of funds adequate for the work of the Committee. The Committee should make every effort to secure funds from private sources. In addition, the member states should be urged to make material contributions toward the work of the Committee. The delegates to the Bermuda Conference believe that it would be preferable to revive the theory of pro rata contributions on the Geneva basis. However, they would be prepared to accept as satisfactory a suggestion that these contributions be placed upon a voluntary basis. Considerable increases in the staff of the Executive Committee will be essential to the proper conduct of the important duties which the Committee must assume. The delegates believe that these additions to personnel may be made by the Executive Committee without special authorization from the member states and that they can be effected from time to time as the occasion demands. However, a specific recommendation is made for the creation within the Executive Committee of a management committee composed of a paid chairman, the director, and the secretary.

2. The pressure of events will not permit long delay in the completion of the measures proposed above. If the labors of the Conference on Refugees in Bermuda are not to be in vain, it is essential that early and decisive action be taken upon the proposals which are to be made. The delegates to the Conference at Bermuda therefore propose that their Governments should instruct the American and British representatives of the Intergovernmental Committee to call an immediate meeting or, if possible, to agree among themselves by telegraph regarding the suggestion made for widening the scope of the Committee."

[Dodds]

BECK

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548.G1/46 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943—11 p. m.

92. Your 128, April 22, 7 p. m. For Dodds from Long. We assume that transportation costs on Rumanian vessels for refugees in question proceeding to Palestine will be in the neighborhood of \$100,000 to \$150,000. Please advise. We have arranged to have funds available

and are glad to be able to state that the American Government will share transportation costs with the British Government. Because of the nationality of the vessels involved we prefer to make payment to British Government. [Long.]

HULL

548.G1/54 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 24, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received April 25—4:13 a. m.]

139. Personal for Long from Dodds. I wish to urge personally the importance attached by the American delegates to the proposal for North Africa. Both Lucas and Bloom strongly support my recommendation and hope for early and favorable action. The place of refuge would be removed from the area of direct military action or importance. Perhaps some spot near Mogador might be feasible. The impression created by the removal from Spain all refugees but the Jews would be unfortunate and would furnish ammunition for the pressure groups and even friendly Jewish organizations and humanitarian groups. This would be a concrete example of our desire to contribute to a solution in spite of special difficulties which are recognized fully by every one. Under no circumstances would the delegates recommend British supervision of these temporary places of refuge.

Proposal for refuge in Africa under American administration appears to be only new contribution we can make that would impress public opinion as matching British measures which otherwise will monopolize attention. Consider possible military objections to area removed from war theatre will not impress interested people. [Dodds.]

BECK

548.G1/55 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 24, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received April 25—2:29 a. m.]

140. For Long from Dodds. Draft proposal regarding Intergovernmental Committee tentatively accepted today in general with only language modifications. Will telegraph final draft when approved. [Dodds.]

BECK

548.G1/56 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 24, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received April 25—2: 28 a. m.]

141. For Long from Dodds. The British delegates today agreed to recommend to their Military Authorities that the possibility of using Cyrenaica as a place of refuge for Greek or Polish refugees be reexamined. It was felt that this would be a practical illustration of a mutual desire to include on an equal basis refugees of all races and nationalities. Their attitude suggested confidence approval by their Military. [Dodds.]

BECK

548.G1/53 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—3 p. m.

2631. Department has received following telegrams from American delegation at Bermuda:

“(No. 133, April 23, 4 p. m.) The American and British delegates agree that some assurance must be given to neutral states in regard to the eventual repatriation of those refugees received by these states. There will be two categories of such persons. First, those who are nationals of Allied Governments and, second, those who are nationals of enemy governments. It would be possible for separate declarations to be issued, similar to the Polish,<sup>31</sup> which might cover those persons in the first category. However, some special declaration is necessary in connection with the repatriation of enemy nationals.

It is obviously impossible for the Intergovernmental Committee to issue such a statement and therefore the situation can be met adequately only by the issuance of a joint declaration by the governments concerned. The delegates have agreed on a formula which will be transmitted in my next telegram. This declaration will also be submitted by the British delegates to their Foreign Office. It is suggested that the British and American Governments give earnest consideration to the possibility of approaching the other governments concerned in order that the declaration may be issued in the near future.

(No. 134, April 23, 5 p. m.) Following is text of proposed joint declaration: ‘The Belgian, Czechoslovak, Greek, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslav Governments recognize with gratitude the humanitarian contributions made toward the solution of the refugee problem by those neutral states which accept and preserve those people fortunate

<sup>31</sup> Vol. III, p. 344.



enough to escape across their borders from areas where [their]<sup>32</sup> lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion or their political beliefs. They understand that this action often increases the difficulties already caused by the war within these states. These burdens may, of course, be borne under emergency conditions and for limited periods. It cannot be expected that these countries, some of which are already overcrowded, should maintain these people for an indefinite period.

The above-mentioned Governments hereby declare that [they will] at the termination of this war, admit to their territories all of their nationals who may have been displaced by the war into other countries. They further declare that it is a part of the settled policy of their Governments to ensure such conditions in the territories at present subject to disturbances caused by the war as will enable all such persons, of whatever nationality, to return to their homes at the end of the War.' ”

Following reply is being sent :

“We are completely in accord with the idea of issuing some such joint statement as proposed regarding the repatriation of refugees. This was contemplated by us as indicated in Item C of our proposed agenda for your conference. However, the wording of the statement will require careful consideration by us and the British before presentation to the other Governments for their acceptance in order to minimize controversial issue as might arise, for example, between the Polish and Soviet Governments. For instance, we think that the second sentence of the final paragraph of the proposed declaration as given in your 134 might well refer exclusively to ‘enemy territories’ and to ‘persons, of whatever nationality displaced therefrom’ who are to be returned to their homes.

This telegram is being repeated to our Embassy at London for communication to the British Government with an invitation for suggestion as to the manner in which the other Governments should be approached. Once agreement with the British Government has been reached on specific language, we would be glad to participate in a joint approach to the other Governments or to have the British Government approach them in our name as well as their own.”

Please take action as indicated in last paragraph of above reply and telegraph report as soon as practicable.

HULL

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548.G1/50 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—7 p. m.

100. For Dodds. Your 136, April 23, 10 p. m. Your message was submitted to the Honorable Myron Taylor for his suggestions in view

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<sup>32</sup> In telegram No. 230, May 10, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 178, the word “their” was inserted here.

of his close connection with the refugee problem as Chairman of the American Delegation in the Intergovernmental Committee. Mr. Taylor's comments are given below and the Department finds the changes, which Mr. Taylor suggests be made in the proposals envisaged in your telegram, to be advisable and recommends them to the favorable attention of the American delegation.

"1. (Section III, last paragraph<sup>33</sup>) Mr. Taylor thinks there is great disadvantage and no advantage in transferring the negotiating powers of the Committee from the Director's office to the Executive. The Executive Committee was intended to be an informal working group consisting of the Chiefs of certain delegations who might meet more conveniently and on shorter notice than the Committee as a whole. It was always understood that the members of the Executive Committee, being the Chairmen of certain delegations, could not, of course, speak for the Committee as a whole since the Committee consists of the representatives of the sovereign governments. The Executive Committee could, however, advise and recommend, and Mr. Taylor believes it should continue in this capacity. The Director's office, on the other hand, was set up for the specific purpose of negotiating in behalf of the Committee as a whole following such mandates as might be given it by the Committee.

Accordingly, Mr. Taylor believes that in the first sentence of the recommendation the words 'Director's office' should replace the words 'Executive Committee'.

2. (Section III, last paragraph, 2nd sentence) Mr. Taylor does not object to the extension of the mandate of the Committee as proposed in this sentence, subject to the approval of President Roosevelt.

3. (Section III, last paragraph, last sentence) Mr. Taylor does not object to the receipt and disbursal of funds both public and private by the Committee, but believes that the funds should be disbursed by the Director's office with the approval of the Executive Committee. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor proposes that the words 'Executive Committee' on lines 10 and 11 should be replaced by the words 'Director's office, with the approval of the Executive Committee'.

4. (Section III, last line and Section IV,<sup>34</sup> first two sentences) Mr. Taylor agrees that a recommendation should be made for the expansion of the Committee although he recalls that every effort made previously to invite or solicit the collaboration of the Soviet Union was rebuffed and that Portugal turned down all informal efforts to bring it into the Committee because it is suspicious of the Committee's intentions with regard to Angola. However, Mr. Taylor is thoroughly agreeable to trying once more in these two cases and to approaching the other governments.

5. (Section IV, first paragraph, third and last sentences) Mr. Taylor believes that no mention of France should be made. France is entitled to membership on the Executive Committee and certainly in

<sup>33</sup> This reference and those in paragraphs numbered 2 and 3, *infra*, are to last paragraph on p. 162.

<sup>34</sup> This reference and that in paragraph numbered 5, *infra*, are to paragraph on p. 163 beginning, "It is further recommended . . ."

North Africa may have to play an important role in connection with refugees. In fact, the last delegate nominated by the last pre-armistice government of France, M. Georges Coulon, is now in New York where he is acting as Assistant to Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland, Chairman of the Coordinating Foundation. In short, Mr. Taylor feels that the reference to France is gratuitous and should be omitted.

6. (Section IV, page 1, last paragraph and first sentence of Section IV, page 2<sup>37</sup>) Mr. Taylor is in agreement with this recommendation.

7. (Section IV, last paragraph, sixth and seventh sentences) Mr. Taylor agrees with the principle of the recommendation but believes that in Line 2 the words 'Director's office' should be substituted for the words 'Executive Committee', that in line 5 after the word 'personnel' the words 'of the Director's office' should be inserted and that the word 'authorized' should be substituted for the word 'made' in the same sentence.

8. (Section IV, last line, and Section V, first three lines) Mr. Taylor does not approve of the proposal to create within the Executive Committee a Management Committee or to have a paid Chairman of the Committee. He believes that the Director's office subject to the advice and supervision of the Executive Committee should be in fact the Management Committee. Accordingly, he would propose that the words 'paid Director' be substituted for the words 'paid Chairman' and that a Vice Director be added. Accordingly, this recommendation would read:

'However, a specific recommendation is made for the strengthening of the Director's office which shall serve as the Management Committee under the supervision of the Executive and shall be composed of a paid Director, Vice Director and Secretary.'

9. (Section V, last sentence<sup>38</sup>) Mr. Taylor proposes the following:

'The delegates to the Conference at Bermuda therefore propose that their governments should recommend to the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee to call an immediate meeting of the Executive Committee at such a place and time as may be agreed upon by the governments therein represented, to consider these proposals.' ["]]

Note: Mr. Taylor telephoned from New York after this was prepared and expressed some concern with regard to the recommendation that the Committee, or rather the Director's office, should receive public and private funds. Mr. Taylor recalled that throughout the work of the Intergovernmental Committee there has been a covert duel between the private organizations and the governments, with the private organizations saying they would put in some funds if the governments would put in money, the governments saying they would make some contribution if the private people would provide substantial funds. As a solution of this difficulty there was set up, upon the proposal of President Roosevelt, the Coordinating Foundation which was to draw in the private funds while the Committee would handle

<sup>37</sup> This reference and those in paragraphs numbered 7 and 8, *infra*, are to paragraph on p. 163 beginning, "It is recommended . . ."

<sup>38</sup> This reference is to last sentence of telegram No. 136, p. 163.

only public funds. Former Prime Minister van Zeeland, of Belgium, upon the invitation of the President, was asked to head the Coordinating Foundation. An Anglo-American Board was set up composed of distinguished private individuals with authority in the financial worlds of London and New York. Mr. Taylor suggested this formula was reached after much heartache, and he questions whether it is wise to revive the whole controversy by transferring all the fund raising authority to the Intergovernmental Committee. He, therefore, suggests that in Section III, line 10 (our paragraph 3) the words 'public and private' be omitted and that further thought be given to this whole problem and the use to which the Coordinating Foundation may be put. He thinks it too bad to scrap a piece of machinery which may prove very useful in a fund raising capacity.

HULL

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548.G1/71 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 27, 1943—2 a. m.

[Received 5:45 p. m.]

148. For Long from Dodds. Following is the text of recommendations in regard to the proposed reorganization of the Intergovernmental Committee which has been definitely agreed upon by the delegates of the two Governments at Bermuda:

"Recommendations arising out of the proposed utilization of the Intergovernmental Committee in connection with the solution of the problems presented by the refugees.

The American and United Kingdom delegates to the conference held at Bermuda have agreed to the submission to their respective Governments of the following recommendations. These recommendations concern the contribution to be made by the Intergovernmental Committee towards the solution of the pressing problems created by the existence of large numbers of refugees resulting from the present war. It is recognized by both delegations that this problem as it is now constituted can only be solved by the community of civilized nations. The problem is of such magnitude as to be incapable of solution by the United States and Great Britain alone.

Various means of obtaining concerted action between the nations interested in this problem have been considered and it is the unanimous conviction of the delegates to this Conference that the problem should be entrusted to the Intergovernmental Committee. The future welfare of these refugees will be largely dependent upon the successful prosecution of the duties which may be entrusted to the Committee. Special care therefore must be taken to define accurately the scope of these duties and to extend wherever necessary the powers and responsibilities of the Committee.

The Bermuda Conference therefore presents four positive recommendations to the two Governments here represented for considera-

tion by the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee. These proposals involve new duties for the Intergovernmental Committee, a widening of its field of activity and a strengthening of its organization. They envisage the necessity for negotiations with Allied and neutral Governments but not, of course, with enemy governments. These negotiations will include, for example, approaches in regard to the chartering of neutral shipping, the procurement of places of refuge and in some cases appeal to neutral governments for the furtherance of humanitarian proposals. The area of primary interest to the work of the Intergovernmental Committee should be confined to those countries and peoples from which refugees come as a result of the war in Europe or in which they may find refuge.

The mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee which was adequate at the time it was adopted at the Evian Conference is now unsuited to the emergency created by the war. The limitations imposed upon the work of the Committee by this mandate are evident. Its scope is now restricted to refugees from Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland. It acts under the stipulation that the maintenance and transport of refugees is not to be at the cost of member Governments. It will be for the Intergovernmental Committee to receive and disburse funds both public and private. In addition, the Intergovernmental Committee as it now exists is free under its mandate to negotiate with the German Government on refugee matters. The Committee suffers from a further disability in that its membership does not include some of the United Nations and neutrals whose assistance is of particular value.

It is obvious that these conditions must be altered. It is of the utmost importance that the scope of the activities of the Intergovernmental Committee be broadened so as to permit its efficient and energetic operation.

The following measures are proposed by the delegates to the Refugee Conference at Bermuda:

(a) The Committee should be invited to revise its mandate. In order to effect this purpose it is suggested that the mandate should read as follows:

"The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or Allied states or organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion or their political beliefs. The operation of the Committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come as a result of the war in Europe or in which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse for the purposes enumerated above funds, both public and private."

(b) It is further recommended by the delegates to the Conference at Bermuda that the membership of the Intergovernmental Committee be broadened. Specifically, invitations might be extended to the USSR, Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia, and possibly to other countries. It is assumed that France's place on the Executive Committee must unfortunately for obvious reasons be considered vacant for the present. However, the interests of the citizens of France will be protected by the Committee with the utmost care and the hope that France

may soon be able to take her place on the Committee will be constantly borne in mind.

(c) It is recommended that provisions be made for the procurement of funds adequate for the work of the Committee. The delegates to the Bermuda Conference believe that it would be preferable to revive the practice of pro rata contributions on the Geneva basis. However, if this should prove impracticable they would regard as reasonable the alternative of voluntary contributions from member Governments. In addition the delegates assume that considerable funds will be available from private sources.

(d) The administrative organization of the Committee is not conducive to efficient correspondence. Considerable increase in the staff of the Executive Committee will be [necessary?] to the proper conduct of the important duties which the Committee must undertake. The delegates believe that these additions to personnel may be made by the Executive Committee without special authorization from the member states and that they can be effected from time to time as the occasion demands. However, a specific recommendation is made for the creation within the Executive Committee of a management committee composed of a salaried chairman, director and secretary.

It is obvious that the pressure of events will not permit long delay in the completion of the measure proposed above. If the labors of the Conference on Refugees in Bermuda are not to be in vain, it is essential that early and decisive action be taken upon the proposals which are to be made. No lack of effort or interest must be permitted to stand in the way of the efficient prosecution of the various measures planned for the alleviation of the unhappy plight of the refugees. The delegates to the Conference at Bermuda meeting propose that the Government should take immediate steps to implement the recommendations relating to the Intergovernmental Committee."

It is the feeling of the delegates that the following steps should be taken in connection with these recommendations:

1. Lord Winterton should be requested by the British and American Governments to secure by telegraph the assent of the other members of the Executive Committee to these proposals. If necessary he should be supported by joint representations made by American and British representatives accredited to the other states on the Executive Committee.

2. When the assent of the Executive Committee to these proposals is secured, the member states of the Intergovernmental Committee should be requested by telegraph to approve of the suggestions made. Requests for such action will be made by the Executive Committee and will again be supported by diplomatic action on the part of the Governments represented on the Executive Committee.

3. As soon thereafter as possible the adhesion of other neutral and Allied states should be sought.

4. When steps 1 and 2 have been completed the Executive Committee should make all necessary changes in or additions to personnel.

[Dodds]

BECK

548.G1/89a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation to the Bermuda Conference (Dodds)*

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1943—noon.

12. Department has not yet received response to its telegram concerning the use of a location in North Africa as a refugee haven. In view of the intention of the delegates at Bermuda to conclude tomorrow their conference there and further in view of the fact that the Department lacks authority at present to send any instructions which would commit the Government of the United States, I have to suggest that the delegates recommend to their respective Governments that they each take such steps as they may find possible to arrange promptly for places of refuge in such parts of Africa as may be practical, with particular reference to French Morocco, Madagascar, (or French Equatorial Africa) Cyrenaica and Ethiopia.

If such a recommendation is made to the American Government by the Bermuda Conference the American Government will take all practical steps to implement the recommendations of the conference on the understanding that the British Government will do likewise.

Madagascar (or French Equatorial Africa) is desired to be included because of the very delicate de Gaulle-Giraud situation.<sup>41</sup> De Gaulle controls Madagascar and French Equatorial Africa. Giraud has political influence in Morocco. To present Giraud with a proposal which would leave the onus of a refusal on him would be unfair unless an opportunity were presented to de Gaulle to provide a haven in territories under his control or to refuse.<sup>42</sup>

HULL

548.G1/85 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 28, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received April 28—2:54 p. m.]

151. For Long from Dodds. The following agreement has been concluded between the American and British delegations.

The United States delegation pointed out to the United Kingdom delegation that on their return to their respective capitals all the delegates would be under heavy pressure to disclose what had been the course of the discussions at the Bermuda Conference, and what had been the recommendations. The British delegation would be

<sup>41</sup> See vol. II, pp. 23 ff.

<sup>42</sup> In telegram No. 157, dated April 29, 11 a. m., from the Consul General at Hamilton, the Chairman of the American Delegation indicated that the recommendation regarding Madagascar was agreed to by Law (548.G1/90).

faced with a debate in the House of Commons, which was not of the government's seeking, while in both the Senate and Congress searching questions might very well be addressed to Senator Lucas and Congressman Bloom. It would be very embarrassing to both sides to refuse information and take their stand on the secrecy of the whole proceedings, if one side then made any facts public without due warning and before a mutual agreement had been reached.

It was therefore agreed that none of the delegates, and neither of their Governments would disclose any of the proceedings of the Conference or its recommendations except by mutual agreement sought through the diplomatic channel.

The delegates expressed the hope that it might very soon be possible for their Governments to make certain items public, at intervals, and it was recognized that the recommendations regarding the Inter-governmental Committee, when passed on to a number of foreign governments would have to be disclosed. But both delegations agreed that such publication would only be made by mutual agreement and should be simultaneous. [Dodds.]

BECK

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548.G1/86 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Hamilton (Beck) to the Secretary of State*

HAMILTON, BERMUDA, April 28, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received April 29—1:48 a. m.]

155. For Byington<sup>48</sup> from Bucknell. Following is text of joint communiqué which we are issuing tomorrow, April 29, at 3 p. m. EWT.

"The United States and United Kingdom delegates examined the refugee problem in all its aspects including the position of those potential refugees who are still in the grip of the Axis Powers without any immediate prospect of escape. Nothing was excluded from their analysis and everything that held out any possibility, however remote, of a solution of the problem was carefully investigated and thoroughly discussed. From the outset it was realized that any recommendation that the delegates could make to their Governments must pass two tests: Would any recommendation submitted interfere with or delay the war effort of the United Nations and was the recommendation capable of accomplishment under war conditions? [The] delegates at Bermuda felt bound to reject certain proposals which were not capable of meeting these tests.

The delegates were able to agree on a number of concrete recommendations which they are jointly submitting to their Governments and which, it is felt, will pass the tests set forth above and will lead to the relief of a substantial number of refugees of all races and nationalities. Since the recommendations necessarily concern governments

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<sup>48</sup> Homer M. Byington, Jr., of the Division of Current Information.



other than those represented at the Bermuda Conference and involve military considerations, they must remain confidential. It may be said, however, that in the course of discussion the refugee problem was broken down into its main elements. Questions of shipping, food and supply were fully investigated.

The delegates also agreed on recommendations regarding the form of intergovernmental organization which was best fitted, in their opinion, to handle the problem in the future. This organization would have to be flexible enough to permit it to consider without prejudice any new factors that might come to its attention.

In each of these fields the delegates were able to submit agreed proposals for consideration of their respective governments."

[Bucknell]

BECK

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548.G1/86: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1943.

107. Your 155, April 28, 10 p. m. Department had been of the thought that the conference on its own responsibility would make a statement to the press. Department feels sure that public opinion will desire some statement and that the public will not understand the reasons for the use of the words "they must remain confidential" in the second paragraph. If the conference continues of the same opinion it is suggested that there be inserted at the end of the quoted phrase the words "until the delegates can consult their respective governments". Department would not now bring this to the attention of the delegates were it not considered of real importance from the point of view of public relations not only for the delegation but for the Department itself.

HULL

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548.G1/104h: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Hamilton (Beck)*

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1943—5 p. m.

15. For Dodds. In view of the possible adverse press and public criticism which may follow the withholding of information as you propose, the Department feels that it is most important that as frank a statement as possible of your recommendations be published immediately after your arrival in this country.

As the members of both delegations will be together in New York I have instructed Travers<sup>44</sup> to meet you at airport with the thought

<sup>44</sup> Howard K. Travers, Chief of the Visa Division.

that a statement may be approved by both delegations and telegraphed to London for concurrence in order Joint statement may be released by both Governments Sunday afternoon.

HULL

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548.G1/106 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 5, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 5—8:45 p. m.]

3134. With reference to Department's 2631, April 26, 3 p. m. I have just received the following letter from the Foreign Office.

"Thank you for your letter of the 27th April enclosing copies of a proposed joint declaration by the Allied Governments, drawn up by the United States and British delegations at Bermuda, by which it is proposed to give certain guarantees in regard to maintenance and movement of refugees in neutral, enemy or enemy occupied territories, together with a copy of a telegram addressed to the United States delegation by the State Department embodying the Department's comments.

I am in general agreement with the declaration as drafted and approved by the two delegations and have so informed Mr. Law, adding, however, that your Government are considering the advisability of introducing certain modifications which I am having examined.

I have given careful thought to the views of the State Department in this matter, particularly with reference to the possibility of the present wording of the declaration raising controversial issues with the Soviet Government. I fully agree that we should do all we can to avoid such a contingency, and I would therefore suggest that it might be advisable for us to follow the line which as you know has been taken on certain other occasions where multilateral agreements with the Soviet Government were concerned, and consult the latter before submitting the proposed draft instrument to the other prospective signatories. I shall therefore be grateful if you will communicate our view to the State Department, and inform me in due course of the result of any discussions which they may have had on the subject with the Soviet Government.

I assume that the United States Government would wish to make their approach to the Soviet Government through their representative in Washington, but if it is preferred that the matter should be taken up by His Majesty's Government I shall, of course, be glad to approach Monsieur Maisky<sup>45</sup> here.

As regards the general sense of the modifications proposed by the State Department in the last sentence of the draft declarations, it might be advisable to defer offering any further comments until the receipt of the views of our respective delegations, and also of the agreement in principle of your Government to the proposed approach to the Soviet Government.

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<sup>45</sup> I. M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

Finally, as regards the communication which will ultimately have to be made to the Allied Governments I feel that it might be appropriate if this was done in London—since all the Allied Governments (except the Greek) are established in this country—through our duly accredited representatives.” (Signed Anthony Eden).

WINANT

548.G1/201

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The American and British Delegates to the recent Bermuda Conference on Refugees have unanimously recommended a program of positive action involving a number of specific steps which should be taken in an effort to alleviate the plight of European refugees. I am enclosing a copy of a summary or outline of the recommendations for your information.<sup>46</sup>

You will note that the recommendations fall within two general and distinct categories; (a) those requiring action by the American and British Governments, and (b) those requiring action by all governments through the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, which was organized at Evian, France in 1938. With reference to the first category, the most urgent and important of the items recommended at Bermuda concerns the evacuation of some 5,000 persons from Bulgaria via Turkey to Palestine. This recommendation has been approved with the understanding that the Government of the United States would contribute half of the necessary expense, the payment of which has been arranged in the amount of several hundred thousand dollars.

Another important recommendation requiring action by the Government of the United States, as well as by the British Government, relates to the movement of some 20,000 refugees from Spain to North Africa, not only to relieve the Spanish authorities of the present burden, but also in order to make it possible for Spain to receive more and more refugees who in turn may be evacuated to North Africa. This raises at once a question of major policy. Temporary refuge in North Africa is not approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has therefore been requested.<sup>46a</sup> General Giraud, after discussing the matter with General Eisenhower, has agreed that after the completion of the movement to North Africa of some 14,000 of these refugees, who are French, the remainder, which consists of the so-called stateless Central Europeans may be welcome to North Africa where many of them may be able to contribute something to the common military effort.

<sup>46</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>46a</sup> For letters from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, April 26 and May 7, see pp. 296 and 299, respectively.

With reference to the second category of recommendations of the Bermuda Conference, namely, those requiring action by the Intergovernmental Committee which was organized at Evian, France in 1938, I attach a draft of a suggested cablegram to be sent to our Embassy at London<sup>47</sup> proposing that the British Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee call a meeting thereof in Washington in the near future in order that the program recommended at Bermuda may be put into effect as soon as possible.

Mr. Myron C. Taylor, who is the American member of the Intergovernmental Committee and of its Executive Committee, and who is no doubt desirable to you as the person to continue the work with which he has been identified, has raised certain questions of purpose and authority to the effect that a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee, or the Executive Committee thereof, would be futile unless the American and British Governments are prepared to lead the way for the other governments and to make definite commitments regarding the assumption of our share of the cost of evacuation, transportation, maintenance, and eventual repatriation of a large number of persons, which may run into millions of dollars. We would also be obligated to find not only temporary places of refuge but permanent places of settlement for refugees.

These questions require decisions of high policy, about which I must consult you.

1. The unknown cost of moving an undetermined number of persons from an undisclosed place to an unknown destination, a scheme advocated by certain pressure groups, is, of course, out of the question. However, as a practical matter it may be possible for the Government of the United States to undertake its share of cost in financing from time to time the movement of a specific number of persons from a particular place to a designated destination, as determined upon by the Intergovernmental Committee.

2. The immigration quotas of the United States are sufficient to accommodate a large number of Central European refugees who are able to qualify individually under the immigration laws. Any attempt to bring refugees into the country without compliance with the immigration laws, or in excess of quota limitations, would be likely to result in throwing the whole refugee question into Congress, where there is a prevailing sentiment for even more drastic curtailment of immigration into this country in time of war when our own citizens are going abroad to lay down their lives, if necessary, for their country.

3. So far as the United States is concerned, admission under the quota includes the privilege of permanent residence. However, it is not believed that places of permanent settlement in other countries would be as readily offered as temporary asylum or refuge. This question was explored and discussed at great length at Bermuda and

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<sup>47</sup> President Roosevelt approved this telegram and it was sent as No. 3128, May 15, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 180.

the conclusion was reached that the desire of refugees to settle permanently must be subordinated to the wishes of the country of asylum if any appreciable number of them are to be saved.

The following questions are therefore posed with respect to the first phase of the implementation of the program drafted at Bermuda :

1. Do you agree that North Africa may be used as a depot for those refugees who can be evacuated from Spain without interference with military operations and with the full approval of the military commanders in that area ?

This would approve the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference to save as many as quickly as possible, providing them with temporary asylum in Africa and obtaining commitments for their post-war return to their home countries.

2. Should we undertake to defray a part of the cost of moving these and other particular groups from one place to another from time to time, and if so, what funds will be available for that purpose ?

3. I cannot recommend that we open the question of relaxing the provisions of our immigration laws and run the risk of a prolonged and bitter controversy in Congress on the immigration question—considering the generous quantity of refugees we have already received.

4. I cannot recommend that we bring in refugees as temporary visitors and thus lay ourselves open to possible charges of nullification or evasion of the national origins principle embodied in the quota laws.

The above-indicated course would obviate either of these last two possibilities.

May I have your directives for determination of the recommendations of the refugee program formulated at Bermuda.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

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548.G1/120a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1943—7 p. m.

230. The American and British delegates to the Conference on refugees at Bermuda agreed that some assurance must be given to neutral states in regard to the eventual repatriation of those refugees received by these states. There will be two categories of such persons: First, those who are nationals of Allied Governments and, second, those who are nationals of enemy Governments. It would be possible for separate declarations to be issued, similar to the Polish, which might cover those persons in the first category. However, some special declaration is necessary in connection with the repatriation of enemy nationals.

It is obviously impossible for the Inter-Governmental Committee to issue such a statement and therefore the situation can be met ade-

quately only by the issuance of a joint declaration by the governments concerned. The delegates have agreed on a formula which is transmitted below :

[Here follows text of proposed joint declaration quoted in telegram No. 2631, April 26, 3 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, printed on page 165.]

The British Foreign Office has indicated its general approval of the text of the declaration. However, before an approach is made to the other Governments concerned it is desired to obtain the views of the Soviet Government. You should therefore seek an early opportunity to secure approval of the declaration.

Should objection be made to the second sentence of the final paragraph you are authorized to suggest a change providing specifically for reference to "enemy territories" and to "persons of whatever nationality displaced therefrom".

HULL

548.G1/201

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943.

In regard to your letter of May seventh, following the Bermuda conference, I suggest on Page #4—Paragraph #1,<sup>48</sup> that we do not give unlimited promises but that we undertake with Britain to share the cost of financing from time to time any specific cases.

As to Paragraph #2, I do not think we can do other than comply strictly with the present immigration laws.

I agree that North Africa may be used as a depot for those refugees but not a permanent residence without full approval of all authorities. I know, in fact, that there is plenty of room for them in North Africa but I raise the question of sending large numbers of Jews there. That would be extremely unwise.

On Page #6—Paragraph #2,<sup>49</sup> I think we should defray a part of the cost of moving. Can this come out of Lehman's funds?

As to Paragraph #3, I agree with you that we cannot open the question of our immigration laws.

I agree with you as to bringing in temporary visitors. We have already brought in a large number.

I have okayed the telegram, which I return herewith.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT];

<sup>48</sup> Paragraph numbered 1, p. 177.

<sup>49</sup> Paragraph numbered 2, p. 178.

548.G1/121 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 15, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received May 15—11 : 56 a. m.]

457. Department's 230, May 10, 7 p. m., to Kuibyshev. Please clarify what is meant by the separate declaration "similar to the Polish".

STANDLEY

548.G1/201a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1943—midnight.

3128. The conference on refugees at Bermuda having been terminated the American and British Governments have the recommendations of the conferees. These recommendations require action by and in respect of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Both Governments desiring speedily to implement the recommendations of the conferees, a meeting should be called of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee to be followed in short order by a meeting of the full Committee.

We wish you to approach Mr. Eden at once and ask him to propose on behalf of this Government to the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee that he convoke at the earliest practicable date a meeting of the Executive Committee, at a place to be agreed upon by the Governments members of the Executive Committee. (In view of the French situation<sup>50</sup> we agree that the sending of any invitation to the French representative should be omitted.) Please inform Mr. Eden that this Government would be agreeable to Washington as the place of both meetings, in which event we would suggest that the Executive Committee meet on June 1 in Washington under the present chairmanship and that the full Committee meet also in Washington shortly thereafter at the call of the Executive Committee. As the Food Conference<sup>51</sup> opens on May 18 arrangements for the refugee conference cannot well be made before June 1. Besides some time will be necessary to notify the member Governments and to permit them to appoint and instruct their representatives. It is assumed

<sup>50</sup> Vichy France had severed diplomatic relations with the United States on November 8, 1942.

<sup>51</sup> See pp. 820 ff.

that, in the large number of cases at least, those representatives will be the chiefs of mission here so that the meeting need not long be delayed.

This message has been seen and approved by the President.

HULL

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548.G1/121 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1943—3 p. m.

321. Your 457, May 15, 1 p. m. Prior to the Bermuda Conference the Polish Government made a declaration in regard to the return after the war to Polish territories of Polish nationals. It was at first contemplated that each of the United Nations should make similar declarations. However this idea was dropped and the proposed joint declaration was substituted therefor.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/3791 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, May 17, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 18—1: 10 a. m.]

3415. I brought the contents of Department's 3128, May 15, midnight, to Mr. Eden's attention and have just received the following communication from him.

"In reply to your letter of May 17 and following our conversation on the same day, I enclose my comments on the message you were good enough to send me regarding the meeting of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee.

I should be grateful if in sending my comments to your Government, you would explain that on May 8th I sent instructions to our Ambassador to represent to the State Department<sup>52</sup> our anxiety to proceed forthwith with the Bermuda Conference recommendations regarding the Intergovernmental Committee, and putting certain points which it seemed to us it might be convenient to settle between our two Governments before the Executive Committee met. We should at the same time as we pursue the question of the calling to-

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<sup>52</sup> British *aide-mémoire* of May 11, left at the Department by Mr. Law, missing from Department files.



gether of the Intergovernmental Committee, be very glad to have your Government's observations on the points we raised."

Begin quote enclosure referred to in Mr. Eden's letter:

"His Majesty's Government is in entire agreement with the United States Government in the desire to implement speedily the recommendations of the American and British delegations at Bermuda, and in particular regarding the early meeting of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee. Mr. Eden will at once approach Lord Winterton, the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee, and ask him to convoke a meeting of the Executive Committee through an approach to the Argentine, Brazilian and Netherlands Governments.

It is noted that in the message of May 15 from the Department of State it is suggested that the place of meeting should be agreed on by all the Government-members of the Executive Committee. So far as His Majesty's Government is concerned they would be willing to meet at any place convenient to the other Government members, but in view of the fact that the present chairman and director are both in London and the headquarters of two of the member Governments are in the same capital, it had already occurred to His Majesty's Government that there might be an advantage in having the smaller meeting of the Executive Committee in London, to be followed by the meeting of the full Committee in Washington. Another and more important advantage of having the first meeting in London would be that the Executive Committee, in reconstituting itself and thereafter trying to bring about a meeting of the full Committee on a wider basis, will need unofficial contacts with other Governments of the United Nations established in London. Questions of some difficulty may present themselves which could be more easily smoothed out by informal conversations with the Government concerned than by diplomatic correspondence, whereas if the smaller committee meets in Washington with some of these anticipated questions unsolved an inconvenient gap may occur between the ending of the Executive Committee and the date on which the Plenary Committee can assemble.

While therefore repeating that as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned they should agree to any place convenient to all fellow members of the Executive Committee, would like to suggest that the advantages should be represented to the United States Government of calling the Executive Committee to meet in London to dispose of all anticipated or unforeseen difficulties as quickly as possible so as to permit of the meeting in Washington of the Plenary Committee at a very early date. While awaiting a reply regarding the place of meeting, His Majesty's Government will forthwith ask Lord Winterton to issue invitations as proposed in the American note, leaving open for the time being the question of place. As for the date, it may be that by meeting in London the Executive Committee assemble earlier than suggested, so making it possible for the Plenary Committee to meet in the first half of June."

548.G1/191

*Statement Issued to the Press by the Department of State,  
May 19, 1943*

The delegates appointed by the American and British Governments to confer at Bermuda upon the refugee problem have now terminated their discussions and have submitted a report<sup>53</sup> to their respective governments. The two governments have received this and are at present engaged in carrying out its recommendations. Throughout the discussions at Bermuda, the United States and British delegations as well as the two governments worked in complete harmony and in a spirit of mutual cooperation. The report was submitted as a joint report and contains no divergence of opinion.

While the details must be regarded as confidential so long as a knowledge of the recommendations contained therein would be of aid or comfort to our enemies or might adversely affect the refugees whom all are trying to aid, certain facts may now be made public.

The two delegations accomplished the useful task of dividing suggestions and proposals for the solution of the refugee problem into two categories: (1) what was possible under existing war conditions and (2) what was impossible under these same conditions.

All suggestions were measured by two strict criteria. In the first place, nothing could be recommended that would interfere with or delay the war effort of the United Nations, and, secondly, any recommendation submitted must be capable of accomplishment under war conditions.

The shipping problem was recognized to be of the utmost urgency and it was agreed that any plan looking to the diverting of allied shipping from the war effort to remove or care for refugees would present considerations of a military character which would disclose almost insuperable difficulties. It was also agreed that no negotiations with Hitler could be undertaken since his entire record has left no doubt that he would only agree to such solutions as would be of direct aid to the Axis war aims.

The conference was, however, able to recommend measures both for removing refugees from neutral countries and, in those cases where such removal was not possible, for giving assurances of international cooperation in the future of the refugee problem so far as it affected them.

It also recommended a number of temporary refugee havens to which refugees could be transported and maintained if and when shipping should become available. At least one such movement has been effected.

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<sup>53</sup> Not found in Department files.

Certain measures of a financial nature to cover necessary expenses and a declaration of intention to provide for repatriation upon the termination of hostilities were also recommended.

The conference also submitted a plan for an expanded and more efficient inter-governmental organization with increased authority to meet the problems created or likely to arise under war conditions.

Some of these measures are now being put into effect and others, it is hoped, will soon be possible. It is therefore believed that the practical results of the recommendations submitted by the conference will soon become apparent.

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548.G1/136 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 21, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 11 : 59 p. m.]

500. The Department's 230, May 10, 7 p. m., to Kuibyshev. I delayed presenting this matter to the Soviet Government until I had an opportunity to discuss it with Molotov<sup>54</sup> with whom I had an appointment yesterday. In the meantime, however, the British Ambassador has advised me that the British and American Governments have not agreed on the wording of the last sentence of the draft declaration referring to the territories to be affected by the aforementioned assurance. He said that the State Department had taken the view that in order to minimize such an issue as might arise for example between the Soviet and Polish Governments the last sentence should refer exclusively to "enemy territories" and to "persons of whatever nationality displaced therefrom" who are to be returned to their homes; that in the view of the British Government this suggested modification would be too restricted and that the British Government would like to see the words "enemy territories or territories in enemy occupation" substituted for the words "territories". The Ambassador said that he had been instructed to consult with me on this question pointing out that the British Government desired him to associate [himself] with the American approach to the Soviet Government. [Since the British and American Governments] had not yet agreed upon the wording of the last sentence of the draft, [I] suggested that either no approach be made until full agreement had been reached between the two Governments on the draft or the approach at this stage be confined merely to ascertaining whether the Soviet Government would agree that a joint declaration should be made.

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<sup>54</sup> V. M. Molotov, Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

In view of the above I have postponed taking this question up with the Soviet Government. The Department's instructions are requested.  
STANDLEY

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548.G1/154a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1943—11 p. m.

345. Your 500, May 21, 7 p. m. Department approves your action in postponing presentation of question to Soviet Government in view of British Ambassador's statements, and will consult British Government again and send you new instructions.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/3633

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You asked about the proposed Ottawa conference to consider the refugee problem. The suggestion came about in the following way:

On January 20 the British Government submitted an *aide-mémoire* reviewing Great Britain's activity in helping Jewish refugees, making some inquiry as to what the United States could do in addition to what it had done, and suggesting that the matter was essentially a United Nations problem which might be dealt with in a United Nations conference.

We replied under date of February 25, reviewing what the United States had done, expressing our deep interest in the problem of racial, religious and political persecution and suggesting instead of a United Nations conference that the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, which you will remember was the product of the Evian Conference, be used as the instrumentality for the work, partly because it already existed, and further suggesting that a preliminary conference between the United States and Great Britain be held in Ottawa for the purpose of developing the possible field of action of that Committee.

In suggesting such a conference it was thought that it would be preferable to have the coordinated activity of the American and British Governments as a guide to the contemplated work of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee.

I am enclosing copies of the British *aide-mémoire* and of our reply.<sup>55</sup>

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

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<sup>55</sup> *Ante*, pp. 134 and 140, respectively.

548.G1/142: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 27, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 27—10:25 p. m.]

3657. Mr. Eden asked me and Lord Winterton, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, to meet him in his office this afternoon in order to go over certain points which he thought our two Governments would like to consider before the meeting of the Executive Committee. He said the invitations were ready to go out to the other members of the Executive Committee, namely, the Argentine, Brazilian and Netherlands Governments (it being agreed that France should be omitted) as soon as the place and time of meeting had been determined. He mentioned he hoped he would hear from us shortly about this on the basis of his note transmitted in my 3415, May 17, 12 midnight.

The points raised by Mr. Eden on which he would like the American Government's opinion with a view to completing our understanding before the Executive Committee meets were the following:

(1) Shall the Executive Committee, when it meets, invite to the plenary meeting all the original members of the Intergovernmental Committee? With the agreed upon omission of France, the British Government's opinion was in the affirmative, and Mr. Eden thought that the member Governments would find the invitations acceptable, with the possible exception of Switzerland. He believed in any case that should a sufficient number of member Governments agree, the meeting of the Plenary Committee could then be called.

(2) In order to eliminate the necessity of the Executive Committee first calling together a full meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee with its present membership we felt that the Executive Committee could consult with the Governments as to the final membership of the Plenary Committee to be called in Washington and as to the agenda to be considered. If you approve of this procedure then the question of the Governments to be asked should be agreed upon by the British and ourselves before the Executive Committee meets. The British thought certainly that Russia, Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia also should be invited, and they sought our views with respect to Spain and Portugal.

(3) Where should the headquarters of the Intergovernmental Committee be established? Mr. Eden reiterated the reasons outlined in my 3415, May 17, 12 midnight in favor of the choice of London as the place of meeting of the Executive Committee, but suggested Washington as the place of meeting of the Plenary Committee.

(4) For which category of refugees should the full Intergovernmental Committee be responsible? The British favored the Bermuda Conference formula as set forth in chapter 5 of the conference re-

port,<sup>56</sup> namely all refugees from religious, racial and political oppression in Axis held countries.

In the course of our conversation Lord Winterton raised the question of the relationship between the Intergovernmental Committee and the League of Nations refugee bodies. Since Sir Herbert Emerson is director of the former and is also League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees there is at present no problem, but should it be decided later to have a younger man replace Sir Herbert the relationship referred to above would need to be considered. Lord Winterton also mentioned that should the headquarters of the Intergovernmental Committee be established in Washington, as he personally hoped it might be, his parliamentary duties in London might make it difficult for him to continue as chairman, and he suggested that he be replaced by an American. Lord Winterton finally raised the point of financing future refugee work. He referred to the funds hitherto largely derived from private Jewish organizations and he suggested that in view of the wider scope recommended by the Bermuda Conference, financing henceforth be made a Government responsibility. No definite opinions were expressed concerning these questions raised by Lord Winterton since we felt they were matters which might more appropriately be taken up later when the Plenary Committee meets in Washington.

With respect to the numbered points set forth above I would be grateful if the Department could give me its views for communication to Mr. Eden as soon as possible, as he believes that a preliminary understanding with us would assist the Executive Committee in drawing up its agenda and proceeding quickly with its work.

WINANT

548.G1/180

*Memorandum by Mr. George L. Brandt, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 3, 1943.

Subject: Proposed Joint Declaration of United States and European Allies to Give Assurance for Repatriation of European Refugees upon the Termination of the War

Prior to initialing the attached draft telegram to the Embassy at London<sup>57</sup> on the above matter, Dr. Bowman<sup>58</sup> raised with Mr. Long and Mr. Brandt the question whether the declaration contemplated the repatriation of Quislings or other traitors, as for example, in the

<sup>56</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>57</sup> Airgram No. 791, June 7, 6 p. m., *infra*.

<sup>58</sup> Isaiah Bowman, President of Johns Hopkins University and member of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.

case of a Quisling who had fled from Belgium to Spain. It was agreed that the declaration would not cover such persons in as much as they would not be considered as persons displaced from their native country "and who have sought refuge in other countries, because of persecution on account of their race or their religious or political beliefs", in the language of the declaration, the emphasis being primarily on the word "persecution". The case of any person claiming repatriation under the terms of the declaration would be subject to examination.

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548.G1/136: Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1943—6 p. m.

791. Reference Department's 2631 of April 26, 3 p. m.

1. Upon receipt your reply no. 3134, May 5, midnight, Department telegraphed Ambassador at Kuibyshev requesting him to obtain the views of the Soviet Government on the proposed joint declaration relating to the repatriation of refugees, in the language recommended at the Bermuda conference. The Ambassador was informed that the British Foreign Office had indicated its general approval of the text but that should objection be made by Soviet authorities to the second sentence of the final paragraph he might suggest a change providing specifically for reference to "enemy territories" and to "persons of whatever nationality displaced therefrom".

2. Ambassador now telegraphs British Ambassador informs him British Government desires associate itself with American approach to Soviet Government but that as it has not yet agreed upon wording last sentence of draft it suggests either no approach be made until full agreement reached between our two Governments on draft or that approach at this stage be confined merely to ascertaining whether Soviet Government would agree that a joint declaration should be made. British Ambassador stated further that his Government considered modified language proposed by Department to be too restricted and that it would like to see the words "enemy territories or territories in enemy occupation" substituted for the words "enemy territories". American Ambassador accordingly has postponed taking up question with Soviet Government pending Department's further instructions.

3. The proposed joint declaration, in the wording recommended at Bermuda, first states, in the initial sentence of the second paragraph, that the Allied Governments named, upon the termination of the war, "will admit to their territories all their nationals who may have

been displaced by the war into other countries". The next and final sentence states that it is a part of the settled policy of those Governments "to ensure such conditions in the territories at present subject to disturbances caused by the war as will enable all such persons, of whatever nationality, to return to their homes at the end of the war".

4. The Department considered it possible that the Soviet Government might refuse to join in any declaration obligating it to receive in their former homes persons, other than Soviet nationals, displaced from territories now under enemy occupation. The Department therefore suggested that the final sentence refer only to "enemy territories", leaving the first sentence to cover the occupied territories. It is now seen that that sentence only provides for the return of the "nationals" of the occupied territories and also, that French territory in occupation would not be covered. Presumably, British objection to the change arises from those considerations.

5. The Department now proposes that the second paragraph of the declaration read as follows: "The above-mentioned Governments hereby declare that they will, at the termination of this war, admit to their territories all of their nationals who may have been displaced by the war into other countries. They further declare that it is a part of the settled policy of their Governments to ensure such conditions in the enemy countries and the countries under enemy occupation as will permit the return thereto of all persons, of whatever nationality, now displaced therefrom and who have sought refuge in other countries, because of persecution on account of their race or their religious or political beliefs."

6. The Department suggests this language because it promises the return of the persons in question to the "countries" of their former domicile rather than to their former "homes" which could mean the precise places where they had resided. Thus, there would be allowed a broader latitude of action in the resettlement of the displaced persons. This might particularly be more acceptable to the Soviet Government. Finally, the Department believes that the declaration should identify the persons to be repatriated as those who are refugees from persecution for racial, religious or political reasons, they being the only persons in whose behalf the declaration is to be made.

7. Please take up the question with the appropriate British authorities and report their views as promptly as possible. Inform them that the Department is of the opinion that it would be advisable for the American Ambassador at Kuibyshev to approach the Soviet Government with a text of the proposed declaration to facilitate that Government's consideration of the proposal.



548.G1/165b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1943—1 p. m.

3879. For the Ambassador's information only. Your 3415, May 17 midnight, and 3657, May 27 midnight, and also *aide-mémoire* of May 11 left by Mr. Law in Department,<sup>59</sup> regarding implementation of recommendations of Bermuda Refugee Conference.

1. On June 18, with the approval of the Secretary, Mr. Myron C. Taylor met with Lord Halifax. Mr. Taylor outlined a plan for initial agreement between the American and British Governments involving the following elements:

- I. Agreement between Britain and United States on place of temporary refuge.
- II. Agreement to bear expense jointly.
- III. Meeting of Intergovernmental Executive Committee in London to
  1. Appoint a full time Vice Director (American) ?
  2. Appoint a full time Secretary (?)
- IV. Agreement that after arrival at place of temporary refuge United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration will maintain refugees until end of war when they may
  - A. Return to their homes
  - B. Be transferred to places of permanent residence
- V. British and American Embassies or Legations in the countries concerned would delegate each a representative to carry out the plans for transit and reception of refugees.
- VI. With these agreements the Director's Office in London may contact all countries represented upon the Intergovernmental Committee to secure
  - A. Offers to accept refugees
  - B. Contributions to the fund for support of the office
  - C. Contributions to the funds for transit of refugees and their maintenance in places of temporary refuge.
- VII. Under these conditions no meeting of full Intergovernmental Committee would be necessary at this time.
- VIII. Any change of authority by Intergovernmental Committee enlarging scope to include all refugees can be accomplished without Intergovernmental Committee full meeting by letters to be secured from representatives of government members in London.

2. Mr. Taylor reported that Lord Halifax appeared to favor this plan and said that he would present it to London immediately.

HULL.

<sup>59</sup> *Aide-mémoire* missing from Department files.

840.48 Refugees/3919a

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference we have been in negotiation with the British Government to arrive at a method of procedure and have now received from the British Embassy the agreement of the British Government to a proposal made to them in writing by Mr. Myron Taylor after consultation with Mr. Hull. This is particularly gratifying. Among other things it provides for a meeting in London of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee and it is our thought that it will operate under a British chairman with an American as Director of Operations acting under him and with a secretary from some other country, probably the Netherlands.

Mr. Taylor has been so long identified with this work it is hard to think of carrying it on without his continuing participation. I know he has some reluctance to continue active on this account, due largely to his occupation in post-war studies and other activities here.

I discussed the matter with Mr. Hull and we were of the opinion that it would be well if you would ask Mr. Taylor to continue. He need not necessarily devote his personal time and energy to attending meetings for he could designate an alternate and could in fact name the Director of Operations mentioned above. This Director could report through the Department to Mr. Taylor so that he could be generally advised of the movements and developments of the work carried out by the Executive Committee.

If you agree, I wonder if you would not be willing personally to let Mr. Taylor know of your desire that he continue. I think his continuation would be particularly welcome to all of the groups directly interested in this work and I feel that it would likewise assist greatly in the successful completion of the work.<sup>59a</sup>

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

840.48 Refugees/3924

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

With reference to the *Aide-Mémoire* dated June 29, 1943, handed by Mr. Hayter of the British Embassy to Mr. Reams of the State

<sup>59a</sup> Mr. Taylor was unable to attend the August meeting, and, as indicated in telegram No. 5069 from London, August 4, 10 p.m., p. 199, Ambassador Winant was present instead.

Department,<sup>60</sup> concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, the United States Government concurs in the views of His Majesty's Government as outlined therein, with the following qualifications:

Paragraph III. The United States Government would prefer that the Chairman of the Executive Committee continue to be the British representative.

The United States Government agrees with His Majesty's Government in the proposal that invitations be extended by telegram to the Brazilian, Netherlands and Argentine Governments at once.

The United States Government suggests that should it be found expedient to invite a representative of the French Committee for National Liberation to attend the meeting of the Executive Committee, that this invitation be extended by the Executive Committee after it meets in London.

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1943.

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840.48 Refugees/4060 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 23, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 11:11 p. m.]

4810. Refugee problem. Lord Winterton and Sir Herbert Emerson called on me by appointment today, accompanied by Mr. A. W. G. Randall, Counsellor of the Foreign Office, and discussed a possible preliminary understanding between the American and British representatives before the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees which it is hoped will take place in London on August 4. Winterton laid emphasis upon his desire to proceed on July 29 with the inviting of representatives of other countries, and the Department's response to the proposals below is therefore urgently requested at as early a date as possible. These proposals are aimed at incorporating to date all requirements in the matter, including suggestions heretofore offered by the Department. Winterton, Emerson, and Randall brought with them a draft of suggestions for a preliminary understanding. This we jointly discussed and modified to read as follows:

"It is suggested that before the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee, which it is hoped will take place in London on August 4, there should be a preliminary understanding between the British and American representatives, to be followed if

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<sup>60</sup> Not printed.

possible by a similar understanding with the other members of the Committee, regarding the following main questions:

(1) France. The French Government was a member of the original Executive, and in view of the importance of French colonial territory in connection with refugees it seems very desirable that a place should be found on the Executive for a French representative. It is suggested that while the status of the French National Committee of Liberation is being fixed by the British and American Governments a French representative should be invited to take part in the deliberations of the Committee.

(2) Procedure. When the Executive Committee meets under Lord Winterton's chairmanship, with the director present, it will have an agenda based on this present memorandum and one of its decisions should be to charge the director with notification of the meeting of the Committee to all the original members. This notification would describe the changes in the constitution, membership and scope of the Committee which the Executive propose to effect, and ask for approval. It is agreed that there need be no meeting of the whole Committee. A notification would also be made of the Executive Committee's decision to invite non-members to join the Committee, and this would only be sent when the necessary approaches had been made as described in paragraph 4 below.

(3) Present membership. This is as follows: Australia, Argentine Republic, Belgium, Bolivia, United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, United States of America, France, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela. Guatemala and Panama both withdrew in 1940, but it is suggested that they should be invited to resume membership.

(4) New members. South Africa, Poland, Roumania, Greece, and Costa Rica sent observers to the foundation meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee at Evian in 1938, but did not become members. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, and Czechoslovakia had no concern with the Committee. It seems desirable that all except of course Roumania should be invited to join the Committee, and, if this is agreed by the Executive, it is suggested that before the director issues a formal invitation the British and American Governments should make a diplomatic approach to the potential new members and ascertain whether they would welcome the invitation, should it be sent.

(5) Scope or [of?] Committee's action. The following recommendation was made by the British and American delegations at Bermuda:

"The Committee should be invited to revise its mandate. In order to effect this purpose it is suggested that the mandate should read as follows: "The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or Allied states or organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion or their political beliefs. The operation of the Committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come as a result of the war in Europe or in which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered

to receive and disburse, for the purposes enumerated above, funds both public and private.”’

This formula was adopted in order to bring under the Committee refugees other than Jews, such as the Poles who are in or are being transferred from Persia and the Greek and other Allied refugees in Egypt and elsewhere. It seems desirable, however, to find wording which would give discretion to the Committee, guided by the Executive (which is not necessarily bound by the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference), to include or not various groups of refugees according to what may be found practicable. Accordingly the following alternative is suggested:

“The Committee shall extend its mandate so as to include, as may be found necessary and practicable, in addition to those already within the mandate, those persons wherever they may be who as a result of events in Europe have had to leave or may have to leave their countries of residence because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs.

With regard to persons coming within the mandate as extended the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee would be empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or Allied states or organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport them. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse, for the purposes enumerated above, funds both public and private.’

(6) Finance. The Executive should be informed of the decision by the American and British Governments jointly to underwrite the expenses of the Committee, but should also be told that when a clearer idea has been obtained of the money required for the efficient conduct of the Committee’s work under its new commitments an invitation will be addressed to all the member governments, inviting them to contribute to the running expenses of the Committee and to the transport and maintenance of the refugees, in accordance with their abilities and interest in the humanitarian work which the Committee will undertake.

(7) Staff. It is proposed that the Executive Committee should empower the director to submit an estimate of the staff required, but forthwith to make arrangements for appointing, subject to the Committee’s approval, a salaried full-time vice-director and a salaried full-time secretary, with the necessary clerical staff.

(8) Maintenance of refugees. The American and British Governments have agreed, and presumably will find no difficulty in securing, the agreement of the other members of the Committee, that after the refugees arrive at places of temporary refuge which the Committee has succeeded in obtaining for them they shall be maintained by the United Nations Relief Administration if it is able to carry on activities in the countries in question. If, as seems probable in neutral countries, the United Nations Relief Administration is unable to function, it will then be for the Intergovernmental Committee itself to assume responsibility for maintenance after negotiation with the governments concerned. In general it should be agreed that normally maintenance responsibilities should not be retroactive and that member governments or voluntary organizations who have assumed financial commitments in respect of refugees will wish to continue. Cases of hardships can be considered on their merits. The question whether new groups of refugees should be maintained by the Intergovern-

mental Committee or by their Governments would be for consideration equally on the individual merits of each group.

Foreign Office, 22nd July, 1943."

With regard to the above the Embassy's comments, offered for your consideration, are contained in Embassy's 4811, July 23, 10 p. m.<sup>61</sup>

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4058 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 23, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received July 24—12:35 a. m.]

4811. Reference Embassy's 4810, July 23, 9 p. m. I offer the following comments regarding the proposals in connection with the forthcoming August 4 meeting of the Executive Committee on refugees:

In the matter of a French representative, I find Lord Winterton fully agreeable to pragmatic solution of the question (if the status of the French National Committee of Liberation is not fixed within the next few days) on the basis of the selection, by joint agreement of all parties concerned, of a name which Winterton might announce to the meeting convening on August 4 as having already been agreed upon for the choice of a person to serve as French representative. May I suggest to the Department the desirability of speedily obtaining approval for such a nomination in order that the Executive Committee may be relieved of the necessity of discussing the problem?

With reference to the Department's proposal contained in airgram 791, June 7, 6 p. m., on a proposed joint declaration relating to the repatriation of refugees, and the Embassy's telegram 4661, July 17, 4 p. m.,<sup>62</sup> relating thereto, Randall stated today that the Foreign Secretary had signed a note to me accepting the Department's proposal for a joint declaration and asking that the British Government be informed when an approach pursuant thereto is to be made by the American Ambassador at Kuibyshev in order that the British Ambassador may be instructed to take similar action. The note has not yet been received by the Embassy, but Randall's statement about it is here mentioned for the Department's information in connection with the subject of the present telegram.

WINANT

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<sup>61</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>62</sup> Not printed.

548.G1/185 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 26, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

4874. I received today from Mr. Eden the following reply to a communication sent to him by me upon receipt of the Department's airgram 791, June 7, 6 p. m. :

"Taking in order the points dealt with in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the message from the State Department, we feel, with regard to the point that French territory is not explicitly covered by the terms of the proposed declaration, that, as the declaration is to be issued in the name of 'Governments' it might be difficult to include, at the present stage, the French Committee of National Liberation. Should, however, that body shortly be recognized by our two Governments, its name could eventually be inserted in the declaration, as finally approved by all concerned after the name of Yugoslavia—as was done with the French National Committee in the declaration read by me of the 17th December last in the House of Commons regarding the persecution of the Jews.<sup>63</sup> Alternatively, France could be regarded as covered by the second paragraph of the declaration as now redrafted by the Department of State, but the first suggestion would appear preferable to my Government; it would, we think, be invidious to avoid all mention of French refugees in a statement on behalf of all the Allied countries.

As regards the other modifications of the draft suggested by the Department of State, I am glad to be able to inform you that my Government are in agreement with these. In order to save time His Majesty's Government propose to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow to communicate the draft to the Soviet Government, provided that he sees no grave objection from the Soviet point of view to the modifications proposed, together with the necessary oral explanations for their views and, it is hoped, their concurrence. He will be instructed to act in association with his United States colleague as soon as the latter has received the necessary instructions from the State Department.

I shall be grateful if you will inform me as soon as it is decided to send the necessary instructions to the United States Ambassador at Moscow so that our Ambassador may associate himself with Admiral Standley's approach to the Soviet Government."

WINANT

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<sup>63</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 385, col. 2082.

840.48 Refugees/4060 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1943—9 p. m.

4539. Your 4810, July 23, 9 p. m. The Department is in accord that it is desirable to reach a preliminary understanding between the British and American representatives and concurs with the recommendations in the numbered paragraphs of your telegram with the following exceptions:

1. While it is undoubtedly desirable that a French representative should attend this meeting since French North Africa is to be utilized, the Department does not feel that we should ask the Committee to appoint a representative until our relations with the French Committee of National Liberation are clarified. There is no objection to having the British discuss the matter informally with the French authorities in North Africa with a view to having the latter select a representative. If our relations with the Committee are defined prior to the meeting, all will be well. If not, we would desire the French representative to attend the meeting on a clear understanding that his attendance would not be regarded as affecting the question of our relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation.

4. We believe that the Director should issue formal invitations to the potential new members without any diplomatic approach being made beforehand, as proposed. The public is certain to note and to inquire concerning the omission from any announcement of new member countries of any country which may have declined membership. Accordingly, we feel that such a country should not be in a position to state that no invitation had been issued to it, leaving the British and American Governments to explain.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4087 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 29, 1943.

[Received July 30—2:15 a. m.]

51. Polish series. Mr. Masaryk, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, and Mr. Romer, Polish Foreign Minister, called today and on behalf of Governments listed below requested me to convey to you following message dated July 28, 1943: <sup>64</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> This same message was sent to the British Government which conveyed it through Lord Winterton to the Executive Committee at meeting on August 4.



"The Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia\*<sup>65</sup> have been informed of the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Bermuda Conference on aid of refugees.<sup>66</sup> They have also been informed of the declaration of the United States State Department of May 19th last<sup>67</sup> and of the statements made by Mr. Eden and Mr. Peake<sup>68</sup> on the same day in the House of Commons.<sup>69</sup> They understand that the Conference, although accepting the principle that the winning of the war in the shortest time possible was the best service which their respective Governments could render to the refugees and to all those who are suffering under the tyranny of the Germans and their satellites, reached the conclusion that there are certain possibilities of a limited character for aiding refugees immediately. The Conference has in view, among other things, a scheme to support neutral countries who are receiving refugees, and who would be given an assurance that they are not expected to shoulder unaided and indefinitely the burden entailed by the receiving of refugees. A scheme of financial help to neutral countries is also being contemplated. This presupposes an efficient machinery of international consultation, collaboration and action and to this purpose it is proposed to reestablish an intergovernmental committee on a wider basis, carrying much greater authority.

The Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia prompted by the endeavor to assist to the utmost of their ability their citizens who are suffering severe hardships under the yoke of the Germans and their satellites, but at the same time bearing in mind all the difficulties in the way of a large-scale handling of this problem, avail themselves of this opportunity to assure the American Government that they are fully prepared to undertake the closest cooperation for affording all possible aid to refugees.

It has been suggested and considered with approval that the scheme for financial help to neutral countries should if necessary apply also to Governments of the United Nations who are ready to afford hospitality to refugees."

\* "The reply of the French Committee of National Liberation has not yet arrived from Algiers."

[BIDDLE]

<sup>65</sup> In telegram No. 56, August 12, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, it is explained that the first asterisk indicated in the message refers to a footnote and the second asterisk is the footnote itself (840.48 Refugees/4151).

<sup>66</sup> See telegram No. 155, April 28, 10 p. m., from the Consul General at Hamilton, p. 173.

<sup>67</sup> *Ante*, p. 183.

<sup>68</sup> British Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department.

<sup>69</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 389, cols. 1117-1204.

840.48 Refugees/4104a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1943—4 p. m.

4579. At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees to be held in London on August 4, 1943, the Department desires that you:

1. Recommend that Sir Herbert Emerson continue as the Director of the Executive Committee.

2. Recommend that Mr. Patrick Malin, an American citizen, be named as Vice-Director of the Executive Committee.

3. Recommend that the Secretary of the Executive Committee be a national of one of the member-Governments other than Great Britain or the United States.

4. Vote for a revised mandate as recommended in the report of the Bermuda Conference.

5. Recommend that all projects and the financing thereof be considered individually and the American and British Governments consulted before any favorable decision is taken thereon, in view of the agreement of those Governments to underwrite the expenses of the Committee's operations.

6. Endorse such recommendations for financing as may be made which will cause the other member-Governments to contribute for individual projects, and recommend that the administrative expenses of the Executive Committee be shared equally by the various countries represented.

7. Recommend that the headquarters of the Intergovernmental Committee be continued in London.

8. Recommend that the specific duties of the Intergovernmental Committee as differentiated from the duties of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration be determined.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4115 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, August 4, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received 11 : 44 p. m.]

5069. The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees met at the Foreign Office at 11 o'clock this morning. The following Governments were present, Argentina, Brazil, France, Netherlands and United States, with Lord Winterton in the chair

representing Great Britain. The program you asked me to support was accepted by the Executive Committee with unanimous agreement of those present to so recommend to their Governments.

It was understood that Sir Herbert Emerson will continue as Director. The Executive Committee accepted Patrick Malin as Vice Director and the Secretary was to be a national from another country. We are trying to get Van Weede of the Dutch Government, to accept this post but his name did not come up at the meeting this morning. The Director was empowered to find a suitable candidate and then ask consent of the members of the Executive Committee here.

There is a matter on which I would like your opinion as it has not come up in our interchange of messages. The Director on his opening remarks said that he hoped that the relationship with the League Committee would not be diminished. As you know he has served as Director of the Intergovernmental Committee and also as High Commissioner of the League of Nations Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. I find that he has taken no salary from the Intergovernmental Committee but continues to receive his salary as High Commissioner of the League Committee, a position he held at the time he was made Director. His salary as Commissioner is free from British taxation. If he were paid by the Allied Governments his salary would be subject to income tax here.

I think the British were inclined to accept the League's formula of proportional payment on administration costs. I intervened by recommending that administrative expenses of the Executive Committee be borne equally by all Government members. This was accepted by the Committee for the present year and was made part of the general recommendations. This you asked be done. When the full minutes have been received by the Embassy we will forward a more complete report.

Please tell Mr. Taylor that he was very much missed.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4096 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943—6 p. m.

662. Your 975, July 30, 2 p. m.,<sup>70</sup> and previous. Please present proposed declaration in following language to Soviet Government for agreement:

"The Belgian, Czechoslovak, Greek, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United States and Yugo-

<sup>70</sup> Not printed.

slav Governments recognize with gratitude the humanitarian contributions made toward the solution of the refugee problem by those neutral states which accept and preserve those people fortunate enough to escape across their borders from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion or their political beliefs. They understand that this action often increases the difficulties already caused by the war within these states. These burdens may, of course, be borne under emergency conditions and for limited periods. It cannot be expected that these countries, some of which are already overcrowded, should maintain these people for an indefinite period.

"The above-mentioned Governments hereby declare that they will, at the termination of this war, admit to their territories all of their nationals who may have been displaced by the war into other countries. They further declare that it is a part of their settled policy to ensure such conditions in the enemy countries and the countries under enemy occupation as will permit the return thereto of all persons, of whatever nationality, now displaced therefrom and who have sought refuge in other countries, because of persecution on account of their race or their religious or political beliefs."

We are in agreement with the British Government which suggests that should the French Committee of National Liberation shortly be accepted by our two Governments, the name of the Committee be inserted preceded by the word "and" after "Yugoslav Governments" in the initial paragraph of the declaration and also after "Governments" in the first sentence of the second paragraph.

We are in accord on the proposal to have your British colleague associate himself with you in the approach to the Soviet Government.

The proposed declaration as now written promises the return of the persons mentioned to the "countries" of their former domicile rather than to their former "homes" which could mean the precise places where they had resided. Thus, there would be allowed a broader latitude of action in the resettlement of the displaced persons. The language now identifies the persons to be repatriated as those who are refugees from persecution for racial, religious and political reasons, they being the only persons in whose behalf the declaration is to be made.

Please endeavor expedite agreement by Soviet Government and telegraph results promptly.

HULL

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548.G1/185 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943—10 p. m.

4779. Your 4874, July 26, 8 p. m., and previous. We are in accord with British Government's proposal to have its Ambassador at Moscow

associate himself with our Ambassador in approach to Soviet Government and have today telegraphed our Ambassador to proceed.

Following excerpt from Department's telegram to Moscow is quoted for your and British Government's information:

[Here follows paragraph 4 of telegram No. 662, August 7, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, printed *supra*.]

Such insertion in the second paragraph would require change of second sentence thereof and in quoting proposed declaration to Moscow Department changed that sentence to read: "They further declare that it is a part of their settled policy" etc.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4115 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1943—7 p. m.

4802. Your 5069, August 4, 10 p. m. We see no reason for any change at this time in relationship of Intergovernmental Committee with League Commission as originally established. We appreciate Sir Herbert's continued donation of his services to the former.

Please advise who represents the French at meeting and how designated.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4128 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 9, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received August 9—4: 18 p. m.]

5228. In reading over the minutes of the Executive Committee meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (my 5069 August 4, 10 p. m.) I found that, in place of the phrase "that administrative expenses of the Executive Committee be borne equally by all Government members" the word "share" alone appeared. My statement to the Committee was clear, as I read it from a typed sheet and then argued in support of the position. The Brazilian representative acquiesced in accepting the United States viewpoint, and no one present dissented. As soon as I received the minutes I had Coville<sup>71</sup> contact the Foreign Office. He has just handed me the following memorandum:

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<sup>71</sup> Cabot Coville, First Secretary of Embassy.

“Sir Herbert Emerson has just called me by telephone this afternoon to discuss the matter raised by you of altering the minutes of the recent Executive Committee meeting by the insertion of the word ‘equally’ to read ‘with regard to finance, it was recommended that the member Governments should share equally the administrative expenses of the Committee, and members of the Executive Committee further agree to commend this to their own Governments’.

Sir Herbert states that he has discussed the question with Lord Winterton, who is of the definite opinion that he could not make this alteration without submitting the question to all the other representatives present, and feels that this could not be done without holding another meeting. Lord Winterton states that in putting the question he did not use the word ‘equally’, and that therefore the agreement which was expressed was agreement in the form as used in the minutes only.

Sir Herbert points out that the minutes in their present form, constituting a recommendation that the member Governments should share the administrative expenses, must inevitably bring up hereafter the question of the basis of sharing, and that the American Government will have full opportunity upon that occasion to pursue its proposal of equal sharing of the administrative expenses. This being so, he feels that the American point of view would lose nothing by leaving the minutes in their present form; whereas, if you press for insertion of the word ‘equally’ at the present time, the decision of the members of the Committee might well be against acceptance of this change.

Sir Herbert’s particular apprehension is that for this matter to be pressed now would inevitably cause delay and would hold back the communications to Governments, based on the action taken by the Executive Committee, which he has prepared and holds ready for intended sending tomorrow (August 10). He therefore asks that you accept the minutes as they are (recognizing that the basis of sharing is undetermined but recognizing also that sharing on a basis of equality must inevitably be given consideration hereafter) in order that the work growing out of the meeting may proceed without further waste of time.”

I would gladly call for a re-convening of the Committee, but if you feel, on the other hand, that it is not worth while, I believe that we are protected in the position we took.

Please advise me by cable tonight if possible.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4124 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943—5 p. m.

4815. Your 5228, August 9, 8 p. m. It occurs to us that assent to the insertion of the word “equally” into the minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee might be obtained without another formal

meeting by individual approach to the other members with the explanation of its inadvertent omission. However, in view of the considerations mentioned by you we are agreeable to proceeding as is proposed.

We suggest the advisability of some public statement being made by British and us announcing the meeting and such of the proceedings as it may be deemed expedient to publish at this time. Please consult British confidentially and prepare with them draft for their and our agreement. Bucknell<sup>72</sup> may be of assistance to you in this connection as he was at Bermuda.

We do not understand reference to meeting in Washington contained in your 5138, August 6, 7 p. m.<sup>73</sup> The proposal to hold a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee in Washington was dropped in agreement between Mr. Taylor and Lord Halifax. In this connection see Department's 3879, June 25, 1 p. m. We are still averse to a meeting here.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4142 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 12, 1943.

[Received August 12—5: 43 p. m.]

5303. Following is text of press communiqué given out by Director's office following meeting of Executive Committee of Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees on August 4:

"4th August 1943. Press communiqué. The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees met this morning at the Foreign Office, presided over by Lord Winterton, chairman and British Government representative. The other members of the Committee present were as follows: H. E. the Argentine Ambassador Señor Dr. Don Miguel Angel Carcano, KBE; H. E. the Brazilian Ambassador Señor J. J. Moniz de Aragao, CBE; H. E. the Netherland Ambassador Jonkheer E. Michiels van Verduynen; H. E. the Ambassador of the United States of America, the Honorable Mr. John Gilbert Winant; Monsieur P. Vienot, representative in London of the French Committee of National Liberation. Sir Herbert Emerson, as Director, was present.

The Committee agreed on recommendations involving the reorganization of the Committee as a whole, and an extension of its scope and activities. These recommendations are to be submitted forthwith to the other member Governments. The Committee expressed the hope that the recommendations, when approved, would enable it to make an

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<sup>72</sup> Howard Bucknell, Jr., Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

early contribution towards the alleviation of the present position of refugees, and materially assist in solving the post-war refugee problem.”

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4150 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 12, 1943—9 p. m.  
[Received August 13—1: 50 a. m.]

5305. My 5228, August 9, 8 p. m., and Department's 4815, August 10, 5 p. m. I have now received the complete recommendations of the meeting of August 4th which are embodied in a communication from the Director to member Governments of the Intergovernmental Committee. Text will be forwarded by airmail.<sup>74</sup>

The following two points, in addition to the omission of the word "equally" in connection with the sharing of the administrative expenses of the Executive Committee (which has already been reported to the Department) were omitted from the text although they are implied: (1) That all projects and the financing thereof be considered individually and the American and British Governments consulted before any favorable decision is taken thereon in view of the agreement of those Governments to underwrite the expenses of the Committee's operations, and (2) that the headquarters of the Intergovernmental Committee be continued in London.

I immediately took up with Sir Herbert Emerson the matter of the textual inclusion of these two points in the recommendations to member Governments as desired by the Department. He foresees no objection to agreement on the part of the member Governments to include the desired phraseology as a clarification of the original minutes and as an addition to the recommendations made by the Executive Committee.

With Winterton's approval he is taking up these two points individually and informally with the members of the Executive Committee. Also with Winterton's approval, Emerson discussed the question of the recommendation regarding the equal sharing of the administrative expenses of the Committee with the Foreign Office which seemed to approve but which did reserve the right to reconsider in case objection develops. Emerson now proposes to approach members of the Executive Committee informally and individually regarding this point, although he feels that this may be the occasion of some disagreement. He is not clear as to (a) exactly what the "administrative expenses

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<sup>74</sup> Letters dated August 10, not printed.



of the Executive Committee" are intended to include and (b) whether it is proposed that these expenses be shared equally by members of the Executive Committee alone or by members of the Intergovernmental Committee as a whole. The Department's instructions on these points are requested.

As regards a statement to the press concerning the meeting of August 4th, it was agreed by the Executive Committee at that time that the press communiqué quoted in our telegram No. 5303, August 12, should be given out by the Director's office to all newspapers and domestic and foreign news services. It was agreed that this should be brief and do little more than state the fact of meeting in that it was felt that the reaction on Governments would not be favorable if they just learned of recommendations of the Executive Committee through the press.

It appears that due to lack of space this communiqué was not referred to or published in any way in England insofar as the Embassy can ascertain. I propose, however, to have an early discussion with the Foreign Office to endeavor to prepare a statement to the press which could be released jointly by our two Governments. Any draft agreed upon would of course be submitted in advance to the Department for approval.

My reference in my 5138, August 6, 7 p. m.,<sup>75</sup> to a meeting in Washington was through inadvertence since it was agreed at the meeting on August 4th that no plenary meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee would be necessary.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4150 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1943—4 p. m.

4927. Your 5305, August 12, 9 p. m. We regret omission of two points mentioned in Committee's recommendations. They must be included. The first relating to consideration of projects individually is highly important in as much as it follows a directive from the President. In a memorandum dated May 14, 1943, in answer to a question presented by the Secretary regarding our participation in the cost of financing from time to time the movement of refugees, the President stated "I suggest that we do not give unlimited promises but that we undertake with Britain to share the cost of financing from time to time any specific cases".

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<sup>75</sup> Not printed.

Our answers to the questions raised regarding the administrative expenses of the Executive Committee are: (a) expenses as heretofore incurred in the financing of which we have shared and propose to continue to share; (b) the expenses should be shared equally by members of the Intergovernmental Committee as a whole, membership on that Committee carrying with it such responsibility.

In regard to publicity concerning the Committee meeting, we received advance information on August 12 that a portion of the press here was to publish on the following day a story regarding the meeting. Accordingly, we were obliged to prepare some statement for immediate release in time to reach the press on August 13.<sup>76</sup> The substance of the release is given in Radio Bulletin no. 192 of August 12. The British Embassy was informed and given an advance copy of the release to be telegraphed to London with the request that you be also advised. It would have been of much assistance to us to have had beforehand the communiqué issued by Sir Herbert Emerson as conveyed by your 5305 of August 12.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4155: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 17, 1943.

[Received August 17—5:55 p. m.]

5387. The Chairman having obtained the consent of the members of the Executive Committee on Refugees, the Director is today addressing to the members of the Intergovernmental Committee identical letters as follows:

“In continuation of my letter dated 10th August to Your Excellency, I have been instructed by the Chairman of the Committee to say that the Executive Committee has adopted the further recommendations, first, that: ‘The headquarters of the Intergovernmental Committee should continue to be in London’. Second, that: ‘In view of the agreement of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America jointly to underwrite the expenditure of the Committee other than administrative expenses, it be agreed that all projects and the financing thereof be considered individually, and that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America be consulted before a project is sanctioned or expenditure incurred thereon.’ I am accordingly to request that Your Excellency will kindly communicate these recommendations to Your Excellency’s Government for favourable consideration.”

WINANT

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<sup>76</sup> See Department of State *Bulletin*, August 14, 1943, p. 98.

840.48 Refugees/4175 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 20, 1943.

[Received August 20—9:15 p. m.]

5470. I have received from the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees a letter dated August 19 enclosing the memorandum quoted below. The Director states that the Chairman has instructed that it be circulated to the members of the Executive Committee and that the Chairman will be grateful if I communicate in due course any comments which I may wish to make on the memorandum, notifying the Director whether I would wish the memorandum to be discussed in Executive Committee. I should appreciate the Department's instructions. The memorandum follows:

"12th August 1943. Memorandum on relations of the Intergovernmental Committee with voluntary organizations. The relations between the Intergovernmental Committee, on the one hand, and private organizations and workers, on the other, are of importance. Before war, voluntary organizations were active in many countries. Some were concerned with refugee questions in general but most of them were interested in particular groups of refugees, e. g. Russians, Armenians, Spaniards, German and Austrian, Czechs, etc. Within the nationality groups there were and still are separate organizations according to religion—Catholic, Protestant, Jewish. The activities show much diversity. In some organizations the functions are purely humanitarian. In others they are almost entirely political. Often they are mixed. As might be expected from the nature and size of the problem, great difference exists among the Jewish organizations. During the war new bodies have been formed relating to fresh groups, e. g. Greeks and Poles, or have devoted themselves to particular aspects of old or new problems. Contact with organizations previously working in occupied countries has necessarily been lost, but it is known that some have been able to continue, although with limited and controlled functions. As soon as conditions allow, others will revive and new ones be formed. Private organizations already number many hundreds. They may well run into thousands after the war.

2. There is a great volume of good will, effort, and also money being devoted to the cause of refugees; it is most desirable to encourage, extend and utilize it. The Intergovernmental Committee will, therefore, presumably wish to cooperate so far as practicable with responsible private organizations and individuals working in the refugee field, and to charge the Director and his staff with this general duty. Cooperation can be secured in various ways:

(a) by establishing and maintaining contact with the various organizations

(b) by being accessible in receiving deputations and representations

(c) by giving the more important and reliable organizations information regarding activities and plans, where it is not neces-

sary, in the interests of refugees or for other reasons, to observe secrecy

(*d*) by encouraging the organizations to furnish information which they may have

(*e*) by consulting organizations and individuals on particular matters on which they may have special knowledge and experience

(*f*) by inviting, where this is desirable, individuals with special knowledge or experience to join (1) the sub-committees which the Intergovernmental Committee or the Executive Committee may set up for the study of particular questions, and (2) committees which the Director may find it convenient to form for a similar purpose.

In short, the Director and his staff must be accessible to voluntary bodies interested in any of the numerous classes of refugees that are included within the activities of the Committee. In particular, they must give no ground for complaint that the Committee is more interested in one group or another, although, of course, from time to time, a particular group, because of the actual facts, may require more attention than another.

The fact that the scope of the Committee's activities is very wide indeed should be continuously borne in mind.

3. It may sometimes be convenient and economical for the Committee to arrange for the maintenance of refugees through voluntary organizations rather than direct, and to subsidize them where necessary. This is a particular aspect of the question which will require separate attention.

4. The methods of cooperation suggested above would apply not only to the headquarters staff of the Committee, but also to the representatives of the Committee in other countries. An important part of their duties would be to keep contact and to cooperate with responsible organizations within their area.

5. The degree of cooperation will necessarily vary. It can be full when the objects of the organization are humanitarian. When they are mixed up with politics, the Director and his staff will have to be careful. For instance, the merits or otherwise of a free Austria after the war are not their concern; nor should they get involved in the political side of the Palestine question. Again, there are organizations whose motives are excellent but whose methods are to bring pressure on their own Government and sometimes other Governments by public agitation, which, in the past, has sometimes included irresponsible and unfounded charges. It is suggested that while the Director and his staff should be accessible to such bodies where they have useful contributions to make, they should not allow themselves to be associated with attacks on any member Government of the Committee. This does not mean that the Director and his officers would be debarred from urging on member Governments more liberal measures. Indeed, this will be an important part of their duties, especially as regards the reception of refugees, but they have to do this through friendly relations by reason and persuasion.

6. It will probably be desirable for the Executive Committee itself to receive deputations when important questions of policy are involved. There is almost certain to be a revival of certain proposals

submitted by private bodies or individuals for consideration at the Bermuda discussions. Some of these have been rejected as impracticable by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America and public statements have been made to this effect. This will not prevent them being raised again, and I anticipate that requests will be made for the Executive Committee to receive a deputation or deputations. It is only fair that non-official refugee organizations, provided that their *bona fides* is above reproach, should have an opportunity of prosecuting their case before the Executive Committee itself, although some of their proposals may not be practicable.

7. I do not think that it would be wise in the early stages at any rate, to establish formal and regular relationship with any particular organization or group of organizations, e. g. to set up an advisory council. Proposals of this kind have already been made by some of the Jewish organizations, but apart from the practical difficulties that would arise in getting a truly representative body, the principle, if accepted for one class of refugees, must be extended to others, and administration would be hampered by a multitude of counsellors.

The methods of cooperation which I have suggested are practical and should be adequate. H. W. Emerson."

WINANT

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548.G1/187 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 24, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received August 24—7:20 p. m.]

5574. Declaration on maintenance and repatriation of refugees in neutral states. In replying to my note based on the Department's 4779, August 7, 10 p. m., the Foreign Office states that it has duly informed the British Ambassador in Moscow. The Foreign Office further states its agreement with the changes in the declaration along the lines suggested.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4175 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1943.

5180. Your 5470, August 20. The Department has considered the memorandum of August 12, 1943 which you have received from the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and concurs in all of the suggestions contained therein, with the following reservations:

1. The suggestion mentioned in clause (f) of part 2 is not desirable so far as any proposal to invite individuals from private organizations to become members of technical committees or subcommittees may be concerned. However, the Department would interpose no objection to the action of any technical committee or subcommittee in inviting members of private organizations to appear before them and discuss with them any proposals which may be under consideration. A distinction should be maintained between the responsible members of a committee or subcommittee, whose action should be authoritative, and the status of a technical witness or special pleader, whose opinions should be of a recommendatory character only.

2. Part 3 of the memorandum involves a proposed practice which may jeopardize the procurement in the United States of official appropriations or funds necessary to operate individual projects. It is possible that the subsidizing of private organizations would not meet with congressional approval. It is also likely that that procedure would create dissension among the various interested private organizations.

The Department concurs that it would be inadvisable to establish any permanent advisory council as mentioned in paragraph 7.

In view of the above comments and the possibility that other members will also comment on the memorandum, it would seem that a discussion of the memorandum by Executive Committee would be necessary to reconcile divergent points of view.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4476 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 14, 1943.

[Received September 14—4:05 p. m.]

6097. Reference Embassy's airmail despatch 11174, September 13, 1943,<sup>77</sup> I have received the following communication from the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees:

"13th September 1943. There will be a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee at 3 p. m. on Thursday 30th September at the office of the Committee, 11D Regent Street, London. The agenda is as follows:

1. Appointment of the Secretary
2. Estimate of staff requirements

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<sup>77</sup> Not printed; it transmitted copy of a letter of September 9 from the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and three memoranda received therewith. The Director stated that the subjects discussed in the memoranda would be included in the agenda of the next meeting of the Executive Committee. (840.48 Refugees/4483)

3. The relations of the Intergovernmental Committee with voluntary organizations
4. Proposals to include private individuals in the Intergovernmental Committee
5. The administrative expenses of the Executive Committee
6. Any other business.

Memoranda on items 2, 3, 4 and 5 have already been circulated. A memorandum on item 1, and a further memorandum on item 3 will be circulated before the meeting."

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4483 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1943—3 p. m.

5876. Your 6097, September 14 and your airmail despatch no. 11174, September 13.<sup>78</sup> You are instructed to represent the United States Government at the meeting of the Executive Committee to be held September 30, 1943, since Mr. Myron C. Taylor is unable to attend.

The following comment refers to the numbered paragraphs of your no. 6097:

(1) The Department understands that the Secretary will be a national of a member Government other than Great Britain or the United States.

(2) The Department perceives no objection to the estimate of additional staff requirements mentioned in Enclosure 3 to your despatch under reference, but you are free to discuss this question with an open mind and agree to any changes which seem reasonable to you.

(3) and (4) The Department stated in its no. 5180 of August 25, its position regarding the extent to which private individuals or voluntary organizations should be permitted to participate in the deliberations of the Committee. The views expressed by Sir Herbert Emerson in paragraphs 3 to 5 inclusive of Enclosure 2 to your despatch under reference are fully concurred in by the Department.

(5) While the Department has felt that the administrative expenses of the Executive Committee should be shared equally by the member Governments of the Intergovernmental Committee the Department is willing to consider a recommendation of the Executive Committee that such expenses be shared according to the Evian Scale as we had formerly agreed when the Committee was first organized.

The Department will appreciate receiving a complete report of the proceedings of the meeting of the Executive Committee to be held on September 30, 1943.

HULL

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<sup>78</sup> With reference to the latter, see footnote 77, p. 211.

840.48 Refugees/4669 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 14, 1943.

[Received October 14—12:30 p. m.]

7021. Reference third sentence of Embassy's telegram 6616, October 1 and section numbered 7 of airgram A-1160, October 3 [2], 2 p. m.<sup>79</sup> An appropriate question having been asked and answered in the House of Commons yesterday, a press communiqué is being released today at 5 p. m. Greenwich time by the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee in the form agreed to at the September 30 meeting of the Executive Committee. Effort is being made to assure attention by the press. The complete text follows:

"At the meeting held on August 4th last, the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees agreed on recommendations involving the reorganization of the Committee as a whole and the extension of its scope and activities. These recommendations were submitted to the member Governments of the Committee and communicated to certain other Governments that were invited to join the Committee.

The following Governments are members of the Committee or have been invited to join:

Australia, Argentina Republic, Belgium, Bolivia, United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, United States of America, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Salvador, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

As the recommendations have reached all the Governments concerned, it is now possible to make public the nature of the proposals.

Previous to the reorganization of the Committee, its activities were restricted to refugees from Germany and Austria and from the Sudeten areas. It is now proposed to extend the mandate so as to include, as far as practicable also those persons wherever they may be who, as a result of events in Europe, have had to leave, or may have to leave, their countries of residence, because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs.

It has been further recommended that with regard to persons coming within the extended mandate, the Executive Committee should be empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or Allied states or with organizations, to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport the refugees and to receive and disburse for the above purposes both public and private funds.

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<sup>79</sup> Neither printed.



With regard to finance, the Executive Committee has recommended that the administrative expenses should be shared by all the member Governments. With regard to other expenditure, the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America have agreed subject to legislative consent to underwrite it jointly on the condition, first, that all projects which come within this offer shall be considered individually, and the two Governments consulted before a project is sanctioned or expenditure incurred thereon; and second, that when a clearer idea has been obtained of the money required for the efficient conduct of the Committee's work under its new commitments, an invitation will be addressed to all the member Governments inviting them to contribute to this expenditure also, in accordance with their abilities and their interest in the humanitarian work of the Committee.

The responsibility for maintenance will not be retroactive and it is confidently expected that member Governments or voluntary organizations who have assumed financial commitments in respect of refugees will continue to do so. The question whether new groups of refugees in need of assistance will be maintained by the Intergovernmental Committee or by their own Governments will be for consideration on the individual merits of each case.

The Executive Committee has recommended that, in order to avoid overlapping, the proposed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration should be responsible for maintenance of refugees in areas where it is operating, if it is prepared to undertake this task."

WINANT

840.48 Refugees/4687 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 20, 1943.

[Received October 20—10 p. m.]

7236. With regard to a joint declaration to neutral states concerning repatriation of refugees, the Embassy has today received the following letter dated October 18 from the Foreign Office:

"On 18th of August Mr. Law wrote to your Ambassador regarding the proposed declaration of the Allied nations regarding the maintenance and repatriation of refugees now receiving hospitality in neutral countries. It appears that the United States Ambassador and our Ambassador in Moscow communicated the text on which both our Governments had agreed to the Soviet Government on 14th August, just 2 months ago. No reply has come, and we are therefore asking the Ambassador in Moscow to make an effort to get one. Should the Soviet Government still not furnish their views I should like to suggest that both our Governments might agree for our respective Ambassadors in Moscow to:

(a) Press the Soviet Government to say why they are unable to concur; or

(b) Obtain the Soviet Government's concurrence in our ap-

proaching all the other Governments concerned, to none of whom have we of course yet communicated either the text or even our intention of promoting the declaration at all.

It would be unfortunate if the declaration had to be issued with the Soviet Government omitted but it is our feeling, as also, I think, [that] of the Intergovernmental Committee, that the Allied declaration should be issued as soon as possible and that at the very least the other Governments whom it is proposed to ask to join in it should not be kept in ignorance in the absence of any expression of views on the part of the Soviet Government."

Instruction as to the action which the Department may take in response to the British suggestions above would be appreciated by the Embassy.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4096 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)*

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1943—11 p. m.

1039. We have just observed that the word "now" in the final sentence of the second paragraph of the proposed joint declaration relating to the repatriation of refugees, as embodied in our 662 of August 7, 6 p. m., could be interpreted so as to limit the number of refugees affected to those displaced at the date of issuance of the declaration. Please therefore request the Soviet authorities, to whom you have presented the draft for consideration, to delete the word from the draft.

We doubt the advisability of pressing the Soviet authorities at this moment for their agreement to the declaration but we would appreciate the receipt of a statement from them to be obtained later by you at a more opportune time, as to the Soviet Government's acceptance of the declaration.

Foregoing repeated to London <sup>80</sup> for the information of the British Government.

STETTINIUS

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840.48 Refugees/4722 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 1, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 6 : 25 p. m.]

7565. In accordance with Department's 6549, October 20, midnight,<sup>81</sup> we informed the Foreign Office by letter dated October 21

<sup>80</sup> As telegram No. 6549, October 20, midnight.

<sup>81</sup> See footnote 80, above.

and have now received the following reply from the Foreign Office dated October 29, seeking the Department's agreement to certain instructions:

"Thank you for your letter of the 21st October informing me of your Government's reactions to the present impasse which the affair of the declaration to neutrals has reached.

We agree that the word 'now' should be omitted from the last sentence of the second paragraph of the draft declaration, and also that we should not press the Soviet Government to agree to the issue of the declaration. At the same time, however, the considerable fresh influx of refugees into Sweden and Switzerland seems to make it advisable that we should not await the Soviet Government's concurrence before informing at least those governments whose refugees are now burdening the neutral countries that we hope to arrange in due course for the issue of an Allied declaration. Subject, therefore, to the agreement of the State Department, we should like to instruct our representatives to the Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Greek, Norwegian, Belgian and Netherlands Governments to inform orally the Governments to which they are accredited of the step we hope to take. I hardly think we can withhold this information much longer."

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4729 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 2, 1943.

[Received November 3—1: 23 a. m.]

77. Polish series. In a note of October 26, Monsieur de Jean, head of the French Mission accredited to the Allied Governments established in London, refers to the communication of July 28 (quoted in my 51 of July 29th) regarding the desire of the Allied Governments named therein to collaborate in aiding refugees as envisaged by the Bermuda Conference, and states that he now desires to advise that the French Committee of National Liberation whose reply had to be reserved at that time considers itself as engaged by the above-mentioned *démarche* of July 28.

Interested authorities here informed.

[BIDDLE]

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840.48 Refugees/4722 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1943—8 p. m.

1191. With reference to Department's number 1039, October 20. Large number refugees in Sweden and Switzerland make it urgent

to announce proposed joint declaration on repatriation in near future. Other countries have not been informed of proposed declaration pending Soviet Government's acceptance. You are requested to discuss this with Soviet authorities at earliest appropriate date and endeavor to secure their acceptance.

STETTINIUS

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840.48 Refugees/4722 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1943—10 p. m.

7089. With reference to your number 7565, November 1, Department is unable to see how benefits derived from informing other governments of proposed declaration on repatriation prior to having approval of the Soviet Government would justify incurring possible displeasure of Soviet authorities should they disapprove the declaration. Department believes declaration will be of little value unless accepted by Soviet Government and is requesting American Ambassador at Moscow to endeavor to expedite Soviet reply.

STETTINIUS

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840.48 Refugees/4763 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 11, 1943.

[Received November 12—1:29 a. m.]

7867. The Secretary of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees has circulated notice of an Executive Committee meeting November 18th. The agenda includes the following.

1. Procedure for approval of minutes as proposed in enclosure to despatch 12063 November 4, 1943.<sup>82</sup> Department's instructions are requested.

2. The acceptance of Kullmann<sup>83</sup> as Honorary Assistant Director. Embassy believes Department's already expressed approval will be sufficient.

3. There may be a report from the sub-committee on administrative expenses if the Brazilian Ambassador receives instructions in time. No new instructions to us are believed necessary at present.

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<sup>82</sup> Not printed.

<sup>83</sup> Gustave Gerard Kullmann, Swiss citizen, Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations.

4. The Embassy desires Department's instructions with regard to relations between IGC<sup>84</sup> and UNRRA<sup>85</sup> concerning which the following memorandum dated November 8th from the Director is to serve as basis for a request by him for authorization by the Executive Committee:

"1. At the meeting of the Executive Committee held on the 30th September 1943, the Director stated that he and the Vice-Director had started preliminary and exploratory inquiries regarding the relations between the IGC and the UNRRA, and that when the case was ready it would be submitted for consideration at the next meeting of the Committee.

2. The preliminary stages of inquiry and discussion included the following:

(a) The draft of a memorandum by the Director in consultation with the Vice-Director stating their conception of the relations between IGC and UNRRA.

(b) Discussions of this memorandum with Sir Frederick Leith-Ross<sup>86</sup> and his colleagues on the British side, the result being that it was accepted with very slight modification as according with their views.

(c) Discussion of the memorandum with representatives of the Embassy of the United States of America and also representatives in this country of the OFRRO,<sup>87</sup> the official American relief organization. As a result of this discussion the memorandum was referred by the representatives of OFRRO to their headquarters in Washington, the question also being raised as to whether it would be desirable for the Director or Vice-Director to be present if, and when, the question was discussed at the conference relating to UNRRA which is to take place this month in Atlantic City.<sup>88</sup>

(d) The result of the reference in Washington is given in the letter attached (enclosure 1 from Mr. Jackson, Special Assistant to Governor Lehman, the Director of OFRRO, to Mr. Hoehler, the head of its London office).

(e) During those discussions, it was made clear by the Director and Vice-Director that the memorandum represented their views only and not necessarily those of the Executive Committee, and that the object of the discussions was to enable the Director to submit the case to the Executive Committee in a form in which the issues would be clearly defined. Similarly, it was made clear on the other side that the views expressed could not commit UNRRA and that the question would have to be considered by that body.

(f) Subject to the above qualification, the present position is that a large, indeed almost complete, measure of agreement has been reached in the preliminary and non-committal discussions,

<sup>84</sup> Intergovernmental Committee.

<sup>85</sup> United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

<sup>86</sup> Chairman, Inter-Allied Committee on Postwar Requirements.

<sup>87</sup> Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Department of State.

<sup>88</sup> See Department of State Conference Series No. 53: *First Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Selected Documents, Atlantic City, New Jersey, November 10-December 1, 1943* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1944).

and that the question is likely to be discussed in the very near future in the course of the conference at Atlantic City.

3. The attached memorandum (enclosure 2) embodies the views of the Directorate put forward during the preliminary discussions, and accepted to the extent indicated above. The Executive Committee is now requested to consider and to adopt, with such modification as it may deem necessary, the conception of the relations between the two bodies as stated in the memorandum.

The Executive Committee is further requested to authorize the Directorate to take what consequent action may be necessary including the following:

(a) To arrange for the decisions of the Executive Committee to be available during the discussions in Atlantic City.

(b) To arrange that, if any difference of a principle should emerge during those discussions, the IGC be given an opportunity of representing its views before any conclusions are reached.

(c) To invite Mr. Myron Taylor, on behalf of the Executive Committee, kindly to represent the IGC if this is necessary, or if he is unable to attend, kindly to arrange for Mr. Robert Pell (formerly on the IGC staff and now in the Department of State, and designated as Mr. Taylor's alternate on IGC matters) to represent the IGC and to arrange that Mr. Myron Taylor be adequately briefed."

First enclosure mentioned above is letter of October 14<sup>89</sup> from Hugh Jackson of OFRRO to Fred K. Hoehler and second is memorandum transmitted with despatch 11508, October 5th.<sup>90</sup>

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4763 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1943.

7283. With reference to your 7867 November 11, Department concurs in procedure for approval of minutes of Executive Committee as outlined in despatch 12063, November 4.<sup>90</sup>

Concerning relations between IGC and UNRRA Department will delay instructions in view of discussions taking place at Atlantic City Conference.

We believe it inadvisable for IGC representative to attend Atlantic City Conference at this time. Matter has been discussed with Mr. Myron Taylor who concurs in this view.

HULL

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<sup>89</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

840.48 Refugees/4788 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 19, 1943.

[Received November 19—11:30 a. m.]

8078. The November 18 meeting of the Executive Committee of the IGC took place uneventfully. For the agenda see despatch 12251 November 16.<sup>91</sup> We acted in accordance with Department's 7283, 17th. Because of our stating that in the matter of relations between IGC and UNRRA Department will delay instructions in view of discussions taking place at Atlantic City Conference the Director did not request the authority outlined in his November 8 memorandum<sup>92</sup> but asked for permission to make arrangements for tentative discussions on the basis of that memorandum. The Committee without committing itself authorized him to do so, subject to report to the Committee's subsequent approval or disapproval (Lord Winterton particularly asked for concurrence to this, stating that it would be useful in meeting anticipated questions in the House of Commons on IGC activities in arranging for relations with UNRRA).

A subject discussed informally with Winterton, Emerson and Randall after the meeting is taken up in the Embassy's next telegram.

WINANT

840.48 Refugees/4782 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 19, 1943.

[Received November 19—12:10 p. m.]

8079. A matter has been raised with the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees which may make desirable a decision to whether the organization's affairs are to be subject to determination by majority vote, require unanimity, or are to be regulated in accordance with some basic document on procedure still to be adopted stipulating unanimous vote for some questions and majority vote for others. Department's instructions not later than November 24, when the subject is to be discussed further, are urgently requested.

The immediate problem is brought up by part of a letter dated November 14 from the Brazilian Ambassador to the Director as follows:

<sup>91</sup> Not printed, but see telegram No. 7867, November 11, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 217.

<sup>92</sup> Text quoted in telegram No. 7867, p. 217.

“With reference to the subject matter discussed by the sub-committee regarding the administrative expenses of the Intergovernmental Committee, I have received instructions from my Government requesting me to inform them of the point-of-view of the other members of the Executive Committee, namely, France, Argentine and the Netherlands, as to whether they consider that the expenses referred to above should include those of the Committee’s representatives abroad.

Would it therefore be possible to submit to these members the divergent points-of-view of Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and that of Brazil on the other, and the question decided by a majority vote?”

In this connection various alternative possibilities occur to the Embassy:

1. The sub-committee was presumably set up to make a recommendation to the Executive Committee and save it effort, and the Brazilian Government should hardly expect to discharge the responsibility by throwing the decision back upon the Executive Committee. Department may wish to consider instructing Ambassador Caffery<sup>93</sup> to endeavor to have the Brazilian Government retract the instruction. Neither the Director nor Chairman feel that further approach by them to the Brazilian Ambassador here would be effective.

2. To avoid for the present the problem of admitting vote by majority the Department may wish to consider withdrawing our suggestion on administrative expenses and accepting the Brazilian plan. Randall of the Foreign Office is slightly inclined to this course but states that he does not speak for the Foreign Office which seems ready in this matter to follow whatever lead the Department may wish to give. He is putting the question to the British Treasury for its advice.

3. In any event the Director’s in effect canvassing the vote of the Executive Committee for the benefit of the Brazilian member of the sub-committee is too cumbrous a procedure, but the Department may wish to consider having the question referred back to the Executive Committee for decision by majority vote. Winterton inclines to the view that majority voting procedure is desirable in the IGC to increase sense of participation by other Governments and to avoid the limitations always obstructing unanimous procedure organizations. It is not impossible that a vote in the Executive Committee would support the British-American position on administrative expenses, and even if not the cost might be worth the gain. The Executive Committee now numbers six but will be a more workable body for voting purposes when increased as now hoped by some such addition as the Soviet Union, Poland and Mexico. Protection for the United States and Great Britain against cost of projects favored only by other countries is already covered by the requirement of our consent, and the danger of our being blocked by a negative majority vote on proj-

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<sup>93</sup> Jefferson Caffery, Ambassador in Brazil.



ects which we favor does not appear insurmountable when humanitarian considerations are so heavily involved. This is perhaps an opportunity to allow a question to be submitted without comment to majority decision by the Executive Committee, thus permitting the organization to develop in that direction without the necessity of a definitive regulation of procedure in that regard although it must be realized this would establish a precedent difficult to avoid in the future.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4781 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 19, 1943.

[Received November 19—11:35 a. m.]

8080. Foreign Office states that British Ambassador in Moscow reports that Soviet Government has accepted the proposed declaration to neutrals (Department's 6897, 3d<sup>94</sup>) as modified by Department's suggestion. Foreign Office now favors approach to other Allied nations. Department's instructions therefore requested. Urgent letter from Randall, Counselor of Foreign Office, dated November 18 follows:

"I was on the point of replying to your letter of the 4th November and Coville's of the 12th about the draft declaration to neutrals when a telegram arrived from our Ambassador in Moscow saying that the People's Commissariat accepted the declaration together with the omission proposed by the State Department (see Coville's letter of the 21st October) of the word 'now' in the concluding sentence of the second paragraph.

The next step seems to be to carry the other Allied Nations with us so that we can publish an Allied Nation's declaration. I would therefore suggest that our respective representatives to those Governments should concert a joint approach here and (for the Greeks and Yugoslavs) in Cairo. We should therefore be grateful if you would let us know whether the State Department agree so that we may take action as soon as possible."

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4796 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943—1 p. m.

7346. It is suggested that it would be well to establish small offices in Algiers, Naples, Lisbon, Madrid and Ankara for the purpose of as-

<sup>94</sup> Not printed, but see telegrams No. 662, August 7, and No. 1039, October 20, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, pp. 200 and 215, respectively.

sisting refugees. We would be disposed to share with the British Government the expenses of maintenance of such offices in case the expenses could not be conveniently provided from the administrative funds of the Executive Committee. It is thought that both British and American officials should be sent to each office. In the cases of Algiers and Naples the approval of the responsible military authorities would of course have to be obtained. In the cases of Lisbon, Madrid and Ankara the consent of the Portuguese, Spanish and Turkish Governments, respectively, would have to be obtained. Also in the case of Madrid it would seem advisable to obtain the opinion of the American and British Ambassadors there on the proposal in view of the confidential arrangements made with the Spanish Government for the care and evacuation of refugees in Spain.<sup>94a</sup>

Please discuss this with the appropriate British authorities and in agreement with them present it to the Executive Committee and advise us as promptly as possible of the results.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4782 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1943.

7413. With reference to the necessity for determining the manner in which the affairs of the Intergovernmental Committee are to be decided, referred to in your 8079, November 19, the Department approves decisions by majority vote if the approval of the Committee therefor can be obtained.

It may be found necessary to agree that any Government desiring to contribute less than its share of administrative expenses according to the Evian Scale be permitted to do so. The Department agrees to share equally with the British Government the deficit which would result from such action by one or more Member Governments. You are requested to submit this proposal to the authorities of the British Government before presenting it to the Directorate of the Intergovernmental Committee. In this connection reference is made to the Department's 7346 of November 20 suggesting the establishment of small offices of the Intergovernmental Committee in specified cities for the purpose of assisting refugees.

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<sup>94a</sup> See pp. 250 ff.

With reference to the attitude of the Brazilian Government the Department refers to its 7058 of November 9<sup>95</sup> captioned "Personal for the Ambassador from Matthews".<sup>96</sup>

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4096 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>97</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1943—10 p. m.

7442. We are glad to state that we have just received a telegram dated November 13 from the American Embassy at Moscow<sup>98</sup> advising that the Embassy is in receipt of a note dated November 11 from the Soviet Foreign Office stating that the proposed text for the joint declaration concerning the repatriation of refugees as modified (see the Department's 4779, August 7, 10 p. m. and 6549, October 20, midnight to you<sup>99</sup>) is considered acceptable by the Soviet Government. Please immediately inform the British Government which we assume will take prompt steps to place the proposed joint declaration before the other United Nations Governments concerned and ask for their adherence thereto.

In order that there will be no misunderstanding as to the wording of the declaration as now accepted by this and the British and Soviet Governments, it is repeated as follows:

"The Belgian, Czechoslovak, Greek, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslav Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation recognize with gratitude the humanitarian contributions made toward the solution of the refugee problem by those neutral states which accept and preserve those people fortunate enough to escape across the borders from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion or their political beliefs. They understand that this action often increases the difficulties already caused by

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<sup>95</sup> This telegram stated: "Ambassador Caffery telegraphs me that the Brazilian Foreign Minister says he will authorize the \$24,000 contribution." (840.48 Refugees/4688)

<sup>96</sup> H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>97</sup> In despatch No. 12727, December 13, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, it was indicated that the Embassy sent a note similar to this telegram to the British Foreign Office on November 26. In the Foreign Office reply, dated December 10, a copy of which was enclosed with the despatch, the Foreign Office expressed agreement to the text of the joint declaration (as quoted in this telegram), and indicated they had communicated it to the other Allied Governments concerned (with exception of the Soviet Government). With reference to the last paragraph of this telegram, they expressed agreement to the interpretation of the application of the declaration to Europe and the explanation to be used if necessary with regard to the declaration. (840.48 Refugees/4893)

<sup>98</sup> Telegram No. 1939, not printed.

<sup>99</sup> With regard to latter telegram, see footnote 80, p. 215.

the war within these states. These burdens may, of course, be borne under emergency conditions and for limited periods. It cannot be expected that these countries, some of which are already overcrowded, should maintain these people for an indefinite period.

The above-mentioned Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation hereby declare that they will, at the termination of this war, admit to their territories all of their nationals who may have been displaced by the war into other countries. They further declare that it is part of their settled policy to ensure such conditions in the enemy countries and the countries under enemy occupation as will permit the return thereto of all persons, of whatever nationality, displaced therefrom and who have sought refuge in other countries, because of persecution on account of their race or their religious or political beliefs.”

We understand that the conferees at Bermuda in suggesting this declaration thought that it might well be limited to apply to Europe and therefore drafted it for joint issuance by the European Governments named, members of the United Nations, plus the United States, following the joint statement which was made last year (see Department's press release of December 16 [17], 1942, no. 589<sup>1</sup>) condemning Nazi treatment of the Jews in Europe. We have concurred in the thought, as we assume the British authorities also have done and we suggest that in agreement with them this statement is to be used in explaining to any of the other United Nations Governments who may inquire, why they have not been asked to join in the declaration.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4772 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1943—7 p. m.

7519. There is considerable publicity being given to the legislation referred to in your 7970, November 16<sup>2</sup> and because of the very active popular demand for information as to concrete results obtained by the Intergovernmental Committee for saving the Jews from Hitler, the Department desires to make public immediately information concerning (1) the revised mandate as proposed by the Bermuda Conference and (2) the opening of the center in North Africa for persons who escape from Nazi persecution.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1942, p. 1009.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; it mentioned a news item which referred to a joint resolution of Democratic and Republican members of Congress, introduced in both Houses, recommending the creation by President Roosevelt of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate a program to save the surviving Jews of Europe from extinction by Hitler.

The Department believes it would be desirable for such release to be issued by the Intergovernmental Committee and you are requested to ask the British for their immediate concurrence and request the Intergovernmental Committee to make immediate announcement telegraphing text and proposed date of communiqué.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4816a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1943—5 p. m.

7526. From Long. We are confronted here by a serious internal pressure based on humanitarian impulse and surrounded with doubt, uncertainty and suspicion on the part of high officials and a large part of the public including groups naturally interested on account of race and religion. We have been unable to satisfy them that the Department has taken adequate steps to achieve their natural desires. The prohibition upon publication or even use of the deliberations of the Bermuda Conference and the program of the Intergovernmental Committee prevent the Department from enlightening this large and important section of our people as to the efforts made and being made to alleviate distress and persecution.

Under these circumstances it becomes urgently necessary to use the material disclosing our activities and efforts.

Resolutions are in the House and Senate <sup>4</sup> which require recognition and response.

I am sure you will understand our predicament and this will urge you to present it urgently to Law and to the Intergovernmental Committee and such others as may be necessary to consent to our use of these facts immediately.

Of course they may simultaneously use it there or even make a statement of their own in advance but the consent to our use here is a matter of serious moment.

Please do what you can as quickly as possible and advise at the earliest moment because the House Committee <sup>5</sup> is about to take action and the Senate Committee <sup>6</sup> has it under immediate consideration. [Long.]

HULL

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<sup>4</sup> H. Res. 350 and H. Res. 352, providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe; S. Res. 203, favoring the appointment of a commission to formulate a plan to save the Jews of Europe from extinction by Nazi Germany.

<sup>5</sup> House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

<sup>6</sup> Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

840.48 Refugees/4817 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1943.

7556. From Long. Very glad to receive information in yours of yesterday.<sup>7</sup> We agree that the quickest and probably most effective action would be the joint release.

Agree with you that communiqué would be strengthened by the announcement of the five IGC offices abroad and the visit of Vice-Director. We think it is also necessary to include the text of the mandate and we would urge to be included both (a) specific references to the recommendations of the Bermuda conference, and (b) specific references to the program of the IGC. As regards visit of Vice-Director the statement can be made that the Department is recommending the visit.<sup>8</sup>

The facts are that the House Committee has necessarily been advised of the entire program in executive session and in entire confidence. However, the enormously favorable impression made upon the members of the Committee by a full relation is an indication of the very real public reaction in favor of all of our efforts if the public could be advised. We would like to go just as far as possible along that line. [Long.]

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4824 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, December 1, 1943.

[Received December 1—3:56 p. m.]

8384. The Biddle mission<sup>9</sup> is beginning to receive from the British copies of British communications addressed to certain of the Governments in Exile asking their adherence to the proposed joint declaration to neutrals regarding repatriation of refugees. The Department has not made it entirely clear to us whether the approach is to be made by the British solely. The Biddle mission has expressed to us the

<sup>7</sup> Telegram No. 8346, November 29, 9 p. m., not printed; it stated that the proposals contained in telegram No. 7519, November 27, p. 225, were being discussed with the Foreign Office and Intergovernmental Committee and their cooperation was indicated.

<sup>8</sup> In telegram No. 7563, November 30 (not printed), the Ambassador in the United Kingdom was advised that the Combined Chiefs had recommended to the theater commander that a visit be permitted.

<sup>9</sup> Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., was accredited near the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland, established in England, and Yugoslavia, established in Egypt.

view that the reception by the Governments in Exile might be somewhat better if a parallel approach is made by the American Government.

WINANT

840.48 Refugees/4826 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 2, 1943.

[Received December 2—1 : 23 p. m.]

8402. After the Foreign Office yesterday revised and amplified the Director's draft referred to in Embassy's 8372, 1st,<sup>10</sup> the document is this morning being circulated to the members of the Cabinet Subcommittee on Refugee Questions for approval or correction. Foreign Office has in mind using document as basis for debate in House of Commons early next week and, therefore, seeks Cabinet clearance (which is expected by Saturday). The document will probably take the form of a 10-page statement which can mutually be modified in phraseology to some extent to meet our respective needs, rather than the precise wording of a proposed communiqué for identical release. Embassy is also continuing in touch with Director for his suggestions on each draft revision.

BUCKNELL

840.48 Refugees/4826 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1943.

7616. Your 8402, 2d. Procedure outlined is very agreeable to us. A statement which can mutually be modified in phraseology to some extent to meet our respective needs would seem to be a very practical solution and could be used here in connection with the statement Long made to the House Committee<sup>11</sup> as it could be used there as basis for statement to Parliament. Your close attention to this matter is appreciated and is entirely justified by the importance which it assumes here from the point of view of public interest.

HULL

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> *Rescue of the Jewish and Other Peoples in Nazi-Occupied Territory*: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 1st session, on H. Res. 350 and H. Res. 352, November 26, 1943 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 15.

840.48 Refugees/4834 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 5, 1943.

[Received December 5—2 p. m.]

8478. The draft below regarding refugee work is transmitted in response to Department's 7654, December 4, 2 p. m.<sup>12</sup> in the hope that it may be helpful. Such statement as may be approved by the Cabinet Subcommittee may differ in form but the Foreign Office gives us to believe that it expects approval for a statement which will be substantially along these lines though refusing to commit itself in detail. In any event there is no expectation thus far here that the Cabinet Subcommittee will desire identical releases. The Department may wish to amplify statement regarding relations with UNRRA concerning which we have not been informed of the Atlantic City decisions;<sup>12a</sup> it may desire to scrutinize, in the light of information from the theater commander, the reference to an Intergovernmental Committee officer's visiting Italy; and it has presumably received from Madrid a caution (orally mentioned to us by the Foreign Office) from the British and American Ambassadors there concerning danger of premature publicity about North African refugee project which the Department may wish to weigh.

Remainder of this telegram consists of draft subject to above conditions.

Since the Conference on Refugees held at Bermuda in April 1943 between British and American delegations the two Governments have been in continuous consultation on all aspects of this pressing and difficult problem. At the time it was impossible to disclose the course of the discussions without grave prejudice to the interests of refugees. While some reserve must still be maintained, both for this reason and in order to avoid embarrassment to negotiations with other Governments, the following summary of the proceedings of the Conference and of the efforts made subsequently on behalf of refugees in Europe is now issued:

The discussions, which were marked throughout by the utmost frankness, cordiality, and cooperation, had necessarily to conform to war-time realities, and they proceeded on the following agreed basis:

(a) The refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race or faith. Nazi measures against minorities have caused the flight of persons of various races and faiths, as well as of other persons because of their political beliefs.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12a</sup> See *First Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Selected Documents, Atlantic City, New Jersey, November 10-December 1, 1943.*



(b) Wheresoever practicable, intergovernmental collaboration should be sought in these times of transportation difficulty, shipping shortage, and submarine menace, to the end that arrangements may be determined for temporary asylum for refugees as near as possible to the areas in which these people find themselves at the present time and from which those who will be found able to return may return to their homelands with the greatest expediency on the termination of hostilities.

(c) There should, accordingly, be considered plans for the maintenance in neutral countries in Europe of those refugees for whose removal provision may not be made. Their maintenance in neutral countries may involve the giving of assurances for their support until they can be repatriated. It may also involve the giving of assurances in all possible cases by their Governments in exile for their prompt return to their native countries upon the termination of hostilities.

(d) The possibilities for the temporary asylum of refugees in countries other than neutral, and their dependencies, should be explored, together with the question of the availability of shipping to effect their movement from Europe, and the availability of food and accommodation.

(e) Examination of the precise method of organizing concerted action and providing the necessary executive machinery.

It was on these principles that the subsequent discussions took place, and the main problems to which the delegations devoted prolonged and detailed attention were:

- (1) Shipping and supply.
- (2) The Polish and Greek refugees.
- (3) The refugees in Spain and the prospects of alternative accommodation for them.
- (4) The Jewish refugees from the Balkans and the means of removing them to Palestine.
- (5) The refugee children in France and whether there are any possibilities of getting them to the homes offered to them.
- (6) The refugees who are in or might enter neutral countries.
- (7) The future of International Refugee Organization and the executive means to be employed.

It is unnecessary to go into the details of all the foregoing, particularly since certain discussions have been overtaken by developments. In order, however, to remove certain misconceptions regarding the scope and dimensions of the refugee problem, it should be recorded that the Conference had before it complete material on the refugee problem as it had already been handled, showing, among other achievements, that some 40,000 Polish refugees were in the process of being removed from Persia to East Africa, India, Palestine and Mexico through the efforts of the Governments concerned; that the problem of caring for some 16,000 Greek refugees was in hand; that some 195,000 immigrants from Europe, the majority of them refugees, had been admitted into the United States since 1938; that some 60,000

non-British refugees had been admitted into the United Kingdom since May 1940 and were still being admitted at an average rate of at least 800 a month; and that: Over and above admission into Palestine which had already taken place under the White Paper or under special refugee provisions, the Palestine Administration had offered to receive some 34,000 potential Jewish refugees, mainly women and children, from southeastern Europe.

From this review of what had been or was in process of being done the delegations proceeded to an exhaustive examination of the future. As a result, the two delegations made to the United States and British Governments unanimous recommendations for action which may be divided into two main parts:

- (1) Those involving direct action by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America acting jointly.
- (2) Action through the Intergovernmental Committee which was to be reorganized.

The following measures have been taken by the two Governments acting directly:

(1) Successful negotiations have been carried out with the French Committee of National Liberation for the establishment of a refugee camp in Morocco to which certain refugees who have escaped from occupied territory to Spain may be moved and given temporary asylum until permanent arrangements can be made for them.<sup>13</sup> The two Governments have agreed to share the cost of the camp, which will be under American direction with the cooperation of the French and British experts. With the transfer of the refugees to this camp, which is being put in hand forthwith, and with the transfer of other refugees to Palestine, the greater part of the refugees in Spain and Portugal will have been removed.

(2) Following a recommendation from the Bermuda Conference arrangements were undertaken for the issue by several nations of a declaration having as its object to reassure neutral states regarding the future of refugees and thereby to encourage them to give temporary asylum to refugees. This declaration is approaching the point of being published. Taken in conjunction with the proposals regarding the repatriation of displaced populations made by the United Nations Relief [and] Rehabilitation Administration at Atlantic City on November 26th,<sup>14</sup> the declaration provides convincing evidence that the United States and British Governments regard the refugee burden as one to be borne through common international action in which they themselves are fully prepared to take their proper share.

(3) The two Governments have discussed with particular neutral

<sup>13</sup> For correspondence concerning governmental assistance to persons forced to emigrate for political or racial reasons, see pp. 250 ff.

<sup>14</sup> See Resolution No. 10, Department of State Conference Series No. 53: *First Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, p. 37.

states the question of affording to those states assistance towards the maintenance and other expenses incurred by them in the reception of refugees. Details of these discussions could not be disclosed without embarrassment to the refugees themselves, but both the British and United States Governments would reaffirm their high appreciation of all that has been done by neutral Governments for refugees, and their determination that this humanitarian effort shall be assisted to the fullest extent possible, subject only to the overriding limitations of the war situation. It may be recorded here that Switzerland is at present giving shelter to some 64,000 refugees and prisoners of war, and that in recent weeks Sweden has received over 8,000 refugees from Denmark.

(4) The British Government has pursued the question of giving asylum in Palestine to Jews (mainly children, with a proportion of women) from Rumania and Bulgaria. Its efforts, so far, have been unsuccessful because of the refusal of these two Governments to allow the Jews to leave.

(5) The two Governments immediately accepted the unanimous and emphatic recommendation of the Bermuda Conference to reorganize the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. They agreed that it was by this means that the alleviation and, so far as possible, solution of the refugee problem, both during the war and after, could be placed on the most practicable international foundation. In this way the Bermuda discussions were the essential preliminary to the creation of international machinery which is now in operation dealing with current refugee problems and will be able to take advantage of opportunities as they arise during the war, also assuming responsibility for finding homes for those who have difficulty in returning to their own countries after the war.

The scheme of the reorganization of the Intergovernmental Committee was approved by the Executive Committee at a meeting held in London on the 4th August 1943. The main recommendations then adopted have been made public in a communiqué issued by the Committee on the 14th October 1943.<sup>15</sup>

For regular information regarding the plans and activities of the Committee reference must be made, by those interested, to the Committee itself, but the United States and British Governments, on information derived from their representatives, would summarize the chief features of the reorganization in the terms below.

It was decided that the Committee should be enlarged, and invitations have accordingly been issued to 20 Governments to participate. If all these Governments accept the invitation the Committee will consist of 49 member Governments, since previous to reorganization there were already 29 member Governments.

The mandate of the Committee was greatly extended so as to include, as may be found necessary and practicable, in addition to those

<sup>15</sup> For text of communiqué, see telegram No. 7021, October 14, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 213.

already within the mandate, those persons, wherever they may be, who, as a result of events in Europe, have had to leave, or may have to leave, their countries of residence because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs; and with regard to persons coming within the mandate as extended the power is included to undertake negotiations with neutral or Allied states or with organizations, to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain, and transport them, and to receive and disburse for these purposes funds both public and private. While it is proposed that the member Governments should share the administrative expenses, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America have agreed, in the first place, to underwrite all other expenses, leaving it to the other member Governments voluntarily to contribute towards these in accordance with their ability and their interest in this great humanitarian work.

Since August last the Committee has been engaged both in matters of organization and procedure and in measures for the assistance of refugees. Among the former it has considered the question of the relations between itself and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration with a view to close cooperation between the two bodies and the definition of their respective functions. It has laid down the principles which will govern its relations with the many voluntary organizations in various countries engaged in assisting the many different classes of refugees. These principles assume close and continuous contact with voluntary bodies and workers, and include facilities for mutual consultation and assistance and the exchange of information. The Committee is in touch with many voluntary bodies, and welcomes contact with all interested in the refugee cause.

Among the measures taken towards the relief and assistance of refugees are the following:

The Intergovernmental Committee has made direct approaches with the object of obtaining asylum for refugees in neutral states.

It is engaged in carrying out practical schemes for the physical relief of refugees in occupied territory.

It has taken what means are available to assist the escape of particular groups.

It has been kept informed, and has been consulted, regarding the camp in North Africa.

It has been in continuous touch with the Governments of the United Kingdom and United States of America regarding the direct measures which these Governments have undertaken.

It is the aim of the Intergovernmental Committee, to which the United States and British Governments attach the utmost importance, to have its own representatives in various countries so soon as necessary

consent is accorded and details can be worked out. The two Governments are convinced that only by an organization of this kind will it be able efficiently to carry out its duty of maintaining and preserving refugees, and of performing its ultimate function of finding new homes and opportunities for those who are unable to return to their own countries. In pursuance of this policy, an officer of the Committee is about to visit southern Italy, where responsibility for large bodies of refugees discovered in, and escaping to, liberated territory has been assumed by the Allied authorities; and advanced plans are under examination for the appointment of representatives in several other countries. In this way the Committee, in present conditions, can give effectual assistance to refugees, while at the same time being in position to make the best use of opportunities as they arise.

While deferring to inevitable military requirements (as, for example, in instances in which the allocation at a given moment of shipping to the moving of refugees would make impossible troop movements essential to long and carefully scheduled United Nations offensives), and while recognizing the existence of very great practical obstacles to effective succor to refugees in enemy-occupied territory until the enemy is defeated, the Governments which are members of the Intergovernmental Committee, including the British and American Governments, have been unremitting in their attentiveness to all possibilities of aid to refugees. The necessities of operations in wartime have imposed limitations which patriotic persons can not wish violated, however those limitations may be regretted; but in spite of those limitations there have already been carried [out?] preliminary measures well calculated to provide for the most favorable treatment of refugees step by step with the progress of the war henceforth. The Intergovernmental Committee is competently staffed and well organized as the repository and active agent of the combined will of a large group of like-minded nations to carry into effect the best possible solutions of refugee problems.

BUCKNELL

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840.48 Refugees/4724 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1943.

7719. Concerning proposal for approaching other Allied Nations regarding joint declaration on repatriation as outlined in your 8080 November 19, please refer to Department's 7442 November 24, in which it was assumed that British Government would take prompt steps to place proposed declaration before other United Nations of Europe.

Since British Foreign Office believes the respective representatives of Great Britain and the United States should make approach to other Nations jointly, the Department accepts British view. Department is therefore instructing our representatives to United Nations Governments or authorities concerned, namely Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the French Committee of National Liberation, to collaborate with the British representative in securing the adherence of these Governments or authorities to the declaration.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4834 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1943.

7731. Your 8478, 5th. The text seems to be very much along the line of our own thought. It presents the U. S. and U. K. combined activities which Long treated in similar substance, preceding it with a running account of our own activities from the fall of 1939 up to Bermuda. We are planning under pressure to accede to House Committee's desire to release it Thursday. We go on the assumption that the main facts are to be used by each of us in our own way as necessitated by different practices in each country's legislative body and to be generally included in the presentation. That is the way ours was presented orally to the Committee and as they want it released.

What hour Thursday would be agreeable?

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4848 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, December 8, 1943.

[Received December 8—9 p. m.]

8546. Department's 7731, 7th. Although agreeing that main facts are to be used by each of us in our own way the Foreign Office would like to know (for Parliamentary reasons) before its release the complete text which will be released in Washington. We take it there may be additions to the text in Embassy's 8478, 5th. On this account Foreign Office favors aiming at release at a late hour on Friday rather than on Thursday. Regarding North Africa project and Malin's<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Patrick Malin, Vice-Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

visit (see end of foreword of Embassy's 8478) Foreign Office favors deferment of announcement unless Department possesses subsequent approval from Madrid and theater commander, respectively.

BUCKNELL

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840.48 Refugees/4834 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1943.

7780. Your 8546, December 8. As indicated in our 7731 our statement is embodied in testimony which Long gave to House Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 26, preceded by running account of our own activities up to Bermuda and followed by questions and answers. The testimony is contained in 57 printed pages which the House Committee will release tomorrow. We are obtaining advance copies and will deliver them today to British Embassy.

No mention made of Malin's proposed visit to Italy. Regarding North Africa project see our 7760, December 8, 7 p. m.<sup>17</sup> We see no need to refer that matter to Madrid and Algiers considering general nature of statement and that project must become public very soon as it has been approved and further, as reported to us yesterday, it is already known even to refugees in Spain.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4887b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>18</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1943.

7815. For Biddle. You are requested to collaborate with the British representative in presenting the following declaration to the Governments to which you are accredited<sup>19</sup> and to appropriate representatives of the Government of Luxembourg and endeavor to secure their acceptance at an early date,<sup>20</sup> the declaration having already

<sup>17</sup> *Post*, p. 387.

<sup>18</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, as No. 61 to the Minister in Egypt for presentation to the Governments of Yugoslavia and Greece, and as No. 107 to the Consul General at Algiers for presentation to the French Committee of National Liberation.

<sup>19</sup> The Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland, established in England.

<sup>20</sup> Acceptances received by January 15, 1944, from all countries involved, with some suggested modifications. The British Embassy suggested and the Department concurred that, because France, Greece, and several other countries were not in complete agreement regarding present wording of the repatriation declaration, the representatives of the various countries confer in London and agree upon the text. In telegram No. 453, January 18, 1944, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom was instructed to transmit the foregoing information to the Directorate of the IGC. (840.48 Refugees/5042b)

been accepted by the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia.

[Here follows text of declaration as stated in telegram No. 7442, November 24, 10 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, printed on page 224.]

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4865a : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics*

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1943—10 p. m.

The United States and British Governments released today separate but parallel statements explaining what has been done and what is contemplated with respect to the problem of refugees from Nazi tyranny. The United States release is in the form of a statement by the Honorable Breckinridge Long before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.<sup>20a</sup> A copy will be furnished to each mission as soon as available. There follows a summary of points which it is believed will be of immediate interest to you and to the governments to which you are accredited.

1. The United States and Great Britain have now agreed on and are urging the other member states of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees to agree on the enlargement of the scope of the Committee by means of a new mandate reading as follows:

“The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral and Allied states or organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain, and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The operation of the committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come as a result of the war in Europe or in which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse for the purposes enumerated above funds both public and private.”

2. The United States is supporting before the Executive Committee of the IGC in London (on which Argentina and Brazil are the other American republics represented) a proposal that the IGC establish agencies in certain key (neutral) countries.

3. The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have adopted, and are urging adoption by the European Allied Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation, of a joint

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<sup>20a</sup> See footnote 11, p. 228. See also telegram No. 8975, December 24, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 394, and telegram No. 8171, December 27, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 396.



declaration looking toward the return to their homes after the war of those refugees from Axis and Axis-dominated countries who desire repatriation. (The text of this declaration will be transmitted to you after it has been agreed on, and if possible before publication.)

In case any question is raised as to the reasons for limiting the participants in the declaration mentioned in 3 above to the United States, the European Allied Governments, and the French Committee of National Liberation, you are instructed to reply in the following sense: It has been thought that it would be well to limit the declaration to apply to Europe, following the joint statement of December 16, 1942, condemning Nazi treatment of the Jews in Europe (Radio Bulletin no. 297, December 17, 1942<sup>21</sup>). With respect to United States participation you may find it appropriate to remark upon the long-continuing active interest of this Government in the refugee problem and to refer particularly to the President's calling of the Evian Conference in 1938.

For your background information, El Salvador is the only American republic not a member of the IGC, while Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama have not yet participated in the renewed activities of the IGC which have grown out of the Bermuda Conference.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4796 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1943—7 p. m.

7962. The Department believes it to be expedient to take definite steps at once to establish the five additional offices of the IGC referred to in Department's 7346 of November 20.

You are requested to report to the Department as soon as possible the decision of the Executive Committee regarding suggestions in the telegram under reference as to personnel, the method of meeting expenses and the procedure to follow preparatory to establishing the offices.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4885 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 18, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received December 18—5:14 p.m.]

8795. The Embassy has today received a letter dated December 16 from the Foreign Office on the subject of the five additional IGC of-

<sup>21</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1942, p. 1009.

fices at the same time as receiving Department's 7962, December 17, 6 [7] p. m. The Foreign Office expresses agreement in principle and makes several suggestions.

The next meeting of the Executive Committee is to be in January and we understand from a previous statement by the Director that he does not feel free to proceed with the subject until approved by the Executive Committee although he strongly favors the proposal. We feel that time might consequently be saved by having British and American diplomatic representatives clear the proposal at the several proposed places if possible, before the Executive Committee meets, thereby avoiding the delay in awaiting such action subsequent to the Executive Committee meeting, and on Monday we propose to hold an informal joint meeting with the Directorate and Foreign Office with this in mind. This Saturday afternoon we cannot reach them.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4920a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1943.

8071. For the Ambassador and Bucknell. Department refers to the text of the revised mandate of the IGC as proposed at the Bermuda Conference which reads as follows:

"The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or Allied states or organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion or their political beliefs. The operation of the Committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come as a result of the war in Europe or in which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse for the purposes enumerated above, funds both public and private."

You will observe that the second sentence reads "The operation of the Committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come as a result of the war in Europe, etc."

Department has assumed and each of our delegates to the Bermuda conference concurs in the conviction that the area of operations of the Committee includes the German and satellite governments.

This understanding has been fortified by the minutes of the Bermuda conference<sup>22</sup> at Part V immediately preceding the text of the mandate and on the same page thereof where it states, "In addition

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<sup>22</sup> Not found in Department files.

the IGC as it now exists is free under its mandate to negotiate with the German Government on refugee matters". (This refers to the original mandate).

On the preceding page of the minutes in the third paragraph the third sentence reads "They envisaged the necessity for negotiations with Allied and neutral governments but not, of course, with enemy governments". The Department understands that that statement was in the nature of a reservation on the part of the American and British Governments, themselves, of their inability and indisposition to communicate directly with the enemy governments. However, the reservation of the American and British Governments as to their individual or collective activities in that respect was not contemplated to affect the sphere of activity of the IGC comprising as it does neutrals as well as belligerents. The IGC was chosen as the agency because its membership included the neutral governments who were necessary for the wider activity of the Committee and for possible use in dealing with situations within the jurisdiction of the enemy governments and it has been the Department's understanding that the whole movement to enlarge the powers of the IGC was for the purpose of rendering every possible aid and assistance to persons who were persecuted because of their race, religion or political beliefs wherever they might be. This is fortified by the record of the proceedings of the IGC held in London on August 4, 1943 where it states in Section 4: "The IGC shall extend its mandate so as to include as may be found necessary and practicable in addition to those already within the mandate those persons wherever they may be who as a result of events in Europe have had to leave or may have to leave their countries of residence because of the danger to their liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs".

Yesterday a Representative from New York by the name of Celler, as the latest of a series of criticisms and attacks upon the Department, in a widely circulated statement refers to Mr. Long's testimony before the House Committee where he stated (after reading the text of the revised mandate of the IGC), "In other words, they are given plenary authority to do whatever they can within and without Germany and the occupied territories". Mr. Celler then proceeds to state: "I am now informed from headquarters of the IGC on Refugees in London that Mr. Long is absolutely incorrect, that the terms of the mandate do not permit direct negotiation with Germany for the relief and rescue of Jews and other persecuted peoples."

In the light of this you are requested to obtain from the IGC a statement in denial of Celler's allegation and in support of our understanding that the mandate authorizes the Committee to extend

its field of activities to persecuted persons wherever they may be and further, that the mandate does not preclude indirect or direct negotiations by the Committee with any government when and wherever such negotiations may become necessary and promise success for the rescue of persecuted persons. Department will appreciate your very careful and prompt action in the above matter. Your early reply will be appreciated as you will understand that direct challenge to good faith cannot permit of delay in treatment. Also, who could give out a statement such as Celler quotes?

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4898 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 24, 1943.

[Received December 24—8:50 a. m.]

8943. We immediately took up with the Intergovernmental Committee the matter raised by the Department's 8071, December 22. On December 17 the Jewish Telegraphic Agency telephoned the IGC Directorate and stated that it had received from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in New York the following report: "Washington authoritatively learned Intergovernmental Committee given mandate initiate discussions with Germany direct regarding release Jews other oppressed people. Doubt whether Germany will agree but attempt will be made." Emerson instructed an assistant to reply that this report was completely incorrect so far as mandate is concerned. At the time he had no knowledge of Mr. Long's statement quoted in Department's instruction.

We have discussed the considerations set forth in the Department's telegram at length with Sir Herbert, [who] said that he will consider the matter further and will set forth his position definitely in writing but stated that he does not consider that the mandate of the Committee would permit the Committee to have any direct dealings with Germany, although pointing out that indirect negotiations may be undertaken through neutrals. Such neutrals would not be acting as members of the Committee in such negotiations.

Lord Winterton and other members of the Committee are out of London for Christmas. In the event that Emerson's interpretation of the mandate is as forecast would you want us to take further action? Will wait Department's instructions.

WINANT

840.48 Refugees/4898 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1943—2 p. m.

8124. We are of the opinion that any authoritative interpretation of the mandate (referring to your 8943, December 24) must emanate from the Executive Committee. We are further of the opinion, on the question of whether the mandate authorizes indirect or direct negotiations with Germany by the Committee, that the interpretation must be as stated in our 8071 of December 22 "that the mandate does not preclude indirect or direct negotiations by the Committee with any Government when and wherever such negotiations may become necessary and promise success for the rescue of persecuted persons". This interpretation is supported by the record at Bermuda and further, by the fact that the original mandate at Evian authorized the Director to negotiate with Germany and such negotiations were actually undertaken and the revised mandate does not cancel the authority therefor.

Please do your best to have a reply for us by Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4900 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, December 24, 1943.

[Received December 24—10:38 p. m.]

8974. Executive Committee of IGC will meet January 4th and consider Department's recommendation for establishment of five IGC offices for assisting refugees. British Government is informing the Directorate that it is instructing its delegate to support the United States in the discussions. Meantime we have met with Foreign Office and IGC staff to discuss steps to carry the project forward and although opinion is that no diplomatic approach should be made before Executive Committee has opportunity to approve, nevertheless time might be saved (by better presentation to January 4th meeting and by more expeditious action pursuant thereto) if we could have within a few days Department's reactions to the following ideas:

1. Neither Foreign Office nor Directorate see need for both British and American officer in each office and would not confine office personnel to those nationalities.

2. Certain of the offices might be unsuccessful unless in the charge of local nationals. This suggestion was made concerning Algiers and Lisbon.

3. In light of Turkish policy on refugees, no usefulness is foreseen for an office at Ankara, and Cairo is suggested instead, not of course to take the place of Merra but to cooperate with it.

4. The IGC should be charged with stipulated duties toward Fedhala Camp in connection with Algiers office.

5. Department's approval is requested for approach to French Committee for suggestion of a Frenchman to head IGC Algiers office.

6. Kullman is shortly visiting Switzerland and might informally discuss possible IGC office there.

7. Can Department suggest Americans who might serve in various offices and proposed salary scales.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4900 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1943.

8174. We are in accord with proposals 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 presented in your 8974, December 24 regarding establishment of IGC offices for assisting refugees. With respect to proposal 4 we would like to know the nature of the duties with which it is thought that the IGC should be charged toward the Fedhala camp, particularly in order that we may get agreement here with our authorities directing the camp's operation. With regard to proposal 7 we will be glad to investigate and hope to be able to make suggestions regarding Americans who may serve in the various offices and the proposed salary scales.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4921 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, December 29, 1943—noon.  
[Received December 29—9:20 a. m.]

9033. Following statement was prepared by Sir Herbert Emerson and forwarded to the Embassy yesterday (Department's 8124, December 24). After receiving it I asked Lord Winterton to come on to London to discuss the question of mandate with me. He completely supports the interpretation of mandate as stated in the Emerson memorandum. Therefore I am cabling this document in order that it may reach you Wednesday morning Washington time.

In my conversation with Lord Winterton he told me he felt that the matter should be taken up with the Foreign Office as well as with him. Prior to his conversation with me he had not himself ap-

proached the Foreign Office. I am seeing Eden at noon today on this question and will telegraph the Department the results of our conversation.

Following is the text of Emerson's memorandum :

"With reference to the talk you had yesterday with my colleagues and myself regarding the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee, I am now writing to explain the position.

1. On the 17th December, the Jewish Telegraph Agency rang up saying that they had received the following message from their office in New York :

'Washington authoritatively learned Intergovernmental Committee given mandate initiate discussions with Germany directly regarding release Jews other oppressed peoples. Doubted whether Germany will agree but attempt will be made. Russia and Turkey been invited join Committee.'

The agency asked for confirmation. My personal assistant communicated the message to me. For reasons which will appear later, I told her to ask the Jewish Telegraph Agency not to publish the portion regarding the initiation of direct discussions with Germany, since this was not covered by the mandate, but to confirm the part relating to Russia and Turkey. I assumed that, as has happened previously, the message from New York was not a correct report of facts. At the same time, I asked Mr. Malin, Vice-Director, to ascertain the basis of the report so that, if there were any misunderstanding, it might be cleared up. He took steps to do this.

A few days later, Mr. Schick, a representative of the Jewish Telegraph Agency office in London, saw Mr. Malin, when the latter gave him a copy of the communiqué issued by the Intergovernmental Committee, which contained the terms of the mandate.

You will see that the question in issue was whether the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee included the powers to initiate discussions direct with Germany. Believing as I did then, and still believe, that the mandate does not contain such powers, it would not have been possible, even had we known that the statement to this effect had been made in Washington, for us to confirm the statement. The course we might have taken would have been to say that we had no statement to make, and this might have been the wiser course, but the results would have been the same, since the Jewish Telegraph Agency office in London would then have cabled back to say that the Director's office in London had declined to confirm the statement. Much therefore, as I regret the situation that has arisen, and the inconveniences it has, and may, cause, I do not think that any action, or inaction, on our part could have prevented it, other than a confirmation of the statement that the mandate was as described in the message, and this we could not do.

2. The main reason for this view is the mandate itself. I may remind you that the procedure followed by the Executive Committee has been to ask the member Governments to confer on them certain powers, and they have been addressed in this sense. The relevant portion of the recommendation is the following :

'With regard to persons coming within the mandate as extended, the Executive Committee is empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or Allied states or with organizations, and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport them.'

So far as negotiation is concerned, the power is sought in regard to neutral or Allied states only. There is no mention of enemy states. According to the normal canons of interpretation the omission is conclusive. Since powers had been expressly sought in regard to Allied and neutral states, it seems inadmissible to make the assumption that these powers were also to extend to enemy states. This is the more so, since the inclusion of enemy states is a matter on which there may well be considerable difference of opinion among those member states who are at war.

As you know, the mandate, apart from verbal changes, was a formula agreed beforehand between the American and British Governments. I do not, therefore, know what they may have had in mind, but so far as the discussions previous to the executive meeting of the 4th August are concerned, and the discussions in that meeting itself nothing was said or suggested, to my knowledge, to indicate that the mandate did not mean what it said, and that negotiations with enemy states had not been deliberately omitted. Owing to the fact that the Chairman, Lord Winterton, is out of town, and the matter is urgent, I have been unable to consult him. But if he was aware of any reservation in the sense now suggested, he did not communicate it to me, as I believe he would certainly have done, had he been aware of it.

Moreover, so far as my own knowledge goes, and so far as public statements are concerned, the whole trend of policy since public attention became keenly interested in the matter towards the end of 1942, has been in the direction of rejecting any direct approach to Germany. It is necessary to give only one example of this. I would refer you to the relevant portion of the statement made by Mr. Peake in the House of Commons on behalf of the British Government, on the 19th May, 1943, during the debate on the Bermuda Conference. It will be found 1130 of Hansard of that date.<sup>23</sup> It was, presumably, a statement of which the substance had been agreed between the American and British Governments. Giving an account of the Bermuda Conference he made the following statement:

'At the outset they (the delegations) agreed in rejecting, as contrary to the settled policy of both Governments, and calculated to injure the United Nations war effort, any proposal for general negotiations with the German Government to release potential refugees.'

Until the present matter arose, I had no reason to suppose that there had been any change in this policy.

3. Yesterday you mentioned certain considerations supporting a contrary interpretation. Some of these had reference to the report of the Bermuda Conference. In this connection it is, I think, relevant to remember that that report has not been communicated to members of the Executive Committee other than Lord Winterton and Mr. Winant, and it has not been communicated to any other member Governments of the Intergovernmental Committee, or to the non-member Governments who have been invited to join the Committee. While, therefore, it may be relevant as indicating what the delegations had in mind, it is not relevant as to the intentions of the Executive Committee, and still less as to the interpretation by the other Governments of those intentions as expressed in the recommendation.

4. So far as the original mandate of the Committee is concerned, the relevant position is the instruction to the Director 'to undertake

<sup>23</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 389, col. 1130.



negotiations to improve the present conditions of exodus, and to replace them by conditions of orderly emigration'. Negotiations to this end were, in fact, in progress when hostilities began in September, 1939. The war brought them to an abrupt end, and there has been no suggestion that they should be renewed. They relate to a policy of orderly emigration which is no longer an issue, and in any case, they relate only to refugees, or potential refugees, in Germany and Austria.

5. For the above reasons, I still hold the view that if the question had been raised in Executive Committee, or is raised, as to the powers of that body to initiate direct discussions or negotiations with Germany, it would be my duty to give the following opinion: First, that the mandate does not include the conferment of such powers by the member states, and it would, therefore, be *ultra vires* for the Executive Committee to exercise them. Secondly, that if the contrary interpretation were adopted, since the matter is one on which some Governments may take a very keen interest, the right and proper course would be to communicate to them the extended mandate for their agreement. You will understand that since the matter has not arisen in Executive Committee, I am merely expressing a personal opinion, which might or might not be accepted by the Executive Committee, but since I am the servant of the Committee as a whole, I would be bound to give this advice in discharge of my obligations to all members. Although the responsibility is mine, I may add that the matter has been discussed fully with my colleagues Mr. Malin, Dr. Sillem and Dr. Kullmann, and that they agree. What I have said refers only to the issue of the mandate as it now stands, and not to the wider question of policy as to whether it should be expanded so as to include the power of direct negotiations with enemy states.

6. In regard to some other matters which you mentioned which fall outside the direct issue, it is undoubtedly the case that the mandate now includes persons, whoever they may be, in enemy or enemy-occupied territory, or elsewhere, who as a result of the events in Europe, have had to leave, or may have to leave, their countries of residence because of the danger to their lives or liberty, on account of their race, religion or political beliefs. The aim of the Intergovernmental Committee is to give them all assistance they can within the powers conferred on them. Even if it cannot, within its powers, enter into direct negotiations with enemy states, it can initiate and carry out measures for their assistance. The approach to Sweden is one example, although it may be noted that Sweden has been asked to move the German authorities as a neutral country, and not as a member of the Intergovernmental Committee, acting on its behalf. Similarly as regards the approaches that have been made, or are contemplated [with] regard to Switzerland. In fact, the question of a direct approach to Germany is, apart from questions of policy, largely academic, since there are no means by which such an approach can be made. Nor does the absence of the necessary powers, if this is in fact that position, detract from the practical measures that can be taken, at present. The situation may change as the war develops, and it may be necessary to seek wider powers. This is, perhaps, what the Bermuda delegation had in mind in framing their first recommendation, namely, 'that no approach be made to Hitler for

the release of potential refugees in Germany or German-occupied territory but that the question be borne in mind by the Intergovernmental Committee in case conditions altered at a later date'. In short, the lack of those particular powers is not an obstacle at present, since the powers which exist are sufficient to take advantage of such opportunities as occur. May I here take the opportunity of saying how very much we appreciate the great help the State Department has given during the past few months in initiating proposals and in referring them to the Intergovernmental Committee. This makes me regret the more that I have added unconsciously to its difficulties."

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4926 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 29, 1943.

[Received December 29—11 : 19 a. m.]

9034. Director states that December 28th Soviet Embassy informed him that Soviet Government accepts membership in Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4935 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 31, 1943.

[Received December 31—11 : 18 p. m.]

9111. Pursuant to my conversation with Eden (this refers to the Embassy's telegram No. 9033, December 29, noon) we have again reviewed the entire question of the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee with Emerson and with a representative of the Foreign Office. We also examined the text of Mr. Long's statement as quoted in the printed hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Foreign Office representative pointed out that Mr. Long in his testimony on page 34 did not read the revised mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee but did read the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference which have never been placed before the Committee. Both Emerson and the Foreign Office representative also referred to the Department's press release following the Bermuda Conference of May 19 number 198<sup>24</sup> in which the following appears: "It was also agreed that no negotiations with Hitler could be undertaken since his entire record has left no doubt that he would only agree to such solutions as would be of direct aid to the Axis war aims". They

<sup>24</sup> *Ante*, p. 183.

also referred to Peake's statement before the House of Commons quoted in the telegram referred to above which was agreed to by both the British and American authorities as was the Department's announcement before it was issued. They felt that they could not issue any statement that indicated that the Intergovernmental Committee through its revised mandate had authority to negotiate with Germany or other enemy governments and pointed out that such a step would only result in a public outcry in this country and difficulties with the member Governments of the Committee, particularly Soviet Russia.

It was agreed however that the scope of the activities of the Committee should be clarified and Emerson has handed us the statement quoted below which is addressed to the Department of State and signed by Emerson as Director of the Committee and which may be published as a communication from the Director by the Department of State if the Department so desires or alternatively issued as a communiqué here in London. Emerson prefers the first alternative since so far the matter has received practically no publicity here and informs me that he understands that the Foreign Office would also prefer this if acceptable to the Department. The statement has the approval of Winterton and of the Foreign Office and I consider that it goes to the absolute limit that either the Executive Committee or the Foreign Office is prepared to go in meeting the Department's views as set forth in its instructions numbers 8071 December 22 and 8124, December 24, 2 p. m. I therefore suggest that it be accepted and published by the Department in the belief that it will serve to clarify the existing situation.

Following is text of statement :

"On 14th October, 1943, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees issued a communiqué<sup>25</sup> which included the terms of its mandate. It seems desirable to amplify the communiqué by some account of the scope of the powers of the Committee, and the manner in which they are being exercised.

The procedure followed by the Executive Committee has been to invite all the member Governments to confer on it certain powers. Owing to the difficulty of communications, replies have not yet been received from all those Governments, but those so far received have given the necessary agreement. The persons coming within the activities of the Committee include all those who, as a result of events in Europe, have had to leave, or may have to leave, their countries of residence because of the danger to their lives, or liberties, on account of their race, religion or political beliefs. Provided they come within the above definition, it does not matter where they are—in neutral, occupied or any other countries. It is true that some persons do not need assistance because their own governments are willing, and

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in telegram No. 7021, October 14, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 213.

able, to look after them. Nonetheless, the Intergovernmental Committee is at the service of those governments. It is further true that it is not, at the moment, possible to extend assistance to all, or indeed to the majority who come within the mandate. This is because of the stern facts of war.

The Executive Committee has been empowered for the purpose by the member Governments. Although under the mandate, as it stands, it is not empowered to undertake negotiations with other than neutral or Allied states or organizations, it may, and does, within the powers it has, take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport the persons coming within its responsibility. In the exercise of these powers, the services are sought, when necessary, of neutral governments, some of whom are members of the Committee. Some are willing and able, in their individual capacity, to discuss refugee matters in which the Committee is interested with those governments with whom the Intergovernmental Committee itself cannot carry on negotiations. Their assistance, which has already been of value, is much appreciated; it will be continually sought as occasion requires. The assistance of voluntary organizations is available, and is being used. Thus, under its present revised mandate, the Committee has all requisite authority to do whatever can be done, under present circumstances. The sphere of activities of the Committee is conditioned by practical realities, and not by lack of authority. At present the powers are adequate. If conditions change so as to require an enlargement of them, it is open to the Executive Committee to seek the agreement of member Governments."

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4935 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1944.

53. Concerning IGC mandate referred to in your 9111 December 31, Department accepts statement prepared by Emerson. However if statement is published inclusion of last sentence might raise new controversy and it seems preferable to omit it. At present we have no intention to publish Emerson's statement but we may desire to do so at any time omitting last sentence.<sup>26</sup> There is no objection here if statement is published in London.

HULL

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<sup>26</sup> Telegram No. 135, January 6, 1944, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom indicated that there was no objection to publishing Emerson's statement in the United States, omitting the last sentence (840.48 Refugees/4962).

GOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE TO PERSONS FORCED TO  
EMIGRATE FOR POLITICAL OR RACIAL REASONS <sup>1</sup>

852.48/1406 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 4, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 4 : 58 p. m.]

17. Several thousand French and other United Nations refugees now in Spanish concentration camp and prisons are undergoing great suffering from inadequate housing, clothing, heat, food, medicines and sanitary facilities. American and British Embassies are doing everything possible to ameliorate their hardships, and Foreign Office and War Department appear to be doing their best to cooperate but Spanish Minister of Interior reported to be placing obstacles in way.

Papal Nuncio actively interesting himself in problem under special instructions from Vatican.

I believe it would be helpful if you would call in Ambassador Cárdenas and remind him that Spain is now being given treatment usually accorded to a neutral and that we expect that Spain will accord humane treatment to United Nations refugees and in particular will give them as favorable treatment as that given to Axis refugees, such as members of German-Italian Armistice Commission who escaped from French to Spanish Morocco and have never been placed in concentration camp but have been allowed to return to Germany. If you agree you might request that French refugees be permitted to continue their journey to French North Africa just as many Spanish citizens were allowed to pass through France from one nationalist zone to another during Spanish civil war. Please acknowledge.

HAYES

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840.48 Refugees/3559

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Plans made in 1941 for the evacuation from Spain and Portugal in an emergency of British subjects and approved Allied nationals pro-

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<sup>1</sup> See also section entitled "Bermuda Conference to Consider the Refugee Problem, April 19-28, 1943, and the Implementation of Certain of the Conference Recommendations," pp. 134 ff. For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 450 ff.

vided for their transport in the first instance to Halifax. Owing to the scarcity of shipping and to the lengthy journey this would have meant leaving most of them behind.

In view of the changed situation in North Africa this question has been reconsidered and it is now suggested that in such an eventuality the evacuees should be taken to Algeria or French Morocco. According to present information, the numbers likely to be affected are:—

From Portugal	—	2,000;
From Spain	—	1,000 British subjects and 2,000 Allies.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn whether the United States Government would see any objection to the above proposal.

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1943.

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840.48 Refugees/3530 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson) to the Secretary of State*

MONTEVIDEO, January 11, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 7:45 p. m.]

46. Uruguayan Foreign Office states it has been approached by local Jewish committee with request to permit entry into Uruguay of several hundred Jewish refugee children, the committee claiming that the United States Government has acceded to a similar request made by Jewish committees in the United States. Foreign Office would appreciate confirmation of above before taking action.

DAWSON

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852.48/1408 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 12, 1943—midnight.

[Received January 13—8:21 a. m.]

75. It would be helpful to me if you would let me know if you are agreeable to calling Cárdenas in and talking to him in the sense of my 17, January 4, 10 a. m. I am delaying further representation here pending information concerning your conversation in the event you concur.

HAYES

840.48 Refugees/3557

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the  
Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 16, 1943.

MR. WELLES: Our information is that there are approximately 4,000 refugees from France now in Spain. The Red Cross has sent \$25,000 to Hayes.<sup>2</sup> He has at our suggestion received from Portugal a delegation of American relief workers who are administering relief in the camps, out of these funds under Hayes' direction. Many of the refugees have ample funds. Governor Lehman<sup>3</sup> has now taken over the relief phases and is attending to the Spanish situation.

Concerning the migration of refugees, the effort to get children out has not progressed well. Only 170 are reported available and only 35 are enroute to this country. Lack of transportation facilities complicates the problem.

Some four hundred adults have applied for visas and most of them will probably receive them, as several hundred cases have already been approved. They go through the regular war-time visa procedure and receive the most expeditious attention practicable.

Eisenhower<sup>4</sup> has a representative at Madrid selecting such refugees as qualify for the war effort in Africa.

The President's Committee (through Mr. Warren<sup>5</sup>) suggests that 1,000 go to Palestine, travelling from Lisbon to Lourenço Marques by Portuguese vessel, and that an allied vessel be provided to take them northward from Lourenço Marques. They also suggest that from 500 to 1,000 go to the relief camp at Jamaica by Portuguese vessel.

Spanish lower officialdom has not been very amenable to suggestions to free those of military age from internment camps, but the Spanish authorities appear to be committed not to return them to Germany.

The attached draft of a letter to Myron C. Taylor<sup>6</sup> has been prepared for your consideration and possible signature.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

<sup>2</sup> Carlton J. H. Hayes, Ambassador in Spain.

<sup>3</sup> Herbert H. Lehman, former Governor of New York; Director, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>4</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>5</sup> George L. Warren, Secretary, President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, p. 253.

852.48/1413 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 17, 1943—5 a. m.

[Received 3:32 p. m.]

116. Following telegram has been sent to Tangier.

French Military Attaché Madrid has forwarded to French Military Attaché Tangier a list of French refugees detained in Spain whom the Spanish Government is willing to release to the French Embassy for departure from Spain. He requested his colleague in Tangier to transmit the list to Rabat to ascertain whether the persons could enter French Morocco.

We are endeavoring, with the representatives here of the French North African regime, to obtain jurisdiction over French refugees in Spain and the Foreign Office has offered to refer the cases of these refugees to us if the French Embassy is not in a position to take care of them.

It is important that the French Military Attaché in Tangier decline to forward this list to Rabat and so inform his colleague in Madrid, or, if the list is forwarded, Rabat should decline to handle the matter through the channel suggested. There is a good chance that, if this is done, we will obtain jurisdiction over French refugees, which is the objective we have in mind.

As you already know the French Embassy in Madrid is endeavoring to act as liaison between General Noguès<sup>7</sup> and Vichy and the device adopted would facilitate the Embassy's objective which we wish to defeat.

Repeated to Algiers and the Department.

HAYES

840.48 Refugees/3566

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the American Representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees (Taylor)*

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. TAYLOR: I have your letter of January 13, 1943<sup>8</sup> and its enclosures regarding the problem of the refugees from France who are now in Spain.

The British Ambassador<sup>9</sup> has also approached me on this subject.

The American Embassy at Madrid is giving attention to this problem and has arranged to afford some relief to those who are interned. Governor Lehman has taken up the tasks involved.

With reference to the migration of the refugees in Spain, I have been informed that General Eisenhower has a representative at Ma-

<sup>7</sup> Gen. Albert Noguès, French Resident General in Morocco.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> Viscount Halifax.



drid, who may accept those who may be found to qualify for war work in Africa. Advisory approval has been given under the war-time visa procedure for the issuance of visas to several hundred, who may be able to come to the United States. We have sent a message to London<sup>10</sup> regarding the proposal of the President's Advisory Committee that 1,000 be taken to Palestine and from 500 to 1,000 to a relief camp in Jamaica. I shall also speak to the British Ambassador about this.

I perceive no objection to the proposal of the President's Advisory Committee to approach the Netherlands authorities regarding a possible place of refuge in Surinam for these refugees for the duration of the war.

The lack of available shipping facilities complicates the problem.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

840.48 Refugees/3557 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1943—10 p. m.

450. Department's 6434, December 18, 1942.<sup>11</sup> There has been no change in policy since the date of cable under reference.

In Africa military conditions are considered of paramount importance. Other questions are subordinated to them and are worked out by Eisenhower in accordance with his military plans.

In Spain the refugee problem is receiving the attention of the American Embassy, which has arranged for representatives of American relief societies to administer relief and which has received \$25,000 and certain supplies from the American Red Cross for that purpose.

The number of refugees in Spain is estimated to be approximately 4,000. Some may be accepted by Eisenhower's representative for the war effort in Africa. Some may have received visas for the United States and others will probably receive them, as several hundred such cases have been given advisory approval under war-time visa procedure.

The President's Advisory Committee has proposed that 1,000 proceed from Spain to Palestine on Portuguese vessel to Lourenço Marques and north from there on allied vessel, if available; and that 500 to 1,000 proceed by other Portuguese vessel to relief camp at Jamaica.

<sup>10</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>11</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 479.

You may inform Emerson<sup>12</sup> of substance, as reply from Taylor to his message in your 7390, December 28, 10 p. m.<sup>13</sup>

HULL

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852.48/1415 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 24, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 9 : 20 p. m.]

181. Problem of French refugees growing more serious daily. Absolutely essential from both political and military point of view we give adequate relief to these Allies of ours who cannot be expected to look to Vichy for relief.

Most refugees seeking to reach North Africa. Many are trained fighters including generals and other high officers. Our problem is not only maintaining them but transporting them to North Africa.

Urgently request \$100,000 be made available immediately. My 171, January 23, 11 a. m.<sup>14</sup>

HAYES

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852.48/1415 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1943—noon.

162. Your 181 January 24. Essential that we have further information in order to consider and discuss further financial aid with budget authorities.

1. Do we understand that the money which you request will be used exclusively for French and American nationals?

2. How many do you estimate are included in group for which you propose to assume responsibility and what is the probable rate of addition to this group?

3. We understand that French North African officials are prepared to take military personnel and civil servants useful to the military effort. What progress has been made with regard to screening French nationals for service in North Africa? Can you estimate the total number and percentage of French refugees who might successfully pass this screening?

4. How many French nationals will remain who cannot be sent to North Africa? What arrangements do you propose for the care of these refugees? Is this likely to entail an indefinite responsibility on our part?

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<sup>12</sup> Sir Herbert Emerson, Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

<sup>13</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 480.

<sup>14</sup> Not printed; it indicated that it was imperative that the United States assume responsibility with North African regime for care and evacuation of French refugees loyal to that regime (852.48/1417).

5. With respect to those French refugees who cannot be transported to North Africa would it be practicable to have private agencies handle the situation?

6. For what period would the \$100,000 you have requested meet the need there?

7. To what extent are the British prepared to continue looking after other nationals? How many do you estimate will be cared for by the British?

Your telegrams have to some extent informed the Department of the various elements of the problem with which you are faced but it is desired that you give us a complete up-to-date picture of the situation with respect to refugees including information as to nationalities involved, numbers, possibilities for their maintenance in Spain, and estimated number of those who are continuing to pass the Franco-Spanish border. This information is desired as rapidly as possible but do not delay your answer to numbered points above pending complete report.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/3530 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson)*

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1943—5:50 p. m.

A-228. Your telegram no. 46, January 11, 1943. Prior to the occupation of former unoccupied France, American Consuls in that area were notified that arrangements were being made to receive up to 5,000 refugee children of refugee parents who had been deported from France or who were about to be deported. The arrangements for issuing visas to such children under 16 years of age were suspended when the Consular Offices in unoccupied France were closed, but at the present time authorization has been given to Consular Officers in Spain and Portugal to grant visas to such children who have reached those countries and to refer to the Department for expeditious consideration the cases of refugee parents desiring to accompany their refugee children to the United States. The general arrangements relating to children only also apply to children with parents in Spain or Portugal who have signified their desire to have their children proceed without any relation to the parents' own immigration.

As a large portion of the child refugee cases handled have concerned Jewish children, it is possible that the Uruguayan Jewish Committee had in mind the special arrangements outlined above when it approached the Uruguayan Foreign Office.

HULL

852.48/1408 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1943—7 p. m.

187. Your 17, January 4, 10 a. m., and 75, January 12, midnight. This matter was discussed with Ambassador Cárdenas on Tuesday on the basis of your telegrams under reference.

HULL

852.48/1420 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 28, 1943—midnight.

[Received January 29—10:05 p. m.]

224. Department's 162, January 26, noon.

1. Yes.

2. We estimate from 1500 to 2000 now receiving aid of some sort. At Miranda we are giving equivalent \$3.50 cash weekly as well as blankets, sweaters and gloves to approximately 600. British supplying extra rations but we have agreed to take over this responsibility as soon as Red Cross supplies arrive (my 71, January 12, 6 p. m.<sup>15</sup>). We are maintaining over 200 in hotels at Pamplona at about \$2.00 a day and giving material assistance to scores of others in Pamplona prison. When these latter are released upkeep will increase to \$2.00 daily. Also maintaining about 25 women and children in Madrid at same rate. Consulate Barcelona maintaining large number of persons, sending relief to over 500 in prisons and giving emergency relief to others for total expense nearly \$500 daily. Consulate Bilbao maintaining about 50 at \$2.00 daily. Total expense relief program therefore approximately \$10,000 weekly and increasing.

Impossible to obtain exact current figures on numbers of persons in these categories as estimated several hundred still unlocated in prisons and several hundred others believed in hiding. It is estimated that from five to seven hundred a week are still crossing frontier. We are, of course, hopeful of evacuating most of these persons to North Africa when the Regime there opens its doors and the Spanish Government agrees to evacuation in larger numbers than at present.

3. Colonel Malaise, our liaison with French High Commission, is screening. Estimated that about 75% would pass test.

4. This will depend on number crossing border and facilities for release from detention and evacuation to North Africa. It is believed Joint Distribution Committee would take care of large percentage of those inadmissible to North Africa. Quakers and Red Cross might

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

also help. If latter aid can be enlisted there will be no indefinite responsibility on our part.

5. See above.

6. About 2 months barring large scale transportation costs to North Africa.

7. British prepared to give generous help as in past. They are now spending \$25,000 a month in caring for 800 refugees or average of more than \$1.00 per man daily. Refugee governments take care of their own nationals with British help.

Pending allotment of sum requested I should like prompt authorization to continue expenditures at approximately present rate. I cannot over-emphasize relation of this whole problem to our war effort and desirability of not requiring the British to bear the principal burden for relieving French especially since North African campaign under our direction.

HAYES

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840.48 Refugees/3559

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of January 11, 1943 in regard to the desire of the British Government, in case of an emergency in Spain and Portugal, to evacuate British subjects and approved Allied nationals to French North Africa. The United States authorities in North Africa have been consulted in regard to this matter and have stated that, in the event of an emergency, they will be prepared to receive these refugees. They believe that it would be preferable that the refugees be evacuated to Morocco rather than to Algeria, though it might be necessary to alter this recommendation in case the emergency should extend to the Spanish zone of Morocco.

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1943.

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852.48/1420 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1943—9 p. m.

255. Your 224, January 28. Special allotment of \$100,000 from President's Emergency Fund has been secured for relief of refugees of American and French nationality in accordance with general procedure suggested in your recent messages on this subject. You are authorized to draw on Department up to this amount, charging OFR

No. 1. Draw separate draft; render separate account in such detail as may be found practicable. Since you are temporarily assuming care of French refugees as governmental responsibility, such assistance should be provided those in need regardless of race or religion.

Essential that Lehman, Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, be provided with periodic reports on expenditures from this allocation, methods of relief administration, size of problem, numbers being sent to North Africa, and other pertinent details. No assurance any further sums will be available but if you contemplate request of any further sum, it is essential that Department be advised in sufficient detail and far enough in advance to permit careful consideration of proposal.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/3482

*The Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the preliminary conversations which you have carried on with officials of this Department relative to the arrangements being made between the Polish and Mexican Governments to receive in Mexico a substantial number of Polish refugees from the Middle Eastern area.

It is understood, in this connection, that the Mexican Government has agreed in principle to receive for the duration of the war up to a maximum of 28,000 Polish refugees from the Middle Eastern area. While it is further understood that the final details regarding the probable number of such refugees to be sent to Mexico have not been settled and that no definite detailed plan has so far been worked out for the reception and care of these persons in Mexico, there are set forth below the arrangements which the United States Government is willing to make in order to facilitate the transportation and care of these Polish nationals from the Middle Eastern area:

1. The United States Government will place to the account of the Polish Government the sum of three million dollars for the purpose of transporting and caring for these Polish refugees in Mexico. It is believed that this sum will be sufficient to meet the necessary expenses involved during the first year of the proposed plan since it is understood that the number of Polish refugees to be sent to Mexico during that period will in all probability be between three and five thousand. In the event that, on the basis of experience gained in handling the first groups of Polish refugees in Mexico, it is learned that further sums are needed or additional controls are advisable, the matter will again be discussed.

2. The release of funds from this account for the use of the Polish Government in connection with the transportation to and the care of

these refugees in Mexico would be based on specific estimates of quarterly requirements drawn up by the Polish authorities which would be submitted for approval to the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

3. While the expenses for the care and transportation of these Polish refugees arriving in the United States would be covered by the Polish Government from such funds, the Office of Relief and Rehabilitation Operations would cooperate with the Polish officials and with officials of the State Department for the reception and transportation of these refugees to Mexico.

4. The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations will make arrangements to assign an experienced Relief Administrator to the United States Embassy in Mexico City for the purpose of advising and assisting in the plan for the reception, care and location of these refugees. The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations will also provide such additional American personnel as may be required to assist the Polish Government in the technical supervision of this work.

5. In order to assist in this work the Polish Government should employ such additional personnel as the American Advisor shall recommend for the purpose of administering the project. The salaries of such additional personnel shall be met by the Polish Government from the above-mentioned funds provided by the United States Government.

6. It is clearly understood that the arrangements between the Mexican and Polish Governments concerning the conditions for the entry into Mexico and the subsequent repatriation of these Polish refugees are entirely matters between these Governments, the United States Government assuming no responsibility in respect thereto.

It would be appreciated if you could confirm whether the above stipulations are satisfactory to the Polish Government.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

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852.48/1426 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 15, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received February 16—12: 07 p. m.]

379. The Foreign Minister<sup>16</sup> informed me this morning that, in the absence of unforeseen developments, all French refugees will be allowed to continue their journey through Spain, on the theory that France is now non-belligerent. The Spanish Red Cross has been designated to assist in their evacuation.

I urge again that these refugees not be denied entry into North Africa. Any further screening necessary in North Africa should be

<sup>16</sup> Gen. Francisco Gómez Jordana.

done by the North African authorities. My 350, February 11, 9 p. m.<sup>17</sup>

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy.<sup>18</sup>

HAYES

840.48 Refugees/3615

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State*

738/SZ-t/14

[WASHINGTON,] February 22, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to your note of February 5, 1943, concerning the arrangements which the United States Government is willing to make in order to facilitate the transportation and care of Polish refugees to be evacuated to Mexico from the Middle Eastern area, and to inform you that I am instructed by my Government to say that they accept with gratitude the stipulations contained in the above-mentioned note. These stipulations are as follows:

[Here follow the six stipulations contained in note of February 5 to the Polish Ambassador, printed on page 259.]

Accept [etc.]

J. CIECHANOWSKI

852.48/1434 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 28, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received March 1—1:35 a. m.]

469. French refugee problem continues to grow despite Spanish Government's decision in principle to release French nationals as number now crossing frontier far exceed number who can be released and evacuated with present facilities. We are working with Colonel Malaise on a program of large scale evacuation to North Africa and it is expected that over a thousand will leave during the coming week but influx of refugees from France continues at an estimated rate of from 150 to 500 daily with indications of further increases. Recently arrived refugees report that further large numbers are preparing to leave France prompted by German labor mobilization there and by reports of general release of French refugees in Spain and there are prospects of a drastic increase as the snows recede. Vast majority of refugees appear to be males of military age anxious to reach North Africa to fight and many are highly qualified military men.

Pending preparation of more detailed figures on expenditures for relief (which include cash and/or material assistance to over 1500

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

<sup>18</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.



refugees) it is estimated that our funds as well as those available to Colonel Malaise for refugee relief will be exhausted before end of March and it is highly important that arrangements be made well in advance of that time which will make possible the continuance of this work on the present scale. As previously discussed I consider it very desirable that the primary responsibility for the care of French refugees in Spain be turned over at earliest possible date to the French North African regime and its representatives in Spain who could then continue the work with our assistance. Such an arrangement would, however, still leave with us responsibility for the care of lesser number of refugees of declared American nationality who are not yet eligible for release except in special categories.

Department's 302, February 11, my 401, February 17, midnight.<sup>19</sup>

HAYES

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852.48/1434 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1943—11 a. m.

494. Your 469 February 28, 9:00 p. m. We understand from Murphy and Hoehler, Lehman representative in North Africa, that French authorities there state they have sent 25 million francs to you and are considering possibility of assuming further responsibility for supplying food stuffs. If this information correct we assume that this will meet problem of French nationals for considerable period.

With regard to remaining problem of smaller number of refugees of declared American nationality, we request that you submit to us by March 15 your estimate as to amount of additional funds you desire and further details on numbers involved and arrangements proposed there for care. There is no assurance that additional funds can be procured here but if we have your request and substantiation by March 15 will explore possibilities.

WELLES

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840.48 Refugees/3642 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 6, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

541. This morning Spanish Government suddenly cancelled permission for 1400 French refugees to depart from Cadiz on two French ships to be sent for purpose. Our information is that decision fol-

<sup>19</sup> Neither printed.

lowed violent protest by German Ambassador acting under instructions from Berlin. Ambassador said to have threatened to torpedo refugee ships and to have said Spaniards must stop letting French out.

While the German attitude is explainable on the basis of Germany's natural reluctance to lose the thousands of able-bodied French workers now crossing into Spain and reluctance at seeing them reach North Africa, we must not discount possibility that *démarche* is only a part of general diplomatic offensive to bring Spain into the war on Axis side or exact other military concessions from Spain.

Reports of new German troop concentrations in Southwest France have been spread freely in Spain for several weeks (such concentrations amount to two divisions according to our best information).

A High Spanish official is quoted as having said that a German diplomatic offensive in Spain began yesterday and that refugee matter is merely a pretext.

Despite foregoing Foreign Office seems still disposed to release French refugees and has asked North African representatives to endeavor to obtain Portugal's consent to transit through that country.

Repeated to Algiers, Lisbon and Tangier.

HAYES

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852.48/1439 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 8, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received March 9—10:20 a. m.]

546. I called on the Foreign Minister this morning to discuss the present status of the steadily increasing number of French refugees in Spain. I said I had understood that Spain had agreed to treat them as non-belligerents and allow their passage through the country. Colonel Malaise had arranged with the Foreign Office for the evacuation of some 1400 refugees who were to leave various places of concentration today for Cadiz and embark there onto French ships. On Saturday Malaise had suddenly been told that authorization had been canceled due to German pressure on the Foreign Office. I inquired what the present status of the refugees was and what the Foreign Office's policy toward them was.

General Jordana assured me that there was no change in Spain's basic policy. The Government was anxious to have these refugees leave Spain. It was a question of ways and means. There was no thought of returning them to camps or prisons or interning them. It was true that strenuous representations had been made and that he had given way because the Government figuratively did not have a leg to stand on. The non-belligerent status of Frenchmen was of

course a fiction since they are on their way to a battle zone and many, perhaps a majority, will participate in the war. The Minister had hoped we would work fast enough so that at least this first contingent could get out before German pressure became too strong. However, representations had come sooner than he had expected.

The problem now was to find some other way to get them out. The Minister wished to return to his earlier suggestion that they leave via Portugal. He had called the Portuguese Ambassador on Saturday to request them to arrange this but he was out of town over the weekend. He would call him again and requested that I also see him.

I told the Foreign Minister that the delay in evacuating this first group took place principally in the Government Departments concerned. However, I did not want to embarrass the Spanish Government but rather wanted to continue to cooperate.

I appreciated his renewed assurances that the refugees could leave. I knew that the Portuguese Ambassador was away, but that he had now returned and I would endeavor also to see him.

Jordana expressed his appreciation and said that he thought arrangements could be made for the refugees to go to Lisbon from which port there was communication with Casablanca.

In explaining further why he had given way to pressure, Jordana said there had in fact been a threat to sink the refugee ships. He was fearful the threat would be carried out and that a dangerous incident might result. He feared for instance that the ships might be sunk in Spanish territorial waters or that some persons or countries might believe that they had been sunk with Spanish connivance. He referred also to the sinking on February 24th of the Spanish vessel *Monte Igueldo* off the coast of Brazil. He obviously had in mind the possibility the Germans might sink other Spanish ships.

I expressed the hope that there would be no further pressure, as for example, of a military nature from the same source. Jordana said there had been no other pressure to date and said, "I can assure you Spain will resist pressure in any case in which we are in the right".

I thanked him for his reiterated assurance.

While the failure to evacuate this first large group through Cadiz is disappointing and annoying, I am hopeful that arrangements can be made to evacuate French refugees via Portugal as General Jordana suggested initially. If this proves not feasible, I shall explore other means.

Jordana was in excellent spirits this morning and his apparent determination to seek the means for evacuating the French refugees leads me to accept this statement that there is no other pressure on Spain at the present time, and to believe that Spain will resist any military pressure which Germany may exert in the future.

Meanwhile the British Embassy, at the instance of the military authorities at Gibraltar where the two French ships, *Sidibrahim* and *Gouverneur General Lepine*, have been waiting to proceed to Cadiz to embark the refugees, has expressed fear that the Axis might procure the legal arrest of these ships. The British Embassy said it was considered undesirable, therefore, that the ships should proceed to Cadiz unless the Spanish Government will guarantee that they will not be hindered by any means whatsoever, including legal process, from leaving again.

Whether this means the Gibraltar authorities would detain the French ships until such guarantees are obtained, I do not know. However, if arrangements are made to evacuate the refugees from Portugal by French steamer, the same problem will probably arise in that country. If the refugees are to leave by Portuguese steamer the problem should not arise.

Gibraltar has requested assurances also that adequate security examination will be held either in North Africa or in Gibraltar itself. I have assured the British Embassy that adequate security examinations being held in North Africa.

Repeated to Algiers and Lisbon; copy by mail to Tangier.

HAYES

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840.48 Refugees/3873

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

No. 8175

MEXICO, March 10, 1943.

[Received March 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 8103 of March 8, 1943<sup>20</sup> reporting on my conversations with the Foreign Minister<sup>21</sup> and the Undersecretary<sup>22</sup> concerning the admission of Polish refugees into Mexico from Iran via India and a West Coast port of the United States.

This morning the Polish Minister, Dr. Wladyslaw Neuman, who has only recently presented his credentials called and I outlined to him the rather unfortunate situation which has developed here due principally to the lack of an organization to receive the first batch of refugees. I told him of my conversations at the Foreign Office and emphasized the preoccupation of the Mexican Government as well as my Government that no arrangements have so far been made for the selection of a site where these people may reside, much less for their housing or provisioning. I told him that I was loath to interfere

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<sup>20</sup> Not printed.

<sup>21</sup> Ezequiel Padilla.

<sup>22</sup> Jaime Torres Bodet.

in this matter but that following my conversations in Washington and my knowledge of the situation here, I felt I had an obligation since my Government has assumed some measure of responsibility in agreeing to financing the maintenance of these refugees. I said that I had reported to the Department fully on this matter and had recommended that a committee be composed of a Mexican citizen, a Polish citizen and an American citizen (possibly an officer of this Embassy) to work out the details looking forward to the reception of the refugees.

I found the Minister understanding and himself deploring the lack of organization. He attributed this to the departure of his predecessor and his recent arrival. I was somewhat relieved when he told me that it was his understanding that the first group of refugees had not yet left Iran and that therefore there was time to effect some sort of an organization and to carry on the conversations which must be preliminary to any definitive arrangements. He told me that immediately after presenting his letters of credence he had while calling on the Minister of Gobernación<sup>23</sup> as a matter of courtesy mentioned this matter to him. He found that Mr. Alemán had no knowledge whatsoever of the expected arrival of these refugees but that after consulting with his undersecretary, the Minister of Gobernación said that it might be possible to place the refugees in either Guanajuato or Querétaro. The Polish Minister said that Guanajuato might be the better of the two places because Señor Ernesto Hidalgo, formerly chief clerk of the Foreign Office, who conducted the negotiations preliminary to the signing of the agreement between General Sikorski, and the Mexican Government<sup>24</sup> concerning these refugees is now a candidate for Governor of that State. The Polish Minister expressed himself as believing he would be the next Governor.

The Minister explained that on leaving my office he was going directly to the Ministry of Gobernación to speak with Mr. Alemán and that he would keep me closely informed of the results of conversations he may have there as well as with other officials of the Mexican Government.

I desire to emphasize that I will be very appreciative if the Department will give me the benefit of its precise instructions as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

G. S. MESSERSMITH

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<sup>23</sup> Miguel Alemán.

<sup>24</sup> Exchange of notes between Polish Prime Minister Sikorski and Mexican Foreign Secretary Padilla regarding the admission of Polish refugees to Mexico, December 30, 1942, transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Mexico in his despatch No. 6270, December 31, 1942 (840.48 Refugees/3508). For texts of the notes exchanged, see *Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1942-1943* (Mexico, D.F., 1943), pp. 457-460.

840.48 Refugees/3642 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1943—11 a. m.

548. Your 541, March 6, 10 p. m. The Department feels this may offer grounds for protest and desires you to take whatever action of the sort you may deem advisable. Please keep the Department currently and promptly informed.

WELLES

852.48/1441 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 11 [10?], 1943—midnight.

[Received March 11—4: 32 p. m.]

576. Department's 494, March 5, 1 [11] a. m. Colonel Malaise states that although 25,000,000 francs have been voted for relief of French refugees in Spain there are no immediate prospects of any substantial portion of peseta proceeds becoming available to him here and at present he is not even receiving enough to pay off back indebtedness. Moreover, recent cancellation by Spanish Government of permission for 1400 refugees to leave Spain (my 541, March 6) together with continuing influx of refugees from France is resulting in a steady increase in the number of persons to be cared for. The practical result of these factors is that number of French refugees looking to us for assistance is increasing rather than decreasing and will continue to do so until French representatives here can be effectively supplied with adequate peseta funds or until large scale evacuations can be arranged.

Until such time, therefore, as French North African representatives in Spain may be in a position actually to take over financing of relief to their nationals and in view of increasing scale on which such relief must be administered, it is estimated that Embassy will need at least \$100,000 a month for refugee relief, starting from March 15, on which date it appears that present funds will be virtually exhausted.

According to best present estimates this amount will be spent approximately as follows: Subsistence allowance to 1,225 persons in Miranda and in prisons at 5 pesetas a day, totaling 183,750 pesetas monthly; supplementary food to 650 in Miranda at 120 pesetas a month, totaling 78,000 pesetas; maintenance of 1,100 persons in pensions at 25 pesetas a day, totaling 825,000 pesetas monthly. Grand total 1,086,750 pesetas monthly or \$99,246.58 at rate of 10.95. Small reductions in expenditures which may be occasioned in near future

by availability of Red Cross food will be balanced by increase in numbers involved.

The declared Americans, numbering from 200 to 250, are included in the above figures and it is estimated that about \$10,000 a month will be expended for their care.

In explanation of number of persons maintained in pensions it should be stated that they were removed from imprisonment at our request because of severe overcrowding and abominably unsanitary conditions in northern prisons, and in an attempt to forestall a threatened typhus epidemic which could have reached disastrous proportions.

It is of utmost importance that we receive prompt information as to availability of funds and assurance that arrangements will be made to permit uninterrupted continuance of this program. We clearly recognize extreme desirability of transferring this responsibility to its proper place in hands of French North African regime and have worked with this constantly in mind but it appears that, unless other means can be devised of making funds available to their representatives here, the financial burden may remain on our shoulders for some time to come. Meanwhile we are continuing to seek a workable formula for large scale evacuation of these persons to North Africa.

HAYES

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852.48/1441 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1943—9 p. m.

577. Reference 576, March 11 [10?]. Since it appears from Malaise's statement that dollars are needed to buy the pesetas desired for the French refugees, it is suggested that the French African administration provide the necessary dollars out of their funds in the United States. For your information, the Giraud<sup>25</sup> administration has approximately \$50,000,000 in accounts here. Treasury is prepared to issue the requisite licenses for this purpose. Malaise need simply request the Foreign Exchange Institute in Spain to furnish pesetas against dollars to be transferred from the French African accounts here to the Institute account here.

If Malaise should have any difficulty in buying \$500,000 worth of pesetas from the Institute against dollars, you are authorized to take appropriate steps to support his request.

We are anxious to effect the arrangements outlined above in preference to securing further appropriation of American funds for this

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<sup>25</sup> Gen. Henri Giraud, French Civil and Military Commander in Chief in North Africa.

purpose. We will advise you respecting funds for declared Americans after receipt of information concerning above proposal. If arrangements can be made for French North African regime to assume financial responsibility for French refugees as indicated above, we are agreeable to your taking whatever steps necessary to assist in the administration of such relief and authorize use of McDonald's<sup>26</sup> services for that purpose.

WELLES

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852.48/1449a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers  
(Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1943—9 p. m.

457. For Murphy. American Embassy Madrid has requested allocation of \$100,000 per month of American funds for relief of refugees of French nationality in Spain. This request is predicated on statement from Madrid that although 25,000,000 francs have been voted by French North African regime for relief of French refugees in Spain there are no immediate prospects of any substantial portion of peseta proceeds becoming available to Malaise and at present he is not even receiving enough to pay off back indebtedness.

The following telegram has been dispatched to Madrid in reply:

[Here follows text of telegram No. 577, March 13, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in Spain, printed *supra*.]

Please indicate to the French that it is difficult for us to assume further financial responsibility at present and that it would be desirable for them to follow the procedure proposed in the telegram to Madrid.

WELLES

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852.48/1444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 13, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 14—3:45 p. m.]

608. My 576, March 10, midnight. Rapidly increasing proportions of refugee relief problem make it extremely difficult even approximately to estimate future needs but it now appears that Embassy requirements for next 30 days will exceed \$150,000.

HAYES

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<sup>26</sup> Charles McDonald, official representative of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations at the American Embassy in Spain, formerly with the American Red Cross.



852.48/1446 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 15, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 16—10: 15 a. m.]

626. Although a report from a neutral diplomatic official just returned from France indicates that Germany has greatly strengthened her border patrols in an effort to keep Frenchmen from entering Spain clandestinely they continue to enter at rate of several hundred per day.

Portuguese Ambassador told me this morning upon his return from Lisbon that Salazar<sup>27</sup> is entirely agreeable to Jordana's suggestion that French refugees be allowed to proceed through Portugal in transit to North Africa. He said Portugal has always followed a policy of letting refugees through and if the Germans complained they would be told that. Spain hitherto had not followed such a policy and he regarded Jordana's evident willingness to allow Frenchmen to depart as a very helpful sign of Spain's changing attitude which Portugal wanted to support.

He said Salazar would like refugees to pass through Portugal without stopping any longer than absolutely necessary. It made no difference through what port they departed but he suggested Lagos would be most convenient because of shorter distance and adequate rail communication. The Ambassador has been authorized to grant group visas and would like arrangements for transit to be made in Madrid at least for the present because he would like to keep in close touch himself and keep the matter out of Lisbon for the time being.

He recommends greatest haste in arrangements. It is immaterial whether British or French ships call for refugees. He would prefer that refugees leave in lots of 200 to 300 although I doubt he would object to 1400 leaving at once if reasons for this were made clear to him. He has pointed out limited hotel facilities at Lagos and I assume he does not [expect] it to be too ostentatious.

I later discussed matter with British Ambassador who said he would urge London promptly to facilitate use of French ships for this purpose. If two French ships scheduled to call at Cadiz are still in Gibraltar, I recommend they proceed promptly to Lagos or Lisbon when Malaise requests them. If they have departed I request other arrangements be made promptly upon Malaise's request. My 546, March 8, 6 p. m.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy and Lisbon; copy by mail to Tangier.

HAYES

<sup>27</sup> Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese Prime Minister.

852.48/1449 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, March 20, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 9:17 p. m.]

437. From Murphy. Madrid's 626, March 15 to Department and Department's 457, March 13, 9 p. m. and 475, March 17, 10 p. m.<sup>28</sup> Following is my No. 40, March 20, 3 p. m. to Madrid in reply to Madrid's 626 to Department:

"From Murphy. Your 32, March 15, midnight. Informed by High Command French refugee ship has left Gibraltar. French say March 31 is earliest date they can send vessel to Lagos to embark preferably minimum of 1,000 passengers. British Navy are endeavoring arrange earlier trip.

French financial authorities have been informed of procedure for acquiring pesetas against dollars transferred from account of Bank of Algiers to Instituto and they have telegraphed Malaise and French-American Banking Corporation in New York to consummate initial transaction for \$100,000. Further sums will be transferred when necessary.

Department and Lisbon informed.[""]

[Murphy]

WILEY

852.48/1450 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, March 20, 1943.

[Received March 22—8:40 p. m.]

The following telegram has been sent [to Madrid]:

41. March 20, midnight. From Murphy. My number 40, March 20, 3 p. m. The French Admiralty has agreed to send two French ships, the *Gouverneur General Lepine* and the *Sidibrahim*, to Lagos, Portugal to embark the 1500 French refugees now in Spain and whose passage through Portugal has been approved. The two vessels, which will fly the British flag, will arrive Lagos about March 28.

Arrangements are also under way to permit the sending of two other ships the *Jebe Laurez*, a French vessel, and the *Rangitata*, a British vessel, to Lagos about April 2 to embark further contingent of approximately the same number of refugees.

The French authorities believe there are approximately 14,000 French refugees now in Spain. Please confirm this estimate.

Repeated to Lisbon and Department. [Murphy.]

WILEY

<sup>28</sup> Telegram No. 475 not printed; it indicated that in reply to Department's telegram to Madrid, quoted in telegram No. 457 to the Consul General at Algiers, the Ambassador in Spain had replied that Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute approved arrangement and had urged an immediate transfer of \$500,000 from French funds in New York to the Institute's account with the National City Bank (852.48/1446).

852.48/1451 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 22, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received 11 : 55 p. m.]

679. The following telegram has been sent to Algiers.

40. March 22, 10 p. m. For Murphy. Your No. 40, March 20, 3 p. m. French financial authorities should be informed \$100,000 will be insufficient to cover even immediate needs and initial amount should be increased by at least another \$150,000. Cost of refugee relief continues to rise and pending evacuation arrangements will involve large additional expenditures. Urgent necessity of making funds immediately available should be stressed as both French and American funds completely exhausted.

Repeated to Department.

HAYES

840.48 Refugees/3701 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, March 24, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 2 : 50 p. m.]

289. For Lehman. At my suggestion British and Polish Ministers<sup>29</sup> and I had a meeting with the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs yesterday and I fortunately had your last letter.<sup>30</sup> In view of difficulties in making arrangements it is helpful to know that no refugees will probably arrive before middle June. All were in agreement that if we could start with 500 instead of a large number it would be most helpful. We are awaiting arrival of Kelly<sup>31</sup> before committee will visit possible sites, and I have informed the committee Kelly will be here for a meeting to be held first Monday in April. Am writing fully immediately. Please assure that arrangements are made for Kelly to arrive here for above-mentioned meeting.

MESSERSMITH

852.48/1455 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 24, 1943—noon.

[Received March 25—10 : 12 a. m.]

709. Inasmuch as French funds have not yet been made available here and in view of complete exhaustion of our own funds as predicted we have been placed in the embarrassing and highly undesirable position of being unable to meet continuing obligations incident to refugee

<sup>29</sup> Charles Bateman and Wladyslaw Neuman, respectively.<sup>30</sup> Not found in Department files.<sup>31</sup> Eric P. Kelly, in charge of the refugee camp at León.

relief operations. Despite agreement of French to take over expenses of care of their own nationals it should be pointed out that we are still conducting the relief program and therefore looked to by Spanish and refugees alike as responsible for the support of this program and any onus resulting from the failure to meet obligations promptly is bound to fall on us.

It is urgently necessary that funds be made immediately available to French for care of French refugees bearing in mind that over \$100,000 will be required to cover unpaid past obligations alone.

Funds are also urgently needed for our own account to cover care of declared Americans and expenses incident to relief operations in general. For these purposes are [*we?*] request the sum of \$100,000 which should cover past obligations as well as future obligations for several months. This estimate assumes the necessity of no further expenditures on behalf of French refugees as such.

Repeated to Algiers.

HAYES

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852.48/1453 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 24, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 24—9 : 50 p. m.]

704. My 626, March 15 midnight. Portuguese Ambassador, Madrid, in agreement with Salazar has urgently asked that our Minister in Lisbon<sup>32</sup> address a letter to Salazar requesting Portugal to grant transit to refugees departing from Spain with Spanish consent. I have communicated this request to Mr. Fish who I believe would like instructions from the Department.

I should appreciate it if the Department would immediately authorize Mr. Fish to address such a letter to Salazar, omitting references to nationality, destination and age of refugees.

Repeated to Lisbon.

HAYES

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852.48/1453 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)*

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1943—2 p. m.

501. Madrid's 704, March 24 repeated to you. You are requested to address a letter to Salazar concerning the transit of refugees from Spain in accordance with Ambassador Hayes' suggestion.

Repeat to Madrid.

HULL

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<sup>32</sup> Bert Fish.

852.48/1456 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 25, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

652. Reference to Madrid's 704, March 24 to Department. After receiving the communication from Ambassador Hayes requesting me to address a letter to Salazar asking Portugal to grant transit to French refugees departing from Spain with Spanish consent I first established contact with Salazar through his secretary and was given to understand that it would be sufficient to assure the passage of the initial groups of French refugees through Portugal if I were simply to address to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note stating that the Legation would appreciate any assistance which the Portuguese Government could give in this matter. Such a communication was accordingly delivered to the Foreign Office today. Salazar did not appear to have any knowledge of any such understanding as that implied by the request of the Portuguese Ambassador at Madrid or of any particular agreed formula for my communication to him. This being the case I saw nothing to be gained by acting precisely within the terms of Ambassador Hayes' request and I trust that the action I have taken will be sufficient to make possible the cooperation of the Portuguese authorities with respect to at least the first four shiploads of refugees.

Repeated to Madrid.

FISH

852.48/1457 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 26, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 11:17 p. m.]

728. The following telegram has been sent to Algiers.

49. March 26, 8 p. m. For Murphy. Portuguese Ambassador informed directly by Salazar he is agreeable to evacuation of French through Portugal. Salazar strongly recommends Vila Real port of embarkation. Ambassador says it is a river port, secure and can handle ships up to 5,000 tons. Ambassador would like evacuation of first group of up to 1,500 completed before evacuation of next group undertaken. Repeated to Department and Lisbon.

HAYES

852.48/1461 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 27, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 11:04 p. m.]

740. The following telegram has been sent to Bern:

March 27, 8 p. m. Spain has now closed border to French refugees. For purposes of comparison will you please inform me whether Swiss permit refugees to cross into Switzerland and what treatment given those who cross clandestinely? In particular, are they turned back into France?

Repeated to Department and Algiers for Murphy.

HAYES

852.48/1458 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 27, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

Following telegram has been sent to Algiers:

34. March 27, 9 p. m. For Murphy. Re Madrid's 49, March 26th to you. According to British Ambassador here British Admiralty still maintains that it is safer to bring the ships to Lisbon than to Vila Real. From a conversation which the Ambassador had at the Foreign Office this morning it developed that Salazar is most reluctant to have the refugees come through Lisbon and that insistence on Lisbon as the embarkation point may jeopardize the entire action.

I fear that it will be difficult to convince the Portuguese that it is safer to bring these vessels around Cape Sagres and up to Lisbon at an estimated added distance of at least 500 miles than to bring them to Vila Real, whereby they would remain within the close radius of Gibraltar.

The facts are transmitted in the event that you may wish to discuss this matter with the competent British authorities.

Repeated to Madrid and Department.

FISH

852.48/1464 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 29, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received March 30—12:44 p. m.]

757. Department's 577, March 13. My 679, March 22. Foreign Exchange Institute has received authorization to pay proceeds \$100,000 to French. In view of extensive past obligations, high rate of continuing expenses and pending plans for large scale evacuations, however, it is urgently requested that entire amount of \$500,000 be made available at earliest possible moment.

Repeated to Algiers.

HAYES

852.48/1463 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 29, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 30—12: 54 p. m.]

758. I delivered the following note to the Foreign Minister this morning:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ministry's *note verbale* number 182 of March 25, 1943 stating that the Spanish Government has ordered the complete closing of the Pyrenees frontier to those persons not in possession of legal documentation. I have transmitted the contents of this note to my Government.<sup>33</sup>

This Embassy has been assured by the Foreign Office on a number of occasions that the Spanish Government would not return refugees of belligerent or occupied countries to the countries of their origin or to territory occupied by the enemy without their consent. I should like to be able to inform my Government promptly that this policy of the Spanish Government has not been modified in any degree.

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration."

My 734, March 27, 11 a. m. repeated to Algiers for Murphy.

HAYES

852.48/1465 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 29, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 30—8: 38 p. m.]

760. I told Foreign Minister today I had received his note of March 25 and had communicated it to my Government. I had considerable misgivings concerning the impression it would create, and before communicating further on the subject I wished more information (my 741, March 27, 9 p. m.<sup>34</sup>).

I asked whether it meant Spain was going to abandon its policy of declining to return refugees to places of origin or enemy-occupied territory without their consent. He said this had not been determined yet. The purpose of the note was to declare Spain's policy of doing its utmost to close the border. No decision had been made as to what would be done with refugees who succeeded in crossing. He wanted to discuss possible cooperation on our part in this growing problem. So long as small numbers of refugees had crossed the border Spain had not been disturbed. However they have entered in ever

<sup>33</sup> Transmitted in the Ambassador's telegram No. 734, March 27, 11 a. m., not printed.

<sup>34</sup> Not printed; it stated that so far there was no indication that the Spanish Government had withdrawn its permission for large numbers of French refugees to leave Spain via Portugal (852.48/1459).

increasing numbers. Reports have reached him that regular organizations exist in France for effecting wholesale immigration of French into Spain. He has heard also that persons connected with our Embassy are actively engaged in the traffic.

I said the latter report was not true. No one connected with the Embassy or working for the United States Government is engaged in this traffic. I pointed out Tunisian campaign so far advanced these French would arrive in North Africa too late to be of any military value. Meanwhile we contemplated military action within France at which time it would be to our interest to have able-bodied Frenchmen there to cooperate with us.

I said it was clear that French, threatened with slavery under their enemies, were trying to escape. It was only natural that they should.

Minister said it was a game several could play. He feared Germans and Italians might enter Spain as refugees, establish themselves in certain ports, and at the appropriate time don uniforms. In this connection he said he wished to state more emphatically than ever before that Spain, including the Caudillo,<sup>35</sup> is really resolved to resist any possible Axis aggression.

Minister assured me closing of border does not affect arrangements for evacuating French already in Spain. I asked if this assurance applied to other agencies of the Government and he said it did.

I questioned him further concerning treatment of refugees who managed to cross the border. He said decision concerning them would be made later, that Spain is trying to patrol its side of the border and exerting pressure on the French to patrol their side.

I said we had learned from Barcelona that Seguridad<sup>36</sup> has actually returned certain persons to France, and were threatening to return a declared American citizen. I pointed out that if American soldiers succeeded in escaping into Spain and were returned to France we would consider this an unfriendly act and I could not answer for the consequences. He said he understood this perfectly and that Seguridad had been told escaped prisoners should not be interfered with.

With reference to French refugees, I referred again to previous assurances from the Foreign Ministry that refugees would not be returned to Axis or Axis-occupied territory. I said that any reversal of this policy would have a very unhappy effect on the outside and I hoped he would give the latter his very earnest consideration. He said he would.

Meanwhile, I have been informed that orders to return refugees to France have been rescinded in both the Barcelona and Pamplona areas, and that 200 refugees arrived in Pamplona yesterday.

<sup>35</sup> Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

<sup>36</sup> General Directorate of Security, under the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, principal agency for maintaining the internal security of the Spanish State.



The British Ambassador this morning made representations similar to mine. Jordana told him no refugees would be sent back unless and until we are advised. I shall also endeavor to enlist cooperation of Papal Nuncio and of other American representatives in urging Foreign Office not to return refugees to France.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy.

HAYES

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852.48/1466 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 30, 1943—noon.

[Received 9:48 p. m.]

766. Portuguese Ambassador informs me that Salazar has not yet received necessary note from our Government formally requesting Portugal to grant transit to refugees departing from Spain with Spanish consent and that informal representations made by Mr. Fish as reported in his 652, March 25, 7 p. m. are not sufficient. I had informed the Department in my 704, March 24, 10 p. m. of the nature and form of the note desired by Salazar and of my belief that Mr. Fish would like instructions accordingly from the Department.

With Spain, the British and the French cooperating and with Portugal prepared to cooperate as soon as Salazar received desired note only the lack of instructions from the Department to Lisbon stands in the way of starting large scale exodus of refugees from the peninsula. Such instruction is most urgently requested.

Repeated to Lisbon.

HAYES

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852.48/1455 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943—5 p. m.

729. Your 709, March 24, noon. An additional allotment of \$100,000 from the President's Emergency Fund has been obtained for expenditure in accordance with provisions set forth in Department's 255 of February 5, 9 p. m. concerning original allotment. These American funds are to be expended for the particular purposes enumerated in your 709 March 24. We understand that this sum will be sufficient for your needs for several months. You are authorized to draw a separate draft on the Department for this amount charging 19-112/30006/014 Emergency Fund for the President, National De-

fense, 1942 and 1943,—Allocation No. 42/3-98 (OFR-1). A separate account, supported by such details as you may find it practicable to present, should be rendered and this telegram cited.

You are being informed by a separate telegram of the transfer of \$250,000 of French North African funds to Malaise for French refugees.

HULL

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852.48/1464 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943—6 p. m.

730. Your 757, March 29. You will be advised today by separate telegram of the allocation of \$100,000 of American funds for refugee relief.

The French North African authorities have now authorized the French American Banking Corporation in New York to make two transfers—one for \$100,000 and the other for \$150,000—to the account of the Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute for use by Malaise in the care of French refugees in Spain. It is our understanding that the first of these transfers has already been effected and that the second will be cleared within the next day or so. We are also informed that the French authorities intend to authorize the transfer of an additional \$250,000 within the next few days. When this has been effected, the full sum of half a million dollars appropriated by the French for the refugees in Spain will have been transferred to Malaise.

Is the projected evacuation of refugees to Portugal now proceeding satisfactorily? Have you any reason to believe that, if the majority of the French refugees now in Spain should be evacuated, the Spaniards might be inclined to reopen their northern border to admit additional French refugees?

HULL

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852.48/1458 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943—8 p. m.

602. For Murphy. Lisbon's 34, March 27 to you. Have any vessels left or are they leaving in the near future to pick up French refugees in Portugal? Is there any reason why Portuguese request that the vessels call at Vila Real rather than at Lisbon cannot be granted?

HULL

852.48/1458 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943—9 p. m.

2006. It is understood that the British Admiralty desires that ships which are being sent from North Africa to Portugal to pick up French refugees being evacuated from Spain should call at Lisbon. The Portuguese Government strongly prefers that they call at Vila Real which is 500 miles closer to North Africa. Our Legation in Lisbon states that Salazar is most reluctant to have the refugees come through Lisbon and that insistence on Lisbon as the embarkation point may jeopardize the entire action. Please take this matter up with the appropriate British authorities and report as soon as possible.

HULL

852.48/1458 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943—11 p. m.

550. Your 34, March 27 to Murphy repeated to Department. The Department is taking this matter up both in London and in Algiers. Are French refugees actually arriving in Portugal now?

Repeat to Madrid as Department's 742.

HULL

852.48/1470 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, April 1, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received April 1—1:10 p. m.]

2316. Department's 2006, March 31, 9 p. m. The Foreign Office likewise has information that the Portuguese Government would greatly prefer embarkation of the French refugees from a south coast port and not from Lisbon. The Foreign Office states, however, that there must be some misunderstanding on the Department's part with respect to the attitude of the British Admiralty. I am told that since the latter have to provide escort vessels they are perhaps even more anxious than the Portuguese that the French vessels sent to pick up the refugees should come to a southern Portuguese port as near as possible to North Africa. Unfortunately, the Foreign Office says, both the Portuguese Minister of Marine and the British Naval Attaché

at Lisbon have confirmed that Vila Real is impracticable for ships of more than about 14 feet draught and cannot therefore take the French ships to be employed in the evacuation.

The Foreign Office further tells me that while the Portuguese Government have not so far as it is aware raised final objection to Lisbon the British Ambassador there has suggested to Admiral Cunningham, Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, the port of Setubal as a possible alternative. The latter is about 25 miles south of Lisbon where the departure, the Foreign Office believes, could be arranged less ostentatiously than from Lisbon. It has not yet learned the view of Admiral Cunningham on this suggestion. The Foreign Office feels that in view of the urgency of the matter it would be more convenient to leave the arrangements to Admiral Cunningham in consultation with the authorities in North Africa and the British Ambassadors at Lisbon and Madrid; that reference to London at each stage would only complicate matters and cause unnecessary delay. Mack<sup>37</sup> asks me to assure the Department, however, that the British authorities concerned are fully aware of the importance attached to the early evacuation of these French refugees as well as the evacuation of "many other refugees of other Allied Nationalities who have been even longer in Spain".

MATTHEWS

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852.48/1472 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 1, 1943—midnight.

[Received April 2—11:15 a. m.]

793. So far as we know all local orders to return newly arrived refugees to France have been canceled. Confidentially informed Foreign Office has sent German Embassy note placing responsibility for keeping refugees from crossing border on the Germans. In reply to German claim that refugees are extraditable Foreign Office maintained since Germany carrying on total war refugees entitled to treatment as escaped prisoners of war.

Thus while it appears refugees reaching Spain will not be returned I have received no assurance that new arrivals will be allowed to continue their journey to other countries.

Your 730, March 31, 6 p. m., repeated to Algiers.

HAYES

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<sup>37</sup> W. H. B. Mack, Counsellor in the British Foreign Office.

852.48/1471 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 2, 1943—noon.

[Received 8:04 p. m.]

797. Following telegram has been sent to Lisbon.

43. April 2, noon. Portuguese Ambassador says Salazar aware of letter you wrote but would like a formal note in terms set forth in my letter of March 24 and would like note delivered to him. Salazar would appreciate it if you would do so promptly under authorization contained in Department's 549, March 31, 7 p. m.<sup>88</sup> Repeated to Department.

HAYES

852.48/1473 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, April 3, 1943—noon.

[Received 2:23 p. m.]

745. Department's 550, March 3 [31], 1 [11] p. m. There have as yet been no organized transports of French refugees into Portugal.

Individuals occasionally manage to cross the border illegally usually with assistance of de Gaullists. In this case they are usually sent to England.

The port question is apparently still unsettled. The British now maintain that Vila Real is not deep enough for the vessel concerned. Meanwhile we understand that the French were diverting the vessels at this time for some other purpose with the idea of making them available later. In view of this situation, the British Naval Attaché here has proposed to the Admiralty that April 17 be fixed as the date of arrival of the first two vessels at a Portuguese port.

The British Ambassador said yesterday that he understood that this Legation will be expected to take responsibility for the care of these refugees while on Portuguese territory. The Portuguese have said nothing to me about this and I have hesitated to ask them in view of the indications in Ambassador Hayes' telegram 626, March 15, to Department that it was desirable to keep negotiations on these matters out of Lisbon and in the hands of the Portuguese Ambassador at Madrid. If it is true that this Legation is to be charged with the care of the refugees on Portuguese territory I should appreciate early instructions to this effect and I must also recommend that the Department arrange for an immediate initial allotment \$25,000 for this purpose. Until we know the port to which refugees must proceed we

<sup>88</sup> Not printed; it requested that necessary note be presented to Salazar without delay (852.48/1466).

can not make any estimate of expenses. We might require funds however at any time and any unused amount can always be returned.

The Legation is investigating the question of organization of this relief action as among the various agencies represented here and I shall telegraph the conclusions shortly.

Repeated to Madrid.

FISH

852.48/1473 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 3, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received April 4—3:47 a. m.]

551. [From Murphy.] Your 602, March 31, 8 p. m. Following is my reply to Madrid's 49, March 26, 8 p. m.:

"From Murphy. Your 49, March 26, 8 p. m. only decoded today. British naval staff has been informed by British Naval Attaché, Lisbon, that Vila Real impracticable for vessels of more than 14 feet draft. It is tentatively arranged to embark refugees probably at Setubal on April 17th in two ships having accommodations for approximately 1200 persons.

Repeated to Department and Lisbon."

Foregoing is repeated to Lisbon as answer to its 34, March 27, 9 p. m. [Murphy.]

WILEY

840.48 Refugees/3733a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1943—11 p. m.

403. The Department has been informed that the Swedish Government has under consideration a plan for the admission into Sweden of a number of Polish Jewish children. This Government is interested in any possibility for the alleviation of the condition of these unfortunate people. You are authorized in your discretion to make informal inquiries of the Swedish Government in regard to the status of this matter.

HULL

852.48/1473 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1943—midnight.

775. Refer Murphy's reply of April 3 to your 49, March 26. Please consult Legation, Lisbon and thereafter report whether or not arrange-

ments proposed by Algiers are satisfactory and approximately 1200 refugees may be expected to embark April 17.

HULL

852.48/1477 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1943—5 p. m.

777. Your 804, April 2, 10 p. m.<sup>39</sup> Concerning the conversation mentioned between a member of the British Embassy and Assistant Secretary Long, for your confidential information there is quoted below paraphrase of memorandum of that conversation held on March 24.

“The urgency of the refugee problem in Spain was presented to me by Sir Ronald Campbell,<sup>40</sup> who wanted immediate action for the evacuation of all refugees from Spain and the establishment of an internment camp in North Africa in which to put them. My reply was that that suggestion could not be accepted; that it was not practical from the viewpoint of being feasible; nor was it possible from the political viewpoint. I stated that because of the political entity of French North Africa we would not be in a position to establish an internment camp there under conditions now existing.

“He felt there should be immediate action of an intergovernmental nature.

“He did not seem to be entirely advised as to the steps already being taken in this matter, with the exception that he knew the British Embassy in Madrid was being of assistance financially and otherwise. I brought to his attention the plans for evacuation of 1400 persons for which vessels were being provided by the British Government; that 160 had already been transferred; that on March 28 and April 2 there would be further repatriation; that refugees had been removed from Miranda; that our Embassy had been active and had made funds available, as had private individuals; that General Eisenhower had chosen persons he could use in Africa; and that by agreement with the British Government 1000 were going to Palestine. I told him that as of March 24 there were but 10,000 refugees, 7500 of whom were French, and that after the completion of the evacuations now planned there would be left but a few thousand who would not be in immediate danger and that the preliminary conference between the American and British Governments soon to be held<sup>41</sup> would probably consider their welfare. I told him that we felt such matters should be taken up by that conference and recommendations made by it to the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees.”

HULL

<sup>39</sup> Not printed.

<sup>40</sup> British Minister.

<sup>41</sup> Bermuda Conference to Consider the Refugee Problem, April 19-28, 1943; see pp. 134 ff.

840.48 Refugees/3744

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

No. 9002

MEXICO, April 6, 1943.

[Received April 10.]

SIR: With reference to previous correspondence in connection with the proposed settlement of Polish refugees in Mexico, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum drawn up in the Embassy following a meeting on April 5, at the Foreign Office which I attended and during the course of which arrangements were made for representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior to communicate with the Governor of Guanajuato with respect to the possibility of locating the refugees in that State.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in Mexico  
(O'Donoghue)*

## CONFERENCE

Present: The Ambassador  
British Minister  
Polish Minister  
Señor Manuel Tello, Oficial Mayor  
Counselor of Polish Legation  
Lic. Aguilar Alvarez, Foreign Office  
Representative of Gobernación  
Mr. Cheetham, British Legation  
Mr. Kelly  
Mr. O'Donoghue

A Conference in connection with the Polish Refugee question was held at the Foreign Office at 11 a. m. on April 5, the above-named individuals being present. Señor Tello opened the discussion by stating that he had been instructed by the Foreign Minister to say that Mexico welcomed this opportunity to engage in a humanitarian enterprise such as the locating of Polish refugees in Mexico, and that to this end he thought it would be helpful to have some information as to the number of refugees who might be coming in the first group, and what the group would be composed of.

The Ambassador then said that he understood 500 Polish refugees are now at Bombay and ready to sail for the United States and that a further group of between 1,000 and 1,500 were presently in Iran and ready to leave that country for India upon the receipt of instructions to do so. Mr. Messersmith said that the question of transport-



ing these individuals to the United States was one which he believed was in the hands of the army, using army transports; that these vessels had to make hurried voyages back to the United States and he believed that if they were transporting refugees they would like to take as many as the ships could carry; that is up to approximately 2,000 refugees per vessel. However, he had no definite information as to the number which might be coming on the first trip.

Señor Tello then said that the Ministry of Gobernación had selected the State of Guanajuato as the site for the location of the refugees and he suggested, therefore, that a representative from the Foreign Office and from Gobernación should proceed immediately, or as soon as an appointment could be arranged, to Guanajuato to interview the Governor, and to ascertain from him where he proposed to settle the refugees.

The British Minister here broke in to say that he thought the entire Committee should immediately proceed to Guanajuato since it was a question of urgency more especially as "five months have been wasted" since the matter was first broached to the Mexican Government; that these refugees would shortly be arriving here and numerous plans and possibly much construction work would have to be undertaken. He added that in a conversation which he, the Ambassador and the Polish Minister had had with the Undersecretary of State not long since, the Undersecretary said that the sites had already been selected by the Governor.

Señor Tello then said that that had been his impression also, but that he had just learned that actually the Governor had nothing particular in mind, and he thought therefore that it would be best to send the representatives of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of the Interior to Guanajuato to confer with the Governor and when the several sites had been determined upon, to send for the other members of the Committee, consisting of representatives of the Polish and British Legations and the Embassy.

The representative of Gobernación said that he would be glad to get in touch with the Governor immediately and if the Governor could receive him and the representative of the Foreign Office tomorrow, they would immediately proceed to Guanajuato. He went on to state that the Ministry of Gobernación had had considerable experience in locating large refugee groups particularly some 15,000 Spanish refugees and that once the site had been selected, plans regarding the building and construction repairs would not be too difficult.

The Ambassador then said that he understood that there were in Guanajuato several large haciendas on each of which several hundred

refugees might be comfortably placed and where there were already standing buildings which would need only a minimum amount of repair in order to be habitable, and he hoped that perhaps something like this could be found and that it would be best, if it did not turn out to be feasible to place the first group of refugees in one center, that they could be placed with the minimum degree of separation. He also felt that for purposes of morale and health that it would be best if such sites as were determined upon should also have a small amount of land—say from 8 to 10 hectares—where the refugees could do a certain amount of garden planting and also raise chickens and other food products which would not only give them something to do, but which would also keep down expenses. The Ambassador also stressed that it was not the intention of this group of refugees to engage in any employment in competition with Mexicans, but that such work as they might undertake would be solely in connection with the refugee center.

The representative of Gobernación agreed with the Ambassador respecting the necessity for the refugees to have a certain amount of ground and added that it would also be helpful if he could have some indication as to the nature of accommodation which should be provided for them.

In reply to this latter question the Polish Minister said that he understood that the great majority of these refugees were of the peasant type; that even though they have undergone considerable hardships to date, this did not mean that the Polish Government wished them to have any special accommodations provided; if simple middle class accommodations and facilities are available, they would be more than satisfied.

After certain further general discussion the meeting adjourned at noon, it having been decided that the representative of Gobernación would immediately endeavor to telephone to the Governor of Guanajuato to arrange an appointment with him, after which he would communicate with Señor Tello when the representatives of Relaciones and Gobernación would go to Guanajuato where the other members of the Committee would presumably join them some two days later. It seemed to be the opinion that all things being equal, the non-Mexican members of the Committee would go to Guanajuato on or about April 8th.

SIDNEY E. O'DONOGHUE

MEXICO, April 5, 1943.

852.48/1489 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 8, 1943—1 p. m.  
[Received April 8—12:35 p. m.]

844. My 793, April 1, midnight. Foreign Office has given oral assurances refugees who succeed in entering Spain will not be returned to France.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy.

HAYES

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852.48/1491 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 8, 1943—5 p. m.  
[Received 10:27 p. m.]

849. Department's 775, April 5, midnight. British Embassy Lisbon has telegraphed London and Madrid that Chargé called yesterday on Secretary General who informed him that Salazar agreed on April 17 as evacuation date but insisted Setubal be used. It is understanding of British Embassy Madrid that although British would greatly prefer evacuation thru Lisbon (they now allege rail connection with Setubal unsatisfactory although as a matter of fact they have nothing to do with rail transportation of these refugees) they are prepared to accept Setubal which they suggested originally as compromise proposal. We are still basing our arrangements on arrival evacuation ships at Setubal 17th and hope for prompt confirmation that Portuguese and British are in agreement not only on date but on port.

Repeated to London, Lisbon and Algiers for Murphy.

HAYES

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852.48/1492 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, April 9, 1943—1 p. m.  
[Received 1:20 p. m.]

793. My 752, April 3, 6 p. m.<sup>42</sup> I have today received a note from the Foreign Office referring to my previous communication concerning the departure of refugees from Spain and stating that the transit through Portugal of the refugees who are at present in Spain and who desire to embark in Portuguese ports is authorized. The note goes on to specify that the refugees should be divided into as many groups as there are vessels assigned to remove them, that each group

<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

should not exceed the capacity of the respective vessel and that entries of each group should only take place when the date of departure has been fixed. It is further specified that the refugees once on Portuguese territory may not postpone their embarkation on pretext of illness or any other motive.

Repeated to Madrid.

FISH

840.48 Refugees/3748 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 13, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received April 13—7:02 p. m.]

1182. I spoke briefly with Boheman<sup>43</sup> today on subject matter Department's 403, April 5, 11 p. m., and my 1118, April 9, 12 noon.<sup>44</sup> Question involving Polish Jewish children is now being explored by Swedish officials and I understand is to be taken up at Cabinet today. Boheman told me, however, that Swedish Government has so far been unsuccessful in every endeavor to secure German consent for admission of Jews to Sweden. Only exceptions have been of certain individuals whose admission has been secured he said by unpleasant ways including even payment of money. Any Jew he said could be got out of Germany if enough money was paid. Germans have flatly refused Swedish offer to receive all Jews from Norway and he mentioned another instance of request for Jews from Holland being turned down. Boheman does not believe that Germans will consent to Polish Jewish children coming to Sweden.

Legation will telegraph as Swedish Government decision is known regarding specific question Polish Jewish children.

JOHNSON

840.48 Refugees/3744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1943—6 p. m.

573. Have heard from appropriate people that the movement referred to in despatch 9002<sup>45</sup> may start about 25th of this month and naturally to culminate in about 30 days. Have not yet received answer from Bombay in regard to number, types and conditions of people. Our best guess here 500 to a thousand. Am telegraphing again asking that this information be sent immediately. In meantime it would seem wise for you to discuss with committee and for

<sup>43</sup> E. C. Boheman, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>44</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>45</sup> Dated April 6, p. 285.

it to determine whether without further information it would be possible for a group of this number to be admitted into Mexico irrespective of the fact that when it is available it will be telegraphed you immediately. Will appreciate advice on results of Guanajuato survey. As soon as we receive more information will communicate with you further.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/3868

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid learned in the last week in March that the Spanish Government had closed the Pyrenean frontier to refugees and that foreigners entering Spain clandestinely were to be sent back to France where they would be handed over to the German authorities.

Subsequently the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, while maintaining that closure of the frontier was necessary, informed Sir Samuel Hoare <sup>46</sup> that the Spanish Government had not given instructions to the frontier authorities to surrender refugees and escaping prisoners. The United States Ambassador at Madrid is understood to have obtained an assurance that the closing of the frontier would not compromise the exit of prisoners and refugees already in Spain.

His Majesty's Government later learned that the instructions to the Spanish frontier authorities to hand over refugees to the Germans had been rescinded, but understand that the frontier remains officially closed in spite of the protests of the United States and British Ambassadors.

Accordingly the Prime Minister made strong representations to the Spanish Ambassador in London on the subject on April 7th, and a short account of the conversation is attached. His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will make representations on similar lines to the Spanish Ambassador in Washington.

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1943.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Prime Minister (Churchill) and the Spanish Ambassador (Tormes)*

The Prime Minister said we hoped for friendly relations with Spain and that we wished to see Spain peaceful and prosperous but that if

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<sup>46</sup> British Ambassador in Spain.

the Spanish Government went to the length of preventing these unfortunate people seeking safety from the horror of Nazi domination, and if they went further and committed the offence of actually handing them back to German authorities, that was a thing which would be the destruction of good relations.

The Spanish Ambassador said that his Government were very apprehensive of the embarrassment to which they might be exposed by the mass of influential refugees helped by Foreign Embassies from France. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was for the Germans to regulate this and to patrol their side of the frontier. If they could not do this effectively it was certainly not up to the Spanish to reject these unfortunate people and there could not be reprisals by the Germans for accepting them.

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840.48 Refugees/3757: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, April 19, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 9:50 p. m.]

382. Department's 573, April 15, 6 p. m. regarding Polish refugees. Kelly and O'Donoghue have just returned from survey in Guanajuato in company with representatives Mexican Government and British and Polish Legations. O'Donoghue and Kelly report as follows: They found one large hacienda, Santa Rosa, which is in good condition and which, with certain amount of unavoidable reconstruction, would be capable of housing up to 1,000 persons. Hacienda is located 20 minutes from León, population over 100,000, with year round communication. This is the only property capable of being made ready in limited time available to receive large group of refugees. Rental would be 1,000 pesos monthly, payable 1 year in advance, and option has been given thereon up to May 14.

In view of urgent necessity to get work under way immediately and to conclude contracts for purchase of necessary equipment such as beds, blankets, et cetera, on the basis of 1,000 refugees, it is recommended \$100,000 be made available immediately to the competent Polish authorities. It is understood the Polish Ambassador in Washington will make request for this amount.

Wiesiolowski, Counselor of the Polish Legation here, is ideally suited to handle the preliminary phases in connection with project but Embassy understands he is seriously handicapped by fact that despite repeated requests for assistance Polish Legation is presently staffed only by the Minister and himself. It is therefore practically impossible for Wiesiolowski to absent himself from the Capital for any

length of time in order to complete arrangements for setting up camp at Santa Rosa. It is recommended that an assistant be assigned to Legation in Mexico as well as one other person experienced in handling large groups of refugees. It is further suggested that Polish Ambassador in Washington be advised of above and of existing emergency.

Complete report re Guanajuato survey will be forwarded by air mail.

MESSERSMITH

840.48 Refugees/3839

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On the 29th of March, Mr. William Strang<sup>47</sup> handed to Mr. Dunn<sup>48</sup> the draft text of the instructions sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara and to His Majesty's Minister at Berne with the purpose of arranging with the Turkish and Bulgarian Governments (the latter by way of the Swiss Government) for the evacuation to Turkey from Bulgaria of 30,000 Jews who were, it was understood, to be deported to Poland.

The State Department will no doubt have received from the United States Ambassador at Ankara a telegram to the effect that it is the agreed view of the United States and British Ambassadors that there is no prospect whatever of persuading the Turks to agree to receive the 30,000 Bulgarian Jews, and that the only possible solution of the problem would be to arrange for their transport to some other destination.

The State Department are also aware of the attitude of the Swiss Government who feel unable to make to the Bulgarian Government an official communication requesting that no obstacle be placed on the departure of the 30,000 Jews from Bulgaria.

In the meantime, representations have been made to the Ambassador in writing by Dr. Weizmann,<sup>49</sup> and to the British Secretary of State verbally by Rabbi Wise<sup>50</sup> and Judge Proskauer<sup>51</sup> in favour of the Jews in Bulgaria. His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to reply to these representations by calling attention in the first place to the fact that practical arrangements are under way for the evacuation of 4500 Jewish children and 500 accompanying adults from Bulgaria, and suggesting that the communication to the Bulgarian Government of a further scheme before this first scheme is completed

<sup>47</sup> Acting Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

<sup>48</sup> James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State.

<sup>49</sup> Chaim Weizmann, President, Jewish Agency for Palestine.

<sup>50</sup> Stephen S. Wise, President, World Jewish Congress.

<sup>51</sup> Judge Joseph M. Proskauer, President, American Jewish Committee.

might give the Bulgarian Government an excuse to delay the present operation while considering the more ambitious proposal. Lord Halifax<sup>52</sup> is also authorised to draw the attention of the Jewish representatives to the improbability of the Bulgarian authorities agreeing to the issue of exit permits to any man of military age.

Lord Halifax would finally propose to quote to the Jewish representatives an extract from a speech by Viscount Cranborne in the House of Lords on March 23rd in which he said "The capacity of Great Britain and of her Colonial territories to maintain vast quantities of refugees is dependent and must be dependent in war-time on two vital and inter-related considerations. Those are shipping and food. Already our resources are greatly stretched".<sup>53</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1943.

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840.48 Refugees/3761 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 20, 1943—midnight.

[Received April 21—10:47 a. m.]

1281. Mr. Adler-Rudel<sup>54</sup> who is returning to London tomorrow has had conferences this week with Boheman and Secretary of Social Welfare Moller. Boheman's attitude he claims is much more cooperative than before Cabinet meeting last Thursday, he presumes because of instructions from Prime Minister as Acting Foreign Minister. Boheman now claims Sweden will do what it can without prodding from American and British Governments, as he previously had suggested might be necessary (see Legation's 1235, April 17, 2 p. m.<sup>55</sup>).

Boheman suggested instead of attempting to bring children only from Polish area that Germans might be more likely to permit them to be evacuated from the Low Countries and other western areas. Adler-Rudel says that if children can be evacuated from anywhere he will not urge concentration on any particular area but he considers that physical condition of children in Polish area to be worse than elsewhere. Social Welfare Minister Moller claimed that Sweden would be unable to finance feeding, housing and other expenses for children in Sweden, consequently should this scheme prove effective Adler-Rudel will attempt to obtain funds in Great Britain and America. He feels much encouraged by attitude of Boheman and Cabinet but there is a very long road to follow before any real results can be obtained.

JOHNSON

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<sup>52</sup> British Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>53</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, vol. 126, col. 852.

<sup>54</sup> Representative of Jewish Agency for Palestine in London.

<sup>55</sup> Missing from Department files.



840.48 Refugees/3765 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, April 22, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 11 : 44 p. m.]

402. Reference O'Donoghue telephone conversation of today with Carrigan.<sup>56</sup> Embassy is of the opinion that it will be possible to accommodate in Mexico, more particularly at Santa Rosa Hacienda, up to 2,000 Polish refugees to arrive in the first group. Considerable difficulties, however, will have to be overcome and it is not anticipated that conditions will be overly comfortable for the first few weeks after arrival. However, within next 3 months accommodations should be sufficient.

It will be necessary to get under way immediately and it is therefore recommended that the sum of \$150,000 be made available immediately to Polish authorities. As soon as it can be done quarterly estimates will be submitted but in meantime money must be made available in order to get enterprise.

MESSERSMITH

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840.48 Refugees/3765 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943—6 : 10 p. m.

A-1577. Referring your 402, April 22, 7 p. m. You are authorized to draw draft for \$150,000 and, in your discretion, to pay this immediately, in whole or in part, to the Polish Legation to be expended incident to the settlement of Polish refugees. Amounts advanced, either in dollars or in the equivalent pesos, may be advanced against the receipt of the appropriate officer of the Polish Legation, and the Department would appreciate a periodic report from you of additional monies which may be necessary for this purpose, accompanied by a report indicating that in your opinion the monies have been expended for the purpose for which intended.

The Department would like the receipt of tentative estimates broken down into objective classification, if practicable, as you have been previously instructed and in addition if accounting data could be obtained from the Polish Legation showing the actual disbursements made it is desired for the record. It is suggested that the Embassy or Mr. Kelly, or both, might assist the Polish Legation in rendering a reasonable accounting of these funds until such time as provision can be made for an appropriate accounting staff to be attached to the

<sup>56</sup> John W. Carrigan, of the Division of the American Republics.

Polish Legation. Items in your accounts should be charged to Appropriation 19-112/30006.014, and of course no accounting responsibility will be assumed by the Embassy with reference to the disbursements made by the Polish Legation other than in an advisory capacity, nor should any indication be communicated at this time with reference to the proposed assignment or detail of an auditor or accountant by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

HULL

851R.00/463a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943—7 p. m.

774. For Murphy.<sup>57</sup> Please present the following matter to General Eisenhower with the request that he consult General Giraud also and that we be advised as quickly as may be practical of the decision.

The American and British Governments are meeting in Bermuda<sup>58</sup> to discuss ways and means for saving refugees, a number of whom have found their way out of German military jurisdiction and some of whom are now in Spain. The delegates at Bermuda are impressed with the thought that Spain is the only effective channel of escape for these unfortunates who remain in Western Europe composed of various nationalities. They feel it is of supreme importance that this channel be kept open as the consequences of closure would be that the admission of additional refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government; that the Allies would be deprived of persons who are useful to them in North Africa; and that world opinion would come to the conclusion that we were not making any serious effort to deal with that problem if something were not done about the situation in Spain. There are six or seven thousand persons of this category in Spain who are not of French nationality but who are largely Jewish, and of either enemy nationality or are stateless persons. The proposal is that they be transported to North Africa because of the scarcity of shipping for long journeys and the proximity of that region to their present residence. Further, that they be assembled there in a camp to be built, if necessary, the site of which would be selected by the military authorities there, and with the consent and approval of the French authorities. The camp would be either under military authority or be under the jurisdiction of the British who have offered to make available personnel for that purpose. To keep them in Spain would prevent the advent into Spain of additional persons. Provision for the number mentioned in Africa would be for purposes

<sup>57</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.

<sup>58</sup> See pp. 134 ff.

of a temporary domicile until another place could be found to which to move them and with the assumption that persons later arriving in Spain might fill their places in such a camp in Africa after the persons there had been moved to other jurisdictions.

We are advising the Bermuda conference that the matter involves consultation with the military authorities and approval by the French authorities in North Africa and that they are being consulted.

The Department will appreciate receiving a reply as promptly as possible considering that the conferees in Bermuda will be entering the second week of what was expected to be a short conference.

For your confidential information the Department is consulting the Joint Chiefs here and any final decision as it might affect the North African military effort must await receipt of their advices.

HULL

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*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State*<sup>58a</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The United States Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to your letter of April 23<sup>58b</sup> with regard to removing refugees from Spain and also to the British proposals regarding this subject which were enclosed.

There are some political and humanitarian aspects of the questions presented upon which the State Department is best qualified to formulate United States policy. The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, confine their comments to the military aspects.

The immediate proposal is to transport some 3,000 to 5,000 refugees, largely Jewish and of enemy nationality or stateless, to North Africa. There they are to be either completely free or interned in a rest camp under British control. The British memorandum indicates that there are now 45,000 such refugees<sup>58c</sup> in Spain and that it would be desirable to remove all of them. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that there will be similar proposals to transport increased increments of refugees to North Africa in the future.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that acceptance of the British proposal would have the following results:

(a) It would require the utilization of personnel shipping capacity which is urgently needed for military purposes.

(b) It would require a constant utilization of cargo shipping in order to feed and supply the refugees after their arrival in North Africa. At the present time the cargo shipping available is not suffi-

<sup>58a</sup> Copy of letter obtained from the Department of Defense.

<sup>58b</sup> Not printed.

<sup>58c</sup> Should read "4-5,000 such refugees."

cient to meet the military needs in Africa as well as those of an already strained civilian economy.

(c) It would put an added and unwarranted administrative responsibility on the Supreme Commander in North Africa.

(d) The influx of a considerable group of Jewish refugees to North Africa might cause such resentment on the part of the Arab population as to necessitate military action to maintain order.

For the above reasons the United States Chiefs of Staff strongly urge that the British proposal be rejected.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

*Chief of Staff to the*

*Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

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851R.00/488 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 28, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received April 29—6 p. m.]

729. From Murphy. Your 774, April 23, 7 p. m. The question of the transfer of refugees from Spain to French North Africa has been the subject of several discussions in which the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in the Mediterranean and the Chief of Staff have participated. The Department knows that there are at present approximately 15,000 French refugees in Spain, including many officers, specialists, engineers, and others whose services in the war effort are of urgent interest. These include many of the Jewish faith.

Allied and naval authorities are experiencing difficulty in supplying the necessary shipping and escort vessels to transport these persons to North Africa. It is expected that the first group of approximately 1,400 will depart shortly via Portugal. If these French refugees can be removed from Spain, such action would go far to relieve the pressure under which the Spanish Government is now resting. It would also ease the lot of the six or seven thousand persons of various nationalities mentioned in the Department's telegram under reference. Unfortunately, publicity, for obvious reasons, cannot be given to the effort being made to transport refugees from Spain because of possible Axis reaction.

With respect to specific questions asked in the present telegram, undoubtedly the local French authorities will be glad to cooperate whenever they may have succeeded in transferring from Spain the large number of French refugees now hoping to proceed here whose

number is being daily augmented by a steady flow over the Franco-Spanish frontier. Arrival of refugees in this area, where there exists an acute shortage of building material, clothing, medical supplies, foodstuffs, and approximately everything necessary for their welfare, should be accompanied by importation of these necessities. In any event it should clearly be understood that these refugees would be concentrated in North Africa only as a temporary measure pending eventual transport elsewhere. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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851R.00/490: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, April 30, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received May 1—12: 27 p. m.]

758. From Murphy. Your 792, April 26, 1 p. m.<sup>59</sup> I discussed this matter with General Giraud who expressed the desire to cooperate with us in every way practicable. He emphasized the considerations presented in my 729, April 28, 5 [4] p. m., regarding the urgent necessity to solve the problem presented by approximately 15,000 French refugees in Spain.

Mogador offers certain advantages, but several sites might be considered.

With the necessity of dealing first with the problem of French refugees in Spain in the light of the acute shipping problem involved, there seems little possibility of dealing with the question of these additional refugees for some months to come. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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840.48 Refugees/4111a

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

The *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy dated April 16, 1943, in regard to the action of the Spanish Government in closing the Pyrenean frontier to refugees, has been given careful consideration.

This matter has been brought to the attention of the Spanish Ambassador,<sup>60</sup> who has stated in reply that his Government is giving refuge to the persons entering Spain through the Pyrenees and is not returning them to Germany or delivering any of them to German influences. He added that he was in every way sympathetic and that

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<sup>59</sup> Not printed; it requested that Mr. Murphy ask General Eisenhower to seek the consent of General Giraud to the suggestion made in Department's telegram No. 774, p. 295, and asked if Mogador would be a practical solution (851R.00/497a).

<sup>60</sup> Juan Francisco de Cárdenas.

on his return to Spain next week he would present the matter orally to his Government and would urge it to continue the practice which it has instituted and to render every assistance to the refugees.

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1943.

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*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State*<sup>60a</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on April 30th the British Chiefs of Staff presented their views to the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the removal of Axis refugees in Spain to North Africa. The British views are presented in C.C.S. 204, copy of which is attached hereto.<sup>61</sup>

At that time the United States Chiefs of Staff informed the British of the views which they had expressed to you in their letter of April 26th but agreed to reconsider their decision.

The matter was again considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 4th and they decided to adhere to the views expressed in their previous letter to you. The British Chiefs of Staff have been so informed.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

*Chief of Staff to the*

*Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

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852.48/1528 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 9, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 7:29 p. m.]

834. From Murphy from Bernstein<sup>62</sup> for Morgenthau.<sup>63</sup> Reference Madrid's 1099, April 30 to Department.<sup>61</sup> French request transfer additional \$300,000 to Malaise at Madrid for expenses maintenance and evacuation to North Africa of French refugees in Spain. Approval of transfer is recommended as it is continuation of program for which transfer of funds was previously approved.

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<sup>60a</sup> Copy of letter obtained from the Department of Defense.

<sup>61</sup> Not printed.

<sup>62</sup> Presumably Edward M. Bernstein, Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department.

<sup>63</sup> Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

French also request transfer of \$200,000 to Madrid for support of French schools in Spain which have rallied to Giraud and are opposing Vichy control. We have no additional information concerning the merits of this latter request.

To Department. Repeated to Madrid. [Bernstein. Murphy.]

WILEY

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840.48 Refugees/3796a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*<sup>64</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1943—11 a. m.

898. For Murphy. British Embassy has presented to the Department a note<sup>65</sup> stating that a total of 700 refugees consisting of 300 Poles proceeding from Spain via Portugal and 400 British and so-called French and Polish Canadians proceeding direct from Spain are expected momentarily in Gibraltar and that an additional 370 "Canadians" of mixed nationalities and nearly 300 Poles will be free to leave Madrid or Miranda as soon as transport can be arranged. The Governor of Gibraltar reports that there will be no further shipping from Gibraltar to the UK for about a month and that in view of limited accommodation on the Rock it is doubtful whether even the first contingent of "Canadians" referred to above can be received there. These persons are all intended for service in the armed forces operating with the British. The British point out the importance of not interrupting the flow of refugees through Spain and urge that those above mentioned, in view of the shortage of shipping from the Iberian Peninsula to the UK, be permitted to come to North Africa in transit to the UK. The total number they believe would not exceed 500 at any one time.

The Department is inclined to recommend concurrence in this proposal provided that representatives of the British Government in North Africa assume full responsibility for these refugees during their stay there and providing they have identification and travel documents of a character which will ensure their admission into the UK. The War Department is agreeable subject to the above conditions. Department also feels that they should not be given precedence over other refugees intended to help the military effort and suggests the possibility that they might be evacuated in smaller groups along with larger groups of the other refugees. However, practical con-

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<sup>64</sup> Repeated on the same date as No. 1062 to the Ambassador in Spain, as No. 821 to the Minister in Portugal, and as No. 2986 to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

<sup>65</sup> British *aide-mémoire*, dated May 7, 1943, not printed.

siderations would govern this if approval is given to the policy involved. Unless you perceive objection thereto please take this matter up with General Eisenhower and the French authorities and endeavor to obtain their approval.

Repeated to Madrid, Lisbon and London.

HULL

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852.48/1532 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, May 13, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received May 14—10:49 a. m.]

1267. Your 1062, May 11, 11 a. m.<sup>66</sup> I agree that the flow of refugees should not be interrupted but should rather be speeded up. British Embassy policy is to divest itself of all responsibility for care of refugees. It still has in mind desirability of a refugee camp for all nationalities in North Africa. (Your 777, April 6, 5 p. m., which seems not to have been repeated to Algiers.)

It now wishes to turn over to the North African representation the care of the bulk of declared Canadians not eligible to release as such and therefore not eligible to be evacuated to Gibraltar. This would increase financial burden on North African representation in the amount of some 2 million pesetas a month.

Because of the proximity of Gibraltar and of British naval control over this area, the British enjoy special facilities for getting out refugees in whom they are interested including those of other than French nationality and Frenchmen who have declared themselves Canadians and are eligible for release as such.

We evacuated our first large group of French refugees declared as such via Setubal, April 30. Since then Malaise has been unable to obtain shipping from the British for further evacuations although Spanish and Portuguese Governments prepared to facilitate evacuation.

It is damaging to prestige and morale of French who have declared themselves as such for other nationalities and Frenchmen who under British auspices have declared themselves of other nationalities to be evacuated while declared French are unable to leave because of British failure to supply shipping. It is also of course very expensive for North African authorities to maintain them here and burdensome on French representation as well as on this Embassy.

Whether refugees now under British auspices, whatever their declared nationality, are allowed to go to North Africa would appear

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<sup>66</sup> See footnote 64, p. 300.



from our point of view to be a matter for decision of North African authorities but they should not be evacuated at cost of having declared French in Spain.

Repeated Algiers, London and Lisbon.

HAYES

852.48/1533 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, undated.

[Received May 14, 1943—1 : 42 p. m.]

1268. The following telegram has been sent to Algiers.

14. May 13, midnight. For Murphy. Your 834, May 9, 4 p. m. to Department. Full amount of \$500,000 requested by French here and referred to in my 107, April 30, 7 p. m., is needed for refugee relief and it is desired by them that funds granted for support of loyal French institutions in Spain be in addition to this.

With regard to merits of request for funds for latter purpose I consider it important that North African representation be in position to carry on support of these institutions which occupy significant place in life of French community in Spain and which are important centers for education and dissemination of French culture. Otherwise it will be most difficult to keep them out of hands of Vichy Government who strongly desire to retain control.

HAYES

852.48/1532b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>67</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1943—9 p. m.

3118. The American and British Governments and the French authorities in North Africa have been much interested to provide for the passage out of Spain into Africa of refugees. These refugees seem to consist of three categories :

(a) French citizens desiring to proceed to North Africa to join the war effort there,

(b) Stateless persons who are refugees from political, racial and religious persecution fortunate enough to have escaped into Spain,

(c) About 1500 or more declared Canadian citizens of former other nationality who would be forwarded from a port in North Africa in British bottoms to England to join various elements of the fighting forces.

<sup>67</sup> The same on the same date as No. 943 to the Consul General at Algiers, as No. 1106 to the Ambassador in Spain, and as No. 856 to the Minister in Portugal.

The Department considers that this refugee movement should be viewed as a whole and considers that it would be unfortunate if exclusive priority were insisted upon by any of the authorities concerned for a group in which they are particularly interested. If there should develop an insistence upon the evacuation of one of the categories mentioned in preference to another category there might develop a rigidity which would tend to defeat the whole movement. Such a development the United States Government would view with apprehension for its effect would be twofold. First, it would interfere with the flow of fighting men both to North Africa and to the forces operating under British command, and second, it would tend to have a very discouraging effect upon the whole movement to protect and preserve those refugees of political, racial and religious persecution whose fate is the concern of the civilized world.

With these thoughts in mind the Department expresses the hope to its representatives concerned with these movements that they do whatever they may be able to secure the onward movement of these persons out of Spain through Portugal and to Africa. For this purpose it is essential that there be ships available. Several vessels were used as recently as April 30 to transport refugees from Portugal to North Africa. It seems that these vessels could still be used. If they could be continued for 60 or 90 days all of the persons mentioned could be evacuated. The cooperation of the naval authorities who control the use of the vessels on that run and the cooperation of the Portuguese and Spanish Governments to permit the movement of persons to board those vessels are necessary for the whole movement of refugees depends upon the use of either those particular vessels or similar tonnage. It is the Department's hope that its representatives will be able to secure the cooperation of the appropriate authorities and have vessels continue this movement and hopes that the same vessels may be still available and continue to be made available. At the same time it is felt that an insistence upon the prior evacuation of any particular category might develop in such a way as to defeat the whole purpose.

These matters are called to your attention and you are requested to continue to work out the problem as expeditiously as possible.

This same telegram has been sent to Algiers, Madrid and Lisbon.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/3814a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1943—11 a. m.

1182. The British Government is endeavoring to complete arrangements for the evacuation of 4,000 children and 500 adults from Bul-

garia to Palestine. In the near future the British Minister at Bern will approach the Swiss authorities in regard to arrangements with the Bulgarian Government for the selection of the individuals to be evacuated.

In view of the American interest in this humanitarian plan you are instructed to consult with the British Minister and to associate this Government with the approach to the Swiss authorities.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/3797: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 18, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received May 19—12:54 p. m.]

914. From Murphy. Department's 898, May 11, 11 a. m. The French authorities have agreed to permit the entry of allied nationals and to harbor them at the shelter in Casablanca until they can be sent to their final destination. Facilities available at Casablanca will permit the entry of groups of 150 at one time at approximately 10-day intervals but the French ask that one group be cleared before the next arrives. They will assume responsibility for them while in North Africa.

It will, however, be difficult to provide transportation for them to the United Kingdom. Consequently it is doubtful whether large numbers can be handled by a regular service.

Macmillan<sup>68</sup> has informed London of the foregoing arrangement with the French. [Murphy.]

WILEY

840.48 Refugees/3799: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 19, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 8:14 p. m.]

1610. British Minister<sup>69</sup> has sent me a memorandum in which he says he discussed with Adler-Rudel before latter left and with Boheman subsequently question of asylum in Sweden for about 20,000 Jewish children from German-occupied countries (see Legation's 1235, April 17, 2 p. m.;<sup>70</sup> 1281, April 20, midnight, and references mentioned). Boheman stated it would greatly assist Swedish Government in proceeding with this problem if it could have assurances from

<sup>68</sup> Harold Macmillan, British Adviser in North Africa.

<sup>69</sup> V. A. L. Mallet.

<sup>70</sup> Missing from Department files.

British and American Governments that arrangements would be made to remove children from Sweden as soon as possible after war. Adler-Rudel told Mallet it would be of assistance if British and American Governments could permit additional foodstuffs to enter Sweden through Goteborg to help support these children. Adler-Rudel also referred to fact that Swedish Government was not prepared to bear whole financial responsibility. Mallet mentions decisions of Bermuda Conference which recommend, in principle, that British and American and other Allied Governments should give a joint undertaking to neutral governments that maintenance and eventual removal of refugees would be guaranteed.<sup>71</sup> It was pointed out to him, however, that Allied Governments could hardly bind themselves to give any assurance to removal of these children to places outside Europe since to do so would amount to acquiescence in German Government's Juden Reich [*Judenrein?*] policy.<sup>72</sup>

Mallet is accordingly instructed to inform Boheman confidentially that decision of Swedish Government to approach German Government concerning asylum for 20,000 Jewish children is considered a human gesture highly appreciated by British Government; that British Government will give sympathetic consideration to question of allowing additional foodstuffs through Goteborg to support children, but with respect to request that assurances be given concerning their removal after war British Minister can only say that this will no doubt be part of international problem at that time, and that British Government cannot now bind itself to a particular ultimate destination for them inside or outside Europe.

British Minister states that he wishes me to be fully conversant with situation before making confidential memorandum to Boheman along above lines. He adds that when he makes this communication he will take opportunity to find out why Swedish Government which has shown generous attitude to refugees in past now seems concerned with financial responsibility in this particular plan. Mallet's memorandum also referred to decision at Bermuda Conference.

JOHNSON

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840.48 Refugees/3817a : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943—5:30 p. m.

A-1766. The U.S. Immigration Service is planning to provide a train at shipside on the West Coast for the Polish refugees to trans-

<sup>71</sup> See telegram No. 2631, April 26, 3 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 165.

<sup>72</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 574 ff.

port them through to Mexico City and incidentally to provide medical care for them en route. The Immigration Service has suggested the desirability of your arranging with the Mexican Immigration Service for their reception at the border in order to facilitate the arrival of the train in Mexico City without delay.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/3812 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 23, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 9 : 20 p. m.]

950. From Murphy. Department's 943, May 15, 9 p. m.<sup>73</sup> There is complete agreement here between the French, British, and ourselves that the flow of refugees from Spain should not be interrupted and arrangements are under way with the British Naval Command to insure a regular but limited service to Portuguese ports. The next vessel is scheduled to leave Setubal May 24.

The French authorities naturally prefer to receive refugees of French nationality, although as stated in my 914, May 18, 6 p. m., they have agreed to permit the entry of Allied nationals in small groups and to shelter them until arrangements can be made for their transportation abroad. Arrangements to receive large numbers are pending decision regarding the establishment of the refugee center (see my 729, April 28, 5 [4] p. m., and Department's 774, April 23, 7 p. m.).

Our figures, however, indicate that, in addition to the six or seven thousand persons of various nationalities mentioned in Department's 774, the number of refugees alone in Spain exceeds 15,000 including the alleged "Canadians" of French nationality. Recent arrivals, however, consider this estimate is far too low. Consequently a considerable shipping problem is involved which will require consultation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and probably a directive from them if further facilities are to be made available.

To Department, repeated to London, Lisbon and Madrid. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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840.48 Refugees/3816 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, May 24, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received May 25—9 : 05 a. m.]

3169. Department's 1182, May 18. British Legation informs me that present status of this matter is as follows:

<sup>73</sup> See footnote 67, p. 302.

Presumably upper [*under?*] German pressure Bulgarian Government has lately adopted stiffer attitude. Minister of Interior has intimated to Swiss Chargé d'Affaires at Sofia that Bulgarian Government has decided to close Turkish-Bulgarian frontier to all Jews. Chargé d'Affaires reporting this development to Swiss Government on May 18 added that it is impossible to take further steps to evacuate Jews from Bulgaria to Palestine.

This was reported to F. O. by British Legation on May 21. I was told that I would be advised of British Government's reaction. Will report further.

HARRISON

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852.48/1558

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1943.

MR. LONG: Lord Halifax, who is leaving town this evening for a week, called me on the telephone. He told me that on May 22, in a conversation he had had with the Secretary, he had asked urgently, in the name of his Government, for a reply from us with regard to the question of the construction of the proposed camps in North Africa for refugees from Spain. He told me that the Secretary had replied that the matter was before the President for the latter's decision and that he would do his best to expedite a reply. Will you see what can be done to get the necessary answer to the British Government? Lord Halifax requested that when we had an answer we inform Sir Ronald Campbell, since he himself will not be back until the week after next.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

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852.48/1540: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 29, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received May 30—1:30 a. m.]

3683. We have now received the promised memorandum from Strang at the Foreign Office with reference to the problem of providing passage out of Spain for the several categories of refugees referred to in the Department's telegram No. 3118, May 15, 9 p. m. and

Embassy's 3425, May 18, 6 p. m.<sup>74</sup> Referring to our letter on the question Strang writes:

"You drew particular attention to the opinion of the State Department that this refugee question should be considered as a whole and that it would be unwise to insist upon exclusive priority for any particular group of refugees. I can assure you that His Majesty's Government share the State Department's anxiety to see the whole refugee question in Spain liquidated as soon as possible. Hitherto, however, it has been unavoidable that certain categories of refugees and internees should be evacuated before the others. For instance, it has always been more easy to secure Spanish agreement to the release for internees of British nationality including of course Canadians, than for internees of any other European nationality, and we have naturally concentrated on securing their rapid passage through Spain. Amongst those of British nationality who have been released have been included many of Allied nationality who have registered themselves on reaching Spanish territory as being British subjects and who have been accepted as such by the Spanish authorities. Apart from this the Spanish authorities have been willing to agree to the release of a number of Netherland and Belgian internees on the pretext that they were proceeding to territories overseas under Netherland or Belgian sovereignty. It has also been possible from time to time to secure the release of other Allied nationals for whom destinations could be found, principally in the fighting forces. Certain categories of internees have also been allowed to proceed via Gibraltar but the numbers of these are clearly limited by the fact that Gibraltar is primarily a military fortress.

Since the beginning of the North African operations and the completion of the German occupation of France by far greater number of refugees entering Spain have been of French nationality and Jews either stateless or of enemy nationality. As regards the French quite a number who registered themselves as Canadians have been allowed to depart while others registered as Frenchmen have until fairly recently been held by Spanish authorities who have been afraid owing to German pressure to grant them exit visas. Their reluctance has now been overcome and it is understood that the Spanish authorities are ready to grant visas freely for the evacuation of Frenchmen via Portugal. In this work of evacuating Frenchmen, I understand that the representatives of General de Gaulle<sup>75</sup> and General Giraud<sup>76</sup> in Madrid work in close contact in spite of the allegations made by their respective headquarters in London and Algiers, and it is to be hoped that as soon as there is agreement between the two Generals the two French organizations in Madrid will be merged.

There remains the question of disposing of all those refugees who cannot for one reason or another come to this country or the United States or other Allied territory, or who owing to age, sex or sickness cannot join the Allied fighting forces. These persons include Allied nationals, stateless persons and Jews of a number of nationalities.

<sup>74</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>75</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French National Committee in London.

<sup>76</sup> Gen. Henri Giraud, French Civil and Military Commander in Chief in North Africa.

His Majesty's Government share the anxiety of the State Department to arrange for their departure from Spain as soon as possible but the question of a destination has hitherto prevented any appreciable progress being made. The only practicable proposal so far as His Majesty's Government can see is that of establishing a refugee camp in French North Africa which was put forward at the Bermuda Conference. Despite the anxiety of the State Department and His Majesty's Government to see this camp established the competent military authorities in Washington and No. Africa have refused their assent. Until this is settled I can see no hope of a radical solution of the problem created by this category of refugee.

As regards the immediate future, the principal problem is to arrange for the earliest convenient evacuation of Frenchmen via Portugal. I understand that for this purpose the French authorities in North Africa are willing to make available one or two ships which they maintain for their own use. If, therefore, the Spanish and Portuguese Governments continue to allow Frenchmen to be evacuated through Portugal, it should only be a question of arranging a series of evacuations through some appropriate Portuguese port. For this purpose, we should hope that our naval authorities would from time to time be able to provide the necessary escorts.

The above explanation will I hope have shown that there is no divergence of policy between the State Department and ourselves on this question. In practice, however, it has been impossible to avoid some degree of differentiation in the handling of different categories of internees.

We hope, however, that circumstances are now rendering this less necessary than in the past and, if the objections still held in military circles at Washington to the establishment of refugee camps in North Africa can be overcome, the refugee problem in Spain should soon be reduced to easily manageable proportions."

Repeated to Madrid, Lisbon and Algiers.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/3880

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1943.

Sir Ronald came in this morning at his request and asked for an answer, if possible, to the inquiry made to the Secretary of State by Lord Halifax and subsequently referred to by Sir Ronald in a conversation with Mr. Welles and which was the subject of a memorandum from Mr. Welles.<sup>77</sup>

I told Sir Ronald that perhaps Lord Halifax had received from his Government information which indicated to him that arrangements of a definitive character had been made for the reception of

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<sup>77</sup> Dated May 27, p. 307.



refugees in North Africa when that was not exactly the case. I then proceeded to explain that while the French authorities had agreed in principle and while the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had disagreed, and while the matter had been brought to the attention of the White House, it was all related to the general subject of refugees, which had been the reason for the Bermuda Conference. This Conference had reported and recommended the convocation of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Before we attended that Committee meeting or specifically sponsored its convocation, the American Government had felt that the American delegate ought to have certain definite authority. The matter had been referred to the President during the visit of the Prime Minister.<sup>79</sup> We have now been informed that the President discussed the matter with Mr. Churchill but that Mr. Churchill had stated that it would be necessary for him to consult his authorities in London before he could give a definitive answer and go along with the President. The President had not yet heard from Mr. Churchill. Consequently, while the matter had been referred "across the street" by us, it had been referred "across the ocean" by Mr. Churchill and we were still waiting to hear from England.

I went on to express the deep interest we had and to review the situation as it existed in Spain, stating that we would be very glad to see that whole situation picked up by the Intergovernmental Executive Committee and carried forward.

I also told Sir Ronald of a very interesting telegram which had been brought to our attention from Rabbi Perlszweig which possibly his Government had also had access to and which indicated a change of policy and possibly of mind of some of the gentlemen who had been very active, and which further indicated that they were convinced that no very real results could be obtained in the movement for the evacuation of Jewish people from territory held by the enemy. Their new point of view seemed to be realistic and in line with the beliefs of our two Governments as indicated at Bermuda.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

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840.48 Refugees/3881a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1943—midnight.

1103. For Murphy and Hoehler from Lehman. Department is considering the question of establishing a refugee camp in North

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<sup>79</sup> Prime Minister Churchill was in Washington for a conference with President Roosevelt May 12-25, 1943. Correspondence regarding this conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

Africa for the reception of stateless refugees, enemy aliens, allied nationals and Jews of various nationalities who are now in Spain. Matter is entirely in exploratory state but if agreement should be reached with War Department and French officials it is probable that we would be asked to operate such a camp as purely American project. Present thought is that a new camp should be developed rather than using one of previous internment camp sites. It is estimated that approximately 1,000 men and women would be housed in such a camp at any given time.

Would like your judgment on following points:

1. Would it be feasible for our staff to operate such a camp as direct American project with necessary guards provided by the Army or French?
2. Would present Lend-Lease supplies allotted to you be available for construction and subsequent supply to such a camp?
3. Would special supplies in addition to those now being sent to North Africa be necessary for this purpose?
4. What cash funds would be required for camp construction?
5. What do you estimate continuing cash expenditure would be for operation of camp of this character over and above probable Lend-Lease supplies available for this purpose?
6. How many American staff members would be needed for operation and could they be made available from your present staff in North Africa?

If plan materializes we would prefer to have camp operated by personnel on our payroll and not by private agency personnel loaned to us.

Please treat this matter in strictest confidence. You will readily appreciate the very undesirable repercussions which would follow should the project become public and be found impossible of accomplishment. [Lehman.]

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/3887 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 14, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 3:46 p. m.]

1096. For Lehman from Murphy, from Hoehler. Reference to the Department's number 1130 [1103]. Staff agrees that it might be desirable to set up colony here for miscellaneous refugees now in Spain.

Discussed with Royce.<sup>80</sup> Will discuss with French and Army and give you definite reply later. Supplies in subsistence reserve and army stores available would in our opinion meet food and clothing needs. Would attempt to add some subsistence farm and self-help features to colony. Maintenance costs 1 year for 1000 people over and above available supplies would approximate \$100,000. Staff for operation would approximate \$25,000 more. Sending estimated construction costs and more definite operating costs with a later wire. [Murphy and Hoehler.]

WILEY

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840.48 Refugees/3906a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1943—4 p. m.

970. In January the Mexican Embassy informed the Department that the Mexican Government wished to assist the Spanish Republican internees in North Africa and would be pleased to receive in Mexico those who wished to emigrate there and to pay the costs of their transportation. Acting upon this advice the Department took the matter up with the American military authorities in North Africa and with the French. Both were eager to facilitate the movement as removing a possible source of unrest behind the Allied lines and the War Department agreed for this reason to transport the refugees free of charge to a US port from which they would proceed to Mexico. The refugees were canvassed and approximately 2,000, of whom more than one-half are believed to be women and children, expressed a desire to come to Mexico.

In April, however, the Mexican Government began to raise difficulties, suggesting first that it should send a representative to North Africa to screen the proposed immigrants and then intimating that it did not have sufficient funds to finance the movement, even though this Government's offer to provide ocean transportation gratis left only the cost of rail transport from the US port to the Mexican border to be covered. Incidentally, the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, a private group in this country, has offered to pay some and possibly all of these rail transport costs. The Mexican Embassy in Washington at the Department's request has repeatedly asked the Mexican Government to decide finally whether or not it will accept these refugees but no decision has yet been received here.

Meanwhile our representatives in Algiers report that the internment camps in which these and other refugees in North Africa were de-

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<sup>80</sup> Alexander B. Royce, Executive Chairman of the North African Economic Board and Director of American Economic Operations in this theatre.

tained have been closed and that the Spaniards who wish to proceed to Mexico, being unwilling for this reason to accept work contracts, are without funds, without work and living in crowded quarters. The War Department urges strongly that the matter be decided without further delay.

You are requested to take this matter up with the appropriate Mexican authorities and to urge that a definite decision be reached at once so that the refugees may either be shipped forthwith to Mexico or, if this is not to be authorized, may be informed that they will have to accept other arrangements for their disposition.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4036

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1943.

The British Ambassador called at his request. He brought up the question of establishing a camp in North Africa for refugees and inquired about the nature of this Government's reply to the British. He said that Mr. Churchill denied that he and the President discussed the Jewish refugee and relief questions generally, and that, therefore, the British Government is awaiting a reply from us.

I stated that there must be some mistake in recollection for the reason that the President told the State Department that he would have the conference with Mr. Churchill on this subject, and that the latter said that he must first return home and have a conference with the appropriate officials and, after doing so, would report back to the President. I added that we would check this matter and see what had actually transpired. I said that I thought the question of a communication from us in regard to establishing a camp for refugees in North Africa was contained in our memorandum<sup>80a</sup> on the entire Jewish question which was placed in the hands of the President, but I could not be absolutely sure and that therefore I would check on the matter.

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852.00/10733

*The Mexican Embassy to the Department of State*

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the various communications of Mr. Charles W. Yost, Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs, of the Depart-

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<sup>80a</sup> See letter of May 7 to President Roosevelt, p. 176.

ment of State, to Secretary Anzorena, of this Embassy, on the Spanish Republican refugees in North Africa.

As confirmation of the information transmitted verbally by Secretary Anzorena to Messrs. Laurence Duggan<sup>81</sup> and Charles W. Yost, the Embassy now advises having received the following data from Mexico:

A Committee has been organized in Mexico, D. F., to study the various aspects of the plan of receiving the Spanish Republican refugees from North Africa. Mr. Felix F. Palavicini, an Official of the Secretaría de Gobernación, both [*sic*] representing the Mexican Government, and Messrs. Ginés Langa Tremiño and Jerónimo Gamariz Latorre, Spaniards now residing in Mexico, form the Committee.

The Mexican Government is willing to consider the entry of those Spanish Republicans whose immigration may be deemed as favoring the national economy; preference to be given to farmers, fishermen, specialized mechanics, etc. Mr. Alejandro Quijano has offered that the Mexican Association of the Red Cross and the International Red Cross would gladly cooperate.

The Committee in due time, would take up with the Secretaría de Gobernación the question of the issuance of permits and the manner of issuance of necessary documents. As to transportation, the Mexican Government would avail itself of the offer of the United States Government, which is appreciated, of the United States War Department bearing the full cost of transporting the refugees across the ocean. Other offers as the one by the Joint Antifascist Refugee Committee may materialize into the bearing of rail transportation costs from the port of debarkation to the Mexican border.

As reported to Messrs. Duggan and Yost, the Committee has requested that "U.S. Consulates in Algiers, Casablanca and Tunis urgently formulate a list of the Spanish refugees and their families who wish to go to Mexico, preference being given to farmers, fishermen, mechanics, specialized workers and persons who may easily adapt themselves to the economy of Mexico"; the Committee suggests that U.S. Consulates engage the assistance, as advisers, of Messrs. Salvador García Muñoz and Lorenzo Carbonell Santacruz, in Oran, José Alonso Mallol and Antonio Pérez Torreblanca, in Casablanca, and Julián Sánchez Eroftalbe and Ildefonso Torregorsa García, in Tunis. It was pointed out in the communication received from Mexico that these data were urgently needed with a view to examining at once the feasibility of the refugees in question being admitted into Mexico.

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<sup>81</sup> Adviser on Political Relations.

The information furnished by Mr. Yost in his letter of June 16, 1943,<sup>82</sup> was immediately transmitted to Mexico, on that date. The reply dated the 18th was received on the 19th, stating that, in order to decide on the entry of the refugees, it was indispensable that the data requested be furnished.

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1943.

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851R.00/547 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 21, 1943.

[Received June 23—3:38 a. m.]

1132. Your 978, May 21, 10 p. m.<sup>83</sup> Following is the text of a statement which we propose to release to the press correspondents here at noon local time Thursday, June 24:

"The Joint Commission for Political Prisoners and Refugees reported today that according to its records all persons who were interned in concentration camps, incorporated into work companies or whose residence was confined to restricted areas in French North and West Africa before November 8, 1942 have now been liberated.

This Commission was set up in January, under the joint chairmanship of the United States and British Consuls General in Algiers, to assist in the release, relief and repatriation of these prisoners and refugees. The liberation has proceeded in orderly manner over the past few months, as swiftly as military security investigations and the making of arrangements for maintenance of internees after their release would permit. Today's report marked the climax of months of effort, involving close cooperation between British, American and French authorities, for the solution of a complex problem.

Special local assistance in the manifold details pertaining to the gradual liquidation of the internment camps was provided by a field party of the Commission, which visited the camps several times. The field party included representatives of the United States and British Consuls General, the French High Command, the Public Welfare and Relief Division of the North African Economic Board (this division is the operating agency in North Africa of the United States Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations) and the International Red Cross.

The Commission also reported that all those who were released from work companies on February 12, 1943, given the status of civilian

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<sup>82</sup> Presumably Mr. Yost's letter of June 11, to the Third Secretary of the Mexican Embassy in which he stated that since the North African authorities desired to close on June 15 all of the internment camps in that area except those devoted to Axis internees, the question of how to dispose of the approximately 2,000 Spanish Republicans who desired to accept the Mexican Government's invitation to proceed to Mexico was of the greatest urgency, and that he would appreciate anything that could be done to expedite a final decision by the Mexican Government (840.48 Refugees/3899a).

<sup>83</sup> Not printed.

workers at current wage rates, employed by the Mediterranean Niger Railway or the coal mines of Kenadaa, and whose residence was restricted to the area in which they worked, have been given complete liberty to leave this region and accept work where they wish. With the exception of a few individuals who, of their own free will, signed contracts with one or the other of these companies and prefer to remain, all the former internees and members of work companies have left this region.

The former internees, members of work companies and persons in forced residence have all been provided with useful occupations of their own choice. A large number have signed contracts for work as civilian employees with the American Armed Forces. They are employed in various capacities, are paid at current wage rates for the types of work they do and are not organized in any military formations. Another large group have joined the British pioneer battalions, a noncombatant labor unit of the British Army, in which they receive the pay, rations and quarters of British soldiers. A considerable number have been absorbed into local industry in employment of their own choice.

The situation of the Spanish Republican refugees who have signified their desire to proceed to Mexico presented a serious problem since the internment camps and work companies have been totally liquidated and definite arrangements regarding their departure for Mexico have not been completed. This problem was resolved through the excellent cooperation of the American Army which agreed to employ them under work contracts with the understanding that the contracts would terminate when arrangements were made for their transportation to Mexico.

In addition to assisting in the liberation of all persons from internment camps and work companies, the Joint Commission for Political Prisoners and Refugees obtained from the French authorities an agreement that on the presentation of a contract of employment either with the American Army or private industry, identity and ration cards would be immediately issued. This provision is especially important, since it legalizes the civil status not only of persons released from internment camps, but also of a large number of internees who at one time or another had escaped from camps and were in constant danger of being either returned to the camps or sent to prison. The identity cards are being issued with a minimum of red tape, at reduced rates, and, in the case of destitute persons gratis.

Released internees who were unable to work on account of advanced age or physical disabilities are being cared for by the Public Welfare and Relief Division of NAEB with funds contributed by private sources. Special rehabilitation camps are being developed for them. This division also has provided clothing, food and funds to relieve the immediate needs of persons released from camps who arrived at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers to begin work. Many of them were given assistance in finding living accommodations.

During the visits to internment camps the field party of the Joint Commission for Political Prisoners and Refugees also visited prisons in which political prisoners were confined. There are now in prison approximately 200 foreign refugees who, although they have been duly sentenced by courts, should be considered as political prisoners

since the offenses consist chiefly of infractions of discipline in internment camps or political demonstrations involving violence. The greater part of these prisoners are Spanish Republican refugees. The French authorities agreed to liberate from prisons all Spanish Republican refugees for the purpose of proceeding to Mexico. The Joint Commission suggested, however, that these prisoners should be liberated and allowed to make their own dispositions. Dr. Jules Abadie, former Secretary of the Interior and now Commissioner of National Education, Justice and Public Health, has given an assurance that an amnesty will be granted to these prisoners after their cases have been examined in regard to military security. The granting of these amnesties has been delayed by the temporary confusion resulting from the transition from the high command to the French Committee of National Liberation, but is expected soon. ["]

WILEY

840.48 Refugees/4029

*Memorandum by Mr. R. Borden Reams of the Division of European Affairs to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: With reference to the Secretary's memorandum of conversation with the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, dated June 17, 1943 in regard to the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa, there is attached a memorandum<sup>84</sup> which the Secretary may wish to hand to Lord Halifax when he calls at the Department.

The following information in regard to this matter is submitted for the Secretary's information.

The Bermuda Conference recognized that one of the most pressing problems in connection with refugees was concerned with the evacuation of the refugees now in Spain from that country. It was further agreed that the place to which they would be evacuated must necessarily be as close as possible to Spain since shipping facilities are limited by the demands of the war. The British delegation proposed formally that a camp should be established in North Africa for the reception of that part of the refugees having no government of their own. The total number of stateless and enemy refugees now in Spain is estimated to be between 5,000 and 6,000 persons. The American delegation opposed this suggestion on the grounds of military necessity. However the recommendations were transmitted to the Department of State and were supported by the American delegation so far as the Department is concerned. During the discussions which ensued at Bermuda it was made clear that approval of this plan, if possible, could only be made on the basis of a temporary refuge and that a place

<sup>84</sup> Copy not found in Department files.



of permanent refuge must be found for these people by the Inter-governmental Committee.

The Department of State has worked earnestly in order to secure the assent of the interested authorities to the establishment of a temporary place of refuge in North Africa. It is contemplated that this camp should be located in a part of North Africa removed from the scene of active military operations. Some spot near Mogador was suggested as a possibility. The assent in principle of General Eisenhower and Giraud have been obtained. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have refused up to now to give their consent. The matter was presented by the Secretary to the President in a letter dated May 7, 1943.<sup>85</sup> The President was informed that "temporary refuge in North Africa is not approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and was asked "Do you agree that North Africa may be used as a depot for those refugees who can be evacuated from Spain without interference with military operations and with the full approval of the military commanders in that area? This would approve the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference to save as many as quickly as possible, providing them with temporary asylum in Africa and obtaining commitments for their post-war return to their home countries." The President replied: <sup>86</sup> "I agree that North Africa may be used as a depot for those refugees but not as a permanent residence without full approval of all authorities. I know, in fact, that there is plenty of room for them in North Africa but I raise the question of sending large numbers of Jews there. That would be extremely unwise."

On June 5, 1943 Governor Lehman's office was requested to ascertain whether it would be able to operate any place of refuge which might be established in North Africa for the care of these refugees. It is understood that investigations are now being carried out in regard to this matter.

While the President's reply to the Secretary's letter would appear to give authority for the establishment of a temporary place of refuge on a limited basis it might be well to further clarify this situation. It is not known whether a further approach on the basis of the President's reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is necessary. It is assumed that the President's point that large numbers of Jews should not be sent to North Africa is not applicable in this present case. The total number of stateless and enemy refugees in Spain does not exceed 6,000. Not all of these people will be able to leave Spain even though transportation can be arranged and not all of those who can go will be Jewish. It is not possible at the present time to state definitely

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<sup>85</sup> *Ante*, p. 176.

<sup>86</sup> Memorandum dated May 14, p. 179.

the number of Jewish people who could be evacuated from Spain but several thousand such persons will hardly be considered as excessive in number.

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840.48 Refugees/3913

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1943.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at my request.

I raised with the Ambassador the need for action in getting Jewish refugees out of Bulgaria. I said that the Jewish organizations in this country were very fearful that if further delay took place none of these refugees would be permitted to leave Bulgaria and that I felt that in such event the United Nations could very properly be held responsible for the situation which would then develop. The Ambassador said that he had spoken with Mr. Myron Taylor recently concerning this matter and asked if any definite word had yet been received with regard to the construction of concentration camps in North Africa for refugees from Europe. I reminded the Ambassador that there seemed to be some discrepancy of views as to what the status of this situation was since the President had given Mr. Churchill a memorandum on the subject which the latter had said he would discuss with his Cabinet in London, whereas Mr. Churchill apparently was maintaining that the President had not discussed the matter with him at all. The Ambassador asked if I would at least ascertain whether our highest military authorities were agreeable to the construction of these concentration camps in North Africa. I said I would be glad to confirm my understanding of this situation.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

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840.48 Refugees/4009

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the  
Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: The rescue of European Jewry was a subject of the Bermuda Conference. The fate of Jews as such was not considered separately from the fate of other persons who are persecuted because of religious, racial or political sentiments, but the Jews constitute the larger proportion of them and the Conference considered their situation in Europe as well as efforts to extricate them.

It was considered that we could not negotiate with the Government of Germany on any account during the war so that the Jews within

the jurisdiction of the German military authorities could not be helped unless they should escape from that jurisdiction.

Escape has been made by six or eight thousand of them into Spain across the Pyrenees. The Bermuda Conference recommended that steps be taken to move them from Spain so that others might be moved into Spain from France who would in turn be extricated.

The agency to do this work was to be the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Without waiting for that Committee to commence operations the United States Government in collaboration with the French authorities in North Africa and the British Maritime authorities agreed to the movement of refugees out of Spain. This movement is proceeding gradually and some three thousand have already been moved into Africa. Many of the Jews are of French nationality and have been moved into Africa, but the stateless Jews and Jews of enemy nationality have not yet been moved. However, the pressure upon them by the Spanish Government has been alleviated by reason of the fact that the Spanish Government realizes there is being made a serious effort to move all the refugees in its jurisdiction to other places.

We have recently sent to London a memorandum of the conversation had by Mr. Myron Taylor with the British Ambassador on the subject of getting in operation the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. A copy of the telegram is attached.<sup>87</sup>

There has not yet been located a place for permanent refuge. The word "permanent" means for the duration of the war. The Mediterranean is not yet open for passage East, and shipping is not available because of the demands of the military authorities.

At the suggestion of the Bermuda Conference we agreed to move 4500 children and 500 elders out of Bulgaria by ship or through Turkey to Palestine where England agreed to make visas available. We agreed with England to pay half of the costs and we actually set aside \$300,000 out of which was to be paid the American share. The Turkish Government refused to permit them to transit Turkey by land along the line of the railroad and stated that their people looked upon them as Bulgars irrespective of their religion and would not permit it. An effort was then made to charter two vessels and it looked as if the charter had been arranged. We instructed the American Ambassador at Ankara to render all possible assistance. The British Government undertook to arrange the charter of Rumanian vessels using Turkey as an intermediary. The negotiations conducted by the Turkish Government fell through. Turkey agreed to permit them to traverse Turkish territory as far as Istanbul and to be there loaded, but the Rumanian Government withheld the vessels and the Bulgarian Gov-

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<sup>87</sup> Telegram No. 3879, June 25, 1 p. m., p. 190.

ernment subsequently closed its frontiers and transferred these persons to the interior of Bulgaria.

The United States and British Governments have not yet come to an agreement on the question of the Intergovernmental Committee though every effort has been made by the Department to arrive at an agreement.

You will recall the President discussed the matter with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and has been awaiting information from him, which as far as we are advised has not been received.

The question of the rescue of persons outside the jurisdiction of Germany is one thing. There are very few Jews in places of probable danger such as their precarious position in Spain. All the other Jews who need help are within the confines of Germany or occupied territory but there is no help that we can give them short of military destruction of German armies and the liberation of all the oppressed peoples under its jurisdiction. We are bending every effort in that direction. It is quite improbable that Germany would permit the departure of Jews even if we could bring ourselves to the point of negotiating with the enemy during the course of the conflict.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

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840.48 Refugees/40364

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

TEXT OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON  
JUNE 30TH

Following is text of a message sent by the Prime Minister to the President on June 30th.

*Personal and Most Secret.*

Begins,

The need for assistance of refugees, in particular Jewish refugees, has not grown less since we discussed the question and all possible outlets need to be kept open. Of these the most practical still is North Africa, and I hope the difficulties over the proposed refugee camp there have now been cleared up, and that an early practical decision is now possible. Our immediate facilities for helping victims of Hitler's anti-Jewish drive are so limited at present that the opening of the small camp proposed for the purpose of removing some of them to safety seems all the more incumbent on us, and I should be grateful if you could let me know whether it has been found possible to bring the scheme into operation. General Giraud has given the project his general approval.

840.48 Refugees/3915 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, July 2, 1943.

[Received July 3—1:40 a. m.]

665. Seven hundred six Polish refugees arrived Leon 3 p. m., July 1. Only two cases minor illness. All group in excellent spirits and pleased with reception accorded them in the United States and Mexico as well as with food and quarters provided.

MESSERSMITH

840.48 Refugees/4036%

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to President Roosevelt*<sup>88</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1943.

Attached is a proposed draft of a message for you to send to the Prime Minister in response to his 339.<sup>89</sup>

I believe I can confidently state that funds which have been made available out of your funds are still available in sufficient quantity to defray our share of the cost of rail transportation out of Spain and our share of the sea transportation from Portugal to the west coast of North Africa. So I shall not have to trouble you on that account.

However, it seems that the cost of maintenance of these persons in Africa will have to be arranged. It probably can be done partly through Lend Lease and partly through the use of military cots and tents supplied by the Army. There are certain other costs of an administrative nature and probably extending to certain items of maintenance which may have to be defrayed. Governor Lehman will be in charge of these phases of the operation and will continue in charge at least until the refugees can be removed from their place of temporary residence in Africa to some more permanent place of settlement. There are between 5,000 and 6,000 of these refugees with probably more to come. While the total bill for maintenance is indeterminate Governor Lehman feels that he should be assured of a sum which for different items and over an indefinite period may run to five hundred thousand dollars of United States funds.

In order to institute this program a few authorizations are necessary:

1. To ask Mr. Murphy to obtain from Generals Eisenhower and Giraud a definite location;

<sup>88</sup> Marginal note: "Myron Taylor agrees over phone. B. L."

<sup>89</sup> June 30, p. 321.

2. To Lend Lease to supply necessary items of food and supplies;
3. To the Army to supply tents, cots and pertinent equipment;
4. To allot to Governor Lehman \$500,000, or as much thereof as may be necessary, to meet other administrative and maintenance costs.

The British will assume an equal part of the total cost.

In this connection there should be noted that the project to open a temporary residence on the Atlantic coast of North Africa (which is the subject matter of the Prime Minister's cable but which is only one phase of this whole program) has been approved in principle by Generals Eisenhower and Giraud, by the Bermuda Conference and the Combined Chiefs of Staff <sup>89a</sup> and by the Department of State, but the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have withheld their agreement.

The proposed telegram to the Prime Minister is based on the assumption that you will care to proceed with this broad policy and to authorize the directives necessary to its implementation.

[Annex]

*Draft of Proposed Message to the British Prime Minister*

This refers to your 339, June 30, 1943, regarding provision for refugees in North Africa.

I will set out the elements of the problem as I understand them:

1. There are at present an estimated five or six thousand stateless or enemy-nationality refugees in Spain to be moved, largely of the Jewish race.
2. I am asking Generals Eisenhower and Giraud to designate Mogador or some other place in French North Africa as a place of temporary residence for these refugees and others who may be able to escape from Axis territory into Spain. They have already agreed in principle to the establishment of such a place of temporary residence.
3. I will arrange for the transportation of these refugees by land from Spain to the selected port in Portugal for their embarkation.
4. You will arrange for their sea transportation from Portugal to a port in North Africa.
5. I will request the American military authorities to make available cots and tents in sufficient number to meet the emergency needs of the refugees arriving at the temporary place of residence.
6. I will also arrange that preparations will be begun immediately for a temporary reception center of more substantial character where

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<sup>89a</sup> The statement that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed in principle was incorrect. The differing views of the British Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had been transmitted to the Department of State on May 7, 1943. See letter of that date, p. 299.

the refugees can be housed and cared for until subsequent arrangements are made for their disposition which should be at the earliest possible moment.

7. The costs of the refugees' transportation from Spain and their maintenance in the place of temporary residence until such time as a more permanent settlement is agreed upon will be borne equally by our two Governments.

8. The work of administration for the refugees at the temporary place of residence will be the responsibility of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations under Governor Lehman, with representatives of your Government cooperating and assisting.

9. I am in complete accord with the thought of the French military authorities in that area that both for political and military reasons it is essential to transfer the refugees, after their arrival at the temporary place of residence, to a place of more permanent settlement for the duration. In this connection the Department of State has just been informed by your Embassy here in response to conversations Lord Halifax has had with Mr. Myron Taylor that certain places, among them Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Madagascar, are under active discussion and it appears not impossible that sites may be available there for the refugees. It is also my understanding that a limited number of the refugees may be admitted into Palestine.

10. The subsequent transportation of the refugees from the temporary place of residence to places of more permanent settlement and their continued care thereafter would be provided under the auspices and jurisdiction of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee, the costs thereof to be underwritten jointly by the British and American Governments.

I trust that you will let me know at the earliest convenient moment that we are in complete accord when I shall issue the necessary directives to complement those which you will issue.

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840.48 Refugees/4036%

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1943.

I thank you for your memorandum number 308 of July 5th,<sup>90</sup> by which you have forwarded to me a recommended message to the Prime Minister in response to his 339.

I have sent the message and I request that you initiate the measures listed in the fourth paragraph of your memorandum.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

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<sup>90</sup> *Ante*, p. 322.

840.48 Refugees/4036§

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*<sup>91</sup>

Following sent by Prime Minister to President on July 10th No. 357.

I am most grateful to you for your number 308.<sup>92</sup>

I am in complete accord with your suggestions, which will provide a solution for our difficulties in Spain. As soon as I hear from you that you have issued the directives to Generals Eisenhower and Giraud and to American Ambassador in Madrid and Lisbon, I will give complementary instructions to our authorities.

840.48 Refugees/4014 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 15, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 5 : 30 p. m.]

1557. The Portuguese Government has suddenly and without giving sufficient reason for its action refused to grant further visas to French refugees wishing to proceed from the Spanish border to transit Portugal and embark at Setubal.

On July 9 at the request of our Embassy at Madrid the Legation addressed the usual note to the Foreign Office here requesting visas for 1,500 French refugees for whom arrangements had been made to arrive at the Portuguese Spanish frontier the night of July 15.

On the afternoon of July 12 Crocker<sup>93</sup> was called to the Foreign Office and informed that visas for only 484 could be granted. Upon inquiring as to the reason for this figure he was informed that as the Foreign Office records showed that to date 2,516 French refugees had already passed through Portugal and that the Legation's original note of March 24 last mentioned the number 3,000, the Portuguese Government would be able to grant visas for only the difference. At the time of the original exchange of notes on the subject no mention was made of any limitation as to numbers. The number 3,000 referred to was merely a statement of the number of French refugees which it was hoped to send through in the first groups for whom four ships were allocated. This number was later reduced to 758 by reason of the inability of the railroads to handle such a large number and for other reasons.

<sup>91</sup> Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador in note dated July 13, 1943.

<sup>92</sup> For draft text, see p. 323.

<sup>93</sup> Edward S. Crocker, American Consul at Lisbon.



Copies of the Legation's note of March 24 and of the Portuguese Government's reply thereto of April 8 were transmitted with our despatch 913 of April 9.<sup>94</sup>

Having been unable to move the Portuguese Government from its position, the Legation referred the matter to Madrid which approached the Portuguese Ambassador there and apparently as a result of his intervention with Dr. Salazar<sup>95</sup> the Foreign Office called the Legation at 11:30 last night and stated that 760 visas would be granted which would permit those refugees who had already entrained at Barcelona to proceed as scheduled, but it was explained that no further visas would be granted unless a new agreement were reached.

In view of Dr. Salazar's long established principle on humanitarian grounds of permitting passage through Portugal of refugees of all sorts and conditions, the Legation is at a loss to explain the reason for this *volte-face* on the part of Portuguese Government. The following considerations are however advanced:

- [1.] Possible German pressure.
2. The desire of Dr. Salazar, in view of recent military developments in the Mediterranean, to bring pressure to bear upon the Spaniards in the hope that they may be forced to agree to ship French refugees directly to North Africa instead of through Portugal.
3. The remote possibility of sabotaging action by the Foreign Office here which is resentful of the Portuguese Ambassador at Madrid's practice of dealing directly by telephone with Dr. Salazar.

Repeated to Madrid.

FISH

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840.48 Refugees/4016 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 16, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received July 16—4:25 p. m.]

1565. Following is a translation of a note received last night from the Foreign Office:

"Number 55. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the American Legation and with reference to the latter's *note verbale* of the 9th instant has the honor to state the following:

When in March last the British and American Government addressed themselves to the Portuguese Government requesting facilities for passage through Portugal of refugees who were in Spain, the Portuguese Government hastened to give assent to the request, but of course within the terms in which the request was made, that is, up to the maximum limit of about 3000, which had been expressly fixed in

<sup>94</sup> Not printed.

<sup>95</sup> Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese Prime Minister.

the American *note verbale* of March 24. No other interpretation could be given to the acquiescence given in the *note verbale* of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of April 8 addressed to the American Legation, for in granting a request the authorization solicited is given and not an unlimited and permanent authorization which would exceed what was requested.

We have always worked on that basis. Therefore on examining the request recently made for the transit of refugees, the official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entrusted with that service observed that the numbers exceeded the balance remaining to be filled to reach the figure of 3000 originally indicated and, therefore he could not order the visas to be granted without the Government's authorization.

According to the information received from Madrid, the number of refugees for whom a train has already been prepared in Spain (Barcelona) is still higher than that on which Lisbon figured since it [amounts to 780 in excess of the 3000]<sup>95a</sup> which had originally been fixed.

The Portuguese Government does not want to fail to give proof of its goodwill and to avoid upsetting arrangements of material nature already made even though made without previously consulting it and therefore it once more condescends to authorize the coming of the 780 refugees who in Barcelona are awaiting the order or signal to leave; it must however, be understood that any future authorization for the transit of refugees can only be granted after the question in its general aspects shall have been the subject of a new examination and general discussion between the Portuguese Government and the organization believed competent to deal with it.

It would be impossible and very inconvenient if when requests such as the one set forth in the American note of the 9th instant are being made of the Portuguese Government and even before an answer has been received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, the organization entrusted in Spain with the material execution of the plan should continue to carry out arrangements as though assent has already been given thus placing the Portuguese Government in the alternative of either creating harmful difficulties if it refuses what is asked or else to grant it under pressure of a consideration which is not indifferent to its spirit of goodwill.

Lisbon, July 15, 1943."

FISH

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840.48 Refugees/4017 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 16, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 11 : 10 p. m.]

1566. Legation's 1557, July 15, and 1565, July 16. French refugees. The British Embassy has reported the action of the Portuguese Government to London and has been in communication with Madrid.

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<sup>95a</sup> Correction made on basis of information given by Foreign Ministry to Embassy in Lisbon as quoted in despatch No. 483, May 23, 1960 (023.1/5-2360).

We are informed that Sir Samuel Hoare made vigorous representations to the Portuguese Ambassador at Madrid who is alleged to have admitted that the action of the Portuguese Government in stopping the transit of French refugees at this time was for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on the French in connection with the shipment of phosphates from North Africa. While there may be some truth in this it seems extraordinary in view of the fact that the first shipment of phosphates has already reached Portugal. However, in view of the increasing seriousness of the grain shortage here it is possible that the Portuguese may wish to use the refugee question as a lever in connection with their desire also to obtain badly needed cereals from the French. Please see our 134 Cross 3018, July 14.<sup>96</sup>

In view of the Mediterranean area it occurs to us that the time is favorable to press the Spaniards for a revival of the original plan to evacuate the refugees directly from Spain to North Africa thus bypassing Portugal.

Repeated to Madrid and Algiers.

FISH

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840.48 Refugees/4014 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)*

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1943—10 p. m.

1221. Your 1557, July 15, 1 p. m., and 1565, July 16, 5 p. m. Please express to Dr. Salazar our regret for this evident misunderstanding but explain that we are deeply concerned for the continuing transit of these groups and hope that he will grant his approval in principle, with the understanding that our missions in Madrid and Lisbon will do their utmost to see that the Portuguese Government is provided timely and accurate information on these movements in future. Report by cable Portuguese reaction, keeping Madrid informed.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4050 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, July 21, 1943—noon.

[Received 3:44 p. m.]

1896. Portuguese Ambassador assures me his Government has no intention to stop transit of refugees. He regrets interference with the last convoy which happened because officials familiar with the matter were all absent from Lisbon and representations had been

<sup>96</sup> Not printed.

made to a protocol officer who adhered narrowly to literal meaning of the record.

Ambassador agrees it would be desirable for Legation, Lisbon, to send another note requesting agreement in principle to transit of refugees, but omitting any reference to numbers. We understand from you this already done. He requests following procedure be followed: Each time French in Madrid know about when they want a group to go and size of group they should inform Embassy, Madrid, which should inform Legation, Lisbon, which should request visas and other facilities. When Legation learns visas authorized he requests it notify Embassy which should notify him informally.

Ambassador points out Foreign Office divided into two sections one handling diplomatic and commercial matters with which Clarac<sup>97</sup> undoubtedly has contact and the other handling consular matters. Refugees come under the latter section. Clarac probably has no regular contact with that section and for that reason Ambassador thinks it preferable for our Embassy and Legation to continue to make requests on refugees.

Sent to Lisbon. Repeated to Algiers and Department.

HAYES

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840.48 Refugees/4068 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, July 23, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received July 24—4 p. m.]

A-1699. Reference previous correspondence in connection with settlement of Polish refugees in Mexico. The British Minister in Mexico just telephoned me to inquire if he could not come in to see me together with our Polish colleague to discuss with me the bringing to Mexico of a further group of 4,000 Polish refugees within the next 2 months. He said that he had been instructed by the Foreign Office to take this matter up with the Mexican authorities.

I told the British Minister that while I would of course be glad to see him, I had no instructions from my Government as to any other groups of Polish refugees coming here and therefore any discussion which we might have would be fruitless, in as much as I was not prepared to join in any approach to the Mexican Foreign Office without direct instructions from the Department. The British Minister said that in view of this he would present the matter again to his Government.

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<sup>97</sup> A. Clarac, French Consul General at Tetuan.

I have just received a memorandum from Mr. Eric P. Kelly, in charge of the refugee camp at León, wherein he states: "I have had to get sharp about the demand on the part of employed refugees for pay and realize that the whole thing stems back to India where they were promised heaven knows what before they sailed. It must be understood with all new groups that no money is to be earned here. When one spends some \$50,000 to \$75,000 fixing up Santa Rosa, furnishing homes and feeding the people, setting up schools and trying to give modest compensation, one does not relish sour reception of the possibilities."

When Mr. Kelly speaks of "employed refugees," he means those refugees who have been put to work on the project and who are being paid a nominal wage. It is of course out of the question to think of placing these people in employment in competition with Mexican nationals. However, I understand that some of the refugees now in León had been engaged in small businesses in India and only gave these up on the assurance that they would be permitted to engage in gainful employment in Mexico. I cannot too strongly emphasize that it must be understood by all refugees coming to Mexico that they do so under the terms of the agreement between Foreign Minister Padilla and the late General Sikorski,<sup>98</sup> which automatically prevents their being employed privately in Mexico or entering into business here.

The experience gained in the construction of Santa Rosa indicates that we must go slowly and not endeavor to bring in any large groups of refugees within as short a space of time as that of the last group. Santa Rosa, after 2 months of intensive work and effort, is only now ready for the refugees to be lodged there. It would take at least from 4 to 6 months' advance preparation to make ready further centers for the large group of refugees to which the British Minister referred. If it is absolutely indispensable that these refugees be brought here, then I must insist on at least 4 to 6 months' advance notice.

I should appreciate the Department's observations with regard to the above.

MESSERSMITH

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840.48 Refugees/4083a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1943—4 p. m.

1185. In view of need for preparation in the event Navy will be in a position to transport second group of Poles from India, will you

<sup>98</sup> Exchange of notes regarding the admission of Polish refugees to Mexico, December 30, 1942, transmitted to the Department by its Ambassador in Mexico in his despatch No. 6270, dated December 31, 1942, not printed (840.48 Refugees/-3508). Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, was killed in an airplane accident near Gibraltar, July 4, 1943.

kindly advise us when it will be possible to arrange for reception of such a group.

We have no definite information about transportation, but there is possibility an arrangement can be made similar to one just completed.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4082 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, July 27, 1943—noon.

[Received July 28—4:50 p.m.]

748. Department's 1185, July 24. With minimum 2 months' notice 500 to 1,000 additional refugees could be accomplished [*accommodated?*] in Colonia Santa Rosa.

For additional large groups it would be necessary to establish new centers and we would require 5 to 6 months' advance notification.

MESSERSMITH

840.48 Refugees/4079 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 27, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

Following telegram has been sent to Algiers:

144, July 27, 5 p. m. Legation's 114, to Madrid, July 22. Refugees.

1. We have learned that arrangements are in progress looking toward the shipment of 1500 refugees via Portugal on August 1, and that vessels have been allocated therefor.

2. The Legation cannot sufficiently emphasize that should word of such contemplated arrangements reach the ears of the Portuguese Government before a new agreement has been reached in principle with respect to the question of the transit through and embarkation in Portugal of such refugees it would constitute a serious hindrance to the conclusion of such an agreement.

3. Despite the opinion apparently held elsewhere that the Portuguese may be attempting to link the question of French refugees to that of phosphates we are loath to believe and do not believe that Salazar has any such connection in mind. Our considered belief is (and this view is supported by the British Embassy here and by Clarac) that the Portuguese Government in some manner had become disgruntled over the way in which the refugee shipments were being handled and that either the groups were becoming too large or that sufficient advance notice was not being given them the result being in their eyes that they were being constantly confronted with a series of *faits accomplis* and that the granting of group visas had become merely a pro form of [*pro forma or?*] rubber stamp performance.

4. The negotiations for a new agreement will have to be handled delicately and with due respect for the sensibilities of the Portuguese. We urge therefore that the Legation be not hampered in its efforts by any premature action elsewhere or by undue pressure for haste. The British Ambassador is calling upon the Foreign Office this afternoon and is supporting our representations.

5. We are following this question with the utmost care.<sup>98a</sup>  
Repeated to Department and Madrid.

CROCKER

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840.48 Refugees/4100b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*<sup>99</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1943—6 p. m.

1383. For Murphy. Reference Department's 774, April 23, 7 p. m., and your 750 [758], April 30, 6 p. m., regarding refugees in Spain. The President after discussion with Mr. Churchill directs that you ask General Eisenhower and the French North African authorities to designate a place in French North Africa as a place of temporary residence for those refugees of enemy nationality or stateless at present in Spain whose numbers are still estimated to be around 6,000 at present. It is unlikely that this entire group would arrive at one time. Quarters should be located immediately for approximately 1,500 with the understanding that additional space for the entire number may be required at a later date. We understand from Royce and Hoehler that this entire question was discussed with General Hughes<sup>1</sup> some weeks ago. The staff of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations has presumably been exploring possible sites in Morocco and may have useful suggestions. The care of the refugees at such temporary place of residence will be the responsibility of that Office under Governor Lehman, with representatives of the British Government cooperating and assisting. The President is directing the Secretary of War to issue instructions to the Army authorities concerned to cooperate fully with that Office in that connection with the thought that it may be necessary for the Army among other things to provide cots and tents and other equipment required for the immediate care of the refugees and the requisitioning or construction of buildings for their better housing.

<sup>98a</sup> In despatch No. 1200, July 29, the Chargé enclosed a translation of a Portuguese note of July 27 and reported that "an agreement has now been reached with the Portuguese Government which will permit the resumption of the transit through and embarkation in Portugal of French refugees arriving from Spain" (840.48 Refugees/4118).

<sup>99</sup> Marginal note: "OK FDR".

<sup>1</sup> Gen. Everett S. Hughes, Deputy Theater Commander, North Africa.

The land transportation in Spain of these refugees to the selected port of embarkation will be arranged by the American and British Embassies and Legations in Spain and Portugal. Sea transportation will be arranged by the British Government. The costs of the refugees' transportation and their maintenance in the place of temporary residence will be borne equally by the British and American Governments.

The President informed Mr. Churchill that he is in complete accord<sup>2</sup> with the thought of the French military authorities in North Africa that both for political and military reasons it is essential to transfer the refugees, after their arrival at the temporary place of residence, to a place of more permanent settlement for the duration of the war. To avoid the implication that the United States is conducting a concentration camp for these refugees it is contemplated that they should be given some freedom of movement and that those who are qualified to help meet the labor shortage in French North Africa should be granted permits to work temporarily while awaiting transfer elsewhere.

The subsequent transportation of the refugees from the temporary place of residence to places of more permanent settlement and their continued care thereafter will be matters to which the Executive Committee of the Intergovernment[al] Committee on Refugees, of which this Government is a member, will attend.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4068 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1943—2 p. m.

A-2216. Reference your A-1699, July 23, 1943, 11:00 a. m. and previous correspondence in connection with settlement of Polish refugees in Mexico.

The Department realizes, of course, the problems which invariably arise when refugees seek employment in the country of refuge. Nevertheless the Department is somewhat at a loss to understand the statement in your airgram under reference that the agreement between Foreign Minister Padilla and the late General Sikorski "automatically prevents their being employed privately in Mexico or entering into business here."

Article 5 in Padilla's note, consented to by General Sikorski, reads as follows:

"5. The Polish Legation has received instructions to cooperate fully with the Government of Mexico to the effect that the Polish citizens

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<sup>2</sup> See p. 324, paragraph numbered 9.



received here be distributed throughout appropriate zones, in order that the various groups may select their own representatives—who will cooperate with the respective Mexican officials—and who will particularly achieve the establishment of those immigrants who may be able to engage in various activities beneficial to the agricultural and industrial economy of Mexico without competing with Mexican citizens; a matter which shall be subject in every respect to the determination of the corresponding authorities of that country.”

This certainly contemplates the entry of Polish immigrants into non-competitive activities.

A possible method of approach would be to suggest to the Polish Legation that it initiate discussions with the competent Mexican officials with a view to ascertaining those lines of endeavor in which openings for these immigrants can be had. On the basis of such studies, further measures may be planned.

Neither OFRO<sup>3</sup> nor the Polish Embassy is aware of any promises made to these refugees of the kind you mention, and any further information you may be able to get for us in that regard would be useful.

The Department suggests that you inform the British Minister that we consider the entry of further groups of Polish refugees into Mexico to be a matter for discussion between the Polish Legation and the Government of Mexico. As you are aware, at the time of the Sikorski-Padilla correspondence, the Polish Government indicated that they hoped to bring over a total of approximately 3,000 refugees during the first year; but their agreement with the Mexican Government contemplated a total number of 25,000 refugees. We would not think it wise to actively assist in arranging transport for additional immigrants, however, until some clarification is achieved on the question of employment possibilities in Mexico.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4104b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1943—10 p. m.

1400. For Fryer<sup>4</sup> from Lehman. The President and Mr. Churchill have now personally agreed upon a plan of providing temporary reception and care in North Africa of enemy nationality and stateless refugees presently in Spain. These refugees will remain in North Africa until arrangements for their more permanent care elsewhere can be made by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

<sup>3</sup> Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>4</sup> E. Reeseman Fryer, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations; on staff of Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers.

Responsibility for care and maintenance in North Africa has been placed upon our office with agreement that the British Government will provide some personnel to assist in operation under our direction. A special allotment of \$500,000 has been made for this project with the understanding that the British will share expenses and provide a similar amount if this total is needed. Details of joint financing have not yet been worked out but presumably we will meet initial expenses and British will reimburse us.

Murphy has been directed to secure designation of site for temporary residence from Eisenhower and French North African authorities. He has been advised that Hoehler discussed this question with General Hughes and that you may have suggestions as to possible site.

Plans for care in North Africa include provision that refugees should be given some freedom of movement and that those who are qualified to help meet the labor shortage in French North Africa should be granted permits to work temporarily while awaiting transfer elsewhere.

President has written the Secretary of War in part as follows: "I desire you to issue instructions to the Army authorities concerned to cooperate fully with the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in that office's responsibility for the reception and care of the refugees upon their arrival in French North Africa. This may entail, among other things, the provision of cots and tents and other equipment required for the immediate care of the refugees and the requisitioning or construction of buildings for their better housing."

We understand from Hoehler and Royce that new construction difficult and that use of existing structures in or near Casablanca probably best solution of housing problem.

We now believe that original plans should be made for reception of about 1500 although it is possible that first movement may be of smaller number.

So far as practicable maintenance supplies should be provided from your present stockpiles or current Lend-Lease shipments. Cash funds now allotted can be used, of course, for purchase there of essential maintenance supplies not otherwise available, as well as housing, etc.

Discuss project with Murphy and advise us as quickly as possible of plans which you propose including probable cost, personnel required and proposed plan of operation. Also indicate date when first refugees could be received and number which you believe could probably be handled in first group. [Lehman.]

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4116

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Director of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (Lehman)*<sup>5</sup>

MEXICO, July 29, 1943.

DEAR GOVERNOR LEHMAN: I have received the Department's Airgram 2216 of July 28, 1943, with reference to my A-1699 of July 23, 11 a. m., in connection with the settlement of Polish refugees in Mexico. I note that the Department is somewhat at a loss to understand the statement in my airgram that the agreement between Foreign Minister Padilla and the late General Sikorski "automatically prevents their (the Polish refugees) being employed privately in Mexico or entering into business here."

In my despatch number 8587 of March 24, 1943,<sup>6</sup> I reported a meeting which, in company with my British and Polish Colleagues, I had had on March 23 with Dr. Torres Bodet, the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs. During the course of this meeting, the Undersecretary made a very clear and definite statement as to the obligations of the Mexican Government under the exchange of notes between Licenciado Padilla and General Sikorski. With respect to the possibility of the refugees' working in Mexico, he said: "Whether it would be possible for these refugees to engage in some useful work during their stay in Mexico would depend on circumstances as they developed. He made it clear that the Mexican Government had not assumed any obligation that the refugees would be permitted to work and also that it had not taken any decision that they could not work. He emphasized that public opinion could easily be aroused in this matter and that the Mexican Government had made it clear that the refugees could not compete with Mexican labor. Just what could be done, so far as work was concerned, would depend upon developments."

In this same despatch I stated: "It is my opinion that it will be useless to think in terms of these refugees being absorbed, even temporarily, in any number in the Mexican economy. To endeavor to do so will arouse difficulties with labor and in other quarters here."

In conversations which I have had with the Mexican Foreign Minister and in conversations which members of my staff have had with officials of the Foreign Office and of the Ministry of the Interior, the very definite impression has been obtained that so far as these officials are concerned the economic activities of the Polish refugees in Mexico will be restricted to such activities as may be useful and proper in com-

<sup>5</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Mexico in his despatch No. 11909, July 31; received August 5.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

munity life; that is, that they may engage in raising their own produce, making their own wearing apparel and such other manual work as may improve the conditions of the refugee colonies and their inhabitants. That they may engage in private occupation for gain or in any work in competition with Mexican nationals is out of the question. And, quite frankly, I cannot think of any work in which the refugees might engage which would not be in competition with Mexicans. If there were certain skilled technicians and others of scientific background among the refugees, it is quite possible that their special qualifications might prove of benefit to the Mexican economy; but in the main the male members of the present group at León are artisans and farm laborers, of which type of labor it might almost be said there is an over-abundance in Mexico.

So far as entering into private business is concerned, I can foresee innumerable objections thereto. The Mexican Government already is giving refuge to a large number of Spanish republicans, many of whom are engaged in small businesses throughout Mexico, which has been the source of constant annoyance to the Government and the cause of complaint on the part of the people of the country. I very seriously doubt if permission could be obtained for any of the Polish refugees to set up business in any of the Mexican cities or towns.

Doctor Wiesiolowski, the Counselor of the Polish Legation, has just returned from León and is to have a meeting with Mr. O'Donoghue, of my staff, this afternoon. During the course of this meeting it is possible that the question of whether the Polish Legation might initiate discussions with the competent Mexican Officials with a view to ascertaining the lines of endeavor in which openings for these refugees can be had may be brought up. I understand, however, that it is the point of view of the Legation that it will not initiate any such discussions but will await the first move from the Mexican authorities.

I am glad to note that you do "not think it wise to actively assist in arranging transport for additional immigrants, however, until some clarification is achieved on the question of employment possibilities in Mexico." If further transport to Mexico of Polish refugees is contingent upon their being absorbed into the Mexican economy, then I very much fear that the number of such refugees will be extremely reduced if not nonexistent. In view of this, I would suggest that the question of transporting other groups of refugees to Mexico be definitely held in abeyance until such time as we have some definite knowledge as to how the present project at León will work out.

With kindest personal regards, believe me

Cordially and faithfully yours,

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH

840.48 Refugees/4122 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*ALGIERS, August 5, 1943—8 p. m.  
[Received August 6—1:30 a. m.]

1374. For Lehman. Your 1383, July 27; and 1400, July 29. (From Murphy from Fryer.) After several conferences staff has decided in light of telegram 1383 of July 27 and 1400, July 29 that it is your desire and that of Department to select first 1500 refugees on basis of their acceptability as immigrants to countries other than North Africa. On this assumption propose that all screening of refugees be done in Spain and that following three qualifications be essential for each of first group of 1500: (1) Enemy national or stateless; (2) desire to leave Spain for North Africa; (3) obvious potentiality whether professional, psychological or physical for resettlement outside North Africa. For those who possess all of above qualifications following four categories will govern priority in order named: (1) Prisoners and internees whose release conditional on ability to leave Spain; (2) persons of military age or politically active persons in danger of internment, reinternment or deportation to country of origin; (3) family units especially where children are involved and single women; (4) holders of immigration visas to other countries. Please inform urgently whether foregoing meets with your approval.

[Garbled group] McDonald, OFR<sup>7</sup> representative in Spain, and what is his status in this operation? Unless you instruct otherwise propose to send Spain Youdin<sup>8</sup> and as much other OFR personnel as may be required to do screening of refugees, and to work in cooperation with other American and British officials.

Army offers fullest cooperation. Colonel Reekie<sup>9</sup> conferring Army in Casa[blanca] concerning selection of place of temporary residence and services to be furnished by Army there. Date arrival and size first contingent will depend largely on your ability to furnish center personnel. Complete budget and personnel requirements will be furnished after Reekie's return from inspection quarters.

As soon as definitive arrangements are concluded with the Army in regard to place of residence matter will be further discussed with French authorities. [Fryer. Murphy.]

WILEY

<sup>7</sup> Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Department of State.

<sup>8</sup> Richard J. Youdin, officer on duty at OFRRO at Algiers.

<sup>9</sup> Col. Dudley A. Reekie, U.S. Public Health Service; special assistant on staff of Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers.

840.48 Refugees/4122 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943—9 p. m.

1475. For Murphy and Fryer from Lehman. Your 1374 August 5. The selection of refugees of enemy nationality or stateless presently in Spain to be cared for temporarily in North Africa at a site to be designated by the Army will be made by the American Embassy in Spain. The American and British Embassies and Legations in Spain and Portugal will arrange land transportation to a Portuguese port from which the British will provide sea transportation to North Africa. It will not be necessary to send personnel from North Africa to Spain. Charles McDonald of OFRRO has been assisting the American Embassy in Spain to administer relief to American and French refugees and will be available to assist in the foregoing arrangements. The determination of a place of more permanent settlement to which the refugees are to be removed from their temporary refuge in North Africa and their transportation to that place when selected are within the competence generally of the Intergovernmental Committee which already has these matters under consideration. For this reason and because it is planned to move all of the above refugees from Spain eventually, the screening which you suggest is not essential. Awaiting your further report after Reekie's return. Forwarding of instructions from the Department and British Government to American and British missions in Madrid and Lisbon for the organization of their part of the undertaking awaiting designation of site, as requested in Department's 1383 July 27, and indication as to when you will be ready to receive refugees.

Reference your letter July 27<sup>10</sup> about termination of work, assume you will plan to use substantial part of present personnel on this project. [Lehman.]

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4143 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, August 11, 1943—2 p.m.

[Received 10:54 p. m.]

1397. From Murphy [and] Fryer. My 1374, August 5, 8 p. m. In cooperation army officials have selected Camp Marshal Lyautey for

<sup>10</sup> Not found in Department files.

refugee center. Located 10 miles north Casablanca near Fedala on site overlooking Atlantic. Buildings are of semi-permanent construction. Water is pumped from city mains with hypochlorinator attached to 25,000-gallon storage tank. Sewage treatment and disposal plant designed for 15,000 persons. Electric power provided by 15 kw Diesel plant. Camp has recreational facilities, shower baths, warehouse and mess facilities. Is ideal in every respect and will require minimum expenditure funds to adapt it for refugee use. Will accommodate 2,000 refugees if [*in*] semi-permanent buildings and capable of expansion to six or eight thousand by use of tents. Will be completely evacuated by Army this month.

The French authorities have been asked to agree to the designation of this camp as well as to allow the refugees certain freedom of movement and the possibility of obtaining work. Further detailed questions will be arranged as soon as French agreement in principle has been secured. [Murphy and Fryer.]

WILEY

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840.48 Refugees/4181a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1943—5 p. m.

4860. For Riefler<sup>11</sup> and Funkhouser<sup>12</sup> from Stone<sup>13</sup> and Lehman. Some time ago British Embassy here through Noel Hall<sup>14</sup> reported that Swiss Government had responded favorably to a preliminary approach relative to receiving in Switzerland up to 100,000 children from occupied areas for a limited period. British suggested to us that Swiss Government be asked to take responsibility for selecting the children solely on the basis of their need for improved living and food conditions and without reference to political or racial qualifications.

Possibility of a similar scheme for sending children to Sweden has been discussed with the British. Department and Office of Foreign Relief are greatly interested in this plan and also in the special proposal to transfer 20,000 Jewish children from Germany and occupied areas primarily Poland to Sweden for the duration of the war which was initiated by Mr. Adler-Rudel, representative of the World Jewish Congress, and discussed by British Minister in Stockholm with

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<sup>11</sup> Winfield W. Riefler, economist, acting as special assistant to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

<sup>12</sup> Richard Funkhouser, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>13</sup> William T. Stone, Assistant Director of the Board of Economic Warfare.

<sup>14</sup> Former British Minister in the United States.

Swedish Government and referred to in your telegram 4095 of June 21.<sup>15</sup> The two Swedish schemes are under active consideration here but no final decision has been taken as yet as to the best means of promoting them.

However, there seems to be no reason why the original Swiss plan should not be pressed. British suggest that negotiations to this end be transferred to London in connection with the forthcoming Anglo-American-Swiss war trade negotiations.<sup>16</sup> The original British proposal called for permission for Switzerland to import additional foodstuffs, fodder and raw material for clothing to make up for any supplies the Swiss might use for the children but stipulated that the Allied governments must make the necessary arrangements for the acquisition of Swiss francs, which should not be secured against sterling, or against gold under the proposed Anglo-Swiss financial agreement. (It would probably be necessary for us to make a similar stipulation that if the use of Allied dollar balances is necessary to finance these arrangements, the Allied governments must arrange directly with the Swiss for the acquisition of francs against blocked dollars). After agreement with the Swiss Government the latter would be asked to approach the German Government and to assume responsibility for selecting the children and for their transportation to and care in Switzerland and possibly the cost of their maintenance within Switzerland. Costs outside Switzerland could presumably be taken care of by the Allied governments or lend-leased.

You are instructed jointly to discuss this plan with MEW<sup>17</sup> which is fully familiar with it. OEW<sup>18</sup> sees no objection to it as outlined above provided the plan for selecting the children is satisfactory. The Department concurs and would like to see the matter pressed as rapidly as possible.

Copies of correspondence with Noel Hall are being sent by air mail. [Stone and Lehman.]

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4136 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1943—3 p.m.

1325. From Lehman. Reference your A-1811, August 7, 11 a. m.<sup>15</sup> Wiesiolowski, Counselor Polish Legation Mexico, Szmejko, sent by

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<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

<sup>16</sup> See vol. II, section under Switzerland entitled "War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland".

<sup>17</sup> British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

<sup>18</sup> Office of Economic Warfare.



Minister Social Welfare London to take over direction of camp,<sup>20</sup> and Lepkowski, First Secretary Polish Embassy in Washington, have conferred with us at length with the following results:

(1) Polish Government earnestly desires the second contingent of Poles, composed predominantly of children, to come to Mexico.

(2) The Navy is giving favorable consideration to transportation of children, reserving right to determine appropriate number of accompanying adults. Group must be ready early in September if advantage is to be taken of next transport.

(3) Wiesiolowski is going to New York, to return for further conference August 18. Will then go to Chicago to confer with Polish-American Council, possibly returning to Washington for final conference before proceeding to Mexico.

(4) Szmejko will proceed to Mexico to take charge of camp as Wiesiolowski's assistant within a week.

(5) Decision on Alter<sup>21</sup> is held in abeyance by Poles, pending consideration of another candidate.

(6) An educational director, Sobota, is coming with Szmejko.

(7) Poles are to assume administrative responsibility and Kelly to remain as advisor and consultant.

(8) The problems of poor selection, cash allowances, and the growing of food have been thoroughly explored and will be discussed in a later dispatch. [Lehman.]

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4136 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1943—5:30 p. m.

A-2340. Reference our 1325 August 16. We understand that the Poles are now planning to clear formally with the Mexican Government concerning the entry of a second group of refugees in a number not to exceed 750, this group to be composed predominantly of orphaned children now said to be in Karachi. An appropriate proportion of competent adults to act as escorts will accompany the party.

Polish representatives here are making inquiries in India to ascertain definitely that children can be brought from Karachi to Bombay in sufficient time to take advantage of next transport. If present plans eventuate this contingent would arrive Mexico during latter part of October. We anticipate definite word from India and from

<sup>20</sup> Polish refugee camp in Mexico.

<sup>21</sup> Leon Alter; the Polish Minister in Mexico had expressed the desire that the Polish Embassy send Alter, then in New York, to Mexico.

our own navy about the end of this week. Will advise you just as soon as plans appear to be definite.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4182 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, August 19, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received August 21—noon.]

A-1916. Department's airgram 2340, August 16, 5:30 p. m., and related correspondence respecting the possibility of a second group of Polish refugees not to exceed 750 coming to Mexico. It is noted that if present plans eventuate, the contingent will arrive in Mexico during the latter part of October.

While I am personally of the opinion that it would have been advisable to have waited some time in order to see how the first contingent of refugees now at León would work out, I am nevertheless prepared to accept the proposal to send this second contingent provided that they are properly selected at the point of origin and that it be clearly understood by them that the prospects of obtaining employment in Mexico are practically nonexistent. As I have indicated in previous correspondence with the Department, it will be absolutely necessary to have a minimum of 2 months' advance notice in order to prepare additional quarters at Santa Rosa for this second group. It would therefore be appreciated if the Department would advise me in sufficient time prior to the arrival of this group in order that we may get the necessary preparations under way.

I am sending O'Donoghue to León on August 23rd to confer with Mr. Kelly and Polish Legation officials in respect to the possibility of this second group coming to Mexico.

MESSERSMITH

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840.48 Refugees/4192 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943—11 p. m.

1410. Your A-1916, August 19. Have today heard from Karachi that preparation is being made to send on transport to be in vicinity early in September 387 orphan children between ages 4 and 15, 39 capable adult escorts of whom 30 are teachers. In addition, there will be 60 adults which Navy will use for scullery and special duties, a doctor and approximately 8 nurses. There will be a Polish speaking person in charge of the entire group. As there are not more children in vicinity will send 250 additional adults, making total amount 750.

We are outlining necessary requirements for the selection of the 250 to enable them to fit more easily into the life at Santa Rosa. The Poles have been specifically advised, and our representative in Karachi has been cabled the following conditions which it is imperative that all adults selected for second group must accept: (1) Refugees will live in an especially arranged Polish colony which provides only basic necessities; (2) They will not be free to move from the colony to other parts of Mexico or to proceed to other parts of the Western Hemisphere; (3) They will not be able to secure employment in Mexico or carry on business enterprises; (4) Adults will be able to work only within the colony on necessary operational and agricultural work incident to the maintenance of the colony itself; (5) All Polish refugees will be repatriated to Poland at the conclusion of the war.

As soon as the Navy gives us more definite dates, we will communicate with you, but you can proceed with plans on the assumption that this group will arrive in León the latter part of October.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4429: Airgram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, September 1, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received September 3—noon.]

A-2014. Reference is made to the memorandum of August 18, 1943 to Governor Lehman from Mr. Hugh R. Jackson of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations,<sup>22</sup> in respect to the conversations held with Dr. Wiesiolowski in regard to policy of administration of Polish Refugee Colony at León, Guanajuato, and the possibility of the Polish American Council making cash advances for refugees.

Mr. Kelly, who is now in Mexico, has just received a telegram from the Polish American Council, Inc., 1200 North Ashland, Chicago, Illinois, reading in part as follows:

"Re letter August 17 transferring to you \$25,000 License 22933 for Polish refugees Santa Rosa."

It will be recalled from my despatch number 12,615 of August 27, 1943,<sup>23</sup> transmitting a memorandum prepared by Mr. O'Donoghue respecting his recent visit to León, that the suggestion was made that

<sup>22</sup> Memorandum not found in Department files.

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

if the Polish American Council is prepared to advance \$25,000 monthly towards the support of the Colony, an amount which would be more than ample to defray current operating costs, consideration should be given to creating a sinking fund from the surplus in order eventually to meet construction and installation costs in so far as possible.

It is not known whether such an idea as that advanced is feasible, but it is my considered opinion that it should be explored. It is of course quite possible that the Polish American Council does not intend to make regular advances of \$25,000 monthly. The Department doubtless has more definite information as to this.

So far as the present remittance of \$25,000 to Mr. Kelly is concerned, he does not wish, and I do not believe that he should be forced to have the responsibility of administering this money on behalf of the Polish American Council. It is believed that such payments should be made either directly to the Polish authorities or to the Treasurer of the United States through the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

Mr. Kelly is taking no action with respect to the present remittance and we should appreciate urgent telegraphic instructions from the Department as to the disposition he should make of the draft in question.

MESSERSMITH

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840.48 Refugees/4424 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Algiers (McBride) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, September 1, 1943—6 p. m.  
[Received September 2—10:42 a. m.]

1519. From Murphy. Department's 1593, August 30, 6 [1] p.m.<sup>24</sup> As stated in Fryer's and my previous telegram General Eisenhower has agreed to use of Camp Marshal Lyautey as a site for refugees from Spain. All physical arrangements necessary to provide for reception of the first batch have been concluded with military authorities.

I am continuing to urge upon Massigli<sup>25</sup> importance of giving unqualified agreement to the proposal. Massigli again informed me today that he would again ask Moroccan authorities to reply urgently. The French have agreed in principle but may wish to impose certain conditions regarding the length of stay, et cetera. [Murphy.]

MCBRIDE

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<sup>24</sup> Not printed; it stated that the Department would be pleased to have a report on the status of negotiations with French North African authorities for designation of site for refugees (840. Refugees/4423a).

<sup>25</sup> René Massigli, French National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

840.48 Refugees/4477a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1943—5 p. m.

5358. The following telegram has been received from Bern and should be referred to the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee.

“‘De la Sem’<sup>26</sup> states that about 15,000 foreign Jews at present in Italian occupied France are waiting to take refuge in Italy to escape from Germans should these replace Italians as occupants. It is further stated that Italy which is already more or less supporting 14,000 refugee Jews living on Italian soil is willing to receive this fresh contingent of Jews but only in transit for another destination since the country has not the resources to support additional burdens. This is Tittmann’s<sup>27</sup> 164, August 25. The ‘De la Sem’ therefore proposes that with help of a humanitarian organization, such as Red Cross which would supply ships, Jews now in danger in France be permitted by Allies to proceed to North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria or Morocco) when they could be assisted with the funds, already available in United States and Great Britain.

“Matter is stated to be extremely urgent for the Jews in France and probably for those in Italian occupied Greece as well.

“The ‘De la Sem’ also hopes that eventually the 14,000 foreign Jews now residing in Italy may be evacuated to North Africa in same manner.

“My British colleague has reported foregoing proposal by telegram to London.”

The Department hopes it will be possible for the Committee to assist these refugees now in danger in France and Italy.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4429 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith)*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943—5 : 55 p. m.

A-2473. Your A-2014 September 1st. We do not understand that Polish American Council is prepared to advance \$25,000 monthly toward the support of Santa Rosa Colony. Both Wiesiolowski and Szmejko have recently been to Chicago for discussions with this organization in line with Jackson’s memorandum of August 18. Polish American Council representative is coming to Washington end of

<sup>26</sup> A Jewish agency in Italy.

<sup>27</sup> Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., assistant to the Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII.

next week for clarification as to what they are prepared to do in assistance of Santa Rosa project.

We agree that expenditure of present remittance of \$25,000 should be the responsibility of Polish representatives rather than Mr. Kelly. We think it important, however, that Kelly exercise policy supervision over expenditure of private funds as well as public funds. We suggest that Kelly hold present remittance but take no action toward its disposition until we instruct you further after meeting with Polish American Council.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4479 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1943—10 p. m.

5436. For Riefler and Funkhouser from Stone and Lehman. Department's no. 4860, August 12, 1943. In view of reference to Inter-governmental committee of plan to bring 20,000 Jewish children from occupied areas to Sweden for the duration, there seems no reason why efforts should not now be made to institute a general child feeding plan in Sweden similar to that suggested to the Swiss government. British Embassy here reports that MEW has tentatively presented the matter to the Swedish Government and that a reply is expected shortly.

Such a plan should in principle apply to children from occupied areas selected solely on the basis of need regardless of racial or religious affiliation and if possible should not be confined to Norwegian children. Difficulties may arise if Germans refuse to permit Jewish children to be included or if they agree only on the basis that Jewish children who may be included must not be returned to Germany after they are restored to health. This in turn may create for the Swedish Government the same difficulty on a smaller scale as that which stands in the way of the plan for permanent evacuation of 20,000 Jewish children. British assert that they have expressed their readiness to the Swedes to cooperate in any such plan whether it involves a permanent removal or return and replacement after a restoration of health or a combination of the two. Department believes our policy should be equally broad.

You are instructed to familiarize yourself with the terms of past discussions with the Swedes and upon the reply of the latter to recommend a further course of action. [Stone and Lehman.]

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4450 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, September 7, 1943—4 p. m.  
[Received September 10—7:10 a.m.]

2463. Winant informed me in telegram September 3 that Department had approved an arrangement for selection in Spain of refugees to be sent to North Africa agreed upon at conference held in London between representatives of Foreign Office, OFRRO and Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees. He said committee would consist of representatives of American and British Embassies in Madrid, with Patrick Malin, Vice Director of Inter-Governmental Committee, and that I was to designate chairman. He said a memo of the understanding was being sent to me by airmail.

I am, of course, most sympathetic with efforts being made to assist stateless and former enemy refugees in Spain and am anxious to help in such efforts to the greatest possible extent.

The proposal to set up an inter-governmental selection committee in Spain is new to me and I have received no indication of the proposed status of such a committee vis-à-vis the Spanish Government or Spanish Red Cross and no indication that the subject has ever been discussed with either of these.

I assume, of course, that nothing will be done to carry out the arrangement until I have received the memo which is being sent and until I have had an opportunity to study it and to offer my suggestions.

Repeated to London, Algiers for Murphy and to Lisbon by mail.

HAYES

840.48 Refugees/4426 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1943—8 p. m.

5494. Reference Department's 5358, September 2, 1943 the following telegram has been received from Lisbon quoting Tittmann's 169, August 30:

"De la Sem (a Jewish agency in Italy) reports Italian Government prepared to provide steamships *Vulcania*, *Saturnia*, *Duilio* and *Giulio Cesare* which are capable of transporting approximately 30,000 Jews from Italy to North Africa in three voyages. Expenses would be \$5500 per day while under navigating plus insurance, fuel, lubricants and food to be borne by Jewish organization in the United States. Fuel and lubricants to be furnished by British Government

against reimbursements. Color and personnel of ships which recently returned from East Africa with Italian repatriates have already been agreed upon by British and American Governments. Early action should be taken while ships are still in condition to accommodate refugees."

The Department desires to commend the above to the appropriate consideration of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4449 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, September 9, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 5:30 p. m.]

5590. From Tittmann 179, September 6. My 169 August 30 from Lisbon. Following from sure source.

*a.* Italian Government has authorized all French and foreign Jews residing in France in the zone over which it will not have control to transfer their residence to the zone of the Alpes Maritimes Department over which it will still have control. The Italian military authorities are in every way facilitating travel of those persons and their establishment in the new district. Some categories of Jews are provided with Italian police escort who have orders to prevent by force any opposition to their transfer.

*b.* Italian Government would have been willing to accept without conditions or guarantees the above-mentioned Jews as it did in the case of previous 14,000 from the Balkans were it not for the fact that the localities to which it would have been possible to send them are already occupied by Italian citizens evacuated from the bombed areas. The purpose of the "De la Sem" proposals is to relieve the Italian Government of this fresh burden and to avoid the possibility that the Jews might be deported in spite of the manifest wishes of the Italians.

*c.* A long delay in carrying out the proposals would compromise the desired results.

*d.* The "De la Sem" suggests that Osborne<sup>28</sup> and myself be authorized to contact the Italian Government (which I am told is only too willing to collaborate) with a view to solving the problem at the earliest possible moment. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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<sup>28</sup> Sir Francis Osborne, British Minister to the Holy See.



840.48 Refugees/4529

*The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State*

Ref: 608/14/43

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I write to let you know that His Majesty's Government recently decided that in future all Jews, whether adults or children, who may succeed in escaping to Turkey from enemy-controlled territory since the closing of the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier in May last, will be eligible (after a preliminary security check in Turkey) for onward transport to Palestine, where they will be placed in camps, go through a further security check and if found satisfactory will be gradually released as legal immigrants into Palestine against the current half-yearly immigration quotas. By "onward transport" is meant such transport by sea or rail as may be arranged by His Majesty's Government in cooperation with the appropriate diplomatic mission.

This policy will also apply to Jews who manage to escape to other neutral countries, but where they have escaped to countries in which they are safe they will normally remain there. Thus the Jews at present in Mauritius, Cyprus and Spain would remain there (unless, as is hoped, arrangements can be made in the case of Spain to remove them for the duration of hostilities to Allied territory in North Africa) and only in very special cases and for very special reasons would authority be given for any onward transport to Palestine.

The numbers to be admitted under these new proposals will not entail any increase in the total number of immigrants permissible for the period ending the 31st March, 1944.

I have been asked to emphasize the confidential nature of this letter, as secrecy is essential in the interests of the refugees themselves and His Majesty's Government intend to make no public announcement of the policy described above. They are, however, informing the Jewish Agency for Palestine in confidence of what is proposed.

I am writing a similar letter to Mr. Myron Taylor.

Very sincerely yours

R. I. CAMPBELL

840.48 Refugees/4462: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 9, 1943.

[Received September 9—11:47 p.m.]

5982. Having made an unsuccessful effort to convene a meeting of the Executive Committee (which apparently cannot meet before Sep-

tember 30) the Director of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees called an informal meeting in his office this afternoon at which the Embassy and Foreign Office were represented and the Director and Vice Director attended. With the entire agreement of the Vice Director, the Director presented the following personal joint suggestions for the consideration of the Department and Foreign Office:

"The messages from the Department of State conveyed through the American Embassy raise two questions which are closely related, namely (1) the safety of foreign refugees in Italy itself and (2) the safety of foreign refugees in the portions of southern France hitherto occupied by the Italians. The unconditional surrender of Italy has changed the position in some respects. It would seem to have changed it for the better insofar as (1) direct and open negotiations can now take place between the Allied authorities and the Italian authorities, (2) it is definitely in the interests of the Italian authorities to do all they can to meet the wishes of the Allies, (3) one may expect, although one cannot assume, that the territory occupied by the Allies in Italy will expand in the near future, (4) the prospects of Switzerland having access to countries other than those occupied by the enemy are definitely improved although the date at which there will be a common frontier between Switzerland and Italian territory occupied by the Allies, depending as it does, on the progress of military operations, is still uncertain. Nonetheless, the direction which the war is now taking does open up prospects of Switzerland ceasing to be a country completely surrounded by Axis countries and, therefore, unable to get people out except by the consent of the Axis authorities. This may well have an important influence on the attitude of the Swiss authorities towards giving asylum to refugees.

On the other hand, the unconditional surrender may well complicate the situation because (1) it may be anticipated that the Germans [*Germany*] will take over control of as much of Italy as she can, (2) she will certainly take control of the departments of France hitherto occupied by the Italians. The Italian authorities will no longer operate in those departments. On the above analysis the means of helping refugees in Italy would seem to be the following: (a) Encouragement by the Allies of the Italian authorities, amounting to pressure if necessary, to give such protection to the refugees as is possible to help their concealment by the population by their passage to areas where they would be safe. (b) Encouragement Swiss Government to give asylum to all refugees from Italy who are able to cross the frontier. The encouragement to the Swiss Government to be really effective must include (1) an assurance regarding food supplies, (2) an assurance that she will be relieved as soon as possible of the refugees she may receive. The second is far more important than the first. The assurance might take the form that so soon as possible the Allies will take back into Italy any refugees therefrom whom Switzerland now takes. It is suggested that this assurance should be confined to returning the refugees to Italy and not their transfer elsewhere because (1) the very few places elsewhere to which they could be transported will be required for other refugees, (2) the return to Italy would be comparatively simple so far as transport is

concerned, (3) the final settlement of the refugees in question is likely to be more easy if they return to Italy and are not dispersed elsewhere. (c) There was the possibility of escape by sea of refugees from Italy to other places e.g. Spain, North Africa and Cyprus. Having regard to the military operations now in progress and the flight of the Italian ships from Italian ports in order to escape the Germans, this does not now seem to be a possible means of escape, [on] organised lines, although a few may have got away on Italian ships or may be able to get away within the next day or two. The safety of the ships and not of the refugees must obviously be the dominant consideration, and unless there are ports not under control by the Germans, which is improbable, nothing can be done.

With regard to the refugees in southern France, it must be assumed that if this has not already happened, there will be full German control within a few days. The Italians will not be able to organise the removal of refugees from there into Italy and it seems unlikely that many will wish to cross the frontier into the portions of Italy strongly occupied by the Germans. For those who do cross the Italian frontier what has been said in the previous paragraph will apply.

The remaining means of escape is into Switzerland. Here again, approaches to the Swiss Government should be accompanied by assurances regarding food relief and the removal of the refugees. As regards the latter, a distinction may be made between children and others. In the summer and autumn of 1942 when there was still a prospect of the Vichy Government allowing children to leave Vichy France, various governments offered to give asylum. The Government of the United States, for instance, generously agreed to take 5,000, the age limits being 16 for children of Allied nationality and 14 for children of enemy origin. The offer by the United States was later extended to children who were able to escape into Spain. If the United States were willing to extend it to children who may now be able to escape from the southern departments of France to Switzerland, an assurance could be given to Switzerland that such children would be removed when communications allowed. Approaches on the same lines could be made if necessary to other governments concerned but the number, unfortunately, is likely to be so small that the offer, if made, by the United States would probably not involve liability of more than a few hundred. For adults, the assurance would have to be, in present circumstances, on more general lines. Here again, the number is likely to be so small that I think an assurance could be safely given, remembering that when Italy is occupied it should be possible within reasonable time to open a camp there, if facilities in North Africa and elsewhere did not suffice. The above suggestions are, of course, contingent on and subject to military considerations."

The Director made it clear that reference to refugees in Italy is intended to be limited to foreign refugees in Italy. He expressed appreciation of the Department's having referred suggested projects to the Intergovernmental Committee, explained that on account of the urgency of the situation and the impossibility of a prompt meet-

ing of the Executive Committee he was following the procedure of submitting his suggestions as above for consideration by the American and British Governments. In conversation he attached particular importance to the desirability of the guarantees proposed by him to be given by the British and American Governments to the Swiss Government.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4492 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, September 20, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received September 22—11 a. m.]

2674. My 2463, September 7, 4 p. m. Memorandum mentioned in London's telegram September 3, 8 p. m., has just been received and I offer following observations:

1. As indicated in my 2275 of August 24, 1 p. m.<sup>29</sup> total number of refugees without nationality and of former enemy nationality now in Spain who would be eligible for evacuation as planned probably does not exceed vicinity of 1500, which fact would appear to greatly narrow latitude of selection and render superfluous formation of special inter-governmental selection committee.

[2.] I recommend instead, and British Embassy concurs, the list of prospective evacuees be prepared by David Blicken's staff, Madrid representative of American charitable organizations, whose office is only agency here in possession of required information concerning such refugees, and that lists then be submitted to American and British Embassies, and if considered desirable Military Attachés, for security check.

3. Recommendations of interested organizations as to criteria for priority of selection could be communicated to Blicken staff for his guidance if considered necessary. Foreign Office London has already suggested to British Embassy here that special consideration be given to those refugees who have valid permits to enter other countries, those who can assist in camp construction and those with special humanitarian claims.

4. I have as yet made no formal approach to Spanish Government in this matter but feel that it should be fully informed of plan before concrete steps are taken here.

Repeated to London, Algiers for Murphy and Lisbon by courier.

HAYES

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<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

840.48 Refugees/4424 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943—6 p. m.

1722. For Murphy. Your 1519 September 1. You are requested to make urgent representation to the French for prompt agreement to the plan of providing temporary asylum at Camp Marshal Lyautey to stateless and enemy nationality refugees now in Spain and at expense of British and American governments. The long delay in acceptance of this plan is not understood by us. It is imperative that we have final approval before selection and preparation of refugees in Spain can begin and necessary staff can be recruited here for the administration of the project.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4450 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943—10 p. m.

5797. Reference your telegram of September 3 to Madrid and latter's no. 2463, September 7, 4 p. m. to Department repeated to you, regarding committee for selection in Spain of refugees to be sent to North Africa. It is assumed of course that the Ambassador at Madrid has received your memorandum and has had opportunity to study it and to offer his suggestions. The Ambassador at Madrid will have had to consider whether the delicate arrangements with the Spanish and Portuguese Governments for the evacuation of the refugees in question will be endangered by the setting up in Spain of a committee as proposed and also the possibility whether too discriminate a selection of the refugees in Spain, except of subversive elements, would defeat the objectives of relieving Spain of the care of the refugees and providing a channel for further escapes of such refugees from Axis territory.

Repeated to Madrid.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4492 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1943—8 p. m.

2022. Your 2674, September 20, 5 p. m. Department concurs in your recommendations contained therein. Murphy has not yet ob-

tained unqualified agreement of French authorities for use of Camp Marshal Lyautey. Until that is obtained and movement of refugees can begin, it would not seem to be advisable to take up matter with Spanish Government. That should be done, of course, as soon as the French agreement is obtained and before concrete steps are taken for the evacuation of the refugees from Spain.

Please repeat to London, Algiers and Lisbon.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4462 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1943—9 p. m.

5885. Your 5982, September 9. Considering the military situation in Italy at the present time, it would not seem to be possible for the Italian Government to take steps to ensure the safety of the refugees in question. There therefore remains only the possibility, unless the refugees should be able to succeed in escaping into Spain which seems very unlikely under present circumstances, of their crossing into Switzerland. Before proceeding to take up with the various agencies concerned here the Director's proposals for facilitating the refugees' entry into and maintenance in Switzerland, it would seem to us to be advisable to obtain beforehand a definition of the Swiss Government's attitude toward the proposed reception of the refugees and a statement of the conditions under which it would be willing to receive and maintain the refugees pending such further disposition of them as may subsequently be made by the Intergovernmental Committee. Toward that end we suggest that the British Government instruct its Minister at Bern to approach the Swiss Government at the same time informing us when we will instruct our Minister there to join with his British colleague in the approach. If the British will be willing to act in the immediate future this Government will be prepared to do so simultaneously.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4529

*The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Campbell)*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I have received your letter of September 9, 1943 in regard to the decision of your Government to

accept for onward transport to Palestine all Jews who may succeed in escaping to Turkey from enemy-controlled territory.

I assume that the British Ambassador at Ankara will be informed of this decision and hope that it will be possible for him to communicate it informally to the American Embassy at Ankara. Such action would be of great assistance in connection with our joint efforts to relieve the sufferings of these unfortunate people.

Sincerely yours,

A. A. BERLE, JR.

840.48 Refugees/4512 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, undated.

[Received September 28, 1943—5:06 p. m.]

2760. The following telegram has been sent to Algiers.

377, September 27, 10 a. m. (For Murphy.) Embassy has today been informed by Foreign Office that Spanish Government has granted authorization for direct evacuation of French refugees from Spain via Spanish ports and in French ships and, although certain details remain to be worked out, we are initiating arrangements for first convoy at once. Although no port is specifically mentioned by Foreign Office, we are assuming that Algeciras or Cadiz will be acceptable.

In so far as arrangements here are concerned, decisions regarding dates of departure will in all probability be determined primarily by availability of rail accommodations for transportation of refugees to port of embarkation and I should like to be informed as to how much advance notice is required by French and British authorities at Algiers for arrangement of necessary shipping facilities for each group.

Repeated to Department, London and by courier, Lisbon.

HAYES

840.48 Refugees/4542 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1943.

6009. Dr. Nahum Goldmann of the World Jewish Congress has approached the Department with a proposal to provide food, clothing, and medicine to remnant groups of surviving Jews who may be specifically located in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other parts of Central Europe.

Dr. Goldmann proposed that the International Red Cross be the agent to reach these groups and gave the impression that the International Red Cross had expressed willingness to do so. He asked if the American Government could make some contribution in money to allow the International Red Cross to buy in Europe medicines and concentrated foods which it could use as opportunities developed. He stated that the Jewish people in this country could raise privately approximately \$2,000,000. He thought the total program depending on developments might run to perhaps \$10,000,000.

Dr. Goldmann was informed that the Executive Committee in London of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees had been established by this Government and the other member Governments of the Intergovernmental Committee as the agency to act upon proposals of this character. We had agreed with the British Government that we would jointly underwrite the cost of specific projects to help refugees in Europe in a situation such as he described. We would be very glad to bring his proposal to the attention of the Executive Committee and the British Government through our London Embassy and would under our particular arrangement with the British Government be prepared to share with Great Britain the cost of specific projects approved by the Executive Committee (procedure, of course, would follow the understanding we and the British have reached with the Executive Committee relating to prior consultation with us before a project is sanctioned or an expenditure incurred thereon). We would also be glad to recommend to the consideration of the Executive Committee the possibility of accepting the International Red Cross as the agency (in territories occupied by the enemy) to be employed to carry out approved projects and that the Committee favorably consider such particular projects as the International Red Cross might recommend as practical for the assistance of the remnant groups in question.

You are requested to bring this matter appropriately to the attention of the Executive Committee on or before its next meeting and advise the Department of any action taken by the Committee regarding it.

You may bear in mind for possible use in discussing this proposal that the adoption of the program on a project basis would obviate the necessity of seeking large overall sums of official funds.

The foregoing is subject to the general proviso that the German Government obtain no benefit from the execution of any project.

BERLE



840.48 Refugees/4517 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*ALGIERS, September 29, 1943—11 p. m.  
[Received September 30—2:17 a. m.]

1662. For Lehman from Fryer. Dutch Consul Casablanca has made informal inquiry concerning use of Marechal Lyautey refugee center to house 1500 Dutch refugees for a period of 30 days.

These refugees are now in Spain. They would be despatched to Casablanca and held there pending Dutch-made arrangements for transportation. We view this project favorably if it will not conflict with Washington-London plans for housing stateless refugees. We assume Dutch will make formal inquiry in Washington and wish to assure you that we can assume all responsibility for taking care of these refugees if you are formally approached by the Dutch and if you approve. We assume that Dutch Government would reimburse the United States Government for expenditures made in its behalf. Should this be brought to your attention formally Dutch Government should advise you of measures it will take in Spain to screen refugees for security purposes in order that this information may be transmitted to G-2 section of HQ. We are advised by Dutch Consul that the French have approved this project. [Fryer.]

WILEY

840.48 Refugees/4522 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*STOCKHOLM, September 30, 1943—10 p. m.  
[Received October 1—8:24 a. m.]

3149. Foreign Office states it learned yesterday from what is considered authentic sources that Germans plan to send Silohous [*sic*] and Jews from Denmark to Reich. Only newspaper item covering this today was short reference in editorial in *Svenska Dagbladet* which said that recent Danish refugees coming to Sweden believe that by this threat Germans are trying to blackmail King and Danish Parliament to establish legal government.

Foreign Office has instructed its Minister in Berlin today to approach German Government and state that if this transfer were put into effect it would have very unfortunate effect on public opinion in Sweden. Minister is instructed to state Swedish Government is prepared to receive these Jews in Sweden and if German Government fears they might exercise influence of political nature Swedish Gov-

ernment is prepared to intern them. Foreign Office has asked for immediate reply and hopes to have something today.

JOHNSON

740.00114 European War 1939/4351 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, September 30, 1943.

[Received September 30—8:40 p. m.]

6103. Legation's 5937, September 23.<sup>30</sup> Federal Councillor von Steiger, head Federal Department Justice and Police, informed Swiss Parliament September 29 that 21,860 refugees from Italy including 960 escaped POWs arrived Switzerland since September 17. Total refugees from all countries now 57,734. Previously arrivals averaged 30 daily now 300. Despite rumors no border incidents occurred.

Three weeks' quarantine imposed especially as safeguard against typhus although no cases yet noted. Barracks with capacity 5,000 order costing 3 million francs. Army supplied 20,000 blankets, also underclothes, socks. Italians to be used construction work, woodcutting, road building, quarries where most useful.

Military considerations require removal from southern frontier cantons of recent arrivals from Italy as soon as possible. From legal point of view distinction must be made between military internees whose status is defined in international law, political refugees to whom right of asylum is extended under certain rules and panicky civilians who have no reason to remain here. Right of asylum and Swiss humanitarian ideals will continue to motivate Swiss authorities who must also be mindful of dictates of national safety and practical possibilities.

HARRISON

840.48 Refugees/4537 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 4, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received October 4—1:59 a. m.]

1700. From Murphy. My 1632, September 23, 10 p. m.<sup>30</sup> I have today received the French [reply] to the proposal for the establishment of temporary asylum for stateless refugees at Camp Marshal Lyautey. The Committee accepts the proposal which places the

<sup>30</sup> Not printed.

responsibility for housing, maintenance and transport of the refugees on the British and American Governments as the second replacement center of the Atlantic base section at Fedhala with the understanding the [*that*] not more than 2,000 individuals will be admitted at the same time into Morocco.

Certain additional conditions are imposed as follows:

1. Inasmuch as nationals of enemy states domiciled in Morocco and of mobilization age are interned, unless they have served in the Foreign Legion or have a relative in the Allied [*garbled group*] or have rendered exceptional services to France, it is difficult for the French authorities to afford more favorable treatment to other stateless individual or nationals of enemy powers just entering the territory. The Committee consequently considers that the refugees cannot be allowed to establish themselves outside of the camp or to accept work unless they come within the foregoing categories. In the case of those desirous of obtaining work, records must be communicated to the Residency General before authorization may be obtained.

2. Since the town of Fedhala is situated upon the coast and close to Casablanca, it may be considered necessary [*for*] security reasons to transfer the refugees to another locality. Should this be the case the Committee would give adequate notice to the American and British Governments who would be requested to assume expenses of any new installation.

3. Inasmuch as the French Government is responsible for the maintenance of order and security within the Protectorate, the French administration must exercise police control of the future reception center. This will be undertaken by the security services in Morocco who will assume charge of the surveillance of refugees in association with the personnel operating the camp. If the foregoing provisions should be acceptable to the American and British Governments the French committee is prepared to give the necessary instructions to the Resident General.

It appears that whereas the French consent to this proposal has finally [*been*] achieved the conditions establishing it are such that the French authorities will insist upon taking such security measures as they wish which will in fact prevent any large number of refugees from obtaining work locally.

Sent to Department, repeated to London and Madrid. [*Murphy.*]

WILEY

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840.48 Refugees/4536 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 4, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 11:45 p. m.]

3196. Chief Political Division Foreign Office says advices from Denmark indicate local German officials there are being very lax in

carrying out instructions for deportation of Jews. Although final figures are unavailable as many who escaped to Sweden do not arrive in populated spots nearly 3,000 have already escaped to Sweden, i.e., nearly half of number intended to be deported. Official mentioned above believes that strong campaign from Sweden has affected local German officials in Denmark so that they fear for their personal safety if carrying out instructions too vigorously.

Swedish Government has followed up its original *démarche* in Berlin (see Legation's 3149, September 30, 10 p. m. and 3180, October 2, 10 p. m.<sup>32</sup>) by requesting that in any case Jewish children be sent to Sweden, stating children could not be cause of trouble in Denmark which is alleged cause for deportations.

JOHNSON

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840.48 Refugees/4538 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 5, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 11:21 p. m.]

3209. Background action against Jews in Denmark may probably be explained by two considerations: (a) Long desired by more radical Nazis in Berlin and only deferred until now by subordination this question to general German policy of moderation towards Denmark which continued effective until end August; and (b) threat such action undoubtedly used by Germans in September to try and induce Danes cooperate politically (as suggested my 3175, October 2, 4 p. m.<sup>33</sup> See also my 3196, October 4, 6 p. m.). Regarding (a), it is likely that Hitler himself became aware during August political crisis that Jewish problem Denmark had never been "properly solved".

Action will obviously greatly increase tension Denmark and deepen cleft between Danes and German authorities. Believed that all prospects of another Danish Government may now be dismissed.

Interesting [to] note that Germans thought it advisable accompany their action against Jews by promise release interned Danish soldiers in near future (see my 3195, October 4<sup>33</sup>). This suggests clumsy attempt win back Danish good will.

Fact that over 2500 Jews have succeeded escaping to Sweden in last few days deserves mention and indicates excellent organization Danish underground movement which Legation understands decided fortnight ago do everything possible bring Jews across Oresund.

<sup>32</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

Clear that action against Jews in Denmark is based purely general Nazi policy, as it is well known that there was no Jewish problem there and all evidence shows that Jews have behaved very well and quietly ever since German occupation began as result their continual dread that this might indeed happen. In other words, German allegations given first item my 3193<sup>35</sup> are simply not true.

JOHNSON

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840.48 Refugees/4462 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1943—5 p. m.

2436. London's 5982, September 9, refers to the desire of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees to save as many as possible of those refugees who are fleeing from persecution and impending death at the hands of military autocracy and who recently proceeded or may proceed from Italy and from territory in France previously occupied by Italian troops and now reported occupied by Germans. Distinction is to be made between this class of refugees and those others who should be prosecuted as war criminals for having persecuted or threatened with persecution those presently attempting to escape their jurisdiction. It is especially recommended that encouragement be given to Swiss Government to give asylum to those refugees presently fleeing from persecution and who may be able to cross the frontier.

The Department suggested to Embassy at London in its 5885<sup>36</sup> that before proceeding to discuss with various agencies concerned the Director's proposals for facilitating refugees' entry into and maintenance in Switzerland that we should obtain beforehand definition of Swiss Government's attitude toward the proposed reception of the refugees and a statement of the conditions under which it would be willing to receive and maintain them pending further disposition as may be subsequently arranged by Intergovernmental Committee. Toward that end British Government is instructing its Minister at Bern to approach Swiss Government after consultation and agreement with you and:

1. Inquire number of refugees in Switzerland before the Italian Armistice.
2. The number of refugees and prisoners, if possible by nationality, admitted after July 25, the date of Mussolini's fall.
3. What assurances would the Swiss Government need or expect from British and American Governments in order to enable Switzer-

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<sup>35</sup> Telegram dated October 4, not printed.

<sup>36</sup> Dated September 24, 9 p. m., p. 355.

land to face increased burden and to continue to accept such refugees as may find their way to the Swiss Border.

The telegram further states that "Foreign Office feels that the two Ministers should point out that the furnishing of any supplies to Switzerland at the moment would be very difficult. It feels also that it would perhaps be a good thing for them to say that since Switzerland is the only country of refuge for persons from either Italy or France our two countries are anxious to do anything possible to encourage Switzerland to continue its humanitarian effort with regard to refugees."

Department has just received your 6103, September 30. You and the British Minister may desire to consider situation in light of information furnished therein and submit recommendations here and to London for different course of action than that proposed above.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4555 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State*

MEXICO, October 7, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received October 9—11 a. m.]

A-2283. Department's 1661, October 5, 7 p. m.<sup>37</sup> The budget submitted by the Polish Embassy in Washington for the first quarter for refugee expenses at León, which is identical with the budget brought back to the Department by Mr. Kracht,<sup>38</sup> was drawn up by Mr. Kracht in collaboration with Mr. Kelly and may therefore be considered to have the approval of the latter. Likewise, the budget was submitted to officials of the Embassy and no objection was found thereto. Items in the budget which was drawn up the latter part of August naturally did not take into consideration the revision suggested in the letter of September 15.<sup>39</sup>

The Polish Minister here is agreeable to the suggestion of drawing up separate budgets for the Polish American Council and National Catholic Welfare Conference, but he states that inasmuch as the responsibility for the project will rest upon Mr. Smezcko, the representative of the Polish Ministry of Social Welfare, he proposes to await the arrival of the latter before taking any action in the matter. This last observation applies also to the question of wage scales.

Smezcko was due to arrive here last Saturday but has not yet put in an appearance. He will doubtless not wish to take any action regarding setting up of budgets for private agencies or in connection

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<sup>37</sup> Not printed.

<sup>38</sup> George V. Kracht, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>39</sup> Not found in Department files.

with wage scales until after he has discussed matter with Polish Minister and has spent some days at least in investigating conditions at León.

In the meantime, Kelly at León is proceeding with the necessary construction work for the reception of the new group due to arrive by end of October. Such construction costs money and is, in general, on a cash basis. In a memorandum dated October 4, Kelly stated that he was out of funds and that the Polish Minister had had to advance him money for construction expenses from the \$25,000 given by the Polish American Council. This is obviously an undesirable condition and I recommend therefore that, pending the approval of the budget submitted by the Polish Embassy, arrangements be made for the transfer of funds, in the amount of \$50,000, to the Embassy to be advanced to Kelly and the Polish authorities here as needed.<sup>40</sup>

I should add that Dr. Wiesiolowski has been in hospital for past two weeks, having suffered a coronary thrombosis, and that I greatly fear his able assistance and counsel in the project will no longer be available. His condition is such that he cannot now be bothered with details of administration, etc.

MESSERSMITH

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840.48 Refugees/4550 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 7, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 10:37 p. m.]

6784. In reference to the proposal for removal of some 20,000 Jewish children from Germany to Sweden (see Department's telegram 5436, September 6, 10 p. m.) and in reference to the Department's having given consideration to this proposal, the Directorate of the Intergovernmental Committee reports that it is receiving repeated inquiries from private organizations as to the Department's decision in the matter. The Foreign Office also is interested. The question is raised whether the Department may now wish to consider the desirability of a definite approach to the Swedish Government regardless of any anticipated possibility of ultimate Swedish or German veto. The Department's views are requested.

WINANT

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<sup>40</sup> In telegram No. 1718, October 13, 1943, 10 p. m., to the Ambassador in Mexico, an additional \$50,000 was authorized in accordance with this recommendation (840.48 Refugees/4684d).

840.48 Refugees/4557 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*STOCKHOLM, October 9, 1943—6 p. m.  
[Received October 10—2:30 a. m.]

3261. Boheman <sup>41</sup> has just informed that number of Danish refugees now in Sweden has reached 6000, 1800 having arrived within last 24 hours. Of the total number fully 90% are Jews. He said that there are approximately 6000 Jews registered in Denmark as of Hebrew faith. Number of Jews unregistered because of belonging officially to no faith or conversion to Christianity is not known but he does not believe number is great. Germans have not yet made any reply to Swedish *démarche* (my 3149, September 30, 10 p. m.) and Boheman doubts that any reply will be made. Increase in press articles in Germany attacking Sweden he thinks are in fact directed and constitute a form of reply to Swedish protest. Boheman regrets violence of Swedish press comment and attacks on Germany which he thinks unnecessary and blustery as logical conclusion of such attacks would mean a Swedish declaration of war on Germany which is out of question. He remarked, that in view of fact almost entire Jewish population of Denmark is now in Sweden, objective of Swedish *démarche* in Berlin has been attained.

JOHNSON

840.48 Refugees/4684a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1943—3 p. m.

6316. Your 6784, October 7, 5 p. m. In our study of the proposal for the removal of Jewish children from Germany to Sweden, we have been concerned about the possibility that an approach by the Swedish Government to the German Government for the release of Jewish children alone would result in a rejection of the proposal by the German Government and we have been hopeful that these children could be included in some proposal for the release of children generally from German-held territory. The matter was discussed along these lines at the Department with Thorold of the British Embassy now in London. Nevertheless, we are prepared to give immediate consideration to the proposal as it stands. However, in view of the uncertainty which the Swedish authorities have hitherto shown as to the course of action which they might follow and in light of the

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<sup>41</sup> E. C. Boheman, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.



developments with respect to Jews in Denmark, we suggest that confidential inquiry be made of the Swedish Government as to its willingness to take up the matter now with the German Government, and of the assistance it will need of us for the care of the children. Perhaps the inquiry could be made by the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee or we would be willing to have the matter presented jointly by the American and British Ministers at Stockholm.

We feel that a definite statement should be obtained from the Swedish Government before we and the British authorities proceed to make arrangements, including the allocation of funds by the President for our share of the expenditures to be incurred, to put the proposal into execution.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4684c : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1943—6 p. m.

A-1391. Department has received following telegram from Dr. Goldmann, World Jewish Congress:

“Am being informed from London that 4000 Jewish refugees and Yugoslavs recently in internment camps Yugoslavia have been freed by Yugoslav partisans and removed to Adriatic island of Rab. Understand food and medical supplies urgently needed as island suffers serious shortage. In view of possibility island being recaptured by Germans most desirable remove refugees soon as possible to safer area. Southern Italy, Sicily or North Africa. May I respectfully request to bring this matter to the attention of authorities North Africa and Sicily asking them to take necessary steps.”

Please refer to Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee and if you deem it advisable transmit it to Murphy for Eisenhower.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4692a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1943—5 p. m.

2537. The reported influx of refugees into Switzerland, both escaped prisoners of war and fleeing civilians, has resulted in pressure in this country on the Government, Amcross, and other private relief organizations to send assistance to them.

In order that proper consideration may be given to this matter, please inform Department by telegraph:

(1) Number and nationality of refugees now estimated to be in Switzerland with separate figures as to escaped prisoners and civilian refugees.

(2) Are escaped prisoners of war interned in camps for the duration and separated from civilians?

(3) Are civilians confined to camps or at liberty?

(4) How are needs of refugees met, that is, by Swiss Government, Swiss Red Cross, private relief agencies, or through combination of these methods?

(5) Is assistance by American relief organizations desired? If so, in what form and amounts? Through what Swiss agencies should such assistance, if desired, be channeled? (Please note that this is not a commitment but merely an inquiry at this stage.)

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4537 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1943—11 p. m.

1889. For Murphy.

1. We regret exceedingly to learn that the French authorities, according to your 1700, October 4, 2 p. m., (numbered paragraph 1) desire to impose conditions of internment upon the refugees to come from Spain for whose temporary residence in French North Africa we have asked that a site be designated as directed by the President in agreement with Mr. Churchill. We pointed out in our 1383, July 27, 6 p. m., that the implication that the refugees would be placed in a concentration camp had to be avoided. We indicated that they would therefore have to be given some freedom of movement and we cannot recede from that position. Confinement of the refugees in a camp following their evacuation from Spain where, we believe, they enjoyed some liberty, would cause instant and violent press and public criticism of us and of the French authorities. We recall in that connection the public agitation for the liberation of the political internees in North Africa. We were unaware that there are other internees in Morocco, of enemy nationality, domiciled in Morocco, and desire an informative report from you on that subject.

2. You will note from Madrid's 2674, September 20, 5 p. m., to the Department, repeated to you, that security check on the refugees will be undertaken by both the American and British Embassies. Participation of the French authorities in the checking procedure might well be arranged. This checking will, of course, be conducted primarily to eliminate the forwarding to North Africa of any and all

refugees whose entry into North Africa would be undesirable for security reasons. In view thereof we do not see the need for confinement of refugees to a camp if that is in fact contemplated by the French authorities, or for holding them under any other restrictive measures than apply to the general population locally. The reason for placing them in a camp such as Camp Marshal Lyautey, as we see it, is to afford them most conveniently housing and maintenance, the expenditures for which can thus best be controlled in behalf of the British and American Governments who will share the costs.

3. We do not insist that the refugees should be allowed to work outside the camp but we suggest strongly the advisability, from a humanitarian as well as an economic viewpoint, of affording refugees, according to their various qualifications, permission to work.

4. Madrid's 279, September 29, 11 p. m., to the Department,<sup>42</sup> repeated to you, reports that the number of refugees now in Spain of the categories in question is 1600. The condition that the French authorities desire to make that not more than 2000 of these refugees will be admitted at the same time in Morocco is accordingly acceptable to us.

5. We do not understand the reference to the proposed center as "the second replacement center of the Atlantic base section at Fedhala" (see first paragraph of your 1700), and desire clarification and confirmation that Camp Marshal Lyautey is meant. Considering, among other matters, the cost and labor of setting up the center for the refugees, we desire to leave open to future agreement between us, the British and the French authorities, the question of the subsequent transfer of the refugees to another locality, should that arise (see numbered paragraph 2 of your 1700).

6. We are agreeable to the proposal that the French Administration should exercise ordinary police control wherever the refugees may be accommodated, in association with the personnel operating the reception center (see numbered paragraph 3 of your 1700).

7. Please immediately approach the French authorities again and request their consent to the reception of the refugees in accordance with the views expressed above. It is suggested that in doing so you emphasize the important humanitarian contribution which the French authorities will be making in affording temporary asylum for the persecuted, homeless persons for whom it is needed.

We are repeating this to London<sup>43</sup> with request that British Government instruct Macmillan to express to the French authorities its concurrence in our views.

Please repeat to Madrid.

HULL

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<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

<sup>43</sup> Telegram No. 6448, same date.

840.48 Refugees/4697 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 21, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received October 22—2:27 a. m.]

1811. From Murphy. Department's 1889, October 15, 11 p. m. Department's views concerning the conditions imposed by the French authorities with regard to the plan for temporary residence of refugees from Spain have been communicated to Massigli who has promised to review the situation in light of the Department's observations and to give an early reply. Massigli fully understands our objection to the establishment of a refugee center organized as a concentration camp and equally wishes to avoid any adverse public criticism.

Information regarding the number of other enemy internees in Morocco was also requested.

With regards to paragraph 5 of the Department's telegram under reference, the "second replacement center of the Atlantic base section at Fedhala" is the army designation for Camp Marshal Lyautey.

Information which has reached us from Spain through the Jewish Distribution Committee and other persons dealing with the refugee problem in Spain, however, indicates that the problem of providing temporary refuge in North Africa may have changed materially since the question was first discussed at the Bermuda Conference. We understand that the majority of the refugees are now at liberty in Spain, where they are being supported through the efforts of the J. D. C. and others, and evidence little desire to be removed further from their homelands. The progress of the war has apparently altered their situation and there seems little likelihood that they will be deported to Germany.

Under these circumstances, might it not be desirable before finally determining upon the size of the camp at Fedhala to endeavor to ascertain from the individuals in question how many would wish to proceed to French Morocco under the conditions of the Anglo-American plan? Estimates of the total number of refugees involved have already been reduced from 6,000 to 1,600 of whom a large number are said to have visas for Palestine and would probably wish to proceed direct from Spain or Portugal when conditions of travel permit. In other words, we consider it would be desirable before proceeding further with the scheme to ascertain exactly how many persons would wish to take advantage of the temporary asylum afforded them in French Morocco under the changed conditions in Spain.

Sent to Department, repeated to Madrid and London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

840.48 Refugees/4706: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, October 25, 1943.

[Received October 26—2:35 p. m.]

3106. The following telegram has been sent to Algiers:

429, October 25, 10 p. m. For Murphy. Our 1811, October 21, 5 p. m., to Department. With reference to question raised by you of necessity or desirability of continuing arrangements for removal of stateless refugees from Spain in light of changed conditions here I should like to make following observations:

1. Despite fact that most of these refugees are now at liberty and being supported by American charitable organizations, there is no assurance that they will be allowed to remain at liberty if unable to leave Spain in very near future.

There are in fact signs of increasing annoyance on part of Spanish of their remaining so long in Spain, and it is considered by no means impossible, that many of them may be returned to internment or imprisonment if their stay is perforce prolonged.

2. It is believed that most of these persons would greatly prefer to go to North Africa rather than to remain in Spain if they could be assured of finding there a certain degree of freedom and the right to work. Not many, however, would be anxious merely to exchange a Spanish concentration camp for a French one.

3. Between five and six hundred out of estimated six to seven hundred refugees have Palestine visas but have so far been unable to proceed there. They would, of course, prefer to go directly to Palestine if transportation could be arranged in near future, but if not they would prefer to wait in North Africa if above-mentioned conditions are to obtain.

Repeated to Department and London.

HAYES

840.48 Refugees/4716c: Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1943—10:10 a. m.

A-1444. On August 21, 1943, at Quebec, the Secretary was handed a memorandum by a representative of the British Government<sup>44</sup> in which it was proposed that in the future approaches to neutral countries concerning refugee questions be made through the Director of

<sup>44</sup> Correspondence on the conference between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Quebec in August 1943 is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

the Intergovernmental Committee. It was also suggested that any announcement of such a decision should make it clear that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain were not disinterested themselves from these questions but were initiating the proposed procedure for greater efficiency and expedition.

The United States Government agrees to the proposed procedure for approaching neutral governments and has, as you know, already proceeded on this basis with several projects which have come to its attention. It would seem advisable, however, to make an exception for the time being in the case of refugees in Spain where arrangements for their care and evacuation are being made by the representations of the British and United States Governments.

It would not seem proper to make any public announcement of this understanding pending the receipt of replies from the member Governments to the Executive Committee's recommendation for revision of its mandate. Under no circumstances, of course, would our arrangements concerning refugees in Spain be disclosed in a public announcement.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4711 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 28, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received October 28—4 p. m.]

7452. Pursuant to Embassy's 7341, October 25, 4 p. m.,<sup>45</sup> we have now received from the Foreign Office a letter dated October 26 which states as follows:

"We concur in the point of view put forward by the State Department and have asked Mr. Macmillan to give Mr. Murphy any support which may be necessary to ensure that the French conditions should be interpreted as liberally as possible. We added that in particular it seemed desirable that all suitable refugees should be allowed to take up some form of employment.

I understand from you that the French authorities have now consented to review the position, and I shall be interested to hear the result, so that the exodus from Spain can begin without any further delay."

WINANT

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

840.48 Refugees/4719 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, October 30, 1943—4 p. m.  
[Received October 30—1:50 p. m.]

7517. Embassy's 7284, October 22, 7 p. m.<sup>46</sup> The Director has made the exploratory approach to the Swedish Minister and although the Minister shows entire sympathy for the proposal he, nevertheless, states that he does not believe his Government will entertain the idea of approaching the Germans and if it were willing he does not believe there is the slightest chance that the German authorities would agree to release the children. Concerning Sweden's unwillingness to make the approach he said that recently it had specifically requested the Quisling regime in Norway to allow Norwegian children to go to Sweden to be maintained by the Swedish Government and had encountered a definite refusal. This being the position concerning children from Norway he is confident that his Government will be unwilling to make an approach concerning other children because, first, this would weaken the case as regards Norwegian children for whom it intends to continue its efforts and because second, Sweden could hardly accept a position in which it should be unable to help the children of Norway, a country with which it has close bonds of kinship and sympathy while extending help to children scattered over Germany and occupied areas with whom it does not have the same bonds. The Minister, nevertheless, stated that he is leaving for Stockholm in a few days and consented to put the matter to his Government.

WINANT

840.48 Refugees/4741 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, November 6, 1943.  
[Received November 6—10:35 a. m.]

7713. The Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees has proposed that the Vice-Director should immediately visit Italy, presumably by way of North Africa. The Department's approval is sought as well as the necessary steps with military and civilian authorities concerned to provide requisite facilities. The Em-

<sup>46</sup> Not printed; it referred to Department's telegram No. 6316, October 11, 3 p. m., p. 365, and reported the matter had been taken up with the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee (840.48 Refugees/4700).

bassy's opinion is that refugee matters under consideration here would be greatly benefited by the proposed visits taking place. The Director's letter making the proposal, dated November 5, follows:

"As we have already told you in personal conversation, we think the time has now come to raise simultaneously with the Foreign Office and the Department of State the question of an immediate visit to Italy by a member of our headquarters staff. Reports about the refugee situation there are now reaching us from various quarters, including information concerning the flight of Yugoslavs and others from the North to the South and inquiries about conditions and proposals for action are continually being presented to us. A prompt visit by the Vice-Director, who is ready to undertake the task, would serve the following vital purposes:

(1) Accurate and impartial, comprehensive and up-to-date factual information would be obtained by a person acquainted with the refugee problem, and representing a body officially and specifically dealing with it. The Office of the Intergovernmental Committee, reorganised as a result of Anglo-American initiative at Bermuda, and publicized as the chief instrumentality of many other nations as well in the refugee field, should be enabled to become quickly the central clearing-house of facts and ideas on the subject. Furthermore early activity by the Intergovernmental Committee in every accessible United Nations or neutral area is a means whereby member governments can demonstrate good faith to persons who may not sufficiently understand the barriers which for the most part prevent current activity on behalf of refugees elsewhere.

(2) First-hand contacts would be made with the authorities—military and civilian, public and private Anglo-American and Italian—who would deal practically with the urgent problems of refugees found in an area liberated by Allied Armies. Such contacts might help those authorities, who are seldom specialists on refugee matters, and who are over-burdened with other duties; certainly, the later and vastly larger work of the Intergovernmental Committee would benefit from having someone at headquarters equipped from the start with direct knowledge of the early sample situation in Italy. While there, he would also be able to prepare for the work of the resident representative, whose appointment in the near future we have previously discussed with you in general terms.

En route to Italy, presumably by way of North Africa the Vice-Director could become briefly acquainted with new developments in situation there, particularly in respect of the proposed camp for refugees now in Spain. After spending a month or two in Italy (Sicily, if necessary), he could stop in North Africa for as much time as had been made desirable by progress with the camp, et cetera.

We should be grateful if you would present our proposal to the proper authorities in the Department of State. If further conversations with yourself or others seem needed, please let us know. Should



the Foreign Office and the Department of State approve of our proposal, we should be glad if they would take the necessary steps with the proper military and civilian authorities in London and Washington, North Africa and Italy, to provide the requisite facilities for the Vice-Director's Mission."

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4762: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 11, 1943.

[Received November 11—11:59 p. m.]

7865. By letter dated October 1st we communicated to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees the substance of Department's 6009, September 29 and have today received the following reply dated November 10 in which the Director confidentially requests certain information probably in the possession of the United States Treasury:

"May I refer you to your letter of the 1st October with which you conveyed a message from the State Department relating to a proposal put forward by Dr. Goldmann of the World Jewish Congress to provide food, clothing, et cetera to remnant groups of surviving Jews located in Central Europe.

As you know we wrote to the International Red Cross asking it to supply us as soon as possible with as detailed an outline as possible of such particular projects as it might recommend as practical for the assistance of the groups in question. We further suggested that it should limit itself to recommending projects whose nature is such that only lack of funds prevents their being undertaken or extended. We still await a reply.

In the meantime, however, we have received some information regarding the help that is being given, first by Allied Governments to their own nationals including Jews, and secondly by voluntary organizations, mainly Jewish, to Jews in occupied territory. Our information is, however, far from complete and in order to put the case fully before the Executive Committee in due course we should have complete and accurate knowledge of what is being done under existing arrangements insofar as it affects persons coming within the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee.

We understand that the normal system is for the United States Treasury or the British Treasury as the case may be to grant licenses giving exchange facilities to the Allied Governments or to the organizations as the case may be for the purpose of purchasing food et cetera in certain neutral countries. The food so purchased is then sent, under certain guarantees, for the benefit of the nationals or the Jewish groups respectively in the occupied territory.

We are at present inclined to think that whatever may be the nature of the reply from the International Red Cross, the extension of the existing system may be a contribution towards the problem that has been referred to us. In any case it is a relevant fact about which the Executive Committee will wish to be informed. We shall be grateful therefore if you can obtain from the American Treasury through the State Department information regarding the licences now in force which have been issued for this purpose, the Governments or organizations to which they have been granted and the amount of the exchange facilities to which they relate. This information would be treated as strictly confidential and for the information of the Executive Committee only.

I have written a similar letter to Mr. Randall of the Foreign Office."

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4770 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, November 11, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received November 14—2:30 a. m.]

1977. From Murphy. Translation of reply of November 9 received from French in regard to camp for refugees from Spain at Fedhala, Morocco follows:

The personal representative of President Roosevelt, North Africa by note 36 of October 18 kindly advised the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the agreement of the Government of the United States to the proposals of the French Committee concerning the project for accommodating in Morocco certain stateless refugees or nationals of enemy countries who are now held in Spain.

Mr. Murphy has moreover called the attention of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the interest which the American-British Governments attach to it not appearing that these refugees are being submitted to the internment regime of a concentration camp.

The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has the honor to advise Mr. Murphy that it has never been the intention of the Committee to subject foreign refugees to measures designed to deprive them of liberty. French Committee wishes as do the British and American Governments to assure as generous as possible an asylum to refugees but it has appeared indispensable to take certain precautions with regard to persons whose antecedents are not known and for whom a simple review of the file would not furnish sufficient guarantees.

It is of course understood that the French authorities are prepared after an examination of each particular case to grant permission to work in Morocco to refugees, who can continue their professional work without disadvantage to the economy of the Protectorate. In this connection such refugees will enjoy the right to remain in the area where it will have been possible to obtain employment for them, with the sole reservations of conforming to such controls which may be deemed necessary.

With respect to refugees who will not have been authorized to work and who as a result will have to be cared for at the Fedela [*Fedhala*] camp, it goes without saying that the French administration, if the occasion arises will grant them facilities to remain away temporarily from the Housing Center, on the condition that they maintain their regular residence at the camp and observe scrupulously the laws and regulations of the country in particular those regarding immigration.

The Commissioner of Foreign Affairs hopes that these decisions, which have been taken with the twofold concern of treating unfortunate foreigners in a humane manner and of safeguarding order and security in the territories under French sovereignty, will meet with the approval of the American and British Governments.

Repeat to Madrid and London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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840.48 Refugees/4830a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1943.

7287. Will you advise the Department in response to no. 6009, September 29, what action the Intergovernmental Committee may have taken. If no action has been taken please urge that the decision be made favorable to the proposal.

For your information Department has this afternoon conferred with Dr. Goldmann and Rabbi Miller in connection with projects under that program.

Department has committed itself to support an application to the Treasury for the issuance of a license for \$250,000 to be held in Switzerland as a contingent reserve for emergency purposes and to be expended for payment for the cost of projects approved by the International Red Cross and authorized by the Intergovernmental Committee and to be expended in case official contributions from the British and American Governments are not available.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4786 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, November 19, 1943.

[Received November 19—9:52 p. m.]

8095. By letter of November 3rd we made known to the Foreign Office the substance of Department's airgram 1444, October 26th. The

following letter dated November 17 from Randall, Foreign Office Counselor, requests the Department's agreement to certain suggestions, and the Department's instructions would be appreciated:

"Thank you for your letter of the 3rd November informing me that the United States Government agree that approaches to neutral countries on refugee matters should be made for reasons of efficiency and expedition, through the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee.

The Foreign Office would like this agreement to be one for procedure in general and they hope that eventually the Intergovernmental Committee will deal with all refugee matters within its mandate. They agree, however, that for the present an exception to this practice should be the arrangements by the United States and His Majesty's Governments for the care and evacuation of refugees in Spain.

It would also, we would suggest, be advisable that another exception should be the arrangement for the evacuation of refugees from enemy-occupied countries through Turkey in transit to Palestine and other countries of asylum. His Majesty's Government have now practically completed arrangements with the Turkish Government for journeys of children from Roumania and Hungary through Turkey to Palestine and I think you would agree that it would be inconvenient for the Intergovernmental Committee to deal with this matter at this stage. They would not wish either that the Intergovernmental Committee should deal with matters concerning Greek refugees who escape from Greece to Turkey; when Greece joins the Committee and accepts its recommendations then this can be reconsidered. Lastly, the question of the refugees in Italy is pending, and until we have the Commander-in-Chief's observations on the suggestion to send Malin to make a report, this matter must, we think, also be reserved.

The Foreign Office consider that it might be an advantage if the United States Government and His Majesty's Government agree to make the approach jointly to the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee to carry into effect such projects as the two Governments consider practicable for the rescue and care of refugees.

The Foreign Office agree that no public announcement of these arrangements would be proper pending member-governments' replies to the Executive Committee's recommendations for the revision of the mandate of the organization, nor in any event should there be any disclosure of arrangements concerning refugees in Spain, except after mutual consultation and taking into account views of United States and British Ambassadors in Madrid.

I should be grateful if you would forward the Foreign Office views on these matters to the State Department and inform me whether they are in agreement with them. If they are, then I would suggest that if you or we are confronted with any refugee problem other than the exceptions I have named we should turn it over to Sir Herbert Emerson, each informing the other that he has done so."

WINANT

840.48 Refugees/4805 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 24, 1943.

[Received November 24—4: 11 p. m.]

8211. Algiers repeated to us its telegram 1977, November 11, 10 p. m., and we communicated its substance to the Foreign Office from which we now have the following reply dated today and signed by Randall:

“We have confirmation of the French terms as set out in your letter and in the interests of swift action are prepared to agree generally. If your Government approve, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan might consult and, when the appropriate moment arrives, tell our respective Embassies in Madrid to put the necessary machinery there in motion. Please let me have your views.”

Please instruct.

WINANT

840.48 Refugees/4770 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*<sup>47</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1943—10 p. m.

2516. Please take action as indicated in following telegram sent to Murphy<sup>48</sup> and keep Department advised for its information of movement of refugees.

“We accept with appreciation the French Committee’s offer of the assembly center for refugees at Fedhala as set forth in the letter of November 9 of the French Commissioner of Foreign Affairs quoted in translation in your 1977 November 11, 10 p. m., taking note that the French Committee does not intend to subject the refugees to measures designed to deprive them of liberty.

We are repeating this telegram to the American Ambassador at Madrid asking him to communicate through you with Beckelman of the Lehman organization, who is now en route to North Africa, and arrange with the latter to receive the refugees after concerting with the British Ambassador in Madrid to evacuate them.

We are also repeating this to London with instructions that the proper British authorities be informed and asked to issue such instructions to the British officials concerned to cooperate as may be necessary.

We are also asking Embassy at London to repeat to you Department’s 7336 November 19 and Embassy’s 7683 November 5<sup>49</sup> regarding British personnel for assembly center.”

HULL

<sup>47</sup> Similar telegram sent on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as telegram No. 7486.

<sup>48</sup> Telegram No. 12, November 26, 10 p. m.

<sup>49</sup> Neither printed.

840.48 Refugees/4816 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 29, 1943.

[Received November 29—4:30 p. m.]

8328. Upon receiving Department's telegram 7287, 17th, regarding proposal for refugee relief through International Red Cross we wrote Director of Intergovernmental Committee on November 18 and have now received his reply dated November 26 as follows:

"In reference to your letter of November 18 in the matter of a proposal to provide food, clothing and medicine to remnant groups of surviving Jews in central Europe, may I first call your attention to my letter of November 10 dealing with this question. We still await a reply from the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva to the original cabled and written enquiry which went forward in the middle of October; but we are informed by the Committee's delegate in London that last week on his own initiative he cabled asking for speed.

The Director's office appreciates the Department of State's urgent desire that a decision may be made favourable to the proposal, but it is of course necessary—as emphasized in your letter of October 1 by which this matter was referred to us—to present somewhat specific projects for consideration by the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee. In an effort to combine promptness with definiteness and acting on the basis of recent information, we have now had an additional conference with the International Red Cross Committee's representatives in London and as a result they are cabling to Geneva again along the following lines.

They are asking for a cabled reply to our original enquiry giving such details as are possible concerning particular projects. In addition they are asking the International Red Cross Committee to give urgent consideration to the possibility of a further arrangement whereby funds might be placed at its disposal to enable it to take advantage of opportunities as they arise of meeting emergency needs.

Such an arrangement would, it is being pointed out to the International Red Cross Committee, depend on the fulfillment of three conditions: First, that the German Government obtain no benefit from the execution of any project; second, that there must be assurance of supplies reaching the intended beneficiaries; and third that an account be rendered.

The International Red Cross Committee is being requested after consideration of the above tentative proposal to cable the amount of an initial advance which could be expended during the next 3 months. As soon as a reply from Geneva permits us to do so we shall present the matter for consideration by the Executive Committee—which was informed at its meeting on November 18 of the State Department's original letter of October 1 and the preliminary action taken thereon.

A copy of this letter is being sent to Mr. Randall at the Foreign Office."

WINANT

840.48 Refugees/4729 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1943.

7574. With reference to the arrangement for evacuation of children from Hungary and Rumania through Turkey, mentioned in your 8095, November 19, we have received no information indicating that the Turkish Government is considering a reversal of its original decision. Please keep Department fully advised on such matters. Department concurs in your suggestion concerning Greek refugees escaping into Turkey.

Department agrees that it is advisable for the United States and British Governments to present jointly to the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee such projects as the two Governments consider practicable for the rescue and maintenance of refugees.

A separate message is being sent to you concerning Malin's proposed visit to Italy.<sup>50</sup>

HULL

868.014/84 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Izmir (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

IZMIR, December 1, 1943—9 p. m.  
[Received December 2—12: 03 p. m.]

58. Germans on Samos have issued proclamation stating population will not be oppressed; also that population must arrange own food problems.

To date about 10,000 island refugees arrived Kusadasi and are being rapidly evacuated to Alep as result of excellent cooperation Turkish, British, Greek authorities.

JOHNSON

840.48 Refugees/4827 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, December 2, 1943.  
[Received December 2—2: 10 p. m.]

8405. Below is quoted a letter dated November 29 from the Foreign Office signed by Randall concerning maintenance of Dodecanesian refugees. Department will note that the question is raised of referring

<sup>50</sup> Telegram No. 7556, November 30, p. 227.

the matter to the Intergovernmental Committee. In that connection the Director informally tells us that he sees no obstacle thereto in the Greek or Greco-Italian character of the refugees nor in the non-membership of Greece; that the IGC would be ready for the responsibility; but that all should understand that an organization would have to be built up including a field office probably at Cairo. Department may wish to consider possibility of Cairo office in relation with the five offices recently suggested. Embassy has informed Foreign Office that letter is being forwarded to Department and instructions are being requested. Text of November 29 letter follows:

"A problem has arisen in regard to the maintenance of Dodecanesian refugees mainly of Greek origin and including women and children, brought by the military authorities to the Middle East. These people are, of course, Italian subjects and while the British Government, in view of the urgency of the problem, have assumed initial financial responsibility for them, we have asked Mr. Macmillan to notify the Italian Government that they will have to refund any necessary expenditure. We do not know if the Italian Government are prepared to accept this charge or will attempt to dispute it, but obviously we must feel sceptical about their ability to pay.

We should be grateful to know whether your Government would be prepared to share the cost of maintenance of these refugees with the British Government on a 50/50 basis. Or would they favour the question being put up to the Intergovernmental Committee? I have mentioned the question privately to Sir Herbert Emerson. The procedure of approaching the Committee would raise delicate issues because the Greeks, who have not yet joined the Committee, would have to be consulted before this particular class of refugee could be accepted under the Committee's mandate and on the whole we feel it would make for simplicity if the United States Government could see their way to agree to share the cost of maintenance and also to help with supplies.

Our Minister of State in Cairo reports that clothing, with which these refugees will have to be furnished, cannot be provided from local resources. In view of the demands for clothing for refugees in Italy which so far cannot be met, I doubt if Algiers could provide any. I also think it practically certain that the Board of Trade would confirm that there are no supplies of new clothing to be procured from this country. We are, however, asking them about this. If these two sources fail, I can only suggest that the American Red Cross might be asked if they can increase the supplies which they are already generously giving, or the Middle East Supply Centre might be requested to procure clothing for this special purpose.

I should be very grateful for your views on this problem, which has come upon us unexpectedly and is a serious addition to the heavy responsibilities in transport, accommodation and supplies which we have been carrying for the last 18 months over the clearance of the Polish refugees from Persia. I should add that estimates of the numbers which will eventually be involved are about 20,000; the Middle East Refugee and Rehabilitation Administration in Cairo is assuming responsibility for housing in its area of operation, but sup-



plies and maintenance generally would appear to be beyond their present resources. Hence this letter, which I should be glad to supplement with a talk if you wish it."

BUCKNELL

840.48 Refugees/4861

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Visa Division (Travers) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1943.

Mr. Hayter of the British Embassy called on me yesterday with reference to the six-thousand children who are in France and who Mr. Leavitt<sup>51</sup> desires to move to Switzerland. It seems that the Swiss Government is willing to accept these children if they can have a guarantee that the children will be moved after the war. Mr. Leavitt proposed that between one-thousand and three-thousand numbers be used in the Palestine quota and I had previously told Mr. Leavitt that we would recommend that procedure to Mr. Hayter. Mr. Hayter has submitted the matter to London but desires also that the matter be taken up by the Intergovernmental Committee. He asked if we had any objection to the Intergovernmental Committee giving consideration to the movement of these children to other countries as well as Palestine and I told him, of course, we would be glad to save these children and send them to any country where they would be safe.

I mentioned that we could not agree to accept them here after the war as we could not answer for the future especially as there might be a change in the immigration laws. He is taking up the matter with the Intergovernmental Committee and I told him that we agreed with his proposal to do so.

H. K. TRAVERS

840.48 Refugees/4856b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)*

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1943—9 p. m.

64. For Murphy and Gordon<sup>52</sup> from Fryer and Latimer.<sup>53</sup> In view agreement for establishment refugee center Morocco, cable us authority from AFHQ for transportation from U.S. for one ad-

<sup>51</sup> Moses A. Leavitt, Secretary of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

<sup>52</sup> Paul W. Gordon, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations; on staff of Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers.

<sup>53</sup> Presumably Murray Latimer, Assistant Director, Liberated Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration.

ministrative officer, two nurses, one nutritionist, two stenographers, and one port and transportation officer,—all for refugee center. This personnel will be sent when we receive notice from you. Cable was recently sent British requesting them to furnish initially one doctor, two nurses, one recreational organizer and one person with experience in camp operations. Advise Hoehler when they will be needed.

Beckelman<sup>54</sup> is directed to communicate with Hayes regarding advisability his going to Spain to canvass situation with refugees. In this connection we feel it very desirable refugees should understand fully nature and conditions of center and accept before they leave Spain.

Fryer indicates following steps in completing final arrangements for center:

1. Official designation of Camp Marshal Lyautey and its assignment by Army for purposes refugee center.
2. Confirm arrangements previously made with Army for necessary equipment and supplies and advise us accordingly.
3. Renew arrangements for temporary assignment of automotive and truck transportation. Passenger cars from here for center have been shipped and trucks already purchased and awaiting shipment.

[Fryer and Latimer.]

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4837 : Telegram

*The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, December 6, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received December 7—10:06 a. m.]

103. It was decided at a meeting held today between Beckelman, representatives French Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, office British Minister, Allied and French military security organizations and this office that it would be desirable for Beckelman, reference Department's telegram no. 12, November 26<sup>55</sup> and my 102 today,<sup>56</sup> to proceed to Madrid at an early date to investigate the type of refugees to be evacuated to French North Africa and then return with an advance party of selected refugees who would assist him in organizing the camp at Fedhala to receive main body of refugees as soon as they are accepted and can be transported. Beckelman probably will stop off in Rabat en route to Madrid to discuss details with French Moroccan officials.

Discussion at meeting concerned chiefly form of document of iden-

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<sup>54</sup> Moses William Beckelman, representative of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>55</sup> See footnote 48, p. 378.

<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

tity that will be issued to accepted refugees before they leave Spain. It was tentatively agreed to use a modified form of document similar to that prescribed in the 1938 League of Nations Convention on Stateless Refugees<sup>57</sup> which could be used as a travel document. However, the Intergovernmental Committee may have approved a new form of international certificate, in which event such form might be used.

In course of discussion French authorities emphasized that the Fedhala camp should be considered primarily as a transit site pending the employment of refugees in North Africa or their emigration to points elsewhere.

French authorities also raised question of medical examination of refugees prior to their departure from Spain. Beckelman will explore this question in connection with his plans for American and British personnel for the camp.

It was suggested that a joint French, British, American committee would be formed at Madrid and have charge of screening refugees prior to departure.

Aforementioned meeting took place prior to receipt of Department's 64, December 4, 9 p. m. Paragraph 2 is construed as granting authority for Beckelman to proceed to Madrid provided Ambassador Hayes perceives no objection. In connection Department's comment that it is very desirable that refugees should understand fully nature and conditions of center and accept before they leave Spain, it would be useful to Beckelman if he could be informed what plans (if any) have been developed to find ultimate destinations for refugees outside of North Africa, in particular, aged persons, children and those with disabilities which would interfere with or prevent their finding gainful occupations.

Sent to Department, repeated Madrid, Rabat and London for Hoehler.

WILSON

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840.48 Refugees/4838 : Telegram

*The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, December 7, 1943—5 p. m.  
[Received December 8—12:44 a. m.]

106. The office of the British Minister has brought to our attention a telegram from the British Foreign Office regarding a joint British-

<sup>57</sup> Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming From Germany, signed at Geneva, February 10, 1938, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxcii, p. 59.

American statement concerning the refugee camp at Fedhala, Morocco which it is proposed to include in a general public statement on the results of the Bermuda Refugee Conference.<sup>58</sup> Following is the substance of the reply of the office of the British Minister to the Foreign Office.

(1) Because of the extreme sensitiveness which the French [Committee?] is now showing, our American colleagues and ourselves agreed to show the draft statement (quoted in telegram from Foreign Office) to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The French do not object to publicity but put forward an alternative draft which seemed unsatisfactory as it omitted any reference to any American responsibility for the camp or to their payment of cost of maintenance.

(2) The French, with great difficulty, have been persuaded to agree to the following draft. This is substantially their version with the exception of the second sentence which has been added and which the French dislike but are prepared to accept. Statement begins:

"The French Commissariat of Foreign Affairs are in agreement with the Governments of the U.S. and the U.K., has taken appropriate steps to receive in Morocco certain refugees who have escaped from territories occupied by the Axis and at present residing in Spain.

The Committee on its side is providing necessary accommodation while British and American Governments have agreed to share between them cost of maintenance of center, which will be directed by a joint American, British and French staff. Refugees will find temporary assignment there until permanent arrangements can be made for them. With removal of refugees to Morocco and transfer of others to Palestine the greater part of refugees in Spain and Portugal will have been removed to other destinations.["] End of statement.

(3) Of course the main object of redraft is to bring out French contribution to plan. The French made following additional points:

(a) In view of Moroccan susceptibilities they would prefer to avoid emphasis on American direction.

(b) They dislike the word "camp" which to the French reader would convey idea of a concentration camp.

(4) We agreed to submit redraft and French comments to Foreign Office but explained that it would not be promised that it would be possible to alter the statement at this stage, if the statement is still to be made. We hope, however, that it may be possible to go someway at least to meet the points of the French and of British message to Foreign Office.

Office of British Minister has informed us that British Ambassador in Madrid has objected to any publicity at this time concerning the

<sup>58</sup> See telegram No. 8478, December 5, from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 229.

Fedhala camp on grounds that plan for evacuation of the refugees from Spain might be interfered with through German pressure.

Repeated to London, Madrid.

WILSON

840.48 Refugees/4762 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1943—11 p. m.

7745. You may inform the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, in reply to your 7865, November 11, as follows, of operations so far in 1943:

1. Licenses have been issued to the American Red Cross for the export of 148 tons of foodstuffs and 4,850 pounds of clothing to Spain for refugee relief. Export licenses have also been issued to American Red Cross for shipment of \$2,958 of medicinals to Switzerland, presumably for refugees. The American Friends Service Committee has been allowed to export approximately 56 tons of new and used clothing to Spain and 10 tons of clothing to Switzerland all for distribution to refugees. No licenses have been issued for the shipment of clothing through the blockade to occupied territory.

2. Department and Treasury have authorized five food package schemes based on Portugal and one on Sweden in the amount of \$12,000 monthly for each program subject to the following conditions: (a) the contents of the packages must be confined to foodstuffs indigenous to Portugal, or Sweden as the case may be, and not of a kind imported through the blockade; (b) adequate assurances must be furnished of the receipt of the package by the addressees; and (c) the number, size and contents of the packages must be approved by the American Minister. Licenses for the shipment of packages from Portugal have been issued to: The Belgian Embassy in Washington for Belgium; the Polish American Council for Poland, other than Jewish communities; the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for Jewish communities in Poland (no funds have been transmitted thus far under this authorization); the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for Czechoslovakia; and the Netherlands War Relief Center, Inc., for the Netherlands. Norwegian Relief, Inc., has been issued a license for the shipment of packages from Sweden to Norway.

3. Department has occasionally approved exceptional shipments of other food packages under the same restrictions. For example, the

transfer of \$100,000 for the purchase of 250 tons of foodstuffs in Turkey for distribution in Trans-Istria was recently authorized.

4. In addition, Department and FEA<sup>59</sup> have periodically approved small shipments of food and medical supplies from within a neutral country to occupied areas for the relief of civilians, particularly women and children. The Governments-in-exile of Belgium, Norway, Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Poland and Czechoslovakia have all made partial use of a credit of £500,000 in Swiss francs made available to them by the British for the purchase of relief supplies in Switzerland. Purchases have been limited to milk and milk products, medical supplies, some meat and ascorbic acid. Department has generally insisted that distribution of such goods be under the control of the International Red Cross.

5. Licenses for export of medical supplies through the blockade totaled over \$700,000 in 1943, excluding pharmaceuticals sent to Greece.

6. It must be clearly kept in mind that Greek relief program is exceptional and is considered as completely separate from the food package program in paragraph 2 above.

7. There is no way of determining exactly how many or what percentage of the recipients of the food package programs mentioned above are persons who come within the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4838 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom*  
(Bucknell)

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1943—7 p. m.

7760. Have received Algiers 106, December 7, 5 p. m. Mr. Long's statement<sup>60</sup> referred only in general way to the place of temporary residence center in Africa and is not out of line with the thought in the French draft.

HULL

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<sup>59</sup> Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>60</sup> *Rescue of the Jewish and Other Peoples in Nazi-Occupied Territory: Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st sess., on H. Res. 350 and H. Res. 352* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 15. See also *ante*, pp. 228-238.

840.48 Refugees/4847: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 8, 1943.

[Received December 8—8:45 p. m.]

8533. Please instruct regarding the following note dated December 3d from Foreign Office, and state whether we should obtain from Foreign Office material mentioned in final sentence:

"We consider that there is a case for handing over to the Intergovernmental Committee the problem presented by civilian refugees, whether Allied or stateless, who have succeeded in escaping to Switzerland. Such a procedure would fall in with our generally agreed policy of lightening the burden imposed upon the Swiss authorities by the abnormal influx of refugees into Switzerland since the Italian armistice. Neither Allied military refugees (escaped prisoners of war) nor military internees in the strict sense (e.g. British and the Polish divisions) should, in our view, fall within the Committee's sphere of action.

I should be grateful if you would find out the views of the State Department and let me know them. If they agree, then we could cooperate in drawing up the terms of reference to the Director, who would require to know what offers of help had been made to the Swiss Government in connection with refugees, what help was now being given and what were the Swiss requirements, economic, financial and political, stated in response to the joint inquiry by the United States and British Ministers last September. We now have material on all this."

BUCKNELL

840.48 Refugees/4789: Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1943—6 p. m.

A-1688. You are requested to transmit to the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee the following information which is contained in telegram No. 7262, November 19, from Bern.<sup>61</sup>

Mr. Pilet Golaz<sup>62</sup> gave the American Legation at Bern a note dated November 16, which describes the responsibilities and burdens which the influx of refugees has placed on the Swiss Government as follows:

The large number of refugees who have arrived in Switzerland places that country in a more and more exposed position and it assumes

<sup>61</sup> Not printed.<sup>62</sup> Marcel Pilet-Golaz, Chief of the Swiss Federal Political Department.

a great responsibility in receiving them. The Federal Council is first of all concerned with strictly maintaining the country's neutrality and in knowing that this neutrality will be respected by the warring nations in accordance with the assurances which were given in this respect by careful avoidance of all incidents which might compromise it in the eyes of one or another. Many of the refugees in Switzerland, however, are considered unstable and unassimilable.

The refugees realize that Switzerland can only provide temporary shelter for them and that later they must go elsewhere to establish their homes. It would be helpful for the refugees themselves as well as for the Swiss authorities to have assurances that as soon as circumstances permit, they can depart from Switzerland and that the American Government will cooperate in this respect.

Swiss authorities are concerned as regards the proper means of keeping these uprooted elements orderly and quiet. Police control alone is not enough. In order to avoid demoralization they must be kept busy and provided with work. Work can only be provided so long as the stable population is not unemployed. Refugees cannot be employed on public utility works if native labor must be employed in this manner as a means of lessening unemployment among Swiss citizens.

The possibilities available to the Swiss for importing and exporting determines the extent to which Swiss industry can be kept active. If foreign trade is reduced, unemployment will result which will have profound repercussions on the serious problem for Switzerland of receiving and taking care of refugees. The Federal Council would like the United States Government to give sympathetic consideration to this aspect of the question as its importance from a moral and practical standpoint goes beyond the actual costs of providing refugees with food, clothing, housing and other necessities.

The material charges in caring for refugees are considerable. The Swiss Government so far has spent over 100,000,000 francs on behalf of refugees and internees. This does not include gifts by the Swiss people of over 12,500,000 francs as well as clothing, foodstuffs, and loan of buildings and grounds free of charge by individuals or various institutions. Expenses of maintaining refugees are increasing daily and further facilities of a financial nature will certainly be necessary. Nearly 63,000 refugees are being cared for, 30,000 of whom arrived within a few weeks in a completely destitute condition. To provide warm clothing, and blankets for these people the stocks set aside for the needs of the Swiss population as well as the army stocks have had to be used.



Requirements of the large refugee population became more and more of a burden on food supplies which, at the beginning of the fifth year of the war, are evidently very limited. The Federal Council hopes that if the need arises it can make supplementary purchases for this purpose and that the United States Government will consider with sympathy requests which may be presented for licenses to purchase and transport stocks for replacement including foodstuffs and textiles.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4852 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 9, 1943.

[Received December 9—11: 59 p. m.]

8553. We followed out the instructions contained in Department's 7486, November 26, 10 p. m.,<sup>63</sup> in a letter to the Foreign Office dated November 30 and have now received from the Foreign Office the following letter dated December 8:

"Thank you for your letter of 30th November about the proposed camp for refugees at Fedhala.

We have asked our Ambassador at Madrid and also our Resident Minister at Algiers to concert with their United States colleagues in arranging for the transfer and reception of the refugees.

Sir Samuel Hoare informs us that he is supporting the approach to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by asking for permission to evacuate the refugees from Malaga. Since the next convoy of French refugees are to leave on December 15, it will not be possible for the 'stateless' refugees to leave at least until December 25. We feel, however, that this delay may have the advantage that more time will be given for preparations to be made in North Africa.

Both our Embassies feel that, in view of possible German reactions, publicity would be undesirable before the transfer is over and that any public announcement should, therefore, be postponed for at least 3 weeks."

We are not yet repeating this message to either Madrid or Algiers feeling that the Department may have its own instructions in the matter.

BUCKNELL

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<sup>63</sup> See footnote 47, p. 378.

840.48 Refugees/4911

*The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter) to the Chief of the Visa Division (Travers)*

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1943.

DEAR MR. TRAVERS: The Foreign Office have been approached by the European Division of the World Jewish Congress on the subject of the Jewish deportees from Roumania at present in Trans-Dniestria. The World Jewish Congress are naturally concerned as to the possibility of deportation of these refugees by the retreating German army. The numbers concerned are said to be between 75,000 and 150,000. The World Jewish Congress have asked that measures be taken to rescue these people, which according to information supplied by their headquarters in New York is a possibility since Antonescu<sup>64</sup> is said to be willing to be conciliatory. The Congress therefore suggest an approach to the Roumanian Government through the latter's representative in Lisbon or Ankara.

The Foreign Office admit that the military and other difficulties in the way of the proposed action are obvious. They would nevertheless like to know whether the United States Government has received a similar approach and have any views on the method of dealing with the question. In particular they enquire whether the United States Government would be prepared to join in any approach to the Soviet Government, or to recommend such an approach to the World Jewish Congress.

I should be very glad to have your views on the above.

Yours sincerely,

W. G. HAYTER

840.48 Refugees/4874a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*<sup>65</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1943—midnight.

2637. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs released on December 10, the text of a statement made before the committee by Assistant Secretary Long, regarding the refugee problem. This statement contained a résumé of action taken by the American Government and by governments associated with it for the rescue and relief of these unfortunate people. Brief mention was made of the transportation to a camp in North Africa of the stateless refugees now in Spain.

HULL

<sup>64</sup> Gen. Ion Antonescu, Rumanian Prime Minister.

<sup>65</sup> The same on the same date to the Ambassador in France as No. 130.

840.48 Refugees/4847 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1943.

7946. Concerning problem of assisting the large number of refugees who have escaped to Switzerland mentioned in your 8533 December 8, this Government wishes to lighten burden on Swiss as much as possible. We concur with views expressed in note from British Foreign Office. Please collaborate with British in drawing up terms of reference to IGC Director and submit to Department for our information. Regarding offers of help made to Swiss Government, Department has not yet replied to note from Swiss dated November 16, outlining needs of that country as a result of influx of refugees. Reply to Swiss note is being drafted and you will be advised of commitments this Government may make to assist Swiss in caring for refugees. Swiss note paraphrased to London in A-1688 December 9.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4911

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Visa Division (Travers)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1943.

Mr. Hayter, of the British Embassy, called upon me on December 16th and I told him of the telegrams which we have exchanged with Turkey<sup>66</sup> and also efforts to cause the Rumanians to permit the Jews who had been deported to Trans-Dniestria to be returned to Rumania and thus not be caught between the German and Rumanian armies. I mentioned that this had been tentatively agreed to but the Germans had become aware of it and had stopped the movement after four thousand had been approved. I also told him that we were sending a further telegram to Turkey<sup>67</sup> on the matter. I was emphatic that we had had no direct dealings with the Rumanians and that these arrangements were made some time ago.

Concerning any approach to Russia, I said that we certainly had no objections to the British Government approaching the Soviet Government and that we would be prepared to join in such an approach but I personally was in some doubt as to the advisability of it.

HOWARD K. TRAVERS

<sup>66</sup> None printed.<sup>67</sup> See telegram No. 1399, December 20, 10 p. m., to the Minister in Sweden, p. 393.

840.48 Refugees/4789 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1943—11 p.m.

3159. Reference Legation's 7262, November 19.<sup>68</sup> Following telegram has been sent to London.

"From Department and FEA. Swiss Federal Council delivered on November 16 a note to U.S. and British Legations in Bern describing the heavy burden imposed on their economy by the refugee problem and indicating that reduction in their exports may cause unemployment which will make even more difficult their aid to refugees.

Department and FEA suggest that the substance of the following communication be presented to the Swiss authorities by the British and U.S. Legations:

"The United States Government is aware of and appreciates greatly the generous reception which the Swiss Government has extended to the large number of refugees who have made their way to Swiss territory. This Government also looks forward to the time when these refugees may be repatriated and will lend its cooperation in every feasible way toward the achievement of this end.

This Government appreciates also the burden upon Swiss resources resulting from the care of these refugees and will be glad to give sympathetic consideration to such proposals as the Swiss Government may wish to make with a view to easing the burden which the care of these refugees has placed on the Swiss economy. The Swiss Government may be assured that the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom will give as favorable consideration as circumstances permit to requests for the purchase and import through the blockade of additional supplies of foodstuffs and textiles to relieve the burden placed on Swiss resources by reason of assistance extended to refugees.

In this connection reference is made to the Department's telegram 2537, October 15, in which mention was made of the sympathetic attitude in this country on the part of various relief organizations and their desire to be of assistance. Funds in substantial amounts, contributed for foreign relief, are available in the United States if the Swiss Government desires to avail itself of this assistance."

If you and your British colleagues agree, please inform the Legations in Bern."

No action should be taken pursuant to above message until British agreement is communicated to you by Embassy, London.

HULL

840.48 Refugees/4859 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1943—10 p. m.

1399. Department's 1194 November 5.<sup>69</sup> The Consulate General at Istanbul reported on November 1 that the Rumanian Government was engaged in repatriating some 65,000 Jews from Transnistria. A

<sup>68</sup> Not printed; it contained translation of a note dated November 16, 1943, from the Swiss Foreign Office.

<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

further report dated December 11 indicated, however, that German pressure had forced the Rumanian Government to abandon these plans and reduce the number to be repatriated to 4,000. The Department is accordingly sending Istanbul telegraphic instructions as follows:

"The Department has no information other than that contained in your 482R98 November 26 and 530R107 December 11 <sup>70</sup> regarding the character and extent of any measures the Rumanian government may have taken to effect the repatriation of the Rumanian Jews remaining in Transnistria.

"The Department would like you to continue to utilize every opportunity to emphasize in suitable quarters the lively interest of the American Government and people in the fate of those Jews in Transnistria who remain alive today but would face extermination if left at the mercy of the retreating Nazi armies. You should leave no doubt as to the depth of the American feeling of revulsion to and abhorrence of such a disregard of the elemental laws of humanity as would be represented by the failure of the Rumanian government to take all measures within its means to prevent further slaughtering of these unfortunate people."

You should be guided by the foregoing.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4901 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 24, 1943.

[Received December 25—4: 48 a.m.]

8975. In connection with difficult problem of necessary limits to publicity in refugee matters Department may be interested in the following examples of complaints by certain organizations concerned with refugees against publicity demanded by other organizations concerned with refugees.

We have been supplied translation purporting to be communication December 18 from International Red Cross Geneva to London Red Cross delegates as follows:

"Have just dispatched to you detailed letter concerning action suggested by World Jewish Congress. Press releases that Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, informed Foreign Affairs Committee of House of Representatives <sup>70a</sup> that United States Treasury were examining desirability first transfer to Switzerland of \$250,000 for assistance to Jews on request of Jewish body New York to send funds to International Red Cross understood to contemplate purchase

<sup>70</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>70a</sup> See footnote 11, p. 228.

food supplies for relief of remnants Jews in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Although we appreciate that our efforts are recognized we consider this publicity regrettable as stated in letter of Malin to Haccius dated October 12. We feel that publicity to our efforts will compromise our slender chances to take action in Germany and occupied territories. Please inform Intergovernmental Committee pointing out that extreme discretion is essential in interest of beneficiaries for whom relief is envisaged."

Intergovernmental Committee Vice Director Malin received letter dated December 22 from Easterman of World Jewish Congress London as follows:

"We are most surprised to read in today's issue of Jewish Telegraphic Agency *Bulletin* a message from Washington to the effect that Mr. Breckinridge Long, United States Secretary of State, has disclosed to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the scheme for the distribution of relief in Europe through the International Red Cross Committee and the contribution of the British and American Governments of \$4,000,000 each. Mr. Long evidently went so far as to disclose that \$2,000,000 are to be contributed 'by an unnamed American Jewish organization'. I enclose a copy of the JTA report; no doubt you have a copy of the *Bulletin* in your office.

It is difficult for us to understand how Mr. Long comes to make public the details of a scheme which it has been strongly impressed upon us must be maintained strictly confidential. It is equally difficult to understand the necessity impelling Mr. Long to make this public statement. We appreciated the necessity for maintaining this confidentiality and we have adhered most strictly to it. We have likewise impressed upon our executive in New York that it was the express desire of the various authorities concerned that no publicity whatever should be given to this scheme, or to the means of financing it. We have reason to believe that our executive in New York have also adhered strictly to the confidential nature of the whole matter.

We can only hope that this disclosure on the part of Mr. Long will not adversely affect the carrying out of this scheme of relief and that the International Red Cross Committee will not be placed in an embarrassing position by reason of his disclosure. We can well appreciate that there is a possibility that these consequences may ensue; if they do, this will be an unfortunate end to what would have been an important measure of bringing aid to thousands of suffering people in Europe and perhaps even saving their lives.

As the scheme has now been made public through the statement of Mr. Long there does not seem to be any reason why we should not now inform our members and constituents and for that matter the Jewish public in this country of the nature of the scheme and how it was proposed to carry it into effect. Before taking any steps in this direction, however, we shall be glad to have an opportunity of discussing the situation with you and I shall be glad to know when it will be convenient for you to do so."

Enclosed with Easterman's letter was extract from Jewish Telegraphic Agency item dated Washington, D.C., December 21 as follows:

"Mr. Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, in the course of his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, declared that the British and American Governments are ready to contribute \$4,000,000 each to a \$10,000,000 fund for the purchase of food to be dispatched to Jews in the ghettos of Poland and Czechoslovakia, it was revealed here by members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The food supplies they said are to be distributed through the International Red Cross. The balance of \$2,000,000 will be contributed by an unnamed American Jewish organization."

Any instructions by Department would be useful.

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4901 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1943.

8171. Your 8975, 24th. Department has consistently held the opinion expressed by the correspondents of the Intergovernmental Committee as quoted in yours under reference—and still adheres to that opinion.

Mr. Long was requested to appear before the Congressional Committee which had before it resolutions concerning the refugee problem. As a condition precedent he insisted that his testimony be given in executive session and received in confidence by the Committee.

The following is quoted from the record of the proceedings. Mr. Bloom<sup>71</sup> speaking:

"The Chairman would like to state that I asked Mr. Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, to appear before this committee and give us information regarding these two resolutions. The Secretary asked me if we were to be in executive session so that he may be able to give certain testimony that up to now it has been considered advisable to hold strictly confidential, and I informed the Secretary that this committee has always kept its word when we were in executive session, and he would be asked to testify, and everything that he testified to before this committee, will be strictly confidential and not go outside of the committee room until released.

"Mr. Long, you can testify with the assurance that whatever you say here will be in strict confidence.

"Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I present Mr. Long, Assistant Secretary of State."

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<sup>71</sup> Sol Bloom, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Long speaking:

"Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am glad to come before you, and I asked Mr. Bloom about the executive nature of the session because there are certain things which I think you will appreciate, as we get into them, that are for the time being confidential, and if they were not retained within the confidence of this committee and kept from our enemies, the actions contemplated and the operations would not be possible to be carried forward, and it would react against the interests of the people that we are trying to help and are interested in.

"You have before you these two resolutions. I think that for a full understanding of them, it would be necessary for you to have an idea of what has happened and something of the history of this whole refugee question."

Department is still of the opinion just above quoted.

However, members of the Committee including the sponsor of the resolution during the hearing requested publication. It was printed as a confidential print for use by members of the Committee. Insistent requests for publication continued. After 2 weeks the Department yielded to persistent requests and the Committee published it with the following announcement.

"Notice. Since this hearing was held, during which time the testimony contained herein was given, it has been determined that it need not be held in confidence any longer and it is consequently released for public information.

"By order of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Sol Bloom, Chairman."

The correspondents of the Intergovernmental Committee probably realize that there is a very large public desire on the part of the people of the United States to assist the persecuted persons and an accompanying desire on their part to know what is being done in behalf of those persons. When agencies of the Government are unable to announce their activities the assumption is made by interested elements of the public that the Government is **inactive or negligent or indisposed** or not interested and these assumptions become the bases for criticisms and even sometimes for vicious attacks.

If the correspondents of the Intergovernmental Committee would communicate to the persons in the United States on whose account they are acting abroad and suggest to them that they advise their associates and others here to desist in their demands for and indulgence in publicity with its consequent danger to the persons we are all trying to assist it would no doubt be a help to all concerned and would, if the advice were heeded, permit the various agencies to operate in that atmosphere of confidence which the Department considers necessary to the better attainment of the objectives. And that advice might also



be heeded by those here who malign the instrumentalities of relief and impugn the motives of responsible officers.

For your own information you are advised that the Department has been under most severe pressure from persons both within and without the Government through a long succession of months. The continuing silence of the Department, even in the face of violent attacks in important parts of the press, created a situation in which the Department was unable to defend itself and which laid the basis for a gradually expanding belief that the Department was inattentive to humanitarian appeals and callous to the suffering of the Jews under Hitler as well as unresponsive to expressions of deep emotion by their fellow religionists here.

But even in that situation the Department did not initiate any public statement but realized the earnestness of the Committee of the Congress to publish the record of the hearing and accepted its decision.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4904 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 27, 1943.

[Received December 27—9:45 a. m.]

8997. In connection with preparations for January 4th meeting the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees hopes Department will instruct regarding questions raised in his following letter to Embassy:

“As you know the question of getting children out of France is being referred to the Intergovernmental Committee by the American and British Governments. It will probably come before the Executive Committee at its next meeting to be held on the 4th January. The actual reference is confined to the possibility of persuading Switzerland to give temporary asylum if the Vichy and German authorities will allow the children to leave France. There is, however, another line which we think should be simultaneously pursued, if the Executive Committee agrees.

When the problem arose during the late summer and autumn of 1942, offers were made by various governments to give asylum to children from Vichy France, if they could be got out. The offers which are relevant to the present situation are those made by your Government, the Dominion Government of Canada and the Government of the Argentine, and further the question of certificates being made available by the Jewish agency for Palestine. We are now ascertaining as a preliminary to the matter being put before the Executive Committee, first, whether these offers still hold good and second, how far the Governments concerned are willing to modify them

if necessary to meet the present circumstances. Although I have no official information giving the exact terms of the offer made by the Government of the United States, I understand that it was prepared to take 1,000 children from Vichy France, the age limit being 16 years of age for children of non-enemy origin, and 14 years of age for children of enemy origin. There was the further prospect of the number being raised to 5,000 should this be necessary. The arrangements then contemplated were that the children would be got out into Portugal in the first place and thence direct to their countries of asylum. Our view is that we should pursue the direct passage through Portugal as well as the line of persuading Switzerland to receive some of the children. We also think that our efforts should extend to children in the whole of France, and not merely to Vichy France. The success of either method is of course dependent upon the willingness of the French and German authorities to grant exit permits, and the prospects of their doing so are not favourable. We have, however, to make plans on the assumption that there will be a favourable response and have therefore to ascertain what places of asylum are still available. I shall therefore be grateful if you will ascertain from the State Department:

a. Whether the previous offer still holds good. If so how many children does it cover and what are the exact terms of it?

b. If it applied only to children from Vichy France, can it be extended to cover children from the rest of France?

c. Assuming that in addition to getting children out through Portugal the Swiss Government would agree to giving temporary asylum also to some groups, and further assuming that before the end of the war it may be necessary and possible to remove them from Switzerland, would the offer be extended to cover such children and if so would the age limits apply to the date of removal from France or Switzerland respectively?

Since the matter is very urgent I shall be very grateful if you could request an early reply from the State Department.[<sup>7</sup>]

WINANT

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840.48 Refugees/4901 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1943.

8215. According to Easterman's letter quoted in your 8975, December 24 he proposes to inform the members and constituents of his organization and the Jewish public in Great Britain of the nature of the scheme for distributing relief to Jews in Europe through the International Red Cross Committee and how it was proposed to carry it into effect. We think that Easterman's attention should be called to the fact that Mr. Long's testimony as published did not disclose

the confidential details of the scheme and that Easterman and his associates must accept responsibility for such failure of the scheme and tragic results as may follow their public exposure of the confidential details thereof. We refer in this connection to our reply 8171 of December 27 to your 8975.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4876 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*<sup>72</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943—10 p. m.

2755. Reference is made to screening of refugees discussed in your 3692, December 15.<sup>73</sup> Department feels that screening, with exception of preliminary security screening, should be kept at a minimum. Since a primary purpose of Fedhala Center is inducement to Spain to receive further refugees, every effort should be made not to contravene Spanish wishes in screening process. Department understands that Spanish authorities may well object to process whereby sick and helpless refugees are left there. It is desirable that screening for health reasons should be limited so as to exclude only those persons having contagious diseases of such nature that their presence would endanger other refugees, and such persons as cannot be given proper medical treatment at Fedhala Center. With respect to persons excluded by such health screening, it may be well to make plans for care and treatment in Spain under the jurisdiction of IGC. Please advise Department this regard indicating probable number to be excluded.

HULL

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840.48 Refugees/4951c

*The Secretary of State to the Mexican Chargé (Colina)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Mexico and refers to the Embassy's Memorandum of June 21, 1943 concerning the proposal to permit Spanish-Republican refugees now in North Africa to enter Mexico.

The Secretary of State takes pleasure in informing the Embassy that lists of these refugees, totalling approximately sixteen hundred names, have been received from the American Consulate General at Algiers and have been transmitted to the American Embassy at Mexico, D.F. for submission to the Mexican-Spanish Commission. The name,

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<sup>72</sup> Repeated to Algiers as No. 260, and to London as No. 8241.

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

date and place of birth, occupation, and number in family is given for each refugee and each has indicated his willingness to work as an agriculturist. The Department understands that there will be approximately four hundred additional names for consideration by the Commission.

When additional information concerning this project is received by the Department the Embassy will be further informed.

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943.

ALLIED DECLARATIONS AND WARNINGS REGARDING  
NAZI ATROCITIES; <sup>1</sup> ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF  
WAR CRIMES

740.00116 European War 1939/754 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, January 22, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received 11 : 22 p. m.]

604. Embassy's despatch No. 6393, November 21<sup>2</sup> and previous. In bringing me up-to-date on the question of the investigation of war criminals, the Foreign Office tells me that considerable progress has been made in British discussions with the Russians and that they expect shortly that the Soviet will formally agree to accept membership on the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes. The Chinese, I am told, have already accepted though they may raise a "delicate point" by asking that the scope of the Commission's activities be made retroactive to cover the Manchurian incident of 1931.<sup>3</sup>

While it has not wished in the interim to have further conversations with us on this subject for fear of arousing additional Russian suspicions, the Foreign Office will, as soon as Russian agreement has been received, wish to talk over with us questions concerning the practical establishment and operation of the Commission, i.e., where it shall have its principal seat, who shall be the president, the scope of its activities, etc. Roberts<sup>4</sup> informally mentioned the desirability of having the principal Commission sit in London as nearer to the "scene of the crimes" than the United States, possibly under an American president. He emphasized, however, that the British have no fixed views on the subject. (He did tell me in confidence that the British representative has been selected, namely Sir Cecil Hurst, Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague.

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<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 45-71; see also section entitled "The Trial and Sentencing of German War Criminals and Russian Accomplices in the Soviet Union," *ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 845 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; it enclosed the note of November 18, 1942, from the First Secretary of the British Foreign Office, printed *ibid.*, 1942, vol. I, p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, 1931, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>4</sup> F. K. Roberts, First Secretary of the British Foreign Office.

The Department may wish to transmit to the Embassy for its information and guidance its views with regard to the Commission. I gather there is some impatience in London that the Commission has not already been set up.)

[MATTHEWS]

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740.00116 European War 1939/813 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 5, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received March 6—2 a. m.]

1608. My telegram No. 604, January 22, 11 p. m., and previous correspondence concerning investigation of war criminals. The Foreign Office tells me that it has sent a telegram to Ambassador Halifax<sup>5</sup> in the following sense:

1. All governments concerned have now agreed in principle to the proposals for a United Nations Commission and have agreed to participate in its work. (This includes both the Soviet and Chinese Governments.)

2. The British have appointed Sir Cecil Hurst as their representative on the Commission and would like to learn as soon as possible whom the United States Government proposes to nominate as its representative.

3. The British Government would like to have us agree to the chairmanship of the Commission being accepted by the United States representative. The British consider that the headquarters of the Commission could most conveniently be located in London.

4. If London is acceptable as headquarters the British would propose that panels of the Commission, if the Governments so desire, may be established in Washington, Moscow, or Chungking to enjoy "the greatest possible degree of autonomous action and prestige consistent with the central and coordinating functions and authority" of the headquarters of the Commission in London.

5. The British assume that membership of the Commission should be restricted to the four major United Nations, the Dominion Governments, if they so desire, and Allied Governments in London. "Arrangements will have to be made for French representation".

Lord Halifax is instructed to ascertain as soon as possible the views of the American Government on the above proposals.<sup>6</sup> Similar telegrams have been sent to the British Embassies at Chungking and Moscow to sound out the Chinese and Russian Governments respectively.

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<sup>5</sup> Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>6</sup> British note presented March 11, not printed.

In acquainting me with the foregoing the Foreign Office has emphasized the growing interest in the question both on the part of the exiled governments in London and on the part of the British public. The latter's interest finds expression in an increasing number of questions asked in Parliament. The Foreign Office believes that while the question of investigation of war criminals is hardly one directly connected with the prosecution of the war, those whose time and thought would be devoted to its study are probably precisely those who are not fully occupied with the war effort.

I should appreciate being informed of the nature of the Department's reply to Lord Halifax.

MATTHEWS

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740.00116 European War 1939/841

*Memorandum by Mr. Edwin F. Stanton of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1943.

Mr. Tsui<sup>7</sup> telephoned yesterday afternoon and stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received a communication from the British Embassy at Chungking in regard to the proposed establishment of a War Crimes Commission.

Mr. Tsui stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had telegraphed the Chinese Embassy here and asked the Embassy to ascertain (1) whether the United States Government is in favor of such a Commission, (2) whether we think membership on the Commission should be restricted (in this connection paragraph 5 of London's 1608, March 5, 9 p. m. states that the British assume that membership on the Commission should be restricted to the four major United Nations, the Dominion Governments, if they so desire, and Allied Governments in London and that arrangements will have to be made for French representation); and (3) the name of the American representative. Mr. Tsui also stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had indicated that the Chinese Government would welcome an American as Chairman of the Commission. Mr. Stanton told Mr. Tsui that he would look into the matter and give him an oral reply as soon as possible.

Mr. Stanton discussed the foregoing this morning with Mr. Hackworth,<sup>8</sup> who is handling this matter. Mr. Hackworth stated that as regards the first inquiry he felt it would be in order to inform Mr. Tsui that this Government was in favor of the establishment of

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<sup>7</sup> Tswen-ling Tsui, First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy.

<sup>8</sup> Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser.

this Commission. As regards the other points, Mr. Hackworth suggested that Mr. Tsui be orally informed that these matters were being given careful consideration but that no definite decisions have yet been made. Mr. Tsui has been orally informed in the above sense.

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740.00116 E.W.1939/921

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

The following announcement was issued from No. 10 Downing Street on the evening of April 21st:

“Reports have been received from several sources that Hitler is making preparations for using poison gas against Russian front. Accordingly His Majesty’s Government take early occasion to renew warning which the Prime Minister<sup>9</sup> gave last year viz. that any use of poison gas against their Russian Ally by Nazi or other satellites will immediately be followed by fullest possible use of this process of war upon German munition centres, seaports and other military objectives throughout the whole extent of Germany. British resources and scale of delivery have greatly increased since last year.

“The necessary precautionary measures against German reprisals have already been enjoined by competent authorities throughout the United Kingdom.”

His Majesty’s Government have had to make this announcement urgently in response to a Russian request. They suggest that the United States Government may wish to make some similar announcement in respect of their air forces in the United Kingdom.

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1943.

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740.00116 European War 1939/921

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1943.

Admiral Leahy<sup>10</sup> telephoned me this morning and said that he had taken up with the President the note we had from the British Embassy informing us of Prime Minister Churchill’s statement on the possible use of poison gas by the Germans. Admiral Leahy said that the President felt that in view of the Prime Minister’s statement it would serve no useful purpose for the President to take any action along these lines at present.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

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<sup>9</sup> Winston S. Churchill.

<sup>10</sup> Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.



740.00116 E.W.1939/921

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the  
Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1943.

MR. ATHERTON: The Secretary this afternoon said that the President had asked him to have drafted a form of announcement the President might make with respect to the use of poison gas by any of our enemies. He preferred not to take any action with respect to the reported threat of the use of poison gas by the Germans against the Russians such as the announcement in that respect made by Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain on April 21 last, but he would prefer to have any declaration or announcement he would make apply to any enemy situation where poison gas might be employed.

I don't know just whom you might choose to start the draft on such a pronouncement.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

740.00116 European War 1939/925

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with your request I enclose a draft statement which you may wish to make with respect to the use of poison gas by any of our enemies.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

*Statement by the President on Gas Warfare*<sup>11</sup>

From time to time since the present war began there have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare.

I have been loath to believe that any nation, even our present enemies, could or would be willing to loose upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons. However, evidence that the Axis powers are making significant preparations indicative of such an intention is being reported with increasing frequency from a variety of sources.

Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope that

<sup>11</sup> Issued to the press by the President on June 8.

we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.

As President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the American Armed Forces, I want to make clear beyond all doubt to any of our enemies contemplating a resort to such desperate and barbarous methods that acts of this nature committed against any one of the United Nations will be regarded as having been committed against the United States itself and will be treated accordingly. We promise to any perpetrators of such crimes full and swift retaliation in kind, and I feel obliged now to warn the Axis armies and the Axis peoples, in Europe and in Asia, that the terrible consequences of any use of these inhumane methods on their part will be brought down swiftly and surely upon their own heads. Any use of gas by any Axis power, therefore, will immediately be followed by the fullest possible retaliation upon munition centers, seaports and other military objectives throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis country.

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740.00116 European War 1939/813 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1943—9 p. m.

3936. Your 1608, March 5, 9 p. m., regarding establishment of the United Nations Commission for the investigation of War Crimes.

The Honorable Herbert Claiborne Pell, formerly a member of Congress from the State of New York and more recently American Minister to Lisbon and Budapest, respectively, has been appointed as this Government's representative on the Commission. He will proceed to London within the next 10 days or 2 weeks. The British Embassy is being informed.

This Government appreciates the statement that the British Government would be agreeable to having the American member accept the Chairmanship of the Commission but it feels that this might give rise to some dissension or misunderstanding on the part of other Governments. For its part this Government is of the view that since the Commission is to meet at London, and since Sir Cecil Hurst is a member of the Permanent Court of International Justice, it would be fitting for him to serve as Chairman of the Commission.

You may inform the Foreign Office in the sense of the foregoing.

HULL

740.00116 European War 1939/991 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 13, 1943—midnight.

[Received July 13—9 p. m.]

4567. In reply to our communication conveying the substance of Department's 3936 of June 28, 9 p. m., to the Foreign Office, we have just received the following from the Foreign Office:

"I write to thank you for your letter of the 29th June about the appointment of the Honorable Herbert C. Pell to be the representative of the United States Government on the proposed United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes.

As this appointment has been made public we have decided to make a similar announcement of the appointment of Sir Cecil Hurst as the British representative. His Majesty's Embassy at Washington were instructed to inform the United States Government in advance of our intention to do this.

I note that the United States Government would prefer that Sir Cecil Hurst rather than Mr. Pell should become the Chairman of the Commission. We appreciate the United States Government's feelings on this point and would be very willing that Sir Cecil Hurst should serve as Chairman if this were acceptable to the other Governments concerned; but a final decision in the matter cannot I think be taken until the Commission has been established. In this connection we feel that it would be unwise to assume that the Commission will be set up in the immediate future. While we are as anxious as the United States Government to press on with its establishment, we still await the final replies of the Chinese and Soviet Governments to the proposals made to them last March and even when these are received it will be necessary to consult the other Allied Governments concerned and see to matters such as the Secretariat of the Commission and related questions. We are therefore suggesting to the United States Government through His Majesty's Embassy at Washington that Mr. Pell should not leave for London until the position is clearer."<sup>12</sup>

WINANT

740.00116 European War 1939/1036 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 7, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received August 7—2: 07 p. m.]

5177. Department's 4719, August 5, 5 p. m.<sup>13</sup> Foreign Office states that in about a week a note will be sent by it to the United Nations,

<sup>12</sup> By Department's telegram No. 4350, July 17, the Ambassador was informed that Mr. Pell's departure was being postponed.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed; it inquired as to the status of negotiations and probable date on which Mr. Pell's presence in London would be required (740.00116 E.W.1939/-991).

suggesting a meeting of United Nations representatives to prepare details for the setting up of the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes. Foreign Office believes, and this seems reasonable to us, that a month or 6 weeks will elapse before this meeting will take place. Until this meeting takes place it is difficult for us to say anything helpful regarding the probable date when the proposed Commission will begin functioning.

We shall, of course, immediately inform the Department of the substance of the note mentioned above.

WINANT

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740.00116 E.W.1939/1052

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*

No. 369

LONDON, August 10, 1943.

[Received August 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to forward the attached copies of a confidential *Aide-Mémoire* handed me by the Polish Foreign Minister Romer, containing a very recent report upon the ruthless measures of extermination presently being applied by the Germans against the Poles.

In handing me this *Aide-Mémoire*, Minister Romer drew my attention to certain suggestions as to measures to prevent further murders, namely (a) widespread radio broadcasting to Germany and the occupied countries of the character and extent and purpose of the mass murders committed against the Polish people; (b) the issue of an official statement by our Government—and if possible jointly with the British Government—embodying certain arguments and the essence of the proposed broadcast action; (c) an examination of measures for immediate reprisals.

Minister Romer furthermore said that notwithstanding certain objections on the part of the British Government to the Polish Government's suggestion, when the Polish Government had discussed the problem of reprisals in connection with the extermination of the Jewish population, the Polish Government felt that the present grave situation in Poland, and the danger of its becoming worse, might oblige the Polish Government to suggest to our and the British Government the need for renewed consideration by the three Governments of the principle of reprisals as such, and in event this were positively settled, of their character and scope.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

[Enclosure]

*The Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy  
Near the Polish Government in Exile*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. The Polish Government along with the Governments of other Allied countries received with great satisfaction the announcement that neutral countries had been warned against granting asylum to war criminals. Information received from Poland, and referred to in Paragraph 2 below, impels the Polish Government to draw the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that, apart from the punishment of war criminals for the crimes they have committed, it has become more imperative than ever to restrain the Germans from committing further the mass murder of the Polish population in Poland. This becomes all the more urgent since it may be anticipated that the policy of exterminating the population of entire provinces, as is practiced in Poland, may also be applied by the Germans in the present final stage of the war to the people in other German-occupied territories, like the Czechs, Yugoslavs, French and those in the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R.

2. According to the news received from Poland, after exterminating the majority of the Jewish population there, the Germans have since the autumn 1942 begun to deport hundreds of thousands of Poles whose homes lie along a 100 kilometer broad belt to the West of a line reaching from Bialystok along the rivers Bug and Zbrucz.

A large proportion of those intended for deportation were murdered. In addition thousands of Polish children were separated from their parents and sent to Germany to be brought up as Germans. A considerable number of the Polish minorities living in East-Prussia farther to the North of the Bialystok area, was deported to the Reich proper.

The inhabitants of the province of Lublin to the West of the belt which had been cleared of its population were not deported; the Germans began to murder them in July 1943. Men from 14 to 50 are taken to Germany. Women, children and old people are sent to camps to be killed in gas chambers which previously served to exterminate the Jewish population of Poland.

On July 26th the Polish Government learned from the Homeland that the Germans are adopting the same methods in the provinces of Radom and Cracow. The population of the provinces of Lublin, Radom and Cracow total more than 7 million. Details regarding the above information are given in an Appendix.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

3. It may be presumed that the Germans are reckoning on the possibility of a defeat, and have consequently decided to exterminate the largest possible proportion of the Polish population with a view to assuring to the German race, after the war, a numerical superiority over its neighbors in the aggregate. If no preventive measures are taken, these mass murders in the provinces of Lublin, Radom and Cracow may be extended to the inhabitants of the remaining Polish provinces, as well as to war prisoners and Polish forced labourers in Germany, in other words to the whole Polish nation.

There is no reason to believe that this mass extermination will not also be applied to other occupied countries in Europe. As a matter of fact Sauckel, the Reich's plenipotentiary for labour, declared at a public meeting in Cracow on the 19th June 1943: "If the Germans lose the war, we shall see that nothing remains either *here* or *elsewhere* in Europe."

4. Faced with the possible extermination of further millions of Poles, the Polish government feel compelled to appeal to the Government of the United States of America to do all in their power to prevent further murders. In the view of the Polish Government, the application of the following measures might be effective and as such are worthy of consideration:

/a/ A widespread broadcasting, over the radio and otherwise, to Germany and also to occupied countries of the character, extent and purpose of the mass-murders committed against the Polish people. This should be amplified by repeated categorical warnings to the German criminals, their families in Germany, and to the whole German people wherever they may be, that all those guilty of such deeds will be held responsible for them. It may be expected that if such warnings are given drastically and repeatedly today when Germany listens to the overseas wireless more than at any other time, it will not only in a certain measure have the desired effect, but will also be instrumental in splitting German public opinion by supplying facts and providing arguments for the opposition, thus deepening the defeatist attitude already noticeable in Germany.

/b/ The issue of an official statement by the Government of the United States of America, (if possible jointly with the British Government) embodying the arguments and the essence of the proposed broadcast action. The statement itself should also be the subject of broadcasts and should be dropped in the form of printed leaflets over Germany including, if possible, Eastern Germany.

/c/ The campaign of broadcasting warnings might also be extended to broadcasts to the satellites of the Reich, for under certain conditions those nations may also become the victims of German murders; such a measure may also have important consequences by contributing to the distrust of these satellites of Germany and influencing their political relations with the Reich.

/d/ An examination of measures for immediate reprisals.

When the Polish Government discussed the problem of reprisals with the British Government in connection with the extermination of the Jewish population, they met with certain objections on the part of that Government. However, the present grave situation in Poland and the danger of its worsening still further, may oblige the Polish Government to suggest to the United States and British Governments the need for a renewed consideration by the three Governments of the principle of reprisals as such, and should this be positively settled, of their choice, character and scope.

LONDON, August 5, 1943.

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740.00116 European War 1939/1136

*The Netherlands Ambassador (London) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the course of Her latest visit to Hyde Park the Queen discussed with you the opportunity of issuing a declaration with a view to preventing as much as possible destruction by the Germans upon their leaving the occupied countries. The Queen discussed this idea also with the British Prime Minister and the British Foreign Secretary,<sup>15</sup> who were in favour of it and asked for a draft declaration. Such a draft has now been prepared and approved by Her Majesty.

Acting upon instructions I have just received, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the draft which has also been handed to the British Foreign Office.

Dr. van Kleffens<sup>16</sup> instructs me moreover to submit to you the request that this draft be discussed with the British Prime Minister, if this would be agreeable to you.

I beg to add that the Queen would have no objection against a shorter and more strongly worded text.

Dr. van Kleffens would highly appreciate if further consultations could take place for the final drafting of this declaration and its subsequent handling, especially with regard to the opportune moment of its publication. In this connection Mr. van Kleffens ventures the suggestion whether it would be desirable to ask the Soviet Union to participate.

With my highest esteem [etc.]

A. LOUDON

<sup>15</sup> Winston S. Churchill and Anthony Eden, respectively.

<sup>16</sup> Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Government in Exile at London.

[Enclosure]

*Draft Declaration Warning the Germans Against Injuring Property or Population Prior to Their Withdrawal From Occupied Countries*

In the regions of Europe which Germany has occupied, the German authorities and their subordinates have shown a measure of harshness and cruelty which not only violates clear and binding rules of international law but runs counter to the most elementary feelings of common decency. Confinement in concentration camps of evil and sinister repute, seizure of hostages (a practice expressly forbidden in a solemn treaty of 1907, to which Germany has expressly adhered) and large scale deportation of men and even of women, are common German practice and these are far from being the worst offences committed in the name of Germany. In many cases, especially in Eastern Europe and with regard to the Jews, German action assumed proportions of bestiality. Wholesale slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent people will be forever a blot on the German name. In the economic field the Germans have taken measures indicating that far from their showing any regard for the occupied countries and their population, they are bent upon crippling the resources of those territories. The German nation as a whole may not as yet have a full knowledge of all the savagery and brutality committed in its name. But that nation cannot be presumed to be ignorant of what has been and still is being done. Remembering further what the German authorities did towards the end of the last war in territory then under their occupation, the Governments of . . . . . issue the following warning to the German Government, civil and military authorities and people:

When the hour of liberation strikes for the occupied regions, those Germans who are stationed there may receive orders, or feel inclined to do their utmost not to leave the territory they hold before having wrought havoc, not only by an attempt to destroy objects of value to the well-being of the country concerned but also by murdering or deporting a still larger part of the population. All Germans should bear in mind that those guilty of such acts will be held responsible for their misdeeds, not only the leaders and authorities who plan crimes of this kind or give orders to commit them, but also the actual perpetrators. Moreover, from now on any further action against the population of the occupied regions including that part of the population that has been deported to Germany—in complete disregard of international law—either as prisoners or as hostages, as workers in war-industries or otherwise, any act of destruction calculated to obstruct the resumption of the economic or social life of the occupied countries to impoverish them or to impede their recovery, exposes Germany and the Germans to retaliation of the severest kind.



740.00116 European War 1939/1137

*The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State*

No. 551

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has the honour to inform Mr. Hull that His Majesty's Government have been approached by the Netherlands Government with a proposal for a Joint Declaration warning the Axis nations that depredations by their Forces and Authorities in Occupied countries at the time of the withdrawal would entail punishment, not only of the originators and perpetrators of such depredations, but also of the Axis nations as a whole.

Sir Ronald Campbell is informed that His Majesty's Government replied to this approach, stating that they were interested in such a proposal being carried out at the proper time and that His Majesty's Government would be glad to consider the draft of any warning which the Netherlands Government cared to prepare.

The Netherlands Ambassador in London has now communicated to the Foreign Office a draft declaration, addressed specifically to the Germans. In presenting this draft the Netherlands Ambassador stated that the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington was presenting a similar draft for the consideration of the United States Government.

Sir Ronald Campbell is informed that His Majesty's Government see certain objections to the draft declaration in the form put forward by the Netherlands Government. It is felt that the present draft does not make sufficiently clear the immediate object of the warning and contains undesirable reference to "retaliation of the severest kind" against Germany and the Germans. His Majesty's Government are working on a re-draft.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive the comments of the United States Government upon the proposal put forward by the Netherlands Government.

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943.

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740.00116 European War 1939/1052 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London*

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943—1 p. m.

Polish Series No. 26. With reference to your despatch no. 369, August 10, it has been agreed with the British to issue on August 30

an identic declaration on German crimes in Poland, the British text of which may be obtained from Ambassador Winant. Ours will be identic with appropriate changes for the United States Government.

If the British concur, it is planned to inform the Soviet Government of the text of the declaration on August 28. If this procedure is agreed upon and the British concur, you may give the text of the declaration to the Polish Government on that date.

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1098a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943—1 p. m.

5191. With regard to the "Identic Draft Declaration on German Crimes in Poland" agreed on in Quebec<sup>17</sup> to be issued on August 30 by the British and American Governments, we believe it would be advisable to give the Soviet Government for its information an advance copy of the text. We propose, if the British are agreeable, to give the text to the Soviet Chargé here on August 28. Please telegraph urgently if the British concur.

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1065 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, August 27, 1943—noon.  
[Received August 27—7:10 a. m.]

5640. Department's 5191, August 26, 1 p. m. Foreign Office states text was telegraphed to Soviet Government in Moscow 2 days ago and there would be no objection to Department handing to Soviet Chargé text on August 28. Foreign Office added that they had instructed their Ambassador to suggest to the Soviet Government that that Government might issue a similar declaration if they saw fit. Our informant added that he was not sure that the Soviet Government would see fit to take such action however.

WINANT

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<sup>17</sup>The records of the First Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943, are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

740.00116 European War 1939/1107a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1943—10 p. m.

758. I handed the Soviet Chargé today a copy of the following text of the "Declaration on German Crimes in Poland" which is to be released simultaneously by the British and ourselves on August 30:

"Trustworthy information has reached the United States Government regarding the crimes committed by the German invaders against the population of Poland. Since the autumn of 1942 a belt of territory extending from the province of Bialystok southwards along the line of the River Bug has been systematically emptied of its inhabitants. In July 1943 these measures were extended to practically the whole of the province of Lublin, where hundreds of thousands of persons have been deported from their homes or exterminated.

These measures are being carried out with the utmost brutality. Many of the victims are killed on the spot. The rest are segregated. Men from 14 to 50 are taken away to work for Germany. Some children are killed on the spot, others are separated from their parents and either sent to Germany to be brought up as Germans or sold to German settlers or despatched with the women and old men to concentration camps, where they are now being systematically put to death in gas chambers.

The United States Government reaffirms its resolve to punish the instigators and actual perpetrators of these crimes. It further declares that, so long as such atrocities continue to be committed by the representatives and in the name of Germany, they must be taken into account against the time of the final settlement with Germany. Meanwhile the war against Germany will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor until the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny has been finally overthrown."

The Embassy in London has informed us that the British Foreign Office conveyed this text to the Soviet Government 3 days ago with the suggestion that the Soviet Government might issue a similar declaration if it saw fit. The foregoing is transmitted for your information, but if you consider it desirable you may transmit a copy of the above text to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1104a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1943—5 p. m.

767. Department's 758, August 27, 10 p. m. At the suggestion of the British Government which says there is insufficient evidence to justify the statement regarding execution in gas chambers, it has been

agreed to eliminate the last phrase in paragraph 2 of the "Declaration on German Crimes in Poland" beginning "where" and ending "chambers" thus making the second paragraph end with "concentration camps". Please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the change in text.<sup>18</sup>

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1079 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 1, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received September 6—4 p. m.]

A-967. Embassy's 5177, August 7, 5 p. m. The following note, dated August 30, 1943, has just been received from the Foreign Office:

"I have the honour to refer to Mr. Roberts' letter of the 18th November 1942,<sup>19</sup> enclosing a copy of a note addressed to the Soviet Ambassador, Chinese Chargé d'Affaires and Representatives of the Allied Governments in London on the subject of the proposed United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes.

2. The replies now received from all the Governments concerned, including Your Excellency's Government, indicate that a sufficient basis of agreement exists to enable further progress to be made. I am impressed by the urgency of setting up the Commission without further delay and to this end would propose that a meeting of the Diplomatic Representatives in London of the Allied Governments concerned should be held towards the end of September in order to take the necessary steps to set up the Commission and to settle its constitution and functions. As a basis for discussion at the meeting I have the honour to enclose a memorandum setting out the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom upon the various points which have been raised in previous correspondence by the Allied Governments concerned.

3. I have the honour to express the hope that you will be able to attend such a meeting on behalf of your Government.

4. I would also enquire whether your Government wish to suggest the name of a legal expert to participate in the work of the proposed small technical committee, referred to in paragraph 9 of the attached memorandum. An early reply on this last point will be appreciated."

The memorandum enclosed with the Foreign Office note quoted above reads as follows:

"1. *Headquarters of the Commission*

There appears to be general agreement that the Headquarters of the Commission might most suitably be established in London.

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<sup>18</sup> For text released on August 30, 1943, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 4, 1943, p. 150.

<sup>19</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 63.

## 2. *Panels*

Machinery will, of course, be required for the collecting and recording of evidence in places where the main body of the Commission could not conveniently operate. The Chinese Government, for instance, are understood to favour the establishment of a 'panel' in Chungking. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, do not consider that the circumstances call for the establishment of a 'panel' in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States Government would prefer to leave this sort of question over for consideration by the Commission itself after it has met. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would, therefore, propose that the Commission should be empowered to set up 'panels', or arrange otherwise in the light of the wishes of the Governments most closely concerned, for local investigations on its behalf so far as these seem appropriate.

## 3. *Membership*

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have appointed Sir Cecil Hurst to be the United Kingdom member of the Commission. The United States Government have similarly appointed Mr. Herbert C. Pell and the Chinese Government Mr. Wellington Koo.<sup>20</sup>

## 4. *Chairmanship*

The United States Government have expressed the view that it would be appropriate that the British representative should be the Chairman of the Commission. The Soviet Government have proposed that the chairmanship might suitably be held in rotation by the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of America, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would propose that it should be left to the Commission to settle this question at its first meeting.

## 5. *Procedure*

In general, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would propose that it should be left to the Commission to settle its own procedure.

## 6. *Secretariat*

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared to find a British Secretary General for the Commission if this was considered appropriate by the other Governments concerned. They would propose that the secretarial staff should be of mixed nationality and would be glad if any of the other Governments who may wish to do so would furnish them with the names of officials and typing and secretarial staff who could be made available for this purpose.

## 7. *Expenses*

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would propose that each member of the Commission and his staff, if any, should be paid by the Government appointing him. The salary of the Secretary General and additional secretarial and administrative expenses should

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<sup>20</sup> Chinese Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

be divided equally between the various Governments represented on the Commission.

#### 8. *Premises*

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared to find accommodation for the Commission.

#### 9. *Technical Committee*

The primary task of the Commission will be, as has already been publicly announced, to collect and record evidence, with a view to identifying those responsible for war crimes, and assembling the proof of their guilt. This is a most essential task, and upon its adequate discharge depends the possibility of punishing war criminals who are brought to trial. There are, however, certain other matters of a technical kind which require consideration and which would be most appropriately considered by a committee of experts to be appointed by the Governments concerned, who would work concurrently with the Commission and in adequate contact with it. For example, the Governments concerned will require to be advised as to the sort of tribunals to be employed, and as to the procedure to be adopted and the rules of evidence to be followed. His Majesty's Government share the view held by a number of the other Governments that this work would be most properly entrusted to a separate committee of the kind described. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would propose that such an expert committee would be formed at the earliest possible moment, and if necessary in advance of the establishment of the Commission, and that it should consist of legal experts, the nomination to be made by those of the various Allied Governments participating in the work of the Commission who desire to be represented on the Committee."

Copies of Mr. Roberts' letter and of its enclosure, referred to in the first paragraph of the Foreign Office note of August 30, were transmitted to the Department with Embassy's despatch No. 6393 of November 21, 1942.<sup>21</sup>

The Department's attention is called particularly to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Foreign Office note quoted above.

WINANT

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740.00116 European War 1939/1136

*The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Cumming)*  
*to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON], September 17, 1943.

MR. DUNN: At your suggestion, I called Mr. Gore-Booth, Second Secretary of the British Embassy, regarding the proposal made by Queen Wilhelmina for a joint declaration by the United States and United Kingdom warning the Germans as to the results of atrocities against persons and property in the Netherlands.

<sup>21</sup> Despatch No. 6393 not printed.

I told Mr. Gore-Booth that we had been more or less waiting to receive the redraft which the British Embassy had informed us in its note of August 26 was being prepared by the Foreign Office. He said that he understood that his Government was a little cool to the idea of issuing a declaration applicable only to the Netherlands but that he would telegraph the Foreign Office today to ascertain its present views on the subject and would at the same time ask that any draft of a declaration which might have been prepared in the Foreign Office be sent on to Washington for presentation to the State Department.

I think the matter may now rest until we hear further from the British.<sup>22</sup>

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740.00116 European War (1939)/1079 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1943—5 p. m.

A-1291. Your airgram A-967, September 1, 5 p. m., regarding War Crimes Commission.

1. The Department authorizes you to attend the meeting of the diplomatic representatives.

2. The Department sees no objection to the British proposal that the Commission be empowered to set up panels or arrange otherwise in the light of the wishes of the Governments most closely concerned for local investigations on its behalf when appropriate.

3. Likewise, the Department has no objection to the proposal by the Soviet Government that the Chairmanship of the Commission might be held in rotation by the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, nor does it object to the suggestion of the British Government that this matter might be left to the Commission. The Department would, however, desire to be consulted before the conferring of the Chairmanship upon the American representative.

4. The Department sees no objection to leaving to the Commission settlement of its rules of procedure.

5. The selection of a British Secretary General would be agreeable to the Department. The Department is not now prepared to suggest names for the Secretarial staff. Mr. Pell will take with him an assistant and a secretary, but they would not be members of the Secretarial staff.

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<sup>22</sup> On October 11, Mr. Gore-Booth informed Mr. Cumming that the Foreign Office hoped to telegraph the redraft shortly. No further communication on this was received, however, in 1943.

6. The British proposal regarding expenses is satisfactory, but we should like to know as soon as possible the estimated amount of our quota.

7. The Department agrees that a technical committee for the purposes indicated in the British memorandum may be desirable, but it does not see why the setting up of this committee should precede the establishment of the investigating commission. The Department is considering whether this Government should have a representative on the committee and will communicate with you further on this subject.

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1130 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 21, 1943.

[Received October 21—9: 15 a. m.]

7238. Department's A-1291, September 25, regarding War Crimes Commission. The meeting of the representatives of the Allied Governments concerned to take steps to set up the proposed United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes was held yesterday afternoon in the Foreign Office presided over by Viscount Simon.<sup>23</sup> It was agreed to establish the Commission forthwith in London and a communiqué to this effect was issued at the close of the meeting, along with the names of the countries represented at the meeting. The countries represented were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, India, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia and the French Committee of National Liberation.

It will be noted that the USSR was not represented. This was explained by Lord Simon as due to two or three technical points which had not yet been cleared up but which it was hoped would be settled shortly. The meeting passed a resolution for transmission to the Soviet Government expressing the hope that it would shortly be able to take part in the proceedings of the Commission.

The Department's instructions as given in the airgram mentioned above have been complied with. The question of the chairmanship of the Commission was left to be decided by the Commission. I made clear the position of the United States Government both in regard to the Soviet proposal that the chairmanship be held in rotation, as well

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<sup>23</sup> British Lord Chancellor.



as the alternate proposals approved by the Department. A British Secretary General was agreed to and it was indicated that the choice for this position would probably be Mr. McKinnon Wood, formerly of the legal section of the League of Nations. Premises for the Commission are to be provided in the Law Courts Buildings.

The question of setting up a technical committee of experts occasioned considerable discussion with a predominance of opinion that a technical committee was essential. It was the unanimous opinion that this committee would be set up on a parallel basis rather than as a subcommittee of the investigating commission, with an advisory relationship to the Commission as well as to the Governments concerned. The Governments present agreed however to the American position that the setting up of such a committee would be postponed until after the establishment of the investigating commission.

The Norwegian representative suggested that the original secretariat be limited to English personnel. I objected to this and was supported by the meeting.

The British delegate to the Commission, Sir Cecil Hurst, suggested that an unofficial meeting be held of those members of the Commission now in London and this was agreed to. It will take place sometime within the next 10 days or 2 weeks.

WINANT

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740.00116 European War 1939/1131 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 21, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received October 21—9:30 a. m.]

7239. Reference Embassy's 7238, October 20 [21]. The Embassy was informed confidentially before the meeting by the Foreign Office that the real reason for the abstention of the Soviet Government from the meeting to set up the War Crimes Commission was a dispute which had arisen over the question of representation. The Soviet Government contends that each of the individual Soviet Socialist Republics should be represented upon the Commission in the same manner as the British Dominions as it is claimed by the Soviet that each of these republics possesses individual sovereignty. The dispute has not as yet been settled.

The Foreign Office hopes that emphasis will not be made of the absence of Soviet representatives from the meeting and if the press asks questions an answer will be given similar to that given by Lord Simon at the meeting, namely, that technical questions have arisen which prevent for the time being the presence of the Soviet repre-

sentatives but that it is hoped the matter will be cleared up within a short time. The Foreign Office has expressed the hope that the matter could be treated the same way in the American press. Mr. Eden, in Moscow has been notified and it is presumed he has informed Secretary Hull.<sup>24</sup>

WINANT

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740.00116 European War 1939/1133 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 26, 1943.

[Received October 26—8:49 p. m.]

7373. The informal meeting of the members of the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes mentioned in the last paragraph of Embassy's 7238, October 21, met this afternoon at the Law Courts and was presided over by Sir Cecil Hurst. At my request Allison<sup>25</sup> sat in as an observer. While there was considerable discussion about the exact purpose and functions of the Commission and just what the scope of its activities should be, there was no attempt made to reach a final decision in view of the unofficial character of the meeting. It was stressed by Sir Cecil Hurst that until it had been decided whether or not the Soviet Government was to be represented and until the United States representative arrived<sup>26</sup> it would be impossible to hold official meetings. However, it was the consensus of those present that much useful preliminary work could be accomplished in an informal manner and it was decided that another meeting should be held in the near future, the exact date to be determined by Sir Cecil later. A small sub-committee was appointed to draw up a paper outlining the broad lines on which the Commission should get to work and this paper will be considered at the next informal meeting. It was also agreed generally that each of the Governments represented should be requested to inform the Commission of what it may already be doing or have done in the matter of collecting information with regard to war crimes. It was stated that in the United Kingdom this work was being carried on by the Department of the Treasury Solicitor. A record of this meeting is being prepared and upon its receipt a copy will be forwarded to the Department.<sup>27</sup>

WINANT

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<sup>24</sup> Mr. Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Hull were attending the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, October 18–November 1; see pp. 513 ff.

<sup>25</sup> John M. Allison, Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

<sup>26</sup> Mr. Pell arrived in London on November 25, 1943.

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

740.00116 EW 1939/4-1144

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower*<sup>28</sup>

28 October, 1943.

Individuals suspected of having committed war crimes should not be tried before military tribunals. Until a determination has been made by the United Nations as to their ultimate disposal, they will be retained in custody by the Allied command.

While held in custody, all available evidence and information concerning suspects, and concerning the war crimes which they are alleged to have committed, will be obtained. This will be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for transmission to the Allied government having the greatest interest for forwarding by that government to the United Nations War Crimes Commission.

Military courts appointed by you may try, however, in normal manner, persons who commit offenses against your command during the period of occupation.

The United Nations Commission is being established as a result of decision made in London by the Allied governments on 20 October. It is contemplated that all evidence furnished the Commission by the governments of the United Nations respecting war crimes committed by the enemy against United Nations nationals will be recorded and reviewed by it; that, where it appears that sufficient evidence will be available, the Commission will report such cases to the governments concerned; and that it will, in addition, study the means by which a common policy can be determined for such matters as the applicable laws, the procedure to be followed with respect to the surrender and detention of criminals, the type of tribunals to be used for war crimes trials, etc.

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740.00116 European War 1939/1147a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland*  
(Harrison)

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1943—7 p. m.

2681. According to the Italian High Command a division of Italian troops in Montenegro has been called upon by the Germans to surrender on threat of treatment as Francs-Tireurs unless complied with. Allied military authorities in Italy are of the opinion that prompt action should be taken to forestall, if possible, any such German action.

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<sup>28</sup> Copy received from the War Department in a letter dated April 11, 1944.

It has been decided by the British and American Governments that for the time being our action should be limited to a warning to the German Government through the Representing Power. Consequently, you should concert with your British colleague and request the Swiss Government to transmit a warning to the German Government along the following lines:

The Government of the United States of America warns the German Government that it will hold personally responsible for his action any German authority who treats otherwise than in accordance with the laws of war members of the armed forces of any of the countries fighting at the side of the United States against Germany, including members of the Italian armed forces.

You should report telegraphically when this communication has been made to the German Government.<sup>29</sup>

STETTINIUS

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740.00116 European War 1939/1142: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 4, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received November 4—1: 15 p. m.]

7652. Reference Embassy's 7239, October 21, 1 p. m. This morning's *Daily Sketch* carried a brief item to the effect that the Soviet Government had appointed a representative to the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes and that this altered its previous decision not to be represented.

A high official of the Foreign Office has informed the Embassy that as far as he is aware the situation has not changed from that previously reported and that negotiations are still in progress with the Soviet Government on this question. He expressed the opinion that the author of the item in the *Daily Sketch* had misinterpreted the meaning of the Moscow declaration on punishment of German war criminals.<sup>30</sup> The Foreign Office will keep the Embassy informed of developments.

WINANT

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<sup>29</sup> The Minister in Switzerland reported in his telegram No. 7051, November 10, 1943, 5 p. m., that the note had been delivered to the Swiss on November 8 and that his British colleague had taken similar action (740.00116 European War 1939/1151). In telegram No. 7350, November 22, 6 p. m., he reported that the note had been delivered to the German Government on November 17 (740.00116 European War 1939/1163).

<sup>30</sup> For text of declaration, see p. 768.

740.00116 European War 1939/1159 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, November 18, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received November 18—9:35 a. m.]

2025. From Murphy.<sup>31</sup> In connection with trial of German prisoners of war accused of atrocities falling within purview of Moscow declaration, it may be interesting to note that a directive has been sent to Fifteenth Army Group in which latter is instructed not to try accused immediately but to hold them in custody and to collect evidence. Accused are to be segregated to prevent evasion and article 2 of Geneva Convention<sup>32</sup> will be observed.

Evidence of war crimes is to be recorded whether accused are prisoners of war or not and witnesses are to be protected in order to procure full testimony. Announcement is to be made that alleged murderers have been captured (this relates to an incident arising in the village of Caiazzo<sup>33</sup>). Prisoners are to be kept in custody awaiting full judicial proceedings which United Nations will eventually hold in the case of all persons accused of war crimes. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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740.00116 E.W. 1939/1169 : Telegram

*The American Representative on the Politico-Military Commission at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, November 23, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received November 24—7:01 a. m.]

12. From Murphy. AFHQ has now decided against any publicity in connection with capture, collection of evidence, or trials of war criminals (my 2025, November 18, 2 p. m.) because of fear that any such publicity would lead to reprisals against American officers in Axis hands, especially those held by Japanese.

Accordingly censorship stop order was imposed in regard capture of officers involved in village of Caiazzo incident. Psychological warfare representatives here feel, however, considerable propaganda value could be made of announcements of capture and identification of war criminals, together with statements they will be given full judicial

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<sup>31</sup> Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser, Staff of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre; also personal representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.

<sup>32</sup> International convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

<sup>33</sup> The massacre of Italian civilians by German officers.

trial after war and, if guilty, punished at that time. PWB<sup>34</sup> is making such recommendations to CinC.<sup>35</sup> While policy is under discussion, ban against any publicity regarding specific war criminals remains in effect. [Murphy.]

WILSON

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740.00116 European War 1939/1159 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative on the Politico-Military Commission at Algiers (Wilson)*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1943—8 p. m.

10. For Murphy in reference to your 2025, November 18, 2 p. m., and 12, November 23, 5 p. m. Department agrees most emphatically with AFHQ's decision against publicity in connection with capture, collection of evidence and trial of war criminals and believes that any temporary propaganda advantage that might be gained from such publicity would be completely over-balanced by the danger of reprisals against American prisoners of war in enemy hands. Relatives and friends in the United States of American prisoners of war in enemy hands are constantly pressing the Department to extend a maximum of relief and protection to American prisoners. The attitude displayed in this connection by many relatives and by organized groups of relatives suggests the possibility that were publicity with regard to trials of war criminals by the United States to result in retaliation by the enemy which could be presented to the American public by short-wave broadcasts as reprisals for action taken or threatened by the American Government the reaction might well be to the disadvantage of the United States.

The Department is further of the opinion that it is equally inadvisable to segregate as war criminals any prisoners of war since the reasons for such segregation cannot be kept secret either from the prisoners themselves, from the protecting Power, which experience has shown sooner or later finds out the reasons for everything we do, or from other persons who may learn of the segregation. Since a great number of persons are therefore certain to learn of the segregation and the reason therefor, it is inevitable that eventually information that such segregation is taking place and the reason therefor will become known to the enemy. In that event American prisoners of war in enemy hands will be likely to suffer the same dangers as from direct publicity.

It would seem therefore more advisable and less risky secretly to

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<sup>34</sup> Psychological Warfare Board.

<sup>35</sup> Commander in Chief.

compile evidence of war crimes and to delay until after the war segregation of the prisoners to be tried. In any event, the military authorities know at all times the whereabouts of prisoners in their hands.

Although in view of the urgency of the matter the Department has not had time formally to consult the War Department, informal consultation with officers of that Department indicates that they share this Department's point of view with regard to the inadvisability of any publicity whatsoever whether direct on the basis of a propaganda announcement or indirect as a result of a segregation operation.

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1182

*The Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Gore-Booth) to the  
Legal Adviser (Hackworth)*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1943.

DEAR MR. HACKWORTH: With reference to our conversation today, I have pleasure in sending you the substance of the telegram from London regarding the treatment of the Germans involved in the Caiazzo incident.

With reference to paragraph 3 of that telegram, you will recall that the main reasons for not trying the cases of atrocities immediately were: (1) that such a procedure would cut across attempts to agree on a common policy in regard to the type of courts to be employed for the trial of war criminals, the law to be applied, the procedure for custody and surrender of criminals, etc., and (2) that if we started trying such cases now there might be unfortunate reactions upon our own prisoners still in enemy hands.

I understand from Mr. Jones<sup>36</sup> that the Department's policy in this matter is not yet completely agreed, and I am accordingly awaiting further word from him before we report to the Foreign Office.<sup>37</sup>

Yours sincerely,

PAUL GORE-BOOTH

[Enclosure]

*Substance of Telegram From the British Foreign Office, Dated  
November 24th*

Please refer to General Eisenhower's telegram N.A.F. No. 522 to Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>38</sup> and J.S.M. telegrams Nos. 1322 and 1327 to

<sup>36</sup> J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of Southern European Affairs.

<sup>37</sup> Mr. Hackworth in a letter of December 3, 1943, merely expressed thanks for the communication of the telegram from London.

<sup>38</sup> Not found in Department files.

War Cabinet Offices. Outrage in question consisted of massacre of Italian civilians by a German officer. It does not therefore strictly speaking come within the competence of the United Nations Commission since the latter's investigations are restricted to war crimes committed by the enemy, against the United Nations' nationals. Italy although co-belligerent cannot yet be classed as a United Nation and there would be obvious difficulties about associating her with the work of the commission.

2. This case is however covered by Moscow declaration on war crimes, which specifically referred to crimes being committed by "the recoiling Hitlerite Huns" on *inter alia* Italian territory. The declaration laid down that "those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities, etc. would be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done to be judged and published [*punished*] according to the laws of those liberated countries and of free governments which will be erected there." Lists were to be compiled from all these countries including specifically Italy.

3. Under this procedure the Germans responsible for Caiazzo incident should eventually be tried in Italy by the Italians. Para. 3 of my telegram No. 7274 set out however the reasons why cases of atrocities should not be tried immediately and why suspected persons should continue for the present to be held by the Allied military command in accordance with general directive to General Eisenhower contained in Combined Chiefs of Staff telegram FAN 260.

4. Please discuss the matter with the State Department on the foregoing lines with a view to the issue of agreed instructions to General Eisenhower.

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740.00116 EW 1939/4-1144

*Circular Issued by Allied Force Headquarters at Algiers on  
November 27, 1943*<sup>39</sup>

1. The ultimate disposition of persons charged with the commission of war crimes is a matter for consideration by the governments of the Allied Nations.

2. Trials by military courts of persons suspected of war crimes will not be held unless directed by this headquarters. Such persons will be held in custody pending decision as to their disposal. While suspects are under detention all available information about them and about war crimes of which they are suspect will be collected and forwarded to this headquarters.

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<sup>39</sup> Copy received from the War Department in a letter dated April 11, 1944.



3. The following procedure will govern:

*a.* Secret reports, through command channels, will be made to this headquarters containing all possible information concerning the specific individual held under detention as a war criminal suspect and concerning the time, place, character and details of the alleged war crime. It is imperative that each report include not only the names and addresses of witnesses but also the gist of the evidence which each may reasonably be expected to give in any proceedings which may later be resorted to to perpetuate such testimony for trial purposes. In order that these investigations may be kept strictly within command channels, they will be made by persons subject to the direct orders of the Commanding Officer making the report.

*b.* Reports submitted to this headquarters shall pertain only to persons then being held in detention.

*c.* For the purpose of this directive, war crimes are acts committed by persons in violation of the laws and customs of war. Should any doubt exist as to whether reported acts constitute war crimes, the case will be reported as above directed for consideration by this headquarters.

*d.* When reports are received at this headquarters and further investigation is considered advisable, either unit commanders will be directed to make the supplementary investigation or the supplementary investigation will be carried on directly from this headquarters.

*e.* When any change in the place of detention of a person upon whom a report has been made is directed by any authority other than this headquarters, an immediate report of such change will be made to this headquarters, in order that any supplementary investigation may be expeditiously carried on.

4. Situations may come to the attention of Commanding Officers in which the alleged war criminal is not in detention or may even be performing duties not incompatible with the Allied cause. In order that orderly procedure with respect to such situations may be followed, Commanding Officers will report such cases to this headquarters with all available information.

5. Italians who commit crimes against Italian Nationals are not to be considered as war criminals and such persons will be handed over to Italian Government representatives for trial.

6. Persons who commit crimes against members of the Allied Command during the period of occupation of Italian territory may be charged and tried before military tribunals in accordance with established practice.

7. It is enjoined upon all persons of this command to refrain from giving any publicity whatever to war crimes or war criminals or to any act taken by the military forces with respect thereto.

The release of any information concerning war crimes or war criminals is specifically reserved to this headquarters. (AG 000.5-1 GAP-AGMO)

By command of General Eisenhower:  
 W. B. SMITH  
*Major General, G.S.C., Chief of Staff*

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858.9111 RR/43.12.02 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

STOCKHOLM, December 2, 1943.

[Received December 3—7:08 a. m.]

3908. Swedish politics. Our 3899.<sup>40</sup> Swedish Foreign Office announces today Foreign Minister Guenther yesterday made the following *démarche* German Minister Stockholm:

“Swedish Government learns with greatest concern of measures against students, teachers, Oslo University. It cannot refrain from making urgent request measures be stopped especially announced intention deport students. In interest continued Swedish-German relations, Government appeals German Government comply with deeply felt desire Swedish people.”

JOHNSON

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740.00116 European War 1939/1130 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
 (Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1943.

7644. The Department is interested in learning of the progress that is being made looking to the establishment of the proposed technical committee of experts to advise on tribunals, procedure, rules of evidence, etc., referred to in your 7238, October 21, and previous exchanges of communications.

The Department is considering whether this Government should name a member of the committee.

HULL

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<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

740.00116 European War 1939/1185 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 7, 1943.

[Received December 7—2 p. m.]

8504. Following from Pell re United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes.

An informal meeting of the members of the War Crimes Commission was held on December 2d at the Law Courts to consider a report of the subcommittee mentioned in Embassy's 7373, October 26. Mr. McKinnon Wood was appointed Secretary General and will proceed to organize a permanent secretariat. The Soviet Government was not represented apparently for reasons previously reported. Sir Cecil Hurst stated that it was the view of the Foreign Office that steps toward formal organization would have to be taken unless the situation is clarified in the near future. Sir Cecil acted as temporary chairman pending such organization. Referring to Department's 7644, December 3 to Embassy practically all members of the Commission believe that a separate technical committee would be undesirable. If it be subordinate to the Commission it would be superfluous. If it should be of equal authority it would hamper the work of the Commission. My opinion is that we should oppose the formation of such a committee and appoint no one to it. It is probable that most of the governments concerned would appoint the present members of the War Crimes Commission to the proposed technical committee. A record of this meeting is being prepared and upon its receipt a copy will be forwarded to the Department.<sup>41</sup> [Pell.]

BUCKNELL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1187 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 7, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

8526. The Embassy has received a communication from the Foreign Office suggesting that it might be useful for Mr. Pell to have a general talk with Sir Cecil Hurst, British representative on the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, and Mr. McKinnon Wood, the Commission's Secretary General, with regard to the Commission's work particularly in reference to the question of

<sup>41</sup> Not printed.

Soviet participation in the work of the Commission. The Foreign Office refers to the fact that no explanation with regard to the Soviet Government's claim to separate representation on the Commission for certain of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union has yet been given to the other Allied Governments represented on the Commission. The substance of the resolution passed at the preliminary meeting on October 20 inviting His Majesty's Government to inform the Soviet Government of the wish of the Allied Governments concerned that the Soviet Government should participate in the Commission's work has been conveyed to the Soviet Ambassador for the information of his Government but no response has yet been received from him.

The Foreign Office feels that in the circumstances the Commission will have to proceed with its work without Soviet participation but that if this is done it will be necessary to explain to the other Allies represented, the reasons for the absence of the Soviet representative, and the question of the Soviet claim will become one for all the Governments represented on the Commission to deal with and should, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, no longer be dealt with by His Majesty's Government alone.

The British Embassy in Washington is being instructed to discuss the matter with the Department on the foregoing lines and to express the hope that the Department will agree with the British proposed course of action.<sup>42</sup>

Meanwhile, the Foreign Office thinks it would be useful if arrangements could be made for an informal discussion of these matters with Mr. Pell, Sir Cecil Hurst and Mr. McKinnon Wood, and asks the Embassy to inquire of Mr. Pell whether he would be ready to attend such a meeting and if so whether he would be prepared to do so at an early date or if he would prefer to wait until he has received the instructions of the U.S. Government.

The Foreign Office proposes the following questions which might be discussed at such an informal meeting:

(1) The manner in which the question of the Soviet Government's views as to participation in the work of the Commission and their claims to separate representation for the constituent republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should be brought before the other Allies represented upon the Commission;

(2) The manner in which the latter's views upon this subject should be conveyed to the Soviet Government;

(3) The question of arrangements for keeping the Soviet Government currently informed of the work of the Commission;

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<sup>42</sup> British Embassy *aide-mémoire* of December 10, 1943, not printed.

(4) The question of inviting the various United Nations Governments not represented upon the Commission to submit to it information regarding war crimes against their own nationals.

Mr. Pell has informed me that he would appreciate the instructions of the Department with regard to this matter. The Foreign Office is being so informed. Mr. Pell further states that while he feels that it is highly desirable that a representative of the Soviet Government should sit on the Commission the urgency of the Commission's work makes it desirable for it to proceed officially as soon as possible.

The Department's instructions are urgently requested.

BUCKNELL

740.00116 European War 1939/1188 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 9, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received December 9—5:08 p. m.]

8582. From Pell. I strongly urge the presentation to the War Crimes Commission of the tentative draft provisions on the punishment of war criminals L document 60G.<sup>48</sup> Some plan for a court will undoubtedly be proposed and Mr. Hackworth's plan is probably the best although some amendments will undoubtedly be wanted. I believe quick answer is desirable as another plan may be proposed to the next meeting. [Pell.]

BUCKNELL

740.00116 European War 1939/1190a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1943—midnight.

1365. Your 3908, December 2. Please inform the Foreign Minister that this Government has read with much gratification the text of the *démarche* made to the German Minister at Stockholm on the occasion of this further instance of barbaric and inhuman action by Germany.

HULL

740.00116 European War 1939/1159 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1943—4 p. m.

3222. Department refers to press and radio reports that German authorities intend to try as war criminals American aviators held as

<sup>48</sup> Not found in Department files.

prisoners of war by Germany, allegedly upon a basis of a precedent established by the Soviet authorities. Request Swiss to report fully by telegraph regarding this matter. You may assure Swiss that this Government is not proceeding against German prisoners of war along lines similar to above reports but is strictly observing the provisions of the Geneva Convention by which the United States and Germany are respectively bound.

Repeated to London.<sup>44</sup>

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1188 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943—2 p. m.

8229. For Pell. The Department could not authorize you to present to the Commission the tentative draft provisions on the punishment of war criminals contained in L 60g referred to in your 8582, December 9, for the reason that the draft has not been passed upon by other than the Committee which prepared it. Moreover, considerable revision of the draft in the light of more recent developments and trends of thought may be necessitated. Furthermore, it is not clear to the Department whether the Commission will be expected to concern itself with the nature of the tribunal or tribunals and the procedure to be followed following the development of cases and evidence. See for example the statement by the Lord Chancellor on page 2 of the minutes of the meeting of October 20 enclosed with the Embassy's despatch 12374 of November 22.<sup>45</sup>

The Department has noted the statement in your 8504 of December 7, but so far as it is informed there has been no definite abandonment of the British suggestion that a technical committee, such as that referred to in the Department's telegram of December 3, should be created to consider these subjects. This is a matter on which the interested governments will have to reach a decision.

If it should be decided that the Commission for Investigation of War Crimes should make recommendations on these additional sub-

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<sup>44</sup> As Department's No. 8142.

<sup>45</sup> Despatch No. 12374 and the minutes of the October 20 meeting not printed. Reference is to the Lord Chancellor's statement that he felt that it might be difficult at the meeting to secure agreement with the Netherlands Government's proposal that the proposed Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes should also be charged with making preparations for the bringing to trial of war criminals. He proposed that the meeting should take a decision to set up the Commission forthwith but that the question of the scope of its investigations and functions should be reserved for future consideration. (740.00116 European War 1939/1175)

jects, the Department will then decide whether the draft to which you have referred, or some modification of it, might be used by you. This does not mean that, subject to what has just been said, you may not draw upon the outlines of the draft in any discussions of the subject with your colleagues.

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1187 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943—3 p. m.

8230. The Department has received a communication from the Embassy here <sup>46</sup> on the subject presented to you by the Foreign Office as related in your 8526 of December 7.

The Department would have no objection to allowing Mr. Pell to participate in discussions with the Foreign Office, Sir Cecil Hurst, and McKinnon Wood, but in view of the important political aspects of the question it has grave misgivings regarding the desirability of having it aired in the Commission for Investigation. It feels that the matter is a very delicate one and must be handled with extreme care. The logic of the British position as to the implications involved in such representation is appreciated, but this Government is particularly desirous that nothing should occur which might in the slightest degree in any wise impair the closest cooperation with the Soviet Union in this and other matters relating to the general war effort and post-war arrangements. It, therefore, doubts the advisability of having the Commission express itself on the subject. It appreciates the desire of the British Government to acquaint the other Allied Governments with the situation, but it at the same time feels that the matter should not be agitated any more than is absolutely necessary and it wonders whether the suggested procedure would be best calculated to resolve the differences that have developed.

The Department is wondering whether the next step might not be in the nature of a further appeal to the Soviet Union along the lines of the earlier suggestion by the British that when matters affecting any particular republic are under consideration, that republic might have an adviser to the USSR representative, calling attention to the fact that if each political subdivision of the states represented on the Commission (there are 48 political subdivisions in the United States, not including the outlying possessions) is to have direct representa-

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<sup>46</sup> British Embassy *aide-mémoire*, December 10, 1943, not printed.

tion, the Commission would become an unwieldy body and its effective work would be correspondingly impeded.

In view of the understandings reached at Moscow, every effort should be made, in keeping with the spirit of cooperation displayed there and at Tehran,<sup>47</sup> to avoid an impasse.

You will fully appreciate what the Department has in mind, and the Department relies upon you to seek an early occasion to counsel with Mr. Pell and the two of you with the Foreign Office with a view to avoiding the raising of sharp issues and giving them publicity.

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1219 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, December 31, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 6:13 p.m.]

8236. American Interests, Germany. Your 2681, November 1, Legation's 7051, November 10, and 7350, November 22.<sup>48</sup> Foreign Office official assured Tait<sup>49</sup> yesterday afternoon in handing him note dated December 30 in French that this exact translation German Foreign Office note in German to Swiss Legation Berlin except as indicated below.

Following translation:

"Referring to the courteous note A.I. No. 6691, November 8, by which Legation of the United States of America requested Division of Foreign Interests of Federal Political Department to notify German Government of a message from American Government concerning treatment by German authorities of members of armed forces fighting beside United States, the Division has the honor to inform the Legation that according to a letter from Special Division of Swiss Legation Berlin dated December 3, German Foreign Office has stated that it will take no cognizance of this communication on part of American Government and that it considers it as nonexistent. German Foreign Office added that it will return without hesitation every further communication of this nature and it requested Special Division so to inform American Government."

Tait was informed Swiss Foreign Office deleted words "to the Swiss Legation" which should be inserted between words "return" and "without hesitation".

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<sup>47</sup> See section entitled "The Tripartite Conference in Moscow, October 18—November 1, 1943," pp. 513 ff.; and *Foreign Relations*, the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 459—652.

<sup>48</sup> Legation's telegrams Nos. 7051 and 7350 not printed, but see footnote 29, p. 425.

<sup>49</sup> George Tait, First Secretary of Embassy in Switzerland.



This note greatly disturbed Swiss and was subject discussion between Pilet-Golaz<sup>50</sup> and De Pury.<sup>51</sup> Swiss Foreign Office informally said that it considered it impossible include in note to United States words deleted without embarrassment. Foreign Office official further expressed view present note represents definite indication by German Foreign Office to Swiss Legation not to communicate subsequently such notes. He inquired whether, should there be subsequent similar communications from American Government, these might be communicated by radio.

HARRISON

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<sup>50</sup> Marcel Pilet-Golaz, Chief of the Swiss Federal Political Department.

<sup>51</sup> Arthur de Pury, Chief, Division of Foreign Interests, Swiss Federal Political Department.

INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION AGAINST ACTS OF DIS-  
POSSESSION COMMITTED IN TERRITORIES UNDER  
ENEMY OCCUPATION OR CONTROL; <sup>1</sup> ESTABLISHMENT  
OF INTER-ALLIED SUB-COMMITTEE ON ACTS OF DIS-  
POSSESSION

740.00113 European War 1939/592 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1942—5 p. m.

6679. Your 7346, December 24, 1942.<sup>2</sup> We do not believe that it is desirable to distinguish between the American republics as proposed by the British. We feel that the American republics which have broken off political and economic relations with the Axis should be treated on the same footing as those in class 1 and should be invited to associate themselves with the declaration. In the case of Chile and Argentina, we see no harm in extending a similar invitation to them and think that there are certain definite advantages. Moreover, although this reason need not be mentioned to the British, you will appreciate the political desirability from our viewpoint of treating the hemisphere as a unit.

It occurs to us that it might be preferable for this Government to communicate the declaration to the other American republics, although we appreciate that a change in plans might not be feasible at this late date.

We assume that you will eventually notify us of the exact designation of each government in the declaration (last paragraph of your 6797, December 1<sup>3</sup>).

HULL

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740.00113 European War 1939/612 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, January 2, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received January 2—8 p. m.]

62. Department's 6679, December 31, 5 p. m., came just after the Foreign Office had sent out a communication setting the time for the

<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. I, pp. 72 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

release of the declaration to the public Tuesday, January 5 at 12 noon local London time. It was difficult to change the procedure in the short time available but after informal talks with the Foreign Office, substantial changes have been made.

1. The Foreign Office agrees to making a distinction between "technical" neutrals who have broken off relations with the Axis and neutrals who are neutrals in fact as well as in name. They will telegraph tonight to British representatives in Asunción, Bogotá, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Montevideo and Quito asking that the action to be taken in regard to the governments concerned should be brought in line as far as possible with that to be taken in the case of the Latin American Governments who are at war. The British representatives in these capitals will be instructed (a) to make their communication on January 4 instead of January 5; (b) [possible omission] make it difficult for any government not actually in a state of war to associate itself directly with it; they hope that the governments to which they are accredited will be able to make public statements condemning acts of dispossession perpetrated by the Axis in territories occupied by it or under its control, and in addition will declare its intention not to recognize such transfers of property; and (c) to take every precaution against premature disclosure of the declaration, and to request the governments concerned to treat the matter as confidential until the time of public release.

2. The Foreign Office does not favor taking the same line with the Argentine and Chilean Governments as with the Governments which have broken off relations with the enemy. They feel that, at least as regards the Argentine Government, to do so might draw a rebuff which might hinder attempts to make the declaration known fully in Argentina. They believe that they can explain later to the satisfaction of other parties to the declaration the distinction now to be drawn between the method of communication of the declaration used in the case of neutrals which have severed relations with the Axis and that used in the case of neutrals which are neutrals in fact as well as in name. But they believe that they would be criticised by other parties to the declaration if without consulting all parties they adopted a special approach to particular neutrals which had not broken with the enemy. They think, therefore, it would be better to allow the communication by the British Ambassadors in Argentina and Chile to be made on the morning of January 5, which is the time set for communicating the declaration to other neutrals which are neutrals in fact as well as name, and to make the communication on the lines indicated under heading (2) in Embassy's 7346, December 24.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 87.

The Foreign Office, however, considers that this would not preclude the United States Government from separately giving its own opinion to the Argentine and Chilean Governments.

3. Regarding the suggestion in the second paragraph of Department's 6679, December 31, the general procedure that Britain as the coordinating power should make the communication on behalf of the powers concerned to United Nations other than those making the declaration was indicated in section III of Embassy's 6797, December 1<sup>5</sup> and as no comment was received from the Department, the Foreign Office assumed that this arrangement met with the Department's approval. At this late date it would be difficult to put the suggestion fully into effect but the Foreign Office will send tonight a further instruction to British representatives in Latin American countries that they should communicate the declaration to the governments concerned jointly with their United States colleagues if the latter in his own judgment or following instructions from the Department should express a preference for this procedure.

The Foreign Office says that the arrangements for British representatives to communicate the declaration were only intended as a matter of convenience and wishes to make it clear that the action to be taken by British representatives as the agents of the other parties does not impair the rights of other parties to make individual communications to particular governments if they so desire.

4. The exact designation of each Government was received yesterday from the Foreign Office as follows: The Union of South Africa, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, the Czechoslovak Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia and the French National Committee.

6. [5.] We understand that the Foreign Office will shortly make a communication to the parties concerned regarding the formation of the Committee of Experts<sup>6</sup> referred to in section II of Embassy's 6797, December 1. This communication will deal with a number of comments on the subject which have been received from some of the Allied Governments.

MATTHEWS

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<sup>5</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 81.

<sup>6</sup> No such communication found in Department files. See telegram No. 550, January 21, from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, with respect to the establishment of the subcommittee of experts, p. 445.

740.00113 European War 1939/613 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 3, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 9:22 p. m.]

74. Referring to the Embassy's telegram 6797, December 1, 8 p. m.<sup>7</sup> and 62, January 2, 8 p. m.

1. The following changes have been made in the interpretive note transmitted in section IV of Embassy's 6797, December 1.

(a) The title of the interpretive note is as follows:

"Note on the Meaning, Scope and Application of the Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control."

(b) In the first sentence of paragraph 2 of the note the words "of all parties" are substituted for the words "of the participating governments".

(c) In the first sentence of paragraph 3 the words "of the participating governments and of the French National Committee" are substituted for the words "of the governments concerned".

(d) The last sentence of paragraph 3 has been reworded, without affecting the meaning, as follows: "The declaration makes it clear that it applies to transfer and dealings affected in territory under the indirect control of the enemy (such as the former 'unoccupied zone' in France) just as much as it applies to such transactions in territory which is under his direct physical control."

(e) In the first sentence of paragraph 4 the words "the parties" are substituted for the words "the participating governments".

(f) The second sentence of paragraph 5 as communicated in section IV of Embassy's 6797 of December 1, should be replaced by the following: "The declaration marks, however, the solidarity in this important matter of all the participating governments and of the French National Committee and this means that they are mutually pledged to assist one another as may be required, and, in conformity with the principles of equity, to examine and if necessary to implement the invalidation of transfers or dealings with property, rights et cetera which may extend across national frontiers and require action by two or more governments".

(g) In the first sentence of paragraph 6 the words "the parties" are substituted for the words "the participating governments". At the opening of the second sentence of paragraph 6 the words "the parties" are substituted for the words "the governments". In the fourth sentence of paragraph 6 the words "by the governments making the declaration and the French National Committee" are substituted for the words "by the governments making the declaration".

<sup>7</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 81.

2. When the Foreign Office makes the declaration public at 12 noon, local London time, January 5, it will make the following introductory statement :

“His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have today joined with 16 other Governments of the United Nations, and with the French National Committee, in making a formal declaration of their determination to combat and defeat the plundering by the enemy powers of the territories which have been overrun or brought under enemy control. The systematic spoliation of occupied or controlled territory has followed immediately upon each fresh aggression. This has taken every sort of form, from open looting to the most cunningly camouflaged financial penetration, and it has extended to every sort of property—from works of art to stocks of commodities, from bullion and bank notes to stocks and shares in business and financial undertakings. But the object is always the same—to seize everything of value that can be put to the aggressors’ profit and then to bring the whole economy of the subjugated countries under control so that they must slave to enrich and strengthen their oppressors.

It has always been foreseen that when the tide of battle began to turn against the Axis, the campaign of plunder would be even further extended and accelerated, and that every effort would be made to stow away the stolen property in neutral countries and to persuade neutral citizens to act as fences or cloaks on behalf of the thieves.

There is evidence that this is now happening, under the pressure of events in Russia and North Africa, and that the ruthless and complete methods of plunder begun in Central Europe are now being extended on a vast and ever increasing scale in the occupied territories of Western Europe.

His Majesty’s Government agree with the Allied Governments and the French National Committee that it is important to leave no doubt whatsoever of their resolution not to accept or tolerate the misdeeds of their enemies in the field of property, however these may be cloaked, just as they have recently emphasized their determination to exact retribution from war criminals for their outrages against persons in the occupied territories. Accordingly, they have made the following joint declaration, and issued the appended explanatory memorandum on its meaning, scope and application :”

MATTHEWS

740.00113 European War 1939/688a

*Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control*<sup>8</sup>

The Union of South Africa, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, the Czechoslovak Republic, the

<sup>8</sup> Copy transmitted to the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (Quezon) by the Secretary of State in his letter of January 12, 1943 (not printed). The text of the declaration was released to the press by the Department on January 5, 1943; presented by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament and printed (with covering statement and explanatory memorandum) as British Cmd. 6418, Misc. No. 1 (1943).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Greece, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the French National Committee:

Hereby issue a formal warning to all concerned, and in particular to persons in neutral countries, that they intend to do their utmost to defeat the methods of dispossession practiced by the governments with which they are at war against the countries and peoples who have been so wantonly assaulted and despoiled.

Accordingly the governments making this declaration and the French National Committee reserve all their rights to declare invalid any transfers of, or dealings with, property, rights and interests of any description whatsoever which are, or have been, situated in the territories which have come under the occupation or control, direct or indirect, of the governments with which they are at war or which belong or have belonged, to persons, including juridical persons, resident in such territories. This warning applies whether such transfers or dealings have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or of transactions apparently legal in form, even when they purport to be voluntarily effected.

The governments making this declaration and the French National Committee solemnly record their solidarity in this matter.

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740.00113 European War 1939/612 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1943—7 p. m.

155. Your 62, January 2.

1. Our missions in the American republics, other than Argentina and Chile, were instructed by circular telegram of January 4<sup>9</sup> to express to the governments to which they are accredited the earnest hope of this Government that they would associate themselves in some form with the declaration and that they will indicate publicly their refusal to recognize the looting by the Axis of territories which have come under its domination. Our missions in Santiago and Buenos Aires were instructed,<sup>10</sup> unless they deemed it inappropriate, to express to the Argentine and Chilean governments the hope of this government that they would find it possible to issue some public statement indicating their sympathy with the declaration and the fact that they

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Instructions not printed.

do not condone the Axis looting of occupied countries. You will be advised in regard to the reaction of the Argentinean and Chilean governments.

2. In the future, whenever possible, we would like to be consulted about the time of day when releases of considerable interest are to be made. In the present case, the hour chosen made it impossible for us to have the release appear in the morning papers.

HULL

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740.00113 European War 1939/652 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 9, 1943—midnight.

[Received January 10—1:25 a. m.]

241. Department's 155, January 7, 7 p. m., paragraph 2. We shall endeavor to arrange in future for consultation with the Department about the time of day when release[s] of considerable interest are to be made. In the case of the declaration on property transfers it was indicated in section 3 of Embassy's 6797 of December 1<sup>11</sup> that the declaration would probably be made at midday. As no comment was received it was assumed that the Department had no objection to this arrangement.

MATTHEWS

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740.00113 European War 1939/815 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 21, 1943.

[Received January 21—10:30 p. m.]

550. Embassy's 7108, December 15, and 6796 [6797], December 1, section 2, and Department's 6286, December 11.<sup>12</sup> At a meeting at the Foreign Office on January 13, which was attended by representatives of the Allied Governments in London, the French National Committee, Britain, Australia, China, U.S.S.R., and an observer from this Embassy, arrangements were made for the establishment of the sub-committee of experts referred to in the telegrams cited above. Its title is "The Inter-Allied Sub-Committee on Acts of Dispossession." It was decided:

(1) That the sub-committee should be composed of one representative of each of the parties attending the meeting. Canada, New

<sup>11</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 81.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 87, 81, and 86, respectively.



Zealand, South Africa, and India do not desire representation on the sub-committee.

(2) That any other government of the United Nations should be at liberty to send a representative to a meeting of the sub-committee on prior notification.

(3) That each Government represented on the sub-committee should prepare for the sub-committee a statement of its existing national legislation under which transfers and dealings of the kind referred to in the declaration would be or could be invalidated.

(4) That each Government should prepare for the sub-committee a statement on the methods of dispossession known to have been practiced in its territories. This statement is to follow a draft list of headings which will be sent by air pouch.<sup>13</sup>

The first meeting of the sub-committee will take place on February 1st and in accordance with the arrangement indicated in Department's 6286, December 11, and Embassy's 7108, December 15, Spiegel<sup>14</sup> will attend it. Other decisions of less immediate importance will be found in the minutes of the meeting which will be despatched by air pouch.<sup>15</sup> The Department will observe that the paragraph numbered (3) above requires action.<sup>16</sup>

MATTHEWS

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740.00113 European War 1939/612 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1943—7:20 p. m.

A-386. Reference Department's telegram No. 155, January 7, 1943, concerning the association of the American republics with the declaration on transfers of property in occupied territory.

Each of the American republics with the exception of Chile has announced its adherence to or association with the declaration in one form or another. In most cases the declaration was fully accepted; in a few instances there were implicit or express reservations. State-

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<sup>13</sup> Not printed; it was transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in his despatch No. 7860, February 23; received March 10.

<sup>14</sup> H. R. Spiegel, American representative on the sub-committee.

<sup>15</sup> Minutes of meeting not printed; they were transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in his despatch No. 7860, February 23.

<sup>16</sup> The Department's instructions No. 2719 of May 18 and No. 2766 of June 1, 1943 (not printed), transmitted copies of a statement on existing national legislation of the United States under which transfers and dealings of the type referred to in the declaration might be invalidated (740.00113 European War 1939/855, 887); full text of the United States memorandum is contained in Appendix A of Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Acts of Dispossession transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 9758 of June 24, 1943 (not printed); for a summary of the U.S. statement, see p. 449.

ments issued by each of the countries in connection with their action will be forwarded to you under separate cover.<sup>17</sup>

In Argentina, Foreign Office replied by submitting a note to the British Embassy and subsequently informing the press that the Argentine note adhered to the United Nations protest "On the behalf of the principles of order and respect for International Law which have been invariable rules of our conduct with others". The Argentine Government did not publish the terms of its note but stated that this may be done by the British Government. The British have made the contents of the note available to the United States Mission which has informed us that the pertinent paragraph of the note reads in translation as follows:

"In taking note of this declaration the Argentine Government considers that, when the moment for a decision arrives, it will then be the time for an application in a similar sense of the rules that inspire the political and juridical tradition of the republic, within the guarantees and procedures provided for in the institutional regime of the country for the protection of law and liberty in its own territory."

No report has been received concerning Chile's action in regard to the declaration but the Department will advise you as soon as a statement is received.<sup>18</sup>

HULL

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740.00113 European War 1939/613 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1943—9 p. m.

860. Your 74, January 3.

1. The Department had not understood from your previous telegrams that it was intended to make public the interpretative note as an agreed interpretation of the parties to the declaration. We had understood that it would be used merely for guidance in handling publicity on the declaration. The publication of the note in this form and the changes indicated in your reference telegram, particularly the change described in paragraph (f), seemed to the Department to have political implications inconsistent with our policy. It was not possible for the matter to be brought to my attention until late in the afternoon of January 4, at which time it seemed unlikely that any

<sup>17</sup> Instruction No. 2446 of February 26, to the Chargé in the United Kingdom, not printed.

<sup>18</sup> The Department's airgram No. A-406, February 4, 1943, advised the Chargé in the United Kingdom of the receipt of a note from the Chilean Government expressing approval of the declaration (740.00113 European War 1939/723).

change could be made. It was accordingly decided that only the text of the declaration should be released here and that no publication should be made by this Government of the note.

Please advise the appropriate official of the Foreign Office in the sense of the foregoing, explaining that this Government naturally does not consider itself bound by the interpretative note. While we assume the language referred to was the result merely of inadvertence, we wish to be sure that there be no misunderstanding as to this Government's position.

HULL

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740.00113 European War 1939/784 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 12, 1943—2 p. m.  
[Received March 12—1 p. m.]

1760. Department's 860, February 8, 9 p. m. The appropriate official of the Foreign Office (Ward)<sup>19</sup> has been informed of the substance of the above telegram and it was made clear that the United States Government does not consider itself bound by the explanatory memorandum for the guidance of press and radio on the declaration on property transfers in enemy-dominated countries.

In informal conversation he explained that the change in paragraph 5 of the explanatory memorandum on the declaration on transfers of property in enemy-dominated territories was made to avoid giving the impression that the French National Committee were recognized as a government. He emphasized that the operative instrument in relation to commitments for the parties concerned is the declaration itself and not the explanatory memorandum. The status of the latter is only that of a communiqué to the press and public.

The Foreign Office official said that the reference in paragraph 5 of the explanatory memorandum to the parties being "mutually pledged to assist one another as may be required" arose out of the last paragraph of the declaration itself. The origin of that paragraph was explained in section (1) of Embassy's 5422, September 29,<sup>20</sup> in the paragraph immediately following the text of the declaration.

While expressing regret that anything in the explanatory memorandum may have created embarrassment for the Department, the Foreign Office official expressed confidence that difficulties would not be likely to arise in practice, since it may be hoped that when the

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<sup>19</sup> John G. Ward, Acting First Secretary, British Foreign Office.

<sup>20</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 77.

time comes after victory to implement the declaration there will be a recognized government of France.

MATTHEWS

740.00113 European War 1939/1006

*Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control: Interim Report of Inter-Allied Sub-Committee of Experts*<sup>21</sup>

[Extract]

PART II.—SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATION OF EACH COUNTRY

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. By Section 5(b) of its Trading with the Enemy Act as amended<sup>22</sup>—

Power is conferred on the President of the United States during time of war or national emergency to investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit any transfer or dealing which involves any property in which any foreign country or national thereof has an interest; he may exercise these powers with respect to any transfer or dealing wherever effected, which involves any property or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The President is empowered to vest any property or interest of any foreign national or country. Authority is conferred upon the President to define all of the terms employed in said section.

These powers of the President have been made available by delegation to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Alien Property Custodian.

2. General Ruling No. 12, issued by the United States Treasury Department<sup>23</sup> under the authority of the said Act, provides that, except as licensed by the Treasury—

Any transfer, effected after freezing control was extended to a country, of property in a “blocked account” of that country or of any national thereof, is null and void.

The word “transfer” includes, with certain exceptions, any acts or transactions effected outside as well as in the United States which may convey or surrender any right or power with respect to prop-

<sup>21</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 10401, July 29; received August 5.

<sup>22</sup> Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 415) as amended by Title III of the First War Powers Act, 1941; 55 Stat. 838.

<sup>23</sup> Treasury Department, *Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds Control*, March 30, 1944, p. 36.

erty. The expression "property" in General Ruling No. 12 includes, in general, money, bullion, securities, financial instruments, book debts and written contracts, but not as a rule real property or chattels. The exclusion in general of real property or chattels does not necessarily mean that the United States Government considers such transfers to be valid; such exclusion merely means that no formal statement with respect to the invalidity of such transfer has been issued.

3. Pursuant to powers contained in the said Act, freezing control is applied mainly under Executive Order 8389 as amended<sup>24</sup> and regulations issued thereunder. The freezing orders, in general, prohibit the following transactions if they involve any "blocked" country or national thereof or any property in which any "blocked" country or national thereof has an interest or any payment or transfer expressed in terms of the currency of such country: all transfers of credit, or payments involving banking institutions within the United States; all foreign exchange transactions; all dealings in securities (including securities physically situated outside the United States); all exports from the United States or earmarking within the United States of gold or silver, coin, bullion, or currency. The term "banking institution" is so broadly defined as to include anyone holding a credit for another as a direct or incidental part of his business.

Any transaction prohibited by the freezing orders may be licensed by the Treasury.

The following are "blocked" countries:—

Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France (including Monaco), Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Andorra, Austria, China, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, U.S.S.R., and any area which has been under the occupation or control of any of the foregoing countries at any time after such occupying or controlling country has been blocked.

The U.S.S.R. and the four European neutral countries (Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) have each been granted a general licence under the freezing orders. The general licence granted to the U.S.S.R. effectively unblocks that country and its nationals, but does not validate any acts effected under Axis occupation.

Persons whose names are on the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals are treated as enemy nationals for the purposes of the freezing orders for such time as their names appear on such List.

<sup>24</sup> For text of Executive Order No. 8389 (3 CFR 128 (Supp. 1940)) as amended by Executive Order No. 8785 (3 CFR 225 (Supp. 1941)), with amendments effected after June 14, 1941, indicated by footnotes, see *Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds Control*, March 30, 1944, pp. 5-10.

4. Control over securities has been established under other prohibitory measures issued by the United States Treasury. Any securities or currency imported into the United States must be reported to and deposited with specified Government agencies. It is illegal to receive or hold any such currency or securities without specific authorisation of the Treasury.

Further, no security to which a tax or other stamp or notarial seal of a foreign country has been attached may be dealt with in the United States unless a certificate has been attached to the security by the authority of the United States Treasury.

No transfer or dealing with respect to any security registered or inscribed in the name of a blocked country or national thereof may be effected without a licence from the Treasury.

To prevent looting, special measures have been taken to prohibit dealing in any Philippine currency or securities.

5. The Alien Property Custodian is empowered to take such action as he deems necessary in the national interest with respect to business enterprises, patents, ships, or vessels and certain other property in the United States where such property is affected with the interest of a foreign or enemy national. The Custodian has (*inter alia*) power to direct, manage, supervise, control or vest any such property.

6. General legal principles in the United States would suggest that, if transfers and dealings referred to in the Inter-Allied Declaration were wilfully contrary to the prohibitory regulations discussed herein, they would be determined by the courts to be invalid, and, in any event, the Executive Branch of the United States Government could legally invalidate such transfers and dealings. It is to be noted that under Section 3(a) of the said Act and General Ruling No. 11<sup>25</sup> all transactions involving trade or communication with an enemy national are prohibited unless licensed.

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740.00113 European War 1939/1102 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 8, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received October 9—12: 50 p. m.]

6833. An indication of the attitude of the Soviet [Union] towards Poland was given here on October 7 at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Axis Acts of Dispossession. This subcommittee was appointed immediately after the signing on January 5, 1943 of the Inter-Allied

<sup>25</sup> *Documents Pertaining to Foreign Funds Control*, March 30, 1944, p. 34.

Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control, to prepare for the main committee a factual report on methods of dispossession and on existing legislation that might be used to invalidate forced transfers. Each government was asked to submit a memorandum to the subcommittee on the facts relating to its own territory. The subcommittee then drew up a draft memorandum to cover the whole field.

At a meeting on October 7 to consider the draft memorandum the Soviet representative, M. Istchenko, a member of the Soviet Trade Delegation, made the following statement.

"Before the subcommittee considers the draft interim report I have the following statement to make:

The members of the subcommittee were invited to submit a memorandum on acts of dispossession practised by the Axis on their own territories. Those memoranda were intended to be a source of information and a basis for report. Among the memoranda received by the subcommittee is one submitted by the Polish representative. The said memorandum contains references to territories which are an integral part of the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These references are on the following pages: Page 1, lines 6-8, 11-21, 26-36; page 2, lines 27-29; page 4, lines 35-37; page 13, lines 34-54; page 14, lines 11 and 53-55; page 15, lines 27-29 and 43.

Taking into consideration the above, I submit that the memorandum of the Polish representative should be corrected in the appropriate way. In any case the said memorandum in its present form cannot be enclosed with the interim report of the subcommittee."

In view of the passages to which the Russian representative has made reference, it appears that territories in question are those in eastern Poland which were occupied by Russian forces shortly after the German invasion of Poland.

Gregory, chairman of subcommittee and Controller of Trading with Enemy Department, stated it would be difficult to ask the Polish representative to withdraw or correct report of his Government and suggested that a formula be inserted into the report making it clear that the references to Poland referred to the geographic area administered by Polish Government on September 1, 1939, and did not affect in any way whatsoever any outstanding question concerning adjustment of frontiers. It is not clear at present whether the Russian representative will be satisfied with anything less than correction of Polish memorandum.

Polish memorandum in question is document I.A.D. 33 of Subcommittee on Axis Acts of Dispossession transmitted to Department under cover of despatch 10904 dated August 30.<sup>26</sup> Copy of draft

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<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

report on methods of dispossession practiced in Europe will be forwarded to Department immediately.<sup>27</sup>

I thought you would like to know about this incident before your departure.<sup>27a</sup>

WINANT

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740.00113 European War 1939/1119 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 26, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

7387. Dispute reported in my 6833, October 8, to Department, raised again by Soviet representative at most recent meeting of Inter-Allied Subcommittee of Axis Acts of Dispossession held October 20. Soviet representative not satisfied with suggestion by Gregory, chairman of committee, that report be prefaced by statement indicating that nothing in report should be regarded as prejudicial to position of any signatory on any outstanding boundary question. Gregory now proposes statement at end of report in which Soviet representative specifically [dissociates] himself from Polish memorandum and any statement in report based on that memorandum. Soviet representative did not appear to be satisfied with this suggestion at meeting. Decision on the question postponed until next meeting of committee. Soviet representative obviously acting on instructions. Foreign Office has instructed Gregory to attempt to find solution [without?] forcing issue. Polish Government not willing to withdraw and amend memorandum as demanded by Soviet representative. All other members of committee want to avoid situation in which Soviet representative will withdraw and refuse to sign report. Soviet report on methods of dispossession not yet received but expected in reasonably near future.<sup>28</sup>

This message will be of interest to Reinstein in Office of Foreign Economic Coordination.<sup>29</sup>

Repeated to Moscow.

WINANT

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<sup>27</sup> Despatch No. 11587, October 9, not printed.

<sup>27a</sup> The Secretary was leaving shortly to attend the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943.

<sup>28</sup> No record found in Department files of receipt of such a Soviet report; statement submitted by the U.S.S.R. on "scope of existing Legislation under which Transfers or dealings would be or could be invalidated" was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 10461, August 2, 1943 (740.00113 European War 1939/1011).

<sup>29</sup> Jacques J. Reinstein, Divisional Assistant, Foreign Funds Control Division; for a short period associated with the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination before its foreign economic operations were transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration, in accordance with an executive order of September 25, 1943.



740.00113 European War 1939/1141 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 11, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 10:14 p. m.]

7864. Reference Embassy's 6833, October 8; 7387, October 26.

1. Sometime after the meeting on October 7 of the Inter-Allied Sub-Committee on Axis Acts of Dispossession, Gregory, the Chairman, proposed to Istchenko, the USSR representative on the Sub-Committee, the following solution:

(1) An amended version of paragraph 27 of the draft report indicating that the material for the report had been drawn from a number of sources other than the memoranda submitted by the various governments and that nothing in the report should be deemed to have any political significance particularly as regards boundary questions;

(2) a proposed new final paragraph in which Istchenko would specifically dissociate himself from any references to Poland in the report but express agreement with the remainder of the report.

A further meeting of the Sub-Committee took place on November 9. Just before the meeting Gregory received a reply from Istchenko that these proposals were unacceptable.

2. At the meeting on November 9 Istchenko pressed for a Sub-Committee vote on the propositions (1) that the Polish Government should withdraw the memorandum which it has submitted to the Sub-Committee or amend it by deleting the references to those territories which are regarded by the Poles as eastern Poland but which in the Russian view are territories belonging to the USSR; (2) failing this to instruct the drafting Sub-Committee to amend the report by deleting all references to Poland.

The Chairman avoided a vote and Istchenko later read a statement indicating that if these propositions were not accepted he would be obliged to refrain from signing the report.

From informal conversations just after the close of the meeting it was indicated that if such a vote were taken the Norwegian representative<sup>30</sup> and possibly also the Czechoslovak representative<sup>31</sup> might vote with Istchenko, while the Dutch representative<sup>32</sup> and possibly also the Yugoslav, French, Belgian and Luxemburg representatives<sup>33</sup> might abstain from voting.

3. It became clear shortly before the meeting of November 9 that no solution would be possible through the channels of the Sub-Com-

<sup>30</sup> M. F. Hiorthoy.

<sup>31</sup> Hugo Stein.

<sup>32</sup> W. Huender.

<sup>33</sup> N. Dimovic, André Gros, R. Golstein, and V. Bodson, respectively.

mittee. The matter was therefore discussed informally by an Embassy representative with Ronald<sup>34</sup> and Lord Hood<sup>35</sup> in the Foreign Office. It was agreed that a vote on the Sub-Committee would be certain to lead to a rift which would make it impossible to get all countries to sign the Sub-Committee's report. Moreover the function of the Sub-Committee has always been considered to be that of a fact finding body only. The only prospect of solution was to deal with the matter at a diplomatic level outside the Committee. In a further informal conversation with Ronald and Lord Hood today it was indicated that the Foreign Office contemplates having the matter taken up in Moscow in the hope that Istchenko's instructions can be amended with a view to the acceptance of a solution possibly along the lines of Gregory's suggestions indicated in section 1 above. Hood will send us for comment a copy of a draft instruction which the Foreign Office will consider sending to the British Ambassador in Moscow. He suggested that if the American Government thought fit it might at the appropriate time consider sending a representation on similar lines. Meanwhile it is expected that Gregory will put off any further meeting of the Sub-Committee until this dispute is settled out of committee.

As soon as we receive the suggested draft instruction which the Foreign Office is preparing to send to the British Embassy in Moscow we will telegraph it to the Department.

WINANT

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740. 00113 European War 1939/1189 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 2, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

8415. The Foreign Office today informed us that they have cabled instructions to the British Embassy in Moscow regarding the Russian-Polish problem referred to in Embassy's 7864, of November 11. We were not shown draft of British cable as previously agreed because of some confusion and misunderstanding arising from the fact that Ward of the Foreign Office who deals with this question, only recently returned from Moscow. However, the telegram, a paraphrase of which has been handed to the Embassy, was along the broad lines previously discussed with Embassy and transmitted to Department in Embassy's 7864.

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<sup>34</sup> Nigel B. Ronald, British Acting Assistant Under Secretary.

<sup>35</sup> Viscount Samuel Hood.

The telegram was sent on November 27 and began by summarizing the developments in the Inter-Allied Sub-Committee on Acts of Dispossession which led to the refusal of the Soviet delegate to sign the draft report unless all references to Poland were eliminated. It explained the grounds upon which the Soviet delegate based his objections to the report and the position he took on the committee. This information is contained in Embassy's 6833, October 8, 7387, October 26, and 7864, November 11.

The telegram explained that the British felt unable to put pressure on the Poles since it would conflict with the British policy of not recognizing territorial changes occurring after the outbreak of war and that deletion of all references to Poland would spoil the report and provoke a dispute between the Poles and the Sub-Committee. It was made clear that the Soviet delegate was acting on rigid instructions and unless these instructions could be modified the choice was between producing no report or producing a report without the concurrence of the Soviet representative, who might be supported by other governments who would also withhold signature.

The Foreign Office stressed that they wanted very much to avoid this situation and they instructed the British Embassy to take up in the most appropriate manner the question of modifying Mr. Istchenko's instructions. The British Embassy was also instructed to explain the concern of the Foreign Office at the development of this unfortunate controversy, partly because they deplored anything which further impaired Russian-Polish relations and particularly because of the British interest in the discussions resulting in the declaration of the 5th of January, 1943 and the setting up of the Sub-Committee with a British chairman. The Foreign Office pointed out that political disputes should not hold up the work of fact finding technical committees and that the British Government hoped that the Soviet Government also considered that the activities of such a committee engaged on the preliminary study necessary for dealing with enemy acts of dispossession were important. The British Government expressed the belief that the Soviet Government would agree that politics had no place on the work of the committee and hoped, therefore, that the Soviet representative would be authorized to sign the draft report since it in fact did not mention either the disputed territory or the disputed Polish Government paper. The fact that the Sub-Committee had agreed to emphasize that no political implications should be drawn from the report and was also willing that the Soviet representative should if he liked specifically disassociate himself from all references to Poland, was mentioned.

The telegram ended by stressing the urgency of the matter and requesting that the Soviet Government be approached. It also expressed the hope that the American Ambassador in Moscow would receive instructions to approach the Soviet Government.<sup>36</sup>

Mr. Ward explained orally that although the British telegram mentioned that if political disputes could not be eliminated from technical committees inter-Allied collaboration on a technical level would become impossible, the Embassy in Moscow was not instructed to raise this general issue but is not precluded from doing so. He felt that confining the approach to the specific issue of Mr. Istchenko's instructions would be the better course. He also mentioned that an appearance of combined action on the part of the British and American Governments would be looked on with suspicion by the Russians. He hoped, however, that the American Embassy in Moscow would receive instructions in line with those of the British Embassy. Until the question is settled in Moscow there will be no further meetings of the Sub-Committee and if the approach to the Soviet Government is unsuccessful, it will probably be preferable to drop the entire matter and wind up the work of the Sub-Committee. This would be an unfortunate development since valuable work has been done.

Penrose,<sup>37</sup> who has been handling this question here, is now in Washington. I suggest he be consulted in the matter and request that whatever instruction is issued to Moscow be repeated to London.

BUCKNELL

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740.00113 European War 1939/1218 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 27, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 6:47 p. m.]

9000. With reference to the British approach in Moscow regarding the Russian-Polish dispute arising out of the draft report of the Inter-Allied Sub-Committee on Axis Acts of Dispossession, the Foreign Office informs us that on December 14 Clark Kerr<sup>38</sup> gave a note to Molotov<sup>39</sup> and discussed the subject with him in accordance with the Foreign Office instruction summarized in Embassy's 8415 of December 2. Clark Kerr reported that Molotov made no comment but listened with sympathy and agreed to look into the matter.

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<sup>36</sup> No record of such instruction found in Department files; for correspondence on Soviet-Polish political relations, see vol. III, pp. 314 ff.

<sup>37</sup> E. F. Penrose, Special Assistant to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

<sup>38</sup> Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

<sup>39</sup> V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

The Foreign Office feels that at this stage it would be most desirable to have some informal expression in Moscow of an American wish that political differences should not enter the sphere of the Sub-Committee's work, and that the draft fact-finding report should be agreed on without delay. The Soviet representative has admitted that there is nothing in the draft report as it now stands to which he objects. There is no reference in it to eastern Poland or to the memorandum submitted by the Polish Government to the Sub-Committee. The draft report is also acceptable to the Poles. All that is needed is a modification of Istchenko's instructions to enable him to sign the report or approve it in line with an informal suggestion that the chairman alone should sign it after the national representatives have indicated their approval. This would mean dropping the demand that the Polish memorandum to the Sub-Committee be formally "withdrawn" or that every reference to Poland be eliminated from the draft report, and accepting as an alternative, if the Soviet wished, (1) a reservation by the Soviet representative dissociating himself from all references to Poland in the report, (2) an amendment in the draft report emphasizing that no political implications, particularly as regards boundary questions, were to be drawn from anything in the report (see paragraph 1 of Embassy's 7864, November 11).

The Foreign Office felt that if a formal American approach had been made simultaneously with the British approach there would have been an impression in Moscow of unduly concerted action between the United States and Britain. They believe, however, that there is now a favorable opportunity. Some time has elapsed since the British approach was made. The American approach might be purely informal and could be justified by the facts that (1) the United States is a signatory to the declaration of January 5, 1943, (2) it has a representative on the Sub-Committee through whom it has been made aware of the difficulties now holding up the draft report, and (3) it has an interest in Russian collaboration on technical matters.

We believe it to be important that the Sub-Committee's work, now practically completed, shall not be held up indefinitely through a political difference that has no reflection whatever in the report. The establishment of the Sub-Committee was publicly announced following the declaration of January 5. Questions have been asked in Parliament regarding the progress of the work of following up the declaration and eminent lawyers in Parliament take a continued interest in the subject. It would, therefore, hardly be possible to con-

ceal a breakdown from the British public and Allied circles generally in London and such a breakdown would undoubtedly be prejudicial to other attempts at technical collaboration.<sup>40</sup>

WINANT

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<sup>40</sup> In telegram No. 9945, November 14, 1944, 9 p. m., the Chargé in the United Kingdom reported that no meeting of the Sub-Committee had been held since November 9, 1943, and that attempts to settle differences out of committee had been unsuccessful. No reply had been received to the British representations to Molotov in December 1943. The Chargé reported that the British Foreign Office's attitude was that the committee should remain in suspense but that there should be no formal dissolution. (740.00113EW/11-1444)

REPRESENTATIONS TO NEUTRAL GOVERNMENTS  
AGAINST THE GRANTING OF ASYLUM TO PERSONS  
GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES

740.00116 European War 1939/1016

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

No. 492

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honor to inform him that, as a result of developments in Italy and the consequent danger that Mussolini and perhaps other prominent Fascists may attempt to take refuge in a neutral country, His Majesty's Government are proposing to issue instructions to His Majesty's Representatives at Berne, Madrid, Lisbon, Buenos Aires, the Vatican, Stockholm and Ankara, that they should present notes to the respective Governments to which they are accredited, conveying a warning in the following terms.

"In view of developments in Italy and possibility that Mussolini and other prominent Fascists and persons guilty of war crimes may attempt to take refuge in neutral territory His Majesty's Government feels obliged to call upon all neutral countries to refuse asylum to any such persons; and to declare they will regard any shelter, assistance or protection given such persons as a violation of the principles for which the United Nations are fighting and which they are determined to carry into effect by every means in their power."

Lord Halifax has been instructed to express the urgent hope that the United States Government will find themselves in agreement with the action proposed by His Majesty's Government, and will instruct their Representatives in the neutral countries concerned to join with His Majesty's Representatives in conveying a warning in the terms proposed.

His Majesty's Government are making a similar approach to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Lord Halifax would be grateful for the favour of a very early reply.

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1943.

740.00116 European War 1939/1016

*Memorandum by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1943.

The attached note<sup>1</sup> was left by Mr. Wright<sup>2</sup> with Mr. Dunn<sup>3</sup> this noon. The Secretary at luncheon discussed it with the President, who stated that he wished to issue a public statement tomorrow.

With the Secretary's approval, Mr. Hickerson<sup>4</sup> read the draft statement over the telephone to Mr. Wright and told him that we would telegraph it, when issued, to the Missions in the capitals mentioned in the Embassy's note, with instructions to bring it to the attention of the respective Governments.

Mr. Wright expressed appreciation and said he would telephone the text to London.

740.00116 European War 1939/1016b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*<sup>5</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1943—2 p. m.

644. The President this morning issued the following statement:

"On August 21, 1942 I issued a statement to the press<sup>6</sup> in which after referring to the crimes against innocent people committed by the Axis Powers I stated:

"The United Nations are going to win this war. When victory has been achieved, it is the purpose of the Government of the United States, as I know it is the purpose of each of the United Nations, to make appropriate use of the information and evidence in respect to the barbaric crimes of the invaders, in Europe and in Asia. It seems only fair that they should have this warning that the time will come when they shall have to stand in courts of law in the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts."

On October 7, 1942 I stated that it was 'the intention of this Government that the successful close of the war shall include provisions for the surrender to the United Nations of war criminals.'<sup>7</sup>

The wheels of justice have turned constantly since those statements were issued and are still turning. There are now rumors that Mussolini and members of his Fascist gang may attempt to take refuge

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*<sup>2</sup> Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy.<sup>3</sup> James Clement Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.<sup>4</sup> John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs.<sup>5</sup> The same to Sweden (No. 826); similar telegrams, on the same date, to Argentina (No. 1132), Portugal (No. 1295), Spain (No. 1631), and Switzerland (No. 1801) with instructions for repetition to the Vatican.<sup>6</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, August 22, 1942, p. 709.<sup>7</sup> See telegram No. 4867, October 6, 1942, 5 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 59.



in neutral territory. One day Hitler and his gang and Tojo and his gang will be trying to escape from their countries. I find it difficult to believe that any neutral country would give asylum to or extend protection to any of them. I can only say that the Government of the United States would regard the action by a neutral government in affording asylum to Axis leaders or their tools as inconsistent with the principles for which the United Nations are fighting and that the United States Government hopes that no neutral government will permit its territory to be used as a place of refuge or otherwise assist such persons in any effort to escape their just deserts."

In concert with your British and Soviet colleagues you are requested to bring the President's statement to the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>8</sup> in writing. You should not, however, delay action if your Soviet colleague has not received instructions.

HULL

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740.00116 European War 1939/1025

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1943.

Mr. Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy, called me on the telephone at 4:45 this afternoon and referred to conversations with Mr. Dunn, Mr. Achilles and me on Thursday and Friday<sup>9</sup> concerning the warning to neutral governments not to admit Mussolini and other Italian officials trying to escape from Italy. He said that the British Government had been very much pleased with the President's statement of yesterday and with the word which we had given him that we had sent instructions to our diplomatic representatives in Stockholm, Ankara, Madrid, Lisbon, Bern, Vatican City and Buenos Aires quoting the text of the statement and instructing them, in concert with their British colleagues in all seven places, and also with their Soviet colleagues in Stockholm and Ankara, to bring the President's statement to the attention of the governments to which they are accredited.

He said that the Embassy had just been informed that the British Government will publish in the British papers tomorrow morning news that the British Government has instructed its diplomatic representatives in those capitals to make representations on this subject to those governments. The representations will be along the line of the note on this subject which the British Ambassador handed to us on July 29. Mr. Wright said that their telegram stated that the

<sup>8</sup> Numan Menemencioglu.

<sup>9</sup> July 29 and 30.

Soviet Government was likewise publishing in the press tomorrow news that the Soviet Government was making representations on this subject in Stockholm and Ankara. He said that the British Government hoped that we would be disposed, if there was time, to let the press know that we had issued instructions to our diplomatic representatives in those seven places to bring the President's statement to the attention of the governments to which they are accredited.

I called Mr. McDermott<sup>10</sup> on the telephone and told him the foregoing. Mr. McDermott and I agreed that he would inform the correspondents that instructions had been issued to the American diplomatic representatives in those seven places to bring the President's statement to the attention of the governments to which they are accredited. Mr. McDermott would add that the British Government had sent similar instructions to its representatives in all seven places and that he understood that the Soviet Government had similarly instructed its representatives in Stockholm and Ankara.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

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740.00116 European War 1939/1032 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, August 4, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received August 6—12: 56 a. m.]

1351. I have learned from reliable source that the Minister for Foreign Affairs shortly after his return to Istanbul yesterday saw the Swedish, Swiss, Spanish and Portuguese diplomatic representatives in succession and thereafter sent for the Italian Chargé d'Affaires.

I am inclined to the view that these visits were in connection with contemplated concerted action by the neutrals in respect of the American, British and Soviet notes concerning refuge to war criminals.

STEINHARDT

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740.00116 European War 1939/1041 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, August 8, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received 10: 20 p. m.]

1387. In conversation with the British Ambassador<sup>11</sup> he said that the Foreign Minister had rejected the suggestion of certain other neutrals for joint action their reply to the American, British and

<sup>10</sup> Michael J. McDermott, Chief of the Division of Current Information.

<sup>11</sup> Sir H. M. Knatchbull-Hugessen.

Soviet notes concerning asylum to war criminals and had advised the Swedish, Swiss and Portuguese Ministers to make "friendly" replies. Hugessen said Numan expressed the opinion that it was "unfortunate" the British note had not followed the form of the American note which was much easier to deal with as it contained no implied threat. Numan promised to discuss with Hugessen the form and substance of the Turkish reply before reaching a final decision, adding that the publicity given the notes had made his position even more difficult. Toward the close of their talk Numan remarked to Hugessen that in any event the Turkish Government would refuse asylum to Mussolini and his henchmen.

STEINHARDT

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740.00116 European War 1939/1043 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, August 9, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received August 10—10:34 a. m.]

4845. Tittmann's<sup>12</sup> 143, August 5. My 142, August 3.<sup>13</sup> I have been informed by Spanish Ambassador to Holy See that his colleague at Quirinal asked Madrid for instructions in case Mussolini made an application for visa for Spain. Reply received was to effect that application should be refused. His Embassy as well would be guided by these instructions Barcenás said.

I assume that Spanish Government's instructions apply to other prominent Fascist as well as to Mussolini, but I am not certain. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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740.00116 European War 1939/1045 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, August 9, 1943.

[Received August 11—2:29 a. m.]

1393. In conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Saturday he invited me to express my personal views "as an international lawyer and not as the American Ambassador" as to the position which the Turkish Government should take with respect to the American, British and Soviet notes concerning asylum to war criminals.

<sup>12</sup> Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Assistant to Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

I pointed out that extradition had long since established the principle of rendition between nations for offenses relevantly as unimportant as bankruptcy frauds; that asylum is not a prerogative of the individual but a privilege to be granted or withheld by a sovereign state; that international law undergoes frequent change in reflecting the conscience of the world and is not a fixed or immutable code; that a better world will never be achieved if nothing is to change; that war criminals should not be permitted to enjoy the Kaiser's luxurious post war existence; that the small neutral states of Europe are the states menaced most by war criminals and in consequence have the strongest incentive not to shield them; that a neutral country which granted asylum to one or more important war criminals would assume the grave responsibility of a repetition of the 100 days after Napoleon's escape from Elba; that the inevitable intrigues of war criminals operating from neutral soil in an endeavor to return to power would disturb the peace of the world; that there is a clear distinction between refugees who had sought to uphold political principles and common criminals masquerading as statesmen, military or police, and that this distinction is as clearly definable as that between *malum prohibitum* and *malum per se*; that those who have knowingly and flagrantly violated international law have forfeited the right to invoke its principles to shield themselves from the consequences of their acts; that the granting of asylum by a neutral state to war criminals masquerading as political refugees would deal a severe blow at the foundation of a new world order of decent international conduct; and that there can be no such new world order without the surrender of some degree of sovereignty as has already been recognized in innumerable multilateral international agreements from maritime codes to entry into the League of Nations.

Numan replied that he was "99%" in agreement with my arguments. He remarked that he personally favored an international law which did not recognize asylum for war criminals, but that he was confronted with the problem of having to act under existing international law. He said he had already rejected the suggestion of some of the other neutrals for joint action and had warned them to be "extremely careful" in their answers to the American, British and Soviet notes as the consequences in connection with the establishment of a new world order might be serious. He said it was his intention to wait another 10 days or 2 weeks before answering the notes in order that public discussion might come to an end and that he contemplated an answer to the effect that the Turkish Government was prepared to apply existing international law or any new international law that had sufficient authority behind it.

740.00116 European War 1939/1053 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, August 18, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received August 19—8:32 a. m.]

5063. This afternoon M. Pilet-Golaz<sup>14</sup> gave an oral reply to my communication of July 31 (cf my telegram 4617, July 31<sup>15</sup>). He handed me for convenience, he said, an *aide-mémoire* translation as follows:

“The Federal Council has taken cognizance with all due attention of the note which the Legation of the United States of America presented to the Political Department on July 31.

It does not think that the American Government's purpose in conveying this communication was to question the right of asylum as such undisputed and sacred prerogative of a sovereign state.

Without doubt it was rather to make known the intentions of the United Nations in regard to those whom the note calls ‘war criminals’ in the absence of a precise generally accepted definition and of indicating in the present state of affairs their views in regard to a problem which international law has not yet succeeded in solving. There seems thus no call for the Federal Council to go into the suggestion which so far remains abstract.

Switzerland which is always determined to safeguard its independence and liberty and is resolutely faithful to the policy of strict and fair neutrality which it has practiced for centuries in its own interest and in the general interest of mankind—the present conflict seems to confirm it—will in reaching independent decisions which circumstances lead it to take in each case continue to be inspired by the supreme good of the state, by its duties as well as its rights as a neutral country and by the higher principles of humanity. Its attitude is furthermore perfectly well known having been manifested on innumerable occasions during the course of these last years.”

In addition to foregoing M. Pilet-Golaz informed me that a like oral reply was being given to my British colleague. He referred to difference in our two notes. He stated that he had not consulted other neutrals. No publicity would be given to his reply. He emphasized that each case would be decided in light of best interests of Switzerland external as well as internal and that each case would be considered and judged “intelligently”. He recalled certain historical cases such as that of Louis Napoleon. The grant of asylum for instance to Madame Mussolini would no doubt, he said, be viewed favorably by Swiss people while they would strongly oppose asylum

<sup>14</sup> Chief of the Swiss Federal Political Department.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

for, say Hitler. He foresaw a problem in eventual requests for asylum by Frenchmen. He also mentioned large number of war refugees already in Switzerland and possibility that Swiss abroad would likewise have to be taken care of. M. Pilet intimated that he would have preferred if our communication could have been made without publicity.

In view nothing is to be given out here beg to suggest that M. Pilet be consulted before any statement be made should that be deemed necessary.

HARRISON

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740.00116 European War 1939/1059 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ISTANBUL, August 20, 1943—noon.

[Received 6:31 p. m.]

1448. The Foreign Office has replied to our note concerning asylum to war criminals. The text of the covering letter is as follows:

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs has had the honor to receive the communication under date of July 31st 1943 which the Ambassador of the United States of America was good enough to address to him for the purpose of bringing to his attention the text of the statement made on July 30, 1943 by the President of the United States of America concerning ‘asylum which might be accorded by the neutral countries to the Axis leaders or their creatures’.

Mr. Numan Menemencioglu thanks Mr. Steinhardt for having brought to his attention the point of view of the Government of the United States in the matter in question and hastens to send him here-with an announcement of the line of conduct which the Government of the Republic proposes to follow in such eventualities.”

The text of the statement enclosed with the Foreign Minister’s note is as follows:

“The Government of the Republic has always been careful to conform its attitude to the rules of international law for the triumph [of] which the United Nations [*Nations*] have themselves many times declared that they were fighting.

It has decided not to depart from its line of conduct in the matter of possible refuge of Axis leaders.

The decision in this matter of the Turkish Government will thus be inspired, if and when the situation arises, by the principles which are recognized at the present time, or which by general consecration shall be at that time recognized, as rules of international laws.”

STEINHARDT

740.00116 European War 1939/1074 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Argentina (Reed) to the Secretary of State*

Buenos Aires, September 1, 1943.

[Received September 1—11 : 17 a. m.]

1997. Department's 1132, 13th [30th].<sup>16</sup> Foreign Office made public last evening text of reply to British note regarding war criminal refugees. Communiqué stated similar reply made to this Embassy but we have not yet received it.<sup>17</sup> Note states in substance that Argentine Government distinguishes between common crimes and political offenses; that it holds asylum should be granted only in case of political offense and that it will decide accordingly each case that may be presented. Note is couched in courteous terms and is accompanied by explanatory communiqué. Full text by mail.<sup>18</sup>

REED

740.00116 European War 1939/1088 : Telegram

*Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State*

VATICAN CITY, September 11, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received September 12—7 : 45 a. m.]

189. Under date of September 11, 1943, the following note has been received from the Cardinal Secretary of State.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication No. 24 dated August 3 last relative to the asylum which neutral countries might possibly grant to persons termed in your letter 'war criminals'. After an attentive examination of the document, I have the honor to inform you that in the case of need, the Holy See will conform its decisions in the matter to the principles and the norms of natural and international law as well as to the dictates of Christian charity."

Foregoing is in reference to my telegram No. 143.<sup>19</sup>

TITTMANN

<sup>16</sup> See footnote 5, p. 461.

<sup>17</sup> Copy of reply transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in Argentina in his despatch No. 11722, September 1.

<sup>18</sup> Copy of translation of the Foreign Office communiqué published in *La Nación*, September 1, 1943, transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in Argentina in his despatch No. 11795, September 4.

<sup>19</sup> See telegram No. 4845, August 9, 11 p. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 464.

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN MEASURES FOR  
THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND  
HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS

840.403/10

*The Chief Justice of the United States (Stone) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I write as Chairman Ex-officio of the Board of Trustees of the National Gallery of Art, to ask your support of a plan for the creation of an organization functioning under the auspices of the Government, for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic or historic monuments and records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and returning to, or compensating in kind, the lawful owners of such objects which have been appropriated by the Axis powers or by individuals acting with their authority or consent. Beside the accomplishment of these worthy objects an incidental, but not unimportant advantage to be immediately gained is the proclamation to the world, friends and enemies, of our practical concern in protecting these symbols of civilization from injury and spoliation.

The Board of Trustees of the National Gallery considered the matter at a recent meeting and asked that I bring it to your attention. I have been in consultation also with Mr. Francis Henry Taylor, Director of the Metropolitan Museum of New York and Chairman of the Association of Art Museum Directors, and with Dr. William Bell Dinsmoor, President of the Archaeological Institute of America, who are equally concerned that steps should be taken to meet the present situation.

With the assistance of Mr. Taylor and Mr. Dinsmoor, and also Mr. Finley and Mr. Walker of the National Gallery, I have prepared the enclosed memorandum<sup>1</sup> which I submit for your consideration and earnestly hope that some measures may be taken for the formation of a Joint British and American Committee for putting into effect the suggestions made in the enclosed memorandum.

It is our thought that a committee such as is suggested will function best in connection with the organization headed by Governor Leh-

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed; it was the same as the substitute memorandum enclosed with Chief Justice Stone's letter of December 23, 1942, *infra*, except that in this earlier memorandum no provision was made for the participation of the Soviet Union.



man,<sup>2</sup> and in association with military officers attached to the command of our Armies of Occupation and specially charged with the protection of such artistic and historic objects.

Faithfully yours,

HARLAN F. STONE

840.403/70

*The Chief Justice of the United States (Stone) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is to supplement my letter of December 8th proposing, in behalf of my associates at the National Gallery, a program for the organization of a committee for the protection and salvage of historic monuments in Europe.

Those who were active in the preparation of this program have come to the conclusion that Russia should be asked to participate in the work of the committee. I approve of this suggested change and hand to you herewith a revised memorandum which may be substituted for the memorandum which I enclosed in my earlier letter.

Yours faithfully,

HARLAN F. STONE

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Chief Justice of the United States (Stone)*

The following recommendations are submitted for the consideration of the President:

1. That the President appoint a Committee to be known as the American Committee for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe. The purpose of such a Committee shall be to aid in the conservation of artistic and historic monuments in Europe, and in the establishment of machinery to return to the rightful owners works of art and historic documents appropriated by the Axis Powers.

The Committee to function with:

The appropriate branch of the Army.  
Governor Lehman's Rehabilitation Program.

The Committee to consist of:

A Chairman who shall be an officer of the United States Government with rank not lower than a member of the President's Cabinet.  
Governor Lehman.

<sup>2</sup> Herbert H. Lehman, Director, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Department of State.

The Librarian of Congress.

The Director of the National Gallery of Art.

The President of the Association of Art Museum Directors.

The President of the Archeological Institute of America.

2. That the United States Department of State be requested, through the appropriate officials in Washington, London and Moscow, to present a request to the British Government and the Government of the Soviet Republic for the formation of a British Committee and a Russian Committee to act with the American Committee in carrying out the work outlined above.

3. It is further recommended that the American, British and Russian Committees form a Subcommittee of Experts in the different fields of art such as:

The Chief Curator of the National Gallery of Art.

The Director of the Chicago Art Institute.

The Director of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.

A representative of the Library of Congress.

A representative of the Archeological Institute of America.

Five representatives of equivalent institutions in England.

Five representatives of equivalent institutions in the Soviet Republic.

4. The function of the American, British and Russian Committees shall be:

A. During the War:

i. The American Committee to work with the appropriate branch of the United States Army, and the British and Russian Committees to work with the appropriate branches of the British and Russian Armies, for the purpose of furnishing to the General Staff of each Army, museum officials and art historians, so that, so far as is consistent with military necessity, works of cultural value may be protected in countries occupied by armies of the United Nations. There are, at present, serving in the armed forces of this country, (and also probably in the British and Russian Armies) qualified museum officials and art historians who could, if desired, be attached to general headquarters of armies on active combat in the European theatre of operation.

ii. To compile, through the assistance of refugee historians of art and librarians, lists of property appropriated by the Axis invading forces, by representatives of Axis governments, and by private citizens of Axis countries. This work should be begun and supervised by the American, British and Russian Subcommittee of Experts under the general direction of the three National Committees.

B. At the time of the Armistice:

i. The American, British and Russian Committees for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments should urge that the Armistice terms include the restitution of public property appropriated by the Axis Powers. Where it is not possible to restore such property, either because it has been destroyed or cannot be found,

restitution in kind should be made by the Axis Powers to the countries from which the property has been taken. In such cases, the Subcommittee of Experts should recommend to the American, British and Russian National Committees a list of equivalent works of art or historic documents which should be transferred to the invaded countries from Axis museums or from the private collections of Axis leaders.

ii. The American, British and Russian National Committees should urge that restitution be made of private property appropriated by the Axis Nations. Claims for such property could be presented to and reviewed by the Subcommittee of Experts which would, in turn, report to the American, British and Russian National Committees and make recommendations for equitable settlements.

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840.403/5a : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>3</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1943—7 p. m.

A-612. The Chief Justice of the United States acting in his capacity as Chairman ex officio of the Board of Trustees of the National Gallery of Art has submitted to the President a plan for the creation of committees in the United States, Great Britain and Russia, to cooperate in effecting a program for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic or historic monuments and records in Europe. The plan anticipates the formulation of a program which would enable the three committees to assist in salvaging and returning to, or compensating in kind, the lawful owners of such objects which have been appropriated by the Axis powers or by individuals acting with the latter's authority or consent.

The President has indicated his approval of the proposal in principle, and has requested the Department to give it further study. It is considered that the adoption of the proposal might have a moral effect of positive advantage to the Allied cause, serving as it would to underscore the criminal acts of the Axis and the determination of the Allies to restore order and justice. You are accordingly requested to approach the government to which you are accredited, inquiring what studies have been made of this problem and what plans have been considered for dealing with it, as well as whether that government would be prepared, in case the project meets with general approval, to appoint a national committee to cooperate with corresponding committees appointed by the other two nations concerned. Please report to the Department by airgram.

HULL

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<sup>3</sup> The same to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union as No. A-16, April 19, 5 p. m.

840.403/10

*President Roosevelt to the Chief Justice of the United States (Stone)*

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: In my letter of December 28, 1942<sup>4</sup> I informed you that the proposal for the creation of an organization for the protection and salvage of artistic and historic monuments in Europe, as set forth in your letter of December 8 written as Chairman ex officio of the Board of Trustees of the National Gallery of Art, had been referred to the appropriate agencies of the Government for study.

Since the proposed American committee would necessarily have to work in close touch with the appropriate branches of the United States armed forces during the war, it was considered appropriate at the very outset to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The matter was accordingly taken up with Admiral Leahy,<sup>5</sup> who replied that, while this undertaking does not appear to promise any military advantage, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement as to its eventual desirability and will, when and if the committee is appointed, direct the American commanders concerned to give the committee every practicable assistance that does not interfere with their military operations.

Since your original memorandum suggested that Governor Lehman be a member of the American committee, a suggestion with which I am in hearty agreement, the proposal was next discussed with him. He replied that it is quite possible that if a United Nations relief and rehabilitation agency is created, it may be willing to interest itself in the plan, but that he cannot, of course, speak for the proposed agency. He added that if the suggested committee is formed, he will be glad indeed to serve as a member.

The next logical step, prior to the formal constitution of an American committee, would appear to be an approach to the British and Soviet Governments, inquiring whether each would be prepared, in case the proposal meets with general approval, to appoint a national committee to cooperate with corresponding committees appointed by the other two nations concerned. This step is now being taken by the American Embassies in London and Moscow. I shall keep you informed of any further developments.

Sincerely yours,

[FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT]

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed.<sup>5</sup> Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

840.403/6 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 7, 1943—12:20 a. m.

[Received June 12—4 p. m.]

A-435. Department's A-612, 7 p. m., April 19. The Embassy has received a note dated May 31, 1943, from the Foreign Office. After referring to the Embassy's note of May 3rd which transmitted as requested by the Department, the suggestion for the creation of Committees in the United States, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to examine the question of works of art looted from European territory, and asked what study the British Government had made of this problem, the Foreign Office note continues as follows:

"2. His Majesty's Government have always had in mind that some sort of Reconstruction Commission, operating probably under the supervision of such United Nations authority as was deemed appropriate, would be required for the purpose *inter alia* of endeavouring to recover looted works of art, and to effect their return to their lawful owners. To the extent, therefore, that the committees, which the United States Government have in mind, could help the work of the Reconstruction Commission by preliminary study and by the collection of information, His Majesty's Government would be in favour of their establishment.

3. The question, however, of deciding on compensation, whether in kind or otherwise, in cases where works of art could not be found or had been damaged, raises problems of a different order. Such demands for compensation will be only one among many categories of claims made against the enemy countries after the war, and it does not seem possible to consider them in isolation. This question seems to His Majesty's Government to be essentially a matter for the Governments concerned, and one which could not usefully be discussed by committees of the kind proposed.

4. It is in any event clear that the machinery required for identifying and recovering works of art will be much the same as in the case of other looted property. It therefore seems important that the functions of the proposed committees should be clearly laid down, and the nature of 'works of art' strictly defined. Is it, for instance, intended that these should include historic and cultural treasures and the contents of libraries? His Majesty's Government would be glad to know what the United States Government have in mind in this connexion.

5. They would also be glad to learn the views of the United States Government on the manner in which such committees, if set up, would operate, and on their general composition and status. His Majesty's Government are not themselves primarily affected by the looting of works of art in Europe, and it seems to them that the major

contribution to the studies of such a committee, if set up in London, would necessarily come from the seven Allied Governments temporarily established in London and from the Greek Government, who maintain a nucleus staff here. This being the case, it would seem that an intergovernmental committee composed of representatives of these Governments and representatives or observers of the United States, Soviet and United Kingdom Governments, if they so wished, would be the most appropriate body for this work in London. His Majesty's Government presume that it would be the intention that the three committees should be given official status, and that the members should represent their respective Governments. If, however, their chief function was to identify works of art the members would presumably need to be experts.

6. His Majesty's Government have not given close study to this problem which, as explained above, is not of direct concern to them, though they are naturally interested in seeing that pillaged property is returned to its rightful owners. Nevertheless, there exists in London a purely unofficial Committee of the Central Institute of Art and Design of the National Gallery, which contains a number of foreign representatives and has already given a considerable amount of preliminary study to the subject. It might be possible to associate this committee with any new body which is set up in London, or at least arrange for the information collected by this unofficial committee to be made available to the new committee. The new committee would also no doubt enjoy the benefit of information collected by the committee set up under the Interallied Declaration of the 5th January, 1943, against Acts of Dispossession.<sup>6</sup>

7. Your Excellency will observe from the above that His Majesty's Government are in general favourably disposed to the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's communication, and they would be glad to have the observations of the United States Government on the points mentioned in this note."

WINANT

840.403/14½

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>7</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I refer to a letter addressed to you by the Honorable Harlan F. Stone, the Chief Justice of the United States, dated December 8, 1942, concerning the creation of an organization to function under the auspices of the Government for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic or historic monuments and records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and returning to the lawful owners such objects as have been appropriated by the

<sup>6</sup> For text of declaration, see p. 443; also printed as British Cmd. 6418, Misc. No. 1 (1943): *Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation or Control.*

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "CH OK FDR 6-23-43."

Axis powers or by individuals acting under their authority or consent. Besides the accomplishment of these worthy objectives, an important advantage to be gained immediately by such an organization is the proclamation to the world, friends and enemies, of our practical concern in protecting these symbols of civilization from injury and spoliation.

In your reply to the Chief Justice, dated December 28, 1942,<sup>8</sup> you advised him of your interest in the formation of such an organization, and stated that his letter had been referred to the appropriate agencies of the Government in order that the proposals set forth might be studied in detail. In your subsequent letter to the Chief Justice, dated April 24, 1943, you advised him of progress which had been made in securing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Governor Lehman, and that inquiries are being made of the British and Soviet Governments through the American Embassies in London and Moscow, inquiring whether each Government would be prepared, in case the proposal meets with general approval, to appoint a National Committee to cooperate with corresponding committees appointed by the other two nations concerned.

I now have to inform you that, under the auspices of the War Department, a special section has been formed in the School of Military Government, functioning at Charlottesville, Virginia, under General Wickersham,<sup>9</sup> with the idea of training certain officers in the Specialist Branch of the service so that they could be attached to the staffs of our armies to advise the commanding officers of such troops as to the location of, and the care to be given to, the various artistic and historic objects in occupied territories. It is contemplated that after the occupied territory has passed from a military to a civilian government, this work would be turned over to the properly constituted civilian authorities representing the United Nations.

It would seem, therefore, that it would now be appropriate to appoint a commission to be known as the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe,<sup>9a</sup> such Commission to advise and to work with the School of Military Government at Charlottesville and subsequent organizations of civilian character which may take over control of occupied territories when it is possible to relinquish military control.

I would suggest for your consideration that Chief Justice Stone, who is Chancellor of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution and also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National

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<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham.

<sup>9a</sup> The title of the Commission was officially changed on April 21, 1944, by the substitution of "War Areas" for "Europe".

Gallery of Art, be requested to serve as Chairman of the Commission; that the Director of the National Gallery of Art, David E. Finley, be appointed Vice-Chairman; and that the other members of the Commission be as follows:

- Governor Lehman, Chairman of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations
- The Librarian of Congress (Hon. Archibald MacLeish)
- The President of the Archeological Institute of America (Dr. William Bell Dinsmoor)
- The Associate Director of the Fogg Museum of Fine Arts at Cambridge, representing American Universities (Dr. Paul Sachs)
- The President of the Association of Art Museum Directors (Mr. Francis Henry Taylor)

The Commission should be authorized to secure, on a volunteer basis, the services of a committee of experts composed of museum directors and other qualified persons to advise on the above project and to furnish information required for carrying it out. Some valuable preliminary work has already been done by individuals in compiling lists of artistic and historic monuments and works of art in both public and private collections in Europe and in compiling charts and maps showing the location of these objects. This material could be collected and made available to the Commission for the use of the armed forces.

The function of the Commission might be:

A. During the War:

i. To work with the appropriate branch of the United States Army, for the purpose of furnishing to the General Staff of the Army, museum officials and art historians, so that, so far as is consistent with military necessity, works of cultural value may be protected in countries occupied by armies of the United Nations. There are, at present, serving in the armed forces of this country, qualified museum officials and art historians who could, if desired, be attached to general headquarters of armies on active combat in the European theatre of operation.

ii. To compile, through the assistance of refugee historians of art and librarians, lists of property appropriated by the Axis invading forces, by representatives of Axis governments, and by private citizens of Axis countries.

B. At the time of the Armistice:

i. The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments should urge that the Armistice terms include the restitution of public property appropriated by the Axis Powers. Where it is not possible to restore such property, either because it has been destroyed or cannot be found, restitution in kind should be made by the Axis Powers to the countries from which the property has been taken. In such cases, the Commission should recommend a list of equivalent works of art or historic documents



which should be transferred to the invaded countries from Axis museums or from the private collections of Axis leaders.

ii. The Commission should urge that restitution be made of private property appropriated by the Axis Nations.

I would suggest that the offices of the Commission be in the National Gallery of Art, in Washington, in order that the Commission may function in close contact with the War Department and with the State Department and other civilian agencies which will later be concerned in the affairs of liberated or occupied territories. I am advised that office space is available in the National Gallery for that purpose.

It is not foreseen that expenses of such a Commission would be an item of importance as it is contemplated that the members would serve without compensation; but I would suggest that from some funds already available about \$25,000 be set aside for such clerical and other expense as may be necessary.

If this proposal meets with your approval, I shall be glad to approach the various officials suggested above to ascertain whether they would be willing to serve on such a Commission.

I have consulted with Secretary Stimson<sup>10</sup> concerning this matter and he is in accord with these suggestions.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

840.403/10

*The Secretary of State to the Chief Justice of the United States  
(Stone)*

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: I refer to your recommendations to the President concerning the creation of a national commission to function under the auspices of this Government and in conjunction with similar groups in other countries for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic and historical records in Europe and to aid in salvaging and returning to the lawful owners such objects as have been appropriated by the Axis Powers or by individuals acting under their authority or consent.

I am now glad to inform you that the President has approved the establishment of "The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe". As you are aware, the President after receiving your recommendations requested the Department to seek the views of the appropriate officials of the Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Governor Lehman

<sup>10</sup> Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

indicated a willingness to assist in this undertaking and I can assure you that this Department will be happy to collaborate in every possible way. Communications have also been sent to the British and the Soviet Governments inquiring whether they would be prepared to appoint similar national commissions.

It is contemplated that the members of the Commission will serve for a period of three years and will cooperate with the appropriate branches of the Army and of the Department of State, including the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, as well as with appropriate civilian agencies.

The President has now authorized me to inquire whether you are in a position to accept the Chairmanship of this Commission. I sincerely hope you will find it possible to undertake this important service.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

840.403/24

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>11</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I refer to previous correspondence concerning the establishment of "The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe". You will recall that the plan contemplates that this national Commission shall function under the auspices of this Government and in conjunction with similar groups abroad. Its object is to protect and conserve works of art and artistic and historical records in Europe and to aid in salvaging and returning to the owners artistic objects which have been appropriated by the Axis Powers or by their agents.

In pursuance of this initiative you authorized me to inquire whether the following persons would accept membership:

- The Chief Justice of the United States, *Chairman*;
- The Honorable David E. Finley, Director, National Gallery of Art, *Vice-Chairman*;
- The Honorable Herbert H. Lehman, Chairman, Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations;
- The Honorable Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress;
- Dr. William Bell Dinsmoor, President, Archeological Institute of America;
- Dr. Paul Sachs, Associate Director, Fogg Museum of Fine Arts;
- Dr. Francis Henry Taylor, President, Association of Art Museum Directors.

<sup>11</sup> Marginal note: "CH OK very good FDR."

The Chief Justice of the United States replied that he was obliged reluctantly to decline the invitation because his obligations to the Court preclude his assuming any other continuing responsibilities. The other persons who were invited to serve have accepted membership on the Commission.

Informal recommendations have been received that Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts be requested to accept the chairmanship of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe. I understand that the Chief Justice is agreeable to this designation. I heartily concur in this felicitous choice and I further suggest, after consultation with the appropriate officials, that Mr. Huntington Cairns, Secretary-Treasurer and General Counsel of the National Gallery of Art, be designated as Secretary-Treasurer of the Commission.

I shall appreciate your informing me whether these suggestions meet with your approval.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

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[For text of press release issued by the Department of State, August 20, 1943, announcing the establishment of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 21, 1943, page 111.]

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840.403/36 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>12</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1943—11 : 10 a. m.

A-1370. Your A-435, June 7, 12:20 a. m. The President has approved the establishment of an American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, composed of the following:

*Members:*<sup>13</sup>

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,  
*Chairman;*  
The Honorable David E. Finley, Director, National Gallery of Art,  
*Vice-Chairman;*

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<sup>12</sup> Similar airgram sent on the same date to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union as No. A-24.

<sup>13</sup> In a letter dated November 8, President Roosevelt inquired whether former Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York would be in a position to accept membership on the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe. A certificate of designation, following his acceptance, was transmitted by the Secretary of State on December 31.

The Honorable Herbert H. Lehman, Special Assistant to the President;  
The Honorable Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress;  
Dr. William Bell Dinsmoor, President, Archeological Institute of America;  
Dr. Paul J. Sachs, Associate Director, Fogg Museum of Fine Arts;  
Dr. Francis Henry Taylor, President, Association of Art Museum Directors.

*Secretary-Treasurer:*

Mr. Huntington Cairns, Secretary-Treasurer and General Counsel, National Gallery of Art.

The Department referred certain of the points raised in the note of the Foreign Office of May 31, 1943 to the Commission. As soon as the Commission's comments are received the Department will send a reply to the whole note.

A confidential airgram has been received from the Embassy at Moscow,<sup>14</sup> the pertinent portions of which are as follows:

"a note dated August 5, 1943, has been received from the Foreign Office in reply to the Embassy's note of May 31, concerning the protection of works of art and historical monuments. The reply states that:

"the questions referred to in this note fall within the competence of the Extraordinary Commission for establishing and investigating the crimes of the German-Fascist usurpers and their accomplices and the damage done by them to the citizens, collective farmers, public organizations, State enterprises and institutions of the USSR, established by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of November 2, 1942.

"Having in view the communication of the Embassy regarding the plan for the creation of a committee for collaborating in the realization of a program of preserving and guarding art monuments, historical monuments and works of art in Europe, the People's Commissariat hopes that the Embassy will be good enough to inform the People's Commissariat of further measures relating to this question".

"The decree referred to was published in *Izvestiya* on November 6, 1942".

As approved by the President, the American Commission will cooperate with such other national commissions as may be established for the purpose of taking steps to protect and conserve works of art and artistic or historical monuments and records in Europe and to aid in salvaging and returning to the lawful owners such objects as have been appropriated by the Axis powers or by individuals acting under their authority or consent. Under the auspices of the War Department a special section has been formed in the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, for the purpose of training certain officers in the Specialist Branch of the service so that they could

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<sup>14</sup> Airgram No. A-7, August 11, 4 p. m.

be attached to the staffs of our armies to advise the commanding officers of such troops as to the location of and the care to be given to the various artistic and historic objects in occupied territory. It is contemplated that after the occupied territory has passed from a military to a civilian government, this work would be turned over to the properly constituted authorities representing the United Nations.

The Commission is to secure, on a volunteer basis, the services of a committee of experts composed of museum directors and other qualified persons to advise on the above project and to furnish information required for carrying it out.

The Commission will have its offices in the National Gallery of Art at Washington and will function in close contact with the War Department and the State Department, as well as civilian agencies which will later be concerned in the affairs of liberated or occupied territories.

HULL

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840.408/883

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to Justice Owen J. Roberts, Chairman of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. JUSTICE: The President referred to the Secretary of State a letter of August 12, 1943 from the Honorable Archibald MacLeish suggesting the desirability of effecting some international agreement to restrict the transfers of valuable books in the liberated areas of Europe and to protect cultural materials against disposition under the pressure of economic distress. For your information a copy of Mr. MacLeish's letter is enclosed.<sup>15</sup>

Secretary Hull in a letter of September 13, 1943<sup>15</sup> informed the President that he believed it would be desirable for the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe to undertake a thorough study of this question and to make appropriate recommendations before any approaches are made to foreign governments in this regard. The Secretary added that if this procedure met with the President's approval, he would submit the question to your Commission and that he also had in mind consulting the appropriate national and international bodies with a view to obtaining technical information at their disposal as well as their suggestions concerning the most effective means of assuring

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<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

successful international cooperation in achieving the objectives described by Mr. MacLeish.

The President approved these suggestions and I am therefore writing to inquire whether the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe will be willing to undertake a study of this proposal and communicate its recommendations to the Department.<sup>16</sup> In the meantime, the Department will initiate its consultation with the appropriate national and international groups.

I am confident that Mr. MacLeish will be glad to assist the other members of the Commission in connection with the proposed inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

A. A. BERLE, JR.

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[For texts of orders with respect to the protection of historic monuments issued on December 29, 1943, by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, and by General Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces, see the *United Nations Review*, volume IV, 1944, No. 3, pages 93-94.]

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<sup>16</sup> In a letter dated October 19, 1943 (not printed), Mr. Justice Roberts informed Assistant Secretary of State Berle that the Commission would undertake a study of this proposal.

## PEACE-FEELER APPROACHES FROM THE AXIS NATIONS <sup>1</sup>

740.00119 European War 1939/1927 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*<sup>1a</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1943—7 p. m.

The Department has received an increasing number of reports indicating the desire of various of the so-called "satellite states" to establish contact with official or unofficial representatives of the United States. All of these reports have one common element: the individuals desire assurance that their territories will be maintained at the end of the war.

There is an official mission from Hungary at present in Ankara. Semi-official attempts have been made in Stockholm and in Lisbon. Unofficial individuals claiming to represent various parties in Rumania, notably Maniu and Mihai Antonescu, have appeared both in Switzerland and in Turkey. Though the Department has no direct reports, it is clear that a number of Bulgarians are endeavoring to do the same thing in Turkey.

Since contact with the missions of the United States is obviously impossible, these emissaries frequently endeavor to make contact through representatives of the Office of War Information, or of the various Intelligence services. The Department has uniformly declined to permit discussion, though it has not interfered with the gathering of information from these, and other enemy nationals, by the Intelligence services. The Department has pointed out to the representatives of the Intelligence services and the Office of War Information that this Government was associated with British and the Soviet Union in the present war, and that care must be taken that no action or utterance should occur which might be misconstrued as being contrary to the spirit of our common effort.

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<sup>1</sup> In an *aide-memoire* of June 18, 1942, the British Embassy informed the Department that during the past few months there had come to the attention of the British authorities a number of indirect approaches from persons claiming to represent alleged anti-Nazi groups in Germany. The British Government inquired as to any information the Department of State might have of this nature. On June 23, the Secretary of State informed the British Ambassador orally that there had been no such peace feelers of a tangible nature reaching this country. (740.00119 European War 1939/1060, 1057)

<sup>1a</sup> The same to the American diplomatic missions in Stockholm, Madrid, and Lisbon.

All services having representatives in the country to which you are accredited have been instructed to report to you any contact purporting to be on behalf of an enemy government or group, and thereafter to follow your guidance.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/1948 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 21, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

W6. Argentine Ambassador <sup>2</sup> informs me that Rumanian Minister <sup>3</sup> on behalf of his Government yesterday requested him and Portuguese Ambassador <sup>4</sup> to serve as intermediaries in communicating Rumania's desire to make peace with United Nations at earliest possible moment.

HAYES

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740.00119 European War 1939/1958 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 23, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received March 25—1:12 a. m.]

W7. Argentine Ambassador has given me following additional details on subject of my W6, March 21. Rumanian Minister has just returned from Bucharest. He had been charged to contact Portuguese and Argentine Ambassadors by Antonescu <sup>5</sup> who had been with Hitler at latter's headquarters (apparently only 2 weeks ago). Antonescu had had lengthy conversations with Hitler on whose behalf he gave Rumanian Minister his instructions.

Hitler is a changed man. He no longer thinks it possible for Germany to win the war. However, Germany still bulwarks against communism which in event of German defeat would engulf Europe. Hitler asks understanding from United States and Britain. He will agree to restore all conquered territories including Poland to prewar boundaries but will want part of Ukraine under protectorate. Peace would be guaranteed by united force of Germans and Anglo-Saxons.

Argentine Ambassador said he inquired what would be done with Hitler. Minister said he would have to stay. He had done such marvelous work in Germany. German people had confidence in him and were solidly behind him.

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<sup>2</sup> Alberto Palacios Costa.

<sup>3</sup> Nicolas Dimitresco.

<sup>4</sup> Pedro Teotonio Pereira.

<sup>5</sup> Ion Antonescu, Rumanian Chief of State.



Ambassador replied he had no idea we would deal with Hitler and that his own Government would not look favorably on dealings with Hitler.

I told Ambassador I would transmit his message but that I could tell him in advance the answer would be no.

Rumanian Minister told Ambassador in passing that Rumanian casualties have been 50 percent, that Russians have new guns better than those supplied by Germans and that Rumania is at the end of its ropes.

HAYES

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740.00119 European War 1939/1358 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1943—11 a. m.

W-5. Your W 6 and W 7, March 21 and 23. The Department will continue to receive with interest further communications along this line. For your information and guidance, however, the Department does not wish you to give your Argentine colleague the impression that you have received any indication of interest, or even any reply, from your Government concerning the messages he communicated to you.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/1446

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

A tendency to establish contact with British representatives abroad as a reinsurance against a German defeat is common to all the minor German satellites in Europe and should increase with further Axis reverses. His Majesty's Government have therefore been considering whether it might now be advisable to endeavour further to weaken the already faltering loyalty of these countries to the Axis and for this purpose to modify the entirely negative attitude which His Majesty's Government have hitherto adopted towards any peace feelers from these countries. His Majesty's Government have however reached the conclusion that the position of the various minor satellites, as summarised in the immediately following paragraphs, differs so greatly that it is neither possible nor desirable to adopt a common line in regard either to peace feelers emanating from them or to British propaganda towards them.

*Finland.* One of the principal preoccupations of the Finnish Government has been to convince their own people (and the world in general) that they are not participating in the general war but are merely fighting against Soviet Russia and that the United States of America, and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain, will protect them at the end of the war. In agreement with the United States Government His Majesty's Government have, therefore, been at pains to impress upon the Finns that this is not so.<sup>6</sup> His Majesty's Government do not themselves in any case desire to be concerned with mediatory action between the Finnish and Soviet Governments and would propose, if they receive peace feelers from or on behalf of the Finnish Government, to make it clear that in their view it is with the Soviet Government that the Finns must deal and that His Majesty's Government cannot serve as a means of approach.

*Roumania.* His Majesty's Government have received from the Roumanian Government no approach that could properly be called a peace feeler. Should they receive any, His Majesty's Government would take the line that the Soviet Union is primarily concerned as bearing the main burden of the war being waged by Roumania in alliance with Germany and Italy and should be approached in the first place. His Majesty's Government consider that the Soviet Government are in a better position than they are themselves to hold out inducements to the Roumanians to abandon the Axis.

*Hungary.* The existing opposition to the despatch of Hungarian troops to the Eastern front has been much strengthened by the recent disasters to the Hungarian armies in the east. Hungary has succeeded in preserving a greater degree of independence than any other satellite in South Eastern Europe. A relatively strong democratic opposition has emerged based mainly on the Peasant and Socialist Parties, upon the Trades Union organizations, which still function in Hungary, and upon the intellectuals. There is also a right-wing opposition, with which Count Bethlen<sup>7</sup> is connected, guided mainly by nationalist and anti-German feelings. Leaders of these organizations have been surprisingly outspoken and speeches have been made inside and outside the Hungarian Parliament condemning the present orientation of Hungarian policy. The Primate, Cardinal Serebi, has also denounced Nazi conceptions publicly. Baranyai, the Governor of the National Bank, has recently resigned in protest against Hungarian concessions to Germany. There have been not unsuccessful efforts in Hungary to moderate the persecution of the Jews.

<sup>6</sup> For correspondence regarding the attitude of the United States toward the participation of Finland in the war, see vol. III, pp. 213 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Count Stephen Bethlen, former Premier of Hungary.

Finally developments in Italy have closely influenced Hungarian policy for many years past and any further weakening in Italy's position and especially in her ties with Germany will have a close effect upon Hungarian policy.

Although His Majesty's Government do not consider that any early and decisive change in Hungarian policy is likely, the general background seems favourable for some slight modification of the rigid attitude which His Majesty's Government have hitherto adopted towards Hungary. They accordingly propose in response to any serious Hungarian peace feelers and in their propaganda to Hungary to follow in future the following line:—His Majesty's Government cannot enter into any undertakings regarding the future of Hungary nor are they prepared to negotiate with individual Hungarians on the basis that they may in due course be in a position to establish a Hungarian Government. However, instead of confining themselves to saying as hitherto, that "so long as Hungary continues to fight against our Allies and to help the Axis she can expect neither sympathy nor consideration," His Majesty's Government would propose in future to add that they have been glad to note certain developments within Hungary in the right direction, such as those referred to in the preceding paragraph, but that they obviously can have nothing to do with a regime which allied itself with the Axis and, without provocation, attacked in turn Great Britain's, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Soviet Allies. With a view to disposing of Hungarian fears of a new and more far-reaching Trianon settlement,<sup>8</sup> the line might then be developed that, although Hungary will have to make adequate restitution to our Allies, His Majesty's Government have no desire to see Hungary torn to pieces or to penalise the Hungarian people for the follies of their Governments. Our attitude and that of our Allies will inevitably be influenced by the practical steps taken by the Hungarians themselves to free themselves from Axis domination and to hasten the victory of the United Nations and their own liberation. In this connection attention would be drawn to the Secretary of State's<sup>9</sup> reply to a question by Mr. Mander in the House of Commons on the 16th December last, of which a copy is attached.<sup>10</sup> Great care will of course have to be taken in regard to Czechoslovak and Yugoslav susceptibilities although there have recently been signs of a less rigid attitude towards Hungary from the Czechoslovak side.

<sup>8</sup> Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, signed at Trianon June 4, 1920, *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. III, p. 3539.

<sup>9</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>10</sup> Not reprinted; Mr. Eden, in reply to Mr. Mander's question on whether the British Government favored a Danubian federation, stated that the British would continue to foster such organization.

As regards the recent Hungarian approaches, summarised in the enclosed memorandum,<sup>11</sup> His Majesty's Government are inclined to think that those received through Angora, in particular that from Professor Szentgyörgyi,<sup>12</sup> are in a somewhat different category from those made previously. The earlier approaches had all been clearly instigated by the Hungarian Government in an attempt to reinsure their own position; and His Majesty's Government still see no advantage in adopting a forthcoming attitude towards them. Professor Szentgyörgyi on the other hand appears to enjoy a certain independence and in many respects he seems to be a person with whom discreet contact might usefully be maintained through suitable underground channels. It is accordingly proposed to arrange for Professor Szentgyörgyi to be informed that his views have been transmitted to London and that the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Hungary is that summarised in the preceding paragraph.

*Bulgaria.* Bulgaria seems to be in a somewhat similar position to Hungary though she is not at war with the Soviet Union. His Majesty's Government have hitherto received no indications of peace feelers from the Bulgarian Government. If any approaches are made in the future it will be open to His Majesty's Government to decide on their merits whether or not they should be pursued. It should be borne in mind, however, that any negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Bulgarians would at once arouse the deepest suspicion on the part of the Greek, Yugoslav and Turkish Governments. In the meantime a propaganda line similar *mutatis mutandis* to that proposed for Hungary would also be appropriate in the case of Bulgaria.

Before initiating any action on the lines suggested in the preceding paragraphs His Majesty's Government would however in the first place be glad to receive the early observations of the United States Government on the general considerations set out in them. No attempt has been made here to deal with His Majesty's Government's attitude towards Italy, the major German satellite. Nor of course are His Majesty's Government prepared to modify their propaganda or their attitude towards the Quisling<sup>13</sup> administrations in Slovakia or Croatia, since they regard the problems of Slovakia and Croatia as being respectively internal Czechoslovak and Yugoslav affairs, which properly fall for consideration in the first place by our Czechoslovak and Yugoslav allies.

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1943.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12</sup> Albert Szentgyörgyi, Hungarian scientist and Nobel prize winner.

<sup>13</sup> Vidkun Quisling was Minister-President of the puppet government set up by the Germans in Norway.

740.00119 European War 1939/1423

*The Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: Pursuant to your letter of March 27, 1943<sup>15</sup> (Reference A-B) we have instructed our representatives in Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey in language of which the following is a paraphrase:

"At the request of the Under Secretary of State you are hereby instructed that in case contact is made with you by anyone purporting to speak on behalf of any enemy government or group within an enemy country you shall report this fact immediately to the American Ambassador or Minister resident in the country where you are stationed. In case of need such report may be given instead to the nearest American Consul.

"The above instruction is issued in view of the increasing number of efforts which are being made from the Axis satellite states to contact American Government officials."

Mr. Berle<sup>16</sup> has been informed of certain such approaches, already made indirectly to our representative in Switzerland. For your and his convenient reference we attach briefs covering such approaches.<sup>15</sup> In all these cases the American Minister has been simultaneously informed by our representative with whom he is working closely.

These proposals are the only ones known to us to have been made to our people in any of the countries mentioned above. Under our previous instructions they have been bound to report such overtures to American diplomatic officers in the country where they are stationed. These new instructions will confirm and regularize existing practice.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

740.00119 European War 1939/1447

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The *aide-mémoire* dated April 6th left by Sir Ronald Campbell<sup>17</sup> with Mr. Dunn<sup>18</sup> on April 7th described the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards peace feelers put forward by the minor German satellites in Europe.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.<sup>16</sup> Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.<sup>17</sup> British Minister.<sup>18</sup> James C. Dunn, Political Adviser and member of the Committee on Political Planning.

Three further approaches have been made to His Majesty's Government in the past few days.

His Majesty's Minister at Berne<sup>19</sup> has reported that the Hungarian Minister in Vichy has attempted through the Brazilian Minister to get into touch with the United States Minister<sup>20</sup> and himself. Mr. Norton and his United States colleague declined to have anything to do with the matter. It is, however, understood that the United States Minister has reported to his Government. Mr. Norton's attitude has been approved and he has been instructed, in the event of further approaches being made, to continue for the present to take the same line.

His Majesty's Minister at Berne has also reported that Monsieur de Barcza, who until 1941 was Hungarian Minister in London, is about to visit Switzerland. Mr. Norton is being instructed that he should not himself have any dealings with him but that other arrangements are being made to find out discreetly what if anything he may have to say.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara has reported that his Netherlands colleague has received a visit from a Hungarian, Charles Schrecker, who stated that he had been asked by a number of leading Hungarians, from Conservatives to Socialists, to explain to His Majesty's Government Hungary's past and present position and his views as to the future and to obtain information as regards the views of His Majesty's Government. The Netherlands Minister understood that Schrecker's visit had been made with the knowledge of the Hungarian Prime Minister<sup>21</sup> and that he had a letter which he wished to deliver to His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Ambassador is being instructed that he should not himself enter into contact with Schrecker but that arrangements are being made through other channels to find out what he may have to say.

The above information is being communicated to the Soviet Government.

In view of these further developments, His Majesty's Government would appreciate receiving the early comments of the United States Government upon the proposals contained in the *aide-mémoire* of April 6th.

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1943.

<sup>19</sup> Clifford J. Norton.

<sup>20</sup> The United States Minister, Leland Harrison, reported this approach in telegram No. 2319 from Bern, April 13, 1 p. m. (864.00/1060).

<sup>21</sup> Miklos Kállay de Nagykálló.

740.00119 European War 1939/1446

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State is in general agreement with the views suggested in the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of April 6, outlining the position of the British Government as regards peacefeelerers emanating from the minor German satellite states.

The attitude of the British Government on this subject in relation to Finland and Rumania, as outlined in the *aide-mémoire*, has been noted and requires no comment at this time.

It is noted that with particular attention to Hungary and Bulgaria the British Government are considering whether it might now be advisable to modify the entirely negative attitude which has hitherto been maintained. While concurring in this view, because of the advantages in psychological warfare which may result therefrom, the Department of State would like to make certain observations relative to the situation in these two countries.

*Hungary.* The Department of State sees no reason to question the genuineness of the various Hungarian approaches mentioned in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*. It believes, however, that neither the friendly elements within the present Hungarian Government nor individuals or groups which, in opposition to the Government, might hope to effect a change of regime, would be able at this stage to accomplish the fundamental changes of Hungarian policy, which would be necessary in order to promise a definite advantage to the United Nations. Moreover, it is feared that premature efforts to this end would result only in the liquidation of those elements which would be most useful to the United Nations at the moment when a far-reaching action within Hungary would offer the best prospects of success. The Department is also of the opinion that the individuals now in positions of high authority in the Hungarian Government should be considered as primarily interested in the tenure of the present regime; consequently propositions emanating from them should be regarded in that light with extreme reserve. With these reservations, the Department acknowledges the advantage of a somewhat less rigid attitude as suggested in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, as a means of bringing the Hungarian people themselves to a realization of the practical steps they must take to free themselves from Axis domination and contribute to the victory of the United Nations.

*Bulgaria.* The general tenor of reports reaching the Department indicates that the Bulgarian people, as compared with the Hungarians, are less ready to admit the mistakes of their Government's policy, or

to take the positive action which would be necessary if they are to make any effective contribution to the defeat of the Axis. It may be suspected, therefore, that there is an element of "re-insurance" in whatever peacefeeler may have been made thus far, if emanating from official quarters. The Department therefore believes that the agencies concerned with the state of public opinion in Bulgaria should intensify their efforts to bring about a change in Bulgarian mentality, preliminary to any indication of interest in anything Bulgarian spokesmen may have to say. To this end the propaganda line indicated in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* would appear to offer an effective means of testing the real sentiments of those elements in Bulgaria which might be useful in the prosecution of the war.

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1943.

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871.00/979: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 13, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received August 14—12: 38 p. m.]

2538. Maniu,<sup>22</sup> leader Rumanian party, has by reliable intermediary sent to Stockholm message for transmission to American and British Governments. Manner in which this reached Legation and various comments on message are reported in my 2539, August 13, 5 p. m.<sup>23</sup>

Following is broad paraphrase of message as it reached Legation.

"Both National Peasants Party and Liberals have completely organized whole of Rumania, a town by town, province by province, preparing for day when present regime be overthrown. Each man knows exactly what to do, how to act, where to go when hour strikes. This organization been achieved because about 90% of Rumanian people, including Army, *bourgeoisie* and most Government employees are pro-Allied.

2. As leader of United Opposition, I pledge my word to both American and British Governments that within 24 hours from time British-American forces reach Danube present dictatorship will be overthrown and that with Army's help but without blood the democratic regime will come into power. United Opposition has been given free hand by Mihai Antonescu.<sup>24</sup> (Germans repeated insistence he be removed thus far stubbornly refused by Marshal Antonescu<sup>25</sup>).

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<sup>22</sup> Iulius Maniu, Rumanian Peasant Party leader.

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

<sup>24</sup> Vice President of Rumanian Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>25</sup> Marshal Jon Antonescu, Rumanian Chief of State.



3. I earnestly request American and British Government not to urge in radio broadcasts to Rumania that people should conduct sabotage campaign against Germans or revolt against present regime for following reasons:

(a) Only possibility for United Opposition to organize country for Allies is under peaceful conditions.

(b) Nazis are still strong enough to paralyze completely possibility of internal resistance and drastic steps surely be taken if revolt occurs prematurely.

(c) If Germans given excuse to crack down, Hungary and Bulgaria may be expected promptly occupy Transylvania and Dobruja. This point also concerns Allies because strong Rumania, militarily and administratively, must be in their interest.

4. Believing I could serve my country's interests better outside Rumania, I had intention to depart but have not been able to do so since my movements closely watched by Germans who informed me they would consider my departure as act of rebellion. I ask American and British Governments place full confidence in me no matter what may happen."

Foregoing is said to be message proper but Maniu also transmitted following additional information likewise said to be intended for American and British Governments.

1. Within a week (of August 6) United Opposition will submit direct to King an extensive memorandum in which it will ask:

(a) Immediate withdrawal of Rumanian Army to the Dniester.

(b) Change in Rumanian foreign policy at earliest possible date.

2. Present Rumanian Government and United Opposition agree on necessity of defending Bessarabia. Delta of Danube is European as well as Rumanian problem and if held by Russia would constitute threat to Straits and Suez. Rumania will not negotiate with Russia without receiving definite and well-founded guarantees from British and Americans, with whom, however, it is ready to negotiate.

3. Both Governments and United Opposition agree Transylvania is Rumania's most vital problem but disagree on suggestions for its solution. This is subject of frequent discussions between these two groups.

(a) Government proposes rectification of boundaries based on population exchange on same basis as Rumanian delegation's proposals to Hungary at Turnu-Severin August 1940.<sup>25a</sup>

(b) Opposition opposes change of boundaries but advocates resettlement of Rumanian minorities from Trans Istria and Balkans in Transylvanian districts now inhabited by Hungarians. Latter would

<sup>25a</sup> See *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. X, pp. 547-549.

be moved to sub-Carpathian Ukraine whose Ruthenian population would be moved to Ukraine proper.

4. Fact Americans have not bombed civilian objectives has made excellent impression and it is hoped this policy be continued. Without deprecating effects of bombing Rumanian oil fields fact is Rumanians suffered greater losses because Germans long been refining crude oil production for their use elsewhere. American prisoners taken in raid are well treated and still in Rumanian hands as Antonescu has refused Germans' request they be surrendered to them.

5. Allies are reminded organization of united powerful opposition throughout whole Rumania is unique among occupied countries, that it has been possible to build up this organization because of conditions which permitted opposition work relatively freely and that Nazis must not be given provocation to start terror which would end possibilities of achieving maximum constructive results.

JOHNSON

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741.74/12

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

After the careful study of the document prepared by the Office of War Information and entitled "Long Range Plan for Bulgaria",<sup>28</sup> His Majesty's Government feel that it should be helpful to present the following review of their policy towards Bulgaria, and a statement about the line of propaganda adopted in consequence of this policy.

In the months preceding the rupture of diplomatic relations in March, 1941 between this country and Bulgaria, repeated warnings were given to the Bulgarian Government regarding the consequences that would follow Bulgarian surrender to Germany and above all any attack by Bulgaria on her neighbours. His Majesty's Government gave Bulgaria every inducement and all support in their power to maintain her independence. Nevertheless, Bulgaria finally succumbed to German pressure and when the German troops marched in, actively co-operated with them, an attitude in sharp contrast to the passive attitude of an unwilling victim, for example Denmark. Later when the Germans invaded Greece and Jugoslavia, Bulgarian troops followed in their wake playing the part of the jackal and making good territorial claims against these countries the satisfaction of which by forcefulness the Bulgarian Government had solemnly renounced as late as January, 1940.

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<sup>28</sup> No copy of this OWI document has been found in the OWI files in the National Archives.

In his final interviews with the King of the Bulgarians<sup>27</sup> and the Bulgarian President of the Council,<sup>28</sup> His Majesty's Minister, Sir George Rendel, made it clear that Bulgaria must accept responsibility for the consequences of her traitorous action. It is worth recalling that when Sir George expressed his deep regret that His Majesty's Government's policy of trying to preserve Bulgarian independence had failed, M. Filoff replied that the question of the maintenance of Bulgarian independence was one with which the Bulgarian Government had been and were competent to deal with without our help. To this His Majesty's Minister answered that he would take careful note of this statement since it might prove of great importance at a future conference to know that the Bulgarian President of the Council at this crisis in Bulgarian history had taken full responsibility for the effect which the Bulgarian Government's present policy might ultimately have on Bulgaria's independence. Throughout the two interviews, moreover, neither the Bulgarian King nor his Minister could advance any better excuse for Bulgaria's capitulation than that a German victory was inevitable.

His Majesty's Government therefore regard Bulgaria's inclusion in the Axis camp as the result of a deliberate decision taken with full knowledge and warning of the consequences. They refuse to recognise the annexation by Bulgaria of Greek and Yugoslav territory and they regard themselves in no way committed to the survival of a sovereign Bulgarian state. His Majesty's Government's tentative idea regarding the future of South East Europe is that these regions should be grouped in some form of confederation, the exact organisation of which, both as regards its federal mechanism and its internal and external frontiers, being a matter which must be settled at the peace conference by the interested belligerent powers, and particularly with the co-operation and agreement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Such a confederation must naturally include Bulgaria, and in the cursory discussions which His Majesty's Government have had with the Soviet Government on the question, the latter raised no objection in principle to the inclusion of Bulgaria in such an organisation. On the other hand, it is impossible at this stage to say whether Bulgaria would form part of this organisation as an independent state, and consequently, although there may be much in favour of the idea of the Bulgarian people forming an independent state, His Majesty's Government feel it would be unwise to commit themselves to a pledge of this nature.

As regards His Majesty's Government's attitude towards the Saxe-Coburg dynasty, it will be recalled that the present war is the third

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<sup>27</sup> Boris III of the House of Saxe-Coburg.

<sup>28</sup> Bogdan Filoff.

occasion on which a member of this House has been party to a treacherous attack on one of its neighbours. The responsibility in the present instance cannot be transferred from the King to the Bulgarian Government, who are regarded by Bulgarian people as the creatures of their King, and are so in fact. If the future of South East Europe is on a federal basis, there will moreover be no place for a Bulgaria ruled over by a member of the present royal House because of the natural and justified feelings of rancour with which he would be regarded by the neighbouring states, and particularly the royal Houses of Jugoslavia and Greece. His Majesty's Government therefore cannot have any dealings with King Boris, whose fate they regard as a matter of indifference, any more than they can have with the present government. The King is a man of no little ability and cunning, but morally weak and incapable of courageous decision, a true son of his father. Any attempt to give him support in the hopes of detaching Bulgaria from the Axis would probably fail and we should merely compromise ourselves in the eyes of our Balkan allies and the world besides laying up for ourselves incalculable difficulties in our plans for the future of South Eastern Europe.

The policy of His Majesty's Government towards Bulgaria being of this character, it follows that our Bulgarian propaganda must be of a similar nature. The general lines were set out in the *Aide-Mémoire* given to the State Department, and dated April 6, 1943. We can only impress on the Bulgarian people that the misery into which they are gradually being drawn is the responsibility of the present regime, and that their only hope is to rid themselves of the people who have betrayed them either by revolution or by unconditional surrender to the armies of liberation when the time comes. We can make no promise and give no undertakings regarding the future of Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian people must trust that by honourable capitulation they will find the only way out of their present misery.

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1943.

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740.00119 European War 1939/1614 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 27, 1943—4 p. m.  
[Received August 28—2:30 a. m.]

1196. Personal for the Secretary. In conversation with Molotov<sup>29</sup> last night the British Ambassador<sup>30</sup> informed the Foreign Minister of

<sup>29</sup> Vyacheslav Mikailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>30</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

certain Hungarian peace feelers which had come to the attention of his Government. These feelers involved an approach to the British Embassy in Istanbul made by a certain Veres, a Hungarian official who claimed he represented a group made up of the Hungarian Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the General Staff, and other important Hungarian officials. The approach encompassed the unconditional surrender of Hungary. Clark Kerr stated that British Embassy had been instructed to verify Veres' good faith and to listen to what he had to say but to take no further action. Molotov appeared to be somewhat suspicious and asked many questions as to who Veres represented and how the British Government viewed the matter. Clark Kerr stated that his Government believed that Veres was worth listening to and that once his full story had been known it would, of course, be communicated to the Soviet Government.

STANDLEY

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740.00119 European War 1939/1928

*The Military Attaché in Portugal (Solborg) to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence, G-2 (Kroner)*<sup>31</sup>

No. 201

[LISBON,] 14 September, 1943.

DEAR GENERAL KRONER :

1. I wish to report on the conversation I have had with a Hungarian diplomat who has arrived in this country a short time ago and is now accredited here as Counsellor to the Hungarian Legation. His name is Alexander de Hollan, a career diplomat previously "en poste" in Bucharest, Vienna, Paris, Berlin and Madrid. A man in his early forties, of pleasing personality, with perfect command of French and German languages, who I understand is related to the best families in Hungary.

2. The interview was arranged through Dom Saldanha da Gama in his country home at night; only de Hollan and Saldanha being present. I was formerly told by the latter that the Hungarian wished to meet me, and having consulted Mr. Kennan<sup>32</sup> on the subject I consented on the following conditions:

- a. Meeting to be absolutely unofficial on both sides.
- b. Mr. de Hollan to be aware of the fact that I would ask him questions of military and politico-military nature which I should expect him to answer.
- c. That I would answer no leading questions and would offer no encouragement to his demands if any.

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<sup>31</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Maj. Gen. George V. Strong.

<sup>32</sup> George F. Kennan, Counselor of Legation in Portugal.

d. That no matters relating to restoration of Habsburg monarchy would be raised.

3. This background was scrupulously observed and I have found Mr. de Hollan a gentleman of great tact and sincerity. He told me that Hungary wishes to quit the Axis at the earliest opportunity and he intimated that the Hungarian Army, about 500,000 strong, would cooperate with Allied forces once the latter are within negotiable distance. He mentioned the strong affinity Hungary possesses for Poland and that they would welcome Polish troops on their soil when the appropriate time comes.

4. He stated that his government asked Berlin for permission to withdraw Hungarian occupationary divisions from Russia and was told that the Government of the Reich would consent only if the Hungarian government would send equivalent number of troops to Croatia or the Balkans. His government has turned down this proposal. It will be noted that there are roughly 9 divisions in Russia, plus aviation brigade of 8 squadrons and some labor battalions, totaling roughly 120,000 men.

5. He invoked two extenuating circumstances, which to his mind should serve to benevolently consider the case of Hungary, namely: her friendly treatment of Polish problems (borne out by other sources); and the fact that the armistice terms granted Hungary in 1918 have been violated on several occasions by the then forces of occupation (at the instigation of neighboring countries) which justified Hungarian initial mistrust of Allied motives in this war.

6. He further stated that Hungary would be willing to reach an amicable solution of the Transylvanian problem providing the settlement would be final and definite and, he added, that the creation of an autonomous Slovakia economically united to Czech state would be favorably envisaged by his government in the post war adjustment. He said that his government is desirous of establishing contact with the Yugoslav government but opined that in view of the deep seated passions and divergences between the Croats and the Serbs, also the very big difference between the cultural levels of the two respective countries he failed to see how they can again form a political entity.

7. My interlocutor concluded by saying, that generally speaking and in his personal opinion, his government wishes to be guided by the desiderata of the Allied leaders in all the above mentioned problems and would wish to receive directives as to its immediate attitude and conduct. This, said he, particularly applies to the military units now in Russia which strategically should be removed so as to be available when Allied forces penetrate into the heart of Europe.

8. All throughout his exposé a note of anxiety was discernible as regards Soviet intentions in Eastern and Central Europe, as much of

Hungary's destiny in the present strife is wrapped up in this enigma, stated Mr. de Hollan. He did say, however, that the President's and Mr. Churchill's<sup>33</sup> utterances have done much to instill hope in Hungary to the effect that just and equitable settlement of this problem would be forthcoming. Mr. de Hollan expressed the desire to be able to continue these conversations which he intimated may grow into official proposals on his part at an early date.

9. He asked me what were American aims in this war, and I have referred him to the Atlantic Charter,<sup>34</sup> and so that he may have a modest amplification of the meaning of four freedoms from an average American citizen, I told him that we were fighting this war to the end so that we would not have to repeat the experience every quarter of a century, and because we believed in what we preached, namely, liberty of mankind, and absence of persecution of any kind. He seemed quite pleased with this frugal response to his quite spontaneous and voluminous exposé.

*Evaluation:* A discreet investigation conducted subsequent to this interview revealed that Mr. de Hollan is a man of importance and high in the esteem of Admiral Horthy.<sup>35</sup> He has been sent here at this psychological time with the mission of exploring the possibilities of contact with the Allies and of reporting on the leading personalities in the Allied camp in Lisbon.

From a military point of view it would seem that contact with bona fide, duly accredited personalities at this stage, and in this locality should be of value, providing it is kept on an exploratory basis. I visualize that when and if our onward march in Europe takes us into Yugoslavia, military help from Hungary will become a burning question, and yet it must be so timed as to reap the full benefit of this impact and preclude German preventive measures.

It is known to me that there is a great bond of sympathy between the Poles and Hungarians, based on a goodly fund of mutual trust. I therefore believe that there are distinct possibilities of military nature by a carefully prepared plan of Hungarian cooperation with the ultimate aim of using their forces in conjunction with Polish units incorporated into an Allied Army of liberation to strike a flanking and a mortal blow at Germany. There are also other advantages of strategic and political nature which it is not within the precinct of this thesis to develop.

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<sup>33</sup> Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

<sup>34</sup> Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

<sup>35</sup> Adm. Miklos Horthy, Regent of Hungary.

In view of the above, I should request directives as to the attitude to adopt when further approached by this source.

With kindest regards,

ROBT. A. SOLBORG  
*Colonel, G. S. C.*

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740.00119 European War 1939/1926a

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Strong)*

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1943.

MY DEAR GENERAL STRONG: You were good enough to send to the Department a copy of Colonel Solborg's secret and personal letter dated September 14, 1943 to General Hayes A. Kroner. This related to a conversation held between Colonel Solborg and the Counselor to the Hungarian Legation at Lisbon, Alexander de Hollan, relating to the possible surrender of Hungary and ensuing cooperation from the Hungarian Army with the Allied forces, once these are within negotiable distance.

It is suggested that you give the following directives to Colonel Solborg in the event of further approaches through the channels established there:

(1) The information conveyed to the Military Attaché through the Hungarian official has been brought to the attention of responsible American quarters.

(2) The question of Hungary is among those receiving the continuing attention of the Government of the United States in consultation with the governments of its principal Allies.

(3) An offer of unconditional surrender addressed to the three principal Allies through a fully authorized representative of the Hungarian Government is the only form of proposal which may be expected to receive serious consideration. The Military Attaché need not refuse to receive further approaches through the channels established in Lisbon for the purpose of receiving any communications along this line which the Hungarian Government may wish to make.

(4) The Allies, meanwhile, are taking careful note of the continued participation of Hungary in the prosecution of the war against Russia, as well as all phases of Hungarian collaboration with Germany and, in general, any actions hostile to the Allied cause or principles.

(5) The Military Attaché should be informed that other approaches along more or less the same lines as those conducted by de Hollan are being made in various quarters.

Sincerely yours,

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.



740.00119 European War 1939/1958 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)* <sup>36</sup> *to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 13, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received November 14—6:30 a. m.]

1935. I received today from Molotov a letter dated November 12 of which the following is the text in translation:

"I consider it necessary to inform you for communication to the Government of the United States of certain peace feelers on the part of the Germans which took place recently in Stockholm. In the beginning of November the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs received a communication to the following effect:

The Soviet Mission in Sweden received by post a letter in the middle of October in which the author without giving his name but mentioning an agreed address, communicated his willingness to turn over to the Soviet Government information which might be of use for the liquidation of the war in 1943. While not attaching much significance to this letter, the Soviet Mission nevertheless did not refuse to listen to this information and authorized one of the staff to do so. This staff member also met the author of the above mentioned letter.

It turned out that the author of the letter was one Edgar Klaus, a German citizen and businessman. Klaus told the member of the staff of the Soviet Mission the following:

In Germany there allegedly exists a group of industrialists headed by a representative, Kleist, of the firm Stuum (it has not been possible up to the present to establish whether or not such a firm or such a person exists). This group is in close contact with Ribbentrop <sup>37</sup> and the members of the group are in favor of the conclusion of a separate peace with the Soviet Union. With a view to seeking contact with Soviet representatives for conversations in conclusion of a separate peace, several representatives of this group of industrialists are said to have come to Stockholm in the autumn of this year in order, it is alleged, to establish contact with the Soviet representatives in Sweden, but they did not find any suitable intermediary and this attempt ended in failure. The second attempt to establish contact was undertaken by these German industrialists through the above mentioned German businessman Klaus, who also sent to the Soviet Mission the letter referred to above. Klaus, referring to the instructions which he had from Kleist and other industrialists, declared to our staff member that the Germans would agree to everything that the Soviet Government demands and are prepared (to accept) even the 1914 frontiers. Klaus declared in this connection that it is clear to the Germans that they have lost the war, that the morale of the people is catastrophically worsening and that Germany has not sufficient armed forces for the further prosecution of the war (the ruling

<sup>36</sup> W. Averell Harriman was appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union on October 7, 1943, and presented his letter of credence on October 23.

<sup>37</sup> Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

circles are disturbed over the Moscow Conference<sup>38</sup> and the retreat of the German Army on the Soviet-German frontier). In conclusion Klaus inquired whether he could promise to the persons who had sent him the possibility of establishing contact with Soviet representatives and whether someone from the Soviet representatives did not desire to meet Ribbentrop.

The staff member of the Soviet Mission, on instructions from the Chargé d'Affaires, replied to Klaus that there could be absolutely no question of contact with Soviet representatives and that they refused to carry on any conversations whatsoever or have any further meetings with the above mentioned person. The Soviet Government confirmed to the Chargé d'Affaires the correctness of his answer."

In concluding, the letter stated that the British Ambassador in Moscow had been similarly informed.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/1972

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*<sup>39</sup>

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has received a telegram from the American Ambassador in Madrid<sup>40</sup> in which he reports that he has been shown by the First Secretary of the Rumanian Legation a letter in which the latter had been instructed by Michel (Mihai) Antonescu, Rumanian Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to establish contact with the Ambassador to the end of ascertaining what Rumania should do in order to withdraw from the war.

The Ambassador further reports that he informed the Rumanian Secretary of the Legation that the formula for withdrawal from the war was unconditional surrender. The Ambassador went on to state that, whereas there might in the case of Rumania be certain mechanical differences in procedure, a precedent could be found in the case of Italy's conclusion of a military armistice with Great Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States. The Ambassador then suggested that, in the light of the publicly known details of the Italian negotiations, a Rumanian representative possessing satisfactory credentials should declare Rumania's willingness to surrender unconditionally to Great Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States, requesting that negotiations to that end be undertaken between a Rumanian military representative and a military representative of the United Nations.

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<sup>38</sup> For correspondence, see pp. 513 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Excluding the last paragraph, an identical *aide-mémoire* was sent to the Soviet Embassy.

<sup>40</sup> Telegram No. 3346, November 15, 1943, 4 p. m., not printed.

Rumania, he added, should accordingly designate for this purpose a military officer with plenipotentiary powers. The Ambassador concluded by saying that such negotiations could be conducted in almost any neutral capital.

The Rumanian Secretary of Legation said that he would communicate the Ambassador's statements to Bucharest through a courier leaving Madrid for Rumania on Wednesday, November 17.

The foregoing is communicated to the British Embassy in accordance with agreed procedure whereby any one of the three principal Allies will communicate to the other two any peace overtures which it may receive from enemy countries.

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1943.

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740.00119 European War 1939/1972: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1943—6 p. m.

2462. Your no. 3346 November 15.<sup>42</sup> The Department concurs fully with the sense of your observations to the Secretary of the Rumanian Legation and your entire treatment of his approach is approved. In accordance with agreed procedure an account of the conversation is being communicated to the British and Soviet Embassies for transmission to their respective governments.

For your information, in one instance in which OSS asked the Department for its views in connection with a somewhat similar approach to an OSS representative in Bern it was suggested that language in the following general terms be employed in providing guidance for use in the event of any further approaches through these channels:

"1. The information conveyed to the OSS representative in Bern by a Rumanian diplomatic representative has been brought to the attention of responsible American quarters.

2. The position of Rumania is among those subjects which are receiving the continuing attention of the United States Government in consultation with its principal Allies.

3. Whereas an offer of unconditional surrender addressed to the three principal Allies through a fully authorized representative of the Rumanian Government is the only form of proposal which may be expected to receive serious consideration, there would appear to be no reason why the OSS representative in Bern should refuse to receive further approaches through the channels established in Bern for the purpose of receiving any communications which the Rumanians may wish to make by this means.

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<sup>42</sup> Not printed, but see *aide-mémoire* dated November 18, *supra*.

4. The Allies meanwhile are taking careful note of the continued participation of Rumania in the prosecution of the war against Russia, as well as all phases of Rumanian collaboration with Germany, Rumania's treatment of the Jews, and, in general, any actions hostile to the Allied cause or principles."

The Rumanians have made various peace overtures in Stockholm, Bern, Istanbul and Lisbon. You will be kept currently informed of any future developments that may be reported from these points.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/1972 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1943—11 p. m.

2465. Your 3346, November 15.<sup>43</sup> The following telegram was sent to Stockholm, London, Bern, Lisbon and Ankara on November 16:

The Department has been aware of the existence of discrepancies in various recommendations reaching the Rumanians through propaganda and other channels which they may have taken as instructions or advice from the British and ourselves regarding the time and manner of their projected withdrawal from the war. So far as we are aware, however, no intimations to the Rumanians emanating from official American quarters have strayed from the principle of unconditional surrender, while our official propaganda has held to the theme that the Rumanians should withdraw their soldiers from the Russian front, terminate their collaboration with Germany and impede the Nazi war effort by every means at their disposal.

Fully cognizant of the likelihood that premature or ill-prepared action by the Rumanians might entail full German occupation of the country, the Department has itself been particularly mindful of the disadvantages, as against the obvious advantages, that might be expected to attend such an occupation. Our military authorities have now made it clear, however, that it is their considered view that immediate unconditional surrender by Rumania would be desirable even if such surrender were to entail immediate German occupation of the country. In as much as it is recognized that military considerations constitute the ruling factor in any determination of policy in this regard, the Department has now taken the foregoing view as its own. The American position, which is believed to be in accord with the

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<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

British, may accordingly be summarized for your confidential information and possible background use as follows:

1. The immediate surrender of Rumania would be in the interest of the Allied cause;
2. The Allies are interested in no proposals for surrender on other than unconditional terms; and
3. Any proposals of unconditional surrender should be presented to the three principal Allies, namely Great Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States, by a fully authorized representative of the Rumanian Government.

No reason is known why the Rumanians should await or expect any indication or signal from the Allies before taking action.

You may, in your discretion, convey the sense of the foregoing to members of your staff or responsible representatives of other American agencies who are in a position to ensure its proper use.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/1972

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has now received the following information to supplement that contained in its *aide-mémoire* to the Soviet Embassy of November 18, 1943,<sup>44</sup> regarding the endeavors of the First Secretary of the Rumanian Legation in Madrid to ascertain on behalf of Mr. Mihai Antonescu what Rumania should do in order to withdraw from the war:

The Rumanian Secretary of Legation has been instructed to return to Bucharest for fifteen days leave because of alleged illness in his family, but has made known to the American Ambassador in Madrid his belief that he is really being called back to discuss the problem of Rumania's withdrawal from the war. Because of the difficulty of communication between officials in Rumania and representatives of the United Nations, he purposes to suggest that arrangements be made for a high-ranking officer of the Rumanian Army, carrying full authorization to negotiate an armistice on the basis of unconditional surrender, to proceed to Ankara by commercial plane and then to Syria by train for the purpose of entering into negotiations with Allied representatives there or at any other place they may wish to designate.

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1943.

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<sup>44</sup> See footnote 39, p. 503.

740.00119 European War 1939/2051

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

## MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has taken note of the text of a telegram dated November 19, 1943 which the British Embassy has received from London <sup>45</sup> regarding Mr. Maniu's desire to send a special delegate out of Rumania for the purpose of discussing arrangements for a political changeover in that country. The British Government proposes to reply to Mr. Maniu's message by saying that his emissary will be received with the understanding that his only function will be to discuss operational details looking to the overthrow of the present regime in Rumania and its replacement by a Government prepared to surrender unconditionally to the three principal Allies. It is further noted that the Soviet Government has given its approval to this proposed reply, at the same time indicating its expectation that Soviet representatives will participate in any negotiations that may be carried on with Mr. Maniu's representative.

The Department is in agreement with the proposal of the British Government, as approved by the Soviet Government, regarding the character of the reply to be made to the message from Mr. Maniu.

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1943.

740.00119 European War 1939/2004 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, December 2, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received December 2—7:23 p. m.]

3913. Usual contact in Rumanian Legation has received message from Bucharest in reply to question from British regarding identity of two proposed emissaries mentioned in my 3793, November 20, 6 [1] p. m.,<sup>46</sup> that "high political personality" whom Rumanian nation and King wish to send to Cairo and London is Constantin Visoiano. Informant said this man had reputation of having been one of most brilliant and capable young men around Titulescu;<sup>47</sup> he had been active in league secretariat, that era also Minister in Warsaw and the Hague, but was not career diplomat. Selection "high military officer" has not been made but it is claimed person to be chosen will certainly be qualified in every respect to discuss military angle.

<sup>45</sup> Copy of this telegram was handed to the Department on November 21 by a member of the British Embassy staff; not printed.

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

<sup>47</sup> Nicholas Titulescu, once Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Informant stated his principals in Rumania hoped emissaries would be able to proceed to London which seemed best place to contact three principal Allied Nations. Soon as British Government assured emissaries would be received it would be informed how and when men would leave. Urgency of matter was stressed *inter alia* on grounds it might soon become impossible to arrange departure.

Rumanians hoped British, American and Soviet Governments would not refuse to receive emissaries who while not "duly authorized representatives of present Rumanian Government" nevertheless represented King, organized opposition and certain military elements. Not being official representatives of Government they could not make offer of unconditional surrender but they had valuable information with them and what they had to say certainly was "designed to implement and accelerate offer of unconditional surrender".

JOHNSON

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740.00119 EW 1939/20121: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 6, 1943—noon.  
[Received 9:15 p. m.]

Greek Series No. 122. Saying that he did so at the behest of Mr. Eden,<sup>48</sup> the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia approached me last night with a plan evolved by the British SOE<sup>49</sup> to bring out from Rumania an emissary of the Peasant Party Leader, Maniu, who is alleged to be ready, if encouraged, to take action at an early date for the overthrow of the Antonescu Government and the country's unconditional surrender.

According to a document shown me by the Ambassador and drafted according to him by the SOE it is projected that the emissary will lay before "representatives of Great Britain, the United States and Russia" the plans which Maniu is prepared to carry out. Also according to that document of which the Ambassador said he could not give me a copy, the British and Russian Foreign Offices have been advised for some time of the SOE in this connection and have taken some part in guiding.

The Ambassador said that General Wilson<sup>50</sup> has been informed and that it is possible that the emissary will arrive in Cyprus within

<sup>48</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>49</sup> Secret Operations Executive.

<sup>50</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Commander in Chief of the British Forces in the Middle East.

the next 10 days and be brought to Cairo for a meeting at which the Ambassador suggested that I should act as American "representative" along with himself and the Russian Ambassador to Greece and Yugoslavia.

I replied that I was grateful to Mr. Eden for the above information and would be glad to learn of anything which the emissary might have to say but that I could not meet with the latter unless under instructions. The Ambassador said that he would convey my reply to Sir Alexander Cadogan,<sup>51</sup> now here, and possibly also to Mr. Eden. He said he would let me know should it be desired that I pursue the matter further and indicated that the British regard it as promising particularly in the event of Allied forces approaching nearer to Rumanian territory. Meanwhile he requested the most absolute secrecy.

I shall not fail to advise the Department promptly of any developments.

[MACVEAGH]

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740.00119 European War 1939/2004 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1943—9 p. m.

1327. Your 3913 December 2. Department was informed by British Embassy on November 21<sup>52</sup> that a message had been received from Maniu indicating his desire to send a special delegate or delegates out of Rumania for the purpose of discussing arrangements for a political change-over in that country. The British Government proposed to reply to Mr. Maniu's message by saying that his emissary would be received on the understanding that his sole function would be to discuss operational details looking to the overthrow of the present regime in Rumania and its replacement by a Government prepared to offer unconditional surrender to the three principal Allies. It was stated that the Soviet Government had approved this proposed reply, at the same time indicating its expectation that Soviet representatives would participate in any negotiations that might be carried on with Mr. Maniu's representative.

Department gave its agreement to the proposed British reply as already approved by the Soviet Government.

HULL

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<sup>51</sup> British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>52</sup> See memorandum of November 27 from the Department to the British Embassy, and footnote 45, p. 507.



740.00119 European War 1939/2051a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1943—2 p. m.

1916. Your telegram No. 122, Dec. 6, noon. On November 21 the British Embassy informed the Department that a message had been received from Maniu<sup>53</sup> indicating his desire to send a special delegate out of Rumania to discuss arrangements for a political changeover in that country. The British Embassy stated that the British Government proposed to reply to Maniu's message by saying that an emissary would be received on the understanding that his sole function would be to discuss operational details looking to the overthrow of the present regime in Rumania and its replacement by a government prepared to offer unconditional surrender to the three principal Allies. The British stated that the Soviet Government had approved this proposed reply, at the same time indicating its expectation that Soviet representatives would participate in any negotiations which might be carried on with Maniu's emissary.

The Department gave its agreement to the proposed British reply as approved already by the Soviet Government.

In the light of the foregoing the Department is agreeable to your presence at any conferences which may be held in Cairo with Maniu's representative provided the Russian Ambassador likewise attends.

The Department will be much interested in your reports of any further developments.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/2093

*Mr. Hugh R. Wilson of the Office of Strategic Services to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1943.

DEAR ADOLF: On the second of November we informed our representative in Bern<sup>54</sup> that the J.C.S.<sup>55</sup> had instructed us to do what we could to detach the satellite countries, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania immediately from the Axis.

We are today in receipt of reply dated December 9th which cites the above mentioned telegram and states that in line with the above, Leland<sup>56</sup> has received instructions of an analogous character but deal-

<sup>53</sup> See footnote 45, p. 507.

<sup>54</sup> Allen W. Dulles.

<sup>55</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>56</sup> Leland Harrison, Minister in Switzerland.

ing with Rumania only. The message then inquires whether they are to pursue the same policy in regard to Hungary.

We are wiring Dulles in reply that the J.C.S. order applied to all three nations and that I am communicating this inquiry to you.

I hope you profited from your vacation.

Sincerely,

HUGH R. WILSON

740.00119 European War 1939/2023 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, December 14, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received December 15—1:29 a. m.]

3671. Your 2462, November 18, 6 p. m. First Secretary Rumanian Legation informs me he did not go to Bucharest. However, he says private secretary of Mihai Antonescu has passed through Madrid en route to Lisbon as courier and has told him members of Rumanian Council including Marshal Antonescu have decided to surrender unconditionally but with surrender timed so as to coincide with entry into Rumania of British and American as well as Russian troops. Hope was expressed British and Americans would enter by sea through Dardanelles.

No letter to this effect could be sent out by courier because of increasing fear that Germans will examine courier correspondence but at appropriate time a Rumanian military officer would proceed to Near East as already suggested in order to discuss armistice terms and effective date of surrender.

Courier intends to spend a day in Madrid on return from Lisbon and I shall report any new development.

Secretary says 3 German divisions now in Rumania (he says previous estimate of 30 divisions erroneous) and considerable number in Hungary, Bulgaria, southern Poland and east of Bessarabia. He says seven Rumanian divisions in Rumania, all well equipped, as well as fairly large reserves but latter not equipped. Bulk of Rumanian Army in Crimea.

HAYES

740.00119 EW 1939/2036½ : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, December 22, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received December 23—6:12 p. m.]

3769. I have talked to the First Secretary and to the courier mentioned in my 3671, December 14, 7 p. m. Latter confirms that Ru-

manian Government including Marshal Antonescu have decided unanimously on unconditional surrender to United States, Britain and Russia. Government's attitude is that surrender can be made effective only when (1) Allied forces enter Balkans, or Turkey enters war. Immediately either development occurs Rumanian Government will at once send by plane to whatever place we may suggest officers with full powers to arrange details. If we prefer, Rumanian Government will send, in advance, a confidential communication containing its surrender to the Turkish Government with which it has a secret understanding.

Courier informs me he and First Secretary have arranged a secret code which may be used to transmit to him in Rumania any message we may care to send.

HAYES

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740.00119 European War 1939/2039 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 26, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

2324. Personal for the President and the Secretary: The British Minister has informed me that according to the Swedish Government an unnamed pro-Nazi Swedish businessman has recently had talks in Berlin with a member of the German Foreign Office and Himmler.<sup>57</sup> The Swedish Government has advised the British Government that Himmler indicated in these conversations that he was ready to send one army officer and one party official to meet the British to obtain definition of the term unconditional surrender.

The British Minister has been instructed to inform Molotov of the above and to ask Soviet approval of the British Government's intended reply to the Swedish Government that unconditional surrender requires no definition.<sup>58</sup>

The British Minister has put this in writing to Molotov but has so far not received a reply.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>57</sup> Heinrich Himmler, Chief of the German Police; Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior.

<sup>58</sup> In telegram No. 8238, December 30, 8 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, the Department advised that it had given its assent to the proposed reply, but that it understood from the Embassy at Moscow that the Soviet Union had not yet expressed an opinion (800.00 Summaries/5v).

THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW,  
OCTOBER 18–NOVEMBER 1, 1943<sup>1</sup>

PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*<sup>1a</sup>

[Extracts]<sup>2</sup>

LONDON, 11 August 1943.

410. Former Naval Person<sup>3</sup> to President. Message from Stalin<sup>4</sup> delivered by Soviet Chargé d'Affaires<sup>5</sup> for transmission to Prime Minister 10 August.

“I agree that a meeting of the Heads of three Governments is absolutely desirable.<sup>6</sup> Such a meeting must be realized at the first opportunity having arranged with the President the place and time of this meeting.

“At the same time, I ought to say that in the existing situation on the Soviet German Front, I, to my regret, have no opportunity to absent myself and to leave the front even for one week. . . .

“Nevertheless, in order not to postpone an examination of the questions which interest our countries, it would be expedient to organize a meeting of the responsible representatives of our States and we might come to an understanding in the nearest future concerning the place and date of such a meeting.

“Moreover, it is necessary beforehand to agree on the scope of the questions to be discussed and the drafts of the proposals which have to be accepted. The meetings will hardly give any tangible result without that.

[File copy not signed]

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<sup>1</sup> For an account of the Moscow Conference by Cordell Hull, who as Secretary of State headed the American delegation, see *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), vol. II, pp. 1252–1318.

<sup>1a</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

<sup>2</sup> The full text of this telegram is printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Code name for Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

<sup>4</sup> Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

<sup>5</sup> Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev.

<sup>6</sup> For papers on arrangements for the meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 3 ff.

*President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister (Churchill) to the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)*<sup>7</sup>

[Extract]

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

We have both arrived here with our staffs and will probably remain in conference for about 10 days. We fully understand the strong reasons which lead you to remain on the battlefronts, where your presence has been so fruitful of victory. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize once more the importance of a meeting between all three of us. We do not feel that either Archangel or Astrakhan are suitable but we are prepared ourselves, accompanied by suitable officers, to proceed to Fairbanks in order to survey the whole scene in common with you. The present seems to be a unique opportunity for a rendezvous and also a crucial point in the war. We earnestly hope that you will give this matter once more your consideration. Prime Minister will remain on this side of the Atlantic for as long as may be necessary.

Should it prove impossible to arrange the much needed meeting of the three heads of governments, we agree with you that a meeting of the foreign office level should take place in the near future. This meeting would be exploratory in character as, of course, final decisions must be reserved to our respective governments.

CHURCHILL—ROOSEVELT

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)*

[Extracts—Translation]<sup>8</sup>

Moscow, August 24, 1943.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I transmit herewith for your information the text of a personal message from Premier I. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill, and the President, Mr. F. Roosevelt.

“With regard to the meeting of representatives of our Government and perhaps precisely the representatives in charge of foreign affairs, I share your opinion regarding the expediency of such a meeting in the near future. This meeting, however, should not be of a narrow

<sup>7</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. It was sent at the beginning of the First Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943. Documentation regarding the Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

<sup>8</sup> This translation of the original message is from the files of the Embassy at Moscow. Other portions of this message are printed on p. 783 and in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 22.

exploratory character but of a practical preparatory character in order that after the conference our Governments might take definite decisions and at the same time might avoid delays in taking decisions on urgent questions.

Therefore, I consider it necessary to revert to my proposal that the range of questions to be discussed by the representatives of the three powers should be determined in advance and the proposals selected which are to be studied by them and presented to our Governments for final decision.

24 August 1943.”

The above message has been telegraphed to A. A. Sobolev, the Chargé d’Affaires of the U. S. S. R. in London, for transmission to its destination.

Please, Mr. Ambassador, accept [etc.]

V. M. MOLOTOV

863.014/29

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The attached paper entitled “The Future of Austria”<sup>9</sup> has been considered by His Majesty’s Government who would be glad to receive any comments on it which the United States Government may wish to offer.

It may be observed that the paper contemplates two stages in the future development of Austria after the war: first, the re-creation of an independent Austrian state, and second, the subsequent association of Austria with some form of Central or South-Eastern European confederation. When Mr. Eden visited Moscow in 1941,<sup>10</sup> M. Stalin told him that he thought “Austria should be restored as an independent state”. It has been noted, however, that, in the communication which M. Molotov addressed to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Moscow on the 7th June last, he indicated that the Soviet Government were unwilling to pledge themselves in regard to the creation of a federation embracing Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Austria and Hungary; and that they disapproved of the inclusion of the last two countries. It may be hoped that this disapproval would not extend to the inclusion of an independent Austria and possibly a reformed Hungary in some confederation of the kind adumbrated in paragraphs 30–34 of the Foreign Office paper, on condition, of course, that any such confederation was in no way hostile to the Union of

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> For correspondence concerning the visit of Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Moscow for discussions, December 16–22, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 192–205.

Soviet Socialist Republics. The difficulty of striking the balance between the advantages and disadvantages of the inclusion of Austria in such a confederation is fully realized. On the other hand, a free and independent Austrian state will inevitably be weak and therefore a potential danger spot, and with a view to strengthening her international position it is considered essential that the way should be left open for her inclusion, if circumstances permit, in whatever form of international or regional structure may develop in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Indeed His Majesty's Government see an advantage, if it is at all practicable, in bringing about such an inclusion as soon as possible after the war has ended, before there has been time for opinion to harden on other lines.

As the tide of war turns increasingly in favour of the United Nations, the possibility of causing embarrassment to Germany by encouraging resistance and sabotage in Austria improves. Anti-German feeling appears to be growing and there is some evidence that active resistance to the German regime is on the increase. On the other hand opinion in Austria seems to be aimless and in need of reassurance regarding the aims of the Allies for the future of the country. With this in mind and in the hope that the United States and Soviet Governments will be prepared to agree in principle to the re-creation of an independent Austrian state after the war, His Majesty's Government have prepared as a basis for discussion the draft of a declaration to be issued jointly as soon as possible by His Majesty's Government, the United States Government and the Soviet Government, making clear their desire to see re-established a free and independent Austria. A copy of this draft is attached and His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive as soon as convenient the United States Government's views upon it.

His Majesty's Government are also consulting the Soviet Government on this subject.

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1943.

[Enclosure]

#### REVISED DRAFT DECLARATION

Austria was the first free country to fall a victim to Nazi aggression. In 1938 the Austrians were deprived by the Nazis of the rights of self-government<sup>11</sup> set forth in the Atlantic Charter,<sup>12</sup> and reaffirmed by the United Nations.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> For correspondence on the annexation of Austria by Germany, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 384 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *ibid.*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

<sup>13</sup> Declaration by the United Nations, signed January 1, 1942, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 25.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are determined to liberate the Austrian people from German domination. Having taken counsel together in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, they hereby declare that they regard the union imposed upon Austria by Germany on the 15th of March 1938 as null and void. They regard themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria, which shall enjoy, in association with those neighbouring States which will be faced with similar problems, that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

The Austrian people must, however, remember that they have a responsibility which they cannot evade, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of the part they play in assisting to expel the German invader.

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800.0146/159a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943—10 p. m.

799. It is evident that some uneasiness exists in the minds of the refugee governments and authorities and their respective countries over the question of the possible establishment of military government in those countries. As there is every intention of having those governments and constituted authorities participate to the extent practicable in the function of maintaining law and order and in the administration of the liberated areas it has seemed desirable to make a public statement to that effect. This Government proposes therefore to issue an identic statement on liberated areas with the British Government on September 15.<sup>14</sup> You are instructed to communicate this statement to the Soviet authorities for any comment they may care to make with regard thereto and for similar action if they so desire. You should request that the matter be considered strictly confidential until the date of release.

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<sup>14</sup> The text of this draft statement was agreed to by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in a meeting at Quebec on August 22. For additional details, see *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, pp. 1239-1240.

In his telegram No. 1299, September 8, 1943, 2 p. m., the Ambassador stated: "I left with Vyshinsky on September 7, a note [presumably dated September 6] containing the considerations set forth in your telegram and requested expeditious action." (800.0146/160)

In telegram No. 850, September 15, the Department directed the Ambassador to inform the Soviet Government that publication of the statement had been temporarily postponed (800.0146/165).



The statement reads as follows:

"1. The Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of their military operations in enemy territory, must assume the major responsibility for the administration of enemy territories conquered by their forces in pursuance of the war against the Axis.

"2. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, while continuing to exercise supreme military authority in liberated areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be agreeable to the policy of the governments and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with the function of maintaining law and order with such assistance by the Allied authorities as may be necessary, subject always to military requirements.

"Conversations and arrangements with the governments of those countries have already been in progress for some time on these aspects of the mutual interests involved."

HULL

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Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)*<sup>15</sup>

[Extract]<sup>16</sup>

[WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943.]<sup>16a</sup>

Both the Prime Minister and myself are pleased with the idea of a political and military meeting on the State Department level.

It should be held, I think, as soon as possible. Perhaps September 25 would be a good date. What do you think of this?

The Prime Minister has suggested London or some other place in England, and I should agree to have my representative go to either of these if you also think it best. I am inclined, however, to the thought of a more remote spot where the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. Perhaps Casablanca or Tunis, and I do not object to Sicily, except that the communications from and to there are more troublesome.

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<sup>15</sup> Transmitted in a letter from Ambassador Standley to Foreign Commissar Molotov, September 6, 1943, not printed. Mr. Molotov acknowledged receipt of the letter in a note dated September 7, and stated that "the message in question has been transmitted by me to its destination".

<sup>16</sup> Other portions of this message are printed on p. 784 and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 23.

<sup>16a</sup> Place and date taken from the copy at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective governments as I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, although I do not want to have the meeting develop at this stage into a full scale combined chiefs' conference.

If Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden attend I should wish to send Mr. Hull but I do not want Mr. Hull to undertake such a long journey, so I would, therefore, send Mr. Welles, the Under Secretary of State. Mr. Harriman<sup>17</sup> would also attend as he has an excellent knowledge of shipping and commercial matters. I shall endeavor to send someone from my staff as American military adviser. He would be in complete touch with the work of the combined staffs.

ROOSEVELT

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*The Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)  
to President Roosevelt*<sup>18</sup>

[Extract—Translation]<sup>19</sup>

Second. I consider that the beginning of October as the Prime Minister suggested, would be convenient time for the meeting of the three our representatives, and I propose as the place of the meeting—Moscow. By that time the three Governments could have reached an agreement regarding the questions which have to be discussed as well as the proposals on those questions, without which (agreement) the meeting will not give the necessary results in which our Governments are interested.

[Moscow,] September 8, 1943.

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<sup>17</sup> W. Averell Harriman, special representative of President Roosevelt; appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union on October 7, 1943.

<sup>18</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.; it was transmitted by the Soviet Chargé in the United States, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

<sup>19</sup> Other portions of this message are printed on p. 784 and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 23-24.

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)*<sup>20</sup>

[Extract]<sup>21</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1943.

Regarding the meeting of our three representatives, I will cheerfully agree that the place of meeting be Moscow and the date the beginning of October—say Monday, the fourth. I will send you in two or three days a suggested informal list of subjects to be discussed, but I think the three members should feel free, after becoming acquainted with each other, to discuss any other matters which may come up.

ROOSEVELT

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*<sup>22</sup>

[Extract—Translation]<sup>23</sup>

2. With regard to the meeting of our three representatives I propose that we consider as settled the place of meeting—Moscow, and also the time of the meeting—October 4—as the President has proposed.

I also believe that in the interest of the success of this meeting it is necessary to know in advance those proposals which the English and American Governments have to discuss at the meeting of the three representatives. I have already written about this. In this respect, however, I do not propose any limitations in regard to the agenda.

[Moscow,] September 12, 1943.

<sup>20</sup> Transmitted in a letter from Ambassador Standley to Foreign Commissar Molotov on September 11. The latter acknowledged receipt of the letter in a note dated the same day, and stated that "the message in question has been transmitted by me to its destination".

<sup>21</sup> Other portions of this message (which concluded with the statement: "I really feel that the three of us are making real headway.") are printed on p. 785 and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 24.

<sup>22</sup> This message was telegraphed by Mr. Molotov to Soviet Chargé Gromyko in Washington for transmission to the President. Mr. Molotov sent the text of the message to Ambassador Standley on September 12, from which this translation was made.

<sup>23</sup> The other portions of this message are printed on p. 786 and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 25.

740.0011 Moscow/9-1443

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1943.

In response to your request I am transmitting herewith draft suggestions for an agenda for the Tripartite Conference.

This matter requires some rather careful consideration.

It seems to me that it would be well not to be too detailed in suggesting items for discussion but try to keep the exchange of views on the broad basis of general world security within which framework, if the Soviet Government is willing to cooperate, many of the detailed questions would be more easily solved.

It might be well to have the question of the Soviet attitude toward the Pacific war situation come up, but I question the advisability of including any such item in a proposed agenda.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Enclosure]

*Draft Agenda for Tripartite Conference*

September 14, 1943.

1. *General security (four-nation declaration).*

As a basis for the maintenance of peace and security in the world after the end of hostilities, it is suggested that the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China enter into a four-nation arrangement which would provide for consultation and cooperation in carrying out the responsibilities of those four nations for the maintenance of peace by continuing after the war the present collaboration in the prosecution of the war.

A tentative draft of such declaration is attached hereto.

2. *Treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.*

(a) During armistice period, international military, political, and economic control over Germany.

(b) Steps towards ultimate settlement:—length of armistice period, future status of German Government, frontiers, and other questions.

3. *Economic matters for reconstruction.*

(a) Question of reparations.

(b) Cooperation in rehabilitation of war damage in U. S. S. R.

(c) Joint action for assistance to other countries.

- (d) Collaboration on an international basis dealing with matters such as food and agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade, and I.L.O.<sup>24</sup>
- (e) Any specific matters either of the other Governments wishes to raise.

4. *Methods of dealing with current political and economic issues and those which may arise as the war progresses.*

Our proposal is that matters on which it is found desirable for the three Governments to consult should be dealt with in Moscow, London, or Washington as may be most appropriate on an *ad hoc* basis by the permanent diplomatic representatives in each capital. Experts could be sent if desired to participate depending upon the character of the subjects under discussion. This is not intended to preclude the holding of international or tripartite conferences as occasion may make desirable.

We will be prepared to discuss at the October Moscow Conference any current issues proposed by either of the other two Governments on which it may be found timely to consult.

[Subenclosure]

ANNEX No. 1<sup>25</sup>

*Tentative Draft of a Joint Four-Power Declaration*

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations,

<sup>24</sup> International Labor Organization.

<sup>25</sup> This is the first of two drafts for a Joint Four-Power Declaration prepared on August 11, the second being a slight revision of this one. The only changes were that paragraph 8 in this draft was changed to paragraph 7 in the new draft, while paragraph 7 in this draft became paragraph 8 and was changed to read: "That they will confer and cooperate to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period."

The two drafts apparently became confused. The first draft attached to the file copy of the memorandum to President Roosevelt of September 14, here printed, is the draft sent to Moscow in telegram No. 874, September 18, 7 p.m., printed on p. 528, and is also the draft filed with the Moscow Conference records as "Conference Document No. 3" (see bracketed note, p. 705).

The second draft is printed in Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, 1949) p. 553, and is there described as "Document as taken by Secretary of State (Hull) to First Quebec Conference and the Moscow Conference, 1943." (Documentation on the First Quebec Conference, August 17-24, is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.) This draft was apparently the one given to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) at Quebec and is

to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy, and to any occupation of enemy territory and of territory of other states held by that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the requirements imposed upon their present enemies.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security, they will consult and act jointly in behalf of the community of nations.

6. That, in connection with the foregoing purpose, they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved, including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to the peace.

7. That they will cooperate with each other in bringing about a practicable lightening of the burden of armaments for themselves and for the world.

8. That they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation and agreement.

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the one upon which the amendments presented in British Embassy Note No. 612, September 28, printed on p. 531, were based. It is also the draft which was revised by the "Tentative Draft of a Joint Declaration" presented at the Moscow Conference by Secretary Hull on October 21 and printed on p. 600.

800.0146/155½ : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 15, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 11:21 p. m.]

1364. Your 799, September 4, 10 p. m. I have received a note from Molotov dated September 14, the essential paragraphs of which read in paraphrased translation as follows:

"The Soviet Government recognizes that the main responsibility for the administration of enemy territories should rest on the command of the armed forces conquering those territories up to the time when the local civilian authorities begin to function. At the same time in organizing the administration of regions conquered from the enemy the Soviet Government considers it to be the task of the military command to draw into the administration on a wide scale local personnel who are sympathetic to the Allies and who can render assistance in the establishment of the local organs of authorities organized on democratic principles.

The considerations concerning the drawing in of local personnel are applicable to a still greater degree to liberated regions formerly occupied by the enemy. However, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to point out that it learned for the first time from the Embassy's note of September 6<sup>26</sup> of the conversations on this subject which were carried on by the American and British Governments with the refugee governments. The Soviet Government has not been advised of the contents or character of these conversations. However, it is evident from the Embassy's note in question that a certain uneasiness exists among refugee governments' authorities and their respective countries over the question of the possible establishment of military governments in those countries. From the circumstances set forth above and taking into consideration that the point of view of the interested governments in this question is not known to the Soviet Government it is quite understandable that the Soviet Government not having at its disposal the necessary information can not express an opinion on the proposed statement of the American and British Governments and cannot subscribe to the statement.

The Soviet Government attributes serious importance to this question.<sup>27</sup> It therefore believes that it would serve a useful purpose to submit the question for preliminary consideration to the political

<sup>26</sup> Presumably note based on telegram No. 799, September 4, 10 p. m., p. 517. See especially final paragraph of that telegram.

<sup>27</sup> On September 28, 1943, Sir Ronald Campbell, British Minister in the United States, informed the Adviser on Political Relations, James Clement Dunn, that his Government felt that the time and the appropriateness for the issuance of a joint statement on liberated areas by the British and American Governments had passed in view of the fact that the Soviet Government had now displayed a strong interest in the matter, and his Government desired that the joint statement as agreed upon at Quebec on this subject be definitely cancelled. Mr. Dunn stated in reply that the United States Government was entirely in agreement to the cancellation of the joint statement. (800.0146/228)

military commission of the Soviet, American and British Governments together with the participation of a representative of the French Committee.”

STANDLEY

*The British Minister (Campbell) to President Roosevelt*<sup>28</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received a telegram from Mr. Eden containing the text of our agenda for the Foreign Ministers' Conference. In a further telegram Mr. Eden explains the reasons for the changes made from the earlier text, most of which are designed to take account of the comments made by the State Department. Mr. Eden instructs me to communicate to you, and also to the State Department, the text of the agenda and his explanations. I add a copy of the earlier text for ease of reference.

Believe me [etc.]

R. I. CAMPBELL

[Enclosure 1]

TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM MR. EDEN TO HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR  
AT MOSCOW DATED SEPTEMBER 18TH, 1943<sup>29</sup>

My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text of our agenda.<sup>30</sup> *Begins.*

1. Exchange of views of the situation in Italy and the Balkans.
2. The setting up of machinery for dealing with questions requiring current and close collaboration, with particular reference to functions and scope of politico-military commission in Algiers.<sup>31</sup>
3. Question of joint responsibility for Europe as against separate areas of responsibility.
4. Relations between the U. S. S. R. and Poland and policy in relation to Poland generally.
5. Question of agreement between major and minor allies on post war questions.

<sup>28</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

<sup>29</sup> Corrected text, transmitted by the British Minister on September 19 to Brig. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, U. S. A., Military Aide to the President.

<sup>30</sup> A copy of the British agenda in the Moscow Embassy files marked "Left with me by Mr. Balfour of the British Embassy, Oct. 5, 1943. M[axwell] M. H[amilton]." is identical except for the substitution of the word "control" for "under any" before "commission" in paragraph 6 (a), and the addition of the following paragraph: "14. Policy regarding allied territory liberated through the advance of the allied forces." (Moscow Embassy Files: 500 Three Power Conference 1943)

<sup>31</sup> For further documentation on the Political-Military Commission, see pp. 782 ff.



6. Agreement in principle in regard to treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.

(a) During the Armistice period, e. g. under any commission, etc.

(b) At peace settlement, e. g. frontiers, military occupation, disarmament, reparations, decentralization of the German Government, etc.

7. Common policy towards Turkey.

8. Common policy towards resistance movement in Yugoslavia.

9. Peace feelers from enemy states.

10. Attitude towards the French Committee with special reference to its position in Metropolitan France and establishment of eventual French Government.

11. Future of Poland, Greece, Danubian and Balkan countries, including the question of confederations.

12. Common policy in Persia.

13. Post war economic collaboration with the U. S. S. R.

*Ends.*

[Enclosure 2]

TEXT OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM MR. EDEN DATED SEPTEMBER 18TH

You should explain to the State Department that we naturally take account of their comments and that for reasons set out below the following further changes have been made in our agenda:

(a) The cross headings (A) (B) and (C) are confusing and have been omitted.

(b) Item 2. This combines B(1) and B(10) of our original agenda.

(c) Item 5. This is intended to cover the question of proposed Soviet-Czech treaty and any similar situations that may arise in the future.

(d) Item 9. This item has been inserted to cover all peace feelers including those from Finland.

(e) Item 13 is new but clearly unobjectionable.

2. Following items have been omitted from our original agenda:

(a) B(2). We agree with American comment, and policy towards liberated territories is already being dealt with apart from the Conference.

(b) B(8). We do not wish to raise this point ourselves but Stalin raised it in 1941 and we must therefore be prepared to deal with it again.

(c) C(1). This has already been settled.

(d) C(4). This item appears in the American agenda and we do not propose to duplicate it though we shall probably wish to raise the

question of procedure for handling of post war civil aviation under item 3(d) of the American agenda.

3. I should be glad to know whether the Americans intend to circulate any papers. We should be particularly interested to know what they have in mind as regards item 3(e) and 3(d) of their agenda in order to consider what preparations we should make for discussions on these items. I am contemplating the possibility of circulating brief memos accenting particular points which we consider require scrutiny, in those of our items where this course would appear useful and possibly draft proposals in the case of a few of them.

[Enclosure 3]

AGENDA <sup>31a</sup>

- A. Military. . . . . Italian and Balkan situations.
- B. Political issues which may arise as the war progresses.
  - 1. Functions, scope and location of proposed Three-Power Commission.
  - 2. Common policy to prevent Allied territories evacuated by Germans from falling into chaos in the absence of liberating Allied armies.
  - 3. Common policy towards resistance movements in Yugoslavia.
  - 4. Resumption of relations with Poland, constitution of union of Polish patriots, and general policy in relation to Poland.
  - 5. Attitude towards French committee with special reference to its position in metropolitan France, and establishment of eventual French Government.
  - 6. Policy towards Turkey and question of our modifying our relations with her.
  - 7. Question of getting Finland out of the war.
  - 8. Post-war control of the entrance to the Baltic (Stalin raised this in 1941).
  - 9. Policy towards Persia.
  - 10. Setting up of special machinery for dealing promptly and jointly with questions requiring current and close collaboration.
- C. Political problems after the termination of hostilities.
  - 1. Proposed Four-Power declaration.
  - 2. Question of joint responsibility for Europe as against separate spheres of influence.

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<sup>31a</sup> Superseded by Enclosure 1.

3. Treatment of Germany and other enemy countries.
  - (a) During the armistice period, e. g. control commission, etc.
  - (b) At the peace settlement, e.g. frontiers, military occupation, reparations, decentralization of German government, etc.
4. Possibility of Soviet co-operation in international bodies dealing with such matters as finance, transport, aviation, etc., and I. L. O.
5. Economic matters insofar as this is possible as a result of present talks in Washington about Article VII.
6. Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan countries, including question of confederation.

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740.0011 Moscow/9-1843 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1943—7 p. m.

874. In connection with arrangements for the tripartite meeting and in response to the request of the Soviet Government for our suggestions for an agenda for the meeting, please communicate to the Soviet Government the following suggested agenda: <sup>32</sup>

*“Suggestions of the United States Government for Agenda For Tripartite Conference:*

[Here follows text, with Annex 1, which is the same as that transmitted to President Roosevelt by the Secretary in his memorandum of September 14, 1943, printed on page 521.]

HULL

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740.0011 European War/9-1843 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943—8 p. m.

886. Reference Department's 874, September 18, 7 p. m. Please endeavor to ascertain from the Soviet Government when we may expect their suggestions for an agenda and comments on those submitted in our telegram under reference.

HULL

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<sup>32</sup> A paraphrase of the agenda and draft of the four-nation declaration were transmitted to Foreign Commissar Molotov by the Ambassador in a letter of September 20, 1943.

800.0146/155½: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1943—5 p. m.

894. Reference Embassy's 1364, September 15, 11 a. m. Please convey to Molotov the appreciation of this Government for the frank expression of the views of the Soviet Government regarding the proposed declaration on liberated areas and leave with him a memorandum embodying the following observations of this Government on the points raised in his note of September 14 outlined in the Embassy's telegram under reference.

1. In so far as this Government is aware the conversations and arrangements with the Governments-in-exile referred to in the last paragraph of the draft declaration, have been confined entirely to matters relating to military operations which might be undertaken in their respective countries and to the needs for supply, relief, et cetera with which the Allied armies would be confronted when military operations reach those areas. These discussions for the most part have taken place in what is known as the Leith-Ross Committee<sup>33</sup> in London in which a representative of the Soviet Government has participated. The general attitude of the Governments-in-exile referred to in the telegram has been made known to this Government through reports of the American Ambassador accredited to those Governments and it was assumed that the Soviet Government had received similar reports from its Ambassador in London accredited in like capacity. The draft declaration in question was drawn up at the Quebec conference<sup>34</sup> and was immediately submitted to the Soviet Government for its consideration.

2. This Government finds itself in agreement with the views of the Soviet Government concerning the administration of enemy territories in that the main responsibility in such administration must rest on the Allied Command of the armed forces conquering those territories. It shares the view of the Soviet Government that it is desirable to have the participation at the earliest possible moment of local democratic civilian authorities who are sympathetic to the Allied cause, but considers that as long as the war against Germany continues the decision as to time and the degree of such participation must be left to the Allied Command in those areas.

3. As set forth in Article 2 of the proposed declaration, pending the final defeat of the enemy, the Allied Command must continue to

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<sup>33</sup> The Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, of which Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government, had been Chairman since 1942. See Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 86-87, and *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 89 ff.

<sup>34</sup> The First Quebec Conference, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, was held August 17-24, 1943. The records of this Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

exercise supreme military authority in those liberated areas which will continue to be a base of military operations. During this period of continuing military operations, however, it appears to this Government that the participation to the extent practicable of the governments and constituted authorities of the various countries would appear to form the best method of facilitating such military operations and also of furthering the desire of our three Governments to create and maintain conditions of public order which would assure with as little delay as possible the participation of local and national authorities organized on democratic principles in the administration of the liberated countries.

We would be glad to be informed whether the Soviet Government would have any objection to the issuance of the draft statement, leaving for further consideration and discussion by the three Governments the whole question of the practical administration of liberated areas.

HULL

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Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov)*

Moscow, September 28, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I am setting forth herewith a secret and personal message of September 27 to Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt which I have received this morning:

"Personal and secret to Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt.

"I regret that I feel it necessary to reopen the question of the meeting of the foreign ministers, but on further consideration I am most anxious that Secretary Hull attend in person in the meeting with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden.

"Mr. Hull would find the long flight to Moscow extremely difficult for physical reasons. Would it be possible, therefore, for the conference to be held in England. It would, I believe, be a great advantage to all of us if Mr. Hull could personally attend the conference.

"I feel sure the British would be willing to make the change. Could the date be made October 15 for the opening session."

I would appreciate it if you would transmit this message to Marshal Stalin.<sup>35</sup>

Sincerely yours,

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

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<sup>35</sup> In a note to the Chargé dated the same day, Mr. Molotov acknowledged receipt of the letter and stated that he had transmitted the message to Marshal Stalin.

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)  
to President Roosevelt*<sup>36</sup>

[Translation]

I received today your message of September 27.

I share your opinion concerning the desirability of the personal attendance of the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, at the forthcoming conference of the representatives of the three Governments.

At the same time I must inform you of the great difficulties which would arise in the event of a change in the decision already agreed upon for the selection of Moscow as the meeting place for the forthcoming conference. The situation is that in case the Conference is convened not in Moscow but in England, as you now propose, Mr. V. M. Molotov, whose presence at the Three Power Conference as representative of the Soviet Government I consider indispensable, would not be able to go to the Conference at the intended time. The departure of V. M. Molotov from the Soviet Union, at least in the near future, is impossible since in a short time, as you know, the departure of A. Y. Vyshinski, the First Assistant of V. M. Molotov at the Foreign Office, for Algiers is proposed.

Furthermore, it is well known that the press in the United States and in England has already published widely that the forthcoming meeting will take place in Moscow and the selection of a new place of meeting might give rise to undesirable suspicions.

There are no objections on my part to fixing October 15th as the date of the Conference. It is necessary to suppose that by this time it will be possible to agree finally on the agenda for the Conference between the three Governments.

[Moscow,] September 28, 1943.

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740.0011 Moscow/8½

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 612

His Majesty's Embassy enclose the text of an amendment which His Majesty's Government desire to offer to the draft 4-Power Declaration.<sup>36a</sup> The proposed amendment has been approved by the Cabinet in London after consultation with the Governments of His Majesty's

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<sup>36</sup> This message was forwarded by Mr. Molotov to Chargé Gromyko in Washington for transmission to the President. Mr. Molotov sent the text of the message to the American Chargé in Moscow (Hamilton) on October 3, 1943, from which this translation was made.

<sup>36a</sup> See draft printed on p. 522, and footnote 25.

Dominions. Unless the United States Government sees any objection, His Majesty's Government propose to communicate it to the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1943.

[Enclosure 1]

*British Amendments to Draft Four-Power Declaration*

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Russian Union and China, united in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of January 1st, 1942 and subsequent declarations to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender, conscious of their responsibilities to secure liberation of themselves and the people allied with them from the menace of aggression; recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, jointly declare

1. That their United action pledged for the prosecution of the war will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy, and to any occupation of enemy territory and liberation, of other States held by that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognise the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization based on the principle of sovereign equality of all nations for the maintenance of international peace and security in which all peace-loving nations, great and small, may play their parts.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security they will consult one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That in connection with the foregoing purpose they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to peace.

7. That they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation and agreement.

8. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

[Enclosure 2]

*Observations by the Foreign Office on the British Amendments to the Draft Four-Power Declaration*

*Paragraph 2:* The re-draft is designed to meet the susceptibilities of the European Allies and scarcely alters the sense. The words "of the territory" should be inserted after the word "liberation".

*Paragraph 3:* The original American phrase "the requirements imposed upon their present enemies" might be held to mean that we proposed at some early date to make friends with the latter. "Requirements" is rather vague and "terms" seems to meet the case better.

*Paragraph 4:* There was at first a tendency here to think the words "sovereign equality" might unduly encourage the pretensions of the smaller Powers, but the Dominions were, broadly speaking, in favour of keeping them in. We should like to temper the doctrine of sovereign equality to the extent of adding the words "in which all the peace-loving nations, great and small, may play their part". This would avoid the criticism that we were intending at some early stage to admit the ex-enemy powers into our new system on a footing of equality. It also implies that some nations may have a greater part to play than others.

*Paragraph 5:* The American draft is open to the interpretation of inaugurating a sort of four-power dictatorship. This point was especially stressed by the Dominion Governments. Our formula is designed to suggest a middle way. It does not exclude consultation between the four powers only, but is a little weaker than the American in form in that it says "with a view to joint action" instead of "act jointly". We believe this is the minimum which would be willingly accepted by the smaller powers.

*Paragraph 7:* Remains as in American draft but its implication ought to be examined at the Conference. Should we and the Americans, for instance, be barred from operating in France or Holland except after consultation with the Russians, and would the Russians be unable to advance into Poland or Roumania except after consultation with us?

*Paragraph 8:* Our addition is designed to make the declaration more palatable to the smaller powers.



Moscow Embassy Files, 500 Three Power Conference

*The Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)* <sup>37</sup>

Moscow, September 29, 1943.

[Translation]

DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: With reference to your letter of September 20 concerning the agenda proposed by the Government of the United States for the Three Power Conference,<sup>38</sup> I have the honor to inform you that Ambassador Gromyko<sup>39</sup> has been instructed to transmit to the Government of the United States the following reply of the Soviet Government:

"The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the agenda for the conference of the representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union proposed by the Government of the United States. The Soviet Government, in expressing its agreement to the holding of the Conference, expressed itself in the sense that for the success of this Conference it was desirable to receive from the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America a list of the questions to be considered at the Conference, as well as proposals on these questions. This proposal of the Soviet Government met with no objection but thus far such proposals have not been advanced by the American Government, except for the proposal concerning the Four Power Declaration.

For its part the Soviet Government proposes the following:

1. To consider measures for shortening the war against Germany and its allies in Europe.

It has in view such urgent measures on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States in 1943 as will insure the invasion of Western Europe by the Anglo-American armies across the English Channel and which, together with the powerful blows of the Soviet armies against the basic forces of the German Army on the Soviet-German front, should basically undermine the military strategic position of Germany and lead to a decisive shortening of the length of the war.

2. The Soviet Government has no objection to the consideration of the proposals of the Government of the United States on questions concerning European countries. The Soviet Government considers it desirable, however, that the Government of the United States of America communicate in advance its proposals concerning the questions submitted by it for agreement between the three Governments.

<sup>37</sup> As corrected by a letter from Mr. Molotov to the Chargé dated September 30, 1943.

<sup>38</sup> See footnote 32, p. 528.

<sup>39</sup> Mr. Gromyko became Soviet Ambassador in the United States on September 29, 1943.

Furthermore, the Soviet Government draws the attention of the American Government to the fact that this conference, as was agreed, should be a conference of three powers—the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—as a result of which the Soviet Government sees no reason for the inclusion in the agenda of point one, which contains a project for a joint four-power declaration.

3. The Soviet Government considers that the conference of the representatives of the three Governments should have only a preparatory character and should elaborate proposals for final decision by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR.”

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

800.0146/155½: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union  
(Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1943—10 p. m.

928. Reference Department's 894, September 23, 5 p. m. With reference to statement that Soviet Government had participated in work of Leith-Ross Committee, Department was under impression that the Soviet Government had been represented at least by an observer. It has been advised that Soviet observers may not have attended meetings of the Committee but understands that they have been invited to attend and have in any event been kept fully informed and received full documentation of the Committee.

The foregoing is communicated for your information and communication to Molotov.

BERLE

740.0011 European War 1939/31369½: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 30, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received October 1—11:20 a. m.]

1503. Personal for the Secretary. The British Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon and outlined to me a telegram which he is sending Eden commenting on the Soviet Government's reply to the suggestions put forth by the British Government as to an agenda for the forthcoming three-power conference. The British Ambassador showed me the Soviet Government's reply to the British Government which corresponds to statements contained in Soviet Government's reply to the American Government,<sup>40</sup> of which Molotov sent me a

<sup>40</sup> September 29, p. 534.

copy. The British Ambassador is stating to his Government that at first blush the Soviet Government's emphasis on discussing the question of the second front might create an impression that the Soviet Government wishes to cause the plan for the conference to be abandoned but that he does not feel that this is an accurate interpretation of Soviet reply. He feels that the Soviet Government will insist on discussion of the second front issue; that the discussion will be preparatory to the meeting later of the Heads of Government; that the British Government should be prepared to discuss the issue at the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers; and that the best way to do this will be for the British Government to augment the military representation on its delegation so that such representatives may set forth fully the factors which are in the judgment of their Government pertinent to the issue.

With regard to the Soviet Government's request of the British Government that it put forth definite proposals for the implementation of suggested topics which the British Government has listed in its proposed agenda, the British Ambassador is recommending to his Government that it reply that in view of the shortness of time it may not be practicable to evolve precise proposals on all subjects but that the British Government will do the best it can. The British Ambassador stated that he had in mind recommending also that his Government suggest to the Soviet Government that it would be helpful if the Soviet Government would state what proposals it had in mind on the various subjects mentioned by the British Government. The British Ambassador is also suggesting that his Government might point out to the Soviet Government that the basic idea of the conference is to have a round-table discussion and interchange of views with the objective of working out common solutions to various problems in which all three of the Governments are concerned.

In reply to the British Ambassador's inquiry, I said that my initial reaction was that the Soviet Government should be informed that the second front issue did not properly fall within the scope of the forthcoming conference but that on further consideration it seemed to me that the British Ambassador's suggestions were sound. I added that obviously we did not wish to encourage any false hope in the mind of the Soviet Government in reference to any decisions which our Governments might take or might have taken but that the best way of attempting to convince the Soviet Government of the soundness of our position would be to have a full and frank discussion of the matter.

HAMILTON

740.0011 EW/10-243

*The Soviet Chargé (Gromyko) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to the letter of Mr. Hamilton, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated September 20 and addressed to Mr. V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,<sup>41</sup> regarding the proposed by the Government of the United States agenda for the three partite conference, I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet Government has instructed me to bring to the knowledge of the United States Government the following:

The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the suggested by the United States Government agenda for the conference of representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government having expressed, in due time, its consent to the arrangement of the conference, then and there advanced its point of view that for the success of this conference it was desirable to receive, from the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America, a list of questions to be considered at the conference as well as suggestions on those questions.

This proposal of the Soviet Government did not meet with any objections, however, up to the present time, the United States Government, on its part, did not present any proposals with the exception of that of the declaration of four nations.

On its part the Soviet Government proposes the following:

1. To consider measures of shortening the war against Germany and her allies in Europe.

In view are such urgent measures to be carried out yet in 1943 by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, which will secure the invasion of Western Europe, across the English Channel, by the Anglo-American armies and which, with simultaneous mighty blows of the Soviet troops upon the main forces of the German Army at the Soviet-German front, are to undermine fundamentally the military-strategic position of Germany and lead to a decisive shortening of war.

2. The Soviet Government has no objections against the discussion of questions, proposed by the United States Government concerning European countries. The Soviet Government considers it, however, desirable that the Government of the United States of America transmit in advance its proposals on the questions presented for concordance of those proposals among the three Governments.

Besides, the Soviet Government draws the attention of the United States Government to the fact that this conference, as it was agreed

<sup>41</sup> Letter of September 20 not printed, but see footnote 32, p. 528.

upon, must be a conference of representatives of three countries—the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, that is the reason why the Soviet Government does not see any ground to include into the agenda, point 1, containing the draft of the Joint Declaration of Four Nations.

3. The Soviet Government considers that the conference of the representatives of the three Governments is to be of a preliminary character and has to work out the proposals for consecutive [*consequent?*] decisions of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Accept [etc.]

A. GROMYKO

111.11 Hull, Cordell/1591

*The British Minister (Campbell) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have been asked by Mr. Eden to convey to you the enclosed personal message.

Believe me [etc.]

R. I. CAMPBELL

[Enclosure]

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the Secretary of State*

[LONDON,] October 3, 1943.

So glad we are to do this work together. Delighted to meet you for preliminary talks either in London or in Cairo whichever suits you. Please let me know your dates and mode of travel.

[File copy not signed]

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)* <sup>42</sup>

WASHINGTON, 4 October 1943—6: 45 p. m.

No. 373. For the Former Naval Person from the President. On the front page of the *Washington Post*, dated Saturday morning, October 2, there appeared a story headlined as follows: "Stalin Said To Have Rejected London as Meeting Place."

<sup>42</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

The article stated in substance that Russia had politely rejected a proposal made by me personally to change the location of the three-power conference from Moscow to London because the health of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, made the longer journey undesirable. In order to appear in this edition of the newspaper, the story had to be released actually many hours before I had personally received Stalin's reply stating that he did not care to change the location.

This article, written by Frederick Kuh and copyrighted by the *Chicago Sun*, appeared under a London date line. Since the *Chicago Sun* is a highly reputable paper and friendly to this administration it seems reasonable to conclude that the date line was not faked and so the story did in fact originate in London. To my mind the mere fact that this story got into the newspapers in the first place indicates a dangerous leak somewhere, and furthermore, indicates a bad mistake on the part of some censor for passing the story for publication as he must have in this case.

Don't you think perhaps it would be beneficial to us both if this leak could be run down and so avoid another one in the future when there is more at stake.<sup>43</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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111.11 Hull, Cordell/1585b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1943—8 p. m.

6121. Personal for Ambassador Winant. Please convey the following message to Eden:

"Deeply appreciate your message and while nothing would give me greater pleasure both for personal and official reasons than to spend the day in consultation with you in Cairo I am apprehensive lest such a meeting be misconstrued to the subsequent disadvantage of both our Governments alike. I cannot arrive in Moscow before October 17 and unless you feel strongly on the subject I believe it would be best for us to await our arrival in Moscow where we will have ample opportunity to confer."

Please inform Harriman of the foregoing.

HULL

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<sup>43</sup> Mr. Churchill replied to the President the next day in his telegram No. 436 (not printed), which read in part: "3. Your number 373. I will have an immediate enquiry made into the possible leakage."

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Soviet People's  
Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov)*

Moscow, October 5, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I am setting forth herewith a secret and personal message dated October 4, 1943, to Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt which I have received this afternoon:

"Personal and secret to Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt. Your wire<sup>44</sup> has reached me and our delegation will be in Moscow on October 15th. While I do not consider this conference as one to plan or recommend military strategy, I have no objection to and would welcome the widest exchange of views of your proposal relating to an expedition directed against France.

"General Deane,<sup>45</sup> who is to be a member of our mission, will be informed fully of our plans and intentions.

"That this is a three power conference and that any discussion on our proposal should be limited to the future intentions and plans of these three powers exclusively is agreeable to me. This would, of course, in no way preclude a wider participation at some later date and under circumstances which would be mutually acceptable to our three governments.

"I am sure that we are going to find a meeting of minds for the important decisions which must finally be made by us. And so this preliminary conference will explore the ground, and if difficulties develop at the meeting of our Foreign Ministers, I would still have every hope that they can be reconciled when you and Mr. Churchill and I meet.

"It appears that the American and British armies should enter Rome in another few weeks."

I would appreciate it if you would transmit this message to Marshal Stalin.<sup>46</sup>

Sincerely yours,

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

<sup>44</sup> Dated September 28, p. 531.

<sup>45</sup> Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission to the Soviet Union.

<sup>46</sup> In a note to the Chargé dated October 6, 1943, Mr. Molotov acknowledged receipt of the letter and stated that he had delivered the message to Marshal Stalin.

Lot file 60D-224

*Memorandum of Conversation With President Roosevelt*<sup>46a</sup>

[WASHINGTON, October 5, 1943.]

Participants: President Roosevelt  
 Secretary Hull  
 Under Secretary Edward R. Stettinius  
 Leo Pasvolsky  
 James C. Dunn, Adviser, Office of Foreign Economic  
 Coordination  
 Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser  
 H. Freeman Matthews, Chief, Division of European  
 Affairs  
 Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Com-  
 mander in Chief of the Army and Navy

## MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE, OCTOBER 5, 1943

I. *Mediterranean Commission*<sup>46b</sup>

The idea of the Commission was suggested by the Soviet Government and acquiesced in by the President and Churchill. The functions are to be recommendatory to the governments. It is to have no control over military authorities and no power of decision, but it should consider all questions relating to enemy and liberated territories. Other interested countries, including Brazil, should be brought in when their interests are involved. The position of the French Committee is not clear. It has been promised participation on the lines indicated above but something more might be necessary.

II. *Four-Power Arrangement*<sup>46c</sup>

We should make every effort to secure both British and Russian agreement to China's participation. Both may present difficulties. Churchill does not like China. Two three-power arrangements will not be nearly as good as one four-power arrangement. It should be possible to find a formulation which would clearly absolve Russia from participation in questions relating to the Pacific area until after the termination with the war with Japan. Alternatively, provision might be made for China's adherence later on. But the four-power concept should be preserved, even at the cost of getting no agreement at this time. China is too important a factor, both

<sup>46a</sup> Authorship not indicated but presumed to be Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chairman of the Committee on Special Studies. This meeting was held to discuss with President Roosevelt questions likely to arise at the Moscow Conference.

<sup>46b</sup> See section entitled, "The Political-Military Commission," pp. 782 ff.

<sup>46c</sup> See "Tentative Draft of a Joint Four-Power Declaration," p. 522, together with British and Soviet reactions, pp. 531 and 534, respectively. For related documents, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, pp. 819-835.



now and in the future, both because of herself and because of her influence over British India, to be alienated.

### III. *Germany*

The President stated categorically that he favors partition of Germany into three or more states, completely sovereign but joined by a network of common services as regards postal arrangements, communications, railways, customs, perhaps power (although he thought power arrangements should be made on a continental basis), etc. The new German states should be deprived of all military activities, including training, and of armament industries. East Prussia should be detached, and all dangerous elements of the population forcibly removed. As against the argument that partition would have many undesirable results and that the customs union arrangement would either prove to be unworkable or become a powerful instrument of re-unification, the President stated that we are inclined to exaggerate these effects. Later in the discussion, however, the President said that the whole transitional period would have to be one of trial and error, and that it may well happen that in practice we shall discover that partition, undertaken immediately after the war, may have to be abandoned. As regards reparation, there will be no exaction in money, but rather in manpower and equipment.

### IV. *Baltic States and Poland*

When he meets with Stalin,<sup>46d</sup> the President intends to appeal to him on grounds of high morality. He would say to him that neither Britain nor we would fight Russia over the Baltic States, but that in Russia's own interest, from the viewpoint of her position in the world, it would be a good thing to say that she would be willing, in two years or so after the war, to have a second plebiscite, since, while she is satisfied that the earlier plebiscite was conclusive, the rest of the world does not seem to think so. The same idea might be applied to Eastern Poland. The President thinks that the new boundary should, in any event, be somewhat east of the Curzon line,<sup>46e</sup> with Lemberg going to Poland, and that a plebiscite should take place after the shell-shock of war had subsided.

<sup>46d</sup> For documentation on arrangements looking to a meeting of the Heads of Government, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 3 ff., and for Secretary Hull's memorandum of a conversation on October 6 with the Polish Ambassador regarding the forthcoming conference at Moscow, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. III, p. 467.

<sup>46e</sup> In regard to the origin of the Curzon line and for a description of it, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. Further details are in *ibid.*, vol. IX, pp. 272-273, 286, 434, 446-447; *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXXII, pp. 971-972; H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (Oxford, 1924), vol. VI, pp. 233-283, 317-322; and S. Konovalov, *Russo-Polish Relations: An Historical Survey* (London, 1945), pp. 33-38, 57-63.

### V. *Belgium*

There is not likely to be any trouble about the restoration of Holland or the Scandinavian countries. But Belgium is likely to present difficulties. Apart from the equivocal position of the King (who has British support because Churchill believes in the restoration of monarchies, but who may cause trouble vis-à-vis the government-in-exile), Belgium is an artificial, bilingual state, with the Walloons and Flamands traditionally at odds with each other. He mentioned, in this connection, a German study made in 1940, proposing a federal union of Alsace, Lorraine, Luxembourg and the two parts of Belgium.

### VI. *Yugoslavia*

He is not sure that Yugoslavia can be restored as a unit. Croatia may have to be set up separately from Serbia.

### VII. *Trusteeship Idea*

We ought to lay a great deal of stress on the possibilities of the trusteeship idea and apply it widely to all sorts of situations. The following are examples:

1. The Baltic passages—Kiel and the Straits—might each be set up as a free zone, under international trustees.
2. A similar zone might be arranged for Russia to the Persian Gulf.
3. The British might, as a gesture of generosity, return to China sovereignty over Hong Kong and the peninsula, while China might, in return, immediately declare Hong Kong a free port under international trusteeship.
4. Indo-China might be placed under international trusteeship.
5. The mandated islands of the Pacific might be taken away from Japan and placed under international trustees.
6. Security points in many parts of the world might be placed under international trustees—Truk, Bonine Islands, Kurile Islands (although the Kuriles should really go to Russia), Rabaul or some point in the Solomons, appropriate points in the Dutch East Indies, Ascension Island, Dakar, some point in Liberia.

A variant of the trusteeship idea might be applied to colonial areas. The draft declaration<sup>46f</sup> proposed on this point some time ago has great possibilities especially as regards its inspection and publicity features, which would be powerful means of inducing colonial powers to develop their colonies for the good of the dependent peoples themselves and of the world.

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<sup>46f</sup> See Document No. 44, U.S. Draft of a Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence, p. 747.

840.50/2875

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Embassy enclose the text of a draft declaration<sup>47</sup> which His Majesty's Government wish to propose under Items 3 and 11 of the British agenda for the Three-Power Meeting.<sup>48</sup> Mr. Eden proposes to suggest that this declaration should be discussed with a view to publication if agreed upon at the meeting.

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1943.

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[An *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy in Washington, October 5, 1943, enclosing a British note to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London on the subject of the negotiation by either the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union of commitments or agreements with other European governments in respect to questions covering the peace settlement or the postwar period, is printed as Conference Document No. 23, page 724.

In a memorandum dated October 8, 1943, attached to the file copy of the British *aide-mémoire*, the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews) noted that on October 6 the Secretary of State had consulted President Roosevelt with regard to the *aide-mémoire*; Mr. Matthews' memorandum continues, "The President said that he did not think much of the proposed British draft. He further said that it smacked too much [of] 'spheres of influence' policies, the very thing which it was supposedly designed to prevent. Mr. Dunn informed Sir Ronald Campbell that the President's first reaction was unfavorable." (741.61/10-543)]

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740.0011 Moscow/60

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Mr. Eden suggests that it might be useful if during the Moscow meeting the British and United States representatives should mention the desirability of concluding a tripartite agreement between the United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R. for the exchange of

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<sup>47</sup> See Conference Document No. 31, p. 736, which is identical with the enclosure to this *aide-mémoire* except for the insertion of the word "that" after "provided" in numbered paragraph 2.

<sup>48</sup> See enclosure 1 to letter of September 18 from the British Minister to President Roosevelt, p. 525.

technical information on warlike inventions. It is not proposed that it should be put on the agenda.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have already had some discussion on this following a memorandum which the Prime Minister gave to the President.<sup>49</sup>

Mr. Eden suggests that his approach might be that community of development between the British and the Americans in many cases has suggested to him that it is inappropriate that Great Britain and the U. S. S. R. should be linked by a bilateral agreement and that there should be no link between the United States and the U. S. S. R. Mr. Eden would continue that on sounding the United States Government he had found that they felt that they had technical information which they would like to give the U. S. S. R. The natural solution seems therefore to be a tripartite agreement.

Mr. Eden might go on to say that if it is generally agreed that a tripartite agreement was desirable in principle, details could be discussed at leisure later. If, however, any general points at once occurred to Mr. Hull or the Soviet Government it might be agreed to record them as guidance for drafting the agreement later.

If the State Department agree that time would be saved by trying to get an agreement in principle at the Conference, Mr. Eden will raise the matter on the above lines. He will not do so if the United States Government feel that exploration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should go further first.

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1943.

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740.0011 Moscow/5 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 6, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 5:55 p. m.]

6739. The following communication dated October 5 just received from the Foreign Office outlines the general line which it is provisionally proposed that the British delegation to the forthcoming Three-Power Conference should take with regard to the question of Allied policy in Iran, which is stated to have been put on the agenda for the discussions. Foreign Office states in this connection that Mr. Wallace Murray,<sup>50</sup> in a recent conversation with a member of the British Embassy at Washington suggested that it would be most

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<sup>49</sup> Not found in Department files. For previous correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 738-740 and 753-754.

<sup>50</sup> Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State.

valuable if His Majesty's Government could induce the Soviet Government to give greater support to Dr. Millspaugh.<sup>51</sup>

"The success or otherwise of Allied policy in Iran has been found to depend to a very large extent on the degree of cooperation which can be achieved between the Allied representatives in Tehran. Where the Soviet, United States and British representatives are agreeable to take concerted action, serious difficulties can be overcome. Conversely, if one of these representatives is not prepared to cooperate or is unable to obtain the necessary instructions from his Government, then the relevant problems become far harder to solve.

In Iran, a more satisfactory degree of cooperation has been achieved recently than in the past. There is perhaps room for further improvement, particularly in the economic sphere.

The three Allied Governments would do well, in Iran's interests and in their own, to give full support to the work of the United States advisers. Dr. Millspaugh's recent reports show that Iran's economic and financial position is critical. Dr. Millspaugh has asked, in particular, for financial assistance. The question of a United States credit is under consideration. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have agreed to an advance of royalties. The Soviet Government's contribution might, it is suggested, take the form of a revision of certain contracts which impose a heavy burden on the Iranian budget; for example, under the munitions factories contract, the entire responsibility for financing the production of arms in these factories, for the benefit of the Soviet forces, falls on the Iranian budget.

It would also seem desirable that the whole of Iran, including all those areas where Soviet, United States or British troops are stationed, should be treated as a single administrative and economic unit. Every facility should be granted to the Iranian Government to exercise administrative control over the whole country. This would conform to article IV of the Tripartite Treaty,<sup>52</sup> under which the Allies undertook to disturb as little as possible the administration and the economic life of the country.

The explanations given to the Soviet Government regarding the employment of US transportation troops in Iran have already, it is hoped, cleared up any doubts which may have arisen on this point. The Soviet and British troops will, in accordance with the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Tripartite Treaty, be withdrawn from Iran within 6 months of the end of hostilities with Germany and her associates, and it is of course understood that the United States troops will likewise be withdrawn before that date.

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<sup>51</sup> Arthur Chester Millspaugh, American economist, Administrator General of Finances, Iran, 1943-45.

<sup>52</sup> The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and Iran was signed at Tehran on January 29, 1942; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249 (reprinted from British Cmd. 6335, Persia No. 1 (1942)). For correspondence relating to the treaty and its negotiation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 263 ff.

To sum up, it is suggested that the policy of the Allied nations toward Iran may be defined simply and concisely. So long as the war in Europe lasts, that policy should aim at the utmost development of Iran as a channel for the passage of supplies into the Soviet Union.

At the same time, all practicable measures should be taken to ease the strain which that policy places upon the internal economy of Iran herself.

After the war, there should be rapid withdrawal of Allied controls and the aim of the Allied nations should be to respect the integrity and the independence of Iran and to enable her to maintain the stability of her administration by any economic assistance which she may require and which it may be in their power to afford her."<sup>53</sup>

Copy of the Foreign Office letter has been given to Harriman.<sup>54</sup>

WINANT

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111.11 Hull, Cordell/1586 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 6, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received October 6—1:35 p. m.]

6740. Personal for the Secretary. Your 6121, October 4, 8 p. m. Yesterday I conveyed your message to Mr. Eden. He has just forwarded a reply to the Embassy which he asked that I cable to you:

"Thank you very much for your message. I agree with you that it might be inadvisable for us to have a formal period of conference in Cairo. I had been aiming at arriving in Moscow on October 15, but as you are not now proposing to get there until 2 days later, I think I had better not arrive there before you. I had in any event been proposing to halt a while in Cairo. We shall therefore presumably be there together, and if our time should overlap by a day or an evening, I much hope that we could meet informally for a talk. I am sure that this would be useful. From my experience Moscow is not a very good place for confidential discussion. All good wishes for your journey."

WINANT

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<sup>53</sup> In telegram No. 6264, October 8, 1943, the Department replied instructing the Ambassador to inform the Foreign Office that the Department wholly concurred in the communication quoted herein concerning Allied policy in Iran.

<sup>54</sup> W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador designate to the Soviet Union and member of the American delegation to the Moscow Conference.

*The Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars  
(Stalin) to President Roosevelt*<sup>56</sup>

I received your message of October 4th.

As regards the military questions, i. e., British-American measures of shortening of the war, you already know the point of view of the Soviet Government from my previous message. I hope, however, that in this respect a preliminary meeting of the three will bring useful results, having prepared our future important decisions.

If I understood you correctly, at the Moscow conference will be discussed questions concerning only our three countries, and, thus, it can be considered as agreed upon that the question of the declaration of four nations is not included in the agenda of the conference.

Our representatives have to do everything possible to prevent possible difficulties in their responsible work. It is understood that the decisions as such, can be made only by our governments and, I hope they will be made at my personal meeting with you and Mr. Churchill.

Best wishes to the American and British Armies to fulfill successfully their task and enter Rome, which will be a new blow inflicted upon Mussolini and Hitler.

[Moscow,] October 6, 1943.

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740.0011 Moscow/11 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, October 7, 1943—11 p. m.  
[Received October 8—12:21 a. m.]

6811. From Harriman. I have had long discussions with Eden and Winant on our two agendas. Also Leverich<sup>57</sup> is in continuous contact with Strang<sup>58</sup> and the other Foreign Office members of the British delegation. I believe we understand the British approach to the various subjects and their views insofar as they have been fully crystallized and can report them to you in Cairo. Eden agrees that items 1 and 2 of our agenda shall be taken up first in the Tripartite Conference if you wish it.

My present schedule is to leave London on Monday, the 11th, spending 12th in Algiers, arriving Cairo late afternoon 13th where I will await your arrival. [Harriman.]

WINANT

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<sup>56</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

<sup>57</sup> Henry P. Leverich, Division of European Affairs, Department of State; member of the American delegation to the Moscow Conference.

<sup>58</sup> William Strang, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; member of the British delegation to the Moscow Conference.

863.014/29

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

## MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has examined with attention the documents attached to the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy of August 28.

The status of Austria as set forth in the Foreign Office's secret paper "The Future of Austria,"<sup>59</sup> and the observations made therein as to the prospects for a viable independent Austria are in general concordance with the Department's views.

The Department is also agreeable to the proposal that a declaration concerning Austria be made jointly by the British, Soviet, and American Governments. In substance the draft text submitted with the *aide-mémoire* as a basis of discussion would be acceptable to the Department. Since, however, the American Government has not yet had occasion for a definite statement of policy on the matter of federations or confederations in Central and Eastern Europe, the Department would prefer that the text of the declaration should not carry the implication that Austrian independence is to be conditioned on "association with neighboring states," however desirable it may be that the way should be left open for Austria's inclusion in some regional structure.

The Department would like to make two further comments, both matters of drafting rather than substance. First, it believes that the phrase

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are determined to liberate the Austrian people . . ."

could be interpreted to indicate an action taken regardless of the will of the Austrian people, or without expectation of any Austrian contribution to the achievement of this liberation. Second, the opening paragraph might well be recast since it refers to events preceding the formulation of the Atlantic Charter.

With these considerations in mind the Department has prepared a variant text of the British draft declaration. This alternative draft is attached hereto, for the Embassy's examination.

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1943.

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<sup>59</sup> Not printed.



[Enclosure]

*Alternative Draft of Proposed Declaration, Suggested by the  
Department of State*

Having taken counsel together in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Nazi aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the union imposed upon Austria by Germany on the 15th of March 1938 as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to reestablish a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves to find, in association with those neighboring States which will be faced with similar problems, that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

The Austrian people must, however, remember that they have a responsibility which they cannot evade, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of their own contribution to the liberation of their country.

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740.0011 Moscow/23a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union  
(Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1943—7 p. m.

970. The British Embassy informs us this morning that the Soviets agree no announcement will be made of arrival of delegates or arrangements for the conference until a joint text has been agreed upon at Moscow. The Department hopes that the text of this statement can be communicated to us prior to its release with specific information as to whether it may be given out in the three Capitals simultaneously.

[STETTINIUS]<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Secretary of State Hull and members of the American delegation left Washington for Moscow on October 7, 1943, and arrived there on October 18. The greatest possible degree of secrecy was maintained with regard to details of their departure and itinerary, in order to assure their safe journey. To help maintain this secrecy, outgoing telegrams and other messages during the period of Mr. Hull's journey to Moscow continued to be signed with his name rather than that of Mr. Stettinius, the Acting Secretary of State. In printing these telegrams Mr. Hull's name has been omitted and that of the Acting Secretary (Stettinius) has been inserted in brackets. Incoming messages were addressed to the Secretary of State instead of to the Acting Secretary, according to the usual practice when the Secretary is absent.

[In a letter from London, October 10, 1943, to the Secretary of State, the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) reported that sentiment among British leaders favored "the concept that in the formation of an 'Executive Committee' for United Nations purposes, an arrangement among four Powers (that is including China) would be better than either a two Powers or a three Powers arrangement". Text of this letter is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, China, 1943*, page 821.]

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740.0011 Moscow/19 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 11, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 4:15 p. m.]

1587. The daily bulletin issued by the British in Moscow stated in the issue of October 9 that on October 7 Mr. Eden cordially welcomed the new Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain and that they reviewed plans together "for the three power conference in Moscow". It stated further that both the British and Soviet Governments were glad that Mr. Hull "is prepared to make the long journey". It would be very helpful to me if I could be informed by urgent telegram whether there has been any official announcement that the conference is to be held in Moscow and if such announcement has been made the substance thereof. As the Department is aware we rarely receive the radio bulletin in Moscow and any official announcement contained therein is usually not available to us.

HAMILTON

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740.0011 Moscow/34b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers* <sup>62</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1943.

Amdel <sup>63</sup> 5. An *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy today <sup>64</sup> states that under Item 8 of the British Agenda the following represents the British proposal: The present policy of the British Government is

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<sup>62</sup> Transmitted to the U.S.S. *Phoenix*, at sea. The Secretary of State and part of the American delegation flew from Washington to San Juan, Puerto Rico, on October 7 and 8, 1943; there they boarded the cruiser *Phoenix* to make the Atlantic crossing, and disembarked at Casablanca on October 15; from Casablanca they flew by stages to Moscow, arriving there on October 18.

<sup>63</sup> "Amdel" was the designation assigned to a series of telegrams from the Department of State to the American delegation; "Delam" was the designation assigned to telegrams from the American delegation to the Department.

<sup>64</sup> Dated October 9, 1943; not printed.

to support all resistance elements in Yugoslavia provided they fight against the Axis and not amongst themselves.

The British Government considers that in the future the principal Allied effort should be directed toward trying to bring about some sort of *modus vivendi* between the Partisans<sup>65</sup> and Mihailović<sup>66</sup> in order that their military efforts can be effectively coordinated to serve the interests of the Allies.

The second *aide-mémoire* also received today<sup>67</sup> puts forth the following British views with respect to Item 13 of their Agenda: The British Government is desirous of obtaining any views about the type of goods which the Soviet Government is likely to need after the war and also the type of goods that the Soviet Government will be able to export. This information is desired so that the British Government may be able to put into more precise form the proposals which they hope to discuss subsequently with the Soviet Government.

[STETTINIUS]

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740.0011 Moscow/19: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union*  
(Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1943—10 p. m.

980. Your telegram No. 1587, Oct. 11, 10 a. m. There has been no announcement that the Three-Power Conference is to be held in Moscow and no announcement that the Secretary is heading our delegation. The British Embassy had informed us that it had been jointly agreed with the Soviet Government that no announcement would be made until the arrival at Moscow of the British and American delegations. We concurred in this arrangement and are therefore at a loss to understand the statements published in the British Daily Bulletin.

[STETTINIUS]

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740.0011 Moscow/34d: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1943.

Amdel 7. The second numbered paragraph of telegram number 1470, September 26, from Moscow<sup>68</sup> quoted Molotov's secret com-

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<sup>65</sup> The Yugoslav Communist guerrilla forces, led by Marshal Tito (Josip Broz).

<sup>66</sup> Gen. Draža Mihailović, leader of the Yugoslav Nationalist guerrilla forces.

<sup>67</sup> No record of this document found in Department files.

<sup>68</sup> Vol. II, p. 377.

munication with respect to the proposed message to General Eisenhower<sup>69</sup> concerning Italy as follows: Obviously the Allies must be interested in the strict execution by Italy under the control of the Allies of the detailed terms of the armistice agreed upon and ratified by the Allies. The Soviet Government therefore perceives no reason for giving instructions regarding the lightening of the terms of the military armistice for Italy as is suggested in point 2 of the message, particularly as it is not clear from the contents exactly what form of lightening the terms is being considered. Furthermore it is necessary to bear in mind that an alteration of the provisions ratified by the Allied Governments obviously can only take place with the agreement of these three Governments.

An *aide-mémoire* received from the British Embassy<sup>70</sup> with reference to the above paragraph comments as follows: As regards point 2 which questions the agreed policy of the United States Government and the British Government of regulating the application of the terms of the armistice according to services rendered, the Prime Minister has made it clear to the President that in his opinion we cannot be put in a position of having to defer on this point to the Soviet Government. (Mr. Churchill said, the *aide-mémoire* continues, "We cannot be put in a position where our two armies are doing all the fighting but Russians have a veto and must be consulted on any minor variation of the armistice terms which Eisenhower considers militarily essential. Unconditional surrender and terms expressing it are basic principle. The Commander in Chief must be free to apply it as, when and how he thinks most helpful."). The British suggested that the Department might wish to draft an answer to the Soviet Government along the foregoing lines, adding that they would be glad to have an opportunity to comment upon it before any reply is sent. After it had gone the British Government would instruct the British Ambassador at Moscow to inform Mr. Molotov that it had nothing to add to the answer sent by the United States Government.

After consultation with General Hilldring,<sup>71</sup> we are informing the British Embassy that it seems preferable to make our position clear to the Russian Government during the forthcoming talks at Moscow

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<sup>69</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>70</sup> Dated October 11, vol. II, p. 385.

<sup>71</sup> Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, Special Staff, War Department.

as the question would presumably come up for discussion there under Items 1 and 6 of British agenda.<sup>72</sup>

[STETTINIUS]

740.0011 Moscow/38a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1943.

Amdel 8. The British Embassy has left with the Department a draft memorandum defining the scope and functions of the Mediterranean Politico-Military Commission which the British Government wishes to communicate to the Soviet Government prior to the Moscow conference as a proposal under Item 2 of the British Agenda. The British Embassy states that the draft memorandum treats the work of the Commission as confined for the present to Italian affairs but they have not overlooked the fact that the Soviet Government has proposed that the Commission should also deal with the problem of Axis Satellites who may dissociate themselves from Germany and with the question of the liberation of Allied territory in Europe. The British Government favors having an Inter-Allied Commission handle these subjects but it doubts whether a Commission sitting in Algiers or elsewhere in the Mediterranean "would be well placed to study these questions". The British propose, therefore, that if the Commission is to have this wider scope and if, as is probable, "still further matters are referred to it in the future" it would be better to establish it in London where a number of other Allied governments are. This could be done, the British suggest, after the Commission has acquainted itself with the Italian problem and made its first recommendations. Thereafter, Italian matters could be handled, the British suggest, by "a Sub-Commission of four subordinate representatives" who would continue to meet in Algiers. The British Embassy adds that it would be "for consideration whether or not

<sup>72</sup> The Secretary of State replied on October 15, 1943 (in Delam No. 4, U.S.S. *Phoenix*), that he entirely agreed with the British *aide-mémoire* both as to the military authority of the Allied Commander in Chief and the responsibility of the U.S. and British Governments when the conduct of serious military operations was involved. He recommended that "messages more or less identic along these lines should be sent to the Soviet Government by both British and American Governments without awaiting our arrival at Moscow for discussion of the subject there." (740.0011 Moscow/31)

The Department informed the Secretary in telegram Amdel No. 19, October 18, 1943 (740.0011 Moscow/39e), that a message in accordance with his request had been transmitted to the Chargé in the Soviet Union for delivery to Molotov (see telegram No. 1002, October 16, 1943, 8 p. m., vol. II, p. 388), and that the British Embassy had communicated this text to London and had informed the Department on October 17 that the British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed to present a similar note.

the French Committee of National Liberation should be permanently represented on the London Commission."

The British draft memorandum reads as follows in paraphrase:

The Politico-Military Commission will be composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation. If necessary, Service advisers will assist these representatives. For the present the Commission will meet at Algiers. In the first instance it will deal with questions relating to Italy. The Commission members will be supplied by the three Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on military and political developments affecting their work and in their turn they will report on local developments. They will make joint or several recommendations to the three Governments or to the Committee of Liberation but will not have the power to take final decisions. They will not, of course, intervene in the military functions of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief. At the discretion of the Commission, the other European Allied Governments will have access to the Commission when it has under consideration matters especially affecting their interests. The functions of the Commission can be more exactly defined as experience is gained of its work. If its scope increases it will be necessary to reconsider the question of its location. The following indications are given of the treatment of questions at present remitted to the Commission:

Italy. The Commission will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs. It will maintain for this purpose close touch with the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and will have the right to request information or explanations on matters affecting its work. It will likewise have access to the Control Commission for Italy and such other inter-allied bodies, whether economic, political or military, as may be established either for the purpose of ensuring execution of the terms laid down for Italy or of exercising supervision and control in the sphere of civil affairs. The members of the Commission, in the light of this information and of their joint examination thereof, will tender advice on Italian affairs to their Governments, either individually or collectively, informing Allied Commanders-in-Chief if they think it appropriate. It is from the United Kingdom and United States Governments, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, that the Allied Commanders-in-Chief continue as in the past to receive instructions.

The Department is informing the British Embassy that it believes that the question is one of such importance that the Secretary will wish to discuss it with Mr. Eden when they meet at Cairo and that it does not feel that it should beforehand even state that it has no objection to the British Government communicating it to the Soviet Union.

The British Embassy has likewise informed the Department that word has been received from the Foreign Office that in spite of our lack of enthusiasm for their revised declaration concerning liberated

areas the British propose to discuss it at Moscow and they are meanwhile presenting it to the Russians as the British proposal for discussion under Item 14 of the British Agenda.

[STETTINIUS]

740.0011 Moscow/279

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt and the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)*<sup>73</sup>

[LONDON,] 12 October 1943.

Please consider the following with a view as to whether something like it might not be issued over our three signatures:

"Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union (in whatever order is thought convenient, we being quite ready to be last) have received from many quarters evidence of the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of the Nazi domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst forms of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that, in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties.<sup>74</sup>

"Accordingly the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare, and give full warning of their declaration, as follows:

" 'At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party, who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to the invaded parts of Russia, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia, Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy. Thus Germans who take part in the wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages, or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in the territories of the Soviet Republic which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back, regardless of expense, to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.'

<sup>73</sup> Transmitted by Lt. Col. Chester Hammond of the White House Staff to Acting Secretary of State Stettinius on October 13, 1943, with a note stating that the President desired his comments and recommendations with reference to the message.

<sup>74</sup> For correspondence concerning Allied declarations and warnings regarding Nazi atrocities and concerning the establishment of the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, see pp. 402 ff.

“The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localization. Signed Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill.”

I am not particular about the phraseology, but if this, or something like this, were issued over our three signatures, I believe it would make some of these villains reluctant to be mixed up in butcheries now they realize they are going to be defeated. We know, for example, that the severities inflicted on the Polish people were mitigated by our threats of reprisals. Use of the terror-weapon by the enemy without doubt imposes on our armies an additional burden. Moral scruples may be developed by many Germans if they know they are to be brought back to the country, and perhaps the very place, where their cruelties were inflicted. This principle and policy of the localization of judgment has been endorsed by the British Cabinet, and I strongly commend it to you as likely to deter enemy terrorism.<sup>75</sup>

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740.0011 European War 1939/32214 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*<sup>76</sup>

LONDON, October 13, 1943.

455. Your telegram No. 373 of October 5th [4th]. An investigation has been made into this leakage. Your telegram<sup>77</sup> containing Stalin's reply was dated October 2nd and reached me on that day. Kuh's cable was filed on the evening of October 1st. Although the Soviet Embassy here are not generally so promptly and fully informed by Moscow, these facts suggest that they were on this occasion told the terms of Stalin's reply before that reply reached you, and that they gave its contents to Kuh.

The censor who passed Kuh's cable made an error of judgment and has been reproved. He was influenced by the statement in Kuh's cable that its contents came from "American sources". This may have been a device to disguise its real origin.

Kuh's messages frequently show him to be in possession of information to which he is not entitled. He often causes us trouble. We are trying to track down his sources. Any help your people can give would be welcome.

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<sup>76</sup> Mr. Stettinius replied the same day in a memorandum for the President: "I am in hearty accord with the attached suggestion of the Prime Minister but believe it should be issued from Moscow towards the close of the conference there to indicate to the world that the fate of these unhappy people was not overlooked in this great tripartite discussion." See telegram No. 1014, October 18, 8 p. m., to the American delegation, p. 566.

<sup>78</sup> This telegram was received from the British Foreign Office by the British Embassy in Washington on October 13, 1943, and forwarded by the latter to the Department of State on October 16.

<sup>77</sup> Not found in Department files.



740.0011 Moscow/22b: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union  
(Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1943—5 p. m.

1001. Please notify us at the earliest possible moment of the time agreed upon for the issuance of the joint statement in order that the Under Secretary can inform the correspondents in Washington of the Secretary's arrival in Moscow and provide them with a list of the delegates from the Department. This refers to the Department's 970, October 9, 7 p. m. We hope that it will be possible for us to have this information prior to its release from Moscow or London in order that the correspondents in this country may not be scooped as regards the whole story. It is felt this is important since correspondents here have been particularly cooperative in connection with the conference and should therefore be protected in every way.

[STETTINIUS]

**REPORTS OF MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS, AND RELATED PAPERS**

[The text of the statement issued by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius at his press conference on October 18, 1943, announcing the arrival of Secretary of State Hull and his party at Moscow for the Tripartite Conference, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 23, 1943, page 271.]

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*Members of Delegations to the Conference*

[EDITOR'S NOTE: The decision was made at the Conference not to list the delegations until after publication of the Final Act. Such a list, however, has not been found. The following lists of the delegations are based on official documentation and other sources within the Department:

AMERICAN DELEGATION

Cordell Hull, Secretary of State.  
 W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador designate in the Soviet Union.  
 Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser, Department of State.  
 James Clement Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State.  
 Maxwell M. Hamilton, Minister Counselor in the Soviet Union.  
 Major General John R. Deane, Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; Chief of the U. S. Military Mission to the Soviet Union.  
 Michael J. McDermott, Chief of the Division of Current Information, Department of State.

- Brigadier General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, U. S. Army Air Force; member of the U. S. Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- Commodore Clarence Edward Olsen, U.S.N.; member of the U.S. Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, War Department.
- Colonel Harry A. McBride, War Department.
- Cecil W. Gray, Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Department of State.
- George V. Allen, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- William A. Fowler, Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, Department of State.
- Philip E. Mosely, Assistant Chief of the Division of Political Studies, Department of State.
- Cavendish W. Cannon, Division of European Affairs, Department of State.
- Henry P. Leverich, Division of European Affairs, Department of State.
- John D. Jernegan, Third Secretary of Legation and Vice Consul in Iran.
- G. Frederick Reinhardt, Division of European Affairs, Department of State; Secretary of the Delegation.
- Dr. Matthew W. Perry, Personal Physician to the Secretary of State.
- Lieutenant Commander F. R. Meyers, U.S.N. Medical Corps.
- Captain Henry H. Ware, Aide to General Deane.
- Lieutenant R. P. Meikeljohn, U.S.N.R., Assistant to Ambassador Harriman.
- George A. Morlock, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- Henry E. Thomas, Special Agent, Department of State.
- John W. Burnett, member of the clerical staff.
- Malcolm P. Hallom, member of the clerical staff.
- John C. Hrones, member of the clerical staff.
- Nelson Newton, member of the clerical staff.
- Harold N. Waddell, member of the clerical staff.

#### BRITISH DELEGATION

- Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
- William Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

- Oliver Charles Harvey, Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- Valentine George Lawford, Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- Adrian Holman, Counselor, British Legation in Iran.
- Douglas Frederick Howard, Acting First Secretary, Head of the Southern Department, Foreign Office.
- John Guthrie Ward, First Secretary, British Legation in the Soviet Union.
- Geoffrey Wedgwood Harrison, Acting First Secretary, Central Department, Foreign Office.
- John Eltringham Coulson, First Secretary, Economic and Reconstruction Department, Foreign Office.
- Geoffrey Masterson Wilson, Russian Expert, temporarily a member of the Eastern Department, Foreign Office.
- Major William A. B. Iliff, Financial Counselor, British Legation in Iran.
- Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, Deputy Secretary of the War Cabinet.
- Brigadier French, Offices of the War Cabinet.
- Colonel Price, Offices of the War Cabinet.
- Paymaster Commander M. H. Knott, Private Secretary to General Ismay, Offices of the War Cabinet.
- Lieutenant Colonel Denis Cuthbert Capel-Dunn, Offices of the War Cabinet.
- Major Arthur H. Birse, Translator, British Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- Brigadier Leslie Chasemore Hollis, Senior Assistant Secretary, Office of the War Cabinet; British Member of the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

#### SOVIET DELEGATION

- Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars, and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars, and People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars.
- Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

- Vasily Alexeyevich Sergeyeu, People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Trade.
- Major General Anatoly Alexeyevich Gryzlov, General Staff of the Soviet Army.
- Georgy Filipovich Saksin, Adviser, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Vladimir Georiyevich Dekanozov, People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- Alexander Yevdokimovich Korneichuk, People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- Sergey Ivanovich Kavtaradze, People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
- Alexey Pavlovich Pavlov, Member of the Collegium, and Chief of the Legal Section, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Yakov Zakharovich Surlits, Adviser, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin, Chief of the American Section, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Kirill Vasilyevich Novikov, Member of the Collegium, and Chief of the Second European Division, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Anatoly Iosipovich Lavrentyev, Chief of the Near Eastern Section, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Sergey Alexandrovich Golunsky, Soviet Consultant on International Law, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Anatoly Maximovich Baranovsky, Consultant, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Boris Fedorovich Podtserob, Senior Assistant to Foreign Commissar Molotov.
- Andrey Andreyevich Smirnov, former Soviet Ambassador to Iran.

*Secretariat*

- Valentin Mikhailovich Berezhkov, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Dmitry Stepanovich Chuvakhin, Assistant Chief of the American Section, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- Vladimir Yakovlevich Yerofeyev, Assistant Chief of the Second European Section, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- A. A. Khatuntsev, Secretary-Interpreter.]

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov)*

Moscow, October 18, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I am setting forth herewith a secret and personal message of October 17 to Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt which was received at midnight last night:

"Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt.

"In view of Mr. Molotov's note to the United States Chargé d'Affaires of October 14, and in order that there may be no misunderstanding with regard to representation on the Political-Military Commission, I think I should make clear that, as indicated in my telegram to you of September 5,<sup>78</sup> I feel that French representation should be restricted to matters other than the military occupation of Italy in which the three Governments establishing the Commission<sup>79</sup> decide that France has a direct interest.

"I feel that in this regard French representation should correspond to that which I suggested in my message of October 13<sup>80</sup> should be accorded to the Governments of China, Brazil, Greece and Yugoslavia, or to any other Governments which may by mutual agreement be invited to participate.

"It was never my intention that the French Committee of National Liberation should function on the same plane as the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States or enter into its deliberation on all subjects."

I would appreciate it if you would transmit this message to Marshal Stalin.<sup>81</sup>

Sincerely yours,

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

740.0011 Moscow/39d : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1943—noon.

1008. Amdel No. 18. The President transmitted Saturday night<sup>82</sup> messages to Marshal Stalin<sup>83</sup> and Prime Minister Churchill setting

<sup>78</sup> *Post*, p. 784.

<sup>79</sup> For correspondence regarding the establishment of the Political-Military Commission, see pp. 782 ff.

<sup>80</sup> See telegram No. 6368, October 13, 1 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, and footnote 41, p. 795.

<sup>81</sup> In a note to the Chargé dated October 18, 1943, Mr. Molotov acknowledged receipt of the letter and stated that he had delivered the message to Marshal Stalin.

Marshal Stalin replied on October 21, 1943, in a message to President Roosevelt transmitted through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington: "I have received your message of October 17. On my part there is no objection to the proposal contained therein concerning the extent of the rights of the French representative on the Military-Political Commission of the Allied countries."

<sup>82</sup> October 16.

<sup>83</sup> See *supra*.

forth his understanding of the character of French representation on the Political Military Commission as suggested in your Delam no. 1.<sup>84</sup> Presumably the text will be available to you at Moscow.

Referring to Amdel no. 8<sup>85</sup> the British Embassy was informed Saturday of your agreement with the presentation of the proposed British memorandum to the Soviet Government prior to the Conference except that the proposed membership status granted the French Committee in either London or Algiers did not accord with the President's position. The British Embassy stated Saturday that in view of the shortness of time before the Moscow Conference a memorandum had already been presented to the Soviet Government.

[STETTINIUS]

740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Minutes of Meeting Held at the Kremlin, October 18, 1943*

Present: The Secretary of State  
 Mr. W. Averell Harriman  
 Mr. James Clement Dunn  
 Major General Deane  
 Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton  
 Mr. Anthony Eden  
 Sir A. Clark Kerr  
 Mr. William Strang  
 General Ismay  
 Mr. V. Molotov  
 Mr. Vyshinski

*Interpreters:* Mr. Pavlov  
 Mr. Birse

The meeting opened at 6 p. m.

THE SECRETARY raised the question of the publicity to be given to the proceedings during the Conference. His idea was that agreement should be reached between the representatives of the three Governments about giving out to the Press the names of the persons who have come to Moscow and the names of the persons associated with himself and Mr. Eden. He was only raising the question.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had no objection and would leave it entirely to Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden. He thought a short communiqué giving the names would be required.

MR. EDEN suggested a communiqué saying they had arrived and who was with them.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether there were any other proposals.

<sup>84</sup> Dated October 15, p. 797.

<sup>85</sup> Dated October 12, p. 554.

MR. EDEN said there was the question of the time of announcement.

MR. HARRIMAN said the announcement should be made before 11 p. m. that night.

MR. MOLOTOV said he understood that no report made by the foreign correspondents should be released before 11 p. m.

MR. EDEN said that until the communiqué was published nothing was to be sent by the correspondents.

MR. MOLOTOV said a list of the names had been given to the correspondents, but not released. The correspondents had evidently been informed by the Embassies, as they came with the telegrams in their hand. If it was desirable to postpone publication, the telegrams could be held back.

MR. MOLOTOV then instructed his secretary to make arrangements to hold the telegrams until further orders.

MR. EDEN suggested that someone from each delegation should assist in drafting the announcement.

MR. MOLOTOV said they had prepared a draft and suggested the appointment of delegates to draft the announcement.

THE SECRETARY said Mr. Harriman had the American list of names.

MR. MOLOTOV then sent his secretary for the Soviet draft.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had no objections to Mr. Hull's and Mr. Eden's statements.

MR. EDEN said if these drafts were agreed the next thing was to decide whether anything more was to be said to the Press before the Conference ended.

MR. PAVLOV then translated the Soviet draft into English.<sup>86</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV asked if someone from the two Embassies could be appointed to agree to this draft. On the Soviet side he would appoint Mr. Novikov.

MR. EDEN suggested that nothing be said to the Press except by agreement.

MR. HARRIMAN said if events required it, it would be possible to make proposals.

*Agreed:* that a representative from the British Embassy (the Minister) and one from the U.S.A. Embassy would agree the draft of the announcement with Mr. Novikov later in the evening.

MR. MOLOTOV asked when it would be suitable to start the work of the Conference. Were there any proposals?

THE SECRETARY said he was at the service of his two associates at any time.

MR. EDEN said he was also.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed 4 p. m. on October 19th at the Spiridonovka.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>87</sup> Secretary of State Hull describes Spiridonovka Palace in his *Memoirs* as "a fine old Czarist mansion".

*Agreed.*

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether any speeches should be made at the first meeting. He pointed out that the Conference was confidential.

MR. EDEN suggested no speeches.

THE SECRETARY said it was strictly business.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV asked who would be present at the first meeting and at the later meetings. It would be desirable to know beforehand, especially for the first meeting; the persons to take part in subsequent meetings could be agreed later.

THE SECRETARY asked whether it would be preferable if there were just the three or should some of the associates be present with a view to discussing important questions.

MR. EDEN thought it should be something like the present meeting.

THE SECRETARY said that instead of Mr. Hamilton the Americans would have Mr. Hackworth, otherwise there would be no change.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had no objections. He would now state who would be present as the Soviet Delegation. It would be the seven members mentioned in his note sent to the British Ambassador and to the American Chargé d'Affaires: Molotov, Vyshinski, Voroshilov, Litvinov, Sergejev, Major General Gryzlov, Saksin.

He wanted to add that the presence of all the members would not always be necessary and on the other hand others might be called in as experts or on technical questions. He hoped this would be agreeable to all the Delegations. He did not exclude personal meetings with Mr. Eden and the Secretary.

MR. EDEN entirely agreed.

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740.0011 Moscow/39f: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1943—6 p. m.

1012. Amdel No. 20. British Embassy has just informed us that a cable received from the Foreign Office states that the British Government have agreed that the statement on "civil affairs for France"<sup>88</sup> should be "taken as a basis for discussion in Moscow." (Your Delam no. 2, October 15.<sup>89</sup>)

[STETTINIUS]

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<sup>88</sup> Conference Document No. 19; for text, see Annex 5 to the Secret Protocol signed at Moscow November 1, 1943, p. 760.

<sup>89</sup> Not printed; in it the Secretary requested to be informed when concurrence of the British Government on the statement was received from the British Embassy (740.0011 Moscow/29).



740.0011 Moscow/39h : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1943—8 p. m.

1014. Amdel 22. There is transmitted herewith by direction of the President the text of a message which Prime Minister Churchill transmitted simultaneously on October 12 to the President and Premier Stalin<sup>90</sup> with a view as to whether "something like it might not be issued over our three signatures". The President would like you to consider the text of some such statement to be issued at the close of the Moscow conversations as an indication to the world that the fate of these unhappy people under German control has not been overlooked at this Tripartite meeting. Should such an action meet with your approval and a text in its general character agreed upon with your British and Russian colleagues, the President suggests the statement to be issued in Moscow should be a joint statement as by the three governments.

It is believed that without prejudice to any action we may take against past offenders, this warning should refer specifically to present and future atrocities in order to avoid in so far as is possible driving to desperation those cornered rats who have in the past murdered their helpless victims and to whom we can and will apply the same punishment without any notice.<sup>91</sup>

In due course I shall look for some indication of your decision.

The text is contained in the telegram immediately following.<sup>1</sup>

[STETTINIUS]

740.0011 Moscow/39u : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1943—11 p. m.

1017. Amdel 24. Johnson<sup>2</sup> reported from Stockholm that in conversation on the 9th Boheman<sup>3</sup> expressed Sweden's profound interest in outcome of the conference to extent it would have bearing on the Northern countries. He made following statements orally as to

<sup>90</sup> *Ante*, p. 556.

<sup>91</sup> In a memorandum of October 16, 1943, to the Acting Secretary of State, President Roosevelt stated: "It is suggested that the following be added after the first paragraph of your proposed message, and that the message be sent without delay to Secretary Hull." Then followed text of the above paragraph. (740.0011 Moscow/279)

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Herschel V. Johnson, American Minister in Sweden.

<sup>3</sup> Erik C. Boheman, Swedish Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Swedish position and policy towards certain problems and hoped they might be of interest:

1. Swedes believe Norway and Denmark will be liberated as outcome of the war and restored to complete independence.

2. They feel prospects for Finland's future are much less clear. Finns feel they have right to ask for full liberty and independence which would mean a frontier drawn without foreign enclaves, such as Hango in Russian hands and without destruction of Finland's most important industrial areas (Saima-Viborg frontier) and more than anything else complete independence in conduct of their domestic policy.

3. It is of primary importance to Sweden that Finland remain independent.

4. Sweden intensely desires both for political and economic reasons to have best possible relations with U.S.S.R. and sincerely feels that not only correct relations but relations based on mutual confidence between it and U.S.S.R. are of utmost importance for security of north.

5. Sweden is convinced a free Finland would adhere to that peaceful policy of Sweden and other northern countries in Finnish relations with U.S.S.R. and Sweden would use all its influence to that end which it has no doubt would succeed. Sweden feels such a common Northern policy in that respect could be arrived at and would be most satisfactory result for Russia also. Swedish and Finnish people and in Swedish opinion surely peoples of Denmark and Norway also are confident Allied Powers in conformity with repeatedly declared principles would consider it necessary for Finland to retain this independence. Sweden fears that if these hopes are not realized far-reaching reactions on public opinion in the North will follow and peoples of those countries will lose their confidence and hope in future organized peace.

[STETTINIUS]

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740.0011 Moscow/22 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 18, 1943.

[Received October 19—12:10 a. m.]

1635. For Byington<sup>4</sup> from McDermott.<sup>5</sup> Following announcement agreed upon by three Governments and released at 11 p. m. Moscow time.

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<sup>4</sup> Homer M. Byington, Assistant Chief, Division of Current Information.

<sup>5</sup> Michael J. McDermott, Chief of the Division of Current Information and member of the American delegation at the Moscow Conference.

"The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Eden, arrived at Moscow on the 18th of October. Mr. Hull was accompanied by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador designate of the United States to the Soviet Union; Mr. Green Hackworth, Legal Adviser of the Department of State; Mr. James C. Dunn, Political Adviser of the Department of State, General John R. Deane, USA. Mr. Eden was accompanied by Mr. W. Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and Lieutenant General Sir H. L. Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence.

Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden and the officials accompanying them were met at the airport by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov; the Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. G. Dekanosov and Mr. M. M. Litvinov; by the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Trade, M. S. Stepanov; Colonel General F. I. Golikov; the Vice President of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet, M. A. Yasnov; the Commandant of the City of Moscow, Major General K. R. Sinilov; and the following officials of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: K. V. Novikov, G. N. Zarubin, F. I. Gomin and the Chief of the Foreign Liaison section of the People's Commissariat for Defense, Major General V. N. Evstigneev.

There were present at the airport the British Ambassador to the USSR, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr; the Canadian Minister, Mr. A. Dana Wilgress; the United States Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. M. Hamilton; the Australian Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Keith Officer, and members of the United States and British Embassies and of the British Military Mission. A special guard of honor was present at the airport which was decorated with the flags of Great Britain, the United States and the USSR."

Secretary Hull issued following statement upon arrival:

"It gives me special satisfaction to visit Moscow, the capital of a great country united with my own in a common cause. I also have the pleasing opportunity of returning the visit to Washington of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, and I am looking forward to the conversations with him and Mr. Eden."

Eden issued following at same time:

"I am very happy to come back to Moscow for this conference and to have this opportunity of returning the visit paid by M. Molotov to London last year. I much look forward to the coming discussions with him and Mr. Hull."

It was decided by the three Foreign Ministers not to make the other names public at this time. [McDermott.]

HAMILTON

800.0146/209 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 19, 1943—8 a. m.

[Received October 20—5 : 26 a. m.]

1639. Department's 894, September 23, 5 p. m. The Embassy has received from the Foreign Office a memorandum dated October 16 replying as follows to the Embassy's memorandum communicating to the Soviet Government the numbered observations concerning the draft declaration regarding the administration of liberated enemy territories contained in the Department's telegram under reference :

“1. The reference contained in the memorandum to the participation of a representative of the Soviet Government in the Committee known as the Leith-Ross Committee<sup>6</sup> is without foundation since actually a Soviet representative did not enter this Committee and took no part in its work.

2. The Soviet Government affirms the agreement in the viewpoints of the Soviet and American Governments on the question of responsibility for the administration of enemy territories of the command of the Armed Forces conquering these territories. The Soviet Government also notes with satisfaction the agreement of the Government of the United States of America with the views of the Soviet Government respecting the drawing into participation in the administration of local personages as set forth in the letter of V. M. Molotov dated September 14, 1943.<sup>7</sup> The Soviet Government however does not share the opinion expressed in the memorandum that the decision of the question of the degree and time of such participation by such personages should be left to the Allied Command of the respective areas since this question in the opinion of the Soviet Government should be brought within the competence of the Political-Military Commission.

3. With respect to the question of the supreme authority of the Allied Command over territories liberated from enemy occupation which is discussed in paragraph 3 of the memorandum and also to the question of the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the draft statement which was communicated by Mr. Standley in his note of September 6 (Department's 799, September 4, 10 p. m.) the viewpoint of the Soviet Government concerning these questions was set forth in the letter of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, dated September 14, 1943 (Embassy's 1364, September 15, 1 p. m. [11 a. m.]).[”]

HAMILTON

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<sup>6</sup> The Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, of which Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government, had been Chairman since 1942. See telegram No. 928, September 29, 10 p. m., to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 535.

<sup>7</sup> See telegram No. 1364, September 15, 11 a. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 524.

740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum of Meeting at Spaso House,<sup>8</sup> Moscow, 12 Noon,  
October 19, 1943*

Present: Mr. Hull  
Mr. Eden  
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr

Mr. Eden accompanied by the British Ambassador to the USSR called on the Secretary of State at noon.

Mr. Hull suggested to Mr. Eden that, although it had been agreed with Mr. Molotov that there should be no public statements regarding the Conference until its conclusion without common consent, the American press and public would be speculating, possibly unfavorably, regarding the progress of the Conference unless there were at least some general information given out. It was pointed out that last night the Soviet censor cut out of the American press stories reference to the fact that the Secretary and his party arrived in good health.

Mr. Eden agreed that, as long as there was no mention made of the progress of the Conference nor any comment on political matters released, it would be desirable to allow the press to report when meetings took place or when Mr. Molotov called on either Mr. Hull or himself and to give whatever human interest material might be available.

It was agreed that both Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden would mention this to Mr. Molotov when they met.

It was agreed also that Mr. Hull's press representative would keep in touch with the British Embassy press representative and the press bureau of the Foreign Office to develop as much material along the above lines as was possible and see that the censorship released it.

Mr. Hull suggested to Mr. Eden that it would be well to give the Soviet Government every indication possible that both the United States and British delegations were ready to discuss any matters separately with the Soviets. Mr. Hull specifically suggested that it would be well if he mentioned this to Mr. Molotov this afternoon, and indicated that the members of his party were free to make themselves available to their opposite numbers of the Soviet group on an informal basis whenever it might be desired.

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<sup>8</sup> Spaso House, once the residence of a wealthy Russian merchant and subsequently used by officials of the early Soviet revolutionary period, had been rented from the Soviet Government to house the American Embassy following the establishment of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1933. Secretary Hull stayed at Spaso House during the Moscow Conference.

Mr. Eden agreed with the above and said that when he was here in December of 1942 [1941] <sup>9</sup> Mr. Maisky <sup>10</sup> had come around to the Embassy in the evenings after the formal meetings and discussed the results of the conference informally with the idea of finding solutions. Mr. Eden thought it would be well if Mr. Strang had informal discussions with Mr. Vyshinsky whom he knew from previous meetings and suggested that Mr. Dunn might wish to have parallel talks.

Mr. Hull explained that it might be well for others of the staff to have similar relationships if Mr. Molotov agreed. At all events he considered it important to make the suggestion in order to avoid a feeling of suspicion on the part of the Soviet Government that the British and United States groups, living as they are together at the National Hotel, were conferring without giving the Soviet Government the benefit of their discussions.

It was agreed that every attempt should be made to encourage informal talks.

Mr. Clark-Kerr brought up the matter of the desire of the Soviet Government to have military discussions, particularly with reference to the Second Front.

It was agreed to wait and see what Mr. Molotov proposed this afternoon. It would be proper for him to make the suggestion as to the first matter to be discussed. If he did insist on the military matters being discussed first, Mr. Hull indicated that he would make a general statement with regard to the United States determination to prosecute the war to its conclusion and to give full assistance to her allies, and that, if it was desired to go into more detail, a similar meeting could be arranged either immediately or at a later date, as the details were of such a secret nature that they could not be discussed in a large meeting. Should this meeting extend over a longer duration than Mr. Hull was prepared to give to it, he indicated he might wish himself to retire.

It was agreed that we should give the Soviet Government full information on our plans, the reasons for the decisions and the results attained, and receive any suggestions that they wish to make. It should be made clear, on the other hand, that there could be no military negotiations carried on at this meeting.

Mr. Eden brought up the question of the Mediterranean Commission and explained to the Secretary the Soviet Government's expanded ideas about its operations. Mr. Eden expressed the view that Algiers was not the proper place for a Commission with expanded responsibilities, and suggested that London might be a more suitable place.

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<sup>9</sup> For correspondence concerning the visit of Anthony Eden in Moscow, December 16-22, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 192-205.

<sup>10</sup> Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

He would welcome a Commission being set up in London dealing with all these matters, leaving in Algiers a sub-committee to consider the Mediterranean. Mr. Eden also made it clear that his Government was unwilling to give plenary power to the Commission as demanded by the Soviet Government.

Mr. Eden explained certain difficulties in regard to the North Russian convoys<sup>11</sup> which he was going to take up individually with Mr. Molotov.

He raised also the question of the recognition by the Soviet Government of the Polish Government and expressed the hope that Mr. Hull would join him in bringing as much pressure as possible on the Soviet Government to do so.

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Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-150

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John D. Jernegan of the American Delegation*

Moscow, October 19, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Iliff, Financial Counselor, British Legation, Tehran;  
Mr. Holman, Counselor, British Legation, Tehran;  
Mr. George Allen;  
Mr. John D. Jernegan.

Subject: Allied Policy in Iran.

Mr. Holman and Mr. Iliff said that they were anxious to insure that Iranian problems received attention during the present conference. They felt that, as a first step, Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should discuss the matter in general terms and then, after reaching an agreement on principles, leave details to be thrashed out by subordinates. The British view was that the three powers should agree that the objective was to get as much as possible for the war effort out of Iran and at the same time to do as little damage to the Iranian economy as possible. Mr. Allen said that he thought it would be preferable to word this statement of policy a little differently since, as phrased, it would sound to the Iranian ear as if we admitted that we were going to harm Iran to a greater or lesser extent. It was suggested that the statement might be made to read "that the policy of the three powers is to facilitate in every way possible Iranian participation in the war effort and at the same time to render every practicable assistance to the Iranian economy."

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<sup>11</sup> For correspondence concerning consideration of the question of sending convoys by the northern route to the Soviet Union, see vol. III, pp. 624-703, *passim*.

Mr. Jernegan and Mr. Allen mentioned that it had been suggested in London and also in Tehran that a tripartite declaration by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union should be made to renew the assurances already given that Allied troops would be withdrawn from Iran within six months after the end of the war. The purpose of such a declaration would be: (1) to give fresh assurance to the Iranian people that their sovereignty would be respected; (2) to give an assurance in this respect to the Soviet Government which, it was feared, looked with some suspicion on the presence of American troops in Iran; (3) to bring the United States for the first time into a joint pronouncement regarding Iran and thereby give evidence of Allied unity in that area. Mr. Holman and Mr. Iliff appeared to feel that this proposal might have merit.

The two British participants in the conversation stated emphatically that they regarded the continued functioning of American advisers in Iran, most particularly Dr. Millspaugh and his associates,<sup>12</sup> as of the most vital importance. Mr. Iliff stated that he was convinced that withdrawal of the Millspaugh mission at this time could only result in catastrophe which would adversely affect not only British and American interests in Iran but also those of the Soviet Union, since a collapse must inevitably interfere with the movement of Lend-Lease supplies to Russia. Mr. Iliff stated he had, as recently as Sunday, October 17, urged Dr. Millspaugh not to resign, at least until the new Iranian Majlis (Parliament) should be elected and convene a month or six weeks hence. If the new Majlis should prove as refractory as the present one, then Millspaugh might well feel that he could do nothing except resign, but he should at least make the trial. Millspaugh had assured him (Iliff) that he would do nothing definite until after the conference at Moscow.

In connection with the discussion of Dr. Millspaugh's position, Mr. Allen pointed out that the mission was not connected with the American Government and had been employed directly by the Iranian Government with only the interposition of good offices by the Department of State. The United States did not attempt to dictate policies or measures to Dr. Millspaugh, nor would it attempt to decide whether or not he should resign. Mr. Holman and Mr. Iliff said that they entirely understood this.

Both Mr. Holman and Mr. Iliff seemed to feel that there was a great deal of unjustified suspicion on the part of the Soviet authorities toward American and British activity in Iran, especially the activity of the American advisers. Mr. Iliff and Mr. Allen, however, also men-

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<sup>12</sup> For correspondence in connection with the Millspaugh Mission and other groups of Americans employed by the Iranian Government, see vol. iv, pp. 510 ff.



tioned that the British and American Governments might be unduly suspicious of Soviet aims in Iran and pointed out that we had as yet no real reason to doubt that the Soviet Government would live up to its undertakings under the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942.

It was agreed that it would be most desirable, once the chiefs had arrived at a general policy agreement, for the subordinate members of the British and American delegations to sit down with their Soviet counterparts to go over the details involved in carrying out that policy. Mr. Holman gave Mr. Jernegan a copy of a lengthy memorandum which had been prepared by the British Legation at Tehran on the various problems involved.

Mr. Jernegan suggested in passing that one means of working out a policy of close collaboration among the three interested great powers would be to bring Russian administrators into certain parts of the Iranian governmental machine in the same way that British and American representatives were now functioning, either as Iranian Government employees or as officials of their own government on loan to the Iranian Government. The particular field in which Soviet officials could be useful was that of grain collection and distribution in the northern provinces. This might serve a dual function of lessening Soviet doubts regarding Anglo-American policies and motives, and of increasing the efficiency of the grain collection and distribution organization in Iran. Mr. Holman and Mr. Iliff agreed that this suggestion was worthy of consideration, although they appeared to feel that it would be difficult to obtain Soviet assent.

JOHN D. JERNEGAN

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740.0011 Moscow/33 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 19, 1943—2 p. m. [?]

[Received October 20—3:40 a. m.]

1647. Pending the establishing of a procedure here for supplying you regularly with telegraphic reports relating to the activities of the U.S. Delegation to the Three Power Conference I am giving you a brief résumé of the activities during the first 24 hours since the delegation arrived.

Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden accompanied by Mr. Harriman and the British Ambassador, respectively, and by the senior members of the

respective American and British delegations called on Mr. Molotov on October 18, at 6 p. m. During this call there were taken up in a preliminary way questions relating to procedure and to publicity. The atmosphere throughout the call was very cordial and friendly.

Following the arrival of the U.S. delegation at their hotel, McDermott met the American press correspondents and gave them informal background comment in regard to members of the United States delegation.

On October 9 [1943], at 11 a. m., Secretary Hull held a meeting of the members of the American delegation. At 12 o'clock Mr. Eden conferred with Mr. Hull. At 2:30 p. m. Mr. Molotov called on Mr. Hull. At 4 p. m. there occurred the first regular meeting of the three Foreign Ministers. By agreement there were present in addition to the three Foreign Ministers only the senior representatives of each Government.

The Soviet Government has placed at the disposal of Secretary Hull an armor-protected limousine with bullet-proof glass. It has assigned to him as aides an officer of the Foreign Office and a colonel of the Red Army.

HAMILTON

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740.0011 Moscow/39v : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1943—2 p. m.

1025. Amdel 25. For the Secretary. On October 16 Dr. Soong,<sup>13</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked Ambassador Gauss<sup>14</sup> to inform the Secretary that China is in complete agreement with the American draft of the proposed joint four power declaration; that in case the Three Power Conference gives consideration to any modifications of the American draft China asks that we consult her; and that China hopes that we will inform her from time to time of negotiations at the Three Power Conference when this matter is discussed.<sup>15</sup> Dr. Soong also told Ambassador Gauss that he had received the proposed British redraft of the declaration.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>13</sup> T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>14</sup> Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador in China.

<sup>15</sup> For correspondence relating to assistance by the United States in securing admission of China as a signatory of the Four-Power Declaration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, pp. 819 ff.

740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the  
American Delegation*

Moscow, October 19, 1943—2:30 p. m.

Participants: The Secretary of State  
The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr.  
Molotov  
Mr. Pavlov  
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen

Mr. Molotov said that he was glad to see Mr. Hull looking so rested, as he had appeared somewhat tired upon arrival at the airport yesterday. After an exchange of generalities in regard to the trip and airplane travel in general, the Secretary said he would like to touch on a few matters of business before the meeting this afternoon. The Secretary said that yesterday the American correspondents had not been permitted to send through the censor any human interest stories concerning the arrival of the American Delegation, such as for example that he had stood the trip well. The Secretary inquired whether it would not be possible to make some arrangements whereby details and human interest stories concerning the American Delegation and the conference, which did not in any way touch upon the official business of the meetings could be permitted to be sent back to the United States. He suggested that the type of material which would be harmless to send might be decided by a representative of the Soviet Government and representatives of the British and American Delegations. Mr. Molotov said that he could not understand the "stupidity" of the censor in not permitting such harmless stories to go through and he said that he would see to it that no similar prohibition of such types of stories were enforced in the future. He said that he would give orders that any type of material which the British and American Delegations desired to give to their respective correspondents in the Soviet Union would be permitted to pass through the Soviet censor.

The Secretary said that since he was convinced that our three countries would be engaged in close cooperative international action not only during the war but in the post-war period as well, it was important that misunderstandings or suspicions which might exist between our peoples should be steadily and progressively broken down. He therefore suggested that it might be a good idea if the subordinate members of the American Delegation could be put in touch with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Government, not for the purpose of any official discussions or the taking of any decisions, but merely to get to know each other and to talk over the problems in their specific fields. Mr. Molotov agreed that this would be a good idea. The Sec-

retary then said that he desired to tell Mr. Molotov what he had already told Mr. Eden, that he envisaged cooperation between the three countries on an entirely equal footing and that there should therefore be no secrets between the three of them. Mr. Molotov heartily agreed with the Secretary's views on this point. In conclusion, the Secretary said he desired to assure Mr. Molotov that he was profoundly convinced of the importance of the closest collaboration between the three great Powers—the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States—in the future, since we were all in the same boat, and that he personally was prepared to devote the closing period of his life to facilitating and developing such collaboration. Mr. Molotov thanked the Secretary for his statement and said that in so far as he was able he was prepared to do everything in his power to facilitate the achievement of that aim.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the First Session of the Moscow Tripartite Conference, October 19, 1943, 4 p. m., at Spiridonovka*<sup>18</sup>

Present: The Secretary of State  
 Mr. W. Averell Harriman  
 Major General Deane  
 Mr. Hackworth  
 Mr. James Clement Dunn  
 Mr. Charles E. Bohlen  
 The Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov  
 Marshal Voroshilov  
 Mr. Pavlov  
 Mr. Vyshinski  
 Mr. M. Litvinov  
 Several Soviet minor officials  
 One Major General of the Soviet General Staff  
 The British Foreign Minister, Mr. Anthony Eden  
 Mr. W. Strang  
 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr  
 General Sir H. L. Ismay  
 Mr. Wilson  
 Mr. Birse

THE SECRETARY. Mr. Hull proposed that it be the unanimous decision of the meeting that Mr. Molotov be elected permanent presiding officer.

<sup>18</sup> Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov welcomed the representatives of Great Britain and the United States and expressed the best wishes of his Government for the success of the meeting. He said if there were no objections he proposed to hold daily meetings except when, by agreement, other arrangements were made, and that these daily meetings would last from four until seven o'clock with such intermissions as might be desirable.

**MR. EDEN.** Mr. Eden said that he had no objection, but it would of course be understood that the sessions could be prolonged if the subject required it.

Mr. Molotov's proposal was accepted.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov said that while he appreciated the compliment of the proposal that he be presiding officer at all meetings, he believed it would be better to rotate the chairmanship.

Both Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden objected and stated that it would be preferable in every way if Mr. Molotov would agree to preside at all meetings. Mr. Molotov accepted the chairmanship of the present meeting but reserved the right, if necessary, to raise the question of rotating the chairmanship at further sessions.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov stated that before proceeding to consideration of the agenda he desired to ascertain exactly what would be the powers of the representatives at this meeting and particularly whether it was Mr. Hull's and Mr. Eden's understanding that it would be possible for the conference to adopt resolutions binding their Governments on questions on which agreements had been reached at the meetings. He added that he was proceeding on the basis that these meetings were not only informative, but would have the power to take such binding resolutions on questions on which there was agreement and also the authority to prepare proposals on other questions for submission to the three Governments for decision.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull suggested that any proposals which might be submitted to the respective Governments for decision should include all pertinent data and other material brought out at the present meetings.

**MR. EDEN.** Mr. Eden said that he believed the question of decision for submission to their Governments would depend upon the character of the problems; there might be some things the representatives present here might be able to decide on the spot; others would of course have to be submitted to the three Governments for future decision.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull said that he was here under instructions not to take final decisions, but that this would not in any way preclude the submission of recommendations to the three Governments for information.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov then summed up the question of powers as he envisaged them :

(1) That there would be questions on which the representatives present could reach agreement and adopt resolutions binding their three Governments.

(2) That there would be other questions on which there would be proposals subject to confirmation by the three Governments as formulated.

(3) That there would be questions of a purely informational character which would involve merely an exchange of views. Mr. Molotov added that he wished to emphasize that in his view the meetings here were not to be narrowly informatory.

**MR. EDEN.** Mr. Eden expressed agreement with the division of questions into the categories as set forth by Mr. Molotov.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull said that he saw no grounds to fear decision on this point since the representatives here were being in constant and close touch with their Governments and would be able quickly to receive authorization if necessary. He added that we were here primarily for the purpose of preparing the ground for the meeting of the three heads of state at which definite decisions would be made, but that obviously in pursuing that aim the meetings as they went along would undoubtedly come to certain conclusions on matters arising out of this preparatory work, and that it would be possible in any case to receive authorization from the respective Governments to adopt resolutions upon any of these points. He proposed, therefore, that the meetings should proceed to the business of the conference.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov said that he would like to understand more clearly Mr. Hull's observation as to whether it meant that this meeting was to have only the task of preparing the ground for the meeting of the three heads of state and could not even take decision on matters on which agreement had already been reached.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull replied that the representatives here, in his opinion, had full latitude to take all preparatory steps and to submit any proposals to the three heads of state and repeated that this would, of necessity, involve decisions incident to that aim, but that he did not envisage decisions on questions not directly connected with the preparatory work of the the meeting of the three heads of state.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov stated that it was unnecessary to dwell further on the preliminary questions but that it was clear to him that the representatives present would be able to take decisions on the basis of their existing powers, but that he would not object to a further clarification on this point, if necessary. He suggested, how

ever, for the moment that the matter be left with Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden satisfied. Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden agreed.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov inquired whether there were any other preliminary questions which would be taken up before passing on to the agenda.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull referred to the matter of permitting the foreign correspondents in Moscow to send human-interest stories not connected with the work or progress of the conference in any way, concerning which he had spoken briefly to Mr. Molotov this afternoon. He added that it was his understanding that Mr. Molotov was agreeable to having the press representatives of the three Governments pass on such material before its release.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov said that he would repeat what he had already told Mr. Hull, namely, that anything that Mr. Hull or Mr. Eden desired to release to the foreign correspondents in Moscow would be passed by the censor without hindrance or delay.

**MR. EDEN.** Mr. Eden thanked Mr. Molotov for his statement on this point but added that personally while he understood the difficulties of the press he also was keenly alive to the vital importance of the work of this conference and he did not desire to see any material released to the press which would provide ground for speculation all over the world as to the progress of the work here, and he added that no publicity of any kind should be given out even though not directly related to the conference except by agreement among the press representatives of the three Powers.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov said that he did not see any real difference between the views of Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden on this point.

**MR. EDEN.** At Mr. Eden's suggestion, it was agreed that the three Governments would designate their press representatives to meet and discuss this question.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov then said that he would proceed to the consideration of the agenda and distributed copies of the draft agenda which had been prepared by the Soviet Delegation.<sup>17</sup> He suggested that there be called an intermission to consider this agenda. There was an intermission for approximately twenty minutes.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov stated that it would be noted that all of the suggestions submitted by the United States and British Governments had been included in the agenda with one omission, namely, the United States proposal regarding the Four-Power Declaration. He said that this point had not been included on the agenda since it was not clear to the Soviet Government from the correspondence with the British and American Governments whether this point was to be

<sup>17</sup>Not found in Department files.

omitted or not. He added that if it was so desired this point could receive further consideration.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull stated that while he appreciated the reasons why the Four-Power Declaration which constituted point 1 in the accepted agenda had not been included, he was glad that Mr. Molotov had expressed willingness to put this point back on the agenda. He added that he considered that this proposal regarding the Four-Power Declaration affected so many aspects of the mutual interests of the three countries concerned in international collaboration that he proposed that it be made point 2 on the agenda following immediately after point 1 proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

**MR. EDEN.** Mr. Eden expressed entire agreement with Mr. Hull that the Four-Power Declaration should form point 2 of the agenda. Mr. Eden went on to suggest a number of changes in the order of the agenda after some discussion of the exact order of the other questions on the agenda.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov summed up the suggestions as follows: that the Soviet proposal for point 1 should remain. Point 2 would be the Four-Power Declaration submitted by the United States Delegation. Point 7 of the combined draft agenda should become point 3. Point 2 should become point 4 and point 3 to become point 5, and the rest of the questions on the combined agenda should be left in their present order. These changes were adopted without further question.<sup>18</sup>

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov stated that in regard to point 1 on the agenda it should be agreed that all proposals should be submitted in writing, that any decisions reached should be likewise reduced to writing. He then distributed English translations of the Soviet proposals in regard to point 1 on the agenda and read the text. A copy of the text is attached.\* Mr. Molotov explained that although there were undoubtedly other methods of achieving the aims set forth in point 1 of the agenda submitted by the Soviet Delegation concerning the shortening of the war, the Soviet proposals had been restricted to the three points as set forth since they were regarded as the most important means to achieve that end. Mr. Molotov suggested that perhaps Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull would like to have time to discuss the Soviet proposals with their respective delegations and between themselves before proceeding further.

<sup>18</sup> For text of the adopted agenda, see Conference Document No. 1, p. 703.

\*This was a secret communication sent through to the White House by means other than State Department channels. It is not being attached hereto. [Footnote in the file copy. For text of the Soviet proposals, see the Most Secret Protocol, p. 770. Secretary Hull transmitted these proposals to the President in telegram Alusna 192114, through Navy channels. For the President's reply to the paragraphs relating to Turkey and Sweden, see p. 644.]



**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull said that he would like to submit the proposals immediately to the consideration of the President.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov said that there was, of course, no objection to that and that they did not expect immediate discussion of the Soviet proposal.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull replied that he was not referring to discussion, which they were prepared to do at any time, but to the question of decision.

**MR. EDEN.** Mr. Eden said that he felt as Mr. Hull did and that it might be necessary to submit these proposals to his Government. He added that the British Delegation had come to Moscow prepared to give their Soviet allies all information regarding military decisions reached at Quebec<sup>19</sup> and concerning military plans for the future. He said, however, that this work was not quite completed and he would like to have until tomorrow to finish it. He suggested, furthermore, that since the subject matter would be of the highest secrecy it might be well to submit the information in a restricted session of the heads of the delegations and their general officers for discussion of these military matters.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull stated that he would of course wish General Deane to attend in order to answer any Soviet questions on military matters.

**MR. MOLOTOV.** Mr. Molotov said that there was no objection to the heads of delegation and their military advisers alone attending the meeting, but that the heads of delegation should have the right to select the members they desired to have attend. He added that he wished to include Major General Glukov [*Gryzlov*] of the Soviet General Staff and Mr. Vyshinski, First Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

**THE SECRETARY.** Mr. Hull said that he desired to have Ambassador Harriman also attend.

It was agreed that in view of the length of the subject which would be discussed at tomorrow's meeting that the conference assemble in restricted session at three o'clock.

The conference thereupon adjourned until three o'clock, October 20, 1943.

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<sup>19</sup> The First Quebec Conference, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, was held August 17-24, 1943. The records of this Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

740.0011 Moscow/10-2043

*Record of the Second Meeting of the Tripartite Conference Held at the Guest House of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Moscow, October 20, 1943, 4 p. m.*

Present: Mr. Eden  
Sir A. Clark Kerr  
Lt.-General Sir H. Ismay  
Colonel Price  
Mr. Cordell Hull  
Mr. A. Harriman  
Major-General Deane  
Brigadier-General Vandenberg  
Captain Ware  
Mr. Molotov  
Marshal Voroshilov  
Major-General Gryzlov  
Mr. Vyshinski  
Mr. Berezchkov

*Interpreters:* Mr. Pavlov  
Mr. Birse

Mr. Molotov was asked to preside at this meeting, and after some hesitation, he accepted.

MR. MOLOTOV referred to the Soviet proposals which had been handed around on the previous day. He asked for a reply.

MR. EDEN said that if agreeable he would ask General Ismay, Chief Staff Officer to Mr. Churchill as Minister of Defence, to give an account of the decisions taken at Quebec and the action taken by the British and U.S.A. Governments. General Deane would, if necessary, amplify what General Ismay said.

[Here follow statements by General Ismay and General Deane on the military factors involved in the preparation for the projected cross-Channel invasion of France in 1944. The statement by General Ismay is printed as Appendix 1 to the Most Secret Protocol, page 774; the statement by General Deane (the last two paragraphs of which are not included in the record of this meeting) is printed as Appendix 2 to the Most Secret Protocol, page 778.]

Mr. Molotov and Marshal Voroshilov then asked a number of questions, which were duly answered, clearing up doubtful points in connection with the build-up of Anglo-American Air Forces in the United Kingdom and with the transfer of the British and U.S. Divisions from the Mediterranean theatre to the United Kingdom.

MR. EDEN referred to General Deane's statement in respect of the number of British aircraft which would be available in the United Kingdom by 1st April, 1944. He said that the figures were:—

Bombers—about 1900 (of which 1600 were  
Heavy Bombers)

Fighters—nearly 2000.

MR. MOLOTOV thanked General Ismay and General Deane and said that their reports included an account of the effort which had so far been made and which the Soviets valued highly. It was of great value to the Soviets that General Ismay and General Deane had given detailed information about what had been done and about future plans. During the reading of the reports he and Marshal Voroshilov had asked a few questions on the points which interested them. As suggested previously by Mr. Eden, they would study these reports and they might ask for supplementary details. He had one preliminary question to ask: Were these proposals supplementary to the Soviet proposals and what was the fate of the latter?

MR. HULL asked to what proposals did he refer.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Government had made three proposals with regard to shortening the war and he wanted to know what was Mr. Hull's and Mr. Eden's attitude to those proposals.

MR. HULL doubted whether it was desirable for him to express an opinion on questions which were purely military.

MR. EDEN said that it was the British intention that General Ismay's and General Deane's statements should be the answer to Mr. Molotov's first question in the paper which had been handed round on the previous day. Perhaps when Mr. Molotov and his associates had looked at the statement, copies of which would be given to them for study, they could again discuss the position.

Mr. Molotov had also raised two interesting questions on which Mr. Eden was ready to express his preliminary views, namely:—

1. Turkey's immediate entry into the war.
2. The use of Swedish air bases.

If Mr. Molotov agreed, he would make some preliminary observations.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he would be glad to fall in with Mr. Eden's wishes.

#### TURKEY

MR. EDEN thought there was no disagreement between them as to the desirability of bringing Turkey into the war.<sup>20</sup> The only ques-

<sup>20</sup> For the attitude of the United States toward the question of the entry of Turkey into the war, see bracketed note, vol. iv, p. 1057.

tion he wanted to discuss was when could this most usefully be achieved in the common interest. As regards the war material which Britain was supplying to Turkey, it had been made clear to Turkey that this was being sent to enable her to play her part in the war against Germany. A draft lend-lease agreement had been prepared for Turkey to sign. When the time came to ask Turkey to give effect to the agreement and if Turkey failed to do so, there would be an immediate halt in the supplies.

As regards the British attitude to the Balkans, Britain would welcome Turkey's help to drive the Germans out of the Balkans, but Britain was not interested in Turkish intervention in the Balkans once the Germans had withdrawn. With regard to the military position, from what had been said they would see that we were withdrawing our forces from the Eastern Mediterranean for use in Italy or for the Cross-Channel operations. If we were now to approach Turkey to enter the war, she would ask for the forces which we undertook to send to her aid if Germany attacked her. She was nervous about Istanbul. We had promised 25 squadrons to help the Turks, and the aerodromes have been prepared. We have not got these 25 squadrons in the Eastern Mediterranean and under present conditions Turkey, whose military preparedness is still very backward, would, as our partner in the offensive, probably be more of a liability than an asset.

To some extent the strategic situation had been modified during the last few months. A few months ago we wanted Turkish airfields from which to bomb the Roumanian oilfields. Now we could use Italian airfields. Turkey's partnership would have certain advantages, but they would be of a different character. At present Turkey was giving us some help in the Dodecanese in the way of oil supplies and she was taking some action which is of non-neutral character. If, however, our Soviet friends thought that we ought to press Turkey, we should be glad to consider the matter.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether the above was Mr. Eden's view and that of H.M. Government.

MR. EDEN said that it was the British Government's point of view, but it was not a point of view which was held very strongly.

MR. HULL on being asked by Mr. Molotov, said that he could not add anything to Mr. Eden's statement. He preferred not to speak on military matters. Mr. Eden, who was fully conversant with the position, had, no doubt, spoken accurately as far as his Government was concerned, and he thought that the U.S.A. Government shared the same opinion.

MR. EDEN said that the British Government much desired a common policy. Their views were not rigid and he was ready to exchange views with Mr. Molotov.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

#### SWEDEN

MR. MOLOTOV asked about the Soviet proposals with regard to Sweden.

MR. EDEN confessed that Mr. Molotov's idea was a new one but new ideas were not necessarily bad ones. Swedish opinion was to some extent influenced by the Soviet attitude to Finland. If a joint approach were to be made with regard to facilities in Sweden, the chances of success would be increased if the Soviet Government could indicate their intentions about the independence of Finland—he presumed that it was their intention to have an independent Finland.

Apart from the political question, their Staffs should examine what air protection they could give Sweden. Judging by our experience with Portugal,<sup>21</sup> Sweden was sure to ask for some assistance. The technical aspect would have to be examined. He was ready to submit proposals to his Government, and to ask for an examination by the Staff.

MR. MOLOTOV said that his proposal referred to the war against Germany and he feared that the extension of the question to Finland would only prevent them from studying the question as proposed. The Soviet Government valued the British and American Governments' success in the negotiations with Portugal, and they welcomed it. He would like to ask Mr. Hull for his opinion.

MR. HULL thought that Mr. Molotov would have observed from his remarks on military questions that he thought he should refer such questions to his Government before undertaking to elaborate upon them. Naturally, he had his views, but he preferred to wait overnight in order to confer with his Government.

MR. EDEN endorsing what Mr. Hull had said thought that the Portuguese parallel could not be applied to Sweden. Britain and Portugal had been allies for six hundred years, and this fact had enabled us to obtain facilities. It also helped us to negotiate the same facilities for the Americans. Britain had no alliance with Sweden, nor had the Soviet Union. However he was interested in the idea and he would consult his Government.

MR. MOLOTOV understood Mr. Eden's wish to consult his Government. As to the parallel with Portugal, he did not insist upon that

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<sup>21</sup> See vol. II, section under Portugal entitled "Interest of the United States in obtaining water-port and airport facilities in the Azores."

point, but only thought it the right opportunity to congratulate Mr. Eden.

MR. MOLOTOV then referred to the first point of the Soviet proposals which spoke of shortening the war. This question appeared to be a popular question. The chief question in the Soviet proposal referred to the statement made by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill with regard to an invasion in the spring of 1944. He wanted the meeting to understand him. He did not insist upon an immediate reply, but he would be grateful for a reply in due course. When General Ismay began to read his report, he correctly emphasized that all his remarks referred to the desire to shorten the war, and he had set out in detail an account of the decisions taken in Quebec. The point was that the Soviet statement had referred to Mr. Roosevelt's and Mr. Churchill's letter to Marshal Stalin of June 3rd about the Washington conference in May.<sup>22</sup> That communication stated that the invasion was to take place in the spring of 1944. After Washington there was the Quebec conference and the Soviet Government had received no indication as to whether the May decision was still in force. He thought his colleagues would understand that the Soviet Government was greatly interested in this question, namely whether the decision was still in force or had been withdrawn.

MR. EDEN thought that there was some misunderstanding. As far as he knew the May decisions had been confirmed by the conference at Quebec, and therefore the answer to Mr. Molotov's question was "Yes", subject to the conditions quoted by General Ismay in his statement. All the preparations for the operation were going ahead.

GENERAL DEANE said that the decision to undertake a cross-Channel operation in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed at the last conference in Quebec. Now it must be understood that such decision, as in the case with any military decision made far in advance, is subject to certain conditions existing at the time the operation is to take place. The conditions in this case have been stated to you. We confidently feel that these conditions will exist and are proceeding with full scale preparations to launch the attack. One can only appreciate the firmness of the decision by witnessing the intensive spirit with which preparations are now being carried out. I have spoken previously of the landing craft program which has recently been expanded in the United States. The effects of such a readjustment are felt not only in England but throughout the breadth of the United States including the California coast. Such a change in production affects the shipyards along the coast and the engine manufacturers in the middle west. It is inconceivable that

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<sup>22</sup> The records of this Conference and of the Quebec Conference in August 1943 are scheduled for publication in subsequent volumes of *Foreign Relations*.

such dislocation of industry would be permitted if the intention to launch the operation was questionable.

MR. MOLOTOV said he understood from what had been said that if conditions did not deteriorate before the spring, then the decisions would be carried out.

MR. HARRIMAN said that General Deane was here to keep the Soviet Government informed weekly or even daily of the progress of operations.

MR. MOLOTOV said he was very grateful.

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740.0011 Moscow/39n : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1943—8 p. m.

1036. Amdel 30. For the Secretary. General Eisenhower has telegraphed the following views on the relations between the Political-Military Commission, the Allied Control Commission and the Allied Commander-in-Chief which Murphy<sup>23</sup> has asked the Dept to cable you:

1. There is no objection to the Political-Military Commission obtaining information from headquarters on matters which concern the Commission. Allied CinC<sup>24</sup> must continue, however, to receive instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and from them alone whether on political or military subjects.

2. With respect to the Allied Control Commission, North African experience has proved that as long as active military operations are in progress the final authority with respect to political relations between the local administration and the occupying armies must remain with the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3. Upon the termination of operations the interest of the Commander-in-Chief is reduced to the safety of any bases and security of any lines of communications on which he may be relying. Normal diplomatic machinery may be allowed to function safely.

4. In placing into operation this analogy with respect to Italy there would be three periods. During the first period, that is from the present moment until Badoglio's<sup>25</sup> Government is in a position to exercise authority, it is believed that skeleton arrangements should be made for a Control Commission. When the Badoglio Government is in a position to exercise effective authority, period two will be reached. Operations in Italy will be continuing during this stage and the maintenance of the authority of the Commander-in-Chief remains the governing factor. The Control Commission will become

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<sup>23</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa, with the rank of Minister; Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; and U.S. Political Adviser, staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>24</sup> Commander in Chief.

<sup>25</sup> Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government.

fully operative at this point. The Russians and the French as well as the Greeks and Yugoslavs will have to be associated with it as soon as this happens.

The following arrangement is recommended:

The President of the Control Commission will be the Commander-in-Chief. The day-to-day managing head will be his deputy. High commissioners representing the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the French Committee, Greece and Yugoslavia will form an advisory council to the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as President of the Commission. This council would meet, act as a body and make its own arrangements as to which commissioner should be chairman. This could be arranged by seniority or in rotation. The advisory council would have the dual function of advising the President of the Control Commission on general policy and of taking care of any special interests of the States represented on the Commission or the nationals of these States. Period three would not arrive until either the Italian campaign had terminated or the Allied Governments, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, were in a position to bring the direct military control of the Government of Italy to an end.

STETTINIUS

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740.0011 Moscow/10-2343 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to  
President Roosevelt*

Moscow, 21 October 1943.

6. Supplementing our report of last night on yesterday's conference of October 20th,<sup>26</sup> I believe that you would be interested in the background of events to date.

Mr. Hull has stood the trip well under the careful eye of his capable doctor. He's conserving his strength in every way for the business of the Conference. The days have been bright and crisp, the finest New England November football weather.

Molotov and our Soviet hosts have been extremely hospitable and friendly. Yesterday's conference, which considered the only point on the Soviet agenda, namely the war and the second front, was opened by a luncheon banquet in characteristic Russian style. The many toasts by Molotov were carefully worded to show perception of the character of your leadership and the war effort of the United States in production and in the field, interspersed with a little friendly

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<sup>26</sup> Reference is to Secretary Hull's telegrams Nos. 3 and 5 to President Roosevelt, not printed, reporting the meeting of October 20.



humor. Mr. Hull was most gracious and understanding in his responses.

The meeting was set for 3 o'clock but we did not convene for business till 4, the Russians showing complete disregard for time. Then, half an hour was spent by Molotov arguing and insisting that Mr. Hull take the chair for this conference because it dealt with the Soviet proposal. He finally gave way and followed [allowed?] Ismay and Deane to proceed with their presentation.

This had been prepared after conferences between them, Eden and myself, and both officers did an extremely competent job in outlining and explaining our plans and showed willingness to answer freely any and all questions. Deane was precise in defining the conditions which must be precedent to their fulfillment. At the same time he explained in such detail the preparations now under way that he appeared to satisfy and win the confidence of the Soviet delegates.

In personal conversation with me, Molotov indicated there might be further questions they would like to ask and hoped that we would feel free to decline to answer them if they were in any way embarrassing. I explained that General Deane and the other members of his military mission had been sent to Moscow by you and the United States Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of being available to provide the fullest information desired not only during the Conference but also currently thereafter. He expressed gratification and thanks to you and to me as well for bringing the mission.

There may be difficulties ahead after the Soviets have had a chance to analyze the written statements but there is no indication that they are not convinced of our intentions and desire to collaborate closely with them. From past experience I am not ready to say that we are finished with the subject. On the other hand, I must say that, thus far, they have given us every indication that they have made up their minds they want to do business with us.

From a personal standpoint my Soviet friends have gone out of their way to be cordial to me.

[HARRIMAN]

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740.0011 Moscow/345

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Third Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 21, 1943, 4 p. m.*<sup>27</sup>

After a short meeting of the conference of restricted delegates on military matters, the full conference reconvened at 4:30 p. m.

MR. MOLOTOV: Permit me to pass to Point 2 on the Soviet agenda.

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<sup>27</sup> Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation. The file copies of the summaries of proceedings of this and subsequent meetings of the Conference, except the Tenth Meeting, do not contain lists of the delegations present.

The Soviet Delegation received from Mr. Hull the revised draft of the Four-Nation Declaration<sup>28</sup> and a draft of the oral statement which Mr. Hull intends to make in explanation of the changes.<sup>29</sup>

**THE SECRETARY:** Have these changes been translated?

**MR. MOLOTOV:** Yes, but we have not had time to study them. Nevertheless we are prepared to discuss these papers at this session.

**THE SECRETARY** then gave the following general description of the views of the United States Government concerning international cooperation and particularly the extension of the existing wartime cooperation into the post-war period with particular reference to the Four-Nation Declaration. In addition to the prepared statement which was made part of the record, the Secretary made the following observations:

When the peace-loving countries of the world found themselves confronted with the threat of world aggression on the part of the Axis Powers they drew closer together in self-preservation and began to help each other by military means. That is what we mean by cooperation in pursuit of our common aim to defeat the enemy. We are now at a stage when the cooperation of all the United Nations based primarily on self-interest must be considered in the light of the period which will follow our final victory. It is clear that there are overwhelming common interests which are closely secondary to the primary task of winning the war. Speaking for my Government, I may say that at the present time our primary purpose is to bend every ounce of energy to defeat our common enemy and due primarily to the Russian resistance we have beaten back the enemy and have passed on to the offensive on all fronts. However, we feel that without in any way impeding the primary task of winning the war we should begin to divert our efforts to the gradual preparation even while the war is in progress for the early construction of a program of international collaboration. If reason and experience of past years, some of which has been disastrous, are to play their part, we must draw now on that reason and experience to develop, preserve and carry forward the great traditions on which the common welfare of our peoples so largely depend. We have many interests in common, among those a mutual interest in the preservation of peace and the establishment of international security which we regard as the only means of assuring the welfare, political, economic and social, of every people in the world. The welfare of our people depends not only upon the measures taken internally by each Government, but also the establishment of a world power under law which will at all times preserve peace and guarantee to the peoples of the world the possibility of continuing their progress.

<sup>28</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>29</sup> *Post*, p. 601.

We feel that the basic principles of this international policy are those set forth in the Atlantic Charter<sup>30</sup> and the subsequent declaration of the United Nations<sup>31</sup> and that only [all?] worthwhile nations will be interested in the preservation and extension of these principles.

In all the allied countries there is a growing desire to obtain leadership and guidance from the great nations of the world and to receive from them some sign as to the future course of international affairs. In particular there is a desire to ascertain whether the great nations of the world will revert to isolation and its suicidal consequences or whether in the interest of self-preservation they will adopt the path of cooperation which will lead to progress and the utilization of the valuable opportunities for the promotion of human welfare which are now present. It should be emphasized that the democratic countries in general required a considerable period of time to formulate their policies in the international field. Public opinion moves slowly in these countries and the people desire to see clearly the direction in which their Governments are moving. For this reason we regard it as important that the peace-loving Governments of the world take even during the war such necessary preparatory steps as will hasten the development of this process and will set forth the principles which point the way to international collaboration.

I shall not burden you with a further discussion of these general principles which are so well known to the Governments represented here and will now pass on to the consideration of the document which we now have before us which should not be regarded as perfect, but merely as a basis for discussion. I may add that these documents were drawn up in the spirit of the United Nations, having in mind not only the general world situation but also the particular circumstances in which each of our allies finds itself. I believe Mr. Eden has some observations to make, but first I would like to know if Mr. Molotov desires to comment on this document.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether Mr. Eden had any comment.

THE SECRETARY added that since he always wished to speak with clarity and frankness he wished to inform the Conference that this document had been sent to the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments for their consideration and comment.

MR. EDEN stated that he could say, on behalf of his Government, that they were sincerely desirous of establishing the closest possible cooperation between the three Governments on which the entire future of the nations of the world depends. If it is possible for these three Governments represented here to understand each other the settlement

<sup>30</sup> Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

<sup>31</sup> Declaration by the United Nations, signed January 1, 1942, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

of all questions will be rendered comparatively easy, but if this general understanding cannot be obtained then we have failed in our work here. The British Government regards the proposal of the United States—the Four-Nation Declaration—as a step forward in that direction and therefore recommends it.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Government was very favorably disposed towards the principles set forth in this declaration and therefore welcomes it. He added that the countries represented here had a common interest, as stated by the Secretary, in carrying on their work in a spirit of mutual understanding. With reference to Mr. Eden's observations, Mr. Molotov said that he personally saw no grounds for believing that it would be impossible to find a common basis of understanding during the course of the work of the Conference. He said that the Soviet Government and people were vitally interested in measures to prevent future aggression and to ensure peace and he was confident that this opportunity would unite the members of the Conference in their work. He suggested that the Conference proceed to the concrete questions contained in the draft declaration. He added that the first question which occurred to the Soviet Delegation which had arisen immediately after the receipt of the original draft from the United States Government in September<sup>32</sup> was whether it would be possible to consider a draft Four-Nation Declaration which included China in the absence of any representative of that country.

THE SECRETARY stated that as he had previously said the United States Government was anxious to ascertain the attitude of the various Governments associated with it in this war, whether in whole or in part, toward the principles which were set forth in this document. In regard to procedure the Secretary said that he was willing to accept anything that was agreeable to the others in regard to the mechanics of consideration of the draft and that in regard to China he felt that the inclusion of China was of the greatest importance, in order to preserve the spirit of the unity of the United Nations. He went on to say that China could sign later and also other nations if they desired, as in the case of the United Nations Declaration.

MR. MOLOTOV asked if there would be any objection to changes being made in the draft proposal without the presence of the Chinese at the Conference.

THE SECRETARY replied that in his view this was a matter for the assembled delegates to handle and that he believed that the document as agreed upon here could be submitted to the Chinese Government before the close of the Conference. He added that according to con-

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<sup>32</sup> See telegram No. 874, September 18, 7 p.m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 528.

firmation which he had received from the Chinese Ambassador the Chinese Government approved the Four-Nation Declaration and merely desired to be informed of any changes which might be introduced in the text at this Conference.<sup>32a</sup> He went on to say that if and when the document is finished here the Chinese Government could be informed immediately and asked to participate.

MR. MOLOTOV said that from the point of view of the Soviet Government the difficulty lay in the fact that no final decision could be made on the document if China was to be a party in the absence of a Chinese representative, whereas if the document was considered as a Three-Power Declaration it would be possible to agree and sign it during the Conference.

THE SECRETARY repeated that in his opinion it would seem logical to perfect the document at the Conference as a four-nation one, sign it, and pass it on later to the Chinese Government for its approval or disapproval.

MR. MOLOTOV said that in considering all of the advantages of which he was fully aware of having the Four Nations sign the document, the one great disadvantage from the Soviet point of view was that if China was to be associated originally in the Declaration it could not be finally decided upon at this Conference.

THE SECRETARY said that in the view of the United States Government this proposal was completely in line with the previous declarations of the United Nations which were designed to bring into association all the nations associated in whole or in part with one aspect or another of the war against the Axis and that if we should now abandon the spirit and nature and letter of the United Nations movement it would produce division of opinion and only lead to confusion, since on all these broad questions every country associated with us in the war, whether in whole or in part, were equally interested in the general principles involved.

MR. EDEN said that it seemed to him that there were two points to consider: (1) the particular problem of China, which might be handled by perfecting and agreeing on the Declaration here and then immediately submitting it to the Chinese Government, and if the Chinese approved it might be possible to obtain the signatures of the four Nations before the end of the Conference, and (2) whether or not Mr. Hull intended that other nations would immediately adhere to this Declaration since he personally had already envisaged it as an instrument of the Four Nations.

THE SECRETARY replied that he believed that many nations would make application to join, but that he was not advocating such policy.

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<sup>32a</sup> See telegram No. 1025, October 19, 2 p. m., to the American delegation, p. 575.

MR. EDEN said that he had particularly in mind Section 6 with regard to the technical military commission since he felt it would be undesirable at this stage to associate any other nations in such a commission.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he agreed with Mr. Eden's views on this point. He then proposed that the Conference consider this draft as one of three and not four Powers, but if it should prove possible to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government before the end of the Conference it could then be transformed into a Four-Nation Declaration. He said that he advanced this proposal in order to make the text proposed by the Secretary, the contents of which were viewed so favorably by all present, independent of the consent of any fourth nation not represented at the Conference.

THE SECRETARY pointed out the importance of considering the psychological situation of all the nations participating in one form or another, together with us, in the war, and that he felt that if one of the great nations which was making an important contribution to the war should be excluded, the psychological effect would be most harmful for the unity of the United Nations.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he thoroughly agreed with the Secretary on the importance of the psychological aspect of the question, and, for that reason, he therefore felt that a failure to obtain an agreement among the three Powers on this draft would have a very adverse effect on the other members of the United Nations, and that since the Conference was dealing with the concrete problems presented by the Draft Declaration any undue delay would in effect prejudice from the psychological point of view the purpose that everyone had in mind. He suggested therefore that the Conference proceed in the spirit of the United Nations to the consideration of the concrete proposals.

THE SECRETARY said that his observation had been in the nature of an inquiry.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had welcomed the Secretary's observations, but he would like to repeat that in his view this document should not be regarded as necessarily a declaration of the four nations.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed a short intermission, which was accepted.

[The conversation recorded by the Secretary of State, page 602, took place during the intermission, after which the meeting gave detailed consideration to the Tentative Draft proposed by the United States, page 600.]

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the Conference continue until 7:30 and then turning to the consideration of the Draft Declaration, inquired if anyone had any amendments to make in regard to the preamble of the document.

Mr. EDEN made the suggestion, which was adopted, to change the words "Great Britain" to "United Kingdom".

Mr. MOLOTOV said, returning to the question of Chinese participation, that it was his understanding that the question was to be left open, if he had correctly understood the Secretary.

THE SECRETARY suggested that if desired, discussion of this question could be resumed as the work proceeded and that it should be regarded as unfinished.

Mr. EDEN said that he had one observation to make in regard to point 1 on the basis of a revised draft which the Secretary had kindly circulated to the British and Soviet Delegations this morning concerning the first two articles. As it stood in article 1 he proposed the elimination of the words "on the same basis". He explained that he did not desire to see post-war cooperation restricted in any way. As there was no objection, this deletion in article 1 was accepted.

Mr. EDEN suggested in point 2 that the word "liberated" be inserted before the words "territory of other States", since, while the meaning was clear, it might look as though the four powers intended to occupy the territory of their allies.

Mr. MOLOTOV proposed an amendment to point 2 which would make the suggestion of Mr. Eden unnecessary. He proposed that the article after the words "of that enemy" be eliminated entirely, as well as all references to occupation of enemy and other territory. He went on to explain that it was unnecessary to speak of the question of occupation as all such matters would be covered by the terms of surrender, or, if not, would relate to active military operations in the prosecution of the war which would not permit of an agreement in advance between the allies. He added that it seemed to him that this elimination removed the unclarity which previously existed in article 2 which he considered undesirable.

THE SECRETARY inquired whether Mr. Molotov would be willing to accept an amendment to his amendment and omit the reference to "enemy territory" leaving in the reference to liberated territories.

Mr. MOLOTOV replied that his original objection stood since even with the Secretary's suggestion the wording might be construed in such a manner as to interfere with active military operations.

Mr. EDEN observed that it was obviously not the intent of the draft to interfere in any way with active military operations and was very much along the lines of the terms of reference of the Mediterranean Commission.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> For the British proposals regarding the scope and functions of the Political-Military Commission (Mediterranean Commission), and Secretary Hull's statement of agreement, see telegram Amdel No. 8, October 12, to the American delegation in Moscow, and telegram Delam No. 1, October 15, from the Secretary of State, aboard the U.S.S. *Phoenix*, pp. 554 and 797, respectively.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that in regard to the Political Military Commission, sometimes referred to as the Mediterranean Commission, he saw no possibility for disagreement, but in the present instance he considered article 2 as drafted very indefinite. For example, it might be construed to mean that in the areas liberated by the Anglo-American forces, such as Holland, Belgium and France, Soviet troops should participate, and, conversely, on the Eastern Front, Anglo-American forces should participate in such liberation.

MR. EDEN said that he could not, of course, undertake to interpret a United States document, but that he was certain that there was no intention to provide for joint occupation.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that in regard to the Mediterranean Commission, the question was one of policy, that here it was one of occupation.

MR. EDEN stated that what he had had in mind was certain misunderstandings which had arisen between the three Governments precisely in regard to questions of occupation of enemy territory and referred specifically to Soviet criticism of AMGOT.<sup>34</sup> He said that in his view the purpose of the wording of article 2 was to avoid such misunderstanding and the creation of a situation similar to that relating to AMGOT.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the wording was still not clear; in any event that there was no Soviet representative participating in the administration of AMGOT, and that the Soviet Government had not been fully informed on that subject.

MR. EDEN replied that it was precisely the purpose of this article to make sure that the Soviet Government would be fully informed on all matters relating to the occupation or liberation of friendly territories. He further suggested that this article be reserved for future consideration.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed to postpone consideration, although he stated he still preferred to see the concluding phrase of the article eliminated.

It was agreed by the Conference that article 2 be deferred and that the United States and British Delegations would try to evolve a new draft.

MR. EDEN proposed in regard to article 3 that the word "requirements" be replaced by "terms" and that the word "present" be eliminated. He stated that he desired to eliminate the word "present" since it might carry the implication of intention to make friends immediately with the present enemies.

THE SECRETARY accepted the British suggestion, which was adopted.

MR. EDEN proposed that the wording of article 4 be changed to read "organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all

<sup>34</sup> Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories.



nations for peace and security, in which all peace-loving nations, large and small, may play their part".

MR. MOLOTOV said he agreed in general with Mr. Eden's suggestion, but proposed a simpler amendment, namely, to insert the word "States" for "nations" and to insert the words "peace-loving" so as to read "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States". As there was no objection, Mr. Molotov's amendment was adopted.

MR. EDEN proposed that in article 5 the words after the last phrase of the article be made to read "they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations. He explained that the small nations and in particular the Dominions, especially Canada, had objected to the wording of the article numbered 4 since it seemed to imply a four-Power dictatorship.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that Mr. Eden's amendment appeared to be in conformity with the statements of the Secretary in regard to the United Nations. Mr. Eden's suggestion on article 5 was adopted.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed that in article 6 he would like to make some observations. He said that the wording of this article brought out one of the arguments in favor of a three instead of a four-nation declaration since, while he could say in strict confidence that the Soviet Government and people would welcome it when the allies had defeated Japan, nevertheless to include China in a technical military commission as outlined in article 6 might lead to complications in the Soviet relations with Japan, which it would be better to avoid. He therefore suggested that no final decision be taken on this article.

THE SECRETARY said that out of consideration for the views of the Chairman, Mr. Molotov, he proposed to omit article 6 entirely. The Secretary's proposal was adopted.

In regard to article 8, which in the original draft had been article 7, Mr. Eden said that he really did not favor this article since he was fearful that it might involve a general world conference on disarmament, which evoked unpleasant memories of the past.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he saw no harm in the inclusion of this article since he believed there were many people in the world who would very much desire to see a reduction in the burden of armaments. He therefore proposed that it be left in the declaration.

MR. EDEN replied that if it was to be left he desired to insert the words "with one another and with other members of the United Nations" after the word "cooperate". Mr. Eden's suggested amendment was adopted.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed in regard to article 7 of the revised draft (article 8 of the original draft) that before the words "following the defeat of the enemy" there be substituted "in the post-war period".

MR. EDEN observed that while he had no personal objections to the change, it might be suggested to the United States and Great Britain since "post-war" to them meant "following the defeat of Japan".

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the original phrase meant the same thing and suggested that the Secretary decide the question.

THE SECRETARY suggested that further study be given to this point since there might be a considerable period between the surrender of the enemy and the formal establishment of peace, which, in his view, would mark the beginning of the post-war period.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested the Secretary's proposal be given further study. He said he had an additional suggestion to make with reference to the requirement for joint consultation and agreement before any of the signatories would employ their military forces within the territory of other States. He inquired as to what effect this might have on the agreements between one of the signatories and a non-signatory State which gave the former the right to establish troops in the territory of the latter. He added that he knew of several instances in which the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom had such treaties. He proposed, therefore, that the words "joint consultation and agreement" be omitted.

MR. EDEN said that he thought that Mr. Molotov had raised a very real point which might not cause any real difficulty between the countries represented at the Conference, but might be objected to by other States. He proposed that before the words "other States" there be substituted "against other States".

MR. MOLOTOV then proposed that at any rate the words "and agreement" at the end of the article be eliminated. This proposal of Mr. Molotov was adopted.

MR. EDEN then inquired as to the interpretation of the word "consultation", particularly as to whether that would apply to treaties giving one of the signatories the right to station troops in the territory of another State.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that he would prefer to drop all reference in article 7 to joint consultation and agreement, but that he understood that it had been agreed only that the words "and agreement" should be eliminated. It was agreed that further consideration would be given to article 7.

Article 9 was approved by the Conference without objection.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed that the meeting adjourn until 4:00 p. m., October 22, 1943, when item 3 of the agreed agenda would be discussed, provided there was no suggestion to revert either to items 1 or 2.

740.0011 Moscow/10-2143

*Proposal of the United States*TENTATIVE DRAFT OF A JOINT DECLARATION <sup>34a</sup>

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war *against their respective enemies*, will be continued *on a similar basis* for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy, and to any occupation of enemy territory and of territory of other states held by that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the requirements imposed upon their present enemies.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security, they will consult and act jointly in behalf of the community of nations.

6. That, in connection with the foregoing purpose, they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved, including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to the peace.

<sup>34a</sup> The italics in this draft are the passages underscored as explained in the first paragraph of the oral statement by Secretary Hull, *infra*.

7. That *following the defeat of the enemy* they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation and agreement.

8. That they will confer and cooperate to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

9. *That this declaration is without prejudice to the relationship between the respective signatories and nations with which such signatories are not at war.*

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740.0011 Moscow/10-2143

*Oral Statement by Secretary Hull Regarding the Proposed  
Joint Declaration*

We have made a few changes in the proposed Joint Declaration which I shall undertake briefly to explain. These changes occur in paragraphs 1 and 7 with a new paragraph numbered 9. The changes and the additional paragraph have been underscored for your convenience.

The changes in the paragraph numbered 1 are designed to make it clear that the Declaration is to apply only with respect to the countries with which each of the four Powers are at war, that is to say, each Government declares that their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war, *against their respective enemies*, will be continued *on a similar basis* for the organization and maintenance of peace and security is to take place only as regards countries with which each of the four Powers is at war. In other words, neither the Soviet Union nor any of the other signatories would be obliged to join in any action toward a Power with which it is not now at war.

Paragraph numbered 7, as originally drafted, is in the nature of a self-denying ordinance. Its purpose was to show that the four Powers did not have in mind the use of their military forces in territories of other countries, except for the purposes envisaged in the Declaration and after joint consultation and agreement. The principal purposes envisaged in the Declaration have to do with (1) the surrender and disarmament of the enemy, (2) the occupation of enemy territory and of territory of States under enemy control, (3) the taking of measures to provide against violation of requirements imposed upon the enemy and (4) the maintenance of international peace and security. Paragraph 7 has, therefore, been qualified by the statement that *following the defeat of the enemy* the four Powers will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States,

et cetera. The reasons for this qualification will be apparent when it is considered that an undertaking not to employ the military forces within the territory of other States, except for the purposes envisaged in the Declaration and after joint consultation and agreement, might conceivably interfere with ordinary military operations. In other words, the self-denying ordinance or declaration in paragraph 7 would come into operation only after defeat of the enemy.

Paragraph numbered 9, which is entirely new, is designed more clearly to show that the Declaration is not to prejudice the relationship between the respective four Powers and other nations with which the respective Powers are not at war.

It is the feeling of the United States that the four Powers that are making the greatest contribution toward the defeat of their enemies and the enemies of smaller Powers should now declare their purpose to see to it that those enemies shall observe the conditions of surrender and shall not again bring upon the world the ravages of war and that they should act together in their own interest and in the interest of the community of nations at least until a general system of security shall have been established.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 21, 1943.

During an intermission for tea, after Mr. Molotov had raised objections to the inclusion of China in the Four-Nation Interim Agreement, I said to him privately that the American Government is doing everything and has done everything possible with respect to the Chinese situation, that it would be impossible in my judgment to omit China from the Four-Nation Agreement, that it was the attitude of my government that China has been in the world picture as one of the Big Four for the prosecution of the war and for her now to be dumped out on her face by Russia, Great Britain and the United States in connection with the proposed Four-Nation Agreement would create in all probability the most terrific repercussions, both political and military, in the Pacific area, and that this might call for all sorts of readjustments by my Government for the purpose of keeping properly stabilized the political and military situation in the Pacific. I added that Great Britain would probably be likewise affected so far as giving attention to the Pacific might be concerned. I said furthermore that public opinion in my own country would be hopelessly torn and rent by the news that this Government had joined with the Soviet Government in Moscow to throw China out of the war picture, as the

public would probably interpret her exclusion from the Four-Nation Declaration proposal.<sup>34b</sup> These things were said in private to Mr. Molotov and he appeared to recognize the reasonableness of what I said.

We then turned to the question of developing closer relations between our two countries and I emphasized the entire practicability of the matter, resting this view on the broad condition that there are absolutely no material interests or international interests that are not common to both countries, and that each supplements the other with respect to trade and general economic relations, etc. I added, before leaving, that I would be glad to sit down and talk with him about some of the important points involved in the undertaking to bring about closer relations and closer understanding. He said he would be glad to take these matters up with me at any time.

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740.0011 Moscow/39s : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1943—10 p. m.

1049. Amdel 35. For Dunn from Atherton.<sup>35</sup> Refer to our Amdel 30.<sup>36</sup> In paragraph 4, General Eisenhower recommended that the Advisory Council of the Allied Control Commission be set up only after "period 2" had been reached (presumably Rome). I recommended at the American meeting of the CCAC<sup>37</sup> yesterday that a skeleton advisory council, including the Russians, French, Greeks, and the Yugoslavs, be established and attached to the skeleton Allied Control Commission suggested for period 1 which would take care, in our opinion, of the immediate wishes of these United Nations with respect to the Italian surrender. This point was accepted by the War Department members, and will be included in the telegram of reply to the General.<sup>38</sup> [Atherton.]

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<sup>34b</sup> For related correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, pp. 819 ff.

<sup>35</sup> Ray Atherton, American Minister to Canada, was recalled to the Department, October 4, 1943, for consultation. He was formerly Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

<sup>36</sup> October 20, 8 p. m., p. 588.

<sup>37</sup> Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

<sup>38</sup> Secretary of State Hull telegraphed the Department (Delam 15, October 23, 1943): "Your action as stated in your Amdel No. 35 is much appreciated and is helpful to us in indicating to Soviet Government disposition to meet their desire for early association with developments in Italy." (740.0011 Moscow/50)

740.0011 Moscow/45: Telegram

*The American Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 22, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received October 23—2:30 p. m.]

Delam<sup>39</sup> No. 10. Personal for the President and Acting Secretary from the Secretary of State. (Reference Delam No. 9<sup>40</sup>) The telegram sent last evening giving an account of the proceedings of yesterday did not make fully clear the attitude I maintained throughout the conversation constantly and invariably from the standpoint of our Government regarding the absolute necessity of having China included in the Four Nation Interim Agreement. I made an elaborate appeal to Molotov in private conversation in addition to the discussions during the meeting of the Conference. When I decided that he might discuss the Chinese matter for almost an indefinite time, I felt that it would place us in a stronger position with reference to the Chinese Government matter if we should go forward and perfect the document so that Mr. Molotov would be committed to all the doctrines and policies embraced in the document while holding it solely on account of China. This was the course I pursued. Naturally we will agree to no three nation declaration in any circumstances in accordance with our understanding before I left home. [Hull.]

740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 22, 1943, 4 p. m.*

Before proceeding to the consideration of Item 3 on the Agenda, at Mr. Eden's suggestion the Conference agreed to the setting up of a Drafting Committee to facilitate and expedite the work of the conference. Mr. Hackworth and Mr. Dunn were designated by the Secretary as the United States representatives on this committee, and Mr. Eden designated Mr. Strang and one other whose name would be communicated later. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet representatives on this committee would be proposed at the next session and that he would possibly name as one an official of the Foreign Office not present at the conference.

MR. EDEN then presented the British proposal under Item 3 of the

<sup>39</sup> The designation assigned to a series of telegrams from the American delegation to the Department of State; they were transmitted by the Embassy in Moscow, but the Embassy numbers and the Ambassador's signatures are being omitted.

<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

Agenda for the setting up of the machinery for consultation with particular reference to the Politico-Military Commission at Algiers (copy of the British proposal and Mr. Eden's remarks as circulated at the conference is attached <sup>41</sup>). Mr. Eden divided the subject into two general categories: (1) the problem of the Commission to deal with all questions affecting Europe arising out of the progress of the war with the exception of those pertaining directly to military operations, and (2) the machinery for controlling the carrying out of the Italian armistice terms.

In regard to the first point, MR. EDEN stated that under the widest terms of reference which were proposed for the Politico-Military Commission, he suggested that it should meet in one of the three capitals and proposed that London be selected. He pointed out that under these broader terms of reference, which were to include questions of a wide range of all European problems arising out of the prosecution of the war with the exception of military operations, it would be manifestly impossible for the Commission to function properly in Algiers or Italy. He explained that in the view of his Government because of constitutional difficulties this proposed Commission in London could not have any executive function but would have the widest possible consultative powers. He said that he thought that this enlarged scope of the Politico-Military Commission was very much in the line of the suggestions put forward by the Soviet Government on the subject of the so-called Mediterranean Committee. He said that the British Government would welcome at the earliest possible moment the setting up of such a Commission in London.

Turning to the second point dealing with the specific question of the machinery for controlling the Italian armistice terms, MR. EDEN outlined the following scheme:

It was proposed to designate three periods for Italy. (1) The first would run from the present time until the Italian Government is established in Rome, a period which we all hoped would be very brief. During this period a skeleton Allied Commission would operate directly under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in matters pertaining to the carrying out of the armistice terms. (2) The second period would run from the establishment of the Italian Government in Rome to the end of the campaign in Italy or in certain designated areas, when it was agreed that Allied military control was no longer needed. During this period there would be alongside the Allied Control Commission under the Commander-in-Chief an Inter-Allied Advisory Council composed of High Commissioners of the United

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<sup>41</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Conference Document No. 6, p. 705, and footnote 80, p. 706.



States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and, if desired, of the French Committee, Greece, and Yugoslavia. This body would advise the Commander-in-Chief as Chairman of the Control Commission on all matters pertaining to the putting into effect of the armistice terms. Mr. Eden said he was sure that everyone agreed that as long as military operations continued the Commander-in-Chief should remain in supreme command. In addition these High Commissioners would care for the interests of their respective Governments and nationals.<sup>41a</sup> (3) At the close of the second period the Commander-in-Chief would relinquish the presidency to the Control Commission which would pass to the Allied Advisory Council.

MR. MOLOTOV requested further clarification of the exact time when the third period would begin.

MR. EDEN explained that he meant at the end of hostilities in Italy or in certain designated areas when in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief Allied military control was no longer necessary.

MR. EDEN then proposed that this Conference decide whether the French Committee should be admitted as a permanent member of the proposed Politico-Military Commission in London or whether it should be limited to the representatives of the three powers attending this conference. Neither the Secretary nor Mr. Molotov made any comment at this time on the question of French membership.

MR. MOLOTOV then said that the Soviet Government desired to know what was the connection between Mr. Eden's proposal today and the suggestions contained in the memorandum handed by the British Government to the Soviet Ambassador in London on July 1 of this year.<sup>42</sup>

MR. EDEN replied that he recalled this document very well and that it embodied the views of his Government at that time, but that it was now felt that that was not sufficient since it was of great importance to set up some form of a clearinghouse which was to be the purpose of the proposed Politico-Military Commission in London with broad consultative powers to deal with general questions arising out of the war. He added that in so far as Italy was concerned he had a completely open mind and was willing to discuss any form of machinery for ensuring the close collaboration of the three powers in implementing the Italian terms of surrender. He added that the memorandum of July 1 to which Mr. Molotov had referred dealt only with conditions for terminating hostilities, whereas the proposed Commission in London would have a larger scope and could deal in a consultative capacity with such questions as the future of Germany and the general

<sup>41a</sup> For a comment on this sentence, see telegram No. 1086, October 25, 6 p. m., to the American delegation, p. 635.

<sup>42</sup> See Conference Document No. 7, p. 708, and footnote 84, p. 710.

question of liberated areas. In reply to Mr. Molotov's inquiry, Mr. Eden said that the principles contained in the July 1 memorandum were still valid and that the proposal that he had just presented might be regarded as growing out of that document.

MR. MOLOTOV said he would like to have further clarification on that point since the suggestions contained in the British memorandum of July 1 had been found acceptable by the Soviet Government. He said he would like to hear the views of the Secretary in regard to the British memorandum of July 1.

THE SECRETARY replied that this document had been given study by the appropriate officials of the United States Government and that his Government was in general favorably disposed toward the suggestions contained therein but that there would have to be further and more detailed discussion of the document before he could make any further statement.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired whether in the opinion of the Secretary Item 5 on the agreed Agenda dealing with the United States proposal for methods of consultation would be taken care of by Mr. Eden's statement.

THE SECRETARY replied that he felt that in the main Mr. Eden's proposal would take care of what the United States Government had in mind, but that there were nevertheless some questions which would have to be considered through diplomatic channels on a three-power basis.

(At Mr. Molotov's suggestion the Conference adjourned for fifteen minutes.)

MR. MOLOTOV stated that since the British documents had only been received this afternoon and that there had not been time to make Russian translations, he suggested that in view of the importance of the general suggestion it should be deferred until tomorrow's session. He proposed that the Conference pass on to the consideration of Item 4 on the Agenda, the British suggestion for an exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans.

MR. EDEN said that he was entirely agreeable but that as he had not brought the necessary papers there would be some slight delay while he sent for them.

THE SECRETARY said that in view of the slight delay it might be possible to dispose of Item 5, the United States suggestion for the machinery of tripartite consultation. The Secretary then read the following statement on Item 5: "Our proposal is that matters on which it is found desirable for the three Governments to consult should be dealt with in Moscow, London or Washington as may be most appropriate on an *ad hoc* basis by the permanent diplomatic representatives in each capital. Experts could be sent if desired to partici-

pate depending upon the character of the subjects under discussion. This is not intended to preclude the holding of international or tripartite conferences as occasion may make desirable.”<sup>43</sup>

MR. EDEN inquired if this implied any opposition to the setting up of the Commissions in accordance with his proposal.

THE SECRETARY replied that it did not but was merely designed to keep alive the method for tripartite consultation on questions of common interest which was being used here and was to supplement and not supersede the Commissions suggested by Mr. Eden.

THE SECRETARY, in reply to Mr. Litvinov's question as to whether this meant that the Secretary had in mind the setting up of a special commission, said that he had not, and he went on to say that the purpose of the United States proposal was to ensure that as questions of common interest to the three powers arose they might be dealt with on a tripartite basis by the utilization of the existing diplomatic machinery in one of the three capitals in order to supplement the customary bilateral diplomatic exchanges.

MR. MOLOTOV said that it might be desirable to define the exact meaning of the United States proposal in regard to Item 5 more closely but that this was just a suggestion.

THE SECRETARY said he would be glad to submit a redraft of the proposal with that in view.

MR. MOLOTOV then proposed that the words “after preliminary agreement between the three Governments” should be inserted after the words “to consult” in the United States proposal. This amendment was accepted by the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired if there was to be any restriction placed on the questions which the representatives of the three powers might discuss in the manner suggested in the United States proposal.

THE SECRETARY said that there was absolutely no restriction on the questions which could be discussed and that he had brought up the United States proposal under Item 5 of the Agenda because he thought it could be disposed of quickly in the light of Mr. Eden's proposals which had rendered it somewhat less important.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the proposal be accepted as a basis for discussion and referred it to the Drafting Committee. It was agreed also by the Conference to submit in addition Mr. Eden's proposals to the Drafting Committee.

MR. EDEN then proposed that Items 6 and 14 on the Agenda be combined and it was agreed that Item 6 would be moved down to Item 14.

MR. EDEN, then turning to the British suggestion under Item 4, stated that he had no more remarks to make on the subject of Italy

<sup>43</sup> This statement printed as Conference Document No. 17, p. 719.

other than those which he had already made concerning the machinery for putting the Armistice terms into force but that he was willing to answer any question on these points.

MR. MOLOTOV expressed surprise at this and pointed out that the first question on the original British suggestion for an agenda of this meeting had been the one which was now Item 4.

MR. EDEN replied that when the original British agenda had been submitted in early September events had not proceeded so far as they had now and Italy had not been in the war on our side.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that in his opinion the question of Italy, to which the Soviet Government attached the greatest importance, should be discussed here and he went on to say that the Soviet Government had had no representatives on the spot in Italy or North Africa and that, having encountered difficulties in sending representatives to those areas (which difficulties he was glad to say had now disappeared), it had for this reason proposed the creation of a Politico-Military Commission, sometimes referred to as the Mediterranean Commission. He said that the Soviet Government had been very happy at the unconditional surrender of Italy and, while realizing the predominant part played in this by the British and American armies, he felt that although far away the Soviet armed forces had also contributed their part. He added that as Italy was the first country to surrender to the Allies, new problems in this connection were arising which affected very directly the cooperation between our three countries and that the Soviet Government was greatly interested in receiving accurate information in regard to the development of events in Italy as they affected the political, economic and military situation and also that the terms of surrender should be put into effect in a manner which had been approved by the three Governments. He pointed out that this was impossible in the absence of a Soviet representative on the spot. Mr. Molotov went on to say that the Soviet Government had a number of minimum suggestions in regard to Italy in which it was vitally interested, but he would like to have first the opinion of the Secretary and Mr. Eden on the following point: He inquired whether in their opinion there were adequate guarantees that the terms of the surrender would be promptly put into effect and complied with.

MR. EDEN replied that he had had very much in mind the Soviet need for adequate information concerning developments in Italy and that his suggestion of the appointment of High Commissioners to the Inter-Allied Advisory Council had been very much designed to remedy that situation. With reference to the terms of the armistice, Mr. Eden stated that it had been made quite clear at the time of the acceptance of Italy as a war participant that it had been done merely

as a matter of convenience and that the terms of surrender remain in force *in toto* and could only be changed following the collective agreement between the three Governments. He said that according to information in possession of the British Government Italian co-operation up to the present has been only passive in character and that in the opinion of the British military authorities little help of a military nature could be expected in the war against Germany. He said that British policy on this question was in line with the doctrine approved by the Prime Minister of "payments by results". He added parenthetically that according to their information the Germans had been behaving with great brutality toward the inhabitants.

MR. MOLOTOV emphasized the fact that the Soviet Government attached the greatest importance from the political point of view to the development of events in Italy and since everyone was familiar with the role of Fascism in starting this war it was regarded as important that there be a speedy change over to a democratic system.

MR. EDEN stated that so far as the Fascist structure was concerned, wherever the Allied armies had been, for example in Sicily, there had been a virtual destruction of that system; and while it was true that there had been no elections held this had been due entirely to military necessity. He added that he had just had word from Mr. Macmillan<sup>44</sup> that there was a general desire to include at this time liberal and socialist elements in the Italian Government and that it was possible that Badoglio, after the signature of the protocol, would leave the post of Prime Minister and lapse into obscurity. He said that the chief difficulty was to find authoritative persons who were non-fascists after twenty years of the fascist regime; that Sforza<sup>45</sup> had been suggested as such a person, and that while his American friends knew more about him he himself had not been very favorably impressed by Sforza the one time he had seen him.

MR. MOLOTOV then said he would read certain urgent political measures which the Soviet Union desires to see put into effect in Italy immediately by joint agreement of the three Governments. He said these proposals would be distributed in writing after the meeting. He then proceeded to read seven measures which the Soviet Government desire to see introduced in Italy (copy in translation of these proposals attached).<sup>46</sup> Mr. Molotov said that it would be most beneficial if our three Governments could jointly express themselves in favor of putting these seven proposed measures into effect in Italy immediately.

<sup>44</sup> Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

<sup>45</sup> Count Carlo Sforza, Italian anti-Fascist leader; former member of the Italian Senate, Secretary of State, and Ambassador to France.

<sup>46</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Conference Document No. 13, p. 714.

MR. EDEN observed that a great many of the measures proposed by the Soviet Government had already been put into effect and were in general very much along the lines of the instructions under which the much criticized AMGOT was now operating.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he attached great importance to Mr. Eden's statement in regard to the measures which are already being put into effect in Italy, which in his opinion constitutes an additional reason why it would be desirable for the three powers represented here to express themselves in favor of the Soviet proposals. He added that there was no need to emphasize the great political significance which the acceptance of the Soviet proposals would have on the other members of the United Nations.

MR. EDEN answered that he would like time to study the Soviet proposals but that he would make available at the next session a paper on the political principles which the Allied forces are now trying to observe in the areas which they have conquered. He added that AMGOT in most of the territories which had been conquered had disappeared in favor of skeleton Allied control commissions, and he had had in mind when making his proposals that the Inter-Allied Advisory Council, which he hoped would be composed of the representatives of the Soviet, United States, British and French Governments, would take over as soon as possible the functions of the skeleton control commission.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed with Mr. Eden that we must work along those lines and then inquired if the Secretary had any ideas he cared to express on the principles involved.

THE SECRETARY stated that he would not undertake to add very much to what Mr. Eden had said but that he and Mr. Eden, jointly or separately, would submit to the Conference at the following session a chronological and detailed list of the policies which their two Governments had been following in Italy since the invasion of Sicily. There was no secrecy in regard to these policies which had been carried out in the full light of day. The Secretary went on to say that one of the great purposes of this war as reflected in the Atlantic Charter and other declarations of the United Nations was to destroy every vestige of Fascism and Nazism, to uproot their policies and obliterate them leaving no trace. The question, however, as to how far the Allies are going in setting up the type of governments they would like to see in these areas and in the use of force for this purpose, has not yet been made clear. It is obvious that it is no quick or easy undertaking to uproot fascism in all its forms. This will require immense effort and great organization. The Secretary said that if he had his way,

he would take Hitler<sup>48</sup> and Mussolini<sup>49</sup> and Tojo<sup>50</sup> and their arch-accomplices and bring them before a drumhead courtmartial and at sunrise on the following day there would occur a historic incident. (This statement was greeted with great satisfaction by the Soviet delegation.)

THE SECRETARY continued that he wished to make sure that all of our Allies, and this referred particularly to the Soviet Union whose great contribution to our common cause was apparent to all, would have the fullest information in regard to our policies and views. The most urgent task therefore was the development and setting up of adequate machinery to ensure such consultation and exchange of information so that the Soviet Government and the general population would be thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of our thinking. The sooner, therefore, that we could work out at this conference the plan along the lines of Mr. Eden's proposal for the setting up of efficient and workable machinery for close consultation the better it would be.

MR. MOLOTOV expressed great pleasure in the statements of the Secretary and Mr. Eden and added that he had only one more proposal to make along constructive lines. He said that the representatives here were not only politicians but in some way businessmen. He therefore made the following proposal on behalf of the Soviet Government which he asked the Secretary and Mr. Eden to approve. Before presenting the proposal he said that, as is well known, Italy, largely due to Mussolini, had taken an active part in the war against the Soviet Union and together with Germany had, up to the surrender of Italy, wrought great damage to the Soviet people and economy and particularly to the Soviet naval and merchant fleets. It was difficult to evaluate the exact amount of the damage done by Italy in more than two years of war against the Soviet Union, but it seemed logical and right that following the Italian surrender Italy should begin to some extent to rehabilitate the damage she had done to the Soviet Union. Mr. Molotov then referred to a recent statement of Prime Minister in the House of Commons to the effect that more than 100 war vessels and 150,000 tons of merchant shipping had been turned over to the Anglo-American forces as the result of the Italian surrender. He then proposed that in order to intensify the struggle against Germany there should be immediately handed over to the Soviet Government the following former Italian vessels of war: one battleship, one

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<sup>48</sup> Adolf Hitler, Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.

<sup>49</sup> Benito Mussolini, at this time head of the Italian Socialist Republic in German-controlled Italy.

<sup>50</sup> Lt. Gen. Hideki Tojo, Premier of Japan.

cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, these vessels to be sent immediately to the northern ports of the U.S.S.R.; and in addition 40,000 tons of merchant shipping from the total of 150,000 tons which were turned over to the United States and Great Britain should be immediately despatched to the Black Sea. (A copy of this Soviet request is attached.<sup>51</sup>) Mr. Molotov concluded that he was not insisting upon an immediate decision but later on at an appropriate time.

MR. EDEN said he would submit the Soviet request to his Government and he merely wished to say that in his opinion permanent peace in the Mediterranean could not be assured if the Italian fleet was left intact.

THE SECRETARY said he would be glad to submit the Soviet request to the President and urge sympathetic consideration on a fair and equitable basis.

(The Conference then adjourned until 4 p. m. October 23.)

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the  
American Delegation*

Moscow, October 23, 1943—3 p. m.

Participants: Mr. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs  
The Secretary  
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen  
Mr. Bereskov

After an exchange of amenities in regard to the Secretary's health and his impressions of Moscow, the Secretary inquired how Molotov felt about the progress of the Conference. Mr. Molotov replied that he was satisfied with the progress, but that we had not yet completed our very great task.

The Secretary said that he had come to Moscow for the purpose of frank and friendly discussion with the representatives of the two Governments here and that he intended to have no secrets from either of them and for this reason he had sent to the Soviet Delegation the paper in regard to our policies in Italy.<sup>52</sup> Mr. Molotov thanked the Secretary, but said that since they had had no representative on the spot it was very difficult to obtain firsthand information; that the Soviet Government had been forced to rely on third, fourth and even tenth-hand reports in regard to developments in Italy, and that this had led to confusion.

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<sup>51</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Conference Document No. 13, p. 714.

<sup>52</sup> Not found in Department files.



The Secretary replied that one of the purposes of his visit was to examine any existing misunderstandings and to work together to set up machinery which would rule on matters of common interest in order to avoid such misunderstandings in the future, to which Mr. Molotov expressed complete agreement. The Secretary then said that with good will there are no problems that could not be resolved by joint consultation and discussion provided these problems were attacked along broad lines and did not get submerged in details. He said that one of the chief purposes of our meeting here was to get ready for the meeting of the heads of state and that all other deliberations here should bear that constantly in mind and endeavor to present to the heads of state, when they meet, as clear an expression of the positions of the three Governments as was possible. The Secretary added that with this in mind the United States Delegation would have ready for distribution today a paper on Germany.<sup>53</sup> He then inquired what the attitude of the Soviet Government was to the economic discussions which were now in progress with the British in Washington,<sup>54</sup> to which the Soviet Government had been invited, but that up to the present no reply had been received. He added that he felt that the Soviet Government would have good reason to participate in these discussions since they were progressing and were approaching the stage where certain understandings would be reached.

Mr. Molotov replied that it was rather difficult for him to answer that question because he was not personally acquainted with the problems involved in the discussions with the British in Washington, but he knew the matter was being studied by the appropriate officials of the Soviet Government and that there would be little more delay.

The Secretary went on to say that these discussions were not only financial and economic, but that other problems were being discussed in the whole broad field of commercial policy and he had personally directed our economic experts to make a study as to the best methods of including the Soviet Union in line with our general commercial policy on a mutually profitable basis.

Mr. Molotov observed that from his brief acquaintanceship with the documents which the British and American Governments had communicated to the Soviet Government he received the impression that the question was a very complicated one and that there existed many differences in opinion, some large and some less important between the British and American Governments on these

<sup>53</sup> Conference Document No. 20, p. 720.

<sup>54</sup> The informal discussions in Washington between U.S. and British economic experts had in fact ended on October 18. For a report of the topics discussed in the course of these conversations, see the memorandum printed on p. 766.

questions. He repeated that these matters were being studied by the Soviet Government.

The Secretary then said that if matters such as these and other problems for carrying on into the post-war period were left until the end of the war it would be very difficult to get the unified support of public opinion in many democratic countries, such as, for example, the Latin American countries. He said that the end of the war would probably be followed by many divisions of opinion among groups in the various countries concerned and that the peoples of the United Nations would not be as united as they are now. He felt that it was very important for us now to take advantage of that unity brought on by the war, in order to apply that unity to the solution of post-war problems. Mr. Molotov agreed. The Secretary continued that at the end of the last war there had been great changes in a number of important countries, and, in his opinion, at the end of the present war there would be from ten to fifteen countries going through the same process, many without adequate food and in no condition to guide themselves along the proper channels. He repeated that he felt there would be many nations without adequate food for their people. He said that he had participated in some of the discussions with President Wilson at the end of the last war and he had seen how catastrophically events had developed and that he had been tempted to convey to the British his belief that this time the United States was prepared to play its part in the post-war world, but had waited until he was reasonably certain that this was true and could be conveyed both to the British and Soviet Governments at this meeting. The Secretary then inquired if it was agreeable to Mr. Molotov to hear these general expressions and views.

Mr. Molotov replied that it was not only agreeable but that he warmly welcomed them. The Secretary then outlined in general terms his views as to the importance of developing the closest relations and confidence between our two countries, since he was convinced that if we could emphasize to both our peoples that they are in fact allies and comrades in the common struggle that nothing could prevent their becoming fast friends. Mr. Molotov entirely agreed.

The Secretary added that he felt that by concerted efforts this situation could be further developed, since our two peoples had many things in common: they shared in large measure the same tastes, the same jokes and in general were very congenial. The Secretary then went on to say that speaking frankly, as must be the case between friends, one of our difficulties had come from the efforts to promote communism in the United States from abroad and also the question of religion in the Soviet Union. He added that happily in recent

months steps had been taken to improve this situation. Mr. Molotov smiled and replied that he did not see why the United States had any reason to fear the forcible imposition of communism. In regard to religion he could say that the widespread opinion in regard to religious matters in the Soviet Union was different than actually existed in fact and he was inclined to believe that this opinion was based on prejudice rather than knowledge.

The Secretary stated that certain religious elements in the United States and elsewhere and people with strong religious beliefs may put the wrong interpretation on religious events in the Soviet Union. That was one reason why he felt that the exchange of information in regard to our countries was so important. He went on to say that Mr. Molotov was right in his observations that there was little danger that communism would be established in the United States, but that what he really was referring to was the extreme opposition among the American people to what they regarded as attempts from outside to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States, and that this belief played into the hands of agitators who were attempting to stir up trouble.

Mr. Molotov remarked that he did not quite fully understand what the Secretary had in mind. The Secretary replied that he meant that some communists in the United States frequently sought to give the impression that they were acting under authority from outside and that while he realized that this may not be true now it was difficult to convince the people of this. He added that he knew that this impression had caused difficulties for the Soviet Union since it had been seized upon by mean and trouble-making newspapers in the United States. Mr. Molotov then inquired what papers the Secretary had in mind, and he replied that he meant newspapers interested in fomenting difficulties.

Mr. Molotov then said that he did not think that the opinions of some newspapers were very important and so far as he was concerned they could go ahead and write all they wanted to, that frequently certain sections of the Soviet press replied in kind, but what was important in his opinion was that the leaders of the two Governments give guidance along broad general lines. The Secretary added that it would be far better if, instead, they were urging friendship.

In conclusion, Mr. Molotov said that he had discussed with Marshal Stalin the proposed declaration regarding German atrocities and that with a few minor changes which should be made, the Marshal was favorably disposed to the proposal.

At this point Mr. Molotov remarked that it was five minutes before four and that they would have to be going to the Conference which was scheduled for four o'clock, but expressed a desire to continue the conversation with the Secretary at the latter's convenience.

740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 23, 1943, 4 p. m.*

MR. MOLOTOV opened the session by designating Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Golonski, an official of the Soviet Foreign Office, as Soviet representatives on the Drafting Committee. He then inquired whether there were any proposals in regard to articles 1 and 2 of the Joint Agreement and stated that in his understanding items 3 and 4 were to be referred to the Drafting Committee, as item 2 had already been. The Secretary and Mr. Eden agreed that it would be desirable to refer items 3 and 4 to the Drafting Committee.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that we consider the Soviet proposals in regard to Italy.<sup>55</sup>

MR. EDEN replied that he thought it better to await instructions from his Government and that in the meantime he had turned in to the Conference a joint statement together with the United States Delegation of Allied policies up to the present in Italy.<sup>56</sup>

THE SECRETARY said that he likewise had transmitted the Soviet proposals on Italy to his Government but that he could say that in his opinion they were very much in line with the political philosophy of the United States and other members of the United Nations.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that the second part of item 4 dealing with the Balkans be discussed.

MR. EDEN then read a statement in regard to the British attitude toward the resistance movement in Yugoslavia. He said that the long-term desire of the British Government was to see Yugoslavia restored to her former freedom and independence with the preservation of the three kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. He said that the British had been in touch with both of the main resistant groups in Yugoslavia, Mikhailović<sup>57</sup> and the Partisans.<sup>58</sup> When he had been in Cairo he had discussed with King Peter<sup>59</sup> and the Yugoslav Government the attitude toward Mikhailović and had said that the British Government's chief desire was to have him actively engage in operations against the enemies Germany and Bulgaria. He had outlined to the King two operations which the British would like to see Mikhailović carry out, namely the destruction of the Bor copper mines and the cutting of the strategic railroad between Belgrade and

<sup>55</sup> Conference Document No. 13, p. 714.

<sup>56</sup> Conference Document No. 15, p. 715.

<sup>57</sup> Gen. Draža Mihailović, Leader of the Yugoslav Nationalist guerrilla forces.

<sup>58</sup> The Yugoslav Communist guerrilla forces, led by Marshal Tito (Josip Broz). For related documents on this subject, see vol. II, section under Yugoslavia entitled "Concern of the United States regarding disunity among Yugoslav resistance forces." See also Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), pp. 332 ff.

<sup>59</sup> Peter II, King of Yugoslavia.

Nishi. King Peter had promised that if at this Conference a common policy in regard to Yugoslavia could be agreed upon he would send immediate orders to Mikhailović to carry out these operations for which it was believed he had adequate forces. It was made quite plain to the King that if these orders were not carried out the British Government would have to reconsider its attitude toward Mikhailović and the question of sending him further supplies. Mr. Eden added that the British were continuing to supply the Partisans and it was hoped in the near future that more ample supplies could be sent by the Adriatic. Mr. Eden then outlined his proposals which were simply that efforts be made to unite the two factions in the common struggle against Germany and to prevent in the future their fighting each other. He said that he thought this would be possible since they were operating in different areas.

THE SECRETARY said that he had nothing to add to the statements of Mr. Eden at this time.

MR. MOLOTOV said he likewise had little to add, particularly as it was the first time that he had heard of the suggested two operations and he would like to have more time to consider the question. He then stated that he had understood that under item 4 there was to be a discussion of the general situation in the Balkans since the specific question of resistance movements in Yugoslavia was provided for in item 16.

MR. EDEN replied that he had given out this information as he thought it would be of value to the Soviet Delegation.

MR. MOLOTOV said he would study the British statement and it could be discussed when item 16 on the Agenda was reached.

MR. EDEN said that in regard to general policy the British aim was to assist guerrilla bands in that area in their struggle against the German occupying forces and whenever possible to prevent these bands from fighting among themselves; that the British had had officers in touch with Greek guerrilla bands who up until recently had been cooperating with each other, but that very lately this agreement had broken down and he felt that efforts should be made to patch it up. He said that the Italian attitude in the Balkan countries had varied a great deal, that in some places such as the island of Corfu the Italians had joined wholeheartedly with the Greeks in fighting the Germans but this was not uniformly true in other parts. He went on to say that Rumania had recently approached the British Government in regard to the possibility of separate peace but he felt that that had better be considered under the specific item of the Agenda dealing with such peace feelers. Mr. Eden added that they had very little information with regard to Bulgaria and hoped to obtain some from their Soviet colleagues. The only thing that

they did know was that Bulgarian divisions had relieved German forces in northern Greece and northern Serbia.

THE SECRETARY said that in this connection he would like General Deane to be permitted to make a statement.

GENERAL DEANE said that the United States Chief of Staff considered that there was great opportunity in the Balkans, particularly during the winter months, to intensify sabotage and disruptive work in order to undermine German military strength. He said that the Office of Strategic Services had the equipment and trained personnel to carry on this work and was prepared to penetrate the area by air or other means. He said that the American Military authorities hoped that this would be agreeable to the Soviet Government and he wished to assure them that the purpose of these operations was purely military.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether it would be possible to get a clearer picture of the operations envisaged.

GENERAL DEANE answered that it was somewhat difficult since all such operations were of necessity opportunistic, but that the Office of Strategic Services had done very valuable work in other countries.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he would like to postpone that question until another session since he would like to have more information on that point.

MR. EDEN said that if it would be agreeable to Mr. Molotov he would ask General Ismay to submit a paper on sabotage activities in the Balkans.

MR. MOLOTOV, then turning to the establishment of a Politico-Military Commission in London and machinery for carrying out the Italian terms of surrender, said he would like to propose that these two questions be separated and to deal first with the Italian aspect.

THE SECRETARY inquired how the economic phase was to be brought into the work of these commissions.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the economic question had not yet been raised but he saw no reason for necessarily excluding such questions. He emphasized, however, that the situation with regard to Italy was urgent since the Soviet Government had no representative on the spot. He proposed therefore that in accordance with Mr. Eden's suggestion of October 17 and his remarks on October 22<sup>60</sup> the Advisory Council of High Commissioners in regard to Italy be set up at once. He said that if we could agree on this basis the question might be referred to the Drafting Committee.

MR. EDEN said that he fully shared the desire of Mr. Molotov to see a Soviet representative in Italy as soon as possible and that he had

<sup>60</sup> For latter, see summary of the fourth session of the Conference, October 22, p. 604.

already recommended that the Advisory Council be set up at once without waiting for the end of the so-called first period in Italy.

THE SECRETARY stated that he had received information that his Government had already commenced action along those lines.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the name of the commission was of course not of vital importance but that there might be some advantage in having the commission with regard to Italy called the Politico-Military Commission since that designation had already been widely used by the press, but that the main thing was to expedite the setting up of a commission in Italy, and he again proposed to submit it to the Drafting Committee. This was agreed to by the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV then proposed an intermission, but before doing so said he had the pleasure of announcing that the town of Melitopol had been captured by the Soviet armies.

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MR. MOLOTOV proposed that the terms of reference of both the Italian commission and the London commission should be agreed upon here and he proposed to accept as a basis the British memorandum of July 1, taking into account the observations which Mr. Eden had made at the previous session. He added that if the Secretary considered the British draft of July 1 acceptable it would be referred to the Drafting Committee.

THE SECRETARY said that this question could be referred to the Committee and that from the results of their work we would be able to make our recommendations and decisions.

MR. EDEN said that in his view the only difficulty of using the memorandum of July 1 was that it dealt only with the question of the terms of armistice for the ending of hostilities in Europe.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that such was not his impression and he had given very careful study to the contents of the document.

MR. EDEN replied that the contents of the memorandum of July 1 referred to conditions after the war whereas he had in mind for the Politico-Military Commission in London consideration of current questions such as the peace feelers from satellite states and other political questions affecting Europe.

MR. MOLOTOV answered that in our work we should endeavor to improve and not worsen the memorandum of July 1, but that he felt that if the powers of the Politico-Military Commission in London were made too broad there would be no work left for the Foreign Ministers and that personally he saw merit in the proposals advanced by the Secretary yesterday that there be tripartite meetings utilizing existing diplomatic machinery in the capitals of our three countries under the presidency of the Foreign Minister of the capital selected

and with the participation of the Ambassadors of the other two countries. He went on to say that the London mission might well start with the consideration of the preparation of armistice terms but that perhaps some combination of the British and United States proposals could be worked out on this. It was then agreed to turn over the question to the Drafting Committee on the basis of the British memorandum of July 1.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had only just received the United States proposals in regard to the treatment of Germany<sup>61</sup> and wished to have time to study it and prepare Russian translations and therefore wished to postpone consideration of this question until a later session.

It was agreed that the Conference would discuss items 7 and 8 and possibly 10 and 12 at the next session, which was set for 3 p. m. on the following day.

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*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*<sup>62</sup>

LONDON, 23 October 1943—8:05 p. m.

472. From Former Naval Person. My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>63</sup>

Following are extracts from telegram I have sent to Eden. (Begins). Your number 48.

1. Para 5: Turkey. If we force Turkey to enter the war she will insist on air support, etc., which could not be provided without detriment to main operations in Italy. If however Turkey enters on her own initiative, perhaps moving through a phase of non-belligerency, we should not have the same obligation and yet great advantages might be reaped. Obviously timing is vital and dependent upon what is the aggressive strength of the enemy in Bulgaria and Thrace. The prize would be to get into the Black Sea with supplies for Russia, warships and other forces. This is what I call giving Russia the right hand. Such a movement by Turkey is not impossible, especially if the Germans should begin to cut their losses in the Balkans and withdraw towards the Danube and the Sava.

2. Finland and Sweden. It would be a great advantage to bring Sweden into the war. We do not think the Germans have the strength to undertake a heavy invasion of Sweden. We should gain a new

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<sup>61</sup> Conference Document No. 20, p. 720.

<sup>62</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>63</sup> In his telegram No. 471, October 23, Churchill said: "I send you in my immediately following extracts from a telegram I have sent to Eden who asked for guidance about the Russian wish to bring Turkey and Sweden immediately into the war. I wonder what you think on these subjects?" No record has been found of a reply by Roosevelt.



country and small but good army. Our gains in Norway would be far-reaching. Valuable facilities would be afforded to Russian Air Forces. For ourselves, we can do far better bombing of Germany from East Anglia where we are mounted on a vast scale than from Sweden where everything would have to be improvised and imported by air. Our range from England over Germany is just as good as from Sweden. In fact with present British facilities plus those we hope to acquire North of Rome there is no part of Germany we cannot reach with great weight.

3. Personally I would like to see Turkey come in on her own and also Sweden. I do not think either of them would be overrun, and every new enemy helps Hitler's ruin. I suggest however that the first step is to find out what we and the Russians want and what will help both of us most in both quarters, and then as a second step go into ways and means immediately thereafter. Try this, and let me know. (Ends)

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

Moscow, October 24, 1943—noon.

Participants: Mr. Anthony Eden  
The Secretary  
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr  
Mr. Harriman

Mr. Eden, accompanied by the British Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull at noon, Sunday, October 24. The talk lasted about an hour. Ambassador Harriman was present.

Mr. Eden's primary purpose in the call was to discuss the question of the re-establishment of Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations.<sup>63a</sup> The Secretary explained that he considered it more of a British problem in view of their treaty relationships. Mr. Eden agreed but countered by saying he understood from the Poles that the Secretary was very friendly to them, much interested in seeing the matter settled, and would support them in Moscow.

After further discussion it was agreed that the British Ambassador would suggest to Molotov that the subject be discussed at a small meeting later in the Conference with not more than four from each side present. If this suggestion were followed, Mr. Eden would open the discussion by indicating that the break in relations between the

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<sup>63a</sup> For further documentation on this subject, see vol. III, pp. 314 ff.

Soviet and Polish Governments was a breach in the United Nations solidarity, and would ask Mr. Molotov whether he had any suggestions.

The Secretary agreed to respond to Mr. Eden's opening statement by explaining the friendly relations that existed between the United States and Polish Governments, paralleling similar relations with the Soviet Government, and expressing the hope that the Soviet Government would find it possible to re-establish friendly relations with the Polish Government—explaining the importance we placed on this in connection with Soviet relations in the United States on account of the large elements of Polish population in the United States, and sympathizers with the Poles.

The conversation then turned to other points being considered by the Conference.

Mr. Eden said that he would fully support the Secretary's strong position on the inclusion of China in the Four-Power Declaration. The British Ambassador expressed his personal strong sympathy for this position and its importance at this time. He suggested that some slight concession to the Soviets might be necessary if it could be done without in any way compromising the Four Power aspect of the Declaration. He suggested that the announcement might be made as a declaration from the tri-partite conference with the combined offer of the three participants to China to join in order to make it a four-power declaration. He expressed the view that there would be no difficulty in getting the Chinese Government's immediate acceptance. This small concession might well overcome Molotov's reluctance to have a four-power declaration emerge from a tri-partite conference. The Secretary did not agree as to concession.

The Secretary read to Mr. Eden the brief *aide-mémoire* recently prepared on our position as to Iran.<sup>64</sup> At Mr. Eden's request he gave him a copy.

The Secretary also read a cable he had sent to Washington<sup>65</sup> commenting on the Soviet seven-point principles to be followed in Italy. Mr. Eden requested a copy of this also, which it was arranged he should have.

The conversation closed with an exchange of views on the progress and atmosphere of the Conference.

W. A. HARRIMAN

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<sup>64</sup> Not found in Department files, but for the substance of Secretary Hull's remarks, see the letter of November 4, 1943, from Mr. George V. Allen to the Secretary of State, vol. iv, p. 400, and *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, p. 1505.

<sup>65</sup> *Infra.*

740.0011 Moscow/54: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 24, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received October 25—10:07 a. m.]

1715. For the President and the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Referring further to the 7-point proposal of Mr. Molotov in regard to political policies in Italy,<sup>66</sup> I am wondering whether you want us to consider prefacing our reply to Mr. Molotov by saying that military considerations must be considered uppermost when enemy territory is occupied, until the need for military occupation ceases and the area is ready to be turned over to a Civil Commission or other agency of Government. In the second place, the attitude of the United Nations with respect to the political policies that should be applied to Italy is that the utter destruction of Fascism and all traces of it is the supreme political consideration and that any list of proposals undertaken to embody this broad supreme political objective such as Mr. Molotov sets forth in his seven points are in complete harmony with the objective of destroying Fascism and substituting the best obtainable or available elements and agencies calculated to maintain law and order and improve benefits of Government. In some enemy areas the fact is recognized that on account of differing conditions the foregoing transition steps may require more or less time as the circumstances may make necessary.

The foregoing might be made a preface to Mr. Molotov's 7-point proposal so as to give a broader setting to the entire set of problems involved. [Hull.]

HARRIMAN

740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Sixth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 24, 1943, 3 p. m.*<sup>67</sup>

Moscow, October 24, 1943—3 p. m.

MR. MOLOTOV opened the session by requesting that the discussion of the question of Germany be postponed until tomorrow to permit more time for study.

MR. EDEN then took up the item on the agenda dealing with the question of agreements between major and minor Allies on post-war questions. He said that during Mr. Molotov's visit to London in June

<sup>66</sup> Conference Document No. 13, p. 714.<sup>67</sup> Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.

1942<sup>68</sup> he had had some discussion with him on this point and from that and his subsequent conversation with Mr. Maisky he had received the impression that the Soviet and British Governments were in agreement as to the undesirability of their concluding any agreements during the war with small states relating to the post-war period and thus avoid any scramble for special relationships with small Powers. He said that it was in this spirit the British Government had refused to consider some approaches they had on this subject from Allied small Powers. It was, of course, realized that there would have to be some exceptions to this general rule and that the Soviet Government in the case of the Soviet-Czech treaty<sup>69</sup> had already informed him of one. He said that his main point was to ensure that there would be consultation and agreement between the Soviet and British Governments before any such treaties were concluded in the future.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he gathered that Mr. Eden was not against the conclusion of treaties of this nature, but only desired to ensure preliminary consultation and agreement between the British and Soviet Governments before either state concluded any such treaty.

MR. EDEN said that he was referring to a general principle.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the British and Soviet Governments had been discussing this question for about a year and a half, but he did not know whether the United States Government was fully informed on this matter and that now that the question had been brought before the Three-Nation Conference he wished to make sure that the United States was fully familiar with all the material.

THE SECRETARY said that his Government had followed with interest and profit the discussions on this subject between the British and Soviet Governments and that he personally was not familiar with all the details and he felt, therefore, that Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov were in a better position to discuss the matter and that perhaps at some future stage he might have something helpful to add.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated his desire to have the United States Government fully informed as to what had occurred in the past and expressed his willingness to make available to the Secretary all information in the possession of the Soviet Government on the exchange with the British.

MR. EDEN said he would, of course, be glad to give the United States everything they had.

MR. MOLOTOV then said that he would like to inquire whether in the event that the British and Soviet representatives here were able to agree on this question, should the three Powers represented be parties to it or should there merely be Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

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<sup>68</sup> For correspondence regarding Mr. Molotov's visit to London in May and June 1942, see *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. III, pp. 552-553 and 556-566.

<sup>69</sup> Enclosure to Conference Document No. 43, p. 744.

THE SECRETARY repeated that he was not familiar with all the details of this lengthy correspondence and he felt, furthermore, that should Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden fail to reach an agreement on this there would be little value in his participating in those differences. He added that he was, however, greatly interested in all of the proceedings of the Conference and would be glad to be of any help.

MR. EDEN emphasized that he did not have in mind a treaty, but merely a practical arrangement to ensure further consultation and agreement between the Soviet and British Governments. He suggested that the British and Soviet Delegates each name a representative to consider this question on a small committee.

MR. MOLOTOV then reviewed the history of the Soviet-Czech negotiations. He said that when Mr. Beneš<sup>70</sup> had approached the Soviet Government with the idea of a treaty of mutual assistance directed against any recrudescence after the war of German aggression, his Government had responded favorably and after a number of exchanges the treaty had finally been agreed upon and Dr. Beneš had been invited to come to Moscow to sign it, but had been unable to do so because of objections on the part of the British Government.

MR. EDEN at this point stated that there would be no objection to Dr. Beneš' visit.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that there was probably no objection to the visit but perhaps there was to the signing of the treaty. He said that neither the Soviet nor Czech Governments nor their respective public opinion could understand why the British should have any objection to a treaty of this character which was between two countries with a common frontier for their immediate security.

MR. EDEN repeated what he had said previously with regard to his understanding that the Soviet and British Governments were in general agreement as to the undesirability during the war of treaties between great and small allies which related to the post-war period and that his Government had been thinking more along the lines of a system of collective security. He said that he now had a draft of the proposed treaty which he had not had at the time Dr. Beneš suggested his visit in July and that after examination he felt that there would be nothing objectionable from the point of view of his Government to the signature of this treaty.

MR. MOLOTOV expressed pleasure at this statement and said he would then immediately telegraph to the Soviet Chargé to the Czech Government in exile in London to invite Dr. Beneš to come to Moscow.

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<sup>70</sup> Edward Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London; formerly President of the Czechoslovak Republic.

MR. EDEN asked and Mr. Molotov agreed that he be given 24 hours to inform his Prime Minister of the opinion he had just expressed in regard to the Soviet-Czech treaty, so that he would not learn this for the first time from Dr. Beneš.

MR. MOLOTOV then said that in order to avoid any further delay he would read the statement of the Soviet Government on this question. (Copy attached.<sup>71</sup>) The British Delegation then nominated Mr. Wilson and the Soviet Delegation Mr. Novikov to consider this question.

The Conference then adjourned for fifteen minutes.

MR. MOLOTOV then took up item 10 on the agenda—common policy towards Iran.

MR. EDEN said he felt we should consider the various practical questions involved in this matter, such as transport, finance, coordination of trade activities, etc.

THE SECRETARY said he thought it would save time to refer this question to a special committee.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had some observations to make on this question, that just before the meeting the Iranian Ambassador<sup>72</sup> had called at the Foreign Office to call attention to the existing Soviet-Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1942,<sup>72a</sup> which envisaged the presence of an Iranian representative at all international conferences in which questions relating to Iran would be dealt with.

MR. EDEN replied that it had not been intended to take any decisions in regard to Iran, but merely to discuss among ourselves certain practical measures which would redound to the benefit of Iran in the exchange of views on the subject.

MR. MOLOTOV said it was his understanding, which the Secretary confirmed, that the United States had no such treaty with Iran, but that one was in process of negotiation and might soon be brought to a successful conclusion.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that a small commission be formed to consider these practical questions without settling in advance any of the questions in principle.

Mr. Allen and Mr. Jernegan were named to this commission for the United States; Mr. Holman and Mr. Iliff for the British and Mr. Kavtaradze and Mr. Smirnov for the Soviet Union.

The Conference then turned to the questions of confederation, which had been included in the merger of items 12 and 17.

MR. EDEN then said that on the question of confederations it was impossible to decide now whether or not in some form or other any

<sup>71</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Conference Document No. 24, p. 726.

<sup>72</sup> Majid Ahy.

<sup>72a</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249, and for documents concerning United States reservations regarding the treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 263 ff.

association of small Powers would be desirable or possible. He added that it had been difficult to find any satisfactory solution of such problems even in economic matters. He then outlined four principles which he said should guide the discussions on this subject, as follows: (1) No interference with forms of government; (2) Association to be based on mutual welfare; (3) Great powers to give their support in the general interest of prosperity; and (4) No separate areas of responsibility on the part of the great Powers.

THE SECRETARY said that his Government had several important phases of this important question under study in relation to our main problem, but he had not had a chance to acquaint himself with all the details and he thought it might be well to postpone until some future meeting this discussion.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that the Conference adjourn to reconvene at 4:00 p. m. tomorrow.

THE SECRETARY then asked if it would not be possible to return to point 2 of the Four-Nation Declaration and to finish with this question, to which the Conference agreed.

The Conference then adjourned to reconvene at 4:00 p. m. tomorrow to take up the Four-Power Declaration, the question of Germany and, if possible, items 13 and 14 on the agenda.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum for the Secretary of State*<sup>73</sup>

Moscow, October 25, 1943.

Last night, during the intermission at the Ballet, Mr. Vyshinski talked at considerable length with General Deane and myself. Vyshinski expressed the warmest conviction that the future hope of the world rested in collaboration between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and that without such collaboration he feared there would be no future. He said that the first task was the utter defeat of Germany and after that Japan and then there would be no more trouble in the world. With reference to Japan, he said that that was a subject which would have to be handled "wisely" and it must be taken in its proper turn.

Mr. Vyshinski then went on to say that in the past the difficulties between Great Britain and Russia had been due to the fact that the Czar's Government pursued an aggressive policy of seizing foreign territory and so did the British, and so they were constantly running into each other. (Mr. Geoffrey Wilson of the British Delegation, who understands Russian, participated in this conversation.) Mr.

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<sup>73</sup> Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.

Vyshinski added that that was all changed now, that all of the three great Powers represented here had sufficient territory, population and resources, that the Soviet Government had no interest in any territories beyond the Soviet frontiers and that there, therefore, was no real obstacle to the development of the closest kind of cooperation.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Seventh Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 25, 1943, 4 p. m.*<sup>74</sup>

MR. VYSHINSKI informed the Conference that since there were still a few minor changes of a drafting nature to be made in the text of the Four-Nation Declaration the Drafting Committee could not present it to the Conference today and suggested tomorrow's meeting instead.

MR. MOLOTOV turned to consideration of Item 7 on the Agenda, the treatment to be accorded Germany, concerning which a proposal had previously been submitted by the Secretary.<sup>75</sup>

THE SECRETARY said that he wished to point out that this paper was not designed to be an all-inclusive study of the many problems involved but was more in the nature of an outline and framework which might form the basis for further study and discussion.

MR. EDEN said that his Government had studied with great interest the Secretary's proposals and considered them a very useful contribution on the subject. He proposed that the document be studied by sections. This proposal was accepted by the Conference.

MR. EDEN said, in regard to the first section dealing with inter-Allied control, that he felt this was a subject which might very appropriately be turned over to the Politico-Military Commission in London, if it was agreed to set up such a commission, since in his opinion the subject was one which was related to the contents of the British memorandum of July 1<sup>76</sup> which was to be the basis for setting up the Commission.

MR. MOLOTOV then interrupted the proceedings of the conference to announce that Soviet forces had captured Dnieperpetrovsk and another important center in the Ukraine.

MR. EDEN suggested that the next two paragraphs of the document dealing with the duration of control over Germany and the question of reparations might also be referred to the London commission.

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<sup>74</sup> Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.

<sup>75</sup> Conference Document No. 20, p. 720.

<sup>76</sup> See Conference Document No. 7, p. 708, and footnote 84, p. 710.



THE SECRETARY said that he thought that the question of reparations was sufficiently specialized as to require a special commission which, however, could work under the supervision of the London commission.

After some further discussion as to the mechanics of giving further study to this document, Mr. EDEN returning to the document itself stated that his Government favored the total disarmament of Germany with the retention of only enough police force to preserve order.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he agreed with Mr. Eden's proposals but that there were certain questions in the text which were not clear; for example, point three referred to the scrapping of German war matériel.

THE SECRETARY replied that he thought it likely that someone at the peace conference might suggest that some part of German war equipment be turned over to the Soviet Government to take off out of sight and scrap, but what was done with it after that was of course another question.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question as to the form in which the decisions of the Conference on the question of Germany should be embodied: whether in a declaration, in an agreement, or in some other manner.

THE SECRETARY stated that he thought that the Conference could well pass this document on to some agency for detailed study and to adopt such amendments as might be necessary. He emphasized again that the document was merely an outline.

MR. EDEN agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired whether the Conference should give publicity to any decisions reached on Germany.

THE SECRETARY said that he thought it might be desirable to have a special committee appointed to consider all the results of the Conference with a view to determining, subject to the approval of the three Foreign Ministers, what part of that work could appropriately and beneficially be made public.

MR. EDEN said that he envisaged three types of documents that might emerge from the Conference: (1) documents which could be given to the press in whole; (2) secret documents which should be given no publicity at all; and (3) the fact of agreement could be made public but not the exact decisions reached.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired under which category the present document on Germany fell, in Mr. Eden's opinion.

MR. EDEN replied that he thought it fell in the third category.

MR. MOLOTOV then explained that the Soviet Government was strongly of the opinion that no publicity whatsoever should be given

to any decisions which might be adopted regarding political, economic or other treatment of Germany after the war since to do so would merely serve to unite the German people further in their war effort and would play into the hands of Hitler. He added that the Soviet Union had been reproached by the British and United States press on their lack of clarity in regard to their attitude toward Germany, but he could assure the Conference that such criticism would not make them like Hitler any the more.

MR. EDEN then stated that the British Government would not like to see a united Germany remain but would prefer to see it divided into separate states and particularly the separation of Prussia. He said the British Government would therefore encourage any separatist tendencies within Germany but there was a division of opinion within the British Government as to the desirability of attempting to impose the dismemberment of Germany by forcible means.

MR. MOLOTOV said he would like to say that the Soviet Union gives its full approval of all measures which would render Germany harmless in the future.

MR. EDEN said that he would like to know the view of the Soviet Government on the question of the dismemberment of Germany, including the possible use of force for this purpose.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he understood that the draft submitted by the Secretary was in the nature of a minimum program which might be expanded. He added that it had been their impression that the United States Government was willing to go farther on the question of dismemberment of Germany than the British, but that from a study of the Secretary's proposal he saw no evidence of that. Furthermore there had been no specific proposals from the British Government on this point.

MR. EDEN replied that he had stated the view of his Government, which was that of his Prime Minister who was very much disposed to take into account the views of the Soviet Government on this question.

MR. MOLOTOV said he would reply to that question in due course but first he would like to have some expression from the Secretary as to the position of the American Government.

THE SECRETARY said that he had little to add to what was stated in the United States proposal which had been put in as a possible contribution to the consideration of the entire question. He said that his Government had been struck by the widely divergent views among Allied governments on the subject of the dismemberment of Germany. In high quarters in the United States when the study of this problem had begun there had been a general disposition to favor the dismemberment of Germany, but as the discussions progressed and conflicting

and often very convincing arguments were advanced for or against, there was an increasing disposition to keep an open mind on this point and to explore it more fully before determining upon the final attitude, although dismemberment is still in favor.<sup>76a</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Government was somewhat behind in its study of the post-war treatment of Germany due to the greater preoccupation of its leaders with the military prosecution of the war. He added that to the United States Government and to Mr. Hull in particular belongs the honor of setting forth the first definite expression of an attitude toward Germany. He stated that the Soviet Government is of the opinion that the proposals presented by the Secretary to the Conference set forth correctly the program that should be adopted toward Germany but that the Soviet Government regards his program as a minimum and not a maximum one. He said that he understood from the Secretary's observations here that he himself did not expect that discussion of the problems should confine itself to the exact contents of the document. On the subject of dismemberment Mr. Molotov said that he believed this was a subject requiring further study; that there was a strong movement in Soviet public opinion for the dismemberment of Germany; and that there were those who would not be satisfied with the extent of the Secretary's proposals on this point. He added that the Soviet Government, as it always does, pays great attention to the feelings of the Soviet public and also to the feelings of the public of Allied nations, but also must consider the political advisability of any such step. He concluded that the Soviet Government had come to the definite conclusion that the dismemberment of Germany was not excluded but that the question would require further study.

After an intermission, MR. MOLOTOV said he noted that in the United States document the question of German frontiers was left until the final peace settlement, and he inquired whether this meant that Germany was to be allowed to keep any of her conquests.

MR. EDEN replied that he was sure there was general agreement that Germany must be made to return to her pre-Anschluss frontiers.

THE SECRETARY added that he thought indeed that there was unanimity on that point and also on the question of East Prussia.

MR. MOLOTOV commented that there could be no two opinions on the necessity of forcing Germany to disgorge her conquests.

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<sup>76a</sup> See, for example, documents entitled "Germany: Partition" (August 17, 1943), and "The Political Reorganization of Germany" (September 23, 1943), in Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 554-560.

MR. MOLOTOV said that it might be possible now to turn to the question of Austria concerning which the British had submitted a proposal.<sup>77</sup>

THE SECRETARY said he had nothing to add to what the British had proposed.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed to send the British proposal on Austria to the Drafting Committee.

The Conference then turned to consideration of Item 13 "Peace Feelers from Enemy States".<sup>77a</sup>

MR. EDEN stated that his Government had sent to the Soviet and United States Governments an account of all serious approaches in regard to peace which it had received from the smaller enemy states. In regard to the question of the Rumanian approach he said he would like to have Mr. Molotov's views.

MR. MOLOTOV said that in regard to the general question of Rumania his Government was of the opinion that there should be no dealing with the Rumanian Government except on the basis of unconditional surrender. In regard to the second point raised by the British in previous correspondence, namely the advantage of establishing contact with the Maniu<sup>78</sup> group, he felt that this was not advisable as Maniu had nothing to offer and they had nothing to discuss with him.

MR. EDEN said that subject to the Secretary's attitude the British Government felt that it was for the Soviet Government to decide such questions involving Rumania.

THE SECRETARY said he had nothing to add to what Mr. Eden had said.

MR. EDEN then said he would like to see the Conference adopt some resolution to the effect that the three Governments represented here would inform each other of any peace feelers and consult with one another with a view to concerted action. The British proposal on this point<sup>79</sup> was submitted to the Drafting Committee.

MR. MOLOTOV said that Mr. Eden's letter on the subject of Rumania had raised the question by what means Rumania could be induced to interfere with the German war effort.

MR. EDEN replied that he thought it had been agreed to leave that matter to the Soviet Government.

MR. MOLOTOV said that in regard to Hungary there had been some disagreement with the British Government which he hoped to liquidate. He said that the Soviet Government was opposed to any

<sup>77</sup> Conference Document No. 21, p. 724.

<sup>77a</sup> For related documents, see pp. 484 ff.

<sup>78</sup> Iulius Maniu, exiled president of the National Peasant Party of Rumania.

<sup>79</sup> Conference Document No. 33, p. 737.

negotiations except on the basis of unconditional surrender of the Hungarian Government, and that while they were most interested in interfering with the German war machine on any territory, whether Hungary or Rumania, he did not believe that half measures or negotiations were of any value. He added that the same applied to Finland.

MR. EDEN then suggested that he and Mr. Molotov should study this question apart from the general conference and that in his Government's opinion, since the Soviet Union had a primary interest, it would seem logical that it should decide questions of this character in regard to countries which were engaged in active warfare against it alone.

THE SECRETARY voiced no opposition to this statement.

It was agreed that the Conference at its next session would consider Item 17 dealing with resistance movements in Yugoslavia; Item 1, the Soviet proposal for measures to shorten the war; and Item 2, the Four-Nation Declaration.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 25, 1943—5 p. m.

During the recess this afternoon, Mr. Molotov brought up the question of Turkey's entering the war and made it very clear that Russia's proposal is that she, the United States and Great Britain should "suggest" to Turkey that she come into the war and that by this word "suggest" he meant to suggest peremptorily, which meant in effect a command by the three great Powers.

I again made it clear that whatever the merits of the idea may be this was purely a military matter, which, as I had previously stated, came exclusively within the province of the President and the Chiefs of Staff so far as my Government was concerned, and added that no doubt they would be glad to talk this matter out with the Chiefs of Staff and the Heads of the other two Governments. I said that, of course, the British had taken the lead in dealing with the Turkish situation so far as she and the United States are concerned.

Mr. Molotov added that he saw no reason why the Allies and Great Britain should be furnishing arms to Turkey without getting some fighting out of her. I said that again I would have to refer him to Great Britain and to my own Chief of Staff along with the President. I concluded by saying that when this proposal, along with the Swedish proposal, was first made by Mr. Molotov for his Government, I had stated that I had no authority to deal with those war matters, but as

a courtesy had promptly sent the proposals to my Government for any comment it might see fit to give to me.<sup>79a</sup>

I then proceeded to re-emphasize some of the main points I had made to Marshal Stalin earlier today in support of the proposal of President Roosevelt that the three Heads of Government should meet at Basra.<sup>80</sup> I said the stage in the war situation had been reached where we were strongly on the offensive and that if we should wait until the end of the war to formulate a basic foundation for a post-war international program peoples in all of the democracies would be scattered in every direction under every sort of discordant influence by various elements, groups, societies and individuals with the result that nothing would be more impossible at that belated stage than for a country like mine to pursue a suitable post-war program and rally and unite all of the essential forces in support of it. This made it all-important, therefore, that we should realize the disastrous nature of the opposite course of postponing everything until the military decision has been reached. I said that if an official in my country should announce that he were opposed to formulating the fundamental policies for a post-war world until after the war is over, he would be thrown out of power over night.

Mr. Molotov then asked me what different phases of international cooperation I had in mind. I again repeated to him numerous proposals that I had more than once stated to him since coming here. They included cooperation to preserve peace permanently and to provide for the maximum of economic advantages and benefits to each country for the equal enjoyment of their respective peoples, to preserve world order under law so as to avoid international anarchy, to provide for relief against starvation in many nations immediately following as well as during the war, to relieve the post-war German situation, to deal with dependent peoples, to deal with stabilization as a basis for suitable international trade and like relations, etc., etc. He agreed and then inquired if isolation did not hurt the United States. I said the truth is it has almost destroyed the United States and Soviet Russia. He said he agreed that isolation would not do.

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740.0011 Moscow/46 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1943—6 p. m.

1086. Amdel No. 44. For Dunn from Atherton. In view of my understanding and the American Section of the Civil Affairs

<sup>79a</sup> See footnote indicated by an asterisk, p. 581.

<sup>80</sup> Mr. Hull reported this conversation with Stalin in telegram No. SD 3, October 26, printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 45.

Committee, I suggest it should be understood that the last sentence of paragraph 3 of your 1693, October 22, midnight,<sup>81</sup> might properly have read "He pointed out that the High Commissioners of the countries represented would also care for the interests of their respective governments and nationals (with the following addition) 'through the machinery of the Allied Control Commission'". This would estop the High Commissioners or their staffs from dealing directly with the Italian Government. [Atherton.]

STETTINIUS

740.0011 Moscow/212

*Summary of First Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Iran,  
October 26, 1943*<sup>82</sup>

The sub-committee met for the first time on October 26. The British members proposed consideration of their draft declarations,<sup>83</sup> and the American members put forward a memorandum (enclosure No. 3)<sup>84</sup> containing a proposed amendment to the British draft of a tripartite declaration together with a draft of a declaration to be made by the United States regarding withdrawal of its troops from Iran. It was proposed that this latter declaration be made simultaneously with the similar Anglo-Soviet declaration suggested by the British members. The British members at once accepted the American amendment to the draft tripartite declaration.

Owing to delay in delivery, the Soviet members had not received advance copies of either the British draft declarations or the American memorandum. They felt that they could not discuss those documents without written Russian translations, and it was agreed, therefore, to defer their consideration until the following day.

<sup>81</sup> Telegram not printed; it contained a report of the meeting of October 22, 1943. The sentence quoted corresponds to the penultimate sentence of the fifth paragraph of the summary of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, p. 604.

<sup>82</sup> Extract from an unnumbered despatch to the Secretary of State from George V. Allen (apparently at Tehran), November 4, 1943; the despatch is printed in full in vol. iv, p. 400.

Members of the Sub-Committee on Iran were as follows: For the American delegation, Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Mr. John D. Jernegan, Third Secretary of Legation in Iran; for the British delegation, Mr. Adrian Holman, Counselor of the British Legation in Iran, and Mr. William Iliff, Financial Counselor of the Legation; for the Soviet delegation, Mr. S. I. Kavtaradze, Soviet People's Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Andrei Smirnov, former Soviet Ambassador to Iran. Mr. Philip E. Mosely of the Department of State attended the meeting of October 26 as interpreter for the American members.

<sup>83</sup> See Conference Document No. 27, enclosures 1 and 2, pp. 732 and 733, respectively.

<sup>84</sup> Printed as Conference Document No. 29, p. 735.

The British members put forward, for later discussion, the following specific points on which they thought it desirable to reach agreement, at least in principle:

(1) That all three powers should do what they could to relieve the food situation in Iran.

(2) That all three powers should do what they could to relieve the Iranian road transport situation.

(3) That all three powers should coordinate as far as possible their policy with regard to local purchases in Iran.

(4) That during the war period all three governments should coordinate their programs of imports into Iran.

(5) That an understanding should be reached regarding matters of finance involved in the operation of the Trans-Iranian railroad. (In this connection, the British members presented a memorandum containing the principal points which they considered should be incorporated in a four-party Anglo-American-Soviet-Iranian agreement (enclosure No. 4).<sup>85</sup>)

(6) That the three powers should conclude an agreement regarding payment of Iranian taxes.

(7) That there should be regular consultation in Tehran between the three chiefs of mission on all economic and financial questions.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Eighth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 26, 1943, 4 p. m.*<sup>86</sup>

At the opening of the session MR. MOLOTOV suggested that Item 1 of the Agenda dealing with the Soviet proposals for measures to shorten the war be considered at a restricted session on the following day.

MR. EDEN suggested that since the questions of Turkey and Sweden would be discussed and would be less military than political he did not see the necessity for a restricted session.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he understood from General Ismay and General Deane that there would be other matters relating to military plans discussed also and therefore proposed the restricted meeting.

The Conference then turned to consideration of Items 17 and 12 together, the first part of which dealt with the British proposals concerning general as against separate areas of responsibility in Europe.

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<sup>85</sup> See enclosure to Conference Document No. 28, p. 734.

<sup>86</sup> Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.



MR. EDEN said that he had little to add to the proposal which he had submitted to the Conference on this question (copy attached)<sup>87</sup> but that perhaps the Secretary would have some remarks.

THE SECRETARY then said that in its general approach to all these questions the Government of the United States believed that the first step was to agree upon and adopt a broad set of principles capable of world-wide application which would then guide our three countries in our consideration of separate and specific questions, of which the British proposal was one. He said that the United States Government had not sought to select any particular area or question for special consideration before the general principles were agreed on, and that he personally felt very strongly that the only orderly and reasonable approach to the entire question of international collaboration and the creation of a stable and lasting basis for world peace was to take the general questions first. He added that in the absence of any proclaimed set of general principles he felt that he had little of a specific nature to add to the present question under discussion and therefore deferred to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden for their advice.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he did not quite clearly understand the situation: Was the question general as against separate areas of responsibility to be discussed or was it not?

THE SECRETARY said that he had merely sought to present the view that he felt it of great importance that we should reach a common understanding on the basic principles to be applied in the solution of all these individual questions.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had no objection to discussing this particular question at this time and if he correctly understood the Secretary he was willing to leave it to the British and Soviet representatives to express their views.

THE SECRETARY then added that he knew that the United States Government, in accordance with general considerations which he had set forth above, very much hoped that no decision would be taken at this Conference in favor of separate areas of responsibility.

MR. EDEN in discussing the draft of the British proposal said that he had attached special importance to points one and four dealing with the rights of peoples to choose their own form of government and expressing opposition to the principle of separate areas of responsibility. He said the other two points, two and three, were not so important. He added that although his proposal dealt specifically with Europe he felt the same principle should be applied everywhere.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he knew of no reason to believe that the Soviet Government would be interested in separate zones or spheres

<sup>87</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Conference Document No. 31, p. 736.

of influence and he could guarantee that there was no disposition on the part of the Soviet Government to divide Europe into such separate zones. He observed that although Mr. Eden had said these principles should be applied universally there was no indication to that effect in the draft, and he added that if it was to relate to the world as a whole it might be better to consider points one and four of the British proposal as possibly falling within the scope of the Four-Nation Declaration.

THE SECRETARY and MR. MOLOTOV [*Eden?*] voiced no objection to the consideration of these two points when the Four-Nation Declaration came before this session.

MR. MOLOTOV then proposed that the Conference consider the question of confederations on which the Soviet Government had prepared a statement. He then read his statement and criticized the idea of planning schemes of federation at this time and stated that the Soviet Government considered the active consideration or encouragement of such schemes as premature and even harmful not only to the interests of the small countries but to the general question of European stability. He said, however, that the Soviet Government would be willing to consider again at some later date this question in the light of post-war experience and under conditions existing then (copy of Soviet statement attached<sup>88</sup>).

MR. EDEN said that it was hardly necessary to state that the British Government was not interested in creating a *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union but was very much interested in creating one against Germany. He said that there was great force in Mr. Molotov's argument and he would not therefore insist.

THE SECRETARY stated that without going deeply into the details of the matter in any way, he wished to state that his Government had for some years consistently upheld the principle of the right of small nations to take such measures as they considered desirable for the welfare of their people, particularly in an economic sphere, provided such measures did not affect the larger questions of peace and security.

MR. MOLOTOV said he understood from the statements of the Secretary and Mr. Eden that his suggestion had met with no objection.

MR. EDEN observed that in his opinion it was largely a question of time and there might be further exchanges on this subject at some later date.

After an intermission MR. MOLOTOV proposed that we consider the draft of the Four-Nation Declaration as prepared by the Drafting Committee and asked for a report from that Committee.

MR. HACKWORTH said that the Drafting Committee had introduced two or three changes of an unimportant character in the text, and that

<sup>88</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Annex 7 to the Secret Protocol, p. 762.

since it had not been possible to agree on a title it was merely being presented as a declaration since the Committee was not authorized to deal with the question of the number of powers which were to participate. He added that he understood Mr. Vyshinski, the Soviet member of the Committee, had a number of observations to make.

MR. VYSHINSKI said that there were a number of points in regard to wording which he felt should be decided by the Conference. One related to Article 5 concerning the difference between "joint action" and "with a view to joint action", the latter being preferred by the British and American representatives on that Committee. In Article 6, Mr. Vyshinski continued, he had proposed in place of the words "following the defeat of the enemy" the substitution of "after the end of the war". After some discussion on this point Mr. Molotov agreed to accept Article 5 in the United States version and it was agreed by the Conference to substitute "after the termination of hostilities" for the words "following the defeat of the enemy".

THE SECRETARY raised the question of the participation of China as an original signatory which had been left open in the previous meeting on the subject.

MR. MOLOTOV then announced that the Soviet Government had no objection to the inclusion of China as an original signatory, but since he was most anxious to have some declaration signed and announced before the Conference broke up he was doubtful whether from a technical point of view it would be possible for the Chinese Ambassador here to receive the necessary powers before the end of the Conference.

THE SECRETARY said he would undertake to communicate the text to the Chinese Government and he was convinced that the necessary powers would be forthcoming to the Ambassador here for China to sign before the end of the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV accepted the Secretary's suggestion but expressed the strong hope that there would be no delay which would interfere with the publication by the Conference of the contents of the Declaration.

THE SECRETARY then said that he had thought of an alternative method of ensuring China's participation as an original signatory but he was merely putting it out as a possibility as he was optimistic that the Chinese Ambassador here would receive the necessary powers in time. This alternative method was to permit China to sign as an original member within ten days following the close of the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV then said he considered that the Conference was in complete agreement and authorized the Secretary to submit the text to the Chinese Government on behalf of the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV said he would like clarification on a number of points, in particular the intent of Article 6 providing that none of the signatories would use their armed forces within the territory of another state except for the purposes envisaged by the Declaration. He particularly inquired as to what special cases the Secretary might have in mind.

THE SECRETARY then said that the general idea of this article was that it was in the nature of a self-denying act on the part of the large nations to demonstrate to and allay the suspicions of the smaller nations in regard to the use of their superior force.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired whether this would apply to the establishment of naval and air bases which might result from agreements between one of the signatories and other states.

MR. EDEN also stated that his Government had examined this article very attentively with this in mind but had perceived no objection because it was inconceivable that any of the powers represented here would use their armed forces or establish bases in the territory of other states except for the purposes envisaged by the Declaration.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired whether this article would require that there be prior consultation between the signatories before any one of the states could conclude an agreement with any other power for the establishment of bases within the territory of the latter.

MR. EDEN replied that he thought that that was the case but that agreement was not required.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that a special committee be created to study this particular question.

THE SECRETARY inquired precisely what Mr. Molotov had in mind in regard to Article 6.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he wanted to be sure that in the light of Article 6 no obstacles to the future collaboration of our three Governments might result from agreements which one or another of our Governments might have for mutual assistance and the establishment of bases with other countries.

THE SECRETARY then stated that he thought that Article 6 could not be taken apart from the rest of the Declaration; that the intent and purpose of the Declaration was clearly set forth in all its articles; that it was designed to ensure that the signatories would act together in matters relating to surrender and disarmament of our respective enemies and that such measures would be taken as might be necessary to ensure observation of the terms of surrender and the other aims as set forth in the Declaration. He said that in addition the Declaration consisted of a general set of principles dealing with the whole approach to the question of international collabora-

tion and that he felt that every consideration was sufficiently taken care of in the text.

MR. MOLOTOV answered that he was happy to hear Mr. Hull's remarks and was satisfied with his explanation with regard to Article 6. He then went on to say that he did not quite understand what was meant by "existing relations" in Article 8, as to whether it applied to both published and unpublished documents setting forth those relations.

THE SECRETARY said it was his understanding that the word "existing" no longer appeared in the revised draft.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that notwithstanding he still wished to know whether this referred to public agreements and to agreements which had not been published.

THE SECRETARY said that the only purpose of the article was to reassure any one of the signatories which was not at war with a country at war with the other two.

[MR.] MOLOTOV expressed some doubt as to the exact meaning and even value of the article.

THE SECRETARY then said he desired to suggest that it be stricken out in its entirety. This was accepted by the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV then said he considered that the Conference had definitely agreed upon the text of the Declaration and he had only one more observation to make. He proposed that a resolution be adopted which was not to be included in the Declaration itself but was to relate to Item 4. This resolution suggested that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union appoint representatives to a committee to work out jointly the preliminary questions connected with establishing the general international organization referred to in Article 4. He added that this committee could meet in any one of the three capitals that was desired and that if necessary other members of the United Nations could be invited to participate.

THE SECRETARY said he thought that this was a most interesting suggestion on the part of Mr. Molotov and a really practical step in the direction of international cooperation, adding that he personally felt, without examining the resolution in detail, that the best results would be obtained by having the work of the committee informal and not in the early stage associating other members of the United Nations since that might only lead to rivalries and jealousies.

MR. EDEN expressed general approval of Mr. Molotov's suggestion and it was agreed to accept the suggested resolution at another session.

MR. MOLOTOV said he was pleased to note that both the Secretary and Mr. Eden looked with favor upon his proposal.

The Conference then adjourned, to reconvene tomorrow at 4 p. m. in restricted session to consider Item 1 on the Agenda.

740.0011 Moscow/10-2643 : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 26 October 1943—6:05 p. m.

The seven points of policy outlined in the Soviet proposal, your Delam 13<sup>89</sup> and 14,<sup>90</sup> are in conformity with this Government's policy towards Italy. It would appear advisable, however, that the acceptance thereof be conditional on such preamble as indicated by you in your 1715, October 24, 1 p. m.

It may be well to make two observations for your guidance. First, that the time when these seven points of policy can be made effective must be governed by military factors in Italy, and, secondly, in the carrying out of point 6, no steps should be adopted, even in this early stage, which would not meet with the prior approval of the supreme allied commander-in-chief or would run contrary to our announced policy of permitting the people (in this case, of Italy) ultimately to choose their own form of democratic government.

ROOSEVELT

*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*<sup>91</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1943—6:10 p. m.

262234. In regard to turning over naval vessels and merchant ships to the Soviet, the President desires that Italian shipping, both naval and merchant now in Allied possession, be used wherever<sup>92</sup> it may promise the best service to the common Allied cause (with due reference to the terms of the Admiral Cunningham Agreement<sup>93</sup> if and as amended), without any final transfer of title to any Nation at the present time.

The question of permanent title to ships and other material surrendered by Italy while in an enemy status or by other enemy countries hereafter can be determined at a later date without prejudice

<sup>89</sup> Not printed; it contained a report of the meeting of October 22, 1943 (Fourth Plenary Meeting). For summary of this meeting, see p. 604.

<sup>90</sup> Delam 14 not printed; it contained a translation of the Soviet proposal in regard to Italy, printed as Conference Document No. 13, p. 714.

<sup>91</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

<sup>92</sup> The word "whenever" appeared in the telegram instead of "wherever" as originally sent, but was corrected in telegram No. 271356 from the President to the Secretary of State on October 27, 1943 (not printed).

<sup>93</sup> Memorandum of Agreement on the Employment and Disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine Between the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, Acting on Behalf of the Allied Commander in Chief and the Italian Minister of Marine, 23rd September 1943, Department of State Publication No. 2669: *United States and Italy, 1936-1946: Documentary Record*, p. 53. Amendment, signed November 17, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 66.

to the interest of the allied nations, and without adversely affecting the present and prospective Italian war effort against Germany.

ROOSEVELT

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740.0011 Moscow/10-2643 : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 26 October 1943—6:15 p. m.

The following is the point of view of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as regards paragraph *b* and *c* of Alusna 192114.<sup>94</sup>

It would not be deemed advisable to push Turkey at this moment into a declaration of war on the side of the Allies since the necessary compensation to the Turks in war material and war supplies including armed forces and ships would divert too much from the Italian front and the proposed OVERLORD<sup>95</sup> operation. However, inquiries could be started on basis of lease by Turkey as a neutral of airbases and transportation facilities.

Sweden should not be asked at this time to make a large system of air bases available to Allied use since the necessary employment of Allied defending forces and Allied war material together with equipment and maintenance supplies and personnel would cause too great a diversion from OVERLORD operations. This would not debar later consideration of seeking lesser air bases from Sweden along the line of those recently obtained in the Azores.<sup>96</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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740.0011 Moscow/71 : Telegram

*The American Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 27, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 11:57 a. m.]

Delam 32. For the President and Acting Secretary from the Secretary. If you have approved the text of the Four Nation Declaration (reference Delam No. 31<sup>97</sup>) as adopted in the Conference yesterday, I would appreciate receiving immediately your authorization to sign this Declaration on behalf of the United States. It is of vital im-

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<sup>94</sup> Not printed: reference is to the telegram sent by Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt from Moscow on October 19 containing the text of the Soviet proposals regarding point 1 of the Agenda.

<sup>95</sup> Code name for the cross-Channel invasion of France.

<sup>96</sup> See vol. II, section under Portugal entitled "Interest of the United States in obtaining water-port and airport facilities in the Azores."

<sup>97</sup> October 26, 1943, *Foreign Relations, 1943, China*, p. 829.

portance that I have these powers at the earliest possible moment.<sup>98</sup>  
[Hull.]

740.0011 Moscow/212

*Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Iran, October 27, 1943*<sup>99</sup>

Present: Mr. Kavtaradze	}	Soviet members.
Mr. Smirnov		
Mr. Holman	}	British members.
Mr. Iliff		
Mr. Allen	}	American members.
Mr. Jernegan		

The sub-committee proceeded to the discussion of the draft declarations which had been proposed by the British Delegation and the amendment and parallel declaration suggested by the American delegation. The three draft declarations under consideration were as follows: No. 1, a tripartite United States, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. statement of general policy toward Iran;<sup>1</sup> No. 2, a United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. renewal of Soviet and British pledges to withdraw their troops from Iran within six months after the end of hostilities;<sup>2</sup> and No. 3, (so designated by the Soviets) a parallel but independent American declaration regarding withdrawal of troops.<sup>3</sup>

The course of the discussion, which lasted more than three hours, may be summarized as follows:

The Soviet members questioned the competence of the sub-committee to deal with matters affecting Iran, in view of the provisions of Article 6 of the tripartite Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance,<sup>4</sup> which they suggested required Iranian participation in any discussions

<sup>98</sup> The Acting Secretary replied in Amdel No. 52 (telegram No. 1102), October 27, 1943, 10 a. m.: "Personal for Secretary Hull. This is to confirm my statement over the telephone to Mr. Gray that the President has authorized you to sign the Four Nation Declaration as modified in the light of your telegrams from Moscow." (740.0011 Moscow/69a)

<sup>99</sup> Enclosure No. 5 to unnumbered despatch from Mr. George V. Allen, Tehran, November 4, 1943.

<sup>1</sup> Conference Document No. 27, enclosure 1, p. 732.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, enclosure 2, p. 733.

<sup>3</sup> Conference Document No. 29, paragraph 4, p. 736.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the treaty signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249. Article 6 reads: "(i) The Allied Powers undertake in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty. They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran. (ii) His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah undertakes not to adopt in his relations with foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty."



concerning Iran. They pointed out that Mr. Molotov, at the plenary session of the conference on October 24, had stated that a few days before the Conference opened the Iranian Ambassador at Moscow<sup>5</sup> had called to request assurances that Iran would be consulted with regard to any decisions concerning his country and had been assured that no decisions regarding Iran were expected to be taken at the present conference.

The American members pointed out that Mr. Eden, in his reply to Mr. Molotov, had made it clear that no new decisions affecting the status of Iran under the treaty were contemplated and that the conversations, if they proved successful, could only be beneficial to Iran. Mr. Allen said he had assumed that Mr. Molotov's action in subsequently agreeing to the appointment of a sub-committee on Iran and in nominating Soviet members of the sub-committee had constituted Mr. Molotov's acceptance of Mr. Eden's point of view. If there could be no discussion of Iran, the establishment of the sub-committee would have been pointless.

With respect to the treaty provisions, Mr. Holman of the British Delegation pointed out that Article 6 only obligated Great Britain and the Soviet Union to refrain from action prejudicial to Iran or affecting her status under the treaty.

It was further suggested, by both the American and British members that, if the Soviets felt it necessary, the proposed declarations might, following agreement by the Conference as to wording, be submitted to the Iranian authorities for their views regarding the advisability of the declarations and their publication.

The Soviet members said that since the declarations in most respects merely repeated assurances and undertakings given in the Tripartite treaty and in an agreement which the United States had recently proposed to Iran, they saw no necessity or occasion for issuing new declarations at this time, the situation having remained unchanged since the tripartite treaty was signed.

Both the American and British members strongly expressed the view that declarations of the kind proposed would be welcomed by the Iranian Government and people and would have a beneficial effect upon the general situation there. It was further pointed out that the United States had not yet made any public declarations of the kind proposed and that it might be undesirable for the American Government to issue a statement following the conference unless the other two governments did likewise, since an American statement alone might give rise to speculation regarding the reason for British and Soviet silence.

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<sup>5</sup> Majid Ahy.

Mr. Smirnov asserted that he did not believe there was any alarm or inquietude in Iran regarding the policy of the Allies. He was sure that the Iranian people were entirely satisfied that the provisions of the tripartite Treaty of Alliance were being and would be carried out. With respect to American forces, he said there had never been any doubt regarding their purpose or the intention of the United States to withdraw them after the war, and he was certain the Iranians realized this. In any case, the draft American-Iranian agreement<sup>6</sup> contained all the assurances in this regard which it was proposed to embody in declaration No. 3. The Soviet members expressed the fear that a new declaration would have an effect opposite to that intended, since the Iranians would be disturbed by this indication that Allied intentions in Iran were susceptible of discussion. Mr. Smirnov doubted that the reaction of the "Iranian Government and people, i.e., the ruling class" would be that intended to be achieved by the proposed declaration.

Mr. Allen said that he felt the question should be looked at from a broad point of view. The present conference had been called to establish a basis for cooperation among the three great powers. Iran was the one place in the world where the three nations came into most direct and intimate contact and the only country which had on its soil substantial numbers of troops of our three armies. Some uneasiness on the part of the people of a country in such a situation was almost inevitable. If the three great powers could show the Iranian people and the world that they were able to arrive at a just and honorable agreement on policy at that point of contact, it would have very beneficial effect not only in Iran but elsewhere, particularly among small states, some of which have shown an inclination to question the motives of the large Powers. Mr. Allen could not imagine that the friendly, open and honest declarations which had been proposed would be received with anything but satisfaction in Iran. This point of view was fully supported by the British members. Mr. Jernegan especially emphasized the importance of American participation, for the first time, in a statement regarding Iran.

Mr. Smirnov agreed that a statement of principles was helpful on appropriate occasions, but he did not believe that such an occasion existed with regard to Iran at the present time.

When pressed to suggest any objections they might have to the wording of the proposed declarations, the Soviet members raised questions regarding the exact meaning of certain parts of the draft declarations. In particular, they questioned the final sentence of

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<sup>6</sup> For correspondence relating to discussions looking toward the negotiation of an executive agreement covering the presence of American troops in Iran, see vol. iv, pp. 453 ff.

paragraph 2 of the British draft declaration No. 1, as amended by the American Delegation. It was explained that the undertaking to support "the various foreign advisers, groups and agencies working with the Iranian Government" referred primarily to the Millspaugh mission and similar groups of Americans employed by the Iranian Government,<sup>7</sup> but that it was not exclusive and would apply also to British and Soviet nationals or officials in similar positions and to such agencies as the three great powers might set up to assist in the rehabilitation of Iranian economy. The Soviet members questioned the propriety of undertaking to support an agency of the Iranian Government or an agency established in Iranian territory by foreign governments. They suggested that this might make it appear that we regarded the foreign advisers as the directors of Iranian policy, rather than as servants of the Iranian Government, and that we proposed to interfere in internal Iranian affairs in a manner contrary to the Iranian constitution. In general, they felt that this section of declaration No. 1 would be regarded as an infringement of Iranian sovereignty.

Mr. Jernegan said that the Iranian Government had already proclaimed its need for foreign assistance by requesting, on its own initiative, the services of the American advisers. The situation in Iran was not comparable to that in other countries, and the proposed declaration, therefore, should be judged in the light of the peculiar existing conditions. He explained that the foreign advisers were having an extremely difficult time and that it was widely felt in Tehran that they could not succeed unless they had the support of the three powers. He had heard criticism of all three governments for alleged failure to provide such support. A declaration of this kind, therefore, should have an excellent effect in strengthening the position of the advisers.

The Soviet members further questioned the wisdom of renewing the undertaking to do everything possible to spare the Iranian people the privations of war. This was substantially the same undertaking as that contained in the Tripartite Treaty. If it were re-stated, the Iranians would at once demand concrete measures to carry it out; they would be inspired to dump all their troubles on our heads immediately.

Since the discussions of the proposed drafts did not appear to be progressing, Mr. Allen asked whether Mr. Smirnov would care to prepare counter-drafts for consideration. The Soviet members made no direct reply.

<sup>7</sup> For correspondence in connection with the Millspaugh Mission and other groups of Americans employed by the Iranian Government, see vol. iv, pp. 510 ff.

The British members asked whether the Soviet members would be willing to accept the draft declarations in principle, leaving aside for the moment the question of their publication. Mr. Smirnov said that he could not express an opinion at the moment; there were some points which might not be in accord with Soviet policy and which would require further study. Mr. Jernegan said that he would like very much to have the observations of the Soviet members on any such points, since one important purpose of the present meeting, as he understood it, was to thrash out any differences of opinion among the three powers. The Soviet members indicated agreement but did not pursue the subject further.

In conclusion, Mr. Kavtaradze said that he thought the meeting had produced a useful exchange of views. We were all agreed that parts of the draft declarations represented repetitions of the Tripartite Treaty, in so far as Great Britain and the Soviet Union were concerned. The Soviet members, however, did not consider that any convincing reasons had been presented for the issuance of public declarations at this time. Certain new points had been raised during the conversation, which the various delegations would probably wish to study before the next meeting.

Mr. Allen mentioned that the sub-committee had two points for decision: (a) whether it was desirable to publish the declarations; and (b) whether their form and wording was acceptable or should be changed. Mr. Jernegan added that he thought a third, very important, matter was to make sure that there existed in fact, as in appearance, complete unanimity of the three governments with regard to their policy in Iran.

Mr. Allen remarked in passing that the Secretary of State had regarded it as important that a declaration be made regarding withdrawal of American troops from Iran. Mr. Allen could not say, therefore, whether the Secretary might not consider it desirable to issue such a declaration, even if the Soviet and British Governments did not wish to follow suit, although he was sure the Secretary would not wish to do so from Moscow if it would embarrass the other two governments.

As a final thought, Mr. Allen suggested as a point to be considered the possible public reaction if the Conference *failed* to issue a statement of any kind regarding Iran.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In his despatch to the Secretary of State from Tehran on November 4, 1943, Mr. Allen stated: "At no time during the second meeting of the sub-committee did the Soviet members advance any affirmative suggestion, their attitude throughout being negative. It was noticeable that they frequently made no response to the arguments and observations presented by the American and British members, whose views appeared to be substantially in accord." (740.0011 Moscow/212)

740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Ninth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 27, 1943, 4 p. m.*<sup>9</sup>

Before the opening of the session the Secretary presented Mr. Molotov with a signed copy of the Department's publication "Peace and War".<sup>9a</sup> Mr. Molotov expressed great appreciation of this gift and said he was sure he would find it a most useful volume.

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MR. MOLOTOV opened the meeting by stating that following a conversation with Mr. Eden just before the session it had been agreed, with the Secretary's concurrence, to postpone consideration of the Soviet proposals under Item 1 for measures to shorten the war. He then inquired whether the Secretary and Mr. Eden had received the necessary instructions from their Governments concerning the Soviet proposals in regard to political policy in Italy.

THE SECRETARY said that he had not yet heard from his Government but that he desired to say that although he was sure that the President would approve the general political principles set forth in the Soviet proposal it must not be forgotten that Italy is still the scene of active military operations.

MR. EDEN said that he had not yet heard from his Government but referred in this connection to a letter which he had addressed to Mr. Molotov<sup>10</sup> which had been worked out together with the American Delegation regarding the political lines being followed by the Allied High Command in occupied Italian territory.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had in mind a short resolution on the subject of general policy toward Italy which might be adopted by the Conference. He did not intend to go into detail in regard to the evaluation of the activities of the various authorities and groups in Italy. He proposed therefore that the Drafting Committee be given the task of preparing such a resolution which might be published at the close of the conference.

THE SECRETARY then repeated that he felt that the substance of the seven points of the Soviet proposal was in harmony with the political philosophy of his Government, but he had in mind that the military situation in Italy was still the dominant factor in the entire situation and it might therefore be necessary to obtain the views of the Commander-in-Chief in that area in regard to any decision on Italian

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<sup>9</sup> Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.

<sup>9a</sup> Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943).

<sup>10</sup> Conference Document No. 16, p. 718.

policy which the Conference might reach. He said he was not advancing this as a proposal but merely as an indication of what the Conference might have to consider.

MR. EDEN said that the Conference should agree on the general objective and not go into detail.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question whether or not to publish any resolution on policy in regard to Italy which might be adopted here. He suggested that the resolution be first worked out and then the question of publication could be considered after the resolution had been accepted. There was a general disposition on the part of the Conference to consider that the publication of any resolution agreed upon by the Conference on Italy would have a very helpful effect.

THE SECRETARY agreed with Mr. Molotov's proposal but with the one qualification that the matter would of course be decided in the last analysis by the respective governments, to which Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden readily agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV advanced the proposal, which was accepted by the Conference, that the Soviet proposals together with Mr. Eden's letter be taken by the Drafting Committee as a basis for a resolution on policy toward Italy and if this resolution was accepted by the Conference the question of publication should be decided.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired whether the Secretary and Mr. Eden had had any word from their Governments in regard to the Soviet request for former Italian war vessels and merchant ships.

THE SECRETARY and MR. EDEN replied in the negative.

MR. MOLOTOV then said that at a previous session he had promised Mr. Eden the information in possession of the Soviet Government regarding the situation in Bulgaria and he circulated to the Conference a paper on that subject (copy attached).<sup>11</sup>

The Conference then turned to the question of Item 14 on the Agenda regarding policy in the liberated areas.

MR. EDEN said that his Government considered it very important that the three powers represented here should adopt a common policy in this connection and that after an exchange of views at this Conference the question might appropriately be referred to the proposed London Commission.<sup>11a</sup> He referred to the British proposal of a draft declaration which had been circulated to the Conference (copy attached).<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Conference Document No. 12, p. 712.

<sup>11a</sup> The European Advisory Commission (see pp. 801 ff.). For a reference to a variation between United States and British minutes of this discussion, see memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews), December 24, p. 814, and for further details on British and United States planning with regard to liberated areas, see F. S. V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government, North-West Europe, 1944-1946* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961).

<sup>12</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Conference Document No. 35, p. 738.

THE SECRETARY then said that he saw a connection between the question of the liberated areas and the next point the Conference was to consider, namely the attitude toward the French Committee. He thought there was merit in Mr. Eden's suggestion that the question under discussion be submitted to the London Commission. He added that in discussing these matters (liberated areas and the French Committee) there will increasingly arise the question as to how far the Allied Governments are prepared to go in setting up the kind of governments they desire and in using force to maintain them. He said that there were already many varying opinions on this point; some people desired to go much farther in this direction than others who felt that the general attitude should be very flexible on this point. He felt that we could all agree on the desirability of seeing democracy established everywhere and on having the political, social and economic structures of the post-war world reflect democratic principles, but how far we should go in carrying out our desires was a very complicated question and one which would take on different aspects as the different countries or areas came up for consideration. He agreed therefore with Mr. Eden that the London Commission which would be composed of able, experienced public officials in close touch with their Governments should be given the opportunity to review all the material available in each individual case. He said he thought that this method would be more helpful than any attempt of the three Governments themselves to directly and inflexibly impose one form of government or another in the areas in question. He added that he was disposed to go as far as practicable along the lines of the seven points set forth in the Soviet proposals in regard to Italy,<sup>12a</sup> but that the conditions were so varied that it was difficult to adopt a definite attitude which could be universally applied. He pointed out that you might have ten governments-in-exile several of which would be entirely acceptable to our three Governments and others concerning which there might be some doubt. He repeated that he thought it very logical to turn the study of this question over to the London Commission which could then report back to the Governments represented.

MR. MOLOTOV said he was certain we could agree on general lines and he appreciated and attached great value to the explanations of the Secretary and Mr. Eden and he quite agreed that the question was very complicated and would take some time to study. He proposed, and the Conference agreed, to submit study of the question of liberated areas to the proposed London Commission.

After the intermission the Conference turned to the consideration of the attitude to be adopted toward the French Committee of Na-

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<sup>12a</sup> See Conference Document No. 13, p. 714.

tional Liberation. MR. EDEN, presenting the proposal on this point, said it represented the combined views of the United States and British Governments and had been set up in this fashion in view of the joint responsibility of those two countries for military operations in Western Europe (the document is the one drawn up in Washington entitled "Civil Affairs for France"<sup>13</sup>). He added that the difficulty in regard to France was that the French Committee was not a government and made no pretense of being one; that the future French Government was a matter for the decision of the French people after their liberation.

THE SECRETARY agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV raised a number of questions in regard to the text of the draft on which he requested clarification as to the exact meaning of the words. One related to the manner in which the French military authorities, which would operate as a Civil Affairs Commission under the Allied Commander-in-Chief, would be connected with the French National Committee.

MR. EDEN explained that the Civil Affairs Committee would be appointed by and would maintain direct contact with the French National Committee; that it was necessary to make this arrangement since the Allied Commander-in-Chief could not deal directly with the French National Committee which was a political body. After some discussion on the technical set-up of the machinery for civil affairs in France, the Conference agreed to refer this question to the London Commission.

MR. MOLOTOV observed parenthetically that he thought the attitude toward Vichy was very well and clearly set forth in this document and he fully approved of it.

The Conference then decided that the Drafting Committee, because of its complete familiarity with all the details of the documents which the Conference had approved or would approve, would be also the committee to decide the question of what documents should be published.

The Conference then adjourned to meet tomorrow in restricted session to discuss Item 1, the Soviet proposal for measures to shorten the war, and, if time permitted, to discuss in full session Items 3 and 15.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 27, 1943.

During intermission for tea today, Mr. Molotov was even more sociable and friendly and agreeable in every way, if possible, than

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<sup>13</sup> Annex 5 to the Secret Protocol, p. 760.



before. In emphasizing again further the points calling for collaboration and cooperation between our countries, I strongly urged that communications facilities be quickly increased, adding that people simply would not travel back and forth between our two countries if there is only one scant line around by the far out-of-the-way city of Tehran, and that it would be entirely easy to improve greatly these traveling facilities by a small effort and very little attention. He said he agreed with what I had said about the whole matter.

I then said that my stay at this Conference had been as interesting and enjoyable as any in all my previous experience, but that I find that I am almost obliged to leave here on Sunday next.<sup>14</sup> I then inquired what he thought about it, and he replied that he thought the business of the Conference could be worked out accordingly. I expressed my appreciation and suggested that a committee should be designated to whip together all the odds and ends remaining on the agenda so as to expedite and complete the work in the meantime. To this he agreed. I suggested Mr. Hackworth as my representative and he suggested Mr. Vyshinski, and I think Mr. Eden suggested Mr. Strang.

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740.0011 Moscow/84 : Telegram

*The American Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 28, 1943—8 a. m.

[Received 6 : 20 p. m.]

Delam No. 35. From McDermott. American and British correspondents in Moscow are very patient and cooperative despite decision to withhold news until end of conference. At appropriate time they expect to have first page stories and want to be first to break news of results in the U.S. and Great Britain. They have had difficulties in the past because Berlin picked up their news radiograms in transmission and immediately broadcast distortions of the news. Correspondents and delegations believe that following plan will give them the desired break and circumvent Berlin. Delegations will wire State Department and Foreign Office texts of statements, declarations, et cetera, as far in advance as possible. Later Department will be informed which texts will be made public. Texts will be available to correspondents in Moscow but they will not transmit them depending on their colleagues in Washington and London to get them from State Department and Foreign Office. Correspondents here will confine themselves to interpretations, general roundups, overall coverage, atmosphere of conference, et cetera. Transmission time may take as

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<sup>14</sup> October 31.

long as 7 hours. Meantime Berlin will take transmissions. It is suggested that Department discuss this problem with Elmer Davis,<sup>15</sup> Byron Price,<sup>16</sup> press associations and broadcasting companies and request that anything from Berlin or Moscow radios received in advance of correspondents' stories be voluntarily withheld from publication or rebroadcast pending arrival of Moscow stories. Every American correspondent will ask his editor to notify the Department immediately his story reaches the newspaper. Department is requested not to make texts available until three such notifications shall have been received and then to release pertinent texts immediately. We are confident everybody will be glad to cooperate. Please report reaction. Please keep Elmer Davis confidentially informed regarding publicity plans.

To assure security of British and American delegations it is most important that nobody say anything about closing date of conference until I wire Department. I shall also at same time wire Embassy, Moscow, after which press stories will be released by Soviet censorship.

Please request Byron Price to contact Army, Navy, British and Brazilian censorships to make doubly sure nothing is printed or transmitted regarding movements of American delegation. [McDermott.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-2843

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

TURKEY AND SWEDEN

After consulting my Government regarding the proposals concerning Turkey and Sweden presented by the Soviet Delegation as a means of shortening the war, I am now prepared to set forth our attitude on these questions.

*Turkey:*

We do not consider it advisable at this time to induce Turkey to declare war on Germany. We are now straining our resources in personnel, shipping and supplies in the build-up for an invasion of Northern France. Our resources in the Mediterranean are fully occupied in support of the Italian offensive. In view of these and other commitments it would be unwise to undertake voluntarily the additional drain on our resources which Turkey's entry into the war, because of pressure from us, would entail.

As an alternative my government proposes that inquiries to the Turkish Government be begun as soon as practicable to lease from Turkey, as a neutral, the use of air bases and transportation facilities.

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<sup>15</sup> Director of the Office of War Information.

<sup>16</sup> Director of Censorship.

*Sweden:*

My Government feels that a system of air bases available for Allied use should not be asked of Sweden at this time. They would require Allied defending forces, equipment, and maintenance supplies which we cannot afford to divert from our main effort—the build-up for a cross channel operation.

It is recognized that the privilege of using Swedish facilities would be valuable for the purpose of emergency landing of planes that penetrate deep into Northeast Germany and German-held territory for refuel and repair and to permit return to the United Kingdom. We suggest, therefore, that at a later date consideration be given to seeking this privilege which, if granted, can be expanded as circumstances permit.

Moscow, October 28, 1943.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-2843

*Record of the Tenth Meeting of the Tripartite Conference Held at the Guest House of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, October 28, 1943, 4 p. m.*

Present: Mr. Eden  
Sir A. Clark Kerr  
Lt.-General Sir H. Ismay  
Colonel Price  
Mr. Cordell Hull  
Mr. A. Harriman  
Major-General Deane  
Brigadier-General Vandenberg  
Captain Ware  
Mr. Molotov  
Marshal Voroshilov  
Major-General Gryzlov  
Mr. Vyshinski  
Mr. Berezhev

*Interpreters:* Mr. Pavlov  
Mr. Birse

Mr. Molotov was the chairman of the meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that questions would be welcomed and an exchange of views desired on the topic to be discussed at this meeting, namely: the shortening of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe. It was indicated that the possibility of the entry into the war by Turkey and Sweden would be discussed.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOV gratefully acknowledged the two written reports received, one from Lt.-General Ismay, and one from Major-General Deane.<sup>17</sup> He indicated that he wanted clarification on a particular point. He referred to the prerequisite condition of having in northern Europe not more than 12 full divisions of mobile troops at the disposal of the Nazis at the moment of the planned Allied invasion across the channel. Marshal Voroshilov asked if there were not 12, but 13 or 14 divisions, would the invasion go ahead as planned. What was the range? If 15 or 16 divisions, then what? If the Germans had that many mobile divisions, would that serve as a reason for postponing the moment of attack, or effect difficulties? What is the measuring stick by which this number of 12 divisions was arrived at? If reliance is placed upon military intelligence, how can it be determined whether or not the Germans can move 15 divisions more or less, along the lines of communication?

LT.-GENERAL ISMAY outlined some of the major difficulties which would be met in connection with invasion operations. Ports in Northern France are prepared for complete demolition by the Germans, and could not be counted on for use by the Allies until 60 days after capture. In calculating the number of mobile German divisions available to combat the cross-Channel operation, it is impossible to be precise. The estimate of 12 divisions is an approximation. The actual number the Germans may have available depends on their preoccupation elsewhere. At the present time it does not look as though the Germans would have divisions to spare from any other front.

MARSHAL VOROSHILOV May God see it so.

LT.-GENERAL ISMAY In this cross-Channel operation, the whole weight of Allied air support is expected. German communications will be hampered by the bombing of road and rail lines. At this time, bombing of industrial Germany will be suspended to offer further support to the operation of bombing lines of communication. Approximately 4,000 bombers will be available at that time.

MR. MOLOTOV Do these statements represent the official attitude?

MR. HULL The attitude of the British and American governments together with the experience of the military General Staff.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether the affirmation made at Quebec regarding the cross-Channel operation in early spring of 1944 is still valid.

MR. EDEN asserted that the decision made at Quebec is still valid. This decision, however, is not a binding legal contract; though we will do all in our power to work out the plan which we are following for our common aim.

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<sup>17</sup> Marshal Voroshilov evidently referred to written texts of the statements presented orally at the session of October 20; these statements were subsequently included as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 to the Most Secret Protocol, pp. 774 and 778, respectively.

MR. HULL stated that the situation at this time is that Lt.-General Ismay and Major-General Deane have in the frankest manner made statements to the appropriate Soviet officials, and that these officials will be kept regularly informed of future developments. This should result in a working relationship between the general staffs of these governments.

MR. MOLOTOV thanked Mr. Hull and Lt.-General Ismay for the above expressed views, in which he himself joins. The meeting, therefore, has a positive value in this respect, and will have its beneficial effect on the populace in the U.S.A., United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. Then Mr. Molotov proposed a decision on the first part of the question put forward by the Soviet delegation, on the shortening of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe. He suggested that a formulation of this decision together with the written reports presented by Lt.-General Ismay and Major-General Deane be made a part of the protocol of the Conference. The draft decision is to express facts only, to contain nothing not stated at the Conference. There should be a reiteration of statements and a clarification of suggestions which had been brought up. The Soviet delegation expressed the hope that events decided upon for the spring of 1944 will be carried out as planned. Mr. Molotov suggested that the document be drawn up with the British and American views on each point stated on one side of the page, and the Soviet on the other side of the page.

MR. HULL expressed his desire to have this proposal in writing, to avoid misunderstanding and possible suspicion.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that from the beginning he proposed to have these things in writing, and that he sees no grounds either for misunderstanding or suspicion. The Soviet delegation has reason to hope that the measures in draft will be carried out; and would want a generally accepted agreement that we can all count on: Mr. Eden, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Molotov.

MR. EDEN remarked that we have tried to be completely frank, and that after we see the documents, he feels sure a generally acceptable agreement can be worked out. He added that last night when talking with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stalin, he had told them of the latest developments just as he would have told them to Mr. Churchill.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested passing to the next question.

MR. HULL would want the President and General Staff to look it over first, if anything new was to be inserted into the discussion.

MR. MOLOTOV assured that no new element was contemplated, and that it would all be within the limits of the protocol.

MR. HULL remarked that he just didn't want the heads of government and their respective military staffs to think that we at the Conference were trying to take over their functions. Mr. Hull said that

he felt that a meeting between the three heads of government would be desirable and that he hoped it was being contemplated.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the heads of government and the general staffs have more important business to attend to than what we were considering at the Conference.

MR. HULL said that we came here with the idea of talking about the cross-Channel operation and reiterating our intentions; and that we will continue to inform the Soviet government periodically as to current developments. In this connection, Mr. Hull said he hoped for mutual understanding.

MR. MOLOTOV thanked Mr. Hull for this explanation, stating that these were his ideas, too; and that this is the purpose of the Military Mission in Moscow.

Returning to the question of the formulation of the accomplishments of the Conference, Mr. Molotov reminded us that we all would be asked how the Conference concluded, what answer shall we give? The formulation of the answer should help our common cause. Therefore, a generally accepted statement would be desirable, in a finally agreed form.

MR. EDEN said we must look it over, and that he thinks we can reach an agreed form. At this point, Mr. Eden brought up the question of information. We both expect to be operating in Europe on a larger scale. We would like much more information on the successes of the Russians against the German armies. We have given our information, but now are getting less information on Soviet action than before. The desire for more information does not stem from idle curiosity; but we have lots to learn. Mr. Eden suggested that the protocol should include a statement to the effect that all information, military and technical, regarding the mutual enemy be made mutually available.

MR. MOLOTOV said he considers Mr. Eden's request quite natural. He said that until today he had not heard of such shortcomings in regard to information, that none had been mentioned to him or to Mr. Stalin. This matter should have the attention of the Conference. Mr. Molotov would like to ask Mr. Eden for his proposal in writing, and would like to facilitate a decision by holding a preliminary discussion with his military colleagues.

#### *Intermission*

Mr. Molotov then opened for discussion the question of Turkey and Sweden, stating that the communications from Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull<sup>18</sup> had been received.

<sup>18</sup> For latter, see *supra*. Mr. Eden's communication has not been found in Department files, but see the telegrams sent to him by Prime Minister Churchill, October 23 and 25, in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Closing the Ring* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 288 and 289, respectively.

MR. EDEN said that he would like very much to see Turkey at war; that on this point his government agrees with the Soviet government. However, the question as to how this could be accomplished remained a question in his mind. A possible method has been suggested. Any other suggestion for any other method would be welcomed, especially if it could bring quicker results than the neutrality to non-belligerency method.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that possibly we should consider Turkey and Sweden separately.

MR. HULL reiterated the United States suggestion of requesting from Turkey air bases and the use of transportation facilities.

MR. MOLOTOV observed that so far no agreed opinion has been achieved on this point; that the 3 proposals give the impression of 3 points of view, Mr. Hull suggests that Turkey remain neutral but help the Allies, and that consequently it is not advisable to induce Turkey to enter the war. England's proposal contains many points. To fully consider these would require two more conferences. But there is Mr. Eden's proposal to change Turkey from a neutral to a non-belligerent country. Mr. Eden says it would be useful if Turkey entered the war as soon as possible, but the British government does not think it advisable to suggest to Turkey that she enter the war immediately. Therefore, the Soviet proposal to ask Turkey to enter the war immediately does not meet with the support of Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull and their respective governments. The Soviet attitude is that notwithstanding the difficulties indicated by the American and English delegations if Turkey were to enter the war now, nevertheless, the complications facing Hitler would be much greater than any which might develop for the Allies. Time is too short to fully go into the matter. If Turkey's entrance into the war is to be postponed, why should she be receiving shipments of armament? Mr. Molotov suggested that it be announced to Turkey that further shipments of armament will be stopped if she fails to enter the war immediately. Bases, Mr. Molotov contended, would not be enough to request of Turkey at this time. Turkey's participation is needed now; later it will not be so necessary, claimed Mr. Molotov, who concluded that therefore Turkey should be asked to come into the war now. A three-power request to Turkey, Mr. Molotov suggested, would not be disregarded.

MR. EDEN stated that in his opinion the request to Turkey merely on the basis of threatening to stop shipments would not be enough to get the desired result. Mr. Eden expressed a desire to communicate more with his government on this matter, reaffirming his desire to get Turkey into the war now.

MR. HULL pointed out that Turkey has neither the necessary shipping nor supplies that would enable her to proceed efficiently with military movement. Furthermore, there is not enough U.S. shipping available to back up Turkey in a war at this time. He emphasized the already heavy commitments made by U.S. in the Mediterranean and Italy, and in preparation for the coming cross-Channel operations. Mr. Hull suggested that he would be glad to present the whole question for further consideration to the President and the U.S. military authorities.<sup>18a</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV reiterated the Soviet position that bases were half-measures not of decisive importance, and that he would rather see Turkey's immediate entry into the war. He added that the Soviet government was particularly interested in results now. The Soviet suggestion, he added, is now in the interest of Turkey as well as of the Soviet Union.

MR. HULL underlined the U.S. opposition to the Soviet proposal, stating that we could not give Turkey the needed support in ships, armament and supplies because already our operations are very spread out all over the world.

MR. EDEN stated that in regard to Sweden, he had become better informed than previously, and that therefore he had now come to a conclusion counter to his first idea. Swedish airfields could not be used as effectively as existing ones now in the hands of the Allies.

MR. MOLOTOV raised the question of the possible use of Swedish air bases by the Soviet Union air force. The use of Swedish bases he said would be a step ahead compared to the present situation. Perhaps after further consultation with the military authorities, some conclusions may be reached.

Regarding Turkey and Sweden and measures for shortening the war, are there any other proposals? Is there anything else to suggest, if we do not take concrete serious measures concerning the Soviet proposals on this subject? Mr. Molotov emphasized that he still maintains that the matter of shortening the war is in the interest not only of the Soviet government. Admitting that the Soviet proposals may not be sufficiently worked-out or may be considered untimely—are there other proposals?

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<sup>18a</sup> A telegram of October 29, 1943, from Mr. Hull to President Roosevelt (received at Washington October 31 and forwarded by the White House Map Room to President Roosevelt at Hyde Park) stated, with reference to this discussion of Turkey's role in the war: "I held persistently to the view expressed in your telegram [i.e., that of October 26, 6:15 p. m., p. 644] but agreed that the matter might be the subject of further discussions by the Heads of Governments and informed Mr. Molotov that I should be pleased to present the Soviet views to you upon my return. It was agreed that the matter should be dropped during this conference and that the discussions be reported to the Heads of Government with a view to further consideration of the matter at a later date."



MR. EDEN stated that air bases in Turkey would be much more valuable than air bases in Sweden. He said he was willing to agree to the American proposal to further consider the question of Swedish air bases; and had nothing further to add to the picture presented by Lt.-General Ismay.

MR. MOLOTOV again stated that bases are too little to require of Turkey. Now that Italy is practically out of the war, Turkey should feel freer to act.

MR. HULL brought up the proposal submitted by Major-General Deane in regard to air bases, meteorological stations, weather information, communications and transport.<sup>18b</sup> Mr. Hull asked if the Russian experts would take up this proposal with Major-General Deane.

MR. MOLOTOV asked if there was any further discussion on proposals for shortening the war. Are there any new proposals?

MR. HULL expressed the belief that if the General Staffs were in closer working relationship and if the heads of our respective governments were in closer cooperation, those questions would come to mind which had to be dealt with, and this would facilitate the conduct of the war more than anything. Mr. Hull said he believed this type of closer cooperation would come about, and that there are gratifying possibilities for the future.

MR. MOLOTOV said that Mr. Hull's considerations are very valuable, but that we do not want to get away from the subject under discussion today. Therefore, let us continue with the question of shortening the war as quickly as possible. Let us confine ourselves to an exchange of views and conclusions which may be drawn. Tomorrow we shall discuss the economic phases of the same general question, at 3 o'clock.

The drafting committee reported that disagreements had arisen among themselves. These disagreements the committee would try to liquidate. If these differences remained, however, they would be cleared up at the next session of the Conference. Tomorrow's session begins at 3 p. m., with the draft report.

*Session adjourned.*

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Eleventh Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 29, 4 p. m.*<sup>19</sup>

At the opening of the session, on behalf of the Drafting Committee Mr. Vyshinski reported on the status of the drafts for the Italian Advisory Council and the proposed London Commission.

<sup>18b</sup> See section (c) of the Most Secret Protocol, p. 773.

<sup>19</sup> Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.

In regard to the first MR. VYSHINSKI said that some differences of opinion had arisen in regard to the representation on this Council and a few minor points of drafting. In regard to the composition of the Council he said that although the opening paragraph provided that the Advisory Council should be composed of representatives of the three powers here and of the French Committee of National Liberation, in subsequent paragraphs it appeared that through the inclusion of Greece and Yugoslavia the Council would be composed of representatives of six powers. The minor drafting points were cleared up at the conference.

MR. EDEN stated that on the question of the composition of the Council his Government felt very strongly that Greece and Yugoslavia should be represented since both of those countries had suffered greatly at Italian hands and had contributed in no small measure to the Italian defeat. He then proposed an amendment to the effect that the High Commissioners of Greece and Yugoslavia should be brought in as full members of the Council as soon as the original four members considered it desirable.

MR. MOLOTOV then said that from the correspondence between the President and Marshal Stalin<sup>20</sup> it was clear that Mr. Roosevelt had desired to limit the representation on the Politico-Military Commission in Algiers to the representatives of the three powers here and participation of the French Committee was to be on a limited basis.

THE SECRETARY then said that it was his understanding that the President's views to which Mr. Molotov referred related to the Politico-Military Commission which was originally intended to sit in Algiers and not to the immediate question under discussion, namely the Inter-Allied Advisory Council for Italy. He went on to say that he thought the President had felt it would not be advisable to have any other groups or elements given voting power on this Commission. He added, referring to the Advisory Council for Italy, that a proposal had been received from our military authorities regarding its composition and Mr. Hackworth and the Drafting Committee had therefore supported that view.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had understood the Secretary's remark to be in conformity with the President's message of October 17 to Marshal Stalin on the subject of the Politico-Military Commission.<sup>21</sup>

MR. EDEN then stated that the Politico-Military Commission was one thing and the Italian Advisory Council was another. He said that the proposal for the latter had been agreed upon by General

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<sup>20</sup> See pp. 782-800, *passim*.

<sup>21</sup> See letter of October 18, 1943, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, p. 562.

Eisenhower to include representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, the French Committee, Greece and Yugoslavia. He said that he had always regarded the Politico-Military Commission as originally planned as having now become the proposed London Commission.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the question of the Italian Advisory Council be resubmitted to the Drafting Committee.

MR. VYSHINSKI then turned to the question of the London Commission.<sup>21a</sup> He said that there were disagreements in the Drafting Committee on two points: (1) the composition of the Commission, and (2) its terms of reference. On the first point he said that the Soviet representative on the Drafting Committee considered that provision should be made in paragraph one, in conformity with the spirit of the British memorandum of July 1,<sup>21b</sup> to include other members of the United Nations when their interests were involved, whereas the British and American representatives desired to confine the Commission to three members. On the second point of disagreement Mr. Vyshinski said that the Soviet view was that the Commission should deal in the beginning only with the questions involved in the termination of hostilities and the drawing up of armistice terms, whereas the British and American view was that the Commission should have broad consultative powers on all European questions connected with the war.

MR. EDEN pointed out in this connection that in the last analysis the Commission would deal only with questions which the three Governments considered advisable to submit to it and that already the Conference itself had referred to the proposed London Commission several questions such as liberated territories, the administration of France, attitude toward Germany, which were outside the narrow question of armistice terms.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he merely wanted to make sure that the London Commission would have clearly defined functions as otherwise its work would be needlessly complicated, and he felt that the document setting up the commission should express unequivocally its exact purposes.

MR. EDEN then proposed, in regard to the terms of reference of the Commission, that paragraph two be changed so as to limit the terms of reference to European questions connected with the ending of the war. He added that if membership was not limited to the three powers represented here every other Government in Europe or in exile would want membership.

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<sup>21a</sup> See Conference Document No. 8, p. 710.

<sup>21b</sup> See Conference Document No. 7, p. 708, and footnote 84, p. 710.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the British Government did not appear to have had this feeling on July 1. Mr. Molotov's proposal to resubmit the draft on the proposed London Commission to the Drafting Committee was accepted.

After the intermission the Conference turned to the consideration of the United States proposal on economic questions under Item 15. THE SECRETARY said that several days ago he had distributed to the Conference four documents: 15(a) dealing with cooperation in the rehabilitation of damage in the U.S.S.R.;<sup>22</sup> 15(b) joint action for assistance to other countries;<sup>23</sup> 15(c) collaboration on an international basis dealing with matters such as food and agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade, and the International Labor Office;<sup>24</sup> and 15(d) dealing with the question of reparations.<sup>25</sup> The Secretary then said he would like to know if it would be agreeable to the British and Soviet representatives here to express their views on the general principles laid down in these documents and also when the Soviet Government might be prepared to submit to the Government of the United States, and to other Governments if it so desired, estimates of the specific kinds and amounts of goods needed from abroad for the rehabilitation of war damage in the U.S.S.R.

MR. MOLOTOV said that his Government approved the idea advanced in the United States proposal under Item 15(a) to have negotiations on this question conducted between representatives of the Soviet Government and the United States Embassy in Moscow.

THE SECRETARY then said that in regard to the United States document under Item 15(b) he would like to have the views of the British and Soviet representatives on the first sentence of paragraph two which reads: "We believe that it would be desirable to have the longer-range work of reconstruction dealt with on a cooperative, joint-action basis."

MR. MOLOTOV said that he could approve that proposal but he would suggest an addition which would make it clear that the assistance would be given primarily to members of the United Nations.

THE SECRETARY replied that the whole scheme had been originated for the purpose of assisting the United Nations and possibly some neutral states. He went on to say that his purpose in submitting these documents was not to put before the Conference concrete proposals which would be discussed or agreed upon here, but merely to give an indication to the Soviet and British Governments of the lines along which the American Government was working in preparing the ground for the proper consideration of economic questions after

<sup>22</sup> Conference Document No. 36, p. 739.

<sup>23</sup> Annex 8 to the Secret Protocol, p. 763.

<sup>24</sup> Annex 9 to the Secret Protocol, p. 763.

<sup>25</sup> Conference Document No. 39, p. 740.

the war. He added that all of these questions were interrelated and that he recalled very clearly the inadequate preparation on economic matters at the time of the Versailles Conference and the incalculable harm which the world suffered as a result of the inadequate treatment of economic problems after the last war. He wished to ensure that this time economic questions should be considered in good time. He mentioned that informal conversations had been in progress between the British and American Governments on some of these related economic matters and the Soviet Government had been cordially invited to participate.<sup>25a</sup> He hoped that the Soviet Government would find it possible to take part.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he could state that the Soviet Government viewed favorably the general principles set forth in the first three of the four United States documents submitted by the Secretary on economic questions. However, in regard to the fourth, 15(d), there were certain objections from the Soviet point of view to the purposes set forth in paragraph one and he therefore did not believe that it would be wise to set up a special commission for [reparation] until these purposes were more clearly defined and agreed upon.

MR. EDEN said that he was sure that his Government was in general agreement with the principles outlined in the documents submitted by the Secretary to the Conference, but that naturally the subject would require very close and detailed study.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that before any commission could be established for the study of these economic questions the three Governments should give further study to the entire question.

THE SECRETARY said he merely wished to remark that he regarded all these questions as interrelated and that a rise in the living standards of the peoples of the world was only possible through the proper consideration and treatment [of] the various related economic questions.

THE SECRETARY then said that he had circulated to the Conference a paper<sup>26</sup> setting forth certain views of his Government considering desirable policy in regard to dependent peoples but that he realized

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<sup>25a</sup> For documentation on discussions regarding postwar economic policy and monetary and financial arrangements, see pp. 1054 and 1099 ff.

<sup>26</sup> Document No. 44, p. 747. The Secretary of State submitted a copy of this proposal to Mr. Molotov on October 24. At the same time, Mr. Hull informed the British delegation of his action. On October 26, Mr. Eden addressed an informal note to Mr. Hull stating that the draft declaration had reached his hands at the close of his visit to Washington in March 1943 (vol. III, pp. 1 ff.), and that subsequently he had had conversations with Ambassador Winant in London. "From what I said to Mr. Winant on that occasion", Mr. Eden wrote, "you will have learnt that the memorandum and draft resolution would not be acceptable to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in their present form." (740.0011 Moscow/342)

that there was not sufficient time for the Conference to consider this question.

MR. EDEN replied that he was not prepared to discuss this question but he could state that his Government was not in agreement with the views set forth in the Secretary's paper on the question.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he felt that the question of dependent peoples should receive further study and that his Government attached great importance to this matter.

The Conference then turned to the consideration of the question of Poland. MR. EDEN said it was a matter of great regret to his Government that no diplomatic relations existed between Poland and the Soviet Union, both members of the United Nations, and he felt a great personal regret at this situation since he had taken an active part in the establishment in July 1941 of relations between those two countries.<sup>27</sup> He said that his Government was prepared to make any contribution that it could at this Conference looking toward a reestablishment of those relations. He mentioned the fact that the Polish Government had recently requested that the combined chiefs-of-staff of the United States and the United Kingdom send arms to the Polish resistance movement in order that they might carry out increased sabotage against German lines of communication. Up to the present only small quantities of explosives and some money had been sent to the Polish underground and the combined chiefs-of-staff before making a decision on the request of the Polish Government desired to have the views of their Soviet allies on this point.

MR. MOLOTOV said that even though he was not a military man it was quite clear that the most important factor in the sending of arms anywhere was to make sure that these arms fell into reliable hands and would be used for the purpose intended. He went on to say that the Soviet Union was of course vitally interested in the question of relations with Poland since Poland was a neighboring country and he felt that was a question that primarily concerned the Soviet Union and Poland. He said he wished to make clear that the Soviet Government stood for the independence of Poland, but there must also be a Polish Government which entertained friendly feelings toward the Soviet Union and it was precisely this element which was lacking. He repeated that not only did the Soviet Government desire to see an

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<sup>27</sup> For correspondence regarding interest of the United States in measures culminating in the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreement in London on July 30, 1941, establishing diplomatic relations between the two Governments, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 240-248, *passim*. For correspondence relating to the interest of the United States in the reestablishment of relations between the Polish Government in Exile in London and the Soviet Government following the rupture on April 25, 1943, see *ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 389-494, *passim*.

independent Poland but was prepared to help it provided there was a Polish Government friendly to the Soviet Union. He said that there were other United Nations who through no fault of the Soviet Government have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but in the case of Poland he thought it was a question that primarily concerned the two countries.

THE SECRETARY then said that in so far as his Government was concerned when two neighbors fell out the other neighbors, without going into the causes or merits of the dispute, were entitled to express the hope that these differences could be patched up. He added that in the United States there were groups of people friendly toward Poland and others who were likewise friendly toward the Soviet Union, and that without knowing the causes of the dispute these elements in the United States did hope that the two neighbors would be able to reestablish normal and friendly relations.

MR. MOLOTOV said that that was also the hope of the Soviet Government.

MR. EDEN said that he was in the same position as the Secretary in so far as the British people went, but that the position of the British Government was complicated by the fact that they had treaties with both Poland and the Soviet Union. He said that just prior to his departure the Polish Prime Minister and the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed a desire to reestablish good relations with the Soviet Union.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that this was the first that the Soviet Government had heard of this desire and that he merely wished to add that the Polish division on the Eastern front was fighting heroically against the common enemy.

MR. EDEN said that he hoped there would soon be other Polish divisions fighting the Germans and that any delay which had occurred in that was due to the decision of the British military leaders who felt that the Polish troops had been insufficiently trained and not the fault of the Poles.

MR. MOLOTOV then remarked that he believed that General Sosnkowski,<sup>28</sup> as was well known, had opposed Sikorski<sup>29</sup> when the latter reestablished relations with the Soviet Union.

MR. EDEN then said that he had spoken his piece on the subject of Poland and merely desired to reiterate that his Government was prepared to make any contribution which would be found possible looking toward the reestablishment of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland.

<sup>28</sup> Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski resigned as Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile in London on July 26, 1941, in protest against the decision to conclude the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.

<sup>29</sup> Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile.

THE SECRETARY then inquired whether Mr. Molotov had any suggestion as to the time of signature of the Four-Nation Declaration.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the signature might take place at the end of tomorrow's session.

MR. MOLOTOV then inquired as to the status of the proposal<sup>29a</sup> he had made previously concerning the setting up of a commission of representatives of the three powers to study the question of the future establishment of a world organization.

THE SECRETARY said that he was strongly in favor of Mr. Molotov's proposal in general but that he felt that the same results could be achieved through less formal methods. He was fearful that if a special committee was set up for this purpose political groups and other elements in the United States might give undesirable publicity to this commission and stir up agitation in regard to a future world organization. He therefore suggested that the three Governments designate representatives in one or another of the three capitals to act as a commission but not to announce it publicly.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had not had in mind making a public announcement of the creation of any such commission.

Before closing the session MR. MOLOTOV inquired if the British had had any reply on the Soviet request for Italian ships, adding that he could not state that the reply from the United States Government<sup>30</sup> had been satisfactory.

MR. EDEN replied in the negative.

MR. MOLOTOV then said that he did not understand why such a simple question should be postponed and referred to the meeting of the three Heads of Government, particularly when the time of that meeting was still indefinite and it was not even sure that the meeting would take place in the near future.

THE SECRETARY said that upon his return to Washington he intended to press for an early decision on the Soviet request and that in mentioning the proposed meeting of the three Heads of Government he felt that that was only one possible method of giving further consideration to the request.

<sup>29a</sup> See Conference Document No. 5, p. 705.

<sup>30</sup> See telegram No. 262234, October 26, from President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, p. 643. On October 28 Mr. Hull informed Mr. Molotov of the position set forth in President Roosevelt's telegram, and—perhaps in the light of the reference, in the telegram, to the determination of title to the Italian ships "at a later date"—he added, "Further discussion should be held between the staffs of our three Governments, or perhaps by the heads of Governments"; Hull, *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 1302. On October 29, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill cabled Mr. Eden that "it would be better to put off this question till 'EUREKA'" (*The Tehran Conference*, November 22–December 1, 1943); Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 295. For further documentation on the question, see *Foreign Relations. The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, under index entry: "Italy: Soviet Union, request for Italian naval and merchant shipping."



The Conference then adjourned until four o'clock of the following day.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1848

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 29, 1943—8. p. m.

Mr. Molotov, while attending the reception at the Embassy here this evening, sent word to my apartment that he would be glad to say a few words to me. I cordially invited him to come up. When he came in, without much preliminaries, I expressed my high opinion of the splendid results of the Conference over which Mr. Molotov is presiding. I then said that I wondered whether I could say a few words to Mr. Molotov as a warm friend of both of our countries, anxious to bring them and keep them more closely together. He replied in an agreeable manner in the affirmative. I thereupon said that I was very much concerned about the possible course the second front discussion may well take; that the fullest possible discussion of this and all other military questions in which the great allied nations are interested, either or all, should be most welcome at all times, such discussions, for instance, as have been taking place here during the Conference and kept private. I said the danger is that as time goes on terrific controversies conducted by the press in which great shafts of bitter criticism are hurled back and forth between the press of our respective countries, according to their respective viewpoints and calculated to create serious friction between our countries in the future, may largely handicap the very fine movement launched at this conference for ever increasing international cooperation among our countries as well as others. I said this would be most regrettable and that I was speaking without any reference whatever to the merits or demerits of military questions, including the second front.

Mr. Molotov seemed interested to hear this viewpoint and did not undertake to argue in the opposite direction, but offered some comment about how the press might carry on such a growing controversy.

I then said that the second front controversy carried on in public is one of the circumstances that might go far to submerge and divert attention from the monumental accomplishments of the Conference here this week and that another circumstance that may contribute to the same effect is that while some of us know the truth about the military requirements and the emergencies which the Marshal<sup>31</sup> feels thus far have prevented him from going away to meet the other heads of governments in military conference, I said the great public of

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<sup>31</sup> Marshal Stalin.

other countries is steadily getting the impression that the Marshal does not desire to go to meetings away from home but prefers to remain at home as in the past. I added that if the Marshal could see his way clear at the end of this Conference to approve strongly its work and at the same time to say that he is thoroughly agreeable to meeting Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt at points abroad and that only compelling military emergencies prevent his making such trips at any time just whenever he might be invited, but that he could only go when in his own judgment military considerations would permit him to leave home, and then proceed to go as in the pending situation in which he has an invitation from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, the effect of this, combined with the Conference, would be world-wide and tremendous.

Mr. Molotov again emphasized the view that most people, including ourselves, did not give the Marshal full credit for the true significance of the military emergencies and their effect on his own movements. I then again reiterated that some of us fully understand. I then said, "Why cannot the Marshal fly down even for one day and meet the President and Mr. Churchill?" He held out a little hope for his doing so and said that if it was so extremely important to have the proposed meeting why was the President not willing to fly just a little further and meet the Marshal in Tehran. I then repeated my inquiry and said "Why could not the Marshal fly down and meet the President and Churchill for even one day and then leave you there as his representative?" Mr. Molotov instantly dissented from this suggestion by saying that he himself was in no sense a military man and would not fit into that sort of a situation. Mr. Molotov requested me the second time to repeat what I said about the Marshal giving public approval to the work of the Conference and indicate his interest in meetings with Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill, and then undertake to carry out the latter.

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740.0011 Moscow/92 : Telegram

*The American Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 30, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 10:35 p. m.]

Delam 43. From McDermott. Penultimate paragraph only of Delam No. 35<sup>82</sup> is now canceled and the following arrangement substituted. Arrangements agreed upon by American, British and USSR delegations are that Moscow stories of the close and results of conference shall be released simultaneously in the three countries

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<sup>82</sup> October 28, 8 a. m., p. 654.

at midnight Monday, Moscow time, 5 p. m., Eastern War Time, November 1st. Censor will permit correspondents to begin filing at 4 p. m. Moscow time, November 1st. Should the Germans tap the news transmissions, any publishable pickups of German broadcasts on the subject are not to be published or rebroadcast in the United States, Great Britain or Russia until after publication of the Moscow stories. [McDermott.]

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*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>33</sup>

Moscow, 30 October 1943—10:42 a. m.

301042. Personal for the President. From Molotov's attitude at the Conference and from what he said at a personal visit he paid on me last night I am convinced that the Soviet authorities are bitterly disappointed at our reaction to their request for Italian naval and merchant vessels. My impression is that they desire this shipping as a token to convince their people of our recognition of the part the Soviet forces have played in the collapse of Italy and as an indication that our three countries are collaborating. I believe it is their feeling that they have made every effort to meet us in our proposals in other matters and are at a loss to understand our reluctance to make this, what seems to them, small gesture, particularly as we have not been able to agree to their only two proposals concerning Turkey and Sweden. I cannot overemphasize the importance they appear to place on the acceptance by us of this request and I believe it would be of great importance in cementing the spirit of cooperation initiated in this Conference if an acceptance of their request in principle at least could be given promptly, even though the technical questions would have to be reserved for detailed examination and negotiation.

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740.0011 Moscow/122a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1943.

1139. President at press conference yesterday said that he wished to discuss the Moscow conference, net result of which had been definitely good. He said that the thing that impressed him most about the conference was the spirit, which was amazingly good, and that Mr. Hull deserved a great deal of credit for that spirit. Russia and Great

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<sup>33</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

Britain, he added, deserved equal credit. He said the conferees had talked things out quietly and in 100 percent relationship between themselves. President stated that certain agreements had been reached and that documents embracing these agreements would be signed shortly. President pointed out that Moscow accomplishments refuted predictions of cynics who thought talks would be clouded with suspicion and would accomplish little.

Correspondent asked if success of Moscow conference brought nearer proposed conference between President, Stalin and Churchill. Mr. Roosevelt replied that he didn't know any more about it than he did 2 weeks ago. Correspondent asked him if he could be more specific concerning the text of the agreements which were ready to be signed, and Mr. Roosevelt said that he thought that he better not elaborate because he didn't want to cross any wires. He added that these agreements fitted in with the objective of unanimity not only in prosecution of war but in later transition period. He pointed out that conference was not concerned with question of what can be done with crossing of t's and dotting of i's but it was considering big things—objectives of peace and post-war world.

Correspondent asked if President could be more specific about just what those objectives were, and Mr. Roosevelt replied that the agenda of the conference concerned matters of general policy and he pointed out that if Mr. Hull was bound by his instructions and British and Russian delegates likewise, no progress would have been made. He said they had met and discussed and thrashed things out in a friendly spirit with complete give and take. President added ultimate objectives were peace in world and end of aggression.

President was asked if the statement on tremendous success of the Moscow conference had strengthened his belief of willingness of Russia to cooperate in maintaining peace. President replied that he would not put it that way because he always had been confident of Russian desire to maintain peace.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-3043

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 30, 1943—noon.

Participants: The Secretary  
 Mr. Anthony Eden  
 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr  
 Mr. W. A. Harriman

Mr. Eden called on the Secretary and told him that he had expressed forcibly his disappointment at not having received a favorable reply

in response to the Soviet request for Italian vessels, and that he had just received a reply indicating that the Prime Minister was favorable to the request although there were certain technical difficulties, including the question of repairs.

The British would be unwilling to give the Russians one of the *Littorio* Class battleships but would be willing to give them one of the less modern ones. The *Littorio* Class would be of value in the Pacific.

Mr. Eden hoped that the President also would express his sympathy with the Soviet request. Mr. Hull explained that he intended to discuss the matter and urge it on the President on his return to Washington.

The question of the postponement of the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister for a few days in order that the Secretary might have time to meet the President before his departure was discussed. Mr. Eden agreed to cable the Prime Minister asking his concurrence and incidentally [to give?] Eden more time to do certain business which he had in mind on his way back and still have sufficient opportunity not only to talk over Conference affairs with the Prime Minister but also to become familiar with affairs at home to enable him to take over his responsibilities in leading the House.

The question of the meeting of the three heads of state was also discussed, and the military conference beforehand. Mr. Eden said he would urge the Prime Minister to invite the Soviet military to attend this conference.

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740.0011 Moscow/212

*Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Iran, October 30, 1943*<sup>34</sup>

Present: Mr. Kavtaradze	} Soviet members.
Mr. Smirnov	
Mr. Holman	} British members.
Mr. Iliff	
Mr. Allen	} American members.
Mr. Jernegan	

Mr. Kavtaradze opened the discussion by saying that the documents which had been submitted by the British and American members had required very careful study and analysis, sentence by sentence. Although apparently short, they contained many important points. The more the Soviet members had studied the documents, the more difficulties had developed with respect to them. As an ex-

<sup>34</sup> Enclosure No. 6 to unnumbered despatch from Mr. George V. Allen, Tehran, November 4, 1943.

ample of these difficulties, Mr. Kavtaradze mentioned the first part of paragraph No. 2 of the British draft declaration No. 1.<sup>34a</sup> By the provisions of this section, the three Governments would make certain undertakings which would require very careful study. We should need to have a clear understanding of what the undertakings were, and what specific means would be available to carry them out. (The first sentence of paragraph No. 2 says that the three governments "undertake to do all within their power to safeguard the people of Iran from the privations and difficulties" caused by the war.) As another example, Mr. Kavtaradze mentioned the final sentence of the same paragraph (which pledged the three Governments to support the foreign advisers working with the Iranian Government). He asked whether we could accept this formula without having full information as to what was being done by the advisers.

Mr. Kavtaradze said that he foresaw that points of this kind, contained in the draft declarations, might lead to future difficulties in the mutual operations of the three Governments in Iran. He thought that general declarations were undesirable; they should be more concrete and specific. Close study would be necessary to produce a declaration in clear form. He then remarked that it would be better to postpone study of this question until after the signature of the Irano-American agreement.<sup>34b</sup> In reply to Mr. Jernegan's query regarding the reason for this latter suggestion, Mr. Smirnov suggested that after signature of the Irano-American agreement it might be possible to issue a joint declaration by all three nations with respect to the withdrawal of their troops, instead of a joint British-Soviet statement and a separate American declaration as was now proposed.

Mr. Allen said that he had reported to the Secretary of State the views of the Soviet members, expressed at the previous meeting, to the effect that public declarations at this time would not be desirable since they would be largely repetitions of assurances already given and might be misinterpreted. He said the Secretary of State had expressed appreciation of the logic of the Soviet position and had agreed that reassurances were not necessary "every time the moon changed". The Secretary had added, however, that his idea had been that a declaration issued at the close of the Conference would be helpful in improving the situation in Iran. Mr. Allen went on to say that perhaps our information regarding Iranian conditions differed from the information of the Soviet Government. From its own reports, the American authorities felt that the situation was not by any means satisfactory.

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<sup>34a</sup> See Conference Document No. 27, p. 732.

<sup>34b</sup> For documentation regarding this proposed agreement, see vol. iv, pp. 453 ff.

Mr. Jernegan confirmed this statement, and expressed the belief that the Iranians had not yet recovered from the shock they had received at the time of the Anglo-Soviet entry into Iran. Their recovery was handicapped by the presence of foreign troops in Iran and the fact that a large part of their system of communications was being used for the benefit of the United Nations rather than for the benefit of Iran itself. The Iranians were unable to reorganize themselves and properly direct their efforts. Among the results of this state of affairs was an uncertainty, which Mr. Jernegan was convinced existed, with respect to the motives and intentions of the three powers which had troops in Iran.

Mr. Holman agreed that there was uncertainty in Iran regarding Allied policy. He felt that there was need for reassurance and for financial and economic help to the Iranians. He knew that the Iranians were wondering what was being done at the present Conference. Just before leaving Tehran the British members of the subcommittee had met the Iranian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, both of whom said that they hoped and expected that something would be done for Iran at Moscow.

Mr. Holman went on to say that he assumed there was nothing in the draft declarations to which the Soviet Government objected in principle, that the question was merely one of clearer expression. The Soviet members made no reply.

Mr. Allen asked whether Mr. Kavtaradze agreed with his own expression that there was no material difference in the policies of the three Governments with regard to Iran. If there were any such difference, Mr. Allen felt that the committee should try to reconcile the opposing views, or at least find out what they were.

Mr. Smirnov repeated his doubts regarding the utility of general declarations of the type proposed, containing no definite information. He said that it was quite clear that the attitude of the three Governments towards Iran was fully expressed in the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance (Anglo-Soviet-Iranian). Further evidence was contained in the discussions which had preceded the Iranian declaration of war against Germany. That Iranian action had also shown clearly what Iran's own attitude was.

Therefore, Mr. Smirnov could not share the point of view expressed by the British and American members that there was a feeling of suspicion in Iran towards the three Governments. During the two years that he had spent there, he had never had a hint of any such feeling. He was convinced that both the Iranian Government and the Iranian people had full faith in the Tripartite Treaty.

In Mr. Smirnov's opinion, the shock which Mr. Jernegan had men-

tioned had not been to the present Iranian Government and people, but to the Germanophiles who had been in power at the time of the occupation. The greater part of the Iranian people had condemned the German sympathies which had then existed. He could not agree that the results of that shock still persisted. If that were the case, we would not have the cooperation of the Iranian Government which we were receiving, as exemplified by the Iranian declaration of war.

So far as the withdrawal of Allied troops was concerned, Mr. Smirnov said the Iranians had full faith in the existing agreement. They knew that the foreign troops were not interfering with the internal life of the country and that they were being maintained on Allied account and not in any way at the expense of Iran. Mr. Smirnov failed to see the uncertainty and confusion in the Iranian Government which had been mentioned.

With respect to communications, Mr. Smirnov said that everything was being done to meet the civil demands of the country. British, Soviet and American representatives met every month to discuss this matter. Transport bound south from the Caspian Sea carried Soviet cargo for Tehran. During June and July of this year the U.S.S.R. had delivered 25,000 tons of wheat to Tehran.

Like the rest of the world, Mr. Smirnov continued, Iran was interested in the present Conference, but it was fully satisfied that its interests were already protected by the Tripartite Treaty. The Iranians knew that the result of the Conference would lead to a quicker defeat of Germany, which in itself would satisfy them.

Mr. Holman asked whether, if the Iranians themselves would like to have the proposed declarations made, the Soviet Government would still have objections to their issuance.

Mr. Smirnov replied that this raised the question of whether it would be desirable to query the Iranian Government on such a point. It might serve as a precedent for other countries, such as Turkey, to which assurances of one kind or another had been given. The Conference would have to decide such a question.

Mr. Allen agreed that there was some merit in Mr. Smirnov's observation, a precedent might in fact be set. Like the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States would prefer not to make declarations unless some positive help was to be derived from them. He felt that the crux of the difference among the members of the subcommittee was a difference of opinion regarding the need for a declaration regarding Iran at this time. The Soviet members indicated agreement.

Mr. Allen then referred to the earlier Soviet suggestion that after the signing of the proposed Irano-American agreement conditions



would be more suitable for the issuance of a joint declaration. He said that this seemed to indicate some progress by the sub-committee.

Mr. Holman remarked that if this were agreed upon, the representatives of the three powers in Tehran could be working out details and preparing drafts, pending completion of negotiations on the Irano-American agreement.

Mr. Smirnov said that he could not commit himself on the subject of a later joint declaration because he did not know the details of the proposed Irano-American agreement. (The American members pointed out that a text of the latest draft had been given him at the first meeting, but he stated it had not yet been translated.) Mr. Smirnov understood that the agreement followed the lines of the Tripartite Treaty but differed from it in some respects, principally in that the Treaty involved an exchange of rights for undertakings, whereas the proposed agreement was primarily concerned with the legal status of the American troops in Iran. He knew what had been in the first draft but not what might be provided in the new draft.

Mr. Jernegan stated that the new draft was substantially the same as the first draft and that it contained almost word for word the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty with regard to respect for Iranian rights, non-intervention in Iranian affairs and the withdrawal of troops after the war.

Mr. Allen pointed out that the hour for the final meeting of the Conference was approaching, and asked whether the sub-committee could agree upon a report to the Conference to the effect that it had been unable to concur on the issuance of declarations at the present time but recommended further study by the representatives of the three Governments at Tehran regarding the possibility of the issuance of a declaration or declarations at the time of signature of the Irano-American agreement. He thought that such a recommendation by the sub-committee would be quite in keeping with the action of the main Conference in setting up procedures for continued consultation among the three powers through their representatives at various capitals. As the Soviet members failed to reply, he emphasized that he was asking merely that the *possibility* of a declaration or declarations at the time of signature of the Irano-American agreement be kept under consideration. He thought that Mr. Smirnov had himself suggested such a possibility.

Mr. Smirnov agreed in principle to Mr. Allen's suggestion, and the British members also indicated agreement. The Soviet members, however, expressed some doubt regarding the practicability of carrying on a study of the questions involved simultaneously with the negotiation of the Irano-American agreement.

Mr. Iliff then prepared the following draft report, which was unanimously adopted by the sub-committee:

“The Committee reports to the Conference that

“a) After an exchange of views they detect no fundamental difference in the policy towards Iran of any of the three Governments.

“b) The Committee was unable to reach agreement on the expediency of making any immediate declaration or declarations with regard to Iran.

“c) The issue of such a declaration or declarations might be further considered by the representatives of the three Governments in Tehran with a view to the three Governments coming to a decision about the expediency of issuing such a declaration or declarations after the signature of the proposed Irano-American Agreement, and after appropriate consultation with the Government of Iran.”

Mr. Kavtaradze asked the members to note that this report did not specify that the declarations must be made at the time of signature of the Irano-American agreement.

It was agreed that the American, British and Soviet members should each inform the chiefs of their respective delegations of this report, and that Mr. Kavtaradze, as chairman of the sub-committee, should also transmit the report to Mr. Molotov in his capacity as chairman of the main Conference.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Summary of the Proceedings of the Twelfth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 30, 1943, 4 p. m.*

In opening the last formal session of the Conference, Mr. MOLOTOV said there remained the following questions for consideration: (1) the report of the Drafting Committee on the Commissions to be set up; (2) the question of the press communiqué; (3) the Protocol of the Conference to be signed by the three Foreign Secretaries; (4) the time when the communiqué and public declarations were to be released; and (5) the report of the Committee for Iran.

MR. EDEN stated that he would like to say a few words in regard to points 1 and 4 of the declaration regarding general European responsibility as against spheres of separate responsibility.<sup>34c</sup> He said he thought that the principles expressed in points 1 and 4 would be a valuable addition to the work of the Conference if they could be published.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had understood that Mr. Eden had withdrawn his proposal on this question, to which MR. EDEN replied that

<sup>34c</sup> See Conference Document No. 31, p. 736.

he had in fact withdrawn his suggestion to embody points 1 and 4 in the Four-Nation Declaration merely to facilitate the final adoption of the latter document.

MR. LITVINOV then said that in his opinion the principles set forth in points 1 and 4 of the British document in question were already embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and since there was no evidence that any of the three powers here was seeking special areas of responsibility or influence he felt that to make a special declaration denying this would give rise to the belief that there had been some such intention on the part of one of the three countries here represented. He also inquired why it was confined only to Europe.

MR. EDEN answered that he felt that there was greater suspicion in that regard on the part of the small nations of Europe, but added that he did not feel he could press the point if there was any objection.

THE SECRETARY said that he was agreeably disposed toward Mr. Eden's suggestion but he wondered whether there was sufficient time at this closing session of the Conference to consider the question. It was then agreed by the Conference to postpone Mr. Eden's suggestion until the next conference.

MR. VYSHINSKI on behalf of the Drafting Committee said that there had been agreement on all the documents submitted to the Committee with the exception of a few minor points in the draft concerning the Advisory Council for Italy and in the draft of the document regarding peace feelers.<sup>34d</sup> In regard to the Italian Advisory Council he said there was some difference as to the wording of the last paragraph which dealt with the time of putting into effect the agreed policy in regard to Italy, since the Soviet draft provided that the Commander-in-Chief would only take action in this sphere on the basis of instructions from the combined Chiefs of Staff after consultation between the three Governments.

THE SECRETARY proposed an amendment to alter the last sentence of the last paragraph to read after the words "Chiefs of Staff": period (punctuation), and the following additional sentence: "The three Governments parties to this declaration will at the request of any one of them consult on this matter." Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden accepted the Secretary's amendment.

MR. EDEN then said that in the declaration regarding common policy toward Italy,<sup>34e</sup> he would like to eliminate from paragraphs 3 and 4 the words that would indicate that there had been some failure on the part of the British and American Governments to uproot Fascism. He said that to leave those words in would carry an implied censure of Allied policy in Italy which he thought was undeserved.

<sup>34d</sup> See Conference Documents Nos. 11, 33, and 34, pp. 712, 737, and 738, respectively.

<sup>34e</sup> See Conference Documents Nos. 13 and 14, pp. 714 and 715, respectively.

MR. MOLOTOV said he felt that the Soviet wording in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the declaration on Italy merely reflected the actual facts since he understood that there were some Fascist institutions such as sport organizations still in existence. He agreed, however, in deference to Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull to eliminate these references as requested.

MR. MOLOTOV in regard to the declaration on German atrocities<sup>34f</sup> then stated that it was not clear in the Russian text whether the names of the three Heads of Government were to appear.

THE SECRETARY said that he understood that it was to be issued under the name of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin; that it was their desire that it be merely made public by the Conference.

In reporting on the draft of the peace feelers agreement MR. VYSHINSKI said that there was some difference of opinion as to the wording of the paragraph concerning the applicability of the principle of unconditional surrender by satellite states to those of the three Powers with which they were at war.

THE SECRETARY said that he felt there would be some objection on the part of the United States Government to the present wording since it was obvious that the United States could not recommend unconditional surrender for countries with which it was not at war.

MR. EDEN pointed out in this connection that the principle of unconditional surrender was set forth in the preamble to the Four-Nation Declaration and that therefore there was no inconsistency in including it in the proposed agreement on peace feelers.

THE SECRETARY replied that he felt the general spirit of the Four-Nation Declaration took care of that but that he would be glad to consider the inclusion in the peace feeler draft of the exact wording used in the preamble to the Four-Nation Declaration.

MR. MOLOTOV then said that the Soviet Government interpreted the statement about unconditional surrender under discussion as meaning that the United States would morally support the Soviet Union and Great Britain as against Finland, and that the Soviet Union would give moral support to the United States and Great Britain as against Bulgaria.

After some further discussion on this point MR. MOLOTOV agreed to resubmit it to the Drafting Committee and if an acceptable wording could not be found the whole paragraph might be dropped. THE SECRETARY and MR. EDEN agreed to this proposal.

Following the intermission it was decided to sign the Four-Nation Declaration as soon as the Russian and English texts had been compared and that the Chinese Ambassador would be brought into the

<sup>34f</sup> See Conference Document No. 40, p. 741.

Conference Room for this purpose. While waiting for the texts to be compared the Conference discussed the question of the exact time of the release.

THE SECRETARY and MR. EDEN said they would like to see the British and American correspondents in Moscow given an opportunity to send their stories several hours in advance of the official announcement in order to assure simultaneous publication in the three capitals.

MR. MOLOTOV said he was afraid that if this were done the Germans would pick up the stories which would go by radio and would announce to the world some garbled version before the official release. It was agreed that the press representatives of the three delegations should meet and agree on the time and method of release and the time of making available to the British and American correspondents the documents to be published.

At 6:30 p. m., October 30, 1943, the three Foreign Secretaries and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow<sup>35</sup> signed the Four-Nation Declaration. Soviet newsreel cameramen took pictures of the ceremony.

After the signature the Conference turned to the question of the report of the Committee on Iran.<sup>35a</sup>

MR. EDEN proposed that the Conference refer this question for discussion in Moscow by Mr. Molotov and the British and American Ambassadors on the basis of a resolution on Iran which he presented to the Conference (copy attached).<sup>36</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV said he was agreeable to Mr. Eden's suggestion to refer the question to diplomatic channels but he felt that Tehran might be a more suitable place than Moscow.

THE SECRETARY said that he also felt that Tehran might be more suitable since all materials and data on the subject would be there and the diplomatic representatives of the three countries might be more closely in touch with the local situation. It was agreed that no publicity would be given to the resolution on Iran and that further discussions would take place between the diplomatic representatives of the three powers in Tehran.

In closing the Conference of the three Foreign Secretaries in Moscow, MR. MOLOTOV expressed warm appreciation of the unflinching cooperation which he had received from the Secretary and Mr. Eden and to which he in large measure attributed the success of the Conference.

THE SECRETARY said that he was sure he was expressing Mr. Eden's sentiments when he said that he had never seen a better example of skill and cooperation than Mr. Molotov had displayed during the

<sup>35</sup> Foo Ping-sheung.

<sup>35a</sup> Conference Document No. 30, p. 736.

<sup>36</sup> Presumably enclosure 1 to Conference Document No. 27, p. 732.

Conference. He said that he had attended many international conferences but he had never encountered one where the spirit of cooperation and genuine desire to produce fruitful work had been more manifest than at this meeting. This he attributed for the most part to Mr. Molotov's able direction of the work. He also thanked Mr. Molotov for the unfailing hospitality and the many kindnesses which he and members of the American Delegation had received throughout from the Soviet authorities.

MR. EDEN warmly seconded the Secretary's remarks and proposed that at any future meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries Mr. Molotov be selected as permanent Chairman.

The Conference ended on this note.

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*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*<sup>37</sup>

WASHINGTON, 30 October 1943—6 p. m.

302232. Personal for Secretary Hull. Alusna Moscow 301042.<sup>38</sup> I am very much surprised about Molotov's misunderstanding of my message of October 26 relative to disposition of Italian naval ships and merchant ships. I meant to convey that I was in favor of the request of the Russian Government for the use of these ships. The only proviso I made was that the Italian ships which were turned over to our respective countries would be used to prosecute the war against our enemies and that final determination of what would become of these ships would be made at the peace conference.<sup>39</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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740.0011 Moscow/86 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1943.

1135. Amdel 60. The Dutch Minister left with the Department this morning a memorandum<sup>40</sup> expressing the desire of the Netherlands Government that provision be made for permanent representation of smaller nations under a system of rotation on the so-called

<sup>37</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. For text of what apparently was an earlier draft of this message, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 127.

<sup>38</sup> October 30, 10:42 a. m., p. 672.

<sup>39</sup> A memorandum numbered "White 13", and dated "30 Oct 43", with the heading "For the President from the Map Room," in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, states that "This message was prepared by Mr. Hopkins, was approved by Admiral Leahy, and has been sent to Secretary Hull."

<sup>40</sup> *Post*, p. 799.

Mediterranean Commission and other "institutional (i.e. not *ad hoc*) international commissions which may eventually be established." The Minister asked that the viewpoint of his Government be brought as soon as possible to the Secretary's attention in Moscow. We understand that the Dutch presented a similar viewpoint in London to Eden and subsequently to Cadogan.

STETTINIUS

740.0011 Moscow/84 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1943—8 p. m.

1138. Amdel 61. For McDermott. Your 1758; <sup>41</sup> Elmer Davis, Byron Price and I at my office this afternoon conferred for an hour with representatives of A.P.,<sup>42</sup> U.P.,<sup>43</sup> I.N.S.,<sup>44</sup> C.B.S.,<sup>45</sup> N.B.C.,<sup>46</sup> Mutual,<sup>47</sup> Blue Network,<sup>48</sup> *N.Y. Times*, *N.Y. Herald Tribune*. Your suggestions given careful consideration by all, Elmer Davis and Byron Price and I first having discussed carefully your proposal this morning and I having discussed the matter at the White House. It is the unanimous agreement of all concerned that because of mechanical difficulties, it is not possible to follow suggestion contained your wire and on your arrival we will explain in detail complicated reasons why. It is suggested, however, that the following might be a practical solution satisfactory to all concerned here if agreeable to you and others in Moscow. That you notify us of a simultaneous release time for Moscow, London, and Washington in accordance with security considerations and with the understanding that each government could give to the press of each capital advance text 3 hours before release hour. Further with the understanding that there would be no distribution of text or information for domestic or external circulation prior to release time. We hope that you can request such an arrangement be definitely binding censorship authorities of all governments concerned. Realize difficulties of problem, however, after thorough consideration with Davis feeling that this is the only possible formula which would be acceptable to the American press and radio. Acknowledge receipt urgently.

STETTINIUS

<sup>41</sup> Telegram Delam No. 35, October 28, 8 a. m., p. 654.

<sup>42</sup> Associated Press.

<sup>43</sup> United Press.

<sup>44</sup> International News Service.

<sup>45</sup> Columbia Broadcasting System.

<sup>46</sup> National Broadcasting Company.

<sup>47</sup> Mutual Broadcasting System.

<sup>48</sup> Later became the American Broadcasting Company.

*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*<sup>49</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 30 October 1943—8:20 p. m.

310051. Personal for the Secretary of State. My 302232.<sup>50</sup> Final disposition of all Italian ships should apply to those used by British and Americans as well as to those used by Russians.

ROOSEVELT

740.0011 Moscow/10-3043

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 30, 1943.

I sat at the right of Marshal Stalin at the dinner given by him to the members of the Tri-partite Conference which came to a close today. He was in a most agreeable state of mind and no matter what subject was discussed he seemed to overlook nothing that might make more clear my understanding of his situation present and prospective. Mr. Stalin proceeded, first, to address me by saying, "You have had a successful conference." I at once replied that the credit was entirely his, that he had authorized his great country to take the decisive step of joining with Great Britain and the United States in a world program based on cooperation. This seemed to please him. Throughout the conversation he expressed himself as unqualifiedly for a broad program of international cooperation—military, political, economic and peace.

He brought up the matter of his meeting the President at Basra and indicated definitely his conclusion that he in all sincerity could not leave his military emergency conditions here at present, and he then proceeded to say that he would send Mr. Molotov in his stead, since under the Soviet law Mr. Molotov was his duly constituted second-ranking man in the Government, who would take his place on any occasion desirable when he himself might be absent. He asked what I thought of this idea of sending Molotov, and I promptly replied that, of course, if he should find it absolutely impossible to go, Mr. Molotov would make a good representative, but in the mind of the President and myself the main point in the matter is that were Mr. Stalin himself to go it would have a tremendous psychological effect that would extend throughout the world and that I desired still to plead with him if at all possible to get away from his military emergency and to go himself. I got nowhere with this and the conclusion reached by him seemed to be final in his mind.

<sup>49</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>50</sup> October 30, 6 p. m., p. 683.



I inferred that either he or his advisers or both together had talked over this matter many times and that each time they felt that the time had not yet come when the necessities of the military situation or the urgent need for a conference were such as to make his trip favorable from the military standpoint or absolutely necessary from the consultative standpoint, although he based the matter solely on military considerations. I think we have reached a stage where it is necessary to recognize him as being sincere in respect to the military phase. Otherwise, the situation could get hurt rather than helped. I left the matter as to his not going and as to Mr. Molotov's going just as I have described and there it stands. In the immediate relationship to this question of his going to Basra and as a part of my urgings, I sought to bring out more clearly the tremendous prestige he and the people of Soviet Russia have in many parts of the world and the extreme compelling need for leadership such as he, in conjunction with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, alone could offer. I said to Marshal Stalin that he had no idea how great was his prestige in the world today and therefore how necessary it is for him to exert leadership without delay, and that failure to do so would be serious and damaging. I then added that through all past history more than three-fourths of the human race until very recently have simply had to have leadership and that real leaders only appear in the world every one or more centuries, and that he himself has demonstrated that leadership both at home and abroad and that he has a responsibility to exercise it in this stage of the gravest possible world crisis by immediately appearing out in the world in close conjunction with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. He agreed that I was correct about the course of human affairs in the past and about the need for leadership now, but made no further response about meeting the President.

Marshal Stalin then said some most confidential things to me about the Pacific area which he requested me to transmit to the President. This I am endeavoring to do without inserting them here.<sup>50a</sup>

We had some general exchange of remarks in regard to international cooperation on some of the political and economic phases of the problems ahead.

At the end of the evening's entertainment at two o'clock in the morning, Marshal Stalin showed every disposition to collaborate and work with the United States and Great Britain. He said that his country was not for isolation and I emphasized the soundness of that

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<sup>50a</sup> The message was a promise "to get in and help to defeat the enemy in the Far East after German defeat." See two telegrams of November 2, 1943, from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 147.

view by again pointing out that isolation had almost ruined my country and his. He referred to our two countries and the great necessity for collaboration and cooperation in the most sympathetic and favorable manner. I said that this was wonderful as a program to be carried out, that our two peoples were very much alike in many respects, that each was a great people and that there need be no serious difficulty at all in promoting close understanding and trust and friendship and on these, the spirit of cooperation, to all of which he agreed. I finally added that patience on the part of both countries and especially their leaders in key positions would be necessary in dealing with a mistake made here and there and with intemperate individuals who would be trying to give trouble in both countries, etc., etc.

Mr. Stalin, as we went out from dinner, stopped and two or three of us sat down in an adjoining room for a few minutes before going to the cinema. He proceeded on his own initiative to elaborate in the most sarcastic terms about those who have been circulating reports in the past to the effect that the Soviet Union and Germany might agree on peace terms. He wound up his repeated sarcasm by ridiculing all phases of the matter in unequivocal terms with the idea of effectively disposing of that report. I remarked that any person who knows the Russian people and their relation to Germany in this war know that they are incapable of making a peace with Germany. This he subscribed to very heartily.

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*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*<sup>51</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 30 October 1943—11 p. m.

310349. Personal for the Secretary of State. Tell Molotov I am sorry the staff telegram about the Italian ships was not clear. All I want is that the ships be used for whatever is the most useful war purpose. I hope the Soviet can use their third, and I see no reason why they should not do so. Personally, I think that after the war the Italian tonnage should be distributed equitably for the permanent use of the allies. In the meantime, it ought to be used by the three nations. This is certainly not a time to delay in the use of this tonnage by the three nations. This is what we intended to convey in the staff telegram which I regret was not more clear.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>51</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

740.0011 Moscow/92 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Delegation*

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1943—2 a. m.

1143. Amdel 63. For McDermott. Reference Department's 1138<sup>52</sup> and your 1788<sup>53</sup> (Amdel 61 and Delam 43). In order to synchronize the plans outlined in our messages under reference we propose to give correspondents in Washington text of documents at 2 p. m. for publication at 5 p. m., Eastern War Time, November 1st. As indicated in our 1138, no assurance possible here that German stories will not be rebroadcast or published in this country in advance of agreed release time.

STETTINIUS

740.0011 Moscow/10-3143

*Memorandum of Conversation*<sup>54</sup>

Moscow, October 31, 1943.

Participants: The Secretary  
 Mr. Anthony Eden  
 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (Joined meeting as it was closing)  
 Mr. W. A. Harriman

Mr. Eden called on Mr. Hull about 4:15 P. M. and remained about forty minutes. The question of the meeting of the heads of state was discussed. The Secretary outlined to Mr. Eden his conversation last night with Marshal Stalin in which he urged on Stalin the importance of the meeting. The talk with Stalin was friendly and Mr. Hull got the impression that he was sincere, but it was not productive of a change in the negative attitude of the Marshal. Stalin mentioned the possibility of Molotov attending the meeting, to which Mr. Hull responded that, although Molotov was well qualified, it would not be the same thing at all to the world. The Secretary read to Mr. Eden a draft of a cable which he was preparing to send to the President on his recommendations regarding this and related subjects.<sup>55</sup>

Mr. Eden brought up the question of a certain Italian general, now a member of the Badoglio Government, whose anti-Allied record was so bad that he thought we should insist on his removal. Mr. Eden asked if Mr. Strang might discuss the matter with Mr. Dunn, to which the Secretary agreed.

<sup>52</sup> October 30, 8 p. m., p. 684.<sup>53</sup> Telegram No. Delam 43, October 30, 9 a.m., p. 671.<sup>54</sup> Presumably drafted by Mr. Averell Harriman.<sup>55</sup> Telegram No. 312031, p. 690.

The conversation closed with the subject of Turkey regarding which Mr. Eden was about to talk with Molotov. Mr. Eden said a cable from the Prime Minister had been received indicating that Leros could not be held without Turkish cooperation, at least to the extent of giving the British use of air bases and some transportation facilities. Also the Prime Minister suggested that it was time for the Turks to allow some British submarines and merchant vessels to pass through the Dardanelles.

Mr. Eden wanted the Secretary's approval before talking to Molotov who he was afraid might be reluctant to take this mild step. Mr. Eden said he would indicate to Molotov a willingness to reconsider the matter in a month or so.

Mr. Eden plans to meet the Turkish Foreign Secretary en route home and put these matters up to him.

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740.0011 Moscow/95 : Telegram

*The American Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 31, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 9:45 p. m.]

Delam 46. For Acting Secretary of State and Byington.<sup>56</sup> New arrangements were made tonight with British and Soviets regarding publicity. Text of joint statement with annexes which are declaration of four nations on general security, declaration on German atrocities, declaration regarding Italy and declaration on Austria will be released by State Department, British and Soviet Foreign Offices for publication and broadcast at 8 p. m. Moscow time (1 p. m. Eastern War Time) November 1.<sup>57</sup> Moscow correspondents will not send texts but will start filing stories at 6 p. m. Monday for publication at 1 p. m. Eastern War Time. Above documents except Four Nations Declaration which Department already has will be wired tonight for release as above.

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<sup>56</sup> Homer M. Byington, Assistant Chief, Division of Current Information.

<sup>57</sup> The texts of the joint communiqué (Conference Document No. 42, p. 741), and the four declarations were released to the press on November 1 as planned, and were subsequently printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 6, 1943, pp. 307-311.

740.0011 Moscow/96 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 30 [31], 1943—8 p. m.

[Received October 31—10:50 p. m.]

1797. For the President and Acting Secretary. Last night (Saturday) Stalin invited us to dinner at the Kremlin. It was smaller and more select than the previous two I have attended. There were 12 of us Americans including the 4 members of the military mission, a similar number from the British, in all a total of about 60 including from the Soviet side all the commissar members of the defense committee and ranking officers from the three services.

This dinner was also more genuine, genial and intimate. The conversation during and after dinner was free and uninhibited with plenty of humor about past misunderstandings. Stalin appeared to enjoy himself as much as anyone else. During the toasts General Deane stole the show in responding to Stalin's toast "to the American forces" by offering one to the day when advance detachments of American and British troops would meet similar Soviet forces in the streets of Berlin. Marshal Stalin paid him alone the high honor of walking around the table to his seat to click his glass and drink the toast with him personally.

After dinner a film was shown depicting the bitter fight of the Red partisans against the treacherous Japs in Siberia during the revolutionary period of 1918. This film was produced in 1938 and when shown publicly in Moscow evoked a strong protest from the Japanese Ambassador. There was no attempt to obscure the purpose behind the selection of this film.

Stalin seemed genuinely pleased that the Secretary remained to the end for a concert by leading Moscow opera stars. All of the Russians went out of their way to show their hospitality to our party, their appreciation of the Secretary's presence, and their solid satisfaction with the results of the Conference.

HARRIMAN

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*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>58</sup>

Moscow, October 31, 1943—8:31 p. m.

312031. I sat by Marshal Stalin for 2 hours at his dinner Saturday night.<sup>59</sup> I presented to him in the strongest way possible all considera-

<sup>58</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>59</sup> October 30.

tions calling for the joining by him of his leadership and cooperation with that of yourself and Mr. Churchill. At one stage he volunteered to bring up the proposed Basra meeting. In so many words he renewed what he and his associates and advisers considered as compelling military reasons for not going beyond Teheran. He said in effect that we must give him credit for being sincere about this. He then said that he would send the official ranking next to himself in the Soviet Government, namely, Mr. Molotov. He inquired what I thought of him as a substitute. I replied parenthetically that he would do in the sense of understanding the questions that would probably arise, but that that was not the point from your and my viewpoints, that the important factor was the broad psychological effect throughout the world of the presence at such a meeting of the Marshal himself. I argued the matter further but got no favorable reaction.

The situation relating to the seeming state of mind of the Marshal is that he talks and acts one hundred percent in favor of our new general forward movement of international cooperation in every way which the Four Nation Declaration proclaims, political, economic, military, specially including postwar organization for peace, world order under law, economic benefits, etc., etc. At the same time he is inflexible at this time about attending a meeting with you and Mr. Churchill at any place beyond Teheran. In the circumstances I think it advisable at present to allow our collaboration and cooperation movement launched here to be cemented by increasing methods of contact from the standpoint of closer military relations in various ways and the same as to the political and peace situation including a definite agreement already entered into for preliminary or informal conferences from now on between the United States, Great Britain and Russia to formulate a postwar program including perhaps other methods of cooperation during the interim period. In due course unless his entire sincerity including both words and acts here are false and this is incredible [*incredible*], the Marshal will inevitably come to the point of joining you and Mr. Churchill for the purpose of conference.

There is nothing left as to meeting Mr. Stalin at the moment unless you should have a meeting in any event at some place like Basra and decide to fly to Teheran for a day to meet him, since it is evident that he will not at present take even a day off to fly anywhere beyond Teheran. Should you feel that this is not feasible or desirable you will then seem to have the question of where you will meet with Mr. Churchill and later with the Generalissimo.<sup>60</sup> Wherever you meet, at Casablanca

<sup>60</sup> Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

or as far west as possible, I think it most important that after inviting Stalin and in event he declines you then invite him to send Molotov and a general of high rank. This matter could become delicate unless even in the face of the Marshal's attitude you invite Molotov and a military man to your conference. You can cable me both at Teheran and Cairo as to what you may have in mind in the light of the foregoing and other considerations which you already have in mind.

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740.0011 Moscow/345

*The Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 1, 1943—noon.

DEAR MR. HULL: I received today your letter concerning the desirability of completing the most secret Protocol by the inclusion of the proposal of the delegation of the United States under point 1 of the agenda. Desiring to meet your desire, I expressed my agreement with your proposal to include it as the last point of the most secret Protocol with certain changes of a drafting nature in the text of my statement presented by you. This, I hope, will assure the completeness of the protocol which you desired. I attach to this letter the text of the supplementary portion of the Protocol with the drafting corrections, etc.<sup>61</sup>

With sincere esteem,

V. MOLOTOV

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 1, 1943—noon.

The Chinese Ambassador called at his request. He said that he merely called to thank me again for what my Government had done for China during the Conference. He then inquired whether I had anything else in mind about the occurrences in the Conference that would be of interest to his Government.

I replied that I had nothing especial, but that I might say that throughout the Conference all Russian officials were exceedingly cordial and friendly and when matters of difference were under discussion they talked them out with us in a thoroughly agreeable spirit. I added that this was a splendid state of mind with which to launch the great forward movement of international cooperation with Russia for the first time a full-fledged member of it without special reserva-

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<sup>61</sup> See the Most Secret Protocol, section (c), p. 773.

tion of any kind, that all of the signs indicate that Mr. Stalin and his Government are opposed to isolation and are wholeheartedly in favor of the movement of international cooperation launched by this Conference with Russia as a full partner with the United States, Great Britain and China.

I then made clear to the Ambassador that neither I nor my associates had intimated anything to the press about China's difficulties in being permitted to become one of the original signatories to the Four-Nation Declaration except that last evening in answer to a question as to who sent for the Ambassador to come and sign, I replied that the Conference sent for him and that there was no opposition to China as such in the Conference.

The Ambassador said that he was pleased to have no publicity about China's difficulty and had cautioned his Government to say nothing whatever about it, although he had given the Generalissimo the facts as to just what had occurred for his confidential and personal information.

The Ambassador then said in great confidence that he had been authorized by the Generalissimo when he came to Moscow to say to Mr. Stalin that if and when Russia should decide to enter the war against Japan, China would be ready to make any kind of alliance with the Soviet Union.

The Ambassador had first inquired whether the Russians had said anything about Japan. I replied that I had nothing in mind that could be taken up with him in that connection; that of course it is my rule to give him the fullest possible information at all times in regard to matters of interest to either of our Governments.

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740.0011 Moscow/11-143

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

Moscow, November 1, 1943.

Participants: The Secretary  
Mr. Anthony Eden  
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr  
Mr. W. A. Harriman

The purpose of Mr. Eden's visit was to explain to the Secretary that Molotov had been opposing his taking up with the Turks for the British the matter of their giving us bases to protect Leros and allowing entry of submarines and merchant ships through the Dardanelles.

Eden told Molotov it was absolutely essential to get immediate use of the Turkish air bases or Leros would fall into German hands.



If this happened the attack on Rhodes, when it took place, would be much more difficult. He explained that they had had additional bad news. A cruiser and two destroyers had been badly damaged and possibly sunk, in addition to the losses last week. Naval losses of this magnitude could not be faced. Fighter cover based on Turkey was therefore essential.

Molotov had insisted that pressure should be put on Turkey to come into the war all out. After a great deal of argument both yesterday and today, Eden had worked out a compromise, namely that Molotov withdrew his objection to the British demands on Turkey for immediate use of air bases while Eden agreed, for the British Government, that they would join at a later date with Russia in demanding Turkey's entry in the war before the end of the year.

Molotov asked Eden to discuss with Mr. Hull whether Mr. Hull would not make it a tri-partite agreement and enter it in the protocol as one of the understandings of the Conference. Mr. Hull explained that he was not authorized to discuss military matters and therefore could not take this step. He asked Mr. Eden to explain this to Mr. Molotov. Eden said he was sure Molotov would be satisfied with the bi-lateral agreement between the British and Soviet Governments. (*Note:* This agreement was signed by Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov later that evening.)

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*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>63</sup>

Moscow, November 1, 1943—10:15 p. m.

[Extract]<sup>64</sup>

012215.

Mr. Eden called on me this afternoon to acquaint me with a further conversation he had today with Molotov in which he again urgently asked for agreement that the British bring pressure on the Turks to give them use of air bases. He explained that he had had word from Prime Minister that unless this privilege was forthcoming from the Turks promptly it would be impossible to hold Leros.

Molotov continued to object but after a long discussion they finally came to following agreement.

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<sup>63</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>64</sup> The omitted portion of the telegram contains the text of a telegram to Prime Minister Churchill from Foreign Secretary Eden reporting his conversation with Mr. Molotov on October 31, 1943, on the Turkish question, a copy of which Mr. Eden sent to Secretary Hull, and also the latter's letter of acknowledgment. The telegram is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 144.

Soviet Government would approve the British immediate demands on Turkey for the air bases and Eden agreed that British Government would join with Russia at a later date to bring pressure on Turkey to come into war before end of year.

Molotov asked whether I would join in this and add it as a part of the Conference understandings. I explained to Mr. Eden that I had no authority to join in such an agreement. Eden has undertaken to explain this to Molotov. If there is time Eden will put his verbal agreement with Molotov into memorandum form.

You may wish to reexamine this question from the standpoint of Turkey's entry into the war. Politically I would favor this. Since the British and Russians are going forward with the matter you may wish to send instructions to Harriman.

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*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>65</sup>

Moscow, November 2, 1943—12: 57 p. m.

021257. I have advised Molotov that sympathetic consideration is being given in Washington to the request of the Soviet Government for certain Italian naval and merchant vessels and that as a result I believed the matter could be worked out to their satisfaction. I further indicated that I would recommend the matter be concluded in all of its aspects as early as practicable.<sup>65a</sup>

Mr. Eden had received a cable from the Prime Minister favoring acceptance of the request in principle but raising a number of questions such as reservation of the two *Littorio* class battleships, recon-ditioning that would be necessary, and the actual use to which the ships would be put.

Considering the above and the fact that Molotov seems satisfied for the present with our general replies I have thought it unwise for me to say more than I have as it will involve me in technical matters with which I am not familiar and in my judgement would complicate rather than help the final amicable settlement of the matter. It seems to me that, since this is a matter of combined British-American interests, joint instructions should be sent to our Ambassadors for transmission to Mr. Molotov.

The instructions should authorize them to inform Molotov that the Soviet request for the use of Italian merchant and naval vessels has been approved subject to such reservations as may be considered appropriate.

<sup>65</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>65a</sup> Secretary Hull's note to Molotov, summarized here, was dated November 1, 1943 (740.0011 Moscow/342).

They should also be authorized to suggest at the same time that representatives of the naval staffs of the three countries meet at, say Algiers, to work out the arrangements necessary for completing the transaction.

I feel strongly that any question of one-third of the fleet being given to the Soviets should not be opened at this time but that the discussion be confined to the acceptance of the specific Russian request. Opening up the discussion to a proportionate division of the fleet would, in my view, lead to serious complications. If at a later date we find the Russians can use additional ships, it might then be to our advantage to offer them voluntarily the specific number and types we believe would be useful. This should only be done after careful consideration of the numbers and types that they have the capacity to use and maintain.

It is the opinion of our Naval officers here that the Soviet Government have been modest in their request because of their inability to employ additional vessels and that they would feel embarrassed if they were faced with the necessity of admitting that they did not have the ability to utilize at the present time their full one-third share.<sup>66</sup>

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740.0011 Moscow/11-243

*Memorandum of Conversation*<sup>67</sup>

Moscow, November 2, 1943.

Participants: The Secretary  
 Mr. Anthony Eden  
 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr  
 Mr. W. A. Harriman

Mr. Eden, accompanied by the British Ambassador, called on the Secretary at 6:00 PM and remained about twenty minutes. Mr. Harriman was present during the discussion.

Mr. Eden showed Mr. Hull the cable which the Prime Minister had dispatched to the President suggesting that Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden remain in North Africa and that the President advance his date of departure to the 9th of November. He gave also the proposed schedule of meetings between himself and the President and the preliminary meetings of the Chiefs of Staff. The Prime Minister recommended to the President that the Soviet staff be invited in the second

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<sup>66</sup> For a continuation of the discussion of this subject, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, index entry (p. 913), "Italy: Soviet Union, request for Italian naval and merchant shipping."

<sup>67</sup> Presumably drafted by Mr. Averell Harriman.

phase of their discussions, possibly with Molotov. The Prime Minister spoke of the Conference as "a stupendous success".

Mr. Hull explained to Mr. Eden that he was planning to fly straight home to Washington and, if there were no delays, he should arrive there by the 9th. He said that the President had already agreed to remain till the 11th. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull expressed strong preference for returning to London and Washington respectively rather than waiting in North Africa.

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*<sup>68</sup>

Moscow, November 2, 1943—10:52 p. m.

022252. Personal for the President. Referring to the Secretary's cable to you 012215<sup>69</sup> (White 45) Molotov and Eden initialed last night their agreement regarding Turkey substantially as follows:

"It is agreed between the Foreign Secretaries of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom as follows:

First. In order that Turkey may take her part with the United Nations in hastening the defeat of Hitlerite Germany in which Turkey and other freedom loving states are interested, the two Foreign Secretaries think it most desirable that Turkey should enter the war on the side of the United Nations before the end of 1943.

Second. It is agreed between the two Foreign Secretaries that on behalf of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments it should be suggested to Turkey at the earliest possible date, to be agreed upon between them, that before the end of 1943 Turkey should enter the war.

Third. It is further agreed that a request should immediately be made of Turkey to give to the United Nations all possible aid by placing at the disposal of the Allied Forces Turkish air bases and such other facilities as may be agreed upon as desirable by the two Governments."

About midnight last night I took the protocol papers of the Conference, previously signed by Mr. Hull, to Molotov's office where he and Eden then signed. During the discussion that followed Molotov expressed to me his satisfaction with the understanding he had reached with Eden regarding Turkey and hoped that we would agree to make it tripartite. I told him that Mr. Hull had informed you for your consideration of the discussions between himself with Eden. Tonight at the ballet Molotov asked me whether any word had been

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<sup>68</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>69</sup> For excerpt, see p. 694.

received from Washington on this subject. I explained of course that there had not yet been time for a reply and, in order to be relieved of daily pressure from Molotov, I stated that I did not know whether you would wish to express an opinion until you had had an opportunity to discuss the matter in detail with Mr. Hull. Molotov seemed disappointed that there should be such a long delay and expressed the hope that a reply could be given sooner. There is no doubt they place great importance on Turkey's entry into the war and have been unimpressed by our reasons for not being favorable to it. Eden told me that the Prime Minister had approved the agreement reached with Molotov and that he expected to see the Turkish Foreign Minister with a senior staff officer in Cairo on Thursday.<sup>70</sup> He would insist on immediate use of the air bases and if he found the opportunity was propitious, he might sound him out on the subject of full entry in the war. Eden states they have no intention of giving the Turks any additional assistance beyond the arms now being shipped and the small fighter force they expect to move from the Middle East. If you are not prepared to take a definite position on this matter at the present time, I believe it would be helpful in our relations if you were to instruct me to inform Molotov of this and an indication of the time you wish to take before reaching a decision.

[HARRIMAN]

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[For a review of the Conference and of the "character of certain real difficulties", see Ambassador Harriman's telegram to President Roosevelt, November 4, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, page 152.]

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*President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*<sup>71</sup>

WASHINGTON, 4 November 1943—12:40 p. m.

Personal for Ambassador Harriman. Subject to the condition that no British or American resources will be committed to the eastern Mediterranean area which in the opinion of the commanders responsible are necessary for OVERLORD or for operations in Italy, this Government agrees to join Great Britain and Soviet in making immediate demand on Turkey for use of air bases and later pressing Turkey to enter the war before the end of the year.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>70</sup> November 4.

<sup>71</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

740.0011 Moscow/146: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

Moscow, November 5, 1943.

[Received November 6—2:15 p. m.]

1848. The Soviet press today publishes the farewell remarks of the Secretary and Mr. Eden at the airport.<sup>72</sup> The Secretary is quoted as stating after thanking the Soviet Government and people for their hospitality and kindness accorded to himself and his associates:

“This international Conference testifies not only to the great possibilities but also to the great probabilities and realities in regard to the broadest plans for the future. I am convinced that the results of this Conference will become greater with the passage of time and to the degree that it is found possible to carry into effect what was decided here.”

Eden is quoted as emphasizing the absolute necessity of the three Governments working together.

HARRIMAN

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*<sup>73</sup>

Moscow, 7 November 1943.

6100. Personal for the President. I delivered personally your message concerning Turkey<sup>74</sup> to Molotov in the form of a letter. Molotov expressed the highest satisfaction at its contents and offered no objection whatsoever to the proviso which it contained. He proposed that your agreement as expressed in my letter be attached to the protocol concerning Turkey which he and Eden had signed, the text of which I have already cabled you,<sup>75</sup> and that these two documents be made a part of the most secret separate military record of the Conference. His anxiety to have this agreement part of the action of the Conference is I believe due to the fact that he is personally under some criticism by the Soviet military authorities for not obtaining action on this matter at the Conference. I see no objection to his proposal and

<sup>72</sup> Secretary Hull and his party left Moscow for the homeward trip early on the morning of November 3, 1943.

<sup>73</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>74</sup> See telegram of November 4, 12:40 p. m., p. 698.

<sup>75</sup> See telegram No. 022252, November 2, 10:52 p. m., p. 697.

ask that you authorize me to put it into effect.<sup>76</sup> He discussed the above with the British Ambassador who is cabling Eden for similar authorization.

[HARRIMAN]

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740.0011 Moscow/256a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1943—5 p. m.

1180. Personal for the Ambassador. The President has handed to me your message no. 6100 sent via Navy.<sup>77</sup> You are authorized to comply with Molotov's request that your letter containing the message concerning Turkey be made a part of the secret military record of the Conference.

STETTINIUS

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[A statement released to the press by Secretary of State Hull on November 10, 1943, upon his return to Washington from the Moscow Conference, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 13, 1943, page 319.]

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740.0011 Moscow/188 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 10, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received November 11—12:20 p. m.]

1901. Personal for the Secretary. Last night midnight I received invitation from Litvinov to attend a meeting this afternoon at 2 o'clock at Foreign Office at which he intended to inform the Chiefs of Mission of the United Nations in Moscow of the results of the Conference.

At 2 o'clock this afternoon in Litvinov's office in addition to British Ambassador and myself were present the Chinese, Mexican, Czechoslovak, Iranian and Belgian Ambassadors; the Canadian, Greek and Yugoslav Ministers; the Chargés d'Affaires of Norway and Aus-

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<sup>76</sup> In a telegram of November 8 (printed in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 161) President Roosevelt authorized Ambassador Harriman to attach the United States agreement regarding Turkey to the protocol, subject to the substitution of the words "Combined Chiefs of Staff" for "commanders responsible".

<sup>77</sup> *Supra*.

tralia; and Garreau, the representative of French National Committee.

With the exception of the most secret military protocol which he did not mention and the military plans discussed, which he said were secret, Litvinov gave full summary of decisions of Conference with particular reference to the position of the Soviet Government on various points on the agenda. He omitted only any reference to question of Iran. He stated that among the means of shortening the war the position [*question?*] of the entry of certain neutrals was discussed, in particular the question of Turkey into war, adding that since it was decided [to take up?] this question with Turkey first of all, Mr. Eden had been empowered to take it up with Turkish Foreign Minister at Cairo.

When he came to the question of confederations in Europe Litvinov read in full the exposition of the attitude of Soviet Government toward federations made to the Conference by Molotov. He added that no objection was raised by Conference to Soviet position on this question. He referred without specifying its exact nature to the general agreement in regard to treatment of Germany but did mention specifically Molotov's observations as to the undesirability of giving any publicity to this attitude.

He gave brief but accurate description of functions and composition of the Italian Advisory Council and the European Advisory Commission in London. He likewise read text of agreement on peace feelers and stated no objection had been voiced at the Conference to Molotov's statement that principle of unconditional surrender should be applied to satellites of Germany such as Finland, Rumania, et cetera, by the United Nations with which such satellites were at war.

Litvinov said relationship of Soviet Government to Polish Government in exile had been discussed and Molotov had reaffirmed the desire of the Soviet Government to see an independent Poland in friendly and neighborly relations with the Soviet Union but that to its regret there seemed little possibility of obtaining such friendly relations with Polish Government in London. He added that discussion of Poland had been confined to this brief exchange of views since no concrete proposals had been submitted.

Litvinov concluded by saying that despite press reports to the contrary no frontiers had been discussed at Conference and that the question had not even been raised. He then added on his own initiative that the Soviet Government considered Soviet frontiers to be inviolable and defended only by the Red Army.

After the meeting Litvinov asked British Ambassador and myself to stay on and inquired our opinion of his talk. Clark<sup>77a</sup> said he had

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<sup>77a</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.



grave doubts as to the wisdom of being so specific in regard to Turkey since it would be all over Europe in no time, to which Litvinov replied that he thought it would be a good thing if it were known. I told him that I did not want to make any comment on desirability of his talk but that I agreed with British Ambassador on his reference to Turkey and that I felt his reference to absence of any objection on the part of Conference to unconditional surrender in specific relation to Finland would leave impression had associate [*that he had associated?*] the U.S. Government with Molotov's observation on this point. As he knew, this was not the case and such an impression might have unfortunate repercussions at home.

Although I disapproved of his uncalled for and belligerent reference to Soviet territorial claims I thought it unwise to embark on any discussion with him on this point.

It would obviously have been more appropriate if the Soviet Government had obtained agreement of British and ourselves before Litvinov held his meeting particularly as to what should or should not be disclosed; however apart from three undesirable statements mentioned above I believe that the talk to the Chiefs of Mission of the United Nations countries in Moscow served to allay suspicion in regard to the unpublished work of the Conference. I cannot however but be concerned over fact that he spoke in English to a group many of whom have only moderate command of the English language which perhaps may lead to misunderstandings and distortions in their reports.

HARRIMAN

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740.0011 Moscow/183 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 11, 1943—noon.

[Received 2:10 p. m.]

1911. Personal for the Secretary, my 1901, November 10, 5 p. m. With further reference to Litvinov's talk yesterday to the representatives of the United Nations in Moscow I should add that he prefaced his remarks by saying that he was sorry there had been a week's delay in making the information regarding the work of the Conference available and he said that this had been done in order to permit the Secretary and Mr. Eden to reach home so that they could if desired similarly inform the representatives of the United Nations in Washington and London.

The reaction of the few United Nations representatives in Moscow whom I have seen since Litvinov's meeting has been that while the

talk was totally unexpected it was well received as a friendly gesture on the part of the Soviet Union to emphasize United Nations solidarity. Litvinov's blunt statement in regard to Turkey has caused surprise and comment.

HARRIMAN

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[The text of Secretary of State Hull's address regarding the Moscow Conference, before a joint meeting of both Houses of Congress on November 18, 1943, is printed in the *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 7, page 9677; also in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1943, page 341.]

### CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

#### Conference Document No. 1

#### *Adopted Agenda*

1. The consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe. U.S.S.R.
2. General security, Four Nation Declaration. U.S.A.
3. The setting up of machinery for dealing with questions requiring current and close collaboration, with particular reference to the functions and scope of the Politico-Military Commission in Algiers. U.K.
4. Exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans. U.K.
5. Methods of dealing with current political and economic issues and those which may arise as the war progresses. U.S.A.

It was agreed that the following items would be treated as listed, but possibly some changes may be made in the order.

6. Attitude towards the French Committee with special reference to its position in Metropolitan France and establishment of eventual French Government. U.K.
7. A. Treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.
  - (a) International military, political, and economic control over Germany during the armistice period.
  - (b) Steps toward ultimate settlement future status of Ger-

- man Government, frontiers and other questions, length of armistice period. U.S.A.
- B. Agreement in principle in regard to treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.
- (a) During the armistice period, e.g. control commission etc.
- (b) At peace settlement, e.g. frontiers, military occupation, disarmament, reparations, decentralization of the German Government etc. (Austria) U.K.
8. Question of agreement between the major and minor allies on post-war questions. U.K.
9. Common policy towards Turkey. U.K.
10. Common policy in Iran. U.K.
11. Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and policy in relation to Poland generally. U.K.
12. Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan countries including the question of confederations. U.K.
13. Peace feelers from enemy States. U.K.
14. Policy regarding allied territory liberated through the advance of the allied forces. U.K.
15. Economic matters for reconstruction.
- (a) Cooperation in rehabilitation of war damage in U.S.S.R.
- (b) Joint action for assistance to other countries.
- (c) Collaboration on an international basis dealing with matters such as food and agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade, and the International Labor Office.
- (d) Question of reparations.
- (e) Any specific matters either of the other Governments may desire to bring forward. U.S.A.
16. Common policy towards resistance movement in Yugo-Slavia. U.K.
17. Question of joint responsibility for Europe as against separate areas of responsibility. U.K.

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Conference Document No. 2

[Conference Document No. 2, Soviet Military Proposals, is incorporated in the Most Secret Protocol, printed on page 770.]

**Conference Document No. 3**

[Conference Document No. 3, U. S. Draft of a Joint Four-Power Declaration, is the same as Annex No. 1 to Draft Agenda sent by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt on September 14, printed on page 522.]

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**Conference Document No. 4**

[Conference Document No. 4, Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, was made Annex 1 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 755.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 5**

*Proposal of the Soviet Delegation Concerning the Creation of a Commission of the Three Powers*

(Draft Resolution)

[Translation]

To create a Commission composed of representatives of Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union to pursue jointly the preliminary working out of the questions connected with establishing the general international organization referred to in Article 4 of the declaration of October 23, 1943.<sup>78</sup>

(Cf. item 2(b) of Secret Protocol<sup>79</sup> for discussion of this proposal.)

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 6**

*Statement by Foreign Secretary Eden on the British Proposal for the Setting Up of Machinery for Dealing With the Questions Requiring Current and Close Collaboration, With Particular Reference to the Functions and Scope of the Politico-Military Commission in Algiers<sup>79a</sup>*

In speaking of this item I should like to speak in particular of the Politico-Military Commission.

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<sup>78</sup> See p. 523.

<sup>79</sup> *Post*, p. 750.

<sup>79a</sup> Statement made during Fourth Session, October 22, 4 p. m., p. 604.

I have already circulated to the Conference a paper suggesting terms of reference for the Commission.<sup>80</sup> Since circulating it, I have been reflecting further on the question and would like to modify my proposal.

I have always thought it would be desirable to set up permanent machinery for consultation between the three powers. There is great need of such machinery and if at this Conference we can set it up we shall have made a further and important contribution to closer collaboration between us. I attach urgent importance to this question and I therefore welcomed the original Soviet proposal for a Politico-Military Commission.<sup>81</sup>

In our original conception, the Commission was to turn its attention first to Italian problems and it was to be located in Algiers. Our idea was that if, as we hoped, its scope was widened, it might move, say, to London.

In making this suggestion, we did not overlook two suggestions made by the Soviet Government.

These were first that the Commission should also deal with negotiations with other Axis satellites who might dissociate themselves from Germany, and with the question of liberated territories; and secondly that the Commission should actually direct and coordinate the work of the various organs of control in Italy.

As regards the first point, the more I think of it, the more I am convinced that the Commission should have very wide terms of reference. Indeed I think that it might be entrusted with the study of any European questions, other than military operational questions, which our three Governments might agree to refer to it. It would have an advisory character and its members would make recommendations either collectively or individually to their Governments. We should thus have a permanent body which would act as a clearing house for European problems of common interest connected with the war. This might be of the greatest service to us all.

A body with such comprehensive terms of reference could not, I think, conveniently meet at Algiers or in Italy. It would be essential that it should meet in one of the three capitals, and I should be happy if my colleagues would agree to London, which would be a convenient central place. We should be ready to welcome it there at any time.

I now come to the second Soviet proposal, namely the proposal that the Commission should take executive charge of the control machinery in Italy.

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<sup>80</sup> For the British proposals regarding the scope and functions of the Political-Military Commission, see telegram Amdel No. 8, October 12, to the American delegation in Moscow, p. 554.

<sup>81</sup> See p. 782.

This raises one or two points.

The first is a constitutional point. In view of our own system of government, we should not be able to agree that a commission of this character should itself decide questions of major policy or have executive functions. In our conception, the Commission would be advisory. It would make recommendations to Governments and the Governments would decide.

The second is a practical point. If the Commission undertook to direct the work of control in Italy, it would become local in character and would be absorbed in day-to-day affairs and would be tied to the Mediterranean area. It could not in these circumstances fulfil the wider functions which we have in mind for it.

There is a third practical point. Other machinery of an international character is in contemplation which would provide for the association of our three Governments, with some others, in the operation of the control machinery in Italy. This would not of course preclude the Commission in London from concerning itself with the Italian question in its broader aspects, if it were desired.

No final scheme has been adopted, but I will now outline the kind of scheme contemplated.

I would emphasize that our information on this subject may not be complete and that my remarks are therefore of a provisional character. Perhaps we could improve the scheme.

Briefly the plan is as follows.

Three periods are contemplated for Italy.

The first period would run from the present time until the establishment of the Italian Government in Rome. This, we hope, would be a very brief period. During this period there would be a skeleton Allied Control Commission under the Commander-in-Chief.

The second period would be from the establishment of the Italian Government in Rome until the end of the campaign in Italy or until military supervision of the Control Commission is no longer necessary. During this period the Allied Control Commission would be in full operation under the Commander-in-Chief as president. Side by side with the Allied Control Commission there would be an inter-Allied advisory council composed of High Commissioners representing the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and also, if thought fit, the French Committee, Greece and Yugoslavia. This Council would advise the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as president of the Allied Control Commission.

I think that we should all agree that during the period of military operations the Commander-in-Chief should have the final authority. The High Commissioners would also watch the interests of their own governments and nationals.

With the opening of the third period the Commander-in-Chief would relinquish the presidency of the Allied Commission of Control and the Council of High Commissioners would take over from him the executive direction of the work of control.

I return now to the Politico-Military Commission.

There remains the question of the membership of the Commission.

The first point that arises is whether the French Committee should be represented as one of the permanent members of the Commission, if it is agreed that it should have wider scope and sit in London, or whether permanent membership should be limited to the three Powers represented at this Conference, other powers having access as and when matters concerning them are discussed. I should be glad to hear the views of my colleagues on this subject.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 7

AIDE-MÉMOIRE <sup>82</sup>

*Suggested Principles Which Would Govern the Conclusion of Hostilities With the European Members of the Axis*

(British Proposal)

One. The terms to be imposed on any European member of the Axis should be presented as one comprehensive document covering all the United Nations at war with that member, and embodying the principle of unconditional surrender.

Two. If there exists a central enemy Government with which we are prepared to treat, a fully accredited representative of that Government should be associated with its Commander-in-Chief for purposes of signature; or alternatively the Armistice should not come into force until confirmed by that Government.

Three. If there is no such Government the Armistice should be signed by the enemy Commander-in-Chief only. In that case provisions which the enemy Commander-in-Chief lacks authority to execute would have to be omitted from the Armistice, which would thus be primarily a military document. Non-military provisions should so far as necessary be embodied in a Declaration or Proclamation issued by the United Nations.

Four. If there is neither an enemy Government nor Commander-in-Chief with whom we can or are prepared to treat, military

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<sup>82</sup> This *aide-mémoire* was handed by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in London and transmitted by him to the Department in telegram No. 4626, July 16, 1943, 5 p. m. (740.00119 European War, 1939/1539).

resistance would presumably be brought to an end by a series of local capitulations. It would, however, probably be desirable that the United Nations should issue a declaration stating their intentions in respect of the defeated power. This would be followed by a series of proclamations issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief containing instructions to the local authorities and population.

Five. The administration of any armistice should be placed in the hands of an inter-Allied Armistice Commission, the President to be alternately a representative of the United States, U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom. The Commission would establish its headquarters in the Axis country concerned, and would be responsible for controlling the execution of the Armistice terms; in the first place, the disarmament and demobilization of enemy armed forces, the collection and disposal of surrendered war material and other mobile property and the handing over of fortifications and other fixed property. Representatives of the Armistice Commission would be dispatched to liberated Allied territory to perform a similar task in respect of the enemy troops there located and to regulate their evacuation or internment.

Six. In the absence of an Armistice (See Paragraph Four) a Control Commission should administer the appropriate portions of the Declaration.

Seven. Any Armistice or Declaration would presumably provide for occupation, whether total or partial, of the countries concerned. In the case of Germany the exact method of organizing such an occupation should be the subject of technical discussions between the military advisers of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. in the first instance.

Eight. The United Nations Commander-in-Chief in any occupied country should have complete responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

Nine. There should be established a supervisory body entitled "United Nations Commission for Europe", composed of high ranking *political* representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., of France and the other minor European Allies, and, if so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the policing of Europe. The Commission should be situated at some convenient point on the Continent.

The Commission would act as the Supreme United Nations authority in Europe to direct and coordinate the activities of the several Armistice Commissions, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and any United Nations civilian authorities that may be established; and to deal with current problems, military, political and economic, connected with the maintenance of order.



A "Steering Committee", consisting of the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., and of France, if she recovers her greatness, should be established as the directing body of the Commission. In the "Steering Committee" the unanimity rule should apply.

Ten. It is likely that a number of civilian authorities will be set up by agreement between the United Nations, some on a world and others on a European basis. Apart from the United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration and the Inter-Governmental Committee which may emerge from the Bermuda Conference,<sup>83</sup> the establishment of a United Nations Shipping Authority and a United Nations Inland Transport Authority for Europe have been suggested. Analogous bodies may well be required to control telecommunications and propaganda, and to handle reparation and restitution and other economic problems. These authorities might, in respect of their European activities, establish their headquarters in the same city as the United Nations Commission for Europe, to whom they would be responsible and provide the necessary technical advice.

14 JULY, 1943.<sup>84</sup>

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 8

*Draft Terms of Reference of the Advisory Commission for Europe*  
(British Proposal)

An Advisory Commission for Europe will be established, composed in the first instance of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. These representatives will be assisted, where necessary, by service advisers. The Commission will meet as soon as possible in London.

The Commission will take into consideration any European questions other than military operational questions which the United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Governments agree to refer to it.

It will in particular, as a first task, establish the principles which should govern the conclusion of hostilities with the European members of the Axis and work out the practical application of those principles. It will take as a basis for its work on this subject the draft statement of principles shown in the annex.<sup>85</sup> This draft will naturally be open to amendment by the Commission in the light of experience or further study.

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<sup>83</sup> For correspondence relating to the Bermuda Conference To Consider the Refugee Problem, Hamilton, Bermuda, April 19-23, 1943, see pp. 134 ff.

<sup>84</sup> This draft differs from that dated July 1, 1943, and handed to the American and Soviet Ambassadors in London on July 2, only in the addition of the words "of America" after "United States" in paragraph 7, and in a few minor variations in punctuation.

<sup>85</sup> i. e., Conference Document No. 7, *supra*.

The members of the Commission will be supplied by their Governments with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work. They will make joint or several recommendations to their Governments but will not have power to take final decisions.

Other members of the United Nations will, at the discretion of the three Powers, be represented on the Commission when matters especially affecting their interests are under discussion.

The establishment of the Commission will not preclude other methods of consultation amongst the three Governments, on current issues. There may, for example, be questions calling for special consideration which may be more conveniently handled by tripartite discussion in one or other of the three capitals between the responsible Head of the Foreign Office and the permanent diplomatic representatives of the other two Governments. There may also be questions calling for international or special tripartite conferences.

Moscow, 24 October, 1943.

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**Conference Document No. 9**

[Conference Document No. 9, European Advisory Commission, was made Annex 2 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 756.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 10**

*Draft Terms of Reference of the Advisory Council for Italy*

(British Proposal)

An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith, composed in the first instance of the High Commissioners for Italy of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation. The High Commissioners will be assisted, where necessary, by service advisers. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible at the seat of the Headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the Governments concerned in regard to problems relating to Italy. The members of the Council will be supplied by the three Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work, and they will in their turn report on local developments. They will make joint or several recommendations to the three Governments or to the Committee of Liberation, but

will not have power to take final decisions. They will not, of course, intervene in the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The Council will attend in particular to the operation of the machinery of control in Italy. Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added to the Council when such matters are under consideration.

The Council will advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as president of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations on matters affecting its work. It will also have access to the Allied Control Commission for Italy and to such other inter-Allied bodies, whether political, economic or military, as may be established, either for the purpose of ensuring the execution of the terms for Italy or by exercising supervision in the sphere of civil affairs.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the United Kingdom and the United States Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control of the Italian administration to an end, the Commander-in-Chief will relinquish the presidency of the Control Commission, and the Advisory Council for Italy will assume the direction of the work of the Control Commission on behalf of the Governments represented on it.

Moscow, 24 October, 1943.

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**Conference Document No. 11**

[Conference Document No. 11, Advisory Council for Italy, was made Annex 3 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 758.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 12**

*Information From the Soviet Delegation Concerning the Situation in Bulgaria*

[Translation]

We are aware that the Bulgarian people are showing increasingly their dissatisfaction with the policy of the Bulgarian Government.

Following the wave of political assassinations of pro-Hitler political figures which occurred in the first part of 1943, in that country

there recently appeared partisan bands composed of peasants in the mountain regions and in particular in the Plovdiv area. In many places also there was noted active opposition on the part of the peasants to the requisitioning of agricultural products carried out by the Bulgarian authorities for the supply of the German Army.

Under the pressure of the growing opposition in the country the Minister of Internal Affairs, Gabrovski, who had particularly compromised himself by his ties with the Germans, was forced to resign upon the formation of the new Government.

The representatives of the new Government have made a number of statements to the Soviet Minister in Sofia<sup>87</sup> to the effect that the Government of Bulgaria had allegedly decided not to send any more Bulgarian troops anywhere and to remain outside of the war. They in particular affirmed that Bulgaria had not sent and would not send its troops into Albania despite the demands of the Germans. Bozhiloff,<sup>88</sup> and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kiroff, declared that they considered Bulgaria's war against England and the United States as purely symbolical. Bulgarian ruling circles have recently emphasized that Bulgaria did not take the path of cooperation with Hitler's judgment on its own will and that at the present time it is seeking ways to withdraw from the war. At the first meeting with the Soviet Minister, Bozhiloff attempted to assure him that the Bulgarian Government intended to pursue in the future a moderate policy. At the same time he stated that the Bulgarian Government was not decided to make at the present time a decisive change and to draw away from Germany since this was considered risky. We are aware that within the Bulgarian Government there has occurred sharp difference of opinion on the question of the recognition of Mussolini. Kiroff, who was formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs for a short period, opposed this recognition, but the other members of the Cabinet obviously under German pressure took a contrary decision, as a result of which Kiroff resigned.

In its internal policy the Government, according to its statements, intends to soften the regime in the country. In particular it has freed 300 to 400 political prisoners from concentration camps. It is indicative that the new Minister of Internal Affairs, Christoff, at a reception of the Bulgarian journalists on September 26, 1943, recommended to them that the press change its tone and take a more moderate position. Fascist organizations in Bulgaria, dissatisfied with the hesitations of the Government and since the growing opposition of the

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<sup>87</sup> Alexander Andreyevich Lavrishchev.

<sup>88</sup> Dobri Bojilov, Bulgarian Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.

Bulgarian people, are attempting now to unite and are increasingly placing themselves in opposition to the Government. For example, on the 22nd of September 1943 under German inspiration there was signed an agreement between the leaders of the organization of legionnaires headed by General Zhekoff<sup>89</sup> and of the organization of soldiers headed by Professor Kantardzhiev<sup>90</sup> regarding the unification of their forces.

It is essential to note that the parliamentary opposition which had several times criticized the Bulgarian Government (Mushanoff,<sup>91</sup> Stainoloff [*Stainov*]<sup>92</sup>) and others) showed themselves to be weak during the governmental crisis following the death of Czar Boris<sup>93</sup> and did not decide to utilize the anti-German sentiment in the country. On the 18th of October there took place a meeting between the regents—Kirill<sup>94</sup> and Filoff,<sup>95</sup> and Hitler, Ribbentrop<sup>96</sup> and Keitel<sup>97</sup> at which, in accordance with the preliminary information which we received, Hitler demanded from Bulgaria the introduction of general mobilization. We do not have at our disposal any more detailed information concerning this meeting of the Bulgarian regents with Hitler nor concerning the position of the Bulgarian Government thereto.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 13

*Proposal of the Soviet Union in Regard to Italy*

[Translation]

I

The Soviet Government considers it desirable in relation to Italy that our three Governments jointly declare themselves in favor of the putting into effect of the following urgent political measures:

1. Democratization of the Italian Government by means of the inclusion of representatives of Anti-Fascist parties.
2. The establishment of democratic freedoms: freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, of the press, of speech and of association of Anti-Fascist groups.

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<sup>89</sup> Gen. Nikola Chekov, Commander in Chief of the Bulgarian Army in World War I, was leader of the pro-German "Legionnaires" in Bulgaria under the German occupation in World War II.

<sup>90</sup> Assen Kantardzhiev.

<sup>91</sup> Nicholas Mushanov, former Bulgarian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; leader of the Democratic Party of Bulgaria.

<sup>92</sup> Professor Petko Stainov, of Sofia University, was pro-Russian and pro-Serbian.

<sup>93</sup> Boris III died on August 28, 1943.

<sup>94</sup> Prince Kyrill was the uncle of the young King Simeon II.

<sup>95</sup> Professor Bogdan Filoff was a former Prime Minister of Bulgaria.

<sup>96</sup> Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>97</sup> Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, German Chief of Staff.

3. The liquidation of the institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime, which up to this time have not been liquidated by the Government of Badoglio—corporations, auxiliary organizations of the Fascist Party, in particular sport organizations, etc.

4. The removal of Fascist and Pro-Fascist elements from organs of administration, institutions and social organizations.

5. Amnesty for political prisoners.

6. The creation of democratic organs of local government.

7. The arrest of the chief war criminals with their subsequent turning over to courts of justice.

## II

The Soviet Government considers it also necessary in the interest of the intensification of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany to transfer immediately to the Soviet Union from the total number of more than 100 war vessels transferred to the Allies by reason of the capitulation of Italy the following war vessels: one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines to be dispatched right away to the northern ports of the Soviet Union, and also 40,000 displacement tons of merchant ships out of the total of more than 150,000 displacement tons of ships which passed to the control of the Anglo-American armed forces as a result of the capitulation of Italy, for immediate dispatch to the Black Sea.

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### Conference Document No. 14

[Conference Document No. 14, Declaration Regarding Italy, was made Annex 4 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 759.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

### Conference Document No. 15

#### *Policy and Administration in Connection With the Military Operations in Italy*

(Joint Note by Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden)

This opportunity for a discussion of the policies which have been followed in connection with Allied military government of occupied enemy territory in Italy is very welcome as there have been many misunderstandings and some misrepresentations in connection with the policy and methods followed in dealing with the political and administrative problems resulting from military operations in Italy.

When military operations against Sicily were in the planning stage, it was obvious that a military organization linked to the invading

armies would be required to control and administer, under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, the civil population and to restore their economic life, in view of the widespread destruction of public services which would be found upon the ejection of the enemy. The military government would also be required to administer the conquered territory in such a way as to promote the military purposes and objectives of the Allied forces in their continued operations against the enemy. It was at the same time the intention to abolish the Fascist regime and some interim administrative machinery had to be prepared before an indigenous democratic regime could emerge.

General Eisenhower was instructed that the military government was to be based upon the following principles:

I. The Allied Military Government was to be essentially military and non-political. It was to serve primarily in the role of assistant to the combat troops in the military operations and therefore it could only be staffed by military personnel and be non-political in character.

II. At the same time the military occupation was to deliver the people from the Fascist regime and to restore their freedom from Axis oppression.

III. The Fascist party organization and all its auxiliaries, including the militia and youth movements, were to be immediately dissolved, the Fascist hierarchy removed from posts of authority, and the Fascist control over the machinery of administration completely eliminated. Fascist doctrine and propaganda were, of course, completely prohibited. Officials who were active members of the Fascist party were to be removed and interned.

IV. Freedom of speech and of the press in so far as military interests were not prejudiced on the grounds of security, and freedom of religious worship, were to be permitted.

V. All discriminatory laws based on the grounds of color, race or creed were to be annulled.

VI. Political prisoners were to be promptly released and the Fascist "Special Tribunals for Defense of the State" were to be abolished.

VII. The administration was to be entirely military and impartial and no organized political groups were to be associated with it.

VIII. War criminals charged by the United Nations were to be imprisoned and held subject to further action.

The Commander-in-Chief was also given guidance as to the introduction of emergency military currency, a moratorium on debts, and the impounding of enemy government and Fascist funds. In particular the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to give careful attention to the matter of sound, fair and voluntary labor relations and to fix, if necessary, the hours and wages of labor.

The instructions on the above lines were issued to General Eisenhower at the end of June and the Allied Military Government began to operate immediately upon the first occupation of Sicilian territory in July.

The Allied forces in Sicily found local and provincial government at a complete standstill. The Civil Affairs officers staffing the mili-

tary government quickly set up the local administrative authorities, operated the municipal administrations and essential local services, enforced the proclamations and orders of the military governor, issued local regulations to insure security and local order, coordinated with combat commanders requisitioning procurement and billeting and implemented generally the policy of the military administration described above. In all this activity the utmost possible use was made of local Italians commanding the confidence of the people, who were well disposed to the Allied cause and not tainted with Fascist ideas. In particular it was found possible to control and use to a large extent the non-Fascist Italian police (Carabinieri), but of course the political police (OVRA),<sup>88</sup> and the Squadristi,<sup>89</sup> were abolished and their members incarcerated.

The policy of rooting out the Fascist regime was carried thoroughly into effect. Fascist officials were removed and jailed. All Fascist organizations were disbanded. Discriminatory laws were annulled, but otherwise local customs and laws were continued in force. The urgent problem of feeding the town populations was tackled with considerable success despite the almost complete absence of transportation. For military reasons, where necessary relief supplies were distributed from stocks imported by the Allied forces.

All reports show that Allied Military Government in Sicily has fulfilled its primary objectives: (1) to facilitate military operations; (2) to root out Fascism. It has performed an essential function in reestablishing the necessary public services, thereby enabling the combat forces to perform their task with the maximum support and cooperation of the civilian population. It has also helped to make available for the common war effort the economic resources of the island.

This form of military government was extended to the Italian mainland when the Allied forces began the invasion in September.

At this juncture the general situation was transformed by the surrender of Italy and the declared intention of the Badoglio Government to assist the Allies against Germany. This was not permitted to alter the policy of the Allied Governments to enforce the terms of surrender and the Badoglio Government accepted this situation. This leaves the Allied Commander-in-Chief in absolute authority to take whatever measures may be necessary to carry out the terms imposed upon and accepted by the Badoglio Government.

The most recent developments have been the Italian declaration of war against Germany, and the acceptance by the Allies of Italy as a co-belligerent with, among other conditions, the understanding that the Italian Government should be reorganized upon a broader and

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<sup>88</sup> Organizzazione Volontaria per la Repressione dell' Antifascismo.

<sup>89</sup> Members of the Fascist "fighting squads" (Fasci di Combattimento).



more liberal basis by the inclusion of representatives of anti-Fascist political groups.

As a result of these developments it is now contemplated that Military Government will be restricted in the future to the combat zone and that elsewhere supervision and control of the Italian administration will be carried out through the agency of a Control Commission under, so long as the military situation requires, the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief.

The arrangements for giving effect to this change and for associating other interested Allied governments with the work of control are described in a separate paper entitled: "Allied Control Machinery in Italy",<sup>1</sup> dated October 21st, which was circulated by Mr. Eden at the meeting of the Conference on October 22nd.

It will be seen from the foregoing that although the administration of conquered Italian territory has hitherto necessarily been controlled by military considerations, the intention and result have already been such as to give effect in a large measure to the principles enunciated by Mr. Molotov at the meeting of the Conference on the 22nd of October.

In accordance with the proposed new arrangements for the administration of Italian territory described in the paper circulated by Mr. Eden and referred to above, it would further fall to the Council of Allied High Commissioners to formulate administrative policies for Italy.

Moscow, October 23, 1943.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 16

*Policy To Be Applied in the Administration of Conquered Territory  
in Italy*

(Joint Note by Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden)<sup>2</sup>

Moscow, October 25, 1943.

You were good enough to confirm to me on October 23rd the proposal of the Soviet Government,<sup>3</sup> which you had described at the meeting of the Conference on October 22nd for a joint declaration on the policy to be applied in the administration of conquered Italian territory.

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<sup>1</sup> Not found in Department files, but presumably this document was the basis for Annex 3 to the Secret Protocol signed at Moscow on November 1, p. 758.

<sup>2</sup> Parenthetical heading on the original, which is a copy of a note addressed by Mr. Eden to Foreign Commissar Molotov.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Molotov transmitted the text of the Soviet proposal in regard to Italy (Conference Document No. 13, p. 714) to Mr. Hull under cover of a note dated October 23, not printed.

In view of the joint responsibility of the United States and United Kingdom Governments for military operations and military government in Italy, Mr. Hull and I have thought it proper and convenient to agree together upon the following considered reply to the proposal transmitted by Your Excellency:—

The principles enunciated by the Soviet Government all derive from the basic principle which has from the outset inspired the policy and actions of the two Governments in regard to Italy, namely the extirpation of Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations.

Mr. Hull and I hope that the joint paper entitled "Policy and Administration in connexion with Military Operations in Italy,"<sup>4</sup> which we gave the Soviet Delegation on October 23rd in accordance with their request at the meeting of October 22nd, will have shown that, although the administration of conquered Italian territory has hitherto necessarily been governed by military considerations, effect has already been given in large measure to the detailed proposals set out in the Soviet Government's draft declaration.

In future, as military operations proceed, it will be possible to give full effect to the detailed proposals set out in the Soviet draft declaration. This is a matter which will naturally fall within the competence of the Advisory Council of Allied High Commissioners which it has been agreed to establish in Italy. But it is necessary to observe that so long as active military operations continue in Italy, it must be for the Commander-in-Chief to decide the timing for the introduction of certain of these proposals.

I would propose that the next step should be to refer to our Drafting Committee the Soviet Delegation's draft and these observations, with instructions to produce an agreed draft text for a declaration to be published in the name of the three Governments.

(Yours sincerely)

ANTHONY EDEN

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 17

*U.S. Proposal With Regard to Methods of Dealing With Current Political and Economic Issues and Those Which May Arise as the War Progresses*

Our proposal is that matters on which it is found desirable for the three Governments to consult should be dealt with in Moscow, London, or Washington as may be most appropriate on an *ad hoc*

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<sup>4</sup> Conference Document No. 15, *supra*.

basis by the permanent diplomatic representatives in each capital. Experts could be sent if desired to participate depending upon the character of the subjects under discussion. This is not intended to preclude the holding of international or tripartite conferences as occasion may make desirable.

(Cf. decision under item 3(a) of Secret Protocol)<sup>5</sup>

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 18**

*Memorandum From Mr. Hull With Respect to Point 5 on the Agreed Agenda*

The importance of my suggestion as to the methods for dealing with current political and economic issues arising between the three Governments will be greatly minimized if Mr. Eden's proposal relating to the Political-Military Commission is adopted. Nevertheless, there may be questions calling for the special consideration of the Heads of the three Foreign Offices, in which event the permanent diplomatic representatives of the other two Governments in the respective capitals would be called in jointly for a tripartite discussion of any subject which it may be mutually considered may be effectively dealt with in this manner. There might also be special questions calling for international or special tripartite conferences.

These matters can be taken care of as occasion demands and in the manner deemed at the moment to be most appropriate.

Moscow, October 23, 1943.

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**Conference Document No. 19**

[Conference Document No. 19, Civil Affairs for France (draft basic scheme for the administration of liberated France, as approved by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill; proposal of the U.S. and U.K.), was made Annex 5 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 760.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 20**

*U.S. Proposal With Regard to the Treatment of Germany*<sup>5a</sup>

It is proposed that, in accordance with the declarations of the principal United Nations regarding the unconditional surrender of Ger-

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<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 751.

<sup>5a</sup> With regard to this proposal, see the account in *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, pp. 1284 ff.

many, the terms of surrender to be accepted unconditionally by Germany shall be previously agreed upon jointly by the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States; and that in coming to this agreement the three Governments be guided by the following principles:

1. That an instrument be signed which contains an admission of the total defeat of Germany.
2. That the instrument be signed both by an authorized agent of whatever German Government may exercise power *de jure* or *de facto* and by an authorized agent of the military authorities.
3. That the instrument empower the United Nations to exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout Germany.
4. That the instrument bind the German Government to deliver, without reciprocity, all prisoners of war and such other nationals of United Nations states as may be held in detention.
5. That the instrument empower the United Nations to regulate the demobilization of the German armed forces.
6. That the instrument stipulate the release of the political prisoners held by the German Government, the abandonment of the concentration camps and the delivery to agents designated by the United Nations of persons who may subsequently be accused of actions within the United Nations' definition of war crimes.
7. That the instrument bind the German Government to the continued maintenance of all agencies of economic control, together with their staffs, complete records and other equipment, for subsequent disposition by the United Nations authorities.
8. That the instrument empower the United Nations to supervise the economic activities of Germany.
9. That the instrument bind the German Government to deliver, according to the stipulations of the United Nations High Command, all arms and armaments, other military and naval stores, and stocks of raw materials wherever located.

#### A.—TREATMENT OF GERMANY DURING THE ARMISTICE PERIOD

*Inter-Allied Control.* It is proposed that during the armistice period a strict international control—military, political, and economic—be maintained; and that this control be exercised through an inter-Allied Control Commission charged with the carrying out of the terms of surrender and the policies agreed upon by Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

*The Occupation of Germany.* For the purpose of securing the execution of surrender terms and assuring the creation of conditions for a permanent system of security it is recommended that the occupation of Germany be effected by contingents of British, Soviet and American forces.

*Local Government.* It is recommended that policy with respect to local government (functions, agencies, personnel) be based upon the principle of minimum interference with established mechanisms and

procedures. All Nazi government officials, in whatever capacity, should be promptly eliminated and every vestige of the Nazi regime should be uprooted.

It is recommended that effective supervision of local government be maintained by the occupation authorities and the Control Commission through the media of:

1. Mandatory and veto power over acts of key administrators.
2. Control of personnel administration.
3. Control over the administrative functions of the governmental authorities.

*Treatment of National Socialist Party.* The National Socialist Party should be dissolved forthwith. The functions of certain existing structures, such as those dealing with employment and social insurance, might be continued temporarily, subject to a thoroughgoing elimination of Nazi and other objectionable elements and to effective supervision by the occupation authorities.

*Reparations.* It is recommended that the principle be recognized that it is the duty of Germany to provide reparations for the physical damages inflicted by its armed forces upon the U.S.S.R. and other Allied and occupied countries; and that the forms, extent, and distribution of such reparations be determined through a Commission on German Reparations, consisting initially of representatives of the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, with provision for the representation of other directly interested governments.

*Disarmament.* For the purpose of providing a basis for a general security system, it is proposed that, on the cessation of hostilities:

1. All German armed forces should be disarmed and demobilized;
2. All arms, ammunition and military equipment and facilities wherever located should be surrendered to the United Nations;
3. Captured and surrendered arms should be scrapped;
4. Manufacture of war matériel should cease immediately;
5. For the armistice period at least the control of arms manufacturing facilities, as well as all economic facilities, in Germany should be transferred to the United Nations.

Among measures of permanent control of German military potential, the following are suggested for consideration:

1. Germany should be denied a standing army and military training should be prohibited;
2. The German General Staff should be disbanded and should not be reconstituted in any form;
3. The military caste system in all its phases should be eliminated;
4. Arms manufacturing facilities in Germany should be dismantled;

5. The importation and manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and materials essential to their manufacture, including all types of aircraft, should be prohibited;

6. A permanent audit and inspection system should be established and maintained under supervision of the United Nations.

#### B.—PERMANENT STATUS OF GERMANY

*Problem of German Political Unity.* At the present time there is no indication whether the effect of defeat will be to strengthen the trend towards political unity within Germany, or whether the reaction against the defeated Hitler regime will lead to emergence of a spontaneous movement for the creation of several separate states out of the territory of the present Reich. Certain vital phases of this question continue under study.

*Democratic Government.* It is the view of the American Government that, in the long run, the most desirable form of government for Germany would be a broadly based democracy operating under a bill of rights to safeguard the civil and political liberties of the individual. Among the conditions required for the success of a new democratic experiment in Germany would be: a tolerable standard of living; restriction of measures of control to the requirements of general security; harmony of policy and purpose among the British, Soviet and American Governments. Since the administration of Germany will be controlled by the inter-Allied mechanisms during the armistice period, it is during that period that the bases of a democratic regime should be laid. Early steps should be taken to restore freedom of speech, religion, and of the press, freedom to organize political parties other than of Nazi-Fascist doctrine, cultural associations and trade unions. When conditions permit, preparations should be made for the holding of free elections for the creation of a central German Government to which the occupation authorities would gradually transfer their responsibility for the internal administration of the country.

*Decentralization.* It is the view of the American Government that the potential threat of Germany to general security might be lessened through decentralization of the German political structure, through assigning to the federal units control over a wide range of administrative functions, and through encouraging any movement which may emerge within Germany in favor of the diminution of Prussian domination over the Reich.

*Frontiers.* This is a matter which should come within the purview of the general settlement.

(This document was referred to the European Advisory Commission.)

740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

## Conference Document No. 21

*Amended Draft on Austria*

(British Proposal)

Having taken counsel together in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, the Governments of the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Nazi aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the union imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15th 1938<sup>6</sup> as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves to find in association with those neighbouring States which will be faced with similar problems, that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

The Austrian people must however remember that they have a responsibility which they cannot evade, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of their own contribution to the liberation of their country.

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Conference Document No. 22

[Conference Document No. 22, Declaration on Austria, was made Annex 6 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 761.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

## Conference Document No. 23

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have addressed to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London a note, the text of which is attached, proposing that pending a final post-war settlement the two Governments should agree that neither of them will negotiate any commitments or agreements with any other European countries allied with them in the common struggle in respect of questions covering the peace settlement or the post-war period, and that the two Governments should consult one

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<sup>6</sup> For correspondence on the annexation of Austria by Germany, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 384 ff.

another whenever necessary so that observance of this agreement may harmonize with their respective and joint interests.

His Majesty's Government regard this as a "draft proposal" in connexion with Item 5 of the British agenda for the Three-Power Conference, and His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow has been instructed to propose to the Soviet Government that the matter be placed upon the agenda.

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1943.

[Enclosure]

*British Note to the Soviet Chargé Concerning Question of Agreement  
Between the Major and Minor Allies on Post-War Questions*

Referring to the *aide-mémoire* handed to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 26th July by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London and to further memorandum sent by Monsieur Sobolev on the 30th August<sup>7</sup> concerning the understanding between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.S.R. not to enter into commitments or agreements with certain other countries in Europe in respect of post-war questions, Mr. Eden has the honour, in accordance with the suggestion of the Government of the U.S.S.R., to propose for the consideration of the latter an exchange of notes between the two Governments which he suggests should be in the following terms:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, bearing in mind the obligation upon themselves and the Soviet Government under the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 26th, 1942,<sup>8</sup> to collaborate with regard to post-war matters, and having regard to the importance of securing in the final post-war settlement a just balance between rival views and claims that may be put forward by other European Governments, consider it in principle advisable that, pending that settlement, the two Governments should avoid entering into any commitments or agreements with other European countries allied with them in the common struggle relating to the period after the cessation of hostilities in Europe.

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom therefore propose that pending final post-war settlement, the two Governments should agree that neither of them will negotiate any commitments

<sup>7</sup> For texts of both memoranda, see p. 728.

<sup>8</sup> The Treaty of Alliance in the War Against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter Between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union was signed at London on May 26, 1942. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ccv, p. 353; concerning negotiations, see telegrams No. 2897 of May 24, 1942, and No. 2922 of May 26, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively.



or agreements with any other European countries allied with them in the common struggle in respect of questions covering the peace settlement or post-war period. The two Governments will consult one another whenever necessary so that observance of this agreement may harmonize with their respective and joint interests."

If the Government of the U.S.S.R. accepts this proposal, the present note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect will serve to place on formal record the understanding between the two Governments in this matter.

Mr. Eden has instructed His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow to propose to the Soviet Government that this matter should be placed upon the agenda of the Anglo-Soviet-United States Conference, which it is proposed to hold in Moscow next month.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 24

[Translation]

*The Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov)  
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 24, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As promised by me at today's meeting of our Conference, I am transmitting to you herewith the text of the Statement of the Soviet Delegation on Point 8 of the Agenda, "Question of Agreement between the Principal Allies and the Small Allies on Post-war questions".

I beg you, Mr. Secretary, to accept the assurance of my highest regards.

Appendix: as mentioned.

V. MOLOTOV

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Statement of the Soviet Delegation on Point 8 of the Agenda*

On the question of agreement between the principal Allies and the Small Allies concerning post-war questions the British Government has presented a proposal, put forward in a draft note which has been presented in the form of a proposal of the British Government regarding this point of the Agenda. According to this proposal, the British Government and the Soviet Government would conclude an agreement not to conduct negotiations concerning any obligations or agreements whatsoever with the Governments of other European

states which are their allies in the joint struggle, regarding questions relating to the post-war period.

The Soviet Government cannot give its assent to this proposal of the British Government. The Soviet Government considers that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of May 26, 1942, does not contain any conditions according to which the contracting parties must not conclude agreements with other Allied countries concerning post-war questions. The Government of Great Britain expressed agreement with this point of view, informing the Soviet Government of that in a Memorandum presented in Moscow on August 23, 1943.

The Soviet Government is prepared, in so far as that corresponds to the desires of the British Government, to conclude an agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom obligating both parties not to conclude, with governments of European states which are Allies in the common struggle against Hitlerite Germany, any agreements or treaties whatever concerning post-war questions without previous consultation or agreement.

The Soviet Government, at the same time, considers it the right of both Governments, both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, for the purpose of preserving peace and resisting aggression, to conclude agreements on post-war questions with bordering Allied states, without making that action dependent on consultation and agreement between them, in so far as agreements of such a character concern questions of the direct security of their boundaries and of the corresponding states bordering on them, as, for example, the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 25

[Translation]

*Mr. Boris Fedorovich Podtserob of the Soviet Delegation to Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the American Delegation*

Moscow, October 25, 1943.

DEAR MR. BOHLEN: In connection with the discussion which took place at the session of the Conference on October 24 concerning the "Question of Agreement between major and minor Allies on Post-war Questions", by instruction of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs I am transmitting to you, for the Secretary of State, copies of the memoranda of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain addressed to the Foreign Office on July 26 and August 30, 1943.

With sincere respect,

B. PODTSEROB

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

## MEMORANDUM

In connection with a communication of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. E. Beneš, stating that in a conversation with him Mr. A. Eden had referred to an agreement existing between the Soviet Union and Great Britain not to conclude, prior to the end of the war, any treaties on post-war problems with other European states whose territories were occupied by the Germans, and having in mind that such a statement concerning an agreement does not correspond to the facts, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to set forth the actual status of this question.

On June 9 of last year, during Mr. Molotov's stay in London, in connection with the question raised by the Yugoslav Government regarding the conclusion of a new Soviet-Yugoslav agreement, Mr. Eden proposed that the Soviet Union and Great Britain agree not to conclude treaties on post-war questions with other states in Europe whose governments are in exile, without prior mutual consultation and agreement. V. M. Molotov promised to study this question and to report to the Soviet Government concerning this proposal.

On July 15 of last year, through the Soviet Ambassador in London Mr. Eden was informed that the Soviet Government agreed in principle with his proposal, but at the same time it was pointed out that the Soviet Government would like to receive from the Government of Great Britain concrete proposals concerning this question. However, no concrete proposals from the Government of Great Britain followed subsequently, and thus the entire matter was confined to merely a preliminary exchange of views.

The Soviet Government considers it its duty to note that relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain are defined by the Treaty of May 26, 1942, which contains no obligations concerning abstention from concluding agreements with other countries on post-war questions. It goes without saying that that Treaty may serve as a basis for subsequent Anglo-Soviet agreements on these questions as well.

JULY 26, 1943.

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

## MEMORANDUM

On July 26 the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London, A. A. Sobolev, handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Eden, a memorandum setting forth the circumstances relating to Mr. Eden's proposal that the Soviet Union and Great Britain should not conclude treaties on post-war questions with other states in Europe whose gov-

ernments were outside the boundaries of their territories, without mutual consultation and agreement. The memorandum further pointed out that the Soviet Ambassador in London, I. M. Maisky, under instruction of the Soviet Government, had informed Mr. Eden in July 1942 that the Soviet Government agreed in principle with Mr. Eden's proposal, but it was pointed out at the same time that the Soviet Government would like to receive from the Government of Great Britain concrete proposals regarding this question. However, these concrete proposals were not received from the Government of Great Britain.

On August 23 of this year the Ambassador of Great Britain, Mr. Kerr, in reply to the above-mentioned memorandum of the Soviet Government, handed to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, a memorandum, in point two of which it was stated that Mr. Eden did not recall I. M. Maisky's having declared that the Soviet Government was awaiting concrete proposals on this question from the Government of Great Britain. In this connection, the Soviet Government has again checked over the data at its disposal, from which it follows that I. M. Maisky had in due course reported to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that such a statement had been made by him to Mr. Eden in July of last year.

In this memorandum it is also stated that the Government of Great Britain would be prepared to renew its proposal of June 9, that the two Governments agree together, relative to undertaking an obligation to observe a condition under which they would refrain from entering into agreement with any of the allied countries whose governments were at present in exile.

Thus, the new proposal of the Government of Great Britain likewise is only general in character and does not include any concrete points. Inasmuch as the Soviet Government had, already in July 1942, stated to the Government of Great Britain that it agreed in principle with Mr. Eden's proposal of June 9 of last year and had asked the Government of Great Britain to communicate its concrete proposals on this question, the Government of the U.S.S.R. considers it necessary again to confirm its view that it is desirable to pass from general statements to the examination of a concrete Soviet-British agreement on the above-mentioned question. Accordingly, the Soviet Government asks to have explained whether a concrete draft agreement, in the spirit of the proposal made by Mr. Eden, will be presented, for joint examination, on the part of the Government of Great Britain, to which the initiative in this question belongs.

In addition, in connection with Mr. Kerr's memorandum, the Soviet Government requests elucidation on the following question.

In Mr. Kerr's memorandum it is stated that the Government of Great Britain proposes that an agreement be made by which the two

Governments would refrain from entering into agreements with any of the above-mentioned allied countries; this proposal differs in two respects from Mr. Eden's proposal of last year. In Mr. Eden's proposal reference was made only to such agreements as deal with post-war questions. The memorandum, however, refers to agreements, without making any reservation regarding post-war questions, in this respect diverging from Mr. Eden's proposal. In Mr. Eden's proposal there was reference to the two parties agreeing not to conclude agreements of the above-mentioned character with other allied countries in Europe without mutual consultation and agreement. In the memorandum, however, it is proposed, in general, not to conclude agreements with these states, a point which likewise is in contradiction with Mr. Eden's proposal of last year.

AUGUST 30, 1943.

740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 26

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, 23 October, 1943.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency for consideration by the Conference a memorandum by the British Delegation on Persia.

2. I understand that this question,<sup>9</sup> which figures as point 10 on the draft Agenda, may be examined by the Conference at its meeting on October 24th and I trust that your delegation will be in a position to give favourable consideration to the proposal set out in the memorandum when it comes up for consideration.

Yours sincerely,

ANTHONY EDEN

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum on Persia, by the British Delegation*

1. The general policy towards Persia of the Allied Powers (Great Britain and the Soviet Union) for the duration of the war at all events, must stand the test of whether or not it conforms to the engagements which the Allies have entered into in the Tripartite Treaty.<sup>9a</sup>

2. In return for the treaty right to maintain military forces in Persia, and to use Persia's communications (subject to certain conditions of payment) in prosecution of the war against the Axis, the

<sup>9</sup> i.e., Common Policy in Iran.

<sup>9a</sup> Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and Iran, signed January 29, 1942; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249.

Allied Powers have guaranteed the territorial integrity and the independence of Persia, and have undertaken "to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Persian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war." Moreover, it is specifically provided in the Treaty that the presence of Allied military forces in Persia does not constitute a military occupation and "will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations."

3. The Government of the United States are also maintaining considerable military forces in Persian territory. While the Government of the United States are not yet in treaty relations with Persia, it is believed that they will wish to conduct their present relations with Persia in accordance with considerations and obligations similar to those set out in the immediately preceding paragraph.

4. For the period of the war, and particularly so long as the Persian supply route to Russia continues to hold its present importance, the policy of the Allies towards Persia should be directed to securing her co-operation in the United Nations war effort to her fullest capacity. Her military co-operation has not been invited (even since her declaration of war on Germany<sup>9b</sup>) except to the extent that the Allies look to the armed forces of Persia to maintain order and security within the country, and especially on the supply routes. It is in the economic and financial field that Persia can make her most useful contribution.

5. In the Tripartite Treaty, Persia has undertaken to place her system of communications at the Allies' disposal. She has done so. The Allies' next requirement has been an uninterrupted supply of currency to meet local expenditure of the Allied military forces on the development and maintenance of the supply routes to Russia. This has been secured, and the currency issue may be regarded as settled. Of secondary importance is the utilisation of Persia's capacity to supply the Allies from her natural and manufacturing resources with commodities of which the Allies themselves may be in need, for example, foodstuffs, minerals and other raw materials, arms, etc.

6. So long as Persia complies with her own Treaty engagements and so long as she grants the Allies their desiderata in the financial and economic field, there is a moral obligation on the Allies to do all they can to ensure that their utilisation of these facilities causes the least hurt to Persian economy, and, in addition, to do all in their power, having regard to the exigencies of their own situation, to safeguard the people of Persia against the privations and difficulties which the war must inevitably bring to them.

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<sup>9b</sup> September 9, 1943.

7. Benevolent treatment for Persia, to the extent of the Allies' capacity, in exchange for co-operation from Persia herself, sums up what should be Allied policy towards her during the war period.

8. It is suggested therefore that the Conference might consider the adoption of a declaration in regard to Persia in the following terms:—

“The Governments of the U.K., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., having in mind the adherence of the Government of Iran to the cause of the United Nations, rely with confidence upon the desire of the Government and people of Iran to make their contribution along the most effective lines in furtherance of the struggle against the common enemy.

The Governments of the U.K., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. undertake for their part to do all within their power to safeguard the people of Iran from the privations and difficulties which the present war must bring to them, in common with all other peoples engaged in the conflict. They further undertake to collaborate closely with each other on all issues as they arise, and to co-operate with the Government of Iran, with a view to the furtherance of the United Nations' war effort, and in the best interests of the people of Iran.”

9. It is for consideration also, whether such a declaration if adopted, should be made public.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 27

*Mr. Adrian Holman of the British Delegation to Mr.  
John D. Jernegan of the American Delegation*

Moscow, 25 October, 1943.

DEAR JERNEGAN: I enclose two copies of each of two draft Declarations with respect to Allied policy in Iran which the British Delegation wish to submit as a basis of discussion by the sub-Committee on Iran.

Copies have been sent also the Soviet Delegation.

Yours sincerely,

ADRIAN HOLMAN

[Enclosure 1]

*Draft Declaration No. 1*

“The Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom having in mind the adherence of the Government of Iran to the cause of the United Nations rely with confidence upon the de-

sire of the Government and people of Iran to make their contribution along the most effective lines in furtherance of the struggle against the common enemy.

2. The Government of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and the United Kingdom undertake for their part to do all within their power to safeguard the people of Iran from the privations and difficulties which the present war must bring to them in common with all other peoples engaged in the conflict. They further undertake to collaborate closely with each other and to cooperate with the Government of Iran on all issues as they arise with a view to the furtherance of the United Nations' war effort. They also undertake to give full moral support in any way acceptable to the Government of Iran to the efforts of the various individuals, groups and agencies, whether Iranian or foreign, which are endeavouring to relieve the existing economic difficulties of the country and to improve security through the strengthening of Iranian Governmental authority.

3. The three Governments similarly undertake to effect as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities the withdrawal or the reduction to a normal peace time establishment of such non-military Governmental organisations as are now operating in Iran in connection with the United Nations' war effort."

[Enclosure 2]

*Draft Declaration No. 2*

Under Articles 1 and 5 of the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Iran of January 29th, 1942, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran and to withdraw their forces from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is earlier.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. now desire to take this opportunity of declaring that the undertakings given to the Government of Iran in the foregoing paragraph still continue to constitute the basis of their policy towards Iran, which has in no way changed since the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty. Furthermore the two Governments affirm their intention of reducing in the meantime their military commitments in Iran as quickly as their general military situation permits.



740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

## Conference Document No. 28

*Mr. W. A. B. Iliff of the British Delegation to Mr. John D. Jernegan  
of the American Delegation*

Moscow, 25 October, 1943.

DEAR JERNEGAN: I enclose two copies of Draft Proposals for a Financial Agreement under Article IV (2) of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of January 1942, with respect to the use by the Allies of the Iranian State Railway.

The document has been prepared by the British Delegation as a basis for discussion by the sub-Committee on Persia.

Copies have been sent to the Soviet Delegation.

Yours sincerely,

W. A. B. ILIFF

[Enclosure]

*British Proposal for Financial Agreement on Allied Use of Iranian  
State Railways*

The following proposals for a Financial Agreement, under Article IV (2) of the Tripartite Treaty, covering the Allied use of the Iranian State Railways, during the period of Treaty collaboration are put forward by the British Legation, Tehran, for the consideration of the Soviet and American authorities, and as a basis for discussion.

1. The Allies should guarantee the Iranian State Railway an annual net revenue (i.e. Gross Receipts *less* operating expenses) equivalent to the annual net revenue in the year immediately preceding the Allied occupation, namely 103 millions rials.

2. The Traffic Rates to be charged by the Railway should be fixed from time to time by a Combined Rates Tribunal, to be composed of four persons, namely, a Persian, a Soviet, an American and a British representative, appointed by their respective Governments.

3. The Traffic Rates to be fixed from time to time should be no higher and no lower than may be necessary to produce the annual amount guaranteed by the Allies under 1 above.

4. To provide the railway with the funds necessary to meet its working expenses, and to enable it to pay the guaranteed net revenue to the Persian Government in monthly installments, the Allies should undertake to make monthly payments on account to the Railway Administration equivalent to 80% or 90% of their estimated traffic bills, and to pay their traffic bills in full as soon as they are rendered by the railway.

5. The Persian Government to agree that the monthly amounts payable under 4 above shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) To the Persian Ministry of Finance: Rials 8.58 millions (being  $\frac{1}{12}$ th of the annual guaranteed net revenue of 103 million rials); and

(b) In so far as the balance remaining exceeds the amount which the railway requires to finance its monthly cash requirements for operating expenses, the excess should be paid into a Suspense Account.

6. British and Russian liabilities for freight carried up to date should be discharged forthwith on the basis of 4 above, and the proceeds dealt with as in 5 above.

7. If in any month the amounts paid under 4 above were insufficient to enable the railway (a) to meet its operating expenses and (b) to earn a net revenue of not less than  $\frac{1}{12}$ th of the guaranteed annual sum under 1 above, then the sum necessary to enable the railway to do so should be transferred to the railway from the Suspense Account. If the sums to the credit of the Suspense Account were insufficient to meet this liability, the Allies would pay into it, in proportions to be agreed between them, the amount of the deficiency. The proportion might be the proportion that Russian traffic bills bear to British traffic bills, at the moment approximating 20/80.

8. The Suspense Account should be operated under Allied control.

9. The Allies should at this stage reserve full rights as to the ultimate disposal of any capital assets of the railway provided by them, or at their expense.

Moscow, 24 October, 1943.

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 29

*U.S. Proposal With Regard to Common Policy in Iran*

Moscow, October 26, 1943.

In connection with British declaration No. 1, the American members of the sub-committee on policy in Iran suggest that the third sentence of the second paragraph be amended to read as follows:

“As one means of implementing these undertakings, the three Governments will support, in collaboration with the Iranian Government, the efforts of the various foreign advisers, groups and agencies which are working with the Iranian Government to relieve the existing economic difficulties of Iran and to improve security through the strengthening of Iranian governmental authority.”

In connection with British draft declaration No. 2, the American members suggest the issuance by the Secretary of State of the United States of a parallel statement as follows:

“American military organizations in Iran consist solely of technical and administrative units, whose only function and purpose is to expedite the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union in furtherance of the war effort of the United Nations, among whom Iran is numbered. The United States has no combat units in Iran; its forces do not in any respect constitute an army of occupation, and they endeavor to interfere as little as possible with the normal life of the Iranian people. They will be withdrawn as soon as the necessity for their presence ceases to exist, and in no case will their withdrawal be later than six months after the cessation of hostilities between the United States and its enemies in the present war.”

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 30**

*Report of Sub-Committee on Iran Adopted by the Conference*

“(a) After an exchange of views, the Committee detects no fundamental difference in the policy towards Iran of any of the three Governments;

“(b) the Committee was unable to reach agreement on the expediency of making any immediate declaration or declarations with regard to Iran; and

“(c) the issue of such a declaration or declarations might be further considered by the representatives of the three Governments in Tehran, with a view to the three Governments coming to a decision about the expediency of issuing such a declaration or declarations after the signature of the proposed Irano-American Agreement and after appropriate consultation with the Government of Iran.”

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 31**

*Draft of Declaration on Joint Responsibility for Europe*

(British Proposal)

The three Governments

Fully conscious of their common responsibility as members of the United Nations, aware that once the Nazi and Fascist powers are crushed the welfare of Europe depends on the widest possible co-operation among the nations concerned, disapproving of those separate

combinations which have in the past spread jealousy and suspicion and led to economic and armed rivalries, declare:—

1. That they affirm the principle that each people is free to choose for itself its form of government and way of life, provided that it respects equally the rights of other peoples;

2. That all States are accordingly free to associate themselves with other states in order to increase their mutual welfare by the establishment of institutions on a wider scale than each can separately maintain, provided that such associations shall not be directed against the welfare or stability of any other States and are approved by any general international organization that may be set up in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Four Power Declaration adopted at . . . . . on . . . . .

3 That, subject to the considerations advanced in paragraph 2 above, they regard it as their duty and interest, so far as lies in their power, to assist other European States to form any associations designed to increase mutual welfare and the general prosperity of the Continent;

4. That for their own part they will not seek to create any separate areas of responsibility in Europe and will not recognize such for others, but rather affirm their common interest in the well-being of Europe as a whole.

(No action was taken on this document.)

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Conference Document No. 32

[Conference Document No. 32, The Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan Countries, Including the Question of Federations (Soviet Memorandum), was made Annex 7 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 762.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Conference Document No. 33

*British Draft of Resolution on Peace Feelers From Enemy Countries*

“The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. agree to inform each other immediately of any peace-feelers which they may receive from the Government of, or from any groups or individuals in, a country with which any of them is at war.

The three Governments further agree to consult together with a view to concerting their action in regard to such approaches.”

## Conference Document No. 34

[Conference Document No. 34, Resolution Concerning Peace Feelers from Enemy States, was adopted by the Conference and incorporated in the Secret Protocol under Agenda Item No. 13, page 753.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

## Conference Document No. 35

*British Draft Proposal for Moscow Conference Under Item 14 of the British Agenda*

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have discussed at their conference the question of arrangements to be made for the administration of Allied territory in Europe when it is liberated by the Allied forces from enemy occupation, and have in general established that there is an identity of views between their respective Governments on this subject.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. desire that self-government should be restored as soon as possible in all Allied territory in Europe liberated from enemy occupation. To that end it is their common policy to facilitate the resumption of authority over liberated territory by the Allied Governments concerned; or, where no such government exists, by an appropriate authority recognized as capable of exercising governmental powers pending the formation of a freely elected constitutional government.

The application of this policy must however, in the opinion of the three Governments, necessarily be conditioned by paramount military requirements, which will make it essential that there shall be a first phase in which the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces of liberation in each theatre of operations must exercise supreme authority in areas where he is conducting active military operations. During this first phase, the three Governments, having regard to the conditions of modern warfare and to the confusion that is likely to prevail in newly liberated territory, consider it indispensable that the supreme responsibility in civil as well as military affairs should *de facto* be concentrated in the hands of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This will be without prejudice to the principles—first, that this responsibility shall be transferred to the appropriate Allied authorities as soon as the progress of operations permits; and second, that the reorganized administrative and judicial services in liberated territory shall be conducted so far as possible by citizens of the Allied country in question who have shown their loyalty to the Allied cause.

(This document was referred to the European Advisory Commission)

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 36**

*U.S. Proposal on Cooperation in Rehabilitation of War Damage in the Soviet Union*

1. The people of the United States will, we believe, be disposed to cooperate fully in the rehabilitation of war damage in the U.S.S.R. It must be pointed out, however, that until the United States has successfully defeated all enemies with whom it is now engaged, any use of her resources that does not contribute directly to the victory we are seeking must be of secondary consideration. After the heavy demands of war on the productive capacity of the United States have ended, our productive capacity will be sufficiently great to enable us to play a substantial part in rehabilitation and reconstruction in the U.S.S.R. We confidently believe that mutually satisfactory arrangements can be worked out to this end.

2. The Government of the United States is prepared to conduct preliminary discussions with the Soviet Government on this subject as soon as the latter wishes to do so. Much time would be saved in the eventual delivery of the material and equipment if the magnitude, character, and engineering details and designs were worked out in the near future. It is suggested that the discussions be initiated between the Soviet representatives and the United States Mission in Moscow.

(The Conference considered it desirable that conversations on this subject be initiated between the Soviet and American Governments.)

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**Conference Document No. 37**

[Conference Document No. 37, Joint Action for Assistance to Other Countries (U.S. Proposal), was made Annex 8 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 763.]

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**Conference Document No. 38**

[Conference Document No. 38, Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation (U.S. Proposal), was made Annex 9 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 763.]

740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

## Conference Document No. 39

*U.S. Proposal With Regard to Questions of Reparations*1. *Purpose of reparations.*

We believe that reparations policy should be formulated with a view to speeding economic recovery and achieving the economic peace aims of the United Nations; that Germany should be required to contribute goods and services to the recovery of the Allied countries in so far as that (a) is acceptable to such countries, (b) does not injure third countries, and (c) can be done without so affecting Germany's living standards and productive plant as to create serious economic and political problems; and that reparations should be considered as one of a series of measures of economic reconstruction and so should be judged by the contribution they can make to the establishment of the kind of world economy desired by the United Nations.

2. *General reparations principles.*

In order to achieve the above purpose, it is suggested that reparations policy should conform to the following principles:

(a) Reparations should be imposed on Germany to the extent that, and in the forms that, they may reasonably be expected to contribute to the strengthening of the post-war world economic and political order.

(b) German reparations obligations should not be expressed in terms of money; reparations obligations should be in terms of goods and services; this would not preclude the statement of certain of Germany's reparations obligations in terms of sums of money expendable by claimant countries only within Germany for specific kinds of goods.

(c) Germany's reparations obligations should be stated in terms of specific amounts of goods or services of specific types that the claimant countries are willing to accept.

(d) The claimant countries should share in the total reparations exacted from Germany in proportion to their losses of non-military property resulting from military operations or the action of German occupation forces.

(e) The period of Germany's reparations obligations should be limited to a period coinciding as closely as possible with the time required for the first stage of European reconstruction.

(f) Reparations should not be relied on as a major instrument of control over Germany's military power.

3. *Commission on German Reparations.*

It is suggested that a Commission on German Reparations, composed initially of representatives of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States, with provision for the representation of other directly interested Governments, be established in the relatively near future. The Commission would be

guided by general principles such as those set forth above, and this would be made clear at the time the establishment of the Commission was announced. In the light of governing principles agreed upon by the Governments concerned, the main tasks of the Commission would be (a) to estimate, as soon as possible, after Germany's surrender, the total amount of reparations, broken down into kinds and amounts of specific goods and services; (b) to recommend how this total, by specific categories, should be divided among the claimant countries; and, after formal approval of the Commission's recommendations, (c) to supervise the discharge by Germany of the reparations obligations finally imposed on that country.

This discussion does not include the subject of restitution.

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**Conference Document No. 40**

[Conference Document No. 40, Declaration of German Atrocities, was made Annex 10 to the Secret Protocol; for text, see page 768.]

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**Conference Document No. 41**

[Conference Document No. 41, Resolution Concerning Mutual Exchange of Military Information, was adopted by the Conference and incorporated in the Secret Protocol under Agenda Item No. 19, page 755.]

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740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

**Conference Document No. 42**

*Anglo-Soviet-American Communiqué on the Conference in Moscow of the Three Foreign Secretaries*

The Conference of Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, and of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. M. Molotov, took place at Moscow from the 19th to the 30th of October 1943. There were twelve meetings.

In addition to the Foreign Secretaries the following took part in the Conference:

*For the United States of America:*

Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the United States,  
Major General John R. Deane, United States Army,  
Mr. Green H. Hackworth,  
Mr. James C. Dunn,  
and experts.



*For the United Kingdom:*

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, His Majesty's Ambassador.  
 Mr. William Strang,  
 Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay,  
 and experts.

*For the Soviet Union:*

Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union,  
 Mr. A. Y. Vyshinski, } Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign  
 Mr. M. M. Litvinov, } Affairs,  
 Mr. V. A. Sergejev, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign  
 Trade,  
 Major-General A. A. Gryslor, of the General Staff,  
 Mr. G. F. Saksin, Senior Official of the People's Commissariat for  
 Foreign Affairs,  
 and experts.

The agenda included all the questions submitted for discussion by the three Governments. Some of the questions called for final decisions and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion, decisions of principle were taken: these questions were referred for detailed consideration to commissions specially set up for the purpose, or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions again were disposed of by an exchange of views.

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been in close cooperation in all matters concerning the common war effort. But this is the first time that the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments have been able to meet together in conference.

In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers, representing the respective Chiefs of Staff, in order to discuss definite military operations, with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared, and in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation in the future between the three countries.

Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the unanimous recognition by the three Governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese Government joined during the Conference and which was signed by

the three Foreign Secretaries and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of their governments. This declaration, published today, provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war. It sets forth the principles upon which the four governments agree that a broad system of international cooperation and security should be based. Provision is made for the inclusion of all other peace-loving nations, great and small, in this system.

The Conference agreed to set up machinery for ensuring the closest cooperation between the three Governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops. For this purpose the Conference decided to establish in London a European Advisory Commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three Governments.

Provision was made for continuing, when necessary, tripartite consultations of representatives of the three Governments in the respective capitals through the existing diplomatic channels.

The Conference also agreed to establish an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy, to be composed in the first instance of representatives of their three governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for the addition to this council of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This Council will deal with day-to-day questions, other than military operations, and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm, by a declaration published today, the attitude of their Governments in favor of restoration of democracy in Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries declared it to be the purpose of their Governments to restore the independence of Austria. At the same time they reminded Austria that in the final settlement account will be taken of efforts that Austria may make towards its own liberation. The declaration on Austria is published today.

The Foreign Secretaries issued at the Conference a declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin containing a solemn warning that at the time of granting any armistice to any German Government those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have had any connection with atrocities and executions in countries overrun by German forces will be taken back to the countries in which their abominable crimes were com-

mitted to be charged and punished according to the laws of those countries.

In the atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding which characterized all the work of the Conference, consideration was also given to other important questions. These included not only questions of a current nature, but also questions concerning the treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, economic cooperation and the assurance of general peace.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE BUT NOT LISTED AS  
CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

Document No. 43

*The Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the  
Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

[Translation]

Moscow, October 23, 1943.

DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: Recently negotiations have been carried on between the Soviet Government and the Government of Czechoslovakia concerning the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and post-war cooperation.

As result of these negotiations a draft of this treaty has been agreed upon in its entirety by the two Governments.

I would appreciate it if you would transmit to the Government of the United States for its information the enclosed draft for the "Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and post-war cooperation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia."

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Draft Text of Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty*

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, AND POST-WAR COOPERATION  
BETWEEN THE USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic, desiring to modify and supplement the Treaty of mutual assistance existing between the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Czechoslovakian Republic and signed in Prague on May

16, 1935,<sup>10</sup> and to confirm the terms of the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Czechoslovakian Republic concerning joint action in the war against Germany, signed July 18, 1941, in London,<sup>11</sup> desiring to cooperate after the war to maintain peace and to prevent further aggression on the part of Germany and to assure permanent friendship and peaceful post-war cooperation between them, have resolved to conclude for this purpose a treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,

The President of the Czechoslovakian Republic—Mr. Zdenek Fierlinger, Ambassador of the Czechoslovakian Republic in the Soviet Union,

who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed to the following:

#### ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties, having agreed mutually to join in a policy of permanent friendship and friendly post-war cooperation, as well as of mutual assistance, engage to extend to each other military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Germany and against all those States which are associated with it in acts of aggression in Europe.

#### ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties engage not to enter during the period of the present war into any negotiations with the Hitler Government or with any other Government in Germany which does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to carry on negotiations and not to conclude without mutual agreement any armistice or other treaty of peace with Germany or with any other State associated with it in acts of aggression in Europe.

#### ARTICLE 3

Affirming their pre-war policy of peace and mutual assistance, expressed in the treaty signed at Prague on May 16, 1935, the High Contracting Parties, in case one of them in the period after the war should become involved in military action with Germany, which might resume its policy of "Drang nach Osten", or with any other

<sup>10</sup> For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLIX, p. 347.

<sup>11</sup> For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 754.

State which might join with it directly or in any other form in such a war, will immediately extend to the other Contracting Party thus involved in military action all manner of military and other support and assistance at its disposal.

#### ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the security interests of each of them, agree to close and friendly cooperation in the period after the restoration of peace and agree to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, as well as of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State. They agree to develop their economic relations to the fullest possible extent and to extend to each other all possible economic assistance after the war.

#### ARTICLE 5

Each of the High Contracting Parties engages not to conclude any alliances and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

#### ARTICLE 6

The present Treaty shall come into force immediately after signature and shall be ratified within the shortest possible time; the exchange of ratifications will take place in Moscow as soon as possible.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years from the date of signature, and if one of the High Contracting Parties at the end of this period of twenty years does not give notice of its desire to terminate the treaty twelve months before its expiration, it will continue to remain in force for five years, unless one of the High Contracting Parties gives notice in writing twelve months before the expiration of the five-year period of its intention to terminate it.

Done in two copies at Moscow . . . . ., 1943 in Russian and in Czechoslovak, both texts having the same authenticity."

A protocol at the time of signature will introduce the following point:

"The Parties undertake that, in the event that any third country bordering on the USSR or Czechoslovakia and constituting in this war an object of German aggression desires to subscribe to this Treaty, it will be given the opportunity, upon the joint agreement of the Governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, to sign this treaty, which will thus acquire the character of a tripartite agreement."<sup>11a</sup>

<sup>11a</sup> For the signature of this treaty in Moscow on December 12, and remarks concerning it, see vol. III, pp. 726-734.

740.0011 Moscow/10-1943

## Document No. 44

MARCH 9, 1943.

*U.S. Draft of a Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence*

In the Declaration signed on January 1, 1942,<sup>11b</sup> the United Nations pledged themselves to a complete victory in this war for the preservation of liberty, independence, human rights and justice. They also proclaimed their resolve to attain, for themselves and for the human race as a whole, the objectives stated in the Joint Declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill dated August 14, 1941, known—from the region in which it was formulated—as the Atlantic Charter.<sup>11c</sup> That Charter sets forth certain fundamental principles and purposes, applicable to all nations and to all peoples, among which are the following:

Respect for the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live;

Restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; and

Establishment of a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

By their adoption of the Atlantic Charter as an integral part of the Declaration of January 1, 1942, the 31 United Nations have thus affirmed their determination that the independence of those nations which now possess independence shall be maintained; that the independence of those nations which have been forcibly deprived of independence shall be restored; that opportunity to achieve independence for those peoples who aspire to independence shall be preserved, respected, and made more effective; and that, in general, resolute efforts will be made to create a system of world security which will provide for all nations and all peoples greater assurance of stable peace and greater facilities for material advancement.

The carrying out of these pledges imposes important responsibilities upon those peoples who possess or who are seeking to regain independence and upon all peoples who aspire to independent status. The particular pledge that peoples who aspire to independence shall be given an opportunity to acquire independent status is, therefore, in varying degrees, of concern to all of the United Nations and to all nations and peoples which now, or which may hereafter, cooperate in carrying forward and applying the provisions of the Atlantic Charter.

<sup>11b</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. I, p. 25.

<sup>11c</sup> *Ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

The effectuation of that pledge requires that all such nations and peoples collaborate to that end with each other to the fullest practicable extent. Accordingly, the United Nations hereby make the following DECLARATION:

1. It is the duty and the purpose of those of the United Nations which have, owing to past events, become charged with responsibilities for the future of colonial areas to cooperate fully with the peoples of such areas toward their becoming qualified for independent national status. While some colonial peoples are far advanced along this road, the development and resources of others are not yet such as to enable them to assume and discharge the responsibilities of government without danger to themselves and to others. It is, accordingly, the duty and the purpose of each nation having political ties with colonial peoples:

*a.* To give its colonial peoples protection, encouragement, moral support and material aid and to make continuous efforts toward their political, economic, social, and educational advancement;

*b.* To make available to qualified persons among the colonial peoples to the fullest possible extent positions in the various branches of the local governmental organization;

*c.* To grant progressively to the colonial peoples such measures of self-government as they are capable of maintaining in the light of the various stages of their development toward independence;

*d.* To fix, at the earliest practicable moments, dates upon which the colonial peoples shall be accorded the status of full independence within a system of general security; and

*e.* To pursue policies under which the natural resources of colonial territories shall be developed, organized and marketed in the interest of the peoples concerned and of the world as a whole.

2. It is incumbent upon all peoples that aspire to independence to exert themselves in every feasible way to prepare and equip themselves for independence—socially, economically, and politically—to the end that they may, as soon as possible, be able to create, conduct and maintain, for, by and of themselves, efficient structures of stable self-government based on sound principles of social and political morality. In the present moment of world emergency, the capacity and desire of such peoples for the enjoyment of freedom can best be demonstrated by their contribution now toward the defeat of the Axis foes of all freedom and independence.

3. The carrying out of the policies above declared will necessarily call for much and continuous consultation and collaboration between and among the nations which are directly responsible for the future of various colonial areas and other nations which have substantial interests in the regions in which such areas are located. In order to provide an effective medium for such consultation and collabora-

tion, there shall be created in each region, by agreement of the nations thus concerned, a commission on which each of those nations shall be represented and in the work of which the various colonial peoples concerned shall have appropriate opportunity to participate and to have or to achieve representation.

4. As a result of the last war, peoples in several areas still unprepared for full independence were released from political ties with nations formerly responsible for them. Other peoples in like status may be similarly released from their former political ties as a result of this war. It is the purpose of the United Nations to assume with respect to all such peoples a special responsibility, analogous to that of a trustee or fiduciary. The United Nations hereby recognize it as their duty to give the fullest cooperation to such peoples in their efforts to prepare themselves for independence through political, economic, social, and moral advancement—and eventually to arrange for their assumption of independent status. To this end, they recognize it as their duty to observe in the case of such peoples each of the policies, obligations and methods hereinbefore set forth for observance by independent countries toward their own colonial peoples.

5. In order to carry out effectively the purposes and functions described in the preceding paragraph, the United Nations propose to establish, as soon as circumstances permit, an International Trusteeship Administration composed of representatives of the United Nations and of all other nations which now, or which may hereafter, cooperate in carrying forward and applying the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. The Administration will operate through regional councils composed of representatives of the nations having major interests in the respective regions. The machinery of each council will be so designed as to give the peoples of the territories held in trust in its region full opportunity to be associated with its work.

#### PROTOCOLS OF THE CONFERENCE

740.0011 Moscow/340

*Protocol, Signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943*

#### SECRET PROTOCOL

of the Conference attended by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, V. M. Molotov, which was held in Moscow from the 19th to the 30th October, 1943.



## The following took part in the Conference :

U.S.A.	Mr. Harriman Major General Deane Mr. Hackworth Mr. Dunn Mr. Bohlen and experts
U.K.	Sir A. Clark Kerr Mr. Strang Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay Mr. Wilson and experts
Soviet Union	Marshal Voroshilov Mr. Vyshinski Mr. Litvinov Mr. Sergeev Major General Gryzlov Mr. Saksin and experts

## AGENDA

1. Consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Hitlerite Germany and her Allies in Europe.

(Proposed by U.S.S.R.)

2. (a) Four-Nations Declaration concerning general security.

(Proposed by U.S.A.)

(b) The establishment of a Commission of the three Powers.

(Proposed by U.S.S.R.)

See the Most Secret Protocol of the Conference.<sup>12</sup>

(a) The text of a declaration was agreed. The Declaration was signed on October 30th. (see annex 1).

(b) It was recognised as desirable that representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should conduct, in a preliminary fashion, an exchange of views on questions connected with the establishment of an international organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security, the intention being that this work should be carried out in the first instance in Washington, and also in London and Moscow.<sup>12a</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Post*, p. 770.

<sup>12a</sup> For further documentation on this subject, see bracketed note, p. 1050.

3. The setting up of machinery for dealing with questions requiring current and close collaboration, with particular reference to the functions and scope of the Politico-Military Commission in Algiers.

(Proposed by U.K.)

4. Exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans.

(Proposed by U.K.)

(a) Information about the position in Italy and the Balkans.

(b) Proposal of the U.S.S.R. about policy in regard to Italy.

(c) Proposal of the Soviet Government as regards the transfer to the Soviet Union of part of the Italian Navy (one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines) and of the Merchant Fleet (to a total of 40,000 tons) which was at the disposal of the Anglo-American forces as a result of the capitulation of Italy.

5. Methods of dealing with current political and economic issues and those which may arise as the war progresses.

(Proposed by U.S.A.)

6. Attitude towards the French Committee with special reference to its position in Metropolitan France and the establishment of eventual French government.

(Proposed by U.K.)

(a) It was decided to set up a European Advisory Commission in London (see annex 2).

(b) It was decided to set up an Advisory Council for Italy (see annex 3).

(a) A written and oral exchange of information took place.

(b) The text of a declaration was adopted (see annex 4).

(c) Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull did not raise any objection to the proposal of the Soviet Government but reserved their final answer.

See the decision under point 3(a).

An exchange of views took place upon the document presented to the Conference by the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.K.: "Basic scheme for Administration of liberated France" (see annex 5).\*

In connection with questions put by the Soviet Delegation and observations made by them, the

\* The American title of this document is "Civil Affairs for France". [Footnote in the original.]

7. A. Treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.

(a) International military, political, and economic control over Germany during the armistice period.

(b) Steps toward ultimate settlement of future status of German Government, frontiers and other questions, length of armistice period.

(Proposed by U.S.A.)

B. Agreement in principle in regard to treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.

(a) During the armistice period, e.g. control commission, etc.

(b) At peace settlement, e.g. frontiers, military occupation, disarmament, reparations, decentralization of the German Government etc. (Austria)

(Proposed by U.K.)

8. Question of agreements between the major and minor Allies on post-war questions.

(Proposed by U.K.)

9. Common policy towards Turkey.

(Proposed by U.K.)

10. Common policy in Persia.

(Proposed by U.K.)

document in question was referred for examination to the European Advisory Commission.

An exchange of views took place, which showed identity of view on the main questions.

The question was referred for detailed study to the European Advisory Commission.

(b) The text of a declaration about Austria was adopted (see annex 6).

An exchange of views took place. Note was taken of Mr. Eden's statement that he had no objection to the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, the draft of which had been communicated to him.

The question was considered in the discussion on point 1.

The following proposal, which was worked out by a committee appointed by the Conference, was accepted: "(a) After an exchange of views, the Committee detects no fundamental difference in the policy towards Iran of any

of the three Governments; (b) the Committee was unable to reach agreement on the expediency of making any immediate declaration or declarations with regard to Iran; and (c) the issue of such a declaration or declarations might be further considered by the representatives of the three Governments in Tehran, with a view to the three Governments coming to a decision about the expediency of issuing such a declaration or declarations after the signature of the proposed Irano - American Agreement<sup>13</sup> and after appropriate consultation with the Government of Iran."

An exchange of views took place.

11. Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and policy in relation to Poland generally.

(Proposed by U.K.)

12. Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan countries, including the question of confederations.

(Proposed by U.K.)

13. Peace feelers from enemy states.

(Proposed by U.K.)

An exchange of views took place. Note was taken of the statement of the Soviet Delegation (see annex 7).

An exchange of views took place. The following resolution was adopted on the line to be taken in the event of peace-feelers being received from enemy countries:

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union agree to inform each other immediately of any peace-feelers which they may receive from the Government of, or from any groups or individuals in, a country with which any one of the

<sup>13</sup> For correspondence on proposed agreement covering the presence of American troops in Iran, see vol. iv, pp. 453 ff.

14. Policy regarding Allied territory liberated through the advance of the Allied forces.

(Proposed by U.K.)

15. A. Post-war economic cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

(Proposed by U.K.)

B. Economic matters for reconstruction.

(Proposed by U.S.A.)

(a) Cooperation in the rehabilitation of war damage in the U.S.S.R.

(b) Joint action for assistance to other countries.

(c) Collaboration on an international basis dealing with matters such as food and agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade, and the International Labor Office.

(d) Questions of reparations.

16. Common policy towards resistance movements in Yugoslavia.

(Proposed by U.K.)

three countries is at war. The three Governments further agree to consult together with a view to concerting their action in regard to such approaches."<sup>13a</sup>

An exchange of views took place. The question was referred to the European Advisory Commission.

It was considered necessary to continue the examination of the questions raised.

(a) It was considered desirable to start conversations between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(b) The statement of the United States Secretary of State on paragraph (b) "Joint action for assistance to other countries" is attached to this Protocol (see annex 8).

(c) The memorandum of the United States Secretary of State on paragraph (c) "Bases of our program for international economic collaboration" is attached to this Protocol (see annex 9).

(d) An exchange of views took place in the course of which there was some difference of opinion on some points in the memorandum which had been put forward.

This question was removed from the Agenda of the Conference at the suggestion of Mr. Eden.

<sup>13a</sup> For further documentation on this subject, see pp. 484 ff.

17. Question of joint responsibility for Europe as against separate areas of responsibility.

(Proposed by U.K.)

18. Declaration about the responsibility of the Hitlerites for atrocities.

(Proposed by U.K.)

19. Mutual exchange of military information.

(Proposed by U.K.)

20. Publication of Conference documents.

Signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943.

CORDELL HULL  
V. MOLOTOV  
ANTHONY EDEN

#### ANNEX 1

#### *Declaration of Four Nations on General Security*

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China;

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

This was dealt with under point 12 of the Agenda.

The text of a declaration was adopted (see annex 10).

The following resolution was adopted: "It is agreed that in order to ensure that all information regarding the common enemy is available to all the Allies engaged in his destruction, the Allies should keep each other mutually and constantly informed of all technical military information reaching them regarding the German Army, Navy and Air Force, the fighting value of enemy formations and the tactics used."

It was decided to publish the documents reproduced in annexes 1, 4, 6, and 10 to the present Protocol.

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purposes of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

#### ANNEX 2

#### *European Advisory Commission*<sup>13b</sup>

1. The Governments of the United Kingdom, United States of America and the Soviet Union agree to establish a European Advisory Commission composed of representatives of the three Powers. The Commission will have its seat in London and will meet as soon as possible. The presidency will be held in rotation by the representa-

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<sup>13b</sup> For further documentation on this subject, see pp. 801 ff.

tives of the three Powers. A joint secretariat will be established. The representatives may be assisted where necessary by technical advisers, civilian and military.

2. The Commission will study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities which the three Governments may consider appropriate to refer to it. For this purpose the members of the Commission will be supplied by their Governments with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work.

3. As one of the Commission's first tasks the three Governments desire that it shall as soon as possible make detailed recommendations to them upon the terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European states with which any of the three Powers are at war, and upon the machinery required to ensure the fulfillment of those terms. The Commission will take into account, as part of the material for its study of these matters, the memorandum of July 1st,<sup>14</sup> circulated by the United Kingdom Government to the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, regarding the principles which should govern the conclusion of hostilities with European enemy States. The Commission will also take account of the experience already gained in the imposition and enforcement of unconditional surrender upon Italy.<sup>15</sup>

4. Representatives of the Governments of other United Nations will, at the discretion of the Commission, be invited to take part in meetings of the Commission when matters especially affecting their interests are under discussion.

5. The foregoing terms of reference will be subject to review by the three Governments if circumstances should arise which call for an extension of the membership and competence of the Commission.

6. The establishment of the Commission will not preclude other methods of consultation on current or other issues which the three Governments think it desirable to discuss. There may for example be questions calling for special consideration. These questions may be handled by tripartite discussions in one or other of the three capitals (Washington, London, or Moscow, as may be found most convenient) between the head of the Foreign Ministry and the permanent diplomatic representatives of the other two Governments.

7. There may also be questions calling for international or special tripartite conferences.

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<sup>14</sup> See Conference Document No. 7, p. 708, and footnote 84, p. 710.

<sup>15</sup> See vol. II, pp. 314 ff.



## ANNEX 3

*Advisory Council for Italy*

1. An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith, composed in the first instance of Representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation. Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added as full members of the Council as soon as practicable, in view of the special interests of these two countries arising from the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war.

2. Each Representative will be assisted, where necessary, by a small staff of technical advisers, civilian and military. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible in Italy at the same place as the Headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3. The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation in regard to problems relating to Italy, other than military operational questions. The members of the Council will be supplied by the respective Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work. They will make joint or several recommendations to their Governments or to the French Committee, but will not have power to take final decisions. They will not, of course, concern themselves with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

4. The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy which will be enforcing the terms of surrender.

5. The Council will advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander-in-Chief as President of the Control Commission and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations on matters affecting the Council's work. It will maintain close touch with such other technical inter-Allied bodies as may be established in Italy and will be entitled to obtain information and explanations from them on matters affecting its work.

6. The Allied Commander-in-Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the United Kingdom and the United States Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

7. When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control of the Italian administration

to an end, the Commander-in-Chief will relinquish the presidency of the Allied Control Commission. The Advisory Council for Italy will thereupon assume the direction of the work of the Allied Control Commission.

## ANNEX 4

*Declaration Regarding Italy*

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In the furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:—

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organisations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from the institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instruc-

tions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The three Governments parties to this declaration will at the request of any one of them consult on this matter.

It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

#### ANNEX 5

#### *Civil Affairs for France*

The primary purpose of the Allied landing in France will be the defeat of Germany. Subject only to this, it will be the object of the Allied forces to bring about the earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors, and the creation of conditions in which a democratically constituted French authority may be able to assume the civil administration. The ultimate aim of the Allies is the free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of Government under which they wish to live. Meanwhile and until this stage is reached, the largest measure of personal and political liberty compatible with military security shall be restored to the French people. As far as the over-riding interests of military operations allow, there shall be freedom of speech, of opinion, of the press and of correspondence. The French flag shall be used on French public buildings.

With these considerations in mind, the following principles may be laid down as governing the civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities.

1. In all liberated areas the Supreme Allied Commander must, so long as and in so far as military necessity requires, have supreme authority in order that the prosecution of the war against Germany may continue unhampered.

2. The civil administration under the Supreme Allied Commander shall, as far as possible, be conducted by French citizens. The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander from the French contingent or French Liaison Mission connected with the military operations in France.

3. The two Governments will inform the French Committee of National Liberation that the Supreme Allied Commander will invite the French military authorities to appoint a military mission on civil affairs to his headquarters. The Supreme Allied Commander shall in the planning of civil affairs consult the French military authorities appointed to assist in this work and give consideration to the policies recommended by them. When operations start, the French Military Liaison Mission shall be associated in the direction of civil affairs.

4. Military control of civil affairs will be of as short duration as is practicable. The time of termination of military control will be decided by C.C.S.<sup>16</sup> on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander.

5. If circumstances permit, the transfer of civil responsibility to French hands may be progressive.

6. In order to achieve the eventual aim of free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of government under which they wish to live, the Supreme Allied Commander shall do his best to hold the scales even between all French political groups sympathetic to the Allied cause.

7. One of the first tasks of civil affairs staff of the Supreme Allied Commander on entering French territory will be to establish relations with resistance groups within France and to secure their cooperation in civil matters.

8. The Supreme Allied Commander shall have no dealings or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of liquidating it. He will not retain or employ in any office any person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has deliberately acted in a manner hostile to the Allied cause.

#### ANNEX 6

##### *Declaration on Austria*

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15th, 1938,<sup>17</sup> as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

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<sup>16</sup> Combined Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>17</sup> For correspondence on the annexation of Austria by Germany, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 384 ff.

## ANNEX 7

*The Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan Countries, Including the Question of Federations*<sup>18</sup>

The Soviet Government consider the liberation of small countries and the restoration of their independence and sovereignty as one of the most important tasks in the post-war arrangement of Europe and in the creation of lasting peace. For this purpose the defeat of aggressive force, as a result of the victory of the Allies and the removal of the threat of new aggression, at any rate in the first years after the war, will create favorable conditions. The Soviet Government consider that the small countries will require some time, which cannot yet be definitely calculated and which will not be the same for all of them, to enable them fully to orientate themselves in the new situation created as a result of the war and in the re-created relationships with neighboring and other States, without being subjected to any outside pressure to join this or that new grouping of states. The premature and possibly artificial attachment of these countries to theoretically planned groupings would be full of danger both for the small countries themselves, as well as for the future peaceful development of Europe. Such an important step as federation with other states and the possible renunciation of part of their sovereignty is admissible only as a result of a free, peaceful and well-considered expression of the will of the people. It is to be feared that neither the existing *émigré* governments nor even the governments which will be set up immediately after the conclusion of peace under conditions still not sufficiently normal, will be able fully to ensure the expression of the real will and permanent aspirations of their people. The creation of such federations by the decisions of *émigré* governments, which, in virtue of their special situation, cannot be closely bound with their people, might be interpreted as imposing on the people decisions not in conformity with their wishes. It would be particularly unjust if countries which had become satellites of Hitlerite Germany should at once be placed, as equal members of any such federation, in conditions as favorable as those of other small states which had been the victims of attack and occupation at the hands, among others, of those same satellites, and thus freed from the consequences of their part in the Hitler-Mussolini crimes.

Moreover, some of the plans for federations remind the Soviet people of the policy of the "cordon sanitaire", directed as is known, against the Soviet Union and therefore viewed unfavorably by the Soviet people.

For these reasons the Soviet Government consider it premature from the point of view of the interests both of the small countries

<sup>18</sup> A statement by the Soviet delegation.

themselves, and of the general post-war settlement of Europe, now to plan and thus artificially to encourage combinations of any states in the form of federations and so forth. They will in due course be ready to re-examine this question in the light of the experience of post-war cooperation with other United Nations and of the circumstances which may arise after the war.

#### ANNEX 8

##### *Joint Action for Assistance to Other Countries*<sup>19</sup>

1. In the immediate post-war period, the most urgent matters of relief and rehabilitation in third countries presumably will be taken care of on a cooperative basis, mainly through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

2. We believe that it would be desirable to have the longer-range work of reconstruction dealt with on a cooperative, joint-action basis. In this connection, economic and financial experts of the United States have given preliminary study to the possibility of setting up an international lending agency which would supplement the facilities which may be offered by private investors, private financial institutions, and governmental lending agencies.

3. The important question of the amount of aid for rehabilitation from the long-range viewpoint will of course have to be determined, from time to time in the future, by each Government in the light of developments relating to the ability of a given nation to render material aid, while at the same time receiving the necessary support of public opinion.

#### ANNEX 9

##### *Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation*<sup>19</sup>

The basic objective of our economic policy is to help create conditions which would enable each country after the war to restore its economic activity as rapidly and as effectively as possible, and thereafter to improve progressively its production, distribution, employment and living standards. All this requires a large measure of international cooperation in many directions.

The first obvious steps, some of which will need to be undertaken even before the attainment of complete victory, relate to international cooperation in providing relief and to cooperative arrangements for the handling of economic problems involved in the occupation of

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<sup>19</sup> Memorandum presented by the Secretary of State.

enemy territories and operations in liberated countries. Arrangements required for these purposes are now under way through the negotiations looking to the convocation of a United Nations Conference on Relief and Rehabilitation and through such measures as the creation of the Mediterranean Commission.

Beyond these steps, international cooperation in the economic field will be indispensable for the following purposes:

1. *Bringing about an expansion of international trade on a non-discriminatory basis.* To this end we believe that consideration needs to be given to the following:

The conclusion of a general convention to which all of the important countries of the world would be parties, which would lay down the rules and principles that should govern trade relations between nations. Such a convention would contain provisions whereby each country would abstain from practices such as nations in the past have adopted in a futile attempt to benefit themselves at the expense of world trade and the welfare of other nations. It would make provision for concrete steps whereby the participating countries would abandon preferences and discriminations, reduce their trade barriers and refrain from export dumping practices. The agreement or agreements would be so drawn as to enable a state-trading country to adhere on an equitable basis.

2. *The orderly regulation and ultimately the elimination of arrangements, public or private, to restrict production and trade in individual commodities.* To this end we believe that consideration should be given the following:

a. The conclusion of special international agreements relating primarily to the marketing of commodities in chronic over-supply or subject to extreme variation in prices.

b. International arrangements for the regulation of cartel activities.

3. *The establishment of stable foreign exchange rates and of the interchangeability of currencies.* To this end discussions are now in progress among the United Nations looking to the creation of an International Stabilization Fund.

4. *Promotion of the development of resources and industries wherever international assistance is necessary for this purpose.* To this end consideration is being given to the possibility of creating appropriate international investment agencies and other improved facilities for international investment and for exchange of technical information and personnel.

5. *Improvement of facilities for shipping, air traffic and other means of transportation.* This will involve:

a. International consideration of the reestablishment of the merchant fleets of the world, the adjustment of ship-building activity, and related topics.

b. International agreement on all aspects of commercial aviation, including passenger and freight traffic arrangements, landing rights, rights of transit, exchange of technical information, questions of subsidization.

c. Similar international discussions regarding problems involved in the improvement of other transportation facilities.

6. *Improvement of means of telecommunication.* This will require the extension of international collaboration already existing in this sphere.

7. *Improvement of nutrition and consumption in general.* The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18 to June 3, 1943,<sup>20</sup> laid the foundation for international collaboration in this field with regard to the consumption of agricultural products. This work is being carried forward by the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. It looks forward to the promotion of appropriate domestic policies for each country and to the establishment of a permanent international organization in this field.

8. *Improvement of labor standards and conditions.* This involves primarily development of the work which has been well carried on by the International Labor Organization.

It is clear that in connection with most of these subjects there will be need for organized discussions among the United Nations, both informal and in formal conferences. We believe that the time has come for the establishment of a Commission comprising representatives of the principal United Nations and possibly certain others of the United Nations for the joint planning of the best procedures to be followed in these matters. Such a Commission might consist of technical economic experts of the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China, and possibly certain other countries such as Canada, the Netherlands and Brazil.

Even before the establishment of such a Commission we believe it to be of the greatest importance that our government and the governments of each of the major United Nations should confer with each other on the technical level as freely and as promptly as possible with the view to exploring the problems which are bound to confront them and the world.

The Government of the United States has recently addressed an invitation to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to send to Washington a group of economic experts to engage in discussions with our experts of matters relating to Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement. Similar invitations were extended to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of China.

In response to this invitation, the British Government has sent such a group of experts to Washington, and as a result a most fruitful informal interchange of views has taken place between us on many topics of basic importance in the fields of monetary stabilization, international investment, commercial policy, commodity arrangements

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<sup>20</sup> For correspondence relating to this Conference, see pp. 820 ff.



and related questions.\* These conversations provided an opportunity to discover the extent to which there is common ground and the extent to which there are differences of importance in the points of view of those whose expert advice may frequently be utilized in the formulation of policy.

It is particularly important that similar conversations be arranged soon between Soviet and American experts. It is our earnest hope, therefore, that the Soviet Government, which participated in the Hot Springs Conference and is now participating in the work of the Interim Commission and in the discussions relating to relief, will find it possible to arrange for such an interchange of views in the near future.

[Attachment]

*Memorandum Concerning the Washington Meeting Between British and American Economic Experts With Reference to Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement*

In the informal discussions which ended on October 18 in Washington between United States and United Kingdom economic experts the following general topics were explored:

1. Commercial Policy.
2. International Commodity Arrangements.
3. Cartels.
4. Coordination of measures to promote employment.

Parallel with these discussions further exchanges of views took place at the Treasury with regard to monetary stabilization. There was also a preliminary exchange of views on the subject of promotion of international investment.

The following are brief summaries of the topics discussed under each of the four headings listed above. It will be noted that in each case no attempt was made to reach definite conclusions but rather to prepare an orderly agenda for further study by each of the respective governments and for possible further informal joint conversations.

1. Commercial policy.

Consideration was given to the relative effectiveness and feasibility of the multilateral as compared with the bilateral method for bringing about a reduction of tariffs. In this connection a number of formulas were examined and compared without, however, at this stage attempting a selection. Consideration was also given to the substantial abolition of preferences and discriminations and the question of the relation of action in this field to the reduction of tariff barriers.

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\* See attached Memorandum Concerning the Washington Meeting Between British and American Economic Experts with Reference to Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement. [Footnote in the original.]

The need for and feasibility of the abolition on a multilateral basis of quantitative restrictions on trade were examined. The question of abolishing export taxes and restrictions was similarly considered as was the general question of subsidies.

The subject of state trading of various types and the need for harmonizing the interests of countries employing such a system with those of other countries was examined. Although no attempt was made to reach definitive conclusions it was apparent from the discussions that this problem should present no great difficulties.

Finally, provisional consideration was given to the need for creating some international body to facilitate the application of such basic principles of commercial policy as may be developed.

### 2. International Commodity Arrangements.

The problems discussed were:

- (a) Short-term price fluctuations in primary products.
- (b) Periodic slumps in demand and in prices as related to the business cycle.
- (c) Excess capacity in relation to past stimulation of high-cost production and to special war-time measures affecting production.

Methods of dealing with these problems were considered, having regard to securing efficient production and, at the same time, to mitigating the hardship on producers in making adjustments to conform to demand.

The methods included:

- (a) Buffer stocks.
- (b) Quantitative regulation schemes.

The discussion included the possibility of stating principles which might govern arrangements for dealing with commodity problems and the possible relation of such arrangements to existing inter-governmental and private international commodity schemes and to other parts of the international economic system, including commercial policy agreements.

### 3. Cartels.

Consideration was given to problems likely to arise in the post-war world from the activities of international cartels. The interchange of views was not so extensive as in the case of the other topics discussed. It was agreed that much further discussion was needed. The officials recommended that each group separately should examine the problems arising from international cartels and appropriate measures, national and international, to solve them with a view to joint discussion at some future date.

Preliminary views were presented by the United States officials on the possible consequences of international cartels in obstructing production and trade and in endangering national and international security.

The United States officials proposed that further consideration should be given to the possibility of intergovernmental undertakings:

(a) To register all non-governmental international agreements for the establishment of enduring relationships between private business enterprises;

(b) To introduce measures to make information about registered agreements available to governments or to international institutions;

(c) To prohibit practices by international cartels inimical to the expansion of production, trade and consumption including, *inter alia*, price fixing and restrictions on the exploitation of inventions.

#### 4. Employment policies.

The problems discussed under the foregoing three heads relate to a wide complex of policies which influence the level of employment in individual countries and in the world as a whole. Some of these policies are of a domestic nature, but facilities should be provided for consultation and for the exchange of information between governments on these matters as well as on matters of a more directly international nature with a view to the harmonization of policies.

The experts therefore discussed:

(a) The desirability of establishing an international advisory economic staff charged with the study of international economic questions with particular reference to the harmonization of measures, national and international, for the maintenance of high levels of productive employment.

(b) The functions and organization of such a staff.

(c) The character of the governing body to which it should be responsible.

### ANNEX 10

#### *Declaration of German Atrocities*<sup>21</sup>

The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are re-

<sup>21</sup> The Soviet Government, in a memorandum dated October 25, agreeing to the draft statement by Prime Minister Churchill (see p. 556), requested the changes which are embodied in the text printed here, viz., adding the final sentence in the first paragraph, substituting "Soviet Union" for "Russia" in the third paragraph, omitting "regardless of expense" from the fourth paragraph, and adding the final clause in the fifth paragraph. These proposed changes were adopted.

doubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:—

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy.

Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.

ROOSEVELT      STALIN      CHURCHILL

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[EDITOR'S NOTE: Two versions of the Secret Protocol exist in the Department's files. The first is a copy of the signed ribbon copy on file in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, where it was deposited by Mr. Cecil W. Gray upon his return from the Conference. Fifteen copies of this document were charged to President Roosevelt; Secretary Hull; Mr. Stettinius, the Under Secre-

tary; Mr. Hackworth, the Legal Adviser; Mr. Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Mr. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations; and Mr. Geist, Chief of the Division of Communications and Records.

On November 11, 1943, Mr. Dunn informed the Secretary that copies of a revised Secret Protocol had been made available to Messrs. Harriman, Kirk, Murphy, Wilson, Winant, Phillips, Biddle, and Atherton. He suggested that additional copies be made available in the Department to the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, the Legal Adviser, the Political Advisers, Chiefs of Geographic Divisions, and the Special Assistants to the Secretary. Approximately twenty copies of this document were circulated.

Apparently the revised edition was authorized for two reasons: to omit any reference to the existence of a "Most Secret Protocol", and to prevent any indication of the nature of those matters discussed by military and naval representatives.

The following variations appear on the revised text:

*Agenda*

Item 1 (Same)	This matter was discussed by the military experts.
Item 4(c) Omitted	Omitted
Item 7(a) (Same)	(See Annex 7) added.
Item 12 (Same)	"Note was taken of the statement . . ." omitted.

Annex 7 ("Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan countries, including the question of Confederations") was omitted from the revised versions, and Conference Document No. 20 ("The Treatment of Germany"), page 720, was substituted. The reason for this substitution is not clear.]

740.0011 Moscow/341

*Protocol, Signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943*

**MOST SECRET PROTOCOL**

of the Conference between the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. A. Eden, and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotov, which took place in Moscow from the 19th through the 30th of October, 1943.

The following took part in the discussions:

*For the United States:* Mr. Harriman,  
Major General Deane,  
Brigadier General Vandenburg  
[*Vandenberg*],  
Captain Ware.

*For the United Kingdom:* Sir A. Clark-Kerr  
Lieutenant General Ismay,

*For the U.S.S.R.:* Marshal K. E. Voroshilov,  
A. Ya Vyshinski,  
Major General Gryzlov.

“THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES TO SHORTEN THE DURATION OF THE  
WAR AGAINST HITLERITE GERMANY AND HER ALLIES IN EUROPE”

(Proposed by the Soviet Delegation on the  
19th October, 1943)<sup>22</sup>

On the question put on the agenda of the Conference of representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov on the 19th October, 1943, made the following proposals which were handed in writing to Mr. Anthony Eden and Mr. Cordell Hull:

“For the purpose of shortening the duration of the war it is proposed:

(1) To put into effect such urgent measures on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and United States of America in 1943, which will ensure the invasion of Anglo-American armies into Northern France and which, together with the powerful blows of the Soviet forces against the main forces of the German army on the Soviet-German front, must radically undermine the military strategic situation of Germany and lead to a definite shortening of the duration of the war.

In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary to determine whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943,<sup>23</sup> to the effect that Anglo-American forces will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in force.

(2) To propose to the Turkish Government on behalf of the three Powers that Turkey immediately enters the war.

<sup>22</sup> See Summary of the Proceedings of the First Meeting, p. 577.

<sup>23</sup> President Roosevelt informed Stalin on June 2, 1943, of the results of the conference between himself and Prime Minister Churchill at Washington in May 1943, at which the decision was made to undertake the cross-Channel invasion of France in the spring of 1944. The records of the Third Washington Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

(3) To propose to Sweden on behalf of the three Powers that she should provide the Allies with air bases for the struggle against Germany."

(a) With regard to point (1) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 19th October 1943, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Eden, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Hull, on the 20th October 1943, endorsed the statement made by the British Lt-General Ismay and the American Major-General Deane (see appendices: statement of Lt.-General Ismay and statement of Major-General Deane) as being an accurate presentation of the most recent decisions of their Governments, taken at the Quebec Conference in August 1943.

With regard to the question put by the Soviet Delegation: whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943, to the effect that Anglo-American troops will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in force, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull gave an affirmative reply declaring that the decision to undertake the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944 had been reaffirmed at the recent conference in Quebec, subject to the conditions quoted by General Ismay in his statement. Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull added that this decision has not been

The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, stated that the Soviet Government take note of Mr. Eden's and Mr. Hull's statements, as well as of the statements of Lt-General Ismay and Major-General Deane, and express the hope that the plan of invasion by Anglo-American troops of Northern France in the spring of 1944, contained in these statements, will be carried out on time.

changed and that preparations to carry out the above mentioned operation are being pressed forward as rapidly as possible.

(b) With regard to points (2) and (3) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation (regarding Turkey and Sweden)

(c)<sup>24</sup> The United States delegates placed the following proposals before the conference.

(1) That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on which U.S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and re-armed.

(2) That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, it is essential that means of communication between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. be strengthened.

(3) That air communication between these two countries be improved.

Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden, and V. M. Molotov recognise the desirability of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and Soviet Union continuing to study the question of Turkey and Sweden.

V. M. Molotov said that the U.S.S.R. agrees to the United States proposals in principle and that the appropriate Soviet authorities will be given instructions to meet with Generals Deane and Vandenberg for the consideration of concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out these proposals.

CORDELL HULL  
V. MOLOTOV  
ANTHONY EDEN

1 Nov 1943.

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<sup>24</sup> Section (c) was first proposed by Major General Deane at the meeting on October 20, 1943 (see appendix 2, p. 778). A day or two later Molotov announced that the Soviet Government approved it "in principle". In his *The Strange Alliance* (New York, 1947), p. 23, General Deane stated that these proposals and the Soviet Government's approval in principle were finally admitted to the record only after Secretary of State Hull had addressed a strong personal letter to Molotov. The text of this letter has not been found in Department files.



[Appendix 1]

STATEMENT MADE BY LT. GEN. ISMAY BEFORE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE  
ON OCTOBER 20TH, 1943<sup>25</sup>

I am instructed to address myself to the following proposal put forward by the Soviet Delegation:—

“In order to shorten the duration of the war it is being proposed:

That the Governments of Great Britain and the U.S.A. take in 1943 such urgent measures as will ensure the invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American armies and, coupled with powerful blows of Soviet troops on the main German forces on the Soviet-German front, will radically undermine the military-strategical situation of Germany and bring about a decisive shortening of the duration of the war.

In this connection the Soviet Government deems it necessary to ascertain whether the statement made in early June, 1943, by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt to the effect that Anglo-American forces will undertake the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944 remains valid.”

The answer to both the points raised by the Soviet Delegation is provided by the decisions taken at the recent Anglo-American Conference at Quebec, which was presided over by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and attended by the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. Thus I shall be speaking on behalf of the American Delegation as well as the British Delegation; but my American colleague, General Deane, will, I hope, interrupt if I say anything with which he does not agree, and will in any case amplify and explain those matters which are predominantly American interests.

Let me say at the outset in all truth that at every single Anglo-American Conference since we have been in the war together, the thought uppermost in all our minds has been so to arrange our affairs as to ensure the maximum possible diversion of enemy land and air forces from the Russian front. I do not for a moment suggest that in so doing we have thought only of Soviet interests. On the contrary, it has been unanimously and invariably recognized as the soundest strategy in the interests of the Allies as a whole. Let me also say that the urgency of the business has always been present in our minds. Thus the following resolution was adopted at one of our earliest Conferences and was absolutely confirmed less than two months ago at Quebec:—

*The overall objective is—*

“In co-operation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date repeat at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis *in Europe*.”

<sup>25</sup> For record of the meeting of October 20, see p. 583.

I should not, however, like it to be inferred that we can concentrate the whole of our combined resources against the Axis *in Europe*. It is essential for us to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. If the Conference so desires, further information on this subject will be furnished by General Deane.

I now turn to describe the decisions taken at Quebec as to the operations to be undertaken in 1943-44 for the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe. First, there is the bomber offensive. I mention this first, as not only does it come first in chronological order, but it is an essential prerequisite to the invasion of North West Europe. It was decided that the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital lines of communication and the reduction of German air combat strength by the prosecution on an ever increasing scale of the day and night bomber offensive against Germany and German Occupied Europe from all convenient bases, should continue to have the highest strategic priority.

As is well known, the American Air Force stationed in the United Kingdom carry out precision bombing by day whenever the weather is suitable, while the British Royal Air Force concentrate more particularly on area bombing against German war industry by night. The prodigious scale of the damage which has already been done is not generally recognized. The American Delegation have therefore brought with them an officer who can give as full details as the Conference may desire of the effects of the day bombing, while the British Delegation have similarly brought with them an officer who can unfold the story of the British night bombing offensive. The graph which I now pass round shows the steadily mounting weight of bombs that have been cast on German war industry by the Royal Air Force alone during the past few months. In August alone it amounted to over 20,000 tons. The graph also shows by way of contrast, the weight of bombs cast on England when the whole weight of the German Air Force was concentrated on us.

It is also to be noted that this combined bomber offensive is to be prosecuted from all convenient bases. It is hoped that shortly we will be in possession of airfields in the vicinity of Rome, which will enable us to attack important war industries in Southern Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania with almost the same intensity that we have been attacking Northern Germany during the past year. These industries have hitherto been out of reach or at extreme range.

I now turn to the cross-Channel operation which it has been decided to undertake in 1944. It has been decided that the invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American forces will be the primary

U.S./British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe in 1944. This invasion is to be launched as soon as practicable after weather conditions in the English Channel become favourable.

The scale of the initial assault is to a large extent dictated by the quantity of special assault shipping and special landing craft which is available when the time comes. Both in the United States and in the United Kingdom the greatest efforts are being made to increase the production of these vital craft. The recent success of the anti-submarine campaign has enabled us to take the risk of turning over a larger part of our shipbuilding capacity to the construction of this type of vessel. It is to be remembered that these special craft are essential not only for the assault itself, but for maintaining and reinforcing the invading armies across open beaches until such time as deep water ports have been captured and put into order. At a conservative estimate, it is calculated that we will have to maintain and reinforce over the beaches for a period of two or three months. It is for this reason, apart from any other, that it is a physical impossibility to undertake the operation in the period of winter storms. Comparatively settled weather is essential.

I cannot yet give details of the scale of the initial assault as this is still under urgent and detailed examination, but our plans and preparations are based on being able to get about 18 divisions ashore after 14 days, together with an appropriate strength of supporting aircraft. After 90 days we hope to have 30 divisions ashore, again with an appropriate strength of supporting air formations. Thereafter three to five divisions per month will be sent from the United States direct to the theatre of operations.

The German strength in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 40 divisions at the present time, including coastal, G.A.F.<sup>25a</sup> and training divisions. The beach and coast defences of France and the low Countries have been built up over the long period of German occupation. Our experience at Dieppe showed without any doubt that, even to gain a footing in North West Europe, is a most formidable operation. Moreover, the enemy disposes of excellent lateral communications across Europe which enable him to move reinforcements to the West by road and rail far quicker than we could reinforce our initial lodgments by sea. The enemy rate of reinforcement is thus limited by the availability of his forces and not by his communications.

In view of the above, it was agreed at Quebec that certain conditions must be present for the invasion to have a reasonable prospect of success. We are fairly confident that these conditions will be fulfilled.

First, there must be a substantial reduction in the strength of the German fighter force in North West Europe between now and the

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<sup>25a</sup> German Air Force, the Luftwaffe.

date of the assault. It is expected that the ever increasing Anglo-American bomber offensive will produce this result.

The second condition is that the German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole must not be more on the day of the assault than about 12 full strength, first quality, mobile divisions. This is of course exclusive of coastal, training and German Air Force divisions. Furthermore, it must not be possible for the Germans to transfer from other fronts more than 15 first quality divisions during the first two months of the operations.

It is hoped that these conditions may be rendered possible by the following:—

- (I) The softening effect of the Anglo-American bomber forces.
- (II) The maintenance of unremitting pressure by Anglo-American land and air forces in Italy.
- (III) Allied landings in Southern France—threatened or actual, synchronizing with the invasion of Northern France.
- (IV) Operations in the Balkans by guerilla forces which will be sustained by sea and by air.
- (V) And lastly, but of course by far the most important of all, co-ordinated pressure on the Eastern front by the Soviet forces.

The third condition is that the problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged period must be overcome. The success of our plans depends on our ability to construct at least two artificial ports. The experiments which have been pursued for some time hold out good promise.

I now turn to the decisions covering operations in Italy. These were conceived in three phases.

- (I) *First phase:*  
The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area, and, if feasible, further north;
- (II) *Second phase:*  
Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica;
- (III) *Third phase:*  
The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy and the creation of the conditions required for the cross-Channel assault and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force, into Southern France.

It is to be particularly noted that operations in Italy are to be carried out by the forces already in the Mediterranean theatre. Seven U.S. and British battle-trying divisions are to be brought back in the near future from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom in order to form the spearhead for the assault across the Channel. These are

divisions which have had experience in amphibious warfare. It has been laid down that, wherever there is a shortage of resources of any kind, the governing principle will be that they will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of the invasion of Northern France.

The operations described above will stretch our resources to the limit. It has therefore been decided that Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to the supply of the Patriot Armies by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

That concludes my survey of the decisions taken at Quebec. It remains to say a few words about the urgent measures which are being taken to give effect to these plans. In the first place, U.S. divisions are being concentrated in the United Kingdom at the greatest rate that shipping resources allow, and their training in amphibious operations pressed forward vigorously. General Deane will elaborate this point. Secondly, United States air forces in the United Kingdom are being reinforced at the greatest possible rate. General Deane will also speak on this point. Thirdly, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the United Kingdom is being turned into one vast airfield. Fourthly, a cross-Channel invasion on the scale contemplated against long prepared defences, manned by German troops, is an operation of a character which has never before been attempted in the history of war. It requires most extensive and elaborate administrative preparations at the ports of embarkation and on the lines of communication leading to the ports. All these measures are being pressed forward with the greatest vigour.

[Appendix 2]

STATEMENTS MADE BY MAJOR GENERAL J. R. DEANE, U. S. A., BEFORE  
CONFERENCE 20 OCTOBER 1943<sup>26</sup>

In the first proposal submitted by the Soviet delegates they recommended that urgent measures be undertaken in 1943 which would insure an invasion of Northern France. I should like to outline some of the measures that are now under way.

In the first place we consider the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom as being by far the most positive and important preparation for a cross-channel operation. In this connection we should welcome an opportunity to make a complete presentation to you gentlemen, and to such others as you may wish, which would give a comprehensive picture of what has been accomplished in the bomber offensive and what is planned for the future. As a preview to this

<sup>26</sup> For record of the meeting of October 20, see p 582

presentation I have asked General Vandenberg to present pictures of our most recent bombing operation against Marianburg. Target in this instance was the Focke-Wulf aircraft factory. It was moved to Marianburg by the Germans for security reasons. Its destruction was almost complete. This particular picture was selected as an illustration because the objective was the most distant from the United Kingdom that has been attacked thus far and also it is the closest to the Soviet front. (at this point General Vandenberg displayed several pictures of bombing operations and explained their significance.)

As I have said, our most urgent preparation for a cross-channel operation is the bomber offensive of the British-American air forces from the United Kingdom and from the Mediterranean. The mission of the offensive is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic systems, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. It is estimated that the bomber offensive shall be far enough advanced by 1 May 1944 to permit the release of its entire strength to support a cross-channel operation. The build-up of the force necessary for the bomber operations will be, for the most part, accomplished by the addition of United States formations. At the present time the United States has in the neighborhood of 20 Groups of 4-engined heavy bombers in the United Kingdom. It is planned that this force will be expanded to approximately 48 Groups or approximately 2,300 aircraft by 1 April 1944. Planned fighter aircraft expansion will be from approximately 9 Groups at present in the United Kingdom to 31 Groups by 1 April 1944. This should amount to approximately 2,300 fighter aircraft by that date. The R. A. F. strength will be about the same and the existing formations will be maintained and kept at full operation strength.

The expansion indicated above is progressing on schedule, the necessary ground installations are being constructed, the ground crews and the operating personnel are being assembled. In order to furnish fighter support for the cross-channel operation it is necessary that approximately 100 additional airfields be constructed in Southern England. This construction is underway and will be completed prior to the time the operation is launched.

The cross-channel operation agreed upon calls for a build-up of 30 mobile infantry and armored divisions to be in the United Kingdom by April 1944. This force will include appropriate corps, armies, and service troops and will be utilized for securing the initial bridgehead.

The build-up of the ground and air force in Britain will necessitate transporting more than one million men from the United States to Great Britain in the next seven or eight months. This will require

the unloading of 400 personnel ships and over 1,000 cargo vessels in the United Kingdom during that period. To do so will tax the port capacity of Britain to the utmost and require that it be diverted exclusively to this purpose.

Approximately 3,300 assault ships and craft will be necessary for the operation. To obtain these the landing craft program has been expanded 35% in the United States despite resulting dislocation in the over-all production program.

It must be expected that German forces will accomplish almost complete destruction of German port facilities in France prior to their capture. It will therefore be necessary to support the operation initially over the beaches, a condition which will probably exist for the first 90 days of the occupation. In the early stages it is estimated that 15,000 tons of supplies per day will be necessary. This figure will increase as the operation expands.

I have presented but a few of the preparations that are now being made. I have selected them because they are of major importance, but as you know for an operation of the magnitude contemplated there are a great many others. The military mission of the United States in Moscow is authorized to keep the Soviet thoroughly informed as to the progress of our preparations. It is hoped that this mission will be utilized as a medium for closer collaboration between our respective staffs.

With a view to measures which might be adopted for hastening the conclusion of the war against Germany I have been authorized to make certain proposals which I shall read and then distribute the translation of them for your information. The proposals are as follows:<sup>27</sup>

That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on which U.S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed.

That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, that U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. communications be strengthened.

That improved air transport be effected between the two countries.

Later, in response to a question presented by Mr. Molotov as to the validity of the decision for a cross-channel operation I made the following statement:

The decision to undertake a cross-channel operation in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed at the last conference in Quebec. Now it must be understood that such decision, as is the case with any military decision made far in advance, is subject to certain conditions existing at the time the operation is to take place. The conditions in this case

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<sup>27</sup> These proposals are incorporated as section (c) in the Most Secret Protocol, p. 773.

have been stated to you. We confidently feel that these conditions will exist and are proceeding with full scale preparations to launch the attack. One can only appreciate the firmness of the decision by witnessing the intensive spirit with which preparations are now being carried out. I have spoken previously of the landing craft program which has recently been expanded in the United States. The effects of such a readjustment are felt not only in England but throughout the breadth of the United States including the California coast. Such a change in production affects the shipyards along the coast and the engine manufacturers in the middle west. It is inconceivable that such dislocation of industry would be permitted if the intention to launch the operation was questionable.



## THE POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMISSION <sup>1</sup>

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)  
to President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister (Churchill)* <sup>2</sup>

[Extract—Translation]

Moscow, August 22, 1943.

2. I consider that the time has come to create a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries—U.S.A., Great Britain and the USSR—for the consideration of questions regarding negotiations with different Governments falling out with Germany. Up to the present time the U.S.A. and England have consulted and the USSR has received information regarding the results of the consultation of the two powers in the capacity of a third, passive observer. I must say that it is impossible to tolerate such a situation any longer. I propose to create this commission (that this commission be created) and to fix its place for the present instance in Sicily.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Also referred to as the Mediterranean Commission, and sometimes as the Military-Political Commission.

<sup>2</sup> This message was telegraphed by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Soviet Chargé in the United States, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, for transmission to the President. A copy was sent by Mr. Molotov on August 23 to the American Ambassador at Moscow (Standley), from which this translation was made. The full text of the message is printed in vol. II, p. 353.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were at this time in conference at Quebec. Documentation on that conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

<sup>3</sup> In a telegram delivered to President Roosevelt by the British Embassy in Washington on August 27, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill stated: "I think we should agree . . . to the setting up of the Commission, though not in Sicily. This is certainly the view of my Cabinet subject to settlement of details." (811.001 Roosevelt, F. D./9357)

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin) to President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister (Churchill)* <sup>4</sup>

[Extract—Translation] <sup>5</sup>

Moscow, August 24, 1943.

2. The additions and corrections to your message and President Roosevelt's message <sup>6</sup> were received yesterday from Mr. Kerr.<sup>7</sup> In this message you have informed me regarding the instructions sent to General Eisenhower <sup>8</sup> in connection with the terms of capitulation drawn up for Italy in the negotiations with General Castellano.<sup>9</sup> My colleagues and I consider that the instructions given to General Eisenhower fully comply with the aims of the unconditional surrender of Italy and therefore cannot evoke any objections. At the same time I consider the information thus far received as absolutely inadequate to permit of an assessment of the measures which the Allies found it necessary to take during the negotiations with Italy. This fact confirms the need for the participation of a Soviet representative in the taking of decisions during negotiations. Therefore, I consider that the time is ripe for the convocation of a military-political mission of representatives of the three countries regarding which I wrote you on the 22nd of August.

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[In his telegram No. 1208, August 28, 1943, 11 a. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) stated his reasons for believing that "the proposal (to create a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries—the USA, Great Britain and the USSR—for the consideration of questions regarding negotiations with

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<sup>4</sup> This message was telegraphed by Foreign Commissar Molotov to Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev, Soviet Chargé in the United Kingdom, "for transmission to its destination." A copy was sent on August 24 by Mr. Molotov to Ambassador Standley at Moscow, from which this translation was made.

<sup>5</sup> Other portions of this message are printed on p. 514 and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 22.

<sup>6</sup> For joint message dated August 19, 1943, from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin, see *Stalin's Correspondence With Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-45* (New York, 1958), p. 144. Text of this message is also scheduled for publication with the records of the First Quebec Conference in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*. A note in *Stalin's Correspondence* states that the British Ambassador presented a partial text on August 20 and the full text on August 22.

<sup>7</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

<sup>8</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief of Allied Forces.

<sup>9</sup> Brig. Gen. Giuseppe Castellano, attached to the Italian High Command. For correspondence regarding armistice negotiations with Italy, see vol. II, pp. 314 ff.

governments falling out with Germany) and to meet in Sicily should be accepted and motivated at once"; for text of this telegram, see volume III, page 567.]

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Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)*<sup>10</sup>

[Extract]<sup>11</sup>

Why not send an officer to General Eisenhower's headquarters in connection with the commission to sit in Sicily on further settlements with the Italians? He would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject.

There is no objection as far as I am concerned to adding a French member to this commission, as we are now in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. It would, however, be very unwise to let the French take part in the discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with the terms of surrender, which they have already signed, I hope they will wholeheartedly support the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians dislike the French greatly, and if we bring the French into occupation discussions, the civil and military elements in Italy will resent it extremely.

The problem of consulting the Greeks and Jugoslavs can be discussed later on.

ROOSEVELT

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*The Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*<sup>12</sup>

[Extract—Translation]<sup>13</sup>

Your message in which you touched upon several important questions I received on September 6th.

<sup>10</sup> Transmitted in a letter from Ambassador Standley to Foreign Commissar Molotov, September 6, 1943, not printed. Mr. Molotov acknowledged receipt of the letter in a note dated September 7, and stated that "the message in question has been transmitted by me to its destination".

<sup>11</sup> Other portions of this message are printed on p. 518, and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 23.

<sup>12</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.; it was transmitted by the Soviet Chargé in the United States, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

<sup>13</sup> Other portions of this message are printed on p. 519 and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 23-24.

First. I still consider, as I did before, that the question of the creation of the Military-Political Commission of the representatives of the three countries with its residence at the beginning in Sicily or in Algiers is the most urgent one. Sending of a Soviet officer to the Staff of General Eisenhower can by no means substitute for the Military-Political Commission, which is necessary for directing on the spot the negotiations with Italy (as well as with other countries dissociating themselves from Germany). Much time has passed, but nothing is done.

As to the participation of the French representative in this Commission, I have already expressed my opinion on this subject. However, if you have any doubt, in this case this question can be discussed after the Commission is created.

[Moscow,] September 8, 1943.

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Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin)*<sup>14</sup>

[Extract]<sup>15</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1943.

I thank you for your message received today.

I agree on the immediate setting up of the military-political commission, but think that Algiers would be better than Sicily if only because of communications and, therefore, suggest they meet in Algiers on Tuesday, 21 September. Full information will be given, of course, in regard to the progress of current and future negotiations, but they should not have plenary powers. Such authority would, of course, have to be referred to their governments before final action.

I am entirely willing to have a French representative on this commission. It is important to all of us that the secrecy of all their deliberations be fully maintained.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>14</sup> Transmitted in a letter from Ambassador Standley to Foreign Commissar Molotov on September 11.

<sup>15</sup> Other portions of this message are printed on p. 520 and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 24.

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-96

*The Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars (Stalin) to President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*<sup>16</sup>

[Extract—Translation]<sup>17</sup>

Moscow, September 12, 1943.

I have received your message of September 10.

1. The question concerning the Military-Political Commission may be considered basically as solved. The Assistant Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars and Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs A. Ya. Vyshinski, who is known to you, has been appointed by us as the Soviet plenipotentiary representative. A. E. Bogomolov, the Ambassador of the USSR near the Allied Governments in London has been named his assistant. A group of responsible military and political experts and a small technical staff is attached to them.

I believe that the commencement of the work of the Military-Political Commission may be fixed toward the 25-30 of September. I do not object that the commission should commence its work in Algiers with the proviso that in the future it itself should establish the expediency of proceeding to Sicily or to some other place in Italy. I find the considerations of the Prime Minister regarding the functions of the commission as correct but I believe that after a certain time, taking into account the initial experience of the work of the commission, we may define more precisely these functions, not only in relation to Italy but also correspondingly in relation to other countries.

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740.00119 MPC/3 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 25, 1943—8 a. m.

[Received 3:03 p. m.]

1458. My 1455, September 24, 10 p. m.,<sup>18</sup> last paragraph. As you know, the Soviet Government has stated several times that it attaches special importance to the establishment of the Mediterranean Com-

<sup>16</sup> This message was telegraphed by Mr. Molotov to Soviet Chargé Gromyko in Washington for transmission to the President. Mr. Molotov sent a copy of the message to Ambassador Standley on September 12, from which this translation was made.

<sup>17</sup> Other portions of this message are printed on p. 520 and in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 25.

<sup>18</sup> Not printed; in the last paragraph the Chargé reported that Vyshinsky had inquired as to who were to be the U.S. representatives on the Political-Military Commission (740.0011 European War 1939/31298).

mission. It designated Vyshinski as its principal representative. Vyshinski seems to be regarded as the senior Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He has been in charge of Soviet relations with the United States and Great Britain. Since Stalin assumed the title of Marshal<sup>19</sup> there has been a tendency for greater responsibilities as Acting Chief of State to devolve upon Molotov and for Molotov to delegate the handling of foreign affairs matters to Vyshinski. I am sure that the Soviet Government would be pleased by the appointment by the American Government as its chief representative on the newly created Mediterranean Commission of a person of outstanding rank and position. This would, I believe, be a manifestation to the Soviet Government of our Government's hearty implementation of the Soviet Government's suggestion that such a commission be established.

HAMILTON

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740.00119 MPC/32: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

RIO DE JANEIRO, September 25, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 7:12 p. m.]

4572. Aranha<sup>20</sup> asked me today to say to you that he has read in the newspapers of the early organization of a Mediterranean committee or commission and he trusts that in view of Brazil's interests in Northwest Africa and intention to send troops to the Mediterranean theatre, Brazil will not be forgotten in the organization of the commission or committee.

CAFFERY

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740.00119 MPC/80

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government feel it is desirable to consider in what terms the French Committee of National Liberation are to be officially invited to participate in the Politico-Military Commission which the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have decided to constitute to consider in the first instance problems relating to Italy. They accordingly suggest, for the consideration of the United States Government, that on the arrival of Monsieur Vyshinski in Algiers, (which will presumably take place

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<sup>19</sup> On March 6, 1943.

<sup>20</sup> Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

between September 25th and September 30th) he, together with Mr. Murphy<sup>21</sup> and Mr. Macmillan,<sup>22</sup> should present identic notes to Monsieur Massigli.<sup>23</sup> The enclosed draft contains the text of what His Majesty's Government would regard as a suitable communication.

His Majesty's Embassy would be glad to receive the views of the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1943.

[Enclosure]

Following is suggested draft.

I have the honour to inform you that the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Union have decided to constitute a Politico Military Commission to consider in the first instance problems relating to Italy. I am instructed to invite the Committee of National Liberation to appoint a representative to serve on this commission together with the representatives of the Three Powers. It is suggested that members of the commission should be civilian, political representatives who might, if necessary, be assisted by service advisers.

The members of the Commission would be supplied by the three Governments and by the French Committee for National Liberation with all relevant information on the political and military developments affecting their work, and they would, in their turn, report on local developments. They would make jointly or severally recommendations to the three Governments or to the Committee of Liberation but would not have powers to take final decisions. They would not, of course, interfere with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

It is proposed that with the approval of French Committee of National Liberation, the Commission should meet in the first instance at Algiers.

The precise scope and functions of the Commission will be defined later after consultation between the three Governments and the Committee of Liberation.

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<sup>21</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa, with the rank of Minister; Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; and U.S. Political Adviser, staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>22</sup> Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

<sup>23</sup> René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French Committee of National Liberation.

740.0011 European War 1939/31399½ : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]<sup>24</sup>

Moscow, September 26, 1943—1 p. m.  
[Received September 27—9 : 55 a. m.]

1470. Your 881, September 21, 11 a. m.<sup>25</sup> There was delivered at the Embassy this morning a secret communication dated September 25, signed by Molotov, reading in translation made by an officer of the Embassy as follows:

The Soviet Government, having taken note of your letter of September 22, 1943, in which is set forth contents of the proposed message of the President to General Eisenhower<sup>26</sup> concerning Italy, considers it necessary to inform the Government of the United States of America of the following:

3. The Soviet Government considers that the establishment of an Allied commission with the functions and powers set forth in point 4 of the message<sup>27</sup> is not necessary in view of the fact that, as is well known, after the ratification of the detailed armistice terms there was established by the decision of the three Governments the Military Political Commission, as a result of which the question of a control commission envisaged in Article 37 of the detailed terms should be considered as falling away. Therefore, in opinion of Soviet Government there should be included in the work of the Military Political Commission the coordination and direction of the activities of all military organs organized won [*in?*] enemy territory and of any Allied civil authorities with regard to questions of the armistice and of control over the execution of the terms of the armistice and, consequently there should be included in the functions of the Military Political Commission the issuance from time to time of instructions and directives on military, political and administrative questions for the Badoglio Government while military operational questions remain entirely under the direction of the Allied Commander in Chief.

<sup>24</sup> The telegram is printed in full in vol. II, p. 377.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 371.

<sup>26</sup> For text of the President's message to General Eisenhower, see *ibid.*, p. 373.

<sup>27</sup> Point 4 of the message read: "The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio government on military, political and administrative matters."



The Soviet Government, therefore, sees no reason for establishment of an Allied commission under the direction of General Eisenhower with above-mentioned functions.

HAMILTON

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740.00119 MPC/9b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1943—11 p. m.

5974. The President has appointed Mr. Edwin C. Wilson, presently Ambassador to Panama, as the representative of this Government on the Mediterranean Commission.

Please inform the appropriate authorities.

BERLE

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740.00119 MPC/32

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1943.

MR. BERLE: Yesterday the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, Dr. Liu,<sup>28</sup> came in to convey the request of the Chinese Government for membership on the Mediterranean Commission. Dr. Liu said that while the Chinese Government had no thought of entering in any great detail in matters dealing with the local Italian situation or with local situations in the Mediterranean, his Government wanted very much to keep up representation on bodies and committees which dealt with the general war situation, particularly when political matters were involved which might affect the general world situation.

I told Dr. Liu that this request would be brought to the attention of the higher authorities of the Government.

I pointed out to Dr. Liu that in the complete terms and conditions of surrender to be imposed upon the Italian Government as a result of Italian unconditional surrender, provision is made for an Allied Control Commission<sup>29</sup> which would be composed of American and British members. This Commission is provided for the purpose of executing

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<sup>28</sup> Liu Chieh.

<sup>29</sup> For correspondence regarding the establishment of the Allied Control Commission in Italy, see vol. II, pp. 402 ff.

the terms of the unconditional surrender. I explained that there is every intention of making further provision for access to that Control Commission by the United Nations Governments in any form they may find convenient to them in order that the interests of each of the United Nations will be taken care of in connection with the execution of the Italian armistice terms and conditions. I said that this Control Commission had not yet been set up as the Italian situation, by reason of the military operations, was in a fluid state at the moment, but that as soon as matters developed to that point provision would be made for the Chinese Government to express its interest in the situation in that way.

I further pointed out that the Secretary of State in his press conference of September 22, 1943, had himself mentioned to the correspondents that the Chinese Government would be kept fully informed with regard to the proceedings of the Mediterranean Commission. Dr. Liu thereupon repeated the request of the Chinese Government for representation on the Mediterranean Commission even though there might be provision for access to the Control Commission as stated above.

I am attaching a copy of a telegram received from the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro<sup>30</sup> transmitting a request of the Brazilian Foreign Minister for Brazilian representation in the Mediterranean Commission. You will note that attached to this copy is a memorandum from the President<sup>31</sup> asking for the Secretary's opinion with regard to this Brazilian request.

You may wish to clear both of these requests with the President.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

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740.00119 MPC/6

*The Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to our conversation of Monday, September 27, I wish to confirm to you the request I had the honor to formulate on behalf of my government that the latter be included among those which will be called to participate in the Mediterranean Commission.<sup>32</sup>

Sincerely yours,

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

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<sup>30</sup> Telegram No. 4572, September 25, 3 p. m., p. 787.

<sup>31</sup> Dated September 28, 1943; it read: "Memorandum for Hon. Cordell Hull: What do you think? F.D.R."

<sup>32</sup> Mr. Berle acknowledged receipt of this letter on October 2, 1943, and assured the Ambassador that the Greek Government's request was receiving the careful consideration of the appropriate authorities of the United States Government.

740.00119 MPC/2 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, September 30, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received October 1—5:28 a. m.]

1667. From Murphy. Following the announcement that the American representative had been appointed to the Mediterranean Council, Massigli has inquired regarding the status of this organization and when the French Committee of National Liberation will be invited to participate as he understood was envisaged. He said that of course no French appointment could be made to the Council until the Committee had been notified of its constitution and of its terms of reference. He also inquired whether the Council would discuss matters relating to the Italian armistice, the long terms of which have been communicated in confidence by the British to the French, or whether this would be done through the Allied Commission established under the armistice.

He was informed that we were still without instructions in this respect but would endeavor to obtain an early reply to these questions. I should welcome any information regarding the present status of the composition of the Council particularly as I understand that the Russian member is reported to be en route to Algiers and is expected to arrive here very shortly. [Murphy.]

WILEY

800.0146/173 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1943—7 p. m.

3783. Your 4572, September 25, 3 p. m. You may inform Aranha that of course Brazil's interests are being given full consideration in the current approach to Mediterranean matters. I feel sure however that Aranha will appreciate the circumstances which render it necessary for the present to restrict the Committee as planned. When the situation is clarified provision for representation of Brazil and of a number of other Governments and Governmental organizations will be given consideration. Meanwhile the President is instructing the United States member of the Commission to bear in mind Brazil's present and future interest in Mediterranean developments.

HULL

740.00119 MPC/88

*The Yugoslav Ambassador (Fotitch) to the Secretary of State*

No. 648

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the Royal Yugoslav Government I have the honor to present the request that Yugoslavia be given a seat in the Mediterranean Commission. Yugoslavia, on account of her geographic position, is interested in all problems pertaining to the Mediterranean Zone which will be dealt with by this Commission, and her ceaseless fighting against the common enemy for more than two and one-half years warrants her request to be represented in the said Commission.

I venture to hope that Your Excellency will be good enough to take the necessary steps with the American Government that this request of the Yugoslav Government will receive satisfaction. A similar request has been presented by the Yugoslav Government to the Governments of Great Britain and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

Please accept [etc.]

CONST. FOTITCH

740.00119 MPC/20a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1943—5 p. m.

963. Please deliver the following message to M. Molotov: <sup>33</sup>

"Reference Para 3 of your message to me dated 26 September 1943.<sup>34</sup> There appears to be no conflict between the Military-Political Commission envisaged by the three governments of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the Control Commission set up by Para 37 of the long term Italian surrender document <sup>35</sup> agreed to by the three governments.

<sup>33</sup> A memorandum for the Secretary of State dated October 8, 1943, and signed by Adm. William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's Chief of Staff, stated that the President requested that the Secretary telegraph this message to Mr. Molotov (740.00119 MPC/10-843).

<sup>34</sup> See telegram No. 1470, p. 789.

<sup>35</sup> The so-called long-term Italian surrender document, entitled "Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy," was signed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government, and Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces, at Malta on September 29, 1943. For text, see Department of State, *United States and Italy, 1936-1946: Documentary Record*, p. 55. The Soviet Government had empowered General Eisenhower to sign the terms of surrender in behalf of the Soviet Government.

Paragraph 37 read: "There will be appointed a Control Commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief."

The Control Commission acts directly under the Supreme Allied Commander to deal with specific problems arising in areas of Italy liberated by Anglo-American armies. These are problems arising in any active military area under direct supervision of the Supreme Commander and so the commission must act under his direct control.

On the contrary, the Military-Political Commission for the Mediterranean Basin will have the purpose, as Marshal Stalin says, of 'considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves with Germany'. Thus it will deal with the broad overall picture in this area. It will not have plenary powers. Its members will study the problems and advise their governments. The governments will then consult each other and reach a decision. If such decision affects the Supreme Allied Commander, he will be informed of it through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Now that the Members of this Military-Political Commission have been appointed and it will meet soon, I feel the policies of our three governments in the Mediterranean area will be harmonized more effectively and quickly than heretofore."

HULL <sup>36</sup>

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740.00119 MPC/16 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 8, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 9:10 p. m.]

1727. From Murphy. Macmillan decided to accompany Field Marshal Smuts<sup>37</sup> to London primarily for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the plans for the Mediterranean Commission. Macmillan intends to point out the need immediate decision on a number of points if a meeting of the Commission is to occur in the near future. For example, the question of whether the Commission should have its seat at Algiers. If it does, would the Secretariat be French. This, we imagine, is not to be considered a practical solution. Both Macmillan and I feel that it would be highly desirable for the Commission to have its seat elsewhere than at Algiers thus removing it from undue French influence. It has been apparent, for example, through the months that it was unfortunate that AFHQ<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Secretary Hull was actually en route from Washington to the Moscow Conference between October 7 and 18, but as a security measure outgoing telegrams from the Department of State during this period bore his signature.

<sup>37</sup> Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs and Defence of the Union of South Africa.

<sup>38</sup> Allied Force Headquarters (United States and British).

should be established in the same city with the Central French administration. I have seen in this connection a telegram dated September 26 repeated from the British Embassy in Moscow to the effect that the Soviet Union is opposed to the organization of an Allied Commission operating under the direction of the Allied CinC<sup>39</sup> in Italy. According to that telegram in the opinion of the Soviet Government the work of the Military Political Commission should include the direction and coordination by all military bodies organizing the conquered enemy territory and all Allied civil authorities concerned with the Italian armistice and execution of the armistice terms. It also stated the opinion that the Military-Political Commission's functions should include the issuance from time to time of directives and instructions on military administration and political questions for the Badoglio<sup>40</sup> Government leaving operational military questions entirely to the Allied CinC.

According to this telegram the Soviet Government is opposed to treating Italy as a cobelligerent.

To London repeated. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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740.00119 MPC/23a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>41</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1943—1 p. m.

6368. You should seek immediate interview with Cadogan<sup>42</sup> and inform him by direction of the President that we have recently received requests from the Chinese and Brazilian Governments that they be accorded representation on the Political-Military Commission which is being set up at Algiers. Similar requests have likewise been received from the Yugoslav and Greek Governments. While such expansion in the size of the Commission might present certain disadvantages, we believe that it is desirable to have them represented on the Commission and suggest that their requests be given favorable

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<sup>39</sup> Commander in Chief.

<sup>40</sup> Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government.

<sup>41</sup> A handwritten note on the file copy, initialed by H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, reads: "Approved by the President".

A similar telegram was sent at the same time to the Chargé in the Soviet Union instructing him to take up the question with Foreign Commissar Molotov. In telegram No. 1958, November 16, 11 a. m., the Ambassador reported that he had received a note from the Soviet Foreign Office on November 11 stating that the Soviet Government considered the question settled by the decision of the Moscow Conference regarding the formation of the Advisory Council for Italy (740.00119 MPC/79).

<sup>42</sup> Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

consideration. We should appreciate receiving the views of the British Government with respect to the granting of the request of these four Governments.

HULL

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740.00119 MPC/22 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 15, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 10:12 p. m.]

1619. A note from Molotov dated October 14 informs me that British Ambassador in Moscow has informed Soviet Government that British Government would like the representatives of Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain on the Political-Military Commission to deliver to French Committee of National Liberation in names of their Governments identical notes containing an official invitation to the representative of the French Committee to participate in work of the Commission. The note states that in the draft proposed by British Government for the identical notes "it is stated with reference to the competence of the Political-Military Commission that the representatives of the three Governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation would give joint or separate advice to the three Governments or to the Committee of Liberation but would not have powers to make final decisions nor would they of course interfere in the military functions of Allied Commander-in-Chief."

Molotov states that in replying to the British Government the Soviet Government has agreed to official invitation to the representative of the French Committee to participate in Commission, and Molotov continues: "With reference to definition of the competence of the Political-Military Commission the Soviet Government has proposed to make a change in the British draft of the official invitation to the effect that Political-Military Commission should direct and coordinate activity of all military organs and of any civil authorities of Allies which are organized on enemy territory concerning questions of armistice and of control over fulfillment of the armistice and that in accordance with this the Political-Military Commission can also issue from time to time instructions and directives to Government of Italy and, in analogous circumstances, to governments of other Axis countries, while military operational questions remain completely under the direction of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief."<sup>43</sup>

HAMILTON

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<sup>43</sup> In telegram No. 1000, October 16, 1943, the Department instructed the Ambassador as follows: "With reference to the last paragraph of your telegram no. 1619, October 15, 11 a. m. you should orally draw Mr. Molotov's attention to the views of this Government as set forth in the Department's telegram no. 963 and conveyed to him by you." For telegram No. 963, October 8, see p. 793.

740.00119 MPC/23 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 15, 1943—5 p. m.  
[Received October 15—12:25 p. m.]

7060. Department's 6368, October 13, 1 p. m. In my absence yesterday while I was with Morgenthau<sup>44</sup> in Scotland, Bucknell,<sup>45</sup> in accordance with your instructions, informed Cadogan of the contents of your telegram mentioned above. Cadogan replied that this was, of course, a matter that he would have to submit and obtain an authoritative decision. His own personal view was that the inclusion, particularly of Brazil and China, would open the door to all of the United Nations which would result inevitably in the Commission becoming unwieldy. He went on to say that it was his understanding that it had been agreed that the membership on the Commission should be limited to those countries who had actually fought the Italians. This would, of course, include the French, Soviets, Greeks and Yugoslavs. If, however, Brazil and China were included, the next step would be to include all of the United Nations. He thought that this would probably cause some difficulty.

We will endeavor to obtain a decision in the matter as promptly as possible.<sup>46</sup>

WINANT

740.0011 Moscow/28 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State  
(Stettinius)*

U.S.S. "PHOENIX,"<sup>47</sup> October 15, 1943.  
[Received 2:50 p. m.]

Delam<sup>48</sup> No. 1. For the President and Acting Secretary. Appreciate receiving your Amdel 3<sup>49</sup> as the President's action will be

<sup>44</sup> Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

<sup>45</sup> Howard Bucknell, Jr., Counselor of Embassy, Chargé d'Affaires.

<sup>46</sup> In telegram No. 7197, October 19, 8 p. m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom quoted a written reply from Cadogan in the same sense as the above (740.00119 MPC/37).

<sup>47</sup> The American delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, headed by Secretary of State Hull, was on board the *Phoenix* en route to the Conference.

<sup>48</sup> The designation assigned to a series of telegrams sent to the Department of State by the American delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

<sup>49</sup> Dated October 9, 1943, not printed; it informed the Secretary that the President had instructed the Embassy at Moscow to transmit to Foreign Commissar Molotov a message pointing out that there would appear to be no conflict between the Allied Control Commission for Italy, as set up by the long-term surrender document agreed to by the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, and the Political-Military Commission envisaged by the same three Governments (740.0011 Moscow/33c). For text of the note to Molotov, see vol. II, pp. 382-383.



most helpful in clarifying jurisdiction of Political and Military Commission meeting at Algiers.

It would be well also to suggest for the President's consideration a message from him to Stalin clarifying limitation of French representative of [*representation on*] that Commission in accordance with the President's view, as stated at our conference in his office of October 5th,<sup>50</sup> that French representation would be restricted to matters other than the military occupation of Italy in which the three Governments decide that France has a direct interest and that the French are not to function as full members (see President's message to Stalin of September 5th<sup>51</sup> on this subject).

If the President also approves, the suggestion might be made to Soviets (and British as well) that China, Brazil, Yugoslavia and Greece might be invited to similarly limited representation of [*on*] the Political-Military Commission at Algiers. You may wish to keep Wilson informed of all these messages for his strictly confidential information.

Referring to Amdel No. 8<sup>52</sup> I am in agreement with the memorandum which the British propose sending to the Soviet Government prior to the conference, except that the granting of full membership status to the French Committee in either London or Algiers is not in accord with my understanding of the President's position in this matter. If the President sends the message to Stalin, suggested above, it will clarify the question of French representation as well as that of other nations which have requested representation.

It should be clearly reiterated throughout that military functions of the Commanders-in-Chief must not be interfered with.

As the arrangements for this Political Military Commission were made in correspondence between the President, the Prime Minister and Stalin, it would be helpful to me at Moscow if clarification of this matter were undertaken before my arrival there.

HULL

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740.00119 MPC/61 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 29, 1943—4 p. m.  
[Received October 30—4 : 23 a. m.]

1863. For the President and Acting Secretary from Wilson. Masigli came to see me today (Murphy is in Italy) to say that the French

<sup>50</sup> *Ante*, p. 541.

<sup>51</sup> *Ante*, p. 784.

<sup>52</sup> Dated October 12, p. 554.

Committee had heard from London that there was a tendency in the Moscow Conference to whittle down the importance of the Political-Military Committee to meet in Algiers, on which the French Committee understood it was to be invited to be represented, and to transfer to a new commission to meet in London all the important questions relating to Germany, the satellite powers, et cetera, and that the French Committee would be excluded from membership thereon. He said that this news had the effect of a bombshell in Algiers. It was discussed yesterday by the French Committee and the greatest concern expressed by all present.

Massigli said that if, in fact, the French Committee is kept out of the important commission, it will have deplorable and far-reaching effects on French opinion not only in Algiers but in France, where it will never be understood why the United States and Great Britain refused to give France a seat at the table where the German problem is under discussion.

Massigli said that this raised a question whether he should not resign. He had stayed on in the Committee urging moderation and declaring that American opinion would evolve more favorably in time towards the French Committee. If France is now frozen out of the important discussions, there would be little point in his staying on. Massigli had previously made somewhat similar observations to the British Chargé d'Affaires.

I said that I had received but little information as to what was under discussion at Moscow concerning the functions of the Political-Military Committee. I asked whether it was the point of view of the French Committee that they should be admitted on the same basis as the Governments of Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the US to whatever body might deal with the important questions. He hesitated, then said that of course the French Committee was not powerful, he did not know just what its status should be on such a commission, but as the only representative authority for France, it clearly should have a definite place.

He said that the French representative at Moscow had been instructed to bring these views to the attention of the delegations there, and he expressed the hope that I would also advise the Secretary.

Repeated to Moscow and London. [Wilson.]

WILEY

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740.0011 Moscow/86

*The Netherlands Embassy to the Department of State*

MEMORANDUM

The Netherlands Government desires to make the following observation with regard to the so-called Mediterranean Commission and other

“institutional” (i.e. not *ad hoc*) international commissions which may eventually be established.

In the opinion of the Netherlands Government it is essential that the smaller powers be adequately represented in such commissions. In order to ensure adequate representation it will be desirable and necessary to entitle these smaller powers to participate on a basis of equality with the Principal Powers in all discussions affecting their interests.

The principle that the smaller powers are entitled to participate in the discussions whenever their interests are involved was already adopted before the war. It will be remembered that the statute of the International Court of Permanent Justice stipulates that if the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of one or either of the parties, the party or the parties concerned may select a judge of their own nationality.

Granted that this principle can still be considered as generally accepted, the Netherlands Government furthermore feels that in the interest of the successful operation of these international institutional bodies, the smaller nations should have a permanent representation on these commissions. This could be done by giving these countries a permanent seat, to serve for a limited time, under a system of rotation.

The Netherlands Government would greatly appreciate it if the abovementioned observations could be brought as soon as possible to the attention of the Secretary of State in Moscow.

[WASHINGTON, October 30, 1943.]

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[The Political-Military Commission was one of the topics discussed at the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow during its sessions on October 22, 23, and 29, 1943. For reports of these meetings, and texts of other Moscow Conference documents relating to the Political-Military Commission, see pages 604–670, *passim*. The Political-Military Commission ceased to exist with the establishment by the Moscow Conference of the European Advisory Commission (see pages 801 ff.) and the Advisory Council for Italy (see volume II, pages 402 ff.)]

## ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION<sup>1</sup>

740.00119 EAC/4 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, November 3, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 8 : 45 p. m.]

7621. The Foreign Office today informed us that they were now occupying themselves with the preparation for the establishment in London of the Advisory Commission for Europe. While they were unable to make any definite plans and had as yet no knowledge of the British representation which would have to await return of Mr. Eden,<sup>2</sup> in view of the fact that it was expected that a large Soviet delegation would appear within a month, certain preliminary preparations should be made as soon as possible. They thought that the United States would also be concerned with similar considerations and asked us to present the following to the Department in a preliminary way :

1. The question of housing. Foreign Office is endeavoring to obtain a building for the use of the Commission which would provide adequate space for the main committee and sub-committee meeting and would be sufficiently large to provide office space for clerical and sub-committee staffs.

2. Joint Secretariat. Foreign Office feels that this should be small at least in the beginning and composed probably of two representatives of each of the nations represented. Since Foreign Office feels that success of Commission depends to a great extent on an efficient secretariat they propose to appoint carefully selected members on the British side, preferably those who have had some conference experience and would be prepared to act as secretaries for the various sub-

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<sup>1</sup>The European Advisory Commission was established by the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, 1943. The project was discussed at the sessions held on October 22, 23, 27, and 29. For reports of these meetings, and texts of other Moscow Conference documents relating to the European Advisory Commission (telegram No. 1135 [Amdel 60], Washington, October 30, 1943; Conference Documents Nos. 8 and 18; and Annex 2 to the Secret Protocol), see pp. 604, 617, 650, 662, 683, 710, 720, and 756, respectively.

For documentation and references to the European Advisory Commission at the Cairo and Tehran Conferences, see page citations under "European Advisory Commission" in the index of *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

<sup>2</sup>Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had not yet returned from Moscow, where he had been the British representative at the Tripartite Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

committees to be established. British believe duties of secretariat should be purely clerical. They suggest tentatively the possibility of appointing of British Secretary General.

3. British are attempting to gather together a clerical staff for the Commission but Embassy feels Department may desire to provide some clerical staff for American representation thereon.

4. Foreign Office thinks that there will probably be established immediately about 10 sub-committees who will prepare studies for the principal representatives on various subjects which will be referred to the Commission. Their feeling is that there should be a [*at*] least one representative for each sub-committee from each nation represented. They recognize, however, that in certain cases it may be possible to have one representative for say two of the various committees should it develop that the sub-committees do not have a full-time job.

5. The question of interpreters may present certain difficulties and we were asked if the American Government could provide two reliable interpreters who could interpret from Russian into English. It appears that they have in mind one interpreter in each sub-committee or other meeting of the Commission interpreting from English into Russian which they think can probably be handled by the Russian delegation and one interpreter translating from Russian into English which will probably have to be provided by the British and ourselves.

We explained that we had no information regarding any plans which might have been formulated by the American Government with regard to the composition of the American delegation to the Commission but that we would present these preliminary considerations to the Department for such comment as it might consider desirable.

It is evident that the British intend to assign considerable British personnel to the Commission and that they anticipate that a very large Russian delegation will appear in London within the relatively near future. This presents staff and personnel problems as regards the American delegation which we are sure has already been receiving the attention of the Department.

WINANT

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740.00119 EAC/2 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 3, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received November 4—6:20 a. m.]

Netherland Series 23. In a recent talk, Foreign Minister Van Kleffens<sup>3</sup> expressed deep concern regarding the position of the Neth-

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<sup>3</sup> Eelco Nicolaas Van Kleffens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Government in Exile at London.

erlands in relation to the Mediterranean Commission<sup>4</sup> and the Three Power Advisory Commission in London.<sup>5</sup>

Van Kleffens referred to the unhappy Dutch reactions in the past to certain procedures affecting the small nations. Thus he said with regard to Dutch representation on the joint chiefs of staff, the Netherlands Government had felt that their country's interests were not being accorded the essential degree of representation, until the President personally took a hand and readjusted matters so that the representatives of the Netherlands Armed Forces should not be merely "consulted" by, but "participate" with, the joint chiefs of staff in their deliberations, when these concerned Netherlands interests.

They had also been greatly disturbed by the draft for UNRRA.<sup>6</sup> He referred to the objections that the Dutch had put forward and recalled that in communicating their subsequent acquiescence in the proposed arrangements regarding the central committee which was restricted to the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, the Netherlands Government had made it clear that it was doing [so] in the interests of the early creation of an international relief organization and in consideration of such an organization's temporary nature, but that it felt obliged to maintain its original objections and to make clear that its willingness to cooperate in the proposed arrangement could not be invoked against it if a similar framework were proposed, contrary to its expectation, in the sphere of international peace organization.

Turning then to the Mediterranean Commission, Van Kleffens said that when his Government learned that it was to be created and to be composed of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, Russia and France, he and his Ambassador had called on Foreign Secretary Eden and urged that the Netherlands be represented on the Commission, if and when its interests were directly or indirectly under discussion. In response, Eden had asked whether Van Kleffens thought the Netherlands would be satisfied to have its interests represented by France. Van Kleffens said he had replied "definitely not".

More recently he had learned of the contemplated creation of the Three-Power European Advisory Commission in London. He and his Ambassador had again called at the Foreign Office and seen Sir Alexander Cadogan<sup>7</sup> in Eden's absence. They had told him that the Netherlands Government felt it to be only just and reasonable to

<sup>4</sup> For a memorandum requesting Netherlands representation on "the so-called Mediterranean Commission and other 'institutional' (i.e. not *ad hoc*) international commissions which may eventually be established," left at the Department of State on October 30, 1943, by the Netherlands Embassy, see p. 799.

<sup>5</sup> The European Advisory Commission.

<sup>6</sup> For correspondence relating to Netherlands objections and subsequent acquiescence in the draft agreement for the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, see pp. 915-919, 923, 943, 957-962, 965, 985-986, and 1011n.

<sup>7</sup> British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

expect to "participate" with, and not merely to be "consulted" by, the Three-Power Commission in London when questions involving Netherlands interests arise for the Commission's consideration. This he continued was quite aside from the fact that the Netherlands Government would consider a fair and democratic procedure, namely, the representation of the smaller nations on the Commission in order of rotation. In other words if Netherlands interests were under discussion at a time when the Netherlands was not represented on the Commission in its proper order of rotation, it would expect to be invited to be represented on the Commission at that juncture.

He thought the Americans, in view of their own history, would be likely to understand the Dutch position. After all, the United States had seceded from Great Britain on the grounds of no taxation without representation.

Van Kleffens added that he had been careful to give me this account of his Government's reactions in order that I should be fully aware both of its current attitude and of the background for it. He said that he wanted me to know, as he had made clear to Cadogan, that his Government intended to pursue its standpoint "determinedly, even stubbornly".

[BIDDLE]

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740.00119 EAC/5: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, November 4, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received November 5—3:12 a. m.]

1913. From Murphy.<sup>8</sup> I am informed by a responsible American correspondent that he learned from what he considers a reliable source that Bogomolov<sup>9</sup> told de Gaulle<sup>10</sup> a week before it was announced that France would not be a member of the new European Advisory Commission to sit in London, but for de Gaulle not to worry; Russia would see that France was taken care of. This correspondent added that he was told de Gaulle's reaction to the incident was that Russia was seeking to play off the French against the Americans and British, and in increasing suspicion of Russian support. This report is passed along for what it may be worth, without definite evaluation.

Sent to Department, repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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<sup>8</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa; Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; and U.S. Political Adviser, staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>9</sup> Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Allied Governments in Exile at London.

<sup>10</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French National Committee in London.

740.00119 EAC/8 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 11, 1943—2 p. m.  
[Received November 12—1 : 01 a. m.]

1913. The following telegram has been sent to Algiers.

November 11, 2 p. m. For Murphy from Harriman.

Thanks for your 1913, November 4.<sup>11</sup> In the same connection believe you will be interested in what Eden told me before he left Moscow :

Molotov<sup>12</sup> told Eden the French Committee had complained to the Soviets that they were not admitted to the London Council,<sup>13</sup> claiming that the British were ready to let them in but the Soviets had resisted. Eden replied that they had had a similar complaint from the French explaining that the Soviets were willing but the British were not. Eden stated to Molotov that this was a clear indication the French were playing the Soviet and British Governments against each other. Sent to Algiers, repeated to the Department.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 EAC/11-1943

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have now considered the question of the combined secretariat for the European Advisory Commission and suggest that this should be on a modest scale to start with. It might for instance consist at the outset of say two American and two British and two Soviet secretaries under a Secretary General who might be chosen when the Commission meets, or previously if desired. They would be assisted by the necessary clerical, interpreting and typing staff.

2. Members of the secretariat would work permanently at the headquarters of the Commission. They would be servants of the Commission as a whole and not of their respective delegations. They would not be concerned with policy. Their duties would be primarily to keep minutes of the meetings of the Commission and of any committees that may be established, to see to the distribution of documents and to make all material arrangements for the Commission's work. Every effort would be made to get the secretariat working as a team. His Majesty's Government suggest that it should establish itself at the headquarters of the Commission as soon as practicable.

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<sup>11</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>12</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>13</sup> The European Advisory Commission.



3. The terms of reference of the Commission laid down in addition that representatives "may be assisted where necessary by technical advisers civilian and military". These advisers would not be members of the combined secretariat but would serve their respective delegations, if necessary representing the chief delegate at sub-committee meetings. His Majesty's Government would be grateful to be informed of the names of any advisers who would accompany the principal United States delegate.

4. His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive the observations of United States Government.

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1943.

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740.00119 EAC/11 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 22, 1943.

[Received November 23—1:25 p. m.]

2012. *Pravda* for November 22nd carried an announcement of the appointment of the principal representative of the USSR on the European Advisory Commission reading as follows:

"In accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference regarding the establishment in London of the European Advisory Commission the Soviet Government has appointed as principal representative of the Soviet Union on this Commission the Ambassador of the USSR in Great Britain Comrade F. T. Gusev."<sup>14</sup>

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 EAC/9 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 22, 1943.

[Received November 22—3:40 p. m.]

8154. Mr. Strang's appointment as British member of European Advisory Commission is announced in following official statement issued last night:

"The King has been graciously pleased to approve the appointment of Mr. William Strang, C.B., C.M.G., M.B.E., an Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, to be a Knight Commander

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<sup>14</sup> Feodor Tarasovitch Gousev.

of the most distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George on his appointment as United Kingdom representative on the European Advisory Commission with the rank of Ambassador."

Mr. Strang's appointment, which had been forecast by press for some days, receives friendly comment from diplomatic correspondents today. *Times* correspondent writes: "The choice is admirable. As an Assistant Under Secretary of State, Mr. Strang has had directly under him department of the Foreign Office concerned with just those problems on which the new European Commission will be required to advise the American, Russian and British Governments. His knowledge of the new Russia is particularly intimate. At the Moscow Conference his work was invaluable, and in his report to Parliament 10 days ago Mr. Eden spoke of him as 'the brilliant Foreign Office leader of our team'."

Press states that Government has chosen Lancaster House—adjoining St. James's Palace—as headquarters of Commission.

Newspapers also carry Moscow announcement that Ambassador Gusev will represent Russia on Commission. *Daily Sketch* and some of yesterday's papers speculate that Ambassador Winant will be American representative, while *Daily Mail* expresses opinion today that "either Mr. Winant<sup>15</sup> or Mr. Phillips<sup>16</sup> will represent the United States".

WINANT

740.00119 EAC/39

*The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Wright) to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1943.

DEAR MATTHEWS: With reference to the *Aide-Mémoire* which I left with you on November 19th, I am writing to say that the Soviet Government have now agreed to our suggestions for the Secretariat of the Advisory Council for Europe. They think that the Secretary-General should be elected when the Commission meets.

As Civil advisers they have appointed A. A. Sobolev,<sup>17</sup> V. S. Kozlov<sup>18</sup> and H. V. Rpanov [*N. V. Ivanov?*].<sup>18</sup>

Yours ever,

MICHAEL WRIGHT

<sup>15</sup> The Department announced the appointment of Ambassador Winant to the European Advisory Commission on December 4, 1943. For text of press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 4, 1943, p. 393.

<sup>16</sup> William Phillips, American Political Adviser to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief of Allied Forces.

<sup>17</sup> Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom.

<sup>18</sup> Member of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

740.00119 EAC/18

*The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Wright) to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)*

3629/19/43

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1943.

DEAR MATTHEWS: I send you herewith an extract from a telegram from the Foreign Office <sup>23</sup> about staff for the Advisory Commission for Europe.

It would be helpful to us to learn whether the United States Government contemplates providing any clerical or typing staff, or any interpreters or translators, for the Secretariat. Would you let me know your thought on this?

Yours ever,

MICHAEL WRIGHT

740.00119 EAC/18

*The Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews) to the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Wright)*

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1943.

DEAR WRIGHT: Thank you for your letter of December 9 about staff for the European Advisory Commission.

We are endeavoring to secure a minimum of one high grade Russian translator and interpreter and one stenographer for the Secretariat. We will, of course, take care of the clerical needs of our delegation and one of our secretaries on the Secretariat will be Russian speaking.

If it becomes apparent that a larger staff will be desirable, we will endeavor to find it.

Sincerely yours,

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

740.00119 EAC/19 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 15, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received December 15—9:21 p. m.]

8731. Personal for the Secretary. On returning here I met with Strang and later called on Gousev. They were both interested in getting the work of the European Advisory Commission under way. Therefore we held an informal preliminary meeting this afternoon. We went over the premises assigned to the Commission, discussed the

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<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

problem of a Secretariat, it being understood that each of us would contribute two secretaries. Gousev and I agreed to a Britisher<sup>24</sup> to head the Secretariat. This seemed reasonable as the British were providing the quarters and would undoubtedly be called upon to supply a larger share of the personnel in the early period of operations. I insisted that as a matter of right each of us would be open to contribute a third of the Secretariat but that as a practical matter we appreciated the generosity of the British in extending to us their available facilities. On the question of the rotation of the chairmanship we decided that each of the three members of the Commission should serve for 1 month and that as I was the senior I should preside at the first formal meeting. The Russian was insistent that minutes of the meetings, documents and final recommendations should be recorded in both English and Russian and that both languages be equally authentic. We agreed that we would call the first official meeting as near January 1st as possible. We agreed that all meetings of the Commission would be secret and that the Secretariat was to have no contact with the press. If at some time it was necessary for the Commission to make a public statement it was only to be made on the direction of the Commission after agreement. At our first meeting we will decide the order in which the subject matter before us will be taken up. I have not an authentic record of the assignment of subject matter from the State Department and am so far dependent on British documentation. I have no doubt that the necessary terms of reference and assignments from both the Moscow and Tehran Conferences have been forwarded to the Embassy. While I was in Cairo I was told that Loy Henderson<sup>25</sup> would be assigned to me. I am looking forward to his early arrival. I had in mind having Henderson and Kennan<sup>26</sup> assist me on the delegation and assigning Thayer<sup>27</sup> and Lightner<sup>28</sup> to the joint Secretariat. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy has promised to send two ranking military men as advisers. We should also have a qualified adviser on European transport from the outset of our deliberations. I believe that Joe Eastman<sup>29</sup> with whom I have worked for many years would be helpful in finding the right man for this assignment.

I want very much to get your ideas as to the ways and means in which you feel the Commission can be most useful.

WINANT

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<sup>24</sup> E. P. Donaldson.

<sup>25</sup> Loy W. Henderson, Minister in Iraq.

<sup>26</sup> George F. Kennan, Counselor of Legation in Portugal.

<sup>27</sup> Charles W. Thayer, Third Secretary of Embassy and Vice Consul in the United Kingdom.

<sup>28</sup> E. Allan Lightner, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy and Vice Consul in Sweden.

<sup>29</sup> Joseph Bartlett Eastman, member of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

740.00119 EAC/19 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1943—6 p. m.

7963. Personal for the Ambassador. Thank you for your telegram no. 8731, December 15, 11 p. m. with regard to plans for the European Advisory Commission and your first informal preliminary meeting. Your arrangements regarding rotation of the Chairmanship of the Commission seem quite satisfactory as well as the proposal to have a British official head the Secretariat.

The terms of reference for the Commission and the subject matter so far assigned to it for consideration are contained in the secret protocol of the Moscow Conference,<sup>30</sup> a copy of which was left with you personally by Mr. Cannon.<sup>31</sup> If it was decided at Teheran to refer additional questions to the Commission for study at this time you will be promptly informed. Kennan is here now and will leave for London shortly after Christmas. We plan to have him take with him full documentation supplemented by oral discussions as to our views. We have also set up a working committee in the Department with representatives of the War and Navy Departments so that there will be no delay at this end in considering the Commission's work.

I do not understand your suggestion that a qualified adviser on European transport questions is needed from the outset since under the terms of reference of the Commission there is no provision that this problem shall fall within the Commission's purview.

As to personnel, we have picked a staff which we consider qualified in every way. Loy Henderson is not available but Kennan, with the President's approval, has been selected in his place. In addition to Thayer, John Stone, who, as you know, has been working in my office, has been assigned to the secretariat. It is contemplated that Lightner will work directly with you and Kennan on the delegation. The War and Navy Departments are giving careful consideration to the selection of their representatives to assist you. I shall see that you are fully posted with regard to our policies as the work of the Commission proceeds.

HULL

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<sup>30</sup> Annex 2 to the Secret Protocol, p. 756.

<sup>31</sup> Cavendish W. Cannon, Division of European Affairs.

740.0011 Moscow/317

*The British Minister (Campbell) to the Adviser on Political Relations  
(Dunn)*

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1943.

DEAR JIMMIE: You will remember that during a discussion of Item 14 of the Agenda of the Moscow Conference (policy regarding Allied territory liberated through the advance of Allied forces),<sup>32</sup> Mr. Eden alluded to certain preliminary negotiations with the Norwegian, Netherlands and Belgian Governments. On the proposal of Mr. Hull this question was referred to the European Advisory Commission (see secret protocol of the Conference under Item 14 of the Agenda<sup>33</sup>). The Foreign Office tell us that Sir William Strang and Mr. Winant are anxious that the European Advisory Commission should make a good start by taking up a question on which it should be possible to reach an agreed recommendation without difficulty. For this purpose they contemplate that the Commission might start its work with a discussion of comprehensive policy in liberated Norwegian territory and consider in particular the draft agreement with the Norwegian Government, which as you know has received the approval of the United States Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

It is therefore suggested that as the question of civil affairs in Norway is primarily connected with combined Anglo-American operations, the British and American representatives on the Commission might circulate formally to the Commission the text of the draft Norwegian agreement, under cover of a note which would explain how the agreement came into being, summarise the main principles on which it has been based, and explain that although the agreement has been kept as a draft pending the clearance of its principles by the Commission, it is important that it should be definitely concluded at an early date so as to provide a firm basis for operational planning by the Anglo-American Command.

The Foreign Office would like to know as soon as possible if you approve the above procedure. If you agree, they propose to instruct the British Ambassador in Moscow<sup>34</sup> to communicate the text to the Soviet Government at the same time, to provide a check on any translation or summary which the Soviet representative on the European Advisory Commission may telegraph to his Government.

Yours ever,

R. I. CAMPBELL

<sup>32</sup> See summary of the ninth session of the Tripartite Conference, October 27, p. 650.

<sup>33</sup> *Ante*, p. 754.

<sup>34</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

740.00119 EAC/45a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943—8 p. m.

8108. Advisory Commission. I thought it would be helpful if I were to give you my impressions and thoughts with regard to the European Advisory Commission.

When the establishment of the Commission came up at Moscow, Mr. Eden proposed terms of reference and jurisdiction for it which were of a most comprehensive character. It was perfectly obvious in the discussions that the Soviet Government had no intention of giving the Commission the wide jurisdiction proposed by Mr. Eden, and in the drafting of the terms of reference the Soviet Government insisted upon restricting the Commission's work to the preparation of terms of surrender of the enemy countries in Europe and the devising of machinery for insuring the execution of those terms. The restriction of the Commission's work to this limited field was entirely in line with the policy of this Government as it seemed to us that the whole question of the occupation and treatment of the enemy countries should be separated in the first instance from general European political questions. We are of course interested in not having any kind of regional council or regional control set up in such a manner that it would precede or supersede the functions of the general organization for the maintenance of peace and security on a world-wide basis. We are therefore desirous of not having any body which deals with European questions set up in a form which might be construed or interpreted as paving the way for a European control body at this time. We feel that the coordination of organizations dealing in the European field should be within the framework and control of any contemplated organization.

We would prefer, therefore, that you keep the work of the Commission within the field of drawing up terms of surrender and machinery for control of the enemy countries, with the exception, of course, of the consideration of those papers directly referred to it by the Conference for its advice.

With respect to the latter, I wish to give you my thoughts on the paper entitled "Civil Affairs for France"<sup>36</sup> referred to the Commission by the Moscow Conference. This paper which was dated October 6, 1943, received the agreement of the United States and the British Governments.<sup>37</sup> It purports to lay down a set of principles upon which the participation of the French will be provided for in

<sup>36</sup> Annex 5 to the Secret Protocol, p. 760.

<sup>37</sup> See telegram No. 1012, October 18, 6 p. m., from the Acting Secretary of State to the American delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, p. 565.

the administration of Civil Affairs in France when the Allied military operations begin in that country with a view to the defeat of Germany. There is no attempt in this document to go into any great detail with regard to the methods by which these principles will be carried out. The further development of the document and the application of the principles is intended to be worked out in COSSAC<sup>38</sup> where the military planning for operations in France is taking place. The British and American Governments having agreed to this document, it remained but for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to send it in the form of a directive to COSSAC in order to start discussions with the French military authorities in planning the operation. However, as agreement between the two Governments was only reached on the eve of the Moscow Conference, it was thought best by the two Governments to present it at Moscow for the information of and clearance with the Soviet Government. As the paper came up toward the end of the Conference in Moscow there was not sufficient time for it to be discussed, and the Foreign Ministers sent it on to the Advisory Commission for consideration. It is not contemplated that the paper need be discussed in any great detail as the spirit and attitude expressed in the document is obvious, and, as the operational planning and application for the putting into effect of these principles is left for further elaboration at the planning stage, it is preferable not to introduce into this basic document any more detail than is therein contained. There should be no need for any rewriting of the document, nor of making any great changes in it as it now stands. If any suggestions of major change are brought forward, you may explain that this is merely a basic document of statement of principles, and that operational details and discussion of its application shall take place at a later stage when the French authorities will be represented and when consideration will be given to their views. It is important at this time that the clearance of this document not be further delayed as any further delay is impeding the necessary planning in COSSAC which has already been retarded through not having any directive on the subject from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Under item 14 of the protocol of the Moscow Conference, it is stated that an exchange of views took place on a proposal put forward by the United Kingdom on "policy regarding Allied territory liberated through the advance of the Allied forces", and that this question was referred to the European Advisory Commission.<sup>39</sup>

The paper on this subject which was presented by Mr. Eden is on the same subject which was agreed to between the British and Ameri-

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<sup>38</sup> Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate).

<sup>39</sup> For text of the British proposal, see p. 738. For the record of discussion of the subject at the ninth session of the Moscow Conference on October 27, 1943, see pp. 651-652.



can Governments at Quebec last summer.<sup>40</sup> The text of the agreed statement of last summer is contained in the Department's no. 5417, September 4, 1943, midnight, to Biddle.<sup>41</sup> This Government is still ready to subscribe to a statement in the terms as agreed upon at Quebec.

The text of the proposed statement as put forward by Mr. Eden at Moscow was submitted to the Department just prior to the Delegation's departure. After reference to the President the British were informed that it was not acceptable to this Government as drafted. It was, however, submitted by the British at Moscow. If any consideration is given to a statement to be made on this subject, you will be guided by the text as agreed upon at Quebec, and will not accept any changes therein without reference to this Government as the Quebec text has received the approval of the President.

HULL

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740.00119 EAC/22

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1943.

MR. DUNN: Mr. Michael Wright of the British Embassy telephoned while you were at a meeting and referred to your call earlier this morning. He said that you had explained to him that it is our feeling that the Anglo-Norwegian Agreement does not fall within the terms of reference of the European Advisory Commission but that the subject is one which should be cleared through discussions primarily with the War Department. Mr. Wright said that he wished to refer to item 14 of the Moscow Secret Protocol and to the British record of the Ninth Meeting of the Moscow Conference on October 27. It concerned itself in part with policy regarding Allied territory liberated through the advance of the Allied forces. He sent Mr. Hayter<sup>42</sup> down with the British minutes<sup>42a</sup> which the latter asked me to read. These minutes in part are similar to our own with one important variation. They indicate that Mr. Eden specifically mentioned pending agreements which the British had negotiated with the Belgian and Norwegian Governments as the type of problems he had in mind in connection with liberated areas and they further purport to show that the Secretary was in accord that this type of problem

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<sup>40</sup> The First Quebec Conference, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, was held August 17-24, 1943. The records of this Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

<sup>41</sup> Vol. III, p. 458.

<sup>42</sup> W. G. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

<sup>42a</sup> For the corresponding passage in the American minutes, see pp. 651-652.

should be referred to the European Advisory Commission along with the proposed Liberated Areas Declaration<sup>43</sup> and the French Civil Affairs paper.<sup>44</sup> In view of this apparent misunderstanding with regard to the discussions covering item 14 of the Moscow Agenda you may wish to look into the matter a little further before sending the attached telegram to London and letter to Sir Ronald Campbell.<sup>45</sup>

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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740.00119 European War 1939/2057½ : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1943—10 p. m.

8144. The Department has been informed by the British Embassy that when the question of a joint declaration to the German people on the basis of unconditional surrender arose at Tehran, Marshal Stalin expressed the opinion that this would be bad tactics as far as Germany was concerned, and that he suggested the three Governments work out terms together with a view to making them known generally to the German people. The Embassy's memorandum stated that Mr. Eden suggested that this matter should be dealt with by the European Advisory Commission.

I asked the President for his views and he told me this was not brought up in any way at Tehran in his presence. He feels that you should take it up with the Prime Minister as soon as he returns to London.

HULL

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740.00119 EAC/22

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the  
Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: Reference: Mr. Winant's telegram no. 8837 of December 20, 3 p. m.,<sup>46</sup> suggesting that the agreement with the Norwegian Government for civilian administration and jurisdiction in

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<sup>43</sup> For text of this British proposal presented at the Moscow Conference, see p. 738.

<sup>44</sup> For text of this U.S. memorandum presented at the Moscow Conference, see p. 760.

<sup>45</sup> Neither document attached to file copy, but for the messages as sent on December 29, see pp. 817-819.

<sup>46</sup> Not printed; in it the Ambassador mentioned that William Strang of the British Foreign Office had told him that the British Embassy in Washington had been instructed to communicate with the Department in regard to the subject noted.

Norwegian territory liberated by Allied forces be submitted to the European Advisory Commission.

It is our view that an arrangement or agreement of this kind should not be submitted to the European Advisory Commission. It should be transmitted to the Soviet Government for its information either through Washington or Moscow, but it does not appear to be a matter on which we would want discussion to take place and recommendations to be made by the European Advisory Commission. It is a straight-out agreement as to the respective jurisdiction of our armed forces and the Norwegian Government in Norwegian territory.

The British Embassy here has said that at Moscow Mr. Eden specifically mentioned pending arrangements which the British had negotiated with the Belgian and Norwegian Governments as the type of problems he had in mind in connection with liberated areas, and that the British report of the Moscow proceedings indicate that you were in accord that this type of problem should be referred to that Commission along with the proposed Liberated Areas Declaration and the French Civil Affairs paper.

Our report of the minutes of the Conference contained no record of Mr. Eden having mentioned these papers at the meeting, nor do I recall his so doing myself. I feel sure that when the question of the liberated areas was brought up, from the report of your statement as recorded in our minutes of the meeting, you only had in mind referring to the European Advisory Commission the discussion of the statement on liberated areas which was agreed to at Quebec,<sup>47</sup> together with the British version of such a statement which they presented at Moscow. I feel sure that you did not have in mind that any of these other subsidiary questions should be brought within the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission. I think in order to limit that Commission's activities we should keep out of their deliberations all matters not connected with the terms of surrender and the occupation and control of Germany after the surrender.

Furthermore, we never had had this Norwegian or any of these other refugee agreements referred to us for any consideration by the British or the refugee governments until very recently.

We have, therefore, drafted the attached telegram to Ambassador Winant<sup>48</sup> to clear up this current misunderstanding as to the terms of reference of the European Advisory Commission.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

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<sup>47</sup> For the text of this statement, which had been agreed upon at the First Quebec Conference on August 22, 1943, see telegram No. 799, September 4, 10 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 517.

<sup>48</sup> *Infra*.

740.00119 EAC/22 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1943—7 p. m.

8210. Strang's proposal to clear the Anglo-Norwegian agreement with the Department through the British Embassy and then to place it on the agenda of the opening meeting of the European Advisory Commission (your 8837, December 20<sup>49</sup>) does not harmonize with our views with regard to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

This agreement has not yet been officially communicated to us by the British Embassy, nor, in fact, by the Norwegian Government. However, under date of October 15<sup>50</sup> the Secretary of War transmitted to the Department a copy of the Anglo-Norwegian agreement and stated that at their meeting that day the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved the agreement subject to concurrence by the State Department. The Department replied on October 19<sup>51</sup> that it had no comment to make thereon. Since then, the Netherlands and Norwegian Ambassadors<sup>52</sup> and the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires<sup>53</sup> have raised with the Department the question of the procedure to be followed in taking up the question of a military agreement with this Government as well as matters relating to civilian administration and jurisdiction in their respective national territories liberated by an Allied expeditionary force. The Netherlands Ambassador informed us for the first time that an agreement had been concluded between his Government and the British Government and, on instructions from his Government, expressed the hope that the American Government would approve the agreement as it stood. He was told that the agreement to which he referred appeared to be one between the British Government and his Government only and that if his Government desired to conclude a similar agreement with the American Government, the question should be opened in a written communication addressed to the Chief, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, who would later take up with the State Department any political phases of the Netherlands proposals. Similar information as to the wishes of this Government regarding the procedure to be followed in negotiating with it agreements of the character mentioned has been given to the Norwegian Ambassador and to the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires. Accordingly, in our view, consideration of an Anglo-Norwegian agreement of the character referred to by Strang would not lie within the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission.

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<sup>49</sup> See footnote 46, p. 815.

<sup>50</sup> Letter not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Reply not printed.

<sup>52</sup> Alexander Loudon and Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstjerne, respectively.

<sup>53</sup> Baron Hervé de Gruben.

The British Embassy has indicated that Mr. Eden is under the impression that at Moscow I gave assent to a suggestion by him that the Norwegian agreement be transmitted to the London Commission. Our records of the minutes of the meetings make no mention of such a suggestion, nor do I recall any, though of course it might have been made. In any event, as far as the liberated countries were concerned I only had in mind reference to the Advisory Commission of the proposed statement on liberated areas which was presented by the British Delegation.

Of course, we desire to keep the Soviet Government informed of arrangements such as the proposed Norwegian and Belgian agreements after they are arrived at, but this could best be done by transmission directly to the Soviet Government rather than have them laid before the Advisory Commission for discussion and recommendations.

Please bring the foregoing to the attention of Mr. Phillips<sup>54</sup> for his information.

HULL

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740.0011 Moscow/317

*The Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the British Minister (Campbell)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1943.

MY DEAR SIR RONALD: I have received your note of December 22 on the subject of the consideration of the agreements between the British and American Governments with the Norwegian Government with respect to Civil Affairs in Norway connected with combined Anglo-American military operations in that country.

Some days ago the Secretary received a telegram from Ambassador Winant stating that Sir William Strang had suggested that the draft texts of the agreements with the Norwegian Government be placed before the European Advisory Commission for their consideration. The Secretary of State in his reply to Ambassador Winant stated that the proposal to place these agreements on the agenda of the opening meeting of the European Advisory Commission did not harmonize with the views of this Government with regard to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

The Secretary realizes that there may have been some mention of this subject at the Moscow Conference though he does not recall any particular reference to the Norwegian Agreement, and he realizes that the conversation on the question of referring the statement on liberated

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<sup>54</sup> William Phillips, American Political Adviser to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief of Allied Forces.

areas to the Commission was rather general. In any event, as far as his own remarks are concerned, the Secretary had in mind only referring the proposed British statement on liberated areas to the Advisory Commission.

The Secretary has telegraphed his views on this subject to Mr. Winant in reply to his telegram referred to above.

Very sincerely yours,

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, HOT SPRINGS, VIRGINIA, MAY 18—JUNE 3, 1943; ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERIM COMMISSION ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

550.AD1/b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews)*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1943—9 p. m.

1465. By direction of the President, you are requested to call immediately on the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs<sup>2</sup> and to inform him that the Government of the United States desires to send an invitation, the text of which is given below, to the governments of all United Nations and of those American Republics which have broken off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers and are cooperating with the United Nations in the conduct of the war. Before doing so, we should like to have the views and suggestions of the governments of the United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. This government feels sure of course that the suggested initiative will be favored by the government to which you are accredited, and that we can count upon receiving its cordial cooperation in the efforts which must be undertaken to achieve the objectives sought but we would appreciate receiving at the earliest convenient moment whatever views or suggestions the government to which you are accredited chooses to express. Please request that this matter be regarded as entirely confidential until invitations can be sent to all United Nations. The text of the invitation follows.

“The Government of the United States believes that the time has arrived for the United Nations and other nations associated with them in the present war to begin joint consideration of certain fundamental economic questions which will confront them and the world after the attainment of complete military victory. As a first step in this direction, the Government of the United States hereby invites the Government of . . . . . to send a small number of appropriate technical and expert representatives to a conference which it proposes to convoke at some suitable place in the United States on April 27 for the purpose of providing an opportunity for an exchange of information and views relating to the following topics and for the purpose of exploring and

<sup>1</sup> Similar telegrams were sent on the same date to the Ambassadors in China (No. 310) and in the Soviet Union (No. 122).

<sup>2</sup> Anthony Eden.

seeking an agreement in principle as to the most practicable and desirable methods and means of dealing with the problems indicated below:

"1. Post-war plans and prospects of various countries for the production, import requirements and/or exportable surpluses of foodstuffs and other essential agricultural products in the light of possibilities of progressively improving in each country the levels of consumption within the framework of an expansion of its general economic activity. It is understood that such consideration is entirely divorced from the question of the provision of relief.

"2. Possibilities of international agreements, arrangements and institutions designed to promote efficient production, and to ensure for the world adequate supplies, of food and other essential agricultural products. Consideration would be given to the attainment of equitable prices from the viewpoint of both the producers and the consumers.

"3. Trade, financial and other arrangements necessary to enable the countries of the world to obtain the foodstuffs and other essential agricultural products which they need and to maintain adequate markets for their own surplus production.

"4. Possibilities of international coordination and stimulation of national policies for the improvement of nutrition and for the enhancement of consumption in general."

WELLES

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550.AD1/1: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 10, 1943—7 p. m.  
[Received March 10—3:35 p. m.]

1713. I called upon Mr. Eden this afternoon as instructed in the Department's telegram No. 1465 March 8, 9 p. m., (which I only received this morning) and left with him a letter setting forth our Government's desire and enclosing the text of the proposed invitation. After reading both, Mr. Eden said that of course the British Government was heartily in accord with the purpose of the proposed conference. His first reaction, he added, however, was that it might be difficult for all those interested to be sufficiently prepared by the date suggested to consider the vitally important but complicated problems involved with the best chances of success. Perhaps, he said, agreement might more easily be reached if some preliminary discussion by a smaller group were held. He reiterated, however, that the British Government welcomed our initiative and emphasized that the above observation was merely a preliminary one and in no way represented the considered views of the British Government. He promised to take the question up with the Prime Minister<sup>3</sup> imme-

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<sup>3</sup> Winston S. Churchill.



diately and to give us an early reply. He expressed doubt, however, whether he will be able to do so prior to his departure tomorrow.<sup>4</sup>

MATTHEWS

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550.AD1/9 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Vincent) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, March 18, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 10:21 a. m.]

389. With reference to Department's 310, March 8, 9 p. m.<sup>5</sup> Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>6</sup> has informed me orally that the Chinese Government accepts the invitation to the proposed conference and that such suggestions and comments as it may have to make will be communicated separately on a subsequent date or be incorporated in the instructions of the delegates for communication when they arrive in Washington. Unofficially he stated that the delegation would probably be composed of seven or eight men and that every effort would be made to have them arrive in Washington by April 27, April 5 having been set as the deadline for preparation for their departure from Chungking.

VINCENT

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550.AD1/11 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 21, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 5:45 p. m.]

186. Department's 122, March 8, 9 p. m.<sup>5</sup> Molotov<sup>7</sup> handed to me last evening an *aide-mémoire* reading in translation as follows:

"In an *aide-mémoire* dated March 11, 1943, the Ambassador of the United States of America informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the Government of the United States intends to convene on April 27, 1943, in the United States, a conference to consider certain fundamental economic problems and it inquires of the Soviet Government as well as of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of China regarding their attitude toward the proposed convocation of this conference.

On behalf of the Soviet Government the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs states that the Soviet Government is in full accord

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<sup>4</sup>Mr. Eden left for Washington for a general exchange of views with the United States Government; for correspondence concerning his visit, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>5</sup>See footnote 1, p. 820.

<sup>6</sup>K. C. Wu.

<sup>7</sup>Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

with the initiative taken by the Government of the United States with respect to this question. The Soviet Government is prepared to send representatives to the conference although it is not sure that these representatives will find it possible to arrive in time in the United States in view of the extremely short time that will remain before the date fixed for the convocation of the conference. The Soviet Government understands that the conference referred to above will be limited to an exchange of opinions on the problems enumerated in paragraphs 1-4 of the *aide-mémoire* and that accordingly no decisions whatsoever will be taken by the conference which will be binding upon its members.

The Soviet Government also expresses its desire that in the future, questions subject to consideration at conferences and their agenda should undergo preliminary discussions between representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, England and China so that the framework of the discussions (*forma obsuzhoeniya*) might be more fully determined."

I informed Molotov that I would do everything possible to expedite the travel of the Soviet representatives in order to enable them to arrive in the United States in time for the conference and requested advice as to when they would be ready to leave. Molotov stated that he had no information as to who would be appointed or date of departure, that he would consult Mikoyan<sup>8</sup> who was more closely concerned in the matter and communicate again with me.

Molotov expressed interest in the following questions and I would appreciate receiving any advice thereon which the Department may wish to send me for his information: (1) Have the British or Chinese already appointed representatives to the conference and if so who are they; (2) have any problems been submitted for discussion at the conference other than these enumerated in the invitation.

STANDLEY

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550.AD1/14c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1943—5 p. m.

163. Your 186, March 21, 1 p. m. Please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as follows:

1. We are delighted that the Soviet Government has accepted the invitation to the Conference and will make all necessary arrangements to expedite the travel of Soviet representatives.

2. Action taken in submitting the terms of the tentative invitation to Soviet Russia, United Kingdom and China was in order to accomplish precisely what is suggested in the last paragraph of Molotov's

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<sup>8</sup> Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Vice Chairman of the Soviet Council of People's Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Trade.

*aide-mémoire*. Invitations to other United Nations are being sent out only now after consultation with the above-named three governments.

3. The Chinese Government is sending seven or eight experts. We have no information on this score from the British Government. The size and composition of the United States delegation will be communicated as soon as possible.

HULL

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550.AD1/15a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Vincent)*<sup>10</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1943—10 p. m.

399. Department's telegram of March 8 regarding proposed conference on food and agricultural products indicated the desire of the United States Government to invite the governments of all United Nations and of those American Republics which have broken off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers and are cooperating with the United Nations in the conduct of the war.

There are four other countries outside this hemisphere which for similar reasons might be invited to the conference. These are Iceland, Iran, Liberia and Egypt. Please ascertain from the Chinese Government whether it would have any objection to the inclusion of these nations among those to be invited.

HULL

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550.AD1/58

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

No. 196

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1943.

SIR: I have the honour to refer to the reply of His Majesty's Government to the letter from the United States Chargé d'Affaires in London of the 10th March relating to the proposed Food Conference in which His Majesty's Government stated that they were carefully considering what positive suggestions they could offer to facilitate the work of the Conference. While His Majesty's Government agree that the consideration of post-war plans by the Food Conference should be divorced from the questions of the provision of relief, they attach importance to avoiding the creation of an impression among the European and other Allied Governments that the problem of relief is in danger of being relegated to the background. His Majesty's Government suggest therefore that it would be desirable before convening the Food Conference to consider what steps could be taken to explain the scope of the Food and Relief Conferences<sup>11</sup> and to provide measures for con-

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<sup>10</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (No. 168) and to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (No. 1819).

<sup>11</sup> For correspondence regarding the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, see pp. 851 ff.

necting the two sets of discussions in order to indicate that the urgent problems of relief were not being ignored or neglected.

His Majesty's Government assume that the Food Conference is intended to be primarily of a preliminary and exploratory nature, its main object being to analyse and define the long-range questions relating to foodstuffs and other essential agricultural products which are set out in heading one of the draft agenda, taking into account the problems arising from the structural modifications which have occurred during the war. It is assumed, therefore, that the Conference, while dealing in such detail as may be possible with matters under head one and the related head four of the draft agenda, will in regard to other matters which involve economic and financial issues over a wide field, confine themselves to discussion of the most appropriate method by which these matters may be handled and brought to an agreed conclusion. His Majesty's Government would wish that they should be dealt with in subsequent and separate discussion when there has been time for the necessary preparation.

I have [etc.]

HALIFAX

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550.AD1/15 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 29, 1943—8 p. m.  
[Received March 29—6:30 p. m.]

2236. Department's telegram number 1819, March 24, midnight.<sup>12</sup> The Prime Minister informs me that the British Government has no objection to inviting the four countries concerned.

MATTHEWS

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550.AD1/64a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Asmara (Smith)*<sup>13</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1943—10 p. m.

45. By direction of the President, you are requested to transmit the following invitation to the Ethiopian Government:

[Here follows invitation which is a paraphrase of that sent to the United Kingdom, text of which is printed in telegram No. 1465, March 8, page 820, except that problem 4 mentioned in that telegram is omitted.]

HULL

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<sup>12</sup> See footnote 10, p. 824.

<sup>13</sup> Similar invitations were sent on March 24, March 26, and April 1 to the Governments of the United Nations, those American Republics which had broken off diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers, and Iceland, Iran, Liberia, and Egypt. For list of the nations receiving invitations, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 10, 1943, p. 298.

550.AD1/109

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

It was suggested informally to the State Department that it was highly desirable to make clear to the United Nations that the Food Conference would be part of the discussions contemplated under Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement.<sup>14</sup> His Majesty's Government had in mind the possibility of introducing a reference to Article VII in the draft invitation, but the question of amending the draft was not formally raised.

2. His Majesty's Government are still of the opinion, however, that the Food Conference should be considered from the standpoint of the Article VII discussions as a whole and that in convening the Conference some reference should be made to the connection with that Article.

3. The following views of His Majesty's Government on procedure are not in a form appropriate for communication to other governments and they were therefore not incorporated in His Majesty's Government's formal written observations on the Food Conference.

(i) In regard to the general programme of discussions under Article VII, His Majesty's Government have always believed that the most satisfactory way of making progress would be by reaching preliminary agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. The two Governments would then consult the Soviet and Chinese Governments and subsequently approach the other members of the United Nations.

(ii) It seems, however, that there would be little time for preliminary discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom before the proposed Food Conference if it is to be convened on April 27th. Mr. Eden expressed his doubt to Mr. Matthews on March 10th whether the date for a meeting was not too early in view of the careful preparation beforehand that was necessary to give such a conference a fair chance of success. He was not sure that the exchange of views between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments could be described as having reached this point yet. In view of the shortness of the time now available, might the United States Government consider it advisable to postpone the date of the Conference for a sufficient length of time to allow adequate preparation, and especially to enable delegates who have

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<sup>14</sup> Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States, signed February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433. For correspondence on discussions under article VII, see pp. 1099 ff.

a long way to come to be briefed by their governments? In any case it would be of great value to His Majesty's Government if they could be kept informed in confidence of any detailed agenda or documents prepared for submission to the Conference by the United States Government.

(iii) His Majesty's Government would wish to have a clear understanding with the United States Government that the Food Conference will be a preliminary conference with limited objectives and that it will be only a first step in a general programme which will include all the necessary discussions on the methods of achieving the objectives contemplated in Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement of February 23.

(iv) His Majesty's Government wish to avoid the appointment by the Food Conference itself of committees to deal with wider questions of economic and financial policy, or the issue of invitations by it to other bodies to report on such questions to the Food Conference. They think that the Food Conference should confine itself to pointing out the need for these wider questions to be dealt with by appropriate experts.

(v) His Majesty's Government think it essential to avoid raising at this first United Nations conference controversial topics on which the ground has not been prepared by previous discussion.

There are, however, important matters in regard to nutrition and foodstuffs on which resolutions could be passed based on experience gained under war conditions, even if aspirations towards better nutrition must be of a long-range character. It is better to have rather vague resolutions than to embark on controversial topics.

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1943.

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550.AD1/16 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 30, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 4:05 p. m.]

222. Department's 168, March 24, 10 p. m.<sup>15</sup> In a note dated March 29, Molotov states that the Soviet Government does not object to the inclusion of representatives of the Governments of Iceland, Iran, Liberia, and Egypt among those to be invited to the conference.

STANDLEY

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<sup>15</sup> See footnote 10, p. 824.

550.AD1/25 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Vincent) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, March 31, 1943—9 a. m.  
[Received 1:40 p. m.]

475. Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>16</sup> has informed me that Chinese Government has no objection to the inclusion of the four named in Department's 399, March 24, 10 p. m.

Foreign Office has asked me to obtain from Department some indication of the size of the delegation expected. I have stated that as many delegates as might be reasonably expected effectively to serve would be welcome; that in view of transportation difficulties it might be advisable to limit delegation to less than 10 persons; but that I would try to obtain an opinion from Department on the question.

VINCENT

550.AD1/91

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*<sup>17</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you know, it is the accepted practice for the chairman of the delegation of the host country to serve as the temporary president of international conferences. I believe that this procedure should be followed with respect to the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Food and Agricultural Production and I shall appreciate your informing me whether you approve the designation of the Chairman of our Delegation, Judge Marvin Jones, to serve as the temporary president of the Conference.

This Government also will have the obligation of selecting the Secretary General of the Conference to be in complete charge of the organization and administration of the Conference Secretariat. Administratively, the Secretariat will be independent of the United States Delegation, although close liaison and cooperation of course will be maintained.

I feel that in view of the importance of the position of Secretary General of the Conference, it is highly desirable that a candidate of the highest qualifications and most extensive experience in this specialized field should be selected. I recommend, therefore, that Dr. Warren Kelchner, Chief of the Division of International Conferences of this Department, be named to serve in this capacity. Dr. Kelchner was Executive Vice President in charge of arrangements for the Eighth American Scientific Congress, the largest international meeting ever held in this Hemisphere, and has served in an advisory or

<sup>16</sup> T. V. Soong.

<sup>17</sup> Marginal note: "CH OK FDR".

executive capacity on this Government's delegation to every inter-American diplomatic conference held during the past ten years.

As the preparations for the meeting progress, it will be necessary of course to designate other officers of the Secretariat to serve under the Secretary General. Candidates for these positions will be drawn from experienced personnel in the Government service and if you concur, I shall later send to you for your consideration the names of persons competent to serve in such capacities.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

550.AD1/64b : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>18</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1943—8 p. m.

With reference to the invitations recently extended to the conference on food and agriculture numerous inquiries have been made regarding the nature of the United States delegation and the nature of the delegations which other countries might be expected to send. While no public announcement has been made the following may be helpful to the Government to which you are accredited.

The United States delegation will, so far as can now be foreseen, consist of approximately five delegates and several technical advisers. None of the delegates will be of Cabinet rank but one or more of the delegates will be of sub-Cabinet rank. In general the delegates will have personal and expert knowledge of problems of food, nutrition and agriculture and will typify agricultural and economic statesmanship in the broadest sense.

Other governments participating in the conference may wish to designate similar types of delegates. Each country will obviously also desire, within the necessary limitations which transportation facilities will impose upon the size of the delegations, to have expert advisers upon the particular agricultural problems in which that country is especially interested, as well as experts upon general economic matters.

HULL

550.AD1/67 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State*

BUENOS AIRES, April 8, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received April 9—1 : 24 a. m.]

752. My telegram No. 711, April 2, 6 p. m.<sup>19</sup> Exclusion of Argentina from invitation to post-war food and monetary conferences<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Sent to the diplomatic and consular officers in the countries invited to the Food and Agriculture Conference, except the Philippine Commonwealth.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

<sup>20</sup> For correspondence regarding postwar financial arrangements, see pp. 1054 ff.



has caused a profound impression here, although owing state of siege regulations press comment has, with few exceptions which are being reported by airmail, been extremely guarded.

One of my colleagues informs me that the Finance Minister <sup>21</sup> professed pained surprise that Argentina, one of the world's greatest grain and meat producing countries, should not have been invited to the food conference.

ARMOUR

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550.AD1/58

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax,*

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note of March 27, 1943 transmitting certain comments of the British Government on the forthcoming conference of the United Nations on food and other essential agricultural products.

The United States Government fully concurs in the importance which the British Government attaches to avoiding the creation of an impression among the European and other Allied Governments that the problem of relief is in danger of being relegated to the background as a result of divorcing questions of relief from the considerations of the food conference. For that reason the United States Government agrees with the suggestion that before the food conference convenes it would be desirable to consider what steps could be taken to explain the scope of the food and relief conferences. It is anticipated that there will be full and continuing discussion of the agenda for both of these conferences in the weeks intervening before the convening of either of them. It is the hope and expectation of this Government that before the food conference gets under way all Governments will have heard from both the British and American Governments on the plans for the conference to discuss the proposed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and that this will serve to allay any misapprehensions that might arise.

The United States Government is also in full agreement with the understanding of the British Government that the food conference is intended to be primarily of a preliminary and exploratory nature. The conference may deal in such detail as may be possible with matters relating to nutrition and consumption in general and to plans and prospects for production and exchange of foodstuffs and other essential agricultural products. As regards economic and financial issues over a wide field, the conference would endeavor to relate the problems inherent in the production and exchange of food and agricultural

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<sup>21</sup> Carlos Alberto Acevedo.

products to the wider fields of trade and finance in general in the expectation that these would form, in due course, the subject of further discussions among the various nations. It was the thought of the United States Government in proposing a conference on food and other essential agricultural products at this time that the objective would be to determine through examination and discussion of the relevant facts the major problems which will exist and to make recommendations as to means of dealing with those problems, for the continuing consideration by the Governments represented.

In this same connection the Soviet Government has indicated its understanding that the conference would be limited to the exchange of opinions on the items set forth in the preliminary suggested agenda and that no decisions binding upon the member Governments would be taken by the conference.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

550.AD1/145a

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*The Secretary of State to Certain Chiefs of Mission*<sup>22</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies and Messieurs, the Chiefs of Mission, and has the honor to refer to the invitations which have been extended on behalf of the President of the United States to the Governments of the United Nations and of the nations associated with them in the war to participate in a United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture soon to be held in the United States.

The respective diplomatic missions and consular establishments of this Government are being instructed by telegraph to inform the invited Governments that the meeting has been postponed and now will convene on May 18, 1943 instead of April 27, 1943 as indicated in the original invitations.

The President has approved the designation of the following delegates to represent the United States at the Conference:

The Honorable Marvin Jones, Judge of the United States Court of Claims and Assistant to the Director of Economic Stabilization; *Chairman*.

The Honorable Paul H. Appleby, Under Secretary of Agriculture.  
The Honorable W. L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of Commerce.  
Surgeon General Thomas Parran, United States Public Health Service.

Mr. Murray D. Lincoln, Executive Secretary of the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation.

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<sup>22</sup> Delivered April 10, 1943, to the diplomatic representatives in Washington of the countries invited to the Conference, except Ethiopia, India, the Philippine Commonwealth, and Liberia.

The delegates will be accompanied by a few advisers who are especially qualified in their respective technical fields.

The Conference will be held at Hot Springs, Virginia, which is situated approximately 290 miles from Washington. Arrangements have been made to have the exclusive use of The Homestead at Hot Springs for the Conference. Adequate facilities are available at the hotel for the comfortable housing of the delegates and for the necessary meeting rooms and offices for the Conference. Special rates have been arranged for the delegations.

This Government hopes that the discussions may be as informal as possible and that detailed work of the meeting may be accomplished in technical sections or committees. There will be the customary opening and closing public plenary sessions but it would appear that the technical sections and committees may find it more feasible to consider the various topics in executive session. Although the duration of the Conference will be determined, of course, by the participating delegations in the light of the progress of the discussions, it would seem at this juncture that the Conference may be in session for a period of approximately two weeks.

In view of the fact that this will be a technical war-time meeting, it is felt that only a minimum of social entertainment would be appropriate. In this connection, the limitations on transportation facilities undoubtedly will impose serious restrictions upon the wardrobes of members of delegations traveling to the United States for the Conference, and it is believed, therefore, that business suits will be adequate for all occasions. In view of the difficulties of war-time travel, it is not contemplated that the delegates will be accompanied by wives or other members of their families.

The foregoing information and observations are being communicated to the invited Governments through the diplomatic representatives of this Government abroad.<sup>23</sup>

In accordance with international practice, the Government of the United States will be responsible for the temporary organization of the Conference and for the establishment of the Conference Secretariat which will function under the direction of the Secretary General. The Secretariat has been installed temporarily in the Department of State under the supervision of Dr. Warren Kelchner, Chief of the Division of International Conferences. General information concerning the arrangements for the meeting, travel facilities, reservations, et cetera, may be obtained by addressing the Secretariat, in care of the Department of State; telephone Republic 5600, extension 720 or extension 2129.

Mr. Hull will greatly appreciate the courtesy of Their Excellencies and Messieurs, the Chiefs of Mission, in informing the Conference

<sup>23</sup> By circular telegram, April 9, 1943, 6 p. m.; not printed.

Secretariat as promptly as possible of the names and titles of all delegation members as well as the ports of entry and anticipated dates of arrival of those who will travel to the United States to attend the Conference. The Department of State and the Secretariat of the Conference will be very glad to arrange for the reservations at the headquarters hotel for the delegation members.

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943.

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550.AD1/144c: Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>24</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943—noon.

Reference circular telegram April 9, 6 p. m.,<sup>25</sup> and previous concerning United Nations Food Conference. Please communicate the following to the Government to which you are accredited:

(Appropriate introductory paragraph.)

“Supplementing the suggested outline of the purposes and anticipated scope of the Conference as contained in the invitation, my Government now proposes the following detailed agenda for the Conference:

“This agenda is organized around the following conception of the problem with which the Conference should deal:

“The agenda begins with an effort to ascertain the facts as to what are the needs of the various peoples of the world for food and other essential agricultural products, with due regard to differing conditions and possibilities among countries. It recognizes that in the past excessive accumulations of certain agricultural products were in fact not surpluses at all when measured by the world’s minimum needs of food and clothing; that these so-called surpluses were usually the result of maldistribution and underconsumption. It then seeks to ascertain the prospects for so organizing world agricultural production as to enable the satisfaction of these needs and to explore the measures, both domestic and international, by which production can be enhanced and better directed in terms of consumption. Finally it examines the measures and conditions which are necessary to assure that what can be produced moves into consumption.

“I. Consumption levels and requirements.

A. Food

1. Character and extent of consumption deficiencies in each country.
2. Causes and consequences of malnutrition.
3. Measures for improving standards of consumption (education, etc.).
4. Reasonable national and international goals for improved food consumption.

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<sup>24</sup> Sent to the diplomatic and consular officers in countries invited to the Food and Agriculture Conference, except the Philippine Commonwealth.

<sup>25</sup> Not printed; similar information contained in circular letter to the Chiefs of Mission, April 10, printed *supra*.

- B. Other essential agricultural products.
1. Pre-war consumption levels in various countries as influenced by prosperity or depression and by buying power of the population.
  2. Reasonable national and international goals for improved consumption with sustained employment and expanded industrial activity.
- “II. Expansion of production and adaptation to consumption needs.
- A. Measures for redirection of production toward more essential commodities.
  - B. Measures for shifting production out of commodities in chronic surplus.
  - C. Measures for improving agricultural productivity and efficiency.
  - D. Measures for development and conservation of agricultural resources.
  - E. Opportunities for occupational adjustments in agricultural populations.
- “III. Facilitation and improvement of distribution.
- A. Relation of national and international economic policies to agricultural problems, with special reference to the facilitation of the movement of agricultural products in commerce.
    1. Expansion of international trade.
    2. Broad policies for assuring increased production and consumption in general.
  - B. Improvement of agricultural marketing, processing and distribution.
  - C. Special measures for wider food distribution.
    1. Improvement of consumption of low-income groups.
    2. International disposition of commodities in over-supply.
  - D. Buffer stocks and commodity arrangements to assure equitable prices and adequate supplies.
- “IV. Recommendations for continuing and carrying forward the work of the Conference.

“The following addendum is proposed as a basis for understanding but not for incorporation in the agenda :

“As will be seen from the form of the agenda, it is not contemplated that the Conference would discuss the problems of individual commodities as such, but would rather be organized around the broader aspects of production and distribution in relation to more adequate consumption levels. In any limited discussion of individual commodities that may take place within the broader framework, it would not be contemplated, in any event, that the discussion would include rubber, drug plants, or forest products.

“My Government entertains the hope that the Government of . . . . . will be in a position to concur in the projected agenda and addendum and hopes to receive its response on the proposal by April 24, 1943 in order that a definitive agenda may be promptly prepared and distributed.”

550.AD1/293a

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*<sup>26</sup>

With reference to the informal note of the British Embassy of March 29, 1943, commenting on certain aspects of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, the Department of State has the following observations to make.

1. The United States Government is in full accord with the views of the British Government as to the relation of the conference to Article VII discussions as a whole. It would have been wholly agreeable to this Government to have included in the text of the invitation some appropriate reference to the principles of the Atlantic Charter<sup>27</sup> and the principles and objectives set forth in Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement. The shortness of time remaining before the calling of the conference, however, made it appear inexpedient to attempt to clear further any changes in the text of the invitation with the principal governments which had been consulted in advance. It is the intention of this Government, however, that at the opening address it would be made clear that this Government regards the food conference as an initial and integral part of the general program of discussions contemplated in Article VII.

2. The United States Government is also in full agreement with the British Government that there should be preliminary discussions and agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet and Chinese Governments on all matters relating to the general program under Article VII and that following such discussions, the other members of the United Nations should be approached. With that thought in view the United States Government first sought the views of the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments on March 8<sup>28</sup> and did not issue invitations to the conference until the replies of these three governments had been received. It is also the intention of this Government to begin informal discussions in the next few days with representatives of the British Government on the draft agenda for the conference.

3. With regard to the inquiry of the British Government regarding the possible postponement of the date of the conference, it has now been decided, as the various governments have been informed, to delay the opening of the conference until May 18.

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<sup>26</sup> Marginal note: "Handed by Mr. Acheson to Mr. Opie of the British Embassy 4/13/43."

<sup>27</sup> Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

<sup>28</sup> See telegram No. 1465, March 8, 9 p. m., to the Chargé in the United Kingdom, and footnote 1, p. 820.

4. The United States Government is also in agreement with the British Government that the Food Conference should avoid the appointment of committees to deal with wider questions of economic and financial policy. As indicated in the Department's note of April 8, 1943, it would be the view of the United States Government that the conference would endeavor to relate the problems inherent in the production and exchange of food and agricultural products to the wider fields of trade and finance in general, in the expectation that these would form, in due course, the subject of further discussions among the various nations. As far as matters appropriate to the conference itself are concerned, however, it would appear to be desirable that the conference should make recommendations to the member governments as to methods for continuing and carrying forward the work of the conference.

5. It is not entirely clear what the British Government had in mind in suggesting that at this first United Nations Conference it is essential to avoid raising controversial topics on which the ground has not been prepared in previous discussion. If it was the intention to suggest that there should not be raised at the conference controversial questions of broad political and economic policy, the United States Government believes that the draft agenda which has been distributed makes it clear that it was not intended to raise such questions. On the other hand it would appear that matters which are strictly germane to the sphere of discussions of the conference should be open to free and general discussion at the expert technical level in order that each country might come to understand better the problems and points of view of all other countries. The conference should, however, at this stage, be limited to an exploration of the problems and of the possible means of dealing with those problems and its general resolutions and reports, which would not be final actions for ratification by member governments, would thus offer opportunity to explore and set forth a wide variety of points of view, where such exist, for further study and discussion, without giving rise to controversy which might develop if final solutions were to be decided upon. The United States Government would hope that this is substantially what the British Government had in mind in suggesting the undesirability of embarking on controversial topics.

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943.

550.AD1/144a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1943—midnight.

2384. The following telegram has been sent to Algiers for Murphy: <sup>29</sup>

“This Government is desirous of having French representation at the food conference which is to open here on May 18 if the North African regime and the French National Committee can come to an agreement concerning the composition of a joint delegation. Please take this up with the appropriate authorities of the North African regime and request that they discuss it with the Fighting French Mission in Algiers.

No formal invitation should be extended to the French unless and until they agree upon joint representation. However, for your information and in order that you may inform the French of the subjects with which the conference will deal the text of the invitation which has been extended to the governments of the interested countries is quoted below: (Here is quoted circular telegram of March 24, 9 p. m.<sup>30</sup>).”

Please inform Admiral Stark <sup>31</sup> and request him, if he believes it desirable to do so, to bring to the attention of the French National Committee the fact that, since conversations between the Committee and the North African regime are proceeding in Algiers, we have raised this matter for their joint consideration there. We shall expect to receive our reply in Algiers but wished the National Committee to know at once that the approach is being undertaken.

HULL

550.AD1/447

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have now studied the formal and informal communications which the State Department have been good enough to make to them about the Food Conference. They are extremely gratified that the United States Government are so largely in agreement with their views and have found it possible to go so far in accepting the suggestions contained in Lord Halifax's letter to Mr. Hull of March 27, 1943 and in the informal note of the British Embassy to the State Department of March 29, 1943. His Majesty's

<sup>29</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa, with the rank of Minister; Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; and U.S. Political Adviser, staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>30</sup> See footnote 13, p. 825.

<sup>31</sup> Adm. Harold R. Stark, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.



Government are particularly glad to note that the United States Government share their view that wider problems of economic and financial policy should not be dealt with by committees of the Food Conference but should form the subject of separate discussion in due course.

His Majesty's Government agree generally with the proposed agenda which, if they may say so, seems to them to be an admirable piece of work and to cover the ground very fully. His Majesty's Government would not wish to make any definite suggestions for amendments, particularly as they appreciate that the United States Government desire to circulate it in the final form as early as possible. They have, however, a few observations to make on points of detail which they suggest the Economic Adviser might discuss informally with members of the State Department.

His Majesty's Government are also grateful for the proposed addendum to the agenda which, together with the assurance that wider problems of economic and financial policy shall not be dealt with by committees of the Food Conference, entirely meets their point that controversial matters should be kept out of the Conference.

WASHINGTON, 21 April, 1943.

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550.AD1/281b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—10 p. m.

2643. Your 2826, April 22.<sup>33</sup> Murphy has been authorized, on the understanding that a delegation is being named jointly by the High Command and the National Committee, to extend to the appropriate French authorities the formal invitation to the food conference quoted in the Department's circular telegram of March 24, 9 p. m.<sup>34</sup> and to assure the French authorities that the French representatives will participate in the conference with the same status as representatives of other countries. Admiral Stark may so inform the French National Committee.

HULL

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550.AD1/319a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—midnight.

803. For Murphy. Your 679, April 22.<sup>33</sup> On the understanding that a delegation will be named jointly by the High Command and

<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

<sup>34</sup> See footnote 13, p. 825.

the National Committee, you are authorized to extend formally to the appropriate French authorities the invitation quoted in the Department's 712, April 14.<sup>35</sup> It is, of course, understood that the French representatives will participate in the food conference with the same status as representatives of other countries.

HULL

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550.AD1/362a : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>36</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1943—7 p. m.

Reference circular telegram April 13, noon, and previous concerning United Nations Food Conference. Please inform the government to which you are accredited that the definitive agenda which has been agreed upon following consultation with the governments invited to participate in the Conference differs from the proposed agenda only in paragraph II. A. which has now been revised to read as follows: "Measures for direction of production toward commodities, the supply of which should be increased."

HULL

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550.AD1/402a

*The Secretary of State to Certain Chiefs of Mission*<sup>37</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies and Messieurs the Chiefs of Mission and with reference to previous correspondence concerning the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture encloses, for the information of those who have been designated by their respective governments to participate in the meeting, copies of the Regulations which this Government proposes for adoption by the Conference.<sup>38</sup> It is hoped that the Regulations here presented will be found to be satisfactory in their present form.

The attention of the Chiefs of Mission is invited to Chapter II, Article 8, concerning the Executive Committee which, it will be noted, is to be composed of the chairmen of the delegations. The Conference

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<sup>35</sup> See telegram No. 2384, April 14, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 837.

<sup>36</sup> Sent to the diplomatic and consular officers in countries invited to the Food and Agriculture Conference, except the Soviet Union, the Dominican Republic, Poland, Belgium, and Norway. Similar instructions were sent April 28, 1943, 10 p. m., to the Ambassadors in the Soviet Union (No. 264), and the United Kingdom for Biddle (Polish Series No. 9, Belgian Series No. 8, and Norwegian Series No. 1).

<sup>37</sup> Sent to the Chiefs of Mission of the countries invited to the Conference, except Ethiopia, India, Liberia, and the Philippine Commonwealth; these countries were sent individual letters.

<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

Secretariat is not, in all cases, informed of the names of the individuals designated as chairmen of their respective delegations. Accordingly, it will be appreciated if this information may be communicated to the Secretariat without delay, if this has not already been done.

Advantage is also taken of this opportunity to remind the Chiefs of Mission that the Conference Secretariat should be informed at the earliest possible date with regard to the names and designations of all stenographic and clerical personnel accompanying the delegations to Hot Springs, in order that appropriate accommodations may be arranged at The Homestead.

WASHINGTON, [May 6, 1943.]

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550.AD1/140

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Conferences (Kelchner)*<sup>39</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 6, 1943.

I attach the original of a personal message to the Secretary from Dr. H. V. Evatt expressing concern at the possibility that Australia may be excluded from one of the principal positions in connection with food relief matters.

The broad principles with respect to the organization and administration of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture have now crystallized fairly well and at this juncture I see no justification for any apprehension on the part of Australia or any other "small" country concerning a possible exclusion from active participation in matters pertaining to the Conference. The meeting will be organized and administered on a purely democratic basis and each country will be permitted to join in the discussions of any or all of the technical sections and sub-committees of the Conference. All elections to Conference offices will be determined by majority vote of the participating delegations. I attach for convenience of reference a copy of the Regulations of the Conference<sup>40</sup> which were distributed yesterday among the representative missions in Washington.

It would appear that the concern expressed by Dr. Evatt does not apply specifically to the forthcoming Food Conference and that the matter, therefore, falls within your province.

WARREN KELCHNER

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<sup>39</sup> Addressed to Roy Veatch of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations and to the Director of the Office, Herbert H. Lehman.

<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

[Annex]

*The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to the Secretary of State*

We are very concerned at the possible exclusion of Australia from one of the primary positions in connection with the food relief proposals. Our approach to and work on these questions should be of the greatest assistance to the United Nations.

The suggestion that the executive is to consist of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China would relegate important food producing countries like Australia to a secondary role. Our view in this respect is similar to that of Canada.

MARCH 24, 1943.

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550.AD1/650

*The Secretary of State to the American Delegates to the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1943.

SIRS AND MADAM: You have been designated by the President as Delegates of the United States to the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture which will convene at Hot Springs, Virginia, on May 18, 1943. I wish to assure you of the Government's appreciation of your willingness to accept the responsibility of representing it at this Conference and to furnish for your information and assistance the following general instructions regarding the procedure which may appropriately be followed during your participation in the meeting.

The forthcoming Conference will be the first major effort on the part of the United Nations to approach specific phases of post-war questions. The eyes of the world will be focused on the Conference. Friends and enemies alike will view its spirit and its accomplishments as the measure of the ability and capacity of the United Nations and of the countries associated with them in the war to solve their problems. The Government of the United States has taken the initiative leading to the convening of the Conference and is serving as host to the meeting. You, as this Government's Delegates, will bear the burden of giving vigor and substance to this initiative and of exerting every possible effort to assure a successful outcome.

With regard to the particular subjects to come before the Conference, the United States Delegation should bear in mind the conception of this Government of the purpose and objective which it had in mind in calling the Conference, as expressed in the preamble to the agenda:

"The agenda begins with an effort to ascertain the facts as to what are the needs of the various peoples of the world for food and other

essential agricultural products, with due regard to different conditions and possibilities among countries. It recognizes that in the past excessive accumulations of certain agricultural products were in fact not surpluses at all when measured by the world's minimum needs of food and clothing; that these so-called surpluses were usually the result of maldistribution and underconsumption. It then seeks to ascertain the prospects for so organizing world agricultural production as to enable the satisfaction of these needs and to explore the measures, both domestic and international, by which production can be enhanced and better directed in terms of consumption. Finally it examines the measures and conditions which are necessary to assure that what can be produced moves into consumption."

Corresponding to this conception, the Delegation should participate in a review of the principal consumption deficiencies of the world in food and the other principal agricultural products. The Conference may wish to produce a report on this subject or to provide for continuing study and a later report thereon. The Delegation should seek to secure from the Conference a vigorous call to the nations of the world to recognize and accept new responsibility for the elimination, so far as possible, of such deficiencies, particularly in food, among their peoples and to concert their various national policies to this end.

Such policies, if adopted and pursued, would call for an expansion, rather than a contraction, of world agricultural production, and the examination of production policies and techniques should be undertaken in this light. This is a field for domestic action in large part, but the international pooling of knowledge, techniques, and statistics can make domestic actions much more effective and the Delegation should seek to have the Conference examine in a preliminary way possible means of international collaboration in these and related fields. The Conference might, if the preliminary results appeared auspicious, provide for the establishment of a commission to carry this examination further for later report. The same considerations will apply equally to questions of improvement in marketing and distributing facilities.

At many points the deliberations of the Conference will touch upon and indicate the interrelationship of its topics to other fields not immediately germane to this Conference. Among these are relief of the populations of occupied and war devastated countries, general international trade and monetary relations, international investment and capital development, and general policies for the achievement of world security and prosperity. While these are not considered appropriate to become specific topics of recommendation or action by the Conference, it will be not only necessary, but desirable to indicate in reports and resolutions the importance of these subjects to the attainment of the objectives of the findings and recommendations of the Conference with respect to food and agriculture, and to recommend

to the member governments that they give joint attention to these problems at an appropriate and early date.

In view of the expected short duration of the Conference, it will undoubtedly be desirable to provide for continuing study and reporting on many of the subjects of the agenda, and particularly upon the coordination and expansion of existing forms of international organization in the field of agriculture and the possibilities of new types of international collaboration. It would appear desirable that, if such action is taken by the Conference, one commission with appropriate subdivisions should be established rather than a number of separate commissions. Such a commission would report direct to the member governments. This Government would prefer that the Conference itself should not contemplate reconvening to receive the report of such a commission.

It is anticipated that the deliberations of the Conference will be confined to the matters delineated in the agenda, but should it be found that the discussions tend to deviate from these lines or to involve specific commitments, you are requested to indicate the understanding of this Government that the discussions would be limited to the matters previously agreed upon in the agenda and that accordingly you are precluded from participation in such discussions. You may wish to report to the Department any questions of this character upon which an expression of this Government's views may be imperative.

In the event that proposals are submitted which would have adverse effects upon the interests of the United States, you will, of course, give careful and serious consideration to such suggestions and will endeavor to arrange for their modification in such a manner as would in your opinion be in accord with the general interest and meet with the approval of the Government. Should any resolutions, recommendations, or proposals be presented which may be incompatible with existing legislation or with the decisions of duly constituted regulatory agencies of the Federal, State, or Municipal Governments, the Delegation may wish to record an appropriate statement of its position.

It is, of course, highly desirable that the comments and opinions of the individual delegates represent, in so far as possible, the coordinated view of the entire delegation. Any questions concerning the interpretation of these instructions and the position to be taken or the course to be followed by any individual delegate will be referred to the Chairman of the Delegation for determination.

In view of the technical nature of the Conference, it will not be feasible to authorize the delegates to offer any written or oral statement which might be construed as committing this Government to a definite or specific course of action or which might involve an obli-

gation to expand Governmental funds not previously appropriated and allocated.

I am confident that you will keep constantly before the attention of the participating delegates the unswerving determination of the Government and people of the United States to devote the fullest measure of their resources and energies to the defeat of the common enemy, and to collaborate with the same vigor in the establishment of an equitable and lasting peace.

I take this opportunity to express again the Department's gratitude for your cooperation in undertaking this important and responsible duty.

Very truly yours,

[CORDELL HULL]

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[For complete list of the American delegation to the Conference and officials of the Secretariat, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 15, 1943, page 433. The letter from President Roosevelt to the opening session of the Conference on May 18 is printed *ibid.*, May 20, 1943, page 455.

The proceedings of the Conference, in session from May 18 to June 3, 1943, were recorded in the Conference Journal, in sixteen issues (filed under 550.AD1/1064); these Journals have not been printed.

The summation of the work of the Conference by the Secretary General, the Final Act, and reports of three sections of the Conference are printed in Department of State publication No. 1948, Conference Series No. 52: *United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18-June 3, 1943, Final Act and Section Reports* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943).]

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550.AD1/815a

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing a proposed draft of your speech to the delegates to the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture when you receive them at the White House on Monday, June 7, 1943.<sup>41</sup> As you requested, this draft is about one thousand words, and could be delivered in approximately nine minutes.

This Conference, as I told you, has achieved truly remarkable success. I feel it important that the public should recognize this success

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<sup>41</sup> Draft not attached to file copy; for text of speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1943, p. 518.

and that the delegates should be assured that you, their host, are deeply appreciative.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

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550.AD1 Interim Commission/a

*The Secretary of State to Certain Chiefs of Mission.*<sup>42</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies and Messieurs the Chiefs of Mission, and refers to previous correspondence concerning the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, which terminated its sessions at Hot Springs, Virginia, on June 3, 1943.

In resolution II of the Final Act,<sup>43</sup> the Conference resolved that an Interim Commission be established for carrying out the recommendations of the Conference; that each of the governments and authorities represented be entitled to designate a representative on the Interim Commission; that the Interim Commission be installed in Washington not later than July 15, 1943; and that the Government of the United States be invited to take whatever preliminary action may be necessary for the establishment of the Interim Commission.

The Government of the United States has willingly undertaken to facilitate the establishment of the Interim Commission. In order to carry out the mandate of the Conference, the Diplomatic Missions of the United States abroad have been instructed by telegraph<sup>44</sup> to request each of the governments which participated in the Conference to indicate the name, title, and address of its representative on the Commission.

In order that this Government may be in a position to communicate without delay with the representative designated by each government, and proceed to take whatever steps may be necessary for the establishment of the Interim Commission in Washington prior to July 15, Mr. Hull would be grateful for the assistance of the Chiefs of Mission in obtaining prompt notification from their respective governments with regard to the membership of the Interim Commission.

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1943.

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<sup>42</sup> Sent to the Chiefs of Mission of the countries invited to the Conference, except Ethiopia, India, Liberia, and the Philippine Commonwealth; these countries were sent individual letters. The appropriate French authorities in Washington were informed orally regarding the proposed formation of the Interim Commission. On July 10, 1943, a letter was sent to the Minister of Denmark inviting him to attend in his personal capacity the Interim Commission meeting of July 15.

<sup>43</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1943, p. 552.

<sup>44</sup> Circular telegram of June 11, 1943, not printed.



550.AD1 Interim Commission/132

*The Secretary of State to Certain Chiefs of Mission*<sup>45</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to Their Excellencies and Messieurs the Chiefs of Mission, and refers to his circular note of June 11, 1943 concerning notification by each of the governments and authorities represented at the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture of the designation of a representative on the Interim Commission to be established pursuant to the Final Act of the Conference.

It will be appreciated if Their Excellencies and Messieurs the Chiefs of Mission will inform the respective representatives on the Interim Commission that the inaugural meeting of the Commission will be held at 2:30 p. m. on Thursday, July 15, 1943, in room 105 of the National Archives Building, Pennsylvania Avenue between Seventh and Ninth Streets, Northwest, Washington, D.C. There are enclosed copies of the tentative program of the inaugural session.<sup>46</sup>

The Government of the United States in carrying out the request of the Conference that it undertake to facilitate the establishment of the Interim Commission is preparing for the consideration of the Commission draft regulations and a suggested plan of organization. As indicated in the enclosed tentative program of the inaugural session, the draft plan of organization will be distributed on that occasion. The draft regulations which it is anticipated will be considered at the inaugural session, will be forwarded shortly to the individual members of the Commission.

In this latter connection, it is hoped that the Department of State may receive as soon as possible notifications concerning the designation of the respective members of the Commission by those governments which have not yet taken such action.

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1943.

550.AD1/1024

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*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>47</sup>

STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF JULY 6TH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE<sup>48</sup> IN REGARD TO THE FOOD CONFERENCE AND THE INTERIM COMMISSION

On June 23rd I undertook to make a statement on the results of the Food Conference recently held at Hot Springs. His Majesty's

<sup>45</sup> Sent to the Chiefs of Mission of the countries invited to the Conference, except Ethiopia, India, Liberia, the Philippine Commonwealth, the French Delegation, and the Danish Minister; these countries were sent individual letters.

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

<sup>47</sup> Received by the Department on July 9, 1943.

<sup>48</sup> Anthony Eden.

Government have now had an opportunity to consider the work which the Conference achieved and I should like to congratulate the United States Government which convened the Conference on the successful outcome of this first experiment in comprehensive international discussion of postwar matters. His Majesty's Government have been greatly impressed by the fact that in the midst of a war representatives of more than forty likeminded nations could meet together and achieve general agreement on so many fundamental principles. His Majesty's Government recognize that the resolutions were drawn up in the light of the widely differing physical, political and economic conditions of the various countries represented and that that application will depend on these differences. For their part His Majesty's Government have no hesitation in accepting the resolutions and the obligation to give effect to them in so far as they apply to conditions in the United Kingdom. They will also gladly cooperate with other governments in seeking ways to give effect to those resolutions which call for concerted action. They will commend the resolutions to the governments of His Majesty's Colonies, dependencies and overseas territories. The main object of the Conference was to insure as far as possible freedom from want of food. The House will have noticed that the third resolution recommends that governments should immediately begin the task of increasing food resources and improving the diets of their peoples in accordance with the principles and objectives outlined in the findings of the Conference. His Majesty's Government intend despite the inevitable difficulties which the war entails, to press on with this aim. At the same time it is clear that freedom from want of food depends largely on matters outside the scope of purely agricultural or nutritional policy. This was fully recognised by the Conference which took account of the broad questions of international security and economic expansion which are the necessary background of sustained progress towards freedom from want and a higher standard of living.

Resolution II provides for the establishment of an interim Commission to carry on the work of the Conference and to prepare a plan for a permanent organization in the field of food and agriculture. His Majesty's Government intend to participate fully in the work of this Commission and are arranging to appoint a representative. They note with satisfaction that one of the tasks of this Commission will be to draw up a formal declaration or agreement for the consideration of the governments. In this instrument the governments would recognise their obligation towards their respective peoples and to one another to collaborate in raising levels of nutrition and standards of living for their peoples and to report to one another on progress made.

Finally there is the question of production which bears closely on the relief of peoples living in the countries now occupied by the enemy. The Conference was not concerned with the organisation of relief supplies but the House will note that due attention was paid to the necessity of increasing supplies of basic foodstuffs in the period when territories liberated from the enemy will be in need of help from outside. His Majesty's Government are much impressed by the urgency and importance of this problem and are determined to do all they can for their part to give effect to the resolutions of the Conference on this subject. They earnestly hope that other Governments will do likewise.

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550.AD1 Interim Commission/164

*The Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Gore-Booth) to the Chief of the Division of Economic Studies (Stinebower)*

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1943.

DEAR LEROY: You will remember that when Twentyman<sup>49</sup> and I came to see you the other day, you asked us why the Foreign Office thought the assistance of the League of Nations officials would be appropriate in connection with the drafting of the Interim Commission resolution.

I think I cannot do better than send you herewith the substance of the Foreign Office's reply to the questions which we put to them immediately after our discussion.

As you see, the main emphasis, as we suspected, is on the organisational aspect of the League's assistance rather than on the language of a general resolution.

Yours ever,

PAUL H. GORE-BOOTH

[Enclosure]

*Telegram From the British Foreign Office Dated July 10, 1943*

We had in mind the use of terminology suitable for acceptance by many governments with different constitutional positions.

But perhaps more important than this is the experience possessed by League of Nations officials in methods of drawing up and agreeing budgets of international organisations, the management of voting powers, the relation of the governing body to the individual members, the authority of the Director General, etc. It would seem that this sort of experience would be very useful when the Commission comes to draw up the constitution of the permanent organisation.

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<sup>49</sup>E. Twentyman, British representative on the Interim Commission.

550.AD1 Interim Commission/120

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Conferences (Kelchner) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1943.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM COMMISSION ON  
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

MR. ACHESON: With a view to fulfilling the obligations entrusted to this Government by the Hot Springs Conference in performing the necessary preliminary action for the establishment of the Interim Commission, the following steps have been taken:

(1) The governments and authorities were requested by telegram on June 11, 1943<sup>50</sup> to designate their respective representatives on the Commission. The local missions were also informed. (The Department has been informed of 32 members who have been designated.)

(2) Draft Regulations have been formulated and reviewed by members of the Departments of State and Agriculture and Public Health Service, and have been approved by you. These draft Regulations have been distributed to the local missions as well as to the members thus far designated.

(3) The working group has formulated a tentative plan of organization which should be approved by you and Mr. Appleby<sup>51</sup> well in advance of the meeting since the members have been informed that copies of the plan of organization would be distributed at the inaugural session.

(4) Notifications dated July 8, 1943 have gone to the missions and the other appropriate officials of the forty-four governments and authorities that the inaugural session will be held Thursday, July 15, 1943, at 2:30 p. m. There is attached a copy of the agenda which you have already approved, together with observations and suggestions.<sup>52</sup>

(5) In accordance with your instructions, a letter of designation was prepared last night to Mr. Appleby as the member of the United States on the Interim Commission, as well as a press release on this subject.

(6) It has been deemed advisable to change the place of the meeting from the Archives Building to the Hall of the Americas in the Pan American Union, in view of the possibility of having a larger attendance than had been anticipated originally.

(7) Notes are being sent today<sup>50</sup> to the missions and to the members thus far designated, notifying them of Mr. Appleby's designation as the United States member and of the change of place for the inaugural session.

According to the draft Regulations, the Executive Secretary shall be nominated by the Executive Committee and approved by the Com-

<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Paul H. Appleby, Under Secretary of Agriculture, U.S. representative on the Interim Commission.

<sup>52</sup> Neither printed.

mission. It would seem necessary for you and Mr. Appleby to agree upon the nominee in advance of the inaugural session so that he may be serving on a temporary basis from the very beginning. The Executive Secretary will organize the Secretariat, direct and coordinate its work, et cetera. It is highly important that this individual be apprised of his candidacy as soon as possible since he should take over immediately.

In accordance with the general understanding, we have made no definite provision for a Secretariat beyond the inaugural session. It has been the consensus that no elaborate Secretariat should be established during the early days of the Commission and that, accordingly, whatever personnel is required will be obtained by loan from the various agencies. It is also understood that the Executive Secretary will be someone from the Department of Agriculture and that most of the personnel of the Secretariat will come from that Department.

Mr. Stinebower<sup>53</sup> has informed me that it has been decided that the relationship of the State Department to the Interim Commission will be maintained by you through him. Accordingly, and in view of the fact that the United States member and probably the Executive Secretary will be from the Department of Agriculture, there would appear to be no necessity for IC to assume any active responsibilities beyond the close of the inaugural session. Of course, IC will be glad to cooperate in every appropriate manner.

WARREN KELCHNER

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[The program of the Inaugural Session of the Interim Commission on July 15, 1943, the list of representatives on the Interim Commission, and addresses of welcome by Assistant Secretary of State Acheson and the Representative of India are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 17, 1943, pages 33-38.

In an executive session of the Interim Commission on July 20, 1943, officers were elected and committees were set up; see *ibid.*, July 24, 1943, page 52.]

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<sup>53</sup> Leroy D. Stinebower, Chief of the Division of Economic Studies.

AGREEMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION, SIGNED NOVEMBER 9, 1943<sup>1</sup>

840.50/846

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to reply to his note of December 21, 1942,<sup>3</sup> with reference to the draft plan for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary of State notes with pleasure the agreement of the British Government on the broad lines of the scheme, and its disposition to cooperate in carrying it out in the near future, subject to certain points raised in the memorandum accompanying the Ambassador's communication to which careful consideration is being given by the United States Government.

Similar concurrence, subject in each case to certain conditions and points for further discussion, has been received from the Chinese Government<sup>5</sup> and from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,<sup>6</sup> and there is attached a memorandum<sup>7</sup> stating the views of each of those Governments with reference to the proposal under consideration.

With a view to obtaining agreement among the Governments of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, and the United States, on the draft to be laid before the other United Nations Governments at the earliest appropriate opportunity, and on the procedure to be followed in carrying the scheme into effect, the Secretary of State proposes that representatives of the above four Governments meet with him in Washington at 11:30 o'clock on January 11, 1943, to consider these matters.

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1943.

<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence regarding the negotiation of this agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 89 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Similar notes were sent on January 8 to the Chinese Ambassador (Wei) and to the Soviet Ambassador (Litvinov).

<sup>3</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 156.

<sup>4</sup> The draft plan at this time under consideration was "Draft No. 2", dated August 13, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>5</sup> See telegram No. 1386, November 24, 1942, 2 p. m., from the Ambassador in China, *ibid.*, p. 148.

<sup>6</sup> See note of December 29, 1942, from the Soviet Embassy, *ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

840.50/758

*The Secretary of State to the Netherlands Ambassador (London)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Royal Netherlands Government and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Embassy's note dated October 23, 1942<sup>8</sup> relative to post-war relief. The Department of State is gratified to receive the word contained in the note of the Royal Netherlands Government that the Ambassador agrees in principle to the interim procedure outlined in the note of the Secretary of State dated August 20, 1942,<sup>9</sup> and recognizes that this procedure was adopted for the purpose of enabling the Royal Netherlands Government to proceed with its purchasing plans and to prevent these plans from conflicting with the United Nations' procurement of materials necessary to the common war effort.

The Department notes that the Economic, Financial, and Shipping Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will act as the agent of the Royal Netherlands Government in all matters pertaining to post-war stockpile purchases.

The Department points out to the Royal Netherlands Government that it has set up the machinery which will enable any contemplated purchase for post-war stockpile purposes to be adequately and promptly considered. It is contemplated that all applications for the purchase of materials and commodities of any kind will be submitted to the Combined Raw Materials Board and the Combined Food Board in order that these Boards may pass on the eligibility of the commodities and goods covered by the application for purchase for post-war stockpile purposes.

The Department of State assures the Royal Netherlands Government that the Government of the United States does not presently contemplate any action which will be destructive of stockpiles which have been accumulated in pursuance with the Royal Netherlands Government's four-months' relief program. However, the Department points out that the proper prosecution of the war efforts of the United Nations may require withdrawals from stockpiles created by the Royal Netherlands Government. If withdrawals from the stockpiles of the Royal Netherlands Government are required the Royal Netherlands Government will of course be compensated therefor on an equitable basis.

The Royal Netherlands Government has the assurances of this Department that withdrawals will not be resorted to unless such withdrawals are either directly or indirectly in the interest of the war effort of the United Nations.

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1943.

<sup>8</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 142.

<sup>9</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 125, footnote 30.

840.50/1266

*Memorandum of Discussion in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1943.

After their meeting with the Secretary of State, the British Ambassador, the Soviet Ambassador and the Chinese Ambassador accompanied Mr. Acheson to his office to discuss some points in the draft plan for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Mr. Noel Hall, British Minister, Mr. Liu Chieh, Minister and Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, and Mr. Roy Veatch of the Department of State also were present.

Mr. Acheson invited the Ambassadors to discuss the points raised by the British Government, the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government in their communications to this Government, these having been transmitted to the Ambassadors in a Department of State memorandum of January 8, 1943.

The following is a résumé of the ensuing discussion :

1. The suggestion of the United Kingdom Government that the membership of the Policy Committee be expanded to seven so as to include Canada and two other countries.

Mr. Acheson reported that Secretary Hull had come to the conclusion that it would be unwise to change the draft at this point, at least until some satisfactory solution could be found for the difficulties that otherwise might result.

The Soviet Ambassador said that he surmised that his Government insists on the draft as it stands on this point because of the fear that the other European Governments might find it difficult to reach agreement on the membership of only one of their number on the Policy Committee, because it should be easier for four members to reach agreement and expedite action than for seven members, and because a decision to add to the Policy Committee other Powers in addition to the four Powers would set a pattern which might be embarrassing on other occasions when quite different matters might require decisions or action by the four Powers.

The British Ambassador said that his instructions from his Government were very explicit on this point and that he was firmly bound by them. He knew that the United Kingdom Government was convinced that the cordial cooperation of the supplying countries and the general cooperation of the rest of the United Nations was needed if the proposed Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was to be successful. He laid particular stress upon the importance of the full cooperation of Canada among those nations likely to be principal suppliers. He added, however, that speaking for himself alone he was impressed with the Soviet Ambassador's reference to the influence which this



pattern might have on future decisions regarding other matters, and he said that he would be glad to communicate to his Government any other suggestions that might be made with reference to this point.

The Chinese Ambassador had not had time to communicate with his Government regarding this question but he recognized its importance and also the importance of the proposal that decisions of the Policy Committee should be reached only by unanimous vote.

It was thought that the specific reference in paragraph 4 of Article III to the Inter-Allied Committee on European Post-War Relief might be strengthened so as to enlist the interest and cooperation of the European Allied Governments and it was suggested that the cordial cooperation of the supplying countries might be secured more easily if some reference were made to a specific standing committee on supplies on which would be represented Canada and the other principal supplying countries.

2. The suggestion of the Soviet Government that Article I should be so amended as to require the consent of the government of the state receiving relief as regards the forms these activities may take in that state, and as to admit of ways by which the government of the country receiving relief may undertake the whole responsibility for relief measures within its territory—and the suggestion of the Chinese Government that field operation plans of the Director General should be agreed to by the country concerned and that any differences between them should be referred for settlement to the Policy Committee.

Mr. Acheson indicated that it was the view of the United States Government that it would be difficult to cover these points in the draft in any more explicit form, especially because such a provision might cause embarrassment in dealings with the former enemy governments and in determining the proper governments with which to deal in unsettled territories. He explained however that it was clearly intended that in Soviet territory the Soviet Government would be the appropriate United Nations authority and that relief and rehabilitation measures and activities in that territory would be subject to the kind of relationship proposed in the Soviet Government's memorandum. With respect to the point made by the Chinese Government Mr. Acheson explained that it was clearly intended that in Chinese territory the Chinese Government would be the appropriate United Nations authority and that plans for field operations in that territory would of necessity be developed in agreement with the Chinese Government. He expressed the hope that ways could be found for making this intention clear without a change in the draft.

The Soviet Ambassador said that he had no further instruction on the point. He felt that the anticipated difficulties in unsettled territories would not develop and that the United Nations would be forced

to recognize some government in each territory without delay. He did recognize greater validity in the case of the views expressed by Mr. Acheson with reference to the governments of former enemy territories. He wished to know the views of the British Ambassador on this entire question.

In response the British Ambassador said that he did not feel strongly on the matter but he believed that it would be wise to leave as much latitude as possible so that the United Nations Administration might not be too restricted in its dealings with governments in former enemy countries or in unsettled areas.

3. The Soviet Government's suggestion that the Director General will regularly report on his activities to the Policy Committee which will periodically either confirm the powers of the Director General or recommend to the Council a new candidate for this post.

At Mr. Acheson's suggestion it was agreed that the draft should be so amended (paragraph 5 of Article IV) as to require periodical reports from the Director General to the Policy Committee as well as the Council, and to place with the Policy Committee rather than the Director General the determination of such portions of the reports as should be kept confidential until the end of the war.

Mr. Acheson then referred to the desirability of insuring to the Director General sufficient administrative freedom and continuity of tenure to enable him to administer his great responsibilities effectively. He said that at the same time his Government recognized the desirability of some definite means of terminating the Director General's responsibilities if he should lose the confidence of the Policy Committee, and he offered the suggestion therefore that paragraph 1 of Article IV should provide that the Director General might be removed from office by unanimous vote of the Policy Committee.

The Soviet Ambassador expressed the view that it would be very harsh to remove a Director General from office and that it would be easier and less embarrassing for the Policy Committee merely to fail to reelect him. He agreed however that Mr. Acheson's suggestion met the point raised by the Soviet Government to some degree.

In reply to the Soviet Ambassador's comments Mr. Acheson said that he assumed that a Director General who had lost the confidence of the Policy Committee would be given an opportunity to resign so that he would not be embarrassed by a direct dismissal.

The British Ambassador expressed the opinion that the Director General should be given the fullest possible executive power subject to the control of the Policy Committee and the Council on matters of policy; therefore he agreed with Mr. Acheson's proposal. He suggested that the most desirable alternative to this proposal, if it were necessary to find an alternative, would be to set the Director General's

term of office at a definite period of time, certainly not less than two or three years.

The Soviet Ambassador agreed to submit to his Government the suggestion offered by Mr. Acheson.

4. The Soviet Government's suggestion that all decisions of the Policy Committee should be unanimous.

Mr. Acheson reported that his Government would prefer a specific requirement of a unanimous vote at each point in the draft where it might be agreed that unanimity was desirable. In his opinion it would be desirable to require only a majority vote (three of the four members of the Committee) at all other points, where the decisions might be of minor importance; this arrangement would guard against the possibility of delay and indecision arising from the opposition of an individual member on minor matters on which he might hold some personal opinion quite independent of any instruction from his Government.

The Soviet Ambassador said that he could not imagine a situation in which an individual would obstruct action as a personal matter but he said that he would gladly submit Mr. Acheson's proposal to his Government.

The Chinese Ambassador and the British Ambassador expressed agreement with the proposal submitted by Mr. Acheson.

5. The Soviet Government's suggestion that regional committees be given "powers" as well as consultative functions and the importance attached by the British Government to giving as much scope as possible to the regional committee which would deal with European relief and rehabilitation.

Mr. Acheson explained his Government's conception of the functions of the regional committees as purely concerned with policy and not with executive or administrative functions.

The British Ambassador expressed the opinion that Mr. Acheson's explanation was satisfactory. At his request Mr. Hall then explained the British Government's concern regarding the scope of the regional committees' work. He expressed no disagreement with the idea that the committees' functions should be limited to policy matters but he did urge the British view that the regional committees might be more effective than the Council itself in developing policy since they would be able to meet much more frequently and would be able to do more detailed work close to the actual problems.

It was agreed that Mr. Acheson should consider the possibility of submitting a redraft of paragraph 4 of Article III covering the points discussed.

6. The Soviet Government's statement that with regard to that part of the Administration's activities which will have to do with relief during the war, it reserves to itself the right to abstain from

participation in the solution of problems which may arise in connection with relief to the population of countries in a state of war with countries with which the Soviet Union is not at war.

Mr. Acheson said that his Government would raise no objection to such a reservation. Likewise no objection was raised by the others present.

7. The Chinese Government's suggestion that Article VIII of the draft (Draft No. 2—Revised) should be modified so as to provide for amendment of the provisions of the agreement by a majority vote of the Council and of the Policy Committee.

Mr. Acheson expressed the opinion that such a modification would be undesirable because it might open the way to changes of great importance without the full support of the great majority of the member Powers. The Soviet Ambassador and the British Ambassador expressed agreement with this judgment.

It was agreed that Mr. Acheson should submit to each of the Ambassadors a résumé of the group's discussion together with a draft statement covering modification of the draft with reference to points raised by their Governments, this draft statement then to be submitted by them to their Governments for consideration. It was also agreed that Mr. Acheson should be informed as soon as each Ambassador receives a response from his Government and that a further discussion should be held as soon as all of the replies are received.

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840.50/1266

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*<sup>10</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Great Britain and is pleased to transmit herewith the following documents relating to a conversation between the British Ambassador, the Soviet Ambassador, the Chinese Ambassador, and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, in the Department of State on January 11, 1943, with respect to the draft plan for the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration:

1. A memorandum of the discussion<sup>11</sup>
2. A memorandum presenting drafts of modifications of the draft plan as discussed in the meeting on January 11
3. A copy of a memorandum from the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy, dated January 16, 1943,<sup>12</sup> relating to one of the points raised by the Soviet Government in its comments on the draft plan

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<sup>10</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the Chinese and Soviet Ambassadors.

<sup>11</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>12</sup> *Infra*.

4. A copy of a memorandum from the Department of State to the Chinese Embassy, dated January 16, 1943,<sup>13</sup> relating to one of the points raised by the Chinese Government in its comments on the draft plan

A copy of each of the memoranda mentioned above has been transmitted to the Soviet Ambassador and the Chinese Ambassador for their information.

It is understood that the British Ambassador and the other Ambassadors concerned intend to bring this material to the attention of their Governments and that a further discussion of the subject will then take place with the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson. It will be appreciated if the British Embassy will inform the Department of State as soon as a response has been received from the British Government with respect to this matter. It is hoped that a further discussion can be arranged before the end of the week of January 18.

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1943.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum Presenting Drafts of Modifications of the Draft Plan as Discussed in the Meeting of January 11, 1943*

As a result of a discussion between the British Ambassador, the Soviet Ambassador, the Chinese Ambassador and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, in the Department of State on January 11, 1943 the following suggestions are offered with respect to the draft agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

The draft plan itself might be modified in the following respects:  
Paragraph 4 of Article III to read:

"4. The Committee on Supplies of the Council shall consist of the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing those member governments likely to be principal suppliers of materials for relief and rehabilitation. The members shall be appointed by the Policy Committee, with the approval of the Council if it be in session and otherwise subject to its ratification. It shall consider, formulate and report to the Council and the Policy Committee policies covering the procurement and distribution of supplies designed to ensure the provision of required materials and their continued flow from available sources of supply to areas of need. The Policy Committee shall from time to time meet with the Committee on Supplies to review policy matters affecting supplies."

Paragraph 5 of Article III to read:

"5. The Committee of the Council for Europe shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member

<sup>13</sup> *Post*, p. 861.

governments of territories within the European area, and such other members of the Council, representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the European area, as shall be appointed by the Policy Committee, with the approval of the Council if it be in session and otherwise subject to its ratification. The Committee of the Council for the Far East shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments of territories within the Far Eastern area and such other members of the Council, representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the Far Eastern area, as shall be appointed by the Policy Committee, with the approval of the Council if it be in session and otherwise subject to its ratification. The regional committees shall normally meet within their respective areas. They shall consider and recommend to the Council and the Policy Committee policies with respect to relief and rehabilitation within their respective areas. The Committee of the Council for Europe shall take over and carry on the work of the Inter-Allied Committee on European post-war relief established in London on September 24, 1941."

Paragraph 6 of Article III to read:

"6. The Council shall establish such other standing regional committees as it shall consider desirable, the functions of such committees and the method of appointing their members being identical to that provided in paragraph 5 of this Article with respect to the committees of the Council for Europe and for the Far East. The Council shall also establish such other standing committees as it considers desirable to advise it, and, in intervals between sessions of the Council, to advise the Policy Committee. For such technical standing committees as may be established, in respect of particular problems such as nutrition, health, agriculture, transport, materials and supplies, repatriation, and finance, the members may be members of the Council or alternates nominated by them because of special competence in their respective fields of work. The members shall be appointed by the Policy Committee, with the approval of the Council if it be in session and otherwise subject to its ratification. Should a regional committee so desire, subcommittees of the technical standing committees shall be established by the technical committees in consultation with the regional committees, to advise the regional committees."

Paragraph 7 of Article III to read:

"7. The travel and other expenses of members of the Council and its committees shall be borne by the governments which they represent."

The following sentence to be added to paragraph 1 of Article IV:

"The Director General may be removed by unanimous vote of the Policy Committee."

Paragraph 5 of Article IV to read:

"5. The Director General shall make periodic reports to the Policy Committee and to the Council covering the progress of the Admin-

istration's activities. These reports shall be made public except for such portions as the Policy Committee may consider it necessary, in the interest of the United Nations, to keep confidential until the end of the war."

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840.50/1266

*The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy*

MEMORANDUM

In the Soviet Government's memorandum of December 29, 1942,<sup>14</sup> transmitted to the Department of State by the Soviet Ambassador it was suggested that Article I of the draft plan for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration should be so worded as to cover the following points:

"1. The activities of the Relief Administration under Article I should be based on the consent of the government of the state receiving relief as regards the forms these activities may take in a given state.

"The fulfillment of relief measures by the Administration should admit of ways by which the Government of the country receiving relief will take upon itself the whole responsibility for fulfilling these measures on its territory."

The discussion between the Soviet Ambassador, the British Ambassador, the Chinese Ambassador, and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, on January 11, 1943 brought out the following points which it is the purpose of this memorandum to confirm:

1. Paragraph 2 of Article IV of the draft includes the following statement; with respect to the powers of the Director General:

"In arranging for the procurement, transportation, and distribution of supplies and services, he and his representatives shall consult and collaborate with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations and shall, wherever practicable, use the facilities made available by such authorities."

This sentence referred to "the appropriate authorities of the United Nations" rather than to the governments of territories receiving relief because of the desire to guard against embarrassment and difficulty which might arise if the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration should be required to consult and collaborate with, and to use the facilities of, the existing governments of former enemy territory during the war or early post-armistice period, or to have such relations with factional or contending governments in unsettled areas during these periods. In such cases the appropriate United Nations authority might be either the United Nations military authorities or United Nations civilian officials or agencies in control.

2. However, it was the clear understanding of those who drafted this provision that the appropriate authority of the United Nations

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<sup>14</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 159.

in Soviet territory would be the Soviet Government and that it would be not only practicable but necessary for the Director General to rely upon the facilities made available by the Soviet Government. From this it follows that so far as the activities of the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Soviet territory are concerned they would be based upon the consent of the Soviet Government as regards the forms these activities might take. Furthermore, since the facilities made available by the Soviet Government would be used by the Director General the way would be open, under the present draft, for that Government to undertake the whole responsibility for carrying out relief and rehabilitation measures in its territory.

It is hoped that this explanation will meet the concern of the Soviet Government with respect to the matter under discussion.

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1943.

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840.50/1859a

*The Department of State to the Chinese Embassy*

MEMORANDUM

On November 24, 1942, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated orally to the American Ambassador at Chungking the views of the Chinese Government with respect to the draft plan for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, including the following suggestion:

With regard to paragraph 2 of Article IV, the field operation plan by the Director General should be agreed to by the country concerned and any differences between them should be referred for settlement to the Policy Committee.

The discussion between the Chinese Ambassador, the British Ambassador, the Soviet Ambassador and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, on January 11, 1943, brought out the following points which it is the purpose of this memorandum to confirm:

[Here follows paragraph identical with paragraph 1 in memorandum to the Soviet Embassy, *supra*.]

2. However, it was the clear understanding of those who drafted this provision that the appropriate authority of the United Nations in China would be the Chinese Government, and that the Director General would consult and collaborate with the Chinese Government with respect to relief and rehabilitation in Chinese territory. From this it follows that plans for field operations in Chinese territory would be developed by the Director General in collaboration and agreement with the Chinese Government. It is hoped that this explanation will meet the concern of the Chinese Government with respect to the point under discussion.

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1943.



840.50/1136: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 21, 1943—midnight.

[Received January 22—9:35 a. m.]

583. 1. The Embassy has been informed of a communication sent on December 30, by Brazilian Ambassador to Foreign Office concerning question of Brazil associating itself with post-war relief work. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross<sup>15</sup> in his covering letter to Embassy enclosing a copy of this note remarks *inter alia*:

“You will notice that the note is dated December 9, and that there is no mention of instructions from the Brazilian Government, so that it looks as if the Brazilian Embassy was acting on its own initiative.”

2. Text of Brazilian note sent to Foreign Office is being sent simultaneously with this message in part 1 of Embassy's telegram no. 584, January 21.<sup>16</sup>

3. Leith-Ross has drafted a reply for Foreign Office to be sent to Brazilian Ambassador.<sup>17</sup> Before transmitting it to Foreign Office Leith-Ross would appreciate having any comments Department may care to offer. The Leith-Ross text is given in part 2 of Embassy's telegram no. 584, January 21.

4. The Argentine Ambassador has also twice approached Leith-Ross asking for information about post-war relief problems and the possibility of Argentina being associated with the work. Leith-Ross states that he has “so far stalled them off”. He feels however that should the Brazilians be represented or send an “observer” to meetings of inter-Allied committee, the Argentine Ambassador will again raise the question.

MATTHEWS

840.50/1160

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: I reported to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom our talks, together with the Ambassadors of Russia and China, about the composition of the Policy Committee of the proposed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency.

<sup>15</sup> Chairman, Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements.<sup>16</sup> Not printed.<sup>17</sup> The British reply contained the proposal that the Brazilian Government be represented at the meetings of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements by an observer (840.50/1202).

I have now had the carefully considered reply of my Government, which I am sending to you for your consideration and for communication, if you think well, to the Russian and Chinese Ambassadors.<sup>18</sup> My Government is, as you know, anxious to proceed as quickly as possible with the setting up of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. Nevertheless, it finds itself unable to agree to a draft agreement to be submitted to the other United Nations which, in the British Government's opinion, is not likely to find acceptance either by the European Allies or by the principal suppliers. The cordial collaboration of both these groups of governments is, in the opinion of the British Government, essential to the success of the whole scheme.

His Majesty's Government, after giving much thought to the matter, have come to the conclusion that, while it is almost inevitable that the ultimate control of post war military and political arrangements will tend to lie in the hands of the four great powers, there is in their view no reason to exclude participation of the other powers in organisations set up to deal with particular economic problems in which they are directly concerned. In practice such organisations will only work successfully in the economic field if they secure the willing and full cooperation of the other interested parties. This is particularly the case in the matter now under consideration since the policies of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency must have a great influence on the economic conditions both in supplying countries and in Europe generally.

Though individually the Governments of the European Allied countries cannot claim to be on a level with the Great Powers, their aggregate population amounts to 133,000,000 and their aggregate trade, measured by the average of the immediate pre-war years, was greater than that of either the United Kingdom or the United States. Their Governments can hardly be expected to agree that decisions, vitally affecting the economies of their countries, should be settled by a committee on which they have no representation. Indeed, if they were to agree to such an arrangement their decision might well be repudiated by the peoples of their countries when finally liberated.

While it may be argued that the European allies will be the recipients of relief rather than contributors, this cannot be regarded as a disqualification for membership of the directing committee, and it has to be appreciated that many of these allies will in fact be able to make important contributions to the provision of relief. Thus, Norway and Holland will be able to assist with shipping, and Holland and France with supplies, once their Colonial Empires have been recovered. Belgium, in any case, has important resources in the Congo.

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<sup>18</sup> The letter was transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Chinese and Soviet Ambassadors on January 27.

While there may be difficulties in arranging the exact form of representation, His Majesty's Government believe that agreement can be reached on this. They consider that the important thing is to make provision for some form of representation, so as to meet the main complaint of the minor powers and to secure a wide measure of cooperation, without which the successful working of the organisation will be impossible. With this object in view they believe that it is necessary that the Policy Committee shall consist of seven powers, one representing the European Allies, and two of the principal suppliers, one of which should clearly be Canada.

I am always at your disposal to discuss this and other outstanding points with you and the Russian and Chinese Ambassadors. I hope that before very long you will be able to submit a draft, with which we are all in agreement, to the United Nations Governments.

Yours sincerely,

HALIFAX

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840.50/1231

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1943.

Mr. Pearson<sup>19</sup> called at his request. He said that his Government had been in communication with the British Government regarding the proposed draft agreement relating to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Canada was particularly concerned with having representation upon the Policy Committee of that Administration. His Government had discussed with the British Government the question of whether that Committee should consist of four or seven members, and it was apprised of the views of the four powers upon this matter and the view of the recent British communication to us upon the subject. He wished to give me an outline of the Canadian Government's position.

The Canadian Government was concerned with representation upon the Policy Committee because, in the first place, the movement of supplies for relief might well have a considerable bearing upon the economy of Canada. It would, for instance, be of great importance to Canada if their wheat and agricultural commodities were drawn extensively from this country or another, or in accordance with some principle or plan to be worked out. The Canadian Government would like to take an important part in the formulation of such decisions.

In the second place, Canada would be able to furnish a considerable amount of these materials, and its Government and people could take a larger place on the supplying side if they are represented in the body which made decisions.

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<sup>19</sup> Lester B. Pearson, Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation.

Finally as a political matter, it was of importance to the Canadian Government not to be excluded from the Committee on matters which so vitally concerned Canada.

I then explained to Mr. Pearson the proposed structure of the organization, pointing out that Canada would have a place upon the Council and that it would undoubtedly have a most important place on various committees of the Council. I then suggested to him the proposed Committee on Supplies as a substitute for membership on the Council. I also went over with Mr. Pearson the difficulties in the way of enlarging the Council. He agreed that in the political and military field Canada would not expect a position equal to the four great powers, but that in the economic field it was not necessary to have such an exclusive organization. He was interested in the idea of the Supply Committee, but did not believe that his Government would regard it as an adequate substitute for membership on the Policy Committee.

Mr. Pearson discussed at some length the proposed activities of the Policy Committee and the Council. He doubted whether the Council as a body would be very effective, drawing for this purpose upon his experience with the League of Nations. He thought that the group would be too large and not well enough informed to deal adequately with important matters. He stated that, if the Policy Committee were made up of representatives of the governments participating in it who were selected especially for this purpose and devoted the major part of their time to it, it might be an effective body. If, on the other hand, it was a committee of the ambassadors of the various powers who gave their attention to it from time to time, he doubted whether it would amount to much more than a vehicle for relaying questions from Washington to the various governments and entertaining their replies.

He raised the question as to whether it was necessary to have a Policy Committee, and suggested that the Director-General might select his staff from a sufficient number of nations vitally concerned so that they would feel that they had a place in the making of decisions. I stated that I felt quite sure that this would not be acceptable to the Russian Government and probably would not be acceptable to any of the others.

Mr. Pearson, in conclusion, said that the discussion had been most helpful to him, that he would discuss the matter further with Mr. Robertson<sup>20</sup> and Mr. Wrong,<sup>21</sup> and he would let me know any suggestions that they might have.

I am convinced that the Canadian Government feels strongly about this matter and has been pressing the British Government hard.

DEAN ACHESON

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<sup>20</sup> Norman A. Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

<sup>21</sup> Hume Wrong, Canadian Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

840.50/1135 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom*  
(Matthews)

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1943—10 p. m.

677. Your 583 January 21, midnight, and 584 January 21, 1 p. m.<sup>22</sup> The Department sees no objection to procedure along the lines set forth in the British Government's reply to the Brazilian Ambassador's communication of December 30.

The Department would consider it desirable to continue the "stalling off" process with relation to Argentina's interest in the matter.

HULL

840.50/2155

*The Canadian Legation to the Department of State*<sup>23</sup>

## MEMORANDUM

The Canadian Government has been informed of the course of the negotiations for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and of the suggestion made by the United Kingdom Government that the proposed Policy Committee of the Administration should be enlarged so as to include, in addition to representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, members from three other countries, one of which would be Canada. It is understood that objection has been taken to this enlargement.

The Canadian Government considers that the enlargement of the Policy Committee (if this Committee retains in the final scheme the importance given to it in the draft proposals) is necessary to insure the effectiveness of the Relief Administration. Unless this change is made or other alterations with equivalent effects are adopted, Canada, and no doubt other countries, will not be able to cooperate in the work of the administration as fully as they would be prepared to do if they were responsible partners in a joint international enterprise. The purpose of the Canadian Government in making their position clear at this time is to ensure that the place of Canada in the councils of the Relief Administration will match that Administration's anticipated dependence on Canada as a supplier of relief goods. Unless

<sup>22</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>23</sup> The Department acknowledged this memorandum on March 4, stating that it had been carefully considered and would be laid before the interested Governments represented in the preliminary discussions (840.50/1442).

such a relationship is recognized by the principal participating Powers, Canadian co-operation in this essential project will be prejudiced from the outset. The Canadian Government and people are ready to do their full share in the task of organizing and providing post-war relief. They do not feel they can do so if effective participation in the formulation of policy is to be restricted to the four greatest Powers, two of which will themselves be major recipients of relief.

There is already a good deal of public questioning over the place accorded to Canada in the various inter-Allied bodies which have been set up for the direction of the war. During wartime, problems of this nature are to some extent disguised, because of public concentration on the attainment of victory and because of the secrecy which must surround many aspects of war direction. After the fighting ends, the issues will be seen nakedly. The full activities of the Relief Administration will not begin until the war is over; and it will be very difficult, or even impossible, to persuade the Parliament and people of Canada to accept the financial burdens and other sacrifices, such perhaps as the continuation of rationing and other restrictions on the domestic supply of consumer's goods, which will be necessary for the provision of relief through the Administration on the expected scale, unless they are satisfied that their representatives exercise their due part in the direction.

It is appreciated that there are great practical difficulties in creating effective international agencies that are properly representative of the United Nations. These difficulties are a challenge to statesmanship; they must be faced and on their solution depends in large measure the possibility of an enduring peace. No lasting international system can be based on the concentration of influence and authority in bodies composed of a few large Powers to the exclusion of the rest. Such a system would be a denial of the democratic principle. It would also be unreal, for it is not always the largest Powers that have the greatest contribution to make to the work of these bodies, or the greatest stake in their success. In the opinion of the Canadian Government, representation of countries on international bodies should be determined on a functional basis whenever functional criteria can be applied; this principle can be given wide application, particularly in the case of international economic and technical organizations such as the Relief Administration.

The Canadian Government, therefore, hopes that the Government of the United States will support the alteration of the draft scheme for the creation of the Relief Administration so that it will make provision for the full participation of Canada in its direction.

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1943.

840.50/1442

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1943.

The Canadian Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Pearson, called to see me this afternoon and left with me the memorandum attached herewith.<sup>24</sup>

Mr. Pearson told me that he had already discussed the main issues taken up in the memorandum with Mr. Acheson. He said that the present document had been drafted by the Canadian War Council.

After reading the memorandum, I told Mr. Pearson that I found it very difficult to express any opinion counter to the considerations set forth in this memorandum inasmuch as I believed that Canadian participation in the work of this Committee would be in the highest degree useful. I said, however, that the proposal involved questions of very great political significance, quite apart from the question of Canadian participation. I said that, as Mr. Pearson already knew, the suggestion would involve the selection as an additional member of the Relief and Rehabilitation Committee of some occupied country of Europe and it was very apparent that the Soviet Government was firmly opposed to such appointment. I said that it was not necessary for me to stress to Mr. Pearson the great desirability of our working out questions of this character in full harmony and cooperation with the Soviet Government and, for that reason, I was not in a position to give him any reply today to the question raised in his memorandum. I said that full consideration would again be given to this question and that a written response would be addressed to the Canadian Legation.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

840.50/1307

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*The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State*

## MEMORANDUM

As previously stated, the Soviet Government accepts in principle the American draft agreement of August 13 on Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, as well as the modifications and additions laid down in the memorandum of January 16. The Soviet Government is also prepared to meet the desires of the United States Government with regard to Paragraph 4 of Article 3 on the Supply Committee and Paragraph 6 of Article 3 on Regional and Standing Committees. It is however, regarded desirable to emphasize the control of the Policy Committee over the Supply Committee. With this object in view it is suggested that in Paragraph 4 of Article 3 after the words "sources of supply to areas of need" the following is inserted :

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<sup>24</sup> *Supra.*

“Such policies to be carried out under the control and with the approval of the Policy Committee.”

The suggested additions to Paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article 4 concerning the activities of the Director General are accepted.

The Soviet Government continues to attach great importance to the additions proposed to Article I as formulated in the memorandum of the Soviet Embassy of December 29. It is not intended to extend this formula to enemy countries, which is a question deserving special consideration.

The Soviet Government has not changed its attitude with regard to the number of members of the Policy Committee, which in its opinion should be limited to four, as originally suggested in the American draft.

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1943.

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840.50/1590

*Memorandum of Discussion in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), February 17, 1943*

The British Ambassador, the Soviet Ambassador and the Chinese Ambassador met with Mr. Acheson to discuss further the points raised by their Governments with reference to the draft plan for the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Mr. Noel Hall, British Minister, Mr. Liu Chieh, Minister and Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, and Mr. Roy Veatch of the Department of State also were present.

Mr. Acheson referred to the discussion of the same group, on January 11, 1943, at which time consideration was given to certain points with respect to the proposed draft agreement which had been raised by the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments. He mentioned the British Ambassador's letter of January 24, 1943 in further comment upon some of the points discussed on January 11, and said that the Soviet Ambassador had now received further instructions from his Government on those points. The Soviet Embassy's memorandum of February 16, 1943 was then read and Mr. Acheson also read the substance of the Canadian Legation's memorandum of February 9, 1943 setting forth the attitude of the Canadian Government on some of the issues involved.

At the suggestion of the British Ambassador, the points at issue in the draft agreement were discussed seriatim. The following is a résumé of that discussion:

1. The Soviet Government's proposal that Article I should be so amended as to require the consent of the government of the state receiving relief as regards the forms these activities may take in that state, and as to admit of ways by which the government of



the country receiving relief may undertake the whole responsibility for relief measures within its territory.

Ambassador Litvinov called attention to his Government's statement in the memorandum of February 16, 1943 that it was not intended to extend this formula to enemy countries, which is a question deserving special consideration. He said that his Government was concerned regarding the position of recognized governments which would be members of the proposed Administration, with respect to the degree of control which they might exercise over relief measures within their territories—his Government's concern extended beyond its own territories.

The discussion led to a clarification of the Soviet Government's suggestion. Ambassador Litvinov emphasized the use of the word "admit" in the second part of the proposal, pointing out that it was not the intention to require or make mandatory the granting of full responsibility for relief measures to any government which might desire such responsibility. He explained that it was the concern of his Government to keep open the possibility of such full responsibility for relief measures. He recognized the necessity for agreement between the government in question and the United Nations Administration with respect to methods of administering relief in the territory of that government, pointing out that the Administration itself would have the power to decide whether any relief should be granted to that area. He suggested that all member governments should clearly have the right, under the agreement, to advance proposals with respect to the administration of relief in their territories, including the possibility of full responsibility for such administration, but he recognized that in making such proposals a member government would be required to make its case, that the Policy Committee would have to have some criteria for judging the soundness of that case, and that the Director General would need to have access to pertinent facts concerning the situation for submission to the Policy Committee.

While recognizing that the second part of the Soviet Government's proposal was not so worded as to be mandatory, Mr. Acheson pointed out that the first part of that proposal was mandatory, giving the government receiving relief a veto on the forms which the relief activities might take in the territory in question. In his opinion such an arrangement would in effect give each government the power to insist upon undertaking the whole responsibility for relief measures within its territory since it would be able to veto any other arrangement as unsatisfactory to itself. He suggested, therefore, that Article I might be so worded as to give the mandatory power to any member government to say whether it would wish to receive relief and rehabilitation assistance or not and beyond that to provide or "admit" ways

in which a member government in actual control should be able to determine in agreement with the Administration the forms and methods of administering relief within its territory.

Lord Halifax saw no objection to agreement to the suggestion made by the Soviet Government since as a practical matter he felt that the Administration would have adequate bargaining power in reaching an agreement on such questions in as much as it would be in a position to withhold relief assistance if it felt that the forms of distribution proposed by any government would not be satisfactory. He went on to say, however, that paragraph two of Article IV, or some other provision of the draft, should be so worded as to require consultation and collaboration with the governments of the affected areas. Some escape clause would be needed to cover territories in which no recognized civilian government existed or cases in which even recognized governments might not have effective control of the territory.

The suggestion was made that the Policy Committee should have the power to determine whether the government of a given territory, even though recognized by the Allies, was in effective control of that territory. Ambassador Wei and Mr. Liu expressed the opinion, however, that it might be dangerous to place with the Policy Committee the power to decide whether a given government was an "effective" government; in their opinion the important question would be whether the government was recognized or not.

Lord Halifax thought that there might be cases in which recognized governments were not in a position to make decisions for the territory over which they had nominal sovereignty, and Ambassador Litvinov agreed that in cases where a recognized government was not in control of its territory, the Policy Committee would have to determine the authority with which the Administration should deal.

It was agreed that Mr. Acheson should draft such provisions as would give effect to the Soviet Government's suggestions on this point, as developed by the discussion outlined above.

2. The Soviet Government's suggestion, as set forth in the Soviet Embassy's memorandum of February 16, 1943, that the control of the Policy Committee over the Committee on Supplies should be made explicit in the proposed new paragraph four of Article III.

It was agreed that the object of the Soviet Government's suggestion would be achieved through substituting the word "recommend" for the word "report" in the third sentence of the draft of that paragraph. It was thought that this change would clarify the relationship between the Committee on Supplies and the Policy Committee and the Council, emphasizing the fact that the Committee on Supplies could only propose or recommend policies, final decision resting with the Policy Committee and the Council.

It was also agreed, in response to Ambassador Litvinov's suggestion, that the order of the wording of this sentence should be changed so that the Committee on Supplies should recommend "to the Policy Committee and the Council".

3. Suggestions of the British Government with respect to the wording of the proposed new paragraph four of Article III, concerning the Committee on Supplies.

Lord Halifax and Mr. Hall suggested that the third sentence of the proposed paragraph should be so worded as to require the transmission of recommendations of the Committee on Supplies through the Director General to the Policy Committee and Council, and so as to eliminate the word "procurement". It was their feeling that the responsibility of the Director General as the channel for communications by the Committees should be made explicit and that the wording should preclude any possibility of an assumption that the Committee on Supplies itself would have anything to do with procurement.

There was general sympathy with the British observation on the first point and it was agreed that this could be achieved best through a new paragraph under Article IV specifying the Director General's responsibility for serving as a means of communication between committees and for maintaining records and files of such communications and of all action taken by the Council and its committees.

It was agreed that the second point raised by the British Government with respect to this sentence could be met by rewording the sentence in question substantially as follows:

"It shall consider, formulate and recommend to the Policy Committee and the Council policies designed to ensure the provision and distribution of required materials and their continued flow from available sources of supply to areas of need".

4. The British Government's proposal that the membership of the Policy Committee be expanded to seven so as to include Canada and one European Ally.

Lord Halifax reported that his Government still felt strongly that this modification should be made. He had been impressed with and had reported Ambassador Litvinov's reference to the possibility that a decision in this case might set a pattern for international organization in other spheres. His Government had replied that there was a distinction between political and economic subjects and that in the field of relief and rehabilitation it would be possible to provide for a Policy Committee of seven without prejudicing later decisions in other fields.

Ambassador Litvinov said that the instructions from his Government, as set forth in the memorandum of February 16, contained the same insistence on a Policy Committee of four as provided in the draft agreement.

Ambassador Wei said that he had been instructed to say that his Government supported the arrangement in the draft agreement, for a Policy Committee of four.

Mr. Acheson said that, although the United States Government recognized that strong arguments could be made in favor of both positions, it considered it best, in view of the difference of opinion, to continue with the plan for a Policy Committee of four. He said that the importance of Canada to the scheme was recognized, and that the desire of Canada to be a member of the Policy Committee was given considerable weight, that the United States would like to do everything possible to meet Canada's position, but that it felt that any extension of the membership of the Policy Committee would create difficult new problems. He believed that there was some misapprehension on the part of the Canadian Government with respect to the powers of the Policy Committee; he hoped that the Canadians would understand that the Council would have the fullest possible discussions of policy at its semi-annual meetings, and that the Supplies and regional committees of the Council would be in constant session to give full consideration to policy matters affecting them.

Mr. Acheson said that his Government was not opposing a Policy Committee of seven as a matter of principle, but that it was concerned over the necessity of securing rapid progress in establishing the proposed United Nations Administration. Three of the four Powers were now in agreement on a Policy Committee of four and he hoped that it would be possible for all four to move forward on that basis.

Lord Halifax was in full agreement on the urgency of moving forward. He inquired whether the question of the membership of the Policy Committee could be left for the general meeting of the United Nations or for the first meeting of the Council to decide. This arrangement might avoid the possibility of forcing through an agreement which would be jealously regarded and only grudgingly accepted by many of the smaller nations.

Ambassador Litvinov expressed the fear that the conference of the United Nations and the Council would not only favor a Policy Committee of seven rather than four but would be led to a considerable extension of the number.

Mr. Acheson expressed his conviction that the four Powers must be in agreement when the full United Nations meeting takes place if discord and the possibility of permanent harm to the program are to be avoided. He said that in his opinion the question of membership on the Policy Committee was not so important as appeared at first glance because of the necessary relationship of that Committee and its functions to other committees and their functions. In his view there were three main functions to be performed: (1) The provision of supplies, in which the Director General and the Committee on

Supplies must take the leading role; (2) determination of requirements, in which the Director General and his deputies would work largely with the regional committees; (3) coordination and adjustment of these two, which should be secured largely through the Council and the Policy Committee. He believed that the European Allies would have very little to do with the function of supplying and in the coordination of the supply program with requirements; and he pointed out that in any event they were represented on the Council and had the right to sit with the Policy Committee when the problems of their respective countries were considered.

Ambassador Litvinov expressed the wish that Lord Halifax would place this problem before his Government again pointing out the fact of agreement between the Soviet, Chinese and United States Governments on a Policy Committee of four.

Lord Halifax said that he was certain that his Government would not wish to be the cause of delay in moving forward and that it would be willing to have the draft agreement, as it now stands on this point, submitted to the other United Nations, with the understanding that the British Government would not consider itself committed to pressing for a Policy Committee of four members if subsequent discussions should prove a majority of the United Nations to be strongly of a contrary opinion. Lord Halifax and Ambassador Wei were forced to withdraw at that point, but Lord Halifax said that Mr. Hall was fully informed of the British Government's position and was empowered to continue the discussions in the place of the Ambassador.

Mr. Hall explained that the British Government had been convinced at the beginning that a Policy Committee of four members would be the most workable arrangement; his Government had been led to press for an enlargement of the membership only because of its desire to get the scheme accepted by all of the United Nations involved. In order to facilitate progress the British Government is now willing to go ahead, however, with general discussion of the draft as it now stands on this point. Nevertheless the British Government expects widespread opposition to this arrangement and suggests, therefore, that the four powers consult again shortly before the scheduled conference so that they may, at that time, reconsider the matter in the light of the responses of other governments received in the meantime.

Ambassador Litvinov expressed the belief that there would be less dissatisfaction on the part of the smaller nations with a Policy Committee composed of the four great Powers than would be the case with a larger body; he felt that the leadership of the four powers was already widely accepted.

Mr. Hall said that the proposal to circulate the draft as it now stands for comments would afford an opportunity to test that point;

the four Powers would then be in a position to know the point of view of the smaller Powers.

Mr. Acheson said that he would expect some proposal to be made at the conference, on the part of some of the smaller Powers, for a larger Policy Committee. He felt that the support of the smaller Powers could be secured for a committee of four, however, because of three safeguards: (1) The establishment, as standing committees, of the Committee of Supplies and the regional committees; (2) the provision suggested by the Soviet Government that the form of activities of the Administration within the territory of a member government in control thereof should be determined after consultation with and consent of that government; and (3) the existence of the Council with the provision for at least semi-annual meetings at which each member government would have full opportunity to discuss all policy matters, and its right to participate in the discussions of the Policy Committee when its interests were concerned.

Ambassador Litvinov inquired what position the British Government would take in the event that some controversy arises at the proposed general conference, with respect to the membership of the Policy Committee—would the British Government be neutral or would it expect to take a position for either a committee of four or a committee of seven?

Mr. Hall reiterated the statement that the British Government at this time could not commit itself to pressing for a committee of four and he expressed the opinion that it might wish actually to vote for a committee of seven if, at the conference, there was strong support of a reasonable proposal for such an amendment of the draft.

Mr. Acheson said that his Government would have to consider very carefully whether it could sponsor the proposal without the full support of the other three Powers. Should the proposal be launched without full agreement, there would be the risk that it might lead to disagreement and disunity and this would be a grave risk to take during the war. Rather than run such a risk, the United States Government might wish to explore other methods of organizing the relief work.

Mr. Hall said that he would report Mr. Acheson's concern on this point to Lord Halifax, and expressed the opinion that the views of the governments should be reconciled.

5. The suggestion of the British Government that Deputy Directors General be appointed for each region with responsibility for close cooperation with regional committees.

Mr. Acheson referred to an informal note from the British Embassy<sup>25</sup> setting forth the following proposal:

<sup>25</sup> Note of February 2, not printed.

"The Director General shall recommend to the Policy Committee a Deputy Director General to be appointed for each regional area, and the Deputy Director General shall, with the approval of the Director General, make periodic reports to the committee of Council, for the regional area concerned, as to the general programme of relief operations in that area, consult the committee on all questions of policy and principle that may arise, and give effect so far as practicable to any recommendations made by the committee."

Mr. Acheson said that this suggestion had been given some study and that an alternative draft had been prepared designed to secure the principal objectives of the British suggestion by (1) amendment of paragraph four of Article IV so as to provide for appointment by the Director General of a Deputy Director General for each organized region, and (2) amendment of the proposed new paragraph five of Article III so as to provide that periodic reports by each Deputy Director General should be transmitted by the Director General to the appropriate regional committee, and that policy recommendations of the regional committees should be transmitted to and acted upon by the Council and the Policy Committee and appropriate instructions transmitted by the Director General to the appropriate Deputy Director General.

Mr. Hall recognized that this proposed arrangement would require close collaboration between the regional Deputy Directors General and the regional committees. He saw a definite advantage, however, in the British proposal that the Deputy Directors General for the regions should be appointed by the Policy Committee on recommendation of the Director General—he explained that the intention of the proposal certainly was not to take the appointive power away from the Director General but merely to require the approval of the Policy Committee for these important appointments.

#### 6. The possibility of re-naming the Policy Committee.

Mr. Veatch made the suggestion that the name of the Policy Committee might be changed to the "Central Committee of the Council". In his opinion this name would be more truly descriptive of the position and functions allotted to the Policy Committee, especially with the addition to the draft agreement of specific provisions for two regional committees of the Council and a Committee on Supplies of the Council. He called attention to the fact that the function of determining policy was placed with the Council and with the Policy Committee when the Council was not in session. He advanced the suggestion particularly as a means of reassuring the Canadian Government which, in its memorandum of February 8 [9], indicated particular concern over restriction of effective participation in the formulation of policy to the four big Powers.

There was general agreement that such a change might have merit, but Ambassador Litvinov urged that, in the interest of expediting action, the present form of the draft should not be changed unless some definite advantages were assured. He suggested, therefore, that this change should not be made unless it had been ascertained in advance that such a change would definitely aid in meeting the fears of the Canadians.

It was agreed that Mr. Acheson should prepare a redraft of the agreement embodying the proposed changes on which general agreement had been reached, and that this new draft should be circulated as promptly as possible as a basis for further consideration at an early date.

It was agreed also that Mr. Acheson should furnish copies of the Soviet Embassy's memorandum of February 16 to Lord Halifax and Ambassador Wei.<sup>26</sup>

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840.50/1338

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Acheson and Mr. Noel Hall, British Minister.

Following the meeting with the British, Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors on February 17, Mr. Hall mentioned again his proposal that Mr. Acheson and Lord Halifax attempt to reach an agreement within the next day or two on this point,<sup>27</sup> which appeared now to be the major factor holding up progress with the plan for a United Nations agency.

Mr. Hall agreed that it would be essential for the four Powers to be in agreement on this and on other points when the actual conference of the United Nations meets to consider the proposal. He seemed certain that, therefore, the British Government would be prepared to reach agreement with the other three great Powers on the question of membership of the Policy Committee in advance of the conference. He said that his Government did not want to commit itself now because it felt that the other three Powers might wish to reconsider the matter after this Government had received comments on the draft from the rest of the United Nations. If these comments created no new situation, then, presumably, the three Powers would hold their position on the membership of the Policy Committee and

<sup>26</sup> Copies of the Soviet Embassy's memorandum were transmitted by the Secretary of State to the British and Chinese Ambassadors on February 20.

<sup>27</sup> i.e., membership of the Policy Committee.



the British Government would have to go along with that plan. He said that if this Government would be willing to proceed on this basis he was sure that the British Government would be willing to pledge itself to reach an agreement on this point with the other three at a meeting of the four a few days in advance of the conference.

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840.50/1421

*The Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation (Pearson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: In connection with discussions now proceeding on the proposed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization, I would like to bring to your attention the suggestion made by those interested in Ottawa which might make easier the extension of the Policy Committee of the proposed Organization. It is thought that certain difficulties might be avoided if Switzerland or Sweden could be added to the Policy Committee in place of one of the Allied European Governments. This could, of course, be done only indirectly, since the proposed Organization will be an organization of the United Nations; but it might be possible to insert a clause in the plan authorizing a Policy Committee of six to co-opt a neutral European country as an additional member. If this scheme proved feasible, it would have the advantage that the Russian objection based on the possible nomination of Poland would automatically disappear. Furthermore, the use of Swiss or Swedish territory and personnel might be of great assistance to the Relief Organization in getting started in Europe immediately after the end of the war. There are obvious difficulties about this course, but they may be less serious than the difficulties in selecting one member from the Allied Governments in London.

I would be glad if you would give this suggestion your consideration and let me know what you think of it.

Yours sincerely,

L. B. PEARSON

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840.50/1828

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1943.

M. Alphand<sup>28</sup> called at his request. I had been informed of his proposed visit and questions by Dr. Feis<sup>29</sup> and my reply given below

<sup>28</sup> Hervé Alphand, Director of Economic Affairs of the French National Committee.

<sup>29</sup> Herbert Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

was outlined at a meeting attended by Governor Lehman,<sup>30</sup> and Messrs. Feis, Atherton,<sup>31</sup> Dunn,<sup>32</sup> Hackworth,<sup>33</sup> and Veatch.

M. Alphand informed me that he had been representing the French National Committee on the so-called Leith-Ross Committee in London where he had been working on French requirements after occupation. He had heard of a proposed United Nations organization which we were formulating and that it would supersede the Leith-Ross Committee. He wished to learn anything I would tell him as to the proposed French membership upon that organization as it would be a most serious blow to the French National Committee if, as the result of a new organization, they ceased to participate in this vital work. He hoped that its representatives would be continued as the official French representative and believed that if this would be done an arrangement would be worked out for collaboration between the Committee and the North African Government.

I replied as follows:

The origin of the idea of an international relief organization broader in scope than the Leith-Ross Committee was the view of many of the governments participating in it that it was essential to the operation of any relief organization which had to consider needs in relation to supply possibilities from all sources, to have an organization including supplying countries as well as countries in need of relief, including Russia which was not represented on the Leith-Ross Committee, and including the countries of the Far East which were also not represented. To work out any such organization requires the agreement of a great many countries. At present we are engaged in ascertaining the views of the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments, and therefore no one in this Government could answer the question as to what the proposed membership of any future organization will be. That must be the result of discussions with many powers and the meetings of many minds; so I could not give any official reply to his question, or even an informal personal reply, because the matter has not yet reached the stage where any individual's judgment would be helpful.

It might, however, be useful to discuss with M. Alphand the nature of the problem presented and to get his views as to how it could be approached. Everyone would agree that the French Empire was a most important factor in the relief situation both from the point of view of the relief needs and of the supply available to meet relief needs. It is clearly essential to find some way in which the French views can be presented, needs ascertained, and supplying pos-

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<sup>30</sup> Herbert H. Lehman, Director, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>31</sup> Ray Atherton, Acting Chief, Division of European Affairs.

<sup>32</sup> James Clement Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

<sup>33</sup> Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser.

sibilities enlisted. At the present time the areas under the authority of the French National Committee and of the North African Government should be regarded as net supplying areas, although there is of course some need for relief in North Africa. The great relief needs will come in metropolitan France. The great problem is to find some form of French representation which can bring together the supplying capacity and relief needs, and I suggest for both, if the French National Committee and the North African Government were able to work out such a situation between them, it would be of immeasurable help to all governments which must work together in establishing the relief organization. Therefore, I should hope that, before those of us who are working on the problem have to find an answer to M. Alphan's question, this possibility could be fully explored and if possible solved.

If it cannot be solved, the problems seem to me very perplexing. I could imagine that many of the governments might be concerned over the prospect of having two French delegates, certainly if each delegate were to get a position equal to their own. There would also be the possibility of confused instead of united recommendations as to needs and potentialities.

It seemed to me that, from my point of view, the matter of relief operations was one in which it was almost easier to reach accord than that of military operations, and in view of the achievements made in the latter field, one was very hopeful of similar achievements in this. At any rate, it would seem to me that it would be more useful for the French representatives to explore such a possibility than it would be for me to speculate on what could or could not be done in case this becomes an impossibility.

M. Alphan expressed a general agreement with these views. He asked whether I could say that, provided the two French groups were able to discuss this matter in the near future, no decision would be taken as to membership in the organization until some way could be found in which their views could be communicated. I said that I had great difficulty in answering this question, first because I had no authority to, and second because I was not clear as to what he had in mind by a decision or when or how it would be taken. In fact, what was occurring now was a constant interchange of views. As this went on, the views of the various countries would, we hoped, come closer and closer together. At some point, and in a manner not yet clear to me, these coinciding views would become a decision. I thought, however, that it would be accurate to say that the time for taking action on a relief organization proposal was not immediately imminent, and that there was in fact sufficient time in which the French views could be

considered by all the nations before they reached their own final conclusions.

M. Alphan and again stressed the great seriousness to the French National Committee of being severed from the present European groups considering the needs of that area. I told him that I was sure everyone appreciated this, and appreciated the knowledge of French conditions and a wise counsel which the Committee had brought to the deliberation of the Leith-Ross group. It seemed to me so plainly necessary and desirable to continue and enlarge French participation in this work that I was sure some plan could be found along the lines which we had discussed. M. Alphan also expressed the belief that this would be possible and said that he had found our discussion most helpful.

DEAN ACHESON

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840.50/1515

*The Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation (Pearson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: With further reference to discussions now proceeding on a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization, the Canadian position in this matter has been further reviewed by the Government in Ottawa, who have instructed me to inform you that they will not find it possible to participate in the activities of the proposed Organization unless Canada is afforded in some way a position in the direction of its work which is commensurate with the contribution to international relief which Canada will undoubtedly be expected to make. It is pointed out that necessary support from the Canadian people for this undertaking could not be maintained if Canada did not have an appropriate and effective share in the direction of the policy of the Organization.

I would be grateful if these views of the Canadian Government could be brought to the attention of the interested United States authorities.

Yours sincerely,

L. B. PEARSON

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840.50/1430

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1943.

Mr. Pearson, who called at his request to discuss decentralized export control procedure, stayed after our conference with the Canadian

Commercial Attaché on that subject to discuss the United Nations Relief Organization draft. He told me that yesterday the War Cabinet had met to discuss the recent changes in the draft, creating a Supply Committee on which Canada could play an important part. The Canadian Government had been informed of these changes by the British Embassy. The War Cabinet decided that these changes were not sufficient to alter its prior decision, and still adhered to the view that Canada could not participate unless it had a more prominent part on what he termed the "directorate" of the administration. He said that he thought the underlying reason for the War Cabinet's decision was its belief that the form that this organization took would furnish a pattern for further economic organizations and that Canada must insist upon having a larger part or else it would be excluded from such participation on all other similar organizations.

I explained to Mr. Pearson that I thought the War Cabinet was in error in believing that the organization of the relief administration would furnish a pattern. This organization I thought was necessarily directed to the particular problems of relief. I pointed out that the form of organization in the draft wheat agreement<sup>34</sup> was quite different and that I was sure that if any organizations were considered in the financial fields, they would be still different. In other words, each had been adapted to the particular problems which it was to meet, and function which it was to perform.

I explained further that I thought the War Cabinet was attaching undue importance to the Policy Committee in the relief organization. It seems to me that, aside from the council where overall matters of policy would be decided, the chief centers of gravity would be the Director General, who would have to exercise large powers in the field of managing operations, the Supply Committee, which would be of the greatest importance since the administration could not function without materials to distribute, and the regional committees, where the recipients of relief would have an opportunity to formulate their views upon the part which they wished to play and in the principles which they thought should apply.

After some discussion of this matter, Mr. Pearson said that he thought that it would be most important at an appropriate moment if some official of this Government fully conversant with the proposed organization and with the problems which had attended the draft, could go to Ottawa and discuss the matter fully with the Prime Minister. He said that necessarily the Prime Minister's knowledge of this subject was slight and that it might well be that, upon full presenta-

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<sup>34</sup> For correspondence concerning the draft wheat agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 501 ff.

tion and discussion of all the facets of the problem, he might modify his view.

I then asked Mr. Pearson where he thought we should be if the Canadian Government adhered to its view. I pointed out that, as he knew, the Russian and Chinese Governments held equally strong views and that a relief organization without the participation of those two Governments would be fatally defective, just as it would be immeasurably handicapped if it failed to procure the participation of the Canadian Government. The result might be to produce great suffering on the part of people for whom relief might be delayed. Mr. Pearson was not willing to commit himself in answer to my question, but he was not prepared to say that the Canadian Government would push its position of actually refusing to join the proposed relief organization. He hoped that the discussion with the Prime Minister, referred to above, might furnish a method of solving the difficulties.

DEAN ACHESON

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840.50/1325 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1943—midnight.

1449. Your 1361, February 23.<sup>35</sup> We concur in appointment of a technical subcommittee on displaced populations by the Interallied Committee on Post-War Relief. We suggest that you designate American member from among those now present in London. In view of fact that Lehman does not propose to send special representative to serve on committee at this time we suggest that the chairman be British.

WELLES

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840.48/6090

*The Soviet Ambassador (Litvinov) to the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: I am sending you herewith in writing my Government's remarks on the latest amendments to the draft agreement on Relief and Rehabilitation.

I am at your disposal to discuss these remarks at any time convenient for you.

Yours sincerely,

MAXIM LITVINOFF

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<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

[Enclosure]

*Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Draft No. 2*NEW AMENDMENTS SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT<sup>36</sup>*Article 1.*

Before the word "responsibility" to insert "complete or partial".  
Instead of the word "authorized" to say "planned".

*Article 3 paragraph 4.*

After the words "shall consist" to insert "of representatives of the governments members of the Central Committee".

*Article 3 paragraph 5.*

To omit the last sentence "The committee of the Council for Europe shall take over", etc.

*Article 4 paragraph 4.*

After the words "under the provisions of Article 3" to insert "and two deputies for the committee of the Council for Europe (such deputies to be chosen from the European countries members of the Central Committee)."

S40.50/1761a

*Memorandum of Discussion in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), March 24, 1943*

The British Ambassador, the Soviet Ambassador and the Chinese Ambassador met with Mr. Acheson to discuss further the Draft Agreement for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.<sup>37</sup> Mr. Noel Hall, British Minister, and Mr. Roy Veatch of the Department of State were also present.

The particular purpose of this meeting was to consider four amendments to the Draft Agreement proposed by the Soviet Government and transmitted to Mr. Acheson on March 18 by Ambassador Litvinov. The following summarizes the discussion of the four proposals and sets forth the conclusions reached:

*Addendum to Article I, paragraph 2 (a)*

Mr. Acheson said that he was glad, of course, to accept the substitution of the word "planned" for the word "authorized."

<sup>36</sup> The texts referred to for article 3 are apparently those given in the enclosure to the note of January 16 to the British, Chinese, and Soviet Ambassadors, p. 858. The texts referred to for articles 1 and 4 have not been identified.

<sup>37</sup> Preliminary discussions were held by Department officials with officers of the British Embassy on March 22 and with the Soviet Ambassador on March 23. Memoranda of these discussions not printed.

As an alternative to the insertion of the words "complete or partial" in the sentence, he suggested that the Minutes of this discussion clarify the meaning of the provision as now drafted; he was sure that all would agree to this proposal since it had been the general understanding from the first that in Soviet territory the Soviet Government would be free to assume full responsibility for relief and rehabilitation measures. Ambassador Litvinov said that such an arrangement would be satisfactory with him, and the others raised no objection. There was full agreement and understanding, therefore, that Article I, paragraph 2(a) as it now stands admits of the possibility of a member nation undertaking, in agreement with the Administration, full responsibility for relief and rehabilitation measures within its territory.

*Article III, paragraph 4*

Mr. Acheson suggested that the change of the Draft Agreement in this respect was unnecessary since the Central Committee itself could provide that the Governments represented on its membership should also be represented on the Committee on Supplies. He proposed, therefore, that the Minutes of this meeting show agreement on this point as a means of assurance to the Soviet Government.

Ambassador Litvinov said that this arrangement would be satisfactory to him. Ambassador Wei agreed also, and Lord Halifax said that he believed it would be acceptable to his Government but he thought that he should put the question to London so as to be certain. It was agreed that as soon as Lord Halifax should receive instructions on the point, the Minutes of the group's consideration of this question will carry the following statement:

"There was full agreement and understanding that the membership of the Committee on Supplies, to be determined by the Central Committee, should include the representatives of the four Powers providing the members of the Central Committee."

*Article III, paragraph 5*

Ambassador Litvinov explained that the objection of his Government to the wording of the last sentence of the paragraph as it now stands was due to the fact that it had no way of knowing what the work of the Leith-Ross Committee had been, since it was not a member of that Committee. It objected, therefore, to the provision that the work of the Leith-Ross Committee should be carried on by the Committee for Europe.

Mr. Acheson suggested that the objection of the Soviet Government might be met by changing the wording of the last sentence of the paragraph to the following:



"The Committee of the Council for Europe shall replace the Inter-Allied Committee on European post-war relief established in London on September 24, 1941 and the records of the latter shall be made available to the Committee for Europe."

All agreed on this change.

*Article IV, paragraph 4*

Mr. Acheson said that the Soviet Government's proposal, that two Deputy Directors General should be provided for the European region, one Soviet citizen and one British subject, had been discussed with Governor Lehman and others in the Department. Governor Lehman had considered the suggestion that there be a Soviet Deputy Director and a British Deputy Director for the European region quite reasonable provided that there might also be other Deputies and that the Director General should be unhampered in the appointment of such Deputies and in the delegation of responsibility and functions to them. He did not like the difference in category that had been established, under the paragraph as now drafted, between regional Deputies approved by the Central Committee and other Deputies appointed without such approval; he feared that some administrative difficulties or embarrassments might result.

Mr. Acheson suggested, therefore, that the substance of the Soviet Government's proposal should be achieved by so wording the Draft Agreement as to place all responsibility for the appointment of Deputy Directors General with the Director General without confirmation by the Central Committee in any case, and that agreement should now be reached on the appointment of a Soviet citizen and of a British subject as Deputy Directors General for Europe whenever Deputies are appointed for that region, on the understanding that other Deputies, including an American, might be appointed.

Ambassador Litvinov explained that the only desire of his Government was to be assured that a Soviet citizen should be appointed to such a post. He would be quite willing to have the first sentence of the paragraph under discussion provide that "one or more" Deputies might be appointed for Europe, including a Soviet citizen. He said, however, that Mr. Acheson's suggestion would be quite acceptable.

Lord Halifax recalled the fact that the provision for a Deputy Director for each region, appointed by the consent of the Central Committee, had been inserted at the suggestion of his Government. Its purpose in proposing this provision had been to make the Draft Agreement as agreeable as possible to the smaller countries, especially those in Europe. He felt that he could not pledge himself immediately to agreement on the proposal—he would be glad, however, to refer the question to London and to explain the proposal to his Government.

Ambassador Litvinov said that he did not understand what objection the British Government could have to the proposal.

In response Lord Halifax and Mr. Hall explained the position taken by the British Government from the first favoring the appointment of the administrative personnel of the organization purely on a basis of merit and usefulness for given functions without any reference to nationality. It had not been the British Government's intention to ask for the appointment of a Deputy Director for Europe of British nationality but rather to support the appointment of the best man for the job whatever his nationality might be.

Ambassador Litvinov said that if there were deficiencies in one of the Deputies appointed for Europe, then that might be made up by the others appointed. In any event, his Government wished to have some guarantee that if Deputies are appointed at all for the European region, one should be of Soviet nationality.

Lord Halifax reminded Ambassador Litvinov that it had been agreed that the responsibility for measures within Soviet territory should be the responsibility of the Soviet Government, and he asked why the Soviet Government should therefore be concerned with the appointment of a Soviet Deputy for the entire European region.

In reply Ambassador Litvinov said that two quite separate questions were involved. The Soviet Government did desire to have full responsibility for the work to be done in the Soviet Union but it also had a real interest in the measures to be undertaken elsewhere in Europe.

Ambassador Wei inquired as to how the duties of several Deputies for one region could be determined—it seemed to him that the administrative problem would be much more complicated than would be the case if only one Deputy were appointed. Mr. Acheson agreed that the problem might be more complicated but he expressed the opinion that it could be worked out satisfactorily since the responsibility for delegating authority to these Deputies would rest with the Director General, who should be able to assign to each Deputy those functions for which he was best suited. Ambassador Wei did not offer objection to the proposal.

Mr. Acheson recalled the fact that the Soviet Government had not opposed the original draft which left the entire responsibility for choosing Deputy Directors General with the Director General. He understood that the Soviet Government's suggestion had been made only after the Draft Agreement had been changed to provide definitely for one Deputy appointed with the consent of the Central Committee. The Soviet Government now strongly desired some reassurance on this point and since Ambassador Litvinov was prepared to accept this Government's alternative suggestion, Mr. Acheson

hoped that the British Government would be able to accept the proposal also.

In the event that the four Governments should prove to be in final agreement on the subject presented by Mr. Acheson, it was agreed that paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article IV should be reworded as follows (the changes in paragraph 5 made to conform to the changes in paragraph 4):

"4. The Director General shall appoint such Deputy Directors General, officers, expert personnel, and staff at his headquarters and elsewhere, including field missions, as he shall find necessary, and he may delegate to them such of his powers as he may deem appropriate. The Director General, or upon his authorization the Deputy Directors General, shall supply such secretariat and other staff and facilities as shall be required by the Council and its committees, including the regional committees and subcommittees. Such Deputy Directors General as shall be assigned special functions within a region shall attend meetings of the regional standing committee whenever possible and shall keep it advised on the progress of the relief and rehabilitation program within the region.

"5. The Director General shall make periodic reports to the Central Committee and to the Council covering the progress of the Administration's activities. The reports shall be made public except for such portions as the Central Committee may consider it necessary, in the interest of the United Nations, to keep confidential. The Director General shall also arrange to have prepared periodic reports covering the activities of the Administration within each region and he shall transmit such reports with his comments thereon to the Council, the Central Committee and the respective regional committees."

It was also agreed that when all four Governments are in a position to accept the proposal made by Mr. Acheson, the Minutes of the discussion on this point shall include the following statement:

"There was full agreement and understanding that when Deputy Directors General are appointed for the European region, under the powers placed with the Director General by Article IV, paragraph 4, there shall be included a Deputy Director General of Soviet nationality and a Deputy Director General of British nationality. It was also understood that in addition to such Deputies there might be other Deputies appointed for the European region including one of United States nationality."

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Ambassador Litvinov said that he had already cabled Mr. Acheson's suggestions to his Government, urgently requesting a response as promptly as possible. Lord Halifax and Ambassador Wei said that they would cable the suggestions to their Governments immediately, each requesting the earliest possible reply.

It was agreed that another, and hopefully the final, discussion would be held as soon as replies had been received from all three Governments.

840.50/1630

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 25, 1943.

The Minister of Australia<sup>38</sup> called and handed to me a personal message from Dr. H. V. Evatt<sup>39</sup> as follows:

"We are very concerned at the possible exclusion of Australia from one of the primary positions in connection with the food relief proposals. Our approach to and work on these questions should be of the greatest assistance to the United Nations."

The Minister then proceeded to say that his Government had seen the British proposal to this Government in regard to trusteeships in relation to dependent peoples. He said his Government was in accord with the British proposal. He then added that his Government would in fact be willing to go a little further and provide that a suitable international authority to oversee the mandate operations should also have authority to deal likewise with colonies and their parent governments. He said that a second more advanced position than the British, which his country favors, would be for an international authority to be clothed with more power to supervise backward peoples and the operations of the government authorities in relation to them. I thanked the Minister and said that I had submitted all the available data on the colonial questions to the President, who has the matter immediately in charge.

The Minister then took up the second matter which he desired to present, as set out in the following communication from Dr. Evatt:

"The suggestion that the executive is to consist of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China would relegate important food producing countries like Australia to a secondary role. Our view in this respect is similar to that of Canada."

It makes the same claim for Australian recognition in the proposed United Nations world food control organization that Canada is seeking for herself. I thanked him for the benefit of his views and suggested that if he desired to go into the details of all phases of this matter, Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, who has been presiding when such elaborate details have been discussed, might well be called upon for any more detailed information in which he might be interested. He said he would be glad to do this.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

<sup>38</sup> Sir Owen Dixon.

<sup>39</sup> Australian Minister for External Affairs.

840.50/1430e

*Draft Agreement for the Establishment of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, March 25, 1943*

The Governments whose duly-authorized representatives have subscribed hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Declaration of January 1, 1942, known as the United Nations Declaration<sup>40</sup> and the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,<sup>41</sup>

Being determined that immediately upon the liberation of any area by their armed forces the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes, for the resumption of agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services, to the end that peoples once freed may be preserved and restored to health and strength for the tasks and opportunities of building anew,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

There is hereby established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

1. The administration shall have power to acquire, hold and convey property, to enter into contracts and undertake obligations, to designate or create agencies and to review the activities of agencies so created, to manage undertakings and in general to perform any legal act appropriate to its objects and purposes.

2. Subject to the provisions of Article VII, the purposes and functions of the Administration shall be as follows:

(a) To plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing and other basic necessities, housing facilities, medical and other essential services; and to facilitate in areas receiving relief the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services so far as necessary to the adequate provision of relief. The form of activities of the Administration within the territory of a member government wherein that government exercises administrative authority and the responsibility to be assumed by the member

<sup>40</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

government for carrying out measures planned by the Administration therein shall be determined after consultation with and with the consent of the member government.

(b) To formulate and recommend measures for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments for the coordination of purchasing, the use of ships and other procurement activities in the period following the cessation of hostilities, with a view to integrating the plans and activities of the Administration with the total movement of supplies, and for the purpose of achieving an equitable distribution of available supplies. The Administration may administer such coordination measures as the member governments authorize.

(c) To formulate and recommend for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments measures with respect to such related matters, arising out of its experience in planning and performing the work of relief and rehabilitation, as may be proposed by any of the member governments and approved by unanimous vote of the Central Committee.

## ARTICLE II

### *Membership*

The members of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shall be the governments or authorities signatory hereto and such other governments or authorities as may upon application for membership be admitted thereto by action by the Council or between sessions of the Council, by the Central Committee.

## ARTICLE III

### *The Council*

1. Each member government shall name one representative, and such alternates as may be necessary, upon the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which shall be the policy-making body of the Administration. The Council shall, for each of its sessions, select one of its members to preside at the session.

2. The Council shall be convened in normal session not less than twice a year by the Central Committee. It may be convened in special session whenever the Central Committee shall deem necessary, and shall be convened within thirty days after request therefor by a majority of the members of the Council.

3. The Central Committee of the Council shall consist of the representatives of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, with the Director General presiding. Between sessions of the Council it shall exercise all the powers and functions thereof. It shall invite the participation of the representatives of any member government at those of its meetings at which action of special interest to such government is discussed. It shall invite the participation of the representative serving as Chairman of the Committee on Supplies of the Council at those of

its meetings at which policies affecting the provision of supplies are discussed.

4. The Committee on Supplies of the Council shall consist of the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing those member governments likely to be principal suppliers of materials for relief and rehabilitation. The members shall be appointed by the Central Committee, with the approval of the Council if it be in session and otherwise subject to its ratification. It shall consider, formulate and recommend to the Central Committee and the Council policies designed to assure the provision of required supplies. The Central Committee shall from time to time meet with the Committee on Supplies to review policy matters affecting supplies.

5. The Committee of the Council for Europe shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments of territories within the European area, and such other members of the Council, representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the European area, as shall be appointed by the Central Committee, with the approval of the Council if it be in session and otherwise subject to its ratification. The Committee of the Council for the Far East shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments of territories within the Far Eastern area, and such other members of the Council representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the Far Eastern area as shall be appointed by the Central Committee, with the approval of the Council if it be in session and otherwise subject to the Council's ratification. The regional committees shall normally meet within their respective areas. They shall consider and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies with respect to relief and rehabilitation within their respective areas. The Committee of the Council for Europe shall replace the Inter-Allied Committee on European post-war relief established in London on September 24, 1941 and the records of the latter shall be made available to the Committee for Europe.

6. The Council shall establish such other standing regional committees as it shall consider desirable, the functions of such committees and the method of appointing their members being identical to that provided in paragraph 5 of this Article with respect to the Committees of the Council for Europe and for the Far East. The Council shall also establish such other standing committees as it considers desirable to advise it, and, in intervals between sessions of the Council, to advise the Central Committee. For such technical standing committees as may be established, in respect of particular problems such

as nutrition, health, agriculture, transport, repatriation, and finance, the members may be members of the Council or alternates nominated by them because of special competence in their respective fields of work. The members shall be appointed by the Central Committee, with the approval of the Council if it be in session and otherwise subject to its ratification. Should a regional committee so desire, subcommittees of the technical standing committees shall be established by the technical committees in consultation with the regional committees, to advise the regional committees.

7. The travel and other expenses of members of the Council and of members of its committees shall be borne by the governments which they represent.

8. All reports and recommendations of committees of the Council shall be transmitted to the Director General for distribution to the Council and the Central Committee by the secretariat of the Council established under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 4.

#### ARTICLE IV

##### *The Director General*

1. The executive authority of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shall be in the Director General, who shall be appointed by the Council on the nomination by unanimous vote of the Central Committee. The Director General may be removed by unanimous vote of the Central Committee.

2. The Director General shall have full power and authority for carrying out relief operations contemplated by Article I, paragraph 2(a), within the limits of available resources and the broad policies determined by the Council or its Central Committee. Immediately upon taking office he shall in conjunction with the military and other appropriate authorities of the United Nations prepare plans for the emergency relief of the civilian population in any area occupied by the armed forces of any of the United Nations, arrange for the procurement and assembly of the necessary supplies and create or select the emergency organization required for this purpose. In arranging for the procurement, transportation, and distribution of supplies and services, he and his representatives shall consult and collaborate with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations and shall, wherever practicable, use the facilities made available by such authorities. Foreign voluntary relief agencies may not engage in activity in any area receiving relief from the Administration without the consent and unless subject to the regulation of the Director General. The powers and duties of the Director General are subject to the limitations of Article VII.



3. The Director General shall also be responsible for the organization and direction of the functions contemplated by Article I, paragraphs 2(b) and 2(e).

4. The Director General shall appoint such Deputy Directors General, officers, expert personnel, and staff at his headquarters and elsewhere, including field missions, as he shall find necessary, and he may delegate to them such of his powers as he may deem appropriate. The Director General, or upon his authorization the Deputy Directors General, shall supply such secretariat and other staff and facilities as shall be required by the Council and its committees, including the regional committees and subcommittees. Such Deputy Directors General as shall be assigned special functions within a region shall attend meetings of the regional standing committee whenever possible and shall keep it advised on the progress of the relief and rehabilitation program within the region.

5. The Director General shall make periodic reports to the Central Committee and to the Council covering the progress of the Administration's activities. The reports shall be made public except for such portions as the Central Committee may consider it necessary, in the interest of the United Nations, to keep confidential. The Director General shall also arrange to have prepared periodic reports covering the activities of the Administration within each region and he shall transmit such reports with his comments thereon to the Council, the Central Committee and the respective regional committees.

#### ARTICLE V

##### *Supplies and Resources*

1. Each member government pledges its full support to the Administration, within the limits of its available resources and subject to the requirements of its constitutional procedure, through contributions of funds, materials, equipment, supplies and services, for use in its own, adjacent or other areas in need, in order to accomplish the purposes of Article I, paragraph 2(a). All such contributions received by the Administration shall be accounted for.

2. The supplies and resources made available by the member governments shall be kept in review in relation to prospective requirements by the Director General, who shall initiate action with the member governments with a view to assuring such additional supplies and resources as may be required.

3. All purchases by any of the member governments, made outside their own territories during the war for relief or rehabilitation purposes shall be made only after consultation with the Director General, and shall, so far as practicable, be carried out through the appropriate United Nations agency.

## ARTICLE VI

*Administrative Expenses*

The Director General shall submit to the Council an annual budget, and from time to time such supplementary budgets as may be required, covering the necessary administrative expenses of the Administration. Upon approval of a budget by the Council the total amount approved shall be allocated to the member governments in proportions to be determined by the Council. Each member government pledges itself, subject to the requirements of its constitutional procedure, to contribute to the Administration promptly its share of the administrative expenses so determined.

## ARTICLE VII

Notwithstanding any other provision herein contained, while hostilities or other military necessities exist in any area, the Administration and its Director General shall not undertake activities therein without the consent of the military command of that area, and unless subject to such control as the command may find necessary. The determination that such hostilities or military necessities exist in any area shall be made by its military commander.

## ARTICLE VIII

*Amendment*

The provisions of this agreement may be amended by unanimous vote of the Central Committee and two-thirds vote of the Council.

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840.50/1714

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Jebb<sup>42</sup> and Mr. Strang<sup>43</sup> of the British Foreign Office  
Mr. Acheson

Mr. Jebb and Mr. Strang called at Mr. Eden's<sup>44</sup> request. Mr. Eden spoke to me last night about his forthcoming visit to Ottawa, saying that he would doubtless have to take up the question of Canada's posi-

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<sup>42</sup> Hubert M. G. Jebb, Head of the Economic and Reconstruction Department of the British Foreign Office.

<sup>43</sup> William Strang, Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

<sup>44</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; for correspondence regarding Mr. Eden's visit to Washington during March 1943, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

tion in the relief organization, and asked me if I would review the situation with Mr. Jebb and Mr. Strang so that he might be sure that he had our views directly.

I reviewed with the two gentlemen the history of the discussions and the various attitudes taken from time to time by the British Government, as well as the attitude of the Russian and Chinese Governments. We went over the communications from the Canadian Government, with which they were in general familiar. A summary of the various points made is as follows:

1. Canada's position in the matter is based, as explained by her representatives, not primarily upon concern as to her material interests, but reflects her concern that upon the first international organization to be created in the economic field she should have a leading role, both because of the political importance in Canada and because it may form a pattern for future organizations.

So far as the first consideration is concerned, we have attempted to meet this by creating the Supplies Committee and are willing to assure Canada the leading role on this Committee. The Chairman of the Committee will sit with the Central Committee in all discussions of supplies. This virtually means all discussions. With skillful handling this can be shown to be, as it is in fact, a most important role accorded Canada.

So far as the second consideration is concerned, it seems extremely unlikely that the relief organization will furnish a pattern. An examination of the draft wheat agreement shows an entirely different organization, upon which Canada has a leading role. Various plans which have been discussed in the financial field indicate that the position in such an organization will reflect financial contribution. It therefore appears that international organizations are likely to be created *ad hoc* and the Canadian fear of the establishment of a pattern seems unfounded.

Mr. Jebb asked whether the relief organization could not also be created so as to give prominent position according to contribution. I said that this had been discussed when Sir Frederick Leith-Ross was here, and I felt that upon reflection he would see that such an organization would be even less acceptable to the small nations than the British feared that the present one would be. I also doubted whether the British Government would wish to propose such an organization. He acquiesced in both of these views.

Mr. Jebb also asked me whether we would be willing, if it appeared to be useful, to put in memorandum form our views that the relief organization would not furnish the pattern for future organizations along the lines outlined above. I said that I saw no reason why we could not do this, since it appeared to be clearly the fact. We would, of course, have to consider the request when it was made.

2. I then explained the difficulties of picking out the European country to be a member of the Central Committee upon the assumption that a larger number than four should be provided and also the possibility that the number could not be kept within any bounds hitherto mentioned.

3. I explained the importance which the Soviet and Chinese Governments attached to the smaller Central Committee and some of the reasons for this.

4. Mr. Jebb referred to the possibility of my going to Ottawa to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister. I said that this would have to be taken up with the Secretary, but that, before he was asked to decide the matter, I thought it would be most helpful to get a report from Mr. Jebb of Mr. Eden's talks in Ottawa. He said that he would arrange to give us this through Mr. Noel Hall.

5. I then stressed the great importance of obtaining general agreement upon the draft, since otherwise the institution of the relief organization might be indefinitely postponed and the furnishing of relief seriously prejudiced.

DEAN ACHESON

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840.50/1735

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1943.

The Australian Minister called at his request. He referred to a conversation which he had had with the Secretary on March 25, in the course of which he had transmitted to the Secretary a message from Dr. Evatt regarding Australia's position in regard to the proposed United Nations Relief Organization. He showed me the statements of Dr. Evatt which appeared in the Secretary's memorandum of conversation of March 25. They refer to Australia's "possible exclusion" from one of the primary positions on the administration and also to an alleged suggestion that the "executive" of the organization is to consist of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China. He told me that the Secretary had referred him to me on this matter.

I asked the Minister whether he had seen the proposed draft. He said that he had not, and that although the proposal had been circulated to the Dominions he had some question arising from Dr. Evatt's cable as to whether Dr. Evatt himself was familiar with its details. I then explained to the Minister the proposed organization, pointing out that the "executive" was not vested in any group of nations, but would be in the Director General, and that the whole conception of the executive was to exclude national considerations from

its organization and to have it in an individual who would have the confidence of all the United Nations and would be free to select his staff from the most qualified persons of all the nations. I then explained the composition of the Council and the three committees: the Central Committee, the Supplies Committee, and the Regional Committees, pointing out that Australia would be asked to play a most important part on the Supplies Committee, would obviously be a member of the Regional Committee for the Far East area, and would very probably be a member of the Committee for Europe.

The Minister said that my explanation of the organization left him in some doubt as to how to proceed. He did not know whether his Government thoroughly understood it, and he himself could well understand the reasons for the formulation of the proposal as it now stood. He added that Dr. Evatt was expected in Washington in the very near future. There was some doubt as to whether, if the Australian Parliament was nearing the end of its session, Dr. Evatt would delay his departure for a few days. However, he thought that the best course was to postpone consideration of the draft until Dr. Evatt arrived in Washington. I said that in any event our plans of procedure contemplated a circulation of the draft to all of the nations concerned and a consideration of it with them. He did not ask me to delay circulation if that seemed wise until Dr. Evatt's arrival, and appeared to believe that the Australian position would not present any insuperable obstacles.

DEAN ACHESON

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840.50/1820

*The Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation (Pearson) to the  
Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: With reference to our conversations concerning Canada and the proposed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, I think I should let you know at once (pending an official communication on the subject) that the Canadian Government yesterday discussed this matter and accepted the main constitutional provisions of the Draft Convention which you were good enough to show me unofficially the other day. Their acceptance is without prejudice to a number of observations on drafting points which will be sent forward when the draft is communicated to us officially. The Canadian Government's agreement has in large part been determined by their desire that international organization in this field should get under way as soon as possible.

I have been instructed to make it clear that Canadian acceptance of the proposed draft is on the understanding that the prospective

members of the Central Committee will use their best endeavours to secure the selection of a Canadian as Chairman of the Committee on Supplies on which the States represented on the Central Committee will themselves be members. At the same time, it should be understood that Canada's acceptance of these arrangements in the particular case of the Relief Administration does not indicate any withdrawal from the position the Canadian Government have taken that the four-Power pattern is not in principle an acceptable form of international organization, that representation on international bodies should whenever possible be determined on a functional basis, and that the proposed form of the Central Committee will not be regarded as a precedent in other connections.

Yours sincerely,

L. B. PEARSON

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840.50/1820

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 8, 1943.

Participants: Mr. L. B. Pearson, Minister Counselor of the Canadian  
Legation  
Mr. Noel Hall, British Minister  
Mr. Dean Acheson

Mr. Pearson and Mr. Hall called at Mr. Pearson's request. Mr. Pearson handed me the attached letter<sup>45</sup> and gave Mr. Hall a similar one.

He then inquired as to how the Canadian Government's attitude should be brought to the attention of the other two United Nations and as to how the points made in the letter should be officially recorded. I suggested to Mr. Pearson that the matter might be left for the time being in this way: At my next meeting with the three Ambassadors, which I hoped would take place shortly, we could read Mr. Pearson's letter and record it in the minutes of the meeting. The minutes could also record the understanding that the representatives of the four countries upon the central committee would use their best efforts to have the Canadian representative on the Supplies Committee designated as the Chairman. As to the other points made in Mr. Pearson's letter, the Canadian Government indicated that it wished to make certain observations when the draft agreement was officially communicated to it, and at that time it could mention the points referred to as well. Mr. Pearson said that such procedure would, he thought, be satisfactory; and I told him that I would report this suggestion to the Secretary for his decision.

DEAN ACHESON

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<sup>45</sup> *Supra.*

840.50/1825

*The Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation (Pearson) to the  
Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: May I refer to our discussion on April 8th concerning the association of Canada with the proposed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and my letter to you of that date on the same subject? You will recall that this letter informed you of the acceptance by the Canadian Government of the main constitutional provisions of the Draft Convention, on the understanding that their position in respect of certain matters arising out of the Convention could be accepted and suitably recorded by the Governments to be represented on the Central Committee of the proposed Administration.

In communicating to the Canadian Government the results of our conversation, I pointed out that you had mentioned a possible difficulty in formally recording these understandings now, arising out of the fact that all our previous correspondence and discussions concerning this matter in Washington had necessarily been informal, in view of the fact that the Draft Convention had not been circulated officially. Therefore, as you pointed out, any official Canadian communications to the State Department and to the other three Governments registering Canada's position and requiring formal replies would put on record the fact that we had been consulted and had worked out an arrangement about this matter before certain other countries concerned had had the same opportunity. I therefore suggested to Ottawa a procedure which you felt might be satisfactory, namely, that the State Department would call a meeting as soon as possible of the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and China and read to them my letter to you of April 8th. The minutes of this meeting would then record the agreement of the representatives of the four Governments on the points made by the Canadian Government as conditions to their acceptance of the Convention as now drafted. Later, when the Convention was officially circulated, the Canadian Government could, as part of the official observations which they will make thereon to the State Department, include the points which they have already made through the less formal procedure outlined above.

I have now heard from the Canadian authorities on this matter. They feel that they cannot ask the representatives of the four Powers on the Central Committee of U.N.R.R.A. to do more than note the views of the Canadian Government on the following two points: (a) that the four-Power pattern is not in principle an acceptable form of international organization, and (b) that representation on inter-

national bodies should, whenever possible, be determined on a functional basis. They hope, however, that in respect of the other two points, the agreement of the four Powers will not merely be recorded in the minutes of a meeting held to discuss this matter, but that this agreement might be conveyed in the name of those representatives by the State Department to the Canadian Government. These other two points are: (a) the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and China will use their best endeavours to secure the selection of a Canadian as Chairman of the proposed Committee on Supplies, and (b) they do not regard the proposed form of the Central Committee as a precedent in other connections.

It is hoped that, following the next four-Power meeting called to discuss this matter, these assurances could be conveyed in a memorandum from the State Department in reply to our memorandum of February 10th [9th]. This would close the matter promptly, without requiring the presentation of a formal note by the Canadian Government at this stage, and would avoid procedural difficulties which might arise if the necessary assurances were conveyed to the Canadian Government as part of a formal reply to Canadian official observations on the Draft Convention.

Another possible procedure would be that, when the draft is formally circulated by the Department of State to the United Nations, a covering letter sent therewith to Canada might note the Canadian views on the first two points referred to above and record the agreement of the four Governments on the other two.

Yours sincerely,

L. B. PEARSON

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[Copies of the draft agreement of March 25, 1943, and an explanatory memorandum (not printed), were transmitted on April 17 and April 21 by the Secretary of State for the information of chiefs of mission accredited to Governments comprising the United Nations and to Governments of the following nations associated with the United Nations in the war: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Iceland, Iran, Liberia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.]

840.50/1852

*The Chinese Ambassador (Wei) to the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. ACHESON: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 7, 1943,<sup>46</sup> enclosing the minutes of the discussion held on March 24, 1943 at your office on the draft of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation agreement.

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<sup>46</sup> Not printed.



It was agreed that when the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China are in a position to accept the proposal made by you for the appointment of a British and a Soviet Deputy Director General, the Minutes of the discussion on this point shall include the following statement:

"There was full agreement and understanding that when Deputy Directors General are appointed for the European region, under the powers placed with the Director General by Article IV, paragraph 4, there shall be included a Deputy Director General of Soviet nationality and a Deputy Director General of British nationality. It was also understood that in addition to such Deputies there might be other Deputies appointed for the European region including one of United States nationality."

I wish now to suggest on behalf of my Government the addition of the following statement:

"There was full agreement and understanding that when Deputy Directors General are appointed for the Asiatic region, under the powers placed with the Director General by Article IV, paragraph 4, there shall be included a Deputy Director General of Chinese nationality. It was also understood that in addition to such Deputy Director General there might be other Deputies appointed for the Asiatic region, including one of United States nationality."

I shall be greatly obliged if you will be good enough to bring it up for discussion in the next meeting.

I am [etc.]

WEI TAO-MING

840.50/1899c

*Memorandum of Discussion in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), May 4, 1943*<sup>47</sup>

The British Ambassador, the Soviet Ambassador, and the Chinese Ambassador met with Mr. Acheson to discuss further the Draft Agreement for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Mr. Liu Chieh, Minister and Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, Mr. Guy Thorold, First Secretary of the British Embassy, and Mr. Roy Veatch of the Department of State also were present.

The following is a résumé of the ensuing discussion :

1. Proposals with respect to the nationality of Deputy Directors General assigned to the European and Far Eastern regions.

Mr. Acheson first distributed copies of a letter of April 23, 1943 from Ambassador Wei to Mr. Acheson proposing an agreement with respect to the appointment of a Deputy Director General of Chinese na-

<sup>47</sup> Copies of this memorandum were transmitted to the British, Chinese, and Soviet Ambassadors on May 7. In the letter of transmittal the approval of the Department was expressed with respect to the suggested changes in article II and the Preamble, and the wording of article IX.

tionality for the Far Eastern region similar to the proposed arrangement for the appointment of Deputy Directors General of British and Soviet nationality when Deputies are appointed for the European region.

Mr. Acheson then said that the whole problem had been discussed with the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department of State and that the following alternative statement had been drafted for the consideration of representatives of the other three Powers:

"It was agreed that because of the interest and responsibility of the governments represented on the Central Committee in the work of the Administration, it would be natural and desirable that in the appointment of Deputy Directors General nationals of these countries would be included in their number. When Deputies are assigned responsibilities and duties in connection with the Administration's work in the European region and in the Far Eastern region, it is anticipated that among their number would be included those who are nationals of those countries represented on the Central Committee which lie within those respective regions. Other Deputies might be similarly engaged or might work on matters of a more general nature. While recognizing that all such appointments and assignments were the function of the Director General, the Powers engaged in these discussions were agreed in recommending to him such arrangements and in using their best efforts in helping to establish them."

Mr. Acheson explained that he had borrowed some of the wording originally proposed by Ambassador Litvinov and had made an attempt to draft a statement in a form which would meet the Chinese point of view as well as that of the Soviet Government.

Ambassador Litvinov asked if it might be possible to have all of the Deputy Directors General mentioned in this statement appointed subject to the unanimous approval of the Central Committee since the Director General himself must be nominated by unanimous vote of the Central Committee.

In reply Mr. Acheson referred to the discussion on March 24 when it was decided to drop that arrangement and to cover the matter by a statement in the minutes setting forth the position of the four Powers. He said that under the wording which he now suggested, the Minutes would provide for a recommendation to the Director General on behalf of the four Powers, but not formally through the Central Committee. He assumed that the Director General would quite naturally consult with the Governments involved with respect to the qualifications of the individuals whom he might wish to appoint under this arrangement.

Lord Halifax said that if he understood the proposal properly, it was not a bad compromise between (a) complete authority and independence on the part of the Director General in choosing his staff and (b) recognition of the importance of inclusion of nationals of the Powers represented on the Central Committee in the appoint-

ment of regional Deputies. He said that his Government had been opposed to any arrangement based on the latter consideration, but he said that he could now accept the proposal put forward by Mr. Acheson.

Ambassador Litvinov and Ambassador Wei said that the formula proposed by Mr. Acheson was quite satisfactory and that they could accept it without any further reference to their Governments.

## 2. Chairmanship of the Committee on Supplies of the Council.

Mr. Acheson referred to the discussion in his office in which representatives of the three Ambassadors participated, on April 12,<sup>48</sup> with respect to the chairmanship of the Committee on Supplies. The three Ambassadors said that they had been authorized to join with Mr. Acheson in the statement proposed at that time, namely that the four Powers will use their best endeavors to secure the selection of a Canadian as chairman of the Committee on Supplies.

## 3. Signature of the Draft Agreement and attendance at the proposed conference.

*a.* All of those present said they were now in a position to accept, for their Governments, the change in the second paragraph of the Preamble suggested by Mr. Acheson on April 12, thus opening up signature of the Agreement to Nations associated with the United Nations in this war. It was also agreed that the Draft Agreement should be placed before the United Nations, now including Bolivia, and the eleven Nations associated with them in the war (Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Egypt, Iceland, Iran, and Liberia) and that all of these should be invited to attend the proposed conference and to sign the Agreement.

*b.* Mr. Acheson explained that a question had arisen regarding the relationship of French participation in the conference and in signature of the Agreement to the wording of Article II and the Preamble. He recognized the desirability of participation by an acceptable French authority and the necessity of reinserting the words "or authorities" in Article II, with reference to signature of the Agreement, and a similar modification of the Preamble if the way were to be open for signature of such authority. He suggested, however, that such a provision should be left out of the Agreement at the present time with the understanding that these changes could be inserted in the Agreement, before the date of signature, if the French National Committee and the French Civil and Military Commander in Chief in North Africa should reach agreement on a single authority which would be acceptable to the four Powers for this purpose.

Lord Halifax said that he would raise no objection to Mr. Acheson's suggestion on the understanding that the Minutes would show that

<sup>48</sup> Memorandum of discussion not printed.

the four Governments would favor the necessary modification of the Draft Agreement so as to make possible French signature of the Agreement as soon as the desirable single French authority should be established. He suggested further, however, that the understanding in the Minutes should cover the following three points which had already been discussed by Mr. Thorold and Mr. Veatch:

*a.* That if the French National Committee and the French Commander in Chief in North Africa can agree upon a common delegation, such delegation will be invited to participate in the conference.

*b.* That if prior to the signature of the Agreement these two have established a satisfactory joint authority, the Agreement will be amended to make it possible for such authority to be a signatory thereto.

*c.* That if a satisfactory joint authority is established after signature of the Agreement and not before then, such authority will be admitted to membership under the terms of Article II (through action of the Central Committee if not the Council).

Ambassador Litvinov said that he had no objection in principle to the proposed agreement but that he would have to cable his Government for instructions before he could indicate his Government's agreement. He said that his Government now has diplomatic relations with only one of these groups, the French National Committee, and that he has no instructions covering relations with both or with some joint authority established by the two. In response to a question, he said that he was not informed that his Government had taken any action with respect to joint representation of the two French groups at the scheduled United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture<sup>49</sup>—he recognized, however, that the matter might have been taken up with his Government in some form during his visit to Cuba.

Lord Halifax said that his Government took the position that the question of French Representation and the provisions of the Agreement with respect to signature were all bound together and that he was not in a position to agree at the moment to omitting the words "or authorities" from Article II, with reference to signature of the Agreement, unless he was satisfied that the four Powers were in agreement on a method of handling the question of French participation.

Ambassador Litvinov asked, therefore, whether it would be possible to include the term "or authorities" in Article II, with reference to signature of the Agreement, and then proceed to settle the French question separately. He said that he would prefer that procedure.

Mr. Acheson said that he thought the arrangement suggested by Lord Halifax would be satisfactory to his Government and that Ambassador Litvinov's suggestion also would be satisfactory if the Minutes would show that an authority representing the French must be

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<sup>49</sup> See pp. 820 ff.

acceptable to the four Powers before it would be invited to sign the Agreement.

Lord Halifax pointed out that a specific statement in the Draft that authorities as well as governments might sign the Agreement would cover the possibility of French signature and would be satisfactory to his Government. On the other hand, if the four Governments are not in a position now to make the kind of statement suggested by Mr. Acheson (covering modification of the Agreement later so as to make it possible for a French authority to sign), it still might be possible for him to agree to omitting the words "or authorities", with respect to signature of the Agreement, in the present Draft, if the Department of State would inform the French that arrangements would be made for French signature of the Agreement if a joint authority could be established which would be satisfactory to the four Powers for this purpose.

Ambassador Litvinov expressed the opinion that the Department of State could make such a statement on its own behalf for he could say now, without the necessity of securing further instructions from his Government, that the Soviet Government would not expect signature of the Agreement by any French authority if such authority should not be acceptable to any one of the other three Powers.

After further discussion, it was suggested that the term "authorities" be included in both Article II and the Preamble of the present Draft Agreement, with reference to signature of the Agreement, on the understanding that no authority should be invited to sign the Agreement unless such authority should be acceptable for this purpose to all of the four Governments participating in these discussions.

The British, Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors said that that formula was acceptable to them. Mr. Acheson felt, however, that he must clear with the Department of State before he would be in a position to agree fully with the proposal. He added that in the event that this formula should not be acceptable to the Department, then it would seem to be necessary to ask Ambassador Litvinov to secure instructions from his Government so that the Minutes might cover the agreement of the four Powers on the three points suggested by Lord Halifax with respect to the manner in which French participation would be made possible later.

#### 4. Time at which Agreement will enter into force.

Ambassador Litvinov expressed the opinion that the text of the Agreement should include a definite provision for the entry into force of the Agreement. He referred to a draft provision covering this point which had been included in the earliest draft last summer but which had been dropped in subsequent drafts. That draft provided that the Agreement should enter into force provisionally upon signature and finally for each signatory when it had made the necessary arrange-

ments for compliance with its own applicable constitutional provisions.

Mr. Acheson said that the provision to which reference was made had been dropped from the Draft last August because it was thought that the rest of the Draft had been so worded as to make it possible for the Agreement to enter into force immediately upon signature. He said that he would be quite willing, however, to include a specific provision to this effect in the Draft if that was considered desirable.

Ambassador Litvinov said that in the case of the Soviet Government ratification of a signed agreement is necessary before that Government is bound by its provisions. It would be impossible, therefore, for a representative of the Soviet Government to sign an agreement which specified that its terms would enter into force immediately upon signature.

After discussion it was agreed that the following should be added to the present text of the Draft Agreement as Article IX, subject only to drafting changes which Mr. Acheson might find advisable after consultation with the Legal Adviser of the Department of State:

“This Agreement shall enter into force with respect to each signatory on the date when the Agreement is signed by the signatory, unless otherwise specified by such signatory.”

##### 5. Final agreement with respect to the text of the Draft Agreement.

For the purposes of the record, it was stated that all four Governments are in agreement on the changes in the Draft Agreement proposed by Mr. Acheson in the course of the discussion on March 24.

It was agreed that the Minutes of the present discussion should show that all four Powers are in complete agreement on the text of the Draft as it now stands (subject only to clearance by Mr. Acheson within the Department of State on the wording of Article II and the Preamble with respect to signature of the Agreement, and the final wording of Article IX) and that the United States Government is therefore now in a position to state to the other United Nations and Associated Nations that there is such agreement on this Draft as a desirable basis for establishing the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

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[By a circular telegram dated May 21, 1943, 9 p. m., and by airgrams dated May 21, 1943, the chiefs of mission accredited to the Governments comprising the United Nations and the Governments associated with the United Nations in the war were informed of revisions that had been made in the draft agreement and were instructed to make necessary corrections in the copies of the agreement transmitted on April 17 and April 21.]

[Copies of the draft agreement and explanatory memorandum were transmitted by the Secretary of State on May 27, 1943, to the Consul General at Algiers for the information and attention of the Civil Administrator. One set was to be available for presentation, on further instructions, to General Giraud and another set for presentation to General de Gaulle in the event he was in Algiers on date of presentation.]

840.50/2058:

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Chinese Ambassador (Wei)*<sup>50</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am pleased to be able to inform you that the draft agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration will be presented to the Governments of the United Nations and of the Nations associated with them in this war, and also to the French Committee of National Liberation, during the morning of Thursday, June 10; they will also be given copies of an explanatory memorandum relating to the draft agreement. The presentation will be made by the American Missions near these Governments. At the same time, the representatives in Washington of these Governments will be given copies of the note being presented to their Governments, for their information, together with copies of the draft agreement and of the accompanying memorandum.

In view of the certainty of wide interest in this subject in the press of many countries, it has seemed wise and necessary to forestall speculation by releasing the actual text of the agreement to the press. Arrangements have been made, therefore, to release the text of the draft agreement at 9 p. m. Thursday, June 10, so that it may be published in the Friday morning papers.<sup>51</sup> The press will be given a brief release concerning the subject and it will be furnished also copies of the explanatory memorandum and of two other brief memoranda for background purposes only, these three memoranda not to be attributed to the Department of State by the press.

I enclose for the information of your Government a copy of the note being handed to the representatives in Washington of the Governments of the United Nations and of the Nations associated with them in this war<sup>52</sup> (this note carrying the text of the note being presented directly to those Governments), a copy of the explanatory memorandum relating to the draft agreement,<sup>53</sup> a copy of the press release,<sup>54</sup> and copies of the two additional memoranda being handed

<sup>50</sup> The same on the same date to the British Ambassador and the Soviet Chargé.

<sup>51</sup> Published in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1943, p. 524.

<sup>52</sup> Notes dated June 9, not printed.

<sup>53</sup> Not printed.

<sup>54</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1943, p. 523.

to the press for background purposes.<sup>54a</sup> Copies of these materials are enclosed also for your files.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

840.50/2034b : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives*<sup>55</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1943—2 p. m.

Reference Department's circular telegram May 21, 9 p. m.<sup>56</sup> The following is the text of the note to be used in presenting the draft agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the explanatory memorandum to the governments concerned:<sup>57</sup>

"Acting on the instructions of my Government, I have the honor to transmit to you herewith for the consideration of your Government a draft agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, together with an explanatory memorandum relating thereto.

I know that your Government has been giving attention to the problems of relief and rehabilitation which will exist after the war and in war-torn areas as they are liberated from the control of the enemy even before the termination of hostilities. My Government will be happy to collaborate with the Government of . . . . . in developing plans for joint action by the United Nations and the other Nations associated with them in this war in meeting these vast and challenging problems.

In order to secure a basis for general discussion of the subject, my Government has been engaged in informal discussions with the British Government, the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government; the enclosed draft meets with the approval of those Governments. This draft is being brought to the attention of all of the United Nations and of the Nations associated with them in this war. It is also being placed before the appropriate French authorities.

The representative of your Government in Washington is being informed regarding the substance of this note and he is being told that the Secretary of State and the other officers of the Department of State dealing with this subject will hold themselves in readiness to discuss with him any questions or suggestions which your Government may wish to present.

<sup>54a</sup> Not printed.

<sup>55</sup> Sent to the chiefs of mission accredited to the Governments comprising the United Nations (except China, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and to the Governments associated with them (except Liberia); also to the Consul General at Algiers. Sent as telegram No. 55, June 9, 1 p. m., to the Mission in Liberia. The Consulate at Asmara having been closed, it was impossible to communicate with the Ethiopian Government; the documents were therefore handed to the Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance, who was in the United States to attend the conference at Hot Springs, Va.

<sup>56</sup> See bracketed note, p. 907.

<sup>57</sup> Memorandum not printed. By a circular telegram dated June 9, 4 p. m., the chiefs of mission were instructed to make the presentation early Thursday, June 10. Separate telegrams with similar instructions were sent as No. 56, June 9, 2 p. m., to the Mission in Liberia, and as No. 1095, June 9, 5 p. m., to the Consul General at Algiers.



In order to forestall speculation as to the terms of the proposal, arising out of the wide public interest in the matter in many countries, the text of the draft agreement will be released to the Press for publication after 9 o'clock p. m. Washington time on the day on which it is being placed before the Governments; the explanatory memorandum will be given to the Press for background purposes at the same time. In making this release to the Press my Government will make it clear that the draft agreement is tentative and that no action will be proposed until all of the governments concerned have had an opportunity for full consideration and discussion of the proposal. The Government of . . . . . will feel free, of course, to release the text or to discuss the actual terms of the draft agreement with the Press at any time after the time set for the release in Washington.

In view of the tremendous scope of the problems of relief and rehabilitation which will face our Nations and of the possibility that large-scale assistance will be required for civilians who may be freed from Axis domination in the near future, action by the United Nations and the Nations associated with them is of the utmost importance. It is the hope of the Government of the United States, therefore, that your Government will be in a position shortly to join with the United States and the other Nations in definitive action on this matter."

HULL

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840.50/2098 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 11, 1943—9 p. m.  
[Received June 12—1:04 a. m.]

1083. From Murphy.<sup>58</sup> Your 1095, June 9, 5 p. m.<sup>59</sup> and circular of June 9 were delayed in transmission and received too late for action June 10.

The text of the note if transmitted to the French Committee of National Liberation even with modifications would be construed here as constituting an act of recognition on part of United States Government. On the other hand, it is obviously impossible to present it to the "Government of Algeria".

Inasmuch as a copy of the note has apparently already been given to the representatives of the Committee in Washington, I have hesitated to make any changes here before being instructed as to the form in which the note was given to Hoppenot and Baudet.<sup>60</sup>

Please instruct urgently. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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<sup>58</sup> Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser, Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre; also Personal Representative of the President in North Africa with rank of Minister.

<sup>59</sup> See footnote 57, p. 909.

<sup>60</sup> Members of the delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation at Washington.

840.50/1825

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Minister Counselor  
of the Canadian Legation (Pearson)*

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1943.

DEAR MR. PEARSON: I am now in a position to reply to your letter of April 13, 1943 and to give you information which I hope will meet fully the concern of your Government with respect to the draft agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

At a meeting of the representatives of the British Government, the Soviet Government, and the Chinese Government and this Government on April 12, 1943, I read for the information of those present the text of your letter of April 8. All of those present expressed their gratification at the willingness of the Canadian Government to cooperate with the plan set forth in the draft agreement. At the same time they took cognizance of the statement that Canadian acceptance of the proposed plan is based on the following points of understanding: (a) that the prospective members of the Central Committee will use their best endeavors to secure the selection of a Canadian as chairman of the Committee on Supplies; (b) that in the view of the Canadian Government the four-Power pattern is not in principle an acceptable form of international organization; (c) that in its view representation on international bodies should whenever possible be determined on a functional basis; and (d) that the Canadian Government does not regard the proposed form of the Central Committee as a precedent in other connections.

As you point out in your letter of April 13, there seems to be no need for comment on points (b) and (c) as listed above. With regard to point (d) I believe I can say that there has been nothing in the discussions of the representatives of the four Powers to indicate that any of those Powers take the position that the form of organization proposed in the draft agreement for a relief and rehabilitation administration would in any sense set a precedent for the form of any other international organization. With respect to point (a) I can say that the representatives of the other three Governments have been empowered to join with me in stating that the four Powers will use their best endeavors to secure the selection of a Canadian as chairman of the Committee on Supplies of the Council.

In view of the statements made above I suppose that this communication can be considered as a satisfactory conclusion of the discussion of these matters that has taken place between your Government and my Government, and that no further response is required on the part of the Department of State to the Canadian Legation's memorandum

of February 9, 1943 which you placed before the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, on February 10.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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840.50/2056a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1943—9 p. m.

1123. For Murphy. Your 1083, June 11. You should not present the note until the organization of the Committee has progressed to a more definitive stage and we have established formal relations with it. The Department sees no objection, however, to your making available to the appropriate French officials, on a purely informal basis, copies of the draft agreement and explanatory memorandum and to your communicating to them orally the gist of the circular note which has been transmitted to the interested governments. They may then be in a position to present their views on the proposal as soon as the organization of the Committee has reached a point at which we can deal with it officially.

The documents have already been transmitted to the representatives of the Committee in Washington, appropriate minor modifications having been made in the text of the note. These representatives are now being informed of the procedure which you are being requested to follow in Algiers.

HULL

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840.50/2209

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] June 14, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Mohammed Shayesteh, Minister of Iran  
Mr. Acheson  
Mr. Veatch

The Minister said that the principal purpose of his visit was to inquire regarding the seeming limitation of the scope of operations of the proposed organization, by the wording of the Preamble, to territory which had been occupied by the enemy. He said that the economy of Iran and the welfare of the Iranians was being seriously affected by the war and that, speaking for himself without instructions from his Government, he would like to urge that the wording of the agreement be so revised as to make it possible for the new organization to extend aid to such territories. He thought that similar need for assistance

might arise in territories which are now neutral, such as Turkey or in other areas which have not been occupied by the enemy.

Mr. Acheson explained that the Preamble was not intended to limit the activities of the organization to areas occupied by the enemy. The purpose of this wording was to make it clear that the organization was not intended to send food or other assistance into territories still occupied by the enemy. He pointed out then that Article I provides that the purpose of the organization is to extend assistance to the victims of war, in territory under the control of the United Nations, this limitation again making it clear that assistance was not to be extended behind the enemy lines. He said that the emphasis should be placed upon the victims of war, wherever they might be found outside of enemy occupied territory. For instance, the bombing of an area, even a neutral area, by the enemy would create needs which the organization would be expected to meet since the people suffering from such bombing would be victims of war. On the other hand, the new organization would not be expected to extend assistance to any other area in the world merely because it is not now as prosperous as formerly on account of the war.

The Minister said that in his opinion Iran has suffered greatly from the war operations. He pointed out that Iran is occupied by the United Nations forces, not by the Axis, that it has been called upon to supply great amounts of food and other materials, that its transportation facilities, its factories and its manpower have been mobilized for the Allied war effort, that inflation has resulted, and that the Iranians are in need of many things because of the shortage created by these military demands. He said that his country had not been bombed but that he did feel that they had suffered from the war and that if possible the draft agreement should be so worded as to allow the new organization to extend assistance to it.

Mr. Acheson explained that there are existing organizations in a position to extend assistance in situations such as those described by the Minister and that in the case of Iran assistance is actually being extended by the Lend-Lease Administration, by the financial advisers under the direction of Dr. Millspaugh, and by other means. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration would not be the principal organization to deal with such problems.

The Minister thanked Mr. Acheson for this explanation and said that he would like to check his understanding of what Mr. Acheson had said. He interpreted Mr. Acheson's statements to mean that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration would not be in a position to extend assistance to his country so long as Iran was not directly hit by the war.

Mr. Acheson said that he had not intended to make a legalistic or rigid statement in response to the Minister's question. Some unfore-

seen disaster might occur in Iran or similar areas as a result of the war which would require assistance of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—for instance an epidemic might develop and it should be handled by UNRRA. He explained, however, that the new United Nations relief organization should not be brought into a situation unless it was actually needed, that is unless other organizations were not able to extend the needed assistance. On the other hand there was nothing in the charter of the organization to prevent it from going into new areas outside of territory controlled by the enemy. The emphasis on liberated areas in the Preamble was designed partly for the purpose of emphasizing the most immediate and pressing job, namely assistance to those areas most directly affected by the war, but it did not exclude the possibility of operations in other areas.

The Minister said he appreciated this clarification of the situation.

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840.50 UNRRA/6-1643

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch, of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1943.

Mr. Hall called to inform the Department regarding reactions he has received from the Washington representatives of six of the European Allied Governments who have come to him to discuss certain phases of the draft agreement. He says that these representatives have spoken, of course, without definite instructions from their governments but he believes their remarks mirror the opinions voiced by the governments in London in their discussion of the matter preliminary to making specific replies to this Government. He says that he gained the definite impression also that the European Allied Governments are conferring together regarding the matter.

Mr. Hall referred again to the lack of understanding of these governments of the role of the Director General and his international staff, and of their lessened concern over the composition of the Central Committee once they understand that that Committee will not perform executive or administrative functions. He said that there were some other concerns expressed by the representatives of these governments which could be dissipated by a better understanding of the proposal. Out of his various discussions has come one point of substance, however, which he thought might be of some importance and which should come to the attention of the Department.

This point of substance is the concern of the European Allied Governments over the procedure provided in the draft agreement for the calling of the Council in special session by action of a majority of its

members. These governments apparently feel that the requirement of action by a majority of all the members of the Council puts an unnecessary and undesirable difficulty in the way of bringing the Council into special session if members of the Council feel that that is necessary or desirable. They point out that this arrangement would in effect require an advance vote on the matter to be brought before the special Council meeting. They would much prefer a provision for bringing the Council into special session by request of only a quarter or one-third of the total members.

Mr. Hall expressed the opinion that there was a good deal of logic to support this point of view and that it would be desirable for the four Powers to yield on this point. Mr. Veatch agreed to place the matter before Mr. Acheson<sup>61</sup> and to inform Mr. Hall of his reaction. Mr. Hall said that he would particularly wish to know if this Government saw any strong argument against the proposed change in the draft—he would wish to discourage the idea if it should be discouraged.

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840.50/2137

*The Netherlands Ambassador (London) to the Secretary of State*

GA-1949

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1943.

SIR: 1. The Netherlands Government wholeheartedly welcomes the initiative taken by the United States Government to proceed with the creation of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. It is sincerely convinced that measures for the populations who now suffer under enemy occupation require speedy and intensive preparations if they are to relieve the great suffering of hundreds of millions.

The draft which was annexed to Your Excellency's note of June 9, 1943 gives rise to the following observations, it being understood that the Netherlands Government desires to limit its remarks as much as possible in the interest of an early establishment of the proposed organization.

2. In the opinion of the Netherlands Government, the composition of the Central Committee is too exclusive and too restricted. The only members are the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the U.S.S.R. The Netherlands, however friendly and cordial their relations with both China and the U.S.S.R., differ from either so widely in such pertinent matters as national economy and general ways of life, that they have some doubt as to whether their interests would be fully understood by these States. And in so far as the

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<sup>61</sup> Marginal note by Mr. Acheson reads: "I see no great objection but would like some analysis made of how many countries & what ones would be able & likely to call meetings."

United States and United Kingdom are concerned, the Netherlands, having no special ties with either of the nature of those existing between the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth, or between the United Kingdom and the British Dominions and Colonies, are not even indirectly represented in the Central Committee.

In this connection it seems worth mentioning that there is a striking disparity between the situation in the Far East (where all the United Nations having territories in that region are represented on the Committee with the sole exception of the Kingdom of the Netherlands), and in Europe (where not one of the continental United Nations is represented with the sole exception of the U.S.S.R.).

Moreover it should be remembered that the organization to be established is one in which (a) occupied countries in need of relief and rehabilitation and (b) purveyor countries are the chief elements. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom are occupied countries, and it is certain that the population of the Netherlands Kingdom, both in Europe and in Asia, will seriously doubt whether their needs, hopes and wishes will find full understanding in the Central Committee as planned in the draft. As the liberation of countries now occupied proceeds, this consideration will make itself felt increasingly: their inhabitants will then more than ever want to be able to voice their interests by adequate means. On the supply-side it should be remembered that, great as the quantities of relief-material may be which are to come from the United States and the British Empire for which the United Kingdom can act as a spokesman, much will no doubt be derived from other countries.

The Netherlands Government feels that in the interest of the successful operation of the scheme these considerations cannot be disregarded to the extent to which this is done in the draft under discussion without offering excellent propaganda material to the Axis nations, who will at once start a campaign saying to the smaller countries in all parts of the world that a United Nations victory would mean that the notorious "*chez vous, sur vous, sans vous*"-principle of the Peace of Utrecht is being revived by the four greatest among them.

Furthermore, it can hardly be gainsaid that the composition of the Central Committee as suggested in the draft is not in accordance with democratic principles. It would not satisfy the Netherlands people to know that they may expect to be invited if and when their interests are at stake. Between them the nations who according to the draft would not be members of the Central Committee, number a great many millions of people whose interests, being involved all the time, would seem to require more adequate protection than is laid down in the draft. The Netherlands Government alone speaks for 70,000,000 people.

Finally, the Netherlands Government takes exception to the present proposal as a precedent. If this precedent were to be followed in organizations of the United Nations in other fields, it would mean the end of democratic development in the international community. It may be argued that the proposal as it stands was arrived at with some difficulty. But it is represented that it was arrived at without the foreknowledge of the Netherlands Government who can hardly be expected to accept it because this is a question of some difficulty. Everyone is agreed that the democratic way is rarely the easy way, but the Netherlands Government feels very strongly that this is no reason for abandoning it.

It should perhaps be made quite clear that the Netherlands Government, although prepared to serve on the Committee, is not asking to be a member thereof. What it is anxious to see is that the smaller nations, both occupied countries and purveyor countries, should be adequately represented. This could be done, for instance, by giving two or three of these countries a seat on the Central Committee, to serve for a limited time under a system of rotation. It should not be too difficult to devise such a system, the rotation to be determined by the Council or even by the Central Committee itself, and each nation serving for one year as apart from the four largest countries who would have a permanent seat. The Netherlands Government would even go so far as to accept that decisions be taken in the Committee by a majority vote if, once the more proper representation of all nations having been admitted, this were preferred to unanimous decisions.

3. The Netherlands Government has noted with satisfaction the last sentence of Article III, paragraph 3, of the Draft Agreement. It should like to see an addition inserted, to the effect that this sentence means that any representative invited shall take part in the deliberations and vote on the same basis as the other members of the Central Committee. If this would seem to be self-evident, an assurance to that effect would of course suffice.

4. In paragraph 2*a* of Article I of the Draft Agreement, it is stated:

“The form of activities of the Administration within the territory of a member government wherein that government exercises administrative authority and *the responsibility to be assumed by the member government for carrying out measures planned by the Administration therein* shall be determined after consultation with and with the consent of the member government.”

It would seem to the Netherlands Government that, as a matter of course, in all cases where there is a government which exercises executive authority over its own territory, such government should always be responsible for the execution of relief measures in so far as the continuance of military operations does not require other arrange-



ments, and that therefore the words underlined above<sup>62</sup> should be deleted.

5. In Article III, paragraph 4, it is proposed that the Committee on Supplies of the Council shall consist of the members of the Council representing those governments likely to be principal suppliers of relief and rehabilitation. In this way the consumer is not represented on this body. This unilateral composition of the Council on Supplies is not in harmony with recent and highly desirable trends in the field of necessary collaboration between producers and consumers as evidenced, for instance, at the Food Conference recently held at Hot Springs, and the Netherlands Government considers that provision should be made for the inclusion of representatives of consumer countries.

6. In case it is proposed to subject the Draft to textual revision, the Netherlands Government has a few suggestions to offer in the interest of clarification which are set forth in the annex to this note.

7. The Netherlands Government expresses the hope that the various suggestions made in the preceding paragraphs will receive favorable consideration on the part of the government of the United States of America and the other governments concerned. These suggestions have been inspired solely by the desire to give a healthy basis to the planned organization, in accordance with democratic principles and with what the Netherlands Government considers to be sound conceptions in the field of international collaboration.

Please accept [etc.]

A. LOUDON

#### ANNEX

The Netherlands Government would like to mention the following points which could be examined in case the Draft Agreement is subjected to a textual revision.

1. The Netherlands Government takes it for granted that countries or territories which are now occupied by the enemy and which are, when liberated, in a position to supply goods for the general relief and rehabilitation, shall in due time be represented on the Committee of Supplies.

2. In creating regional councils for Europe and for the Far East (Article III, paragraph 5) it might be desirable, with a view to obtaining rapid and efficient action, for certain powers of the Council and/or the Central Committee to be vested in these regional councils, especially in cases where the urgency of the situation would not permit full-scale consultation between the various relief agencies.

3. Article V, paragraph 3, would be clearer if instead of making "purchases made" dependent on consultation with the Director General, it read "purchases to be made."

<sup>62</sup> Printed in italics.

4. It is suggested, in the preamble, to add, after the words "United Nations", the words "or as a consequence of the retreat of the enemy", in order to put beyond a doubt that liberated territories shall have the same priority as reconquered territories.

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840.50/2177a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1943—10 p. m.

3993. For Winant and Biddle<sup>63</sup> from Acheson and Lehman. M. Gut,<sup>64</sup> Baron Boel<sup>65</sup> and M. Lychowski<sup>66</sup> are on the way to London by plane and expect to confer with officials of the European Allied Governments before the end of the week regarding provisions of the draft agreement on relief and rehabilitation. Baron Boel and Lychowski have had extensive discussions on this subject in the Department and memoranda of these conversations are being sent to you airmail tomorrow.<sup>67</sup>

The following summarizes briefly some of the main points placed before these gentlemen as interpretations of phases of the draft plan which were viewed most critically by them.

1. It is not anticipated that the Central Committee will control the organization or play the major part in determining its policies. The Council is the primary policy-making body. It is not conceivable that the Central Committee would enter into a trial of strength with the Council by reversing any policies established by the Council. The Central Committee's function will be primarily that of a steering and nominating committee, for purposes of expediting business, and of an emergency policy committee available to the Director General whenever unexpected developments create the need for some immediate backing for him.

2. The Director General will have responsibility and authority for operations and administration. The Central Committee is in no sense an executive committee. The Director General will have much the same position in this organization that the President has in the United States Government.

3. The Regional committees and the Supply Committee, and to a lesser degree the standing technical committees, will be the working committees of the Council which in collaboration with the Director General will assemble the necessary information and pursue the de-

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<sup>63</sup> Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., Ambassador near the Governments at London of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

<sup>64</sup> Minister of Finance and Minister of Economics of the Belgian Government at London.

<sup>65</sup> Financial Adviser to the Belgian Government.

<sup>66</sup> Chief of the Economic Section of the Polish Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Shipping at London.

<sup>67</sup> Not printed.

tailed studies required as a basis for wise policy decisions by the Council. They will have much the same relationship as committees of the House of Representatives or the Senate have to the Houses of Congress here.

4. The Director General will have full authority and responsibility for choosing all of his staff, including the Deputy Directors General, and the agreement does not require him to consult with or follow the advice of anyone else. He will of course seek knowledge and advice from all those who can be helpful. He will seek the most competent and able administrators and specialists wherever they may be found and he will have constantly in mind the desirability of securing staff members of many nationalities.

5. The Department has been greatly concerned to learn from the Polish Ambassador that he understood from alleged statements made here and in London that food will be used as a political weapon, and relief be administered with political objectives in view. Every effort is to be made to correct this impression, for this Government has and will have every intention of preventing the distribution and administration of relief and rehabilitation for any other purpose than impartial assistance to those in need. The phrase "food is a weapon" has been used only with respect to prosecution of the war and no American official has intended to give the impression that food would be used as a political weapon.

Within your discretion you may emphasize the position set forth above and in the memoranda being transmitted to you by airmail, whenever you find an opportunity to discuss these matters with appropriate and interested officials.

It will be appreciated if you will keep the Department informed regarding the progress of discussion and thinking on these matters in London.

It is assumed now that September 1 will be the earliest possible date for convening the conference and that that date will be possible only if substantial agreement is evident by the 15th of July and real agreement definite by the 1st of August. [Acheson and Lehman.]

HULL

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840.50/2206

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] July 1, 1943.

Participants: M. Diamantopoulos, Greek Ambassador,  
M. Varvaressos,<sup>68</sup> Mr. Acheson and Mr. Veatch

The Ambassador and M. Varvaressos called to say that a formal note from the Greek Government will be delivered shortly<sup>69</sup> stating

<sup>68</sup> Kyriakos Varvaressos, Governor of the Bank of Greece.

<sup>69</sup> The note was delivered July 2 (not printed). Another note, delivered August 27 (not printed), stated that the Greek Government accepted in full the draft agreement and was ready to sign it. (840.50/2150, 2459)

the willingness of that Government to accept the proposed agreement on relief and rehabilitation in the form in which it was placed before that Government on June 10.

M. Varvaressos said that his Government considered that the plan would be a very useful instrument for assistance to the countries that had been victims of war, and that the general lines of the proposal seemed workable and satisfactory. There were of course details which the Greek Government might prefer to have in some other form, but that Government felt it was desirable to accept the plan in its present form in order to show its optimism with respect to the future and its confidence with respect to the way in which the plan would be worked out in operation.

M. Varvaressos went on to say that he was sure the objective of those who had drafted the plan would be to use all of the means available to the countries that will cooperate through this scheme, in extending assistance to the nations who have been victims of war. His Government was prepared therefore to accept the spirit of the proposal and to leave the discussion of details to the Council after the organization is established.

The Ambassador inquired as to whether other Governments have yet accepted the proposal and when he learned that no other government had registered its formal acceptance as yet, he and M. Varvaressos expressed their gratification that Greece might have the honor of being the first to accept.

M. Varvaressos said that he would be returning to London shortly to wind up some matters there before taking up his residence in Washington. He said that he would wish to confer with his friends in the other European Allied Governments in London, especially those with whom he had worked on the Leith-Ross Committee, in the hope that he could persuade the other governments to take the same action as that now taken by the Greek Government. He was convinced that it was entirely desirable to postpone the discussion of details until after the Council of the proposed administration should meet, for he understood from the draft that the Council would have the power to determine the policies of the organization.

M. Varvaressos also said that he would seek every opportunity in Washington before his return to London to convince representatives of the other European Governments that early and unconditional acceptance of the draft agreement is desirable.

In M. Varvaressos' opinion it would not greatly matter what countries or what individuals should make up the Central Committee. He recognized the necessity of having some Central Committee which would be constantly available to the Director General but he thought there would be little danger in that committee having too great power, or in its abusing the power that it would have.

Mr. Acheson expressed his pleasure in receiving this encouraging reply from the Greek Government. He said also that he agreed fully with the comments which M. Varvaressos had made regarding the desirability of quick action on the draft as it now stands, with the adjustment of details being handled by the Council when it is established. He said that he would of course appreciate anything that M. Varvaressos could do to convince the officials of the other European Allied Governments that such procedure would be desirable.

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840.50/2196½

*The Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation (Pearson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: May I refer again to your letter of June 12th, which dealt with certain points arising out of Canada's association with the proposed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. In the second paragraph of your letter you state that representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and Chinese Governments at a meeting on April 12th took cognizance of the statement that the Canadian Government's acceptance of the proposed plan was based on their understanding that the proposed form of the Central Committee was not regarded as a precedent in other connections. I have been asked to point out that the understanding in question, as stated in my letter of April 13th, covered the attitudes of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and China; not that of the Government of Canada. This is confirmed by sentence 2 of paragraph 3 of your letter of June 12th, which refers in this connection to the representatives of the four Powers and not to the Canadian Government. To make sure, however, that there will be no misunderstanding over the matter, I wish to point out that the position of the Canadian Government in this matter remains as stated in my letter of April 13th.

Yours sincerely,

L. B. PEARSON

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840.50/2154: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 5, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

4391. From Biddle, Polish Series, for Department and Governor Lehman.

1. I have sought informally and upon a purely personal basis during the past 10 days to obtain a reasonably representative cross-section

of the first impressions made by the UNRRA draft upon the Allied Governments and authorities here.

The opinions cited below, I feel certain will tend to become more realistic given a little time for reflection and an opportunity to examine and discuss the draft text in a more objective light than during the first preliminary study of the document.

2. The primary reaction of all the Governments established here, with the exception of the Czechs and the Greeks (insofar as the latter can be considered to be represented by the Greek Minister of Finance) varied from being definitely cool on the part of the Dutch, Norwegians and even the Belgians, to a lukewarm reception by the Yugoslavs and Poles; the voiced opinions of the officials of the latter two States were naturally tempered by anticipation of extensive and urgent needs.

3. The basic difficulty relates to the limitation of membership on the Central Committee and the following outline briefly summarizes their respective first reactions:

*a.* The Dutch tend to resent China's membership on the Central Committee, alleging that China is only potentially, and from a long-term aspect, a great power in the sense of not being in an economic position to contribute, in the near future, to either relief or rehabilitation. Their thesis, in fact, goes so far as to suggest that the Chinese will not be a noteworthy factor in world reconstruction for at least another decade.

On the other hand, the Dutch view of their own position is that the Netherlands Empire, very shortly after its reconstitution, will be in a position to assist substantially in any economic rehabilitation program and even may be able to do so during the latter stage of relief.

*b.* The Belgians cite the Congo's war contribution as their claim for membership. I have the feeling, however, that their complaints are more for the record than a substantial conviction. If they are assured of a place on the Supply Committee they should be satisfied.

*c.* The Norwegians naturally stress their shipping [omission?] contribution and consider that inadequate recognition has been given to the proportional war sacrifices made by them. These sacrifices, they intimate, entitled them to a place on the Central Committee, if only by proxy through the membership of another Western European state. Here I feel the resentment if [*is?*] psychologically the "small power complex" and will gradually subside given a considerate hearing of their point of view.

[*d.*] Most of the Poles tend to view askance the presence of Russia on the Central Committee. China's membership they consider as not affecting their interests and one gains a distinct impression of a preference for solely Anglo-American membership on the executive if it must be limited to the great powers.

*e.* The Czechs I think are prepared to accept the draft text as it is. They view realistically the proposed composition of the Central Committee.

*f.* The Yugoslav attention during the past fortnight has been too deeply concerned with their domestic difficulties for much serious consideration to have been given as yet to UNRRA. Also an appreciation of the fact that they will be one of the principal beneficiaries on the

receiving end has apparently tempered any criticisms they might be inclined to make. However, if they thought any other Allied country was inclined to try to force an increase in the Central Committee membership, they would at the present stage, I believe, give such a move full support.

4. All these countries would like to see the French take a lead in protesting against the absence of any continental power on the Central Committee with a demand for an increase in its membership, to the extent of one or possibly two additions to its membership. According to my French informants, representatives of all the Allies here, except the Greek Finance Minister, have suggested, to such of de Gaulle's people as are still about, that Algiers be urged to take a lead in protesting against the limited composition of the Central Committee.

5. I realize that Algiers is reporting the reaction of the Committee of Liberation and therefore present some of the following local French views as merely providing supplementary background color.

Alphand, who leaves shortly for Africa to discuss the UNRRA draft with the Committee of Liberation and who seems to expect to represent the Committee at the Relief Conference in Washington, told a member of my staff that:

"While every Frenchman resents, in view of the future role France must play in Europe, the failure to place her immediately on the Central Committee, he would not advise that Algiers make more than a formal protest at the moment."

He went on to say that he would strongly recommend however, that France should sign for only a limited period, maybe only for 6 months, and at best, only until a duly constituted authority had been reestablished in metropolitan France. When this happens the subject of French membership would be again raised with the expectation that France would then be included on the Central Committee, not only because of her paramount position on the continent west of the Vistula after German defeat but also as the representative of the interests of western Europe.

6. There are, as far as I have been able to ascertain, no serious objections to remaining features of the draft text.

Some of the concrete suggestions that have been advanced so far and which must be viewed as first thoughts rather than considered opinions, are as follows:

I. Norwegians, in addition to wanting two European representatives on Central Committee (other than Russia), urge that each regional council should have a representative on the Supply Committee. This latter suggestion might be worthy of consideration.

II. The Poles have brought up the idea of a separate committee of recipient states. Leith-Ross has pointed out to them that the regional councils are, in fact, such committees.

III. The French here assert that two members of the Council should be able to demand its convocation.

IV. Apprehension has been expressed by all the Allies that the European Council may not have sufficient authority. The thesis is advanced that this committee should have wide responsibilities with respect to European relief. Difficulty here, I feel, lies in the uncertainty of many Allied officials about how far Inter-Allied Committee will be transformed into the European Council.

7. Finally, there is an undercurrent of fear being expressed here by some of the western Allied officials that in the distribution of relief the administration of the respective Allied countries will be given inadequate participation. As one representative expressed it: "I have a feeling that there are some groups in Washington who hope to ride to fame and high career on the vehicle of relief and will therefore tend to minimize the role that the national administrations, particularly in the western European countries, can and should play very shortly after the liberation of their countries and the reconstitution of their governments".

8. At end of yesterday's formal plenary session of the Inter-Allied Committee, Hoehler gave a short talk about the North African relief work.<sup>70</sup> He made a special point of emphasizing how OFRRO had worked through the local French administrations and that this procedure had been effective; that the number of Americans connected with the relief tasks had been kept to the minimum and were utilized primarily to assist on the supply side, and finally that it was hoped to follow a similar pattern in connection with other Allied Governments where the local administrative machinery permitted.

Hoehler's talk made an excellent impression and will be most helpful in clearing the local atmosphere. I do not think that the preliminary reactions to UNRRA cited in this message should be taken too seriously. The Governments here realize on which side their bread is buttered but I have thought it useful for the Department to have a hint of these "first thoughts" for they represent convictions widely held despite their invalidity. [Biddle.]

WINANT

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840.50/2155

*The Canadian Minister (McCarthy) to the Secretary of State*

No. 355

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1943.

SIR: With his Note No. 907 of June 10th, 1943, the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Ottawa transmitted to the Secretary of State

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<sup>70</sup> Fred K. Hoehler had been sent to Algiers in January 1943 to survey North African needs for the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations; on June 18 he was instructed to proceed to the Department, stopping in London en route.



for External Affairs of Canada a Draft Agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and invited the Canadian Government to submit to you its observations thereon. I have the honour to inform you that the Canadian Government agrees with the view of the Government of the United States that action by the United Nations and the Nations associated with them for the relief and rehabilitation of territories ravaged by the war is of the utmost importance. The Canadian Government is prepared to collaborate fully with the Governments of the United States and of the other United Nations in developing plans for joint action.

With regard to the terms of the Draft Agreement, the Canadian Government does not desire to propose any substantial changes in the general scheme put forward. There are, however, several points of detail which might, in the view of the Canadian Government, be clarified with advantage. In the attached memorandum a number of suggestions, mainly of a drafting character, are put forward for consideration.

A more general comment relates to the possibilities of collaboration of neutral governments in the work of the Administration. It is considered that the Agreement should be framed both so as to encourage full participation by neutral countries as members of the Administration in some cases and so as to permit neutral countries in other cases to contribute supplies and resources to the work of relief without becoming signatories of the Agreement. Article II of the draft should be expanded, in the view of the Canadian Government, to make it clear that the collaboration of acceptable neutral countries will be both expected and welcomed.

Accept [etc.]

L. B. PEARSON  
For the Minister

[Enclosure]

JULY 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM ON DRAFT CONVENTION FOR UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND  
REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

The Canadian Government desire to make the following observations on the Draft Convention referred to above.

*Article III, paragraphs 1 and 2.*

No mention is made in the Draft Agreement of the normal method of reaching decisions in the Council and its Committees. In Article III (2) it is provided that special meetings of the Council may be convened on the request of the majority of its members. In Article

VIII it is provided that the Agreement may be amended by a unanimous vote of the Central Committee and two-thirds of the Council. Presumably the Council and its Committees (except the Central Committee) will normally take decisions by majority vote. Later difficulties might be avoided if this were to be stated explicitly in the Agreement.

*Article III, paragraph 3.*

(a) If it is the intention that unanimity is to be required in the Central Committee on all occasions, it might be desirable that this should be stated explicitly in this paragraph. Reference to the requirement of unanimity in certain circumstances is made in Article IV (1) and in Article VIII.

(b) The relationship of the Director General to the Central Committee is not altogether clear. It is provided that he is to be its presiding officer. It is also provided in Article IV (1) that he is to be appointed on the nomination by unanimous vote of the Central Committee and that he can only be removed by a similar unanimous vote. It is assumed that it is intended that the Director General should not be a voting member of the Central Committee, but it is considered that this should be stated in the Agreement.

(c) This paragraph authorizes the Central Committee to exercise all the powers and functions of the Council between sessions of the Council. So that the prerogatives of the Council as the "policy making body of the Administration" (Article III, paragraph 1) may be protected when it is not in session, it appears desirable to provide that decisions of the Central Committee on matters of policy should be submitted for approval by the Council at its next session.

(d) In the last sentence of this paragraph it is provided that the Chairman of the Committee on Supplies shall be invited to participate in the Central Committee at those of its meetings at which policies affecting the provision of supplies are discussed. It is assumed that it is intended that participation carries with it the full rights and duties of membership of the Central Committee at those of its meetings which he attends.

*Article III, paragraph 4.*

This paragraph provides that the members of the Committee on Supplies shall be appointed by the Central Committee with the approval or ratification of the Council. It might be preferable to have the appointments to this Committee made by the Council on the nomination of the Central Committee. It is also suggested that in the next to last sentence of this paragraph reference should be made to "the Council and the Central Committee" rather than in the reverse order.

*Article III, paragraph 5.*

It is suggested that the Regional Committees should also be appointed by the Council on the nomination of the Central Committee.

*Article IV, paragraph 3.*

It is considered that the Director General's authority under this paragraph should be qualified by adding at its end: "Within the limits of the broad policies determined by the Council or its Central Committee".

*Article IV, paragraph 4.*

By this paragraph the Director General is given authority to appoint the staff of the Administration without any limit except that imposed by the annual budget required under Article VI. It is considered that some provision should be inserted requiring the approval of the Central Committee for the executive establishment desired by the Director General.

*Article V, paragraph 2.*

This paragraph authorizes the Director General to initiate action with member governments in order to secure additional supplies and resources. Without some requirement that, in initiating such action, the Director General should act within the limits of the policies already approved by the Committee on Supplies, it would appear that the responsibilities of that Committee as defined in Article III (4) could in practice be ignored by the Director General.

*Article V, paragraph 3.*

It is understood that the purpose of this paragraph is to avoid competitive foreign buying of relief supplies, especially by governments which will have large relief requirements to meet in their own territories. The language of the paragraph, however, could be construed as restricting supplying governments from making on their own account incidental foreign purchases which might be necessary to complete the relief supplies that they have promised to furnish. For example, the paragraph would seem to cover the purchase in other countries of textile fibres or textiles needed for the manufacture of clothing for relief, and also of sundry medicines and medical equipment needed to furnish complete medical outfits for relief purposes.

*Article VI.*

This article would leave to the Council the responsibility of determining the allocation to member governments of the administrative expenses of the Administration. As this is likely to be a matter of considerable difficulty, it is suggested that concrete proposals should be formulated for consideration by governments before the first meeting of the Council; if it is not considered feasible to specify the principle of allocation in the Agreement itself.

*Article VII.*

It may be considered that the phrase "other military necessities" used in this article is too vague. Its meaning might be extended to cover areas in friendly countries along the lines of communication of armies of occupation long after hostilities have ceased. It is felt that in such circumstances the decision should not be left wholly to the Military Commander of the area. Consideration might therefore be given to narrowing the scope of the article by a more exact definition of the circumstances in which it would apply, once hostilities have ended in an area of relief.

*Article IX.*

It is open to question whether the final phrase is necessary, as it appears to invite delay. Reservations are likely to be appended by certain signatories, in any event.

840.50/2218 $\frac{1}{2}$ *The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Polish Ambassador has called at the Department twice to discuss the proposed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. In the course of his conversations with Mr. Acheson he has stated that he has received a very definite impression from the statements of American officials, in public addresses and elsewhere, that food and other relief supplies are to be used as a political weapon or influence in European countries after they are liberated.

The Ambassador referred particularly to your conversation with the Prime Minister of Poland and to a conversation between Governor Lehman and General Sikorski.<sup>71</sup> Since the Ambassador served as interpreter in both of these cases he felt that he had a clear understanding of the statements made on those occasions. His very definite impression was that it would be the policy of this Government to use "food as a weapon" in restoring political order in Europe, and he interpreted that to mean backing for certain leaders or governments and denial of support to others.

After checking with Governor Lehman the Department has assured the Polish Ambassador in very definite terms that Governor Lehman intended to leave no such impression and that his own position is emphatically quite the opposite. The Ambassador has been told that Governor Lehman has used the phrase "food as a weapon"

<sup>71</sup> Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of the Polish Armies. Regarding his visit to the United States, see vol. III, pp. 314-321 and 346.

only with respect to the prosecution of the war and the support of morale in the occupied countries through the promise of relief to those areas when liberated.

I believe that you will consider it desirable to have this impression definitely corrected, especially since one of the Polish Ambassador's colleagues from London has reported that the same impression is current there. If you approve, the Department will take occasion to inform the Polish Ambassador, and any others who have so misinterpreted our intentions, (a) that no responsible official of this Government has intended, by reference to food as a weapon, to indicate that food and other relief will in any way be used as a political weapon, and (b) that it was the intention of this Government in drafting the proposed agreement, and that it will be the intention of this Government so far as it can affect the administration of the agreement once it is adopted, to provide for the distribution of relief supplies on the basis of need alone and for the administration of the relief and rehabilitation program on an impartial and non-political basis.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

840.50/2196%

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by Mr. F. D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1943.

Participants: Greek Ambassador, Mr. Cimon P. Diamantopoulos  
Mr. Roy Veatch (OFR)  
Mr. Kohler

Mr. Veatch called this morning and said that in view of the fact that the Netherlands' objections to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agreement had already broken in this morning's press, it would be desirable that the Greeks give full publicity to their unreserved acceptance of the proposal.

At Mr. Veatch's suggestion I called the Greek Ambassador and told him so. He seemed pleased and said he would consult Mr. Varvaressos with a view to amplifying their proposed statement to the press.

Later he called and read to me the following statement, which he said would be released to the press tonight:

"The Greek Embassy has notified the American Government of the acceptance by the Greek Government of the draft agreement for the establishment of a United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration in its general lines. In taking this decision the Greek Government have considered that there is an urgent need for the creation of an organization which while representative in character should also be in a position to take prompt decisions and carry them out. The

Greek Government are of the opinion that the proposed agreement fulfills this requirement and feels confident that by a close cooperation of the United Nations the important object of relief and rehabilitation of our countries will be attained."

840.50/2326

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations  
(Duggan)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1943.

The Ambassador<sup>72</sup> stated that he had been instructed to inform this Government of his Government's point of view with regard to the draft agreement for a United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration. Its attitude is as follows:

"The President of the Republic has approved in principle the draft agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to be discussed at a meeting to be held in Washington. A reply to this effect is being transmitted to the American Embassy. I ask Your Excellency to keep me advised as to all that may occur in this connection, including, in due course, the membership of the delegations of the United States, of the other American countries and of Great Britain."

The Ambassador then went on to say that in a friendly way which was not in any sense to be considered as representations his Government was not happy about the exclusion of Brazil from the Committee. In the first place, it felt that there should be representation of the "Latin world", of which Brazil was an important member, and in the second place the background of a peculiarly close association and friendship suggested Brazil for appointment. The appointment of a Brazilian as one of the four chairmen of committees at the Food Conference had created an excellent impression in Brazil.

In concluding, the Ambassador reiterated that his Government was not presenting an objection, since its official position was as set forth earlier, but that nevertheless in a friendly way his Government wanted us to know of its disappointment.

840.50/2218½

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1943.

The impression which the Polish Ambassador received<sup>73</sup> is, of course, utterly contrary to the fact. In my talk with General Sikorski and the Ambassador I spoke of food as a weapon in the actual war. The

<sup>72</sup> Carlos Martins, Brazilian Ambassador.

<sup>73</sup> See letter from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, July 5, p. 929.

only other thing I said was that it was obvious that after the war food would go by priority to the people of our Allies—the United Nations—ahead of food to feed people in Germany. That statement is, of course, obvious.

I hope you will take the matter up with the Polish Ambassador.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

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840.50/2191a

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives*<sup>74</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1943.

SIRS: There is enclosed for your information a copy of a memorandum of conversation of June 23, 1943 between officers of the Department and officials of the Belgian Government<sup>75</sup> with respect to the Draft Agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This conversation covered so many of the important questions and also so many of the details that may be of interest to other governments that it is believed it will be of use to you as a guide to the Department's interpretation of the Draft Agreement.

It is the desire of the Department to secure signature of an agreement on this subject at as early a date as possible so that the organization can be established and be prepared to operate as territories are liberated from the enemy.

It is believed that the governments must be given, at least six weeks in advance, some indication of at least tentative plans for a conference at which such signature will take place and that the actual invitation for that conference must be issued at least four weeks in advance. It will be impossible, therefore, to hold the conference before September. It is hoped, however, that governments will be in substantial agreement before the end of July so that tentative plans for the conference can be placed before governments at that time and that all or most governments will be in full agreement soon thereafter so that invitations can be issued for a conference to open some time in September.

You are instructed to seek informal opportunities for discussing this Government's proposal with the appropriate officials of the government to which you are accredited with the objective of meeting if possible some such time schedule as that set forth above. You should keep the Department informed, by telegraph if necessary, regarding the progress of the consideration of the matter by that government.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

DEAN ACHESON

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<sup>74</sup> Sent to chiefs of mission accredited to Governments comprising the United Nations and to Governments associated with them in the war.

<sup>75</sup> Not printed, but see telegram No. 3993, June 30, 10 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 919.

840.50/2368

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1943.

Mr. Hall called at his request. After discussing two matters separately reported, he observed that the Embassy had heard from Sir Frederick Leith-Ross that he regarded the attitude of the Exiled Governments in London toward the UNRRA proposal as quite satisfactory. He said that there was a good deal of grumbling and some protest regarding this Central Committee, but that he thought this would quiet down and would not become a major issue. I said to Mr. Hall that this was an encouraging report and that the view expressed by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross was similar to views which Ambassador Winant had expressed.

DEAN ACHESON

840.50/2396

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch of the Office of  
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1943.

Participants: The Australian Minister, Sir Owen Dixon  
Mr. H. C. Coombs, Director General, Department of  
Post-war Reconstruction, of Australia  
Mr. J. B. Brigden, Financial Counselor, Australian  
Legation  
Mr. Acheson  
Mr. Veatch

Sir Owen Dixon said that he was instructed by his Government to raise a number of questions with this Government regarding the interpretation of the draft agreement and the ways in which it was anticipated that it would work. Since Mr. Coombs was in Washington briefly on his way home to Australia, he had come along also, especially in view of the close relation between his responsibilities in the Australian Government and the proposed relief and rehabilitation program.

1. *Functions of the Central Committee and other committees of the Council*

Sir Owen referred first to the functions of the Central Committee and the other committees of the Council, and the role which Australia might play in connection with these functions. He said that the general view of the Commonwealth Government was quite opposed to any undue domination of any post-war councils by a restricted group



of Powers. He understood that it was the view of this Government that the Central Committee would not dominate the organization and that the other committees of the Council would have very important functions. His Government was glad to know of this view and it was hopeful that the smaller countries could participate effectively in the whole Administration through membership on the other committees.

Sir Owen went on to say that he would appreciate especially some clarification or development of the American Government's ideas regarding the functions and the probable personnel or composition of the various committees, and more particularly of the Committee on Supplies.

In reply Mr. Acheson discussed the functions of the Central Committee, of the Regional Committees and of the Supplies Committee in much the same terms as those used in his other recent discussions of the subject.

## 2. *The Committee on Supplies*

In connection with his discussion of the Committee on Supplies he emphasized the fact that each Government would determine for itself the nature and extent of its contributions of supplies, and that the main function of the Committee would be to advise the Council as to those policies which in its judgment would facilitate the flow of supplies, including the policies covering the distribution of supplies so far as they would be of special interest to the main suppliers. He said that the supplying governments might very well limit all or part of their appropriations for the support of the United Nations organization to particular supplies which they were in position to contribute.

Sir Owen inquired as to whether the receiving countries would be represented in some way on the Supplies Committee, and in reply Mr. Acheson indicated that the Supplies Committee was designed to represent the principal supplying countries, that the receiving countries would find a special place for presentation of their views through the regional committees, and that the Council would serve as the overall body in which the views of both the supplying and receiving countries would be represented. In the course of the conversation on this point Mr. Acheson said that no doubt the United States and the United Kingdom would be represented and perhaps also Soviet Russia and China, although the latter two might not be in a position to be important suppliers for some time. Then certainly Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Brazil should be represented as principal suppliers, and also Argentina when she becomes a member of the organization, and perhaps also such countries as Denmark and Poland on the score that they might very quickly become suppliers of food stuffs for other European regions.

Sir Owen seemed to indicate a preference for a small specialized committee on supplies. He laid particular stress on the peculiar

position of countries like Australia and New Zealand, whose economy is largely dependent upon exports of the primary commodities which would be of particular concern in relief and rehabilitation.

### 3. *Provision of Supplies*

Sir Owen wished to know whether UNRRA would deal only with governments with respect to supplies or whether it would deal directly with individuals or commercial concerns.

In reply Mr. Acheson said that presumably dealings would be between UNRRA and governments, at least during the first stages. For example he said that UNRRA would place before the American Government its schedule of needs and would discuss with the American Government the particular commodities which might be supplied by the United States. The appropriations would then be made for United States contributions to UNRRA and the American Government would arrange for the procurement of those supplies which were to be turned over to UNRRA.

Mr. Acheson went on to say that the program for drawing supplies from various countries for relief and rehabilitation would necessarily be cleared with the appropriate Combined Boards. Mr. Coombs then inquired whether it was expected that the Combined Boards would continue as Anglo-American Boards after the war. In reply Mr. Acheson said that it might be assumed that such controls would become more generally international, at least after the war and perhaps considerably before the end of the war.

Sir Owen inquired as to the way in which UNRRA would operate in relation to normal world demands. He assumed that UNRRA would not be so operated as to upset the normal relations between suppliers and receiving countries in any unnecessary degree, and Mr. Acheson fully agreed.

Mr. Coombs said that he assumed that somebody would continue to decide over-all allocations, presumably the Combined Boards for the present. He was at a loss, however, as to who would determine priorities as between the various countries in need and especially who would finance supplies for countries not in a position to pay cash. He thought it would be a mistake if the supplying countries only were expected to do the financing since contributions of supplies by them would reduce their own supply reserves which they would be in a position to sell later. He thought that the procedure needed clarifying and particularly that governments should know when decisions of this sort were to be made.

Mr. Acheson said that it was expected that the non-supplying countries would also contribute funds to the organization and in some cases these contributions should be considerable. The decision as to what specific contributions each country would make would be left entirely

with the individual country by the Draft Agreement. He said that contributions by supplying countries might be primarily or entirely in kind so as not to raise the problem of foreign exchange.

Mr. Coombs immediately picked up the mention of the foreign exchange problem, saying that the exportation of reserve stocks of commodities normally sold on the foreign market would reduce the ability of a country like Australia to secure necessary foreign exchange through the sale of those commodities later. So far as there might be excess reserves built up which would not be saleable abroad at any future time, this problem would not be raised.

Sir Owen said that Australia may have to face some very serious economic problems because of the uncertainty as to the demands for Australian supplies for military and relief and rehabilitation purposes. With respect to the military demand he said that the demand for supplies for the American army may suddenly be terminated when the American troops move out of Australia or they may be continued, perhaps at an accelerated rate, as the American forces fight their way to Japan. It will be desirable therefore that the demands for relief and rehabilitation be adjusted to the military demand so far as possible.

#### 4. *Representation on Committees*

Sir Owen inquired as to how the chairmen of the various committees would be chosen. In reply Mr. Acheson said that that was not specified in the draft and that presumably the choice would rest with the committees.

Mr. Coombs asked why the Central Committee had to be made up of government representatives. He suggested that if a committee of four should be chosen by the Council out of its own membership, the individuals would then feel that they served the Council directly and that they were not to represent their own governments in their functions on the Central Committee. Mr. Acheson recognized this as a theoretical possibility but expressed the opinion that in reality it would hardly work out that way.

Sir Owen indicated that the Australian Government would have an interest in the work of the European Committee, as well as the Far Eastern Committee and the Supplies Committee, since Australia expects to have much closer economic relations with Europe after the war than was true during the pre-war period. He asked therefore whether Australia might be a member of the European Committee, and in reply Mr. Acheson said he saw no reason why Australia should not be on all the committees.

Sir Owen then said that Australia would also have a strong interest in a shipping or transportation committee if one is established, since the control of shipping will be of very great interest to Australia.

##### 5. *Powers of the Commonwealth Government*

Sir Owen said that there might be some question as to the constitutional power of the Australian Government to carry out some of the commitments which might arise under the proposed agreement. He referred particularly to the possibility that the Australian Government might be required to acquire certain commodities on a compulsory basis either under Article I, paragraph 2 (b) or under some amendment to the agreement. The Commonwealth Government has at the present time the constitutional power to acquire commodities only for the Commonwealth itself and it could not agree to an international instrument which might result in some obligation which the Commonwealth could not carry out.

In response to this observation Mr. Acheson pointed out that action under Article I, paragraph 2 (b) could only be advisory and that separate action by each government involved would be required to implement such advice. With respect to amendments to the agreement, he assumed that no changes would be made which would change the nature of the agreement, which is in the form of an executive agreement without specific commitments as to the contributions to be made by the member governments.

##### 6. *Relation of Rehabilitation to long-run reconstruction*

Sir Owen said that he did not understand fully the relationship which would exist between rehabilitation, under the draft agreement, and measures for long-run reconstruction. He said that his Government would fear that rehabilitation of industries and agriculture during the short-run period might have permanent consequences, especially if it seemed important to restore or develop uneconomic industries during the emergency period. His Government was of the opinion that the relationship between rehabilitation and reconstruction should be recognized in the draft agreement itself, and that a provision might be included for taking into account actual and prospective agreements for carrying out the policy of Article VII of the master Lend-Lease agreements, so that a conflict should not develop between rehabilitation measures and the policy laid down in such agreements.

##### 7. *Relation of Australia to the general plan for UNRRA*

Mr. Acheson inquired as to Sir Owen's general feeling toward the desirability of having an *international* relief organization.

In reply Sir Owen said that he thought that it was entirely *essential* that relief and rehabilitation be so organized. He thought it was important to recognize, however, that there would not be many resources for relief supplies, and Mr. Bridgen added that in his opinion there

will be a need for some equitable assessment of the contributions to be made by the various possible sources of supply.

It was necessary to terminate the discussion before Sir Owen had raised all the questions which he had on his list. It was agreed therefore that Mr. Acheson should ask him to return for further discussion as soon as it might be convenient for Mr. Acheson.

Sir Owen left with Mr. Veatch the following notes on the subjects which he had wished to discuss with Mr. Acheson, saying that many of them had already been covered by the discussion but that he would wish to secure some further clarification on some which had already been brought up, and to raise the few others which had not been discussed:

“1. The general view of the Commonwealth is against the undue domination of any post-war councils by a restricted group of powers.

2. It is hoped that effective participation by small countries in relief administration will be secured, e.g. through subsidiary committees.

3. This is particularly important in the case of the Committee of Supplies and the Committee for the Far East.

4. The Commonwealth is unaware of what is in mind with reference to membership, chairmanship and location of the various committees.

5. It does not appear what are the limits of the Far Eastern region, e.g. does it include India and Burma?

6. It is not clear whether the administration will deal only with governments as such or whether it is intended that it should carry on transactions as though it had a corporate capacity with persons within the territory of member governments. Art. I (1) enables it to enter into contracts.

7. The Commonwealth is concerned with the possibility of encountering constitutional difficulties, as for instance in carrying out Art. I (2) (b) which may require compulsory acquisition. The power of amendment may impose unforeseen obligations.

8. The Commonwealth does not understand the relation of measures of rehabilitation to long term reconstruction and post-war reorganisation of world trade and suggests that the draft agreement should recognise the relation and provide that in the activities of the administration it shall take into account agreements actual and prospective for carrying out the policy of Art. 7 of the mutual aid agreement to the end that action taken for rehabilitation shall not conflict with the policy laid down in such agreements.

9. Art. I (2) (a) in referring to the facilitating of production of basic necessities and to furnishing essential services may lead to measures having permanent consequences and even to the introduction or revival of uneconomic industries.

10. Art. 5 (3) creates the difficulty of distinguishing between purchases for relief and rehabilitation and purchases for the needs of local populations during war time.

11. Art. I (2) authorising the formulation and recommendation of measures for individual or joint action may be insufficient to prevent competition after the war between the administration and countries

with financial resources. Should there not be a more explicit undertaking to collaborate with the administration both during and after the war to ensure equitable distribution of scarce resources? A similar point exists with respect to shipping. How does the administration obtain ships?

12. It is assumed that relief is to be wholly contributory and contributions may be in credit or in kind. What kind of transactions are contemplated in the expenditure of the credits and how will they be carried out?"

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840.50/2242: Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Guatemala (Long)*

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1943—6:30 p. m.

A-522. Your A-336, June 29, 5 p. m.<sup>76</sup> Please transmit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note substantially as follows:

"I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I duly transmitted to my Government the text of your Excellency's note of June 25, with regard to the draft agreement for the setting up of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. I am now directed to inform your Excellency that the Government of the United States is gratified to learn that the Government of Guatemala has given such interested attention to the proposed agreement and that it has no objection to accepting the provisions of the draft agreement in principle.

The Government of the United States has taken note of the understanding of the Government of Guatemala that the participation of Guatemala in the establishment of the proposed organization would entail contributions by that Government only within the limits of the resources available to it after meeting the pressing and urgent requirements which in its judgment would be required for the national economic rehabilitation and the relief of its inhabitants who lack the proper elements of economic existence. There would appear to be no inconsistency between this understanding and the interpretation which this Government places upon the pledge proposed in Article V, paragraph 1. Under the terms of this provision each member government would pledge 'its full support to the Administration', within the limits of the resources which it would be in a position to make available for this proposal, and the power to determine the character and extent of the specific contributions to be made would rest with the member government itself."

HULL

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<sup>76</sup> Not printed; the substance of the Guatemalan note of June 25 transmitted in that telegram is adequately given below.

840.50/2276

*The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Spaak) to the American Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London*"

[Translation]

B. No. 04002  
Dos. 134/23

LONDON, July 19, 1943.

MR. AMBASSADOR :

1. The Belgian Government has carefully examined the draft agreement for the establishment of a "United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration", which Your Excellency was good enough to communicate to me in your letter of June 10 last. It has greeted with satisfaction the initiative taken by the United States Government and hastens to reply to the invitation which the latter has extended to it to collaborate toward the successful realization of the proposed action. To this end it will lend its full cooperation.

2. The Belgian Government has taken note of the fact that the document constitutes merely a proposal and a basis for later discussions. It understands, moreover, that the proposed agreement has the limited aim of "Relief" and "Rehabilitation". Thus, the opinions which it is led to express may in no way prejudice the attitude it may take concerning questions which will arise when the United Nations enter upon the study of international cooperation in other fields.

Pursuant to the wish expressed by Your Excellency, I have the honor hereinafter to submit to you the suggestions resulting from the Belgian Government's examination. In formulating them it has above all been moved by the care to give them as constructive a character as possible. In doing so, it has taken into account the explanations which have been furnished on different points during the semi-official exchange of views which took place at the State Department with its representatives.

3. By the terms of Article III, the Council is to constitute the "policy making body". Moreover, it appears from the explanations furnished by the State Department that the Council constitutes the supreme authority; that all the other organs of the Administration, including the Central Committee, are only emanations from it; that the Director General alone has executive power; that, aside from the Director General, U.N.R.R.A. includes as essential organs the Regional Committees and the "Supply Committee".

Such a conception is reasonable and the Belgian Government gives its full support to it. Certain provisions of the proposal, however,

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" Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 79, July 20; received July 28.

appear to contradict it, and it would seem to be desirable to establish a more exact harmony between those provisions and the fundamental conception with which they should correspond.

Thus, by the terms of Article III, Section 3, "in the intervals between sessions of the Council, the Central Committee shall exercise all the powers and functions thereof". One might deduce from this that between sessions of the Council it becomes the "policy making body". To avoid all ambiguity, the Belgian Government suggests that it be stated that action taken by the Central Committee shall remain within the limits of policy adopted by the Council or shall be justified by urgent considerations. In this case, the measures taken should be ratified by the Council. This should be done especially in so far as the admission of new members, as provided in Article II, is concerned. In the same spirit, a proposal put forward by a member, as provided in Article I-2-c, should be susceptible of being submitted for study when it has received the approval of the Council; the members of the "Committee on Supplies" (Article III, 4), the non-European members of the Committee for Europe, the members of the Committee for the Far East who do not belong to that part of the world (Article III, 5), and the members of the technical Committees provided in Article III, 6 should as a general rule be appointed by the Council on the motion of the Central Committee.

Furthermore, it is provided by Article III, Section 3, that the Central Committee shall convene the representatives of any member Government to those of its sessions at which measures of special interest to that Government are to be discussed. It appears from the explanations furnished by the State Department that any member expressing such a wish has the right to be heard by the Central Committee during the examination of questions of special interest to it but that it would have no deliberative voice. The Belgian Government considers that members who are present under such conditions should take part in the deliberations and in the votes on an equal footing with the permanent members of the Central Committee.

Article III, Section 5, defines the composition and powers of the Regional Committees. In order to ensure more rapid and effective decisions, it would be desirable that certain of the Council's powers should be delegated to the Regional Committees.

Article III, Section 2, provides that the Council shall be convoked at the request of a majority of its members. The Belgian Government proposes that such a meeting take place at the request of a quarter of the members of the Council.

In case it were not possible to define the respective powers of the Central Committee and the other organs of U.N.R.R.A., in accordance with the above advanced observations, it would be necessary to



consider enlarging the Central Committee by the addition of supplementary members chosen from among the Governments of the then occupied countries.

4. By the terms of Article I, Section 2, the activities of the Administration within the territory of a member State will be carried out in consultation with and with the consent of that Government. The Belgian Government considers that from the time when a legal Government in fact exercises its authority over national territory, it must clearly be responsible for carrying out all measures for "Relief" and "Rehabilitation", with the sole reservation of the requirements which may result from military operations that are still in progress. The terms of the provision in question should be precisely set forth in this sense.

5. Article V provides that each member Government pledges its full support to the Administration, within the limits of its available resources and subject to the requirements of its constitutional procedure. In this field, the Belgian Government wishes to state that if, as it hopes, the resources of Belgium permit, it intends to make payment itself for purchases made for the "Relief" and "Rehabilitation" of the country. It is prepared to consider the idea of giving other member States such assistance as may lie within its power, but the scope of the undertakings in this respect proposed in paragraph 1 of Article V does not appear to it to be very clear, and it would be desirable, in its opinion, that it should eventually be precisely defined. This should also be done with regard to the scope of Article VII which seems to imply that the military authorities will assume responsibility for "Relief" and "Rehabilitation" until they themselves decide that hostilities and military requirements have ended. It would also be well to state clearly whether, as the Belgian Government believes to be the case on the strength of the explanations which it has received, the Council's decisions will be taken by a simple majority, except in cases where the majority is otherwise expressly specified. Finally, it should be understood that the Agreement would in no way impair the right of the occupied countries to obtain payments in kind from enemy States corresponding to the spoliation which their economic systems may have suffered as the result of a systematic exploitation of their resources.

As regards the "allocations" of both food products and raw materials or other products, the Belgian Government understands that these will be made with due regard to available resources and delivery facilities, and, if these are inadequate to meet requirements, on the basis of equality of sacrifices on the part of all the United Nations.

The proposal does not include any provision with regard to the denunciation of the Convention or its interpretation. The Belgian Government thinks it would be well to repair this omission.

6. Subject to the points outlined above, the Belgian Government is prepared to join the United States and the other interested nations with a view to bringing to realization the proposed course of action.

I take [etc.]

P. H. SPAAK

840.50/23963

*Memorandum of Discussion in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), July 21, 1943*

The Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, and Mr. Noel Hall, Minister of the British Embassy, met with Mr. Acheson to discuss the program of negotiations with respect to the draft agreement for a United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration. Mr. Liu Chieh, Minister and Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, and Mr. Roy Veatch of the Department of State were also present.

*1. Progress of negotiations regarding the draft agreement for UNRRA*

Mr. Acheson explained that he had expected to have available for each of the Embassies copies of all of the important responses this Government had received from the other governments that are considering the draft agreement, and also of this Government's reply to the note from the Netherlands Government. He said that all of the responses received have been favorable except in the case of the Netherlands note,<sup>78</sup> which had been critical. Acceptances of the draft agreement, at least in principle, have been received from the Governments of Greece, Yugoslavia, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia and Guatemala.<sup>79</sup>

Mr. Acheson said that representatives of a number of other governments had discussed phases of the draft agreement with the Department of State. Some of these discussions raised much the same problems as those raised in writing by the Netherlands Government, especially with respect to the composition and powers of the Central Committee.

Mr. Acheson then outlined the main points raised in the Netherlands note and in the draft reply of this Government. He said that this Government's reply to the Netherlands probably would be sent within the next day or two and that he would then send to each of

<sup>78</sup> Dated June 28, p. 915.

<sup>79</sup> Acceptances of the Governments of Yugoslavia, Mexico, and Bolivia are not printed since they raised no points for discussion. For the same reason acceptances in principle received during July and August from the Governments of the following countries have not been printed: Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Liberia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Philippines.

the three Embassies copies of this reply and of the formal responses of any importance which this Government has received from the governments considering the draft agreement.

2. *Questions regarding the functions and composition of the Central Committee*

Mr. Acheson referred to the special concern of governments critical of the draft agreement with respect to the role and composition of the Central Committee. It seemed apparent that concern over this matter was the principal reason for opposition to the proposal on the part of several governments and for the delay in acceptance of the agreement on their part. Since it has been the plan from the first to call the projected conference only after general agreement has been reached on a draft, it seemed apparent that the controversy over the Central Committee must be solved before we can go ahead.

Mr. Acheson said that he wished to counsel with the representatives of the other three big Powers regarding this problem. He supposed that the following represented the three principal alternative ways of handling the matter:

- a. Continue the present effort to convince the critical governments that the draft as it now stands is workable and worthy of their support.
- b. The four Powers to offer to the others some modification of the powers of the Central Committee.
- c. The four Powers to agree to some expansion of the membership of the Central Committee.

In connection with the second alternative, Mr. Acheson listed for the information of the others the following principal suggestions regarding modification of the powers of the Central Committee which had been proposed by one or more of the governments which had been in discussion of the subject:

- (1) Reduce, at least to one-third, the proportion of the Council's membership required to support a request for a special session of the Council.
- (2) Member governments participating in the meetings of the Central Committee in which they have a special interest to be given the right to vote at such meetings.
- (3) Omit from Article II the power of the Central Committee to admit new members between sessions of the Council.
- (4) Transfer from the Central Committee to the Council or a special committee of the Council the power to nominate members of the committees as set forth in Article III, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.
- (5) Modification of the vote required to amend the agreement so that members of the Central Committee would have no special voting right with respect to such amendments.
- (6) Modification of the statement of the powers of the Central Committee as set forth in Article III, paragraph 3, definitely limiting such powers to emergency policy decisions, between sessions of the

Council, on matters not covered by policies already determined by the Council.

In response to Mr. Acheson's invitation for suggestions regarding ways of handling negotiations on the Central Committee problem, Mr. Hall suggested that each Embassy might place before its government the suggested changes in the powers of the Central Committee so that the four Powers might be prepared to support some amendment of the draft agreement with respect to the role of the Central Committee if it should later prove to be impossible to secure adequate support for the agreement as it now stands.

Ambassador Wei expressed the opinion that it would be desirable to delay any other action until replies are in from all of the governments. He expressed the hope that the reply to the Netherlands note would have its effect and would lead therefore to agreement without changes in the powers of the Central Committee.

There was general agreement that the Department of State should continue its efforts to secure acceptance of the agreement without modification of the provisions relating to the Central Committee. It was agreed further however that it would be desirable in the meantime for all of the four Governments to give consideration to the various suggestions for modification of the powers of the Central Committee. In order to facilitate such consideration Mr. Acheson stated that he would provide each of the Embassies with a list of the proposals which had been made for modification of the powers of the Central Committee so that these could be placed before the home governments and their comments with respect to the suggestions then be reported to the Department of State as soon as practicable.

Mr. Gromyko asked Mr. Acheson's opinion as to the reason for delay on the part of so many governments in accepting the agreement and in reply Mr. Acheson said that he thought that a great many governments either feared four-Power domination of the proposed organization, or were at least not clear as to the meaning and implications of many of the provisions of the agreement. He expressed the opinion that it was inevitable that some time would be required for each government to study and discuss the various provisions so that each might have a clear conception of the way the organization would work.

Mr. Gromyko then suggested that it might be useful to send a copy of the American Government's reply to the Netherlands note to each of the other governments now considering the draft agreement; the argument set forth in that reply might expedite acceptance of the draft by the other Powers, especially those that were concerned about the role of the Central Committee.

There was general agreement that some such action on the part of this Government would be useful and Mr. Acheson said that he would

bring the suggestion to the attention of the Department of State. He thought that it might be possible to circulate to all governments considering the draft a statement which would follow the lines of the reply to the Netherlands note if it should seem undesirable to use the exact text of that note.

### *3. Other changes which may be required in the draft agreement*

Mr. Acheson said that the various discussions concerning the draft agreement, with members of the Congress of the United States as well as with other governments, had indicated a number of points in the agreement where some clarification of language would seem to be desirable.

He referred particularly to the language of the financial pledges contained in Articles V and VI, saying that he believed that all of the representatives of other governments that had been in to discuss the draft had raised questions regarding these Articles. He said that the wording of both Articles had also been questioned by members of Congress.

Mr. Gromyko inquired as to the reason for this worry about proposed commitments under Articles V and VI. In response, to illustrate the kind of misunderstanding raised by the present wording of Articles V and VI, Mr. Acheson mentioned the fear of one of the European governments that all of its national resources would be pledged to the organization and that it might be forced to turn over supplies and funds to UNRRA even before it had done anything for its own people. He mentioned also the fear of some of the United States Senators that the natural resources of the United States would be pledged by the wording of Article V, before necessary action had been taken by Congress.

Mr. Acheson went on to say that in both Articles the clause "subject to the requirements of its (the member government's) constitutional procedure" had been used for the purpose of indicating that the pledge taken at the time of signature of the agreement was subject to subsequent action by the appropriate constitutional bodies within each government and that the pledge would not become specific until such action was taken. He said that apparently this clause was not sufficiently specific however to avoid misunderstanding of the nature of Articles V and VI and that the language would need clarification if the purposes of Articles V and VI were to be understood by many of the governments now considering the draft.

Mr. Acheson said that the Department of State was working on some substitute language for the sentences in Articles V and VI which were under question and that this language would be submitted to each of the other three Powers for consideration as soon as possible.

Mr. Acheson also said that there were a few other spots in the draft where modification of a few words would clarify the intent of the

provisions in question without in any way changing the meaning. He thought that probably the other governments would wish to make such changes, if it proves to be necessary to revise the text at all, and he said that he would place proposals for such revisions before the other three governments as soon as the alternative wording of Articles V and VI had been worked out.

Mr. Acheson then referred to one further problem raised in the discussion of the draft agreement which might require something more than clarification of language. He said that several people had pointed out the lack of a provision covering withdrawal of a member government from the Administration and its obligations. He felt that this again probably was a change which would be desired by all governments and he said that he would try to submit to the other three Governments, along with the other possible revisions of the agreement, a proposal for rewording Article IX so as to cover this point.

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840.50/2314

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] July 22, 1943.

Participants: The Australian Minister, Sir Owen Dixon  
Mr. Acheson  
Mr. Veatch  
(Mr. L. B. Pearson, Minister-Counselor of the Canadian Legation also participated in the latter part of the discussion.)

Mr. Acheson had invited Sir Owen to come in for a further discussion of the points which the latter raised in his discussion with Mr. Acheson on July 14. The discussion followed the list of questions and statements left by Sir Owen on July 14 and reproduced at the end of the memorandum of discussion of that date. The following notes on the discussion carry the corresponding numbers.

1. Mr. Acheson assured Sir Owen that there was no intention that the Four Powers should dominate the proposed relief and rehabilitation organization.

2. Mr. Acheson said that certainly the full and effective participation of all countries is not only desirable but essential to the success of the enterprise. In his opinion the regional committees, the Supplies Committee and the standing technical committees will have most important functions. He said that these committees would serve the Council in much the same way that the Congressional Committees serve as working committees of both Houses of Congress in the United States. These committees would have the detailed information re-

quired in the formulation of policies in the first instance which could then be recommended to the Council and Central Committee for action. Members of the Council would be represented on all of the committees in which they had special interest and they would, of course, have full opportunity to participate in the final discussions and decisions of the Council.

3. Mr. Acheson said that there would, of course, be no doubt that the Government of Australia would participate in both the Committee on Supplies and the Committee for the Far East. These Committees would be of unusual importance since the Council and the Director General would have to be guided very largely by these Committees in their specialized fields.

4. Mr. Acheson said that so far as membership on the committees is not specified by the Draft Agreement the responsibility for appointments would rest with the Central Committee subject to approval by the Council. The question of chairmen of the committees is not covered by the Agreement, however, and it might be desirable to cover that point in the Agreement itself or at least in by-laws to be adopted by the Council—otherwise it might not be clear as to whether the chairman should be appointed by the Central Committee or chosen by the committee itself. With respect to headquarters, Mr. Acheson said that it might be assumed that the headquarters of the Administration as a whole would be in Washington, at least at the outset, and that the headquarters of the European region would probably be in London, at least in the early stages. No decision had been reached with respect to Far Eastern headquarters as yet.

5. Presumably the Far Eastern region would not include India as a field of relief and rehabilitation unless India is more directly hit by the war. However, Burma would definitely be covered and the Committee would include governments in the whole general region, not merely those directly affected by the war.

6. Presumably UNRRA would deal directly with governments with respect to supplies, clearing with the Combined Boards and using their machinery whenever it might be available. In most cases the Director General would not enter into private contracts—this would most certainly be impossible in the United States where many war-time controls would make such action impracticable.

Sir Owen pressed the question a little further, however, by asking what would happen if a member government should inform the Director General that it did not wish to have UNRRA enter into direct arrangements with individual concerns within its territory. He wished to know whether there was anything in the Draft Agreement which would preclude such action by a member government. In reply

Mr. Acheson said that he thought there was no such limitation in the Draft and that since there was no limitation of a member government's sovereignty, it would have full freedom to take such action.

7. Mr. Acheson explained that no action could be taken by UNRRA under Article I, paragraph 2 (b) which would commit any member government to any form of action without its specific agreement or consent. He said that the last sentence of paragraph 2 (b) referred merely to those new functions which the member governments might specifically request the Administration to undertake.

Mr. Acheson went on to say that a more serious problem was posed by the wording of Article VIII, with respect to amendments. He said that others had referred to the possibility that some member governments might be placed in the position of having to carry out some amendment to the Agreement which it had not accepted and he thought therefore that some modification of Article VIII would probably be necessary in order to avoid such a situation. Sir Owen agreed that the present wording of Article VIII was too broad.

8 and 9. These two points were discussed jointly. Mr. Acheson explained the limitations placed upon the rehabilitation function of the Administration through the wording of Article I, paragraph 2 (a) and he stated specifically that paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c) of Article I could create no extension of the rehabilitation function without the specific agreement of each government concerned.

Sir Owen said that he wanted to be certain that there could be no new commitments with respect to rehabilitation without the specific consent of each member government concerned since otherwise the Australian Government might find itself in the position of having to carry out some commitment to which it would be opposed. He emphasized the desire of the Australian Government to have some sort of specific directive in the Agreement which would require the Administration to adjust its objectives and its activities to the longer-run objectives of the United Nations as set forth not only in existing agreements but also in those yet to be signed.

Mr. Pearson, the Minister Counsellor of the Canadian Legation, called on Mr. Acheson at this point and was invited to join the discussion.

Mr. Veatch pointed out the possibility that in some urgent situations it might be necessary to support the rehabilitation of some forms of agriculture and even of some forms of industry as an emergency relief measure even though such rehabilitation would be contrary to the long-run interests of the parties affected. Mr. Pearson said that this possibility or probability had been recognized at the Conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs.



Sir Owen then explained that the Australian Government feared that the new relief Administration might become so enthusiastic over its own task and so concerned with the immediate problems which it faced that it would overlook alternative methods of rehabilitation which would be just as effective as others from the short-run point of view without being in conflict with longer-run interests.

He seemed reassured on this question, however, when it was pointed out that such possibilities could be avoided by policy actions of the Council, on which the representatives of all governments would sit. In expressing his concern over this matter he had had in mind primarily the operating people, e.g. the Director General and his staff, but he recognized that the member governments would be in a position through the Council to establish policies which would require adjustment of rehabilitation programs to longer-run reconstruction objectives so far as practicable.

10. Mr. Acheson said that this provision had been drafted primarily to guard against competitive buying of supplies that might be needed by the war effort or which might otherwise be in short supply. It was designed especially to meet situations created by the efforts of the exiled governments to purchase and hold reserve stocks of supplies for use in their own countries after they have been liberated. The provision in question would require use of the Combined Boards and other existing machinery whenever practicable.

Sir Owen said that Australia was concerned as a seller of supplies and that it was important to his Government to know how much territory the provision would cover. For instance, there was the question of British purchases—would such purchases be for the relief and rehabilitation of victims of war or not?

At this point Mr. Pearson said that Canada had already had some dealings with the Netherlands and Belgian Governments with respect to supplies to be used for their populations after liberation and that Norway was now desirous of making similar purchases. He went on to say, however, that in view of the Draft Agreement for UNRRA the Canadian Government is holding in abeyance any agreement with the Norwegian Government.

Sir Owen said that he thought the whole question was a rather minor matter, but he thought it would be desirable to define this provision more closely in the event that the Agreement is to be redrafted.

11. Mr. Acheson said that he could agree fully with Sir Owen that this point was well taken. It was quite true in his opinion that controls would be required after the war, and it was equally true that the provision in question would not in itself commit governments to such controls. It was to be hoped, however, that governments would take

the necessary action following the initiative which might be taken by the United Nations either under this provision or in some other way.

Sir Owen said that the Australian Government would want to be sure that transportation and purchasing should be held under strict control during the emergency period if supplies themselves were to be kept under control during such a period. He was of the opinion, however, that the concern of the Australian Government over the lack of definite commitment on this point arose primarily from its first understanding that the commitments with respect to contributions by member governments and the controls affecting supplies would be much more rigid than would be the case under the interpretation which Mr. Acheson had given to these provisions. In other words it was the Australians' fear that they would be bound to contribute supplies during a period when other governments would not be bound to contribute shipping or to provide for distribution under control.

Mr. Acheson emphasized the fact that certain controls will continue during the war and that some of them may be continued into the early period of peace. He said that it had not been the intention to create a great system of new controls through signature of the proposed agreement on relief and rehabilitation. That instrument would merely be the starting point for securing agreement between governments on whatever controls would be necessary to supplement the wartime controls already in existence, and each government would have full freedom of action to determine its own policy with respect to the proposals for new controls as these proposals are made.

12. Mr. Acheson said that it is assumed that each government will make appropriations to cover its contribution to UNRRA under Article V, that these appropriations would be used in large part to purchase supplies within the country which would then be transferred to UNRRA as contributions in kind and that some part of the appropriations might be contributed to UNRRA as credits or cash funds for use by the organization elsewhere under certain conditions. He thought that UNRRA would have to have some central fund with which to carry on its operations and with which to make purchases in areas in which all available needed supplies could not be contributed by the government of the area. He thought, however, that UNRRA's purchasing programs would be cleared with the Combined Boards and that wherever they had procurement machinery available UNRRA would make use of such machinery instead of creating its own competing procurement machinery.

Sir Owen said that he understood that it was planned that UNRRA should deal directly with governments and that it would not enter into transactions with individuals unless the governments concerned approved such transactions.

940.50/2267: Telegram

*The Minister in the Union of South Africa (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*

PRETORIA, July 23, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 10:42 p. m.]

192. Referring to Department's circular telegram June 9, 1 p. m., the Union Government has now replied to the Legation's note of June 10th as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to your letter of the 10th June 1943, and to inform you that the Union Government have agreed to become a party to the proposed agreement for the establishment of a United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration.

The obligations thus assumed by the Union Government are interpreted in the light of the following considerations:

(1) The contributions which the Union will render under article V will be limited to contributions in kind.

(2) The maximum extent of such contributions will be determined by the amounts provided from year to year by Parliamentary appropriations.

(3) The amount of such appropriations which the Government will ask Parliament to provide will be settled each year in the light of the financial position of the Union.

(4) In determining the nature and extent of the supplies to be made available from time to time, due account will be taken of the Union's own requirements in respect of such supplies and of the effect of the action proposed to be taken on the domestic situation."

MACVEAGH

840.50/2196b

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Thorold)*<sup>80</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. THOROLD: I shall be able to send you shortly the full Minutes of our discussion on July 21 with respect to the draft agreement for a relief and rehabilitation administration.<sup>81</sup> In the meantime, however, I believe the following notes will be useful to you in connection with an immediate report to your Government on the principal subject involved in that discussion.

<sup>80</sup> The same on the same date to the Chinese Ambassador and the Soviet Chargé.

<sup>81</sup> Copies of the memorandum of discussion on July 21 were transmitted in notes dated August 2.

I believe it was our understanding at the meeting in my office that the British, Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors would communicate with their home governments regarding the present status of negotiations with the other governments centering around the powers and composition of the Central Committee, and that those communications would cover the following points:

A. This Government will continue to make every effort to convince the other governments that the provisions in the draft agreement relating to this point are reasonable and workable, in the hope that all the governments concerned will be prepared to accept these provisions after they are fully understood.

B. It seems desirable, however, for the four Powers to consider in advance what action they will be prepared to take in the event that any appreciable number of the other governments prove to be entirely unwilling to accept the draft in its present form. It is assumed that in such a situation the four Powers would prefer to consider some modification of the powers of the Central Committee rather than an expansion of its membership. A number of changes in the powers of the Central Committee as set forth in the present draft have been suggested by the representatives of various governments who have discussed this matter with officers of the Department of State. These suggestions are set forth below for the consideration of the other three Governments:

1. In Article II drop the power of the Central Committee to admit new members to the Administration between sessions of the Council.

2. Modification of Article III, paragraph 2, so as to authorize a special session of the Council at the request of one-third of its members instead of a majority.

3. In Article III, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, transfer from the Central Committee to the Council, or a nominating committee appointed by the Council, the power to nominate certain members of committees of the Council.

4. In Article VIII remove the exclusive veto power on amendments placed with members of the Central Committee by requiring unanimous agreement of all members of the Council to amendments, or by stating in this provision that any member government may declare that it shall not be bound by an amendment it has not accepted.

5. In Article III, paragraph 3, some limitation of the statement that the Central Committee shall exercise "all the powers and functions" of the Council between sessions of the Council, so as to indicate that it would act only on new policy questions regarding which the Council had not previously taken action.

It will be helpful if the other three Governments will communicate to the Government of the United States their views with respect to these possible changes in the draft set forth above.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

840.50/2294

*The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Romer) to the American Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London*<sup>82</sup>

No. 245/43

LONDON, July 24, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to refer to your note No. 145 of June 10th and to the attached draft agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration which Your Excellency transmitted to me together with an explanatory memorandum for the consideration of my Government.

The Polish Government warmly welcome the initiative taken by the Government of the United States in the establishment of a United Nations organization to give post-war relief to those countries which have suffered most heavily through aggression and occupation in the first instance and later also to all other countries in need of such assistance. In the opinion of the Polish Government this initiative is all the more valuable since the rehabilitation of the invaded and for many years occupied countries, provided for in the draft simultaneously with work of a purely relief nature will enable these countries to regain their economic equilibrium and to develop fully their own productive potentialities.

In these circumstances the Polish Government venture to make the following observations with the object of contributing, as far as lies in their power, to the ultimate success of this first international organization of this kind, planned on such a vast scale. The diversity and at times also complexity of the tasks to be undertaken demands that the administration should be made adaptable to varying conditions often widely differing from each other. It should, at the same time, be flexible so as to enable the appropriate help to be given at the right moment and through the proper channels to those who need it most.

1. Mindful of the above considerations, the Polish Government are of the opinion that the application of a general plan of relief and rehabilitation by the U.N.R.R.A. should be based on national plans, best placed to determine the character and extent of help required by each individual member of the United Nations. This observation would call for an appropriate change in Art. 1. par. 2a of the draft agreement. Such national plans would be coordinated by the proposed Regional Committees which in their turn should have a voice in determining the ultimate extent of aid for the various regions and countries, and the time at which such help should be administered. This would necessitate extending the authority of the Regional Com-

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<sup>82</sup> Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 358, July 24; received July 30.

mittees considerably beyond what is stipulated regarding them by Art. III. par. 5 of the draft agreement. The Regional Committees, being composed of representatives of all the United Nations concerned should be in a position to influence the actual carrying out of the relief and rehabilitation by the Administration. Hence their relations to the respective Deputy Directors General should be of a different character from that defined under Art. IV. par. 4 of the draft agreement. The Polish Government are convinced that such changes would render the draft agreement more democratic without hampering the efficient functioning of the Administration.

II. It would also appear necessary to accentuate the democratic character of the scheme in the provisions dealing with the composition and powers of the Central Committee /Art. III. par. 3 of the draft agreement/. The Polish Government are of the opinion that no compelling reason appears to exist preventing the extension of the Committee by adding to its number at least two representatives of the 9 United Nations of Continental Europe. It should be noted that the population of these countries is of about 135 million in Europe alone and of about 260 million if their overseas possessions are included. They are profoundly interested in the progress of relief and rehabilitation. Their representatives could take their seats in the Central Committee in rotation. Each of them would be representative of territories as different from the point of view of relief and rehabilitation as those of Western and Central-Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, the Polish Government consider that the position of the Council as a policy-making body /Art. III. par. 1/ should not be overshadowed by the parallel position of the Central Committee. This latter body seems to have been devised as a kind of steering committee, advising the Director General in his activities. It should therefore be made clear /under Art. III par. 3/ that the Central Committee is fulfilling its task within the framework of a general policy laid down by the Council, but is not itself a policy-making body.

The following matters should moreover be reserved exclusively for the Council:

1. Formulation and recommendation of measures in matters connected with relief and rehabilitation /Art. 1. par. 2c/.
2. Admission of new members to the organization /Art. II. par. 1/.
3. Appointment of members of standing committees /Art. III. par. 6./.
4. Revoking of the Director General of the Administration /Art. IV. par. 1. in fine/.
5. Exclusive power to determine the relief policy /Art. IV. par. 2 first sentence/.
6. Amendment of provisions of the Agreement /Art. VIII/.

Finally, Art. III. par. 3 provides that representatives of members of the organization not belonging to the Central Committee should be invited to participate in meetings at which questions of special interest to such members are discussed. In the opinion of the Polish Government this equitable and democratic principle should be applied in a way leaving no doubt that the invited representatives shall sit in the Central Committee, take part in its deliberations and vote on equal footing along with its permanent members.

III. The studies already undertaken by the Inter-Allied Committee for Post-War Requirements revealed that a full development of relief and rehabilitation in the European region can only be achieved with the concurrence of the European countries which in their turn are receiving relief and assistance in their rehabilitation. This conviction is expressed under Art. V. par. 1 of the draft agreement itself, which imposes serious responsibilities on the United Nations of Continental Europe. These responsibilities in themselves give support to the argument brought forward regarding the composition of the Central Committee. They further lend support to the claim that the Committee on Supplies should also comprise representatives of those European countries which are likely to take an active part in affording relief to other countries, as soon as the work of their rehabilitation has been sufficiently advanced. This would also necessitate a more precise wording of Art. III, par. 4.

IV. For the same reason the production of every individual country will play an important and at times predominant part towards its own relief and rehabilitation. On the other hand both relief and rehabilitation are intended to create conditions in the liberated countries which would favour a return to a normal economic life and development. On account of these two factors the form of cooperation to be undertaken between the U.N.R.R.A. and the governmental or other authorities of a given country should be determined exclusively by agreement between the government concerned and the Administration.

In the opinion of the Polish Government the principle to be adopted is that, as far as the United Nations are concerned, the international relief organization should assist national relief organizations already existing and functioning in the different interested countries. None the less should any of the United Governments apply to the U.N.R.R.A. requesting it to undertake direct activity in a certain sphere other solutions could also be foreseen.

In any case since relief and rehabilitation on the whole are to be paid for by the receiving countries and in view of the responsibilities laid upon the countries receiving such relief /viz. Art. V. par. 1/ the

stipulations under Art. I. par. 2a in fine would need adjustment to bring them in accord with the principles outlined above.

Furthermore it appears to the Polish Government that Art. VII, dealing with the powers of military authorities, might in its present form, render difficult or delay the taking over of relief distribution by civil authorities. The Polish Government therefore suggest that the words "and other military necessities" and the last sentence be deleted.

The Polish Government limit themselves at the present moment to offer their observations on the afore-mentioned four main categories of questions which appear to them to be of special importance for the efficient and smooth functioning of relief and rehabilitation in the territories of the Allied Nations as they are freed from enemy occupation.

It may be mentioned that the observations outlined above do not cover all the adjustments and amendments which the Polish Government desire to submit at an opportune moment, either in bilateral discussions with representatives of the United States or in the course of the conference, whose purpose it will be finally to adopt the plan for the organization of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

Accept [etc.]

TADEUSZ ROMER

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840.50/2308a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1943—11 p. m.

For Biddle, Netherlands series No. 6; and for Winant. The following note given July 28 to the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires:

"The United States Government has given careful consideration to the observations contained in the Ambassador's note of June 28, 1943, and I offer in response the following comments upon the numbered points covered by that note, in the hope that such comments will be helpful in further consideration of the matter by the Netherlands Government.

1. The Government of the United States is in complete agreement with the Netherlands Government in its judgment of the urgency of adequate preparation for the relief of victims of war, especially in view of the possibility of the early removal of enemy control from areas in which great numbers of civilians are in urgent need.

2. The comments of the Netherlands Government on the composition of the Central Committee seem to indicate an interpretation of the powers and functions assigned to that Committee by the draft agree-



ment which does not seem to be warranted by the terms of the draft. It may be helpful to set forth here this Government's interpretation of the respective roles to be played by the Council, the Central Committee, the other standing committees of the Council, and the Director General.

The Council, as specifically stated in the draft, 'shall be the policy-making body of the Administration.' The Central Committee would be a committee of the Council and not a separate or superior body. Between sessions of the Council, the Central Committee would exercise policy-making functions, should any need arise, on behalf of the Council and responsible to it. On the assumption that the Council would exercise the policy-making functions clearly assigned to it, the Central Committee would be required to supply interim policy decisions only in unforeseen situations. In the case of unexpected developments the Director General would be in a position to summon the Central Committee into immediate session so that he might have its judgment and guidance on any policy matters which had not been covered adequately by decisions of the Council.

The Central Committee would also serve as a nominating committee for the purpose of expediting the organization of the committees of the Council, but all of its nominations would be subject to approval or ratification by the Council.

Membership upon the Council and the standing committees provided by the draft (the Committee of the Council for Europe, the Committee of the Council for the Far East, and the Committee on Supplies of the Council) would assure each member government a full opportunity to participate in those policy-making functions in which it will be most interested. For example, the Committee of the Council for Europe would be in a position to give constant and detailed attention to the formulation of the policies of the organization relating to the relief and rehabilitation program in that area. The Netherlands Government, as well as every other government in the European region, would have a full opportunity, not only through the Council but through this committee as well, to propose those policies which in its opinion would best serve the interests of individual countries and of the European region as a whole. Likewise the interests of the Netherlands East Indies would be fully represented by membership on the Committee of the Council for the Far East. The Committee on Supplies of the Council would give similar representation to supplying governments.

If the organization functions as planned, the initial formulation of policy would rest with the regional committees, the Supplies Committee and such functional committees as the Council may establish. The final determination of policy would rest with the Council.

It is hoped that these observations will make it clear that the Central Committee, under the draft agreement as it now stands, would be an agency of the Council and could not properly supersede it or encroach upon its functions. Neither would the Central Committee be an instrument of administration. In the draft agreement all executive and administrative authority and responsibility is placed with the Director General. He would be expected to have a competent staff composed of many nationalities. This staff would have detailed

knowledge of, and would give detailed attention to, relief and rehabilitation problems and the means of meeting those problems, and would work in the closest collaboration with the regional, supplies, and technical committees where policy would be initially formulated. Under the draft the Director General would have the responsibility of providing secretariat and other facilities to all the committees, and his deputies assigned to any region would work in close collaboration with the regional committees. It would seem clear therefore that the agreement would provide for the closest day-by-day cooperation between the Director General's staff and these committees. The Director General would also of necessity be in constant touch with the governments of areas receiving assistance, under the provisions of Article I, paragraph 2 (a).

In the opinion of this Government the present draft would provide for the full participation of each member government in all of the activities of the Administration in which each would have an interest. It is believed that an organization established along the lines laid down by the draft agreement would operate democratically in the shaping of policies and would provide for efficiency and expedition in the carrying out of the programs based on those policies.

3. It was not intended that the language of Article III, paragraph 3, should indicate that special participation of representatives of member governments in meetings of the Central Committee should include the right to vote. However, the last sentence of Article I, paragraph 2 (a) requires the consent of the member government with respect to activities and measures within territory wherein it exercises administrative authority. Furthermore, should an interim policy decision of the Central Committee on some matter not covered by that provision be contrary to the views of an interested member government, that government might have the matter reviewed by the Council either in the next regular meeting or in a special meeting which could be called at any time at the request of a majority of the members.

4. It would be essential that each government should itself undertake as much responsibility as possible for relief and rehabilitation measures within its own territory, and the quoted section of paragraph 2 (a) of Article I would not preclude an arrangement between the Administration and the member government which would place with the latter full responsibility for such measures. This wording was designed first, to cover the possibility that some governments would desire the assistance of the Administration within their territories and second, to provide for consultation and collaboration between the member government and the Administration in the preparation and determination of plans covering the use of supplies furnished or made available by the Administration, in order that supplies made available through its auspices would be utilized in conformity with the broad policies laid down by the member governments through the Council.

The proposed organization will be ineffective if it is not in a position to secure vast quantities of supplies for relief and rehabilitation. It seems unlikely that the necessary action by supplying governments would be forthcoming without arrangements to assure that the policies determined upon by all the member governments through the Council were carried out.

5. There is nothing in the draft that would preclude representation of any member government or group of member governments on the Supplies Committee. No doubt there will be general agreement however that any working committee, to be effective, must be kept small.

What might be termed the 'consumer countries' will be represented in the organization largely through the regional committees, and collaboration between the producers and the consumers will be provided at the Council level.

6. It is believed that the first point set forth in the Annex to Your Excellency's note is covered by the comments under number 5 above.

The second point mentioned in the Annex is covered in general by the comments under number 2 above. It is pointed out there that each regional committee will have a very important function in the formulation and recommendation of policies which in its opinion would best serve the interests of the region as a whole and of individual countries within the region. It was the view of those who prepared the draft agreement, however, that the function of finally determining the policies of the Administration should be located with the Council at the very center of the Administration, and in case of need between sessions of the Council, with the Central Committee. It would seem to be undesirable to create uncertainties and possible confusion of procedure by assigning to the regional committees the power to determine policies, even in cases of special urgency. It is believed that the explanation under number 2 above with respect to the functions of the Director General will make it clear that under his direction the actual operation of the organization can go forward rapidly and efficiently, even in cases of great urgency; such operations would of course necessarily fall within the broad policies laid down by the Council and its Central Committee and they would be carried out in agreement with the governments in authority in the areas of operation.

The third and fourth points in the Annex might, as you point out, clarify the meaning of the draft and they are therefore receiving the sympathetic consideration of the Department of State in view of the possibility, to which you refer, that there may be textual revision of the draft.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration."

This text is being communicated to the British, Soviet and Chinese Embassies here for their information. It is understood that the Netherlands Government presented to the British Government a note identical to that presented to this Government on June 28, and that the British Government will now reply orally to that note taking a position parallel to that set forth in this Government's reply to the Netherlands, quoted above. If the British desire, the Department would see no objection to someone from the American side participating in the discussion with the Netherlands officials; this might be arranged after clearance between Ambassador Biddle and Ambassador Winant.

HULL

840.50/21966

*The Netherlands Embassy to the Department of State*

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1943.

The Netherlands Government has taken cognizance of the Secretary of State's note of July 28th<sup>83</sup> with regard to the creation of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

At present the Netherlands Government wishes in reply to this note to limit its observations to the composition of the Central Committee.

Notwithstanding the American Government's interpretation of the role to be played by the Central Committee, the Netherlands Government feels that the fact that this committee which has the same policy-making powers as the Council, when the latter body is not in session, could in fact if not in theory make the Central Committee the most important institution of the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Netherlands Government therefore maintains its view that the composition of the Central Committee is too exclusive and too restricted.

The Netherlands Government would furthermore wish to draw attention to the following Tass statement:

"A few days ago the London *Times* and Washington *Star* published reports on negotiations between representatives of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and China concerning the composition of a central committee of 'United Nations Administration of Relief and Rehabilitation,' a draft agreement on the organization of which was adopted by representatives of the above-mentioned States in Washington on June 13, 1943.

"These reports contain the allegation that in the course of negotiations on this subject the representative of the Soviet Union demanded that the composition of the central committee be limited to representatives of the four Powers and that the proposal on an additional inclusion in the committees of representatives of three more states was declined 'under strong pressure of the Soviet Union.'

"Tass has been authorized to state that these allegations do not correspond to the facts. In reality, the proposal that the central committee of the Administration be composed of representatives of the above-mentioned four powers figured from the very beginning in the draft of the United States State Department and this proposal was endorsed by the representative of the Soviet Union."

In view of this authorized statement by the Tass Agency, the Netherlands Government feels that the text of the Draft Agreement might now be successfully reconsidered, and that particularly the

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<sup>83</sup> See telegram of July 28, 11 p.m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *supra*.

composition of the Central Committee be modified on the basis of the suggestions which were made to this effect in Dr. Loudon's note to the Honorable the Secretary of State of June 28, 1943, No. GA-1949.

The Netherlands Government expresses the hope that this view will be shared by the Government of the United States of America and that it will soon be possible to establish a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in which the smaller nations will be adequately represented.

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840.50/21963

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1943.

Participants: Secretary of State Hull, Mr. Van den Broek, Minister of Finance of the Netherlands, and Baron W. van Boetzelaer, Chargé d'Affaires

Mr. Van den Broek, Minister of Finance of the Netherlands, and Baron W. van Boetzelaer, the Chargé d'Affaires, called at their request.

The Chargé handed me a memorandum<sup>84</sup> relative to the pending negotiations among the United Nations with a view to working out an agreement on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation organization. I said that this matter would be given careful consideration.

I then added with some emphasis that, while the Netherlands Government has its problems in relation to this relief proposal, this Government also has its problems which are not without real difficulty. I then said that there is a disposition in Congress to oppose what are considered extravagant promises of excessive aid to other peoples and other countries, especially by self-constituted spokesmen in this country, and that Congress already is insisting on a careful examination of every phase of the proposed project and is making it plain that it is unwilling to vote vast sums of money for relief to be turned over to just any country or countries, large or small, to be distributed; that such other countries may or may not be making any real contribution to relief, but would or might exercise a controlling authority in making the distribution. I said this will not be acceptable to Congress or to my country; that otherwise there is every disposition to work and to cooperate in the fullest and freest manner with the other United Nations.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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<sup>84</sup> *Supra.*

840.50/2327

*The Czechoslovak Ambassador (Hurban) to the Secretary of State*

The Czechoslovak Ambassador presents his compliments to His Excellency, the Secretary of State, and has the honor to transmit herewith for the consideration of the Department of State the following remarks of the Czechoslovak Government in London concerning the Draft Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation:

"The Czechoslovak Government welcomes the Draft Agreement regarding the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and will do all in its power to promote the fulfilment of the Agreement in its final form. The Czechoslovak Government approves of the main lines of the Draft Agreement and accepts it gladly. In view of the fact, however, that the Draft was intended as a basis of discussion it ventures to make the following comments:

1. The Czechoslovak Government considers that the composition of the Central Committee would better correspond to the natural desire of the European Allies, whose territories have suffered under enemy occupation to collaborate in the most effective manner in an organization that is to bring relief to their own nations if these European Allied states also received the right to be represented on the Central Committee in some appropriate form.

2. The Czechoslovak Government also ventures to suggest whether Article II of the Draft should not be modified in such a way as to make the final validity of the admission of new members by the Central Committee dependent upon the approval of the Council. In this respect the Czechoslovak Government bases its attitude upon the consideration that the Agreement on Immediate Relief will be one of the first agreements towards international organization of the liberated world and will in many respects provide a model for the post-war organization of the world in other spheres as well.

The Czechoslovak Government submits these suggestions also because it realises that, as compared with the original proposal, they do not involve any changes regarding the position of the United States of America, Great Britain, the USSR and China, while at the same time a solution would be reached by which the principle of close cooperation on the part of all the Allies would be indicated even more plainly."

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1943.

No. 4848/43

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840.50/2371 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) to the Secretary of State*

SANTIAGO, August 11, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received August 12—6:56 a. m.]

1417. Department's confidential mimeographed instruction July 13, 1943, file 840.50/2191a. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs

today read to the Counselor extracts of a draft of an instruction to the Chilean Ambassador in Washington directing the latter to say that the Chilean Government approved in principle and "abstractly" the plans for a relief and rehabilitation administration and was in accord that a conference should be held at the earliest practicable date to form such an administration. It was the Under Secretary's understanding, however, that acceptance of the idea in principle of the proposed organization and attendance at the conference did not imply that Chile would be expected to sign without alteration the draft agreement prepared by the State Department.

The Chilean Ambassador in Washington was directed in the draft instruction to seek confirmation of the Foreign Office's understanding that attendance at the conference and participation in the administration would in no way obligate the Chilean Government to contributions for international relief and rehabilitation beyond the amount which the Chilean Government itself should decide could be given without prejudice to the national economy.

The Chilean Government moreover inclined strongly to object to the draft agreement in that apparently in practice the powers and functions proposed for the Central Committee whose membership was limited to the four principal belligerents would be given too much power for having decision in the hands of those countries recalling the organization of the League of Nations Council to which Chile and other democratic countries had [apparent omission].

The Counselor answered both objections with the observations of Assistant Secretary Acheson enclosed with the Department's instruction under reference. The Under Secretary however maintained that it would be desirable that there be some alteration or enlargement of the Central Committee which would meet Chile's tentative objections and the similar objections which he thought would be raised by other "democratic states".

Will the Department please instruct me by telegraph as to the observations to be made to the points raised by the Under Secretary and inform me whether there is any objection to handing him a copy informally, perhaps editing out the name of Baron Boel,<sup>85</sup> of the section of the memorandum of Mr. Acheson's conversation relating to the role of the Central Committee, and perhaps also all or certain of the answers to the additional questions raised by Baron Boel.

BOWERS

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<sup>85</sup> Financial Adviser to the Belgian Government.

840.50/2378 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) to the Secretary of State*

SANTIAGO, August 13, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 6:48 p. m.]

1431. In conversation last night Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs asked whether the solution of the problem of the membership of the Central Committee might not be rotating, temporary assignments to the Committee of a delegate or delegates representing the smaller countries. He said that Mexico had raised the same objection as that made by Chile (reference to my telegram No. 1417, August 11, 8 p. m.) and had communicated its objections to the Chilean Foreign Office.

BOWERS

840.50/2382 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 13, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

13. Netherlands series from Biddle. Your 6, July 28, 11 p. m. Ronald of British Foreign Office has told Schoenfeld<sup>86</sup> and Gallman:<sup>87</sup>

1. British are sending Dutch Ambassador Michiels van Verduynen an informal communication indicating that they are in accord with position taken in your note of July 28 regarding UNRRA.

2. British officials have made their position clear on the principal Dutch objections and they see no reason for three-cornered discussions with Dutch at this time.

It was agreed that since Dutch objections appear in large degree to grow out of prestige and political considerations, British on their side and we on our side shall separately seek opportunities to reinforce the position with determining Dutch political personalities with a view to ensuring a satisfactory reply. [Biddle.]

WINANT

840.50/2371 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers)*

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1943—9 p. m.

852. Your 1417, August 11, 8 p. m. The Department would be gratified to have the Chilean Government take the action with respect to the plans for relief and rehabilitation indicated in the draft in-

<sup>86</sup> Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, Counselor of Embassy near the Netherlands Government at London.

<sup>87</sup> W. J. Gallman, First Secretary of Embassy at London.



struction to the Chilean Ambassador in Washington.<sup>88</sup> It would be understood of course that such action would not imply a decision on the part of the Chilean Government to sign the present draft agreement without alteration. Furthermore the signature of the agreement as it now stands would in no way obligate the Chilean Government to contribute for the stated purposes beyond the amount which the Chilean Government itself should decide could be given without prejudice to the national economy. Under the terms of Article V of the draft agreement each member government would retain full power to decide for itself what contributions it should make.

With reference to the composition and functions of the Central Committee, which in the draft agreement is limited to four countries for administrative efficiency, it is believed that the objections raised by the Chilean Government have been fully commented upon in the Department's mimeographed instruction of July 13, 1943 and the enclosures thereto. You are authorized to hand the Undersecretary a memorandum containing such information contained in that instruction and its enclosures as may be useful in fully clarifying this point, omitting reference to Baron Boel and any other similar specific references not pertinent to the general question.

HULL

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840.50/2385 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, August 15, 1943—noon.

[Received August 16—6:50 a. m.]

1419. From Murphy. My 1100, June 14, 9 p. m.<sup>89</sup> Massigli<sup>90</sup> has handed me a memorandum setting forth the views of the French Committee of National Liberation on the subject of the draft agreement for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration of which the principal features are the following:

(1) The Committee welcomes the establishment of the Administration and is ready to give its full cooperation in the preparation of and execution of the proposed measures. The Committee, however, wishes to emphasize a distinction between immediate relief operations on the one hand and longer term reconstruction operations on the other.

(2) With regard to the former which are of an urgent nature the Committee considers it essential that international action be undertaken rapidly by an administration which must have as simple and automatic machinery as possible so that it may be able to take quick decisions and be prepared immediately to accumulate reserves, to coordinate purchases, to utilize available shipping space and to insure

<sup>88</sup> Chilean note dated August 20, 1943, not printed.

<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

<sup>90</sup> René Massigli, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, French Committee of National Liberation.

payments to the suppliers. In order that these immediate and restricted operations can be carried out promptly the Committee believes that the Relief Administration should make use of the services and experiences of organizations which during the war have successfully supplied the Armed Forces and the civilian populations.

(3) Inasmuch as reconstruction involves longer term operations the collaboration of the United Nations will require a different and probably more complex administration than that devoted purely to relief. This matter, however, may be made the subject of subsequent discussions.

(4) At present and in compliance with the provisions of the draft agreement the Committee would like to negotiate as quickly as possible an agreement which would set forth the forms of cooperation to be established between the French Administration and the United Nations Administration. Insofar as France itself is concerned the National Administration will, with the assistance of the United Nations Administration, undertake the responsibility of insuring internal distribution.

(5) Furthermore France's position will enable it to make a substantial contribution in the distribution of relief in Europe. Likewise its interests in Asia and Oceania and its traditional knowledge of these regions fully justify its participation in the settlement of problems related to the Far East.

(6) Therefore the French Committee considers that France should be immediately represented on the Committee of the Council for Europe, on the Committee of the Council for the Far East and on the Committee of Supplies. Likewise the Committee desires that the personnel of the United Nations Administration should include qualified French technicians among its principal officers.

(7) Within the framework of the foregoing observations the Committee agrees to accept the text of the draft agreement and to participate in the proposed organization. It must, however, limit its agreement to the period of relief but will recommend that the provisional government to which it will deliver its powers adhere to the entire agreement. This provisional government would then request such modifications in the United Nations Administration as it might consider necessary.

(8) In this respect the French Committee desires to point out that it is inconceivable that France should not take its place at the appropriate time upon an equal footing with China, U.S., Great Britain and Russia in the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as well as in all councils of the United Nations which shall be responsible for the establishment of peace and for the determination of European and general conditions that will regulate the postwar world.

It is understood that a similar communication is being made to the U.S. Government in Washington.<sup>91</sup> Consequently unless otherwise instructed I shall not telegraph the full text of Massigli's memorandum.

In delivering this communication to me Massigli said he wished to emphasize the urgency of the situation insofar as relief matters were

<sup>91</sup> Memorandum dated August 14, 1943, not printed.

concerned distinguishing those from the longer term rehabilitation problems. He considered it essential that some organization be established as soon as possible to deal with this phase of the problem. He felt that if too much time were lost in discussing phraseology or legal terms of a general agreement the more rapid development of the war would mean that relief problems on a large scale would have to be faced before any organization had been set up. Consequently he thought that the postponement of the United Nations meeting to October was most unfortunate and urged that the meeting be convened at an earlier date to draw up a program which although it might [not?] be perfect could be amended later as conditions required. [Murphy.]

WILEY

840.50/2445

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1943.

Participants: General Bethouart, Chief of the French Military Mission  
 M. Baudet, Acting Chief of the Fighting French Delegation  
 Mr. Acheson  
 Mr. Veatch

General Bethouart handed to Mr. Acheson a note dated Algiers, August 14, 1943,<sup>92</sup> explaining that this was the response of the French Committee of National Liberation to the draft agreement for a United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration which had been placed informally before that Committee by this Government.

Since the text of the note was in French, M. Baudet gave Mr. Acheson a brief résumé of the contents in English as a basis for their discussion.

M. Baudet placed some emphasis upon the statement of the French Committee that it would have to limit its commitment to the organization to the emergency relief period, leaving longer-range commitments with respect to the "reconstruction" functions of the organization to the decision of the provisional government of France when established. (M. Baudet and General Bethouart emphasized, at this point, the provision of the French constitution which would bar the creation of a provisional government for France until half of the total territory of metropolitan France had been liberated). This

<sup>92</sup> Not printed; for summary, see telegram No. 1419, August 15, noon, from the Consul General at Algiers, *supra*.

emphasis led Mr. Acheson to inquire regarding the French Committee's understanding of the two periods which it mentions in its note, explaining that it was the conception of this Government that the proposed organization would undertake only emergency relief and rehabilitation connected with such relief, leaving the longer-range reconstruction problems to other agencies.

Discussion of this point brought out the fact that the French Committee had been confused by the word "rehabilitation" in the English text of the draft agreement, which in French they had translated as "reconstruction." M. Baudet's interpretation of the French position was that there would be no objection to participation by the French Committee in the work of the organization during the emergency period which might include the early stages of rehabilitation as well as relief.

M. Baudet and General Bethouart interpreted the concern of the French Committee to be directed more toward the period of time in which the operations were to take place, and the stage in the liberation of Europe during which they were to take place, rather than the nature of the functions. They were much concerned therefore regarding the division of responsibility between the Military and the proposed United Nations civilian organization during the early stages of relief and rehabilitation. They pressed Mr. Acheson therefore for as full a statement as possible regarding the relationship between the Military and the proposed civilian organization in liberated territories.

Mr. Acheson explained that it would be impossible in advance to say when the function of providing assistance to civilians in liberated areas would be turned over by the military to the proposed organization because the decision would necessarily rest with the Military so long as they were in control of the territory and there would be many unpredictable factors affecting that decision. He indicated however that it might be expected that the Military itself would undertake to meet civilian needs in liberated areas during the period of hostilities in that area and that they might also continue to render such assistance after hostilities had ended if the area were then used as a major base of operations for further military effort. He said however that the Military might very well invite the civilian relief and rehabilitation agency to begin to function in an area still under military control if there would be no conflict between such operations and military necessities.

General Bethouart seemed especially concerned over the relationship and the division of function between the Military and the civilian organizations during the emergency period of relief and rehabilitation in liberated areas, and he seemed somewhat critical of the indefiniteness of the relationship as it was explained by Mr. Acheson.

After the main discussion had been closed, M. Baudet said that he had heard that Governor Lehman's organization and Lend-Lease were joining in studies of probable civilian needs in Europe and that these studies were organized country by country. He said that he would appreciate it if Mr. Acheson could tell him whether this report was correct.

In reply Mr. Acheson explained the purpose of the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination and the country studies being undertaken in connection with its work. M. Baudet then asked whether any foreigners were being invited to contribute materials to these studies and Mr. Acheson assured him that this Government would be in touch with the individual governments concerned at the appropriate time. He said also that the country committees here were using the excellent materials turned out by the Inter-Allied Committee on Postwar Requirements in London as a starting point in their consideration of needs in the European occupied countries—there was no intention here of duplicating the studies already made by the European allied governments through the Leith-Ross Committee.

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840.50/3147

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

Participants: Yugoslav Ambassador  
Mr. Acheson  
Mr. Veatch

Ambassador Fotitch called at Mr. Acheson's suggestion to discuss a number of questions which Ambassador Fotitch had sent to Mr. Acheson under date of July 29. The questions presented in Ambassador Fotitch's questionnaire are set forth below, each question being followed by a summary of the discussion.

1. *Article I, paragraph 2-a.* In the introductory paragraph enumerating the purposes and functions of the Administration amongst others, provides for "the resumption of agricultural and industrial production". This function is not mentioned in Article I, paragraph 2-a. Could this provision be repeated also in connection with this paragraph?

Mr. Acheson explained that the language of Article I, paragraph 2 (a) does cover such emergency agricultural and industrial rehabilitation as would be needed to meet relief requirements and he said that the language of the Preamble was not intended to indicate any broader or more long-term function than this.

2. *Article I, paragraph 2-b.* Will the quantity and kind of relief as well as conditions of delivery be, in the sense of this paragraph, also determined after consultation with and with the consent of the member government?

Ambassador Fotitch explained that this inquiry was intended to relate to Article I, paragraph 2 (a). Mr. Acheson stated that certainly there would be consultation between the Administration and a given member government regarding the quantity and kind of relief to be provided in its territory. He went on to say however that "consent" of a member government would not be particularly involved in such consultation, since presumably the principal question would be whether the Administration would be in a position to provide the quantities and qualities of supplies needed. The Ambassador felt that his Government was primarily concerned with the question of consultation and that the question would be met satisfactorily if a written record of this discussion would cover Mr. Acheson's assurances that there would be consultation on these questions. Mr. Acheson agreed that the record should include such a statement.

3. *Article III, paragraph 2.* Could in case of emergency the Council be convened at the request of at least eight nations?

Mr. Acheson inquired as to why the question referred particularly to eight member governments. In reply the Ambassador pointed out that there were only eight governments of occupied Europe and that he felt that this group of member governments should have the power to bring the Council into special session, especially since the group of American Republics might have this power under the present draft. Mr. Acheson expressed the opinion that it would be undesirable from the point of view of the Council to have the power of calling special sessions in the hands of a very small number of the members, but he said that it might be desirable to set a lower percentage (perhaps one-third) of the total membership empowered to call such a meeting.

4. *Article III, paragraph 3.* Could the representative of a member government request that a matter of special interest for his country, which has been discussed and decided by the Central Committee, be again taken up at the following meeting of the Council.

Should the composition of the Central Committee be modified in the sense that a European continental representative will be added to it, it would be also necessary to introduce a rulement [*sic*] of such representatives.

Mr. Acheson replied in the affirmative to the first paragraph.

5. *Article III, paragraph 4. In connection with Article V, paragraph 3.* Will the European continental countries have a representative in the Council of Supplies and the United Nations agencies?

Ambassador Fotitch requested that this question be reworded as follows:

“Will the European continental countries have a representative in the Committee on Supplies and other committees to be created?”

In reply to this inquiry Mr. Acheson said that under the present draft the Council would have the power of approval of appointments to any of these committees so that it certainly would have a voice in their composition. He also said that consideration might be given to the transfer to the Council of the full appointing power.

6. *Article III, paragraph 5.* Will, in the sense of this paragraph, the European Committee have a right to request that no decision by the Council or the Central Committee concerning European areas be made without previous consultation of it? And will the European Committee, in certain conditions of emergency, have the right of decision?

Mr. Acheson pointed out that the draft did not require such consent but he went on to say that in practice the Committee for Europe would be the principal adviser on all of these matters and that there would be every reason to expect that its advice would be followed. He explained that under the draft agreement the Committee for Europe would not make decisions since it was considered important that decisions on policy should be made at the center of the organization so that there would always be adequate coordination and unity in the policies. The Committee for Europe would formulate and propose and have the greatest influence upon policy actions to be taken by the Council and the Central Committee on subjects concerning Europe. With reference to the last sentence of this inquiry, Mr. Acheson said that the Director General would have full power and authority to take action in cases of emergency subject only to the broad policies adopted by the organization. The regional committees would have an opportunity of course to suggest action to the Director General if they desired to do so.

7. *Article III, paragraph 6.* Does the above mentioned paragraph also provide the institution of a regional technical European sub-committee for the relief of European countries from European resources?

Mr. Acheson pointed out that under the terms of this paragraph regional sub-committees of all technical standing committees can be created if the regional committee so desires. Ambassador Fotitch then asked whether this would exclude action by the regional committee itself in appointing subcommittees to report to it. To this Mr. Acheson replied that there was nothing in the agreement to preclude such action though it would be important obviously to coordi-

nate the work of such sub-committees with the work of the standing committees of the Council.

8. *Article IV, paragraph 4.* Does the provision of this paragraph also contain the creation of a special director general deputy for European affairs who will have direct contact with the European regional committees?

Mr. Acheson said that decisions on the appointment of Deputies would be entirely in the hands of the Director General under the draft agreement. He went on to say that he himself had contemplated the possibility of several Deputy Directors being assigned to work in the European region.

9. *Article V, paragraph 1.* The content of this paragraph should be more specific as to the extent of power of the administration so as not to interfere with the future development and rehabilitation of the national economic policy of the respective countries.

Mr. Acheson said that almost everyone had felt that this paragraph needed to be reworded and he expressed the opinion that it would be revised so that the obligations of a member government under it would be clarified.

10. *Article V, paragraph 2.* Will the foreign volunteer relief agencies have the possibility to engage in activity in specific restricted areas and use its own funds regardless of the amount of relief this area will receive from the relief administration.

Ambassador Fotitch agreed that this question referred to Article IV, paragraph 2 rather than Article V, paragraph 2, as stated in his questionnaire. He went on to clarify the question by saying that Yugoslavia would have a special interest in this matter since there was a possibility that a number of private agencies in this country might wish to send special assistance to Yugoslavia. He mentioned particularly the United Yugoslav Drive in the United States and the activities of various national groups in this country in collecting funds to be used for their friends and relatives in their particular regions. For instance there are estimated to be 100,000 Serbian orphans, and Serbian Americans are already raising funds which they would like to have used for these orphans and other Serbians in need in Yugoslavia. Likewise Slovenian Americans have already raised a considerable fund which they would like to have used for the Slovenian population in Yugoslavia. Ambassador Fotitch went on to say that the wording used in Article IV, paragraph 2 seemed to be too restrictive and severe although he was sure that in practice it would be carried out reasonably and the Director General would only seek to coordinate the activities of private groups.

Mr. Acheson emphasized the fact that the paragraph was directed only to the activities of foreign relief groups *in* the territory of a



government receiving relief assistance. He said that there would be no restriction on action by Yugoslav-Americans in raising any amount of money for orphans or other relief purposes in Yugoslavia if those sums were turned over to the Yugoslav Red Cross or some other local body for administration. In spite of this explanation, however, Ambassador Fotitch still felt that the provision in question could be reworded more happily.

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Ambassador Fotitch inquired as to how the financial side of the organization would be handled. In reply Mr. Acheson said that financial arrangements were divided into two parts, (a) the administrative budget under Article VI, and (b) the provision of supplies, services, etc. by member governments under the provisions of Article V. He said that after the administrative budget had been allocated by the Council each government would have to take separate and specific action to provide its share of the administrative funds. In the case of the provision of supplies, Mr. Acheson said that each individual government presumably would make funds available for contribution of supplies which it could draw from its own resources and that in addition some countries such as the United States might make funds available for purchase of supplies elsewhere for use of the Administration.

Ambassador Fotitch said that he would like to have a written record of what Mr. Acheson had said in response to the questions which the Ambassador had placed before him. He asked whether this would be possible and Mr. Acheson said that he would send him a memorandum of their conversation.<sup>93</sup>

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840.50/2424

*The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State*

No. 577

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honour, on behalf of my Government, to acknowledge the receipt of the draft agreement for the constitution of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which was transmitted by the American Ambassador with a letter of the 10th June last.<sup>94</sup>

My Government have requested me to express to the American Government their great appreciation of the initiative taken. Next to the paramount consideration of winning the war and of liberating Norway and the Norwegian people from the German occupation and oppression, the task of providing, immediately upon the liberation of

<sup>93</sup> The memorandum was sent to the Ambassador on September 9.

<sup>94</sup> See note to the Chinese Ambassador, June 9, p. 908.

the country, for effective relief in the form of food and other necessary supplies for the population and of material for the rebuilding of the country, has been the foremost preoccupation of the Norwegian Government.

The Atlantic Charter, to which the Norwegian Government together with the other Allied Countries have adhered, gives expression to their mutual conviction that this war must not only result in the military defeat of the common enemies, but must also lead to a new international understanding ensuring freedom from want and from fear. The first step towards the realization of this objective must be to assure to the victims of the war and of enemy occupation their subsistence and immediate employment when victory is won. This assurance will give fresh hope to the populations of the occupied countries, and increase their will to resistance against the occupying power. The nationals of these countries, taking active part in the war effort outside their home countries, will also thereby receive further encouragement in their struggle.

The common effort uniting the Allied nations is a firm basis for their cooperation in the work of relief and reconstruction necessitated by the war. This immense task can only be performed by joint action. Each nation must, within the limits of its resources, make its contribution towards meeting urgent needs and adjusting the burdens laid upon them by the war.

In view of the restrictions which in the common interest have been laid upon the different countries with regard to their free purchases of post-war supplies, the Norwegian Government consider it to be of the greatest importance that an interallied organisation should be established which can ensure that the necessary supplies will be available when required. They are therefore fully prepared to participate in discussions with a view to establishing in detail the rules governing an organization such as proposed by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China.

In thus accepting the main principles on which the proposed United Nations organization is based, the Norwegian Government desire to make the following observations with regard to some of the questions which in their opinion are of a special importance in this connection.

At the base of the proposed draft agreement lies the principle that a joint effort on the same lines from a great number of states is necessary for carrying out the work of relief and rehabilitation. At the same time the draft endeavours to find a form of organization by which the effective execution of practical measures is rendered possible. Two main questions of far-reaching importance to future international cooperation are here involved.

1. The first of these questions concerns the sovereignty and the special interests of each particular country. The Norwegian Govern-

ment have noted with satisfaction that the draft confirms that the national government of a country, only with the limitations imposed by actual hostilities or other military necessities, has the right of decision with regard to activities to be performed within its territory, and has the complete control of the carrying out of such activities.

2. The second main question is related to the special position and powers conferred upon the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China, as compared with the other participating countries.

In view of the fundamental importance of this latter question to the future international cooperation, the Norwegian Government find it necessary to observe that an agreement as proposed in the draft would establish a distinction between the four countries mentioned and the other countries which would be inconsistent with the principle of equality between states on which all international cooperation must be based. The Norwegian Government realize, however, the special position which certain countries in fact occupy in connection with questions of supplies because of their vast resources and the importance of their participating in the solution of these problems. They also realize that a change in the composition of the Central Committee by including representatives of other countries would not fully meet the demands of the interests involved in this principle. The Norwegian Government have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the said inconsistency should be corrected, partly by strengthening the Council as the supreme body of the Administration and the most representative organism of the interests concerned, and partly by extending the opportunities for the different member governments to participate in the discussion of actions of special interest to them. This may be done without reducing the efficiency of the Administration, which is of such great importance.

As regards possible additions to and alterations in the draft, the Norwegian Government wish to draw the attention to the following:—

(a) It is suggested that the Council should in all cases have power to discuss proposed measures of the kind referred to in Art. I, paragraph 2 (c) of the draft, and that, therefore, the following provision should be inserted at the end of the paragraph: "Such proposed measures may in all cases be taken up for discussion in the Council".

(b) The Council alone should be empowered to admit new members, and it is therefore proposed that the words "or between sessions of the Council, by the Central Committee" in Art. II should be deleted.

(c) In Art. III, paragraph 3, the second phrase should be worded as follows:—"Between sessions of the Council, it shall exercise all the powers and functions thereof, except when expressly stated in this Agreement that a power or function is exercised by the Council alone".

(d) The following provision should be inserted as the last phrase but one of Art. III, paragraph 3:—"The Government in question

can itself propose that it be admitted to participate in the discussions of such actions in the Committee. In case of difference of opinion between the member government and the Committee as to whether such admission should be granted, the question may be referred to the Council for decision”.

(e) In Art. III, paragraph 4, the expression “member governments likely to be principal suppliers of materials for relief and rehabilitation” is understood to cover governments supplying services, as well as those supplying goods. This entails that also representatives of governments being principal suppliers of transport facilities will become members of the Committee on Supplies.

At the same time the services which overseas transports represent are of such decisive importance that, in the opinion of the Norwegian Government, a special permanent Committee should be established on the same lines as the Committee on Supplies, for considering questions related to such transports.

Both as regards the Committee on Supplies and the proposed Committee on Overseas Transports, provision should be made to the effect that the committees shall invite the participation of the representatives of any member government at those of the meetings at which action of special interest to such government in its capacity of important supplier of goods or services is discussed. Provisions corresponding to those mentioned under paragraph (d) above should also be added, giving the particular member government the power of proposing its own admittance to participation in the discussions, and of bringing the question before the council in case of difference of opinion.

The principle that the consumer interests shall be represented when the question of the provision of supplies is discussed, should further, in the view of the Norwegian Government, be applied, e.g. by the regional committees appointing members representing these interests to sit on the Committee on Supplies and on the proposed Committee on Overseas Transports.

(f) In Art. IV, paragraph 5, the following provision should be inserted after the second phrase of the paragraph:—“If the report affects the interests of a member government in such a way as to render it questionable whether it should be published, such government shall be given the opportunity of expressing its views on the question of publication”.

(g) The final provisions of the draft give no rules as to the formalities to be observed by a member government in case it should wish to terminate its membership of the Administration. It is thought that provisions covering this contingency ought to be included in the agreement.

Whatever the form finally given to the organization, the Norwegian Government deem it necessary to make the reservation that it should not be considered as a precedent for other international organizations which might be established during the war or later.

In making the above observations, my Government have instructed me to inform you that they are fully prepared to discuss informally with the American Government any question arising in connection therewith, and that they would be grateful to receive any comment which your Government might wish to make. In accordance with the

suggestion made by the American Ambassador in his letter of the 10th June last, I have been authorized to represent the Norwegian Government in such informal discussions.

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:  
LARS J. JORSTAD

840.50/2380191a

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the British Chargé (Campbell)*<sup>95</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I transmit to you herewith a memorandum setting forth a number of proposed changes in the draft of May 15, 1943 of an agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.<sup>96</sup> The Government of the United States is of the opinion that these changes would be desirable either as clarifying or improving the draft agreement. The changes are suggested by the Government of the United States after further careful study of the draft agreement within the United States Government and in the light of discussions of that draft with the representatives of many of the United Nations and the Nations associated with them in the war.

It will be appreciated if you will bring these suggested changes in the draft agreement to the attention of the British Government and if you will ascertain as promptly as possible whether your Government will join with my Government and the Soviet and Chinese Governments in supporting these changes. A similar inquiry is being made at the same time of the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government through their Embassies in Washington.

If your Government and the Soviet and Chinese Governments are in agreement with my Government with respect to the proposed changes in the draft agreement, my Government will be prepared to place the draft, revised in these respects, before the other United Nations and the Nations associated with them in the war, and to express the hope that the draft so revised will be accepted by those Governments and that they will join with the British, Soviet, Chinese and United States Governments in signing the agreement at a specified date and place. My Government would expect to confer further with your Government and with the Soviet and Chinese Governments with respect to

<sup>95</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the Chinese Ambassador and the Soviet Chargé.

<sup>96</sup> See text released to the press on June 10, 1943, Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1943, p. 524.

the time and place to be set for this purpose before communicating with the other Governments.

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

[Enclosure—Memorandum]

Proposed revisions of the draft of May 15, 1943 of an Agreement for  
a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration:

*Preamble (Third Paragraph) :*

Being determined that immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes, for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services.

*Article I, paragraph 2(a) :*

To plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing and other basic necessities, housing facilities, medical and other essential services; and to facilitate in such areas, so far as necessary to the adequate provision of relief, the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services. The form of activities of the Administration within the territory of a member government wherein that government exercises administrative authority and the responsibility to be assumed by the member government for carrying out measures planned by the Administration therein shall be determined after consultation with and with the consent of the member government.

*Article I, paragraph 2(b) :*

To formulate and recommend measures for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments for the coordination of purchasing, the use of ships and other procurement activities in the period following the cessation of hostilities, with a view to integrating the plans and activities of the Administration with the total movement of supplies, and for the purpose of achieving an equitable distribution of available supplies. The Administration may administer such coordination measures as may be authorized by the member governments concerned.

*Article I, paragraph 2(c):*

To study, formulate and recommend for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments measures with respect to such related matters, arising out of its experience in planning and performing the work of relief and rehabilitation, as may be proposed by any of the member governments. Such proposals shall be studied and recommendations formulated if the proposals are supported by a vote of the Council, and the recommendations shall be referred to any or all of the member governments for individual or joint action if approved by unanimous vote of the Central Committee and by vote of the Council.

*Article II:*

The members of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shall be the governments or authorities signatory hereto and such other governments or authorities as may upon application for membership be admitted thereto by action by the Council. The Council may, if it desires, authorize the Central Committee to accept new members between sessions of the Council.

Wherever the term "member government" is used in this Agreement it shall be construed to mean a member of the Administration, whether a government or an authority.

*Article III, paragraph 1:*

Each member government shall name one representative, and such alternates as may be necessary, upon the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which shall be the policy-making body of the Administration. The Council shall, for each of its sessions, select one of its members to preside at the session. The Council shall determine its own rules of procedure. Unless otherwise provided by the Agreement or by action of the Council, the Council shall vote by simple majority.

*Article III, paragraph 2:*

The Council shall be convened in regular session not less than twice a year by the Central Committee. It may be convened in special session whenever the Central Committee shall deem necessary, and shall be convened within thirty days after request therefor by one-third of the members of the Council.

*Article III, paragraph 3:*

The Central Committee of the Council shall consist of the representatives of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, with the Director General presiding, without vote. Between sessions of the Council it shall when necessary make policy decisions of an emergency nature. All such decisions shall be recorded in the minutes of the Central

Committee which shall be communicated promptly to each member government. Such decisions shall be open to reconsideration by the Council at any regular session or at any special session called in accordance with Article III, paragraph 2. It shall invite the participation of the representatives of any member government at those of its meetings at which action of special interest to such government is discussed. It shall invite the participation of the representative serving as Chairman of the Committee on Supplies of the Council at those of its meetings at which policies affecting the provision of supplies are discussed.

*Article III, paragraph 4:*

The Committee on Supplies of the Council shall consist of the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing those member governments likely to be principal suppliers of materials for relief and rehabilitation. The members shall be appointed by the Council, and the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make emergency appointments between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The Committee on Supplies shall consider, formulate and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies designed to assure the provision of required supplies. The Central Committee shall from time to time meet with the Committee on Supplies to review policy matters affecting supplies.

*Article III, paragraph 5:*

The Committee of the Council for Europe shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments of territories within the European area, and such other members of the Council, representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the European area, as shall be appointed by the Council; the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make these appointments in cases of emergency between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The Committee of the Council for the Far East shall consist of all the members of the Council, or their alternates, representing member governments of territories within the Far Eastern area, and such other members of the Council representing other governments directly concerned with the problems of relief and rehabilitation in the Far Eastern area as shall be appointed by the Council; the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make these appointments in cases of emergency between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. The regional committees shall normally meet within their respective areas. They shall consider and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies



with respect to relief and rehabilitation within their respective areas. The Committee of the Council for Europe shall replace the Inter-Allied Committee on European postwar relief established in London on September 24, 1941 and the records of the latter shall be made available to the Committee for Europe.

*Article III, paragraph 6:*

The Council shall establish such other standing regional committees as it shall consider desirable, the functions of such committees and the method of appointing their members being identical to that provided in paragraph 5 of this Article with respect to the Committees of the Council for Europe and for the Far East. The Council shall also establish such other standing committees as it considers desirable to advise it, and, in intervals between sessions of the Council, to advise the Central Committee. For such technical standing committees as may be established, in respect of particular problems such as nutrition, health, agriculture, transport, repatriation, and finance, the members may be members of the Council or their alternates nominated by them because of special competence in their respective fields of work. The members shall be appointed by the Council, and the Council may authorize the Central Committee to make emergency appointments between sessions of the Council, such appointments to continue until the next session of the Council. Should a regional committee so desire, subcommittees of the technical standing committees shall be established by the technical committees in consultation with the regional committees, to advise the regional committees.

*Article IV, paragraph 1:*

The executive authority of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration shall be in the Director General, who shall be appointed by the Council on the nomination by unanimous vote of the Central Committee. The Director General may be removed by the Council on recommendation, by unanimous vote, of the Central Committee.

*Article IV, paragraph 5:*

The Director General shall make periodic reports to the Central Committee and to the Council covering the progress of the Administration's activities. The reports shall be made public except for such portions as the Central Committee may consider it necessary, in the interest of the United Nations, to keep confidential; if a report affects the interests of a member government in such a way as to render it questionable whether it should be published, such governments shall have an opportunity of expressing its views on the question of publication. The Director General shall also arrange to have prepared periodic reports covering the activities of the Administration

within each region and he shall transmit such reports with his comments thereon to the Council, the Central Committee and the respective regional committees.

*Article V, paragraph 1:*

In so far as its appropriate constitutional bodies shall authorize, each member government will contribute to the support of the Administration in order to accomplish the purposes of Article I, paragraph 2 (a). The amount and character of the contributions of each member government under this provision will be determined from time to time by its appropriate constitutional bodies. All such contributions received by the Administration shall be accounted for.

*Article V, paragraph 3:*

All purchases by any of the member governments, to be made outside their own territories during the war for relief or rehabilitation purposes, shall be made only after consultation with the Director General, and shall, so far as practicable, be carried out through the appropriate United Nations agency.

*Article VI:*

The Director General shall submit to the Council an annual budget, and from time to time such supplementary budgets as may be required, covering the necessary administrative expenses of the Administration. Upon approval of a budget by the Council the total amount approved shall be allocated to the member governments in proportions to be determined by the Council. Each member government will, in so far as its appropriate constitutional bodies shall authorize and approve, contribute to the Administration its share of the administrative expenses so determined.

*Article VIII:*

The provisions of this Agreement may be amended as follows:

a. Amendments involving new obligations for member governments shall require the approval of the Council by a two-thirds vote and shall take effect for each member government on acceptance by it;

b. Amendments involving modification of Article III or Article IV shall take effect on adoption by the Council by a two-thirds vote, including the votes of all the members of the Central Committee;

c. Other amendments shall take effect on adoption by the Council by a two-thirds vote.

*Article IX:*

This Agreement shall enter into force with respect to each signatory on the date when the Agreement is signed by that signatory, unless otherwise specified by such signatory. Any member government may give notice of withdrawal from the Administration at any time after the expiration of six months from the entry into force of the Agree-

ment for that government. Such notice shall take effect twelve months after the date of its communication to the Director General subject to the member government having met by that time all financial, supply or other material obligations accepted or undertaken by it.

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840.50/2439a

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives*<sup>97</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1943.

Sirs: With further reference to the draft, of May 15, 1943, of an agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Department's circular instruction of July 13, 1943 relating thereto, there is enclosed for your information a copy of a memorandum of proposed changes in the draft agreement.<sup>98</sup> This Government is not yet in a position to place these proposals before the other governments which have been considering the draft agreement but it may be able to do so shortly. The texts of the proposed changes are being communicated to you at the present time so that they will be in your hands when the Department can give you definite instructions regarding the way in which a revised draft of the agreement is to be placed before the other Governments. It is expected that those instructions will be telegraphed to you since it is desired to expedite the final decision on this matter as much as possible. Those instructions would include any necessary revision in the texts being transmitted to you herewith.

In spite of the excellent cooperation of the American Missions in the capitals listed above,<sup>99</sup> it has proved impossible to bring the negotiations to the point where a conference could be called during September. It is now the hope that it will be possible to arrange for signature of the agreement and the launching of the proposed Administration through the first meeting of its Council by the end of October. It is the intention of this Government, however, to give the other Governments concerned at least six weeks advance notice of the possible time of such a meeting. If officials of the Government to which you are accredited are concerned regarding the possible timing of such a meeting you may indicate informally the possibility set forth above.

At the time this Government proposes definite action with respect to signature of the draft agreement and establishment of the projected Administration, an effort will be made to give other Governments the

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<sup>97</sup> Sent to chiefs of mission accredited to Governments comprising the United Nations (except China, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and to the Governments associated with them in the war.

<sup>98</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>99</sup> See footnote 97, above.

benefit of this Government's conception of the desirable scope or nature of the meeting and some indication as to the composition of the delegation which this Government will send to the meeting.

There is enclosed also for your information a list of the favorable responses which other Governments have made <sup>1</sup> to date to this Government's initiative in placing the draft agreement before them.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
BRECKINRIDGE LONG

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840.50/23801<sup>1</sup>/<sub>16</sub>

*The Netherlands Ambassador (London) to the Secretary of State*

GA-2970

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1943.

SIR: Acting upon instructions I have the honor to inform you that the Netherlands Government has greatly appreciated the comments contained in your note of July 28th <sup>2</sup> concerning the draft of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which was submitted to the Governments of the United Nations by the Government of the United States of America.

The Netherlands Government has carefully studied the arguments which have been advanced in your above-mentioned note; however, the Netherlands Government does not find these arguments entirely convincing. This applies especially with regard to the fact that whereas under the terms of the draft convention it is possible in theory that decisions and, in general, action taken by the Central Committee can be appealed to the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, those countries which are not represented on the Central Committee can be confronted by said Committee with accomplished facts from which no appeal is possible.

Therefore, the Netherlands Government cannot but maintain its objections which have previously been brought to Your Excellency's attention. However, in view of the urgency that an adequate organization for the relief of the victims of war be established, the Netherlands Government is prepared to acquiesce in the proposals of the United States Government as laid down in the draft agreement which was annexed to your note of June 9, 1943.

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<sup>1</sup> List not attached to file copy. On August 19, Assistant Secretary of State Acheson stated that all responses received by the United States Government with respect to the draft agreement had been favorable with the exception of notes from four Governments which were somewhat critical and which suggested certain changes in the agreement, and certain inquiries which had been received orally; also that in addition to the eighteen Governments which had already made some favorable formal response, a number of other Governments had indicated informally that a favorable response had been drafted or would be presented shortly. (840.50/3288a)

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Netherlands series No. 6, July 28, 11 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 957.

The Netherlands Government, nevertheless, wishes to make it absolutely clear that this willingness to cooperate in this matter should never be interpreted as an acceptance of the principles involved if at any time in the future, contrary to the expectations of the Netherlands Government, a similar setup should be proposed with regard to other international organizations or arrangements.

Please accept [etc.]

A. LOUDON

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840.50/2481a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

[Extracts]

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1943—7 p. m.

743. Reference Department's no. 724, August 21, 2 p. m.<sup>3</sup> The Department wishes you to take whatever steps you consider appropriate and wise to endeavor to secure the Soviet Government's early acceptance of the proposed changes in the draft agreement on relief and rehabilitation. Parenthetically, you are advised Litvinov is fully informed regarding the problems faced by the four Governments in developing the draft of May 15.

The Department is hopeful that the Soviet Government will act on these changes at an early date. The objective now is to sign the agreement and launch the United Nations organization around the first of November but it is considered necessary to give governments 6 weeks notice of the proposed date and responses must be received from the Soviet, British and Chinese Governments before this notice can be given.

When you find opportunities to discuss this matter with appropriate officials of the Soviet Government you can stress the hope of this Government that each of the other three great Powers will be able to accept all of the changes so that this Government can be in a position promptly to propose the signature of that text by all governments, without further negotiation. This Government is of the opinion that the proposed changes are in the nature of an improvement of the text and that they will aid in securing the full cooperation of all governments in the projected organization. This Government is also of the opinion that the proposed changes do not modify the essential powers or procedures of the organization substantially; this is particularly true of the powers of the Central Committee, which have been modified in various minor respects but which remain unchanged in all essential respects, without any change in the composition of the Committee.

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<sup>3</sup>Not printed.

The Department is informed that the Soviet Embassy here has already telegraphed the full text of the proposed changes to the Soviet Government. For your information the following are the principal changes proposed in the draft of May 15:

If the Soviet Government is particularly concerned regarding any of the suggested changes, please inform the Department promptly so that you can be given a full explanation to place before that Government.

HULL

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840.50/2450; Telegram

*The Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) to the Secretary of State*

SANTIAGO, August 25, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received August 26—2:57 a. m.]

1498. The Embassy has received a note from the Foreign Office dated August 22 [20] stating Chilean Government "sympathizes fully with the idea of cooperating within the limits of its possibilities in the praiseworthy work of the aiding and rebuilding of zones of countries devastated by the present conflagration".

Although in compliance with Department's SC telegraphic instruction 852 of August 14, 1943, fully clarifying reassurance was given to the Foreign Office with regard to its misgivings concerning the financial commitments that participation in the Relief Administration might entail and also regaining [*regarding?*] the composition of the Central Committee of the Administration, these objections are again recited in the note which presumably had already been drafted at the time the Counselor had his conversation with Under Secretary recounted my telegram 1417, August 11, 8 p. m.

The note, however, exposes a new objection to the draft agreement in that it recommends that "decisions of the Committee should be adopted by unanimity and not by a majority of the votes". The note goes on to say that the Foreign Office is aware that this system presents "certain inconveniences as regards arriving at rapid decisions" but it is evident that basis a procedure of unanimity would count with greater sympathies and avoid difficulties and opposition which would be interposed by those nations who saw themselves constrained to execute certain acts or to take measures in virtue of resolutions approved by a majority, at times an occasional majority.

In conversation the Under Secretary was a little apologetic as regards this last objection, asserting that he thought in practice the required unanimity would prove to be equivalent to a majority rule. He said that he realized that the proposed Relief Administration was

not a precursor of another League of Nations but he was afraid that the proposed provision for a simple majority decision in matters of relief policy might be used as a precedent in any future international political organization.

BOWERS

840.50/2380j

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the British Minister (Hall)*<sup>4</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. HALL: I wish to refer to the memorandum setting forth proposed changes in the draft, of May 15, 1943, of an agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which Mr. Acheson placed before you on August 19. Subsequent consideration of these changes in the Department has led to the conclusion that this Government would prefer to modify those changes in the following regards:

*Article II.* In the first paragraph the last phrase in the first sentence should read "by action of the Council" instead of "by action by the Council".

*Article III. paragraph 3.* The next to the last sentence should begin "The Central Committee shall invite the participation of the representatives of any member government" instead of "It shall invite the participation of the representatives of any member government."

*Article VI.* The last sentence should read "Each member government undertakes, subject to the requirements of its constitutional procedure, to contribute to the Administration promptly its share of the administrative expenses so determined", instead of "Each member government will, in so far as its appropriate constitutional bodies shall authorize and approve, contribute to the Administration its share of the administrative expenses so determined."

*Article IX.* The last two sentences, which were added to the original Article IX, should be dropped from Article IX and added to the Agreement as "Article X, Withdrawal".

Article IX would then read: "This Agreement shall enter into force with respect to each signatory on the date when the Agreement is signed by that signatory, unless otherwise specified by such signatory."

Article X would then read: "Any member government may give notice of withdrawal from the Administration at any time after the expiration of six months from the entry into force of the Agreement for that government. Such notice shall take effect twelve months after the date of its communication to the Director General subject to the member government having met by that time all financial, supply or other material obligations accepted or undertaken by it."

<sup>4</sup>The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the Chinese Ambassador and the Soviet Chargé.

It will be appreciated if you will inform your Government that this Government wishes to modify the Memorandum of the proposed changes in these respects and hopes that your Government will find these modifications acceptable.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

840.50/2477 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Ecuador (Scotten) to the Secretary of State*

QUITO, August 30, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

759. Embassy's 697, August 9, 6 p. m.<sup>5</sup> Note from Foreign Office marked confidential states Ecuador is disposed to adhere in principle to the draft agreement but proposes that the following sentence be added to article VI: "This proportionate share shall be fixed by taking into consideration the economic situation of each nation, represented by its respective government, member of the administration of the Allied Nations."

Text being forwarded to Department by today's airmail pouch.<sup>6</sup>

SCOTTEN

840.50/3146

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy Veatch of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations*

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1943.

Participants: Noel Hall, Minister, British Embassy

Mr. Acheson

Mr. Kermit Roosevelt<sup>7</sup>

Mr. Veatch

I. Mr. Hall informed Mr. Acheson that the British Government had accepted all of the proposed modifications of the draft agreement of May 15.

II. Mr. Hall added, however, that at the same time the British Government wished to suggest an addition to Article IX or some other means of handling the situation which might arise under that Article. It seemed to the British Government to be possible that some few governments would attach reservations to their signature of the agreement, with respect to later ratification, which would delay the coming into force of the agreement in the case of those govern-

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Note dated August 28, not printed.

<sup>7</sup> Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson.



ments. In the opinion of the British Government, therefore, some arrangement should be made in advance to meet the possibility that some governments would not be in a position to participate in the first Council meeting.

Mr. Hall left with Mr. Acheson the language of paragraphs two and three of the British telegram on this subject so that he might have in detail the British Government's suggestions with respect to alternative ways of meeting this situation. These paragraphs read as follows:

[Here follow proposals either that any government signing the agreement be accepted as a provisional member of UNRRA pending the coming into force of the agreement with respect to that government or that the conference convened to sign the agreement itself set up a provisional Director General and interim organization pending the convening of the Council after ratification of the agreement by the member states. There was also discussion of the means of expediting the establishment of the organization.]

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840.50/2516: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Chile (Heath)*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1943—11 p. m.

1001. Reference your despatch 7390, August 25.<sup>8</sup> The Chilean Ambassador has discussed the content of the Chilean note with the Department and no doubt he will report to his Government the observations made by Mr. Acheson. It will be appreciated however if you will give the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs the following information orally, with reference to his note of August 20:

1. This Government is restudying the provisions of the draft relating to the Central Committee in an effort to clarify its powers and functions.

2. It is hoped that the Chilean Government will give further consideration to its suggestion with respect to unanimous voting by the Council. It would seem that difficulties placed in the way of decisions by the Council would have the effect of throwing greater responsibility upon the Central Committee and the Director General. It may be that the Chilean Government's principal concern was based on the assumption that the Council could create new obligations for member governments and that the explanation in the following paragraph will remove this concern.

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<sup>8</sup> Despatch not printed; but see telegram No. 1498, August 25, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in Chile, p. 987.

3. All decisions with respect to actual contributions or financial and supply commitments by a member government must be made by that government, and the Council, Central Committee and Director General will have no power to make such decisions. This Government is studying means of clarifying the text of Article V so that there will be no misunderstanding on this point.

4. It will be recalled that the possibility of holding a conference of the United Nations on this subject in September was dependent upon favorable responses from all Governments during July. The responses of many Governments were delayed as in the case of the Chilean Government and it is now impossible of course to arrange a meeting in September. In the meantime the rapid development of the military situation has made more urgent than ever the need for the proposed United Nations organization and many Governments are pressing for prompt action in setting up the organization. This Government is making an effort therefore to get the language of the draft agreement into the form which will be most acceptable to all Governments and it hopes very soon to place a revised text before all Governments concerned, with the suggestion that that text be accepted, and signed at a ceremony at the White House in Washington at the earliest date possible. This may be possible by the first of November. This Government would also suggest that the Council of the new organization meet, at a place yet to be selected, immediately after signature of the agreement.

5. The comments and suggestions already presented by the Chilean Government are being given the most careful consideration in connection with a redraft of the agreement and it is hoped that the new text will be acceptable to the Chilean Government.

HULL

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840.50/2481a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1943—8 p. m.

860. Department's 743, August 25, 7 p. m. No reply has yet been received from the Soviet Government although a further note was sent to the Soviet Embassy here on September 10 [9]<sup>9</sup> saying that this Government hoped to have replies from the Soviet and Chinese Governments by September 15 so that arrangements could be made for signature of the agreement before the end of October.

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<sup>9</sup> Notes dated September 9 sent to the British Minister, the Chinese Ambassador, and the Soviet Chargé, not printed.

At the same time the Soviet Embassy and the British and Chinese Embassies were asked to secure the reactions of their Governments to the proposal of this Government that the agreement should be signed at a ceremony in the White House in Washington and that the Council should meet immediately thereafter at a place to be selected outside of Washington. Inquiry was made also as to whether these Governments would be prepared themselves to sign the agreement without reservation under Article IX.

The British and Chinese Governments have stated that the proposed modifications of the draft and the procedural arrangements are acceptable and that they are prepared to sign the agreement without reservation.

A note is being sent to the Soviet Embassy today<sup>10</sup> expressing the hope that the Chargé will send a further telegram to Moscow stating the situation and requesting that responses to the various points raised be expedited so far as possible. The note to the Embassy also states that you have been kept informed of these matters and that you will be prepared to discuss them with the Soviet Government if that would be helpful.

It will be appreciated if you will take whatever steps appear to you appropriate and helpful in securing early action by the Soviet Government. The Department would also appreciate a report from you regarding the attitudes or intentions of the Soviet Government on this matter.

HULL

840.50/2550 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 18, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received September 19—10:53 a. m.]

1399. Department's 860, September 16, 8 p. m. The Embassy has on several occasions requested that the reply of the Soviet Government concerning the proposed modifications of the draft be expedited. The Foreign Office today informed the Embassy in response to a further inquiry that on September 17 the Soviet Ambassador in Washington was instructed to inform the Department that the Soviet Government had no objection to the proposed modifications and that arrangements may accordingly be made for signing of agreement within the period desired.<sup>11</sup>

STANDLEY

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> The Soviet Chargé telephoned the Department on September 18 that the reply of his Government was 100 percent agreement with the suggestions made in the letter of August 19.

840.50/2559 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson) to the Secretary of State*

MONTEVIDEO, September 21, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received September 22—11:16 a. m.]

856. Reference Embassy's airgram 412, August 3, noon.<sup>12</sup> The Foreign Office has forwarded by airmail to the Uruguayan Ambassador in Washington an instruction directing him to advise the Department substantially as follows:

Uruguay accepts in principle the draft agreement for a relief and rehabilitation administration with the following "specifications".

1. That the associated Nations and the United Nations joining the Administration shall be placed on a footing of perfect and absolute equality of treatment.

2. That from the composition, powers and method of functioning of the different organs, it is obvious that the countries represented on the Central Committee will predominate in the direction of the Administration. The Uruguayan Government accepts this arrangement in view of the fact that the principal burden of relief and rehabilitation in the liberated zones will fall on those countries and particularly because of the special connection between the Administration's activities and the course of military operations. However the Uruguayan Government wishes to make clear that this does not imply the establishment of a precedent for other post-war organizations with regard to which it will in general maintain the American principle of the equality of states and it will consider undesirable the distinction between great and small powers.

The Foreign Office adds for the Ambassador's information that Colombia and other American countries made representations with a view to the formation of a regional bloc to advocate equality in the organization of the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration<sup>13</sup> in which Uruguay did not consider it desirable to join for the reasons already set forth and because it does not deem it opportune to follow regionalistic tendencies which might perturb the unity of action indispensable in all matters relative to postwar problems.

I am forwarding to the Department by airmail a copy of the Foreign Office's instruction in question.<sup>12</sup>

DAWSON

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<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

<sup>13</sup> See vol. v, section entitled "Proposal by Colombia for consultation among American Republics not at war regarding status as to cooperation with the United Nations, especially in UNRRA."

840.50/2567a : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives*<sup>15</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943—9 p. m.

Department's circular telegram of June 9 and circular instruction of August 23. You are requested to present a note to the appropriate official of the Government to which you are accredited on September 23 or as soon thereafter as possible, using the following text as the body of the note. The introductory paragraphs of the note will be sent to you by separate telegram.<sup>16</sup> Similar notes will be presented to all of the other Governments which received the draft agreement and to the French Committee of National Liberation. The texts of these notes are being communicated to the respective diplomatic representatives in Washington for their information.<sup>17</sup> Please request the Government to which you are accredited to hold the text of the draft agreement confidential until 9:00 p. m. Eastern War Time, September 23. Release for publication can then be made simultaneously in all countries at that hour.

"Since the draft agreement was first presented my Government has received a number of suggestions from the Governments concerned with respect to modification of the draft and all of these suggestions have been studied with care. As a result the draft agreement has been modified to a considerable degree in an effort to improve the plan and to clarify the language. It is the hope of my Government that your Government will share the opinion that the text submitted herewith<sup>18</sup> is now in the form in which it will be most acceptable to all of the Governments which have been giving consideration to this matter.

Many Governments have stressed the urgent need of prompt action on the lines proposed. The Government of the United States fully shares this sense of urgency and is taking the initiative therefore in

<sup>15</sup> Sent to the chiefs of mission accredited to Governments comprising the United Nations (except China, Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and to the Governments associated with them in the war. Telegrams Nos. 1717, 1723, and 1724, of the same date, were sent to the Consul at Algiers, with instructions regarding the presentation of the note and draft agreement modifications to the French Committee.

On September 22 telegrams were sent to the chiefs of mission in China (No. 1347), the United Kingdom (No. 5830), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No. 892), with instructions regarding the transmission of the note and draft agreement modifications for the information of the Government to which accredited.

On September 23 telegram No. 1405 was sent to the Legation in Egypt for transmission to the Minister in Ethiopia, with instructions regarding presentation of the note and revised text of draft agreement to the Ethiopian Government.

<sup>16</sup> Numbered telegrams, dated September 21, not printed; the introductory paragraphs of the note which they transmitted were concerned merely with past correspondence with each Government on the subject.

<sup>17</sup> Notes, dated September 23, to the respective diplomatic representatives in Washington, not printed.

<sup>18</sup> For complete text of the September 20 draft, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 25, 1943, p. 211.

placing before each of the Governments concerned the following specific proposals:

1. That each Government inform the Government of the United States at the earliest possible moment whether it is prepared to sign the draft agreement in the form in which it is now presented.

2. That each Government also inform the Government of the United States as to whether it is prepared to sign the agreement without any reservation under Article IX. It is hoped that all Governments can take this action so that the agreement may enter into force immediately after signature with respect to all signing Governments.

3. That each Government appoint a representative with full power and authority to join with the representatives of the other Governments in signing the agreement at the White House in Washington on or about November 9.

4. That each Government select in advance its representative on the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration which will be brought into existence by signature of the agreement, and such alternates, advisers and assistants to this representative as it shall wish to have present at the first session of the Council.

5. That the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration be convened in its first session at a place within the United States but outside of Washington a day or two after signature of the agreement.

It will be appreciated if your Government will transmit its views with respect to these proposals to my Government as promptly as possible.

The Government of the United States is prepared to make specific arrangements for signature of the agreement and for the first session of the Council and it will transmit information regarding such arrangements to each Government planning to sign the agreement. If it would be helpful to other Governments in reaching a decision as to the size and character of the delegations to be chosen to attend the first session of the Council, my Government also will transmit to such Governments information regarding the general character of the delegation which will represent the Government of the United States.

In order to expedite action by the Council, my Government will be prepared also, as the host Government, to lay before the Council for its consideration drafts covering its temporary organization and rules of procedure, and the agenda for its first session.

It is the hope of the Government of the United States that the Government of . . . . and the Governments of all of the other United Nations and of the Nations associated with them in this war will be prepared to take the action suggested above so that an effective organization may be established promptly to act for all of these Governments in providing the greatest possible assistance to the victims of the war."

You should present the full text of the draft agreement, designating it "draft of September 20, 1943" and incorporating the modifications

transmitted in the Department's circular instruction of August 23, with the following changes:

1. In the revised text of the Preamble substitute "and" for the last comma preceding "for assistance in" and change the final period to a comma.

2. Use the text of Article VI as transmitted to Governments on June 10, substituting "undertakes" for "pledges itself" in the last sentence, instead of the modification quoted in the circular instruction of August 23.

3. In Article I paragraph 2(a) first sentence add "shelter" after "clothing" and delete "housing facilities".

HULL

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[Replies to circular telegram of September 21, 1943, 9 p. m., not printed, except those in which points of special interest were raised. A number of Governments accepted the agreement with reservations; see bracketed note printed on page 1013.]

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840.50/2579 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Bolivia (Boal) to the Secretary of State*

LA PAZ, September 24, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 2:43 p. m.]

1568. Reference the Department's circular telegram dated September 21, 9 p. m. and No. 1177 of September 21.<sup>19</sup> When the note with the new draft of the agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was presented to the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Subsecretary for Foreign Affairs said that he believed it advisable to clarify definitely the position of the Bolivian Government with respect to the agreement. He said that the Bolivian Government was not prepared to sign the agreement if it were to imply any obligation whatever on the part of the Bolivian Government to make expenditures of funds or materials for relief or rehabilitation. He said that if it were only a question of Bolivia's lending its "moral" support in the Administration, through signature of the agreement, that would change in [*sic*] the situation entirely and Bolivia would very probably be prepared to sign. Since it would be embarrassing to Bolivia to make a formal reply to the note in the telegrams under reference, without a clarification of the obligation which may be implied by signature, it would be appreciated if the Department could clarify this point completely by telegraph.

With respect to the Department's circular telegram of September 23<sup>20</sup> concerning publication of the agreement, the lengthy chore of

<sup>19</sup> Latter not printed, but see footnote 16, p. 994.

<sup>20</sup> Not printed.

translation into Spanish of the revised draft prevents simultaneous publication in Bolivia but the Subsecretary for Foreign Affairs said that the Ministry would try to give a Spanish translation to the newspapers within a few days if the newspapers did not receive it in their own press despatches.

BOAL

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840.50/2586 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 25, 1943.

[Received September 25—8:19 a. m.]

6449. Following is text of a self-explanatory letter received today from Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. I would appreciate being informed as soon as feasible concerning Department's viewpoint respecting the two questions put by him:

"Our legal advisers tell me that so far as this country is concerned, we can bring the UNRRA agreement into effect on signature: But that legislation may be necessary on certain points before UNRRA actually operates here. I imagine that similar difficulties may arise in the United States, and I should much appreciate it if you could ascertain whether the State Department has considered these points and if so what action they contemplate.

The first point is that of the legal status of UNRRA, this must be such as to permit the performance by UNRRA, or by some legal entity created for the purpose, of the functions set out in article I paragraph 1. The fact that UNRRA is set up by international agreement would not suffice to give it any legal status in our courts, and this might cause difficulties if it were to operate here. It appears that there are several possibilities of getting over these difficulties: (a) The Director General could be the Administration's 'agent' in these matters (as is implied by the opening words of article IV); (b) UNRRA might be registered as a corporation in the United States (where its headquarters will presumably be); (c) it could be registered in the United Kingdom as a non-profit making corporation; and finally (d) a special status could be conceded by legislation. Certain constitutional difficulties would arise here in adopting any of these methods, particularly (d). We should like to know whether similar difficulties arise under American law and if so what procedure the State Department have in mind.

Closely connected with this question is that of the immunities which UNRRA and its staff should be granted. Officials of UNRRA or at any rate those working abroad in disturbed areas will need to be protected by being given either full diplomatic privileges (including exemption from direct taxation on their salaries and customs duties on their personal requirements) or some more restricted immunities (e.g. immunity from search and from legal proceedings). It seems to us that the status and privileges of the staff ought if possible to be formulated in a protocol which should be signed at the same time as



the agreement, and domestic legislation might be required also to give effect to any such agreement. The actual immunities which are desirable are a matter for inter-government agreement and we should like to know what your Government has in mind on this point.

A further complication arises in that if the officers of UNRRA are given immunity from legal proceedings, it would affect the possibility of treating the Director General as the legal entity acting for UNRRA, since it would seem necessary that there shall be someone who could be sued in connection with contracts entered into by UNRRA. It seems therefore that the two problems must be considered together and our course of action here must depend very largely upon the action taken on the establishment of UNRRA in the United States.

I should be grateful if you could discover whether any plans have been made by your Government for dealing with these questions and if so whether we might have some details as to the arrangements proposed and also as to the method by which the agreement of the member governments of UNRRA to such arrangements is to be obtained.

In view of the forthcoming conference, an early reply would be appreciated."

WINANT

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840.50/2579 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Bolivia (Boal)*

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1943—9 p. m.

1208. Your 1568, September 24, 10 a. m. Within your discretion you may reply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along the following lines:

1. This Government is hopeful that the Bolivian Government and all of the other Governments of the United Nations and of the Nations associated with them in this war will wish to sign the proposed agreement. However it is for each Government to make its decision without any feeling of pressure upon it, and with a clear understanding of the obligations which would be placed upon member governments by the agreement.

2. The obligations incurred by signatories of the agreement under Articles V and VI are not specific and each member government will be free, after signature of the agreement, to determine, through its appropriate constitutional procedure, the extent and character of the contributions to be made by it. However, should member governments not take the necessary subsequent steps to implement the agreement, through contributions of administrative funds under Article VI and of supplies and other resources for relief and rehabilitation under Article V, the agreement would be meaningless.

3. Therefore this Government would not urge any Government to sign the agreement if such government had no intention of seeking,

through its appropriate constitutional procedure, to make at least the following minimum contributions: (a) its allotted share of the administrative expenses of the organization, which in total amount will be small compared with the overall cost of supplies and operations to be covered by contributions under Article V, and which no doubt will be allocated to the individual member governments on the basis of their relative capacity to contribute; and (b) such contribution of supplies, services or funds in foreign or domestic currency as it may be in a position to spare out of its own economy and which it may be able to finance. It is recognized that in the case of many countries contributions under the second category will be very small but it is believed that every Government will be able to find ways and means of making some such contributions to the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of the war if it so desires.

4. This Government appreciates the frankness of the Subsecretary for Foreign Affairs in placing the present position of the Bolivian Government on this matter before you. It is hoped sincerely however that after careful consideration of the subject the Bolivian Government will wish to have some part in this great task and that it therefore will wish to become a member of the proposed organization.<sup>21</sup>

BERLE

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840.50/2586 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1943.

6227. Your 6449, September 25. You may pass on to Sir Frederick Leith-Ross the following comments on the questions raised in his letter indicating that these comments have been prepared by the legal advisers on Governor Lehman's staff and that they do not represent any formal position or conclusion on the part of this Government. The Department and Governor Lehman's office will be prepared to go into the matter more extensively if in the opinion of the British that seems necessary or desirable at this stage.

"In our view UNRRA will derive from the international agreement creating it the legal capacity to discharge the functions entrusted to it by the agreement and should be accorded in each country a capacity and status in respect of suit, the conclusion and discharge of obligations, the holding of property, etc. like unto that of individual foreign states. We are of opinion that under common law principles UNRRA

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<sup>21</sup> In telegram No. 1704, October 27, 7 p. m., the Ambassador in Bolivia reported: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has now informed the Embassy orally that the Bolivian Government will definitely sign the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agreement and that instructions are now being drafted Ambassador Guachalla to sign." (840.50/2891)

will enjoy such capacity independently of any legislation defining its position since the effect of the international agreement is not to modify existing rules of law but to create as the agent of the signatory nations as a group a new legal person which would be entitled as such to exercise rights under the existing law. Whether legislation designed to recognize the capacity and powers conferred upon UNRRA by the agreement is necessary or is desirable as a matter of practical convenience in any particular country is clearly a matter for decision by the authorities of that country, but in our view it is important that any such legislation should be designed only to give statutory recognition to the status already established by the international instrument. We should see great objection to registration of UNRRA as a corporation in any particular country since such registration might tend to be regarded as implying political subordination to that country, with UNRRA thereby losing its international character, and such registration would presumably involve UNRRA's submission to national regulations and machinery of supervision which cannot properly be applied to intergovernmental agencies.

We entirely agree that officials of UNRRA, or at any rate those working abroad in disturbed areas, will need to be protected to some extent by diplomatic privileges and we would propose to submit for consideration at the first session of the Council a resolution on the subject containing recommendations and authorizing the Director General to approach individual governments and seek their agreement. Consideration is being given as to the advisability of seeking legislation by the American Congress on the subject.

In our view it would be inconsistent with the general status of UNRRA and extremely undesirable in principle that UNRRA transactions should be subject to the jurisdiction of national courts and we would therefore strongly prefer appropriate arbitration arrangements to the suggestion that there should be provision for suit in connection with contracts entered into by UNRRA."

HULL

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840.50/2764a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>22</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1943.

6228. Department's No. 5830, September 22.<sup>23</sup> You are instructed to include the text quoted below in a note to the appropriate official of the British Government and to inform that Government that similar notes are being presented to all of the Governments considering the draft agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Sent, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date to the chiefs of mission in China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

<sup>23</sup> See second paragraph of footnote 15, p. 994.

<sup>24</sup> Circular telegram of October 7 not printed.

"I am instructed by my Government to inform you that arrangements have been made for the use of the Claridge Hotel in Atlantic City for the first session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration if that organization is brought into existence by signature of the proposed agreement by the United Nations and the Nations associated with them in this war. If this plan is agreeable to other Governments, my Government would propose signature of the agreement in the East Room of the White House in Washington, Tuesday evening, November 9, and the assembly of the Council for its first session at the Claridge Hotel on Wednesday afternoon, November 10.

Arrangements have been made to reserve the Claridge Hotel for the exclusive use of the Council for approximately 4 weeks on the assumption that such a period will be ample to enable the Council to transact the business of its first session.

The Government of the United States expects to lay before the the Council for its consideration a draft of agenda, a draft of temporary rules and regulations and proposals for temporary *ad hoc* committees for the first session of the Council somewhat along the following lines: There might be four general committees on which all governments would be represented, covering (1) organization and administration, (2) general policy matters, (3) problems of finance and supplies, and (4) policies of relief and rehabilitation. Such committees if established might expedite their work by appointing smaller subcommittees. For instance, the committee on organization and administration might have smaller groups working on the organization of the Council and its standing committees, on permanent rules and regulations of the Council, on the personnel policies of the Administration, and on the administrative budget, auditing and other financial procedures. The committee on general policy might have smaller groups reporting to it on the scope of UNRRA's activities, on relations with member governments, on relations with non-member governments, and on relations with other inter-governmental agencies. Under the committee on finance and supplies there might be separate groups on means of financing supplies, services and administration, and on procedures for ascertaining and meeting deficits in supplies requiring importation. The committee on relief and rehabilitation policies might have sub-groups in such specialized fields as the policies governing relief distribution, policies with respect to health and medical care, policies with respect to welfare services including relations with foreign voluntary relief agencies, policies with respect to assistance to displaced persons, policies relating to agricultural rehabilitation essential to relief, and policies relating to the rehabilitation of such industries, transport and other services as are essential to relief.

Whatever specific plan the Council may adopt to govern its work during the first session, it seems probable that opportunity will be found for discussion during the course of the session of the subjects listed above and perhaps other subjects of special interest to member governments. It is assumed that at some time during the session, after study of the permanent organization of the Council by the appropriate temporary committee, the Council will establish the standing committees contemplated in the agreement, including the supplies committee and the regional committees.

In view of the difficulty of transportation at this time, it is assumed that each member government will wish to restrict the size of its delegation so far as practicable. If the Council establishes four general *ad hoc* committees along the lines suggested above, the sessions of these committees might be so arranged as to enable each member government to be represented on each of these committees. Since the reports and recommendations of any subcommittees established would be cleared through these general committees before presentation to the Council, presumably each member government would be represented only on those subcommittees in which it would have a special interest and for which it could provide specially qualified members.

The Government of the United States probably will designate a counsellor for each of the four main subjects of discussion enumerated above to assist the U.S. member of the Council, as well as a few advisers or technical experts as shall seem necessary. More specific information regarding the United States delegation will be communicated to your Government in the near future.

It will be of assistance in arranging for necessary accommodations if your Government will supply as soon as possible detailed information regarding the delegation which it plans to send to the proposed first session of the Council."

HULL

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840.50/2694 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Chile (Heath) to the Secretary of State*

SANTIAGO, October 9, 1943—10 p. m.  
[Received October 10—12:24 a. m.]

1765. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs inquires whether the note contained in the Department's circular telegram of October 7<sup>25</sup> does not introduce a new condition in the arrangements for the formation of the UNRRA, namely the joint signature of the proposed agreement without previous discussion of it and conference between the delegates.

He also inquires whether the four committees suggested in the note under reference would be standing committees meeting if need be when the Council itself was not in session and being in communication with the Central Committee in which case he said the Chilean Government would withdraw its objection to the restricted membership proposed for the Central Committee.

The Under Secretary further said that the Chilean Government still felt that the decisions of the Council on matters of fundamental policy should be by unanimous vote but it recognized that the smaller and practical questions should be determined by majority vote.

HEATH

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<sup>25</sup> See telegram No. 6228, October 7, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *supra*, and footnote 24.

840.50/2694 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Chile (Heath)*

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1943—7 p. m.

1099. In response to the inquiry of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs with respect to plans for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, you may stress the following points:

1. In its first note on this subject, presented in June, the United States expressed the hope that the Chilean Government would be in a position shortly to join with the United States and the other nations in definitive action on the matter. In its note of June 9 to the Chilean Ambassador at Washington,<sup>26</sup> this Government suggested the possibility of holding a conference of the nations involved after general agreement had been reached on a program of action, such a conference to be assembled for the purpose of taking such action. In conversations with representatives of all interested Governments, officers of the Department made it clear from the first that this Government had no intention of calling a conference for the purpose of discussing details of the agreement, and that a conference if called would be only for the purpose of formal final action by Governments upon the text of an agreement which had already received general approval. After more than 3 months of general discussion of the first draft of the agreement by a great many Governments, this Government attempted to redraft the agreement in line with the consensus of opinion as expressed to it and it confidently expected that all of the Governments which had been discussing the matter would find the new text acceptable, especially since it attempts only to establish the framework for an organization, leaving decisions with respect to details to the UNRRA Council. This Government would still welcome a further exchange of views with the Chilean Government but it is hoped that that Government will wish to join with the other Governments in accepting the draft agreement as a reasonable basis of action in this field, especially in view of the urgent need for such action.

2. The four committees mentioned in the Department's circular telegram of October 7 would only be temporary committees for the purpose of expediting the work of the Council at its first session. The Council will of course have a permanent committee on supplies and no doubt it will wish to establish the standing committees referred to in Article III paragraph 6. It is believed that these various standing committees will have great influence in the work of the organization and that they may very well be more active than the Central Committee.

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<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

3. As a member government the Chilean Government would have an opportunity to offer its proposal with respect to voting by the Council at the first or any subsequent session of the Council. Article III paragraph 1 provides that the Council shall determine its own rules of procedure.

HULL

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840.50/2787 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 17, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 9:25 p. m.]

1778. From Murphy. Department's No. 1717, September 21; and 1723, September 21.<sup>27</sup> Massigli informs me that although certain objections are seen as regards the form of organization provided, the Committee has nevertheless agreed to proceed to the signature of the revised text of the draft agreement for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. In his note conveying this decision, it is further pointed out that, as stated in its communication of August 13 (see my telegram 1419, August 15) the Committee would like to negotiate as quickly as possible an agreement which would set forth the form of cooperation to be established between the French administration and the United Nations Administration. In so far as France itself is concerned, the national administration would, with the assistance of the United Nations Administration, if necessary, undertake internal distribution of products.

The Committee further desires to underline the vital importance which it attaches to the fact that the relief organization for civilian population must begin to operate during the period of military operations. In its opinion relief for Europe will be ineffective unless it is immediately given and unless some continuity can be established between the period of active military operations and the period which would follow. The Committee, therefore, proposes that import programs should immediately be prepared in agreement between the national administration and the Allied High Command which would permit the national administration effectively and uninterruptedly to coordinate the distribution of aid furnished by the Allies with local resources. The Committee therefore hopes that it will be possible promptly to work out arrangements with the Allied Governments to afford the greatest possible aid to the civil populations. It considers that these arrangements with the Allies can most

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<sup>27</sup> See footnote 15, p. 994.

effectively be carried out through the conclusion of an agreement fixing the relation of the French authorities and the Allied High Command during the period of military operations along the lines of its proposal of September 7 (see my telegram No. 1578, September 10 midnight<sup>28</sup>). Furthermore the Committee points out it is essential that as soon as possible France should take its place in the Central Committee referred to in article III of the draft.

The communication added that the Committee was prepared to sign the agreement without any reservation under article IX.

The Committee also attaches importance to the preparation of the agreement both in the French and English languages, the latter to remain the official text. A French text of the agreement has been prepared by Massigli and will be submitted by airmail. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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840.50/2836 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, October 19, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received October 20—4:43 a. m.]

1797. From Murphy. My 1778, October 17, 3 p. m. I have had conversations with Massigli, Monnet<sup>29</sup> and Alphand regarding the participation of the latter two in the meeting of the Council of the United Nations as representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation. Throughout these conversations their disappointment was that the French Committee is not being treated on a parity with the four great powers.

Monnet is definitely of the opinion that the only subject of interest to metropolitan France is the volume of immediate relief which can be organized for liberated areas. He of course is of the opinion that the European war may end in the not too distant future. He also believes that the meeting at Atlantic City may become bogged down by elaborate discussions and plans for long-term rehabilitation. In his opinion the French themselves are fully capable of making their own plans for longer-term French rehabilitation. Monnet and his associates are anxious in the thought that the Council will not succeed in organizing an immediate relief program. If this is not done, in their opinion the French population will face chaotic conditions resulting both from lack of foodstuffs and other supplies as well as a complete breakdown of distribution and transport.

<sup>28</sup> Not printed.

<sup>29</sup> Jean Monnet, member of the French Committee of National Liberation.



It is also obvious that Monnet and his associates favor the idea that French overseas territories should be enabled to stockpile for the specific purposes of relief in metropolitan France. In their opinion this would not violate the principle that a member of the United Nations group should be obliged to devote surplus of production over its own needs to an Allied pool. They point out that it is obvious that metropolitan France will need much more than any surplus that French overseas territories will be able to acquire. Therefore France should not be called upon to devote temporary surplus which may develop in French overseas territories prior to the liberation of France. They point to the fact that French producers in this area will certainly be stimulated if they are convinced that the fruit of their efforts will go to their own people in metropolitan France of whose present and future sufferings they are acutely aware, rather than to liberated enemy territory.

There is practical value in this point of view and I recommend that it be given sympathetic consideration. [Murphy.]

WILEY

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840.50/2797 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Chile (Heath) to the Secretary of State*

SANTIAGO, October 19, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 11:54 p. m.]

1815. I had a long talk with Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs regarding the proposed Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and he told me that although he personally, as a practical matter, would waive his objections, that the Chilean Government was going to instruct its Ambassador in Washington to request that the signature of the draft agreement be preceded by a brief conference, and that the draft agreement be amended to exclude the provision providing for decisions by a two-third majority vote, and that the provision regarding the Central Committee be changed to permit representatives of others than the four principal belligerents.

He said that, in making these suggestions, it was not any lack of confidence that the proposed organization would be efficient and at the same time protect the interests of small nations, but his Government was concerned both with the precedent that this plan unmodified might set for the international organization which eventually would be set up to replace the League of Nations and, more important yet, the organization which would be brought out by the opposition in Congress to this Government's and to international organizations.

I told the Under Secretary that speaking personally I felt that he took the attitude that this was purely an inter-American project and

remarked that if the membership of the organization consisted only of the American Republics it perhaps might well follow the form and procedure of previous inter-American conferences; however, that the proposed Administration would be participated in by non-American powers with very decided feelings and interests. This necessitated a different attack on the problem and organization. He said that argument had not occurred to him and would be useful in meeting objections to Chile's participation under the proposed terms. I added finally that it seemed to me the Chilean objections were based on the belief that this draft agreement and organization were something sacred which could not be modified by the Council whereas they were merely a "reasonable basis" for practical action.

The Under Secretary admitted to this belief. I thereupon suggested that he make definite inquiry through his Ambassador in Washington whether or not the Council had the power to change the terms of the draft agreement and Administration it set up when such changes appeared desirable. He said he would do so.

HEATH

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840.50/3182

*The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State*

No. 650

2634/6/43

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to state that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are much interested in ensuring the participation of the International Labour Office in an appropriate manner in the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

2. His Majesty's Government would not wish at this stage to express any precise view as to the method in which the collaboration of the International Labour Office should be formalised, particularly as the subject of participation by existent international bodies in post-war relief and reconstruction work is to be discussed at Moscow. They would however suggest that at the first meeting of the Council the delegates should be given the opportunity of considering the whole subject of the participation of other international bodies in the work of the Relief Administration. With this object consideration of the question might form one of the early items on the agenda of that meeting.

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1943.

840.50/2835 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 19, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received October 22—5 p. m.]

A-1248. Reference Embassy's 6449, September 25 and Department's 6227, October 7. Text of Department's 6227 transmitting comments on the question raised by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross regarding the legal status, under national law, of UNRRA and its officers was transmitted to Sir Frederick Leith-Ross by Embassy's letter of October 8.

Following acknowledgement has been received under date of October 15, 1943:—

"I am much obliged to you for your letter of 8th October enclosing telegram dated 7th October communicating the views of the legal advisers of Governor Lehman's staff about the legal status of U.N.R.R.A.

"I have discussed the question with our legal authorities and while they would not regard it as by any means certain that our Courts would accept the view that the international agreement by itself creates a new legal person, they do not anticipate that in practice there would be any difficulty about U.N.R.R.A. owning movable property or entering into contracts, and they would be disinclined to attempt legislation unless it is found to be necessary. They would be interested, however, to get further information on the position of U.N.R.R.A. and its officers under United States law and whether any legislation is contemplated in the United States."

Embassy has informed Leith-Ross that any further information received from Washington in connection with the last sentence of his letter quoted above will be forwarded to him promptly. In connection with the question he raised it is noted that in Department's 6227 the first paragraph of the quoted section included the observation:

"whether legislation designed to recognize the capacity and powers conferred upon UNRRA by the agreement is necessary or is desirable as a matter of practical convenience in any particular country is clearly a matter for decision by the authorities of that country . . ."

It is also noted that in the second paragraph of the quoted section, with reference to protection in the nature of diplomatic privileges for officers of UNRRA working abroad, consideration is being given as to the advisability of seeking legislation by the American Congress on the subject.

If American legislation to recognize the capacity and powers of UNRRA is considered necessary or desirable, early advice to the Embassy for transmittal to Sir Frederick Leith-Ross will be appre-

ciated. Similarly the Embassy would appreciate advice if Congress is to be approached for legislation to protect officers of UNRRA working abroad.

WINANT

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840.50/2888a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1943.

6564. It has been suggested that the official title "Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements" be substituted for the phrase "Inter-Allied Committee on European post-war relief" in the last sentence of Article III, paragraph 5 in the final text of the UNRRA agreement. It is desired to comply with the wishes of the British Government on this point. Please ascertain their preference and inform the Department promptly.<sup>30</sup>

STETTINIUS

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840.50/2916a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers)*

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1943—10 p. m.

1140. Chilean Ambassador discussed with Acheson October 21 matters mentioned in your telegram of October 19 regarding relief and rehabilitation. He was told that it is impracticable to hold any intergovernmental conference on the text of the agreement before signature. Emphasis was placed again upon the safeguards in Articles V and VI, the limited powers of the Central Committee, the rivalries and other difficulties which would arise from any move to enlarge the composition of the Central Committee, and this Government's assurances that the structure of UNRRA is not being set forth as a pattern for other United Nations organizations.

The Ambassador was assured also that under the terms of Article III, paragraph 1 the Council will have full authority to establish its own method of voting, including the majorities to be required for decisions on various subjects. This could be done without any amendment of the agreement. The Council can of course amend provisions of the agreement under the terms of Article VIII.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>30</sup> In telegram No. 7502, October 29, the Ambassador reported that the British Government was in full agreement with the proposed amendment (840.50/2905).

840.50/2848 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Chile (Heath) to the Secretary of State*

SANTIAGO, October 23, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 8:33 p. m.]

1835. Department's 1140, October 22, 10 p. m., Chilean Under Secretary says that in view information and welcome assurances given by Acheson, Chilean Ambassador to Washington is being instructed to sign the draft UNRRA agreement but at the first meeting of the Council to introduce a motion requiring unanimity on questions of fundamental policy.

HEATH

840.50/2948a : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives*<sup>31</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1943—9 p. m.

This Government has been informed, in response to question number 2 in the Department's circular telegram of September 21, that a few governments will attach reservations to their signatures of the UNRRA agreement providing for future ratification or other action before the agreement can become fully effective with respect to those governments. The question has arisen as to the status of the representatives of such governments in the Council and its committees while these reservations are in force.

The Government of the United States expects to place before the Council for consideration and decision at the outset of its first session the suggestion that governments attaching reservations to their signatures shall be considered as provisional members of UNRRA until such reservations are removed or until the expiration of some specific period, say 6 months, from the date of signature. It will be suggested, as a part of such arrangements, that the representatives of these governments be accorded full participation in the work of the Council and its committees, including the right to vote, during such period of provisional membership.

<sup>31</sup> Sent to the chiefs of mission accredited to Governments comprising the United Nations and to Governments of nations associated with them in the war; also to the Consul at Algiers for the French National Committee of Liberation. Telegram No. 1650, November 1, 10 p. m., to the Legation in Egypt contained instructions to place the information before the Yugoslav Government (840.50/2948b Suppl.).

In the expectation that favorable action will be taken by the Council on this matter the Government of the United States is suggesting to those governments signing with reservations that they arrange for such provisional representation at the Council meeting at Atlantic City.

You are requested to place the above information before the government to which you are accredited in an appropriate form and to report to the Department any comments which that government may wish to make upon the matter.<sup>32</sup>

STETTINIUS.

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840.50/2990a : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives*<sup>33</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1943—7 p. m.

Please report the present status of consideration or action by the government to which you are accredited on the numbered points in the Department's circular telegram of September 21. Thirty-seven nations have made full arrangements for signing<sup>34</sup> and only seven have not yet taken final action.

STETTINIUS.

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840.50/3120e : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives*<sup>35</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1943—9 p. m.

No specific answer was received from the Government to which you are accredited with respect to question 2 of the Department's circular telegram of September 21. It is assumed that the signature will be without reservation but you are requested to verify and report.<sup>36</sup>

STETTINIUS

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<sup>32</sup> The Department received no unfavorable comments upon the matter.

<sup>33</sup> Sent to the chiefs of mission in Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Iran, and the United Kingdom (Netherlands Series). Replies from the Governments of Brazil, Haiti, and the Netherlands not printed; they expressed willingness to sign the draft agreement.

<sup>34</sup> The replies of the following 20 nations, received during October, not printed; they all indicated the willingness of their Governments to sign the draft agreement: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

<sup>35</sup> Sent to the chiefs of mission in Australia, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Liberia, Panama, and Venezuela.

<sup>36</sup> The replies from the Governments of Australia, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Liberia, and Panama not printed; they all expressed willingness to sign the draft agreement without reservation.

840.50/2978 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Venezuela (Flack) to the Secretary of State*

CARACAS, November 3, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 11 : 59 p. m.]

1009. Embassy's despatch No. 5053, November 1,<sup>37</sup> being transmitted by direct courier to Miami tomorrow morning, encloses copy and translation of formal note from Foreign Minister stating that the following reservation will be made at the time of signature. This information was requested in Department's circular November 2, 9 p. m.

In accordance with Venezuelan constitutional provisions, the agreement must be submitted to the National Congress before it shall become effective so far as Venezuela is concerned and Foreign Minister adds that the Venezuelan representative will make appropriate reservation at the moment of signing as contemplated in article IX of the agreement.

Foreign Minister adds that after careful examination of text of agreement by Venezuelan Government it accepts the agreement in its present form but considers it appropriate to make the following observations:

1. Modification of composition of Central Committee mentioned in article III so that other countries in addition to those indicated may enter and form part of the organism.
2. With regard to the purchase of certain amounts of foodstuffs, supplies, etc., in addition to contributions in kind which the contracting parties obligate themselves to make, it would be well to establish a procedure for these operations assuring equality of treatment among producing countries.
3. An adequate system of fiscalization or control of the distribution of relief products among the indigent peoples of the war-devastated countries is suggested as well as the desirability of considering that indistinct distribution of relief products might affect the acquisitive capacity of the future import markets of those countries.
4. Suggestion is also made that general directives calculated to assist the Director General in the selection of numerous personnel required by the Administration might be adopted, giving consideration to geographical distribution as well as the technical ability of the aspirants, thus offering opportunity to serve to capable elements from all contracting parties.

The Foreign Minister concluded that in making the four observations above enumerated, the Venezuelan Government hoped that they would be examined by the United Nations and that they might serve to interpret the agreement itself until such time as amendments might be made.

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<sup>37</sup> Missing from Department files.

Foreign Office confirms today that the sole reservation by Venezuela will be that of subsequent approval by the National Congress mentioned in paragraph 2 above. Foreign Office also states in reply to information given it from Department's circular October 30, 9 p. m., that Venezuelan Government agrees that it shall be considered as a provisional member until effects of the reservation cited have ceased, and points out that in the case of Venezuela a 6 months' period of provisional membership would be too short since Congress will not convene until April 19 and the three prescribed discussions in each chamber would preclude definitive action before May 9, 1944.

FLACK

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[The agreement was signed at the White House on November 9, 1943, on behalf of forty-four governments or authorities representing the United Nations or nations associated with the United Nations in the war. It was signed on behalf of fourteen governments with a reservation or statement to the effect, in each case, that the agreement was signed subject to ratification or legislative approval. All forty-four Governments, with the exception of the Iraqi Government, subsequently ratified the agreement. For text of the agreement, including reservations, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 352, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1164.

For recommendations of President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State for congressional appropriation of funds for United States participation in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1943, page 372, and *ibid.*, December 11, 1943, page 416.]



CONSIDERATION OF PROJECTED ORGANIZATION AND  
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND  
REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

840.50/2875

*The British Minister of State (Law) to the Assistant Secretary of  
State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, 5 October, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: I enclose a copy of the memorandum on the "Scope and Operations of UNRRA" which we discussed on Saturday<sup>1</sup> in Governor Lehman's<sup>2</sup> room and which has since been revised in the light of the discussion. It seems to me that we reached almost complete agreement on that occasion. You will remember that the point on which the Governor laid most stress was the necessity of UNRRA having the power to veto or reduce demands put in by liberated territories, whether or not they could pay. We entirely agree that, subject to overriding military necessity, this is a necessary power if UNRRA is to be able to see that supplies are fairly distributed between the various liberated territories. I think our agreement on this point is made clear in the revisions made in the memorandum.

There is, however, one point of importance on which I do not think all those present last Saturday reached agreement. This point concerned the best mechanism through which to handle the requirements of those Governments which have funds and are anxious on restoration to full sovereignty to assert their position in the world. I think we are all agreed that our aim must be to meet the susceptibilities of these Governments so far as we can, while retaining that control over the allocation of resources which we must preserve for war purposes, but at the same time to maintain the authority of UNRRA to veto or cut down the demands of these countries, should this be necessary to promote a fairer distribution. In my view we shall be most likely to retain the co-operation of such Governments if we are prepared to admit them to direct consultation with the authorities controlling the supplies. I have little doubt that it will be the aim of such Govern-

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<sup>1</sup> October 2.

<sup>2</sup> Herbert H. Lehman, Director of Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Department of State.

ments to get a seat on the Combined Boards.<sup>3</sup> Failing that, I think they would press for a form of association with the Combined Boards such that they could be sure of being consulted when their interests were concerned. It is for this reason that we have made certain proposals to the State Department in connection with the French National Committee<sup>4</sup> in particular, and with other third countries in general. We believe that this general approach is more likely to be found satisfactory and to form a sounder basis for future development than would a system by which all Governments of liberated territories were forced to channel their demands in respect of territories liberated after November 9th, 1943, through UNRRA and, unlike those liberated before that date were deprived of direct access to the supply authorities. I think this question is a straight-forward political issue. There is, of course, no question of coercing a Government into one method or the other. I think, however, that this is a kind of question on which it is most important that the political thinking of our two Governments should not be in disagreement. It would, I think, be most unfortunate if we advocated different policies at the UNRRA Council table.

I should like to suggest for your consideration that we might have a word with Mr. Stettinius<sup>5</sup> on the subject and that after that you should let me know whether the views of your Government are in accord with those in the enclosed memorandum. This would enable me on return to London to give the Departments concerned a basis for their further thoughts between now and November 9th.

Yours sincerely,

RICHARD LAW

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum on the Scope and Operations of UNRRA*

A. *Principles.*

1. The purpose of setting up UNRRA is to help liberated territories to secure those supplies and services which are essential for the health and stability of their populations and which cannot be provided by other means. It must see that succour is brought to the needy. The

<sup>3</sup> Combined Production and Resources Board, Combined Food Board, Combined Raw Materials Board, and Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. Documents concerning establishment of these boards are scheduled for publication in the volume of *Foreign Relations* which includes records of the First Washington Conference, December 1941-January 1942. For brief description and membership of these boards, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 16, 1943, pp. 67-69. See also S. McKee Rosen, *The Combined Boards of the Second World War: An Experiment in International Administration* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1951); and H. Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley, *Studies of Overseas Supply* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956).

<sup>4</sup> French Committee of National Liberation.

<sup>5</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State.

supplies and services it will be interested in, therefore, will be in the main consumption goods for the local population and such additional supplies as are required to enable local production to provide for consumption needs which would otherwise call for imports. Long range reconstruction and production for war purposes will not be its task.

2. The period during which UNRRA is active will be one during which, because of the war, or the dislocation caused by the war, many essential supplies will be critically scarce and in which demands upon shipping and other forms of transport will be greater than can be satisfied. Scarce supplies and shipping which are used for the supply of any liberated territory will mean that less are available, not only for other liberated territories, but also for the fighting services and for the populations which are maintaining the armies of the United Nations. It will be necessary, therefore, to maintain the allocation machinery which has been built up round the Combined Boards and with which the principal supplying nations are associated.

3. Certain liberated countries will have little or no foreign exchange with which to finance essential imports and it will be necessary for funds or credits to be provided at the disposal of UNRRA out of which supplies and services can be financed for countries which cannot pay.

4. Other liberated territories will be able to pay for their own imports and there will be a tendency for these countries to attempt to procure supplies which would otherwise be available for countries which are not able to purchase for themselves. It will be an essential part of the functions of UNRRA to see that countries which cannot pay obtain a fair deal and are not deprived of supplies through the heavy demands of the countries which can pay. It will be necessary, therefore, for UNRRA to have complete knowledge of the import demands filed by all liberated territories, whether or not they can be paid for, and to be in a position in which it can if necessary prevent the submission of excessive demands to the allocating authorities.

5. It will be desirable that the greatest possible use be made of the world-wide supply purchasing and handling and ship operating and routing organisations which have been built up during four years of war by the Governments of the United States and the British Commonwealth. This machinery is geared to the allocation machinery referred to in 2. above and will in any case have to remain in operation until the end of the war in the Far East and for some period thereafter. A duplication of it would lead to confusion and waste of resources. The supply agencies (in conformity with policies established by the Combined Boards) will moreover be directly concerned with the development of local industry and resources in liberated territories and (in collaboration with the local authorities) with

mobilizing them as far as possible for the war effort or to relieve overall shortages. For this reason representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Governments will be associated with the local authorities in order to assist them to procure and utilise certain raw materials, industrial equipment, etc. Such representatives will be concerned with the development of sources of supply for purposes other than relief. These representatives and those of UNRRA should be instructed to work out their exact division of function in any area in the light of local circumstances in conformity with the general principle referred to above.

6. It will be the general policy of the Allied and associated Governments that recognised and stable local Governments in liberated areas should be encouraged to do as much as they can for themselves and local Governments will be anxious to do so since in this way they will improve their status in the eyes of their people and will get their own administrative organisation into working order. In the field of relief it will be desirable that local Governments should, wherever possible, themselves organise the distribution of supplies and should be allowed to play as much part as possible in negotiating contracts and making other arrangements with suppliers. The stronger Governments possessing funds, some of which will already have extensive contacts with the supplying authorities before they are restored to their metropolitan territory, will be jealous of interference or supervision and it will be desirable that the comparing and checking functions which UNRRA must perform in order to arrive at a fair distribution of supplies should be as unobtrusive as is consistent with their efficient discharge.

7. UNRRA will come into operation in any liberated territory at such time and to such extent as the military commander shall invite them to do so, or after the military commander has handed over his powers to a local Government, at such time, and to such an extent as the local Government may request.

#### B. *Procedure.*

##### *Allocation of supplies and shipping.*

The machinery for the allocation of supplies and shipping which the Governments of the United States and the British Commonwealth have built up is centred on the Combined Boards and the various Supply Agencies of the Governments. The two main centres of this machinery are Washington and London, while local units exist for the screening and liaison purposes in various overseas territories, e.g. in the Middle East, South Africa, North Africa. The Combined Boards themselves are concerned with the overall supply and shipping picture, the allocation of sources of supply and policy to be pursued

in developing sources of supply and the co-ordination of the activities of the Governments represented on the Boards. The efficient operation of this machinery calls for the establishment in the main centres of committees concerning themselves with the position in the various territories, receiving and processing the import programmes of the territories so that the problems requiring action by the Combined Boards can be isolated and passed to them in the appropriate form, and that uniformity of action by the various Boards and Agencies can be secured. It is most desirable that UNRRA should be closely associated with this machinery so as to be in a position to present the case for the supplies needed for the territories for which it has responsibility on comparable terms to the cases presented for other territories.

*Pre-invasion functions of UNRRA.*

The operations, both of UNRRA and the supply authorities, will be greatly assisted if reasonably complete estimates of requirements can be prepared before the actual invasion of the territories concerned. Such estimates will enable the Combined Boards to gauge the size of the problem with which they will have to deal and to adjust their programmes as far as possible to allow for the demands which will become actual later. In addition advance estimates are required if action is to be taken to accumulate stockpiles or to place orders for the delivery of supplies at future dates when they will be needed. The preparation of estimates in a form in which action can be taken on them requires agreement upon standards of provision, the calculation from such standards of basic requirements for the various territories to be liberated and the formulation (by the use of an agreed strategic key) of overall requirements schedules divided into periods in which delivery will be needed. During this pre-invasion period it will not be desirable for particular supplies to be earmarked for each territory to be liberated and the Governments of these territories should not be able to take action themselves to secure supplies. In formulating plans it will be necessary, therefore, for UNRRA to act for all liberated territories and to collaborate both with the U.S. and U.K. military and supply authorities in the presentation of estimates of requirements and in securing by the national agencies the necessary procurement action wherever this is possible.

*Post-invasion functions of UNRRA.*

Once a territory has been liberated it will be necessary to decide at what time and to what extent the territory concerned will require the assistance of UNRRA in providing and paying for the supplies and services needed from abroad. As soon as possible authenticated programmes of actual import requirements will have to be drawn up to

supplement or replace the advance estimates already prepared before invasion. To some extent these programmes may be formulated during the period of military control. Once representatives of UNRRA are established in the territory, it will be essential for them to play their part, in collaboration with the local authorities and with the military or civilian officers of the liberating powers, in the preparation of import requirements. Such collaboration will require the formation of some kind of joint office or programming authority in which the various interested authorities can work together and the necessary co-ordination secured between them. The form of such an office or programming authority will no doubt vary from country to country and will depend in part on the ability of the local Government to formulate its own demands, to distribute supplies and to pay for its requirements. A well-established local Government with administrative services and foreign exchange at its disposal will be able to do most of the work itself and will only require comparatively small detachments from UNRRA and some representatives of the U.S./U.K. supplying agencies attached to the U.S./U.K. Diplomatic Missions to collaborate with it and advise on the preparation of requirements, the development of industry, etc. Other Governments, with less authority or without funds, will require more extensive assistance. In such cases representatives from UNRRA will no doubt play the major part on the spot in drawing up and screening import requirements. Representatives of the supply agencies in this case would play a supplementary role. In any event, such a U.S./U.K./UNRRA/local Government screening unit will be required if a fair distribution of supplies is to be obtained and if the allocating authorities are to be satisfied that the supplies and shipping made available at the expense of others are genuinely required and properly used.

The position and responsibility of UNRRA in respect of the requirements of any territory will differ according to whether the local Government is able to pay for its imports. If the local Government cannot pay for its imports, it will have to make application to UNRRA for its needs and the programmes of requirements when drawn up should go to UNRRA for action (either direct to its head office or through a regional office if appropriate). It is suggested that time will be saved and efficiency promoted if a copy of such programmes is sent for information direct to the supply authorities, who would, however, take no action as regards allocation or procurement until authority was received from UNRRA. If, on the other hand, the local Government were able to pay for its requirements and was not, therefore, in a position of having to apply to UNRRA for assistance, it would still be necessary for UNRRA to receive complete information about the import programmes and to have a right of veto over excessive

demands if it is to see that supplies are fairly distributed between paying and non-paying countries. The question arises whether in these cases the susceptibilities of the paying Governments would be better met if these Governments were given direct access on their requirements to the U.S./U.K. supply machinery (as the next best thing to direct membership of the Combined Boards) or whether they would feel better satisfied if their requirements were handled exclusively through UNRRA, who could act as their champions (or could disapprove of those requirements which it thought excessive). In the view of the U.K. Government the former method is more likely to achieve the political end of satisfying the susceptibilities of such Governments while preserving the full authority of UNRRA. Accordingly the U.K. Government would propose that in the case of programmes of requirements for which the recipient Government intends to pay, the programmes should be sent by the local screening authorities to the supply authorities in Washington and London (either direct or through the Missions of the recipient Governments in those capitals) while a copy of such programmes should be sent to UNRRA. It would then be for the Director-General of UNRRA or his nominee to inform the U.S.-U.K. authorities whether he approved or disapproved of the demands in the programmes. It would be understood that no demands in these programmes would be submitted to the allocating authorities without his approval. At the same time the Director-General would be able to make such other comments as he saw fit on the programmes which would already have been screened by his representative in the field in the light of local circumstances. Such comments might take the form of suggesting an upward revision if this were appropriate. In this way UNRRA would be able to make sure that the richer countries were not obtaining more than their fair share, while at the same time not interfering with the direct contact between the local Government and the supply authorities which such a Government is likely to demand.

A chart <sup>6</sup> is attached to this note showing in schematic form how import programmes would be drawn up and routed in two typical cases, one a paying country and the other a non-paying country.

### *C. Distribution and Procurement.*

It seems desirable that recognised local authorities should undertake as much as possible of the business of distribution within liberated territories. On the one hand Governments will wish to do this for themselves as soon as they are able and on the other it is doubtful whether UNRRA will wish to become involved in the complexities

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<sup>6</sup>Not printed.

of local rationing and with the political disputes and factions that this may entail. Experience in Europe after the last War points to the desirability of local Governments being encouraged to undertake as much of the responsibility as they can. At the same time, in some countries great dislocation may exist or epidemics or other special conditions may make it essential for some outside authority to come to the assistance of the local Government by providing technically trained personnel. In these cases UNRRA, supplemented as necessary by charitable organisations, would be the appropriate authority. The provision of such assistance should be a matter for discussion between the local Government and/or the military authorities and UNRRA. In any event it must be recognized that UNRRA representatives must be able to supervise distribution of the supplies which UNRRA has financed and to satisfy themselves that they are being properly used.

In cases where UNRRA was undertaking functions of distribution, supplies imported from abroad might be consigned to the local representative of UNRRA. In cases where the local Government pays for supplies, consignment would be made direct to such Government. There would no doubt be political advantages if, in cases where UNRRA paid for the goods but did not distribute them, supplies were consigned to the local Government. If this were done UNRRA would avoid having to deal with the business of shipping documents, general average charges, and the other duties of a consignee. On the other hand UNRRA might find that their supervision over the distribution of free supplies was best enforced if the goods were consigned to their representative. This can only be decided in the light of local circumstances.

Just as local Governments should be encouraged to undertake their own distribution, there would be advantages in their being given as much of the work of procurement and handling as is possible without disrupting the existing machinery. The stronger Governments would no doubt maintain supply missions in London and Washington (some already have them) which would be able to negotiate with suppliers and handle the extensive paper work which is necessary to conform with wartime procedures. The part which such Governments might play in procurement would vary according to the commodity and the source of supply recommended by the allocating authority. The United States Government has taken over all procurement for lend-lease countries and may wish to do so in respect of all large scale purchases for liberated territories however financed. The U.K. and Canadian Governments also would probably not be prepared to allow



Allied Governments complete freedom to negotiate purchases with private firms, although there are often details of specifications, etc., which it is convenient for the agent of the requiring Government to settle direct with the supplying firm. Again in other cases, e.g. certain foodstuffs, where Government Agencies control directly the whole supply, it would be most convenient for such Agencies to do the whole of the handling.

In cases in which UNRRA was providing the finance, it could be arranged, where necessary, that the appropriate Agency of the supplying Government procured and handled the goods and were reimbursed through UNRRA from the credit or fund opened in that country for UNRRA.

Similar considerations would apply as regards shipping, since the various supplying Governments have established procedures for the handling and loading of ships and for synchronising the movement of goods to the ports with the arrival of vessels for loading.

#### *D. Finance.*

Whatever arrangements are made to finance UNRRA, certain general points will have to be met. In the first place UNRRA will have to have credits wherever supplies can be obtained, whether those supplies are to reach Europe or Asia from overseas or later to be carried from one European or Asiatic country to another. In the second place, it will probably be politically easier for the Government of each of the contributing countries if it stipulated that the bulk of its appropriation of funds for UNRRA is to be spent within its own territorial limits. But it will be desirable that the system should be given flexibility and the degree to which each Government is successful in securing some latitude for spending outside of its own territory the sum appropriated will influence UNRRA's ability to finance supplies where supplies and shipping availability is greatest. In the third place, some countries will pay for all their supplies, without drawing on UNRRA, others will pay for some and others again for none of their supplies. It will, therefore, be necessary for UNRRA to establish machinery for deciding at an early stage in the drawing up of an import programme by a country which expects to get all or part of its supplies as a gift, what shall or shall not be eligible to be supplied by UNRRA. The earlier the UNRRA representatives on the local programming authority in the country applying for free supplies can make known to the Supply Committee of UNRRA what is likely to be sought, the less the delay in procuring supplies when the programme is finally presented.

5 OCTOBER, 1943.

840.50/2885

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*<sup>7</sup>

In Re: Organization of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration:

(1) The Secretary of State shall in collaboration with the Special Assistant to the President in charge of UNRRA<sup>8</sup> and subject to the approval of the President:

A. Formulate and approve all plans relating to the policy of this Government vis-à-vis UNRRA;

B. Represent and speak for the President in all negotiations within the U. S. Government as to the policies to be established relating to UNRRA, the representation of this Government on UNRRA,<sup>9</sup> and the plans for the establishment of UNRRA,<sup>10</sup> for its interim financing,<sup>11</sup> and for the first meeting of the UNRRA Council;<sup>12</sup>

C. Exercise general oversight and supervision over all these matters; and

D. Obtain from other U. S. agencies the detail of personnel, on a non-reimbursable basis, to render service in connection with the aforesaid duties and with the first meeting of the UNRRA Council.

(2) The Department of State will continue to handle all negotiations with other governments, and will make the necessary physical arrangements for the UNRRA Conference and for the first meeting of the UNRRA Council.

(3) A. As I stated in my letter of June 3, 1943, to the Secretary of State:<sup>13</sup>

"I want the facilities of our civilian agencies operating in the international economic field utilized to the fullest extent. It is equally

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<sup>7</sup> A memorandum of October 20 by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) stated: "I hand you herewith the memorandum on the organization of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration signed by the President. This will, of course, give you authority to proceed in accordance with its terms. ES."

<sup>8</sup> Samuel I. Rosenman.

<sup>9</sup> For list of persons representing the U.S. Government at the first session of the Council, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 6, 1943, p. 311.

<sup>10</sup> For text of agreement for the establishment of UNRRA, signed at Washington on November 9, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 352, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1164; for further correspondence on this subject, see pp. 851 ff. The Director General, appointed by the Council (first session), was empowered (by art. IV, par. 2 of the Agreement), immediately upon taking office, to create the required emergency organization. From November 11, 1943, to January 1, 1944, the Director General was the only member of the Administration's staff, although during that period a temporary secretariat and staff were made available by the United States Government.

<sup>11</sup> See memorandum of October 11, p. 1027.

<sup>12</sup> See Department of State publication No. 2040, *First Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration: Selected Documents*, Atlantic City, New Jersey, November 10-December 1, 1943.

<sup>13</sup> For full text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1943, p. 575.

essential that the transition from military to civilian operations in liberated areas be consummated as speedily and efficiently as possible."

The reference to "our civilian agencies" is equally applicable to UNRRA within the provisions of Article VII of the proposed UNRRA agreement.

B. Prior to the creation of UNRRA, any arrangements made with respect to the performance of relief and rehabilitation activities by U. S. civilian agencies will be made after consultation with the Special Assistant to the President in charge of UNRRA preparations.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

OCTOBER 19, 1943.

840.50/2832b

*The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt*<sup>14</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following our conversation of October 13 [12],<sup>15</sup> I am sending you a memorandum on the scope of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The position taken in this memorandum follows an exchange of views with Mr. Richard Law, in which Governor Lehman participated, and I believe it represents the consensus of thinking on this subject.<sup>16</sup> If it meets with your approval, we will proceed accordingly to draft for your consideration instructions to Mr. Dean Acheson, whom you have designated as the U.S. representative to UNRRA.<sup>17</sup>

I am enclosing also a memorandum on finance, the result of discussions between the Department of State and the Treasury Department. I gave you the gist of this on Tuesday.<sup>18</sup> If it meets with your general approval, I shall have appropriate legislation, together with a message to Congress, drafted for your consideration.<sup>19</sup>

Faithfully yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

<sup>14</sup> The following marginal notation appears on copy of this letter which was returned to Mr. Stettinius on October 26. "E.R.S. Jr. OK FDR." (840.50/3252)

<sup>15</sup> Mr. Stettinius' conference with President Roosevelt was summarized in a memorandum of telephone conversation by the Under Secretary of State with Judge Rosenman on October 12; not printed.

<sup>16</sup> For text of resolution No. 1, Relating to the Scope of the Activities of the Administration, adopted by the First Session of the Council, see Department of State publication No. 2040, *First Session of the Council* . . . , p. 27.

<sup>17</sup> Memorandum of October 12 regarding Mr. Acheson's appointment, not printed. October 19.

<sup>18</sup> For messages to Congress by President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State concerning proposed legislation on U.S. participation in UNRRA, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, p. 372, and *ibid.*, December 11, p. 416. For text of resolution No. 14, Relating to a Financial Plan for the Administration, see *First Session of the Council* . . . , p. 44.

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum on the Scope and Operations of UNRRA**A. Principles.*

[Here follows seven-paragraph section substantially the same as section "A. Principles" of the British memorandum of October 5, printed on page 1015.]

*B. Procedure.*

UNRRA should be closely associated with the wartime machinery charged with the allocation of supplies and shipping. This centers in the Combined Boards and the various Supply Agencies in Washington and London. UNRRA must be in constant touch with these Boards and Agencies, and with the field staffs of the latter, to present the case for the supplies needed in the territories for which it has responsibility on comparable terms to the cases presented for other territories.

Before the occupied territories are actually liberated, it will greatly assist both UNRRA and the national Supply Agencies to have reasonably complete estimates of the requirements of those territories, both individually and in a group. During this preinvasion period particular supplies should not be earmarked for each territory to be liberated and the Governments of these territories should not be able to take unregulated action themselves to secure supplies. In formulating plans it will be necessary, therefore, for UNRRA to act for all liberated territories and to collaborate both with the U.S. and U.K. military and supply authorities in the presentation of estimates of requirements and in securing by the national agencies the necessary procurement action.

Once a territory has been liberated, more accurate requirements programs will have to take the place of the advance estimates. These may be developed to some extent during military control. Once UNRRA's representatives are established in the territory, they will participate, in collaboration with the local authorities and with the military or civilian officers of the liberating powers, in the preparation of these programs. Such collaboration will require the formation of some kind of joint office or programming authority, the form of which will no doubt vary from country to country according to local circumstances such as the ability of the local government to formulate its own requirements program, to distribute or control the distribution of supplies and to pay for what it gets.

If there is no local government, or if the local government is not able to prepare a program the responsibility for such preparation will fall for the most part upon UNRRA's representatives, with the

collaboration of national Supply Agencies through their representatives attached to diplomatic missions in the area. Where the local government has administrative services sufficiently well established to do its own programming, UNRRA and the Supply Agencies will require only a few representatives in the field. In either event such a unit, consisting of representatives of UNRRA, the Supply Agencies, and the local government, will be required if a fair allocation of supplies is to be obtained, and if the allocating authorities are to be satisfied that the supplies and shipping requested are genuinely required and properly used.

Where a local government cannot pay for its imports, it will have to make application to UNRRA for its needs, and its requirements program should go to UNRRA for action. The overall supply authorities should be simultaneously informed of the program although they would take no action until authority was received from UNRRA. Where the local government is able to pay for its imports it would still be necessary for UNRRA to receive complete information about the import programs and to have an opportunity to veto excessive demands to assure a fair distribution of supplies between paying and non-paying countries.

It will be desirable for recognized local authorities to undertake as much as possible the distribution of goods within liberated territories. However, in some countries severe dislocation, epidemics or other special conditions may make it essential for some outside authority to provide technically trained personnel to assist or to handle completely distribution of relief goods. The provision of such assistance after the emergency military period would be for discussion between UNRRA and the local government and/or the military authorities. UNRRA must be able to supervise distribution of supplies which it has itself financed to make certain that they are being properly used.

So far as they are able, and in so far as conditions permit, local governments should likewise be encouraged to undertake as much of the work of procurement and handling of goods as is possible without disrupting existing machinery.

In cases in which UNRRA is providing the finance, it might be arranged, where necessary, that the appropriate Agency of the supplying government procure and handle the goods and be reimbursed through UNRRA from the credit or fund opened in that country for UNRRA.

Similar considerations would apply as regards shipping, since the various supplying Governments have established procedures for the handling and loading of ships and for synchronizing the movement of goods to the ports with the arrival of vessels for loading.

*C. Finance.*

The Treasury Department has submitted certain proposals with regard to arrangements for the financing of UNRRA. A preliminary memorandum on these proposals is attached, and a fuller report is being prepared.

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum on a Tentative Plan for Financing UNRRA*

[WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1943.

The purpose of this plan is two-fold: First, to provide a yardstick which can be used in discussions with member Governments to indicate the extent of the relief contribution desired from them; second, to provide credits in a large number of countries which can be used to pay for goods or services purchased on behalf of UNRRA.

Wherever possible, liberated countries will pay in gold or foreign exchange for supplies imported from abroad. Many liberated countries may not have gold or foreign exchange with which to do this. They may be asked to pay to some extent in their own currency for such supplies, but this will obviously not provide the foreign exchange necessary to purchase them abroad. It becomes necessary to obtain this foreign exchange, and the following plan is provided to do this.

1. A "donor" country is considered to be a member of UNRRA which has not been occupied by the enemy. Liberated countries will not be asked to be donors, but of course they may donate if they so desire.

2. The goal will be to have each donor country contribute as a once-for-all relief contribution 1% of its national income for the fiscal year 1942-3 (or for the most recent year for which figures are available). At a later date, it may be necessary to reconsider the necessity for further requests, but this proposal is based on one contribution.

3. Each donor country will be asked to make the contribution in its own currency with the expectation that the funds will be spent in that country, except that where a country is able to do so it will be asked to make available 10% of its contribution in gold or foreign exchange for purchases outside of its territory.

4. With these contributions, UNRRA will pay for all supplies and services it obtains in local currency up to the amount of the contribution of the country involved, and when that contribution is exhausted will make use of the gold or foreign exchange available to UNRRA.

5. A country which prefers because of short supplies within its own territory to pay more than 10% of its contribution in gold or foreign exchange will be free to do so.

6. In terms of the request to be made of Congress, this would mean that Congress would be asked to authorize or appropriate approximately \$1,400 millions. It would be explained to Congress that this contribution would be handled through agencies of the United States Government as follows: In respect of commodities which are rationed or are in short supply in the United States, purchases out of the United States contribution would be made abroad wherever possible. In respect of other supplies or services, purchases would be made in the United States. Such a proposal would be, in effect, that, up to the amount indicated, a contribution would be made in kind of American supplies and services, but where such contributions would unduly impinge upon local consumption, they would be purchased abroad.

It is contemplated that the United States' share of the administrative expenses will be contained within the above contribution.

## CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS DURING INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF ENEMY-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY UNITED NATIONS ARMED FORCES

800.0146/43

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury  
(Morgenthau)*

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: By your letter of July 20, 1942<sup>1</sup> you have raised the question of provision for a currency that United Nations armed forces would need within a few days or weeks after invasion of any enemy occupied territory; and also the problem of provision for a sound monetary, banking and fiscal order in any such areas, which the occupation authorities would have to administer behind the advancing armies. You enclosed an able memorandum on the subject,<sup>1</sup> which has been carefully considered.

I shall, of course, be glad to sit down with you, or anyone you designate, as well as with a representative of the War Department, to discuss a recommendation to the President in respect of these very important problems. I have designated Assistant Secretary Adolf A. Berle, Dr. Herbert Feis,<sup>2</sup> and Dr. Leo Pasvolsky,<sup>3</sup> of this Department, who will be available at your convenience.

It may be useful for me to put before you certain tentative lines of thought which have developed in our own talk on the subject and which I submit for your consideration.

(1) An agreement between ourselves and the British to assure either joint or completely coordinated action in this field would appear to be essential. In any re-occupied territory it must be contemplated that there may be both British and American troops. The pay of these troops, and any cash outlays that may be made by the several occupying forces would at once become a large element in the currency circulation of the region. It would seem clearly desirable to avoid all possibility either of divergent policy or of conflicting policy, and clearly desirable that there should either be a coordinated policy agreed upon in advance or a joint policy.

The agreed-on arrangement could obviously take one of various forms and I assume this is one of the first matters to be discussed between the three Departments.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.



(2) It seems to me that despite certain possible advantages it would be on the whole undesirable to issue special dollar or pound sterling occupation currencies for such regions as distinguished from regular dollar and pound sterling currencies. This view rests on various considerations which I presume you will want to review carefully in discussion. Among them I may cite the opinion that any special currency of this character would be less acceptable to the fighting forces and less likely to win over local populations than would a regular currency.

(3) I am in agreement that it would be essential, as soon as practicable after the occupation of any region, to provide that region with a satisfactory currency of its own in substitution for the local currency in circulation at the moment of occupation. The best ways and means of achieving this I recognize also will require much further consideration. The suggestions and alternatives contained in the Treasury memorandum seem to be a helpful starting point for such discussions. I assume that payment to the troops would continue to be in dollars and pounds, with option of or ample opportunity for exchange into these new local currencies.

(4) The second broad question raised, namely, that of providing a sound banking and monetary system for such regions, can probably be more satisfactorily settled after conclusions have been reached on the foregoing matters. They would, also, very considerably depend on circumstances. If, for example, the United Nations were to occupy an entire country, and thereby fully control its banking and central banking system and its currency mechanisms, the problem would be different than that which would exist if only a segment of a country were occupied. Further, as the Treasury memorandum indicates, the situation would differ as between the reoccupation of countries friendly to the United Nations and invasion and occupation of Axis homelands. I shall wait to hear when you wish these discussions to be carried forward further.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

800.0146/45b

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State for President Roosevelt*<sup>4</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] September 15, 1942.

PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY  
OCCUPATION OF EUROPEAN TERRITORY NOW IN AXIS CONTROL

Immediately upon the occupation of any European area under Axis control by American or American and other United Nation forces, there will arise questions not only in the field of military operations,

<sup>4</sup> A draft of the memorandum was submitted to the Secretary by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis) with his communication of September 5 which stated: "I think you will want to give serious thought to this question. I agree with Assistant Secretary Berle that it should be discussed either directly with the War Department executives or perhaps first with the White House." A notation indicated the Secretary's approval: "Right—CH". (800.0146/45)

and of law and order, but also questions of a political and economic character. It is important

(a) that decisions on these matters that will be taken by the military government should be based as largely as possible on harmonious agreement between this Government, the governments of the reoccupied countries, and the governments of any of the other United Nations that may be directly concerned;

(b) that they be in accord with the pronouncements made by this Government from time to time bearing on the treatment of the people of the occupied areas and bearing on the disposition of the area in question.

It is recognized that military considerations should be decisive regarding the military necessities of the situation, and that all decisions in any area must have the full approval of the military commander. It is believed essential that before any actual occupation, understanding be secured between State and War or Navy, as the case may be (and on particular topics, with other Government Departments), as to the political and economic arrangements to be made. Such understanding should cover, among other matters,

(a) the consultation to be held with directly interested governments of the United Nations and the interested governments in exile in the reoccupied countries, and the formulation of appropriate agreements;

(b) the question of whether political representatives of these governments should be put on the staff of the commanding military officer, and if so, in what capacity;

(c) economic policies to be pursued, as, for example, handling local currencies in existence, operation of local banking institutions, control over productive activities in the area.

Discussion should also be had as to what American civilian official or officials should be attached to the staff of the commanding officer to advise and report on economic and political questions. It is recommended that discussions should be immediately inaugurated between this Department and the War and Navy Departments on these subjects, the result to be embodied in an appropriate directive or order to the commanding officers involved.

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840.50/923

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury*  
(Morgenthau)

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There are enclosed copy and translation of an undated memorandum (D. 8443-6) of the Belgian Embassy left at the Department of State December 1, 1942 and copy of a memorandum (D. 8443-6, No. 7661), dated December 15, 1942 with which the Belgian Embassy transmitted the enclosed text of a declaration on

monetary questions made November 18, 1942<sup>5</sup> by the Belgian representative at a meeting of a subcommittee of experts of governments temporarily residing at London. Through these texts the Belgian Government has stated its position on several points of monetary policy which would arise as soon as an expeditionary force of the United Nations should invade and occupy Belgium.

Among other things the memorandum delivered December 1, 1942, having reference to the monetary policies announced by the expeditionary force in North Africa, states that the determination of the rate of the Belgian franc in relation to the dollar is a question of the sovereignty of the Belgian Government, and that the latter could not recognize that any other government has a right to substitute itself for the Belgian Government in this connection. The memorandum adds, however, that there will be no decision taken in this matter without prior consultation with the competent American authorities. The memorandum asked the concurrence of the American Government in the measures envisaged therein.

The Belgian Ambassador has been told that full consideration would be given to his memorandum and that a reply would be made. However, a substantive reply to the various points in the Belgian declaration, which appears to contemplate the use by expeditionary forces of Belgian currency newly printed by the Belgian Government at London to the exclusion of direct use of dollars or pounds for expenditures within Belgian territory, would require consultation with the British authorities in this field. The Department of State, therefore, doubts whether it could go further at the present time than assure the Belgian Government that appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States are considering the matter and count upon full opportunity to discuss the problems with the Belgian Government in due course and before any decision is taken thereon.

The Belgian memorandum states that the subcommittee of experts at London has been kept informed of the measures which the Belgian Government is preparing. For convenient reference there is attached a copy of the minutes of the subcommittee meeting of August 24, 1942,<sup>6</sup> where the Belgian plans are in part set forth.

I should appreciate receiving your advice as to appropriate action by the Department of State in this matter.

I am addressing a similar letter to the Secretary of War.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

<sup>5</sup> None printed.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

840.50/1107

*The Secretary of State to the Belgian Ambassador (Straten-Ponthoz)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Belgian Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the memorandum left with the Under Secretary of State by the Ambassador on December 1, 1942<sup>7</sup> concerning currency measures to be taken when a United States expeditionary force is sent to Belgium.

The memorandum under reference and the relevant declaration transmitted with the Ambassador's memorandum of December 15, 1942<sup>7</sup> have been brought before the appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States. The latter are in agreement that, subject to the proviso that military necessity and secrecy pertaining thereto may preclude the possibility of definite commitment in advance in all details of such matters, the views of the Belgian Government will be given due consideration. They expect in due course to discuss these matters with the appropriate representatives of the Government of Belgium in Washington.

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1943.

800.515/583

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*The Norwegian Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>8</sup>

## MEMORANDUM

It is the opinion and policy of the Norwegian Government that Norwegian currency should be used to satisfy the needs of Allied expeditionary forces on Norwegian territory.

For its own monetary and financial purposes and with a view to supplying Allied forces with adequate amounts of Norwegian currency, the Norwegian Government has taken steps to have printed in London up to 600 million kroner (approximately corresponding to the total amount of Norwegian paper currency in circulation immediately prior to the invasion) in notes of the following denominations: 1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 100, 500 and 1,000 kroner. At the same time coinage of Norwegian small coins (10, 25 and 50 öre) is being effected in London. These notes and coins are intended to cover the Norwegian military and civil needs as well as those of Allied expeditionary forces.

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<sup>7</sup> Not printed; for summary of text, see letter of January 6 to the Secretary of the Treasury, *supra*.

<sup>8</sup> Handed to the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis) by the First Secretary of the Norwegian Embassy (Bryn) and the Financial Counselor (Colbjørnsen), March 31.

The rates of exchange between the Norwegian krone and other currencies will be fixed by the Norwegian Government after discussion with the competent authorities of the various United Nations. The exchange rates will in the first instance have to be fixed provisionally pending the clarification and stabilisation of the various factors involved.

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1943.

800.515/588

*Memorandum by the Treasury Department*<sup>10</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING INVASION AND OCCUPATION CURRENCIES

There is submitted for consideration the following Treasury recommendations and summary of the more important considerations governing these recommendations on some of the problems of invasion and occupation currencies.

1. *In the invasion stage the United States armies should use regular United States currency with a yellow seal and some other minor distinguishing mark.*

(a) No other type of currency can be expected to be as eagerly accepted by the local population.

(b) The additional expense of using regular dollar currency instead of special dollar currency would not necessarily be great. Part or most of the costs of occupation can in any case be shifted to the local population later if desired.

(c) A distinctive mark could permit the isolation of the currency should it fall into enemy hands and also prevent influx into the area of looted dollar currency already in the hands of the enemy.

(d) Were the United States to use a special currency with the word "dollar" on it which it did not intend to redeem eventually at par, it might seem to some people to be resorting to unethical and dishonorable practices unworthy of a great republic.

2. *The best currency for the occupation stage is a currency designated in local units and as quickly as possible the shift should be made from regular United States dollar currency to local currency.*

(a) Great inconvenience and probable increased economic disorder will result to the local populace and economy from having in use a local currency as well as currencies designated in dollars and sterling.

<sup>10</sup> Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis) in his memorandum of March 31, not printed.

(b) The continued use of regular United States currency alongside local currency would result in black markets in which the market rates of exchange are likely to be more favorable than the decreed rate. Unless the exchange rate was repeatedly changed, the discrepancy between the decreed rate and the black market rate would confuse and irritate the soldiers and Army finance officers.

(c) The sooner the local currency is introduced, the less dollars will have to be spent by the invading armies and the subsequent problem of adjustment of costs made easier.

3. *Steps should be taken immediately to provide adequate supplies of currencies designated in terms of local units to be available when needed.*

(a) The Treasury should immediately prepare substantial stocks of specially prepared blank currency with the legend and denomination to be filled in immediately after the invasion has begun (for security reasons).

(b) Such currency should not resemble outstanding local currency and should bear the following legend "United States Military Authority". The same basic design should be used for all countries with variations confined to color, denomination, etc.

(c) By means of the photo-offset process such blank currencies could be produced by the Treasury in sufficient quantities within a month or so after the Bureau is given the green light. The blank currency can then be completed and deliveries begun within a few days after the invasion has started.

4. *The British should be urged to pursue the same procedure as the United States does, except that*

(a) The British will use British Military Authority Sterling notes (B.M.A. notes) instead of U.S. yellow seal currency as their "spear-head" currency. B.M.A. notes will be tied to the dollar at the rate of 4 to 1 and made interchangeable with the dollar just as was the case in North Africa.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> A summary of instructions issued by the French North African authorities to banking institutions in French North Africa was submitted by the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces North Africa (Eisenhower) to the War Department from London, in his telegram No. 267 of November 24, 1942 (not printed), which stated in part: "American bank notes introduced in North Africa by the American authorities and the American troops are similar to those in circulation in the United States, except that the seal on the right-hand side of the note is yellow instead of being blue or some other color. It is specifically understood that American bank-notes bearing the yellow stamp, and special sterling notes BMA (British Military Authority) will be accepted by North African Banks of issue, against corresponding dollar or sterling credits in the United States or the British Empire." (865C.5151/3). A public announcement of November 16 on this subject by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) was printed in the *New York Times*, "Special Currency for Men in Africa", November 17, 1942, p. 9.

(b) A supply of local currency bearing the legend "British Military Authority" will be prepared for the British on the same basis as that described in paragraph (3) above.

5. *No discussions should be held with the Allied governments preparatory to invasion dealing with either the supply of currency or rates of exchange, but each one of the Allied nations should be asked to submit a memorandum to the U.S. and British governments setting forth their views of an appropriate exchange rate to be adopted at the time of invasion of their respective countries.*

#### BRITISH VIEWS

The British strongly desire that we use a special military note instead of the yellow seal currency during the initial period of invasion and that local currencies of invaded areas already available in London, or in the process of being made available, should be used during the initial period of invasion wherever possible.

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800.515/588

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury  
(Morgenthau)*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Adviser on International Economic Affairs has informed me of the meeting held this morning, March 31, on the subject of occupation currencies.

I am in general accord with the line of policy indicated in the Treasury memorandum.<sup>12</sup> I wish however to suggest to you and to the War Department that in the case of the European governments who are now our Allies, every effort consistent with military requirements should be made to work out, by agreement with them, any plans for the use of local currency—whether it be local currency of the special type suggested in the memorandum or any other type. I realize that the need for military secrecy might make it inadvisable in some or all instances to discuss this question with them until military action has begun.

As regards numbered section five of the memorandum, I presume it will be our policy to give the fullest and most careful consideration to the views of the governments of the Allied Nations in regard to appropriate exchange rates that might be adopted in the event of the entry of our troops into their respective countries. Again, I should think it would prove advisable to make our action in this field tenta-

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<sup>12</sup> *Supra.*

tive until time and circumstances are afforded to reach full agreement with them.<sup>13</sup>

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

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865C.515/1

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury  
(Morgenthau)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Feis and Mr. Livesey<sup>14</sup> have informed me of your request for an expression of opinion in regard to the reported British plan for withdrawing Italian lire from circulation in Tripolitania and replacing it with British military authority notes overprinted with the word "Tripolitania".

As I understand it, this would contemplate formal action of some sort on the part of the British authorities requiring the complete conversion of outstanding lire into the new British currency. It would seem to mean that for all practical effects, Tripolitania would have only one currency, and that expressed in sterling as the unit.

If my understanding of the suggestion, as I have just set it forth, is correct, I doubt it is advisable, and I am not convinced of its necessity. There would be, as far as I can tell, no objection to the use by the British of a special military currency designated for use and circulation in Tripolitania; such currency is being used both by ourselves and the British in North Africa at the present time. The enforced substitution, however, of a currency expressed in sterling for all Italian currency might give rise to misunderstanding. It furthermore seems to run contrary to the general principle by which I believe the various departments of this Government are in agreement that resort should be had as soon and as fully as possible to the use of local currencies in reoccupied areas.

I should be obliged if you would let the British Treasury authorities know of this opinion provided the basis of it seems to you clear and adequate.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

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<sup>13</sup> In his reply of April 15, 1943, Secretary Morgenthau informed the Secretary of State that he was requesting the Finance Ministers of various Allied Governments to provide the Treasury with material and information regarding fiscal and monetary problems in their country, including a memorandum concerning their views on the provisional exchange rates that might be set for their particular local currency (800.515/615).

<sup>14</sup> Frederick Livesey, Chief of the Financial Division.



800.515/627

*The Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Bell) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with the request made in your letter of April 10, the British Treasury has been informed of your views on the currency situation in Tripolitania.

At a recent conference in the Treasury, Sir Frederick Phillips of the British Treasury reported to Mr. Bell and Mr. White<sup>15</sup> that his Government was agreeable to the suggestion that British Military Authority pound notes should not be used in Tripolitania. The British Government now proposes to use lira notes with special overprinting.

Sir Frederick Phillips also stated the views of his Government on other questions concerning which I had requested information and which will be of interest to you. He said that his Government still felt that the Allied Governments-in-exile would object to the use by friendly invading forces of any currency other than currency they were preparing or local currency.

It was further stated that British military forces intended during the initial stages of military invasion operations to use local currency previously acquired. Such local currency would be supplemented by B.M.A. notes. The British Government, upon reexamination of the matter, had no fears with respect to the reception that would be accorded British troops using the local currency.

Sir Frederick Phillips inquired, on behalf of his Government, whether Mr. Casaday<sup>16</sup> should participate in discussions which were to take place between the British Treasury and the Governments-in-exile, following the British Treasury's request for the views of the exiled governments on currency matters relating to military occupation. He was informed that inasmuch as these matters were currently being discussed and considered here, and inasmuch as we have already requested the Governments-in-exile for their views, we saw no need for Mr. Casaday to participate in the London conversations.

Very truly yours,

D. W. BELL

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<sup>15</sup> Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

<sup>16</sup> L. W. Casaday, representative of the Treasury Department in the United Kingdom.

800.515/627

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Bell)*

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. BELL: Note has been taken of the various pieces of information conveyed by your letter of April 24, 1943 as regards which you may find the following comments useful:

(1) It is gratifying to learn that the British Government agrees that they will not use British Military Authority pound notes in Tripolitania, but instead will use lira notes with special overprinting.<sup>17</sup>

(2) The information contained in your second and third paragraphs concerning the views of the Allied Governments-in-exile as to the type of currency to be used in the event of entry into their territories and the plans of the British Government, seem to me tentatively to warrant acceptance. However, before the Department could definitely commit itself, it would wish to hear the views of both the Treasury and the War Department fully; and it may be that judgment must be reserved until the facts of any particular situation are more fully established. Mr. Herbert Feis, the Adviser on International Economic Affairs of the Department, will remain available for further discussion of these questions with yourself and the War Department.

(3) I agree with the Treasury's reply to Sir Frederick Phillips regarding the participation of Mr. Casaday. I presume that the British Treasury fully understands that all of these matters require joint decision, and that they will not proceed except in agreement with us.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

800.515/768

*Mr. H. D. White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgen-thau), to the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis)*

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1943.

DEAR MR. FEIS: I am transmitting herewith a copy of a memorandum sent to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Norwegian Em-

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<sup>17</sup> The lire currency situation in Tripolitania was outlined in a letter of September 20, 1943, from Mr. A. T. K. Grant of the British Treasury which was transmitted to the Department by Mr. Harry Dexter White in his letter of October 1, 1943 (not printed); Mr. Grant stated that in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Metropolitan lire (except for the smallest denominations) were being replaced by lire issued by military authority of Tripolitania and that this was expected to have started as from September 15, 1943 (865C.5151/6).

bassy and a copy of a letter to the Secretary by the Belgian Minister of Finance.<sup>18</sup>

Very truly yours,

H. D. WHITE

[Enclosure]

*The Norwegian Embassy to the Treasury Department*

MEMORANDUM

With further reference to conversations regarding use of Norwegian currency during invasion of Norway by Allied expeditionary forces (Memoranda by representatives of the Norwegian Embassy, dated March 30 and June 5, 1943<sup>19</sup>) the Norwegian Embassy have now received a further communication from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance in London, stating that so far no formal agreement has been concluded between British and Norwegian authorities. It is understood that such agreement would need the acquiescence of the proper American authorities.

During the conversations which have taken place in London the British Treasury have stated that they agree to use Norwegian currency during the invasion and that they would have no objection to an exchange rate of 20 Norwegian kroner to 1 pound sterling.

The Norwegian Embassy venture to hope that the American authorities will see their way to take the same standpoint in these matters as those expressed by the British.

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1943.

800.515/785

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1943.

Participants: Mr. T. K. Finletter,<sup>20</sup> Mr. Herbert Feis, State Department.

General Hilldring;<sup>21</sup> Mr. van den Broek, Minister of Finance, Netherlands; Mr. de Iongh,<sup>22</sup> Netherlands Govt.

<sup>18</sup> Letter not printed; the Belgian Minister of Finance (Camille Gutt) stated in part: "Confirming my conversations with Mr. Bell, I wish to advise you of the fact that my government has deposited with the Bank of England, in agreement with the British Treasury, for use in Belgium by any expeditionary force (British or American), an amount of 750 million Belgian francs in notes. The object of this is to make available to the military authorities upon landing the amount of Belgian currency required for their expenses."

<sup>19</sup> Letter not found in Department files.

<sup>20</sup> Thomas K. Finletter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

<sup>21</sup> Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department.

<sup>22</sup> D. Crena de Jongh, Financial Adviser to the Netherlands Government.

The meeting was arranged as a result of the Minister of Finance's desire, as expressed to Assistant Secretary Acheson, that he have the opportunity to discuss certain urgent monetary matters with General Hilldring. It was held in Mr. Finletter's office.

The Minister of Finance stated that he had had meetings with the Minister of Finance of Belgium, and that they had agreed on identical lines of policy as regards exchange rates, the provision of currency for use in the event of reoccupation, etc. He was desirous of explaining his program to the American Government, with the view of securing agreement and of working out any arrangements that were necessary.

The Minister of Finance presented his prospective policy on three main matters:

1. He stated that of course during the German occupation the quantity of guilder currency in circulation in the Netherlands had tripled, or more. He said that his Government intended, upon securing control, to exchange new government bonds for a large part of this currency, in order to reduce its quantity greatly and thereby forestall any marked inflation. Later on, in response to Mr. Feis' quizzing, he made clear that the Dutch Government, before giving bonds for currency, intended carefully to examine the means by which people in the Netherlands had come into increased possession of it. (Incidentally, the same investigation is apparently planned as regards bank balances and securities). He was informed by Mr. Feis that the Netherlands policy in this regard would be regarded by the State Department as the business of the Dutch Government. The Minister incidentally stated that he estimated that with these new bond issues the total debt burden of the Dutch Government would be about one-fifth of their budget.

2. He said that the Dutch Government was undertaking to have printed (I believe in the United States<sup>23</sup>) guilder currency for both the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies. They intended to place this in use upon reoccupation.

It was pointed out to him that in the event that reoccupation in the Netherlands was carried out by American or British armed forces, or both, the necessity would present itself to secure advance agreement between the Netherlands Government and the Governments of the United States and Great Britain as to the many questions which would arise in regard to the use of this currency, such as (a) whether it should be used immediately upon the entry of armed forces; (b) whether it should be used by the armed forces; (c) whether the Netherlands would expect payment for this currency, etc.

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<sup>23</sup> Mr. van den Broek stated in his letter of July 30, 1943, to Mr. Feis (not printed) that the banknotes were being printed in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

A discussion ensued as to how the Minister of Finance could best proceed to clarify these questions. It was agreed that they would properly be decided by the Army, State, Treasury Committee that has been meeting under the Chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of War McCloy to discuss similar matters in other areas. It was further decided, with General Hilldring's full approval, that in order to expedite the conclusions of this Committee on these matters, the Secretary of Finance might well discuss them direct with the Treasury, which in turn would bring them before the Committee through General Hilldring.

3. The Minister of Finance pointed out that at the time when this new guilder currency was issued it would be necessary to determine an exchange rate vis-à-vis the pound and dollar. He said that the Netherlands Government desired to set that rate at 121½ guilder to the pound <sup>24</sup>—which would roughly reestablish the dollar-guilder relationship in terms of their old gold value.

Mr. Feis stated that subject to any opinions that the Secretary of State might have, he believed this would be acceptable to the State Department. There was general agreement, however, that this matter of exchange rate was one of primary interest to the Treasury, and that therefore it was essential that the Dutch Government reach agreement with the Treasury.

It was suggested and approved that, in order to facilitate prompt advancement of these discussions the State Department would make a memorandum of this discussion and transmit it to the Secretary of the Treasury,<sup>25</sup> with a short covering note stating that it was expected that the Minister of Finance of the Netherlands would very shortly seek to enter into discussion with the Treasury as regards to the matter covered by this memorandum.

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800.515/796

*The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstjerne) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: Acting under instructions from my Government I have the honor to confirm the communications previously conveyed to officers of the Department of State and more particularly the Treasury Department, to the effect that it is the opinion and the policy

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<sup>24</sup> In his letter of July 30, 1943, the Minister of Finance indicated that the rate of exchange should have been 10.50 guilders to the pound (instead of 12.50 guilders as mentioned) and that the rate of 10.50 corresponded to a dollar-sterling crossrate of 4, about with the old gold parity of the dollar and the guilder of approximately 2.50 guilders for a dollar.

<sup>25</sup> Letter of July 27, not printed.

of the Norwegian Government [here follows statement of policy similar to those expressed in memoranda of March 30 and June 24, printed on pages 1034 and 1040, respectively.]

During recent conversations with the United States Treasury the representatives of the Norwegian Embassy have reiterated the desire that Norwegian currency be used during a possible invasion by United States armed forces. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance would have liked to obtain an assurance from the United States Treasury Department that the competent United States authorities agree to use Norwegian currency and also agree to a provisional exchange rate of 5 kroner per United States dollar. As no such assurance was received from the United States Treasury, I hereby, on behalf of my Government, venture to approach Your Excellency with a view to reaching a speedy agreement between our governments concerning the use of Norwegian currency and the rate of exchange between the Norwegian krone and the United States dollar for a possible period of invasion of Norwegian territory by U.S. forces.

On the basis of the above it can be stated that an adequate amount of Norwegian kroner can at once or at short notice be placed at the disposal of the proper United States authorities in London or at an other designated place.

I hardly need to emphasize that my Government takes it for granted that in Norway, the territory of a United Nations government, no foreign special invasion money will be sought [or] put into circulation by the authorities of any Allied government without the consent of the Royal Norwegian Government.

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador,  
LARS J. JORSTAD

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800.515/796

*The Secretary of State to the Norwegian Ambassador  
(Morgenstierne)*

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: Careful consideration has been given to your note of August 23, 1943 informing this Government of the plans of the Norwegian Government for the use of Norwegian currency, with the view of supplying Allied forces in the event of military activity in Norway, and giving the views of your Government regarding a desirable exchange rate, and stating finally that your Government takes it for granted that in Norway, the territory of a United Nations government, no foreign special invasion money will be sought or put into circulation by the authorities of any Allied government without the consent of the Royal Norwegian Government.

Copies of your note are being sent to the Treasury and War Departments with the suggestion that fullest and most sympathetic consideration be given to the views on these matters therein expressed.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

800.515/861

*Mr. H. D. White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), to the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis)*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1943.

DEAR MR. FEIS: In accordance with the request of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee<sup>26</sup> at its meeting of September 29, 1943, the representatives of the American and British Treasuries conferred together with a view to deciding upon types of currencies to be used in the friendly countries in Europe and the conditions under which they would be so employed.

It is understood that the United States armed forces will utilize yellow-seal dollars during the spearhead operations and the British will cable London concerning the type of spearhead currency to be used by the British and Canadian Forces.

With respect to the locally-denominated currencies held or being printed under order of the friendly governments, there appears to be a difference in viewpoint between the two Treasuries as to the conditions under which we should accept such currencies for use during the stage of military occupation. There is attached a memorandum which discusses the matters.<sup>27</sup> In the case of France, since the amounts of Metropolitan francs available to the Allies are limited and since there are no stocks of any specially-prepared franc currency available, it has been agreed that if it is necessary to use a supplementary currency, then the Allied Military Franc will be so used. This Allied Military Franc will be similar to the Allied Military Lire except for the change in the name of the country, the name of the currency and the designation, "Emis en France."

Both Treasuries are agreed that there would be considerable difficulty in printing and satisfying the demands of the various countries if we were to use different kinds of Allied Military Currency in the various areas. In the case of Holland, Belgium and the friendly countries other than France, if their stocks of currency are not adequate for military purposes, we should be prepared to use A.M. Currencies for supplementary purposes.

<sup>26</sup> Established in July 1943 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to recommend civil affairs policies for enemy or enemy-held areas that were occupied by combined operations and to coordinate military and civilian agency interests in such matters.

<sup>27</sup> Missing from Department files.

The attached memorandum reviews the conditions under which we think the local currencies of the friendly governments should be accepted for use in military operations. It would be appreciated if you would let us have your views on the matters dealt with in this memorandum at the earliest possible date, so that we may proceed in the negotiations with the British and the appropriate officials of the various refugee governments.

Very truly yours,

H. D. WHITE

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800.515/861

*The Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis) to Mr. H. D. White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WHITE: Replying to the questions presented in your letter of October 7, 1943 regarding the types of currencies to be used in the friendly countries in Europe and the conditions under which they would be employed, the views of this Department are as follows:

(1) As regards the conditions under which the American and British Governments should accept local currencies for use during the stage of military occupation, this Department is entirely willing to be guided by the views of the Treasury and the War Department, and will accept whatever decision they make on the point at issue.

(2) This Department is in accord with the proposal contained in your letter for the use in France of an Allied military franc similar to the Allied military lire, except for the name of the country, name of the currency, and the designation "Emis en France". It is of the opinion that in the absence of important military considerations to the contrary, the Supreme Allied Commander will wish to consult with the French military authorities concerning the use and character of this military currency.

This Department is of the opinion that the issuing authority of any currency utilized should be the Supreme Allied Commander and would be prepared to accept if so desired an Allied military currency issued by the Supreme Allied Commander for the British, United States and French military forces comprising the task force in the liberation of France.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT FEIS

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851.515/190

*The Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Gaston) to the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis)*

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1943.

DEAR DR. FEIS: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 15, 1943 regarding the types of currencies to be used in the friendly



countries in Europe and the conditions under which they would be employed.

As you know, Sir David Waley of the British Treasury has been pressing for some time for what he states to be the strong views of London in favor of the use of some form of currency issued by the French Committee of National Liberation. On the several occasions on which he has expressed these views to the Treasury, we have pointed out to him that the use of such a currency raises important political questions on which we are guided by the State Department. During a recent discussion with the Treasury, following the receipt of your letter of October 15, Sir David Waley indicated that he had raised with your Department the possibility of using some form of *Comité* franc currency with an appropriate overprint such as "Allied Military Currency." We expressed the view that it seemed to us that this also raised the same type of political considerations on the basis of which the rejection of a *Comité* franc without such overprint was premised.

Since the proposal contained in our letter of October 7 with respect to the use of an Allied Military franc in France was premised upon the fact, as indicated by representatives of the State Department in meetings of the American section of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, that for political reasons *Comité* franc currency would not be acceptable, it will be appreciated if you will advise us whether we are correct in assuming that these same political considerations apply to the use of such a currency with an overprint of the nature suggested by Sir David Waley.

Needless to say, as we have previously indicated to you with respect to *Comité* franc currency, we recognize that the question of the use of *Comité* currency with or without an overprint is governed by political considerations whose significance must be evaluated by your Department.

Since this matter is most pressing, we would appreciate a decision by your Department as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

HERBERT E. GASTON

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851.515/190

*The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Bell)*

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. BELL: The receipt is acknowledged of Mr. Gaston's letter of October 22 to Dr. Feis concerning the conversations which officers of the Treasury Department have had with Sir David Waley of the British Treasury concerning the supplemental currency to be used in France.

In reply to your specific inquiry may I say that in the opinion of this Department, use by the Allied Commander-in-Chief of any over-printed French currency, or new issue of French currency, would not be acceptable.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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800.515/912 : Telegram

*The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, December 9, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 6:08 p. m.]

115. For Dunn.<sup>28</sup> Massigli<sup>29</sup> asked to see me and said he and the other members of Committee have been greatly disturbed over recent report received from Hoppenot<sup>30</sup> of a recent conversation with you<sup>31</sup> which dealt particularly with question of type of currency to be used by Allied forces in France. Report was to effect that War Department insisted on using Allied military currency. Massigli said he feared it would be a serious mistake from psychological point of view to use Allied military currency as had been done in Italy, an enemy country. Hoppenot reported that you had explained Allies could not use currency with "French Committee" on it because Committee was not a government. Massigli said he appreciated our point of view but hoped very much that some type of currency would be used which would get away from the appearance of that employed in the occupation of enemy territory.

In the course of a conversation with De Menthon, Commissioner of Justice, who is charged with drafting the Committee's plans for civil government in France, he also referred to the report of the conversation with you, saying he felt that we perhaps did not appreciate how deeply the French people would be affected by the appearance of something like occupation currency and that he most devoutly hoped we would reconsider the matter.

I had a conversation last night with General Kirby<sup>32</sup> who is passing through here from Cairo to London and who said that he had recently discussed this currency matter with McCloy.<sup>33</sup> Kirby said the British position is that they are prepared to agree either to Allied

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<sup>28</sup> James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

<sup>29</sup> René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French Committee of National Liberation.

<sup>30</sup> Henri Hoppenot, Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation.

<sup>31</sup> No record of such a conversation found in Department files.

<sup>32</sup> Maj. Gen. Stanley Woodburn Kirby, British Army, Director of Civil Affairs, War Office, 1943-44.

<sup>33</sup> John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.

military currency or to currency bearing the inscription "French Republic" (with, of course, no mention of the French Committee) provided the French Committee would accept one of these alternatives and support the currency issued.

I have received no information directly from you regarding our attitude in this matter nor the consideration concerning it which we may regard as controlling. I am convinced, however, that it would in fact be a great mistake for us to use a form of Allied military currency in France which would have the appearance of occupation currency. The French Committee would never accept such currency and unquestionably misunderstanding and resentment would be caused by its use among the French people. If, as I presume is the case, it is important to obtain the agreement of the French Committee so that the latter would redeem the currency I am of the opinion that the Committee could be brought to abandon its pretension that the currency used should bear the words "French Committee" and to agree to the use of the words "French Republic" with no mention of the Committee.

I should greatly appreciate information and instructions as to the line to take in any further conversations here.

WILSON

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800.515/912 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)*

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1943—11 p. m.

124. Your 115, December 9, 11 a. m. The British on November 22 proposed a change in the formula of October 6<sup>34</sup> which had been agreed to between the United States and British Governments for French participation in Civil Affairs in metropolitan France, and as the new formula proposed more direct dealing with the French Committee of National Liberation the matter was referred to the President. The President stated that all consideration of Civil Affairs for France should be held in abeyance until his return<sup>35</sup> and further consideration.

In dealing with currency for military operation, War Department, with concurrence of State Department, has taken the position that as there is no governmental authority in existence for issuance of French

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<sup>34</sup> See letter of October 7 from Mr. H. D. White, p. 1044.

<sup>35</sup> President Roosevelt returned on December 11 from meetings with Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, President İnönü of Turkey, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For documentation on these conferences, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*.

currency, an Allied military currency is the only form which could be legally used. That is the way the matter now stands. It is hoped that the form of currency to be used will be one which will not be objectionable to the French people.

We hope to be in a position soon to give you definite information in the premises. In the meantime, it is impossible for any of us to discuss these matters further.

HULL

## PRELIMINARIES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

[The development of United States postwar foreign policy within the Department of State, including plans for an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security, is set forth in Department of State Publication No. 3580: *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, 1949).

The steps leading to the adoption of a draft plan for such an organization, in which President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill indicated an active interest, are related in *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), volume II, pages 1625-1655.

For an unofficial study of the origin of the United Nations organization based on an extensive use of Department of State records, see Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945* (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1958).

References to documentation on some of the developments leading up to the initiation of concentrated active negotiations regarding a postwar organization for the maintenance of peace follow:

1. The Declaration by the United Nations, signed January 1, 1942. See *Foreign Relations, 1942*, volume I, pages 1-38. For text, see *ibid.*, page 25.

2. Expression of views on postwar organization by President Roosevelt to V. M. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in conversations at Washington in 1942. Under this plan the major United Nations would act as policemen to impose peace. See reports of before-dinner conversation on May 29, *Foreign Relations, 1942*, volume III, pages 568-569, and of conversation on June 1, *ibid.*, pages 580-581.

3. Rejection by the United States in 1942 of invitations by the British Government to participate with the British and other Allied Governments in joint studies on the future status of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The reason given was that any consideration of the future of the Court prior to the formulation of views on the nature of the international postwar organization would be highly speculative. See *Foreign Relations, 1942*, volume I, pages 39 ff. (A draft entitled "Tentative Proposal for Revision of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice", dated

June 25, 1943, was prepared by a special subcommittee on legal problems of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. For text, see Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, page 485.)

4. Expressions of British views on postwar organization in February 1943. On February 2, 1943, on the train returning from a conference with Turkish officials at Adana, Prime Minister Churchill prepared a memorandum entitled "Morning Thoughts: Note on Postwar Security." A copy of this memorandum was sent to President Roosevelt who gave a copy to Secretary Hull. (Copy in Lot File 60D-224.) The section dealing with postwar organization is summarized in *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, volume II, pages 1640-1641 and in Churchill's *The Second World War*, volume IV, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), pages 711-712, where the paragraph regarding international organization is quoted. The greater part of this memorandum dealt with relations with Turkey. On February 4, 1943, the British Ambassador presented to the Secretary of State a "Draft of Joint Declaration of Colonial Policy" (500.CC/2-443). This proposal provided for continued responsibility of the "parent" or "trustee" states for administration of their colonies, but in association with regional commissions. For an account of the origin of this draft declaration, see Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1962), page 440, footnote 2. (A prototype for such a regional commission was the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. See White House press release of March 8, 1942, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1942, page 229, and *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, volume II, pages 1236-1237.)

5. Visit of British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, to Washington, March 12-30, 1943. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, volume III, pages 1 ff., especially memoranda of conversations on March 22, 27 and 29, pages 28, 36, and 40, respectively. At this time Secretary Hull gave to Mr. Eden a revised draft, "Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence," prepared on March 9. For text, see Moscow Conference Document No. 44, *ante*, page 747.

6. The Third Washington Conference, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, May 11-25, 1943. Documentation on this conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*. In *The Hinge of Fate*, pages 802-807, Mr. Churchill gives a detailed account of a luncheon meeting at the British Embassy on May 22 at which he discussed the structure of a postwar settlement with Vice President Wallace, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, Under

Secretary of State Welles, and Senator Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

7. The First Quebec Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, August 17–24, 1943. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been meeting at Quebec beginning August 11.) Secretary of State Hull and British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Eden attended this conference. For Mr. Hull's account of the discussion at Quebec of drafts regarding dependent peoples and a four-power declaration on a general postwar international organization, and other political problems, see *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, volume II, pages 1237–1242. Documentation on this conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

8. Radio address by Secretary of State Hull, September 17, 1943, on "Our Foreign Policy in the Framework of our National Interests." For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 18, 1943, page 173.

9. The Fulbright and Connally Resolutions. On September 21, 1943, the House of Representatives passed the Fulbright Resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 25, going on record in favor of participation by the United States in "appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace." See the *Congressional Record*, volume 89, part 6, page 7728. The Senate did not act on this resolution, but on November 5, 1943, it passed the Connally Resolution, Senate Resolution 192, including the declaration "that the Senate recognizes the necessity of there being established at the earliest practical date a general international organization based on the principle of the sovereignty of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." See the *Congressional Record*, volume 89, part 7, page 9222.

10. The Tripartite Conference at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943. For documentation on this conference, see *ante*, pages 513 ff. The Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers on October 30, 1943 (*ante*, page 755), set in motion active negotiations for a postwar international organization. For references to the record of discussions of the Declaration at the Moscow Conference, with relevant documents, see index under heading "Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers: Four-Nation Declaration".

11. Proposal by United States Government that other governments be invited to adhere to point 4 of the Moscow Four Power Declaration calling for the formation of a general international organization. On November 18, 1943, the Secretary of State sent telegrams to

the Ambassadors in London, Chungking, and Moscow instructing them to ascertain from the British, Chinese, and Soviet Foreign Ministers, respectively, their attitude on the proposal that an announcement be made that such adherences would be welcome and should be sent to Washington (500.CC/26a). Favorable replies were received from the Chinese and Soviet Governments. The Embassy in London, however, in a telegram of December 2 quoted a communication from the Foreign Office stating that the British Government was inclined to the view that it would be premature to open this point of the Declaration to adherence by other governments until further progress had been made by the British, American, and Soviet Governments in their exchanges of views (500.CC/29).

12. Discussion between President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin regarding postwar organization at meetings on November 29 and December 1, 1943, during the Tehran Conference. For records of these meetings, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pages 529-533 and 594-596, respectively.

13. Memorandum from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, dated December 29, 1943, transmitting "Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security" and an additional attachment entitled "Principal Obligations of a Member State". For texts of this memorandum and its attachments, see Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, pages 576-581. (For earlier draft plans prepared in the Department of State, "Draft Constitution of International Organization", July 14, 1943, and "The Charter of the United Nations", August 14, 1943, see *ibid.*, pages 472 and 526, respectively.) ]



PRELIMINARY AND EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSTWAR MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS <sup>1</sup>

800.515/5314

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 9, 1943.

Participants: Sir Frederick Phillips;<sup>2</sup>  
Mr. Redvers Opie, Counselor of British Embassy;  
Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.

Sir Frederick Phillips and Mr. Opie called at their request. They wished to ask two questions.

First: Were we making any progress in getting our ideas together in answer to the Keynes Plan<sup>3</sup> which they had presented?

Second: Had we any objections now to their handing copies of the Keynes Plan to Maisky<sup>4</sup> in London and to the Chinese Ambassador there?

I answered the two questions categorically. I said that we had made very considerable progress in getting up our ideas and I thought they were now substantially complete. We did not, however, feel it advisable to lay down an American plan. Instead, the Treasury was contemplating calling a meeting of treasury experts from whom a plan might develop.

As to their second question, I said that in view of the long delay I could not see that we were in any position to ask the British further to withhold their plan from the Russians and the Chinese. We had ourselves stated to the Russians and Chinese that we expected to enter discussions of this kind and suggested that they might wish to consider their own views in connection with currency stabilization and financial arrangements.

Mr. Opie asked to know what nations would be represented in the event of a conference of treasury experts.

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<sup>1</sup>For previous correspondence, see section entitled "Discussions regarding postwar economic and financial arrangements," *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 163 ff.

<sup>2</sup>British Treasury Representative in the United States.

<sup>3</sup>For text of the Keynes plan for a clearing union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 203. John Maynard Keynes, Baron Keynes of Tilton, was Economic Adviser to the British Government.

<sup>4</sup>Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

I said that was presently under consideration. Plainly the British, the Russians and the Chinese would have to be there.

In response to Mr. Opie's question about South America, I said that had not been determined but one suggestion had been that of drawing in a representative from the Inter-American Financial and Advisory Committee. There remained the question of representation of the British Dominions, and of the European governments-in-exile. As to these, we were still studying the matter.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

800.515/551b

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the British Treasury Representative in the United States (Phillips)*<sup>5</sup>

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1943.

MY DEAR SIR FREDERICK: In accordance with our recent conversation, I now send you for consideration a preliminary memorandum and a preliminary draft of a Proposal for an International Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations.<sup>6</sup> These documents were prepared by the technical staff of the United States Treasury in consultation with the technical experts of other departments of this Government. They are intended to serve as a basis for discussion rather than represent, at this stage, an expression of the official views of this Government.

Like copies are being sent to the Russian Ambassador, to the Chinese Ambassador, and to Mr. Redvers Opie.

We should be glad to have any preliminary comments you may care to make and to receive from you any additional suggestions you may wish to make on the general subject of international monetary cooperation.

It is the plan of this Government to send this memorandum for examination to the United and Associated Nations a little later, with the suggestion that they, in the not too distant future, send one or more of their technical experts to Washington to give us their preliminary reaction as to the draft proposal, and discuss with our technical experts the feasibility of international monetary cooperation along the lines suggested in these documents or along any other lines they may wish to suggest.

Sincerely yours,

A. A. BERLE, JR.

<sup>5</sup> Sent also on the same date to the Chinese and Soviet Ambassadors and to the Counselor of the British Embassy.

<sup>6</sup> Enclosures not found attached to file copy. For text of the Preliminary Draft Outline of Proposal for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund issued by the U.S. Treasury Department, see Department of State Publication No. 2866, *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), vol. II, p. 1536.

800.515/586

*The British Treasury Representative in the United States (Phillips)  
to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1943.

DEAR MR. BERLE: I have received the draft International Stabilization Fund proposals and the covering Memorandum which you enclosed in your letter of February 1. The documents were immediately sent to London and their views on the substance of the proposals will be received in due course. After mentioning the matter to the Ambassador, however, I feel that the question of procedure raised in the last paragraph of your letter requires urgent consideration.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer<sup>7</sup> and the other Ministers concerned are most anxious that the procedure adopted should be such as to ensure effective discussion and real progress towards the formulation of a single and agreed scheme. It is not possible for them to express a considered view as to the procedure until the document has reached London and has received preliminary study. We regard it as essential that the United States document should not be communicated to the United and Associated Nations other than the U.S.S.R. and China until the documents have been seen in London and agreed plans for future procedure have been formulated. Meanwhile we have no indication whether our answers to the questions on the Clearing Union raised by the American experts made the Clearing Union Plan sufficiently clear to them or when we may expect your further comments on it. Such comments would greatly help in making progress in the discussions as a whole. The American memorandum and the Clearing Union Plan have a great deal in common and are not so far apart as to preclude the usefulness of trying to conflate them. This is the course which we should much prefer.

Yours sincerely,

F. PHILLIPS

800.515/720

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 16, 1943.

Participants: Sir Frederick Phillips;  
Mr. Redvers Opie, Counselor of British Embassy;  
Dr. Leo Pasvolsky;<sup>8</sup>  
Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.

Sir Frederick Phillips and Mr. Opie came in at their request. They had received copies of the tentative Treasury suggestions for mone-

<sup>7</sup> Sir Kingsley Wood.

<sup>8</sup> Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

tary stabilization. They first inquired what the plans were for sending this memorandum to the other governments. They realized it had already been sent to the Chinese and Russian Embassies here.

I said we had rather hoped to get out the memorandum to the other allied and associated governments within the next few days.

After some discussion as to the difficulties of getting representatives here who might discuss the matter which were apparently framed with the desire of introducing a suggestion that the conference be held in London—(a suggestion which was not made by them, however) they then inquired whether we envisaged a formal conference here. Dr. Pasvolsky said he considered the first thing to do was to have the experts present so we could discuss the matter informally among ourselves. We should thus have the benefit of everyone's ideas on the point.

I said that I understood the Treasury, after such discussion, had in mind formalizing the discussions in a regular conference if it should appear that there was likely to be general agreement.

Mr. Opie said that they had not as yet been able to get the comments of their Government on the Treasury memorandum. He felt we ought to continue discussions between the British Government and ourselves prior to sending out copies of the memorandum to all and sundry. This had started, he said, with bilateral discussions between us, and he thought that these could profitably be carried on some time longer. In any event, he hoped we could have a further discussion, preferably on February 23, at which time they would probably have the comments of their Government; and he hoped that sending out the memorandum to the other countries might be delayed until after that time.

Dr. Pasvolsky and I agreed that there was no objection to that, and we accordingly planned to meet on February 23, at three p. m. Meantime, we would withhold distribution of the memorandum.

Mr. Opie explained that although they had promptly sent the memorandum to England, due to bad plane connections it had only just arrived and their Government had not had a chance to examine it.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

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800.515/551

*The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1943.

DEAR CORDELL: Pursuant to arrangements agreed upon by representatives of the State Department, Treasury Department, and other interested agencies, copies of the draft proposal for a Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations have been given to the

representatives in Washington of the Governments of the United Kingdom, China and Russia several weeks ago. It was also agreed that copies should be submitted, after a lapse of a week, to the other United and Associated Nations. Mr. Berle and Mr. Pasvolsky have informed us that you are in accord with that procedure.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter of transmittal which I should like to send to the Ministers of Finance of the appropriate countries.<sup>9</sup> I understand that the enclosed draft had been approved by Mr. Berle and Mr. Pasvolsky except for the last sentence in paragraph 2. This last sentence is added in response to a request made by the British Treasury officials that we include in our letter of submittal a reference to their study of the problem.

I am appending a list of countries which seem to us to be the appropriate ones to receive a copy of the draft proposal.<sup>10</sup> You will note that France and Argentina are not included in the list and that the Government of India is included. The representatives of the British Treasury approved the inclusion of India. Should you wish to have any alteration made in the list, we shall of course do so.

When you approve of this letter, I shall send it with the draft proposal to the Ministers of Finance of the countries indicated.

Sincerely,

HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.

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800.515/551

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)*

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In reply to your inquiry regarding the list of countries to whom the monetary stabilization plan prepared by Treasury experts might be sent, it would seem appropriate to send this plan to all of the United Nations and to all of the American republics which are not United Nations, other than Argentina.

The self-governing Dominions should, of course, be addressed as separate nations; and India should likewise be addressed separately, since India has representation independent of the United Kingdom.

Sincerely yours,

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

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<sup>9</sup> The letter as transmitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Finance Ministers was dated March 4, 1943; for text, see *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, vol. II, p. 1573.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1574.

800.515/567a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1943—11 p. m.

477. For Murphy:<sup>11</sup> The Treasury has proposed to the Finance Ministers of the United Nations and associated American governments the sending of an expert to Washington to enter into informal and tentative explorations of possible plans for monetary stabilization in the post-war period.

You are requested to make this known to General Giraud<sup>12</sup> and to General Catroux<sup>13</sup> and to inquire whether they could agree on such an expert who might assist in such exploratory discussions on the technical level by giving a French reaction to the suggestions discussed. Both the Treasury and the Department would hope that they would speak with one voice, so that we are not in the position of having the appearance of two interests, instead of one.

Cooperation between the two groups would be welcomed as a sign of increasing progress towards unity.

HULL

800.515/564 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 18, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received March 18—1:45 p. m.]

1898. For State and Treasury from Casaday.<sup>14</sup> Embassy's 1850, 16th and previous.<sup>15</sup> For purposes of information and record, a recapitulation is given herewith of the Embassy's activities in connection with the postwar currency conference held February 26, 1943 and developments growing out of it.

The Embassy's telegram 1481, February 27, 10 p. m.,<sup>16</sup> indicated the

<sup>11</sup> Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser, staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre; Personal Representative of the President in North Africa with rank of Minister.

<sup>12</sup> Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, French High Commissioner in North Africa from December 26, 1942.

<sup>13</sup> Gen. Georges Catroux, member of the Council of Defence of the French Empire, of which Gen. Charles de Gaulle was president.

<sup>14</sup> Lauren W. Casaday, Treasury representative, special assistant to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

<sup>16</sup> Not printed; it reported on an informal meeting held February 26 by Allied Finance Ministers, appropriate British authorities, and observers from the Dominions, the Soviet Union, and China, to receive and discuss a report of the subcommittee on postwar currency problems in occupied countries (840.50/1344).

general purpose and character of the meeting and, among other things, reported:

(1) That Lord Keynes distributed to those present copies of a memorandum embodying the British proposals for an international clearing union;

(2) That Lord Keynes mentioned the existence of an American paper on the same general subject;

(3) That the meeting requested your observers to ascertain whether the American paper would be made available to the governments represented at the meeting;

(4) That a further meeting was to be held if possible within about a fortnight.

Minutes of this meeting have been forwarded by air.<sup>18</sup>

Previous to the conference of February 26, the Embassy had heard indirectly from British sources that the American paper had already been made available to the British, Chinese and Russian representatives in Washington.

On March 3, the British Treasury, reportedly after contacting the Department through the British Embassy in Washington, issued a press communiqué concerning the February 26 meeting. This fact and the initial press reaction to the announcement were reported in the Embassy's telegram 1610, March 5.<sup>18</sup>

Subsequent telegrams (1664, 8th, 1680, 9th, 1752, 11th, 1766, 12th, 1795, 13th, 1850, 16th)<sup>19</sup> reviewed the continuing press comment and pointed out:

(1) That there was considerable misleading speculation and rumor concerning both the British and American proposals;

(2) That members of Parliament and others were urging that the British proposal be made public;

(3) That the Chancellor of the Exchequer eventually announced that the British proposal would soon be published as a White Paper;

(4) That speculation and curiosity as to the American proposal have persisted not only in the press but in the form of numerous inquiries received by this Embassy and by the British Treasury from daily and weekly press representatives and representatives of the various governments with headquarters in London.

Meanwhile, British Treasury officials expressed some concern that no reply had been received to our 1481 of February 27 asking whether the American proposal would be made available here. Accordingly, the Embassy repeated its request for information on this point in telegram 1652, March 8, 4 p. m.<sup>18</sup> No reply was received to this or the preceding inquiry. Yesterday the Embassy learned from a British Treasury official that, according to a report the Treasury recently

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> None printed.

received from Washington, the text of the American proposal was given to representatives of the Allied Governments in Washington as long ago as March 5. He expressed surprise that this Embassy had not been informed of this and considerable concern that the British offer to have the document printed in London in order to save time had been ignored. He stated that since it seems generally agreed that the American and British proposals must be considered together, the next conference of the Allied Finance Ministers, tentatively scheduled for last Friday, would be postponed until all had received a copy of the American paper and had had an opportunity to study it. He also wondered whether the American document, like the British, will be published at an early date or confined to the confidential use of the governments concerned, and suggested that any information the Embassy might obtain from Washington on this point would be appreciated.

Attention is respectfully called to the fact that during the course of the developments outlined above, this Embassy has received no word of information, advice or instruction from Washington and has been placed thereby in a position of some embarrassment.

Attention is also called to the fact that the latest version of the American document possessed by this Embassy (that brought over in January by Snider<sup>20</sup>) is somewhat different in substance and considerably different in arrangement from that possessed by the British Treasury which was given to Sir Frederick Phillips in Washington under a covering letter from Mr. Berle dated February 1, 1943. The Embassy would appreciate receiving copies of the latest revision available—that given to the British on February 1 or that given to the Allied Governments on March 5, if it is different. [Casaday.]

MATTHEWS

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800.515/572

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1943.

Mr. Opie came in to see me at his request. He reported that he had received a cable from London setting out a Brazilian request to be represented in talks which are being held by the British with the Finance Ministers of the governments-in-exile. These talks relate to establishment of currency and currency rates within these countries when they are liberated. In these conferences the United States is represented by an observer, Mr. Penrose.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Delbert Snider, assistant to Mr. Casaday.

<sup>21</sup> Ernest F. Penrose, economist, special assistant to the Embassy at London.



Mr. Opie said that the Foreign Office was taking the line that they were quite willing to invite Brazil to send an observer to these conferences, if they so wished. They were, however, somewhat surprised at Brazil's interest in a conference on monetary matters which was of very little (if any) interest to Brazil, since Brazil of course had none of the territory in question and probably would not be entering into the occupation of these territories. He wished to state this to the United States.

I commented that this probably arose from the statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer some days ago. Kingsley Wood had said in Parliament that they were having conversations with the governments-in-exile relating to monetary matters. This had been confused, in our press, with the talks going forward on monetary stabilization here; and I thought it not unlikely that, because of the misinterpretation given by both the British and American press, the Brazilians were under the same misapprehension as the journalists. In that case, their desire to be represented was quite understandable. I said I thought that on explanation the matter probably would straighten itself out readily.

I said that, if Mr. Opie saw no objection, I would endeavor myself to explain the matter to the Brazilian Ambassador here for his information. We had maintained a steady policy of endeavoring to keep our American associates, and especially Brazil, fully advised of what was going on; they had been sent a copy of the proposed monetary stabilization plan; and I thought a good purpose might be served by explaining to the Brazilian Embassy here that the conferences in London really related to a quite different subject.

I said that it might be useful for the Foreign Office to bear in mind one note which had been appearing from time to time in the Brazilian press. At the close of the first World War, Brazil, with or without justification, considered that she had been pretty much excluded from the Versailles settlements. I had observed certain references to this feeling recently, and I thought that the Brazilian Foreign Office might be a little nervous on the point.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

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800.515/569a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1943—midnight.

1770. For Casaday from White,<sup>22</sup> Treasury. Sir Frederick Phillips has indicated in a letter to me that our Stabilization Fund proposal

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<sup>22</sup> Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, and Director of Monetary Research.

was going to be discussed along with the British Clearing Union plan at a meeting of the Finance Ministers of the Allied Governments in London probably on March 26. Below is a reply which I sent to Phillips. My letter to him represents the views of our State Department also. With the approval of the Acting Ambassador, will you please hand a copy of my letter to Phillips to the appropriate official in the British Treasury as quickly as feasible. I am advising Phillips of this action.

"This is in reply to your letter of March 20, 1943, regarding discussion of the Stabilization Fund proposal in London. We appreciate your courtesy in wishing to have copies of the preliminary draft of our Stabilization Fund proposal made available to the Allied Finance Ministers for discussion at a meeting in London.

"However, in transmitting the preliminary draft of the Stabilization Fund proposal to the various Ministers of Finance for their exploratory study, Secretary Morgenthau indicated that after they had had an opportunity to examine the draft, he would like to have them send their technical experts to Washington to discuss the matter further with him and our Government experts here. He realized that the proposal as distributed required further explanation and amplification to be fully understood and he preferred that at least the initial explanatory discussions should be directly with us.

"In view of the foregoing, we suggest that any discussions of the Stabilization Fund proposal by the Allied Finance Ministers in London should be postponed until after we have had an opportunity to carry on explanatory discussions here in Washington. Needless to say, we will avoid consideration of the Clearing Union in our discussions until you have had an ample opportunity to conduct your explanatory discussions."

[White]

HULL

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800.515/568: Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, March 30, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received March 31—12:05 p. m.]

515. From Murphy. Your 477, March 17, 11 p. m. Careful consideration has been given to the question of sending a French expert to Washington to participate in exploratory conversations regarding monetary stabilization in postwar period. The best qualified person whom the French would like to designate is Maurice Couve de Murville.<sup>23</sup> Other possibilities are Hervé Alphand<sup>24</sup> and Leroy-Beaulieu,<sup>25</sup> but preference is decidedly in favor of Couve de Murville. However, his functions as Secretary General would not permit his

<sup>23</sup> Commissioner of Finance, French Committee of National Liberation.

<sup>24</sup> Director of Economic Affairs, French Committee of National Liberation.

<sup>25</sup> French Financial Attaché at Berne.

departure at the present time. I feel that unless this question is urgent, a decision should be deferred. What will be the probable date of these discussions? [Murphy.]

WILEY

800.515/570 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 5, 1943—1 p. m.  
[Received April 5—8:15 a. m.]

2395. To Secretary Morgenthau. This morning on returning to the office for the first time I had a telephone call from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to inform me that the White Plan <sup>26</sup> had been published in this morning's *Financial News*. The Chancellor told me that the text was in a form which made him believe that it had come from one of the Allied Governments. The Chancellor further explained to me that since I saw you the President had decided to postpone the publication of the White text although the British still planned to publish the Keynes text on Thursday.<sup>27</sup> I understand that the text of the White Plan as published in the *Financial News* has already in part been cabled to the United States by press correspondents.

WINANT

800.515/576b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1943—11 p. m.

2124. From the Under Secretary. Secretary Morgenthau asked me to let you know, in reply to your message <sup>28</sup> which he received this morning, that in view of the publication he is having a press conference at 3 p. m. tomorrow, Tuesday, April 6, at which he will give the press the text of the stabilization plan for release in the morning papers of April 7. [Welles.]

HULL

<sup>26</sup> For text of the original White Plan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 178.

<sup>27</sup> For text published on April 8, see British Cmd. 6437: *Proposals for an International Clearing Union*; or *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, vol. II, p. 1548.

<sup>28</sup> *Supra*.

800.515/573 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 6, 1943—3 p. m.  
[Received April 6—12:17 p. m.]

2418. For Secretary of the Treasury from Casaday. Embassy's 2395, April 5, 1 p. m. and previous. Most London papers today carry reports of Secretary Morgenthau's testimony on the postwar currency proposal yesterday before the Senate Committees<sup>29</sup> together with reports of the reactions of various individual Congressmen. For the most part, editorial comment here is favorable but there is some criticism of the fact that the proposal makes no mention of tariff reduction.

A British Treasury official telephoned this morning stating that he has heard that the American proposal is to be published today at 3 p. m. Washington time. In this connection he repeated his offer to have the text printed here in order to provide earlier English distribution. [Casaday.]

WINANT

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800.515/573 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1943—1 p. m.

2161. For Casaday from Secretary of the Treasury. Your 2418, April 6, 3 p. m. and Department's 2144, April 6, 8 p. m.<sup>30</sup> The text that was cabled to you and released to the press represents the latest revision of the Treasury's draft proposal. Any publication in London should be only of the draft cabled yesterday. You are at liberty to have it mimeographed and distributed as the Ambassador sees fit. [Morgenthau.]

HULL

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<sup>29</sup> For text of statement by the Secretary of the Treasury April 5, 1943, before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Banking and Currency and the Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, see World Peace Foundation, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1942-1943*, vol. v, p. 649.

<sup>30</sup> Latter not printed; it transmitted the text of the statement by the Secretary of the Treasury of April 5, 1943, before the Senate Committees, and the full text of the preliminary draft of the proposal for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund (800.515/567a). For text of the preliminary draft, see *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, vol. II, p. 1536, or *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, June 1943, p. 501.

800.515/568 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943—9 p. m.

703. Your 515, March 30, 3 p. m. Up to the present, all that the Treasury has suggested are conversations of an exploratory nature that may continue for some weeks or possibly even months without fixed date and not a formal conference which might be summoned at some later time if it should prove desirable. In order to avoid risk of being called upon to enter into such informal discussions independently with representatives of the several French factions, it is greatly to be desired that such discussions await agreement upon the selection of a representative that could come with the joint support or agreement of both groups.<sup>31</sup>

Couve de Murville would be particularly welcome here, and in the light of the preceding, it would seem that opportunity to send him would not be lost. If French participation in the discussions were postponed they could satisfactorily be fitted in at a later stage of development of the talks which are expected to proceed over a period of weeks or months as the experts successively arrive to discuss informally the proposal for post-war monetary cooperation.

HULL

800.515/604a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1943—midnight.

2378. To Casaday from White. Secretary Morgenthau is arranging schedule for discussions with technical experts of preliminary draft outline of proposal for international stabilization fund. Secretary would like you to inquire of finance ministers of exiled governments except French National Committee when their experts may be expected for discussions and whom they expect to send. [White.]

HULL

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<sup>31</sup> In telegram No. 656, April 19, the Consul General informed the Department that selection of a French representative would be deferred pending agreement of both groups (800.515/611).

800.515/605 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 15, 1943—4 p. m.  
[Received 4: 50 p. m.]

2648. For Secretary of Treasury from Casaday. Department's 2378, April 14, midnight. There has been some confusion among representatives of the exiled governments here as to the nature of the invitation expressed in Secretary Morgenthau's letter of March 4.<sup>32</sup> It is not known whether the intention is to hold a series of inclusive meetings or conferences attended by representatives of all interested governments at the same time or a series of separate conferences with the representatives of each individual country held when and as each representative may be able to attend.

The representatives of several of the exiled governments here have asked me for information on the above in view of their tentative plans to have the same delegates attend not only the monetary conference or conferences but the Food,<sup>33</sup> Relief and possible other conferences as well. Preliminary to making the inquiries you instruct me to undertake in the telegram referred to, it would be helpful to know:

1. Whether you plan to have meetings with representatives of each government singly or meetings which are attended by representatives of all the governments simultaneously.

2. In either event how long a period and roughly what month or months does the Treasury feel the monetary conference ought to cover? There is a rumor here for example that the monetary conferences will not begin until fall while one London paper this morning states that the monetary conference has been postponed from April to May. This is causing confusion and a number of inquiries have been made on the point.

3. Is it likely that the monetary conferences will be held at such times as to permit the delegates to attend other conferences as well?

For your information I have already been informed without inquiry that the following intend to be in Washington during the month of May: Baron René Boel, Belgium; Dr. P. W. Kuo, China; Dr. Beneš and Dr. J. V. Mladek, Czechoslovakia. [Casaday.]

WINANT

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<sup>32</sup> See footnote 9, p. 1058.

<sup>33</sup> For correspondence regarding the Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Va., May 18—June 3, 1943, see pp. 820 ff.

800.515/715

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1943.

MR. BERLE: You doubtless saw Mr. Morgenthau's statement in his press conference yesterday to the effect that the first of a series of conferences on postwar international monetary stabilization will be held in Washington next week with Canadian delegates.

Presumably this is the meeting about which I told you on Tuesday. You will recall that Saturday afternoon, April 10, Mr. Pearson, the Minister-Counselor of the Canadian Legation, received an urgent message which he was instructed to deliver to Mr. Morgenthau from Mr. Ilsley.<sup>34</sup> This message stated that Mr. Ilsley and his associates had made a careful study of the White plan and of the Keynes plan and that they perceived a number of points of common ground. The message went on to say that Mr. Ilsley and his associates had prepared a compromise draft using material from both plans<sup>35</sup> which they would be glad to discuss with representatives of the Treasury Department, if such an idea could be transmitted to Mr. Morgenthau. The message suggested that perhaps it might be possible to arrange a meeting at the Seignior Club near Ottawa at an early date.

In telling me about this Mr. Pearson said that on Monday or Tuesday Mr. Morgenthau sent a reply stating that although he appreciated Canada's interest and desire to be helpful, this suggestion did not attract him. He stated that representatives of the Treasury Department would be glad to receive any persons Mr. Ilsley might care to designate to discuss the White plan in Washington next week. He added that he and his associates would of course not decline to listen to anything which the Canadians might wish to say about the Keynes plan.

Have you spoken to Harry White about this matter? It seems to me that it would be desirable for the Department of State to take part in the conversations. I hope that if you cannot yourself sit in on them that Mr. Livesey<sup>36</sup> can. If he is not available, Mr. Parsons<sup>37</sup> or I will be glad to sit in as observers if you wish.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

<sup>34</sup> Canadian Minister of Finance.

<sup>35</sup> The Canadians published their plan on June 9, 1943; see *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, vol. II, pp. 1575 ff.

<sup>36</sup> Chief, Financial Division.

<sup>37</sup> Foreign Service Officer assigned to the Division of European Affairs.

800.515/612 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1943—5 p. m.

2537. From Secretary of the Treasury to Casaday. Your 2648, April 15.

1. It is planned to meet separately with representatives of each government for technical discussions on international monetary cooperation. Such separate discussions will probably be interspersed with group meetings of American technical experts with the experts of several countries together.

2. Conversations with the representatives of some countries are now being held and we should like to complete the bilateral exploratory discussions before beginning informal group meetings of experts which are to be held if possible early in May. At the group meetings of experts who have come to Washington, it is expected to summarize and synthesize the views that have been expressed on the various proposals submitted. These informal meetings of experts should not be confused with a formal conference of Finance Ministers which will be called for a later date if an adequate area of agreement emerges from the discussions among the experts.

3. Finance Ministers have been asked to send technically qualified men for the discussions on international monetary cooperation.

Please inquire of the Finance Ministers of the various governments in exile except the French National Committee when their representatives may be expected in Washington for these discussions. The Netherlands representative has already arrived. [Morgenthau.]

HULL

800.515/627a : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)*<sup>38</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1943.

On March 4, 1943 Secretary Morgenthau addressed the following letter to the Ministers of Finance of the United Nations and the countries associated with them.

[Here follows text of the letter of March 4, 1943, printed in *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, volume II, page 1573.]

There appears to be some misunderstanding of the nature of the talks which are going forward in Washington. These conversations

<sup>38</sup> Sent on the same date to Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay; sent as an airgram on the same date to Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela; sent as an airgram on April 22 to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, and Panama.



are between technical experts and are of an exploratory character. Conversations with the representatives of some countries are now being held and we should like to complete the bilateral exploratory discussions before beginning informal group meetings of experts which are to be held if possible in the beginning of May. At the group meetings of experts who have come to Washington it is expected to summarize and synthesize the views that have been expressed on the various proposals submitted. These informal meetings of experts should not be confused with a formal conference of Finance Ministers which will be called for a later date if an adequate area of agreement emerges from the discussions among the experts.

In order to assure discussions with the technical experts of all countries within this time schedule you are requested to inquire of the Minister of Finance when the technical experts of his Government may be expected to reach Washington.

For your further information a copy of the preliminary draft outline of the proposal is being sent to you by air mail.

HULL

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800.515/624 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Vincent) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, April 24, 1943—noon.

[Received 12:20 p. m.]

588. I learn from a reliable source that the following views concerning the forthcoming monetary discussions have been telegraphed from Washington to the Chinese Government.

1. While British and American plans fundamentally similar technically, they differ politically, the former tending to strengthen the political position of the British Empire and the latter that of America.

2. Both plans would make it impossible for countries remaining outside contemplated international monetary arrangement to obtain external financial assistance and would at the same time involve encroachment on sovereignty of countries joining arrangement with respect to monetary and economic affairs.

3. Both United States and United Kingdom anxious that Russia should join arrangement and willing to give her greater role in scheme than her economic and financial strength alone would justify. Dr. Soong<sup>39</sup> therefore recommends that China should use her political bargaining power to get same advantageous treatment as Russia. He advises Chinese Government to treat forthcoming discussions as essentially diplomatic and political and not technical in character and to take this factor into consideration in appointing head of delegation.

With regard to 3 above, high Chinese official has informed me of his understanding that America is making strong bid for Russian

<sup>39</sup> T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, temporarily in Washington.

adherence to the American plan and that British are making similar bid for support of their plan. Official thought that British had greater chance of success but this may derive from the fact that he himself prefers British plan.

VINCENT

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800.515/635b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Vincent)*

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1943—6 p. m.

534. For Adler<sup>40</sup> from the Secretary of the Treasury.

Part I. Please transmit the following message to Dr. Kung:<sup>41</sup>

To Dr. Kung from Secretary Morgenthau: In connection with the U.S. Treasury's preliminary draft of a proposal for an International Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations, which was forwarded to you through Mr. Hsi Te-mou,<sup>42</sup> I would appreciate if you would inform me when Chinese technical experts might be expected to come to Washington to give your preliminary reaction to this draft proposal and to discuss with our technical experts the feasibility of international monetary cooperation along the lines suggested in our draft proposal.

Part II. Please make clear to Dr. Kung in transmitting this message to him that the technical experts are being requested to come to Washington for preliminary discussions of an exploratory character. It is desired to complete bilateral exploratory discussions between the Chinese experts and the United States experts before beginning informal group meetings of experts which are to be held soon, if possible. These informal meetings of experts are not to be confused with a formal conference of Finance Ministers which will be called for at a later date, if an adequate area of agreement emerges from the discussions among the experts. [Morgenthau.]

HULL

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800.515/631 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 27, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received April 27—10:24 p. m.]

2905. For Secretary of the Treasury from Casaday. Department's 2378, April 14, midnight, and 2537, April 21, 5 p. m.

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<sup>40</sup> Solomon Adler, Treasury representative, American member of the Stabilization Board in China.

<sup>41</sup> H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance.

<sup>42</sup> Representative of the Chinese Ministry of Finance in Washington; Director of Central Bank of China and Bank of China.

[Here follows detailed information regarding the experts appointed by the Ministries of Finance of Czechoslovakia, Luxemburg, and Poland for the informal preliminary conversations.]

Dr. Beyen of the Netherlands Government has prepared and sent to the finance experts of the various governments here, including Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. (but apparently not the Chinese) and also to the French National Committee a brief commentary on the British and American proposals. Although couched in general terms the commentary, on balance, clearly favors the principles of the Keynes plan vis-à-vis the American proposal. Beyen, with the approval of Minister van den Broek,<sup>43</sup> suggests in an informal letter that his paper might serve as the basis for private, unofficial conversations here among the experts who took part in the earlier conferences sponsored by the British Treasury. Beyen's letter to me stated that if I (and the others) agreed that such discussions might be useful, a meeting would be called at an early date.

This morning Waley<sup>44</sup> telephoned me that the British were taking the view that Beyen's letter to them was for their information and not an invitation to attend the meeting. He said it seemed obvious and natural that the representatives of the various European governments here wanted a chance to talk things over among themselves and possibly adopt some common approach before proceeding to Washington. He suggests that the participants would probably prefer that neither the British nor the United States representatives attend the proposed meeting, as observers or otherwise. He stated that, in replying to Beyen, the British were merely expressing appreciation for being informed of the proposed conversations but making it clear that they did not intend to send a representative unless specifically requested. Waley intimated that Beyen probably expects a similar reply from me.

After due consideration I decided to reply to Beyen's letter in a sense somewhat similar to Waley's reply. I have indicated, however, my readiness to attend if my presence would be considered helpful and if I am so informed.

I am aware of the possibility that, with or without the foreknowledge of the British, the purpose of the proposed meeting might well be to attempt to secure in advance an agreement among the European delegates to plump for the Keynes plan when they go to Washington. At any rate it seems likely that Beyen will be the chief protagonist among the Europeans for the Keynes plan and that his own purpose in suggesting a "pre-Washington" meeting at this time is not far from that just stated. [Casaday.]

WINANT

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<sup>43</sup> Netherlands Minister of Finance.

<sup>44</sup> Sir David Waley, Under Secretary, British Treasury.

800.515/657

*Mr. H. D. White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1943.

DEAR MR. BERLE: This is in reply to your letter of April 20, 1943,<sup>45</sup> suggesting that the Finance Ministers of Egypt, Iceland, Iran and Liberia be invited to send technical experts to Washington for exploratory discussions on the Treasury's preliminary draft proposal for a Stabilization Fund of the United Nations and the countries associated with them.

Identical letters of invitation have been written to the Ministers of Finance of Egypt and of Iran, to the Secretary of the Treasury of Liberia, and to the Minister of Iceland. Copies of the letters are enclosed.<sup>45</sup> The invitation to the Secretary of the Treasury of Liberia is being sent to your office, with a letter to Mr. Mundy<sup>46</sup> requesting that the communication to Liberia be sent to our Minister in Monrovia for delivery.

Sincerely yours,

H. D. WHITE

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800.515/637 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Vincent) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, April 29, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received April 29—10:15 a. m.]

621. For Secretary of the Treasury only from Adler.

TF 114. Learn from a reliable source that Dr. Kung called a special meeting on April 28 of leading banking and financial experts to discuss British and American international monetary plans. The discussion which took place was intelligent and realistic. Almost all participants favored China's joining in scheme for international monetary cooperation even though it entailed surrender of power to unilaterally change value of her currency. Repeated emphasis was called to the crucial importance of the fixing of the quota and to the need for transitional internal rehabilitation and readjustment measures before China could participate effectively. While a number of people felt British plan more flexible in certain respects, one believed it superior to American plan. Hsu K'an, Minister of Food, reflecting the consensus of opinion stated that though after abolition of unequal treaties China should expect encroachments on her sovereignty, nevertheless as long as international affairs are not conducted by idealists

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

<sup>46</sup> Louis E. Mundy, Administrative Officer in office of Assistant Secretary of State Berle.

China must realistically measure what she would gain against what she would lose.

He strongly favored Chinese participation as beneficial effects would accrue from monetary stabilization. He felt China had more to gain from supporting the United States since with the development of Chinese trade China would inevitably find Britain, but not the United States, a competitor.

The Minister of Finance summing up said China must participate and must work closely with America. He requested those present to submit to him proposals which China might make on the lines of the discussion. These proposals, which [he] warned the meeting should not be made too high [*too high?*] will be worked into an integrated plan by the Ministry of Finance to be submitted to the Generalissimo <sup>48</sup> for his OK. [Adler.]

VINCENT

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800.515/661 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 7, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received May 7—8: 30 p. m.]

3201. For Secretary of the Treasury from Casaday. Department's 2378, April 14, midnight; Department's 2537, April 21, 5 p. m.; Embassy's 2905, April 27, 11 p. m.; Embassy's 3033, May 1; and Embassy's 3038, May 1, midnight.<sup>49</sup>

[Here follows detailed information regarding the appointment of experts by the Ministers of Finance of Norway and Yugoslavia for the informal preliminary conversations.]

The informal meeting of technical experts called by Dr. Beyen of the Netherlands Government was held today. With reference to my 2905 I report herewith that Beyen did send me a second, specific invitation which I accepted in the role of observer. In view of this, Waley decided that the British should also attend. Consequently at the meeting today Waley and Fraser <sup>50</sup> were present in the role of observers, and Waley said he believed that, after all, it was better that both they and I had attended.

In addition to those already mentioned, the meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, USSR (observer only), and Yugoslavia. Possibly because of the presence of the UK and US observers the discussion

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<sup>48</sup> Chiang Kai-shek.

<sup>49</sup> Telegrams Nos. 3033 and 3038 not printed.

<sup>50</sup> Presumably W. L. Fraser, Principal Assistant Secretary, British Treasury.

was very general and did not at any time assume the character of a searching analysis or detailed comparison of the currency proposals. There seemed to be general agreement that no final decisions or commitments on the currency proposals could be made until the longer terms problems of capital movements, loans or other arrangements for reconstruction and relief, and general trade and economic policies had been fully explored and some practical arrangements in these matters agreed upon. The presence of this sentiment at the meeting tends to confirm the statements made in the *Financial News* of May 1 as reported in my telegram 3033 of that date.

The meeting decided to make available to me and to Sir David Waley the memorandum prepared by Beyen, together with today's minutes, for transmission by our respective channels to Washington. A copy of the memorandum is already being forwarded to you by air pouch and a copy of the minutes of today's meeting will follow as soon as received.<sup>51</sup>

It is possible that if, as Waley suggested earlier, the British observers and I had declined to attend today's meeting, the discussion might have assumed a different character. I am inclined to doubt this, although it must be admitted that the purpose in calling the meeting at this time is not entirely clear. During the past week the representatives of at least three of the governments told me they were puzzled on this score and two of them expressed the same feeling following the meeting today. [Casaday.]

WINANT

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800.515/725

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Marriner S. Eccles, Federal Reserve Board;  
 Mr. Ronald Ransom, " " "  
 Mr. Ernest G. Draper, " " "  
 Mr. M. S. Sczymczak, " " "  
 and others;  
 Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.

I lunched at the Federal Reserve Board today at the invitation of Governor Sczymczak. Substantially the entire Board joined us at lunch. They asked the state of affairs in regard to the informal conversations going forward with reference to monetary stabilization.

I said that Dr. Gardiner, who was also present, had attended substantially all the meetings and no doubt had reported direct. On

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

Thursday, May 27th, an informal meeting had been held between Harry White of Treasury, Gardiner of Federal Reserve, Coe of BEW<sup>52</sup> and several of us in the State Department. At this time Treasury had given as its program: (a) an informal general meeting with various of the experts in town, to be held June 8th, and to discuss the proposed plans of stabilization; (b) at the close of this, an American session to determine what plan or modification of what plan should be finally worked out as the American position; and (c) thereafter, informal conversations with the British to see whether we could square our position with theirs.

I noted that Treasury was of course handling the matter. Governor Eccles asked whether we were committed to the plan. I said we were of course in the hands of the financial experts of the Government; and that while we had a great interest, plainly we would expect agreement by the financial authorities before we would be in a position to commit ourselves. I added that the Department hoped that the financial experts of the Government, namely, the Federal Reserve and Treasury people, and others interested, could reach common ground as rapidly as possible, since we knew that the British were already unhappy at the long delay. We should need not only to find a common front on an American position, but we should also have to have in mind the methods by which and the points on which we could reach agreement with the British.

There was general discussion of the plan of the Board; and the consensus appeared to be that the Federal Reserve could not accept the White Plan or any variation of it unless it were assured that legislation would be passed permitting the Federal Reserve Board to deal with the domestic consequences of any such plan. Thus, the White Plan might involve a large increment of gold into the United States and the power of the Federal Reserve to raise reserve ratios so that the resulting growth of deposit should not become embarrassing, would have to be increased.

I said that this, of course, was a matter for them to consider, but I thought that everything indicated the necessity of their getting together with the Treasury and reaching a general agreement.

Governor Eccles inquired whether State would be prepared to undertake to bring the two together. I said I thought not; we had no primary function in the matter, and I thought that Governor Eccles and Secretary Morgenthau could probably work out something together but, if not, it would have to be done through the White House. We naturally had ideas about the foreign affairs aspect of stabilization, and individual views as to possible plans, but we could not take

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<sup>52</sup> Board of Economic Warfare.

primary responsibility in a technical matter in which other bodies were given primary responsibility by law.

Governor Eccles said that when Secretary Morgenthau had expounded the White Plan before various of the Congressional and Senatorial representatives, he had unhappily disregarded the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, which had made trouble; and that, on that occasion, he had not invited the Federal Reserve people to be present. In a sense, this was fortunate, since Federal Reserve had certain points it would wish to urge itself before it became committed to the plan.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

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800.515/734

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1943.

I lunched with Mr. Richard Law,<sup>53</sup> at his invitation. In a couple of hours, we ranged over a considerable field.

Mr. Law inquired about monetary stabilization. He said he had been lunching with the Guaranty Trust Company people and was very much impressed at their view. I said that, fundamentally, the New York banks really wanted to go back to the days when Ben Strong<sup>54</sup> and Montagu Norman<sup>55</sup> settled things secretly in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Mr. Law said he thought that day was over. I said I thought so, too. I said that the task of monetary stabilization was difficult, not because of any insoluble difficulty between governments, but because we had to feel for the kind of arrangement which our public opinion would accept. Mr. Law asked whether they would accept anything. I said I thought they would, though it required some handling. I understood the Treasury planned to accelerate their conferences next week and that shortly after that we should be headed for more intensive conversations to resolve, if possible, any differences between the British and ourselves. I observed that the positions of Britain and the United States had substantially reversed; in earlier times, they were arguing for a tight, hard money policy, when we were arguing for expansion; now it seems to be the other way around.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

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<sup>53</sup> British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>54</sup> Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 1914 until his death in 1928.

<sup>55</sup> Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England since 1920.



800.515/719 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, June 10, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 5:31 p. m.]

891. From Adler to Secretary of Treasury only.

TF 130. At the final meeting held June 8 of monetary experts to discuss the draft instructions to the Chinese delegation to the forthcoming preliminary discussions on international monetary cooperation in Washington, Dr. Kung announced that the Chinese delegation to the preliminary discussions will consist of Dr. P. W. Kuo, Hsi Te Mou, K. C. Lee and T. V. Soong, all "Kung" men. The meeting agreed on a Chinese plan for international monetary cooperation shortly to be submitted to Treasury and on the draft instructions to be issued to the Chinese delegation.<sup>58</sup>

1. The Chinese [plan] has the following new features: (1) Provision for transitional period for restoration of internal monetary stability as an essential part of the plan. (2) China's blocked assets abroad to be free from any restrictions on abnormal war balances. (3) Determination of quota to depend on total value of imports and exports and invisible items in balance of payments and probable postwar developments in balance of payments having regard to postwar price levels, amount of money and bank credit in circulation, holdings of gold and foreign assets, and importance in world economy. Quotas of countries taking advantage of transitional period to be provisional and subject to revision. (4) Quantitative limits of members' quotas and debit balances to be made dependent on arrangements made for relief and economic rehabilitation and for medium and long-term capital investment. (5) Provision for a preparatory committee consisting of one member each from the U.S., the U.K., Russia and China, and three members from the other United Nations.

2. The following points in Chinese draft plan coincide with Treasury and British plans: (1) Objects, membership, consulting with and supplying information to organization. (2) International monetary unit with gold value, gold value for member currencies, and free and dependable market for gold. (3) Exchange rates to be altered only in accord with new organization. (4) An elastic plan re members' debit balances. (5) Abolition of exchange control as soon as feasible. (6) Authorization of continued control over capital movements.

<sup>58</sup> On September 3, 1943, the Chinese Ambassador transmitted to the Department of State for the Treasury Department a memorandum dated June 9, 1943, on the proposal for a United and Associated Nations stabilization fund together with a memorandum dated June 9, 1943, prepared by Chinese experts, giving general observations on the American and British plans for an international monetary organization; neither printed (800.515/805).

(7) Monetary organization to be separate from other international economic organizations.

3. The Chinese draft plan favors the Treasury plan on the following points: (1) Name of organization and name of governing body. (2) Members to subscribe to international fund in gold, currency and securities; but share of quota to be paid in currency one-half and in securities one-fourth. (3) Provisions with respect to funds operation. (4) Formula for determination of quotas with important modifications. (5) Formula for voting with modification that decisions on important matters to be by two-thirds instead of three-fourths majority.

4. Chinese draft plan favors British plan on following points: (1) Non-redeemability of new unit in gold. (2) Monetary standard not necessarily to be bound up with gold policies of particular countries or with gold producing industry; provision for checking excessive inflationary or deflationary world-wide tendencies. (3) Formula for revision of quotas—with modifications. (4) Creditor nations' responsibilities with respect to equilibrium in balance of payments—with modifications. Form of governing body and provision for general meeting. [Omission?] holding monetary reserves outside organization.

5. The following is a summary of most important points in draft instructions to Chinese delegation: (1) Delegation not authorized to commit Chinese Government. (2) Chinese plan drafted in order to help in reconciling Treasury and British plans as well as to provide for matters of particular interest to China. (3) Chinese Government feels that it is necessary to plan more concretely for transitional period of monetary rehabilitation after the war than do either the Treasury or the British plan. This of vital importance to China. (4) External aid will be needed to bridge the gap during the transitional period, though how much it is too early to say. Chinese Government has following measures in mind: (a) Foreign credits to Chinese Government to finance imports, importers when non-government and to pay national currency equivalent of imports to Chinese Government. (b) Direct sale of foreign exchange. (5) Chinese Government will not be in a position to make commitments on its exchange rate until plan for restoring internal monetary and fiscal stability adopted and partly carried out. (6) Chinese Government feels that restoration of confidence dependent to considerable extent on adoption of international plans for relief and economic rehabilitation. (7) Chinese Government stresses great importance of arrangement for international organization to provide capital for economic reconstruction and development. (8) Chinese Government strongly hopes that point 3, item 4 of Treasury plan will be made less restrictive with respect to debit

balances. (9) Chinese Government favors restoration of free exchange market and wishes to remove exchange restrictions when feasible without committing itself as to time. (10) Possibility of reciprocal undertakings to provide information to facilitate regulation of capital movements should be explored. (11) Chinese Government wishes Chinese blocked assets abroad which were frozen at her express wish should be promptly unfrozen after the war in accordance with a procedure to be worked out by the American, British and Chinese Governments. (12) Need is stressed for considering additional factors mentioned in paragraph 1, item (3) above in determining an adequate quota for China. (13) While Chinese interests do not require that unit as "deposits" which were effected in gold should be convertible into gold, Chinese Government has no objection to such a provision if the U.S. prefers it.

[6?] Treasury will appreciate that no prior knowledge of paragraphs 1 to 4, and no knowledge whatsoever of paragraph 5 should be revealed to Chinese delegation. [Adler.]

ATCHESON

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893.5151/947: Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, July 15, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received July 23—12: 15 p. m.]

1189. From Adler to Secretary Treasury only.

TF 139. Learn from reliable source that at a meeting of monetary experts called by Dr. Kung yesterday, Dr. Kung announced he had been informed by Chinese representatives at the Washington monetary discussions that a conference will not be held until the Allied Governments had agreed on the following:

1. That the existence of an international fund is vital and that the U.S. commitment to the fund should not exceed U.S. dollars two or three billion;

2. That every participating country should contribute to the fund;

3. That the initial rate of exchange of member countries be fixed;

4. That the voting power be based on the quota to a certain extent though not entirely.

Discussion in the meeting centered on point 3, the majority of those participating being strongly opposed on the ground that it would be impossible to arrive at a rational decision as to the Chinese exchange rate until some internal financial and economic stability had emerged. Dr. Kung, however, overrode all objections, insisting that China agree to all four points and arguing that it would be most inappropriate for China to hold up conference by refusing its assent to point 3.

The meeting also agreed that Chinese delegation be instructed to recommend that member nations wholly or partially occupied by the enemy be required to pay only two-thirds and not three-quarters of 30 percent of their gold holdings to the fund.

During the course of meeting Dr. Kung indicated that Generalissimo strongly favors stringent foreign trade and foreign exchange control in the postwar period as well as now. [Adler.]

ATCHESON

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800.515/782 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1943—8 p. m.

4585. From Secretary of Treasury for Mr. L. W. Casaday. This is for your and Winant's information. As a result of conversations with technical experts of about 30 countries, the preliminary draft proposal of the Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations has been revised to a considerable extent. The Secretary has written to members of the House and Senate Committees, before which he appeared in April, explaining what we have done and enclosing copies of the newest tentative draft proposal.<sup>57</sup> We expect to make this draft public in about 10 days. Six copies are being forwarded to you by air pouch. [Morgenthau.]

HULL

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800.515/780 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, August 5, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received August 5—7:27 p. m.]

5114. For Secretary of the Treasury from Casaday. Lord Keynes reacted favorably to Dr. White's letter of July 24.<sup>58</sup> He indicated that discussions have been going on among British officials without pause since the close of the currency talks in Washington and stated that within the last few days a formal message has gone to Lord Halifax<sup>59</sup> suggesting a series of bilateral discussions between British and American officials to begin not later than September 15. These conferences would discuss not only the postwar currency proposals but

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<sup>57</sup> See preliminary draft outline revised July 10, 1943, *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, vol. II, p. 1597.

<sup>58</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>59</sup> See British note of August 4, p. 1106.

apparently also rates of exchange, reciprocal aid and the implementation of article VII.<sup>60</sup> Lord Keynes believed that no reply had been received from the British Embassy in Washington up to yesterday.

Keynes noted Dr. White's statements concerning the minimum requirements for any currency proposal which would have a chance of legislative sanction. He stated that the British, for similar reasons, would probably also have to adhere to certain *minima* (mentioned the matter of control of exchange and the question of gold contributions) but he felt sure that the British and American lists of minimum requirements would not prove to be mutually incompatible. He said he himself planned to be present at the series of discussions the British have now proposed and stated that he believed he and Dr. White could reach agreement on most basic points of the currency proposals in a weekend of conversations. Keynes has not yet expressed any reaction to the revised version of the United States proposal as he had not had an opportunity to read it at the time I talked to him. [Casaday.]

WINANT

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800.515/818

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

At the designation of the Secretary, Dr. Pasvolsky and I attended a meeting in Secretary Morgenthau's office this morning. This was a meeting of the Committee on Financial and Monetary Affairs constituted by Secretary Morgenthau under authority given by the President more than a year ago.

There were present Secretary Morgenthau, Secretary Jesse Jones,<sup>61</sup> Chairman Eccles, Federal Reserve Board, Mr. Leo Crowley, Alien Property Custodian, Mr. Daniel Bell, Under Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Harry White, Dr. Pasvolsky and myself.

Secretary Morgenthau said that the subcommittee (Mr. Harry White) had now reported that their preliminary conversations with the various united and associated nations in respect to monetary stabilization were concluded and that as a result a primary draft outline proposal for stabilization of currency had now been evolved and they wished to release this for publication tomorrow. It was pointed out that this draft had been already handed to the Congressmen and Senators interested. He asked whether there was any objection to its release.

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<sup>60</sup> i.e., article VII of the Lend Lease Agreement signed by the United States and the United Kingdom, February 23, 1942, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

<sup>61</sup> Secretary of Commerce.

No one objected and it was determined, accordingly, to make the release.

Secretary Morgenthau then said that he wished now to initiate studies in connection with long-term investment policies. He had felt it necessary to delay these until the stabilization plans were concluded though he knew there was a desire, which he thought was justified, on behalf of the State Department, to get these studies started.

I observed that practically every Government in talking to us had indicated that their attitude toward monetary stabilization was contingent in some degree on the long-term credit situation so that the two were connected.

Secretary Morgenthau said that he knew this was so and agreed; but that he had felt it unwise to proceed until the stabilization matter was pretty well started, as he thought now it was.

It was thereupon agreed to authorize a technical committee under the chairmanship of Mr. White to go forward in the study of long-term international credit policies. It was indicated that these studies would probably have to be concluded prior to the middle of September, at which time it was expected that a British delegation would arrive here to discuss economic cooperation between Britain and the United States under Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

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[On September 14, 1943, the Treasury Department sent to the Department of State 41 letters in sealed envelopes addressed to the Finance Ministers and enclosing a revised text of the Treasury Department's stabilization proposal. These envelopes were transmitted to the Finance Ministers through Department of State facilities.]

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800.515/864

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*<sup>62</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1943.

At Secretary Morgenthau's invitation I went over to the luncheon he was giving for Lord Keynes and Lionel Robbins, who are here with the British economic group. There were only five present: Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. White, Lord Keynes, Mr. Robbins and myself.

Secretary Morgenthau asked what the British idea of a schedule on the monetary conversations was. Lord Keynes said that they expected to be discussing monetary stabilization with the Treasury group; that if an approximate meeting of minds was had on the expert level they would then hope to appoint an international drafting committee, composed of representatives of the treasuries of say five or six

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<sup>62</sup> Addressed to the Secretary of State and to Mr. Pasvolksy.

countries; that this drafting committee would prepare a project which might be submitted to the various governments in advance of the conference; and that the next stage would then presumably be the Treasury conference.

Secretary Morgenthau said this seemed agreeable to him, and he then inquired of me whether the State Department thought it was all right.

I said that we considered that the Treasury was principally interested in the matter; I personally saw no objection.

If we have any objection to this procedure, we ought to make it at once to Secretary Morgenthau. The scheme of course follows the general outline of the plan the Treasury had indicated some time ago.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

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[The currency stabilization discussions with the British Treasury delegation were held at the Treasury in September and October 1943. Minutes of the first two meetings were not kept. Minutes of the other meetings, the third on September 23 to the eleventh on October 9, are not printed. The discussions led to agreement on two documents: (1) A draft directive for a drafting committee, and (2) a set of agreed minutes. These two documents are printed below.]

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800.515/865d

*Text of the Draft Directive or Statement of General Principles*<sup>63</sup>

(Received by the Department from the Treasury on October 11, 1943.)

JOINT STATEMENT BY EXPERTS OF UNITED AND ASSOCIATED NATIONS ON  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION FUND

Sufficient discussion of the problems of international monetary cooperation has taken place at the technical level to justify a statement of principles. Governments will not be asked to give final approval to the principles until they have been embodied in the form of definitive proposals by the delegates of the United and Associated Nations meeting in a formal conference.

1. *Preamble*

The International Stabilization Fund is designed as a permanent institution for international monetary cooperation. The Fund is

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<sup>63</sup> This text is taken from a Department of State memorandum dated October 18, 1943, which gives the following explanation of the draft directive: "The Directive is in the form of a statement of agreed on general principles. The points of disagreement which could not be resolved in the discussions are indicated in the text by giving an 'American Statement' and a 'United Kingdom Statement' wherever an agreed upon provision was not achieved."

intended to facilitate the balanced growth of international trade and to contribute in this way to the maintenance of a high level of employment. The Fund is expected to provide the machinery for consultation on international monetary problems. The resources of the Fund are to be available under adequate safeguards to help member countries to maintain currency stability while giving them time to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to extreme measures destructive to international prosperity.

## 2. *Purposes of the Fund*

(i) To promote exchange stability and to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among member countries and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.

(ii) To assure multilateral payments facilities on current transactions among member countries and to eliminate restrictions inconsistent with this objective.

(iii) To shorten the periods and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balance of payments of member countries.

(iv) To give confidence to member countries by the provision of actual and potential support.

## 3. *Subscription to the Fund*

(i) Member countries shall subscribe in gold and in their local funds amounts determined by a formula to be agreed. Aggregate subscriptions (quotas) on the basis of the formula will amount to about \$8.5 billion if all of the United Nations and the countries associated with them subscribe to the Fund, and to about \$10 billion for the world as a whole.

(ii) The obligatory gold subscription of a member country shall be related to its holdings of gold and free foreign exchange, and shall be fixed at 25 percent of the subscription (quota) or 10 percent of the gold and free foreign exchange holdings of the country, whichever is the smaller.

(ii) The obligatory gold subscription of a member country shall not exceed 12½ percent of the quota, and shall be retained by the Fund as reserve security against the member country's liability to the Fund.

## 4. *Operations of the Fund*

(i) The Fund's account in a member's currency shall be kept at the Central Bank of the member country.

(ii) Subject to (iii) below, operations on the Fund's account will be limited to transactions for the purpose of supplying a member country, on the member's initiative, with a desired and "available" member's currency in exchange for its own "acceptable" currency or for gold.



(iii) But the Fund will also be entitled at its option, with a view to keeping a particular member's currency available.

- (a) To borrow its currency from a member country ;
- (b) To offer gold to a member country in exchange for its currency.

##### 5. *Availability and Acceptability of Member's Currencies*

(i) A currency is available unless the Fund has given notice that its holdings of the currency have become scarce, in which case the provisions of 10 below come into force.

(ii) A currency is acceptable :

(a) If the Fund's total holdings of the currency of the member country have not increased by more than 25 percent of the quota during the previous year, and if they do not exceed 200 percent of the quota ; and

(b) If the Fund has not previously given notice of 6 months to a year which has expired that a member country is making use of the Funds resources in a manner that clearly has the effect of preventing or unduly delaying the establishment of a sound balance in its international accounts.

**U.S. Statement** [Add to the above]<sup>64</sup> The Fund will not give notice if its holdings of the member currency do not exceed 166 percent of its quota.

(iii) The Fund may, in its discretion, sell foreign exchange for a member currency that does not comply with the above tests on conditions that safeguard the interests of the Fund.

##### 6. *Multilateral Clearing*

(i) Subject to 13 (iv) a member country agrees to buy back its own legally acquired currency from any other member with that member's currency or with gold, so long as its own currency is acceptable to the Fund and the other member's currency is available in the Fund.

(ii) So long as a member's currency is acceptable, it is entitled to acquire any available currency in the Fund, subject to half payment in gold or free foreign exchange from a member country whose official gold and free foreign exchange holdings exceed its quota.

**U.S. Statement** (ii) So long as a member's currency is acceptable, it is entitled to acquire any available currency in the Fund.

(iii) A member country desiring to obtain directly or indirectly the currency of another member country for gold is expected, if it can do so with equal advantage, to acquire the currency, if it is available, by the sale of gold to the Fund.

(iv) The local currency holdings of the Fund shall be freely transferable to any member currency, subject to the provisions of the plan.

<sup>64</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

### 7. *Par Value of Member Currencies*

(i) The initial par value of a member's currency shall be agreed with the Fund when it is admitted to membership, and shall be expressed in terms of gold.

(ii) All transactions between the Fund and members, and all transactions in member currencies, shall be at rates within an agreed percentage of parity.

(iii) No change in the gold parity of a member's currency shall be made without its approval.

(iv) Members shall agree not to propose a change in the parity of their currency unless they consider it appropriate to the correction of fundamental disequilibrium, and changes shall be made only with the approval of the Fund subject to the qualifications below.

(v) The Fund shall approve a requested change in the parity of a member's currency if it is essential to the correction of a fundamental disequilibrium. In particular, the Fund shall not reject a requested change which is required in the *de facto* situation to restore equilibrium on the ground of domestic, social or political policies which may have led to the application.

(vi) After consulting the Fund, a member country may change the established rate for its currency, provided the proposed change, inclusive of any previous changes, does not exceed 10 percent since the establishment of the Fund. In the case of application for a further change not covered by the above and not exceeding 10 percent, the Fund shall give its decision within two days of receiving the application, if the applicant so desires.

**U.S.  
Statement**

(vi) After consulting the Fund, a member country may change the established rate for its currency, provided the proposed change, inclusive of any previous changes does not exceed 10 percent within successive ten-year periods since the establishment of the Fund. In the case of application for a further change not covered by the above and not exceeding 10 percent, the Fund shall give its decision within two days of receiving the application, if the applicant so desires.

**U.K.  
Statement**

(vii) Because of the extreme uncertainties of the immediate post-war period and recognizing that rates established during such period will of necessity be tentative in many instances, during the first three years the fund shall recognize that there will be need for many changes and adjustments and shall resolve cases of reasonable doubt in favour of the country requesting changes in rates.

**To be  
considered**

(viii) Provision shall be made for an agreed uniform change in the gold value of currencies with the approval of the Fund and of all member countries with 10 percent or more of aggregate quotas.

### 8. *Repurchase provisions*

(i) A member country may repurchase from the Fund for gold any part of the latter's holding of its currency.

**U.S. Statement** (ii) If at the end of stated periods, a member's official holdings of gold and free foreign exchange have increased, and those holdings are adequate, the Fund may require that half of the increase be used to repurchase any of the Fund's holdings of its currency in excess of its quota.

**U.K. Statement** (ii) If at the end of the Fund's financial year a member's holding of gold and of gold-convertible currencies has increased, the rules of the Fund may require that it shall employ the whole or part of this increase to repurchase from the Fund any excess of the Fund's holding of its currency above its quota.

### 9. *Capital transactions*

**U.S. Statement** (i) A member country may not use the Fund's resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital.

(ii) The Fund may require a member country purchasing foreign exchange from the Fund to control large or sustained outward movements of capital.

(iii) These provisions are not intended to interfere with transactions which do not involve a substantial requirement of foreign exchange, or transactions required in trade, banking and other business.

(iv) Notwithstanding the above provisions, with the approval of the Fund, a member country may purchase foreign exchange to facilitate a transfer of capital.

(v) A member country may not use its control of capital movements to restrict payments for current transactions (except as provided in 10 and 13-iv) or to delay unduly the transfer of funds in settlement of commitments.

**U.K. Statement** A member country may be asked by the Fund to exercise such control as is required to prevent large and sustained capital movements from being financed by recourse to the Fund. This provision is not intended to prevent the use of the Fund for capital transactions of reasonable amount approved by the member country's control as being required in the ordinary course of trade, banking and other business, or for the expansion of exports. Nor is it intended to prevent capital movements of other kinds which are met out of a member country's own resources of gold and foreign exchange.

### 10. *Apportionment of Scarce Currencies*

(i) When it becomes evident to the Fund that the anticipated demand for a currency may soon exhaust the Fund's holdings of that

currency, the Fund shall inform the member countries and propose an equitable method of apportioning the scarce currency.

(ii) When a currency is thus declared scarce the Fund shall issue a report embodying the causes of the scarcity and containing recommendations designed to bring it to an end. It shall also take steps to apportion equitably the sale of the scarce currency among countries requiring it.

(iii) A decision by the Fund to apportion a scarce currency shall operate as an authorization to member countries after consultation with the Fund temporarily to restrict the freedom of exchange operations in the affected currency, and in determining the manner of restricting the demand and rationing the limited supply among its nationals the member country shall have complete jurisdiction.

### 11. *Management*

(i) The Fund shall be managed by a Board and the Executive Committee representing the members.

(ii) The distribution of basic voting power shall be closely related to quotas, but no members shall be entitled to cast more than one-fifth of the aggregate votes.

(iii) All matters shall be settled by majority, except that a change in the basis for determining quotas shall require a four-fifths vote, and no member's quota shall be changed without its assent.

### 12. *Withdrawal*

(i) A member country may withdraw from the Fund by giving notice in writing.

(ii) Thereafter, the Fund may not sell the currency of that country if the Fund's holdings are less than the unliquidated portion of its quota, nor buy the currency of that country if the Fund's holdings are more than the unliquidated portion of its quota. After a country has given notice of withdrawal, its right to utilize the resources of the Fund is subject to the approval of the Fund.

(iii) The reciprocal obligations of the Fund and the country are to be liquidated within a reasonable time.

### 13. *Obligations of Member Countries*

(i) Not to buy gold at a price above the parity of its currency, nor to sell gold at a price below the parity of its currency.

(ii) Not to allow exchange transactions between its currency and the currencies of other members at rates outside a prescribed range based on the agreed cross parities.

(iii) To abandon as soon as possible, when the member country decides that conditions permit, all restrictions on payments for current international transactions with other member countries, and not to impose any additional restrictions (except upon capital transfers, or

in accordance with 10 above) without the approval of the Fund. The Fund may make representations that conditions are favorable to the abandonment of restrictions.

(iv) Not to engage in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices without the approval of the Fund.

(v) The local currency holdings of the Fund shall be freely transferable to any member country, subject to the provisions of the plan.

#### 14. *The Inauguration of the Fund*

Provisions shall be prepared to cover the transitional period and the definitive establishment of the Fund.

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800.515/865d

#### *Text of the Agreed Minutes*<sup>65</sup>

#### JOINT MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF U.S. AND U.K. EXPERTS U.S. TREASURY, OCTOBER 9, 1943

At the final meeting of the experts of the United States and the United Kingdom, held in Washington on October 9, 1943, it was agreed that the following details not included in the directive to the drafting committee are also covered by the discussions on the same basis as the directive itself.

3-i. The agreed formula is to give the United States a quota not to exceed \$3 billion and the United Kingdom a quota of about \$1.3. The formula will also provide for setting aside a special allotment of 10 percent of the aggregate quotas to be used for the equitable adjustment of quotas.

3-ii. "Local funds" are to be a deposit account at the member country's Central Bank. In order to avoid an unnecessarily large working balance, the Fund would hold local funds in excess of a working balance in the form of non-negotiable, non-interest bearing Government bills, payable at par on demand by crediting the Fund's deposit account at the Central Bank.

5-iii. When the provision of additional exchange to a member country is subject to special conditions, the Fund may as one of the conditions require the deposit of suitable collateral.

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<sup>65</sup> This text is taken from a Department of State memorandum dated October 18, 1943, which gives the following explanation of the agreed minutes: "The Agreed Minutes is a statement of important points not considered suitable for inclusion in a document which may eventually be published as a statement of agreed on general principles, but which the United States and United Kingdom representatives will consider binding on their representatives in any Drafting Committee to be appointed to the same extent that the statements in the Directive are binding. In this document also the points of disagreement for future discussions between the two Governments are indicated."

7. The unit of account shall be a given weight of gold. No change in the par value of the currency of member countries shall be permitted to alter the gold value of the assets of the Fund, except that in the case of a change under 7(viii) this provision may be waived by agreement.

The initial rates of exchange of member countries' currencies shall be based on the official dollar quotations of July 1, 1943. If this rate is inappropriate in the judgment of either the Fund or the member country, the initial par value of a member's currency shall be agreed between the member country and the Fund.

11. When the provision of exchange requires approval of the Fund, basic votes on such proposals shall be adjusted, notwithstanding 11-ii, by increasing the vote of creditor countries and decreasing the vote of debtor countries in the Fund. On the suspension or restoration of membership each country shall have one vote.

13-ii. Member countries shall not engage in exchange dealings in non-member countries or in non-member currencies that will undermine stability of exchange rates established by the Fund.

There is a difference of view on the following questions:

3-ii. Whether the obligatory gold subscription should be of 25 percent of the quota or 10 percent of the gold holdings of a country, whichever is smaller; and whether the gold contributed to the Fund shall be held by the Fund as a reserve security.

5-ii. Whether a currency should only be acceptable if it is tendered against another currency which that member can represent to be needed for payments due or shortly falling due.

5-ii. Whether the qualitative controls should apply only after the Fund's holdings of local currency have reached a specified level, or whether such control may be applied at any time with notice of six months to a year.

6-ii. Whether a member having holdings of gold and free foreign exchange in excess of its quota should be required to make payment as to 50% in gold and foreign exchange for currency made available by the Fund.

7-vi. Whether the right to change the established exchange rate of a member currency by a total of 10% should be renewed for each successive decade or not.

8-ii. Whether the provision for the repurchase of local currency held by the Fund shall apply to part of the increase in the free *foreign exchange* holdings of a member country, or only to holdings of gold convertible currencies.

9. Whether the Fund may require a member country not to permit an outward movement of capital which is large and sustained (regard-

less of the source of the funds used to meet the flow) where a member country is significantly using the sources of the Fund.

*In general* whether the Fund, while established on the same fundamental principles as those set out in the Draft Directive, should not be set up and operated in terms of an international currency (monetised unitas).

800.515/865c

*Meeting With British Experts on Proposal for a United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development, at the Treasury, October 11, 1943*

PRESENT

Mr. Bitterman	Mr. A. S. J. Baster
Miss Alice Bourneuf	Lord J. M. Keynes
Mr. E. M. Bernstein	Mr. Liesching
Mr. Casaday	Mr. Lionel Robbins
Mr. W. L. Clayton	Mr. D. H. Robertson
Mr. Benjamin Cohen	Mr. Thompson-McCausland
Mr. Emilio G. Collado	Sir David Waley
Mr. Walter Gardner	
Mr. Frederick Livesey	
Mr. Loucheim	
Mr. A. F. Luxford	
Mr. Leo Pasvolsky	
Mr. Warren Pierson	
Miss Richardson	
Mr. Harry White	
Mr. John P. Young	

Mr. White presented the plan for the Bank and commented that it was not to be considered a final draft.

Lord Keynes raised a question as to the formula according to which capital quotas should be determined, and the amount of gold a country would be called upon to provide. He went on to express doubt as to whether the Bank would contribute much toward equilibrium in the balance of payments. He said, "if the United States, for example, had an export surplus of one billion dollars, how would the Bank help to adjust this situation"? The British contribution to the Bank would, he added, worsen their balance of payments. The plan, he said, did not give enough consideration to the debtor-creditor position of countries.

Mr. White replied that the Bank was not a device to bring equilibrium into the balance of payments, but in so far as it stimulated private capital, would assist in a substantial way. He said that the Stabiliza-

tion Fund was intended to promote adjustment in the balance of payments. Lord Keynes did not seem to agree with this reference to the purpose of the Fund.

Lord Keynes asked the extent to which proceeds from loans would be freely available to be spent anywhere the borrower chose. He wondered specifically whether money borrowed by the Bank from the market would when relaned be restricted in regard to its utilization.

Mr. White replied that for political reasons the capital contribution of the Bank would doubtless need to be restricted in regard to the place of its expenditure. He thought it possible that there might be more freedom regarding money borrowed from the market, and particularly regarding the proceeds from guaranteed loans. He pointed out that in any event the Bank would have a considerable amount of money which would be freely available, consisting of gold plus free exchange. This, he said, would provide considerable latitude. Furthermore, the amount would increase so that after five or ten years extensive multilateral operations would be possible. He said the proposed provisions gave considerable flexibility and that the Bank was relatively free to do whatever it desired.

Lord Keynes replied that the main lines of the plan make it appear very restrictive of the use of funds, but that on closer analysis it seems this feature is mitigated by several jokers. The rigid structure, however, would not facilitate the task of explaining the Bank and dealing with criticisms of it at home.

Mr. White said that there were no jokers in the plan.

Mr. White asked Mr. Clayton whether he felt it would be politically feasible to ask Congress for funds which were to be spent in other countries.

Mr. Clayton was inclined to agree with Mr. White that Congress would be less receptive if loans were to be so used.

Mr. White said that this was classic understatement.

Mr. Clayton said further that Section IV, 1-*c*, seemed to cover the situation as to statutory freedom regarding the utilization of proceeds of loans. This provides as follows:

[“]c. The Bank shall impose no condition upon a loan as to the particular member country in which the proceeds of the loan must be spent; provided, however, that the proceeds of a loan may not be spent in any country which is not a member country without the approval of the Bank.”

Lord Keynes replied that it was this paragraph that bothered him. Mr. White suggested that it be worded to read, “The Bank shall permit freedom, etc.” Lord Keynes said that the difficulty was more than this, that the plan implied a tying of loans to trade. He said that the



plan ties up the sources of supply of funds more tightly than ever before. The borrower does not get funds but instead gets his bills paid.

Mr. Robbins said that he thought it was impossible to make a distinction between proceeds spent in one country and proceeds spent in another country; that in the last analysis the process was interwoven. For example, in most projects the bulk of the expenditures are for local labor and supplies; yet the project may stimulate imports and expenditures in various countries.

In response to a question by Mr. White as to England's role after the war in the field of foreign investment, Lord Keynes replied that England's first task was to repay its debts; that it would wish to pay for the cost of the war and get its accounts in order.

Lord Keynes remarked that the Bank plan was characterized by three features:

- (1) rigidity as to the use of the proceeds of loans;
- (2) the Bank could invest only through bonds, and not through equities, which was too restrictive, and
- (3) that the Bank would only make loans that had clear prospects of repayment; it therefore would not make many loans.

Mr. White thought it elementary that the Bank endeavor to make loans which would be repaid.

Lord Keynes said that other loans are of considerable interest and value to world progress. Many "bad" loans are disguised through the extension of new loans. England over the years has done little more, he said, than reloan interest received on foreign investments. The money accumulated abroad, and was supplemented by new loans. Many old loans would not be repaid, if payment were demanded, because balance of payments conditions were not so adjusted. However, new loans were made which paid off the creditors on maturing loans, as well as provided current interest.

According to the Bank plan, he said, there would be no free funds for this purpose since the proceeds from loans would be available only for audited expenses. There would be no outlet for these other operations.

Mr. White asked if Lord Keynes meant that England had received no benefit from her foreign investments except the accumulation of book assets.

Lord Keynes said that the foreign investments had helped to finance both wars, and had been exceedingly important to Great Britain in this respect. He said that since debtors did not repay loans, it was an error to feel that the extension of loans should depend upon ability of the borrower to build up a favorable balance of payments. He was opposed to the linking of loans directly or indirectly with exports.

He said that loans to China, for example, would raise the standard of living in China, but would not necessarily cause China to produce goods which would build up an export balance; that repayment from an export balance should not be expected.

Mr. White said that the gain to the lending country from foreign loans, on this basis, would be, aside from perhaps cheaper imports as a result of an improvement in productive conditions abroad, the satisfaction that accompanies what we call WPA expenditures. Lord Keynes interjected that there would be a third gain, namely the accumulation of funds for an emergency; that such accumulation at compound interest would provide a country with a valuable asset.

Mr. White referred to the provision that a competent committee was to consider whether a loan would raise the productivity of the borrower, and whether the balance of payments prospects of the borrowing country were favorable to the servicing of the loan.

Lord Keynes remarked that an incompetent committee might come to more useful conclusions.

Mr. White said that Lord Keynes assumed that a country could not adjust its balance of payments so as to repay loans. Mr. White disagreed with this position.

Mr. Clayton remarked that he felt the plan as it now stood had too many conditions, and was too tight in certain respects. He suggested that the American group endeavor to prepare a draft which would be less rigid, and see if we could not meet some of the criticism of Lord Keynes.

Mr. Robbins referred to limitations on loans for projects that used largely local materials and labor, and said that he felt there would be times when the Bank could properly loan foreign exchange for such projects. He said that construction might cause a division of labor which would cause a need for foreign exchange.

Mr. Bernstein agreed and said, for example, railway construction in Brazil might attract coffee growers and affect Brazil's exports of coffee. He said that the plan provides for this, and cited provisions.

Lord Keynes, referring to the plan as a whole, said that he would like to see the provisions stated as loosely as possible.

Mr. White said that he did not see how the provisions could be made much looser, unless it were provided that the Bank make equity investments; the Bank could now do almost anything.

Mr. Robbins raised a question as to whether it would not be desirable to provide machinery whereby the Bank was to seek out desirable opportunities for placing its money, and that it not assume an entirely passive role.

Mr. White said he did not believe that this would be necessary; that the Bank, he felt, would be the recipient of many requests for loans.

Mr. Collado thought that countries would request loans in excess of their ability to use the money effectively.

Mr. Robbins said that in periods of depression it might be useful for the Bank to consider how it might expand its operations.

Mr. White suggested that since the British and American groups had now compared views on the Bank and discussed its major features, it would be well if both groups consider the matter, and after a month or two discuss it further.

The meeting was adjourned.

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800.515/863a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1943—noon.

6312. From the Secretary of the Treasury. On October 5 we appeared in secret session before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, and Banking and Currency, and the Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, and the House Committees on Banking and Currency, Foreign Affairs, and Coinage, Weights and Measures to bring them up-to-date as to what the Treasury is doing on post-war monetary problems. We had agreed with the British Treasury that we would keep the statement submitted to these Committees strictly confidential and we had promised that in case of any disclosure, we would sit on the lid as long as we could reasonably do so. This is in reply to Embassy's cables of October 7, 1943, Nos. 6773 and 6789.<sup>66</sup>

The story carried in the *Financial News* of the previous day received considerable attention in the American press on October 8. As a result, we were subjected to considerable questioning and pressure for confirmation of the report. We much prefer that public discussion take place on the basis of an authoritative draft rather than on the basis of a grossly distorted version.

For these reasons, we discussed with Opie and Keynes the desirability of releasing the statement given to the Congressional Committees in executive session outlining the principles of a bank proposal which the Government experts think should be the basis for further unofficial discussions. Keynes objected to our making the statement public, but Opie agreed that it would be desirable and said he would speak to the Ambassador. All in all, we concluded it would be best to inform the press of the Treasury's proposal together with an explanation of why it was now being disclosed, although were it

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<sup>66</sup> Neither printed. Telegram No. 6789 reported on the publication in the London *Financial News* of October 7, 1943, of an article headed "Ten billion dollar world bank to provide capital for reconstruction—text of secret plan submitted to U.S. Senate Committee." (800.515/843)

not for the story which appeared in the *Financial News* we would not have issued a statement at this time.

For your information, there is no reason to believe that any of the members of the Committees or any other member of Congress was responsible for the distorted story which appeared in the *Financial News* on October 7.

Department is telegraphing the text of the Guiding Principles for a Proposed United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development<sup>67</sup> which was submitted to the Congressional Committees on October 5 and released to the press on October 8 with the explanation that the proposal had not been discussed with experts of the British or of any foreign government. [Morgenthau.]

HULL

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800.515/866a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1943—9 p. m.

1075. From Secretary of the Treasury for Harriman.

"With reference to the matter I discussed with you in Algiers,<sup>68</sup> a copy of the letter I sent to Secretary Hull before his departure<sup>69</sup> is as follows:

'October 5, 1943. Dear Cordell:

Last April a draft of the International Stabilization Fund proposal was submitted to the Russian Government by Mr. Berle together with a letter expressing the hope that the Soviet Government would send technical experts to this country to discuss the proposal with our technical experts here. Soon thereafter, Mr. Gromyko<sup>70</sup> stated that his Government was keenly interested in the postwar monetary proposals and wished to obtain as much information on the subject as possible from us. The Soviet Government did have present an observer at some of the group conferences of technicians that were held here, but so far have not sent any experts to discuss the proposal with our experts.

About 2 months ago, when Mr. Gromyko was here, I mentioned to him the fact that the Russian experts had not yet come to Washington

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<sup>67</sup> Telegram No. 6313, October 11, not printed; for text of the Guiding Principles released October 8, see *New York Times*, October 9, 1943, p. 1, col. 1.

On November 24, 1943, the Treasury Department made public a preliminary outline for a United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development; see *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, January 1944, p. 37. See also *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference*, vol. II, pp. 1616 ff.

<sup>68</sup> The Secretary of the Treasury had arrived at Algiers on October 19, 1943, on an air tour of the Mediterranean battle fields.

<sup>69</sup> For Moscow, as delegate to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

<sup>70</sup> Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Chargé in the United States from May 10 to October 4, 1943, when he became the Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

and expressed the view that we thought that it would be helpful if he could inform his Government that the conversations with the experts of most of the other Associated Nations had already taken place and that we had hoped that the U.S.S.R. would send experts to this country to discuss these problems with us before any decision was made with respect to the holding of a formal conference.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he thought it was desirable for his Government to send technical experts and said that he had so informed his Government and that he would again communicate that view to his Government.

To date we have not heard from them and wondered if you would care to mention the subject when you are in Moscow and encourage them to send their experts here.<sup>71</sup> I think that you will agree that it will be unfortunate if we have to go forward with any formal discussions of postwar monetary problems among the United Nations without having had an opportunity of discussing them with the experts from the U.S.S.R.

Sincerely,

(signed) Henry.

The Honorable Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.' "

STETTINIUS

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740.0011 Moscow/94 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting  
Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 31, 1943—8 a. m.

[Received 1:43 p. m.]

1794. Personal for Secretary Morgenthau from the Secretary of State.

Delam 45. In reply to my oral and written representations on the subject, I have received a letter from Molotov<sup>72</sup> stating that the People's Commissariat of Finance will in the very near future send experts to Washington to take part in the discussions concerning the International Stabilization Fund.

Please repeat to Secretary Morgenthau in the event that he is not in Washington. [Hull.]

HARRIMAN

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<sup>71</sup> The note of October 24, 1943, which the Secretary of State addressed to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs is not printed.

<sup>72</sup> Letter dated October 30, 1943, not printed.

INFORMAL AND EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS  
REGARDING POSTWAR ECONOMIC POLICY<sup>1</sup>

840.50/1619

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I was informed by the Foreign Office that you sent them a message through Mr. Winant in November last<sup>2</sup> repeating a statement that you had made to me on several occasions to the effect that the State Department were willing to embark on exploratory and informal discussions with countries signatory to Article VII,<sup>3</sup> and suggesting that His Majesty's Government might like to designate someone in the Embassy or to send someone from London to carry on such discussions. No reply to your message was sent through the American Embassy in London, since Sir Frederick Phillips<sup>4</sup> and Mr. Redvers Opie<sup>5</sup> were continuing the informal discussions which had been started some time before.

I am now asked to state formally in reply to your enquiry of November last that Sir Frederick Phillips and Mr. Redvers Opie have been designated to carry on informal and exploratory conversations in connection with Article VII.

Believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

HALIFAX

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<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence, see section entitled "Discussions Regarding Postwar Economic and Financial Arrangements," *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 163 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram No. 5628, November 10, 1942, 4 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *ibid.*, p. 230.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., article VII of the Lend Lease Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed February 23, 1942, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

<sup>4</sup> British Treasury Representative in the United States.

<sup>5</sup> Counselor of the British Embassy at Washington.

641.0031/128a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>6</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1943—6 p. m.

3683. On June 11 Magowan, Board of Trade Minister in the British Embassy, advised the Department in complete confidence that an informal meeting would open in London on June 15 between representatives of the British and Dominion Governments on the expert level for an exploratory discussion of postwar commercial policy. He said that no publicity would be given the meeting, that no agreements or commitments were expected and that the discussion would in general not cover details. The purpose was rather to discuss in a preliminary way the broad approach which should be taken in matters of commercial policy. He believed that in general the subjects for discussion were those which had been dealt with by Section III of the Food Conference<sup>7</sup> (the facilitation and improvement of distribution) along the lines set by the Conference but with a view to taking them up with us on a more concrete basis. He also believed the discussion would include the possibility of supplementary trade agreements with us, now that the Trade Agreements Act had been renewed.<sup>8</sup>

The British Government will no doubt wish to keep us closely and currently informed of the progress of these exploratory talks and you are authorized to take such steps as you consider appropriate to ensure effective liaison with the participants, including the designation of an observer should the British Government so desire.

HULL

641.0031/131 : Airgram

*The Chargé in Canada (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

OTTAWA, June 18, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received June 21—3 p. m.]

A-20. Department's A-121, June 14, 6 p. m.,<sup>9</sup> regarding post-war commercial policy. I discussed this matter very informally yesterday afternoon with Norman Robertson, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Robertson informed me that there will be no

<sup>6</sup> Text of this telegram quoted in messages of the same date to Australia (No. 246), New Zealand (No. 182), Union of South Africa (No. 122), and Canada (No. A-121), with instructions to keep the Department advised of any pertinent developments.

<sup>7</sup> For correspondence regarding the conference held at Hot Springs, Va., May 18-June 3, 1943, see pp. 820 ff.

<sup>8</sup> The Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934, was extended by Joint Resolution, June 7, 1943; 57 Stat. 125.

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 6, above.

pertinent developments in Ottawa. He said the Canadians had gone to London for purely preliminary and exploratory discussions on the relation in the post-war period of multilateral agreements to the existing system of bilateral agreements. He stressed that no consideration whatever would be given in the London discussions to specific agreements or to specific tariff items except possibly as exemplifying points brought out in general discussion. He said that the Canadian instructions did not contemplate the discussion of the possibility of supplementary trade agreements with us.

Robertson feels that effective post-war commercial policy may require bold measures. He hopes that we will not continue to be bound by what he termed the "cumbersome procedure and limited scope" of the present Trade Agreements Act. He hopes that we will be able to take bold and prompt action and believes that he will be able to do so if as part of a broad plan. He realizes that Canada may have to strive for a larger share of the market in the United States and said that the London conversations did not represent an effort to confront us with a previously reached British agreement. He reiterated that the conversations in London were preliminary and exploratory only.

Mr. Robertson envisages the possibility that multilateral agreements may replace bilateral agreements in commercial policy, but feels also that multilateral agreements might be on broad bases implemented by bilateral agreements. He said that before Canada had been in a position to negotiate its broad trade agreements with the United States it had been necessary to do a lot of preliminary spade work on its bilateral agreements within the British Commonwealth. The situation had not changed and Canada would likely have to follow a similar procedure in post-war commercial agreements, whether multilateral or bilateral. He stressed again, however, that matters had not yet reached that stage.

I shall report further any information which may be obtained regarding the progress of the discussions in London.

CLARK

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641.0031/132 : Telegram

*The Chargé in New Zealand (Cow) to the Secretary of State*

WELLINGTON, June 24, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received June 24—12:21 p. m.]

294. Department's 182, June 14, 6 p. m.<sup>10</sup> New Zealand officials told me on June 17 that Campbell (see Legation's 180, April 5, noon <sup>11</sup>),

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 6, p. 1100.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.



New Zealand representative at London meeting, had been given no instructions due to the absence from Wellington of both Nash<sup>12</sup> and Fraser.<sup>13</sup> They observed that New Zealand's post-war interests revolved around overseas markets for its primary products. New Zealand was also concerned regarding the implications contained in article VII of United States-United Kingdom Mutual Aid Agreement. Nash told me today that he has been too occupied to send as yet any directive to Campbell. He mentioned the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act and that he would continue discussions when he returns to Washington. Time of return still indefinite.

Cox

641.0031/131

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Canada (Clark)*

No. 1469

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1943.

The Secretary of State refers to the Legation's airgram no. A-20 of June 18, 1943 reporting Mr. Norman Robertson's comments on the current London discussions and on post-war commercial policy.

The Legation is requested, if it perceives no objection, to take a suitable opportunity to ask Mr. Robertson to elaborate on his comments relative to multilateral agreements and bilateral agreements. It would be helpful, for instance, if he would indicate by concrete examples a little more specifically what he means by expressing the feeling that multilateral agreements might be on broad bases implemented by bilateral agreements.

641.0031/133 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 2, 1943—9 p. m.  
[Received July 3—2:10 a. m.]

4355. Personal for the Secretary. Department's 3683, June 14, 6 p. m. Meetings between economic representatives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and the appropriate British authorities have been concluded. They were treated in Whitehall as particularly confidential and no publicity of any kind has been given to them.

From reliable sources we learn that the object of the meetings was to give Great Britain an opportunity to explain to the Dominions and India the policy which it proposes to follow with respect that [to?] the

<sup>12</sup> Walter Nash, New Zealand Minister in the United States.

<sup>13</sup> Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand.

implementation of article VII of the Lend-Lease agreement in the field of commercial policy. It seems likely that in the near future Halifax will be instructed to approach the Department on the subject of discussions regarding postwar commercial policy.

It is believed that the British Government will suggest as a basis for discussion a plan for some form of international union on commercial policy. The development of such a plan in British Government circles was foreshadowed in a confidential memorandum which I brought with me in December dealing with questions relating to article VII. Pasvolsky<sup>14</sup> has a copy. The plan is understood to include suggestions for a ceiling on tariffs; possibly some form of agreed reduction of tariffs, regulations governing the use of quantitative limitation of imports in cases where such limitation might be resorted to in emergency conditions, principles to be observed with respect to cases of state trading (as in the case of Russia).

It is believed that other points in the policy of Great Britain are as follows:

(1) Britain will take the position that, while it welcomes the prospect of reciprocal trade agreements on the basis of our Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, it will not regard such agreements as constituting in themselves a complete fulfillment of obligations under article VII with respect to commercial policy.

(2) Britain will reserve the right to resort to limitation of imports during the emergency immediately following the war insofar as it is considered that such limitation is essential to prevent serious disequilibrium in its international balance of payments. It will however propose safeguards against discrimination in the application of such emergency measures, and it considers that the period in which imports may have to be limited will be greatly reduced if a satisfactory international monetary plan can be established.

The timing of conversations on commercial policy was discussed. Great Britain appears to be anxious to put forward its general suggestions on postwar commercial policy to us before negotiations are started on reciprocal trade agreements. The Dominions do not wish to delay unduly the resumption of negotiations on reciprocal trade pacts. It seems probable that the outcome will be that Britain at a fairly early date will put forward its general proposals to us and that very shortly thereafter Britain and the Dominions will be ready to enter fully into negotiations with respect to the reciprocal trade agreements, so that the discussion of both phases of the subject would go on simultaneously.

Beyond some possible tentative understanding on this question of timing no commitments were entered into at the meetings. Britain is now considering its proposals in the light of the informal comments of the economic representatives of the Dominions and India. It is

<sup>14</sup> Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

ascertained reliably that no commitments of any kind were made respecting the contents of the reciprocal trade agreements between us and Britain and the Dominions and it does not appear that such details were discussed at the meetings.

Hence when the draft agreements come up for negotiation Britain and the Dominions will have to consult one another at the appropriate times when reductions which affect prior agreements among them are proposed in negotiations between us and them.

As most of this information comes from other than British Government official sources I need hardly emphasize the importance of having it treated as most confidential.

WINANT

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641.0031/134

*The Chargé in Canada (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

No. 4721

OTTAWA, July 21, 1943.

[Received July 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's memorandum instruction No. 1469 of July 1, 1943 with further reference to the London discussions on post-war commercial policy.

I had another discussion on this subject with Mr. Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, on July 20. The Canadian representatives have now returned to Ottawa and Mr. Robertson informs me that they did in fact discuss the specific tariff items on which the British contemplate offering reductions to us in the forthcoming negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom under Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement. Mr. Robertson said that, to put it generally, the British had invited representatives of the Commonwealth Nations to London for these discussions with an idea of looking into the condition of its Empire fences before opening discussions with us. He said that as the discussions were on the subject of the United Kingdom's negotiations with the United States, the United Kingdom had expressed the desire that it be allowed to inform the United States of the results thereof. He understood that our Embassy in London had been informed by the British of the developments. He was, therefore, not in a position to give me the details of the discussions.

Mr. Robertson did, however, discuss with me quite fully the general question of post-war trade. He believes that bold, or even heroic, action is needed if Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement is to be effectively implemented. The old methods of trade negotiation, he feels, are too cumbersome and should be abandoned. He is convinced

that the best time to negotiate basic tariff reductions is during the depths of a depression when the inefficient industries have been driven to the wall and eliminated, or at a time, like the present, when because of the exigencies of war normal trade has been disrupted and directed into new channels which, under the control of governmental agencies, should be efficient channels. With vested interests for the time being in the background he feels that this is the time to take basic action toward reducing tariffs. If we do not strike now, he is afraid we will drift back into the old pre-war methods under which, he feels, it will be impossible to effect adequate reduction of tariff barriers.

I asked him what he envisaged by heroic action, and he suggested the possibility of concluding a broad multilateral agreement under which each nation would agree to a progressive reduction in all tariffs or in certain categories of tariffs to a maximum reduction of, say, 70%. Such a multilateral agreement could, he thought, be supplemented by bilateral agreements between countries, possibly worked out under some such system as our existing trade agreements program.

In this connection, he reiterated the opinion he had previously expressed to me that negotiation under our trade agreements program was too cumbersome and too limited in scope to make it interesting for Canada to enter upon further trade negotiations with us. An important third of Canada's foreign trade was, he said, with the United States, another third with the Commonwealth and by far the least important third with the rest of the world. He had found in studying the Empire preferences in their relation to the United States tariff that, by and large, items forming the subject of Empire preferences were those which are covered by protective tariffs in the United States. He believes that the Empire preferences could be removed if a way were found to remove our protective tariff. He wondered whether it might not be possible to disregard the Trade Agreements Act in considering the United States-Canada situation and negotiate a commercial treaty providing either progressive or specific reductions in certain categories of the tariff affecting trade between the United States and Canada.

Mr. Robertson says that he is fundamentally in favor of liberal trade policies and low tariffs, and he is confident that he can negotiate on the bold lines he suggests. Much will depend, he admits, upon policies followed by the creditor nations after the war. If the United States, being the greatest of these, will realize that it must buy in order to sell, then Canada, being a creditor of less importance, can do likewise. He is considerably worried by this problem and believes that his suggested multilateral agreement providing a progressive reduction of tariffs might help the situation.

Respectfully yours,

LEWIS CLARK

840.50/2410

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In November 1942 the United States Government informed His Majesty's Government through the United States Ambassador in London that they looked forward to informal and exploratory talks with representatives of Great Britain and other powers in accordance with Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, and invited His Majesty's Government either to send a delegate for the purpose or to nominate some member of the British Embassy in Washington to represent them. His Majesty's Government at the time nominated Sir Frederick Phillips and Mr. Opie for this purpose but did not otherwise pursue the United States suggestion as discussions of some parts of the ground covered by Article VII viz. monetary policy,<sup>15</sup> were already in progress while other parts were felt by His Majesty's Government to require some preliminary study on their part.

Having now been able to carry further their examination of the various topics, His Majesty's Government feel that the moment has come to initiate with the United States Government informal and exploratory talks on the whole field covered by Article VII and that it is important for these talks to start without delay. They are strengthened in this view by the repeated requests made by some of the Allied Governments in exile for a lead by the United States and United Kingdom. They see great advantage in handling the essentially inter-related matters covered by Article VII as a coherent whole. In pursuance therefore of the United States suggestion mentioned in the preceding paragraph, they intend, if the United States Government see no objection, to send to Washington not later than the first half of September a delegation of senior officials, led by a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, which would be capable of dealing with all these subjects and in particular monetary policy, international investment, the regulation of primary products and commercial policy. His Majesty's Government suggest that the first object of such talks should be to obtain broad United States-United Kingdom agreement on an orderly agenda for the discussion of Article VII. His Majesty's Government continue as in the past to regard as of the greatest importance the attainment of prior agreement on such matters between the United States and United Kingdom Governments before they are discussed in a wide international field. The proposed delegation would also be in a position to push further the talks on

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<sup>15</sup> See section entitled "Preliminary and exploratory discussions regarding postwar monetary and financial arrangements," pp. 1054 ff.

monetary policy which have already begun so as to pave the way for a general monetary conference which might be followed by further international conferences on other post-war monetary and economic problems which call for solution.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to know whether this suggestion would be open to any objection on the part of the United States Government. If not, they would proceed to nominate their delegation forthwith.

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1943.

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840.50/2410

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Careful consideration has been given to the *Aide-Mémoire* which Viscount Halifax left with Secretary Hull on August 4, 1943 in regard to the proposal of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to send to Washington not later than the first half of September a delegation of senior officials to initiate with officials of the United States Government informal and exploratory talks envisaged by Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement of February 23, 1942.

It is noted that the British Government suggests that the first object of such preliminary conversations should be to obtain broad agreement between the two Governments on an orderly agenda for the discussion of Article VII. The American Government is in accord with this suggestion, and it likewise shares the view of the British Government concerning the great importance of the attainment of prior agreement on such matters between the American and the United Kingdom Governments before they are discussed in a wide international field.

It is the view of the American Government that it would be preferable that the conversations on monetary policy continue in the existing channel; that is, in the United States Treasury Department between representatives primarily of the two treasuries. It is also felt that the Treasury representatives should deal with the subject of international investments.

The American Government is making the necessary arrangements for conversations on commercial policy, the regulation of primary products and related topics to take place in the Department of State and will await with pleasure the arrival of the British representatives.

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1943.

840.50/2539

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government received with great satisfaction the acceptance by the United States Government in the *Aide-Mémoire* from the Department of State of August 17 of the proposal that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should send a delegation of senior officials to engage in informal and exploratory talks envisaged by Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement of February 23, 1942.

2. His Majesty's Government cannot yet state definitely who will lead the United Kingdom Delegation but the official members who are coming from the United Kingdom are likely to be:

Lord Keynes, Sir David S. Waley and Mr. F. G. Lee of the Treasury;

Mr. P. Liesching, Mr. R. J. Shackle and Mr. J. E. Meade of the Board of Trade;

Mr. Nigel Ronald of the Foreign Office;

Mr. G. L. M. Clauson of the Colonial Office;

Mr. P. W. Martin of the Ministry of Food;

Professor L. C. Robbins of the Economic Secretariat, the War Cabinet Offices; and

Mr. A. Baster of the Reconstruction Secretariat.

3. The Delegation will also include Mr. J. H. Magowan and Mr. Redvers Opie of the British Embassy, Professor D. H. Robertson of the United Kingdom Treasury Delegation in Washington, Mr. S. L. Holmes, the Dominions Office representative attached to the British Supply Council in Washington and such other members of the Embassy and the British Missions in Washington whose participation is likely at any time to be required.

4. His Majesty's Government have been considering the question of informing the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China that informal and exploratory conversations are to take place and of keeping them informed of progress made. It would not be physically possible for His Majesty's Government to conduct parallel conversations with these two governments while the discussions with the United States Government were in progress. Nevertheless His Majesty's Government would consider it highly desirable to make some communication to both of these governments at a fairly early stage and would prefer to agree with the United States Government the terms of a joint communication stating what the two govern-

ments were doing and promising to keep them generally informed on the upshot of the discussions. His Majesty's Government would welcome the views of the United States Government on this question.

5. In view of the possibility that the United Kingdom Delegation may not escape public notice His Majesty's Government believe that it would be desirable to consider in advance of the arrival of the Delegation what, if anything, should be said to the press in Washington and London whether or not the fact that the discussions were proceeding became known.

WASHINGTON, 31 August, 1943.

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840.50/2542

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1943.

MR. HICKERSON: During the Secretary's visit to Quebec<sup>16</sup> he discussed with Mr. Eden<sup>17</sup> the proposed conversations in Washington on monetary stabilization and related subjects and commercial policy in connection with Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement. The Secretary told Mr. Eden that he particularly did not want to have these conversations formalized, that he preferred to have the financial subjects treated as a continuation of conversations which were already in course with the United States Treasury and that the other subjects he wished kept in the form of exchanges of views for the purpose of drawing up an agenda of topics to be discussed rather than with the view to coming to any agreements on the matters themselves. The Secretary further stated that he did not think it was perhaps the best idea to give the impression that the United States and Great Britain were coming to previous agreements on these matters before other governments were brought in and acquainted with the progress of the discussions.

Mr. Eden said that he knew very little about the subject but that he would see that the matter of the representatives coming to Washington was handled in a way satisfactory to the Secretary.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

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<sup>16</sup> The records of the First Quebec Conference, held August 17-24, 1943, are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

<sup>17</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.



840.50/2539

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division  
of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1943.

Participants: Mr. John Magowan, Commercial Counselor, British  
Embassy  
Mr. Hawkins<sup>18</sup>  
Mr. Hickerson

Mr. Magowan came to Mr. Hawkins' office at 12:30 p. m. today at Mr. Hickerson's request. Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Hickerson referred to Mr. Opie's statement to Mr. Hickerson on August 31 that the British Government wished to consider with the United States Government the matter of informing the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and China about the exploratory conversations on Article VII. He referred also to Mr. Hickerson's statement to Mr. Opie that the United States is in a somewhat different position than that of the United Kingdom in respect to the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government, in that the United States has exactly the same commitments to those Governments that it has to the United Kingdom Government.

In those circumstances it was explained to Mr. Magowan the United States Government had decided to extend invitations to the Soviet Government and to the Chinese Government identical to those which have been extended to the United Kingdom Government and accepted by that Government. A telegram signed by the Secretary to our Embassy at Moscow in that sense was read to Mr. Magowan who was also informed that a similar invitation was being extended to China.

Mr. Magowan said that he would inform the British Government in the sense of the foregoing. He added that it seemed to him that the natural counterpart of the United States' action would be for the United Kingdom Government to notify the Soviet and the Chinese Governments that it had received an invitation from the United States Government to engage in such conversations and had accepted such an invitation. Messrs. Hawkins and Hickerson agreed that this would be a natural action. It was further agreed that if for any reason the Soviet and Chinese Governments find it impracticable to engage in such conversations with the United States at an early date, consideration should be given to keeping those Governments currently informed of the course of the discussions soon to start in Washington between representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments.

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<sup>18</sup> Harry C. Hawkins, Chief, Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements.

Some consideration was given to the reply which would be made by the United States and the U.K. Governments if press inquiries were received about the forthcoming conversations. It was suggested that both Governments might well say that the British officials were arriving in this country to continue the monetary talks with the Treasury Department and to discuss related matters. It was agreed to consider this matter further.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

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711.6111/14a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1943—5 p. m.

791. Please seek an interview with Molotov<sup>19</sup> and inform him as follows:

The provisions of Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942, between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union<sup>20</sup> are contained in the agreements of a similar nature which the United States has with various other governments. We are now prepared to undertake informal and confidential exploratory conversations with certain of these Governments for the purpose of arriving at a broad agreement on an orderly agenda for the discussion of economic objectives referred to in Article VII.

Therefore, if the Soviet Government so desires, we are prepared to begin such conversations at any time convenient to it. This Government considers it appropriate and more feasible to carry on these preliminary conversations separately with certain of the Governments with which it has such agreements. You may add that we are also communicating in the foregoing sense with the British and Chinese Governments.<sup>21</sup>

In conveying the foregoing orally to Molotov you should leave with him a memorandum of your statements.<sup>22</sup>

HULL

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<sup>19</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>20</sup> Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500.

<sup>21</sup> Memorandum handed to the Chinese Ambassador on September 4, 1943, not printed.

<sup>22</sup> In his telegram No. 1293, September 8, 1 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that as he was unable to see Molotov, he had conveyed to Vyshinski (Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs) on September 7, the statements set forth in the Department's telegram and had left a memorandum (711.6111/15).

840.50/2541

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1943.

Memorandum for the President: In November 1942 we informed the British Government of our readiness to begin informal, exploratory talks with representatives of the governments with which mutual-aid agreements had been concluded concerning the steps to be taken toward formulating plans for giving effect to the post-war economic policies laid down in Article VII of those agreements. The British Government designated two representatives to discuss monetary problems with the Treasury Department but indicated that it was not then ready for discussions of other subjects.

In an *aide-mémoire* dated August 4, 1943, the British Embassy referred to the foregoing and indicated that it had carried further its study of the various topics and is now prepared to begin informal exploratory conversations in the whole field covered by Article VII with a view to reaching agreement on an orderly agenda for these discussions, and to send a delegation of senior officials to Washington for this purpose. The plan is for these officials to arrive here in about a week, although the discussions will not begin until September 20 or thereabouts.

The Department, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, has replied that it is in accord with the British suggestion and has expressed the view that it would be preferable that the conversations on monetary policy continue in the existing channel; that is, in the Treasury Department between representatives primarily of the two treasuries; also that the Treasury representatives should deal with the subject of international investments. It was further stated that this Government is making the necessary arrangements for conversations on commercial policy, the regulations of primary products and related subjects, to take place in the Department of State.

It is my intention to ask Mr. Myron Taylor to carry on the discussions in the latter fields on behalf of the United States with the assistance of the following officers of this Government:

*State Department*

Leo Pasvolosky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
Herbert Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs  
Harry C. Hawkins, Chief, Division of Commercial Policy  
and Agreements  
John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief, Division of European  
Affairs  
Leroy D. Stinebower, Chief, Division of Economic Studies

*Treasury Department*

Harry D. White, Assistant to the Secretary and Director,  
Division of Monetary Research

*Commerce Department*

Will Clayton, Assistant Secretary  
 Amos E. Taylor, Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic  
 Commerce

*Department of Agriculture*

Paul Appleby, Under Secretary  
 Leslie A. Wheeler, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural  
 Relations

*Tariff Commission*

Oscar B. Ryder, Chairman  
 Lynn R. Edminster, Vice Chairman

I should appreciate being informed whether the foregoing meets with your approval.<sup>23</sup>

I have advised the Governments of Soviet Russia and China of our readiness to enter into similar discussions with representatives of those Governments, respectively.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

840.50/2540

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*The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, with reference to the Embassy *Aide-Mémoire* of August 31st, has the honour to inform Mr. Hull that the United Kingdom Delegation will be led by the Right Honourable Richard K. Law, M.P., Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

2. Sir Ronald Campbell has also the honour to transmit to Mr. Hull herewith for his information the substance of a telegram which has been sent by Mr. Eden to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Moscow and Chungking<sup>24</sup> with regard to the exploratory talks between representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments envisaged by Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement.

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1943.

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[United States and United Kingdom economic experts held informal discussions at Washington with reference to article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement, ending on October 18, 1943, at which the following general topics were explored: (1) Commercial policy, (2) international commodity arrangements, (3) cartels, and (4) coordination of measures to promote employment. For a summary of these discussions, see page 766.]

<sup>23</sup> The President's "OK" appears on the file copy.

<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

840.50/2924 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 30, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 9:12 p. m.]

7538. For the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary Acheson. From a confidential source we learn that leading civil servants in the Foreign Office and some of the departments have been considering what instructions should be given to the British delegation to the UNRRA meeting<sup>25</sup> if the European Allies express dissatisfaction with the position of UNRRA on supply matters and request representation on the appropriate bodies concerned with supplies and transport.

The suggestions considered have included (1) the formation of an advisory council to the Combined Boards<sup>26</sup> with representation of the Allies concerned, and (2) the inclusion on the board of the Allies concerned after the collapse of Germany.

As against these suggestions, however, an alternative has been put forward, the rough outlines of which may be summarized as follows:

1. Any arrangement made must ensure that the fullest mobilization for the all-out war effort is maintained not only until Germany surrenders but also until Japan is disposed of.
2. If after Germany surrenders some of the European Allies are brought on the boards it is not certain that, apart from Holland, they will be interested in subordinating economic reconstruction in Europe to a hundred per cent effort in the Far East.
3. If nothing is done, however, the European Allies with economic war resources in their territories may not cooperate fully.
4. Therefore new boards or a new unified board should be set up alongside the existing boards, with representation including those Allies who have contributions to make on the supply side and eventually including neutrals in a similar position.
5. The existing boards would be maintained with their present representation and would have complete priority in all the economic matters involved until the end of the war in all areas of the world.
6. After the war in Europe the new board would deal with questions of supply and transport within the limits of what was available after the full needs of the war effort and civilian needs of these countries bearing the brunt of the war in the Far East had been met.
7. As soon as practicable after the end of the war in all areas the new board would displace the old boards.

These are only the rough outlines of this approach and many administrative details would have to be worked out to complete it. It

<sup>25</sup> Held at Atlantic City, New Jersey, November 10–December 1, 1943.

<sup>26</sup> Regarding the Combined Boards on which the United States was represented, see footnote 3, p. 1015.

was not clear yesterday which if any of the suggestions under discussion would be adopted.

To safeguard sources of information it is important that this message should be treated as strictly confidential.

WINANT

840.50/2410

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>27</sup>

No. 3360

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943.

SIR: With reference to the recent exploratory discussions in Washington regarding the formulation of an orderly agenda for the implementation of Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, there is enclosed, for background purposes, a strictly confidential statement, jointly drafted by American and British officials.<sup>28</sup> It is stressed that the United States Government had not formulated any position on the questions discussed, and the American officials participating in the conversations did so in their individual capacities. Thus the enclosed statement does not in any sense indicate the position of the United States Government, but is rather an annotated agenda of certain problems on which it appeared that official positions should be formulated for possible future discussions of a more formal character.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:  
A. A. BERLE, JR.

840.50/3228 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 16, 1943—7 a. m.  
[Received November 17—3:53 a. m.]

1950. The Counselor of Chinese Embassy told Hamilton<sup>29</sup> that in recent conversation between Chinese Ambassador and British Ambassador, there came up question of international economic collabora-

<sup>27</sup> The same, on the same date, to the Ministers in Australia (No. 184) and the Union of South Africa (No. 92), and to the Chargé in New Zealand (No. 134), and on November 17 to the Chargé in Canada (No. 118).

<sup>28</sup> Not attached to file copy, but see Memorandum Concerning the Washington Meeting between British and American Experts with Reference to Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement, p. 766.

<sup>29</sup> Maxwell Hamilton, Counselor of Embassy at Moscow with honorary rank of Minister.

tion as considered at the Moscow Conference.<sup>30</sup> When the Chinese Ambassador asked to see document presented to Conference on this subject, British Ambassador said that that was a United States document. Chinese Ambassador has asked whether a copy of the United States document may be made available to him for his information and study. It is assumed that then what the Chinese Ambassador desires to see are the statement of the Secretary on "joint action for assistance to other countries" and memorandum of the Secretary on "bases of our program for international economic cooperation" with attached memorandum concerning Washington meeting between American and British economic experts with reference to article VII of Mutual Aid Agreement.

In view of the Chinese Ambassador's request I believe that it would be advisable to make document[s] in question available to him, especially as they relate to general principles of United States economic policy which presumably have been discussed already to some extent by officers of Department with officers of Chinese Embassy in Washington.<sup>31</sup>

Instructions are requested.

HARRIMAN

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840.50/3306: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 24, 1943—8 a. m.

[Received November 25—2: 05 p. m.]

2027. The chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office informed Hamilton on November 23 that the Soviet Government is giving consideration to the letter which Secretary Hull sent to Mr. Molotov<sup>32</sup> during the Moscow Conference requesting the Soviet Union to send representatives to the United States to carry on the economic discussions provided for in article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement. Mr. Zarubin said that the provisions of article VII covered such a wide range of questions that it is very difficult for the Soviet Government to decide what kind of representatives should be sent to Washington and he requested assistance in obtaining clarification of the nature of the discussions which the American Government envisages. He said he understood that similar discussions had already been carried on between the United States and the British Governments as well

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<sup>30</sup> For correspondence regarding the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 18–November 1, 1943, see pp. 513 ff.

<sup>31</sup> For texts of these memoranda, see p. 763.

<sup>32</sup> The letter of October 24, 1943, is not printed; but see telegram No. 1075, October 23, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 1097.

as between the United States and the Chinese Governments and he said it would be helpful to have information on the nature and scope of these discussions. Zarubin pointed out that in addition to particularization as to subjects it would also be useful to know which questions would be taken up first. He said it was possible that some of the Soviet experts now attending meetings in the United States might be designated if the questions for which they were competent were to be taken up early in the discussions. He also inquired whether it was contemplated that the discussions would be on a bilateral basis only or whether they were to be preliminary to some general conference which would also include other governments.

Hamilton referred to the memorandum entitled "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation" which was presented by Secretary Hull during the Conference but Mr. Zarubin felt that this did not indicate as precisely as the Soviet Government desires the scope of the contemplated conversations and in particular, the priority of the various subjects.

He was informed that the Embassy would, of course, be glad to endeavor to obtain further details and clarification of the nature of the proposed conversations. Please instruct.

HARRIMAN

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840.50/3228 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1943—9 p. m.

1289. In response to request by Chinese Ambassador reported your telegram 1950, November 16, 7 a. m., you are authorized to give him for confidential information of his Government copies of statements on "Joint Action for Assistance to Other Countries" and "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation" with attached "Memorandum Concerning the Washington Meeting between British and American Economic Experts with Reference to Article VII of Mutual-Aid Agreement". Copies of these documents are being sent today to Chinese Embassy in Washington.

HULL

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840.50/3228

*The Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador (Wei)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Chinese Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the memorandum which was handed to the Ambassador on September 4, 1943<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Not printed; but see telegram No. 791, September 3, 5 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union and footnote 21, p. 1111.



pertaining to proposed discussions of the economic objectives of Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement of June 2, 1942 between the Government of China and the Government of the United States.<sup>34</sup>

There is enclosed in this connection a copy of a memorandum entitled "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation" with an attachment entitled "Memorandum Concerning the Washington Meeting Between British and American Economic Experts with Reference to Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement".<sup>35</sup>

There is also enclosed a copy of a memorandum entitled "Joint Action for Assistance to Other Countries"<sup>36</sup> which relates chiefly to the possible establishment of an international lending agency. It is understood that this subject has been discussed by officials of the United States Treasury Department with appropriate representatives of the Chinese Government in Washington.

The above-mentioned memoranda were submitted at the recent Moscow Conference. They have not been made public and are for the confidential information of the Chinese Government. Copies are also being made available by the American Embassy to the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow.

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1943.

840.50/3306 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1943—1 p. m.

1315. 1. It is contemplated that the proposed Article VII discussions referred to in Embassy's no. 2027 of November 24, 1943 would cover the topics outlined in the memorandum concerning our recent talks with the British which was attached to the memorandum "Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation" with emphasis at this stage on commercial policy and international commodity arrangements, including cartels.

2. In the discussions with the British, these topics, as well as monetary and financial topics, were discussed concurrently in several groups of officials of the two countries. This procedure was found desirable because of the close interrelationship among these topics. In as much as arrangements have already been made for conversations in Washington with representatives of the Soviet Government on monetary and financial topics, it would be desirable for the gen-

<sup>34</sup> Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 251, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1494.

<sup>35</sup> See annex 9 to the Secret Protocol of the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, p. 763.

<sup>36</sup> See annex 8, p. 763.

eral economic discussions to begin at the earliest convenience of the Soviet Government, as it would be helpful, though not essential, if the general economic discussions took place concurrently with at least the later stages of the monetary and financial talks.

3. Although an invitation to the Chinese Government to undertake similar discussions was extended simultaneously with those sent to the British and Soviet Governments, no such discussions have as yet been held and no specific arrangements have been made for holding them with the Chinese Government or with any other government. It is expected, however, that similar bilateral discussions will be undertaken by the United States soon with other governments. Such bilateral discussions are all that are contemplated for the immediate future, although we do not exclude the possibility of multilateral discussions at a later date.

4. Please communicate the substance of the foregoing to the Soviet Government and inform us as soon as possible of its plans in regard thereto.

5. The information contained in telegram no. 1316 which follows should be used only for background purposes in replying to any further questions.

HULL

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840.50/3345a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1943—2 p. m.

1316. There follows an outline of the topics which emerged from the discussions with the British as the principal items for inclusion in an orderly agenda for discussion under Article VII:

A. Commercial Policy

I. Tariffs

a. General effectiveness of multilateral method of reducing tariffs compared with the bilateral method.

1. Relative time required to achieve results
2. Suitability of each method as a part of a general multilateral commercial policy convention providing for the reduction or removal of other barriers to trade as well as tariffs

b. Alternative methods for tariff reduction

1. Multilateral formulas

(a) Reduction of all duties by a given percentage of their height at a given time, or to a given percent ad valorem (or its equivalent in the case of specific duties), whichever may result in the lower duty, but no duty need be reduced below

a given percent ad valorem (or its equivalent in the case of specific duties)

(*b*) Uniform reduction of all duties in all countries by a given percentage of their height on a given date

(*c*) Reduction of all duties by a given percentage, except that no duty need be reduced below a specified ad valorem rate

(*d*) Uniform reduction by a given percentage of the over-all ad valorem equivalent of each country's entire tariff calculated in comparison with its total imports, with provision that there would be no increase in duties

2. Bilateral method

(*e*) Provision whereby each country would agree to negotiate with its principal suppliers bilateral agreements providing for tariff reduction on its dutiable imports.

3. Foregoing alternatives from viewpoint of

(*a*) Technical feasibility

(1) Uniform tariff valuation

(2) Conversion of specific duties

(3) Effect on tariff structures, i.e. relationships between duties

(*b*) Equitability

(1) Effectiveness in reducing excessive tariffs

(2) Relative effects on high-tariff and low-tariff countries

*c.* Possible exception of revenue duties from a multilateral tariff-reduction formula—definitions of revenue duties

1. Duties imposed to compensate for internal taxes

2. Duties imposed on products not produced domestically

3. Ancillary charges on imports commensurate with the cost of services rendered

*d.* Possible exceptions from a tariff-reduction formula for "infant" and "security" industry tariffs

1. Availability of methods other than tariffs for this purpose (subsidies)

2. Special cases of countries finding it difficult to afford subsidies

*e.* Other tariff measures (e.g. countervailing and anti-dumping duties) requiring exploration in the light of the most feasible particular tariff-reduction proposal

II. Preferences

*a.* Action directed toward elimination—relation to reduction of tariffs

*b.* Possible exceptions to provisions for equality of trade treatment

1. Frontier traffic
  2. Existing customs unions
  3. Preferences leading to a customs union
- c.* Possible review by an international commercial policy organization of future customs unions—criteria
1. Likelihood of benefits of larger-scale and more specialized production
  2. Height of external duties
- d.* Political considerations affecting acceptability of future customs unions
- III. Prohibitions and Quantitative Restrictions on Imports
- a.* Desirability of abolishing prohibitions and quantitative restrictions on imports
1. Possible exceptions to general abolition
    - (*a*) “infant” and “security” industries
    - (*b*) To redress acute balance-of-payments difficulties—suggested criteria
      - (1) Definition of circumstances for instituting and removing the exception.
      - (2) Prior approval of an international commercial policy organization.
      - (3) Limited unilateral action with subsequent approval of the international commercial policy organization
      - (4) Alternative methods for restoring equilibrium to balances of payments
      - (5) Special measures to deal with scarce currencies which may be included in an international currency stabilization agreement
    - (*c*) Quantitative regulations imposed to implement international commodity agreements
    - (*d*) Other possible exceptions (sanitary regulations, et cetera)
    - (*e*) Temporary emergency exceptions
      - (1) To meet shortages of supplies, shipping or foreign exchange in immediate post-war period
      - (2) To aid the disposal of surplus stocks
  - b.* Rules of fair conduct—nondiscriminatory administration of permitted quantitative import restrictions
- IV. Export Taxes and Restrictions
- a.* Desirability of abolishing prohibitions and quantitative restrictions on exports
1. Possible exceptions
    - (*a*) Restrictions on imports (see above) applicable to exports
    - (*b*) Severe domestic shortages
    - (*c*) Trade in military supplies

*b.* Abolition of export taxes and other governmental action resulting in sales abroad at prices higher than domestic prices—possible exceptions (e.g. revenue export taxes)

*c.* Nondiscriminatory application of permissible export taxes and permissible quantitative restrictions on exports

#### V. Subsidies

##### *a.* Domestic subsidies

1. Direct subsidies versus tariffs to assist domestic industries

2. Least objectionable uses

(*a*) “Infant” industries; “security” industries

3. Means of controlling

(*a*) Desirability of limiting subsidization in deficit areas of world surplus commodities—relationship of this to prohibition of export subsidies in surplus areas

##### *b.* Export subsidies

1. Effect on trade relations

2. Possibility of abolishing

3. Possible review by international organization

#### VI. State Trading

##### *a.* Kinds

1. Complete state monopoly of foreign trade

2. State monopoly of trade in single products only

3. Nonmonopolistic state trading

##### *b.* Objectives

1. To harmonize commercial interests of state-trading and private-enterprise countries

2. To eliminate discrimination

3. To expand trade

4. To discover provisions designed to achieve these objectives which would be suitable for inclusion in a multilateral convention on commercial policy or in bilateral trade agreements

*c.* Creation of government-trading organizations by private-enterprise countries

Would it be desirable for governments of private-enterprise countries to create state-trading organizations to handle trade with state-trading countries, or should they use only the ordinary trade-control measures which set the conditions for trading with other private-enterprise countries?

*d.* Possible types of trade arrangements between state-trading countries and private-enterprise countries

1. A commitment by the state-trading country to buy a specified amount of goods from a particular private-enterprise country, in exchange for the relaxation of the trade barriers of the latter

2. Provisions for the allocation of purchases by state-trading countries on the basis of multilateral consultation with supplying countries

3. Provisions whereby state-trading countries would agree that, in making their foreign purchases or sales, they will be governed solely by commercial considerations

4. Provisions whereby countries would agree not to give greater protection to home industries by means of state-trading methods than they would be permitted to give under other provisions of a multilateral commercial policy convention—possible helpful criteria

(a) Comparison of the price paid foreign suppliers with that charged home consumers or paid domestic producers

(b) Determination of whether the trade monopoly is satisfying the full domestic demand

5. Provisions whereby a state-trading country, in exchange for tariff and other trade concessions from private-enterprise countries, would agree to purchase abroad not less than a specified amount of goods (i.e., of particular products if the agreement is bilateral, and of total imports if the agreement is multilateral) without allocation between the supplying countries. These provisions would be coupled with an agreement by state-trading countries to make foreign purchases solely on the basis of commercial considerations (see point *d.3.* above)

(a) Possible need for an escape clause regarding exchange availabilities

(b) Suitability of provisions of this kind for inclusion in a general multilateral convention for the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers

*e.* Temporary emergency exceptions from any provisions regarding state trading which might be included in a general multilateral commercial-policy convention

1. To meet shortages of supplies, shipping, or foreign exchange in the immediate post-war period

2. To aid the disposal of surplus stocks

## VII. International Commercial Policy Organization

*a.* Functions in relation to a multilateral commercial policy convention

1. Implementation and interpretation; e.g., future customs unions, permissible quantitative regulations, et cetera.

2. Investigative and fact-finding

3. Adjustment of differences arising under the convention

4. Modification of the convention in the light of experience

5. Determination of membership (e.g. ex-enemy countries); treatment of nonmembers

- b.* Administration
    - 1. Council, representing all member countries
    - 2. Small operating commission, assisted by staff of experts
  - c.* Coordination with other international economic organizations
- B. International Commodity Policy**
- I. Objectives**
- a.* Elimination of excessive short-term fluctuations in prices of primary commodities which may give rise to serious surplus conditions
  - b.* Mitigation of excessive cyclical fluctuations in prices of primary commodities to help moderate the business cycle
  - c.* Provision of a transition period to enable surplus primary producers to shift to other production without serious economic and social dislocations
  - d.* Substitution of international cooperation for unilateral measures, such as subsidies and import restrictions, which may for all concerned in the long run aggravate rather than relieve surplus problems
  - e.* Establishment of an international organization to guide commodity arrangements in accordance with agreed principles
- II. Methods**
- a.* International buffer stock operations (i.e., intergovernmental buying, selling and storing of individual commodities to maintain their market price within an agreed range which would be changed periodically in accordance with changes in basic conditions of supply and demand)
    - 1. Possible conflict in attempting to mitigate at same time both short-term and cyclical fluctuations.
    - 2. The limitations of buffer-stock operations in respect of commodities subject to basic production maladjustments or to unrestricted subsidies and import restrictions
    - 3. The organization and financing of buffer-stock operations
  - b.* International quantitative regulation of exports and/or production of certain primary commodities, either in connection with or apart from buffer stocks.
    - 1. Conditions under which such regulations may be necessary
    - 2. Representation under regulation schemes of importing and exporting countries
    - 3. Provision, under such schemes, for increasing opportunities for supplying world needs to countries in a position to supply them most effectively
    - 4. Other principles and objectives for governing quantitative commodity regulation

## III. International Commodity Organization

## a. Functions and constitution

## b. Its relation to other international economic organizations

HULL

840.50/3411a

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*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1943.

Memorandum for the President: You will recall that confidential exploratory conversations were recently held between British and American officials in the field covered by Article VII of the mutual-aid agreement, with a view to reaching agreement on an orderly agenda for future discussions of a more definitive character.

It would be distinctly advantageous to have a similar interchange of ideas with Canadian officials and I plan to extend an invitation to the Canadian Government to send appropriate officials to Washington in the near future.<sup>87</sup> The procedure followed with the British officials was to hold conversations on monetary and investment policy in the Treasury Department, while simultaneously proceeding in the State Department with conversations on commercial policy, the regulation of primary products, and related subjects. It is proposed to confine, at this time, the conversations with Canadian officials to the latter group of subjects.

As it will be desirable to obtain the tentative reactions of Canadian officials to the general ideas which emerged from the conversations with British officials for the formulation of an orderly agenda for the implementation of Article VII of the mutual-aid agreements, it is my intention to ask Mr. Myron C. Taylor also to carry on the discussions with the Canadian officials, with the assistance of the same officers of this Government who collaborated with him during the recent conversations with British officials. It is also my intention to follow the practice adopted during the conversations with British officials of inviting, from time to time, other American officials to participate in the discussions as they touch on subjects on which they are particularly well informed.

The following American officials are those who would again assist Mr. Taylor throughout the conversations:

*State Department*

Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
Harry C. Hawkins, Chief, Division of Commercial Policy  
and Agreements

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<sup>87</sup> Note to the Canadian Legation dated December 20, 1943, not printed.



Leroy D. Stinebower, Chief, Division of Economic Studies  
John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief, Division of European  
Affairs

*Treasury Department*

Harry D. White, Assistant to the Secretary and Director,  
Division of Monetary Research

*Commerce Department*

Will Clayton, Assistant Secretary  
Amos E. Taylor, Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic  
Commerce

*Department of Agriculture*

Paul Appleby, Under Secretary  
Leslie A. Wheeler, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural  
Relations

*Tariff Commission*

Oscar B. Ryder, Chairman  
Lynn R. Edminster, Vice Chairman

As mentioned in my memorandum to you of September 7, 1943, I have advised the Governments of Soviet Russia and China of our readiness to enter into similar conversations with representatives of those Governments, respectively. Also it is not unlikely that it may become advisable to have such exploratory conversations with officials of other Governments. The procedure, outlined above, contemplated for the exploratory conversations with Canadian officials on commercial policy, the regulation of primary products, and related subjects would likewise be followed in similar conversations with representatives of other Governments.

I should appreciate being informed whether the foregoing meets with your approval.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

BRITISH PROPOSAL TO CONVENE AN INFORMAL  
INTERNATIONAL WHALING CONFERENCE<sup>1</sup>

562.8F4/1

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

No. 201

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943.

Ref: 1354/6/43

SIR: I have the honour to inform you, on instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose to convene, if possible in May next an informal conference under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to discuss the question of making certain amendments of a technical nature to the provisions of the 1937 Whaling Agreement.<sup>2</sup>

It is suggested that the following amendments might be discussed:—

(a) An expansion of the period of three months fixed for Antarctic whaling by Article 7 of the 1937 Agreement to six or eight months;

(b) Exemption from the requirements of Article 11 of the Agreement as regards the comparatively unprofitable back-meat;

(c) Relaxation of Article 9 of the Agreement and Articles 3 and 7 of the 1938 Protocol<sup>3</sup> so as to permit factory ships that take part in the Antarctic whaling season to operate elsewhere in other seasons, more particularly off the coast of West Australia;

(d) Reduction of the minimum size limit for sperm whales from thirty-five feet to thirty feet;

(e) The resumption of the embargo on the taking of humpback whales in any waters south of latitude 40 degrees south, which was included in the 1938 Protocol and extended for a year in 1939 and has now lapsed.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be grateful if the United States Government could appoint a delegate to attend this conference.

I have the honour [etc.]

HALIFAX

<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence regarding regulation of whaling, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 947 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Signed June 8, 1937, Department of State Treaty Series No. 933, or 52 Stat. 1460; see also *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. 1, pp. 920 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Signed June 24, 1938, Department of State Treaty Series No. 944, or 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 1794.

562.8F4/1: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1943—midnight.

3281. British Embassy has advised Department that British Government proposes to convene, this month if possible, an informal conference under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to discuss the question of making certain amendments of a technical nature to the 1937 Whaling Agreement.

Department desires that Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.,<sup>4</sup> attend conference and that John M. Allison<sup>5</sup> act as Mr. Cumming's assistant. Please reply by telegraph whether this arrangement is satisfactory to the Embassy. The Department will transmit detailed instructions by air mail or if necessary by telegraph.<sup>6</sup>

Inquire informally of Foreign Office as to exact date conference may be held. As time will be needed to complete preparation for conference Department hopes date is not earlier than June 10.

HULL

562.8F4/6: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, May 26, 1943—10 a.m.

[Received 5:45 p. m.]

3628. Department's 3281, May 24, midnight. Attendance of Cumming and Allison at conference to discuss amendments to the whaling agreement satisfactory to Embassy.

Foreign Office will let us know date of conference as soon as this has been decided. According Foreign Office date will be some time after June 10th.

WINANT

562.8F4/7

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The British Embassy has inquired whether this Government could appoint a delegate to attend an in-

<sup>4</sup> Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, in London in connection with the Anglo-Swedish-United States war trade negotiations.

<sup>5</sup> Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

<sup>6</sup> Instructions of June 7, 1943, not printed; see later instructions of December 28, p. 1141.

formal conference which the British Government proposes to convene to discuss the question of making certain amendments of a technical nature to the provisions of the Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed at London June 8, 1937.

The primary object of the United States in participating in the international whaling conferences and agreements has been to further the cause of conservation. Four of the five amendments suggested by the British Government for discussion at the conference would relax present international whaling regulations as contained in the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling concluded at Geneva September 24, 1931,<sup>7</sup> the Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed at London June 8, 1937 and the Protocol signed at London June 24, 1938, which are in force with respect to the United States and a number of other countries. So far as is known, none of the whaling vessels of German registry or of Japanese registry are operating at present. A number of the British and Norwegian whaling vessels have been sunk and a number have been converted into oil tankers. Accordingly, it appears that notwithstanding a lowering of the restrictions on the taking of whales, the catch of the vessels available for whaling operations at the present time can not be expected to equal the catch of vessels engaged in those operations prior to the war.

The Department of the Interior has been consulted and has stated that the proposed conference may reveal facts and recently acquired data that will demonstrate that certain of the suggested amendments may be adopted without jeopardizing the future abundance of the whale populations, and that if such assurances are forthcoming then the United States might consider approving some of the proposed amendments or modifications thereof.

The London Whaling Agreement of 1937 was ratified or adhered to by the United States, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, and New Zealand. All of those countries except Mexico and New Zealand ratified or adhered to the Protocol of 1938 amending the London Whaling Agreement of 1937. Argentina is understood to be enforcing the Agreement by Executive Decree but has not yet deposited a ratification.

I believe that the British invitation should be accepted and I suggest the designation of Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr. of the Department of State, who is now in London, to represent this Government at the conference, and the designation of Mr. John M. Allison, Second Secretary, American Embassy, London, as Mr. Cumming's assistant and alternate. It is believed that their attendance at the meeting will

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<sup>7</sup> Signed by the United States on March 31, 1932, Department of State Treaty Series No. 880, or 49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3079.

involve no additional expense to this Government. However, if any expenses are incurred they will be defrayed from funds available to the Department of State.

I should appreciate it if you would inform me whether the appointment of the above named persons would meet with your approval.<sup>8</sup>

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

562.8F4/11 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 26, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 6:25 p. m.]

4218. From Cumming. Department's 3561, June 8.<sup>9</sup> Whaling.

(1) Foreign Office informs me that no agreement has as yet been reached between Norwegian Government and British Government departments concerned as to whether whaling conference will be held in the near future or postponed until October. In latter event, however, no final decision will be made until U.S. Government has been consulted.

(2) Reasons for postponement and general picture are somewhat confused but one factor appears to be Norwegian concern over reported plan of two Swedish companies to construct factory ships with a view to engaging in whaling. According to Collier, British Ambassador to Norwegian Government, the Norwegians feel that, if the convention were revised at present, the Swedes would desire to adhere to it and thereby be in a position to take part in the whaling industry as soon as conditions were favorable. If revision of the convention is postponed until October, it is believed it will be impossible at that time for Swedes to obtain ships' plates from Germany for construction of factory ships.

(3) Collier implied that British Government was sympathetic to the Norwegian attitude and was opposed to countries not previously engaged in whaling industry taking advantage of the war to gain a foothold therein.

<sup>8</sup> Marginal note reads: "CH OK FDR." The Secretary of State addressed a note to the British Ambassador on June 7, 1943, accepting the invitation to appoint a delegate to the Conference and naming Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., for that purpose, with John M. Allison as assistant and alternate.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed; it contained information of the designation of the delegation to the Conference (562.8 F4/9a).

(4) Norwegian Foreign Minister Lie has expressed through Ambassador Biddle<sup>10</sup> a desire to see me June 28 to give me Norwegian point of view.

(5) Commander Richmond, U. S. Coast Guard, who attended previous whaling conference as technical adviser, is now in London and informs me that he was told informally before leaving Washington that he might be designated technical adviser to the U.S. delegation to whaling conference. I recommend that his status as technical adviser be regularized in order that Allison may have the benefit of his help after I leave London next week. [Cumming.]

WINANT

562.8F4/12a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London*

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1943—2 p. m.

3. Norwegian Series No. 20. From Cumming. At Norwegian Foreign Minister's luncheon which you and I attended, Professor Bergersen<sup>11</sup> offered to prepare an informal memorandum setting forth his views on Whaling Conference which he would send me through you. If you see no objection, would appreciate your getting in touch with Bergersen informally and saying that both Dr. Kellogg<sup>12</sup> and I hope to receive this memorandum at earliest possible moment. Any recent indication Norwegian Government's official views would also be useful. [Cumming.]

HULL

562.8F4/14

*The Ambassador to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*

No. 60

LONDON, August 17, 1943.

[Received August 23.]

SIR: Referring to the Department's telegram No. 20 July 30, 2 p. m. and to my reply No. 9 August 17, 1 p. m.<sup>13</sup> on the subject of a possible Whaling Conference, I have the honor to enclose a copy

<sup>10</sup> Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., accredited to the Governments of Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece, established in England.

<sup>11</sup> Birger Bergersen, Norwegian whaling expert.

<sup>12</sup> Remington Kellogg, Curator of Mammals of the National Museum, Smithsonian Institution.

<sup>13</sup> Latter not printed.

of an informal and confidential memorandum<sup>14</sup> prepared by Professor Birger Bergersen regarding such a Conference. The memorandum deals primarily with possible modifications of the Whaling Agreement of June 8, 1937 and the Protocol of June 24, 1938 in the immediate post-war years.

In a conversation with Mr. R. E. Schoenfeld, Counselor of this Mission, Professor Bergersen said that the Norwegians would like an early Conference. They would be prepared for a meeting as soon as they should receive word from the United States. The Norwegians would particularly like to avoid delays which would risk bringing the matter into the pressures of the end-of-the-war period.

According to Professor Bergersen, the British Foreign Office feels that a meeting restricted to those countries engaged in pelagic whaling could properly be held. This would mean the United States, Great Britain and Norway. The other signatories of the Whaling Convention only engage in shore-based whaling. The implication therefore was that because of the differences between pelagic and shore-based whaling, the meeting might properly be restricted to the countries engaged in the former.

Professor Bergersen went on to say that the Norwegians now felt reassured with regard to possible plans of Swedish companies to construct factory ships with a view to engaging in whaling, as they now believed that the Swedes could not build any such ships for some years. The present summer was the danger period and no construction of such ships had been started. He had personally been in Sweden recently and had talked with the Swedish interests in question. A definite reply from the Swedes had not been received but the Norwegians felt practically sure that the danger was now past.

Professor Bergersen referred to the fact that there was not at present a sufficient number of factory ships to take the catch permitted under the Agreement. There was some question of sending out three expeditions in the coming year. Each one would normally take 100,000 barrels of whale oil, or 300,000 barrels for all three.

He hoped that the United States or the British or both would help Norway to obtain two or three new factory ships for use immediately after the war. He suggested the possibility of permitting the construction during the war of four or six tankers susceptible of later conversion. The British, he said, were not in a position to construct such ships. At the present time there was only one free slip and this was too small to permit of the construction of a ship of a suitable size. A factory ship, he said, should be at least 20,000-22,000 tons. He understood, moreover, that the British had an understanding with

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<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

the United States that they would devote their yards to the construction of warships. He therefore hoped particularly that the United States would help the Norwegians. Unless the Norwegians could look forward to obtaining two or three such ships, they saw little direct advantage to themselves in the possible widening of whaling opportunities for the immediate post-war years. This, however, did not prevent them from favoring an early meeting.

In his memorandum, Professor Bergersen classifies the essential points which might be discussed at the suggested meeting under six headings, i.e.

- 1/ Extension of the whaling season;
- 2/ Fullest possible utilisation of whales taken;
- 3/ Sanctuaries;
- 4/ Size limit for sperm whale;
- 5/ Protection of humpback whales;
- 6/ Limitation of the catch.

Commenting orally on his memorandum, Professor Bergersen said that Mr. Dobson, Under-Secretary of Agriculture and Director of Fisheries in the British Government, agreed with him that an early conference would be desirable.

With regard to possible modifications in practices under the International Agreement of June 8, 1937 and the Protocol of June 24, 1938, Professor Bergersen said that he had been rather vague in his memorandum as to the period over which such modifications should be in force. He had suggested that the modifications should only be in force for "the first whaling seasons" after the war. The British commercial interests, he understood, wanted the modifications to extend over a relatively long period. He personally was opposed to this.

With regard to Point 1, Professor Bergersen said that he objected to the idea of extending the three months' period now fixed to seven months as certain British whaling interests desired. He felt that the period could be extended advantageously for a month but no longer. He intimated that the interested British officials were inclined to take this point of view but that Mr. Salvesen, the principal figure in the British whale oil industry, took the other view. He intimated that if, as he thought they would, the United States and the Norwegians supported the shorter period, this would be welcome to the British officials since it would ease the problem of withstanding the pressure of the commercial interests.

With regard to Point 3, Professor Bergersen indicated that he considered the proposal for the withdrawing of certain sanctuaries as wrong. He said that the principal reason for possible amendments was that the whalers, after finishing the season in the Antarctic,





Thus the interested powers could present the changes as in agreement with the intent of those conventions.

Professor Bergersen stated that he believed the British authorities would be willing to support this proposal for the limitation of the catch, though they had never been willing to do so before.

In conclusion, Professor Bergersen mentions in his memorandum that it was obvious that with the whaling tonnage that was likely to be available at the end of the war, 1,500,000-1,600,000 barrels could not be obtained during the first seasons after the cessation of hostilities in Europe. He believed that the commercial interests would probably therefore not interfere, and that sound principles of regulation of international whaling in the future could be introduced at once. He therefore thought that it would be a good thing to have a Conference.

It has not been possible to discuss the question of a meeting with Mr. Trygve Lie, Norwegian Foreign Minister, since he is away on vacation for a fortnight, but Mr. J. G. Raeder<sup>16</sup> is of the opinion that Mr. Lie would be in agreement concerning the desirability of an early meeting.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

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562.8F4/16 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 28, 1943.

[Received October 28—10:25 a. m.]

7443. Reference Embassy's 4232, June 27, 4 p. m.<sup>17</sup> and Ambassador Biddle's strictly confidential despatch No. 60, August 17, regarding possible whaling conference to be attended by representatives of United States, Great Britain and Norway.

Embassy has been informally told by Bureau of Fisheries of Ministry of Agriculture that a whaling conference is to open in London November 3 and that Foreign Office forwarded an invitation to Department through British Embassy Washington on October 7.<sup>18</sup> Bureau of Fisheries asked whether or not we would be represented and was told that Embassy had no instructions. Embassy would appreciate instructions on attitude it should take if again approached by British. Embassy has not been approached by Foreign Office nor has it discussed the question with the Foreign Office.

WINANT

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<sup>16</sup> Commercial Counselor of the Norwegian Embassy in the United Kingdom.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

<sup>18</sup> Not found in Department files.

562.8F4/16 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1943.

6804. In connection with the proposed informal whaling conference reference is made to Embassy's telegram no. 7443, October 28. The British Embassy at Washington has informally inquired whether this Government is agreeable to the conference being held early in November 1943. Department has replied in effect that we are not prepared to attend the conference in November because of a number of developments, including the receipt of information which indicates the need for more information with respect to the scope and purpose of the conference and with respect to the countries invited to attend; that we should like to see the conference postponed and a date not set for the time being to give us opportunity to obtain further information from the British Government which the American Embassy in London is being requested to obtain; and that after we have had time to consider the additional information we shall communicate again with the British Embassy.

If you perceive no objection, please bring the foregoing to the attention of the Foreign Office and request any information available with respect to the agenda for the proposed conference and the names of the governments which have been invited to participate. The Department desires especially to learn whether it is contemplated that an agreement may be drawn up or signed at the conference.

STETTINIUS

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562.8F4/19 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 12, 1943.

[Received November 13—4:30 a. m.]

7905. Department's 6804, October 30, re whaling conference. The Embassy had just received a communication from the Foreign Office enclosing a note prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries answering the questions raised in the Department's telegram under reference.

In answer to the Department's specific questions the British reply indicates that:

(1) The agenda of the proposed conference would be the same as that outlined in the note to the Department from the British Embassy,

Washington, dated March 31, 1943. One or two additional points may be raised which will be discussed below:

(2) The Governments invited to attend the conference are the following: Eire, Norway, Australia, United States, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and Newfoundland, but not the Argentine as they were not considered to be interested in pelagic whaling. All the above Governments had accepted with the exception of the United States and Eire, the latter, according to the British note, "apparently did not consider, as they were not actively engaged in whaling operations, that the modifications which were proposed to be adopted were of sufficient importance to justify their sending representatives".

(3) With regard to the proposed amendments and the signing of an agreement at the conference the British note states, "It will be seen, therefore, that the possible amendments that have been suggested to the international agreement and the subsequent protocols are of a comparatively minor character and it was not proposed to amend the agreement at this stage by any formal document even if a majority of the above points were agreed mutually".

With regard to the proposed amendments to be discussed which are numbered (a) to (e) inclusive in the British Embassy's note of March 31, 1943, the British note just received makes the following comments:

"With regard to the modifications indicated in the preceding paragraph the following information is afforded.

(a) The period during which whaling is permitted under the international agreement runs from 8th December to 7th March, but, in view of the great need for whale oil and the relatively small number of factory ships which can be operated in the immediate postwar period, it was felt by the United Kingdom that the period might, by mutual agreement, be extended for a certain period during the first year or so after the war. Three to five months was suggested, as above, but it is understood now that the Norwegian Government would be hostile to so great an extension but would be prepared to see the period 8th December to 7th March altered to 15th November to 15th March, or even to 31st March. Whales are not in good condition much before the beginning of December, while at the end of the season the weather begins to get bad.

(b) The United Kingdom sees no reason why the requirements of article 11 should be literally imposed for the first season after the war, when the great urge will be to obtain whale oil. Only a limited number of expeditions will be operating and the urge to get oil should not be delayed by too rigid an enforcement of this requirement of the international agreement.

(c) This suggestion was included at the request of the whaling industry. Under the original agreement a factory ship operating in the Antarctic was not allowed to engage in any other whaling operations elsewhere in the same year, and the United Kingdom are of opinion that this is a proper precaution and should not be relaxed, having regard to the still urgent need to preserve and maintain the whale stocks, particularly as any subsequent operations would be likely to be directed largely against humpbacks and whales carrying calves.

(d) Objection is seen by the United Kingdom (and it is believed by Norway) to the proposed reduction of the minimum size for sperm whales.

(e) The embargo on the taking of humpback whales was first included in the protocol to the international agreement of 1938 for one year and was continued by the 1939 conference for a further year. It has now lapsed, and it is considered expedient that it should be reimposed.

It is possible that at the forthcoming conference one or two additional points may be raised by delegates, but these should be capable of adjustment round the table without previous notice. One, for example, is that when it again becomes possible to hold annual international whaling conferences, a limit should be imposed on the number of blue whale units to be caught in any one season and the figure of 15,000 to 17,000 blue whale units has been mentioned. It is not possible that, with the few factory ships likely to be available in the first year after the war, anything like this number will be caught, but it is nevertheless considered desirable, both by the United Kingdom and the Norwegian Governments that the principle of putting a limit of the number of blue whale units to be caught should be ventilated at the earliest possible date, so that it may be brought into effective operation as soon as the number of factory ships increases and renders the imposition of a maximum quantity necessary. It may also be proposed to revive the provisions of article 2 of the 1938 protocol, creating a temporary sanctuary for baleen whales in the Antarctic."

With reference to the proposal to limit the number of blue whale units to be caught in any one season it is believed that this is the Norwegian proposal discussed in Ambassador Biddle's despatch No. 60 of August 17, 1943, on the subject of a possible whaling conference between representatives of Great Britain, the United States and Norway.

The following additional sections of the British note are quoted for the Department's information:

"Consideration is now being given to the revival of whaling after the war, more especially from the point of view of the restrictions imposed by the existing international agreement. The whaling industry have suggested that, in the interests of the food supply of the world and especially the shortage of whale oil, whaling should be started and prosecuted to the fullest extent as soon as possible after the termination of hostilities, and they have even urged that the United Kingdom should denounce the agreement (as they can do prior to the 1st January in any one year) without prejudice to its resuscitation as soon as opportunity offers.

The United Kingdom (and in this they are known to be supported by Norway, the other great whaling country) are absolutely opposed to the denunciation of the international agreement, because in their view it would be extremely difficult to revive again after the war an agreement which was primarily designed to preserve the future stocks of whales. This is an especially important consideration because Japan, who were building up a whaling industry some years before

the war, were never parties to the international agreement, although at the 1939 conference they agreed to become participants at the end of that year: At a later stage after the war in Europe had broken out they decided to withhold participation.

It is important, however, that whaling should be resumed as soon as war conditions permit with a view to obtaining the maximum supplies of whale oil to replenish the present stocks, which are rapidly becoming exhausted, and, with that end in view, the position has been examined by the Departments of the United Kingdom concerned to see if there are any directions in which the international agreement could, by mutual consent and as a purely temporary measure be safely modified without imperilling the position. An invitation was accordingly sent by the Foreign Office to, *inter alia*, the British Ambassador in Washington on 11th March 1943, inviting the United States of America Government to participate in a whaling conference, which it was then contemplated would be held towards the end of that month . . .<sup>19</sup>

It should be clearly understood that the proposals for discussion at the suggested conference would be merely temporary modifications of the existing whaling agreements in order to meet the wholly abnormal circumstances which will exist at the termination of the war. Any modifications agreed on at the conference would operate only during the first season in which whaling operations are resumed (or at most the first two seasons). If it should be found that the acute shortage of whale oil continues for a longer period and that the number of expeditions available remains small, it might be desirable to extend the modifications for another season, but this would be possible only by agreement reached at a subsequent conference. In the absence of any such agreement the conditions imposed by the whaling agreements of 1937-1939 would again be fully operative (except those that have expired by lapse of time).

It is, in the opinion of the United Kingdom, of the utmost importance that these and other matters should be discussed in anticipation of the revival of whaling operations after the war, and it is equally important that this conference should be held before 1st January 1944, as otherwise the whaling industry will continue to press for a denunciation of the agreement before that date. Indeed, the longer the conference is left in abeyance and the decision of H. M. Government remains uncommunicated to the industry, the stronger will be their plea to scrap every vestige of control, in which case the whale stocks would be vitally affected, as they were being affected before the outbreak of war, owing to the inevitable delay which would occur before a new international whaling agreement could be concluded and ratified."

In its covering letter the Foreign Office states, "You will see that we are particularly anxious that the conference should be held before January 1, 1944, and I sincerely hope that the United States Government will be able to meet our wishes in this matter."

WINANT

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<sup>19</sup> Omission indicated in the original telegram.

562.8F4/20 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 18, 1943.

[Received November 18—11:55 a. m.]

8046. Embassy's 7905, 12th, re whaling conference. Foreign Office has informally approached the Embassy with regard to the strong desire of the British authorities to have the whaling conference take place prior to January 1st and has stated it would greatly appreciate an early indication of the Department's attitude.

WINANT

562.8F4/20 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1943.

7786. With regard to your telegram 8046 of November 18, inform Foreign Office that this Government would be prepared to participate in informal whaling conference in London on or about December 15, 1943 or as soon thereafter as transportation can be arranged for one or more of the representatives of this Government, and that information as to names of representatives and probable date of arrival in London of the representative or representatives proceeding from Washington will be furnished at an early date.

Report by telegraph whether this would be agreeable to British Government and whether Commander Alfred C. Richmond will be available to assist this Government's delegates at conference.

President's approval being requested for Steere<sup>21</sup> to replace Cumming as delegate.

HULL

562.8F4/30 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 10, 1943.

[Received December 10—2:29 p. m.]

8589. Department's 7786, 9th, regarding whaling conference. Embassy has been told informally by Dobson, Bureau of Fisheries, that due to engagements made following advice of Department's inability

<sup>21</sup> Loyd V. Steere, Agricultural Attaché in the United Kingdom.

to appoint delegates for conference early in December, it will be very difficult to hold conference on or about December 15th as the Department suggests. He now proposes convening conference the morning of January 4th and states that Foreign Office will issue an official invitation for this date. Commander Richmond is not in London at present and information is not available as to the date of his return.

BUCKNELL

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562.8F4/30 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1943.

7902. Inform British Foreign Office that proposed date January 4, 1944 for convening of whaling conference, mentioned in your 8589, 10th, is agreeable to this Government.

HULL

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562.8F4/31

*The Secretary of State to the Curator of Mammals of the National  
Museum (Kellogg)*<sup>22</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1943.

SIR: With reference to your appointment as a delegate on the part of the United States of America to the informal conference to be held in London to discuss the question of making certain amendments of a technical nature to the provisions of the Agreement for the Regulations of Whaling signed at London on June 8, 1937, you will be guided by the following observations and instructions.

In the note of March 31, 1943 from the British Embassy in Washington inquiring whether the United States could appoint a delegate to attend the proposed conference, there were listed five amendments which might be proposed and discussed at the conference. A copy of that note is enclosed.<sup>23</sup> The British Government has informed this Government that the agenda of the proposed conference will be the same as that outlined in the aforementioned note but that one or two additional points will be raised. Those suggested amendments and the additional points with respect to which the Department has been informed might be raised at the conference are discussed herein below.

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<sup>22</sup> Similar instructions, on the same date, to the other members of the delegation. For composition of the delegation, see telegram No. 8250, December 31, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 1151.

<sup>23</sup> *Ante*, p. 1127.



In the event that amendments and points are brought up at the conference which are not discussed in these instructions, you are requested to transmit the text of those amendments and information regarding those points to the Department along with any relevant comments for study.

This Government is participating in the conference with a two-fold purpose, namely (1) meeting in so far as may be practicable the desire of other Governments to effect some modifications in the existing international whaling regulations as embodied in the Whaling Agreement of 1937 and (2) to lay the groundwork for the holding of a subsequent whaling conference in Washington as soon as international conditions permit.

In the consideration and discussion of any of the proposed amendments and points raised at the conference you will endeavor to counteract and forestall any tentative commitments with respect to any matter on which it may be desirable to defer judgment and action until a later date. You will make every practicable effort to lay groundwork looking to the holding of a subsequent whaling conference in Washington.

At the first opportune moment the American representatives will announce to the conference that the Government of the United States of America intends to call a whaling conference in Washington as soon as international conditions permit. In making the announcement you will explain that the experts of this Government are of the opinion that a conference held in Washington would offer the best opportunity of formulating in the near future a program, based on sound principles of conservation, that would give effective protection to existing stocks of whales. You may also say in this connection that our own national requirements of certain whale oil along with our interest in the conservation of the existing stocks of whales, warrant the active interest of the Government of the United States of America in the international whaling situation.

In connection with the proposed modification of the Whaling Agreement of 1937, your attention is invited especially to the fact that there is a definite distinction in the United States between treaties and other international agreements, the former requiring the advice and consent of the Senate for ratification, the latter not requiring such advice and consent to ratification. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling concluded at Geneva on September 24, 1931 (Treaty Series 880), the Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed at London on June 8, 1937 (Treaty Series 933) and the Protocol to the London Agreement of 1937 signed at London on June 24, 1938 (Treaty Series 944) are treaties in fact and required approval by the United States Senate before they could become bind-

ing on the United States. These treaties are still considered by the Government of the United States as in force.

In connection with an inquiry by this Government whether it is contemplated that any agreement may be drawn up or signed at the conference, the American Embassy has reported to the Department as follows:

“With regard to the proposed amendments and signing of an agreement at the conference the British note states, ‘it will be seen, therefore, that the possible amendments that have been suggested to the international agreement and the subsequent protocols are of a comparatively minor character and it was not proposed to amend the agreement at this stage by any formal document even if a majority of the above points were agreed mutually’”.

However, it may be contemplated that the conference will formulate some understanding or agreement embodying some or all of the five amendments mentioned and possibly additional amendments. In this connection you are instructed to telegraph the Department the text of any proposed agreement before concurring in the provisions thereof other than for purposes of discussion. Should any agreement for signature be drafted at the conference, the signature of that agreement on behalf of the United States of America will be the subject of additional instructions. With regard to any proposed agreement which would change or affect the provisions of the Whaling Agreement of 1937 or of the Protocol thereto signed at London June 24, 1938 you will point out that this Government would desire to submit to the Senate for its consideration any such agreement, and that modification of the Whaling Treaty Act approved May 1, 1936 (49 Stat. 1246) may be necessary. Your attention is invited especially to the fact that the Whaling Treaty Act prohibits the killing of all right whales, gray whales, females accompanied by suckling whales and calves or suckling whales. Section 4 of the Act prescribes minimum lengths for certain whales and Section 6 requires that the fullest possible use shall be made of the carcass of every whale taken.

Four of the five amendments suggested by the British Government for discussion would, if adopted, relax present international whaling regulations as contained in the provisions of the Whaling Agreement of 1937 and the Protocol thereto of 1938. The general intent of the Agreement and Protocol is for the conservation of whales of commercial value, and it is pointed out that the primary object of the United States in participating in the international whaling conferences and agreements is to further the cause of conservation.

Notwithstanding the regulation provided by the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling concluded at Geneva on September 24, 1931 and by the above-mentioned Agreement of 1937 and Protocol of 1938,

we have been witnessing what, without much doubt, is the last phase in the history of whaling, for after the present exploitation of the Antarctic sea reaches its culmination, where in the past 40 years more than 750,000 whales have been killed, no unexplored seas will remain to be harvested. Any alteration of existing whaling regulations should give consideration to the possibility of further depletion of existing stocks of whales, and to the effect that such changes may have on the whaling industry under post-war conditions. Accordingly, this Government is of the view that consideration should be given at the present time to a relaxation of existing International whaling regulations solely (1) because whale oil and other whale products are of great importance in the prosecution of the war, (2) because the needs for fats and oils in the immediate post-war period may be serious, and (3) because it is understood that there has been a considerable reduction in the number of countries and in the number of whaling ships that are at present engaged in whaling operations.

This Government considers it imperative that any relaxation of international whaling regulations should be restricted to the period of the present war and the immediate post-war period.

The amendments which the British Government has suggested for discussion are as follows, each amendment being underlined<sup>24</sup> and followed by observations which have been added for your information and guidance:

(a) *An expansion of the period of three months fixed for Antarctic whaling by Article 7 of the 1937 Agreement to six or eight months.*

1. The limitation on the operation of factory ships in waters south of 40° South Latitude to the "period from the 8th day of December to the 7th day of March following" was based on biological data. Whales taken before December 8 will not have spent sufficient time on the Antarctic feeding grounds to accumulate the usual amount of fat.

2. The purpose of the limitation to the period from December 8 to March 7 was to limit the number of whales killed and to restrict whaling operations to the period when the maximum quantity of oil could be obtained from the captured whales.

3. During the five years of whaling operations preceding the present war, the records showed a steady decline in the number of blue whales killed and a corresponding increase in the number of finbacks killed. The average length of each kind of whale in the annual catch also diminished in a corresponding manner. Evidence from all available sources indicated that the stocks of whales were being seriously depleted by the operations of factory ships.

<sup>24</sup> Printed in italics.

4. During the 1937-38 season, 54,664 whales were killed. Of these, 46,039 were taken in the Antarctic waters during the 97 day season, extending from December 8 to March 15, by 256 whale catcher boats operating with 31 floating factories and two land stations.

5. During the 1938-39 season, which ended on March 7, 1939, at least 31 factory ships were operated in waters south of 40° South Latitude.

6. The factory ships of German and Japanese registry, numbering 13 at least, so far as is known, have not operated since the commencement of the war. Furthermore, it is understood that a number of the factory ships of British and Norwegian registry have been sunk. Others have been converted into oil tankers. Consequently, one may surmise that not more than ten factory ships are now available for operation; these ten factory ships can not be expected to equal the catch of the 31 that operated in this area prior to the war, even though the period is extended to six or eight months. Ice and weather conditions will restrict operations before and after the season specified in the Whaling Agreement of 1937. In the event that you should learn that more than ten factory ships may be available for operations, please inform the Department.

Any relaxation of Article 7 of the Whaling Agreement of 1937 should be restricted to the period of the emergency existing during the present war and the immediate post-war period.

The American Embassy at London has reported to the Department that the British Government has communicated to the Embassy the following comments regarding this amendment:

"The period during which whaling is permitted under the international agreement runs from 8th December to 7th March, but, in view of the great need for whale oil and the relatively small number of factory ships which can be operated in the immediate postwar period, it was felt by the United Kingdom that the period might, by mutual agreement, be extended for a certain period during the first year or so after the war. Three to five months was suggested, as above, but it is understood now that the Norwegian Government would be hostile to so great an extension but would be prepared to see the period 8th December to 7th March altered to 15th November to 15th March, or even to 31st March. Whales are not in good condition much before the beginning of December, while at the end of the season the weather begins to get bad."

*(b) Exemption from the requirements of Article 11 of the Agreement as regards the comparatively unprofitable back-meat.*

Under an emergency such as now exists, and the emergency that may exist in the immediate post-war period, no objection could be offered to the suggested exemption from the provisions of Article 11 as regards back-meat. It is pointed out that Article 6 of the Convention

for the Regulation of Whaling concluded at Geneva on September 24, 1931 provides in part that "The fullest possible use shall be made of the carcasses of whales taken". This provision is the same as the first sentence of Article 11 of the Whaling Agreement of 1937. Any relaxation of this provision in the Convention and in the Agreement should be based upon and justified by circumstances arising from the present war, such as scarcity of shipping space to carry products other than oil obtained from back-meat, the absence of markets for the disposal of such products, the serious need for fats and oils in the immediate post-war period and the existence of a considerably smaller number of vessels engaged in whaling operations, and should be limited to the duration of the war and the immediate post-war period.

It would seem that the expression "fullest possible use" might be construed as an "escape clause" in the event that it should be decided that circumstances require some relaxation of past procedures followed in observance of the provision regarding back-meat. The Department understands that one of the Norwegian experts has suggested that the processing of lean whales should be enforced only after consultation by the inspector of an expedition with the manager of that expedition. It would seem inadvisable to leave such matters to the discretion of an inspector, especially if provisions for relaxing the present requirement regarding back-meat are embodied in a written agreement.

The American Embassy at London has reported to the Department that the British Government has communicated to the Embassy the following comments regarding this amendment:

"The United Kingdom sees no reason why the requirements of article 11 should be literally imposed for the first season after the war, when the great urge will be to obtain whale oil. Only a limited number of expeditions will be operating and the urge to get oil should not be delayed by too rigid an enforcement of this requirement of the international agreement."

*(c) Relaxation of Article 9 of the Agreement and Articles 3 and 7 of the 1938 Protocol so as to permit factory ships that take part in the Antarctic whaling season to operate elsewhere in other seasons, more particularly off the coast of West Australia.*

1. As regards factory ships which will operate in the off-season in waters where mainly sperm whales are taken, no serious objection can be offered for the period of the emergency existing during the war and which may exist in the immediate post-war period.

2. As regards the proposal for operating factory ships in Australian waters, the provisions of Article 9 of the Agreement, and of Articles 3 and 7 of the Protocol should not be set aside or modified. The catch

of factory ships in Australian waters is limited almost entirely to humpback whales. It is generally recognized that on migrating northward humpbacks generally tend to resort to coastal waters. Consequently, if factory ships are stationed on concentrated migration routes, whaling operations might succeed in killing about as many humpbacks as all Antarctic factory ships combined.

Interference with the breeding stock in Australian waters and elsewhere in warmer waters during the winter season, which is the breeding and calving period, is likely to have a more harmful effect on the stock of humpbacks than the same amount of interference in the Antarctic during the summer (December 8 to March 7), especially since the breeding grounds of this species are more circumscribed than those of other species. The following may be of interest in connection with this matter:

Average length of humpbacks taken in Antarctic is 42.26 feet. Female humpback becomes adult at about 41 feet. Male humpback becomes adult at about 39½ feet. During the 1934-35 season, about 700 female adult humpbacks were killed, of which 241 had fetuses.

The humpback stock in Australian waters was so depleted that a proposal was made in 1938 to give complete protection to humpback whales for a suitable period after September 30, 1939 (see last sentence, paragraph 13 of Final Act of Whaling Conference of 1938, Treaty Series 944). The embargo on the taking of humpback whales provided for in Article 1 of the Protocol of 1938 expired on September 30, 1939. A recommendation made by the informal conference held in London in July, 1939, that the provisions of Article 1 of the Protocol should be extended for another year from October 1, 1939 to September 30, 1940, was subsequently put into effect by regulations of the governments concerned. Concentration of factory ships in that area will seriously aggravate already existing conditions in the humpback stock.

The American Embassy at London has reported to the Department that the British Government has communicated to the Embassy the following comments regarding this amendment:

"This suggestion was included at the request of the whaling industry. Under the original agreement a factory ship operating in the Antarctic was not allowed to engage in any other whaling operations elsewhere in the same year, and the United Kingdom are of opinion that this is a proper precaution and should not be relaxed, having regard to the still urgent need to preserve and maintain the whale stocks, particularly as any subsequent operations would be likely to be directed largely against humpbacks and whales carrying calves."

(d) *Reduction of the minimum size limit for sperm whales from thirty-five to thirty feet.*

The American Embassy at London has reported to the Department that the British Government has communicated to the Embassy the following comments regarding this amendment:

“Objection is seen by the United Kingdom (and it is believed by Norway) to the proposed reduction of the minimum size for sperm whales.”

The Department understands from information informally received that the British experts and Norwegian experts are opposing any change in the existing minimum length of 35 feet. Since there seems to be some agreement on this point you should take the same position in view of the serious need for continued protection for sperm whales.

(e) *The resumption of the embargo on the taking of humpback whales in any waters south of latitude 40° south which was included in the 1938 Protocol and extended for a year in 1939 and has now lapsed.*

On biological grounds the resumption of the embargo on killing humpbacks in waters south of 40° south should be recommended (see also remarks above under (c)-2).

It would seem advisable that in any agreement embodying some or all of the amendments set forth in (a), (b), (c), and (d) above there should be included a provision limiting the permissible catch of baleen whales along the lines mentioned herein below as suggested by the Norwegian Government. A global limitation on the total annual take of whales has been supported by the American representatives at each of the previous whaling conferences in which this Government has participated. Such a provision would not only have the effect of giving some assurance that an adequate stock of whales in the post-war period would be available but would also tend to assure a continuing stock of whales during the period of the war.

In connection with any proposals that may be advanced for limiting the number of whales killed, it is suggested that the methods utilized by the International Fisheries Commission appointed under the Convention between the United States of America and Canada for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea signed at Ottawa on January 29, 1937 (Treaty Series 917) might be given consideration. These measures have proven successful in regulating a deep sea fishery. It is believed that by establishing closed areas which are recognized breeding areas, placing time limitations on other areas and providing a maximum catch of whales determined annually by an administrative body, that might be taken from the latter areas, more efficient regulation of whaling might be effected. An administrative body might be set up upon the return of normal conditions by empowering the International Bureau of Whaling Statistics in Norway to perform certain functions. Such an admin-

istrative body could doubtless check on the activities of whaling vessels in the various areas which might be open to whaling until the limitations established for those areas had been reached, whereupon whaling would be prohibited to all countries with respect to which the international whaling regulations are made effective. It is not believed that this Government would favor any system establishing quotas by countries or provisions which would outlaw equipment or limit the number of killer boats that might be attached to vessels but would prefer to see measures taken as above indicated which would prohibit whaling altogether in certain areas, place a limitation on the catch of whales in other areas, and place limitations on the quantity of oil processed and the number of whales taken from given areas.

With regard to a limitation on the total seasonal catch of whales, your attention is invited to the following comments made by the British Government to the American Embassy at London:

"It is possible that at the forthcoming conference one or two additional points may be raised by delegates, but these should be capable of adjustment round the table without previous notice. One, for example, is that when it again becomes possible to hold annual international whaling conferences, a limit should be imposed on the number of blue whale units to be caught in any one season and the figure of 15,000 to 17,000 blue whale units has been mentioned. It is not possible that, with the few factory ships likely to be available in the first year after the war, anything like this number will be caught, but it is nevertheless considered desirable, both by the United Kingdom and the Norwegian Governments that the principle of putting a limit of the number of blue whale units to be caught should be ventilated at the earliest possible date, so that it may be brought into effective operation as soon as the number of factory ships increases and renders the imposition of a maximum quantity necessary. It may also be proposed to revive the provisions of article 2 of the 1938 protocol, creating a temporary sanctuary for baleen whales in the Antarctic."

The Department understands that one of the Norwegian experts has recommended that the total permissible catch of baleen whales should not exceed 20,000 blue whale units annually and since it is generally recognized that further protection should be given if possible to the blue whale stocks in Antarctic waters, that expert proposes that the catch should be restricted to 15,000 to 16,000 blue whale units. One blue whale unit represents approximately 100 barrels, although the actual amount of oil now obtained from the average blue whale is somewhat less than this quantity. On this basis, the calculated blue whale unit is as follows:

1 blue whale equals 2 finbacks or  
2½ humpbacks equals 1 blue whale or  
6 sei whales equal 1 blue whale.



According to the above proposal, the total annual Antarctic catch should be limited to 1,500,000 to 1,600,000 barrels.

1,600,000 barrels of whale oil equals 266,666 long tons (at 2240 lbs.)

[metric ton equals 2204.6 lbs.]<sup>25</sup>

equals 270,970 metric tons

Total Antarctic Production in 1938/39 equals 2,820,771 bbls.

A limitation on the annual catch of whales would be appropriate, in as much as the general intent of the International Agreement is to conserve the stocks of whales and to prevent overfishing. Hence a modification of this kind can be advocated as strengthening the general agreement.

The Department understands from information which it has received in connection with the proposed whaling conference that some consideration might be given to the question of participation in pelagic whaling after the present war by countries with which the United Nations are at war. You will avoid bringing up this matter on your own initiative. However, if the matter should be presented for discussion and it appears that the representatives of other governments are desirous of considering it you will be guided by the following:

1. It appears that it would be very difficult at the present time to formulate any definite policy with respect to this subject;
2. All countries with which the United Nations are at war should be required by the peace treaty or treaties to observe, in the event that those countries engage in whaling operations, existing and future international treaties and agreements for the regulation of whaling. Consideration might be given to the inclusion of specific provisions regarding this matter in the peace treaty or treaties.

In general, you will be guided by the understanding that the primary object of the United States in participating in international conferences and agreements regarding the regulation of whaling is to further the cause of conservation as stated above. Any relaxation of present whaling agreements to which the United States is a party should be justified by circumstances and requirements resulting from the present war. You are authorized to make such recommendations and support such measures as will assure a reasonable regulation of whaling and at the same time agree to such exploitation as may be permissible to meet the needs of the war effort of the United Nations and to meet the humanitarian needs for fats and oils in the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities, bearing in mind all the while that existing stocks of whales should be maintained to the greatest possible extent.

Should you be called on to express an opinion with respect to matters about which you are uncertain as to the views of this Govern-

<sup>25</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

ment, you should communicate with the Department by telegraph before stating your position.

At the conclusion of the conference you should submit a full report on the proceedings, setting forth in particular the position taken by you, and transmitting four sets of any pertinent documents or agreements that may be drawn up by the conference, and the daily mimeographed copies of conference proceedings. Copies of all such documents should be collected each day of the conference.

Copies of the Treaty Series and a copy of the Whaling Treaty Act mentioned hereinabove, copies of the Whaling Regulations of 1940 as amended in 1941 and a copy of the 1943 Halibut Fishery Regulations are being transmitted to the American Embassy in London for the use of the American Delegation to the conference.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
BRECKINRIDGE LONG

562.8F4/30 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1943.

8250. With the approval of the President the following have been designated to represent this Government at the forthcoming informal whaling conference referred to in Embassy's 9037 of December 29, 1943: <sup>26</sup> Dr. Remington Kellogg, Curator of Mammals, United States National Museum, and Mr. Loyd V. Steere, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, London; Technical Assistants: Mr. John M. Allison, Second Secretary, American Embassy, London, and Commander Alfred C. Richmond, United States Coast Guard, now stationed in London.

Please communicate the foregoing to the British Foreign Office, informing it in the strictest confidence that Dr. Kellogg left New York for London via Pan Air on December 29. Obtain suitable hotel reservation for Kellogg and best possible priority for his return by air.

Instructions for delegates and technical assistants follow by air mail. Instructions to Commander Richmond are being sent in care of Embassy. Please inform Richmond of his designation as technical assistant and deliver his instructions to him upon their receipt by the Embassy.

Embassy is requested to place at the disposal of the American delegation necessary stenographic assistance.

American delegation is authorized to use Embassy's facilities for communicating with the Department by telegraph.

HULL

<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

PROPOSED PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN  
MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF ALLIED MINIS-  
TERS OF EDUCATION <sup>1</sup>

800.42/256 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, July 30, 1943.

[Received July 30—8:28 p. m.]

4991. Reference Department's A-699, May 19.<sup>2</sup> At Fifth Meeting of Conference of Ministers of Education on July 27 questions of re-constructing Conference on broader basis, establishing Standing Committee or Bureau of Conference and of financing Conference activities were raised. Conference agreed to appointment of Planning Committee under Chairmanship of Butler, President British Board of Education, to consider organisation of Standing Committee or Bureau and to prepare proposals for financing activities. All delegates to Conference were invited to send representatives to Planning Committee and nations represented by observers were invited to send either accredited representatives or observers. British Council was also invited to send representative. General desire was expressed for active participation of United States, USSR and China in activities of Conference, and all delegates agreed to consult their Governments before next Conference meeting on their attitudes toward reorganisation of Conference.

Embassy was approached informally prior to Conference meeting by officials of British Board of Education and British Council as to possible American attitude toward full participation in work of Conference or Bureau. British Council representatives favored Bureau with Permanent Secretariat staffed by British Council but Board of

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<sup>1</sup>The Conference of Allied Ministers of Education was founded in October 1942. At that time the Ministers of Education of the governments in exile located in London were called together by the British Council, an agency of the British Government responsible for cultural relations with other governments. A decision was reached to form a Conference of Allied Ministers of Education for the purpose of cooperating in studying and planning for the re-establishment of normal cultural and educational life in occupied countries. At the beginning the Conference was composed of representatives from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed; it advised that the Department did not object to a member of the Embassy staff attending the meetings of the Inter-Allied Conference on Education sponsored by Rotary International providing there was no obligation on the part of the United States Government (800.42/213).

Education representatives were prepared to accept International Secretariat. At Conference meeting Butler informed Embassy's observers that British would not put forward specific proposals on reorganization but would allow subject to arise out of discussion at meeting. Nevertheless the mode of procedure adopted was suggested by Mr. Butler. Embassy has not expressed opinion on any of foregoing proposals or suggestions but its observers will attend first meeting of Planning Committee on August 11 unless instructions to contrary are received. Airmail despatch<sup>3</sup> follows giving additional details of meeting.

WINANT

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800.42/256 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1943.

5333. Your 4991, July 30. The Department, which is considering representation in the Conference of Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments, seeks advice on the following matters. What is the scope of activity of the Conference in the view of the British Government? What relation will the Conference have to other United Nations' agencies, especially in the field of physical relief? Does the Conference look towards the planning of programs for the reconstruction of school, library, and other educational buildings? Does the Embassy feel that American representation in the Conference may involve a moral commitment to contribute to the financing of costly programs of educational reorganization in the various countries? A telegraphic reply to these questions is desired.

HULL

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800.42/267 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, September 4, 1943.

[Received September 4—10:20 a. m.]

5863. Department's 5333, September 1. Scope of activity of conference as outlined by Butler, President Board of Education, is to promote closer cultural collaboration between Allied nations, to assist in cultural rehabilitation of war-torn Allied nations and to lay ground work for organization of permanent international Secretariat or Bureau of Education. Butler is preparing statement outlining aims

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<sup>3</sup> Despatch No. 10496, July 28, 1943, not printed.

in greater detail. This will be presented to plenary session on October 5 for approval.

Conference may not define its relationship to other United Nations agencies in the field of physical relief but proposals for the organization of a Conference Executive Committee contemplate that it will make enquiries of the Leith-Ross<sup>4</sup> and the Lehman<sup>5</sup> Committees as to the extent to which these committees would be in a position to help the occupied countries, especially by furnishing school equipment to those countries, which after the war, may find themselves totally bereft of such material. Thus far the Conference and its committees have merely attempted to estimate European requirements and have not begun books or other educational materials.

The Conference has not yet given consideration to the reconstruction of libraries and other educational buildings.

It is the opinion of the Embassy's observers who have attended meetings of the Conference and its sub-committees that American representation in the Conference would involve a moral commitment to assist financially in providing books, laboratory and other educational equipment in Allied countries which have suffered from enemy action and to an extent at least commensurate with any contribution which the British and Dominion Governments might see fit to make. There is a general feeling that a satisfactory program of this character cannot be pushed through without assistance from the United States.

The Embassy is sending forward by airmail<sup>6</sup> a report on the proposed reorganization of the Conference which was discussed by a Conference committee yesterday. Another committee meeting will be held on September 23 to give further consideration to the reorganization plans and a plenary session of the Conference will be convened on October 5 to consider the plan forwarded by the committee and probably to issue formal invitations to the other Allied nations to send fully accredited representatives to the Conference. At meeting yesterday it was suggested that observers merely report informally on present status of reorganization proposals until October 5 meeting.

WINANT

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<sup>4</sup> Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chairman of the Allied Committee on Postwar Relief.

<sup>5</sup> Herbert H. Lehman, Chairman of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

<sup>6</sup> Despatch No. 11042, September 6, 1943, not printed.

800.42/280a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1943.

6089. Reference to previous correspondence regarding meetings Conference of Ministers of Education of Allied Governments, Department is considering sending representatives to be accredited to the Conference in time for its December meetings. In preparation for coming of these representatives Ralph E. Turner, Principal Divisional Assistant, Division of Cultural Relations,<sup>7</sup> (see Department *Register*, October 1, 1942) plans arrive London in time for October 5 meeting to remain for about one month. Dr. John W. Studebaker, United States Commissioner of Education, may go to London the latter part of October in this same connection.

Turner's instructions call for him to act as observer for the Department at October 5 meeting and any subsequent meetings of the committees and sub-committees of the Conference which may take place during his stay. Main purpose of his designation is to obtain information with regard to measures which might be recommended to the Department relating to cooperation of United States Government with Conference in connection with planning and conducting programs of educational and cultural reconstruction. These observations may also include activities of private and quasi-public organizations.

Turner authorized to explore possibilities of cooperation with regard to following specific fields:

1. Organization of Conference as United Nations Agency;
2. Development of cooperative programs of educational and cultural reconstruction for particular countries;
3. Organization of international agencies for service of educational and cultural exchange;
4. General agreement with British Government with respect to cultural activities of two Governments. He is to avoid making any commitments oral or written with respect to present policy and future action of this Government and to place himself under your direction and keep you fully informed with respect to his activities at Conference.

Please assign Richard Johnson<sup>8</sup> or other member of your staff to represent you in furnishing guidance and direction to Mr. Turner and to Dr. Studebaker when he arrives.

Instruction follows.

BERLE

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<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 6186, October 6, 1943, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, it was indicated that Ralph E. Turner was designated Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations, effective September 29, 1943.

<sup>8</sup> Third Secretary of Embassy.

800.42/281 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 7, 1943.

[Received October 7—4: 22 p. m.]

6797. Department's 6089, October 2. The Conference of Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments at the meeting of October 5 set up a bureau of 11 members to coordinate the work of its commissions and sub-committees. This action was taken with the understanding that it would not prejudice future organization if and when the Conference becomes a United Nations body.

Turner explained that, as an observer for the Department of State, he is studying the Conference and its work in order to recommend measures of cooperation which the United States Government may consider in connection with the development of programs of educational reconstruction and cultural rehabilitation. He expressed a desire to discuss relevant matters with the members and observers of the Conference and with its committees.

The position of the Conference does not appear to Turner to be different from that which was recognized in Washington before he came to London. The British have initiated it and are guiding it. Butler, the President of the Board of Education, as Chairman, desires to develop the Conference, step by step, into a United Nations agency in the educational and cultural fields. The delegates of the European Allied Governments appear to be dependent upon the British in policy, financial, and organizational matters. The Norwegian delegates have a greater independence of viewpoint than the others. The Russian and Chinese observers expressed a willingness to discuss the Conference and its future development. The British seem willing to adapt themselves to an American viewpoint. These circumstances appear to offer an opportunity for taking steps to transform the Conference into a United Nations body.

The first step in this transformation should be the determination of a principle of representation. It seems clear that until the end of the war membership should be restricted to the United Nations. The question now is: Shall the United Nations be represented on an equal basis (perhaps two delegates each) or shall a weighted representation favoring the largest United Nations (U.S.S.R., Great Britain, China, U.S.A.) be adopted? The committee which planned the bureau set up at the October 5 meeting acted upon the second principle. The Norwegian delegates vigorously argued for the first principle, and there is considerable sentiment in favor of their position, even among the British.

Turner believes that the United States Government should favor the representation of states on an equal basis. In the educational and cultural fields democratic cooperation and international goodwill require the free and equal association of peoples. At least these are fields in which power, prestige and material interests should have least effect upon the relations of nations.

Acceptance of this principle would reduce the present British representation from 13 to 2. However, the admission of the Dominions and India would bring the delegates from the British Empire to the total of 12. The United States should ask for the representation of the Latin-American signatories of the Atlantic Charter and also for the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The Department's views on the foregoing points are desired in order that Turner may proceed.

The matter of Mr. Studebaker's proposed visit requires consideration. American educators, recently here, have tended to create a confused state of mind about American policy and plans. Even Mr. Butler, President of the Board of Education, is uncertain about the agency of the United States Government which will deal with problems of educational reconstruction and cultural rehabilitation. In view of these facts, it would seem wise to frame Mr. Studebaker's instruction in such a manner that he would not discuss international action or organization in the educational and cultural fields; he could reasonably study the domestic programs of education which the British and Allied Governments may undertake in the postwar period.

WINANT

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800.42/290b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom. (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1943.

6771. The Department is planning to send Dr. John Studebaker, Commissioner of Education to London, for approximately 2 weeks shortly after first of November, as official observer concerning the general question of educational reconstruction now under consideration by the Conference of Ministers of Education. It is planned that Studebaker will receive substantially similar instructions to those of Turner and his observations will supplement those of Turner.

Turner is requested to apprise Studebaker fully of his findings and to assist him in every way, continuing in England until approximately the date of Studebaker's return.

STETTINIUS



800.42/305a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943.

7351. Difficulties in securing priority for the trip of Dr. John Studebaker to England with reference to Department's telegram 6771 of October 28, 1943, promise to delay his departure until approximately December 7. Department would recommend if Embassy concurs that Turner return to Washington immediately to report. Please telegraph probable dates of his departure and arrival in United States.<sup>9</sup>

HULL

800.42/308 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, December 2, 1943.

[Received December 2—3:30 p. m.]

8409. For Turner. Department's 7351, November 20. Dia [*India*] has become full member of Conference of Allied Ministers of Education and Dominion Governments have received formal invitation to become full members. New Zealand observer at Conference informed Embassy observer today that New Zealand did not wish to become full member unless the United States did likewise and that no action would be taken until our position is determined. Attitudes of other Dominion observers have not been ascertained but New Zealand observer indicated that other Dominions will also await United States action.

BUCKNELL

800.42/323 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, December 9, 1943.

[Received December 10—1:40 a. m.]

8556. Our 8531, 8th.<sup>10</sup> Embassy has received following communication dated December 7 from Foreign Office, receipt of which has been acknowledged:

<sup>9</sup> In telegram No. 8323, November 29, 1943, the Ambassador indicated that Mr. Turner left London the night before to proceed on a direct fast sea transport to the United States (123 Edson, Andrew W./239).

<sup>10</sup> Not printed; it reported action at the seventh plenary session of the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education the day before (800.42/322).

"As you are aware the United States Government are represented by an observer on the informal Conference of Allied Ministers of Education which was set up in London in October 1942 under the chairmanship of the President of the Board of Education, to consider what help would be needed by and could be given to the Allied countries of Europe now occupied by the enemy in respect of the restoration of their educational systems after the war.

The Conference has recently circulated a memorandum (AME/A/21A) (This document was submitted with Embassy's despatch 11875 [11885], October 26<sup>11</sup>) showing that the scope of its activities has been gradually extended and proposing that the Conference should now be transformed into an official organization, on the basis of full membership, and that all the United Nations should be asked to appoint official delegates and to assume the financial and other responsibilities of full membership.

The objects of the reconstituted Conference would be: (a) To organize measures of educational relief to the Allied countries of Europe now under enemy occupation and, if desired, to Allied countries outside Europe which have suffered devastation; (b) to consider plans for the formation of a permanent organization, at first confined to the United Nations, but eventually to be placed on an international basis with the object of promoting cooperation in educational matters in the postwar period.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are in principle willing to give formal and financial support to the organization outlined in the memorandum. The other governments already represented by official delegates have likewise approved the memorandum and feel, like His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, that as a first step towards the implementation of its terms, those governments at present represented by observers should be invited without delay to appoint official delegates.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accordingly have the honour to convey to the United States Government on their own behalf and on behalf of the other Allied Governments already officially represented, an invitation to participate in the Conference on the basis of full membership.

A similar invitation is being addressed to the Soviet and Chinese Governments, to His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and to the Government of India. ["]

BUCKNELL.

800.42/31.1 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 16, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received December 16—9: 10 a. m.]

8732. Chinese observer at Education Conference (Embassy's telegram No. 8556, December 9) asked Embassy observer yesterday what

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

Embassy proposed to do about Foreign Office invitation to join Conference. When told that invitation was forwarded to Department, he asked if Embassy had received any indication that United States might accept invitation without making effort to obtain changes of nature suggested in Turner memorandum submitted with Embassy's despatch No. 12183 of November 11.<sup>12</sup> He added that his Government is prepared to join Conference on basis outlined by Turner during conversations with Chinese Ambassador but displayed obvious concern about possibility that China might be left in isolated position as sole supporter of such a basis. In order to keep situation fluid and to assure Chinese cooperation should Department wish to press Turner recommendations or similar proposals, Embassy observer offered to inform Chinese observer of any indications he might receive to the effect that United States might accept invitation without pressing for changes in make up Conference. This offer was received gratefully and it is believed that Chinese will not take action on their invitation until our policy is determined.

WINANT

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800.42/339

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

No. 13013

LONDON, December 30, 1943.

[Received January 6, 1944.]

SIR: Referring to the Embassy's telegram No. 8732 of December 16, 1943, regarding the request of the Chinese observer at the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education to be kept informed about the United States' policy with regard to participation in the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, I have the honor to report that the observer for the U.S.S.R. approached the Embassy's observer yesterday with a similar request.

During the course of the discussion, the observer for the U.S.S.R. asked if it appeared likely that the United States might enter the Conference without asking for organizational changes. He expressed the opinion that the Conference as constituted is too much subject to British influence and is organized on too exclusive a basis. The Embassy's observer stated that to his knowledge our policy was not yet determined, but that he would be glad to inform the observer for the

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<sup>12</sup> Not printed; Mr. Turner made recommendations for transforming the Conference into a United Nations Educational and Cultural Conference with an inclusive international program in the educational and cultural fields (800.42/306).

U.S.S.R. if he received an indication that the United States might enter the Conference without pressing for organizational changes. This offer was received very gratefully. The observer for the U.S.S.R. is obviously afraid that his Government may be embarrassed by the entry of the United States and other observer states without the prior knowledge of the U.S.S.R.

The observer for the U.S.S.R. also asked what basis of representation the United States might desire in a cultural conference. When the Embassy's observer replied that he had no information on this score but advanced the personal opinion that the principles followed in the UNRRA<sup>13</sup> and Food Conferences<sup>14</sup> might be applicable, the observer for the U.S.S.R. expressed the fear that such a basis would give undue and perhaps dangerous influence to small states. The Embassy's observer then suggested that it might be possible to obviate this if matters involving regional or special interests were handled by committees directed by states most concerned, that a finance committee, for example, might properly be directed by the states meeting most of the expenses. The observer for the U.S.S.R. agreed that such a solution should prevent small states from exercising undue influence.

The observer for the U.S.S.R. also raised the question of the establishment of an International Education Office which the Conference has listed as one of its objectives. He indicated that the U.S.S.R. might not feel great hesitancy about participating in the work of such an office as long as its activities were confined to the exchange of purely technical information, but that the U.S.S.R. would be extremely reluctant to participate in an International Education Bureau which undertook to deal with the subject matter introduced in the curricula of national schools.

Throughout the discussion the observer for the U.S.S.R. displayed a somewhat deprecatory attitude toward the Conference and intimated that the U.S.S.R. would prefer to conduct its cultural relations bilaterally. The Embassy's observer got the impression that the observer for the U.S.S.R. hopes that the United States will not affiliate with the Conference, at least as it is now organized. At the same time, he wishes to keep his Government accurately informed about the attitudes of the United States and is evidently apprehensive that the U.S.S.R. may be isolated.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

W. J. GALLMAN

*First Secretary of Embassy*

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<sup>13</sup> See pp. 851 ff.

<sup>14</sup> See pp. 820 ff.

800.42/315: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>15</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1943.

8257. The Department has received the Embassy's telegram No. 8556 of December 9, 1943, communicating a formal invitation from the British Government to this Government to send an official representative to the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education. The Department desires that you transmit the following reply to the appropriate British authorities:

"The United States Government appreciates the invitation of the British Government to participate on an official basis in the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, meeting in London. The Department of State has under consideration various questions relating to this matter and must await further development and study of various problems involved before a final decision is reached."

For the Embassy's information and guidance the Department is giving close consideration to the financial aspect of the proposed participation in the Conference and believes that this presents a real problem which must be resolved before any commitments are made. It is considering asking Congress for authorization to participate in the Conference and for an appropriation of funds in order to meet the costs of such participation.

HULL

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<sup>15</sup> Similar telegrams were sent on January 6, 1944, to the Ambassador in China (No. 32) and the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (No. 32).

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<sup>1</sup> In indexing persons the intention has been to include all references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record, with the following exceptions: (1) The name of the Secretary of State or the Acting Secretary of State appearing as the signer of outgoing instructions unless there is a clear indication of the Secretary's or Acting Secretary's personal interest; (2) the name of an American officer in charge of a mission appearing as the signer of reports to the Department of State, except for personal items; (3) the names of persons to whom documents are addressed.

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