

The Grand Condé and the King: Absolutism, Rebellion, and the Evolution of Political Culture  
(1643-1659)

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## **Introduction**

Many of the most important moments of Louis XIV's early reign center on the Grand Condé. Mere days after the four-year-old Sun King took the throne in 1643, Condé was on the front lines of the epochal Battle of Rocroi, leading French forces to victory over Spain, and turning the tide of the 30 Years War. In 1649, he again led royal troops, this time shockingly laying siege to the rebellious city of Paris. In astonishing contrast, Condé languished in the dungeon of Vincennes throughout 1650, imprisoned for turning against the Crown he had defended. Before a hushed Parlement in 1654, Louis sentenced his cousin Condé to death for waging war against the Crown and allying with Spain. And in 1660, Condé's submissive return before the King closed two decades of chaos and uncertainty, and marked the last instance of a grandee serving a foreign power. Across the 1640s and 1650s, the Prince of Condé appeared by turns as a beloved French hero, blind royal lackey, faithless traitor, and humbled prodigal son. And because he was a Prince of the Royal Blood, national icon, and key power broker, all of his rises and falls, all of the controversies that surrounded him were laden with meaning for the French state, noble order, and national community.

In the following chapters, I analyze the Grand Condé's tortuous career during Louis XIV's early reign, attending equally to his actions themselves, and to the significance that others assigned to him. The centerpiece of my study is the Fronde, the complex rebellion and civil war that engulfed France from 1648 through 1653. The Fronde, and the era surrounding it produced seismic shifts in a bevy of interrelated fields: the monarchy's cultural foundations and political edifice underwent major changes, the national community began to coalesce, and the identity and masculine ideals of the noble order

continued to evolve. Condé's actions exerted an outsized influence in each of these fields, and his image became a primary vector for innovative claims, from diametrically opposed viewpoints. As an actor, Condé sought to mold France's political culture to his advantage; he failed to achieve his stated goals, but his efforts produced potent new discourses. As a medium for contestations over the proper forms of the French state, nobility, and nation, his image left a lasting imprint on Europe's most powerful monarchy.

Louis II de Bourbon, the Grand Prince of Condé, possessed such power and provided for such potent assertions, both because of who he was, and what he did. Born September 8, 1621 at the family *hôtel* in Paris, the infant Duc d'Enghien<sup>1</sup> brought peace of mind to France, for his birth reassured the continuity of the ruling Bourbon line. King Louis XIII seemed unlikely to produce an heir with Anne d'Autriche – a perception that gave Louis XIV's birth in 1638 miraculous significance. Gaston d'Orléans, the King's brother, showed little inclination to procreate at all. And, a crown would rest awkwardly on the un-warlike brow of the King's cousin, Henri II de Bourbon, Prince of Conde. A clear fourth-placed heir to the throne was a welcome relief, scant years after the dynastic catastrophe of the late 16<sup>th</sup> century. Still more, noble blood was supposed to incline a man toward virtue, strength, and honor on behalf of his nation. For the newest *Prince du Sang*, expectations of triumph and glory to come reached a fever pitch. The kingdom attached weighty political and patriotic hopes to the infant Prince, from the first moments of his life.

As his name suggests, the future Grand Condé did not disappoint. Following a kingly education, and apprenticeships in governance and war, in 1643 he assumed his first

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<sup>1</sup> Louis II de Bourbon held this title until his father Henri II de Bourbon's death in late 1646. On Condé's biography, see Bernard Pujo, *Le Grand Condé* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995); Henri Eugène Philippe Louis d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé pendant les XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 7 vol. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1886), books iii-vii.

military command. Immediately, he once again buttressed the monarchy during a dark moment. Mere days removed from Louis XIII's death, the young commander's victory at the Battle of Rocroy was as unlikely as it was pivotal in the Habsburg wars. The following years' campaigns brought further triumph, and embellished his already glorious reputation. By the outbreak of the Fronde in 1648, the Grand Condé seemed "the incarnation of the perfect Prince."<sup>2</sup> Every aspect of his being and behavior was (or, was made to appear) superlative: born at the apex of French nobility, he earned fame as the King's most capable servant, and was attributed the status of national hero. The Grand Condé's merits fulfilled the promise of his impossibly pure, royal blood – at least, for a time. During the Fronde, Condé's reputation imploded, as he successively protected the hated Cardinal-Minister Mazarin, laid siege to Paris, endured a year in chains, and made war against the King. Ultimately, he fled to Spanish lands, and only a hard-won concession from Mazarin in 1659 allowed the Grand Condé to return, humbled, to France. His fall had been steep, fast, and dense with meaning.

If the Grand Condé's star had burned brightly before the Fronde, his career from 1649-1659 was a supernova, whose unaccustomed light reveals corners of French politics and culture that otherwise remain cloaked in shadow. As Condé's decline coincided with an outpouring of uncensored pamphlets (called *mazarinades*) during the Fronde, the door was open to appropriations and interpretations of his image by rebels and royalists alike, as well as Condéen allies anxious to salvage their patron's good name. And because the Prince held massive importance across the interlinked spheres of politics, social hierarchy, and

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<sup>2</sup> Katia Béguin, *Les Princes de Condé: rebelles, courtisans, et mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1999), 63.

national sentiment, those who sought to harness the power of his image necessarily made arguments that spanned all three fields.

My research began as an investigation of noble culture during the Fronde: how noblemen and the concept of nobility affected the rebellion, and how the rebellion changed the Second Estate's collective identity. As my research progressed, I perceived that the Grand Condé's views of noble status and honor were inextricably and consciously linked to royal patronage, and thus to broad questions of royal power and absolutist politics. The scope of my investigation therefore expanded, for evaluating the nobility's engagement in the Fronde required considering how French absolutism developed before and after the civil wars. Further, tracking Condé's career and public image through the Fronde raises issues of national fidelity, in ways both obvious and obscure. The Prince's infamous service to Spain in the 1650s and the process of his repatriation present rich opportunities to ask how the Crown defined noble subjects' obligations. But beyond that, Condé's role in the 1649 Siege of Paris reveals a crucial, and to this point unrecognized stage in the evolution of French nationalism. As commander of the royalist blockade, Condé became a target of derision in rebel pamphlets, the sum of which sketched the borders of the frondeurs' proto-nationalist community, which they called the *patrie*. Upon discovering this phenomenon, I broadened my investigation once more: in addition to questions of nobles' fidelity to France and its King, I ask how the Grand Condé's image affected the development of patriotic discourse for a broader audience (if still a privileged minority). In this way, I explore the effects of patriotic discourse on the development of absolutism.

In sum, my dissertation uses the Grand Condé to address three questions: How did the Fronde employ and affect ideas about the noble order? How did changes in noble

identity and the subject-sovereign relationship shape the power of the absolutist French monarchy, in the early years of Louis XIV's reign? And, how did debates over the Grand Condé's obligations to his nation and its people inform the development of French nationalism, and political culture more broadly?

In answer to these questions, I argue that the Grand Condé's role in the Fronde, as an actor and as a symbol, produced and promoted innovative ideas of the French state, noble order, and national community. The three major factions in the Fronde each promoted a unique political ethos.<sup>3</sup> In brief, Condé and his allies championed "personal kingship," a notion of politics that hinged on the King's personal power, subjects' embodied qualities, and the individuated relationship between the sovereign and his servants. The Crown<sup>4</sup> held to "statism," a *raison d'état*-derived approach to governance that relied on the King's legal heft to compel subjects' obedience and advance the state's interests. Finally, the populist frondeur rebels rallied around the *patrie*, a communitarian ideal that emphasized generosity and prudence on behalf of France and its people. The Grand Condé played decisive roles in the victories and crises that gave birth to these three political models, while his persona was a primary site to imagine and debate their meaning. Ultimately,

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<sup>3</sup> I apply the term "ethos," for all three models are relatively coherent (though flexible), self-contained conceptions of the monarchy's form, power, and relationship with subjects. None, however, possess the intellectual rigor or philosophical foundations that would raise them to the level of "theory" or "ideology." I therefore use more impressionistic terms, such as "ethos," "model," or "notion" to convey such simultaneous consistency and haziness.

<sup>4</sup> Across the years my study covers, the specific location of royal authority was profoundly unclear: until 1651, the Queen nominally held power, though Cardinal-Minister Jules Mazarin was universally known, among the politically-aware, to direct affairs. After the King's majority, though Louis XIV legally and officially held the reins of state, Mazarin continued to substantially conduct affairs. Though it would be simpler and more straightforward to assign agency in royal policy directly to Mazarin, the language of my sources often demands accepting the fiction of the Queen, King, councils, or sometimes abstract "royalty" itself directing affairs. Further, because Mazarin himself was roundly despised before and especially during the Fronde, naming him individually as the author of texts or choices confuses issues of public adoration of the King, but hatred for the Cardinal. So, I use "the Crown" to convey the authority of royal power, which Mazarin wielded, but whose role was concertedly hidden from public eyes during this unsettled period.

though the Fronde ended in an apparent stalemate, the discursive tools fashioned during the rebellion endured, and became indispensable elements of Louis XIV's absolutism. The monarch borrowed from the arguments of the defeated populist and Princely rebels, to build a hybrid concept of royal authority I call "patriotic kingship." In doing so, the Sun King claimed a power over his kingdom and subjects at once more extensive and more intimate than ever. As the cultural medium by which the Crown, rebels, and Condé himself honed the discourses that built royal power, the Grand Condé played a critical role in the making of absolutism.

To make my case, I rely on the evidence of the Fronde's extensive pamphlet literature, private letters and memoirs, Parliamentary debates and acts, and royal records and edicts. In reading these documents, I look above all for evidence of the fundamental beliefs that structured language and action.<sup>5</sup> I conceive of my approach as reading for assumptions, in order to lay bare the implicit understandings that authors held about politics, social hierarchy, gender, and the nation. I hold that such assumptions immanently informed the actors' particular choices, and their representations of those choices. And when the words in question concerned the King, state, nation, or a powerful figure like the Grand Condé, dissecting the author's implicit beliefs provides invaluable insights on the mentalities that structured actors' views of power, community, and identity.

Much of my analysis is built on close reading of mazarinades, the mass of pamphlets that erupted out of the Fronde. As the normal mechanisms of censorship broke down across France during the five-year civil war, authors penned and printers published more

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<sup>5</sup> Jay M. Smith, "No More Language Games: Words, Beliefs, and the Political Culture of Early Modern France," *American Historical Review* v.102 n.5 (December 1997), 1413-1440.

than 5,200 discrete texts.<sup>6</sup> These took their name from their most prominent target, the Italian Cardinal-Minister Jules Mazarin, whom the frondeurs blamed for the troubles their nation faced. These texts appeared from the beginning of the Fronde in 1648 through its last days in 1653, though royalist and Condéen factions sponsored pamphlets in significant numbers only starting in 1651. As a corpus, the mazarinades are a carnivalesque,<sup>7</sup> cacophonous jumble. Even texts produced contemporaneously by a single faction rarely express identical ideas, beyond the sense of which side the reader should support or oppose. Adding to their complexity, many mazarinades make downright pornographic accusations - especially against the eponymous Cardinal, whose body and libido endured searing mockery.<sup>8</sup> The mazarinades are a multivocal, mainly negative, Rabelasian literature, which deal more in political sentiments and popular prejudices, than systematic ideas or coordinated agendas.

As a result, a word to explain my use of these difficult texts is required. Above all, following Christian Jouhaud, I must emphasize that I do not take mazarinades' claims as direct evidence of public opinion.<sup>9</sup> Though Carrier has worked archival wonders in clarifying who made these tracts and why, the evidence on authorship remains too hazy to support broad claims about the motives behind the incongruous mass of mazarinades.<sup>10</sup> Instead, pamphleteers worked within their readers' preferred sensibilities, discourses, and

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<sup>6</sup> Hubert Carrier, *La Presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades. La Conquête de l'Opinion* (Geneva: Droz, 1989); idem, *La presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades. Les hommes du livre* (Geneva: Droz, 1991).

<sup>7</sup> I use this term in a consciously Bakhtinian sense, for the mazarinade authors' mockery of their opponents – especially Mazarin and Condé – display many features akin to the “world turned upside-down” motifs of Rabelais’ works, and the broader festive culture of early modern Europe. See Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Hélène Iswolski (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1984).

<sup>8</sup> Jeffrey Merrick, “The Cardinal and the Queen: Sexual and Political Disorders in the Mazarinades,” *French Historical Studies*, 18 (Spring 1994).

<sup>9</sup> Jouhaud, *Mazarinades*, 38.

<sup>10</sup> Carrier, *Hommes du livre*, 77-91.

cultural worlds to achieve the goal of winning support or spurring action. The mazarinades do not tell us what the politically-aware public thought, then, but what highly-interested observers of the public mood *perceived* they thought.<sup>11</sup> Authors elaborated and innovated on the mentalities they found, to make their arguments relatable, convincing, and compelling. My approach highlights the multiple varieties of claims that coexisted in the unchecked culture of rebellion. It thus allows for analysis not simply of the ideas that “won” the Fronde, but of the also-rans in the heated cultural battles during those years. My approach to the mazarinades lays the groundwork for my central claims, on the persistence of apparently-defeated frondeur discourses under the Sun King.

In approaching my sources and advancing my claims, I assume first and foremost that the Fronde was a meaningful and comprehensible event, with real significance in the broader histories of French politics, nobility, and nationalism. Scholars have not always shared this conviction – indeed, works on the Fronde before the 1980s apply the term “enigma” to the civil wars with striking frequency, and treat it as something of an historical parenthesis. Scholars long advanced explicitly “ambiguous” conclusions of a “révolution

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<sup>11</sup> Though any categorical statement about the backgrounds or motivations of mazarinade authors would be an overgeneralization, blending Jouhaud’s approach with Carrier’s allows for some assumptions about the analytical utility of the texts they produced. Writers might take up the pen for reasons of partisanship, self-interest, patronage, profit, or any of a broad spectrum of incentives. But with few exceptions, they aimed to fit their words to the dominant feelings of their audience. Whether an author wrote because a party leader paid him (and authors were almost exclusively male), because he hoped to sell tracts at a profit, or because he hoped to win support for his side, the arguments needed to resonate with the reader. In this light, the convergence of texts from all sides around certain themes – the *patrie*, love of the King, the image of the Grand Condé, or fear of foreign influence – bears witness to the underlying cultural currents that authors hoped to exploit. In this sense, authorship becomes significant mainly for the relative skill with which the argument was made to match preexisting sensibilités. Mazarinades emphatically do not “speak for themselves”; however, read in conjunction with the broader trends in pamphleteering, and taking into account the surrounding context of events, the ideas and arguments they convey reveal the cultural bedrock of France during the Fronde, even without knowing the author’s name or reasons for writing.

*manquée*<sup>12</sup> - even those who took care to place the Fronde in a larger context, and who dealt seriously with the arguments and ideas of its characters. The strongest statement of this theme, which is by no means exceptional, comes from Ernst Kossman's classic, and generally excellent study: "We do not deny that our interpretation of the Fronde is in truth negative... The Fronde remains a period of imprudence and exaggeration, without sense and without a goal."<sup>13</sup>

Since roughly the "cultural turn," scholars have reached more positive conclusions. Christian Jouhaud and Hubert Carrier have revolutionized our understanding of the mazarinades, and thereby facilitated reassessment of the rebellion as a whole. The most recent concerted study of the Fronde, Carrier's 2004 *Labyrinthe de l'état*, provides a snapshot of French political currents during the five-year rebellion.<sup>14</sup> Though he largely ignores change over time on a broader scale, his use of sources and scrutiny of their ideas represents a major step forward in Fronde studies. Orest Ranum, on the other hand, might be faulted for overplaying the Fronde's large-scale importance: his 1993 work, *The Fronde: A French Revolution*, dubiously asserts that the Fronde might have thoroughly remade the French nation, its politics, and its society.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, scholars in roughly the past two decades have dealt with particular aspects of the Fronde, or considered it to a limited

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<sup>12</sup> A. Lloyd Moote, *The Revolt of the Judges: The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde, 1643-1652* (Princeton UP, 1971), 368; Jay Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1996), 112-113, 119.

<sup>13</sup> Ernst H. Kossmann, *La Fronde*. (Leiden: University Press, 1954), 259.

<sup>14</sup> Hubert Carrier, *Le labyrinthe de l'état: Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653)* (Paris: Champion, 2004).

<sup>15</sup> Orest Ranum, *The Fronde: A French Revolution, 1648-1652* (New York: Norton, 1993). Ranum's overreliance on the Bordelaise Ormée is the centerpiece of his claims on this front, despite the manifest marginality of that movement.

extent in studies of other issues.<sup>16</sup> In sum, the Fronde has enjoyed new attention since the late 1980s, but in rather disjointed, unprogrammatic fashion.

As a result, the Fronde's place in the development of absolutism has not yet been integrated into the current revisionist model. Since the 1970s and especially the 1980s, the traditional view of Louis XIV's power as actually "absolute" has been thoroughly and convincingly critiqued.<sup>17</sup> The pioneering work of Roger Mettam and Albert Hamscher, and especially studies by William Beik, James Collins, David Parker, and many others, have together shown that the King's "absolute" power was a product of constant negotiations and concessions to its partners in governance.<sup>18</sup> Louis' power, they have shown, was less innovative or intimidating than we had believed. Instead, he made increasingly efficient, systematic use of traditional relationships and practices to streamline and regularize the state's functions. The very meaning of "absolutism" shifted remarkably in these scholars' work, becoming by turns a heavily-qualified royalist euphemism, a functionalist "quest to gather information and extend royal authority," or an outright myth.<sup>19</sup> Revisionism became the new orthodoxy quickly over the 1990s, but a school of post-revisionist historians have

<sup>16</sup> Jeffrey Merrick, "Cardinal and the Queen..." capably addressed the mazarinades' sexual imagery; Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: La noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne, 1559-1661* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 251-273, incorporated it in to her scheme of noble political culture; Katia Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, investigated its effects on the Condé fortune and clientele; Jay Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 112-123, acknowledges its place in the development of noble-Crown relations; William Beik, *Urban protest in seventeenth-century France: The culture of retribution* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997), Ch10, examined the dynamics of popular resistance in Bordeaux.

<sup>17</sup> A thorough and forthright expression of the traditional line comes in the edited volume of John C. Rule, *Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship* (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1969), which compiles the work of many first-rate scholars who worked under the assumption of an iron-fisted absolute ruler.

<sup>18</sup> Roger Mettam began this line of argument in his 1967 doctoral thesis, but the fuller expression of his thesis comes in *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France* (New York: Blackwell, 1988); Albert Hamscher, *The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653-1673* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); William Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1985); James Collins, *Classes, Estates and Order in Early Modern Brittany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1994); David Parker, *Class and State in Ancien Régime France: The Road to Modernity?* (London: Routledge, 1996).

<sup>19</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 149; Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy* (Longman, 1992).

posed serious questions since the turn of the millennium. Studies by John Hurt, Guy Rowlands, Roy McCullough, and others have shown that, while royal power was never so unlimited or uncontested as its apologists asserted, Louis XIV did nevertheless wield considerable authority, in ways both more expansive and more intensive than rulers before him.<sup>20</sup> They have highlighted genuine innovations within the French state, particularly in legal, military, and administrative realms. The current state of absolutism studies recognizes the give-and-take process of the Sun King's governance, but finds that the King mostly gained strength through such dialogues. They remind us, too, that at times the monarch had recourse to force.

My research shows the Fronde as a determinative moment in the development of this negotiated absolutism. In doing so, I reconceptualize the cultural foundations of Louis XIV's power, and demonstrate that his absolutism was built in large part on borrowed discourses from defeated rebels. The Crown's victory in the Fronde permitted it to appropriate key notions, most importantly the obligations for selfless service and affective attachments in the *frondeurs' patrie*, and the embodied aspects of loyalty in Condé's personal kingship. By allying these notions with the institutional heft of the royal party's statism, Louis XIV could claim subjects' obedience on the threefold bases of law, love, and blood – an intense, intimate, and durable bond that matches the Sun King's outsized claims to authority. My research underscores the King's claims to embody the *patrie* in the wake of the Fronde as a critical element in the political culture of absolutism, binding together the monarchy's legal, fiscal, institutional, military, and symbolic power. At the same time, the

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<sup>20</sup> John J. Hurt, *Louis XIV and the Parlements: The assertion of royal authority* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002); Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army Under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Roy McCullough, *Coercion, Conversion, and Counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's France* (Boston: Brill, 2007).

royal party's dealings with Condé reveal their recognition that such strong claims were only rarely actionable, and its conscious willingness to cede ground to partners. I shed new light on the substance of key components of Louis XIV's claims to power, alongside the limits of his power in practice.

Much of my argument regarding absolutism proceeds through analysis of the Crown's patronage relationship with its most powerful subjects in the Second Estate. This field, like scholarship on absolutism, has advanced significantly since the 1980s. Thanks largely to Sharon Kettering's magisterial *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France*, we have definitively discarded the older notion of a Crown consolidating power by subjugating an obstinate nobility.<sup>21</sup> Instead of severing or weakening noble clienteles, the powerful ministers Richelieu and Mazarin, and ultimately Louis XIV himself all worked to realign those networks, making them the nervous system of royal governance. As Jouhaud, Béguin, and others have confirmed in greater detail, many grandes actively sought royal employment and favor, especially after the 1630s.<sup>22</sup> By the 1660s, nobles had grown reliant on rewards from the King, both materially, and as an element of corporate and individual self-concept.<sup>23</sup> The Crown came to depend on nobles to carry out the work of ruling, just as nobles depended on the Crown to reward their services and affirm their identities.

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<sup>21</sup> Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford UP, 1986).

<sup>22</sup> In addition to Béguin's painstaking reconstruction of the Condé fortune, see the more limited, but no less significant analysis in Christian Jouhaud, "Politique des Princes: les Condé (1630-1652)," in Philippe Contamine, ed, *L'état et les aristocraties: XIIe-XVIIe siècle France, Angleterre, Escosse* (Paris: Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure, 1989), pp. 336-355.

<sup>23</sup> See Orest Ranum, "Richelieu and the Great Nobility: Some Aspects of Early Modern Political Motives," *French Historical Studies* vol. 3 no. 2 (Autumn, 1963) for an early formulation of similar ideas. Additionally, Jouanna, *Devoir de révolte*.

My analysis of Condé's pursuit of royal favor expands and nuances work on the significance that nobles and royal agents each assigned to patronage. Favor provided the means to reinforce a nobleman's masculine identity, as a paternal provider and protector to subordinate noblemen.<sup>24</sup> Further, Condé construed the mechanism by which the King should reward his servants as built on personal gratitude, in keeping with his model of personal kingship. The Crown, for its part, viewed the distribution of its largesse primarily as a political tool. My reading of Mazarin and Queen Anne's interactions with the Prince on the subject of patronage reveals a vision of service explicitly premised on a subject's *a priori* obligation to serve the state. Examining the battle over patronage between the Prince and the Crown provides a fuller sense not only of how the absolutist monarchy used service and reward, but of the mentalities and identites wrapped up with royal patronage.

Royal patronage shaped nobles' self-concept, but the Second Estate drew much of its identity from the profession it pursued. Historians have therefore devoted major attention to the processes by which the profession of arms evolved in the noble *métier* over the course of the seventeenth century. While the broad contours of the "civilizing process" theorized by Norbert Elias and extended by Ellery Schalk remain intact, many aspects have been reconsidered.<sup>25</sup> Above all, historians no longer assert that the Crown sought to disarm and emasculate the *noblesse d'épée* by pushing them to attend court. Instead, recent studies

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<sup>24</sup> I adapt and apply Bourdieu's framework of "masculine domination," in emphasizing the ongoing contest to demonstrate superiority not only over feminine objects, but especially over lesser forms of masculinity. Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Lewis Seifert, *Manning the Margins: Masculinity and Writing in Seventeenth-Century France* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Robert Nye, "The Transmission of Masculinities: The Case of Early Modern France," in Philip Gorski, ed. *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).

<sup>25</sup> Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: the development of manners* (New York: Urizen, 1982); Ellery Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

of the French army,<sup>26</sup> and of noble violence more broadly<sup>27</sup> have demonstrated that nobles did not eschew warrior pursuits in favor of attending court: using a salad fork does not preclude wielding the sword. Further, Lewis Seifert has argued convincingly that civility provided an arena for contestation and dominance, in and of itself.<sup>28</sup> In a similar sense, Katia Béguin has detailed the Condé house's pursuit of an independent patronage agenda regarding the fine arts and letters, even during the Grand Condé's years of apparent lockstep support for the Sun King.<sup>29</sup> So, even as nobles served ceremonial functions at court and fell more or less in line with royal policy, they maintained a corporate identity that held competition and autonomy in high regard.

The story of an iron-fisted monarch herding unwilling nobles into the “Golden Ghetto” of Versailles has not survived.<sup>30</sup> But, a degree of mystery still surrounds the apparently sudden acceptance of courtly civility among the aristocracy, between the violence of the 1640s and the (comparative) domestic tranquility of Louis' personal reign.<sup>31</sup> My analysis shows that the Fronde itself was pivotal in this process, though not in the sense of crushing nobles' will and exhausting their taste for battle, as it has mainly appeared.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997); Rowlands, *Dynastic State*; McCullough, *Coercion*.

<sup>27</sup> Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

<sup>28</sup> Seifert, *Manning the Margins*. Orest Ranum advanced an early, more political version of this thesis in “Courtesy, Absolutism, and the Rise of the French State, 1630-1660” *Journal of Modern History* 52 n.3 (Sep., 1980), 426-451.

<sup>29</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 265-386.

<sup>30</sup> The formulation of a “golden ghetto” comes from Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century*, trans. William Doyle (New York: Cambridge UP, 1984), Introduction.

<sup>31</sup> For example: Hervé Dréville, *L'impôt du sang: le métier des armes sous Louis XIV* (Paris: Tallandier, 2005), 27, leaps without explanation or justification from Richelieu and Mazarin's efforts to take more direct control of military organization in the 1640s, directly to a description of the world “après la Fronde.” Perhaps more telling still, his Index contains no entry for the Fronde at all.

<sup>32</sup> Yves-Marie Bercé, *The Birth of Absolutism: A History of France, 1598-1661* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), 181.

More positively, I show that the rapid rise and broad acceptance of *patrie* discourse reoriented the terms of noble service after 1649. Frondeur polemics used the Grand Condé's image to demand self-control, generosity, and service to France, rather than strength or courage for their own sake, from all French subjects – noblemen above all. Frondeur patriotism, later incorporated by the Crown, continued to valorize warrior exploits, but only when they benefitted France, and only when they appeared as selfless sacrifice. Battlefield prowess maintained a significant, but secondary place in noble identity, under this scheme. Nobles who wished to serve the King and receive his gifts – not, importantly, oblige his gratitude as Condé had argued – learned to adopt *patrie* rhetoric, and to prioritize service and deference to the monarch who incarnated the nation. In sum, I argue that the Fronde did not simply weaken the Second Estate or strengthen the monarchy, but reoriented the terms of noble and political culture, enabling the Crown to make claims that were different in kind, not simply degree, from his predecessors.

Much of Louis XIV's post-Fronde claims to power over the state, and the new norms of noble service he promoted, stemmed from the King's capacity to marshall the patriotic affection roused during the civil wars. More than patriotism, however, I show that the frondeurs' rhetoric invoked a protean vision of the French national community, and laid crucial conceptual foundations for the rise of "mature" nationalism in later years.<sup>33</sup> The mazarinades worked concertedly to construct what I term a proto-nationalist imagined community, the *patrie*. Frondeur texts lambasted what they saw as the Grand Condé's ambition, emphasizing instead the obligation for participatory service on behalf of the

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<sup>33</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991); John Breuily, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Liah Greenfield, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992).

abstract nation and of one's *citoyens* and *compatriots*.<sup>34</sup> However, the Fronde did not aim to oblige all Frenchpeople universally, but a relatively narrow segment who were engaged in politics at that moment: a mainly urban, usually literate group I dub the "political public."<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, the *patrie* was explicitly not an egalitarian community, as mature nationalism typically requires, for the rebels proudly maintained the hierarchies and privileges that marked Old Regime politics. And yet, the requirement that a significant portion of Frenchpeople must selflessly love and actively serve their nation, in order to consider themselves *bons françois*, holds a clear place in the cultural lineage of nationalism.

In making this case, I recast both the chronology and the course of nationalism's development. My research adds to the work of a new generation of pre-modern scholars, who have pushed the dating of nationalism's origins back into the early Enlightenment, the Renaissance, the Medieval, or even into antiquity.<sup>36</sup> Though I do not make their full-throated case for "proper" nationalism during the Fronde, I do contend that major elements could exist well before the emergence of industrialization, modern nation-states, or a Habermasian public sphere. More specifically to France, I redress Bell's explicit de-emphasis of nationalistic elements emerging during Louis XIV's minority.<sup>37</sup> Beyond chronology, my study intervenes in debates over the top-down or bottom-up "direction" of

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<sup>34</sup> Significantly, both of these terms appear in mazarinades, with only slightly weaker semantic content (below) than modern nationalism would require.

<sup>35</sup> For fuller discussion of the contours and content of this public, see Chapter 2, pp. 100-102.

<sup>36</sup> David Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in Early Modern France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 2001); Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Myriam Yardeni, *Conscience Nationale en France Pendant les Guerres de Religion (1559-1598)* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1971); idem, *Enquêtes sur l'Identité de la "Nation France": de la Renaissance aux Lumières* (Paris: Champ Vallon 2005); Colette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France* trans. Susan Ross Hutton (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1991); Caspar Hirschi, *The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2012); Philip Gorski, "The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of Nationalism." *The American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (2000): 1428-1468.

<sup>37</sup> Bell, *Cult of the Nation*, 6-7.

nationalism. For scholars like Caspar Hirschi, nationalism is a tool used by states to induce loyalty or service from subjects and citizens. For others, like Bell, it originates more organically, arising from elite citizens themselves, and may even serve as a means of opposing a ruler who has misled the nation.<sup>38</sup> My own interpretation finds that the people and the state each appropriated and reinterpreted nationalistic discourses as circumstance demanded. Searching for nationalism's origins appears to me less fruitful than analyzing the circumstances in which it may flourish, the uses to which it may be put, and the influence it exerts on the politics and cultures of the nations in which it takes root.

In analyzing state power, noble identity, and the national community as mutually-constructive terms during the Fronde, I provide a fuller and more holisitic conception of Louisquatorzian politics. Above all, I seek to illuminate not simply the What of absolutism, but the How. That is, while I engage with debates on the relative strength of the monarchy and its relations to its subjects, I am most interested in the mechanisms by which the Crown justified its claims to rule, and the ways in which it made those claims believed by a broad swath of Frenchpeople, during a time of seriously contested authority. Primarily, I show that the Crown strategically appropriated discursive tactics honed by populist rebels and noble malcontents. In the first place, doing so aided in pacifying the kingdom in the aftermath of civil war, by using defeated parties' own words to smooth their reincorporation into the royal fold. But the strategy's more important and enduring effect was to allow the King to harness support from formerly opposed parties, by the most potent means those parties themselves could craft. Mazarinade authors had whipped Frenchpeople into a frenzy of patriotism, while Condé had brought the virtues and

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<sup>38</sup> Hirschi, *Origins of Nationalism*; Bell, *Cult of the Nation*.

responsibilities inherent in blood to the fore – the King stepped into the political vacuum that the Fronde's ambiguous ending left, and capitalized on the era's most prominent discourses and sentiments.

I approach questions of political culture through the prism of an internationally significant individual, in an approach that might be called macro/microhistory.<sup>39</sup> Making my case through close analysis of the Grand Condé holds the advantage of unifying discourse and practice, by following the actions and perceptions of one personally influential and symbolically significant man. My Condé-centered approach allows for side-by-side examination of the words written about the Prince, and the actions that he and others took within the cultural field constructed by those words. In this way, I am able to show not only that Condé's persona was a crucial site for thinking about the King and his power, but to demonstrate the strength as well as the limits of that power in dealing with the Prince and other rebels. I thus add substantively to the concept of Louis' negotiated power, and reconcile the very strong claims that the monarchy made with the concessions that characterized the normal course of absolutism. At the same time, Condé's transnational relationships during and after the Fronde portray the development of French politics as an issue of foreign policy, and place absolutism's development in a continental setting. And, at the level of narrative, following Condé individually through the Fronde does much to dispel the fog of confusion that surrounds the rebellion.

In recognition of that very real fog, however, a brief synopsis of the Fronde is appropriate. The rebellion that erupted in 1648 originated with legalistic resistance, little different from the jurisdictional tug-of-war that had scarred the Regency government since

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<sup>39</sup> Mario Biagioli has written very productively with a similar approach, in his *Galileo, Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism* (University of Chicago Press, 1993).

1643. But the dissent that began in the halls of Parlement took to the streets over the spring and summer of 1648, as unrest over burdensome taxes to fund the Habsburg wars reached a boiling point. After months of vocal protests but minimal violence, the Crown in January of 1649 ordered the Grand Condé to lay siege to Paris, in an effort to crush the nascent rebellion. Instead, the rebels hardened their position, and in a flood of pamphlets excoriated the Prince and Prime Minister who oppressed them. The Siege of Paris lasted only three months, but its fallout would endure far longer. Condé had sacrificed his heroic reputation to serve the King. But Mazarin's failure to compensate the Siege's commander for that sacrifice, as Condé felt entitled, rent the already frayed relationship between the two men. In January of 1650, the Crown imprisoned Condé and his most powerful allies, for thirteen months. During this period, called the "Prison of the Princes," the popular mood shifted against the Regency, resulting in Mazarin's momentary exile and Condé's release in early 1651. Though the Prince smoothed his relationship with the Crown initially, by Louis XIV's majority on September 7, 1651, he was actively engaged in a war against the monarchy. In support of his self-proclaimed effort to rid France of Mazarin's pernicious Italian influence, he enlisted the help of his extensive clientele, the city of Bordeaux, and most controversially, the King of Spain. After nearly two years of battle, the Grand Condé had exhausted his men, money, and popular goodwill. Upon realizing his defeat, he fled to the Spanish Netherlands, and led Philip IV's troops against France for five years. Finally in 1659, Condé was pardoned and rehabilitated through hard-won terms in the Treaty of the Pyrenees that ended Franco-Spanish hostilities. Condé returned home humbled, as the last French nobleman to fight for foreigners against his sovereign.

My analysis of this sixteen-year period proceeds through five chapters. The first deals with Condé's early career, from the Battle of Rocroi in 1643 to the eve of the Fronde in 1648. This was a time of nearly uninterrupted battlefield success for the Prince, and his power and fame reached stratospheric heights. Condé requested honors for himself and his clients, that were in his mind commensurate to his services, and he complained bitterly when the Crown failed to grant them. The terms of his requests and complaints, and the reasons for royal denials, reveal the Prince's and Crown's divergent conceptions of patronage, and their implications for politics and noble culture. This chapter, first, sketches the the Grand Condé persona that would serve so many purposes during and after the Fronde, and second, reconstructs the competing models of personal kingship and statism. I argue that whereas Condé viewed royal favor as a validation of his service and a means to affirm his masculine identity as a benevolent patron, Mazarin focused on the political implications and power dynamics that inhered in those rewards. The two sides' incompatible conceptions set the stage for the long conflict to come.

Chapter Two examines Condé's cultural significance during the early Fronde. The Grand Condé first disappointed the Parisian rebels by siding with the Crown and the hated Mazarin, then outraged the nation by commanding the Siege of Paris in the early days of 1649. Frondeur pamphlets proclaimed that all "good Frenchmen," as Condé had been until that point, must serve the *patrie*. Pamphleteers either implored Condé to reclaim his consummate French virtue, or else demonized him as the intractable enemy and perfect nemesis of their community of *bons français*. In either case, Condé's qualities provided a means to articulate the substance of patriotic virtue, and to mark the boundaries of the "pure" national community. My analysis shows that the reinvention of the *patrie* during the

Siege served as a rallying point for rebels in the short term, and became a turning point in the history of nationalism in the longer view.

Chapter Three reexamines Siege-era mazarinades from the standpoint of noble masculine honor, before extending that analysis into the Prison of the Princes in 1650. I investigate the remarkably sudden rise and wide-ranging effects of frondeurs' *patrie* discourse, and argue that this populist political ethos accelerated long-building shifts in noble culture. The requirement for generous, wise, and selfless service associated with frondeur patriotism played into Mazarin's statist model, by valorizing service even in the absence of material or honorific reward. Similarly, it worked against Condé's individualized notion of subjecthood by requiring a *bon françois* to work for the good of France, rather than personal glory or advancement. I therefore demonstrate that the Crown was able to alloy *patrie* rhetoric with statism, and to deploy that hybrid discourse in justifying the shocking arrest of a Prince of the Blood. Just as denunciations of Condé's dubious loyalties to Mazarin marked the borders of the *patrie*, criticisms of his greed and ambition redefined the substance of noble masculine honor and French subjecthood.

Where Chapters Two and Three deal mainly with Condé's image, Chapter Four recenters on the man himself. During and after the Prison of the Princes, Condé and his allies labored to blend personal kingship with the *patrie*, with mixed results. During the Princely Fronde of 1651-1653, they worked intensely to win over the populist frondeurs, or really any critical mass of French people. The Condéens mounted a pamphlet campaign more than a thousand mazarinades strong, to argue that the Prince's birth and famous exploits rendered him a fitting stand-in for the King, as long as Mazarin's malicious influence persisted. Further, they claimed that any *bon françois* was bound by his French

blood and patriotic affections to aid in the fight against the tyrant Mazarin. Their efforts foundered, however, on Condé's problematic Treaty of Madrid with Philip IV of Spain. Condé's war required support from the King of Spain and the people of France alike, but the two could not coexist in the patriotic atmosphere of the Fronde. Condé's rhetorical offensive failed, and with it his rebellion - but it was a productive failure. Not only did the Prince's missteps demonstrate the limits of national loyalty, but his spectacular defeat provided a high-profile medium for the Crown to propagandize his fall.

Chapter Five analyzes the Princely Fronde and its aftermath from the royal party's viewpoint. The Crown's anti-Condé tracts of 1651-1653, and their very public prosecution of the most notorious traitor in living memory worked in tandem to build patriotic kingship. They emphasized, all at once, the legal standards of a subject's loyalty and obedience to the State, the personal valences of fidelity to the monarch, and the moral and affective qualities of attachment to the *patrie* – all of which the Sun King now claimed he embodied. By intertwining the personal, statist, and patriotic models of the Fronde, the Crown was able to assert expanded and intensified power over France. But such claims were nearly always a paper tiger. My analysis of deliberations over the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 confirms and expands the model of “negotiated absolutism.” The Grand Condé had been legally annihilated in 1654 – the King stripped his name and honors, sentenced him to a commoner's death, and ordered all traces of his power and memory effaced. However, with the insistence of Spain, provisions were included in the Treaty that allowed the Prince and his allies to return, chastened but relatively unharmed by their five-year, self-imposed exile. The process by which this deal was struck reveals in vivid detail the norms of national loyalty under Louis XIV, as well as the Sun King's flexibility in

applying those norms. The Grand Condé's post-Fronde career thus demonstrates both the bold pretensions of absolutist discourse, and the elasticity of absolutist practice.

In the final analysis, the Grand Condé's role in absolutist political culture was influential as an actor, and determinative as a symbol. Though his rebellion failed and his arguments were roundly rejected, his imprint on French politics, noble culture, and national sentiment are unmistakable. An examination of his career during Louis XIV's early reign provides crucial insights on the development of the French monarchy, and reveals the cultural and political dynamics that structured its authority.

## **Chapter 1 - Service, Reward, and the Meaning of Monarchy before the Fronde**

Louis II de Bourbon's first engagement as a commanding general, the Battle of Rocroi, remained the most famous and most important victory of his long, remarkable career. But he nearly declined to fight it. On May 14, the future Grand Condé (until 1646, still the Duc d'Enghien) received two historic messages: first, his scouts reported that a formidable Spanish army had besieged, and would soon capture the critical city of Rocroi.<sup>40</sup> Soon after, he received word that Louis XIII had passed away after a long, dispiriting illness.<sup>41</sup> The news forced Enghien to reconsider his plans to relieve Rocroi, for he feared that the King's death would sow chaos at court, within his army's ranks, and perhaps across all of France. He therefore kept the King's death a secret, even as he admitted to Cardinal-Minister Jules Mazarin that he was "inconsolable" at the news.<sup>42</sup> Ultimately, though, he decided on battle. The night before he took the field, Enghien huddled with his lieutenants, revealing that "the King was dead, and that, at such a tragic moment, risk was necessary."<sup>43</sup> Fearing that the news would demoralize his men, however, he kept the troops in ignorance as they took their positions before Rocroi.<sup>44</sup> Finally, on May 19, Enghien won a decisive, tide-turning victory over Spain, and immediately dispatched a messenger expressly to the new King - a boy of four years.

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<sup>40</sup> Henri Eugène Philippe Louis d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé pendant les XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 7 vol. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1886), iv: 61-66; Henri de Bessé, Sieur de la Chapelle-Milon, *Relation des Campagnes de Rocroi et de Fribourg* (Paris: N. Delangle, 1826), 13-16. Bessé's account, originally published in 1673, is largely a transcription of an eyewitness report by La Moussaye.

<sup>41</sup> Bessé, *Relation*, 12.

<sup>42</sup> Louis II de Bourbon, Duc d'Enghien to Cardinal-Minister Jules Mazarin, 16 May 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 488.

<sup>43</sup> Bessé, *Relation*, 16.

<sup>44</sup> Mark Bannister, *Condé in Context: Ideological Change in Seventeenth Century France* (Oxford, Eng: Legenda, 2000), 14.

As Enghien's anguish in the days before Rocroi demonstrates, the monarch's importance in *ancien régime* politics, society, and even psychology cannot be overstated. Still, many aspects of the Duke's reactions may seem odd: his belief that Louis XIII's death might sway a distant battle, his claims of service to a toddler, and his instructions "to carry news of the battle's outcome to the King," who had not yet learned to read.<sup>45</sup> For the Grand Condé, the person of the King, no matter his age, was the sole object of service; just how to serve him, though, remained unclear. Condé's struggle with this question drives the present inquiry. Since the reign of Henri IV, and especially under Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu, the King had personally recognized and rewarded his subjects. As such, nobles especially valued and even demanded the royal presence as a constitutive element of their identity. When Louis XIII died, his power devolved to the Habsburg Queen Anne d'Autriche, *de jure*; but *de facto*, authority fell to the Italian Cardinal-Minister Jules Mazarin, where it remained until 1661. Placing the reins of state in the hands of these two mistrusted, even hated figures threatened to destabilize the system of royal patronage, the balance of power at court, and the administration of the state, which all revolved around the King's individual person. So in the days before Rocroi, Condé had feared that the King's death might weaken his army and the nation, because the royal person was, symbolically and concretely, the beating heart of the kingdom.

Because of the King's outsized importance, Louis XIV's regency called into question the precise nature of the monarchy and its authority. The present chapter examines the Grand Condé and Mazarin's conflicting views of the King, as they came to light in conflicts

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<sup>45</sup> Duc d'Enghien to Mazarin, 19 May 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 490.

over patronage before the Fronde.<sup>46</sup> The Prince's claims and complaints on this point reveal more than one man's views, for Condé was at once an influential actor, and an icon of the noble order. His actions thus carried enormous weight of themselves, while his treatment by the Crown held broad implications for the noble-crown relationship in general. I argue that Condé insisted on a personal bond with the monarch, predicated on the mutual obligations between protector and servant. This concept, which I call "personal kingship," defined one's status as a subject, for the Prince. In contrast, the Regency employed a model of sovereignty in which the King served as the focus for his subjects' loyalty and obedience, but royal power existed separate from his body. Their model, "statism," framed sovereignty as an abstract web of power relations, which must be managed in the overall interest of the state. The fallout of the two parties' disagreement would ultimately lead to a cataclysmic civil war.

The Grand Condé's victory at Rocroi catapulted him to legendary fame, almost overnight. His nationwide renown at once strengthened his claims for reward, and made his treatment exemplary for noble-crown relations under the Regency. So, we begin with an overview of the French monarchy's precarious position during Louis XIV's minority, and an outline of the "invention" of the Grand Condé as the paragon of French nobility. Against this background, I analyze the Prince's battles over royal favor, which demonstrate the multifaceted importance of patronage for nobles' self-concept, as well as for the deployment of political power. Finally, the Regency's conception of monarchical power comes to light through Mazarin's responses to the Prince's requests. In fighting over the

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<sup>46</sup> Louis II de Bourbon, as noted above, inherited the rank of Prince of Condé upon his father's death in late 1646. However, the cognomen "Grand" is unique, and helps to convey his renown as a conquering general, lofty aristocrat, and French hero. I therefore use the title "Grand Condé" to refer to Louis even in the years before 1646.

mechanisms that mediated subjects' service and royal rewards, Condé and Mazarin in fact fought for competing visions of the monarchy itself.

### **Cardinal, Queen, and Kingdom: France under the Regency**

The Grand Condé became a hero in the 1640s, because France desperately needed a hero. Regency under the *ancien régime* always meant danger, and an extended regency could easily mean disaster. In 1643, a handful of courtiers remained who could recall the Wars of Religion, and more had lived through the factional strife of Louis XIII's early reign – both, products of political uncertainty in a kingless kingdom. In view of the catastrophic and very recent experience of royal minorities, all faithful subjects dreaded the eight long years until Louis XIV's majority, in 1651. Condé's reputation as a French savior drew largely on the relief he provided at Rocroi, five short days after the start of Anne of Austria's term as Queen Regent. The Regency and the perceived health of the kingdom were primary factors in the Grand Condé's image, and therefore in the claims to reward that his image helped to substantiate. We must appreciate the circumstances of Louis' minority in order to understand Condé's fame, and to assess his conflict over patronage with Mazarin.

Queen Anne d'Autriche and Cardinal-Minister Jules Mazarin came to power under decidedly inauspicious conditions. Louis XIII bequeathed to them a realm that would have been challenging for a capable, adult King to rule; Alan James asserts that it was "remarkable that it took five more years [from Louis XIII's death] before the government faced serious political rebellion."<sup>47</sup> The Cardinal and Queen faced crisis on all sides: the

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<sup>47</sup> Alan James, *The Origins of French Absolutism, 1598-1661* (New York: Pearson, 2006), 56.

state had flirted with bankruptcy since France's entry into the Thirty Years' War in 1635, and tax collection remained grievously inefficient. The Habsburg wars had reached a precarious equilibrium, in which a single campaign might tip the scales. Popular unrest was endemic in the provinces, especially the south, while poor harvests and wartime exactions had left much of the peasantry literally penniless. In short, France faced a worst-case scenario on multiple fronts: ongoing domestic, foreign, and fiscal crises, while for many the bare necessities of survival had become scarce.

I speak of regency in the same breath as these disasters, for contemporaries viewed the absence of an adult King as a political famine, a monarchical bankruptcy. We have seen in Enghien's handling of Louis XIII's death just before Rocroi the indispensable, irreplaceable status of the King's person as the ceremonial and interpersonal hub of French politics. Henri IV established, and Louis XIII concertedly reinforced what Jay Smith has called a "personal modality of service," in which the monarch himself recognized and validated meritorious service (in the specific sense of *mérite* discussed below) through the disbursal of *bienfaits*.<sup>48</sup> Louis XIII and Richelieu placed increasing emphasis on the "sovereign's gaze" in granting patronage, and further formalized the power of the royal presence to compel the Parlements' obedience.<sup>49</sup> By the end of Louis XIII's reign, the King's individual will was firmly ensconced in the theory and practice of royal power. So, although the theory of "the King's Two Bodies" held that the man who sat upon the throne mystically

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<sup>48</sup> Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1996), 93-123.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 4-5. On patronage under Louis XIII, see especially Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford UP, 1986); on the legal and pseudo-religious power of the king's body, see Sarah Hanley, *The Lit de Justice of the Kings of France: Constitutional Ideology in Legend, Ritual, and Discourse* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983), especially her Chapter 12; J.H. Shennan, *The Parlement of Paris* (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1998), 253.

incarnated the immortal “body” of the nation, the early death of Louis XIII’s physical person posed a frightful problem for anyone who considered himself a servant of the King.<sup>50</sup>

A vacant throne severely weakened the kingdom, while a regency’s nebulous legal and cultural role provided no remedy. The Regent should, it was universally agreed, deliver Louis XIV to his majority with the skills he needed to rule, and with royal power intact - but the bounds of power in the meantime were cripplingly vague. Most French observers would agree, “We must distinguish between an adult King’s power and that of his ministers during a minority.”<sup>51</sup> A regency could be seen as an “eclipse of royal power,” rather than the transfer of unmodified authority to the Regent. However, the extent of its diminution, or the degree to which power should be shared between the Regent herself, the Royal Council, the Parlement, the *Grands*, or perhaps even an Estates-General, remained unclear.<sup>52</sup> As a corollary to this basic issue, a lack of consensus over who, precisely, stood at the center of the monarchy further muddied the water. The Grand Condé, for instance, formally addressed his reports to a boy who could not read, while speaking sometimes with the Queen, sometimes with the Cardinal, yet always pledging fealty to the King. Far more than a matter of epistolary or courtly courtesy, this awkward position destabilized the sense of service and loyalties, for noblemen above all: did obligation now attach to the boy King, the Queen Regent, the Cardinal who actually set policy, or some other body?

<sup>50</sup> I employ a masculine pronoun here, for royal patronage was an almost exclusively male domain, and in fact a defining feature of noble masculinity, as the following pages will demonstrate. On the “King’s Two Bodies,” see E.H. Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton UP, 1957).

<sup>51</sup> *Lettre d’Avis à Messieurs du Parlement de Paris, escripte par un Provincial* (np, 4 March 1649), in Célestin Moreau, *Choix de Mazarinades*, 2 vol, (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1853), i: 386. It must be admitted that some observers, especially in the early years of the minority, held that royal sovereignty persisted without injury, though this position lost ground after 1645, and in my view had been discredited almost completely by 1648. See especially Ernst Kossmann, *La Fronde* (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1954), 42-43, and A. Lloyd Moote, *The Revolt of the Judges: The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde, 1643-1652* (Princeton UP, 1971), 71-74.

<sup>52</sup> Hubert Carrier, *Le labyrinthe de l’état: Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653)* (Paris: Champion, 2004), 246-247.

If all regencies fought an uphill battle, Queen Anne of Austria faced a downright Sisyphean task: Louis XIII's will had explicitly barred her from wielding power as Regent, for she was always mistrusted by her husband and courtly *Grands*. Though Anne managed to have that document set aside by Parlement, suspicions remained.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, her surname, d'Autriche, raised questions about her loyalties in the wars against Habsburg Spain, Austria, and the Holy Roman Empire. With these handicaps, alongside the calamities facing the state, the regency began under a dark cloud. Anne responded by "evacuating the center," conspicuously avoiding any acts that would seem unfeminine.<sup>54</sup> Even still, complaints abounded at Anne's "unnatural" position of command, as seventeenth-century gender dynamics would have it. One memoirist rails, "We are led by a woman who, by her sex, could never be capable of governing a great State like this. The ancient Gauls were wise to impose a fundamental law,<sup>55</sup> so that the kingdom would never fall into the weeds... I do not wish to accuse [Anne] of malice in her government, but of incapability to rule."<sup>56</sup> Queen Anne led a long regency whose potency had been hobbled by the contingencies of history, the structures of law, the gendered nature of power, and her own choices.

But for many, the regency's most loathsome feature was the power of Jules Mazarin. Born Giulio Mazzarini, in a village near Rome, the future Cardinal had quickly worked his way up the ranks of the papal administration, then the French court, ultimately succeeding

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<sup>53</sup> Duc de Longueville to Duc d'Enghien, 21 May 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, v:395-397; David J. Sturdy, *Richelieu & Mazarin: A Study in Statesmanship* (London: Palgrave, 2004), 92-95.

<sup>54</sup> Katherine Crawford, *Perilous Performances: Gender and Regency in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 2004), 59-97.

<sup>55</sup> The Salic Law, as seventeenth-century commentators read it, barred women from the throne of France, and even from participating in the transmission of royal sovereignty. Sarah Hanley notes, however, that this misogynistic reading dates from the sixteenth century, not to the ancient origins of the Law itself, which made no such provision. See "Identity politics and rulership in France: Female political place and the fraudulent Salic Law in Christine de Pizan and Jean de Montreuil," in *Changing identities in early modern France*, ed. Michael Wolfe (Durham: Duke UP, 1997), 78-94.

<sup>56</sup> Oudard Coqualt, *Mémoires*, 1649-1668, 2 vols (Reims: Imprimerie de l'Académie, 1875), i: 89-90, cited in Carrier, *Labyrinthe*, 252.

Cardinal Richelieu as *premier ministre* in 1643.<sup>57</sup> French nobles were apoplectic that an Italian of allegedly bourgeois origins now held the reins of royal power, where his common, foreign blood should have doubly disqualified him from any position of authority. As an Italian in France, Mazarin operated within a minefield of “virulent Italophobia” whose roots lay deep in the Renaissance, but had been piqued in the 1610s by Concino Concini.<sup>58</sup> In whispers before 1648, and then with gleeful abandon in the frondeur pamphlets that bear his name - *mazarinades* - opponents accused the Cardinal of every sort of sin, error, and misdeed associated with Italy: Machiavellian politics, embezzlement, nepotism, sexual deviance, treachery, assassinations, sorcery. For all of his diplomatic and political acumen, Mazarin never overcame the stereotype of the duplicitous Italian, for many Frenchmen.

A nearly bankrupt state “at the point of total civil war,” led by an intentionally diffident woman and a widely hated foreigner, who together governed with a nebulous and diffuse sovereignty: this was France in the 1640s.<sup>59</sup> If the royal party had opted for conservatism until it reached the safe harbor of Louis’ majority, contemporaries would likely have assented, and perhaps even begrudgingly accepted their leadership. Instead, the Cardinal and Queen used the haziness of royal authority aggressively, endeavoring to expand the King’s power through novel interpretations of sovereignty and patronage. They exploited the lack of consensus over royal power to insist on their own model, which privileged an abstract State over the traditional system of personal bonds. Unsurprisingly, this tactic caused an uproar among jurists and political observers, but most of all among

<sup>57</sup> On Mazarin’s career, see Geoffrey Treasure, *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Georges Dethan, *The Young Mazarin*, trans. Stanley Baron (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977); and especially Pierre Goubert, *Mazarin* (Paris: Fayard, 1990).

<sup>58</sup> Jouanna, *Devoir de révolte*, 232; on the voluminous comparisons between Mazarin and Concini, see Carrier, *Labyrinthe*, 36-40.

<sup>59</sup> Orest and Patricia Ranum, eds, *The Century of Louis XIV* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

*Grands* like Condé, who felt their role in the kingdom and their very identity under attack. Patronage played a central role in state power during this era, and Condé's complaints over the Regency's mishandling of rewards impinged on monarchical authority itself.

The young prince's dissatisfaction grew out of the disjunction he perceived between the magnitude of his service during a moment of dire need, and the paucity of his compensation in return. His perception was further encouraged by the exaggerated praise he earned over the 1640s, during a nearly unbroken string of significant victories. Condé's glory shone all the brighter against the gloom of the regency. Having surveyed the dismal political landscape, then, we turn to the meteoric rise – indeed, the apotheosis of the Grand Condé.

### **Inventing the Grand Condé: Victory and Glory, from Rocroi to Lens**

From 1643 through 1648, Louis de Bourbon won a string of critical victories, assuring the security of the French monarchy at a moment of acute vulnerability. Condé displayed exceptional prowess in the course of these campaigns, prompting hyperbolic praise and providing the stuff of superhuman fame - all before his twenty-third birthday. His renown was more than ornamental, however: Condé's preternatural fame made him a lifelong icon of the whole Second Estate, and more immediately grounded his claims for royal patronage. Because the Battle of Rocroi would remain Condé's most recognized victory throughout his life, we will analyze that event in some depth, while later encounters receive a more cursory overview. The Grand Condé's personal identity, his public image, and ultimately his claims to material compensation all drew heavily on his reputation for

surpassing martial skill and valor; hence, we must examine his victories at war to understand the frustrations at court that followed.

First, a prefatory note. Because Condé's legend grew with him in real time, the lines between myth and reality are blurred. The elision of life and myth occurs not only in secondary accounts, but also in primary sources, especially regarding his pre-Fronde military exploits.<sup>60</sup> Further, the two best sources on the Prince – the contemporaneous *Mémoires* of Pierre Lenet, and the Duc d'Aumale's *Histoire des Princes de Condé* of the 1880s – were both written by men closely attached to their subject.<sup>61</sup> Lenet was the Grand Condé's secretary and confidant, and Aumale was the godson and heir of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century Louis VI Henri de Bourbon-Condé, the final Prince of the line. While both protest their objectivity, both betray those claims in their immoderately glowing accounts of Condé's exploits.<sup>62</sup> Even contemporary battle reports have a discernible pro-Condé flavor, for these were a popular genre for public consumption, which the French Crown used to enhance its power by building the *renommé* of national heroes.<sup>63</sup> Given the tilted ground on which any study

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<sup>60</sup> See Coligny's letter to Enghien, p.14 below.

<sup>61</sup> Fernando González de León, *The road to Rocroi: Class, culture, and command in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1567-1659* (Boston: Brill, 2009), 280-281 n.3, in his account of the Battle of Rocroi itself, refers to Aumale and Lenet as the best and "most even-handed" of all available French accounts. The bar for objectivity is evidently not very high, in this case.

<sup>62</sup> Lenet claims, "I do not intend to write to flatter the Prince of Condé... Those who read these *Mémoires* will easily judge if I am precise, sincere, and truthful." And yet, in the midst of asserting his even-handedness, he declares that, "The material [of Condé's life] is so beautiful, that I may dispense with ornamentation." Though his reports are factual and his claims all verifiable, bias nevertheless permeates his account. Pierre Lenet, *Mémoires de Pierre Lenet... concernant l'histoire du Prince de Condé...*, eds. Champollion-Figeac and Champollion in *Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France*, eds. Michaud and Poujoulat, Série 3: II (Paris: Editeur du commentaire du Code Civil, 1838), 412. For his part, Aumale makes no explicit statement of objectivity, though in various instances he clearly endeavors to hold himself above the historical fray - see, for example, his claim on iv: 228, that "pride and passion may have led the Grand Condé to certain faults, to criminal actions which I will not deny." Though Aumale is frank on the subject of Condé's faults, his enthusiasm for the Prince's heroism spoils any claims to dispassion.

<sup>63</sup> Christy Pichichero, "Inventing Heroes of the 'Fatherland': Representations of Noble Military Service in *La Gazette* during the Thirty Years' War, 1635-1648" (presentation at Western Society for French History Annual Meeting, October 13, 2012). This is corroborated by González de León, who correctly sees "propagandistic" intent in the French accounts. *Road to Rocroi*, 280 n.3.

of Condé necessarily rests, I make no claim to reveal the “truth” of the man’s life. Instead, I analyze the terms that built his image, and that image’s utility in advancing material, and ultimately political claims. Condé’s military success was interwoven with his fame, and I examine the two together.

From the early days of 1643, nothing suggested that France would find success in the year’s campaigns. Indeed, the Duc d’Aumale, the most esteemed biographer of the Condé line, asserts that “it would have been difficult to accept a command under less advantageous circumstances.”<sup>64</sup> French armies were badly over-extended across the Belgian, German, and Spanish fronts, while a fourth army and much of the fleet had been sent to combat Habsburg power in Italy. Spanish forces in northern France were aware of the King’s failing health and the power vacuum at Court left by Richelieu’s recent death, and hoped to capitalize on French misfortunes. Upon learning of Louis XIII’s death, then, the veteran Spanish general Melo altered his plans: he would forgoe the siege of Arras in favor of the more ambitious target of Rocroi, whose capture would give him a free hand in Champagne and an opening to march on Paris itself. These dire circumstances were hardly lost on the French royal party, and instructions for the season were paralyzingly defensive: Enghien’s assignment to the Army of Picardy contained no positive goals, only orders to “impede the effect” of the enemy’s endeavors.<sup>65</sup> Aumale opines, “[Enghien’s] instructions, at once vague and complicated, were designed more to render their recipient indecisive and

<sup>64</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 37. Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 12, emphasizes the positives of France’s position in early 1643, noting the outbreak of rebellions in Portugal and Catalonia, along with the decline in Spain’s imports of American wealth in recent years. Though these developments no doubt factored into French plans for the year’s campaign, the tone of Condé’s instructions and the starkly conservative safeguards on his conduct (mentioned below) suggest a rather less optimistic mood than Bannister teleologically presumes. Modern military historians likewise emphasize the perils that France faced – and which Spain consciously sought to exploit. See William Guthrie, *The Later Thirty Years War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2003), 169-172; González de León, *Road to Rocroi*, 285.

<sup>65</sup> Archives de la Musée Condé (AC), M.xxviii, Louis XIII to Duc d’Enghien, 16 April 1643.

timid, than to direct the inexperience of a young general of twenty [sic] years.”<sup>66</sup> Still more, Enghien had the Maréchal de l'Hôpital as lieutenant general, a man “known for his caution and lack of sparkle.”<sup>67</sup> Between the lines, all of Enghien’s instructions read: defeat will be disastrous – take no risks.

The young Duke’s ambition would not be tempered, however. Ignoring his father’s invitation to return to Paris and attend the King’s imminent death,<sup>68</sup> Enghien marched toward Rocroi at the first report of enemy actions there, covering ground at a rate that took the Spanish by surprise.<sup>69</sup> Upon arriving at the besieged city and seeing the enemy’s superior position, l’Hôpital advised a limited engagement; even the Duc de Gassion, Condé’s friend and “a man who was untroubled by even the most perilous actions,” agreed.<sup>70</sup> Enghien, however, “demonstrated that a restrained engagement ran all the risks of defeat, without any chance of success, and that an attempt to help the city, without a willingness to commit to battle, could lead to nothing but disaster.” The Duke’s reasoning persuaded the rest, even the elderly Maréchal.<sup>71</sup> On the night before the battle, the Duke encouraged his army with “the resolute attitude of a commander-in-chief, the manly words he knew how to

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<sup>66</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 35-36. Enghien was 21 years old in May of 1643.

<sup>67</sup> Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 13.

<sup>68</sup> Duc d’Enghien to Prince de Condé, 14 May 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 487-488. Bernard Pujo, a recent biographer of the Prince, believes this the first instance in Louis’ life that he disobeyed his father. Though unprovable, his conclusion is entirely plausible. See *Le Grand Condé* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995), 64. More significantly, many French officers actually had abandoned their posts to attend the monarch’s death, leading Spanish commanders to perceive significant dissension or weakness within the ranks: González de León, *Road to Rocroi*, 285.

<sup>69</sup> This was both tactically advantageous, and strategically necessary: “only one more day of siege would have been necessary for the capitulation of the town.” González de León, *Road to Rocroi*, 290.

<sup>70</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 479; Bessé, *Relation* 10. It is tempting to report that Spain possessed superior forces to France, as French accounts typically do; however, the numbers are unclear. Spain may have been outmanned by as much as 25% (24,000 to 17,000), or superior by 25% (28,000 to 20,000). Guthrie, *Later Thirty Years War*, 172; Jonathan Israel, *Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713* (London: Hambledon, 1997), 90.

<sup>71</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 78; Lenet, *Mémoires* 478; Bessé, *Relation* 17. Guthrie is unique, in my research, in claiming that Gassion in fact suggested a pitched battle, and that Condé sided with his lieutenant. However, Guthrie provides no citation of his basis for this claim. *Later Thirty Years War*, 170.

deliver.”<sup>72</sup> According to accounts, he displayed an uncanny *sang-froid* in the hours leading up to the battle that would define his reputation, and perhaps France’s fate.<sup>73</sup>

A dangerous, exposed march through a passage wide enough only for one man brought the French army to Rocroi on May 18; on the morning of the 19<sup>th</sup>, the two armies’ troops assembled, following the standard formation of the day: infantry massed in the center, cavalry on the flanks.<sup>74</sup> The outcome of the Battle of Rocroy itself hung in the balance throughout the day: the central infantry engagement see-sawed continuously, while the French cavalry with Enghien at its head dominated the right flank. However, a grievous miscalculation gave Spain the advantage on the opposite flank, and nearly lost the day for France. As the French left collapsed, the Spanish who had overrun them overcommitted, and began plundering the exposed baggage train. Seeing this, the young French general improvised: having secured his flank, Enghien swept his cavalry across the field, cutting behind the central infantry engagement in a move of striking “tactical originality.” This audacious maneuver allowed the French to surprise and demolish the Spanish cavalry as they picked over the French troops’ goods.<sup>75</sup> From that point, the battle became a series of infantry charges against the heretofore-invincible Spanish *tercios viejos*, who at last surrendered. But, mistaking the French parley for another assault, the Spanish opened fire on Enghien and his bodyguards as they approached to offer terms, and the French responded viciously. Spanish soldiers ran toward Enghien “to ask for their lives,

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<sup>72</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 91.

<sup>73</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 479.

<sup>74</sup> For full accounts of the battle, sketched here, see Guthrie, *Later Thirty Years War*, 169-180; González de León, *Road to Rocroi*, 286-312; Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 14-15; Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 79-118, and idem, *La journée de Rocroy (19 mai 1643)* (Paris: Champion, 1890); Bessé, *Relation* 9-42.

<sup>75</sup> Bannister, *Condé in Context* 15-16.

and looked upon him with admiration," until the triumphant general was able to restore order.<sup>76</sup> "Never was a victory more complete in every circumstance."<sup>77</sup>

In the wake of the battle, Enghien surveyed the battlefield, the trophies, the prisoners, and the walls of a vital city he had secured for France, "all these witnesses to a terrible battle and a striking triumph... His heart raised itself toward Him who had blessed the French arms: *Te Deum, laudamus!*"<sup>78</sup> "He dropped to his knees in the midst of the field of battle, and ordered his men to do the same in thanks to God for such an important success."<sup>79</sup> His piety, humility, and charity – all explicit centerpieces of laudatory battle reports for the French public – reportedly manifested further in his treatment of the Spanish army, as he succored the wounded soldiers "without regard for origin."<sup>80</sup> The Duke's humility matched his piety: he gave all credit to his troops, and singled out his lieutenants Gassion and Sirot as deserving of France's highest honors.<sup>81</sup>

Aumale, however, observes that Enghien's modesty emphasizes the honor he had won for himself: only a man "sure enough in his *gloire* to have no fear of diminishing it by recalling the *mérite* of those around him" would have been so generous with his praise.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, the young general could have no concern that he would share credit for Rocroi. As we have seen, the French army fought only at his insistence, and he had attended to strategic and tactical nuances down to the smallest detail. Moreover, he personally led the

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<sup>76</sup> Bessé, *Relation* 38.

<sup>77</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 481.

<sup>78</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 117-118.

<sup>79</sup> Bessé, *Relation* 39. In this, and in the above citation, it is probably impossible to determine whether Condé in fact thanked God as reported. These accounts hew so closely to the trope of pious victor common in this era that I suspect they are at least embellished, if not actually invented.

<sup>80</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 119.

<sup>81</sup> AC M.xxviii, Duc d'Enghien to Prince de Condé, 23 May 1643; Lenet, *Mémoires*, 481; Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 16. The Duke's praise for his subordinates found its most important expression requests to Mazarin for honors and appointments; see below.

<sup>82</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 136.

cavalry charge, wearing a flamboyant white-plumed hat rather than a helmet, to serve as a rallying point for his men.<sup>83</sup> At every stage of planning, everywhere on the battlefield, and after the battle was won, the Grand Condé conducted himself with precocious efficiency, precision, and prevision of consequences.<sup>84</sup> All of the attributes attributed to him at Rocroi - audacity, vision, judgment, magnanimity - set the terms for his career in the following years, and ultimately for the apotheosis of the Grand Condé.

It is here appropriate to note that, even accounting for early modern hyperbole and France's regency-driven insecurity, Rocroi precipitated a tectonic shift in the strategic and geopolitical balance between France and the Habsburgs. Jonathan Israel calls it not just "the end of a strategic phase" in the Franco-Spanish war, but "the end of an era" in which Spain's terrestrial armies seemed, and to a significant extent actually were undefeatable. Military historian William Guthrie suggests that its "heaviest loss was the destruction of the Spanish *tercios*, or rather their myth."<sup>85</sup> Most explicitly still, Fernando González de León argues against the recent trend toward iconoclasm regarding Rocroi, asserting that it revealed, accelerated, and exacerbated Spain's declining hegemony in European affairs.<sup>86</sup> True: the battle's glory was very clearly magnified for contemporary French audiences. But it was nonetheless a real watershed for the campaign of 1643 in the near term, the war with Spain in the medium term, the history of European power politics in the long term, and even military historiography in retrospective terms. And for all the exaggeration of Enghien's honor, wisdom, and skill, he truly had announced himself as a "prodigy," an

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<sup>83</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires* 480; Pujo, *Grand Condé* 70; Bessé, *Relation* 34. His hat became a signature flourish, and a point of friction with both his mother and father, and even Cardinal Mazarin and Queen Anne, all of whom worried for his safety in the years to come.

<sup>84</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 78-79, 119.

<sup>85</sup> *Later Thirty Years War*, 179.

<sup>86</sup> *Road to Rocroi*, 325-328.

historically “great commander” in the making.<sup>87</sup> The Battle of Rocroi effectively established the terms for the Grand Condé myth because it really was a monumental victory.

From Rocroi forward, Enghien built a reputation as a commander who “united all of the essential traits that create masters in the great art” of war.<sup>88</sup> Shortly after his first victory, he marched to take the city of Thionville by siege.<sup>89</sup> This choice shocked contemporaries, not only because siege warfare and pitched battles required totally different skills, but because most observers believed the target posed too great a challenge.<sup>90</sup> Nonetheless, Enghien invested the city on June 18, 1643; it capitulated on August 8. Bossuet captures the effect of this action succinctly: “From this first campaign, after the taking of Thionville, the worthy prize of the victory at Rocroi, [Condé] passed for a general who was equally impressive in sieges as in battles.”<sup>91</sup> And in 1644, Condé once again demonstrated his strategic and tactical adaptability. Near Fribourg, Enghien negotiated treacherous mountain passes, and dislodged an entrenched enemy from its strong defensive position.<sup>92</sup> The Grand Condé delivered seemingly miraculous results in virtually every situation seventeenth-century warfare could present. By 1647, his many and varied successes prompted Mazarin to confess that, “I am totally persuaded that, anywhere that you are present, whatever cannot be accomplished must be impossible.”<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 19; Guthrie, *Later Thirty Years War*, 171. It should be noted that Parrott argues against the “great battle” interpretation of Rocroi, though González de León effectively counters his assertions, while even the chronological framework of Parrott’s own study sets Rocroi as a milestone.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid iv: 178.

<sup>89</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires* 477.

<sup>90</sup> The general view held that, “A place like Thionville, well munitioned and defended by a powerful garrison, could not be taken without a great loss of time and men.” Bessé, *Relation* 56; Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 147.

<sup>91</sup> Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, “Oraison funèbre du Prince de Condé,” in *Orations funèbres de Bossuet*, ed. Jacques Truchet (Paris: Garnier, 1988), 377.

<sup>92</sup> Bessé, *Relation* 93; Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 352.

<sup>93</sup> AC P.i, Mazarin to Prince de Condé, 12 September 1647. Queen Anne wrote separately to express essentially the same sentiment.

The Prince owed his success largely to his audacious tactics and personal conduct. Lenet describes the young Duke as “dying with impatience to invade the enemy lands” after Rocroi, and his “extraordinary gaiety” in battle did not fade in later endeavors.<sup>94</sup> During the campaign of 1646, for instance, Condé had been deployed as lieutenant-general, under the command of the tactically unadventurous Duc d’Orléans.<sup>95</sup> Though Enghien hoped to engage the enemy in the field, *Monsieur* (Orléans’ unique appellation) opted instead for safe targets, and his staid approach led to two minor victories, after two needlessly protracted sieges. Orléans returned to Paris in August, leaving his second-in-command the routine task of arranging quarters. Though the season was late and the climate unfavorable, the young Duc immediately set out to capture the redoubtable city of Dunkirk, home of the Flemish fleet.<sup>96</sup> When a Spanish force attempted to raise the siege, they found Condé too well-prepared, despite the adverse conditions, even to attempt an engagement. Dunkirk fell within three weeks.<sup>97</sup>

The Grand Condé’s affinity for headlong action applied equally to his personal conduct in battle. He placed himself at the front lines of battle and in the trenches of invested cities, evoking the classical trope of the ideal warrior: *miles et dux*, soldier and commander. This characteristic, often ascribed to Alexander the Great, spurred a literature of “Alexandrinization,” equating the Frenchman with the Macedonian.<sup>98</sup> His willingness to fight beside his soldiers was more than an embellishment for his fame, however: a general’s presence on the front lines enabled him to respond immediately to developments, inspired

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<sup>94</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires* 477, 479.

<sup>95</sup> I am more generous in my assessment than Guthrie, who calls him “incompetent.” *Later Thirty Years’ War*, 180.

<sup>96</sup> Guthrie, *Later Thirty Years’ War*, 181.

<sup>97</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* v: 83-100.

<sup>98</sup> Bannister, *Condé in Context* 17-18, and especially 26.

the men beside him, and proved the deciding factor of many finely balanced engagements. In this sense, the Prince's audacity not only adorned his image, but opened the door to its very existence.<sup>99</sup>

The Grand Condé reportedly coupled boldness with unsurpassed strategic judgment, the most striking example of which came in the campaign of 1644. With Imperial forces recently crippled, all of France, and observers across Europe expected him to lay siege to the bitterly contested city of Fribourg. "All those interested in France's public affairs, ministers, the court, shared the sentiment of the army, which accorded with national pride... It was to save Fribourg that Enghien had marched toward the Rhine."<sup>100</sup> But the Prince felt that Fribourg was too well-provisioned and well-defended, and in any case would be lost the following year. He therefore defied the expectations of allies, enemies, and his own army, in proposing a 200 mile march up the Rhine, to take Philipsbourg. The Queen deemed this "so generous, so useful and important," that she enthusiastically approved the young general's plan.<sup>101</sup> His expeditious, unexpected arrival so surprised the German governor there that Enghien found the outer defenses abandoned, and the town unprepared for a siege. Philipsburg surrendered in under two weeks.<sup>102</sup> In quick succession, the French took the nearby towns of Gemmersheim and Mayence, while Speyer, Worms, and other cities voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of the Grand Condé, refusing to surrender to anyone else.<sup>103</sup> The campaign of 1644 would prove decisive in securing peace between France and the Empire: in Münster, the French

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<sup>99</sup> John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997), 315.

<sup>100</sup> Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 20; Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 361.

<sup>101</sup> Services Historiques de l'Armée de Terre (SHAT), A.98 f.69 "Instructions adressés au Duc d'Enghien sur les suites de la victoire devant Fribourg," from Queen Anne to Duc d'Enghien, 17 August 1644.

<sup>102</sup> SHAT A.98 f.137, Gaspard de Coligny to Le Tellier, 10 August 1644.

<sup>103</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 380-387.

ambassador's position in treaty negotiations was immeasurably strengthened. In a letter to Condé, he gushed, "Monsieur, this peace is of your making."<sup>104</sup>

Making peace was integral to the Grand Condé myth, and he gained renown for his clemency and generosity. Lenet traces this trait back to the Prince's adolescence, when he governed the province of Burgundy in his father's absence.<sup>105</sup> There, Enghien witnessed firsthand the havoc that unruly armies could wreak on the land and in the lives of common folk.<sup>106</sup> He learned to arrange troop quarters and local affairs equitably, and put this experience to use in later campaigns, most notably in 1644. We have seen that cities near Philipsburg submitted willingly to the Grand Condé, at least in part because of his reputation as a fair administrator. As French emissaries approached Treves, they were met with an extraordinary greeting: "Go tell whoever sent you that we're holding the Spanish garrison hostage in the keep, and that we're waiting for the Duc d'Enghien; he will give us the same treatment as he did for Mayence."<sup>107</sup> His actions earned the acclaim of no less an expert on liberty than Grotius, who cited his willingness to protect "the peasants everywhere, justice in Speyer, [and] commerce in Frankfurt and Strasbourg, for he came not as a conqueror, but as a protector." Declarations from corporate bodies throughout the Empire echoed Grotius' applause, while Cologne, Coblenz, Andernach, and Bonn all

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<sup>104</sup> D'Avaux to the Duc d'Enghien, 30 August 1644, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 359.

<sup>105</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 448.

<sup>106</sup> Finding ways to avoid quartering troops became a central preoccupation for many corporate bodies, as demonstrated by the annual flood of letters to the Condé family from representatives of places under their power, requesting respite from royal orders to house troops, eg: AC P.i, Habitans de Murviel to Princesse de Condé, 31 September 1647. More generally, see John A. Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2008).

<sup>107</sup> Marolles to Duc d'Enghien, 4 October 1644, transcribed in Aumale *Histoire* iv: 391.

reportedly sought the Duke's protection.<sup>108</sup> The Grand Condé combined mercy with ruthless efficiency in war, to the extent that he made mercy a tool of conquest.

All of the campaigns described above became fodder for the public myth of the Grand Condé. Battle reports, especially in the royally-sponsored *Mercure Français*, were a widely-circulated and very popular literary genre at this time, and provided a starting point for the "opportunistic encomiasts" who wrote effusive praise of the Prince, in hopes of securing his family's patronage. Among the erudite, well-known works by Corneille, and especially Mme de Scudéry furthered this "osmosis between the person [of Condé] and the ideal figure of the prince, of the hero." Over the 1640s, pamphleteers, novelists, and playwrights promoted an image of the Prince that grew to hagiographic dimensions: beyond Alexander the Great, the Prince's victories drew comparisons to Julius Caesar, Achilles, Odysseus, Hector, Cyrus the Great, and a pantheon of classical exemplars, whose exploits he was reputed to have equaled or even surpassed. He became "the incarnation of the perfect prince" for readers across the kingdom and throughout its social hierarchy.<sup>109</sup> Condé quickly became a messianic French hero. A pamphlet from 1648 captures the public sentiment succinctly:

At Lens, just as Rocroi, securing/ a triumph for the youthful King<sup>110</sup> / from those fearsome forces/ who have troubled our borders./ The illustrious Prince of Condé/ with his courage as an aid/ with his troops, like rolling

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<sup>108</sup> Grotius to Oxenstiern, September 1644; transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 388-392.

<sup>109</sup> Katia Béguin, *Les Princes de Condé: rebelles, courtisans, et mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1999), 61-66, examines this process especially in terms of its material and monetary conditions, while Roger Bannister's *Condé in Context* considers the broader ideological trends that Condé's image reveals. See pp. 7-55 - though his presumption of Condé's "feudal nostalgia" demands skepticism.

<sup>110</sup> The battle of Lens in 1648 bore a striking resemblance, in both its tactics and its significance, to the battle of Rocroi five years earlier. I wish to highlight, too, that Condé's victory at both battles was taken as evidence of his virtuous service for the still-minor Louis XIV.

thunder/ reduced the enemy to powder/...Everyone praised his prowess/  
and all were filled with happiness.<sup>111</sup>

Among the political public, the Grand Condé became a legendary hero, a shining example of manly noble virtue and loyal service to the King.

Among the elite audience at the royal court, Condé's enjoyed a different, but no less impressive reputation. In the first place, his noble blood carried greater weight. And as *Premier Prince du Sang* and scion of the cadet Bourbon line, Louis possessed a nobility surpassed by exactly three men: King Louis XIV, his brother Philipe, and his uncle Gaston d'Orléans. Status served more than honorific or ceremonial purposes,<sup>112</sup> for the elevation of one's birth and blood substantially marked one's *mérite*. This term, a false cognate for "merit," denotes a complex amalgam of inherent personal qualities, proven abilities, and above all recognition for services rendered.<sup>113</sup> In the understanding of the ancien régime, therefore, Louis' blood and lineage portended, but did not guarantee, his later excellence indeed.<sup>114</sup> When his service matched this potential, congratulations from all sides framed victories as proportionate to, and a direct product of his birth.<sup>115</sup> The Prince himself took this view: he wrote in 1647 that he passionately wished to "render to His Majesty the

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<sup>111</sup> *Agréable recit de ce qui s'est passée aux derniers barricades de Paris, en vers burlesques* (1648), in Moreau, *Choix*, i:8.

<sup>112</sup> Still, the importance of ceremonial courtesies should not be discarded, as Orest Ranum argues in "Courtesy, Absolutism, and the Rise of the French State, 1630-1660" *Journal of Modern History* 52 n.3 (Sep., 1980), 426-451. Ranum's premise is borne out (though some of his conclusions now seem outdated) in the deferential behavior by La Meilleraye toward the teenaged Enghien, while the Duke was assigned to observe the veteran general during his campaigns in 1640. Lenet, *Mémoires*, 450.

<sup>113</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 11-56. Smith focuses largely on the issue of personal, royal recognition to normalize *mérite*. Other authors have extended the argument to a societal recognition - Arlette Jouanna asserts that, "a noble was above all one who was collectively recognized as such." Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: La noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne, 1559-1661*. (Paris : Fayard, 1989), 12.

<sup>114</sup> The link between noble birth and nobility of spirit had been hotly contested, in France and elsewhere, especially since the publication of Baldassare Castiglione's *Il Corteggiano* in 1528. Ellery Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986), 142-143.

<sup>115</sup> After the battle of Rocroi, AC M.xxviii, La Meilleraye to Duc d'Enghien, 23 May 1643; after Thionville, La Mothe-Houdancour to Duc d'Enghien, 9 September 1643, cited in Béguin *Princes de Condé*, 64, n.3; even after Condé's return from prison, AC P.x, Parlement de Bordeaux to Prince de Condé, 16 February 1651.

services to which I am obliged by my birth.”<sup>116</sup> Although Condé’s elevation helped to burnish his image for a broad audience, his innate status much more powerfully informed his relationships at court, and even his own sense of self.

Similarly, the Grand Condé’s civility and refinement affected his reputation at court more than in popular consciousness. He had cultivated the attributes of the *honnête homme* since his youth: at the court assembled by his mother, Marguerite de Montmorency, “One found all that was the most *galant*, the most *honnête*, the most elevated by birth and by *mérite*. The young prince made himself pleasing there: he attended as often as he could, and gave the first signs of that *honnête* and *galant* civility that he always had, and which he still possesses.”<sup>117</sup> The Prince built upon this promising start during the labyrinthine intrigues of Louis XIII’s late reign, and he navigated the coups of Cinq-Mars, the Cabale des Importants, and various arcane questions of ceremonial precedence with rare facility.<sup>118</sup> And in matters of intellect and erudition, the Grand Condé again impressed all who met him. He was reportedly a superb latinist, and numerous accounts mention his extemporaneous, Ciceronian responses to official receptions during the 1640s; at Mayence for instance, “Addressed in Latin, the Prince responded in the same language with a correctness, a facility which charmed the lettered among his audience, and the lettered were numerous in the land of Gutenberg; they admired in this fearsome and audacious general an intellectual culture that they did not always find in their ecclesiastical rulers.”<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BN], Manuscrits Français [MFr] 6880 f.357, Prince de Condé to Le Tellier, 1 May 1647. The sense of innate duty evident here would later take on massive significance, especially in contrast to the moralistic or legal logics of service that arose in the course of the Fronde.

<sup>117</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 417. On the historical and especially gendered specificity of such terms as *galant* and *honnête*, see Lewis Seifert, *Manning the Margins: Masculinity and Writing in Seventeenth-Century France* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), especially chapters 1 and 3.

<sup>118</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iii: 452-481; Lenet, *Mémoires* 454-468.

<sup>119</sup> Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 387.

The Grand Condé had all the tools of an accomplished courtier. And yet, Lenet maintains that Condé possessed “a *mérite* which would have been mediocre at court, indebted to the vulgar, [but] became dazzling in the action [of war].”<sup>120</sup> Even among a courtly audience, the Grand Condé remained first and always a martial figure.

Condé’s reputation as the consummate warrior persisted among his aristocratic peers, augmented by the shades of meaning carried by birth and civility. After the campaign of 1644, for example, Gaspard de Coligny wrote a letter of congratulations that verges on the euphoric: “By God, you’ve done well as the guard of Champagne’s frontier and a camp administrator,” he exclaimed, with pronounced understatement. He asserted that Condé’s fame had taken on a life of its own, for “the fame and storm [*tempeste*] of your fearsome deeds in the lands where you’ve brought victory and death has struck my ears, and your renown proclaimed your exploits even before the news reached us at Paris.” Moreover, Condé’s actions were too incredible to be believed, even in stories, for the report he sent “says things that surpass imagination; it says things that would serve better to compose novels than histories, but even in this [fictional] genre I know only of M. de Gomberville who would dare to tell your story.” Condé’s exploits had become too fantastic to be believed, and Coligny worried that his apparently impossible accomplishments may even backfire in the annals of history, “for posterity will more easily believe [the lies that] I say, than what you’ve done. But fuck posterity; all the world does you justice, and everyone knows that fame, with all the incredible things published, has underestimated your glory, rather than added to it...”<sup>121</sup> The veteran soldier goes on, with unflagging enthusiasm, for several pages. Though this letter is hardly typical, it demonstrates that praise from Condé’s

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<sup>120</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 444.

<sup>121</sup> Gaspard de Coligny to Duc d’Enghien, August 1644, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire* iv: 614.

fellow courtiers could be every bit as overwrought as anything Parisian *colporteurs* hawked. Perhaps more striking yet, even orders for troop movements, typically terse and formulaic texts, at times bubbled over with praise for the Prince.<sup>122</sup> Condé's image resonated at court as powerfully as in the streets.

Though Condé deliberately, even gratuitously, understated the importance of his victories,<sup>123</sup> his requests for royal favor, and his anger at Mazarin's denials show the value he presumed would attach to such famous service. Other nobles certainly shared Condé's assumption: La Moussaye states that, after Rocroi, "France owed [Condé] a great show of thanks; for one could say that the French had never, in several centuries, won a battle either as glorious or as important."<sup>124</sup> The "thanks" of which la Moussaye speaks, implicitly but unmistakably must include some favor from the King, in order to "normalize" and validate the Prince's service.<sup>125</sup> For Condé and other nobles at court, important services "earned" - that is, required, demanded, mandated - proportionate rewards from the King. Royal patronage alone transformed *mérite* (the fulfillment of potential virtue) into *crédit* (the ability to protect and promote clients), by providing the material and cultural capitals to fulfill subordinates' requests. The King's favor all at once recognized the fulfillment of a nobleman's duty, placed a discernible value on his service, and enabled him to promote the interests of those who relied on him. In a single act, the sovereign affirmed the most important attributes that informed noble masculinity.

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<sup>122</sup> SHAT A.98 f.69, "Instructions adressés au Duc d'Enghien sur les suites de la victoire devant Fribourg," August 17 1644.

<sup>123</sup> The Prince's original report on the Battle of Lens shows that he struck the words "our victory," replacing them with the ostentatiously modest phrasing, "our combat." Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 207-208.

<sup>124</sup> Bessé, *Relation*, 39.

<sup>125</sup> On the "normalizing" role of the King during Louis XIV's reign, see Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 164-180. Though I apply this concept in an earlier period than Smith, it clearly fits the pattern of nobles' conception of service and patronage, as will be shown below.

Throughout the 1640s, the Prince's military exploits prepared the ground for his requests for royal patronage, and the legend that grew up around him added weight to his claims. And in the years to come, his glorious reputation provided a site for reimagining the nature of noble honor, monarchical politics, and the national community. The complex conflicts that imbued Condé's persona with such broad meanings began with a simple question: what is the value of heroism?

### **"As if I Had Rendered No Service": Patronage, Identity, and Personal Kingship**

Shortly after Rocroi, the Duc d'Enghien penned an indignant letter, revealing to his father the abuse he felt Mazarin had directed toward him: "I cannot conceal from you the discontentment I feel at seeing myself treated at Court in the same way as if I had rendered no service." The young general here intimates that service to the King engages the monarch's gratitude (or whoever acts in his name) in direct proportion to the servant's merit. But the root issue was more fundamental still: because Enghien believed that compensation must automatically follow accomplishments, he had given his word to several friends and officers, who he claimed now had reason to question either his honor or his power. The slight was so grave, that he felt the Crown's tactics must have been intentionally demeaning: "I see that they attempt in this way to discredit me." His evocation of *crédit*, and its connection to the value of a man's word, gives the issue heavy seriousness as a matter of masculine virtue. He asks his father rhetorically to "judge for yourself the importance of all this," for the importance should be self-evident to a seventeenth-century nobleman. In closing, he begs melodramatically, "If you care for me... give me satisfaction, for otherwise I swear that I will not be able to console myself, and I do know what I could

resolve to do."<sup>126</sup> This is a dense, complex text, and an unusually explicit artifact of the mentalities that structured royal patronage. It invites us to ask: how did noblemen understand their service to the King, and the rewards he in turn distributed? More urgently, how did they respond when the Crown's understanding did not match their own?

Systems of patronage in early modern France essentially involved the exchange of a client's service for a patron's protection. The service at issue had evolved from feudal military relationships, but by the seventeenth century might include any needed administrative, legal, political, or interpersonal act. Or, service could still mean the exercise of violence. Similarly, while the patron might offer physical security in the traditional sense, protection more often meant career advancement, social honors, political favors, or some other material or symbolic benefit. Patrons and clients interacted through "pyramiding" networks that structured service and reward, which all theoretically shared the common terminus of the sovereign. In the case of royal patronage, individuals found incentives to serve the state in the prospect of recognition and compensation, and the King's favor thereby formed the sinews and tendons that largely animated the body politic.<sup>127</sup>

The distribution of royal favor became an overriding concern for the Second Estate, for patronage was the lifeblood of their order. Many nobles sought royal patronage out of necessity, for "living nobly" frequently required outlays far greater than a nobleman's regular income. In the early seventeenth century, cries of "*la noblesse est pauvre*" appeared ubiquitously in aristocrats' complaints.<sup>128</sup> However, no member of the Condé family could

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<sup>126</sup> Duc d'Enghien to Prince de Condé, June 8 1643, AC M.xxviii.

<sup>127</sup> Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients*, 3-4. Hers remains the best and most thorough analysis of these issues for *Grand Siècle* France.

<sup>128</sup> Orest Ranum, "Richelieu and the Great Nobility: Some Aspects of Early Modern Political Motives," *French Historical Studies* vol. 3 no. 2 (Autumn, 1963), 203. Jouanna asserts that assumptions of an across-the-board impoverishment of the Second Estate during this period may have been overstated, but that further in-depth

claim poverty, for the house was by far the wealthiest among the French nobility. Upon his death in 1646, Henri II de Bourbon possessed a fortune of at least 16 million francs, and earned annual revenues of 1.18 million francs at the minimum. Nearly all of that fortune originated with the monarchy, particularly through the family's longstanding alliance with Cardinal Richelieu.<sup>129</sup> Though the Condé had no need, personally, for more of the King's favor, the imperative to redistribute money and honors made royal *bienfaits* indispensable: "A steady flow of patronage was necessary to attract and keep clients."<sup>130</sup> So, for example, when Enghien's brother-in-law, Armand de Brézé, died and left vacant the extremely lucrative charge of the *Amirauté*, the Condé men immediately pressured the Regent to keep the post within their house. They did not primarily seek the charge's profits for themselves, but hoped to enrich and expand their clientele.<sup>131</sup> Lesser or provincial nobles depended on the King's patronage for the preservation of their aristocratic lifestyle; however, wealthy *grands* viewed royal favor above all as political or symbolic capital, which made them patrons in their own right.

Patronage took on tremendous importance as a political tool, especially under Richelieu and Mazarin. During the period from roughly 1630-1660, the monarchy underwent the momentous changes often dubbed the "rise of absolutism." The Crown's efforts to monopolize the distribution of honors played a central role in this effort. Under the "Renaissance monarchy," great nobles had personally distributed significant patronage, and thereby solidified networks of clients that might rival those of the King. Under the

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study would be required to confirm the contours of noble fortunes. *Devoir de révolte*, 92-98. Kettering claims that such an inquiry may be impossible with extant sources, though she concedes that nobles certainly perceived that their share of royal favor had decreased. *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients*, 180-182.

<sup>129</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 34-41. These totals reflect only the extant evidence – thus, they could easily be higher, but certainly are not less than the given figures.

<sup>130</sup> Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients*, 175-176.

<sup>131</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 507; Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 92-94.

“absolute monarchy,” the Crown sought to reclaim and directly administer patronage, a tactic by which the King could subsume “all fealties to fealty to himself.”<sup>132</sup> Nobles in this period often accused Cardinal-Ministers Richelieu and Mazarin of seeking to weaken the Second Estate, for redirecting clientage ties felt to them like a grave threat to nobles’ power and identity.<sup>133</sup> However, no such intent existed: as Kettering has shown, “The royal ministers did not attempt to destroy the great nobles and their clienteles... They encircled, undermined, and co-opted them using the lure of royal patronage to achieve the same effect.”<sup>134</sup> Monarchical power expanded with the nobles’ cooperation, not in spite of their resistance. Moreover, where nobles proved willing to work with the Crown, their power as patrons persisted and flourished. The Condé themselves provide a potent example of such a noble-crown alliance - at least, before 1643, and after 1660. As governors of Burgundy, they relied upon and reinforced the King’s authority in that province, and in doing so enhanced their own prestige and influence, down through 1789.<sup>135</sup> So, although concern and anxiety over patronage marked noble-crown relations in the 1640s, the story of a dominant monarchy crushing and humiliating a fuming nobility does not survive, least of all in the case of the Condé. And yet, complaints from the Duke and Prince persisted throughout the campaigns of the 1640s.

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<sup>132</sup> J. Russel Major, *From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles, and Estates* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994); Robert Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1978); Roland Mousnier, *The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy*, trans. Brian Pearce, 2 vols (Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 1979) i: 108.

<sup>133</sup> Libels against the “tyrant” Mazarin, and charges that he embezzled from the royal fisc became major features of mazarinade pamphlets during the Fronde.

<sup>134</sup> *Patrons, Brokers and Clients*, 175. Ranum comes to a similar, if less thorough conclusion in “Richelieu and the Great Nobility,” and other recent studies concur with these findings.

<sup>135</sup> Recent work on the province of Burgundy has shown the enduring power of the Condé governors there, through the end of the Old Regime. Julian Swann, *Provincial Power and Absolute Monarchy: The Estates General of Burgundy, 1661-1790* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2003); Beth Nachison, *Provincial Government in the Ancien Régime: The Princes of Condé in Burgundy*, PhD dissertation (U. of Iowa, 1992); Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 300-393.

To understand the Grand Condé's outrage, we must consider patronage as more than material or political capital - though it clearly served those functions. Rather, the ability of a patron to protect and advance his clients affirmed his identity as a manly, paternal provider, in nobles' minds. Masculinity was immanent in patronage ties, first in the explicit power relations between protector and client. "Fidelity language," a pervasive feature of noble epistolary culture, unmistakably depicts the bond between the two parties in terms of "vertical ties of dependence and subordination."<sup>136</sup> A concise example of this dynamic comes in a letter to the Grand Condé from his client Roquost:

Monsieur, I am extremely obliged for the protection that you have given me, and the care you have taken for me with Madame [d'Orléans]. I have a very strong desire to be able to bear witness to my recognition, but as I am powerless, I implore you, Monsieur, to receive my good intentions to serve you in all that you might judge proper, and if I am able to carry out your commands, I will show you my inclination through my obedience.<sup>137</sup>

The *protégé* - literally, "protected one" - voluntarily positioned himself as an inferior and servant to the addressee in every letter he wrote, as seen in the formality of signing letters as, "Your very humble, very obedient, very faithful servant." In fact, these self-effacing words are so universal as to appear banal, and editors nearly always abbreviate them to "etc." But they are far from an empty formality.<sup>138</sup> One man's habit of acknowledging the dominant position of another not only confirmed the client's willingness to serve (with the implicit expectation of reward), but also provided continuing proof of the patron's

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<sup>136</sup> Arthur Herman, Jr, "The Language of Fidelity in Early Modern France," *The Journal of Modern History* vol. 67 no. 1 (Mar. 1995): 1-24, 2.

<sup>137</sup> AC P.i, Sieur de Roquost to Prince de Condé, 12 December 1647.

<sup>138</sup> My analysis centers on the gendering of epistolary formulae, but they held ceremonial and interpersonal significance far beyond the scope of this discussion. See especially Christophe Blaquier, "Entre courtoisie et révolte: La correspondance de Condé (1648-1659)," *Histoire, économie, et société* v.14 n.3 (1995), 427-443.

masculine identity.<sup>139</sup> Such words, and the relationships they constructed must be read as a significant element in the power dynamics of the patron-client bond, and the hierarchy of masculinity they reproduced.

On the patron's side, the provision and protection of clients became matters akin to fatherly obligations within a family, in the minds of noblemen like Condé.<sup>140</sup> The etymology of "patron" links it closely to the Latin *pater*, "father." Likewise, the label *créature* denoted a client whose fortune was the singlehanded "creation" of his patron, and figuratively mimicked the generative aspect of fatherhood.<sup>141</sup> "Fictive fatherhood" became the dominant metaphor in Old Regime patronage.<sup>142</sup> Expressions of dependence and obedience on the part of the client evoke the filial attitudes required toward one's parent – indeed, little distinguishes the tone of Enghien's letters to his father from Lenet's letters to the Grand Condé during the Fronde. Conversely, the obligation to nurture and advance the client's interests mirrors a father's obligation to succor his children, and a sense of manly duty attached to both endeavors. Failure to provide timely or effective aid on behalf of a client brought not only the likely loss of that client, but a loss of *crédit*, and more troubling, honor. How powerful could a man be, if he could not deliver the benefits he had promised to those who depended on him?

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<sup>139</sup> The continual contest to prove masculinity, not only through dominance over the "feminine," but most significantly, to subordinate forms of masculinity and other, weaker men, is a central feature of Pierre Bourdieu's *Masculine Domination*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). I follow Lewis Seifert's *Manning the Margins* in applying this framework to mid-seventeenth century France.

<sup>140</sup> In drawing this comparison, I do not mean that an affective or emotional bond always existed between the two – as scholars from Kettering to Kristin Neuschel have shown, the patronage relationship rarely required exclusivity or permanence. On fidelity language in the sixteenth century, see Kristen Neuschel, *Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989).

<sup>141</sup> Mousnier certainly takes some license in claiming that such a man "belongs to his master body and soul," though his phrasing helps to make my point, here. *Institutions of France* i: 90.

<sup>142</sup> This comparison dates from classical Rome, though the more recent dynamics of Renaissance Italy are a more immediate comparison to French ideas. See Paul D. McLean, *The Art of the Network: Strategic Interactions and Patronage in Renaissance Florence* (Durham: Duke UP, 2007), especially 54-55.

Inasmuch as the distribution of patronage informed questions of honor, protection, and obligation, it had a moral valence, as well. A man of any station bore a duty to provide for his *maison*; for grands, this extended to servants, domestic staff, and especially clients.<sup>143</sup> Failure to do so constituted an abdication of his protective role. In 1648, for example, the Duc de Guise wrote to the Queen and to Mazarin to express his outrage over their treatment of a certain Mlle de Pons, to whom he had offered protection. He lamented that he had been faithfully “risking my life, conquering territory, subjecting kingdoms, and maintaining the people in their fidelity purely through my resolution, without money or bread, just as [I have waged] war without men or munitions.” In short, he had served selflessly and dutifully in adverse conditions. And yet, “I swear, Madame, that I learned with extreme disappointment of the harshness you have employed toward [Mlle de Pons], and I ask very humbly that you consider all that I have done and all that I hope to do for the service of the Crown, and accord me the recompense that she be treated and considered differently, which I hope from your goodwill.” To Mazarin, he declared, “My hopes are thoroughly dashed, and I pity myself to see that I am abandoned by Your Eminence’s protection at the moment when I most need it.”<sup>144</sup>

Guise feels doubly betrayed, here: in the first place, his sacrifices and loyalty to the Crown have gone unnoticed and unrewarded, and Mazarin has even “abandoned” him in spite of all his *mérite*. But more immediately, he had made a commitment to protect Mlle de

<sup>143</sup> Béguin has noted that “une ‘maison’ était une sorte d’entité morale” (*Princes de Condé*, 31), which provides a useful framework for understanding the urgency with which the Condé men lobbied for the interests of their family and clients alike. Aumale notes, by way of example, that Henri de Bourbon’s will provided generously for his family, as well as his domestic staff, despite his famously avaricious nature. Aumale, *Histoire* v: 120. In a similar sense, Béguin tracks the Condé’s “inheritance” and continuing protection of the Montmorency clientele during the 1630s and 40s: *Princes de Condé*, 66-84.

<sup>144</sup> BN Fonds Dupuy 775, f.107-108, Duc de Guise to Queen Anne d’Autriche, Cardinal Mazarin, February 28 1648. Note, further, Guise’s evocation of his past acts in tandem with his future acts, implying that the two temporalities are equally assured – this was a primary assumption of nobles’ inborn *mérite*.

Pons, and now sees that his virtuous services have failed to bring the treatment he had promised her. The Grand Condé had made a similar, if less melodramatic assertion in his letter after Rocroi, in claiming that the Duc de Gassion and Baron de Sirot would “perceive that I am not keeping my word to them,” especially as he had previously claimed that they “deserve a great part of the honor” from the battle.<sup>145</sup> In these instances, Mazarin’s failure to properly reward meritorious service posed a serious threat to each nobleman’s clientele, identity, and masculinity.

The Grand Condé viewed such a failure as a personal affront. Most of all, he bemoaned the loss of his *crédit*, a term which connotes trust, respect, and influence, but above all the ability to achieve desired goals “outside the formal exercise of structured power.”<sup>146</sup> In an early-modern society where power largely operated informally, *crédit* was an indispensable commodity, and its loss could be disastrous. Thus, Enghien’s accusation that in ignoring his appointments after Rocroi, the royal party “seek to discredit me” carried dire implications. Along similar lines, and with barely concealed fury, he made his case to Mazarin in 1648, concerning the governorship of his recent conquest, Ypres. He states dryly, “You may judge sufficiently what feeling I would have after the promise that you did me the favor to make before my departure from Paris. I see clearly that in every campaign that I must receive a little mortification.” Condé poses a stark juxtaposition between the compensation that Mazarin had promised, and the “mortification” the Cardinal had actually provided. The Prince continues, “Still, it is distressing to serve with the passion

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<sup>145</sup> AC M.xxviii, Duc d’Enghien to Prince de Condé, 22 May 1643. In a more positive case, Condé simultaneously requested that his friend and client, the Chevalier de la Rivière, receive a pardon for dueling - technically a capital offense - as a recognition for the Chevalier’s service at Rocroi, and as a favor to Enghien personally. Duc d’Enghien to Mazarin, 23 May 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 497.

<sup>146</sup> Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients*, 43-44.

I do, and to see myself in no state to accomplish anything for myself or my friends."

Mazarin's parsimony has begun to affect Condé's relationships with his clients, such that "I see very few men who now seek me out to obtain any benefit, and I would be very circumspect in asking for anything, out of fear of being discredited completely."<sup>147</sup> This letter is astounding in its frankness and negativity, upon consideration of the epistolary conventions that demanded deference and self-negation as a matter of course. It becomes more striking still, as it is the final letter before a long and troubling silence from Condé, still in the midst of a campaign. Clearly, the Prince jealously guarded his *crédit*, and reacted severely to perceived threats to his reputation as a patron.

The Grand Condé's complaints throughout the 1640s hinge on the assumption of a "correct" mechanism for the translation of service into reward, which Mazarin perverted. Enghien hinted at this belief in his post-Rocroi rant: "I had believed all of these [requests] assured, and had promised them to the gentlemen in question." Condé's confidence rested on his belief that service would, indeed must, always receive a directly proportional reward.<sup>148</sup> Specifically: where a quotidian sacrifice might bring similarly unremarkable compensation, triumph in a kingdom-saving battle should empower the servant to ask for very significant favors. This presumption of a one-to-one ratio was clearest in his claims for the Admiralty in 1646. Upon Armand de Brézé's death, Enghien wrote to Mazarin in brief, almost nonchalant terms: "[Brézé] died in service; I am there [serving] presently. I am assured that you will have the kindness to request his charges and governments for me and for my son."<sup>149</sup> Where service legitimated his brother-in-law's possession of the post, the

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<sup>147</sup> AC P.ii, Prince de Condé to Mazarin, 4 June 1648.

<sup>148</sup> Jay Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 18-29 explores the "norm of obligation" regarding gifts, service, and gratitude.

<sup>149</sup> Dud d'Enghien to Mazarin, June 28 1646, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire* v: 490.

Duke's own service positively demanded his succession. The Regent's ultimate decision to retain the post for herself therefore brought vehement protests from Enghien, while his father the Prince was so shocked that he retired without leave from court - an act of major incivility - and returned only when specifically ordered.<sup>150</sup> The Condé men employed a straightforward equation, what I term an "arithmetic" view of patronage, in their judgment of appropriate compensation.

The King's minority reinforced the need for an objectively "correct" mechanism to reward service, in noble minds. Where an adult King served as the "supreme judge of merit" for his subjects and servants, the regency disrupted the regular order of the monarchy in all respects.<sup>151</sup> Nobles did not trust a woman, even as Regent, to correctly assess the value of service, least of all the manly realm of war.<sup>152</sup> And on the evidence of the mazarinades, many trusted Mazarin even less. Where the Queen might misjudge virtue, the Italian parvenu showed himself unwilling to recognize true *mérite*: "He has done no good for the men of virtue and of *mérite*, nor given any recompense to those who have hazarded their lives and property in service of the King; on the contrary, he has caused nearly all of the King's armies to perish from hunger and extreme want."<sup>153</sup> Mazarin failed to give good men their deserved *bienfaits*, and perverted the system by "giving pensions and honors to even the lowest of lackeys."<sup>154</sup> Without a legitimate judge to arbitrate service, Condé asserted his arithmetic understanding, at least as a stopgap.

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<sup>150</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 507.

<sup>151</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 34.

<sup>152</sup> Anne in many ways encouraged this mistrust, in her constant contention that "Louis XIV's authority was paramount," and that her role as regent consisted only of maintaining her son's authority as King. Crawford, *Perilous Performances*, 104-106.

<sup>153</sup> *Requête des trois Estats présentée à Messieurs du Parlement* (np, 1648) in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 31.

<sup>154</sup> *Le passe-port et l'adieu de Mazarin en vers burlesques* (np, 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 53

But if neither the Queen nor Mazarin were qualified or willing to justly adjudicate *mérite*, to whom could the nobility direct their service? For a culture (as Condé understood it) in which “all service relations were construed through the prism of personal obligation,” no satisfactory solution existed.<sup>155</sup> Condé continued to direct his efforts toward the King: after his victory at Rocroi, he proclaimed that “the King will soon be the master of Thionville,” and arranged the governments of captured cities “for the King’s service.”<sup>156</sup> Throughout his correspondence with Mazarin during the 1640s, he uses such formulae as following “the King’s orders;”<sup>157</sup> and after abandoning the siege of Lerida in 1647, he speaks of “sacrificing my honor for the service of the King.”<sup>158</sup> Despite the boy’s minority, the person of the King plays an undeniably central role in the Prince’s idea of service.

The Prince was not deluded, however, and he fully understood that the Queen and Cardinal in fact held power during Louis XIV’s minority. But the ambiguity surrounding the object of loyalty and the source of recognition persisted, and only grew. Through 1646, Enghien avoided the issue whenever possible, by addressing his reports and especially his requests to his father, who sat at the head of the Regency Council.<sup>159</sup> But he also wrote frequently, even before his father’s death, to various figures at the pinnacle of power: to the Queen primarily on matters of reward; to the Cardinal, or to Secretary of State for War Michel le Tellier on military issues; and to the lieutenant-general of the realm, Gaston d’Orléans (for whom he had little affection) when propriety required. The ambivalence of royal power during the minority is evident in Condé’s letter to Mazarin concerning Ypres:

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<sup>155</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 54.

<sup>156</sup> Duc d’Enghien to Mazarin, 26 June, 18 August 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 523, 553.

<sup>157</sup> Duc d’Enghien to Mazarin, 13 July 1644, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, 588.

<sup>158</sup> Prince de Condé to Mazarin, 19 June 1647, transcribed in Lenet, *Mémoires*, 507.

<sup>159</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 47.

he acknowledges, “She [Anne] is the ruler and may absolutely direct matters in which I might play some part.” But he undercuts the apparent simplicity of this recognition in the very act of writing his letter. He addressed his grievance to Mazarin, to circumvent the Queen’s authority, over the question of reward that ostensibly came from the King. Further, he betrays his dissatisfaction with the conduct of the King’s affairs in his nearly-explicit charge that the Queen has failed to properly evaluate and compensate “the passion with which I serve.”<sup>160</sup> The ideological and rhetorical unity of Condé’s personal loyalty to the King only papered over the deeply troubling fragmentation of sovereignty in practice.

For the Grand Condé, royal patronage validated meritorious service, and reaffirmed a man’s noble status and masculine virtues. So, when praise both public and private, from strangers and from peers, unanimously hailed his victories as the stuff of history, fiction, and legend, he expected favor commensurate with such a valuation. As Mazarin withheld rewards and denied requests, then, Condé perceived not only a personal affront, but a more systemic injustice, stemming from the Regency’s problematic handling of the King’s power. But his complaints fell on deaf ears, for Mazarin understood patronage and service in utterly different terms. Where the Prince considered service, honor, and identity as primary factors in reward, the Cardinal weighed the power relations inherent in patronage, and the threat that might be posed in specific appointments. Instead of Condé’s “arithmetic of patronage,” Mazarin reckoned with a “calculus of security.” Ultimately, where the Prince saw a corruption of the personal bond between patron and client, Mazarin perceived an intricate balance of interests which must be maintained for the overall health of the kingdom. These divergent ideas of the function and nature of royal patronage drove a

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<sup>160</sup> AC P.ii, Prince de Condé to Mazarin, 4 June 1648.

wedge between the two men. To set the scene for their eventual rupture, we turn now to the Regency's "statism."

### **"The Good of the State": Patronage, Power, and Security**

Jules Mazarin did not invent *raison d'état*. His efforts to preserve and even expand royal authority during Louis XIV's regency, however, drew heavily and creatively on that philosophy.<sup>161</sup> In a sense, he had no choice. For the myriad reasons described above, the French monarchy in 1643 was at its weakest point, arguably since the chaos of the League in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century. With threats both foreign and domestic mounting, a plan of action that stressed the health and power of the State above all else served as a needed guide. In light of the regency's awkward legal, political, and cultural position, abstract ideas of the State took on new importance. Mazarin's statism still focused on the King, but distinguished between the individual man (or boy) on the throne, and the power he represented. For noblemen like Condé, eager for personal recognition and reward by the monarch, these new, impersonal referents proved troubling; for the Regency, however, they became a powerful tool for the good of the State.

We should recognize from the outset that Mazarin did not intend his refusals to offend the Grand Condé.<sup>162</sup> Quite the contrary, Mazarin wholeheartedly desired his friendship, and wished him every success in his early campaigns. After all, his talents and

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<sup>161</sup> It is probably not a coincidence that Mazarin's bibliographer and confidant, Gabriel Naudé, was a leading theorist of *raison d'état*. See his *Science des Princes, ou Considérations politiques sur les coups-d'état* of 1639. On Reason of State as a strand of political philosophy, see William Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton UP, 1972); Nannerl Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Princeton UP, 1980). Jay Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 95, succinctly describes what I perceive as Mazarin's major motive: "to make the powers of government commensurate to society's capacity for disorder."

<sup>162</sup> Lenet observes that, even before Richelieu's death, Mazarin recognized that "he must not make for himself an enemy of the Duke d'Enghien's age, quality, or vigor." *Mémoires*, 460.

victories strengthened France. The Cardinal walked a tightrope, then, in maintaining the cooperation of the most promising general in Europe, while ensuring that his power within France did not grow to threaten the security of the State.

At the same time, both the Prince and the Prime Minister recognized the validity of each other's views. When the Duc d'Enghien requested the King's favor for the Duc de Gassion, for instance, he hoped not only to reward Gassion's service at Rocroi, but also sought explicitly to secure the loyalty of "a *créature*... who could well be of use to us in the future."<sup>163</sup> Similarly, La Moussaye had impressed upon the Duke that Rocroi had won him "a thousand men I've never seen before, who give you their compliments as your *créature*."<sup>164</sup> Condé knew full well that patronage conferred power, just as Mazarin thoroughly understood that it affirmed noble identity. The Cardinal's letters to the Prince are filled with expressions (however sincere) of concern for "your *gloire*," while his negative responses invariably include mollifying verbiage. The two men did not pursue truly contrary goals, as has often been asserted regarding Condé's eventual break with the Cardinal - the Prince did not want to make himself King, and Mazarin did not want to cripple the Second Estate. Rather, they "spoke past each other," each primarily concerned with patronage in ways that seemed at best secondary to the other.

Mazarin's need for the Prince's service complicated his need to balance the power of the Grands. The Grand Condé presented a challenge far greater than other grands, by virtue of his family's checkered past, as well as their current power. Over three prior generations, every Prince of Condé had threatened the security of the state: Louis I and Henri I had been leading figures in the Protestant faction throughout the Wars of Religion, while Henri II had

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<sup>163</sup> AC M.xxviii, Duc d'Enghien to Prince de Condé, 23 May 1643.

<sup>164</sup> La Moussaye to Duc d'Enghien, September 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 565.

participated in numerous plots and intrigues between Louis XIII's accession and Richelieu's ministry across the 1610s.<sup>165</sup> Rebellion seemed congenital in the cadet Bourbon line. More immediately, Henri II's fastidious management of the family fortune had positioned the Condé house to exercise huge influence throughout the kingdom by the time of Louis XIII's death. As governors and power brokers in many rich, populous provinces, and patrons of a clientele that stretched across France, the Condé had been important allies in the former King's consolidation of power.<sup>166</sup> But at any moment, they might seriously threaten the peace of the realm, should they choose. Mazarin could not, therefore, afford to alienate the Grand Condé, any more than he could stand to add to his already worrisome power.

In practical terms, Mazarin's guiding principles are best articulated, ironically, by Pierre Lenet, Condé's own secretary and confidant:

My thinking has always been that one cannot give too many charges [of governments] to Princes of the Blood in France, because the expenditures necessary to properly carry out the task leaves them dependent on the Court; neither could they possess too few fortresses, as these provide refuge for their holders, which not only renders them independent whenever they please, but gives them standing to strike out on their own, or to make alliances, which they easily may, with nearby powers.<sup>167</sup>

Regional governments tie *Grands* to the Crown, while fortresses permit them greater freedom of action, perhaps to oppose the King. With this perspective in mind, Mazarin's refusals seem less insulting than Condé would have us believe.

In contrast to his claims of constant neglect, the Prince actually procured much royal favor in the years before the Fronde. In fact, Condé's requests were usually approved: of his

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<sup>165</sup> See Aumale, *Histoire*, volumes i-ii.

<sup>166</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 38-55.

<sup>167</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 200. It is worth noting that Lenet composed his memoirs in the 1660s, after the defeat of Condé's rebellion, but before his full return to the King's good graces. Thus, Lenet's thoughts may not "always" have been precisely as he presents them in retrospect. In any case, his formulation of the material threats and advantages inherent in different types of awards serves my purpose here.

41 documented demands, only seventeen were denied, and Condé did not complain about or contest some of these.<sup>168</sup> It was not the number, then, but the types of refusals that mattered. Military commissions or promotions largely received positive answers from Mazarin - these were mostly without cost to the Crown, and carried little danger. Requests for charges in regional governments garnered as many positive as negative replies, for the power and resources at stake varied greatly from place to place. The Prince's more successful requests from the campaigns of 1644, 1645, and 1646 can be understood in this light: the Cardinal gladly accorded governorships in Condé's theater of operations for those years, beyond the Rhine or in Flanders. But not so for 1643 and 1648, when Condé led troops in Champagne or Picardy, at the heart of the Condéen power base – and only a short, open march to Paris.<sup>169</sup> Appointments for command of fortified places or militarily important cities found Mazarin at his least obliging. As Lenet observes, control of a strategically located city or *place fort* could sway the allegiance of the surrounding region in the event of unrest. That threat multiplied when the *place's* holder owed loyalty to the provincial governor. So it is important to note that the Condé house governed Burgundy, Champagne, Normandy, and Picardy, held several smaller charges, and retained strong connections in the perpetually restive province of Guyenne. Control of strongholds in these places simply gave the Prince's family too much power. Mazarin could therefore justify all of his refusals as politically necessary, as they denied resources to an already-rich rival, and as strategically prudent in the event of civil war. Lenet perceived this tactic: Mazarin "began to fear the influence of [Condé's] successes on the spirits of the *grands*, the soldiers,

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<sup>168</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 99-101.

<sup>169</sup> Matthew Guthrie, *The Grand Condé and the French Army*, Master of Arts diss. (Cambridge, UK: Robinson College, 2002), 39.

and the people," and encouraged the Regent to deny his most important requests.<sup>170</sup>

Reason of State guided these choices, even at a micro-level.

But what, precisely, did the Regency understand by the "State," and how did it differ from Condé's sense of personal kingship? The language of leading figure in the royal party during the siege of Thionville suggests the contours of their conception. Where Condé's reports consistently framed his service in reference to the King, Mazarin totally and conspicuously avoids mention of the royal person during this period. Instead, he variously invokes the benefits of Condé's actions for the "health" and "interests of the State," or their "importance to the State."<sup>171</sup> Such references contrast strikingly with Condé's corresponding insistence on interpersonal dynamics, and reveal a concept of the State as an entity separate from the King, with priorities unto itself.

More telling still are the conceptual slippages apparent in Queen Anne's and Secretary Le Tellier's letters from the same period. The Secretary informed the Prince that "we cannot calculate the advantages that Your Highness has acquired for the State by your great actions, if only to reestablish the reputation of the King's armies."<sup>172</sup> It is the State that benefits from Condé's victories, though the troops he led were ultimately the King's, more personally. And for her part, the Queen expresses "the contentment that I have, for the interest of the service of the King, Monsieur my Son," while assuring the Prince that she, personally, will remember his exploits in apportioning the fruits of his victory.<sup>173</sup> Her own joy stands apart from her son, though it rises out of his interests. More importantly, her will

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<sup>170</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 502.

<sup>171</sup> Mazarin to Duc d'Enghien, 22 June, and 14 July 1643, transcribed in Albert Chéruel, *Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère*, 9 vol (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1862) i: 26; Mazarin to Duc d'Enghien, 12 August 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 547.

<sup>172</sup> Le Tellier to Duc d'Enghien, 14 September 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 566.

<sup>173</sup> Queen Anne to Duc d'Enghien, 26 May 1643, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, iv: 503.

as patroness makes no reference to the King. Mazarin demonstrates a similar vision of sovereignty after Dunkirk, in his praise of Condé for “the services which you constantly render to the King and to the State.”<sup>174</sup> These expressions reveal a notion of monarchy that emphasizes the King, but is not perfectly coterminous with his person.

The sum of these expressions sketch a model that distinguishes, albeit rather weakly, between the King and the State. In brief: the State existed as an immaterial entity represented by the King, but more broadly encompassing the ruler’s ability to maintain social order, territorial integrity, commercial interests, and the myriad variables that fell under the heading of “public health.” In this formulation, the State stands apart from the King, but overlaps extensively with his person and will, even as a minor. This was a subtle but crucial shift away from the personal concept of monarchy that held sway under Louis XIII. Service to a personal King stemmed from the client’s obligation to a patron, and reward accordingly functioned by the logic of gratitude for meritorious services rendered. The State, as Condé found to his chagrin, was more self-interested. Rather than gratitude, security and the overall good of the abstract Crown guided the ruler’s hand, especially regarding *bienfaits*. Importantly, the King remained at the center of politics - any radical change on that point would certainly have been violently opposed - but the good of the State now trumped the monarch’s individual relationships.

I apply the label “statism” to Mazarin’s program of protecting the State’s interests. I do so both to evoke the philosophy of *raison d’état* from which it clearly descended, but at the same time to distinguish it from that ideology. Richelieu’s *Political Testament* describes an overarching governmental framework for the Iron Cardinal’s ministry, and prescribes

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<sup>174</sup> Mazarin to Duc d’Enghien, 2 August 1646, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 497.

specific solutions to discrete problems, in line with that framework. Mazarin did not operate with a rigorous dedication to any such philosophy, but instead (largely by necessity) managed crises, as they arose and as circumstances dictated. The sum of his actions, as Moote has demonstrated, reveal his constant aim to assure and expand royal power, and his incremental success in achieving his goal.<sup>175</sup> But the Cardinal's willingness to adjust his approach, to make use of circumstances as he found them, and to compromise with opponents, all suggest at best weak adherence to any preconceived formula. If *raison d'état* was, in Richelieu's portrayal,<sup>176</sup> a rigorous political philosophy, Mazarin's statism is better understood as a political heuristic: an adaptable, impressionistic guideline, which focused on results rather than processes. Its most consistent and recognizable features were the abstract, impersonal vision of royal authority, and the imperative to compel obedience from the greatest possible number of French subjects.

The impressionistic sketch of the Crown's statism, above, comes into sharper relief when seen in action. Because Mazarin never wrote a *Political Testament*, as Richelieu helpfully did, his approach to politics must be reconstructed through the actions he took and the *ad hoc* words he wrote. One incident illuminates much of his thinking: the 1647 confrontation with Condé that might be labeled "the Battle of Flix."

### Personal Kingship vs. Statism: The Government of Flix

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<sup>175</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, Chapter 2, especially pp. 40-50.

<sup>176</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 95, argues that Richelieu's *Testament* retrospectively imposes unity on a career more marked by pragmatism, as I suggest Mazarin's was. Nevertheless, the term *raison d'état* has, however accurately, come down to us as a coherent ideology, and I employ the term "statism" to connote a more "off the cuff" approach.

By most standards, the Catalonian town of Flix was insignificant. But for a few weeks in the late summer of 1647, it stood at the center of a conflict that nearly split France's greatest general from his King. This event neatly encapsulates the conflicts between Prince and Crown throughout the 1640s, and draws back the curtain on each party's concept of service, reward, and the French monarchy itself.

After his impressive victory at Dunkirk in 1646, Condé's power and reputation spiked to uncomfortably high levels, in the royal party's view. Mazarin named the Grand Condé as Viceroy of Catalonia in 1647 - Lenet alleges that he did so precisely because there was little chance for success there.<sup>177</sup> For years, the region had been a quagmire for the French, and 1646 had seen the Duc d'Harcour spectacularly fail to ameliorate matters. As Condé took the reins, his legendary reputation preceded him, even beyond the Pyrenees. He was greeted enthusiastically at Barcelona, for the Catalans hoped he could set a new course for the government that Harcour had mismanaged.<sup>178</sup> The Prince found the province riven with factional strife, which he felt would be "prejudicial to the service of the King." He therefore set about a whirlwind program of reform and resupply, and was soon poised to undertake operations against the perennial target of Lerida.<sup>179</sup> Though he ultimately abandoned the siege of that impregnable fortress, the balance of the campaign season gave France a number of minor, but strategically important victories.<sup>180</sup> Among these, Condé captured the mountain town of Flix, where he sought to install his client Jumeaux. However, the Queen denied his request, giving the governorship to a certain Saint-

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<sup>177</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 503. See also Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 128.

<sup>178</sup> Their joy was such that they rewarded the messenger who brought news of Condé's appointment with a gold chain worth 500 Louis. Lenet, *Mémoires*, 503.

<sup>179</sup> BN MFr 6880, Prince de Condé (Louis II de Bourbon had inherited the title on December 26, 1646) to Le Tellier, May 1647. Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 28-29.

<sup>180</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 171.

Colombe, a *fidèle* of Michel Le Tellier, instead. Condé, fresh from “sacrificing my honor for the service of the King” at Lerida, took a strong view on this decision.<sup>181</sup>

“I am furious, Monsieur,” he informed Le Tellier, “knowing that M. de Saint-Colombe is one of your friends. I write to you concerning the affair of Flix to ask that the gift that Her Majesty has given him be revoked.” The word choice here is striking: Flix is a “gift” for Saint-Colombe, given with no regard for merit, by the Queen rather than the King. Above all, the Prince worried for his reputation: “All of Catalonia knows that I wrote in favor of M. de Jumeaux... that M. de Saint-Colombe never spoke to me, and that he sent, behind my back, a courier to court to have this government; and that following the poor outcome at Lerida... all the world will believe me powerless, or weak at court.”<sup>182</sup> Condé claims that his *crédit* will suffer, along with (again) “the King’s service.” More troubling still, he charges that the correct workings of service and reward have been subverted. The Regency has failed to properly reward *mérite*, for the conqueror of Flix cannot effect his own desire for the city’s rule. Moreover, Saint-Colombe has violated the personal modality of patronage locally, by circumventing Condé as the victorious general, and as the provincial governor. Though Flix mattered little otherwise, the affair’s visibility added an importance for the Prince’s reputation out of all proportion to the thing itself. Unlike in other cases to this point, where Condé made his requests but grudgingly accepted any contrary appointments, he insisted vigorously on Jumeaux’s appointment for Flix.

Though the Grand Condé’s most pressing concern remained the slight to his image (despite his *pro forma* claims to the contrary), pragmatic considerations played their part as well. He replies to Le Tellier’s first defense of Saint-Colombe’s appointment, in terms of

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<sup>181</sup> Prince de Condé to Mazarin, 19 June 1647, transcribed in Lenet, *Mémoires*, 507.

<sup>182</sup> BN MFr 6880, Prince de Condé to Le Tellier, 30 June 1647.

royal service: disregard for Jumeaux “affects me most of all by consideration of the prejudice that the King’s service will suffer.” He describes the Queen’s appointee as “a rather mediocre personage, by the account of those in the army, who may well be embarrassed... if he finds himself attacked.” Condé even anticipates the Crown’s statist rationale, in pointing out the “rather small utility or advantage I might draw from this government.”<sup>183</sup> In this instance, the Grand Condé sought to fulfill his duties as both a benevolent patron to Jumeaux, and as an effective servant to the King. In these dual efforts, he demonstrates his cognizance of Mazarin’s political approach, but simultaneously reasserts his own imperative desire to serve the King and be rewarded by him.

Ultimately, Jumeaux’s death rendered the matter moot, but Condé’s anger did not subside. Mazarin’s final missive on this debacle, however, definitively settled the issue:

The Queen... has recognized in this event, as in all others, that your strongest passion is the good of the State, and that this zeal is so powerful within you that it could not permit you to have any personal considerations... You can well believe that I have no trouble recognizing how valuable your services to this Crown are... On the subject of Flix: I cannot express the displeasure I feel when I see that you desire a thing, but I find it an impossibility to serve you in [that situation]... And you will see in all affairs that you have no truer a servant than me.<sup>184</sup>

The Cardinal also attached a “Memoir from the King,” concerning the ongoing negotiations with the Emperor at Münster, for Condé’s perusal.

This letter is, in effect, a masterful expression of the Regency’s *modus operandi*. The opening lines, citing the Queen’s “recognition,” read less as flattery than as a prescription for proper behavior. In praising Condé’s “passion for the good of the State,” Mazarin not-so-subtly indicates that this must be a royal servant’s highest priority. Moreover, it is the

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<sup>183</sup> BN MFr 6880, Condé to Turenne, 22 July 1647; BN MFr 6880, Condé to Le Tellier, 10 August 1647.

<sup>184</sup> AC P.i, Mazarin to Condé, 25 August 1647.

Queen who perceives, and implicitly validates Condé's laudable passion. In doing so, however, she redirects his devotion toward the abstract State and the Crown, away from the person of the King as Condé ubiquitously maintained. The lack of any mention of the King in this passage, which includes three other potential objects of national loyalty, is remarkable. Further, Mazarin acknowledges the "value" - note the pecuniary vocabulary - of Condé's service, but laments the "impossibility" of fulfilling his desires. The Cardinal gestures to nobles' need for compensation, and at the same time communicates to the dissatisfied Prince that the Queen remains fully in command of favor. In juxtaposing the worth of Condé's service against the lack of actual reward, Mazarin intimates that the two are not so automatically, arithmetically linked as Condé would hope. Finally, after a customarily obsequious expression of goodwill, Mazarin attaches evidence of the King's continuing, if nominal, sovereignty. The Prince, in the face of this comprehensive reproof, could do no more than sulk home, "not hiding his discontentment with the Cardinal."<sup>185</sup>

The Battle of Flix shows the Regency making positive use of the minor King's protean sovereignty, to rebalance the power of rival factions. During the minority, the absence of a unanimously agreed-upon center or model for sovereignty gave the Regency space to adapt royal power to its needs. Mazarin preferred to name as governor a client of Le Tellier, who had been an unwavering ally of the royal party and Mazarin personally, in a clear application of statism in distributing reward. Where Condé's personal kingship would have rewarded the merits of the city's conqueror and the King's servant in the field, the Regency's statism used the appointment to empower a crucial and reliable royal agent within the administration. Mazarin's letter in the aftermath drives home the point that the

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<sup>185</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 513-514.

State and the Crown, led by the Queen, will retain control of all favor. Though he hoped his conciliatory language would soften the blow, he remains firm on the substance of the matter: royal power holds, and it now functions according to the logic of statism.

## Conclusion

The Grand Condé had singlehandedly saved France - at least, so his legend would have it. But even accounting for the hyperbole of such acclamations, he truly had won a series of crucial, often unlikely victories, which had reassured France in the dark days since early 1643. Mazarin's denials of the Prince's most important requests thus carried the sting not just of insult, but of injustice. In many nobles' minds, such parsimony with patronage constituted abuse of the King's power. Though Condé continued to serve the King (and his insistence on this point never faltered, even as he made war against the Crown<sup>186</sup>), his anger grew, and festered. The Prince earnestly believed that his blood-borne and battle-tested *mérite* must oblige the King, or whoever acted in his name, to compensate his sacrifices and reward his triumphs, through the favor that conferred material as well as cultural capitals. By the outbreak of the Fronde, Condé's dissatisfaction with the Crown's stinginess jeopardized his allegiance to the royal party.

In 1648, the shape and stakes of the contest between Condé and the Regency were unmistakable: the Prince hoped that the personal model of kingship would reemerge, while the Cardinal and Queen persisted in their innovative use of the King's sovereignty for the good of the State (as they saw it). That this battle played out over the issue of patronage should not surprise us, as royal favor was at once a primary tool for the exercise of royal

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<sup>186</sup> See Chapter 4.

power, and a central term in the identity of the Second Estate. Condé's vision of patronage mirrored his vision of kingship: the arithmetic equation of service and reward would correlate the servant's embodied and enacted *mérite* with the King's personal gratitude. Receiving, and being seen to receive the sovereign's thanks in this way enhanced the servant's *crédit* and reputation, at once as a warrior, as a provider, and ultimately as a man of honor.<sup>187</sup> In contrast, the "calculus" of Mazarin's statism accounted for the ever-shifting variables of factional power, administrative needs, and the overwhelming imperative of state security. Though the Cardinal certainly understood patronage as a motive for noble service to the Crown, he could not allow any one party to monopolize royal *bienfaits*, especially at a moment of such shaky political footing. Despite his efforts to balance these conflicting imperatives, after January of 1648, the ground threatened to give way completely. The eventual collapse of the Crown-Condé alliance directly shaped the course of the Fronde, and in doing so, shaped the evolution of the French monarchy.

The Grand Condé's dissatisfaction with Mazarin bore on fundamental questions of royal power, both because of the Prince's significance as an icon of the Second Estate, and because of the ongoing shifts in the monarchy itself. Anne and Mazarin had worked since Louis XIII's death to strengthen, rather than simply maintain, royal authority. A major element in their efforts hinged on the idea that the King was more than a man, and thus not obliged to follow the usual, reciprocal norms of gifts and gratitude. The friction with Condé across the 1640s evinced a broader resistance among the *noblesse d'épée*, in particular, to agree with the Regency's novel approach to patronage. To be sure, nobles willingly aided the "rise of absolutism," as Kettering and others have clearly shown. But they thought they

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<sup>187</sup> On the fraught issues of noble masculine honor and their utility, see Chapter 3.

served the King, and they did so with a very clear idea of the value of their service. Mazarin asked them to serve the State, more in hope of reward than with an ironclad guarantee. This change was not an issue of the King's power over his kingdom, or over the fruits of his realm – few would have questioned his supremacy on these points. Rather, the struggle between the Crown and the Grand Condé, and by extension the noble order, concerned the precise substance of royalty, and the nature of the sovereign's relationship with subjects.

The Grand Condé believed his heroic image substantiated his expansive demands in the battles for patronage, before 1648. After the outbreak of the Fronde, however, other parties made creative use of his persona to advance their own claims. Most of all, the populist frondeurs co-opted the Grand Condé's legendary reputation to advance a novel understanding of the *patrie*, largely through printed libels against Condé himself. Whereas the Prince's battles with the Crown reveal the contested evolution of the monarchy during Louis XIV's regency, the Prince's battles with the frondeurs illuminate the construction of a proto-nationalist community in France, in its earliest stages. The rise of *patrie* discourse would prove a turning point in the history of French political culture, and the Grand Condé played a central role in its elaboration.

## **Chapter 2 - The Prince and the *Patrie*: National Community in the Siege of Paris**

In the years just before the Fronde, the Grand Condé had built a reputation for consummate noble virtue, generous heroism, and dominant strength. In the Fronde's early Parlementary phase, however, Condé's choices inverted all of those traits: he became a bloodthirsty, avaricious, credulous villain, who aided the tyrant Mazarin at the expense of the French people. The reversal of Condé's image may be dated precisely: January 6, 1649. On that day, the Prince executed the Queen's orders to blockade Paris, and in doing so, completed the Fronde's transformation from an often-unruly protest into a full-scale civil war. But the Siege of Paris did not simply escalate the violence between the Crown and frondeurs. Rather, it pushed the rebels to articulate and publicize their sense of duty and affective attachment to the nation of France and the People who comprised it, in a flood of pamphlets. To capture this sense of communitarian moral obligation, the besieged Parisians resurrected and reimagined the figure of the *patrie*. The Grand Condé played a crucial role in constructing and promoting this discourse, for his past glories and present crimes served to elucidate, respectively, the qualities of a perfect patriot and of a consummate *estranger*. If the Prince had been France's greatest national hero since Rocroi, he became its greatest enemy during the Siege. In either case, the Grand Condé persona provided a vehicle for claims about what France was, and who was French, at a moment when those categories were open to radical reinterpretation.

The following pages trace the course and uses of patriotic rhetoric during the early stages of the Fronde, from its outbreak in January 1648, through the Siege of Paris that ended on April 1, 1649. However, "patriotism" and related notions are contentious terms in early-modern European historiography. Most scholars of nationalism hold that such ideas

became thinkable only after the rise of modern, industrial nation-states,<sup>188</sup> or perhaps in the Enlightenment.<sup>189</sup> Very recently, however, some have pushed for a reexamination of the assumptions that summarily disqualify as “nationalist” all early-modern (or even earlier) appeals to national sentiment, the fatherland, and patriotism.<sup>190</sup> Though I stop short of sociologist Philip Gorski’s assertion that nationalism was a meaningful category as early as Hellenic or Hebraic antiquity,<sup>191</sup> my evidence reveals clearly nationalistic discourses and rhetoric at work among a significant subset of French people as early as 1649, and with roots stretching back centuries. On the basis of this evidence, I argue that the Fronde, and especially the Grand Condé’s role in the Fronde, provided not only the opportunity, but the cultural tools for populist rebels to advance innovative claims in the name of the nation.

In the course of my argument, I rely on a number of key terms, about which a word of explanation is required. Where I speak of the frondeurs’ *patrie* (itself, defined at length below) as a “nationalistic” discourse, I seek to convey the sense that they spoke for the nation in ways that prefigure, but do not meet the requirements of “true nationalism,” in mainstream scholars’ usage. Whereas nationalism typically appears as a universal, egalitarian construct which aims to wholly reshape a society, the *patrie* did not aim to

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<sup>188</sup> Among the most explicit and well-known proponents of this line are Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991); John Breuily, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Liah Greenfield, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992). Though these are only the most prominent examples, it can be broadly said that scholars until the 21st century accepted, almost unanimously and largely uncritically, that industrial modernity was a necessary condition for nationalism.

<sup>189</sup> See especially David Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in Early Modern France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 2001); Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

<sup>190</sup> Caspar Hirschi, *The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2012); Philip Gorski, “Nation-ization Struggles: A Bourdieusian Theory of Nationalism,” in Philip Gorski, ed. *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 248-265.

<sup>191</sup> Gorski, “Nation-ization Struggles,” 256; idem, “The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of Nationalism,” *The American Journal of Sociology* v. 105 (2000): 1428-1468.

embrace every soul within France's borders, it remained a rigidly hierarchical community, and it was an explicitly conservative force (albeit, a novel play on old forms), with the purpose of purifying France of foreign influences. Though I contend that the Fronde's *patrie* laid foundations for the construction of nationalism proper in years to come, I acknowledge that qualitative differences distinguish frondeurs' nationalistic rhetoric from later nationalism. I use the term "patriotism," therefore, to capture the affective, moralistic bonds that were supposed to tie a worthy Frenchman - a *bon françois*, in my sources - to his nation (or, less often and less ideally for my authors, her nation). Though I do not find the word "patriotism" itself in my texts, related terms like *compatriot* and *citoyen* do appear, suggesting the conceptual if not literal existence of patriotism, during Louis XIV's minority.

The following chapter argues that the Grand Condé provided a means to construct and express new ideals regarding the French community, and with it the monarchy and even private morality. First, I offer a survey of the Fronde's beginnings, highlighting especially the populist arguments that marked the earliest hours of the rebellion, as well as the Grand Condé's significant but secondary role as an actor and a symbol in French politics during the autumn of 1648. The universal concern over his choice of sides in those days highlights the power of his image in thinking about France - especially as the Prince returned to prominence in January of 1649. The balance of the chapter focuses on the *patrie*, a concept that catapulted to the forefront of political culture during the Siege of Paris. My close reading of frondeur pamphlets - especially the dozens that focused on Condé specifically - reveals a notion of national belonging and sentiment that had evolved, subtly but crucially, toward a community defined by generous service and affective attachments. Condé's status as an eminent nobleman, and a once-and-future national hero

but present-day enemy, provided authors with a uniquely useful figure. His nationwide renown, controversial actions, and peerless standing in the social and political schema of French absolutism could sustain assertions about the nation with nuance, emotion, and power. I argue that, to a significant extent, the Grand Condé (re)made the *patrie*.

The Siege of Paris was an extraordinary trauma in French society, and drew a passionate response from the Parisians who saw themselves as its unjustly victimized targets. The model of politics and national belonging that they produced drew creatively on discourses from the ancient and recent past as well as contemporary events, in building a nationalistic community. The Fronde's *patrie* served as a rallying point in their immediate circumstances, and ultimately as a turning point in the long historical arc of state formation and national identity.

### **“Monarchy Would Be Nothing But an Idea”: Populism in the Early Fronde**

In January of 1648, the Parlement of Paris undertook a series of procedural obstructions to the Crown's extraordinary fiscal measures; in January of 1649, the Queen ordered the Grand Condé to blockade Paris. The Fronde moved from the heady realm of high politics to the bloody theater of civil war with breathtaking speed, largely through the urgency that two entities demanded: the people, and the People. That is, the denizens of Paris - the lower-case people - rapidly mobilized and radicalized in defense of their beloved Parlement, against the tyrant Mazarin. At the same time, appeals to ideas of the People as an abstract figure - their relief, wellbeing, health, and related formulations of the public good - stirred up resentment against the Italian Cardinal-Minister, and added a sense of assurance to the judges' and Parisians' protests. Though the Grand Condé remained away

from the drama in the capital until September, his standing in French political culture made him a vital image to claim, for both the Crown and the rebels. While the frondeurs hoped, and Mazarin worried that Condé's *noblesse oblige* would compel him to defend the oppressed French, the royal party sought to use the Prince's image to communicate the benefits of order and obedience. The first year of the Fronde, then, planted two discursive seeds that would mark the five-year civil war: the communitarian rhetoric that would soon attach to the *patrie*, and the centrality of the Grand Condé for visions of French politics.

A brief explanation of the frondeurs' and my own use of ideas surrounding the "People" will help to situate the following pages. In the first place, the term only rarely signifies a collection of discrete individuals, in my sources. Instead, it refers in most cases to "the totality of a population," though this could have variously positive or pejorative connotations. As a political construct – a major part of the body of the State, and thus the source of an ethical/constitutional imperative for the King's benevolence - the People was an innocent, productive entity to be defended and succored.<sup>192</sup> As a sociological or demographic notion, however, the People most often appears as an unruly mass of negligible plebeians, a "many-headed beast" prone to unrest.<sup>193</sup> Clearly, the frondeurs played more on the former sense, and they played on it very heavily indeed. Orest Ranum notes, "the phrase 'relief of the people' had been heard with increasing frequency" in Parlement's debates over 1648, reaching "crescendo proportions" by late fall.<sup>194</sup> The

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<sup>192</sup> Huber Carrier, *Le labyrinthe de l'état: Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653)* (Paris: Champion, 2004), 121-124 provides an excellent overview of the ambivalent meanings of *Peuple*.

<sup>193</sup> Robert Schneider, "The 'Many-Headed Beast' and Monarchical Supremacy in the Age of Richelieu," paper presented at the Western Society for Historical Studies annual meeting 2012, Banff, Alberta. It should be noted that this negative sense of *Peuple* contains a far more individuated connotation - that is, the people are unruly because their many wills lead them in unpredictable, disorganized directions.

<sup>194</sup> Orest Ranum, *The Fronde: A French Revolution, 1648-1652* (New York: Norton, 1993), 169.

Crown, too, appealed frequently to the innocent People, in its public texts - in private discussions at Court and in councils, their connotations shifted dramatically toward the chaotic herd. For either side, though, the ability to speak convincingly to the people, and for the People, became a primary concern during the Fronde.

In light of the meanings attached to the People, the sense of often-used terms related to the People's welfare - *bien public, repos commun*, etc. - becomes clearer. More than the prosperity of some subset of individuals, these concepts denote the health of a community as a monolithic abstraction. Though anecdotal evidence of individual cases might be employed to convey the People's plight and evoke sympathy for their (more accurately, its) suffering, the public welfare appeared as an indistinct cloud, a political impulse that spurred virtuous action. Again, Ranum expresses this hazy notion well, in his expository remarks on the early Fronde: "The 'people' were a *force*," he concludes, and one whose support all actors in the Fronde sought concertedly to win, or at least claim.<sup>195</sup> As historians of early modern political and popular culture have noted, notions of the *bien public* exercised a powerful, ubiquitous influence in Old Regime society - especially as a means of justifying resistance or rebellion.<sup>196</sup> The frondeurs, true to form, clung to this sense of People from the movement's earliest days, and soon infused its community-focused rhetoric with the weighty moral, nationalistic implications of the *patrie*. With this background, then, we turn to the Fronde itself.

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<sup>195</sup> Ranum, *Fronde*, 53. Italics in original.

<sup>196</sup> See especially Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: La noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne, 1559-1661* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), which demonstrates the centrality of *bien public* rhetoric in noble culture, especially in the sixteenth century. On the downturn of communitarian language under Louis XIII, see below. Additionally, see Yves-Marie Bercé, *History of Peasant Revolts: The Social Origins of Rebellion in Early Modern France*, trans. Amanda Whitmore (Oxford, UK: Polity, 1990).

Louis XIV's *lit de justice* on January 15, 1648, in hindsight, marks the beginning of the Fronde. But on that morning, the King's appearance in a formal session of Parlement to force registration of controversial tax edicts seemed little more than another round in the constitutional tug-of-war between court and Crown.<sup>197</sup> As legal and political historians from A. Lloyd Moote to John Rule have noted, questions over the actually absolute power of the King's will had festered for decades, and Anne and Mazarin's regency had heightened those stresses considerably.<sup>198</sup> Since the latter years of Louis XIII's reign, and especially after his death, the Crown had endeavored to subjugate Parlementary power. Beginning with France's entry into the Thirty Years' War in 1635, the monarchy had pursued extraordinary measures on legal review, administrative procedure, and especially revenue collection to fund its costly anti-Habsburg agenda.<sup>199</sup> After Richelieu and the King's deaths, the regency government continued and in some ways intensified such efforts, especially on fiscal legislation and financial jurisdiction.<sup>200</sup> During Louis XIII's reign, Parlementaires and their supporters had decried such measures, but ultimately accepted that the King's power legally prevailed in these cases. By contrast, Anne and Mazarin's strong-arm tactics drew vehement criticism and ultimately resistance, in the uncertain context of royal minority.

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<sup>197</sup> On the ritual of the King's *Lit*, see Sarah Hanley *The Lit de Justice of the Kings of France: Constitutional Ideology in Legend, Ritual, and Discourse* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983), especially 307-321, on that particular meeting; Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 71-74, likewise narrates the session and its consequences ably. For contemporary accounts and reactions, see *Mémoires de Mathieu Molé*, 4 vol, ed. Aimé Champollion-Figeac (Paris: Renouard, 1856), iii: 195-200; *Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz* ed. Aimé Champollion-Figeac (Paris: Charpentier, 1837), 133-4; Madame de Motteville, *Chronique de la Fronde*, ed. Jean-Michel Delacomptée (Paris: Mercure de France, 2003), 38-39.

<sup>198</sup> Moote spends the first third of his *Revolt of the Judges* outlining the long history of royal-Parlementary conflict; though less thorough on this issue, Rule is attentive to the prehistory of his major concern with Louis XIV's personal reign. See *Louis XIV and the Parlements: the assertion of royal authority* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002).

<sup>199</sup> Albert Hamscher, *The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653-1673* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), xvii-xviii. J.H. Shennan details the financial expedients of 1635, as well as several other cases of "abuse" and "arbitrary authority" - as Shennan, among other observers within or sympathetic to the court have seen them: *The Parlement of Paris* (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1998), 244-254.

<sup>200</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 64-87.

The ceremony of January 15, 1648 arrived after five years of the Regent and her ministers passing onerous, effectively antagonistic fiscal measures through the Parlement, by procedural force or finesse. The *lit de justice* became the last straw. In the first place, a minority *lit* lacked solid precedent, and even its basic legality remained highly dubious.<sup>201</sup> The future Cardinal de Retz reports further that the laws in question, “each one more ruinous than the last, were not communicated to the [judges] until the audience itself.”<sup>202</sup> That is, not only had the Queen been uncivil in calling the session,<sup>203</sup> but the substance of the laws themselves provoked rancor, as the Crown targeted officeholders and privileged bodies in its desperate pursuit of war funds. The stage was set for a confrontation.

Though the judges unmistakably opposed the *lit*, in both form and content, their remonstrances were as respectful as ever. “The King was received with all the honor due him,” First President and Keeper of the Seals Mathieu Molé reports in his memoirs. But the meeting shortly turned adversarial. Molé himself described at length the poverty of the French people, who for years had shouldered the growing burden of wartime exactions. His speech climaxed as he posed the rhetorical question, “At such an important moment, is it just to speak of the duty of kings toward their people, and above all their inescapable obligation to heal them in their misery?” To reconsider the tax measures at hand would be “a resolution worthy of the name French,” he intoned, and would permit the resurgence of “French energies [*fureur*], …of the justice of its victorious arms and the valor of its nobility, which sheds its blood liberally for the grandeur of this monarchy, [and] of the love of the

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<sup>201</sup> There had been a minority *Lit* in 1645; however, it had been held on the day before a recess of the court, and thus had garnered less attention or controversy than in 1648. Further, the matter at issue concerned a legislative technicality regarding a bill to modify the *toisé*, and ultimately, the tax itself proved impossible to collect. Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 103-104; Shennan, *Parlement of Paris*, 257.

<sup>202</sup> Retz, *Mémoires*, 134.

<sup>203</sup> Molé, *Mémoires*, iii: 193-194.

people who always fulfill their duty toward the sovereign.”<sup>204</sup> Molé’s plea, which in a real sense began the Fronde, exhibits the major features of the patriotic rhetoric that dominated French politics during and after the rebellion: the moral valences of national community, the heightened significance of nobility for imagining French virtues, and unwavering love for the “sovereign.”<sup>205</sup> The best results for all of these issues, the most respected man in Parlement claimed, could be assured by helping the People.

In response, Queen Anne maintained a hard line, verging on insulting, regarding the power of the King’s will: to Molé and *avocat général* Talon’s careful remonstrances and graphic depictions of the public’s misery, “the Queen responded that *il faut obéir*, which disappointed the most *honnêtes* men of the Parlement.”<sup>206</sup> Eventually, the laws were registered and all objections silenced, but the *lit* seemed at best a qualified victory for the Regent, in the short term. Over the long run, it became an unmitigated disaster. The meeting that launched the Fronde further cemented the Parlement and Crown’s fundamental ideas: the judges posited the People’s good as the foremost consideration of politics, while the Queen maintained that obedience to the King’s will stood above all else.

Although the ceremony itself had maintained decorum, reactions in the days and weeks after turned toward open hostility. The day after the *lit*, Parlement convened to reopen debate on those laws, which the Queen considered a closed matter.<sup>207</sup> Over the

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid, iii: 199.

<sup>205</sup> It should be noted that Molé’s reference to the “sovereign” in this instance points toward the power of the King’s “divine body,” rather than the personal power of his corporeal presence. While this was a reasonable tactic - especially in the presence of the 10-year-old monarch - it hints at the ambiguous place of the King in *patrie* discourse. Further, Molé’s appeal to the people’s “duty” [*devoir*], rather than some more submissive term - “obedience” would likely have been the Queen’s preference - subtly suggests that royal orders that transgressed traditional moral or constitutional bounds might meet with resistance.

<sup>206</sup> Omer Talon, *Mémoires du feu M. Omer Talon, Avocat Général en la cour de Parlement* (Paris: Gosse & Neaulme, 1732), v: 294.

<sup>207</sup> Retz, *Mémoires*, 135.

course of the Spring, the judges repeatedly outmaneuvered the Crown to frustrate its legislative efforts, having “develop[ed] and perfect[ed] the techniques of legislative and judicial obstructionism” in the years since Louis XIII’s death.<sup>208</sup> They marshaled their procedural expertise to stymie the Regency’s program, always careful to remain technically within the bounds of law. Faced with continuing hostility from the Crown throughout the Spring, the judges on May 13, 1648 took the massive step of passing an *Arrêt de Union*, which brought together all of the chambers of the Parlement in the Chambre St. Louis. This was a powerful act of defiance against the monarchy, both symbolically and legally. The unified chambers met against royal orders (whose validity the judges ignored or denied), to review the Crown’s extraordinary measures, especially on taxation and venality, extending back through the regency.<sup>209</sup>

As the Parlement carried out its protest, the residents of Paris rallied to its side, and signs of the common people’s anger against Mazarin occasionally surfaced during the spring. The royal party now faced a rapidly deteriorating political situation, and dwindling options to address France’s ongoing fiscal crisis, which had acquired major constitutional implications. Another *lit de justice* on July 31, “no more successful than the previous ceremony,” saw the judges lecture the King on the need for reform.<sup>210</sup> Even Omer Talon, known for his royalist sympathies, protested vehemently: “The majesty of sovereigns, the authority that they possess, depends on the submission of their subjects... Without the people, States could not subsist, and Monarchy would be nothing but an idea.”<sup>211</sup> Implicitly working with the common metaphor of the body politic, Talon asserts that although the

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<sup>208</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 91-92.

<sup>209</sup> Shennan, *Parlement of Paris*, 263-4; Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 125-176.

<sup>210</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 148.

<sup>211</sup> Talon, *Mémoires*, 134.

head is the most influential member of the State's body, the People are no less important for the whole State's continued survival. Here, Talon echoes his colleague Molé's argument from January, that the community's welfare must be the first consideration for those in power.

The Grand Condé was probably relieved to have been spared the hassle of Parisian politics, for which he famously possessed little interest or talent.<sup>212</sup> He had been away from Paris throughout the spring and summer, conducting one of the most successful campaigns of his young career along the Flemish border. All the same, early 1648 was a trying time for the Prince: he had won major victories, but again felt that the Cardinal unjustly overlooked his requests. After the capture of Ypres and Mazarin's refusal to appoint the Duc de Châtillon as the city's governor, Condé spitefully refused to answer the Cardinal's letters for over two weeks. Between the Prince's caustic complaints of June 4 and an unremarkable missive of the 22<sup>nd</sup>, at least four letters from Mazarin went unanswered – the last of which, on the 20<sup>th</sup>, pointedly exhorted the Prince to send news. In the midst of a critical military endeavor, this silence would have been especially worrisome.<sup>213</sup> Though correspondence between the two men resumed after that, with all the pleasantries of baroque epistolarity, the substance of the dialogue left room to doubt the Prince's zeal for the Regent's service. When, for example, Mazarin solicited advice on facing Parlement's resistance in July, the Prince's reply was cagey and noncommittal, counseling vaguely that the Queen proceed

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<sup>212</sup> Henri Eugène Philippe Louis d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé pendant les XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 7 vol. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1886), iv: 289. The proof of his ineptitude in this field would come in the summer of 1652, when he squandered, needlessly and frankly foolishly, the goodwill of the populace. See Chapter 4, pp. 240-241.

<sup>213</sup> On Condé's particular grievances after Ypres, see Chapter 1, p. 56. The correspondence in question is held in the Archives de la Musée Condé [MC], P.ii.

calmly, and without injury to royal authority.<sup>214</sup> Would Condé's long-building, recently-stirred anger against Mazarin's statist policies push him to side with the newborn Fronde? The Frondeurs hoped it would, and Mazarin feared that it might.

The test came in the wake of the Battle of Lens, on August 19. The Prince's victory there shared many features with the Battle of Rocroi five years earlier: Condé employed similar tactics, to similar effect, and with equally significant implications for the larger war against Spain. The political fallout, however, differed completely. Paris in 1648 played host to the Fronde (as contemporaries had come to call the fledgling rebellion),<sup>215</sup> and news of Condé's triumph was a cause for joy, tinged with trepidation, on all sides. All informed observers understood that triumph at Lens had removed the only threat to France's northern frontier, freeing troops for any mission the Crown might propose. In his memoirs, Retz bluntly asserts that, "I considered that the army that had been victorious at Lens... could easily be used to invest and cut off goods to [Paris] in the space of a morning."<sup>216</sup> Mazarin clearly comprehended the situation as well, and Lenet remarks that "the glory of the Grand Condé [after Lens] allowed the Cardinal to make daring plans."<sup>217</sup> Those plans

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<sup>214</sup> Cited in Mark Bannister, *Condé in Context: Ideological Change in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford, UK: Legenda, 2000), 81.

<sup>215</sup> "La Fronde" took its name from reports - possibly apocryphal - that teenagers had shot out the windows of Mazarin's ornate carriage house with slingshots (*frondes*), at some point in 1648. Whether this actually happened, the word itself held heavy significance. William Beik notes that while rock-throwing was seen as an impulsive reaction to insult or outrage, slingshots carried the double connotation of youthful rage and indiscretion, as well as a level of premeditation and intentionality absent from the act of hurling a rock found close to hand. Thus, the name "Fronde" at once renders the movement frivolous or childish, yet purposeful and threatening. *Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France: the Culture of Retribution* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997), 31-32. Corroborating this reading, Ranum notes, "the word *fronde* became a shorthand to evoke congeries of disorderly, illegal, and violent activities. Allusions to the *fronde* often center on the idea of a collective prank or an adolescent game that could turn sour, become violent, and even take the lives of some of the participants." *The Fronde*, 5; see also his allusion to the carriage house incident, 51.

<sup>216</sup> Retz, *Mémoires*, 183.

<sup>217</sup> Pierre Lenet, *Mémoires de Pierre Lenet... concernant l'histoire du Prince de Condé...*, eds. Champollion-Figeac and Champollion in *Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France*, eds. Michaud and Poujoulat, Série 3: II (Paris: Editeur du commentaire du Code Civil, 1838), 516.

swung into motion on August 26, with the echoes of the *Te Deum* sung to celebrate France's victory scarcely faded from the stone of Notre Dame. The Regent ordered the arrest of three prominent Parlementaires known for their populist sympathies, and unwittingly touched off three days of violent riots, called the "Days of Barricades."<sup>218</sup> Though the Crown quickly relented and released the judges, tension and suspicion suffused the Parisian atmosphere.

After Lens, and especially after the Barricades, Condé's uncertain loyalties took on amplified importance for all sides, even beyond the military threat carried by a general of his standing.<sup>219</sup> The Frondeurs, for their part, nursed hopes that he would align his messianic reputation and martial prowess with the People's cause. One of 1648's bestselling burlesque pamphlets celebrates Lens, in expectation of similar exploits in the fight against Mazarin: "The illustrious Prince of Condé/ with his courage as an aid/ with his troops, like rolling thunder/ reduced the enemy to powder/ ...Everyone praised his prowess/ and all were filled with happiness."<sup>220</sup> The rift between the Cardinal and the Prince was perhaps the worst-kept secret in French politics, and the rebels had reason to expect that Condé might at last act on his simmering resentment against the Italian. Reports that the Cardinal had intentionally withheld support for Condé's failed siege of Lerida the year before stoked rumors of a rupture between the two men.<sup>221</sup> A short time

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<sup>218</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 151-152.

<sup>219</sup> On Parisian reactions to the news from Lens, see Ranum, *The Fronde*, 150-151.

<sup>220</sup> *Agréable recit de ce qui s'est passée aux derniers barricades de Paris, en vers burlesques* (1648), in Célestin Moreau, *Choix de Mazarinades*, 2 vol, (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1853), i: 8. I perceive that this pamphlet spoke to the common people of Paris, both because of its timing around the Day of Barricades, and because burlesque verse was almost always a medium for scurrilous accusations in the "style du Pont-Neuf," as Carrier labels such texts. *La Presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades. La Conquête de l'Opinion* (Geneva: Droz, 1989), 396.

<sup>221</sup> *Requeste des trois Estats présentée à Messieurs du Parlement* (np [Paris], 1648), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 32; *Lettre du chevalier Georges de Paris à Monseigneur le prince de Condé* (Paris, 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 150.

later, one pamphlet would warn the Prince that Mazarin's "malice, his perfidy, and his ingratitude are so well-known to the whole world that we all understand the evil recompense he's preparing for you."<sup>222</sup> The rebels appealed to the personal injustices Mazarin had perpetrated against Condé, and linked them to the Cardinal-Minister's tyrannical abuses against the People at large.<sup>223</sup>

As it moved from the chambers of Parlement to the streets of Paris, the Fronde continued to carry the banner of the *bien public*, against Mazarin's misused royal power. This self-positioning is significant, for Arlette Jouanna's exhaustive study shows that appeals to the common weal had receded as an element of rebellious discourse during the half-century before the Fronde.<sup>224</sup> Frondeurs resurrected such communitarian ideals in a variety of ways, from unvarnished appeals to "succor the masses," to texts claiming to speak for the unified *trois états* of France against Mazarin's exploitive, "machiavellian" power over the innocent People.<sup>225</sup> The rebels assumed that Condé's noble obligation to defend the weak, his interest in preserving the King's authority, and his superlative Frenchness would all attract him to their side.<sup>226</sup> They presented Mazarin's power as a "great scandal for all the Royal House and all of France" - both, objects to which they

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<sup>222</sup> *Advis d'Estat a Monsieur le Prince pour la seureté de sa personne & de sa vie, & pour l'augmentation de sa gloire* (Paris, 1649), 6; *Lettre du chevalier Georges de Paris à Monseigneur le prince de Condé* (Paris, 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 150.

<sup>223</sup> The frondeurs' belief in a direct correlation between Condé's treatment and the nation's health suggests that Condé's own claims to this effect during the Princely Fronde were based in a broad cultural assumption, beyond his private interests. See Chapter 4, below.

<sup>224</sup> Jouanna *Devoir de révolte*, 212. As the following pages will demonstrate, the claim that such populist rhetoric remained in abeyance during the Fronde is mistaken, though this is largely a product of Jouanna's focus and expertise as a *seizièmiste*. Yves-Marie Bercé finds examples of rebellions under Louis XIII using *bien public* rhetoric, though it occupies a secondary station, behind top-line complaints over taxes. See, for example, his analysis of pamphlets from the Périgord, in *History of Peasant Revolts*, 118-123.

<sup>225</sup> Archives Municipales de Bordeaux [AM Bdx], Manuscrits 214, f.95, *La requeste des trois états présentée a messieurs du Parlement* (1648); *Agréable récit*, in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 2, 7, 18.

<sup>226</sup> This is the major contention of Jouanna's *Devoir de révolte*: the French Second Estate understood itself as obliged to defend the nation, and even to revolt when a tyrannical ruler threatened the innocent people.

presumed the First Prince of the Blood would be uniquely attached.<sup>227</sup> After forcing the Regency's hand during the Days of the Barricades, the frondeurs had cause to think that Condé would return in triumph, to lead the virtuous Parisians against the tyrant Mazarin.

In contrast, the royal party's hopes for Condé's allegiance were more ambivalent.<sup>228</sup> Though they desired the threat of force that he and his army carried, they remained unsure about the Prince's personal loyalties, especially in the midst of the present Parisian uproar. When Condé sent word in the early days of September that he planned to return to the capital, therefore, Mazarin insisted that the Prince stay away.<sup>229</sup> In the wake of the Day of Barricades, the arrival of a personally popular general was a significant and unpredictable variable, and the royals did not yet trust that this circumstance, or Condé himself, would work in their favor. And in any case, Condé's presence could signal to France's enemies that its rebellion had grown so serious as to require the services of its most celebrated soldier - a sure sign of weakness, and an invitation to attack. Even the best-case scenario, in which Condé lent support in putting down the street fighting, presented danger to the regent, and Mazarin therefore attempted to keep the Prince at arm's length.

But when the Fronde found, in the recently-jailbroken Duc de Beaufort, the military commander it had so far lacked, the Regent's requirements suddenly shifted.<sup>230</sup> The rebels now had a credible general, and as such, the Crown's need for Condé's support outweighed

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<sup>227</sup> *Requeste des trois Estats*, in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 29.

<sup>228</sup> Pierre Goubert, *Mazarin* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 257. Moote corroborates this assessment, stating frankly that "No one could tell what these two princes [Orléans and Condé] might do." Though the King's uncle was less pivotal at this moment, it should be noted that his recidivist history of intrigues, combined with his famously pliable loyalties, made *Monsieur's* choice of sides as uncertain as Condé's animosity against Mazarin made his. Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 178.

<sup>229</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 515-516, Kossman, *La Fronde*, 72-74.

<sup>230</sup> Beaufort had escaped from the dungeon of Vincennes in early September. Aumale calls Beaufort "redoutable par son audace et sa popularité" - *Histoire*, v: 275. This estimation tempers, but does not necessarily contradict Bannister's view of the Duc as "singularly unintelligent," *Condé in Context*, 81. In any event, the Fronde had found a veteran general, who bore a deep, personal grudge against the Cardinal.

the risks of his presence, or even of his defection. In an abrupt about-face from Mazarin's initial diffidence, the Queen, Cardinal, and the Prince's mother each sent word on September 12 that Condé should return to Court as quickly as possible. Mazarin sweetened the deal by granting the Prince control of several Burgundian fortresses - ostensibly a reward for victory at Lens, but viewed by historians as the purchase price of a general's loyalty.<sup>231</sup> The Grand Condé arrived in Paris on the 20<sup>th</sup>, and made publicly and unmistakably clear that he would support the Crown.<sup>232</sup> The burlesque author who had previously celebrated his victory now lamented that, "The joy for which our [Parisians'] hearts made preparation/ was not to be of long duration." The Fronde's loss had been the Crown's immeasurable gain.

Condé's allegiance granted not only considerable martial and material advantages, but a potent cultural weapon. In taking the Duc d'Orléans' and the minor King's side, the Prince assured agreement among the three scions of the Bourbon line - the "Principle Heads of the Royal House." The King, his uncle, and his cousin formed a triumvirate that, when in harmony, powerfully represented nationwide cooperation under the King's will. We have seen appeals to this entity in mazarinades, and it continued as an important expression of political unity, for all sides, throughout the Fronde. Partisans deployed this figure during the Siege, and at the Rueil negotiations for its cessation; during the Princes' imprisonment, and after their release; and perhaps most of all during the Princely Fronde, by Condéan and royalist sympathizers alike.<sup>233</sup> At a moment of uncertainty regarding the

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<sup>231</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 179. The weeks of delay between the battle and the reward seems to support the view of a forward-looking "down payment," rather than a retrospective *quid pro quo*.

<sup>232</sup> Princesse de Condé Mère to Prince de Condé, 12 September 1648; Queen Anne to Prince de Condé, 12 September 1648; all in MC, P.ii.

<sup>233</sup> For the Siege, see below; on Rueil, see Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BN], Fonds Dupuy 754 ff.27-46; during the Prison of the Princes, see *Apologie pour Messieurs les Princes envoyée par Madame la Duchesse de*

locus of sovereignty, the unified Royal House provided a measure of assurance that the most important figures in French politics assented to nation's direction. In late 1648, Mazarin craved exactly such a stamp of approval, to counter the frondeurs' widely-accepted allegations of corruption and tyranny at the People's expense.

With the King, Orléans, and now Condé behind him, Mazarin claimed that the Principle Heads backed his policies: the King issued a declaration, certainly written by the Cardinal, proclaiming that the Duc and Prince "bear a truly authentic witness by their conduct, of how much they approve of the Council that Our cousin the Cardinal Mazarin has given Us."<sup>234</sup> The Principle Heads' assent allowed Mazarin to turn frondeur ideas back against their authors, who had argued that Condé and Orléans should take on an elevated importance in steering the ship of state during a regency.<sup>235</sup> In light of the Regency's inherent weakness, especially at a moment of popular unrest, Mazarin hoped that the alignment of the "principle heads" could help to compensate for the Cardinal and Queen's deficit in legitimacy.

The unity of the King's most important subjects helped to support claims of political power, and provided a critical tool in marking the borders of the national community. The royal party understood the potential of the "principal heads" for both of these applications. In a private letter, written just before Condé undertook the Siege of Paris, Mazarin

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*Longueville à Messieurs du Parlement de Paris* (np, nd [1650]); *Lettre du Parlement de Bourdeaux escrive à Monsieur le Duc d'Orléans* (Bordeaux: Mongiron Millange, 1651); during the Princely Fronde, see Chapters 4 and 5.

<sup>234</sup> Archive des Affaires Etrangères, Mémoires et Documents Français [AAE] 866, ff.71-74, *Declaration du Roy, portant suppression de toutes les Charges & Offices dont sont pourveneus les gens cy-devant tenans la Cour de Parlement de Paris, pour les causes y contenus*, 23 January 1649. Though this pronouncement came during the Siege, the Cardinal's persistent use of such rhetoric suggests his firm conviction that it *should* work, even if it had initially failed to pacify Paris.

<sup>235</sup> *Contract de mariage du Parlement avec la Ville de Paris* (Paris: 8 January, 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 39. Coincidentally, on the "ship of state" metaphor, see the broadsheet, *Le salut de la France dans les armes de la ville de Paris* (Paris, 1649), reprinted in Carrier, *Conquête de l'opinion*, 416, which depicts Mazarin as ready to scuttle the ship of France for his own profit.

estimated that, short of brute force, the most effective means “to bring the Rebels to heel is through the union of the principal heads of the Royal House.” The two most powerful Princes of the Blood, “who, for the love and the care they have for the good of the state and for sustaining the Royalty that [the Frondeurs] wish to undermine, cooperate to the fullest extent of their power, of their *crédit*, of their friendships, and of their persons, in order to uphold a cause which is no less their own than the King’s.”<sup>236</sup> This text is significant, both as evidence of Mazarin’s esteem for the power of political culture, and as an expression of the statist terms in which he understood the categories of “Rebel” and “*bons françois*.” The Prince and Duc are admirably French, by virtue of their support for the State and Royalty - tellingly, not the King himself (who remarkably appears as something of a coequal with the Princes in support for the State’s “cause,” here). In opposition stand the “Rebels,” who seek to undermine that Royalty, and by implication are either bad Frenchmen, or not French at all. Mazarin frames national belonging as an issue of obedience to royal power, without any consideration for the People. In this way, the unity of the Royal House helped to delimit the boundaries of the truly French community in Mazarin’s view, and thus to legitimate claims made in the name of the nation.

Mazarin’s use of the “Principle Heads” as a rhetorical weapon against the nascent Fronde failed - but it was a revealing failure, in two ways. First, he used it explicitly as an example-in-miniature of his ideal French politics, further clarifying his conception of the monarchy’s correct form and workings. In Mazarin’s estimation, obedience to the royal will and loyalty to the state were the only meaningful terms distinguishing Good Frenchmen from Rebels. In this regard, Condé’s well-known grievances against the Cardinal were in

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<sup>236</sup> BN, Fonds Dupuy 775 f.83, Mazarin to M. du Fontenay, 6 January 1649.

fact a boon, for the Prince's agreement, despite his dissatisfaction, showed the unqualified submission Mazarin hoped to elicit from the Parisians. The "Principle Heads" was the Cardinal's last, best hope for promoting his statist model without violence.<sup>237</sup> Its impotence, secondly, reveals the contours of the frondeurs' preferred vision of France's monarchy, and its community. Mazarin had recognized national belonging as a concern to address, but made only an implicit effort to define the worthy French nation, which included himself by virtue of Condé and Orléans' assent. For the populist Parisians, however, community was overwhelmingly the primary concern. So, where Mazarin posed obedience to the state as the key issue, frondeurs' concern with the *bien public* overshadowed all other considerations. Though they proclaimed their adoration for the King at every opportunity, the rebels refused to submit to the royal will, when wielded by a tyrant against the good of the People. For this reason alone, Mazarin's claims were doomed from the start.

The Grand Condé had been a significant, but mostly secondary character in the first year of the Fronde. His victory at Lens had renewed hopes that the People might find in him a champion. Instead, Condé's potential return to Paris catalyzed the explosion of violence during the Days of Barricades in late August, although he mostly remained on the sidelines until September. As fall turned to winter, however, the Prince's importance steadily grew. In the realm of cultural symbolism, his fidelity gave Mazarin the means to articulate the harmony and peace that came from obedience. And in the realm of power politics, Condé played a major role in hammering out the October agreement between the Crown and Parlement, which granted major concessions to Parlement and temporarily normalized life

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<sup>237</sup> Though Mazarin used the "Principle Heads" as an example of subjects' duties to the abstract state, it should be noted that others might interpret it differently. Condé, for one, appears to have understood his obligation to obey as a function of his personal status as First Prince of the Blood, rather than the legal requirement that Mazarin used his agreement to promote.

in Paris. Having regained the Queen's confidence, the Prince resumed his role as a leading voice in the Royal Council in the months to follow.<sup>238</sup> As the new year dawned, however, the Grand Condé's persona again became a primary site for imagining France and the People. The Siege of Paris was a defining moment in the history of French nationalism, and it could have had no more appropriate conductor than the Grand Condé.

### **The Siege of Paris: Physical, Political, and Cultural Battlefield**

The Siege of Paris should not have surprised any politically-minded residents of France. Many in the capital had thought a blockade likely since August, and neither the Parlement nor the Crown was satisfied with the "treaty" reached on October 22 - still less was anyone convinced that further violence would be avoided.<sup>239</sup> And yet, the reality of a royal army investing the "the great head of the French kingdom's body" shocked the nation, and produced a spectacular reaction.<sup>240</sup> The Siege itself was an extraordinary confrontation and trauma, simultaneously operating at the levels of constitutional theory, cultural representation, as well as visceral fear, want, and hunger. Before interrogating the frondeurs' response, then, we must understand the circumstances and mentalities that conditioned their views of the Siege.

The events of 1648 had convinced the Regent that a battle of institutional politics would always favor the Parlementaires, in substance and especially in public perceptions.

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<sup>238</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 157; Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 290-291.

<sup>239</sup> Kossman is most explicit on the shaky ground left in the wake of this agreement, claiming that after detailing the contentious process of its creation, "il ne paraît pas nécessaire d'insister sur ses faiblesses." The October Declaration largely favored the judges, permitting continued meetings of the Chambre St. Louis and affirming many of its "reforms" of the Regency's extraordinary policies. But even Parlementaires viewed it as merely papering over the fundamental problems of the monarchy. It was, in effect, a stop-gap or a cease-fire agreement, tacitly assumed by all sides to provide a temporary lull which might lead to calmer talks, and a more solid peace - or at least a respite in which to gather forces for a decisive confrontation. *La Fronde*, 75.

<sup>240</sup> Le *salut de la France*, reprinted in Carrier, *Conquête de l'opinion*, 416.

In the October negotiations with the judges, then, Anne hurriedly accepted terms favorable to the obstructionist judges in order to buy time, and to consider the varieties of force that might be deployed. By December, the royal party's discussions had moved from whether to attack Paris, to when and how.<sup>241</sup> The Duc de la Meilleraye advocated "smoak and gunpowder" in a direct attack on the city, while Secretary of State for War le Tellier suggested a blockade, which he hoped would turn the Frondeurs against each other and against their leaders.<sup>242</sup> Condé and Mazarin's respective roles in the planning stages are hazy. Accounts predictably portray one as desperate or bloodthirsty, and the other as cool-headed and circumspect in the face of an impossible situation, according to the author's feelings toward these polarizing figures. Moote's conclusion seems most plausible: Mazarin deferred to Condé's battlefield experience, which caused the Prince to prefer a siege to house-to-house fighting against Parisians, on Parisian streets.<sup>243</sup> Ultimately, though, the Regent was content with any plan that would simultaneously restore order - synonymous with obedience, in her mind - and punish the upstart judges. With the remark, "I prefer Paris lost than disobedient," Anne removed her son and the royal court from Paris in the early hours of the Day of Kings, January 6, 1649, and blockaded the city with royal troops.<sup>244</sup>

Condé took command of the Siege, as the Queen instructed. But the operation saw little military action, other than the skirmish known as the Battle of Charenton, and a few

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<sup>241</sup> As these negotiations were carried out in person and in secret, no firsthand documentary evidence survives (or probably ever existed). The available accounts, and my own understanding of the matter rely on memoirs and other *ex post facto* testimony, many of which gainsay each other. Ultimately, there can be little certainty about the matter. See, variously, Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 286-288, 307; Benjamin Priolo, *The History of France under the Ministry of the Cardinal MAZARINE (...)*, trans. Christopher Wase (London: J. Starkey, 1671), 116-119; Retz, *Mémoires*, 204-218; Motteville, *Chronique*, 138-139.

<sup>242</sup> Priolo, *Ministry of Cardinal Mazarine*, 116-117.

<sup>243</sup> *Revolt of the Judges*, 185.

<sup>244</sup> BN, *Manuscrits Français [MFr] 17560*, f. 12b, cited in Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 184-185. The festive significance of January 6 was probably intentional, and certainly not lost on the Parisians.

abortive sorties attempted by the passionate but inexperienced Parlementary forces. With the exception of Charenton, these encounters each gave easy, relatively bloodless victories to the seasoned veterans of Condé's army.<sup>245</sup> The Prince had anticipated such resistance, and by all accounts he applied himself to planning the operation with no less vigor than his campaigns against Habsburg forces.<sup>246</sup> Ultimately, the Siege of Paris would last nearly two months, from the King's flight on January 6 until the start of negotiations between Parlement and Crown on March 5. Both sides had readied for a longer standoff, but the threat of Spanish forces on the northern frontier forced the royals to accept the Treaty of Rueil, another mutually unsatisfactory settlement with the Parlementary faction, which was finalized on April 1, 1649.<sup>247</sup> As a *realpolitik* military undertaking, blockading Paris had seemed at first a bold, decisive move; in the final analysis, it was as anticlimactic as it was useless in resolving the dispute between Crown and Parlement.

Though not the turning point both sides had anticipated, the Siege was nevertheless massively significant in Parisians' civic consciousness. The very fact of a blockade provoked vehement outcry, for the choice to deploy the King's armies against Paris recalled the crisis of the Catholic League during the Wars of Religion, and implied that an equally severe malady now infected the land. In case any Parisians needed to be reminded of this comparison, pamphleteers were happy to refresh the public's awareness: one tract, framed

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<sup>245</sup> Ranum asks, regarding the months prior to the Siege, "Could bakers, candlestick-makers, and lawyers be trained to combat a royal army commanded by Condé?" *The Fronde*, 181. By way of response, see Motteville, *Chronique*, 156-165, for a firsthand account of the military misfortunes of the frondeur armies. As we will see, Charenton was notable for the death of the Duc de Châtillon - see below, pp. 128-134.

<sup>246</sup> Indeed, if we allow that Condé's commitment to the royal party may be measured by the degree of his preparation for the task before him, there can be little question of his loyalty. Aumale, *Princes de Condé* v. 318

<sup>247</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 210-214. Like the October Treaty before it, the Treaty of Rueil was widely seen as a compromise that favored Parlement, though the judges were once again mistrustful of Mazarin's good faith in its execution. Their suspicions were not misplaced, though the consequences fell mostly on frondeur noblemen, as well as the Grand Condé, as Chapter 3 will make clear.

as a letter from the personified France, asked the septuagenarian Duc d'Angoulême to recall that “you came into the world during the troubles of the *Religionnaires*, during this monarchy’s darkest days. You witnessed the birth of the League and the battles that followed.” With a similar fate about to befall Paris, France understands how “your spirit must tremble [at remembering] the horrific scenes that played upon my stage, in those times.” But the present situation surpasses anything in the Duc’s long life: now, “a misfortune which has no example in History will rip open my wounds, and tear my poor entrails to pieces.”<sup>248</sup> The feminine France’s plaintive appeal to the reader emphasizes the injustice, the cruelty of the Siege. The inhabitants of the capital city certainly did not feel that their protests had risen to the level of the Wars of Religion, and the royals’ choice to counter their unruliness with outright repression felt like a disproportionate escalation.

The Siege seemed particularly heinous in light of more recent circumstances. First and most immediately, the past several years’ harvests had been meager, and a blockade during the winter following a near-famine seemed a vicious tactic, heaping misery upon the already-miserable.<sup>249</sup> Despite concerted preparation, stores of food in the capital ran low in barely two weeks.<sup>250</sup> Second, the most recent French siege of a French city had been at La Rochelle in 1628-1629. That action had lasted more than a year and killed perhaps 80% of the city’s population, mainly by starvation.<sup>251</sup> Parisian frondeurs felt their cause had not earned the same chastisement as the heretics there, and protested that they wished only to follow the King’s righteous will. The ancient and recent histories of royal sieges dovetailed

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<sup>248</sup> *Les souhaits de la France à Monseigneur le duc d'Angoulesme* (Paris, 11 January 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 82-83.

<sup>249</sup> Emmanuel le Roy Ladurie, *Histoire humaine et comparée du climat: canicules et glaciers, XIII<sup>e</sup>-XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Paris: Fayard, 2004), i: 367-372.

<sup>250</sup> Ranum describes the state of Paris’s reserves in some depth, *Fronde*, 197-207.

<sup>251</sup> David Parker, *La Rochelle and the French Monarchy: Conflict and Order in Seventeenth-Century France* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1980).

with the circumstances of the day to render the present Siege a form of mass torture, in frondeurs' minds. In short, every aspect of the 1649 Siege reinforced the view that Mazarin sought to bleed the French people, perhaps literally, in service to his Machiavellian thirst for power.<sup>252</sup> Unsurprisingly, these mentalities, along with the experience of the Siege, inspired an extraordinary outpouring of fury. Historians are fortunate that this rage largely took the form of printed pamphlets, called *mazarinades* after their favorite target.

The literature of the blockaded Parisians was extraordinary in two senses. First, in volume: during each of the first three months of 1649, frondeur presses produced more *mazarinades* than in any other month during the Fronde. Every month for three months, printers produced more than 400 distinct pamphlets, which readers avidly consumed.<sup>253</sup> And the texts themselves are extraordinary, providing a vivid account of the cultural landscape of French politics during the crisis of the Fronde. They are complex evidence, however, and a word to explain their reception, and my use of them is necessary.

In the first place, Christian Jouhaud is correct to note that *mazarinades* are "not the reflection of a public opinion, and provide only a very poor history of political ideas."<sup>254</sup> Still, I contend that these texts illuminate the terms and arguments that authors believed would resonate with their audience at that moment.<sup>255</sup> Myriam Yardeni takes the same

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<sup>252</sup> "...Le sang des pauvres estoit employé à faire rire le Cardinal Mazarin." *L'amende honorable de Jules Mazarin des crimes qu'il a commis contre dieu, contre le royaume, & contre lui-même* (Paris, 1649), 4; "S'il [Mazarin] se peut voir un jour dedans ton sang baigné,/Jamais il ne s'est pleu dans sa pourpre Romaine,/Au point que celle-là satisfera sa haine." *Souspirs François sur la paix Italienne* (s.l., 1649), 4.

<sup>253</sup> Carrier, *Conquête de l'opinion*, 275. In fact, production during the siege nearly doubled that of the next-closest month, July 1652, during the Grand Condé's controversial reappearance in Paris.

<sup>254</sup> Jouhaud, *Mazarinades*, 38.

<sup>255</sup> I read Jouhaud as drawing a fine distinction between "arguments" (or the like) and "ideas," here. I take the latter term to connote a rigorous system of thought, at the level of political theory, which *mazarinades* very rarely even approach. This is not to say they were devoid of "ideas" in a more colloquial sense, though their discourses were more often based in emotion and hearsay than formal ideology. Accusations that Mazarin was a vampire, sorcerer, or demon, for example, could hardly be considered a new branch of political theory. Along with Condé's "personal patriotism" (see Chapter 4), I deem the *mazarinades*' contentions as part of an

approach to pamphlets from the Wars of Religion: "Good propaganda never creates from nothing, but always bases itself on available realities and states of the soul, prone to exploitation toward its ends."<sup>256</sup> Accordingly, I assume that mazarinades were not the direct product of Parisian "opinion," but reflect authors' view of the frondeurs' loves, prejudices, and fears.<sup>257</sup> So, authors variously railed against the eponymous Italian Cardinal, lauded the Parlementary judges, or pled with Condé, because they felt such tactics would spur their audience to action, as Jouhaud concludes. But in doing so, they reveal the attitudes that authors who had a vested interest in understanding the public mood, believed dominated the city - a secondhand account of those mentalities, to be sure, but as good a documentary basis as the early modern world often provides.

Who, then, were these authors, and who comprised their audience? The former question is difficult to answer, even in generalities - Hubert Carrier's two-volume study of these texts devotes several hundred pages to sketching a response, and still leaves major issues unresolved. Difficulties arise, in the first place, because the majority of texts are anonymous, pseudonymous, or of dubious attribution. Barely 25% of the Fronde's more than 5,200 pamphlets name the author (many of whom were farcically attributed, such as pamphlets by Mazarin's testicles or the Queen's bedsheets), and more than 1,000 of those were letters, declarations, or other pronouncements by the King or other major public

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"ethos," in the sense of a relatively consistent and self-contained cultural/mental model, albeit one lacking the philosophical rigor characteristic of formal political theory in the tradition of Bodin, Grotius, or Bossuet.

<sup>256</sup> Myriam Yardeni, *Conscience Nationale en France Pendant les Guerres de Religion (1559-1598)* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1971), 17.

<sup>257</sup> "Opinion," of course, evokes a persistent debate over the existence or nature of "public opinion" prior to the Habermasian public sphere of the 18th century. Though not my major focus, I do perceive that frondeurs took seriously the power of rumor, propaganda, and some level of popular consciousness, however rudimentary or poorly-informed. As such, I agree with Jeffrey Sawyer and Hélène Duccini, who cite the reign of Henri IV and the minority of Louis XIII as demonstrating a similar style of "public opinion." See Sawyer, *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), and Duccini, *Faire Voir, Faire Croire: l'Opinion Publique Sous Louis XIII* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2003), 58-69.

figures. Even with close study, the authors of fewer than 20% of all texts may be cited with certainty.<sup>258</sup> Still, Carrier concludes that many, perhaps most authors during the Siege were people of little means and relatively low social standing - "starving poets created by the Blockade," like parish priests, schoolteachers, colporters, comedians, etc. However, as he acknowledges, much of the evidence for this case rests on dismissive remarks from royalist contemporaries.<sup>259</sup> Though a few more disinterested sources, and sometimes the texts themselves, hint that many Siege-era mazarinades were penned by underprivileged laborers or minor clerics, I find the sources too uncertain to support more than a tentative suggestion. So, while pamphleteers' popular origins would fit with the populist zeitgeist of the Siege, proving the authorship of these tracts is largely impossible, and in any case tangential to my major claims. Their rhetoric and their reception are the crucial points.

The issue of audiences is only slightly less opaque than authorship. We know with certainty that mazarinades flew from the presses, through the hands of print shops, street vendors, and partisans, and were avidly consumed by the people of Paris.<sup>260</sup> In some cases, we may discern from the texts themselves what kinds of readers authors hoped to reach: many address specific individuals, or else employ a distinct style, idiom, or discourse crafted to appeal to a particular segment of the population. However, Carrier's analysis shows that 56% of the mazarinades targeted a general audience, or a mixture of sub-groups, while 44% seem to have aimed at a discrete readership. Carrier finds that 27% of all texts were intended for an upper crust of the "cultivated bourgeoisie, *robins*, or

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<sup>258</sup> In addition to the previously-cited 1989 volume, see his *La presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades. Les hommes du livre* (Geneva: Droz, 1991), 77-91.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.* 17-24.

<sup>260</sup> Even without analyzing the number of pamphlets or the volume of press runs (which Carrier duly does) the texts themselves speak to a voracious appetite for the printed word: indeed, one pamphlet was entitled *Remerciement des imprimeurs à Monseigneur le Cardinal Mazarin*. Carrier, *Conquête de l'opinion*, 420-424.

churchmen," 10% for the popular classes, 4% for merchants, and the remainder for the First or Second Estates.<sup>261</sup>

Yet, what impact would printed tracts have made on a largely illiterate population? Though cities in general, and Paris in particular, tended to read more and better than the countryside, the printed word could probably reach less than half of the capital's inhabitants directly.<sup>262</sup> However, private reading was not the only, or perhaps even the primary vector of transmission in the seventeenth century, as contemporaries and the mazarinades themselves frequently remind us. Criers made official documents known, friends or family would read aloud at home, and strangers would publicly verbalize posted placards or new pamphlets for the benefit of those who could not decode them. All of these activities were more widespread and urgent than ever during the calamity of the Siege. Further, images, songs, and rhymed verse with memorable refrains were accessible to anyone who cared to hear or see them. So, whether through public readings or other non-textual engagement, mazarinades were able to reach a far wider audience than literacy rates alone would suggest.

I conclude that the literature of the Fronde was largely produced and consumed by what I will call the "political public": that portion of the population with interest in, and access to information regarding the government and nation at large. In normal times, this would have included a relatively narrow cross-section of France's three estates - mainly

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<sup>261</sup> Carrier, *Conquête de l'opinion*, 390-391.

<sup>262</sup> Though firm literacy figures are notoriously elusive for the seventeenth century (thanks to the destruction of contemporary Etat Civil records during the Commune), Carrier estimates that "la plupart" of Paris could read. I find this assumption slightly rosy. So, while H.-J. Martin suspects that most Parisians were at best functionally literate, a slew of scholars have shown the great strides that literacy had made since the school-founding movement that came with the Counter-Reformation. (See Carrier, *Conquête de l'opinion*, 405, notes 80-84.) I suspect that Carrier somewhat overextends these findings, however. My own estimation of Parisian literacy during the Fronde falls around 2/5, though I must emphasize the inherent insecurity of any firm figure. In any case, the following analysis renders such quibbling largely inconsequential.

city-dwellers with some minimal degree of education and leisure, who were probably (but not necessarily) literate. In a cataclysm like the Siege, however, when political events placed all Parisians under immediate threat, the borders of the political public would have enveloped nearly the whole population of the city. That is, as political interests became directly personal interests to a wide swath of individuals, the desire for knowledge of goings-on in the Parlement or Palais Royal would, and certainly did, swell proportionately. Further, because the events at Paris had broad, kingdom-wide implications, the Siege spurred a concurrent, if smaller, spike in demand for news about national and Parisian events, in the provinces. The political public's ranks thinned again after the détente of the Treaty of Rueil, but the people of France - and Paris above all - very clearly took an elevated interest in political arguments during the early months of 1649.

The dearth of royalist pamphlets during the Siege bears mention. Though the monarchy had built up a formidable press apparatus under Richelieu, Mazarin failed to make extensive use of the written word as a weapon in the civil war until after the King's majority, in September 1651.<sup>263</sup> In fact, he seems to have consciously decided to forgo widespread pamphleteering, in the face of his advisor Gabriel Naudé's frequent urging. Whether he thought that a concerted textual counteroffensive would be ineffective among the Parisians, redundant to military measures, or simply unnecessary, the rather startling result remains: the virulently anti-Mazarin pamphlets of 1649 went largely unanswered.

From the roughly 900 Siege-era pamphlets, I have analyzed 181 anti-Mazarin Parisian mazarinades. My sample excludes pro-royal tracts, those printed outside of Paris

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<sup>263</sup> Duccini, *Faire Voir, Faire Croire*, Chapters 1 & 8; Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, Chapter 1; and Marie-Noëlle Grand-Mesnil, *Mazarin, la Fronde, et la presse, 1647-1649* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), Introduction; Carrier, *Conquête de l'opinion*, 145-204.

(except for reprints of Parisian tracts to which I did not otherwise have access), and Parliamentary *arrêts* of a procedural or legalistic nature, which were quite numerous. In positive terms, I preferred texts by and for frondeur Parisians, of a persuasive or partisan nature, because these were likeliest to advance claims regarding the *patrie* and its membership. Finally, my sample skews slightly toward the most popular and widely-distributed tracts, both by virtue of Moreau's *Choix de Mazarinades*, which reproduces some of the most influential texts, as well as simple availability.

Within this selection, the Grand Condé plays a major part in 74 pamphlets (41%), almost always cast as an antagonist, or a criminal in need of correction. And, perhaps obviously, Mazarin figures prominently in nearly all of the pamphlets that bear his name, though I focus less on the Cardinal than the Prince. Additionally, 55 (30%) make claims explicitly about the *patrie*. Many more - indeed, a clear majority - mobilize a diffuse patriotic or communitarian discourse without using the term *patrie* itself.<sup>264</sup> The sudden prominence of the *patrie* is striking, in view of its near-total absence, to my awareness, in texts from before the Siege. In short, the mazarinades of early 1649 spoke extensively about the Grand Condé and about the *patrie*, in direct response to the royals' blockade.

In the limited scope of the Fronde, the Siege of Paris was a significant stalemate. It ratcheted up the use of violence from protests and riots to full-scale civil war, and the use of print from a trickle to a flood. Still, the Siege changed little in the balance of power between Crown and Parlement, and resolved none of the political tensions that plagued

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<sup>264</sup> See, for example, the (falsified) words of Count-Duke Olivarez, in *Lettre du Comte Duc d'Olivarez Ministre d'Estat du Roy d'Espagne a Jules Mazain Cardinal & n'agueres Ministre d'Estat du Roy de France* (Paris: Francois Noel, 1649). In this text, the despised Spanish minister advises the despised French-Italian minister on how to achieve his goals, by appearing to possess traits and virtues that were strongly associated with patriotic discourse: generosity, wisdom, and selfless love for King and kingdom. This text fits seamlessly with the patriotic sensibilities of Parisian frondeurs, though the word *patrie* is absent.

France. The Treaty of Rueil largely confirmed the “reforms” initiated by the Chambre St. Louis in 1648, granted concessions to various noblemen, and eventually returned the King to Paris - in a sense, it treated symptoms, without addressing the kingdom’s festering illness.<sup>265</sup> In the long view of French political and national evolutions, though, the Siege of Paris was a transformational event. Parisian mazarinades responded to the Crown’s perceived cruelties, executed by the Grand Condé, by developing a communitarian, nationalistic discourse - the *patrie* - that posed new relationships between individual and community, subject and sovereign, French and France. We turn, now, to the substance of frondeur patriotism.

### **Of Tyranny, Treachery, and Patriotism: Building the *Patrie* during the Siege of Paris**

The Crown had hoped that the Siege of Paris would end the Fronde. Not only did it fail in this aim, but its perceived brutality generated innovative political discourses centered on the *patrie*, providing the rebels with a shared sense of duty and purpose. The frondeurs’ textual counterattack drew creatively from millennia of history, as well as France’s immediate circumstances. From these foundations, the Fronde constructed a vision of the national community in which compatriots were bound together by their mutual, moral obligations to the People. The King led, but did not embody this community, which was defined by its exclusion not only of literal foreigners, but of moral foreigners who injured or failed to protect France. In popularizing such patriotic discourse, the Fronde introduced a third competitor to the cultural contest between Condé’s personal kingship and Mazarin’s statism. The *patrie* provided a new and powerful means of imagining

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<sup>265</sup> Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 213-214.

national sentiment, subjecthood, and belonging, which left a lasting imprint on the French state and nation. The following pages will trace the genealogy of French patriotism, before examining the central terms of frondeurs' *patrie* rhetoric, in word and in deed. Finally, we will examine the roles of the Grand Condé and the Duc de Châtillon in defining frondeur patriotism. The Fronde's conception of the French community responded to Mazarin's crimes, to be sure, but the rebels' more ambivalent relationship with Condé, and to a lesser extent Châtillon, provided a uniquely rich site for imagining the form and substance of the Fronde's pure, virtuous France. The sum of all these discursive strategies amplified and intensified the communitarian rhetoric of 1648, with far-reaching ramifications for French politics and culture.

### *Patriotic Precedents*

The frondeurs used and adapted the *patrie* in novel ways, but the notion itself had an ancient history.<sup>266</sup> The Roman concept of *patria*, "fatherland," connoted a deep sentimental attachment to the place of one's birth and belonging. This *patria* had survived in Latin jurisprudence and political thought, though within the limited confines of the city-states that dominated Italian life through the Renaissance.<sup>267</sup> The term arrived and flourished in France around the Hundred Years' War, though *patria* held mainly religious or hyper-local connotations until the reign of Francis I.<sup>268</sup> In the early sixteenth century, the neologism *patrie* had come to encompass the whole kingdom of France, but the Wars of

<sup>266</sup> Caspar Hirschi, *The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2012), 1-20, provides a suggestive, if necessarily cursory overview of the pre-modern usages of "patriotism," which he contends originated in the medieval era as a tool by which monarchs endeavored to compel loyalty and service to a still-weak state.

<sup>267</sup> Charlotte Wells, *Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1995), 9-15.

<sup>268</sup> Colette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France* trans. Susan Ross Hutton (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1991), 5.

Religion turned patriotism on its head. Those decades of civil war made the King and *patrie* into distinct entities, whereas before their unity had remained an unexamined assumption.<sup>269</sup> Claiming loyalty to the *patrie* became a way for combatants to maintain ties to France, but not the King, during a time of contested authority. With the end of the civil wars and the acceptance of Henri IV as ruler, the monarch once again united his person with the *patrie*: “It was the King who incarnated and represented all the interests of the *patrie*, and national sentiment was indissolubly tied to his person.”<sup>270</sup> The wartime urgency attached to *patrie* discourse faded under Henri IV and Louis XIII, but the basic terms of the concept had been set.

At the dawn of the *Grand Siècle*, then, French patriotism hinged on three general features. First, the political public had come to think of itself as distinct from, and superior to other nations, as a result of better land, culture, history, language, government, and other traits.<sup>271</sup> These superlative national attributes proved God’s special favor for France.<sup>272</sup> Second, the sense of French superiority and divinely-ordained dominance prompted an affective attachment to one’s homeland, and service on her behalf. So, because France and her King were first among God’s children, working on behalf of the *patrie* was akin to piety

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<sup>269</sup> Yardeni, *Conscience Nationale* 201.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid, 317.

<sup>271</sup> On the broad contours of early-modern national identity, I rely mainly on John A. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1982) and Hirsch, *Origins of Nationalism*. Though theoretically outdated, and prone to conflating prescription and practice, Orest Ranum’s edited volume, *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1975) provides a solid overview of the period. A succinct, contemporary expression of the French sense of superiority comes in the pamphlet *Discours véritable d’un seigneur à son fils qui voulloit suivre le party de Mazarin* (Paris: Arnold Cotinet, 1649), 5: “La Fortune, la Victoire, et la Renommée avoient rendu [la France] depuis tant de temps l’amour et le terreur de toute l’Europe.”

<sup>272</sup> Yardeni, *Enquêtes sur l’Identité de la “Nation France”: de la Renaissance aux Lumières* (Paris: Champ Vallon 2005), 112; idem, *Conscience Nationale*, 34. Additionally, this strand of national pride accords with Philip Gorski’s perception of “Hebraic Nationalism,” in “The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of Nationalism.” *The American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (2000): 1428-1468.

or charity of any other sort, and counted as a virtue, if not a strict obligation.<sup>273</sup> Third, all of the sentiments and loyalties bound up with the *patrie* flowed through the person of King.<sup>274</sup> In this sense, the surge in patriotism born in the Wars of Religion became a wave of monarchophilia, as Henri IV reunited his person with the *patrie*. In sum, patriotism under the early Bourbons combined French exceptionalism with a moralistic incitement to service, focused on the King.

This model of the *patrie* held sway over the early decades of the 1600s, though its unity with the King magnified the monarch personally and minimized the importance of the *patrie* itself. Especially during the reign of Louis XIII, Jouanna perceives a decline in patriotic rhetoric.<sup>275</sup> Though scholarship is thinner for this period than the Wars of Religion, notions of the *bien public* seem to have lost some of their power in the decades before the Fronde. Meanwhile, the figures at the heart of the “rise of absolutism” - Richelieu and Louis XIII - consciously focused attention on the State, and especially on the King as its incarnation. In this way, the “personal modality” described by Jay Smith contributed to the momentary abeyance of patriotism as a self-contained strand of political discourse.<sup>276</sup> While the *patrie* by no means disappeared, its renewed association with the King, especially during the relatively long reign of a competent monarch, served to direct loyalty toward the royal person, rather than toward the fatherland as a distinct entity.

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<sup>273</sup> This had been a relatively recent development, after debates over the spiritual merits of patriotic service in the medieval period. Beaune, *Birth of an Ideology*, 303-304.

<sup>274</sup> Yardeni traces four variants of patriotism during the period of the League, and finds all of them mediated in one way or another through the person of the King. Though they might emphasize religious, institutional, historic, or individual characteristics of the monarchy or a particular monarch, the King remained an indispensable element of late-16<sup>th</sup> century French patriotism, in any formulation. Yardeni, *Enquêtes*, 308-316.

<sup>275</sup> Jouanna, *Devoir de révolte*, 212.

<sup>276</sup> Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1996), 93-123.

The Siege of Paris, during Louis XIV's extended regency, was therefore a fertile moment for new visions of the *patrie*. With the minor King's person legally and conceptually less capable of supporting such heavy meanings, frondeurs reworked the *patrie* to fit their needs. In the first place, though the King retained a critical place in this formulation, the frondeurs made him the leader of the *patrie*, rather than identical with it. The Fronde's patriotism maintained all of the affective and especially moral bonds of prior iterations, but these now bypassed the monarch to attach directly to their idea of the French community itself. Indeed, frondeurs held that patriotic obligations justified disobedience to the royal will, and rebellion against a tyrannical ruler. Secondly, the *patrie* became a more communitarian than territorial construct - that is, it drifted away from *pays*, toward *Peuple* (in the sense of a political force, described above).<sup>277</sup> Finally, where patriotism had been a virtue, it now became a duty whose nonperformance could disqualify an individual from inclusion in the national community. So, in the same way that an Italian could never be truly French, a person born in France who injured the community became an *estranger* on a moral plane. These three mutations combined to produce a new conception of the French nation: an affective, imagined community,<sup>278</sup> led by but not identical with the King, whose borders were defined by a moralistic xenophobia. Though no single pamphlet spells out the terms of this transformation, Parisians' words and actions

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<sup>277</sup> As with any broad statement about the uses of language, I recognize that this shift was neither uniform nor instant. In a handful of cases throughout my sources, *patrie* retains some of its vestigial sense - as a local rather than national attachment, as land more than community, or as a religious rather than secular/moral duty. Still, in these instances, the sense of selfless, affective attachment to a larger moral community remains. At the same time, *pays* (or less often, *nation*) sometimes stands in for *patrie* as a term of affective attachment. Ultimately, though vocabulary certainly matters, these few cases are the exceptions that prove the rule: the Fronde rallied the French to its side using patriotic language and ideals, if not uniformly the word *patrie* itself.

<sup>278</sup> I speak of an "imagined community," mindful of anachronistically applying Benedict Anderson's specifically modern concept, to highlight the feeling of attachment among a population personally unknown to one another, but united by shared engagement with issues and information. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991).

in early 1649 drew on a consistent set of discourses that make clear the evolution of the *patrie* to its new, Fronde-era form.

### *Patriotic Words and Deeds*

At its heart, the *patrie* posed a black-or-white dichotomy: one was either a *bon françois*, or an *estranger*. As frondeur pamphlets construed it, the innocent Parisians defined the white, while Mazarin unquestionably defined the black. So while the *patrie* derived important and nuanced meanings from Condé and Châtillon, those men existed in a problematic grey space, relative to the larger conception of patriotism. To begin, therefore, we will establish the unvarnished, binary foundations of the Fronde's vision of national community, before analyzing the complex meanings of the Prince and Duc's place in the frondeurs' patriotic imagination.

First and above all, the Fronde's *patrie* was a purely French community. Frondeurs made abundantly clear that no foreign influence, let alone *estranger* individual, would have a place within their nation. In this sense, they defined the *patrie*'s borders primarily by opposition, and Jules Mazarin was their most hated opponent.<sup>279</sup> Reference to the Prime Minister's Italian origins and Spanish subjecthood<sup>280</sup> pervade the mazarinades, though accusations that he was variously Spanish, Turkish, Saracen, pirate, or perhaps a dragon or vampire, all make clear that roots in any place (real or mythological) other than France

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<sup>279</sup> As Foucault has remarked, "Identity and that which marks it are defined by the residue of differences." This definition by negation defined citizenship in France as a whole, and the more exclusive category of the *patrie* built from a similar base. Broadly speaking, a French citizen was someone who was *not* burdened with the "anti-rights" of foreigners. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York, 1970), 144, quoted in Peter Sahlins, *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After* (Cornell UP, 2004), 5. Additionally, Sahlins observes, "The foreigner became an important site for thinking about French unity. Printed pamphlets and diatribes against the Italians, Spaniards, and Germans present in France... created a cacophonous discourse against the Foreigner." Ibid, 24.

<sup>280</sup> Rome and Sicily, the territories most commonly associated with Mazarin, were ruled by Spain.

presented equal problems. The Fronde viewed Mazarin as the consummate foreigner, a "Spanishized Italian, and the capital enemy of the name Frenchman."<sup>281</sup> Pamphleteers claimed a divine sanction for their prejudices: one declared, "God has always loathed Foreigners," showing that Scripture provides ample proof, if the historical record of "so many misfortunes, caused in every State by the pernicious, fatal ambition of Foreigners cannot convince us of the extent to which we should be horrified by them."<sup>282</sup> The Parlement agreed with this logic, and formalized it by reviving a mostly-forgotten 1617 edict aimed against Concino Concini, which proscribed foreigners from the King's councils or ministries.<sup>283</sup> At the most basic level, the French *patrie* was an exclusively nativist community.

Frondeurs insisted on French origins for members of the *patrie*, because national roots were presumed to impart moral qualities. As such, mazarinades asserted that Mazarin's innate, Italian disposition caused his underhanded, duplicitous, effeminate, egotistical, kleptomaniacal, satanic - in a word, machiavellian - behaviors.<sup>284</sup> One burlesque pamphlet made this assumption its central tenet, returning at the end of each stanza to the refrain, "He is a native of Sicily/ He is ever ready to do evil."<sup>285</sup> Another pamphlet stipulated that Mazarin's (falsely attributed) Sicilian origins predisposed him toward the curiously specific crime of usurping royal authority, just as the mythical Sicilian Titans from whom he was descended had sought to overthrow Jupiter.<sup>286</sup> Because of these failings, it was critical

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<sup>281</sup> *Factum servant au procès criminel fait au Cardinal Mazarin, touchant ses intelligences aves les Estrangers ennemis de l'Estat* (Paris: Guillemot, 1649), 7.

<sup>282</sup> *L'anathème et l'excommunication d'un minister d'estat estranger. Tiré de l'Ecriture Saincte* (np, 1649), 4-5. Notably, Bossuet cites many of the same passages as this text, in his *Politique*.

<sup>283</sup> Goubert, *Mazarin*, 259; Kossmann, *La Fronde*, 72.

<sup>284</sup> On the particular meanings of these accusations, especially regarding gender and ambition, see Chapter 3.

<sup>285</sup> *Virelay sur les vertus de sa Faquinance* (Paris, 1652).

<sup>286</sup> *Le Geant Sicilien terrassé par les bons Francois* (Paris, 1649), 4-5.

that foreigners remain outside the moral community of France, for “it is a political rule that has always been observed, that foreigners introduce the morals and the iniquities of their lands into those they come to inhabit, that they corrupt everything, and that this corruption gives birth to vices.”<sup>287</sup> Foreigners could not claim inclusion within, much less lead the *patrie*, because their national characteristics would never accord with truly French virtues, and might even pollute those admirable Gallic traits.

The moral limits of the *patrie* were no less significant than its territorial borders. The Fronde sought to address the “Incertitude of the Times,” in the words of the author who lamented, “I cannot tell who I am, and I no longer know if I am French, seeing so many Frenchmen who hold to one party, and others to the opposite.”<sup>288</sup> In the midst of a civil war, frondeurs needed to specify the qualities that set *bons françois* apart from *étrangers*, in order to construct a pure France in the face of Mazarin’s false claims. To this end, the association of nationality with morality worked in both directions: while one’s birth imparted tendencies toward certain virtues or vices, at the same time, a failure to act morally on behalf of the *patrie* disqualified a French-born person from inclusion in the community. The “Furious Normans” declared that they would take up the sword, to “be rid of certain [French] barbarians, who betrayed their blood and their lives to the Cardinal, against our *patrie*.”<sup>289</sup> One could not injure the *patrie*, and remain part of the *patrie*.

While the *patrie*’s borders were drawn primarily along the lines of whom they excluded, the qualities demanded of a *bon françois* were defined in more positive terms. Above all, frondeurs demanded generosity and prudence of their compatriots. As central

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<sup>287</sup> *Raisons d'estat contre le ministère étranger* (n.p. 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, I: 57.

<sup>288</sup> *L'Incertitude du temps* (np, nd), 3

<sup>289</sup> *La fureur des Normans contre les mazarinistes* (Rouen, 1649), 5-6.

terms in the socio-political scheme of early modern culture, the subtleties of “prudence” and “generosity” demand close attention. Most generally, the constituent concepts of prudence - contained variously in terms like *bienséance*, *bon sens*, *adresse*, or other signifiers of sound judgment and wisdom - denoted the ability to discern “the true relation that one thing should have with another.”<sup>290</sup> In the context of the Siege, frondeurs asserted that such discernment must lead to the conclusion that Mazarin was a tyrant who had perverted the King’s power. Accordingly, anyone with such judicious reason must see that maintaining the health of the kingdom and its people were the highest obligations of a *bon françois*, above blind obedience to the King. Along similar lines, *généreux* described a man (and the trait was unmistakably gendered masculine) who gave freely of himself, without expectation of proportional repayment.<sup>291</sup> And again, the circumstances of Parisians in early 1649 imbued the term with particular meanings: the worthy patriot would give and serve generously, even sacrificially, for the good of his community.

Patriotic virtue lay at the intersection of prudence and generosity. A *bon françois*, as frondeurs imagined him, both understood the nature of his true duty to France, and was willing to actively, selflessly contribute to the defense and purification of his *patrie*. In this vein, one pamphlet addresses all “generous Parisians,” and frames the Siege as a political Lent, which should cause the “good citizens of the terrestrial *patrie*” to consider the sacrifices they might make for France.<sup>292</sup> Similarly, the “Dismounted Knight” spoke from his twenty years of martial experience, to tell his readers that he believed that most men “in all

<sup>290</sup> Antoine Gombaud, chevalier de Méré, *Oeuvres complètes du chevalier de Méré*, ed. Charles-H. Boudhors, 3 vol (Paris: F. Roches, 1930), i: 96, cited in Lewis Seifert, *Manning the Margins: Masculinity and Writing in Seventeenth-Century France* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 110. Seifert notes that these concepts were “‘masculine’ qualities par excellence” - an aspect which will receive fuller treatment in Ch. 3.

<sup>291</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 28-32. Like prudence above, generosity was thick with significance to a French nobleman of the seventeenth century, explored in the following chapter.

<sup>292</sup> *Le caresme des parisiens pour le service de la Patrie* (Paris: Jean Petrinal, 1649), 3.

their actions and all their enterprises seek only goodness... and whatever disorder clouds our reason, it never leads to evil.”<sup>293</sup> Now, in France’s hour of need, that “goodness” must address the tyrant who robs, starves, and oppresses the innocent people. Mazarinades defined the *patrie* as a community united in prudent service to France, and willing to sacrifice their lives and goods in that effort.

Moreover, service to the *patrie* was an unavoidable obligation, not simply a praiseworthy virtue. And in a moment of crisis, neutrality was impossible. Specifically, failure to defend the *patrie* was a tacit endorsement of Mazarin’s oppression. So, even a figure as respected as the Duc d’Orléans could be blamed for “sleeping” through the crisis months of the Siege, thereby condemning the personified France, his “Wife and Daughter” in need of his manly protection, to destruction.<sup>294</sup> One author argued that defense of the *patrie* was akin to self-defense, and thus not only permissible, but morally imperative: “One wishes to take my bread and my life? I conserve it, I defend it: this is natural.” And, with divine favor so clearly on his side, the author hopes that he might “reclaim and convert these captive consciences who would oppose the *bien public*, and who have renounced their humanity.”<sup>295</sup> All of these cases emphasize the requirement to defend the *patrie*, respectively by the logics of masculine duty on behalf of the innocent, natural imperatives for self-preservation, and the conscientious demands of basic humanity.

Although service was obligatory, a patriot’s defense of the public good would ideally arise voluntary, from a heartfelt love of his nation. Many tracts made this premise clear in their titles, such as “The Frenchman, Affectionate Toward His *Patrie*,” and more powerfully

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<sup>293</sup> *Le Cavalier desmonté* (Paris: Theod. Pepingué, 1649), 3-4.

<sup>294</sup> *La France parlant a Monsieur le Duc d’Orléans endormy* (1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 169.

<sup>295</sup> *Manuel du bon citoyen ou Bouclier de défense légitime contre les assauts de l’ennemi* (1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 437, 439.

still, "The Heroic Regrets of the Loving Soldier, Resolved to Die for His *Patrie*."<sup>296</sup> Others parlayed emotional narratives into powerful depictions of every French person's duty. One pamphlet took a purported nobleman's despair upon hearing of his son's decision to support Mazarin to build a case for affective, generous attachments. The father's distress that his child would abet "the ruin of your unhappy *patrie*, and for the reestablishment of the tyrant who oppresses it," had pushed him to the brink of death. He therefore begs in histrionic terms for the young man to consider the consequences of his service, and to awaken to the love and pity he should feel for his nation.<sup>297</sup> And, in case such melodrama were too obtuse, another text states the issue in plain terms: "To give completely our affections to our *Patrie*, it is necessary to forget our families, and to sacrifice our children to it."<sup>298</sup> For the frondeurs, love of the *patrie* was an obligation that mirrored, and even surpassed familial bonds.

While the Fronde asserted that *bons françois* must love, and generously sacrifice themselves for the *patrie*, there was some tension regarding the object at issue. Because patriotism had revolved around the King since the reign of Henri IV, mazarinade authors needed to explain how the current incarnation of the *patrie* could excuse rebellion against the King's will. To do so, they relied once again on the primacy of the public good, and at the same time exploited the ambiguity that surrounded the royal minority.

Above all, the frondeurs sought to delegitimize Mazarin, for proving that he should not wield royal authority would instantly validate their rebellion. On this front, one author was shocked that there could be any question of the Fronde's intentions: "And we would be

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<sup>296</sup> *Le Francois affectionné a sa Patrie* (np, 1649); *Regrets heroiques du soldat amoureux, resolu de mourir pour sa patrie* (Paris: Veusve Theod. Pepingué, 1649)

<sup>297</sup> *Discours véritable d'un seigneur a son fils qui vouloit suivre Mazarin* (Paris, 1649), quotation from 3.

<sup>298</sup> *Fureur des Normans*, 5.

labeled factious for stopping [Mazarin]!... We can discern Royal authority very well from that of Mazarin and all his cabal. Yes, yes, we are *bons François*, and we have neither goods nor lives that we would not give a thousand times for our King and our *Patrie*."<sup>299</sup> This author draws a clear line between the Cardinal's tyranny and true royal authority, which he places alongside the *patrie* as an entity to be protected by generous, worthy Frenchmen. Parisians were freed from their duty to obey Mazarin by the Christian political principles that "the obedience that one owes to the King [or his authority] is not blind as some would falsely hold, but conforms to the laws of God."<sup>300</sup> So, because Mazarin had committed every imaginable kind of sin, in his private life and his public policies, France was freed from the obligation to obey. Mazarin was a foreign, common-born, sinful tyrant, and he should never have been allowed to act in the King's name.

But invalidating the Cardinal-Minister's power was only half the battle. If Mazarin was incapable of ruling, and the Queen was a weak-willed woman,<sup>301</sup> all while the King was a ten-year-old boy, then whose will should the frondeurs follow, and toward what entity could they direct their patriotic energies? The *patrie* itself emerged as the stand-in object of nationalistic duty and attachment, in discourse and in practice, during the absence of a personally powerful monarch.

We have seen that the frondeurs were prepared to defend the King and *patrie* with their lives. But they largely recognized that claiming to defend Louis XIV, the "minor, innocent, God-given"<sup>302</sup> boy, was a political nonsense. So, when Parisians cried for the

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<sup>299</sup> *Soupirs François*, 7.

<sup>300</sup> *Maximes morales et chrestiennes pour le repos des consciences dans les affaires présentes...* (np, 1649), in Moreaux, *Choix*, I: 426.

<sup>301</sup> On Anne's consciously demure performance, see Chapter 1, p. 30.

<sup>302</sup> *Lis et fais* (np 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, I: 180.

King's return to Paris,<sup>303</sup> it acted less a statement of personal fidelity to a pre-teen monarch than as a symbolic appeal to reinstate the normal course of politics and to heal the kingdom, above all its blockaded capital. Mazarinades speak frequently of the monarch in abstract terms, by calling on his royalty, majesty, justice, or other kingly traits. Indeed, the first of the *Moral and Christian Political Maxims* emphasized "the honor, reverence, and respect that one owes the King, for royal authority being a divine institution even though many Kings were merely of human character, the character of the Godly majesty that they bear with such acclaim necessarily demands respect from their subjects in proportion to this grandeur."<sup>304</sup> In this formulation, the King's person might be imperfect or weak, but his "royal authority," divine "majesty," and "grandeur" perpetually required his subjects' obedience. Frondeurs made much of such corollaries to the theory of the "King's Two Bodies,"<sup>305</sup> which helped to extricate themselves from the tricky position of claiming to serve a person who was legally incapable of acknowledging such claims.

Having established that, for the moment, the "King" was not the individual person, but the ideals that surrounded his office, frondeurs took the short step of equating those ideals with the public good - that is, the *patrie*. The ubiquitous early-modern metaphor of the body politic helped in this task, for it provided a means to convey the reciprocal obligations between subjects and sovereign. "As a State is a Body of which the Sovereign is the Head, neither party can suffer without the other feeling its pain," explained one pamphlet. That is, the King must aid his People, and the People are in turn obliged to serve the King's godly will. "Thus, as all people have a bond with the Ruler, from which they

<sup>303</sup> Among a host of tracts, see especially *La passion extreme que tesmoignent les bourgeois de Paris pour le retour de sa Majesté en sa bonne ville de Paris* (Paris, 1649); Carrier, *Labyrinthe* 23-25.

<sup>304</sup> *Maximes morales et chrestiennes*, in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 425.

<sup>305</sup> E.H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton UP, 1957).

cannot separate themselves, there is no one in the State who... is not obliged to expend his body and goods for the conservation of the public in which each is essentially engaged."<sup>306</sup> This text invokes the subject's moral duty to give sacrificially for the public welfare, which is intimately connected to the Sovereign's will. Elsewhere, the State is explicitly termed a "moral and political body," to which all members are obliged to contribute.<sup>307</sup> These were precisely the terms of frondeur patriotism. To posit the unity of this "body" with the *patrie* more clearly, the author who constructed an idealized "King of the Frondeurs" spoke in similar monarchical abstractions, claiming that this figure's goals must be "nothing other than the interest of the Sovereign, and the good of the *Patrie*."<sup>308</sup> The Fronde, and especially Louis' minority, had pushed the *patrie* in a decidedly communitarian direction.

Having resolved the question of what object the *bons françois* should love and protect, it remained to clarify whose orders they should follow. In the King's absence, the Fronde placed the burden of leadership on the Parlement. In part, this was a functional decision: the Parlement was the most prestigious institution remaining in Paris, and it had led the resistance against Mazarin for the past year. More theoretically, but no less importantly, Parlement appeared to serve, respond to, and in many ways embody the People's will. The judges were always powerful figures in the daily life of the city, as political leaders and often officers in the civic militia. More immediately, the struggles against Mazarin, especially during the Days of Barricades, had affirmed the "solidarities" between the People and the Parlement.<sup>309</sup> Thus, the *Manual of the Good Citizen* told the

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<sup>306</sup> *Maximes morales et chrestiennes*, in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 429.

<sup>307</sup> *Manuel du bon citoyen*, in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 451.

<sup>308</sup> *Le Roy des Frondeurs, et comme cette dignite est la plus glorieuse de toutes les dignitez de la Terre, Contre le sentiment des esprits du Siecle* (Paris: 1649), 4.

<sup>309</sup> See especially Ranum, *Fronde*, Ch. 3.

Parisians, the judges are “citizens of Paris... and by consequence obliged to fulfill all the functions of good and faithful habitants, in communion with the interests of the other Bourgeois.”<sup>310</sup> Ultimately, the Parlement led the Fronde because it was a “repository of sovereignty,” while at the same time, its members understood the People, because they were of the people.<sup>311</sup>

The Parlement’s choices effectively translated frondeur patriotism from discourse into practice. In establishing the temporary governance of the city, the judges invoked the notions of generosity, sacrifice, and public duty that filled the mazarinades, while maintaining the traditional forms of French society and politics despite the King’s absence.<sup>312</sup> So while they levied taxes, organized contributions to the common defense, distributed food, and raised troops in accordance with the generous, community-oriented principles of the *patrie*, they likewise proved their fidelity to the King by maintaining the regular social hierarchies, political institutions, and pathways of power typical of France’s monarchy. After all, the Fronde claimed to be the true, pure French nation, and they acted to implement their vision.

Such a devotion to regular forms led to serious problems, however: in the all-important matter of military leadership, the Parisians continued to esteem the *mérite* of birth and nobility above experience or proven skill. Almost immediately after the start of the Siege, banal jealousies of social rank flared up between two Peers, the Duc d’Elbeuf, and the Grand Condé’s younger brother, the Prince of Conti, who had cast his lot against his

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<sup>310</sup> *Manuel du bon citoyen*, in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 450.

<sup>311</sup> Kossmann, *La Fronde*, 102-103.

<sup>312</sup> A thorough discussion of daily life and the Parlement’s leadership during the Siege would quickly become superfluous to the central issues of community formation with which I am concerned. Readers interested in exploring these questions more fully should consult Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 315-317; Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 189-190; Kossmann, *La Fronde*, 84-93; and especially Ranum, *Fronde*, 183-214.

brother from the first days of the Siege.<sup>313</sup> Both men sought to lead the Parisians against Mazarin, but in the end Conti's princely rank won him the role of *generalissime*, despite his utter lack of military experience and generally indecisive personality. Retz recalls the younger Prince with flourish, and sarcasm: "I nearly forgot [among the portraits of major figures] M. le Prince de Conti, which is a great sign for a party leader. I couldn't describe him better, than to say that he was a zero who did not multiply, except that he was a *prince du sang*... His spitefulness... drowned all other qualities, which in any case were no more than mediocre and riddled with weakness."<sup>314</sup> The Parisians' adherence to custom buttressed its claims to represent the best version of their nation, and such continuity likely smoothed the collection of revenues and maintenance of order. However, their patriotically uncritical reproduction of social hierarchies hobbled the war effort by ensuring that an unqualified commander led the city's militia.

The problems surrounding Conti's role in the Fronde begin to illuminate the complex meanings and implications that lay underneath the *patrie*'s apparently simple surface. Mazarinades painted the Fronde as the cut-and-dry battle of *bons françois* against *estrangers*, selfless martyrs against ambitious mercenaries, good against evil. In practice, moral lines were hazy, loyalties were rarely binary, and the borders of the national community were vexingly porous. Two men in particular highlight these dynamics: the Grand Condé and the Duc de Châtillon.

### **Patriotic (Counter)Examples: the Grand Condé and the Duc de Châtillon**

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<sup>313</sup> Ranum, *The Fronde*, 188-197.

<sup>314</sup> Retz, *Mémoires*, 257.

From Rocroi to Lens, the Grand Condé had provided a site to imagine the virtues and qualities of the ideal Frenchman, and the Duc de Châtillon had lately risen to a similar status. Both men upset this scheme, however, by choosing to support Mazarin upon their return from the campaign of 1648. The Frondeurs' attempts to reconcile these two men with the blossoming of the *patrie* (strained as those efforts sometimes appear) sharpened the meaning of specific patriotic ideals, and birthed a sub-genre of mazarinade that distilled *patrie* discourse to its essence.

The hero/villain dynamic of Condé and Châtillon's place in the fronders' patriotic imagination complicated authors' claims.<sup>315</sup> But in a broader view, it provided a rich trove of meanings. These figures' past acts could be taken as exemplary patriotic exploits, while their current choices appeared as the polar opposite - often, with both aspects present in the same text. In this sense, the Prince and Duc each stood with one foot in the very center of the *patrie*, and the other firmly beyond its borders. In disentangling the frondeurs' perceptions of men who were both enemies and inspirations, the following analysis illuminates the *patrie* from both sides: the people and qualities it claimed, as well as those it reviled. This final section will investigate the ways in which mazarinades spoke to and about Condé, and the meanings that can be drawn from such texts, before examining the overwrought pamphlets that dealt with Châtillon's dying words to the Prince after the Battle of the Charenton.

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<sup>315</sup> One author gestures toward this necessarily convoluted rhetorical stance: in a pamphlet centered on Mazarin's admission of his faults, countered by the Prince's point-by-point apology for those faults, the chastened Cardinal encourages Condé to abandon the royalist cause and save his reputation, for "You are the people's love, just as I am their hate." *L'Adieu de Mazarin à Monseigneur le Prince, Avec la response qu'il luy a faite pour l'empescher de partir* (Paris, 1649), 3. Such tortuous premises appear frequently in mazarinades dealing with Condé, as will become clear. This pamphlet is significant, at the same time, for its explicit statement of the divergent popular perceptions of the Cardinal and Prince.

Constructing the *patrie* around Condé led to largely similar results as doing so in isolation, or in opposition to Mazarin, but with richer nuance and detail. Condé's persona allowed for more intense exhortations and more specific examples, but the substance changed little: the *patrie* remained a nationalistic community that was defined by a moralistic xenophobia, demanded generous service, and was led by the King but separate from his person.

In the first place, the Grand Condé helped to affirm the moral boundaries of the French community. Although he was by every other measure unassailably and even royally French, the Fronde held firm in barring him from the *patrie*. "Can it be that Frenchmen have taken the side of these excesses? No, no, they are not French, if they fight against the *Patrie*. They are all *Estrangers*, Condé [and other pro-Crown *Grands*]... They are all torturers for the Tyrant Mazarin."<sup>316</sup> Condé was a firstborn son of his nation, and as such, the words of the feminized, maternal France to the prodigal Prince carry great force: "Alas! When I consider the violence you employ against your brothers, you are no longer my son."<sup>317</sup>

Condé's crimes were dark enough to eclipse even the glory he had won in his miraculous victories over the Habsburgs. Some pamphlets, with titles like *The Bloody Impieties of the Prince of Condé*, lambasted the Prince for acts no less heinous than Mazarin's.<sup>318</sup> So, when he "commanded horrible cruelties, the desolation of towns and villages, the violations of women and girls, the profanation of Churches," when he "bathed his horse in Parisians' blood," and in sum, "attempted to destroy, by steel and by flame..."

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<sup>316</sup> *Soupirs Francois*, 5-6.

<sup>317</sup> *Les plaintes de la France, à Monseigneur le Prince* (Paris: Robert Feugé, 1649), 3. See also the prophetic words of *Au Prince du Sang, Surnommé la Cuirrasse* (sl, sd[1649]), which proclaims in its opening stanza, "Prince, que l'on nomme du Sang,/ n'epuise pas celui de France,/ Sous un pretepte de vengeance,/ Ou bien tu y perdras ton rang." (3)

<sup>318</sup> *Les impietez sanglantes du Prince de Condé* (np, nd).

the common *patrie* of all French people,” the Prince forfeited any claim on inclusion within that *patrie*. This author expounds on the historic consequences of Condé’s missteps:

Yes, this furious deed will tarnish the high reputation he has acquired; And as the glory of battles won is wrapped up with the conduct of the commanders... posterity will doubtless judge the actions and qualities of this Prince by the most remarkable [battles] of his life. And when she [history] sees that during the minority of his King, [Condé] sought to ruin Paris... she’ll view with horror such a detestable enterprise, and will consider this Prince as a Monster born for the ruin and the desolation of his *païs*.<sup>319</sup>

The Prince becomes monstrous, and morally foreign, through his betrayal of the innocent people and the minor King, all of whom his birth and duty obliged him to protect.

The need to protect such vulnerable entities was an integral element in French noble identity, and mazarinades made much of this obligation, as well as other central tenets of the privileged order. In doing so, they did not assert that nobility was a requirement for inclusion in the *patrie*; rather, they promoted certain virtues that were significant to the Second Estate as ideal qualities for all patriots. That is, noble qualities were presumed to be the most admirable, and because frondeurs imagined the *patrie* to be the purest expression of the most desirable French traits, they appropriated many of the noble order’s defining qualities. So, one need not possess noble blood to take part in the *patrie*, but the community’s members should aspire to the same virtues that elevated gentlemen above the crowd.<sup>320</sup> And Condé, as the noblest man in France, was a particularly

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<sup>319</sup> *Discours sur la députation du parlement à monsieur le prince de Condé* (Paris, 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 480-3. I read this *païs* as a synonym for *patrie*, on the basis of its moralistic, communitarian connotations.

<sup>320</sup> Though patriots need not be noble, mazarinades violently denigrated Mazarin’s rank and birth as one more means of disqualifying his rule. Beyond pointing out that he was born in Italy under Spanish rule, numerous pamphlets asserted that his father was not only common, but a duplicitous, perhaps Jewish, moneylender and con artist (among others, see *Lettre du père Michel, religieux ermite de l’ordre des Camaldoli près Grosbois, à monseigneur le duc d’Angoulesme, sur les cruautés des Mazarinistes en Brie* (n.p. 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, I:264-5, 267). His mother came in for worse treatment, as one author asserted bluntly that Mazarin was “the son of a whore,” probably sired by a Saracen or pirate (*Agreable et véritable récit de ce qui s’est passé, devant et depuis l’enlèvement du roy, hors la ville de Paris, par le conseil de Jule*

useful figure in defining and promoting such mimesis, precisely because he had failed to live up to those standards himself.

Discernment and generosity were crucial, intertwined terms in noble self-concept - "A generous Prince is nothing if he is not wise and prudent."<sup>321</sup> But when the Grand Condé failed to protect the People, he demonstrated his lack of both qualities, and allowed pamphleteers to sharpen this point as it pertained to the *patrie*. But where some texts made his lack of wisdom an irredeemable failing, others pled with him to return to his selfless, judicious senses: "Illustrious and generous Prince... will it be said that the most prudent and valiant Prince that France ever produced, who so often chained Fortune and Victory to the chariot of his Triumph," has now chosen "to ruin this flourishing Kingdom? You are, or should be, her defender, her strongest support, and her surest shield, yet you help her not at all."<sup>322</sup> Other writers focused explicitly on Condé's noble status, to highlight the duties he had abandoned: "No one is unaware that you are of too illustrious birth, too *bon François*, too much the servant of the King, too vigorous a branch of the Bourbon house, too wise in your conduct, and too generous in your actions to support the party that it seems you have."<sup>323</sup> Because Condé had, in the past, shown all the qualities of a worthy patriot, there might still be room to hope he would return to his former self. In expressing this hope, Mazarinade authors pointed to the noble virtues that the Grand Condé once exemplified, to define the moral fiber that constituted the *patrie*.

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*Mazarin. En vers Burlesques* (Paris : Jacques Guillery, 1649) 5-6). So, although patriots need not be noble, Mazarin's own totally ignoble birth once again made him the antithesis of patriotic characteristics.

<sup>321</sup> *Les subtils moyens du Prince de Condé pour faire revenir nos Louys d'Italie* (np, nd [1649]), 3.

<sup>322</sup> *Advis d'Estat a Monsieur le Prince pour la seureté de sa personne & de sa vie, & pour l'augmentation de sa gloire* (Paris, 1649), 3.

<sup>323</sup> *Lettre d'un Religieux envoyée à Monsieur le Prince de Condé, à Saint-Germain-en-Laye, contenant la vérité de la vie et moeurs du Cardinal Mazarin. Avec exhortation audit Seigneur Prince d'abandonner son party* (n.p. 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 93.

Perhaps the Prince could even be absolved of blame for leading the Siege. If so, this would clear a path to once again forthrightly portray his heroism as a model for patriotic service and attachment. In this way, one self-described “village girl” had convinced herself that only Mazarin’s “charms, or some enchantment” could have swayed Condé to use the same “invincible force of arms” that had triumphed at Rocroi, in support of “an evil party, organized for the destruction of your *patrie*, who have never felt anything but love for you.”<sup>324</sup> Many other authors echoed this attack on Mazarin’s sorcery, which excused Condé’s choices, with the added bonus of making the Italian into an evil wizard.<sup>325</sup> And, as a further benefit, if Condé were deceived, enchanted, or otherwise not responsible for his actions, then the unity of the Royal House would mean nothing. In that case, the Cardinal’s claims to be “applauded and favored by the Duc d’Orléans and the Prince de Condé... not only deceive the people, but shamefully defames the honor of our two greatest princes.”<sup>326</sup> Tracts like this demonstrate an impressive rhetorical jujitsu, in making Condé’s peerless nobility - one of the Crown’s most powerful cultural weapons - into a potent attack against Mazarin’s underhanded, literally diabolical grip on power.

One pamphlet took this reversal a step further, claiming (satirically) that Condé’s fidelity to Mazarin had been a ruse all along. The Prince had played a *double-jeu*, which would soon come to fruition as he repatriated the gold that Mazarin had reportedly

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<sup>324</sup> *Les Admirables sentiments d'une fille Villageoise envoyez à Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, touchant le party qu'il doit prendre* (Paris, Jean Henault, 1649), 3-4.

<sup>325</sup> *Sommaire de la doctrine curieuse du Cardinal Mazarin par lui déclarée en une lettre qu'il écrit à un sien Confident, pour se purger de l'Arrest du Parlement et des Faicts dont il est accusé. Ensemble la response à icelle, par laquelle il est dissuadé de se représenter au Parlement* (Paris: March 4, 1649), in Moreau, Choix, i: 344; *La Seconde lettre du Chevalier Georges à Monsieur le Prince* (Paris, Chez Jean Brunet, 1649), 7.

<sup>326</sup> *L'Anti-desinteressé, ou l'équitable censeur des libelles semez dans Paris sous le nom Du Des-interessé...* (Paris, Cardin Besogne, March 1649), 7.

embezzled, and sent to Italy.<sup>327</sup> From this convoluted maneuver, France sees that "this glorious Prince... is not only very generous, but further very adroit and very prudent. His generosity has been shown in so many encounters - camps routed, cities taken, battles won - that no one in France could gainsay it. His prudence and skill were evident in all these exploits, and one could truly say that he is the most accomplished Prince in all the earth."<sup>328</sup> Though this author's praise of Condé is clearly sarcastic, the terms he employed reinforce the centrality of the noble/patriotic virtues of prudence and generosity. That is, the author mocks the Prince because his actual imprudent and ungenerous behavior had so abjectly failed to achieve the glorious goals that the pamphlet laid out. The humor lies in the yawning gap between the Prince's mockingly-attributed heroism, and his present villainy. The reader is left to ask what might have been accomplished, if only Condé had actually been as praiseworthy as he should have been.

In more straightforward ways, the *Intimate Conversation between the King and Queen Mother*... used Condé to mark the divide between patriotic *gens de bien* and blind servants of the Cardinal. As this author portrayed it, Mazarin followed only his "*maximes d'état*" to hold power and enrich himself at the expense of the nation he ruled. All the while, his *affidez* - with Condé named as their chief - clung to notions of interpersonal loyalty in carrying out his commands.<sup>329</sup> In contrast to those beholden to immoral statist and personal political styles, frondeur *grands* like Conti and Longueville were patriotic *bons François*, specifically because they had retired from court to defend the *patrie*, rather than

<sup>327</sup> Though the stupendous wealth that Mazarin amassed during his ministry invites suspicions of graft, this was probably not the case. See Françoise Bayard, "Du rôle exact de Mazarin et des Italiens dans les finances françaises," in *La France et l'Italie au temps de Mazarin*, ed. Jean Serroy. (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1986), 24. On his finances generally, see Geoffrey Treasure's aptly titled chapter, "The Greatest Private Fortune," in *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 275-282.

<sup>328</sup> *Subtils moyens*, 3.

<sup>329</sup> *L'Entretien familier du Roy et de la Reine Regente sa mere, sur les affaires du temps* (Rouen, 1649), *passim*.

remain “pensionaries” of the Cardinal. That is, those grandes had prudently assessed the nature of the burgeoning conflict, and selflessly forgone the rich rewards Mazarin dangled before them in order to ensure the wellbeing of Paris, and the French People as a whole. This pamphlet’s King voiced concerns that the current course of events would make him seem a new Herod, impoverishing and ruining his kingdom, and perverting the flow of justice. In response, the Queen maintained that Mazarin’s cruelty was necessary to assure his power. She assented to it because of her immoderate passion for the Cardinal, and her thirst for vengeance against the Parlement who had insulted her. In all this, the reader sees clearly that where the *bon françois* frondeurs acted with generosity proceeding from soundly reasoned bases, the royal party’s choices were rooted in feminine errors, manifested in the Queen’s irrational passion and self interest.

Beyond emphasizing the need for prudence and generosity, the *Intimate Conversations* highlights the problem of locating true royal authority under the regency. After all, the pamphlet’s central rhetorical device had the young Louis raise numerous objections to the policies authored by the Cardinal and Queen, and enacted by Condé, only to find that the King himself was impotent to stop them. Indeed, it seemed that Mazarin had moved beyond abusing his status as the King’s minister, and had usurped the throne itself. The Chevalier Georges thus challenged Condé, “Monseigneur, is it not true that to be King is to be absolute, sovereign, and independent? And is it not also true that the Cardinal is thus, although his *raison d’Estat* is nothing but his own pleasure?”<sup>330</sup> Again, frondeurs speak of the attributes that surround and define royalty, rather than the person of the King proper.

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<sup>330</sup> *Seconde Lettre du Chevalier Georges*, 6.

In this case, however, this serves to condemn Condé for failing to see that Mazarin has made himself a false monarch, exploiting the people of France for his own selfish purposes.

The mass of pamphlets aimed at the Grand Condé were more than discursive instruments that happened to center on the Prince's persona. In many cases, they were earnest efforts to appeal to Louis II de Bourbon himself. Such exhortations encapsulate the major features of *patrie* discourse, which authors presumed would prod the Prince to reconsider his loyalties. One reminded Condé that "service to the *Patrie* is the most solid Glory that a Grand Prince and a true Citizen could achieve."<sup>331</sup> Another was more imperative and direct, informing the Prince that "it is good, and even necessary to act, and to join martial prowess [*la vertu guerriere*] with piety." This author continued at length, desperately marshaling the Fronde's patriotic ideals to effect a change in the Prince's heart:

Your blindness is such that neither the affection that you should hold for your *patrie*, nor the rank that your birth grants you within it, nor the glory that your triumphs have brought it, nor the miserable state of so many families starving in the countryside, nor yet the horrible cruelties that *estrangers* visit upon the poor French, [none of these] have been able to alter your will and move your heart, which, being generous, should have more piety and tenderness than it now seems, toward your fellow citizens.<sup>332</sup>

This consummately patriotic paean, and many others like it, aimed to disabuse Condé of whatever mistaken belief had pushed him to Mazarin's side. At the same time, they reiterated the tenets of frondeur discourse, with the added impetus of speaking specifically to a fallen national icon.

Powerful as such direct appeals were, they paled in comparison to the eruption of patriotism that followed the Battle of Charenton. Condé had been emboldened by a handful

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<sup>331</sup> *Lettre d'un gentil-homme Francois, portée a Monseigneur le Prince de Condé par un trompette de la véritable Armée du Roy, pour le dissuader de la Guerre qu'il fait à sa Patrie* (Paris: Arnaud Cotinet, 1649), 3.

<sup>332</sup> *Advis d'Estat*, 13.

of easy victories over the frondeurs in the earliest weeks of the Siege. So, on February 8, 1649, he attempted to capture the Fronde-held hamlet of Charenton along the Marne. The rebels' continued control of the river and especially the bridge there might allow supplies to be brought into the capital. The defense, led by the veteran commander Clanleau, failed, as Condé's planning and battle-hardened troops simply overmatched the passionate but inexperienced frondeurs.<sup>333</sup> The number of casualties on both sides was relatively small, for the Prince had routed the town's guards before the main body of Parlementary troops could arrive. But the battle cost the frondeurs the life of Clanleau, while the Crown lost the promising young Duc de Châtillon, who led the final assault. The latter man had followed Condé, his patron and intimate friend,<sup>334</sup> into royal service, after building a reputation for prodigious valor in Condé's victories, especially at Lens. Even though he was mortally wounded at the head of Mazarin's troops, the Fronde mourned Châtillon's death, and made creative use of it to further their patriotic agenda. More than thirty pamphlets detailing the battle and the Duc's death flew from frondeur presses in February, aiming to inspire and enrage Paris in the wake of a difficult setback.<sup>335</sup> In retelling Châtillon's final moments, mazarinade authors dwelt on the promise of his young career, his heroic valor, and the Prince's fondness for him, to fashion a narrative that met their cause's needs. Their efforts to encourage the Fronde brought *patrie* discourse to its apex.

The pamphlets at hand largely follow a common script, from which they individually elaborate. The master narrative has Châtillon, with his dying breath, recount the glories he

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<sup>333</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 320; Ranum, *Fronde*, 206-207.

<sup>334</sup> Châtillon was one of the close-knit *cabale libertine* who surrounded Condé, in war and in peace. Katia Béguin, *Les Princes de Condé: Rebelles, Courtisans et Mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1999), 73-74. The "libertinage" of this group was evident in their intimate, often unambiguously amorous correspondence. On Condé's "widely known (if less openly discussed) sexual inclinations," see also Seifert, *Manning the Margins*, 152.

<sup>335</sup> Carrier, *Conquête de l'opinion*, 225.

had acquired in Condé's service before 1649. But, realizing the fault of siding against the People, he warns the Prince that service to Mazarin, and especially the Siege of Paris now threaten to overshadow any good he may have done. Finally, he offers a solution: heed the cry of your French blood, turn against the Cardinal, and come to the aid of your *patrie*.

Remarkably, most texts have Châtillon *tutoye* with the Prince in delivering his message.<sup>336</sup> A few placed their words in the mouth of Châtillon's ghost, giving them the supernatural urgency and frankness of wisdom from the afterlife - "A dead man speaks truly/ and the shade of a friend with liberty."<sup>337</sup> But among these differences, one element never varied: the undeniable moral obligation to defend the *patrie*.

Châtillon offered a particularly useful mouthpiece, and authors took care to explain to the audience his unique situation. His famous ancestry, "from the illustrious Coligny family, ancient and fertile race of courageous Captains," placed him in the uppermost echelons of French society. His rank made him almost a peer with Condé, while the two *grands'* battlefield experiences made them brothers in arms. That such a man would perish while "fighting against his *Patrie*, which he had so often spilled his blood to defend," heightened the pathos.<sup>338</sup> That his death extinguished the Coligny line completed the

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<sup>336</sup> I read this tendency as reminding the audience of the intimacy between the two men, further suggesting the unguarded authenticity of his words. But more than that, I perceive that this form of address bridged the social divide between them, as a result of Châtillon's morally superior position. Though this is merely an impressionistic "gut feeling," the sense persists that mazarinades positioned the Duc as a genuine equal to a Prince of the Blood as a consequence of his virtue. Such a reading accords with Sandberg's parsing of the various species of clientage that might win friends in seventeenth-century France. Though birth was a powerful signifier of status, it was not the only term under consideration, and might be overshadowed by other factors, at certain moments. See Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 81-103.

<sup>337</sup> *Les Advis heroiques et importants donnez a M le P de C Par M de Chastillon revenu de l'autre monde. Par l'autheur mesme des Triolets* (Paris: Denys Langlois, 1649), 6.

<sup>338</sup> *Les dernières paroles de Monsieur de Chastillon, tué devant Charrenton le Lundi huictième Fevrier 1649* (Paris: François Prevveray, 1649), 3.

tragedy. Marshaling every bit of melodrama this scenario offered, pamphleteers made the young Duc into the tragic hero of the Fronde.

"Prince, whose valor fills the Universe," one tract opens grandiosely, "I served your grandeur and followed your fortune." But unable to choke back his reproach any longer, Châtillon speaks frankly with Condé: "Your party is unjust, and your war is cruel/ Oppressing your *patrie*, and arming yourself against her." This pamphlet, like most of this sub-genre, rehashes the litany of Princely victories specifically - "Recall that Philisbourg, Norlingue, Thionville,/ Rocroi, Fribourg, Dunkerque, Ypre, Furnes, & Lens,/ have given you glory to last a thousand years."<sup>339</sup> Invariably, however, these victories serve to sharpen the contrast with the horrors of the Siege, and spur the dying Duc to lament, "Would that I had died in glory and innocence, before wetting my steel in the blood of my *Patrie*."<sup>340</sup> The message is clear, and many authors make the point explicitly, that glory comes from advancing the interests of France.<sup>341</sup> Châtillon's death was, by contrast, "ignominious in view of its cause."<sup>342</sup> Though Condé might protest that the Siege of Paris was an act of obedience to the royal will, its manifest injury of the *bien public*, at the behest of a foreign tyrant, negated this defense. For the Fronde, the People and their collective welfare made up the true France, to the exclusion of any other consideration or entity.

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<sup>339</sup> *Advis heroiques*, 3-4.

<sup>340</sup> *Le corps mourant et l'esprit vivant de Monsieur le Duc de Chastillon. Mis en Vers par M.M.G.A. Elegie* (Paris: Pierre du Pont, 1649), 5.

<sup>341</sup> In a similar vein, Condé's (self-styled) mother had made this point in another pamphlet: "My son, the fame of your grandeur, & the happy success of your victorious arms would give me a perfect joy, if this extraordinary courage were employed against *Etranger* foes. But as I see you acting with such fervor against your *Patrie*... I am so filled with horror that I cannot suffer this pain without giving you the proofs of my just feelings." *Lettre de Madame la Princesse Douairiere de Condé, au Prince de Condé son Fils, en faveur de la Ville de Paris* (Paris: Jean Musnier, 1649), 3.

<sup>342</sup> *La rencontre des esprits du Duc de Chastillon et du Baron de Clanleu, apres leur mort, arrivée à Charenton* (Paris: Henry Sara, 1649), 3.

Condé's patriotic attachments should have arisen from his inborn noble duty to defend the innocent. Châtillon thus regrets that Condé has "profaned his birth," and urged him to mend his ways in terms drawn from Roman history.<sup>343</sup> "Add to your high birth/ The benevolent title of Protector of France./ Lest the peerless heart of Condé/ Take another nature, closer to Hannibal./ Show yourself more valiant and a more generous man,/ And spare Paris the fate he [Hannibal] sealed for Rome."<sup>344</sup> Châtillon continues to claim that, whereas the Carthaginian was at least justified in brutally sacking an enemy city for the glory of his nation, the Prince's current actions are infinitely more detestable, as his French and even royal blood demands better. Condé's un-French actions provoke his cry, "O, too-evil scheme, O too-barbarous war,/ worthy not of a Frenchman, but of a Tartar!"<sup>345</sup> With somewhat less passion but no less force, the Duc summarizes the affective ties of birth: "Prince, you must now see/ The gifts that Nature's Author has provided,/ So do not abuse them, and forgo/ The duty that blood instills in you./ Make the Spaniards see the worth of your valor/ (...) and let the *bons François* sing songs of love/ To implore, my Lord, your triumphant return."<sup>346</sup> Condé enjoyed massive privilege by virtue of his birth, and he now had a responsibility to use those advantages to defend his nation against foreign powers.

Châtillon's looming death had forced him to consider his choices in the Fronde, and he gave Condé the benefit of his perspective. He understood, albeit too late, that neither his personal loyalty to the Prince, nor his statist obedience to the royal will should have superseded his devotion to the *patrie*.<sup>347</sup> He told the Prince, after reminding him of their

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<sup>343</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>344</sup> *Corps mourant*, 7.

<sup>345</sup> *Advis héroïques*, 6.

<sup>346</sup> *Corps mourant*, 6.

<sup>347</sup> *Dernières paroles*, 4-5.

years of shared victories and hardships, “I do not regret dying [in your service], I only regret the cause.”<sup>348</sup> He now demands that the Prince be “more prudent,” and “understand, Monseigneur, that there has never been a more unjust [cause, than Mazarin’s].” For, if he thinks ahead to the consequences of victory, he must ask himself, “what satisfaction will you find in drowning your *Patrie* in the blood of its children, and mounting a trophy on the bodies of your Compatriots, not to say your Brothers?... Therefore, quit this unreasonable party, succor the people of Paris, and avenge the outrage he [Mazarin] has committed against them.”<sup>349</sup> Châtillon here concisely expresses the virtues that defined patriotic service: wisdom, employed for justice and generosity, against the irrational forces of cruelty and tyranny.

From his deathbed, Châtillon has reaffirmed the crucial tenets of the frondeurs’ *patrie*: a nationalistic moral community defined by generous, prudent acts, which excluded both literal foreigners, and any Frenchman who failed to meet the standards of the community. His final plea, in one pamphlet’s account, puts this concept into action. The Duc begins by apologizing for not reproving Condé’s mistake sooner, fearing that “you would have believed me soft [*lasche*] or unfaithful to your service. But, having given such firm proof of my courage and fidelity, suffer that I speak, and say to you: you sin, my Lord, you sin.” The Duc feels authorized by his valorous, manly sacrifice to correct the Prince, and he makes apparent the pious urgency and moral qualities of Condé’s “sin,” as he continues. “Your good qualities are prostituted for an evil cause... What right do you have to sustain an *estranger*, against all of France?” Incredulous, Châtillon verges on impertinent: “You have appeared stupid in this matter, yet in others you have shown yourself generous... If

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<sup>348</sup> *Advis heroiques*, 3.

<sup>349</sup> *L'esprit du Duc de Chatillon apparu a Monsieur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Nicolas Jacquard, 1649), 7-8.

you would pause a moment, you would see that your fury [*cholere*] has too much violence and too little justice." Where others had accused Condé only of "blindness," "enchantment," or other fault-neutralizing states, Châtillon boldly accuses the Prince of stupidity - the antonym of generosity, in his phrasing. With this strong condemnation, the Duc's speech crescendos to its climax:

Open your eyes, my Lord, open your eyes, know your error, for there is no shame in denouncing it. As much as firmness in good deeds is glorious, so rigidity in evil ones is infamous - it is not greatness of the soul, my Lord, but rather hardness of the heart. Split this rock, Monsieur, open your closed heart to the love of your *Patrie*... Give yourself to your *Patrie*, and for all the services I have rendered, grant me the grace that my death might change you. If I have served [the *patrie*] in life, I serve it also with my death.<sup>350</sup>

With this perfectly patriotic speech, Châtillon breathed his last, trusting that his dying words would guide Condé back to the path of righteousness.

In myriad ways, speaking to or about Condé allowed mazarinade authors to flesh out the substance and demands of the *patrie*, and moreover to pique the emotions and affections that attached to it. The Prince was a powerful political and military actor, whom pamphleteers hoped to lure back to the side of the People through appeals to patriotic duty. More importantly, however, the Prince was a nationally known, universally admired figure, whose persona was dense with implications for France's self-imagination. Pamphleteers highlighted his past victories, superlative valor, and inborn noble qualities, to articulate the inescapable requirement to serve the *patrie*. The Grand Condé's monumental failure to see past the bonds of personal loyalty, or of legalistic Statist obedience, provided an object lesson for every *bon françois* in the moral obligations of citizens toward their community.

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<sup>350</sup> *Les Attaques et la prise de Charenton. La mort de Monsieur de Clanleau, la blessure de Chastillon, les plaintes & regrets qu'en fait Monsieur le Prince & la genereuse responce de Monsieur de Chastillon à Monsieur le Prince avant de mourir* (Paris, Robert Feugé, 1649), 7-8.

Regardless of the mazarinades' actual success in altering Prince's choices, their pleading elucidated the ideals they hoped to promote for a nationwide audience. And while *patrie* discourse rose rapidly in response to the momentary circumstances of the Siege, its core concepts endured after the blockade fell, even after the Fronde subsided, living on in the nationalist ideals of the centuries to come.

### **Conclusion: Seeds of Nationalism**

On paper, the Treaty of Rueil signed on April 1, 1649, largely returned France to the status quo of the previous October. The Parlement's 1648 reforms were (again) preserved, and the Crown largely retreated from the hardline positions it had assumed during the winter. But no treaty could erase the memory of the Siege and the patriotic fervor that it generated. The new model of the *patrie*, forged in the hardships of Condé's blockade, gave the Parisian Fronde a focal point and an organizing principle. More than aversion to taxation or opposition to a hated foreign minister, their rebellion became a means of purifying their community, and defending their virtuous homeland. The *patrie* gave the Fronde a positive goal.

Resurrecting and reconfiguring the *patrie* as the frondeurs did profoundly influenced not only the course of Fronde, but the development of national sentiment throughout Old Regime France. In the near term, as the following chapter will show, the rapid rise of *patrie* discourse exercised a heavy influence on French political culture, and even on the intimate sense of what made a nobleman both noble and manly. Whereas prudence and generosity became watchwords for patriotic Frenchmen, excesses of ego - ambition, greed, luxury, etc. - became major transgressions against the self and even the

state. At the same time, noble masculine honor continued to shed its primarily martial flavor,<sup>351</sup> and Fronde-era discourses emphasized control, discretion, and magnanimity above brute force. Though I would not argue that the Fronde directly caused these changes, I contend that the rebellion (and especially the Siege) brought long-building evolutions in French culture to the fore. Because the *patrie* claimed such diffuse categories as politics, community, morality, love, and manhood as its constitutive elements, changes in the conceptual makeup of the community sent ripples into unexpected corners of French life.

Significant as these effects would prove, even more fundamental ramifications of the frondeurs' reinvented *patrie* would be felt through the remainder of the *ancien régime*. Though the distinction between the King and the community he led dissipated toward the end of the Fronde, the imperative for active duty on behalf of an imagined national community helped to set the tone for "full-fledged" nationalism in later years. David A. Bell has located the birth of nationalism around the turn of the eighteenth century, and this chronology appears to me largely defensible. However, his assertion that this style of national attachment was "invented" from whole cloth in the 1680s, and his explicit downplaying of the protonationalist implications of events under Mazarin, must be reconsidered in light of the mazarinades' testimony. The frondeurs' *patrie* was not truly nationalist in the narrow, modernist sense of a nationwide program to "actively construct" a nation, "casting its human raw material into a fundamentally new form."<sup>352</sup> Still, the Fronde spurred a concerted effort to bring as many Frenchmen as possible into the fold of

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<sup>351</sup> The classic statement of this trend is Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: the development of manners* (New York: Urizen, 1982), substantially corroborated by Ellery Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

<sup>352</sup> David Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in Early Modern France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 2001), Introduction, especially pp. 3-8.

an imagined community requiring active, participatory contribution to earn the title of “citizen.” Above all, I contend, the shift to strongly associate (if not equate) the *patrie* with the *Peuple* rather than the land of France, blazed a critical new trail in the semantic history of national sentiment.

The Fronde was a confused, confusing period, and its opacity is reflected in its pamphlets. Cacophonous as these texts appear, however, they are not as senseless, pointlessly vulgar, or otherwise unintelligible as some have charged. Just the opposite, their claims became a critically important element in the cultural battles that raged across France through 1653. The following chapters will demonstrate the often-surprising applications and outcomes of the discourses that emerged from the Siege. From the streets of Paris to the halls of St. Germain, from Bordeaux to Rouen, and from the King’s *lit de justice* to the gallows, the *patrie* became an indispensable pillar of political culture throughout and after the Fronde.

### **Chapter 3 - “His Boundless Ambition”: Ego, Honor, and Patriotism**

The Siege of Paris solved nothing, but changed everything. On the surface, Parisian life and politics returned to the fraught normalcy of the regency, upon the agreement of the ceasefire between the Crown and frondeurs in the Treaty of Rueil on April 1, 1649. Meanwhile, the Grand Condé and Cardinal-Minister Mazarin resumed their squabbles over royal patronage. But Condé’s leadership of the blockade, and the patriotic fervor his actions had provoked, now manifested in a sea change in French political culture. Personally, the Prince was no longer the universally beloved hero he had been only a few months ago. More broadly, the rapid rise of the *patrie* with its communitarian, selfless obligations reoriented the norms of service, and of noble masculinity itself. The conceptual contest between Condé’s personal kingship and Mazarin’s statism persisted, but the Siege and the concomitant advent of frondeur patriotism changed the game and tipped the balance against the Prince, just as the longstanding tension with Mazarin reached the point of no return. The rebels’ emphases on selflessness and self-control became primary justifications for the Crown’s arrest of Condé, and the year-long “Prison of the Princes” that followed. The Fronde and the Siege had made the good of the People into the foremost rhetorical object of political debate, and made selfless service on the public’s behalf into a cardinal virtue. Ambition, concurrently, became a deadly sin, and even a crime against the King and *patrie*. This chapter charts the rise and impact of these new, patriotic norms of politics, patronage, and masculine honor.

The Fronde - especially in 1649 and 1650 - was a period of rapidly shifting alliances, arcane courtly intrigues, and bewildering offensives and counteroffensives within the halls of power as well as on the streets of Paris. While contingent political and interpersonal

dynamics were crucial causes of the period's most important developments, my analysis looks beyond the events and players themselves, toward the underlying forces that structured discrete actions. Specifically, I ask how the sudden rise and strikingly universal adoption of *patrie* discourse recast the terms of the Condé-Mazarin conflict. The discursive aftermath of the Siege of Paris manifested in political maneuvers and rhetoric, in the structures of patronage, and in the terms of elite masculine honor more broadly.

The following pages combine analyses of key terms within noble identity and the distribution of material wealth, in pursuit of an essentially political argument. Though we tend to speak of each of these issues as distinct fields of inquiry, of course they were experienced holistically and simultaneously. Changes in the distribution of royal largesse held obvious political and personal implications for royal servants, which contemporaries perceived consciously, and to which historians have insightfully attended.<sup>353</sup> The question of gender, however, has been touched upon only lightly in scholarship on seventeenth century politics and patronage, and I aim to address this gap.<sup>354</sup> I argue, in this chapter and in the broader scope of my dissertation, that appeals to masculine honor were a significant

<sup>353</sup> Beyond the classic works by Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford UP, 1986), and William Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1985), see especially the geographically and methodologically wide-ranging volume edited by Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke, *Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age, c.1450-1650* (German Historical Institute London/Oxford University Press, 1991), as well as Sara E. Chapman, *Private Ambition and Political Alliances: The Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain Family and Louis XIV's Government, 1650-1715* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2004). Most significant for my purposes is Katia Béguin's *Les Princes de Condé: rebelles, courtisans, et mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1999).

<sup>354</sup> To this point, the most thorough, direct treatment of the masculine implications of patronage under the early Bourbon monarchs remains Lewis Seifert's brief but excellent argument against the "emasculation" of the nobility under Louis XIV, in *Manning the Margins: Masculinity and Writing in Seventeenth-Century France* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 74-76. Brian Sandberg discusses the gendered implications of "paternalistic honor," which has clear connections to patronage, in *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 159-163. And while ideas of masculinity could easily be applied to Jay Smith's use of *mérite* as a critical component in patronage, in *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1996), the author himself avoids direct discussion of masculinity.

means of compelling service to France – however that entity was construed at a given moment. Before 1649, Condé had argued that his martial prowess obligated the King to reward his service more liberally; during and after the Siege, the frondeurs proclaimed that the feminized *patrie* required manly protection against Mazarin’s predations; in 1650, the Queen justified the Prison of the Princes by appeals to their abandonment of properly masculine prudence and self-control. We may understand the logics that attached the French to their King and nation only by considering the gendered conceptions of service, loyalty, and community that vied for dominance on the Fronde’s cultural battlefield.

In the course of interrogating the Grand Condé’s ongoing battle with Mazarin, this chapter argues that the Fronde represented an important “tipping point” in the long history of noble identity and masculine honor. Major changes in the self-concept of the Second Estate had been brewing at least since Henri IV’s reign. But the radical openness of rebellion pushed fundamental, usually unspoken concepts to the surface, and provided a space to express novel interpretations of basic tenets of noble identity - especially surrounding service, autonomy, and virtue.

Specifically, I argue that the surge of communitarian, patriotic sentiment prompted by the Siege worked to reprioritize the constitutive elements of of noble honor, which were immanently bound up with gender norms.<sup>355</sup> “Honor,” writ large, was a capacious, nebulous category in the minds of *Grand Siècle* aristocrats. But, as the key terms of the Grand Condé’s pre-Fronde mythos show, martial prowess and paternal protection undoubtedly occupied prominent places in the scheme of noble honor culture. One’s skill and valor on the battlefield, alongside one’s capacity to promote the interests of

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<sup>355</sup> Robert Nye, *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France* (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1998), especially Chapter 2.

subordinates substantially determined one's reputation as an honorable man, and hence as a man, full stop. Primacy in defining honor shifted from martiality toward protection across the early seventeenth century, and historians of nobility ubiquitously assert that a definitive change took place, vaguely in the years around Louis XIV's personal reign. My research pinpoints that turning point at the Fronde, beginning with the Siege of Paris. The mechanism for this shift was not pressure from an iron-fisted monarch, however, but changing norms promoted by the populist frondeurs. Moreover, my sources provide further evidence of a flexible, even progressive noble culture,<sup>356</sup> and add to the mounting case against the notion of a mainly conservative, let alone feudal noble ideal in the mid-seventeenth century.<sup>357</sup>

This chapter surveys three episodes. Beginning with a re-examination of Siege-era mazarinades, I analyze the model of gendered politics these texts constructed, especially through mockery of Mazarin and Condé. With the end of the Siege, the struggle between the Prince's model of personal kingship and Prime Minister's statism instantly resurfaced, now against the backdrop of frondeur patriotism. The battle for material wealth in the latter

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<sup>356</sup> Since Kettler and Beik's pathbreaking work, the vision of a forward-looking nobility cooperating willingly - even eagerly - with the monarchy has begun to hold sway. See, for example, Christian Jouhaud's particularly useful article, "Politique des Princes: les Condé (1630-1652)," in Philippe Contamine, ed, *L'état et les aristocraties: XIe-XVIIe siècle France, Angleterre, Escosse* (Paris: Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure, 1989), pp. 336-355. Béguin, *Princes de Condé* largely follows, and productively expands on Jouhaud's thesis. In Anglophone scholarship, Jonathan Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture in France, 1570-1715* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) is the clearest formulation of the Second Estate's generally modernizing impulse, while Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army Under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) carefully tracks the willingness of aristocrats to work with the monarchy as military officers.

<sup>357</sup> Despite growing evidence for the collaborationist model of noble-crown relations, the notion of a backward-looking nobility, nostalgic for the mythic autonomy of their feudal forebears, persists. This tendency is, perhaps understandably, common in discussions of Condé's role in the Fronde: see Hubert Carrier, *Le labyrinthe de l'état: Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653)* (Paris: Champion, 2004), 477-482, and Mark Bannister, *Condé in Context: Ideological Change in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford, UK: Legenda, 2000). The latter's conclusion that Condé ultimately abandoned his dreams of "a return to an imaginary political normality" (120-122) marked by autonomous nobles and a tightly constrained monarch, are a particularly explicit statement of this problematic tenet.

months of 1649 became a key moment in Condé's career, and a major reference point for pamphlets on all sides in the coming year. Finally, as the Regency made its play against Condé and his family, a war of words erupted between the Crown and remaining Condéen party. A close reading of each side's apologetics provides evidence of their opposing views of affairs. More importantly, it demonstrates that both Princely and royalist partisans learned to speak the language of the *patrie* - albeit, with varying facility - as they each couched their explanations in terms of selfless service and the good of the People.

The frondeurs' emphases on generosity, prudence, and self-control in *patrie* discourse responded to the contingencies surrounding Louis XIV's regency and the rebellion that it facilitated. But the patriotic norms that frondeurs produced outlasted the rebellion that birthed them, and became an integral element of French absolutist culture in the years to come. During the Siege, rebels argued that a truly honorable man must protect his nation and aid his compatriots in order to rally opposition to the Crown; after the Siege, the Crown made the same case in condemning its opponents and expanding its power.

### ***“O chef-d’oeuvre de lascheté!”: Egoism and Effeminacy in Siege-Era Mazarinades***

Frondeurs imagined the *patrie* as a community with masculine honor at its heart. In the consciously patriarchal world of seventeenth-century Europe, it is no surprise that those who claimed to represent the “true” France would claim gendered virtues for themselves, and shame their enemies as effeminate or feminine. But whereas they had reproduced monarchical political structures with little modification from customary forms, the rebels were more innovative in their claims regarding manly honor and the qualities that marked it. The following pages look closely at the gendered meanings that frondeurs

constructed in mocking Mazarin and Condé, in the mazarinades of the Siege. I argue that key terms of frondeur patriotism – generosity, judgment, and communitarian affections – strongly influenced the rapidly evolving standards of masculine dignity in France, especially among the aristocracy. Before the rebellion, strength and battlefield prowess had been primary terms in nobles' masculine self-concept. While the frondeurs continued to value those qualities, they subordinated them to discernment, self-control, and protection. Rather than the “martial honor” that Condé’s virtues had typified before 1649, frondeurs emphasized “patriotic honor,” which Condé’s errors defined by negation.<sup>358</sup>

The Siege of Paris called into question the substance of “masculine honor,” a label I apply to the strongly gendered sense of what actions made a virtuous, respectable man (particularly nobleman). Though honor and masculinity were not perfectly synonymous, each did major work in defining the other: traits centered on strength, self-control, piety, wisdom, and magnanimity appeared at once dignified and manly, for they demonstrated self-mastery, as well as mastery over one’s surroundings and subordinates.<sup>359</sup> But masculinity was a category at once much broader, and much narrower than honor. That is, manhood was taken to connote dominance or superiority, of any sort – the sun over the moon, lions over mice, the powerful over the weak, God over humanity, etc. And yet, because maleness was at that moment considered the unmarked norm, authors rarely spoke explicitly about its substance.<sup>360</sup> So, though my sources’ attacks against Mazarin and

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<sup>358</sup> Many key terms and issues here rely on premises established in Chapter 2: on production and consumption of mazarinades during the Siege, see pp. 97-102; on the centrality of generosity and judgment in frondeur patriotism p. 122; on the rebels’ political institutions, pp. 116-117.

<sup>359</sup> These had been the major elements of apex manhood, dating back to Rome’s idealization of *virtus*. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli* (U. Chicago Press, 1999).

<sup>360</sup> The universal applications of gendered expressions of power, and their simultaneous and intentional invisibility is a central issue for Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford:

Condé's dishonorable actions operate through appeals to norms with heavily gendered implications, the language they use is not uniformly itself gendered. The mazarinades of 1649 and 1650 speak more in terms of virtue and dignity than male and female. While the sum total of their discourse bore substantially on gender ideals, their discrete claims mostly circumlocute such issues. My analysis therefore aims to both reflect the primarily ethical tone of the rebels' rhetoric, and to communicate their overall effects at the level of gender ideals.

Reading for honor and gender in the mazarinades is doubly complex, for they were a decidedly negative literature. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, frondeur authors defined the *patrie*'s borders primarily by excluding *estrangers*; its proper sentiments largely by lambasting unpatriotic errors; its obligations by specifying the injuries committed against it, and so on. Even in the pamphlets reporting Châtillon's clear-eyed deathbed exhortations to Condé, the primary rhetorical mode remained reproof for errors. Likewise with honor, while some tracts praised frondeur heroes and heroines, far more often the qualities that defined masculine honor become evident by inverting the qualities that defined dihonor and effeminacy.<sup>361</sup> So, I read such attributes as self-control, prudence, strength, piety, and the like as manly virtues, though the texts themselves rarely call them masculine, as such. But I am especially attentive to which qualities frondeurs cast as shameful or effeminate. Often, they signalled such a lack of manly vigor by the adjective *lasche*, which I translate

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Stanford University Press, 2001). See also Joan Wallach Scott's seminal article, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *American Historical Review*, v. 91, no. 5. (Dec., 1986): 1053-1075.

<sup>361</sup> Lewis Seifert points out, in explicating his application of a Bourdieusian model of masculinity to the Grand Siècle: "Masculine domination requires the subjection not only of women but also of lesser forms of masculinity itself. Emphasizing, by negation, that dominant masculinity contrasts with both femininity and other forms of itself, effeminacy thus reveals the fundamentally constitutive divisions within normative masculinity. Seen from this perspective, effeminacy - along with femininity and other marginal masculine positions - is in fact crucial to any dominant masculine ideal." *Manning the Margins*, 59.

variously as “soft,” “cowardly,” or “weak,” as context dictates.<sup>362</sup> As libels against the Prince and Cardinal make clear, errors that drew such derision were primarily sins of ego: ambition, greed, vanity, gluttony, luxury, and the like. In sum, patriotic masculine virtue demanded pious, valorous, and skillful service, much as traditional martial honor had; however, these traits counted as virtues only when employed wisely and generously for worthy purposes. For besieged Parisians, manly honor inhered in protecting and promoting the *patrie*.

For the first part of this chapter, my analysis rests on the same selection of mazarinades as Chapter 2: 181 pamphlets, published in early 1649 by rebel presses.<sup>363</sup> In the latter section, concerning the Prison of the Princes that lasted from January 1650 through early February 1651, I examine a much smaller sample of texts, for production slowed substantially after the Siege ended. Though the mazarinade market dried up momentarily after Condé’s arrest, Carrier’s research shows no change in the identities of authors or readers, or in the dynamics of the texts themselves.<sup>364</sup> I therefore continue to approach these words as a evidence of what authors believed their readers already felt. I combine Jouhaud and Carrier’s methodologies, in presuming that authors aimed to operate within the sentiments and idioms that would resonate with their audience, both to “seduce” readers into sympathy and action, and in order to sell their product.

The substance of frondeur pamphlets made the new emphasis on communitarian qualities clear from the earliest, pre-Siege pamphlets, which mocked Mazarin’s selfish

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<sup>362</sup> In truth, the dominant sense of *lasche* in my sources would be best captured by the schoolyard taunt “wimpy,” though academic rigor demands slightly more refined language.

<sup>363</sup> For fuller description of these texts and my rationale in selecting them, see Chapter 2, pp. 98-103.

<sup>364</sup> Hubert Carrier, *La presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades. Les hommes du livre* (Geneva: Droz, 1991), 77-91.

effeminacy and lauded the manly virtues of patriotic heroes. The crucial terms in the Fronde's *patrie* were *prudence*, *bienseance*, *vertu* - in a word, sound judgment. In frondeurs' usage, this referred not only to the self-mastery that enabled a man to conquer his feminine fears or passions, but further demanded that he rightly assess the beneficiary of his actions. Heroic service on behalf of an unworthy object held no glory, and advancing the cause of despotism was a sin against the nation, no matter how spectacular the action. Masculine honor and glory, the mazarinades held, must look beyond martial courage or dominance for its own sake, to the protection and promotion of others' welfare - above all, the *patrie*'s. In this sense, the Fronde aimed to universalize the *devoir de révolte* that noblemen had claimed since the sixteenth century.<sup>365</sup> Mazarin's selfish tyranny, and Condé's service on his behalf, perfectly inverted that requirement, and authors' accusations against them during the Siege show clearly the new model of patriotic masculinity.

Frondeurs sought to portray Mazarin as dishonorable, effeminate,<sup>366</sup> and more broadly illegitimate, through three lines of attack: sodomy, machiavellian politics, and courtly luxury. Though these may seem scattershot, even arbitrarily selected screeds, in fact all three were tightly connected, as manifestations of the Cardinal's unbridled greed. The Grand Condé did not suffer abuse of the same scale or intensity as Mazarin, but neither did he escape the Siege untouched. Tellingly, mazarinades charged Condé with the major crime of ambition, in parallel (if not in proportion) with Mazarin. Frondeurs made

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<sup>365</sup> Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: La noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne, 1559-1661* (Paris: Fayard, 1989)

<sup>366</sup> A small subset of pamphlets goes a step further, in claiming that Mazarin is actually female. See especially *La Juliade, ou Jule demasquée, où se voit vif le caractere de son ame* (Paris: François Targa, 1649), 10; as well as *Le Dioge français ou l'homme d'état a la France soupirante* (Paris, 1652), 13-14. However, seventeenth-century notions of embodied sex are a complex issue, and though the mazarinades' use of sex in addition to gender is a fascinating theme, exploring it fully would demand more space and attention than the present study permits. I wish to note the existence of such attacks, however, to demonstrate the intense, multi-dimensional use of ideas surrounding manhood or its lack, in lampooning the Prime Minister.

selfishness the antithesis of patriotic virtue, largely through the avalanche of libel they produced against the most prominent figures in the royal party. Taken together, mockery of the Cardinal and Prince reveals a rapid, marked shift in the sense of what qualities and acts enriched a man's reputation as honorable.

The mazarinades' Rabelaisian fixation on the "lower bodily stratum" is perhaps their best-known feature, but one that has attracted little concerted study. While Jeffrey Merrick has demonstrated the thick connections between sexual slander and political discourse,<sup>367</sup> the nuances of the mazarinades' play on masculine virtues remains to be explored. Careful analysis of manliness in these texts is especially needed, in light of the modern association of sex between men with effeminacy, a view which seventeenth-century readers did not share.<sup>368</sup> Though Mazarin's alleged sodomy did play a part in pamphlets' gendered libels, he did not appear effeminate because he engaged in sex with men, but because he did so by underhanded means and toward selfish ends.

In the first place, "sodomy" in seventeenth century Christendom was a far broader category than it has since become. It referred to any non-procreative or otherwise illicit

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<sup>367</sup> The lone scholarly treatment of sexual imagery in the mazarinades remains Jeffrey Merrick, "The Cardinal and the Queen: Sexual and Political Disorders in the Mazarinades," *French Historical Studies*, 18 (Spring 1994), 667-699.

<sup>368</sup> Michel Foucault has observed that, until the nineteenth century, "sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them." Sex in the early modern period was thus "an act, not an inclination," which might or might not bear on the perpetrator's masculinity. *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction* (New York: Vintage, 1990), 43. Though it was frequently the case that "accusations of effeminacy and sodomy between men follow each other," this was less because sex between men was *ipso facto* emasculating, but rather because it revealed a lack of self-control or piety. For the passive partner, being penetrated did appear feminizing, but the adult Mazarin was never accused of passive sodomy. See Guy Poirier, *L'Homosexualité dans l'imaginaire de la Renaissance*, Confluences-Champion, 7 (Paris: Champion, 1996), 147; on Mazarin's role in sodomy, see Merrick, "The Cardinal and the Queen," 682-686. A pertinent example of the division between sexuality and masculinity in this period can be found with the Grand Condé himself, who was known (among those privy to court gossip, at least) as an occasional lover of men, but whose manly reputation suffered not at all for this reputation.

sexual act, from masturbation to pedophilia to relations with non-Christians.<sup>369</sup> Sodomy was, in essence, any sexual act that failed to strengthen the family, faith, and society, and was often taken to actively injure these objects. In this sense, it derived from selfishness and lack of self-control, as the lustful pursuit of pleasure without consideration of the worldly harm or divine punishment that must surely follow. Its usage in political contexts took on still broader implications: "The term 'sodomy'... connoted charges of heresy, tyranny, graft, and gluttony, and even responsibility for natural disasters."<sup>370</sup> Sodomy, especially as a political charge, was less a crime of the physical body than the social body, and the mazarinades made extensive, creative use of its meanings.

The whole of Jules Mazarin's career, as told by the frondeurs, was defined by sodomy. As a young boy in Rome, he had overcome the disadvantages imposed by the "ignominious lowness" of his birth, by trading on his unnaturally feminine beauty to secure favor at the depraved papal court. In this way, he was able to "triumph by his prostituted boyhood, over the vigor of men."<sup>371</sup> He rose through the ranks at Rome through his passive role in sodomy, but had taken an active role since his arrival in France. Once installed as Richelieu's favorite, and later as Prime Minister under Louis XIV's regency, frondeurs believed that Mazarin used his power and prestige to indulge his preference for young boys, perhaps even molesting the young king and dauphin.<sup>372</sup> He had certainly engaged in

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<sup>369</sup> Cameron McFarlane, *The Sodomite in Fiction and Satire, 1660-1750* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 2-3.

<sup>370</sup> Lewis C. Seifert, "Masculinities and Satires of 'Sodomites' in France, 1660-1715," in *Homosexuality in French History and Culture*, Jeffrey Merrick and Michael Sibalis, eds. (New York: Haworth, 2001), 37. Note, further, the common theme of ego in these politically-tinged charges: gluttony, graft, tyranny, etc.

<sup>371</sup> *Le proces-verbal de la canonisation du bienheureux Jules Mazarin, fait dans la Consistoire des partisans, par Catalan et Tabouret, Seant Emery Antipape, apotheose ironique* (Paris: Claude Boudeville, 1649), 4-5. See Merrick, "The Cardinal and the Queen," 681-682 for several other pamphlets that played on this claim.

<sup>372</sup> The charge of molesting the King himself is exceptional, though I include it here to convey the shocking violation that I perceive frondeurs sought to communicate by such a claim. (See Merrick, "The Cardinal and

illicit sex with Queen Anne, for her bedsheets themselves informed the public of her impassioned cries: "Jules, whom I love more than the King or the State, I wish to give you proof of my extreme passion. In forfeiting the kingdom, in forfeiting myself, so that you can profit from this noble undertaking... I have taken you for my God, for my Law, for my King."<sup>373</sup> In this telling, the Queen's willing abandonment of the cornerstones of the French state - *foi, loi, roi* - exemplifies the linkages between sex and politics that Merrick observes, and which a multitude of pamphlets corroborate. Mazarin's perverse, selfish sexuality shook the very foundations of France. Further, the Queen's alleged abdication of her role as Regent seemed so unfathomably wrong, that many felt it must have been secured by magic. Frondeur pamphleteers ran with this idea, having the Cardinal admit to his confessor that "I have conquered the decency of women by magical charms."<sup>374</sup> So, even in heterosexual sex, Mazarin supposedly resorted to the underhanded avenue of sorcery.

Authors' focus on exploitation and self-serving, dishonorable dealings unite all of the above accusations. Mazarin had reportedly used his girlish beauty to exploit the sinful weakness of papal courtiers, and thereby risen beyond the limits of his inconsiderable merits. Moreover, reports that Mazarin's counterfeit femininity conquered the "vigor of men" in Rome compounds the confusion of roles, in placing the soft, weak, and passive above (normatively) firm, strong, and active men. Once in France, Mazarin himself had become the predator, and his now-active role in sodomy continued to build his despotic

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the Queen," 677-678.) Much more common was the kind of calumny in *Le temperament amphibologique des Testicules de Mazarin avec sa medecine, Par Maistre Ian Chapoli, son Medecin Ordinaire* (Cologne, 1651), which charged that, after the "free and liberal" ejaculation he had enjoyed in Italy, his stay in France had been less promiscuous. The lack of discharge now caused an imbalance in his humors as the reservoir of unreleased semen crowded his prostate, which (obviously) caused his misrule.

<sup>373</sup> *La custode de la reyne qui dit tout* (n.p. 1649), 3-4. This and other pamphlets made clear that the Queen preferred anal sex, continuing the theme of Mazarin's sodomitical inclinations.

<sup>374</sup> *L'amende honorable de Jules Mazarin des crimes qu'il a commis contre dieu, contre le roy, & contre lui-mesme* (Paris, 1649), 6.

power. His politico-sexual dominance of the Queen and her son symbolized his selfish, tyrannical rule, and magnified its horror. Moreover, his inability to achieve such goals without recourse to deceit, prostitution, or magic distinguished his power from the legitimate, manly dominion that resulted from superior prowess and wisdom. Just the opposite, the Italian Cardinal was “weak, vindictive, and imprudent,” and his rise was motivated by his “avarice” and “ambition” – all, precisely the opposite of every pillar of patriotic, masculine honor.<sup>375</sup> Mazarin’s sodomy mirrored his tyranny, and rendered him effeminate in the logic of the frondeurs’ patriotic discourse, because it was selfish, unwise, and deceitful.

Read in this way, the overlap between charges of sodomy and machiavellian politics becomes clearer. That is, where sodomy connoted self-interest and deceit on an interpersonal scale, *machiavelisme* meant tyranny, graft, and the use of state-level authority to enrich and empower the ruler at the people’s expense.<sup>376</sup> Like sodomy, machiavellianism connoted a wide swath of misdeeds. Beyond self-serving or despotic applications of power, the notion of a *politique de Machiavel* evoked a dire estimation of the ruler’s morality. The term connoted nefarious dealings with servants and subjects - even enchantments or demonology (in keeping with the idea that Machiavelli had been inspired by Satan).

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<sup>375</sup> *La Juliade*, 3, 9,

<sup>376</sup> At the time of the Fronde, French engagement with Machiavelli’s thought seems to have stopped at the level of gross, negative stereotypes. No edition of *The Prince* was published from 1637 until 1664, and the evidence of the mazarinades gives no indication of any fair reading of Machiavelli’s (in)famous essay. In mid-century France, invocation of Machiavelli’s thought flattened the intricacies of the Florentine’s theoretical innovations, and instead related to perceptions of a diabolical, immoral politics. Jacob Soll, *Publishing the Prince: History, Reading, and the Birth of Political Criticism* (Ann Arbor: U. Michigan, 2005), 73. Henry Heller notes that Machiavelli’s diabolical reputation in France was a direct result of the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of 1572: after that tragedy, “what had been Machiavelli’s rather positive initial reputation in France was transformed. Until the massacre Machiavelli had been known in France as an important Italian military theoretician and historian... But from the time of the massacre his name became a by-word for the kind of political treachery, immorality, and tyrannical rule that was held to be characteristic of the Italian nation.” Henry Heller, *Anti-Italianism in Sixteenth Century France* (Toronto, 2003), 9.

*Machiavelisme*, in this general sense, served as shorthand for all “*immoralité politique*,”<sup>377</sup> especially the kinds of self-serving betrayal in service of autocratic power that *The Prince* was broadly seen to advocate. The mazarinades found an audience ready to believe that the Cardinal adhered to such principles.

In a more specific sense, charges that Mazarin was a disciple of Machiavelli reinforced his exclusion from the *patrie* on national grounds.<sup>378</sup> Numerous pamphlets offhandedly decry the Cardinal for his machiavellian tendencies, but many were more pointed in their attacks. For example, one self-proclaimed cleric proclaimed that the Cardinal “has no religion but that of Machiavelli,” uniting charges of atheism (perhaps Satanism), and cynically using his position as a Prince of the Church purely for political leverage.<sup>379</sup> But the most powerful attacks remained those grounded in nationality. One pamphlet informs the Queen that loyal Frenchmen have always been willing to fight against tyrants, “if they were *Machiavelistes*, and to speak plainly, if they were Italians, and not at all French.”<sup>380</sup> Machiavelli was the consummate Italian politician and consummate self-serving schemer, and Mazarin’s emulation of his principles made the Cardinal “effectively the Tyrant, ‘the *étranger* who seeks to rule absolutely.’”<sup>381</sup>

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<sup>377</sup> Albert Cheruel, *La pensée de Machiavel en France* (Paris: L’artisan du livre, 1935), 125.

<sup>378</sup> Accusations of sodomy and machiavellianism intertwine on this point, as well, for homosexual sex was cast as “the infamous vice of Italy.” *Custode de la Reyne*, 3.

<sup>379</sup> *Lettre d’un Religieux envoyée à Monsieur le Prince de Condé, à Saint-Germain-en-Laye, contenant la vérité de la vie et moeurs du Cardinal Mazarin. Avec exhortation audit Seigneur Prince d’abandonner son party* (n.p. 1649), in Célestin Moreau, *Choix des Mazarinades*, 2 vols. (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1853), i: 99. In point of fact, Mazarin had won his Cardinalcy through Richelieu’s advocacy, specifically and explicitly for its political utility. On this process, and Mazarin’s early career in general, see Geoffrey Treasure, *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France*. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 15-44.

<sup>380</sup> *Décision de la question du temps – A la Reyne Régente* (n.p. 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 254.

<sup>381</sup> Christine Vicherd, “Mazarin ou la tyrannie: Le rejet des pratiques politiques ‘italiennes’ par les Frondeurs,” in Serroy, ed. *France et l’Italie au temps de Mazarin*, 57. Includes citation of *L’Oracle des vertus héroïques et cardinales de Monseigneur le Prince de Conty* (Paris: Pierre du Pont, 1649).

The tragic results of Mazarin's magically-usurped, vicious, absolute power were obvious, in the frondeurs' minds. Mazarinades therefore reiterated the *patrie's* national/moral boundaries by conflating Italian identity with a specifically exploitive style of political immorality. They simultaneously emasculated the Prime Minister by accusing him of an inability to master his passions, to exercise power honorably, and above all to protect those under him, as a truly dominant man must. For all these reasons, it was imperative that he be excluded from the purely French, manfully virtuous *patrie* community.

Jules Mazarin had allegedly come to power through sodomy and exercised authority by machiavellian principles, all toward the ultimate end of living a luxurious, soft life. Thus, just as accusations of sodomy and of machiavellianism bled together, both of these played into French prejudices against courtly life.<sup>382</sup> Italian aristocrats had acquired a reputation in France for immoderate indulgence, ever since the sixteenth century had brought an Italian diaspora into France in the train of the Medici Queens Catherine and Marie. The French officers, financiers, and courtiers who were displaced by the new, foreign arrivals developed and effectively deployed a vicious xenophobic discourse in the late sixteenth century, which persisted up to the Fronde.<sup>383</sup> The roots of their concertedly gendered attacks lay in the Italian aristocracy's perceived lack of martial purpose, in contrast to

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<sup>382</sup> Lewis Seifert's overview of anti-courtier rhetoric's history is succinct and convincing: "In no way... does the early modern period 'invent' the attack on effeminate courtiers... This said, attacks on the effeminate courtier were significantly reinvigorated across Europe by the appearance in 1520 of Castiglione's immensely popular, but also controversial *Book of the Courtier*." *Manning the Margins*, 72.

<sup>383</sup> In the last years of the Valois monarchy, "Italian nobles and courtiers acquired exceptional power and were rewarded with large numbers of offices and pensions. At the same time Italian ecclesiastics acquired an unprecedentedly high number of offices in the French church. Italian bankers came to control the finances of the state and oversaw the imposition of new taxes on the increasingly hard-pressed French population. During this period Italian humanists and artists were given preference at court over their French counterparts." The reaction against these changes, Heller argues, centered on a fierce, effective, and durable strain of anti-Italian discourse. Heller, *Anti-Italianism*, 3. Jouanna notes the persistence of an "italianophobia virulente" in the seventeenth century, which the Fronde clearly adopted. *Devoir de révolte*, 232.

French nobles' self-concept as a warrior elite.<sup>384</sup> French culture placed a rising premium on courtly civility, undoubtedly owed much to Italian models and influences.<sup>385</sup> Nevertheless, Italy, its language, and especially its nobility endured abuse for their "corrupt and effeminate" influence on the "virile, robust, and healthy" culture of France.<sup>386</sup> Mazarin of course became the chief representative of this corrupting, effeminating influence.

In point of fact, Mazarin was a masterful courtier, adept at the intricate maneuvering and interpersonal dealings necessary to succeed in the highest socio-political circles. However, in a clever rhetorical move, the frondeurs highlighted and hyperbolized this strength, to render the Cardinal a cunning back-channel schemer, unsuited for the sort of head-on conflict and confrontation that forthright masculinity demanded. Mazarin operated through empty and broken promises, arbitrary arrests, and even assassinations by poisoning to achieve his ends. All these crimes were natural to him, and "following the custom of his land, being unable to suffer any of his enemies to live, especially those who

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<sup>384</sup> The "domestication" of France's nobility - once an historiographical commonplace - has fared poorly under historians' closer attention. At the most basic level, the incidence of violence among French elites hardly saw a uniform downward trend: see Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits*, and Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) for plentiful examples of nobles' thirst for violence under the early Bourbons. And, as Guy Rowlands explicitly argues in *Dynastic State*, and Roy McCullough implicitly assumes in *Coercion, Conversion, and Counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's France* (Boston: Brill, 2007), the noble ideal of armed service persisted under Louis XIV, and helps to explain the Second Estate's cooperation - even enthusiasm - in the reform and expansion of the army under the Sun King. See Smith, *Culture of Merit*, John Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and André Corvisier, *L'Armée Française de la fin du XVIIe au Ministère de Choiseul*, 2 vol. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de la France, 1964). In short, I perceive that the "contest" between courtly and martial modes of noble life was not the zero-sum game that contemporaries long believed, and which historians too easily followed Elias in reproducing. I follow Lewis Seifert's excellent analysis, which poses aggression and dominance as central elements within court society, and argues that new norms for "soft" masculinities arose to accommodate these shifts - see *Manning the Margins*, 57-98. In this reading, not only did noble masculinity actually retain its warrior flavor, but court became an arena for battle and conquest, in its own right.

<sup>385</sup> Jean Balsamo adds some balance to this story, in recounting the pieces of Italian culture that were adopted and welcomed in France, along with the cultural chauvinism of French elites. See his *Les rencontres des muses: italienisme et anti-italianisme dans les lettres françaises de la fin du XVIe siècle* (Geneva: Slatkine, 1992), as well as his edited volume, *Passer les monts: Français en Italie - l'Italie en France (1494-1525)*, Xe colloque de la Société française d'étude du Seizième Siècle (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1995).

<sup>386</sup> Heller, *Anti-Italianism*, 179.

are as brave as he is weak and cowardly."<sup>387</sup> His lack of genuine strength or merit forced him to resort to such machiavellian means.<sup>388</sup> Frondeurs' rhetorical tactics powerfully exploited the conjunction of prejudices against the Italianized court and the Cardinal's Italianate, machiavellian politics. The mazarinades held that "the dishonest, the traitors, and the cunning" - in a word, Jules Mazarin and his compatriots - "are made for court and for intrigues."<sup>389</sup> The manly French, this frondeur author held, courageously faced their enemies head-on.

Further still, and no less damning in the scheme of patriotic honor, Mazarin stole from France to enrich himself, and lived luxuriously while the virtuous French bled and starved. We have seen in Chapter 2 that he was supposed to have sent endless convoys of bullion back to his palace in Italy, but his graft helped him to indulge his immoderate tastes in France as well. Since the early days of the Fronde, rebels had accused Mazarin of spending the proceeds of his theft on extravagant decorations for his palace, and on unimaginable delicacies to sate his hedonistic appetite.<sup>390</sup> During the Siege, these charges crystallized and expanded, in a rising tide of outrage against the Cardinal's allegedly massive collection of lascivious nude statuary,<sup>391</sup> the troupes of Italian comedians and dancers who entertained him,<sup>392</sup> and the ocean of ointments, hair gels, and lemonade he

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<sup>387</sup> *Lettre du chevalier Georges de Paris à Monseigneur le prince de Condé* (Paris, 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 155.

<sup>388</sup> *La Dernière requête présentée à nosseigneurs du parlement par monseigneur le duc de Beaufort, avant le jugement de la calomnieuse accusation intentée par le cardinal Jules Mazarin* (Paris, 1649), 6.

<sup>389</sup> *Discours au Parlement*, in Moreau, ii: 31.

<sup>390</sup> *Agréable récit de ce qui s'est passé aux dernières barricades de Paris, descriptes en vers burlesques* (Paris, 1648), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 14-16.

<sup>391</sup> *Inventaire des merveilles du monde rencontrées dans le palais du cardinal Mazarin*, (Paris: Rolin de la Haye, 1649)

<sup>392</sup> A nineteenth-century edition of seven mazarinades collects a useful assortment of attacks against the theatrical effeminacy of the Cardinal: *Mascarades et Farces de la Fronde* (Turin: Gay et Fils, 1870).

vainly consumed.<sup>393</sup> These “voluptuous” predilections all smacked of effeminacy in themselves.<sup>394</sup> But frondeur pamphlets’ intent focus on their costs, “which surpass reckoning,” reminded readers that the onerous taxes that had touched off the Fronde in the first place funded only these frivolous, courtly tastes.<sup>395</sup> All the while, Mazarin “has done no good for the men of virtue and of *mérite*, nor given any recompense to those who have hazarded their lives and property in service of the King; on the contrary, he has caused nearly all the King’s armies to perish from hunger and extreme want.”<sup>396</sup> Mazarin happily used his unnatural power to bleed France dry, only to finance his own immoral pleasures.

Ultimately, charges of sodomy, machiavellianism, and courtly indulgences all proceeded from the basic sin of unregulated ego. Mazarin seduced or bewitched men and women in order to rise to a position of unwarranted authority, through which he pursued his unquenchable passions, and enriched himself and his lackeys. Chief among those blind servants, in Parisians’ eyes, stood the Grand Condé. In serving Mazarin, the Prince opened himself to similar charges of effeminate shame, though Condé’s sins were portrayed more frequently as a momentary error in judgment or a loss of self-control. Though less caustic in their rhetoric, mazarinades asserted that his mistake was no less an issue of masculine virtue. Whereas Mazarin’s effeminacy was allegedly a natural result of his low birth and Italian origins, Condé’s weakness stemmed from an overabundance of power and success.

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<sup>393</sup> Among all the attacks in the mazarinades, references to Mazarin’s love of lemonade and lotions are some of the most specific and most frequent I have seen. Aside from the generalized charges of tyranny and theft, these appear and reappear with a frequency that is first surprising, then confusing, and ultimately hilarious. See, for just one example, *Le passe-porte et l’adieu de Mazarin en vers burlesques* (n.p. 1649), in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 51-52.

<sup>394</sup> *La Juliade*, 8.

<sup>395</sup> *Lettre d’un religieux*, in Moreau, *Choix*, i: 99.

<sup>396</sup> *Requeste des trois Estats*, in Moreau, *Choix*, I: 31.

Criticizing the Grand Condé's manhood was a striking move, which sharply contrasted patriotic honor against the martial mode that had dominated before. Condé had been the apex warrior nobleman of pre-Fronde France, incarnating what Bannister calls the "class myth of the *noblesse d'épée*."<sup>397</sup> He had won his reputation (described in depth in Chapter 1) almost entirely on the battlefield, and his persona cast him as a military hero above all. To be sure, Condé had earned praise during the 1640s for his generosity, judgment, and piety, in addition to his valor and strength. However, these traits had appeared only in the context of battle, or in its aftermath. During the Fronde, however, the emphasis was inverted, to require generosity, judgment, and piety as preconditions of heroism, rather than portraying them as "icing on the cake" of martial exploits. To a significant extent, this change was spurred by contingency, for the Prince had won his reputation in battles against Spain, at the head of the King's armies. At that moment, there had been little need to evaluate the beneficiary of his victory, or to parse "true" and "false" royal authority. The Fronde tested the Prince's discernment on these matters, and the frondeurs found him severely wanting.

The circumstances of the Regency, the rebellion, and the rise of *patrie* discourse worked together to de-emphasize martial virtues, and to valorize prudent, communitarian service as dominant terms in noble honor. Because the King was absent, the issue of to whom one's service should attach was suddenly cast into disarray. As Mazarin insisted on the continued legitimacy of royal authority, the frondeurs more successfully argued that the moral imperative of the *patrie* should direct a man's actions. Patriotic virtue required a critical eye toward the source of authority, as well as the outcome of one's actions: a true

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<sup>397</sup> Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 11.

Frenchman must serve and benefit the true France. The actions in question were still military, in the main, but the object of loyalty became the first consideration, while the quality of one's performance receded to secondary status.<sup>398</sup> The place of the profession of arms as a component of the noble *métier* had been a fraught question since the Wars of Religion,<sup>399</sup> and the Fronde pushed strongly against a primarily martial conception of noble masculinity. In its place, the mazarinades advanced norms centered on self-control, protection of others, and public-mindedness. As portrayed in texts from the Siege, the patriotic nobleman must conquer himself, before conquering others.

The Grand Condé exemplified the lack of martial honor for frondeurs, and they called him to account for his misjudgments. Just as Condé's unpatriotic crimes helped the rebels to define the moral borders of the *patrie*, his horrific errors during the Siege, particularly on issues of money, provided a means to clarify patriotic honor. Above all, his once-virtuous dominance had given way to greed and ambition, to the point that he now protected Mazarin and persecuted France in order to enrich himself. One pamphlet spread the rumor that Mazarin had promised Condé four million *livres* as compensation for his command of the Siege. This accusation, tellingly, was immediately preceded by a reminder that the fallen angel Lucifer had been spurred to rebel against the Almighty by his ambition, and that "of all the crimes that sully mortals, there is none more heinous... than pride [*orgueil*]."<sup>400</sup> Similarly, a letter from Condé's self-professed mistress, La Petite Nichon, begged him, "What motive has carried you off in such a foolhardy and detestable action? Do

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<sup>398</sup> The Baron de Clanleau, for instance, earned accolades after his defeat and death at the Battle of Charenton.

<sup>399</sup> The authoritative treatment of this question remains Ellery Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

<sup>400</sup> *Le foudroiemment des Geans Mazarinistes abysmez sous les ruines du fameux et desolé bourg de Charenton* (Paris: François Noel, 1649), 3.

you believe you'll win honor or glory?" She poses a clear contrast between imprudence and vice, as an effeminate lack of judgment, and manly honor and glory, which cannot be procured by the means Condé has set out: "If you have conceived such a goal, you are grossly misled." But, knowing Condé as this character does, she poses a more plausible explanation: "I believe that a shower of gold has caught your eye, and that the gift of a cross of diamonds has hardened your heart, pushing you to crucify many persons of virtue."<sup>401</sup> The Prince's greed had blinded him to the clear principle that glory and honor were the true rewards for merit, not money, and that they could be won only by loving, generous deeds on behalf of the virtuous *patrie*.

The *Soupirs François*... goes a step further in equating patriotism with masculine honor, and masculine honor in turn with benevolent, generous dominance. From the opening line, "O masterpiece of cowardice!" the author laments that "France has produced such men/ Traitorous, abandoning her in her need,/ And allied with those supreme deceivers,/ To sell their *Patrie*, in selling themselves."<sup>402</sup> Beyond its implications for inclusion in the national community, "selling" oneself to Mazarin was an act of "cowardice" and effeminacy, as a failure either to discern or to adhere to the need to protect others, rather than enrich oneself. By choosing material self-interest over the public good, Condé made himself a moral foreigner, and an active enemy of the *patrie*. More broadly still, anyone who failed to manfully protect the community in the face of Condé's assaults would lose his claim on the title of *bon François*: "Paris, France: you must now show your courage/ or else abandon your name, and take up that of Slave."<sup>403</sup> Only patriotic, masculine courage

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<sup>401</sup> *Lettre de la Petite Nichon du Marais a Monseieur le Prince de Condé a S. Germain* (np, 1649), 2.

<sup>402</sup> *Soupirs François, sur la paix Italienne* (np, 1649), 3.

<sup>403</sup> *Soupirs François*, 7.

could counteract the immoral, effeminate domination of those who would rule by slavery and naked strength, rather than generous concern for the People.

Condé's jilted lover, la Petite Nichon, further helped to clarify the true substance of masculine honor, as frondeurs would have it, in an extended metaphor. Placing her body in parallel with the *patrie*, Nichon undertakes an uncomfortably sexualized explanation of the dichotomy between brute strength and loving aid: "Who would have believed, Monsieur, that after so many professions of love, of service and fidelity," – the primary terms of frondeur patriotism – "that you would have so little of these for France, and for me? How can you lay siege to a city where la Petite Nichon is, seeking to take [it/her] by force? Alas! you know that I have never refused you entry; I would never fortify that Place against your approaches." When Condé had acted out of "love, service, and fidelity," France's and Nichon's caresses had been his for the taking; but now, as he chose strength over selflessness, he found the gates closed, and the object of his desires available to him only through coercion, rather than consent.<sup>404</sup> Condé had traded his loving relations with Nichon and with the feminine figure of the *patrie* for rape, siege, and infamy. Instead of protecting the weak and vulnerable, he violently exploited them for his own gain. Just as they satirized Mazarin's sodomy, mazarinades translated Condé's misdeed into sexual perversion.<sup>405</sup>

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<sup>404</sup> *Lettre de la Petite Nichon*, passim. Nichon's closing comment offers a rich example of mazarinade humor: "If you only had the ammunition for a single discharge, you might have trained your canon on an eminence near the entrance of the fortress [*une eminence proche de la contrescarpe du fossé*.]" That is, Condé would have been better served by working against the Eminence - the honorific shorthand for a Cardinal - who controlled access to the Queen and her son. The clear *double entendre* reference to anal sex, meanwhile, might be any or all of: a riff on the vice most commonly associated with Mazarin, a suggestion of willing submission by those whose cooperation has been earned by service, or an opportunistic dirty joke - an early modern "That's what she said."

<sup>405</sup> Similarly, in one of the slew of Châtillon-centric pamphlets examined in Chapter 2 (pp. 126-133), Condé's violence appears as an extension of various sorts of domestic abuse. See *Les Advis heroiques et importants*

Condé was certainly an unexpected exemplar of unpatriotic effeminacy, but the positive vision of frondeur masculinity found its model in even more surprising places: the Duchesse de Chevreuse and the Prince de Conti, two of the besieged Parisians' most prominent leaders. As if to underline that the Fronde aimed to reorient the norms of masculine honor, mazarinades held up Condé's bookish, unwarlike brother Conti alongside a woman, as paragons of manly dominance. Though both figures would certainly defeat Mazarin on the battlefield in good time, their admirable qualities derived from generosity and wisdom, rather than bravery or strength alone. Thus, one mazarinade named Conti as chief among the "French Caesars" by virtue of "his sagely conduct, and the zeal he possesses for his *Patrie*." These impulses ensured that "he is never idle, always pushing himself to discover the most powerful, necessary, and important means to maintain Paris in a triumphal state, and to render her victorious over her enemies."<sup>406</sup> Though Conti's tireless efforts would manifest themselves in war, his means are mainly intellectual, rooted in his wisdom and patriotic affections. And the descriptors for his virtues and their results – "never idle," "powerful," "victorious" – are implicitly but unmistakably masculine. The same pamphlet immoderately lauds the (equally dubiously-qualified) Duc de Beaufort, as more passionate for his homeland than Romulus, more capable a commander than Xerxes, and more generous than either: "Our Great Hero seeks no other recompense for his trouble, than to see us [the People] tranquil, and to maintain the abundance of this city, even at the risk of his life."<sup>407</sup> Virtue, honor, and ultimately battlefield dominance would be secured

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*donnez a Monsieur le Prince de Condé Par Monsieur de Chastillon revenu de l'autre monde. Par l'autheur mesme des Triolets.* (Paris: Langlois, 1649), 7.

<sup>406</sup> *La Couronne de gloire de nos Generaux, les Cesars François* (Paris: Morlot, 1649), 3. See also, *Theses d'estat, tirées de la Politique Chrestienne, présentées a Monseigneur le Prince de Conti* (Paris, 1649).

<sup>407</sup> *Couronne de gloire*, 6.

only by love of the *patrie* and service on the community's behalf, and a true patriot needed no reward to secure those goals.

With the Duchesse de Chevreuse, authors were self-consciously aware of their surprising attribution of gendered traits: "Although all virtues are common to men, those that we call heroic are nevertheless found less often among women." Chevreuse reportedly exemplified the exceptional *virago* (in the original, positive sense): she possessed the "temperance to resist excess, the humility to defend against bouts of pride, and the generosity and greatness of courage, which not only combat softness and cowardice, but can vanquish them advantageously." Though such traits were seen as more natural to men, God sometimes endows the "less robust sex" with such traits to show his miraculous power.<sup>408</sup> *L'illustre Conquerante*, after similarly qualifying Chevreuse as exceptional, uses the Duchesse to observe that "generosity is a quality inseparable from Nobility." Thus, this noblewoman, who united temperance, generosity, courage, humility, and constancy of purpose, will become "another Jeanne d'Arc, chasing the *étrangers* from France."<sup>409</sup> Again, pamphleteers defined communitarian, noble virtues, by opposition to the effeminate, "foreign" offenses of self-interest. And, comparing Chevreuse to the most famous female martyr for the *patrie* further reinforced her selflessness. Any reader would have supplied the final point of this argument: the Grand Condé had abdicated his masculine duties, and they had been filled by wise, generous men and even women in his absence. In the tumult of civil war, virtuous "amazons" might take up the needful duties vacated by men.<sup>410</sup> In

<sup>408</sup> *L'Amazone Francoise, ou L'approche des troupes de Madame la Duchesse de Chevreuse* (Paris: Jean Henault, 1649), 3.

<sup>409</sup> *L'illustre conquerante, ou la Genereuse constance de Madame de Chevreuse* (Paris: N. Charles, 1649), 3, 6.

<sup>410</sup> On the issue of "Amazons," see Sylvie Steinberg, "Le mythe des amazones et son utilisation politique de la Renaissance à la Fronde," *Royaume de féminie: Pouvoirs, contraintes, espaces de liberté des femmes, de la Renaissance à la Fronde*, eds. Kathleen Wilcon-Chevalier, Éliane Viennot (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1999),

doing so, they staked a stronger claim to patriotic honor than their effeminate, unpatriotic male counterparts.

The traumatic experience of the Siege of Paris had produced an eruption of patriotism in mazarinades, and introduced a compelling new strand to the discourses surrounding masculine honor. These effects would endure long after the Siege itself had ended. Immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Rueil on April 1, a handful of pamphlets again praised the Grand Condé, though they now did so in terms that explicitly de-emphasized martial valor in favor of patriotic affection. *The Thanksgiving of all France to Monsieur the Prince for his Agreement to Peace* illuminates this change in lucid terms. During his leadership of the Siege, which “clashes with the interests of all of France,” it had seemed that Condé allowed his “passions” to dominate his will - a clearly womanly weakness. But after the cessation of violence, the Parisians had room to hope that the Prince had reacquired his former manly virtue: “I dare to assure Your Highness that the action you have taken eminently surpasses all your others to this point, and though your whole life has been the very picture of combat and of victory, this is the very picture of sweetness and clemency.” In this author’s formulation, an act of mercy outshines the victorious combats that had primarily defined Condé’s reputation until that point. Martial dominance gave way to prudence and virtuous protection, and on that basis, the author drives his point home: “If in all other [encounters], you have always vanquished, in this you have learned to vanquish yourself, which is the most generous, most glorious, and most

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261-273, as well as Brian Sandberg, “‘Generous Amazons Came to the Breach’: Besieged Women, Agency, and Subjectivity during the French Wars of Religion,” *Gender and History* 16.3 (Nov, 2004): 254-188. Further, on the role of women in the Fronde more generally, see the Introduction and early chapters of Joan DeJean, *Tender Geographies: Women and the Origins of the Novel in France* (New York: Columbia UP, 1991). Readers should keep a critical eye, however, on DeJean’s overbroad claims that the Fronde was a “women’s war” (37).

remarkable act you could perform.”<sup>411</sup> It is not simply that this author hoped Condé would not persecute the Parisians any longer; rather, by framing self-control as the superlative path to achieving generosity, glory, and honor, he hopes to teach a more general lesson. Patriotic masculine honor, forged in the Siege, de-emphasized martial prowess or courage for its own sake, and recentered manhood on a self-mastery defined by moderation, protection, and communitarian affections.

In the first half of 1649, frondeurs worked to establish selfless defense of the *patrie* as a primary marker of masculine virtue, in contrast to Mazarin and Condé’s pride, ambition, and egotism. During the Siege, such discourses had largely remained at the level of rhetoric, as an argument to motivate Parisians to serve and sacrifice for their city. But in the latter half of the year, and especially in 1650, patriotic masculinity became a central term in the material, political, and ultimately legal battles between Condé and Mazarin. When the Prince broke with the Crown over yet another perceived insult in Mazarin’s disbursal of wealth, charges of greed and ambition once again flew. Ultimately, Condé’s arrest on January 18, 1650, in the Crown’s telling resulted from his insatiable appetite for royal favor, and his envy of royal power. The aftermath of the Siege made clear that patriotic honor was more than an abstract claim in frondeur mazarinades, but a significant new piece in the cultural landscape of French politics.

### **“An Extraordinary Quantity of Favors”: Patronage and Politics after the Siege**

In Paris, the end of the Siege was welcomed eagerly, even desperately. Crowds had flocked to the Parlement in the late days of March, “asking for nothing other than Peace.”

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<sup>411</sup> *Actions de grace de toute la France a Monsieur le Prince de Condé, Touchant son consentement à la Paix, fait par un Bourguignon.* (Paris?, 1649)

When the Treaty of Rueil was brought before the judges, they accepted it unanimously, without modification, and to massive public acclamation.<sup>412</sup> Peace with the royal party was celebrated with the same pageantry and intensity as a victory over Spain, most visibly in the *Te Deum* sung at Notre Dame. But welcoming peace did not mean forgetting promises, or forgiving debts. The report on public joy over the Treaty also mentions a Parliamentary deputation sent to St. Germain, with orders to both thank the royal party for making peace, and to ask “very humbly that the [frondeur] Princes and Generals be given total satisfaction for all their legitimate wishes.”<sup>413</sup> The civil war had momentarily subsided, but the fight for patronage flared up immediately, and soon spiraled into a battle over the legitimacy of the Prison of the Princes. The first salvo in the renewed, intensified struggle for patronage was fired in the same sentence as peace was proclaimed, and the engagement was fought and decided on the patriotic field that the Siege had established.

In the eight months between the conclusion of the Treaty of Rueil and the start of the Prison of the Princes, the Grand Condé’s major fight shifted from the military and discursive realms of the Siege, and returned to the pecuniary and interpersonal spheres that marked his career through 1648. With the signature of the ceasefire on April 1, the patronage battle between Prince and Crown resumed, now amplified by Condé’s feeling of significant entitlement after his service and sacrifice during the blockade. His enmity against Mazarin irreparably split the two men over the summer and autumn of 1650. On January 18, 1650, the Queen ordered Condé, Conti, and Longueville arrested, on vague charges of hampering royal authority. The three brothers remained incarcerated, at

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<sup>412</sup> Archive des Affaires Étrangers, Mémoires et Documents Français [AAE] 866 f.214 *Declaration du Roy, pour faire cesser les mouvements, & restablir le Repos & la Tranquillité en son Royaume. Verifiée en Parlement le premier Avril mil six cens quarante-neuf.* (Paris, 1649).

<sup>413</sup> AAE f.319, 1 April 1649 “Advis du premiere d’Avril.”

Vincennes and later Le Havre, for the following thirteen months. During this time, known as the “Prison of the Princes,” a skirmish in the Fronde’s larger pamphlet war relitigated Condé’s struggles with Mazarin over reward in 1649. The Crown framed Condé’s relentless drive to secure rewards for himself and his clients as immoderate self-interest, and each side battled to convict or absolve him of the crime of ambition. The following pages examine the factional struggles of 1649 that set the stage for the competing claims of 1650, in order to observe an exceptionally clear instance of the battle between personal kingship and statism.

The struggle over patronage began instantly after Rueil largely because the grounds had been prepared as the Siege was still in progress. In February 1649, Mazarin’s confidant in Paris, a certain Bluet, penned a letter that elucidated the current situation in Parlement and looked ahead to the circumstances likely to emerge from the blockade. Bluet divided the Parlement into three factions: friends, enemies, and neutrals. He proposed a strategy to shore up the first, and win over or marginalize the second two, which hinged on patronage. The Prime Minister should “acquire, by graces and *bienfaits*,” as many opposed and undecided judges as possible. Not only would this reaffirm his power in the Court, it would “put an end to the impression that has arisen, that there is no use in coming before Your Eminence, and that one cannot receive favor except through the two Princes [Condé and Orléans].”<sup>414</sup> Here Bluet expresses, frankly and precisely, Mazarin’s statist philosophy of patronage. Favor was a means to purchase loyalty in advance, a “down payment” on future service (or more cynically, neutrality). Just as important, Bluet continued, such a use of patronage could be an offensive weapon in the zero-sum game of courtly intrigue: “It is

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<sup>414</sup> AAE 864, f.85, Bluet to Mazarin, undated letter from late February, 1649.

furthermore useful to acquire and conserve these groups, for this renders the Princes impotent to undertake anything, and makes Your Eminence more powerful [*authorisée*] than you have ever been, with less worry and more surety." Even as Condé carried out the Queen's orders, Mazarin's closest allies viewed the Prince's wealth, power, and influence over potential clients as a threat to the State's, and the Cardinal's own security.

Bluet notably includes the Duc d'Orléans as a threat comparable to Condé. Both men had clashed with the Crown in the past, though ultimately both sided with the Regency during the Siege. But *Monsieur*, as Orléans was formally known, had so far been a remarkable non-factor in the Fronde. But both Princes were wealthy, powerful patrons, so much so that a well-informed mazarinist charged them with exercising a virtual monopoly over favor in France. These two men occupied the same threatening category not because they posed an imminent danger to the Crown through rebellion. Condé had given no indication that he would take up arms against the Crown, while Orléans seemed inertia-bound to remain on the sidelines. Instead, their influence over clients seemed to overshadow the King's, and this endowed them with a menace which required proactive measures to contain. In effect, Mazarin had decided, during the Siege, to reward Condé as little as possible for his service in the Siege.

If Mazarin viewed the Princes who had remained with the Crown with suspicion, his treatment of frondeur nobles and generals after Rueil was outright derisive. In fairness, the rebellious *Grands* made reconciliation difficult, as they engaged in an "almost endless" succession of petty squabbles and bar brawls with mazarinists throughout the spring and

summer of 1649.<sup>415</sup> More seriously, they published a lengthy list of demands for favors and appointments. These were frankly impossible for the recently-bankrupted Crown to fulfill, but it had agreed to grant them nonetheless.<sup>416</sup> The concessions were not a formal element in the Rueil negotiations (which the Princes refused to attend), but were understood on all sides as part and parcel with the Treaty. Though the Cardinal was fully aware of the gravity that the petitioners attached to these requests, he was deeply reticent to publicly appear to reward rebels, especially so soon after their settlement with the Crown.<sup>417</sup> Tensions festered between the Crown and the pacified but unappeased *Grands* throughout the spring and summer. The duplicity that erstwhile rebel leaders, especially Conti and the Duc de Longueville, perceived in Mazarin's promises only exacerbated matters.<sup>418</sup>

At the same time, Condé's influence with the Queen in the immediate wake of the Siege, in councils and at Court, had never been greater.<sup>419</sup> But this short-lived blessing quickly became an unsustainable burden, as a result of his divided loyalties. As his ex-rebel friends, clients, and family pressed their cases for royal favors in accordance with Mazarin's treaty-bound promises, they expected the aid of the newly empowered Prince. But their demands ran perfectly contrary to the Regency's estimation of the State's interests. Condé's

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<sup>415</sup> *The Revolt of the Judges: The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde 1643-1652* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 235. Mazarin makes an oblique reference to these events in his letter to Condé of 28 June, 1649, transcribed in Albert Chéruel, *Lettres de Cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1883), iii: 354.

<sup>416</sup> AAE 866 f.140, *Demandes des Genereaux et des Personnes qui son unies avec eux* (np, 1649).

<sup>417</sup> Mazarin acknowledges the demands in a letter to Prince Thomas of Savoy, 3 April 1649, but had questioned the wisdom of granting them even before they were finalized, in a memo composed on 21 and 22 March of that year. See Chéruel, 330, 335. His estimation of the appearance of reward for rebellion anticipates his more explicit articulation of this principle in 1659, in negotiations over Condé's pardon in the Treaty of the Pyrenees. See Chapter 5, pp. 301-308.

<sup>418</sup> Contemporaries' mistrust of the Cardinal, along with an anti-courtier bias, has been rather strangely carried into the present by Roger Bannister, who castigates the Minister for relying "entirely on his experience as a courtier and on his skills as a diplomat and manipulator. He was used to promising much and delivering as little as possible, as the agreement that brought peace in April showed." *Condé in Context*, 87.

<sup>419</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 106; Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 349.

dual roles as the “shield of the regency,” and as patron to countless subordinate noblemen, came into direct conflict with each other. Moreover, Condé failed to secure even his own appointment to lead the important assault on Cambrai in May, 1649. In spite of the Prince’s loyalty during the Siege, Mazarin did not trust him with an army of his own.<sup>420</sup> The Prince was shocked, for he felt authorized to demand such an appointment for himself, at the very least. After all, his service during the Siege entailed not only the wholesale sacrifice of his glorious reputation, but extensions of loans to the Crown totaling almost a million *livres*, for which the Condé family jewels served as collateral.<sup>421</sup> His frustration boiled over, as Mazarin failed again to reward his exploits and expenditures, either by favors for himself or on behalf of his clients. This time, Condé’s fury severed his ties with the royal party.

The Prince’s anger with Mazarin first became visible as post-Siege alliances were formalized in marriages during the summer and fall of 1649. The Prince had long taken an extensive interest in the matches concluded among the high nobility, for they were an element of power politics just as much as the King’s favor.<sup>422</sup> Among a bevy of nuptials arranged in the latter half of the year, the most noteworthy concerned the Cardinal’s proposal to wed one of his three nieces, the “mazarinettes,” to the Duc de Mercoeur, a longstanding Condéen rival. Politically-aware observers across France took note of these plans, and decried Mazarin’s pretensions to sully France’s distinguished aristocracy with his common, Italian blood.<sup>423</sup> So, the Prince’s very public, highly aggressive moves to scupper that marriage in mid-September, just days before the vows would be finalized, set

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<sup>420</sup> The appointment was given instead to the wholly mediocre Comte d’Harcourt, a stout ally of the Cardinal. Condé took a perverse pleasure when Harcourt failed to take the city. Ernst Kossmann, *La Fronde* (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1954), 145; Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 88.

<sup>421</sup> Henri Eugène Philippe Louis d’Orléans, Duc d’Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé pendant les XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 7 vol. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1886), v: 332.

<sup>422</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 358-363; Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 83, 107-109.

<sup>423</sup> *L’Anti-nopcier, ou le blasme des Nopces de Monsieur de Mercoeur avec la Niepce de Mazarin* (Amiens, nd).

an unmistakable tone for relations between the two men. Mazarin could hardly mistake the Grand Condé's opposition to his most cherished design, and to his authority in general.

The last straw for Condé came with the Cardinal's handling of the Duc de Longueville's hope to control of the fortress at Pont de l'Arche (Normandy). Power over this stronghold had been one of the marquee items in the March negotiations, and the Duc's ardent desire for it was as well known as the Cardinal's agreement to grant it. Therefore, Mazarin's casual, perhaps willfully dismissive answer to Condé's insistence on the point, months later, landed with the force of a profound insult. Aumale reports that Mazarin laughed in Condé's face when confronted with his promise to the Prince's brother-in-law, Longueville: "It's one of those agreements that you make, with the intention of breaking it," he supposedly chuckled.<sup>424</sup> Though this account is somewhat specious, the tone of Mazarin's response is entirely in keeping with Daniel Dessert's conclusion that the Cardinal deliberately antagonized the Prince in August and September, with the intent of goading him into rebellion so that he could lay claim to Condé's lucrative salt monopolies.<sup>425</sup> If this was in fact Mazarin's intent, he must be commended for his total success in pushing the Prince to move against him. Condé held fast to his arithmetic ratio of service to reward, while Mazarin insisted on service with or without compensation, to the Prince's annoyance.

The rift between the two most powerful men in the kingdom that resulted from the governorship of Pont de l'Arche quickly became public, and toppled the first domino in a series that ended with the Prison of the Princes. As the Parisian frondeurs, effectively led by the Coadjutor de Retz, caught wind of the break, they lobbied the Prince with renewed

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<sup>424</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, v: 364. In this instance as in others, Aumale's distinct pro-Condé bias must be factored in.

<sup>425</sup> Daniel Dessert, *L'argent du sel: le sel de l'argent* (Paris: Fayard, 2012), 146-147.

fervor; he in turn lent them a newly sympathetic ear.<sup>426</sup> The threat of a combined Condéen-Frondeur axis wrenched major concessions from the Crown, for both factions of its opponents: to placate the frondeurs, the Queen agreed in early October to diminish Mazarin's authority in the Royal Council, especially over appointments, and to elevate Condé and Orléans in his stead. The two Princes were given joint vetoes over royal favor, and they therefore held tremendous power over some of the state's primary levers.<sup>427</sup> Bluet's assessment from February now appeared prescient. And, to further satisfy the two *Grands*, the Queen granted Pont de l'Arche to Longueville, though she openly complained that the appointment was provided under duress.<sup>428</sup> The Grand Condé had marginalized Mazarin's influence and checked his dynastic ambitions, just as he and his prospective frondeur allies had hoped. But he had piqued the Cardinal and Queen's anger, and they began to game out their response.

Crucially, the Condé-Fronde alliance never materialized. After widely-reported meetings between the Prince and Coadjutor, their relationship fizzled, and quickly soured. Retz perceived that Condé had never intended to actually side with the rebels, but had leveraged that threat into personal and material advantage for himself and his clients. He was probably correct. So, though the frondeurs obviously had little love for the Prime Minister, the sting of serving as a pawn in service of Condé's ambitions drove the famously spiteful Retz into the Cardinal's camp. Retz donned a disguise for midnight meetings with

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<sup>426</sup> Pierre Lenet, *Mémoires de Pierre Lenet... concernant l'histoire du Prince de Condé...*, eds. Champollion-Figeac and Champollion in *Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France*, eds. Michaud and Poujoulat, Série 3: II (Paris: Editeur du commentaire du Code Civil, 1838), 196; Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 107.

<sup>427</sup> Moote certainly overstates the case in calling their power "dictatorial," (*Revolt of the Judges*, 226) though Bannister is more nuanced in viewing it as a stinging loss for the Cardinal and a proportionate, if not total, victory for the two Principal Heads (*Condé in Context*, 88-89); see also Lenet, *Mémoires*, 204-205, 210.

<sup>428</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 197.

Mazarin (in a bit of melodrama typical of the Fronde) and the two camps reached an agreement.<sup>429</sup> Condé remained ignorant of the isolation he now faced.

Simultaneous with the Retz-Mazarin rapprochement, October and November of 1649 produced yet another uneasy truce between the Prince and Prime Minister. The October agreement that empowered Condé at Mazarin's expense had come with promises of friendship between the two men. As a result, Condé somewhat naïvely overlooked Mazarin's threat. The Prince entrusted his security to "his courage, the great number of servants and friends he had, his reputation," and his presumption of the frondeurs' hatred of the Cardinal.<sup>430</sup> On the other side, Mazarin worked tirelessly to engineer the Prince's downfall. While Condé's position in Council had bolstered his influence on the key issue of royal favor, the Queen and Cardinal still exercised considerable authority, especially on judicial matters. By late November, rumors of a conspiracy against the Prince ran wild, but Condé took no concrete steps to assure his safety. Even when his empty carriage was fired upon on its way to the Palais Royal on December 11, the Prince failed to recognize that his position was insecure, in what Pierre Goubert dubs an "enormous misstep."<sup>431</sup>

In keeping with his cavalier attitude throughout the fall and winter, Condé saw nothing amiss when the Cardinal sent an unsolicited note on January 16, 1650, promising "that I will never diverge from your interests, and will be attached to you, for all and against all, and that I beg Your Highness to have me as your humblest servant and favor me with your protection, which I will earn with every obedience in my power."<sup>432</sup> Two days later, Condé's surprise at his arrest, along with his brother Conti and brother-in-law

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<sup>429</sup> Ibid, 208.

<sup>430</sup> Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 90; Lenet, *Mémoires*, 204, 208.

<sup>431</sup> Pierre Goubert, *Mazarin* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 293.

<sup>432</sup> Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BN], Fonds Dupuy 775, f.122, Mazarin to Condé, 16 January 1649.

Longueville, was reportedly so complete that he at first took it for a sick joke.<sup>433</sup> Parisians and many residents of provincial princely strongholds, however, did find amusement in the arrest of leader of the Siege. They lit *feux de joie* to celebrate his incarceration. A pamphlet even appeared to memorialize this event, whose celebratory title was bitingly ironic for Condé in particular: *Le Te Deum general de tous les bons françois, sur la prise de Messieurs les Princes*. The man whose many victories had inspired commemorative masses, now prompted a textual *Te Deum* with his own defeat.

The Prince's rapid turn from fidelity to animosity toward the Crown demands an explanation that historians have struggled to provide.<sup>434</sup> The fundamental state of the relationship between Condé and Mazarin had changed little since the drawn-out patronage battles of the 1640s. And yet, the outcome of a similar conflict after the Siege found Condé and his brothers in prison. Though the contingency of the Fronde helps to explain the novel course of events, viewing the Princes' arrest in terms of Fronde-centered, interpersonal power politics actually confuses the matter.<sup>435</sup> In the first place, Condé's initial break with Mazarin in 1649 predates his abortive rapprochement with Retz, who courted him only after the split was known; thus, Condé was not turned against the Crown by the rebels. At the same time, Mazarin could hardly have counted on popular approval of the arrest, before the fact. Though many Parisians still mistrusted and even hated the man who had overseen

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<sup>433</sup> Aumale, *Mémoires*, 372-375; Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 90.

<sup>434</sup> Though Moote is never generous in assessing Mazarin's choices, his view of the arrest as a "blunder" (*Revolt of the Judges*, 256) has merit. See also Kossmann, *La Fronde*, 150, for a similar indictment of the move. Jouanna provides the most thorough and historically-grounded treatment of Mazarin's reasoning in arresting the Princes: it was simply the standard playbook for the Crown's response to noble opposition. In the recent cases of Guise, Beaufort and the Importants, and stretching back through Louis XIII's reign, most notably regarding Condé's father Henri II de Bourbon, the royal party's first and last resort to such a threat was to imprison rivals via *lettres de cachet*. *Devoir de révolte*, 231.

<sup>435</sup> This case has been made most strongly by Ranum, *The Fronde*, 273. Further, he notably misreads the popular reaction to the arrest, alleging a muted anger at the Crown which other sources fail to corroborate.

the blockade, the reaction in provincial Princely lands might easily have erupted into a new rebellion. Indeed, Lenet fully expected that such places would spontaneously take up arms.<sup>436</sup> Though the outbreak of rebellion was clearly a catalyst for the Prison of the Princes, the contingent politics of the Fronde alone cannot explain either the Crown or Condé's actions.

Similarly, interpretations rooted in honor or lucre fail to fully satisfy. Jouanna views the rupture as a matter of "*blessures de l'honneur*" on Condé's part, via dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister's uses of patronage.<sup>437</sup> But, one must ask why no previous, similar slights to the Prince's honor had produced the same drastic reaction. Béguin makes a similar, but much more nuanced case, that pecuniary and dynastic considerations drove a wedge between the two men.<sup>438</sup> But she too fails to explain what elevated the importance of Pont de l'Arche, when similar denials of fortresses to a province's governor had led to frustration, but not open war.<sup>439</sup> In short, both of these assessments are correct, but incomplete. To be sure, Condé was angry at Mazarin over his habitual refusals of favor, and the issue of Pont de l'Arche had been especially galling. And, the Prince certainly viewed these cases through the lens of honor and identity, as both historians rightly point out. But favor and honor were merely symptoms of the more fundamental issue of the right forms of the monarchy and the noble-crown relationship.

At its heart, Condé's break with Mazarin, and Mazarin's arrest of Condé and his brothers, marked the culmination of the long-building contest between personal kingship and statism. Pont de l'Arche distilled the essence of this conflict and exacerbated Condé's

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<sup>436</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 209-210.

<sup>437</sup> Jouanna, *Devoir de révolte*, 242-243.

<sup>438</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 107-110.

<sup>439</sup> On the significance of control of *places fortes* by the governor of its province, see Chapter 1, pp. 62-64.

fury. Three aspects of the rivalry came to a head with this incident: the Prince's building resentment, the publicity of the broken promise, and the insult of the refusal itself. Of these three, the latter two were most significant, for they clearly indicated to Condé that Mazarin felt totally free to withhold favor arbitrarily (in the Prince's eyes). Even in the case of a widely-recognized, pseudo-contractual commitment, the Cardinal still refused to recognize Condé's *merite* and costly personal sacrifices by granting his requests. The continuation of such a pattern would be devastating for Condé's *crédit*. If Mazarin could so glibly shrug off this appointment, what cause could there be to hope that royal favor would ever be subject to the arithmetic, interpersonal conditions that Condé earnestly felt should govern its allotment? How could the Prince plausibly claim to protect or advance his clients' interests?

From the vantage of fall of 1649, refusals after Condé's historic victories at Rocroi, Philipsburg, or Ypres took on an inescapably cohesive character, explained not by the momentary conditions or lack of resources the Regency faced, but by the programmatic, persistent application of a perverse understanding of the King's relationship with his servants. Pont de l'Arche showed the Prince that his assumptions regarding personal kingship were hopeless, so long as Mazarin held power. He moved more assertively than ever to marginalize the Italian, and his aggression precipitated a decisive break.

In effect, Condé was precisely right: Pont de l'Arche, and the broader context of late 1649, show clearly the conflicting, now irreconcilable understandings of favor between the Prince and the Crown. For Condé and likeminded nobles, rewards must be granted on a case-by-case basis, according to the *merite* of the servant, the significance of his actions, and the magnitude of his sacrifice. The Crown, by contrast, kept a running tally of the requests each man had been granted, and reckoned their implications for the wider balance

of power within the kingdom. Lenet provides evidence that this ledger of favor was kept quite literally, at least in Condé's case: in a private conversation in which the Prince's secretary sought to normalize relations with the Crown just before October, Mazarin ticked off, point by point, the Prince's requests that had been granted since 1643.<sup>440</sup> Condé's unparalleled accumulation of *bienfaits* justified the Cardinal's refusals after the Siege, notwithstanding the Prince's services. The Queen shared this view, shown in her complaint that "the extraordinary quantity of favors that I have heaped on my Cousin the Prince of Condé have not sufficed to make him act as he should toward me."<sup>441</sup> The Queen and Cardinal looked first to the aggregate balance of favor Condé had been granted, rather than "earned," in a critical semantic distinction. So, even accounting for Condé's services during the Siege, further enriching a man who had enjoyed the lion's share of favor, and who threatened to monopolize its redistribution, would endanger the State at large.

On the subject of Condé's growing power and apparent pride, the Crown found itself well aligned with the emerging patriotic strain of Fronde-era political culture. All the while, the Grand Condé and his allies persisted with their concertedly individualized model of politics, which ran contrary to the strengthening patriotic current. We have seen that the frondeurs had made ambition, greed, and self-aggrandizement into major crimes against the *patrie* and masculine honor, and the Crown ably rode that wave of communitarianism in justifying its move against the Princes. In contrast, Condé continued to view his ability to arrange favors for his clients as an outward signifier of his fatherly, masculine power and noble honor. He and his allies failed, at first, to adapt their deeds or words to the rapidly shifting cultural currents of the post-Siege world. The Crown, meanwhile, was able to cast

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<sup>440</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 199-200.

<sup>441</sup> AAE 864 f.480, Queen Anne to Mazarin, 1 October 1649.

the Prince's overweening wealth and authority as ambition and self-interested bullying. Again, the substance of this battle had changed little, but the rise of the *patrie* altered its appearance, and thus its outcome. The pamphlets and pronouncements that each side produced during the year-long Prison of the Princes provide evidence of the powerful, and still-growing influence of patriotism on claims by the Prince and Crown alike.

### **Crimes Against the *Patrie*: Debating the Prison of the Princes**

In 1650, the Princely, frondeur, and royal Parties published a flurry of pamphlets debating the validity of the Crown's stunning move against the Grand Condé. Throughout the prior year, the Prince had conducted himself according to the personal principles he always held, most of all on matters of money and favor. The Crown worked to cast the Prince as an ambitious, prideful egoist, while Condéens struggled either to shed that label or to impugn Mazarin similarly. The two sides' arguments, and the relative success those arguments found, bear witness to the rapid rise of frondeur patriotism and the attendant model of masculine honor in French political culture. If the Siege had given birth to frondeur patriotism, the Prison of the Princes saw it take its first steps.

On January 20, 1650, the King sent a letter (certainly composed by Mazarin) to the Parlement of Paris,<sup>442</sup> which spoke not only to the judges to whom it was addressed, but to the people of France at large. Two days after the arrest of three Peers of the Realm, Louis XIV explained the causes of his regrettable need to imprison the Grand Condé and his

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<sup>442</sup> Aumale trenchantly questions the wisdom of attempting to justify the arrest at all: "Le soin que prirent les ministres du Roi d'exposer dans un document officiel les motifs de l'arrestation des Princes était bien superflu: il est des actes qu'on ne justifie pas." *Histoire*, vi: 2. Moote concurs, and cites Avocat Général Talon as evidence that even staunchly royalist judges were nervous about this move: Talon wrote in his journal that a ruler "should never engage in so personal a revelation to his subjects in matters which concern *arcانum imperii*." *Revolt of the Judges*, 258.

brothers.<sup>443</sup> The letter spans 20 pages, the bulk of which recounts the King's unprecedented generosity toward the Condé house, "whether in charges, in provincial governments, in fortresses, in tracts of land, in money, or in Church benefices." The King declared that no monarch "has ever given, in so short a time and to the same house, either so much or such considerable graces." But the Grand Condé was insatiable. Ultimately, the King felt it was clear that the Prince was willing "to do anything to reign," to realise "his project to make himself absolute master of the forces of this State." The Prince's extraordinary ambition was the root of his broader crimes against the King and State.

In the course of laying out this top-line charge, the King's letter reveals the terms of the statist approach to patronage. Most explicitly, he blamed the Prince for requesting *bienfaits* "without considering whether they would be prejudicial to the State or not." But this is only the most obvious tenet of the Crown's preferred philosophy on reward. More thoroughly, Louis laid out the relationship of service to honor, glory, and the subject-sovereign relationship:

Having confided to our aforementioned Cousin [Condé] the means, in the theater of war, by which he has acquired a famous reputation, and having further lavished his house and his person with favors of every kind, only the gravest necessity has forced us to abandon the fruit of these graces... [No one could think that we would have done so,] if he had not totally abandoned the path of his duty.

In this telling, the reputation that the Prince won by serving the King on the battlefield was a prize unto itself. Condé had received much from the Crown, not as compensation for past acts, but as an investment for the future, which should bear the "fruit" of his continued service. With or without royal favor, however, service was a duty-bound obligation. As

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<sup>443</sup> All the following quotations are from this letter, published as *Lettre du Roy, sur la detention des Princes de Condé & de Conty, & Duc de Longueville. Envoyée au Parlement le 20 Janvier 1650* (Paris: 1650).

such, Condé's unrelenting drive to enrich and empower himself by his improper claims on royal munificence seemed nothing more than a gluttonous, unregulated ambition, which must be checked. In brief, Condé had won both honor and rewards when he had acted without regard for his own interests; now, as he sought to control a growing share of the King's wealth and power, he lost all he had won, and even lost his freedom.

Significantly, Louis includes the major terms of patriotic masculinity as part of his justification for the arrest. So, it was not simply that Condé had selfishly and ambitiously aimed to build his wealth and power, nor even that he had disregarded the good of the State, that made him culpable. Beyond that, his actions had been detrimental to France, to the King's power, and to the "repose and health of the people." In particular, "he was not satisfied to obtain graces" for himself or his *créatures*,<sup>444</sup> "but has preferred to tear them from us by violence: witness Pont de l'Arche." The Crown was keenly aware that this issue had been the breaking point for Condé's bond with the royal party. In denouncing his actions then, the letter contrasted his behavior in that instance with the Duc d'Orléans, who had volunteered to broker a settlement expressly "to preserve public tranquility." In opposition to *Monsieur's* public-mindedness, Condé actually preferred to injure the monarchy, beyond simply monopolizing favor. On that subject, the King's letter echoes Bluet's advice to Mazarin from the prior year, almost verbatim: Condé pried faithful royal servants from their duty, "persuading them that they could not hope in the future [for favor] by any means except through him." Anyone who would not join him, he slandered as "*lâche*," and spitefully mistreated as best he could. Throughout the King's explanation,

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<sup>444</sup> This is the term always used in the letter for Condé's clients, for it connotes blind obedience and total dependence on a superior. In this pejorative usage, the Prince's network takes on the air of a faction, even something like a cult.

Condé seems driven by an insane bloodlust, which apparently infected the troops and lieutents of his armies, as they drove families from their homes and plundered their livelihoods during their operations. Still, the King “hoped that the prudence that our Cousin might acquire with age would moderate this great ardor,” and he waited until Condé’s threat to the People and State had grown unmanageable to act with severity. Even beyond his greed and ambition, the Prince’s manic quest to usurp the throne came at the expense of the good of the people, state, and royal authority.

Though the King avoided the word *patrie* in his letter (likely for its association with the Fronde), he consistently employed the substance of the rebels’ patriotic discourse to condemn Condé. Accordingly, Louis asserted that would not have needed to act, if the Prince “had been able to moderate his ambition, and had contented himself to live as the richest Subject in all Christendom.” However, he continues, “all was useless – no grace, no effort, no assurance was capable of limiting his boundless ambition.” For all the narcissistic, vicious, treacherous acts listed above, the King had been forced to imprison a member of the *Maison Royale*. The frondeurs had made ambition an unpatriotic transgression, but the King now made it an actionable crime. The royal party had begun to use patriotic language early, but many of the remaining Condéens took somewhat longer to do so.

The shock of the arrest had surprised (if not saddened) all of France, but like their leader, the Princely Party was particularly unprepared. The Princesse de Condé, Claire-Clémence de Maillé-Brèzé, became the nominal head of the household, though Pierre Lenet frantically coordinated most strategic action. Meanwhile, the Duchesse de Longueville and Maréchal de Turenne undertook military and propaganda campaigns largely on their own, from bases around Normandy, Flanders, and Holland. The Condéen Party had hoped that

the Princes' arrest would inspire outrage and perhaps a spontaneous revolt, but the actual response dashed all hopes for provincial uprisings.<sup>445</sup> Significant support for the prisoners' release began to mount only late in the year.

The Princely Party failed to win the nation's sympathy early, I contend, largely because they were unable to harness patriotic discourse on the Grand Condé's behalf. This futility had two sources: on the one hand, many of Condé's closest allies, most importantly Pierre Lenet, had little direct experience of this new mode of political and gender rhetoric. He had been at the Prince's side during the Siege, and thus remained rather insulated from the mazarinades' claims. So, when the time came to make the Party's case to the people, he and much of the Party with him fell back on the arguments the Prince had favored throughout the 1640s: they emphasized Mazarin's perfidious ingratitude and Condé's innate qualities and signal services. On the other hand, a few within the Princely house – most notably Turenne and the Duchesse de Longueville (Condé's older, adventurous sister, and wife of the imprisoned Duc) - had joined the Fronde in 1649, and thus had been firsthand witnesses to the claims-making power of rhetoric built around the *patrie*. The Duchesse and Maréchal stayed in the north, and primarily worked to win over Paris from strongholds in Holland and Normandy, while Lenet led the Princesse and others south to Bordeaux. But the Maréchal and Duchesse's patriotic words on Condé's behalf rang hollow among a Parisian audience whose recent memories of the Prince included the Siege, followed by his putatively selfish domination of royal authority. In sum, the Condéens best acquainted with the potency of frondeur patriotism wrote for an audience totally unprepared to hear claims that Condé was really not ambitious. Meanwhile, more

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<sup>445</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 209-210.

patriotically-savvy leaders remained far removed from the rebellious southern city, where such words might have found fertile ground.<sup>446</sup> The Princely Party's words were mismatched to their audiences, and failed to rouse support.

Nonetheless, the Duchesse de Longueville certainly attempted to win favor with the Parisian Parlement and political public, primarily in an exceptionally long tract published in early 1650. Over 98 pages, she mounted a point-by-point defense against the King's charges of her brother's "boundless ambitions," claiming on the contrary that his intentions had always been pure, selfless, and patriotically manly. Her text blends frondeur rhetoric with the tenets of personal kingship, foreshadowing such hybrid discursive tactics during the Princely Fronde of 1651-1653. So, she explicitly asserts that favors given to Condé were not "gratifications, but recompenses, which we [the Condé house] always had either a right, or justification in claiming, before they were given to us."<sup>447</sup> Further, the consideration that they did receive fell far short of Condé's *merite* and the worth of his services. Here, she lays out the most explicit affirmation yet that Condé and his allies perceived a correct, arithmetic equation of service and reward. Significantly, the Duchesse immediately afterward protests that her brother had never acted selfishly, or even vengefully against Mazarin, but continued to serve France generously: "Monsieur the Prince has always preferred the interests of the State to his own glory, and has never considered anything but the public good." For example, she claims that after Mazarin had reneged on his promise to give Condé the *Amirauté* in 1646, "This young, brave Prince, esteemed by the nobles, beloved by the people, and adored by the armies, remained in blind submission... and without considering the appointment that was stolen from him, wished to show by some

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<sup>446</sup> On the recent, restive history of Bordeaux and Guyenne, see Chapter 4, pp. 199-200.

<sup>447</sup> *Apologie pour Messieurs le Prince de Condé, de Conti, et le Duc de Longueville* (Paris: 1650), 10-11.

other important service that if he would not have the reward, at least he would merit it.”<sup>448</sup>

Where the Grand Condé was condemned for pursuing personal glory at France’s expense, his defense inverted this formula: he pursued the interests of France at the expense of his own glory and wealth, and at the risk of his life. That is, his service testified to his perfect obedience to the royal will and his selflessly patriotic affections, despite Mazarin’s despotic injustices. All of Condé’s actions, Longueville maintains, proceeded from “Monsieur my brother’s patience and vigor, [and] the love he has for his *patrie*.”<sup>449</sup>

Other examples of the Duchesse’s appeals to the *patrie* will be examined fully in Chapter 4, but hers were not the only pro-Condéen claims on patriotic grounds. An anonymous Princely Parlementaire, for example, held forth at some length before the Court, on the dire consequences of the arrest: “This affair... touches on the liberty of three Princes, the health of the State, and the wellbeing of all the French.” Again, Condé’s treatment serves as a barometer of the broader health of the nation. Thus, the speaker continues, “It is the love that I have for my *patrie* that spurs me to try, with all my strength, hoping that this illustrious body will not see cowardice in my speech, but generosity in my design and purity in my intent.”<sup>450</sup> These words ably frame the the Prison of the Princes in the patriotic and gendered terms familiar from the Siege: affective, generous, and contributive masculinity, in opposition to effeminate cowardice. In a similar vein, Turenne wrote an open letter to all Parisians, imploring them to recognize that Mazarin, not Condé,

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<sup>448</sup> The threat conveyed in her aside that Condé was “beloved by the armies” would not have been missed, especially regarding a man who had frequently drawn comparisons to Julius Caesar himself.

<sup>449</sup> The seeming paradox between *patience* and *vigueur* is rich with meaning, especially in the context of the *patrie*. That is, Longueville here asserts that Condé is all at once considered and decisive, calm and vigorous, moderate and active, longsuffering and forceful - precisely the tense combination of attributes that marked him as the ideal patriotic nobleman. *Ibid*, 35.

<sup>450</sup> *Discours au Parlement sur la détention des Princes* (Paris: January 18, 1650), in Chéruel, *Choix*, ii: 10.

had acted out of malicious self-interest, at the expense of the public.<sup>451</sup> These pamphlets, and a handful of others in the early part of the year, used patriotic words and ideas that had proved effective elsewhere to move their audience. However, at that moment, any arguments in Condé's favor were doomed, amongst the Parisians.

Other Princely tracts, however, argued purely within the framework of personal kingship. Nowhere is this more apparent than in *La Satyre des Satyres du Temps*. The author's defense of the Prince appeals concertedly to his individual qualities: he mocks the futility of libels against Condé, "whose name alone shields him from all attacks. For he is a Bourbon, and immune to your insolence." From the first page of this pamphlet, the emphasis on the Grand Condé's blood and birth is apparent. Soon after, the tract doubles down on its pre-Siege style of discourse, arguing that "this Conqueror's" military exploits had made him "the Pharaoh of all your [detractors'] hopes." Apparently pleased with this claim of individual, pseudo-monarchical power and dominant martial manhood, the author continues: "It is not Alexander whom you slander, nor Pompey, nor their ilk. For, you should plainly see that in comparison with such a glorious life [as Condé's], their exploits cannot compare."<sup>452</sup> We should not be surprised that this pamphlet failed to win the Princes their freedom: claims of immunity on behalf of a man who was at that moment in chains were unlikely to succeed. More significantly, it was always difficult to argue for the innocence of one accused of amassing improper personal power, on the grounds that he stood above Pharaohs and Emperors. That these ideas aimed to sway an audience caught up in a current of public-mindedness and self-sacrifice further weakened the author's effort. Tracts like this likely did more harm than good for the Princely cause.

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<sup>451</sup> *Le Mareschal de Turenne aux bons bourgeois de Paris* (Paris: 1650).

<sup>452</sup> *La Satyre des Satyres du temps* (Paris: Francois Noel, nd), 3-4.

But not all appeals on the grounds of unmodified personal kingship were so tone-deaf to the growing importance of patriotism. In Bordeaux, the Princesse very effectively claimed that Condé's individuated relationship with the local Parlement, and with the corporate body of the city itself should govern their allegiances.<sup>453</sup> Elsewhere, the royalist Comte de Saint-Aignan was unsettled enough by similar claims, put forward in leaflets disseminated among his soldiers, that he collected and reported them to Mazarin. The short message, addressed to "All *bons François* among the troops of the Comte de Saint-Aignan," promised good pay, and a worthy cause to any who would rally to the Prince's side. But more than that, it sought to spur outrage for Condé's unjust treatment at Mazarin's hands:

All of France knows that Monsieur le Prince has always, and will always be a very faithful servant of the King, and that Mazarin has imprisoned him through treachery and ingratitude[.] This is why all brave knights and soldiers must serve in his party, until he is freed. When one is on the side of justice and right, so too is God with you.<sup>454</sup>

This note argues concisely that Condé's personal loyalty to the King should have won him Mazarin's thanks and friendship, but has resulted in the opposite. So, all "good Frenchmen" and "brave knights" should defend his cause, not only for its inherent justice, but for its implicit bearing on the wellbeing of France's monarchy.

The inconsistent, and initially impotent usage of patriotic masculinity language in Condéen texts is all the more striking in contrast to its prominent, pervasive place in populist and royalist pamphlets. So, when the Prince's frondeur mistress, la Petite Nichon, again took up her pen to satirically "console" the Prince during his imprisonment, she did not fail to point out the effeminacy of his errors. "I always believed, Monsieur, that the grandeur of your courage that accompanied you in times of danger would follow you still,

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<sup>453</sup> See Chapter 4, pp. 202-206.

<sup>454</sup> AAE 869 f.312, "Copie des billets jettez par les ennemis dans le camp," Saint-Aignan to Mazarin, nd.

in prison." Instead, she has heard rumors that Condé had lost himself to madness at Vincennes, clawing and biting his guards and refusing to see the priest sent to minister to him.<sup>455</sup> Nichon contrasts the Prince's former "courage" in fighting for France and the King, against the wanton violence in his temperament since the Siege, in her contention that God's will alone is responsible Condé's victories: "If you were victorious, it is He who gave force to your arms... You were born to support the throne of a God-given Monarch, and not to weaken it."<sup>456</sup> The Prince had been victorious and courageous - in a word, manly - when he served the King and held God's favor. Since he abandoned both causes, he has descended into insanity: "Beware, Monsieur, of becoming hysterical [*phrenetique*] while you are unable to trouble the public good, and temper impetuosity with moderation."<sup>457</sup> Nichon blames Condé for picking indiscriminate, unworthy, effeminate fights – whether with his jailers or the Parisians - essentially out of restlessness. She therefore pushes him to moderate those womanly passions, and to reclaim the glory that his royal blood and the name of Bourbon portend.

Along the lines of Condé's lineage, but to exactly opposite effect, the royalist *Genealogy of the Prince* detailed "how all those of his House have been harmful to the King and the People." This author needed little artistry to portray the cadet line of Bourbons as self-serving, fickle, often treasonous malcontents, willing to sell their loyalties and even ally with Spain in pursuit of ever greater power and wealth. Thus, Condé's grandfather Henri I

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<sup>455</sup> The accusations on this point, and the assertion that Conti and Longueville were staid, philosophical prisoners by contrast, exactly inverts the reports of the jailer to Mazarin, a certain Comte de Bar. By all accounts, Condé bore his captivity well, while the always-sickly Conti required constant medical attention. Bar's correspondence is preserved throughout AAE 870-873. I would further speculate that her mention of Condé's refusal to see a priest while in chains might have been an oblique reminder that – despite Henri II's intense persecution of Huguenots – the cadet Bourbons had once subscribed to and fought for the *religion prétendue réformée*.

<sup>456</sup> *Consolation de la Petite Nichon, a Monsieur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: 1650), *passim*.

<sup>457</sup> I use "hysteria," to convey the gendered implications of impassioned madness in *phrenetique*.

de Bourbon had betrayed his nation to foreigners, "in order to trouble the repose of the Sovereign and the *Patrie*." The Grand Condé, this pamphlet argued, kept the family tradition alive, for "nothing could impede this ambitious spirit in his quest to reign, and to place the Crown on his head." Its closing passage succinctly expresses the patriotic case against the Prince's "flood of pride and insolence": despite his unwarranted power over the monarchy, Condé's "ambition is hardly perceptive [*clairvoyant*], in such important affairs. He cannot imagine that he might lose himself, in allowing himself to be governed by so unruly as passion as his. Imprudence has misled our Prince... his pride and vanity have pushed him to the precipice of disgrace, where he now finds himself."<sup>458</sup> In this sense, the Queen's choice to imprison him and those who enabled his vainglory had been taken for Condé's own good, as much as the State's. Ambition was a sin against the *patrie*, which injured both the ambitious man and the community.

In the months between the Siege and the Prison of the Princes, patriotic honor had grown from one part of rebels' discursive tactics to motivate opposition to Mazarin, to a cornerstone of effective political claims on all sides. And by 1651, the Princely Party had regained some credibility on this point: upon the Prince's release in February 1651, and Mazarin's simultaneous exile, Parisians again lit *feux de joie*, this time in celebration of a hero's return. At the same time, Condéen presses proclaimed the downfall of the "prideful, ambitious" Italian.<sup>459</sup> In the Princely Fronde that soon followed, both Prince and Crown continued to work feverishly to align themselves with the interests of the *patrie*, and to cast their opponents as self-serving parasites on the People. But the terms of this discursive

<sup>458</sup> *La Genealogie du Prince, et comme tous ceux de cette Maison ont esté funestes au Roy & au Peuple.* (La Haye: 1650). The title page notes, poignantly, that the printer's shop faces the prison where Condé is held.

<sup>459</sup> *Le Claque de la Fronde sur la liberté des Princes. Avec une elegie, aux dames Frondeuses. Par le menuisier de Nevers* (np, 1651).

contest had been set in the Siege, when frondeur patriotism became the primary marker of national belonging, manly virtue, and subsequently, political power.

### **Conclusion: Manhood, Community, Money**

Just as the Grand Condé persona had done major work in defining the boundaries of the virtuous French community, so his image provided the means to thoroughly mark the limits of patriotic masculine honor. His relationship with the Crown was unchanged on either side of the Siege, but the mental worlds of the French public had undergone a revolution, with regard to the meanings of service, loyalty, and virtue. How and why a man served, to whom or what he must be loyal, and the attendant meanings and perceptions of dignity had shifted definitively over the course of 1649, even if those changes had been brewing for long years before the Fronde. On each of these points, Condé exemplified the old order, and was successfully cast as inverting the new.

Above all, the Prince fell short of the patriotic ideal on issues of money. Frondeurs furiously alleged that he had sold his sword to Mazarin's manifestly evil cause, and the Crown charged that he continued to enrich himself to an unbecoming, perhaps malignant extent. Despite their sharply conflicting goals, both of these claims found success during and after the Siege. Less successfully, Condé himself pointed to his considerable personal outlays on the Crown's behalf, his rapidly-dwindling coffers, and the ongoing necessity (in his mind) to provide for friends and clients. Katia Béguin aptly summarizes the tension between Condé's view and the royal party's, observing that "there is a point between the desire to reward and surround oneself with devoted, competent officers, and the design to

use those against royal power.”<sup>460</sup> Condé always insisted, and probably actually believed, that the rewards he sought were warranted, and that his use of favor gratified loyal, meritorious officers and clients. For Mazarin and the Queen, however, Béguin’s middle point between independent power and usurpation, was a nonsense. Within the Sun King’s developing orbit, there could be no second center of gravity. The Cardinal would have much preferred the historical perspective of anthropologist Antoni Maczak, who observes that seventeenth-century monarchs “strove to gain a monopoly of opportunities for social and economic advancement among the nobility as well as other ambitious groups.”<sup>461</sup> Bluet’s dire assessment in February 1649 of Condé’s competing monopoly over favor certainly overstated the reality, but in doing so, illuminated the royal party’s mentality and motives.

Patriotic masculine honor was thus a convenient and effective means for the Crown to redress the Prince’s massive, troublesome wealth and power. The rise of the *patrie* during the Siege had elevated the importance of generosity, and concurrently brought selfish qualities linked to ambition into emphatic disrepute. The frondeurs themselves had focused on Mazarin’s tyranny with such charges, and decried Condé mainly as his accomplice or hired muscle. But the Crown channeled the frondeurs’ aversion to ambition generally, toward Condé in a more focused, and much more consequential way. The Princes’ Prison resulted from their untoward self-interest, which the Regent portrayed as an embryonic stage of usurping royal authority itself. In January of 1649, patriotic masculinity had risen to prominence in conjunction with the rebels’ *patrie*; by January of

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<sup>460</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 97.

<sup>461</sup> Antoni Maczak, “From Aristocratic Household to Princely Court: Restructuring Patronage in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in *Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age c.1450-1650*, eds. Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke (London: German Historical Institute/Oxford UP, 1991), 319.

1650, the generous, protective model of manhood had become the centerpiece of the royal party's justification for a preemptive move against the Grand Condé. And as we will see in Chapter 4, by 1651, patriotic masculinity stood at the heart of the Grand Condé's own apologetics. Though the rival factions in the Fronde agreed on little else, they all shared the view - in public, at least - that service to France trumped all other considerations, and that a man must work for the betterment of the national community.

"Betterment," however, could mean many things, and might be accomplished by a wide array of means. The vicissitudes of patriotic arguments, and the varying degrees of success they might find, are the subject of Chapter 4.

## **Chapter 4 - Patriotic Treason: Spain and Bordeaux in the Princely Fronde**

Since his arrest in early 1650, the Grand Condé had spent more than a year in chains, accused of plotting to usurp the throne of France. It is therefore striking that he left prison not only exonerated, but broadly acclaimed as the most virtuous, most heroic, most patriotic man in France.<sup>462</sup> He once again seemed the most French man in the kingdom. The Prince's friends and allies asserted that his past sacrifices and services to the nation, his patience in suffering Cardinal Mazarin's persecution, and his total obedience to the King had demonstrated the perfect attachment to France that his birth and blood promised. So, it was neither metaphor nor exaggeration when he proclaimed, "The good of the State is attached to my person."<sup>463</sup> This bold declaration followed from the premises that Condé had claimed since Rocroi: his framework of personal kingship demanded recognition in strict proportion to *mérite*, valorized proximity to the monarch, and couched public and political commitments in personal terms. Condé argued that because he stood at the apex of nearly every hierarchy in France, his own treatment directly reflected the health of the State. If the King, or whoever acted in his name,<sup>464</sup> failed to esteem his person and exploits, then no royal servant could hope for a just reward, and the system as a whole was broken. In the abstract, this logic seems unobjectionable, but the latter years of the Fronde would

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<sup>462</sup> The archive of the Prince's correspondence contains scores of letters, from nobles and clerics of all ranks, courts, cities, and corporate bodies across France, as well as rulers and notables across Europe, all congratulating him in ebullient terms, in the months following his return. See carton P.X in the Archives de la Musée Condé [AC].

<sup>463</sup> *Lettre de Monsieur le Prince de Condé, Gouverneur de Guyenne, escrive à Messieurs de la Cour de Parlement de Bourdeaux* (Bordeaux: Jacques Mongiron Millanges, 18 July 1651), 4.

<sup>464</sup> After September 7, 1651, when Louis XIV reached majority, most texts speak of the King choosing, acting, or otherwise exercising power. However, Mazarin was assuredly the *de facto* ruler, advised by the Queen and his close confidants, just as under the Regency. I therefore speak of "the Crown" acting during these years, to include the Cardinal and his confidants, although the language of my sources often requires acceptance of the fiction that the King exercised his personal will. Where Louis XIV himself acted, or where his person was an operative factor, I name him specifically; but, wherever possible, I refer to the office of King rather than the man himself, for the man himself grew into his office only in the late 1650s, and especially after 1661.

put the theory to a stern test. As events unfolded, Condé claimed that his embodied attachment to France could justify incivilities to the Queen, defiance of royal orders, war against the Crown, and even an alliance with Spain. The Grand Condé was so French, the argument went, that even his rebellion and treason were patriotic.

The Princely Fronde, the Grand Condé's long war against the Crown (1651-1653), has been most often portrayed as a purely cynical revolt, devoid of any serious battle over ideas. Historians and contemporary chroniclers have told its story in the movements of armies, the twists of courtly conspiracies, and the naked struggle for money and power. Condé's own acts, especially turning against the King and allying with Spain, after staunchly supporting the Crown through 1649, seem to prove this point. Where the Parliamentary Fronde appears as a "constitutional" movement, or at least a rebellion with a discernible agenda, the Princely phase has been painted as the last great noble revolt, though one with no greater motive than self-interest, vengeance, and thirst for power.<sup>465</sup> Although the Grand Condé did not advance a systematic political ideology, *sensu stricto*, I argue against the portrayal of his Fronde as "a period of imprudence and of exaggeration, without sense

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<sup>465</sup> The clearest example of this line of argument comes in Ranum's *The Fronde: A French Revolution, 1648-1652* (New York: Norton, 1993), though nearly all studies of the period subscribe to such a vision in varying degrees. Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: La noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne, 1559-1661* (Fayard, 1989), 220-244, casts Condé's motivation in the Fronde as a mixture of distaste for Mazarin's monopolization of royal power, and his own injured honor. The otherwise-excellent analysis of Jouhaud, *Mazarinades: la Fronde des mots* (Paris: Aubier, 1985), 112, distinguishes between the "good use" of frondeur pamphlets in the early Fronde, and the more bloodthirsty Condéen pamphlets of the spring of 1652. Albert Hamscher contrasts the moderation of the Parliamentary Fronde with the "anarchy" of its Princely phase, in which "other groups involved in the conflict each pursued their own grievances." *The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde (1653-1673)* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), xx. Notable exceptions include Bannister's *Condé in Context: Ideological Change in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford, UK: Legenda, 2000), though he problematically describes the Prince's conception of the monarchy as "essentially static," and paints his Fronde as a nostalgic effort to reinstate the feudalism of bygone days. Likewise, Béguin's *Princes de Condé: Rebelles, Courtisans et Mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1999) largely skirts the question in its focus on the material concerns of the Prince's clientage network.

and without a goal.”<sup>466</sup> The following pages will demonstrate that the Prince maintained an internally coherent model of personal kingship, and elaborated upon it to accommodate the circumstances of his rebellion as it developed. During the civil war of 1651-1653, the Prince sought to promote, or else impose his “correct” form of the French monarchy, and to mobilize French opinion in its favor. The Grand Condé’s rebellion failed, I argue, because of an inability to harmonize his personal kingship with the community-oriented, moralistic discourse of the *patrie*. The Prince faced battlefield setbacks and material deficiencies, but these might have been ameliorated had the people of France risen to support his cause as he asserted they must. Specifically, he failed to convince the patriotic French that Spanish troops and Bordelaise radicals would work for France’s wellbeing.

The present chapter analyzes three aspects of the Princely Fronde. First, it considers the actions of the Condé house during the Prison of the Princes in 1650. Feeling their honor and liberty threatened, the Grand Condé’s family and friends concluded alliances with Spain and the rebellious city of Bordeaux. In each case, they justified their otherwise-illicit acts by the logics of personal kingship, which they claimed legitimized their resistance and normalized their relationships with extraordinary entities. Second, I examine the creation and promotion of the Party of Princes, in the treaties and pamphlets of late 1651. After Condé’s return from prison and rupture with the Crown, the Prince built ties with critical noblemen, Philip IV of Spain, and the city of Bordeaux. Each highlights an aspect of Condé’s individuated vision of politics: with noble clients, we see his desired arithmetic equation of service and reward, and strict hierarchy of clientage. With Spain, Condé insisted on the centrality of recognition and gratitude, as well as the persistence of embodied national

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<sup>466</sup> Ernst Kossmann, *La Fronde* (Leiden: University Press, 1954), 259.

traits. With Bordeaux, the Prince emphasized the paternal attributes of power, especially fatherly care and filial devotion. Third and finally, the Prince launched a massive pamphlet campaign in support of his martial efforts. The Princely mazarinades of late 1651 and 1652 demonized the Cardinal and deified the Prince along the lines of personal kingship. But more than that, these texts present evidence of the Prince's aim to adopt the selfless *patrie* discourse that had gained currency since 1649, in order to justify his rebellion as a whole, and his Spanish treaty in particular.

The apparent hypocrisy of the Prince's patriotic claims, in the midst of his ostensible treason, demanded a response that Condéen apologists labored to provide. Ultimately, the alliances with Spain and with Bordeaux were each heavily freighted with implications for the status of French subjects, both as French, and as subjects. Could a Prince of the Blood, or any other Frenchman, legitimately engage with a foreign power? Could a French subject defy the King's express orders, for the good of the King's service? What did the *patrie* demand, and who could claim to speak for it? The Grand Condé's personal kingship could supply answers that were tenable and even reasonable as a self-contained construct, but whose relationship to dominant political culture and lived reality remained problematic.

### **"I Entered Prison an Innocent Man, I Returned the Guiltiest of Men"**

The Grand Condé was supposed to have uttered the above words upon his release from the prison at Le Havre on February 17, 1651, after thirteen months there with his brother Conti and his brother-in-law Longueville. Condé perhaps exaggerated his "innocence" prior to his arrest, but his quip summarizes the circumstances he faced when he returned: his clients had spent the prior year fomenting unrest wherever possible, a

Spanish army had attempted to free him by force, and a rebellious city had defied royal orders in succoring his family and friends. The civil war that Condé undertook in the autumn of 1651 was shaped, and perhaps necessitated by the events that transpired during his incarceration. Above all, the actions of his wife, Claire-Clémence de Maillé-Brèzé, and his sister, the Duchesse de Longueville, laid the foundation and set the tone for the remainder of the Princely Fronde.

The Grand Condé's shocking arrest on January 18, 1650 had triggered an understandable panic throughout his household. The Duchesse de Longueville and the Maréchal de Turenne (erstwhile frondeur and friend to Condé<sup>467</sup>) in February fled north to Normandy, where the Duc de Longueville had land, resources, and a well-established power base. The Cardinal and Queen viewed these acts as preparation for civil war, which they already suspected the *Parti des Princes* sought to foment.<sup>468</sup> In response, Mazarin brought Louis XIV at the head of a royal army to Rouen, where Longueville had hoped to rouse support from the Parlement and populace. The Duchesse now fled to Dieppe, and ultimately to Rotterdam ahead of Mazarin's royal troops, while Turenne retired to Stenay (Meuse), a longtime Condéen fortress. From their positions beyond the Crown's reach, the two Grands engaged in international intrigues on the Prince's behalf. By March, they had

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<sup>467</sup> Aumale claims, justifiably, that Turenne's attachment to the Prince was personal and heartfelt. Henri Eugène Philippe Louis d'Orléans, Duc d'Aumale, *Histoire des Princes de Condé pendant les XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 7 vol. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1886), vi: 5.

<sup>468</sup> This reaction was "understandable," and perhaps "correct" fits better - upon news of Condé's arrest, Pierre Lenet's first thought turned to military preparations, and how "it would not be difficult to incite the Parlement, the towns, and the province against the author of so extraordinary a deed [Mazarin]." Ultimately, the enthusiasm for the Condéen cause that Lenet hoped for failed to materialize until much later in the year. Pierre Lenet, *Mémoires de Pierre Lenet... concernant l'histoire du Prince de Condé...*, eds. Champollion-Figeac and Champollion in *Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France*, eds. Michaud and Poujoulat, Série 3: II (Paris: Editeur du commentaire du Code Civil, 1838), 209-210.

arranged for Spanish troops from Flanders to enter France, in an attempt to liberate the princely prisoners, then held just outside Paris at the Chateau de Vincennes.<sup>469</sup>

Though arguably necessary from a strategic perspective, Longueville and Turenne's flight, treaty, and counteroffensive posed obvious representational difficulties with the French political public. Anticipating as much, the Duchesse attempted to forestall any backlash in a series of pamphlets. The opening gambit consisted of two printed letters from Longueville, one addressed to the King and one to the Parlement of Rouen, which appeared at the end of February and early March, 1650.<sup>470</sup> Both attempted to explain, justify, and even evoke a measure of pathos for the rebel Duchesse and her Princely brothers and husband. In these public letters, Longueville emotionally recounts how she was "torn from her mother's arms" by the Cardinal's terrible power, and forced to choose either "to suffer prison, or to flee my *Patrie*." Given these two unthinkable alternatives, she now publicizes the events that have driven her to fight back.

Throughout both letters, Longueville positions herself as a faithful, submissive servant of the King, pushed to rebel by the perfidy of the man who wields royal power. She insists that "nothing could turn me from a total obedience," and claims to have dispatched letters to Court at various moments, to assure the royals that she had no desire for rebellion. Indeed, she has "given orders everywhere that all would obey,"<sup>471</sup> and assured the Parlement of Rouen that she had "no thought at all to trouble this Province."<sup>472</sup>

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<sup>469</sup> The full text of Longueville's Spanish treaty is in the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal [BA], MS 3135 ff.442-461.

<sup>470</sup> Archive d'Affaires Etrangères, Mémoires et Documents Français [AAE] 870, f.174, *Lettre de Madame la Duchesse de Longueville au Roy* (Rotterdam, 28 Feb 1650); AAE 870, f.177, *Requeste de Madame la Duchesse de Longueville au Parlement de Rouen* (Rotterdam, nd 1650). The archivist has marked the date as "early March."

<sup>471</sup> *Lettre... au Roy*, 3.

<sup>472</sup> *Requeste... au Parlement de Rouen*.

Ultimately, neither “my innocence, nor my sex, nor my rank were able to guarantee my safety,” and of necessity, she determined to defend herself by force.<sup>473</sup>

Both of Longueville’s texts focus primarily on Mazarin’s self-serving tyranny, and his perversion of the French monarchy. Longueville rehashed the now-familiar litany of charges against the Italian Prime Minister, with acute focus on the personal ingratitude and “reversal of our fundamental laws” evident in the arrest of the Princes, “to whom all the world knows [Mazarin] owes the greatest obligations.”<sup>474</sup> Such equation of individual relationships with political ties runs throughout her letters, and lays the groundwork for Condé’s claims after his release. Further, she asserted that Mazarin had sabotaged the recent peace talks at Münster in order to prolong the Habsburg war, and with it his excuse to oppress the people for his own benefit.<sup>475</sup> In this telling, Mazarin has abused royal power and broken the private and public bonds that constitute legitimate rule. He has subordinated the *bien public* to his own interests, and oppressed a Princess of royal blood. In her framing of Mazarin’s crimes, and her protestations of fidelity and love of the *patrie*, Longueville stood well within the standard tropes of Fronde-era political rhetoric.

But vilifying Mazarin would not explain the Spanish alliance that Longueville was now known to have agreed (and which she would soon publicly admit). On this front, her two open letters take a curious stance on Spain: they omit it almost completely. It is named exactly once - “[Mazarin] is a foreigner, born the subject of the King of Spain.”<sup>476</sup> Spain appears once more, but obliquely as generic “foreigners.” By labeling Mazarin *étranger*,

<sup>473</sup> *Manifeste de madame la duchesse de Longueville* (np, 9 May 1650), in Célestin Moreau, *Choix de Mazarinades*, 2 vol, (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1853), ii: 170. Though published later, this pamphlet reiterates and synthesizes major points of her arguments from the early spring, notes Hubert Carrier, *La Presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades. La Conquête de l'Opinion* (Geneva: Droz, 1989), 108.

<sup>474</sup> *Lettre... au Roy*, 1.

<sup>475</sup> *Requeste... au Parlement de Rouen*.

<sup>476</sup> *Requeste... au Parlement de Rouen*.

among a litany of his other crimes, the Duchesse hoped to delegitimize the Cardinal. As we have seen, *estrangers* in positions of power automatically meant misrule. But the problem, in Longueville's framework, was not with Spain as an elementally evil force, but with a Spaniard or any foreigner wielding French royal authority. Mazarin's power was invalid and destructive not because Spain itself was corrupt, but because as an *estranger*, he categorically could not rule well. For this reason, Longueville made the point that "*Princes du Sang*... should care for the State under a minority," as their blood-borne attachment to France rendered them incapable of the evils Mazarin had perpetrated.<sup>477</sup> The Duchesse ignored Spain, then, because Spain itself was in her telling a distraction from the major point. Mazarin's foreignness, and her family's Frenchness defined the issue, instead.

Absolving Spain of the blame for Mazarin's perfidy would not of itself excuse her own treason, however. To do so, Longueville once again sought to depict Spain itself as a benign force. She admitted that as she fled from Mazarin's persecution, "many, both countrymen and foreigners, offered me their help."<sup>478</sup> This sentence seeks to gloss over the distinction between accepting help from French sources, or from outside France. By flattening the difference, and misleadingly implying that the *estrangers* in question were private individuals rather than the King,<sup>479</sup> Longueville hoped to ignore entirely her actions' troubling implications for national loyalty. Nor did she volunteer that the foreign "help" would consist of 6000 cavalry and 2000 infantry, for the purpose of an assault on the Princes' prison, just outside Paris.<sup>480</sup> Instead, she focused on the unimpeachably French

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<sup>477</sup> *Manifeste...*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 174.

<sup>478</sup> *Lettre... au Roy*, 3.

<sup>479</sup> Beyond ignoring the problem of serving a foreign power, this studied omission suggests to the reader that the ties between the two entities conformed to the normative clientage relationships of the day.

<sup>480</sup> *Copie d'une Lettre escreite a Madame la Duchesse de Longueville* (Rotterdam, 4 March 1650), 9.

leadership of her party, and their proportionately patriotic goals. Framed in this way, her alliance with Spain would benefit France and Spain individually, and ultimately all Christendom, by securing peace between the most powerful Catholic nations in Europe. With only a little casuistry and deception, Longueville could condemn Mazarin as Spanish, while at the same time inviting Spanish troops to fight against the French Crown.

The capstone of Longueville's rhetorical offensive came in a pamphlet reproducing the first article of her Treaty of Stenay with Spain, "on which all the other [articles in the Treaty] depend." It set as its goals, first, "a just, equal, and sure peace between the two Crowns," and second, "to procure the liberty of Messieurs the Princes of Condé, Conty, and the Duc de Longueville." The anonymous editor unifies and extends these goals in a direct appeal to the reader:

Therefore, as there is no way but this [alliance] to arrive at peace, which is absolutely attached to the liberty of the Princes, it is up to the French to judge if they are not obliged by conscience to hazard their goods and their lives to deliver them, and to secure tranquility for their *patrie*... [against the injustice of] a foreigner condemned by the Parlements.<sup>481</sup>

This one sentence encapsulates the basic premise of the Princely Fronde: peace, both at home and abroad, and the good of the *patrie* may be secured by the Grand Condé alone, for only his superlative French virtue is capable of driving out the foreigner Mazarin and reestablishing France's just laws and customs. In pursuit of this laudable end, revolt or external alliances are permissible, and even necessary. Moreover, the pamphlet implies, any *bon François* should feel morally obligated to make common cause with the Princes against Mazarin's tyranny, "to secure tranquility for their *patrie*."

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<sup>481</sup> BN Fonds Dupuy 754 f.107, *Article principal du traité que Madame de Longueville et Monsieur de Turenne ont fait avec Sa Majesté Catholique* (np, March 1650), 2.

The Crown quickly countered these claims. Its response, in a published letter to Longueville penned by “La Franchise,” enumerated the putative flaws in Longueville’s case. Though he asserted that Longueville had misrepresented the Münster negotiations, the Princes’ arrest, Mazarin’s motives, and her own adventures since January, the treasonous alliance with Spain appeared by far the most troubling issue. With sarcastic incredulity that the Duchesse would publish tracts “so far removed from what everyone has thought of your prudence,”<sup>482</sup> La Franchise first points out the paradox of her claims that Mazarin “is a foreigner, born the subject of the King of Spain, in an effort to render him odious... while at the same time [Turenne and Longueville] held talks with the Spanish Ambassador.” Ties of any kind with Spain are obviously seditious, while by contrast, the Cardinal-Minister speaks on behalf of “Royal authority.” In this light, “anyone with sound judgment would find that this makes you appear... a *mauvaise Françoise*, and covers with your name an enemy of the Crown.”<sup>483</sup> Finally, dispensing with the pretense of disbelief, the author chastises Longueville for such unbecoming acts: “There is not a single *bon François* who has more compassion than aversion for Your Highness, seeing you so far removed from the behavior dictated by your Royal blood, and the love of your *patrie*.” Later, La Franchise lives up to his *nom de plume* in bluntly declaring: “In truth, the Spanish speak through your mouth.”<sup>484</sup> The Crown’s rebuttal made royal authority the only acceptable gauge of fidelity, by which standard Mazarin was actually more French than Longueville. Blood and birth conditioned an individual’s loyalties and even demanded action, but true Frenchness was a

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<sup>482</sup> By all accounts, “prudence” was not the trait that her peers most commonly associated with the Duchesse. Furthermore, mocking her lack of prudence fit snugly with the gendered discourses of pamphlets from the Siege, and reminded readers that an untrustworthy woman was inviting them to join an unworthy cause.

<sup>483</sup> *Copie d’une lettre a... Longueville*, 4-5.

<sup>484</sup> *Ibid*, 7.

product of behavior – specifically, obedience to the royal will. The threat of Spain therefore lay not in Mazarin's origins, but in Longueville's agreement with Philip IV, and the *tercios* that a cabal of noble malcontents had invited into France. The *patrie* at stake here was not a hazy object of love, but the will of the King and his obedient people, while a *bon(ne) François(e)* must remain faithful to the sovereign.

Though these dueling pamphlets predictably differ in tone and in their versions of events, the most important divergence stems from their models of the national community and its demands. The Princely framework for national belonging parallels their model of nobility, relying primarily on inborn qualities of blood and *mérite* to inform loyalty and behavior. The Prince, as the apex of French heroism and patriotism in birth and in deed, stands opposed to Mazarin's perversions. By the same logic, the Cardinal is disqualified from power by his foreign birth and natural subjecthood to a foreign power. For royalists, however, only obedience to the Crown marked a *bon François*. While citizenship is conferred first by birth, belonging derives above all from one's submission to the King. Any alliance with a foreign power against the French King, then, was illegitimate - still more, it was textbook *lèse-majesté*.

Both sides make the *patrie* a cornerstone of their discourses, but crucially, they do not speak precisely the same language. The Condéens have adopted wholesale - albeit problematically, as we will see - the frondeurs' figuration of an abstract moral entity composed of the virtuous People. For the frondeurs, and now the Princely Party, this entity was represented by, but not identical with the King. The Royalists, however, deploy a version in which the King is one with and exclusively speaks for the *patrie*, as the incarnation of the national body. The King himself defines, in a real sense, the *patrie*.

Though both sides share a basic sense of this term as a community centered on service and virtue, the differing concepts of the King's relationship to the community allow each side to make diametrically opposing claims about who were *bons François*, and what were the limits of acceptable action. Which *patrie* would win out became a primary question over the final years of the Fronde, and Longueville's actions and arguments set the tone.

Whatever his argument's other merits, La Franchise had misjudged one important point: he advised Longueville to follow "the examples of Madame your Mother, your Nephew and Daughter-in-Law, who rendered the submission due to Their Majesties' will."<sup>485</sup> In fact, at precisely the moment those words went to press, the Condé family was busily plotting to resist and defy the Crown. Though they had left Paris for Chantilly in late January 1650, as the Crown commanded, their activities since then had had the singular goal of freeing the Princes and ousting Mazarin.<sup>486</sup> So on April 11, when word reached the Château Condé that the King had dispatched a squadron of Swiss Guards to Chantilly, an overwrought scheme swung into motion, involving elaborate disguises, English body doubles, and several dead-of-night escapes.<sup>487</sup> The Princesse (Condé's wife), his son, Pierre Lenet, and a coterie of their friends and clients escaped to the Condé *maison's* stronghold at Montrond (Cher), and finally to the friendly city of Bordeaux.

Bordeaux provided a base for the Princely Party's rebellion that must have seemed tailor-made for the purpose. The civic identity of the southwestern city drew heavily on its privileged status under the French monarchy, and to no small extent on its Gallic, Roman,

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<sup>485</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>486</sup> Lenet's copious notes on these activities detail the formation and evolution of the Princely party. See his *Mémoires*, 210-231.

<sup>487</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 9; Lenet, *Mémoires*, 233-237. To heighten the melodrama of this ordeal, the woman who stood in for the Grand Condé's wife, Mlle Gerbier, had won the affections of Lenet, who orchestrated the plot and most of the Princely Party's escapades during Condé's prison.

and English heritage. Capital of the perpetually unruly province of Guienne,<sup>488</sup> and almost a week's ride from Paris, Bordeaux felt and even cherished every inch of that distance.<sup>489</sup> In recent years, the city and province's sense of distinction and separation had manifested in a nearly non-stop succession of tax revolts and uprisings against the "mortally hated" governor, the Duc d'Epernon.<sup>490</sup> Guienne recalled fondly the days of its absentee governor, Henri II de Bourbon, the Grand Condé's father,<sup>491</sup> and maintained warm affections toward the Condé house. As a result, the city and the province were replete with Princely clients, and the bourgeoisie were positively disposed - even violently so - toward their cause. In sum, Bordelaise and Guiennaise sensibilities fused a sense of historic exceptionalism with a culture of rebellion, while the city and province held a certain nostalgia for Condéen governors. For these reasons, it offered the Princely rebels significant advantages, even over the ostensibly impregnable fortress at Montrond.

The Condéen strategy in Bordeaux depended on two separate, but mutually dependent variables: the people of Bordeaux, and the city's political institutions. Neither of these alone could provide what we see in hindsight as the "city's support." The Parlement and the municipal council called the Jurade could not unilaterally supply the money and material that the Princes required, while popular acclaim lacked the stamp of legitimacy

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<sup>488</sup> Brian Sandberg's *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2010) details the extent to which conflict and civil war persisted in southwestern France in the early seventeenth century, and in large part defined the identities of noblemen there. Conflict was not only endemic, but actively sought by many of the provincial elite.

<sup>489</sup> Caroline le Mao, *Parlement et Parlementaires: Bordeaux au Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ-Vallon, 2007), 52.

<sup>490</sup> Among a vast array of pamphlets, a single title conveys the city's general sentiments on their governor: *Arrest de la cour de Parlement de Bourdeaux. Portant que le sieur Duc d'Epernon, le Chevalier de la Valette son frere & leurs adherans, sont declarez infracteurs de la paix, perturbateurs du repos public, ennemis du Roy, & de son Estat* (Bordeaux, 1 August 1650). Lenet confirms and amplifies this sentiment in his *Mémoires*, 267.

<sup>491</sup> The former governor was so well-regarded that, upon his death, a lengthy, flowery account of the former Prince's funerary ceremony appeared in Bordeaux, and was preserved in the city's archives. Archives Municipales de Bordeaux [AM Bdx] B5 22 f.86, *Les devoirs funebres rendus a la memoire du defunt Prince de Condé dans le college des Jesuites a Paris*.

that the Condéen rebels craved. Further complicating matters, the people, the Parlement, and the Jurade were all of course heterogeneous within themselves, though at least the latter two entities could be carried with a simple majority. The people, as Lenet observed, were a beast with “many heads,” and their “inconstancy” demanded vigilance.<sup>492</sup> At the same time, the political elite divided themselves neatly among the “mazarins” or “epernons” who supported the Crown; the moderate “petite Fronde” whose members opposed royal policy but shrank from rebellion; and the more radical “grande Fronde,” who called unequivocally for resistance, and civil war.<sup>493</sup> With this in mind, we must view the support of the apparently monolithic “Bordeaux” as an overdetermined commodity, secured and constantly threatened by shifting party lines and interests in the streets and Hôtel de Ville. All the same, the city’s material and moral support were utterly indispensable for the Princely Party.

The Princes would have been relieved, then, that at least the people of Bordeaux’s support seemed assured. Word had trickled in since February that the populace favored the Princely Party. Reported cries of “*Vive le Roi et les Princes! Et foutre du Mazarin!*” did much to reassure Lenet and his co-conspirators.<sup>494</sup> And when the city’s elite wavered in their decision to defy royal orders and open the gates to the Princesse de Condé and her retinue, a crowd gathered outside the Hôtel de Ville and threatened to smash the city’s

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<sup>492</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 256. This imagery of the inconstant, even dangerous *peuple* accords precisely with the Parlement’s and even Epernon’s estimation during the Fronde, as reported in le Mao, *Parlement et Parlementaires*, 54-55. Further, the use of the “many-headed hydra” trope had a long history in France, explored by Robert Schneider in “The ‘Many-Headed Beast’ and Monarchical Supremacy in the Age of Richelieu,” presentation at the Western Society for Historical Studies annual meeting, Banff, AB, October 13, 2012.

<sup>493</sup> These categories were recognized and even claimed by contemporary actors; Beik’s articulation, however, is the most succinct available. See *Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France: the Culture of Retribution* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997), 225.

<sup>494</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 265; elsewhere, the cries are recorded as the less-obscene, “...et point de Mazarin!”

locks and rip the doors from their hinges.<sup>495</sup> In the early days of the Princesse's stay in the city, crowds followed her everywhere, and assembled outside her residence, where "until midnight they blessed [the Condés], and continuously vomited execrations against the Cardinal and the Duc d'Epernon."<sup>496</sup> The people's fidelities could, and did, shift over time, but their initial support lent significant strength to the noble frondeurs.

The Parlement and Jurade, however, did not initially welcome the rebels so warmly. As we have seen, absent the threat of popular violence, they likely would not have admitted the Princesse at all. In part, this reticence could be blamed on the subterfuge of the Duc de Saint-Simon, whom the frondeurs had counted among their ranks until the final days of the journey to Bordeaux. He had reconciled with the Crown just before arriving, and rushed ahead of the Condé caravan to urge the Parlement to do the same. All the more gravely, Mazarin had sent orders to both the Parlement and the Jurade, which arrived just one day before the Princesse herself, informing them that they would betray the King if they received the upstart nobles.<sup>497</sup> The judges and and jurats' minds were eventually made up only under duress, and despite broad opposition to the Governor and Prime Minister, many remained reticent toward the Condéen cause.

In the face of the political elites' hand-wringing, the Princely Party deployed all the resources at their disposal to win friends within Bordeaux's halls of power. Thankfully for Lenet and his co-conspirators, the Condé clientele had deep roots in the city - a vestige of

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<sup>495</sup> *Histoire véritable de tout ce qui s'est fait et passé en Gienne pendant la guerre de Bordeaux: commençant du jour de l'entrée de Madame la Princesse, de Messieurs les Ducs d'Anguien, de Boüillon, de la Rochefoucault; le tout distingué par autant de courses, que l'ordinaire en a fait depuis le commencement jusques au départ de la Cour de cette Ville* (Bordeaux, 1650), 5.

<sup>496</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 279.

<sup>497</sup> *Histoire véritable*, 4.

their tenure as governors of Guienne.<sup>498</sup> Condéen agents in Bordeaux worked almost from the moment of the Princes' arrest, both overtly and behind the scenes, to push the city toward support of the rebel grands. From simple reports on the state of the city, to strategically suppressing or raising certain issues in the Jurade and Parlement, the Condé network performed critical tasks within the city.<sup>499</sup>

But the most effective tools at the Princesse de Condé's disposal were the most personal. Throughout the spring, she had protested that all of her actions had sought only to "raise up my son in the fear of God, and [to] lead him by my example toward the same zeal that Monsieur his father always possessed for the service of the King."<sup>500</sup> And in her first speech to the Parlement of Bordeaux, she claimed that she hoped to

place my person and that of my son in your hands: I hope that you will serve as a father to him... He is the last of the royal house who is free... Monsieur his father is in chains. You all know, Messieurs, the great services that [the Grand Condé] has rendered to the State, and the friendship that he has shown you on many occasions, just as Monsieur my late father-in-law did.<sup>501</sup>

For a broader public, the Princesse published a heavily dramatized version of Mazarin's cruelty toward the Condé house. She claims to have suffered "a mother and wife's worst fears, for whom the apprehension of losing a husband and a son who have the honor to be of royal blood, cannot but inspire dark thoughts." Forced on a harsh trek across France, fleeing before the forces of the tyrant Mazarin, she now asks that she and her son "be put in

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<sup>498</sup> The two most important among these were the Chevalier de Thodias, and the Parliamentary President Daffis. Though this study does not call for extensive discussion of the two agents' activities, it should be noted that Christophe Blanquie has studied Thodias' career in the Condé household in great depth, and paints a compelling picture of the role and importance of the Prince's most trusted operatives. See his *Une vie de frondeur, le Chevalier de Thodias (1616-1672): Un gouverneur de Fronsac et Coutras, premier jurat de Bordeaux* (Coutras: GRAHC, 2001).

<sup>499</sup> Le Mao, *Parlement et Parlementaires*, 58. Though she dismisses Le Blanc and Mauvezin as parvenus in the city, she fails to account for the other, more solidly-established Princely agents there. Blanquie, *Une vie de frondeur*, is especially useful on this point.

<sup>500</sup> Princesse de Condé to Le Tellier, 17 April 1650, transcribed in Lenet, *Mémoires*, 239.

<sup>501</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 281.

the safekeeping of the King and the protection of the Court [of Parlement]."<sup>502</sup> Condé's son, the Duc d'Enghien supplied the *coup de grâce*: in the midst of the Parliamentary session where all these speeches were read, "the young Duke bent a knee to the ground and said, 'Be a father to me, Messieurs, for Cardinal Mazarin has stolen mine from me.'"<sup>503</sup>

The intensely personal, positively lachrymose nature of all these appeals fits snugly with Condé's personal model of monarchical politics. Indeed, the Prince,<sup>504</sup> Longueville, and now the Princesse all presented their cases against the Cardinal in nearly identical terms. Mazarin is a tyrant not only because he seeks to exploit France, but because he has betrayed the obligations of individual gratitude that he owes to the Prince. His rule is illegitimate because he is a "natural subject" of Spain, which leads inevitably to the misrule France has endured. By contrast, Condé should exercise authority in the Regency by virtue of his superlative Frenchness, both in birth and in service to the King. And now, the Princesse asserts that the Parlement of Bordeaux must act on her husband's behalf in recognition of the close "friendship" between the Condé house and the city of Bordeaux, begun by the former Prince. Indeed, she intimates that the bond between the Prince and the city is such that the corporate body of Parlement must take Condé's place, both as father to the young Enghien, and as champion of French virtues against the evil Minister. In each case, personal attributes are assumed to define political relationships, even to the

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<sup>502</sup> *Requeste de Madame la Princesse à Messieurs du Parlement de Bourdeaux, pour la seureté de sa personne & celle de Monsieur le Duc d'Anguien: ensemble l'execution de la Declaration & seureté publique* (np [Bordeaux], 1650), 4, 8.

<sup>503</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 281.

<sup>504</sup> It must be noted that while Condé had quarreled with the Cardinal in personal terms, he had not yet pushed his arguments to the point of justifying rebellion, as his wife and sister did.

point that the “fictive fatherhood” of patronage and protection demanded real fatherly duties toward the seven-year-old Duc, from the Parlement’s corporate “person.”<sup>505</sup>

These claims demonstrate the argumentative elasticity of Condé’s personal model of kingship and political obligations. Because private ties of clientage had been harnessed for political purposes from time immemorial, and increasingly so since the reign of Louis XIII,<sup>506</sup> appeals to private sentiments or duty were easily intelligible within the accepted political lexicon. Both the Princesse and the Duchesse hoped to expand the power and meaning of an individual’s personal obligations and embodied qualities within the realm of politics. They argued that Mazarin’s duplicity and tyranny had momentarily severed their family’s ties to the royal party (crucially distinct from the King), and invoked a higher duty to protect the King and kingdom from the Cardinal’s Italian wiles. If duty inheres in the personal logics of birth and gratitude, the Condé women argued, then Mazarin has violated both. In effect, they advanced a hybrid argument, drawing on tropes of the King’s “evil minister” and the Second Estate’s “*devoir de révolte*,” combined with a flexible application of personal kingship. More than a boilerplate appeal to a bygone “golden age” of nobles’ feudal privileges, these claims constitute an innovative, creative, and clearly controversial application of traditional understandings of personal kingship.

Still more novel, the Condé women attempted to excuse an otherwise treasonous alliance, and to push Bordeaux into open rebellion by appeals to personal obligations. Personal kingship has moved beyond providing a framework for the reciprocal bonds of service and reward between the sovereign and his subjects. Individual obligations are

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<sup>505</sup> Absurd applications of corporate personhood are clearly not unique to the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

<sup>506</sup> See Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford UP, 1986), especially chapters 5 and 6.

deployed here to define national sentiment and duty, as well as the ties between a beloved former patron's *maison*, and the corporate body on whom he would come to rely. In effect, they extended the explanatory framework that had driven the Grand Condé to side with the Crown and lay siege to Paris in 1649. But where the singular qualities of royal blood and the Principal Heads had demanded Condé's service then, the Princesse and Duchesse suggested that French blood, of any quality, must now spur action to defend the *patrie* from Mazarin's exploitive tyranny. Personal kingship merged with *patrie* discourse, and in doing so expanded its reach, to embrace Princes as well as commoners, and national sentiment as well as the subject-sovereign bond.

But questions of treachery momentarily subsided in the fall and winter of 1650-51. As Mazarin led the King and a royal army toward Bordeaux to reimpose order and obedience, events back in Paris turned against him. Through a complex constellation of circumstances,<sup>507</sup> the Parlement's deliberations turned sharply in Condé's favor in late 1650 and early 1651, and orders for his release were issued in early February, alongside orders for the Cardinal's exile.<sup>508</sup> Mazarin retreated into German lands, and Condé returned triumphantly to Paris. Public attention had turned away from the Princely Party's questionable foreign and domestic alliances for the moment, but the lull was short-lived. The Princely Fronde that erupted in the fall of 1651 would be defined in large part by the Grand Condé's alliances with Spain and Bordeaux, and by the success of his efforts to elucidate their dubious acceptability. If the Prince had entered prison an innocent man, his

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<sup>507</sup> For fuller treatment of the tortuous events during these months, see Kossmann, *La Fronde*, 117-150 and Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 45-59.

<sup>508</sup> *Arrêt de la Cour de Parlement pour la Liberté de Messrs les Princes, & l'éloignement du Cardinal Mazarin hors le Royaume de France, du 7 Février 1651* (Paris, Imprimeurs du Roy, 1651)

wife and sister's actions in 1650 ensured he would return, perhaps not as "the guiltiest of men," but at least with the path to guilt cleared and paved.

### **The Return of the Prince and the Road to Madrid**

When the Grand Condé returned to Paris on February 17, 1651, he was greeted by *feux de joie*, lit by the jubilant Parisians in celebration of a hero's return.<sup>509</sup> Exactly six months later, however, Queen Anne and the still-minor Louis XIV would proclaim to Parlement that Condé was an "Enemy of the Peace of the State," and asked the Court to exile him once again, precipitating the open civil war that many had been expecting for months.<sup>510</sup> This was not the only dramatic change during that year: Condé would come to embrace his wife and sister's Spanish alliance, which he at first repulsed; governments, appointments, and positions of power were traded and re-traded between Princely and Royal allies; and, most important of all, the King reached his majority on September 7, 1651. Through all the "incomprehensible" twists of these months,<sup>511</sup> the Grand Condé maintained with perfect consistency his personal conception of duty, honor, and the King's role - even when he used it to arrive at contrasting conclusions.

In contrast to Condé's Treaty of Madrid of late 1651, the Prince and populist rebels alike harbored a deep mistrust of foreign intervention since the Siege of Paris, even when it might aid their cause. One Siege-era Parisian pamphlet sarcastically mocks a Habsburg emissary who would have them believe, as the author rendered it, "Therefore, now the

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<sup>509</sup> AAE 874 f.70, Le Tellier to Mazarin, 17 February 1651; Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 58.

<sup>510</sup> *Discours que le Roi et la Reine Regente de France, assistez de quelques Grand du Roiaume, on fait lire en leurs presences aux Deputez du Parlement, Chambre des Comptes, Cour des Aydes, & Corps de Ville de Paris, au sujet de la Resolution qu'ils on prise de l'éloignement pour toujours du Cardinal Mazarin hors du Roiaume et sur la conduite presente du Prince de Condé*, 17 Aoust 1651 (Paris, 1651).

<sup>511</sup> Le Tellier candidly informed Mazarin in a letter of June 17, "The quarrels at court are incomprehensible" (AAE 875 f.233).

wolves and sheep [i.e. Spain and France]/ Are together in the field, at peace."<sup>512</sup> Condé held the same opinion in 1649, announcing that he was "extremely disturbed by the magnitude of [Conti's] fault, in daring to treat with the King of Spain during wartime."<sup>513</sup> His arrest did not change his feelings. An interview in the Spring of 1650 between the imprisoned Prince and the royal secretary Servien showed Condé indignant at the accusation that his friends would ally with the enemy: "Those who are at Stenay [Turenne and Longueville] would never be so faithless as to conspire with the Spanish."<sup>514</sup> And still in February 1651, Condé refused to honor his Party's Spanish alliance. Le Tellier – hardly a Condéen apologist – admits that, "The whole world knows that M. le Prince strongly disapproves of the designs undertaken by his friends, with the Spanish."<sup>515</sup> Among his first actions upon his liberation, Condé sought to divorce himself and his house from their Spanish ties,<sup>516</sup> and to nullify the treaty signed in his name just days before his release.<sup>517</sup> As proof of his fidelity to France, he offered to lay siege to Stenay, recently given to Spain by the Princely Party as part of their broader agreement.<sup>518</sup> In short, the Prince took every available opportunity to distance himself and his cause from their apparently untenable agreement with Philip IV.

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<sup>512</sup> *Ode sur dom Joseph de Illescas, prétendu evoyé de l'archiduc Léopold* (Paris, 16 Feb. 1649), reprinted in Célestin Moreau, *Choix de Mazarinades*, 2 vol, (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1853), i: 223.

<sup>513</sup> Prince de Condé to Girard, 12 March 1649, reprinted in Aumale, *Histoire*, 654-656.

<sup>514</sup> Quoted in Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 32-33; the royal party felt the Prince's outrage to be genuine, as confirmed in AAE 873 f.210, Le Tellier to Mazarin, 2 April 1650.

<sup>515</sup> Le Tellier to Mazarin, 17 January 1651, transcribed in Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 61.

<sup>516</sup> MC P.x, Duchesse de Longueville to Prince de Condé, 24 Feb 1651.

<sup>517</sup> MC P.x, "Copie de la traité conclu par M de Lusignan avec l'Espagne au nom de la Princesse de Condé," 15 Feb 1651.

<sup>518</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 525; Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 64; this offer is confirmed by the royal address to Parlement of 17 August. But because relations had soured between Prince and Crown by then, the royals frame Condé's offer to assault Stenay as a service coaxed from the unwilling Prince. *Discours que le Roi et la Reine Regente de France, assistez de quelques Grand du Roiaume, on fait lire en leurs presences aux Députez du Parlement, Chambre des Comptes, Cour des Aydes, & Corps de Ville de Paris, au sujet de la Resolution qu'ils on prise de l'éloignement pour toujours du Cardinal Mazarin hors du Roiaume et sur la conduite présente du Prince de Condé*, 17 Aoust 1651 (Paris, 1651).

The Prince's rejection of the Spanish treaty emphasizes the novelty of the Princesse and Duchesse's arguments of 1650. Although the Grand Condé had championed the cause of personal kingship since Rocroi, he did not yet understand it as permitting him or his allies to engage a foreign power's aid in rebellion. So long as the Prince cast himself as a servant to the French King, no other power could compete for his attachment. In this sense, it is significant that he had mocked the idea that his family would be so "faithless [*infidèle*]" as to treat with Spain. Now that Mazarin was out of power, the Prince once again saw himself as bound to France, by the formulaic "duty of birth," and by the obligations that past royal goodwill demanded. Despite his wife and sister's earnest arguments during his absence, through the summer of 1651 Condé considered and comported himself as a royal servant, precluding the possibility of any other allegiance.

The early months of 1651 were chaotic days, filled with intrigues and rumors. The Grand Condé had ostensibly won the Queen's trust. He paid homage to the King and took his "natural" place at the head of the Royal Council, while his friends took positions of power in the royal administration and army.<sup>519</sup> Most important, he traded his government of Burgundy for that of Guienne, while remarkably retaining local authority in the former region; at the same time, Conti exchanged Champagne for Provence, rendering the Princes hugely powerful in the restive South.<sup>520</sup> Despite these signs of the Crown's trust, bad faith persisted on all sides: Condé (correctly<sup>521</sup>) suspected that the Queen and her circle remained in constant contact with the exiled Cardinal, while the Royal Party (correctly) felt

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<sup>519</sup> AAE 875 f.30, Le Tellier to Mazarin, 8 May 1651.

<sup>520</sup> The last of these events provoked Mazarin's exasperated outburst: "After this, all that remains is for M. le Prince to have himself sanctified at Rheims." Cited in Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 73.

<sup>521</sup> Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BN], Fonds Dupuy 775 f.157, "Arrest de la Cour de Parlem. de Paris pour informer des caballes que l'on fait pour le retour du Card. Maz."

that Condé's use of his authority worked against their interests. Although "Condé seemed very strong," Aumale concludes, "it was a power more apparent than real."<sup>522</sup>

Even the Parisian Parlement, which had secured Condé's liberty scant months before, by May seemed to doubt his fidelity: in the presence of Condé and Conti, Président Cogneux was said to have "spoken well" in reminding those assembled that "one must not recognize any master other than the King, and that there should be no other power recognized or proclaimed than that on which all others depend." The report notes, "This was remarked as regarding the Princes."<sup>523</sup> This speech recalls the Cardinal's concerns of 1649, when Condé's control of patronage seemed to threaten the King's own power. It seemed necessary, in the mind of a Parliamentary Président, to remind the Grand Condé that any allegiance that departed from the King's interests, whether as master or servant, would necessarily be illicit. Though somewhat premature in late May, this speech proved prescient of the issues Condé would face in just a few months. For the moment, Parlement's cautious stance toward the Prince showed unmistakably that no side trusted any other to operate in good faith.

So when, in this universally paranoid atmosphere, word reached Condé in the dead of night on July 6, 1651, that a squadron of troops were marching toward his Parisian *hôtel*, the Prince immediately concluded that his life or his liberty had again come under threat, and hastily fled Paris to his manor at Saint-Maur. Though the poultry merchants who in fact composed the band probably meant Condé no harm, his instantly defensive reaction belies the threat he perceived from the Crown.<sup>524</sup> His (mis)perception had real consequences: the

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<sup>522</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 65-66.

<sup>523</sup> AAE 875 f.106, Anonymous report from Paris, 28 May 1651.

<sup>524</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, 76.

major figures of the Princely Party instantly assembled at Saint-Maur, and laid the groundwork for their future rebellion. In what became known as the Treaty of Saint-Maur, they pledged to “persist in our will and resolution to obtain security for the person of M. le Prince and all signatories to the present text, by every sort of means, even by arms if need be.”<sup>525</sup> If Condé had been loath to rebel even during his incarceration, the perilous circumstances he encountered as a free man pushed him constantly toward civil war.

By August, the Prince and the Crown were once again openly hostile. On the 17<sup>th</sup>, the King and Queen appeared in Parlement to proclaim that Condé had become an “enemy to the Peace of the State,” despite the Queen having “omitted nothing that could give him every satisfaction” since his release. Anne enumerated examples of his ingratitude: his governments and pensions had been restored and paid in arrears, while his wishes for appointments and honors had been followed, to the point of dismissing and exiling the royal secretaries Le Tellier, Servien, and Lionne. Still, Condé hypocritically shirked the duties demanded by his own personal model of kingship, having seen the King only once since his return, and absenting himself from the Royal Council for over two months, all the while attempting to stir up distrust against the Crown. The last, and most damning of all the Queen’s charges, the Prince had raised troops “capable of composing an army,” who answered only to him, and had carried on “a plot [*intelligence*] with those against whom we are openly at war.”<sup>526</sup> In all of this, Condé seemed to be busily preparing for war against the Crown, with Spanish aid.

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<sup>525</sup> AC P.xii “Traité conclu entre Condé, Conti, la Duchesse de Longueville, le Duc de Nemours, Duc de la Roche, le Président Viole à Saint-Maur,” 22 July 1651.

<sup>526</sup> *Discours que le Roi et la Reine Regente... 17 Aoust 1651.*

The Prince replied that his conduct “in no way troubles my conscience,” and two days later sent a speech almost twice as long as the royals’, rebutting their claims point by point.<sup>527</sup> The essence of his argument can be distilled to three statements: the honors and power he enjoyed had “only ever been employed for the service of the King, and the good of the Kingdom.” While he had taken defensive measures, and avoided the Court, this was because “I felt myself obligated to provide for my security, without lacking in the respect that I owe to the King, which I would never neglect.” Meanwhile, other points are “so ridiculous as to warrant no response.”<sup>528</sup> But the most important element again came last: “I am accused of conspiring [*intelligence*] with the Spanish, which is falsely contrived by my enemies.” The Prince demanded compensation for the “calumny” of this accusation, “the greatest outrage that could be committed against my rank and my quality as *Prince du Sang*.” He insists, in the final, heated lines of his text, that he had committed no act “against the duty of my birth.”<sup>529</sup> As ever, the Prince locates the source of his honor, and the motive for his service to King and kingdom in his embodied dignity and rank. The charges are “ridiculous” because his attachment to Louis and to France is innate and unbreakable.

But Condé’s ties with the royal party (always distinct, in his mind, from the King himself) were already broken. By September 7, 1651, the day of Louis’ majority, it was clear in Pierre Lenet’s eyes that “[the] Court was no friend to him,” a circumstance which “forced the Prince of Condé to consider seriously his position and to assess the dangers he might face” in Paris.<sup>530</sup> The signatories to the Treaty of Saint-Maur reassembled, and decided

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<sup>527</sup> *Response de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé au Discours de la Reyne Regente, leu au Palais Royal, en presence des Deputez du Parlement, Chambre des Comptes, Cour des Aydes, & Corps de Ville de Paris, sous le nom du Roy, & de la Reyne, 19 Aoust 1651.* (Paris: Guillemot, 1651)

<sup>528</sup> Ibid, quotes from 5, 6, and 8, respectively.

<sup>529</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>530</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 527.

among themselves that matters had reached the point of open war. At once, the Party sent agents to the provinces and Lenet to Spain, while Condé and his inner circle went to Bordeaux. In the space of one day, the Princely Fronde had begun.

The suddenness of the Party's resolution for war reflects the immediate, qualitative shift that came with the end of the Regency. Above all, Louis' majority obviated the need to mediate royal authority through the purposefully diffident Queen or the broadly hated Cardinal, and loosed the full force of the King's will, both in law and in the eyes of the political public. At the same time, removing the Cardinal and Queen as the King's mouthpieces nullified much of Condé's rationale for opposition. The Prince's claims to protect the innocent, minor monarch held less credibility now that such defense was legally unnecessary. Though claims centered on freeing Louis from Mazarin's "spell" might still carry weight, rebels would now have far more difficulty in arguing that the King's words did not represent his will, as Condé had alleged as recently as August 19. The Prince might still attempt to sidestep these contradictions, but royalists undeniably occupied a far stronger position on September 7 than the day before.

Nevertheless, the Princely Party had deep roots, powerful allies, and cultural trump cards with the public. They set up a base of operations in Bordeaux, where support for Condé and his cause had never waned,<sup>531</sup> and where the rich land and richer trade network might be harnessed to supply a long struggle. Moreover, Philip IV had been biding his time through the summer, aware that the increasingly likely renewal of hostilities between Prince and Crown would favor Spain - and just as expected, Condé's first moves included the resumption of his Party's ties with Spain. On the cultural battlefield, beyond the potent

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<sup>531</sup> These feelings were confirmed in numerous reports by Condéen agents Lusignan and Dalesme, especially on 12 June 1651 - see AC P.xi.

image of the Prince himself, the Party had lately secured the significant (but never totally dependable) material and symbolic help of the Duc d'Orléans.<sup>532</sup> Together, the agreement of these two “*principales têtes*” could be deployed against Mazarin and the royalists, just as Mazarin had hoped to use the same discourse to pacify Paris in 1649. And, failing all else, Condé presumed that he had an ace in the hole: the public’s searing hatred of Cardinal Mazarin. From the vantage of the Palais Royal in late 1651, it must have seemed that the Prince’s civil war had every chance of success.

Circumstances had changed dramatically between the Prince’s return and the King’s majority. But at every moment, Condé’s personal conception of politics guided his actions. As long as he believed his relationship to the Crown might be salvaged, he refused to honor his family’s agreements with Spain. But the injustice and ingratitude he felt the Queen showed, to say nothing of the insecurity he felt at Court, at last convinced him to cut ties and seek outside aid. Though his embodied French virtues meant his heart would forever belong to the King and *patrie*, his sword belonged to Spain after November 6. As the circumstances of the Fronde evolved, the Prince’s application of personal kingship evolved, too - but how far could this flexible concept bend before breaking?

### **Rebellion on Paper: Condéen Claims in Treaties and Propaganda**

The Princely Fronde spilled ink and blood in equal measure. After all, winning battles and conquering cities would matter little if the people could not be convinced that

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<sup>532</sup> Though less prominent or widespread than the Grand Condé’s, the Duc d’Orléans enjoyed a great esteem in his own right, largely by virtue of his exceptionally high rank. See, for instance, the mazarinade *Les larmes Mazarines* (Brussels, 1651), which claims that the Duc alone can save the kingdom. Jouhaud concurs: “Frère de Louis XIII, il est l'oncle du roi. Longtemps, il a fait figure d'héritier du trône, avant d'être lieutenant générale du royaume de 1643 à 1651. Politiquement et humainement il est très déconsidéré. Chacun sait qu'il ne vaut rien comme chef du parti, cependant sa puissance financière et donc militaire reste immense, bien qu'elle compte sans doute moins que la légitimité que lui confère le sang royale.” *Mazarinades*, 119.

Condé had justice on his side, or at least that his cause would benefit France and its people. Accordingly, Condé's printers flooded the streets of Paris and Bordeaux with denunciations of Mazarin's power over the now-major King, justifications for the Prince's rebellion, and reports of his underdog victories. At the same time, the proliferation of treaties and formal alliances between the Prince and various corporate bodies, nobles, and foreign powers spurred the "transformation of the princely clientele into a faction."<sup>533</sup> By replacing informal understandings with written agreements, Katia Béguin argues, Condé's party sought to stabilize and codify the Party's membership and functioning. Princely pamphlets and treaties are thus a rebellion "on paper" in a double sense: individually, they are the textual basis of the Princely Fronde. As a corpus, they sketch the theoretical form of the rebellion that the Grand Condé hoped he would fight, and the logic that he believed would carry the day. In all aspects of this textual war - the formalized ties of reciprocal obligation, the apologetics for soliciting Spanish aid, and the claims and goals laid before the political public - the Princely Party applied and expanded the framework of personal kingship.

#### *Inviolable Attachments: Formal Alliances in the Princely Fronde*

Whereas the bonds of clientage typically proceeded through implicit, mutual expectations surrounding service, protection, and compensation, the Princely Party made these terms explicit.<sup>534</sup> The stakes were too high to permit any uncertainty. In its relations with the noblemen who would comprise the Party, with the King of Spain, and with the city of Bordeaux, the Prince made clear what service was expected, the terms of the alliance, and the anticipated benefit to the subservient party. But the differences in the

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<sup>533</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 114.

<sup>534</sup> On Princely treaties' terms and geographic scope, see Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 101.

nature, and the notoriety of these agreements demanded that the signatories carefully calibrate the presentation of each relationship. Each type of alliance therefore sheds light on a discrete aspect of Condé's rebellion. With other nobles, the Prince positions himself as an absolute master whose orders must be followed to the letter. With Spain, he appears as the unjustly maligned, perpetually wronged innocent. And with Bordeaux, Condé is the loving paterfamilias to the city, province, and *patrie*. Condé's role in each case underscores the flexibility and internal integrity of his personal vision of politics. At the same time, however, his self-conscious self-fashioning speaks to the weaknesses he perceived - accurately, in the end - within the Party, and in its domestic and international relationships.

As the head of France's most powerful and extensive patronage network, the Grand Condé had developed precise expectations for his clients' service.<sup>535</sup> During the Princely Fronde, however, such expectations became at once more definite, more urgent, and more explicit.<sup>536</sup> So, in place of vague assurances of "friendship" and protection in exchange for service, the treaties that sustained the Party in 1651-52 spelled out the duties assigned to each client, and the compensation he would receive in return. For the most part, the clients' duties included raising and leading troops. Bourdeilles, a powerful Guiennaise nobleman, promised to spend the 1,000 *livres* sent to him to outfit a company of infantry, and 6,000 *livres* for a company of cavalry. The troops would then fall under his leadership, though he

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<sup>535</sup> Condé's expectations, and the consequences of failing to deliver, become clear in a series of letters from the Dijonnais Parlementaire Pierre de Saumaise-Chasans, who attempted to excuse himself from required duties in early 1651. Though Condé's own letters are not extant, the substance of Saumaise-Chasans' messages show unmistakably that the Prince responded with direct threats and naked violence. See especially the letters of March 24, April 7, and April 16, in AC P.xi and P.xii.

<sup>536</sup> Sandberg, in *Warrior Pursuits*, chapter 4 (pp. 79-113), examines the dynamics of patronage networks during the rebellions of the early 1600s. Though the tasks demanded of clients, and the favor and protection that they demanded in return are broadly very similar between the late Wars of Religion and the Princely Fronde, the crucial differences come in the creation of written treaties, and in the very specific promises made on both sides well before the first command had been given or the first service rendered.

swore “to serve in every place where it pleases M. le Prince to command him.” In return, Bourdeilles would not only lead troops as a General himself, but secured the commission of *maréchal de camp* for the Marquis de La Donze.<sup>537</sup> Such treaties ubiquitously maintained the trappings of regular noble clientage - invocations of perfect fidelity, reliance on each man’s honor, etc. - but their written, pseudo-contractual nature set them apart. And in their arithmetic equation of service in exchange for reward, they mirrored precisely the Grand Condé’s pre-Fronde model of personal kingship and patronage.

These interpersonal treaties aimed to impose a centralized order on the Princely Party, but simultaneously revealed the obstacles its leaders foresaw. Beyond the specific duties assigned to each lieutenant, the Prince demanded unwavering fidelity, in no uncertain terms. All agreements included some variation of the client’s vow “to attach myself to [Condé’s] interests in all cases and forever,” and to quit the alliance or lay down arms only by the Prince’s express consent.<sup>538</sup> Further, all agreements contained a clause binding the client to obey the Party’s principle leaders, including the Princesse, Conti, and the Duc and Duchesse de Longueville. While it is not necessarily a sign of weakness to clarify the chain of command, the insistence on obedience and fidelity throughout these documents betrays the Party’s insecurity. The fifth clause of the Comte de Daugnon’s treaty, for example, stipulates, “As the naval armament depends on me and the persons I will have established for its command, [we will] receive orders from Monsieur le Prince and obey them without difficulty.” The superfluous addition of “without difficulty,” on top of repetitive insistence on hierarchy and fidelity, speaks to Condé’s fear of disorder and

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<sup>537</sup> Bourdeilles to Condé, 12 November 1651 - the spelling of the Marquis’ name is uncertain. Along similar lines, see also Prince de Tarante to Prince de Condé, 9 October 1651, both in AC P.xii.

<sup>538</sup> AC P.xii, Comte de Daugnon to Condé, 3 October 1651.

disobedience within the Party's ranks. Moreover, the terms demanded of Daugnon show clearly that Condé understood that the presence of Spanish troops might pose a problem. Otherwise, there would be no need for clause seven: "In the event that Monsieur le Prince would be obligated to avail himself of foreign aid, I will shelter those who will arrive by sea in my ports and harbors, where they may anchor in total surety."<sup>539</sup> These treaties, then, acted both a means of preparing for the anticipated course of the Princely Fronde, as well as evidence of the Party's premonitions at their civil war's outset.

Where interpersonal treaties were purely functional, private documents,<sup>540</sup> Condé's Spanish alliance was at best semi-private. The Duchesse de Longueville's treaty, which provided the model for the Treaty of Madrid,<sup>541</sup> had been broadly known, as Longueville herself had sent its first article to press. And though the text of Condé's treaty was never published, the French political public knew full well that he had aligned himself with Spain, and even Condéen pamphlets referred to the treaty's terms. But most important, the rhetoric employed to frame the agreement, especially in its preamble, echoes throughout the Party's pamphlets and harangues during the Fronde, and even in Condé's private correspondence with Philip IV after 1653. So, although the Treaty itself was not publicly available, the goals and motives its signatories claimed were nevertheless delicately crafted with an eye toward the texts modeled after it. The Treaty of Madrid is therefore significant as much for the alliance it established, as for the terms in which its parties hoped to justify it. As Condé's actions in the spring and summer of 1651 show, he understood fully the problems inherent in the agreement, and the Treaty must be read as a deliberate effort to

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<sup>539</sup> Ibid.

<sup>540</sup> The extant treaties are without exception written in the hand of the client himself, and lack any of the rhetorical ornamentation that characterizes texts intended for a broader public.

<sup>541</sup> The Treaty of Madrid copied verbatim articles 4-10 and 12 of Longueville's Treaty of Stenay.

explain the Prince's reversal. It is neither surprising nor accidental that personal kingship is at its center.

From its first sentence, the Treaty presents its impetus in personal terms. It portrays Condé's rebellion as an effort to address:

...the violent conduct of Cardinal Mazarin, the obstinate aversion he has always had for the conclusion of peace between the two Crowns, and his unabashed efforts against the person of Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, whose illustrious and glorious life places him not only beyond all suspicion of crime, but should cause him to receive the recompense that marks for posterity the gratitude of the Most Christian King for the signal services he [Condé] has rendered.<sup>542</sup>

Once again, the Princely Fronde will correct the injustice of Mazarin's selfish tyranny in international and domestic affairs, as well as in the individual gratitude and recognition that he owes but has denied to France's worthiest servant. And again, Condé's "life" - his corporeal being and his generous exploits - inoculates him against "all suspicion of crime." For these reasons, the Princely Fronde is not just legitimate, but morally necessary. As further reassurance, the reader learns that Condé has set out on this course only "by the advice of many princes, dukes, peers, Marshals of France, governors of provinces, great *seigneurs* and notable personages, [all] interested by the greatness of their birth and by their virtues in the *bien de l'Etat* and in the peace of Christendom."<sup>543</sup> The Princely Fronde bills itself as a valorous resistance movement, in which the greatest heroes of the *patrie* have been called to defend France from the Machiavellian mischief of the foreign Cardinal.

Having outlined the conditions that spur him to rebel, Condé names his goals. He seeks two main ends: first, "the establishment of a just, equitable, *honnête*, and durable peace between the two Crowns." And second, to ensure "the Prince's security, and to

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<sup>542</sup> AC P.xii, Treaty of Madrid, 6 November 1651, preamble.

<sup>543</sup> Ibid, preamble.

reestablish him in the ranks, dignities, and employ that are owed to the grandeur of his birth and his *mérites*." These dual aims evoke the generous, community-focused service demanded by the frondeurs, alongside the personal security that Condé claimed would guarantee peace for France at large. In claiming them side by side, the Prince reinforces the sense of these two items' mutual dependence: there can be no peace for the people of France (or Spain) while the *maison Condé* is at risk. By defeating Mazarin, the Party would assure tranquility for France and safety for the Prince, and thereby restore "the service of the King, the welfare of the people, the surety of the public, and [the Princes'] own particular security."<sup>544</sup> How could a movement with such admirable goals fail to win public approval?

Notably, in the sense of public perceptions, Spain's role in Condé's rebellion is not mentioned in the first several pages. After long passages reiterating Mazarin's misdeeds, Condé has at last "deemed it appropriate for so great a plan, to humbly ask His Catholic Majesty that it please him to help... in the success of an enterprise worthy of being sustained by so great a monarch, and which is ever glorious and advantageous for the two Crowns."<sup>545</sup> The textual space that precedes this request suggests Condé's patience in suffering injury, and his forbearance in seeking foreign aid.

It is critically important, moreover, that Condé initiated the bond. Had Philip IV sought the Grand Condé's sword, it would be difficult to deny that the alliance pertained primarily to the war between France and Spain. In this circumstance, the Prince would appear little more than a condottiere hired by Philip to conduct his war. But by taking, or at least claiming the initiative for himself, Condé hoped to nullify as much of the national

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<sup>544</sup> Ibid, preamble.

<sup>545</sup> Ibid, preamble.

implication as possible. For if we accept the Prince's claims that his royal blood and past exploits proved his adamantine bond to the *patrie*, then any alliance he sought must be good for France. While Philip IV has clearly accepted the overture in consideration of Spanish interests, the peace that the treaty hopes to effect will benefit both nations equally. All the while, the Treaty claimed that its primary intent was to end Mazarin's tyranny, which most helps France. The distinction between a bond at Condé's or Philip's request is purely semantic, of course, and must have seemed negligible to the French troops targeted by Spanish guns, or the Guiennaise peasants burdened with quartering Spanish troops. And from a statist perspective, the difference was utterly moot, as the treaty was illicit, *ipso facto*. Nevertheless, within the logic of personal kingship, Condé's request could appear benevolent, where his acceptance of Spanish overtures would be treasonous.

The terms of the Treaty itself are straightforward: above all, Condé and Philip would support and assist each other for the duration of their now-mutual fight, which must last until "the conclusion of a just, equitable, *honnête*, and durable peace" between France and Spain. For his part, the Spanish King promised that Condé would be specifically included in any agreement between the Crowns, along with all those in his *maison* and Party. To reach this end, Spain promised fantastic sums (in a literal sense): nearly 1.6 million *livres* in a lump sum immediately, and more than 4 million *livres* annually through the war's end.<sup>546</sup> Further, troops, ships, and the full cooperation of the Spanish Empire would be at Condé's disposal. In return, Spain would occupy all cities and fortresses Condé captured until a general peace was concluded, and the Party would be responsible for quartering Spain's troops and harboring her ships - though Philip would underwrite their munitions and

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<sup>546</sup> Henri Duval de Fraville, *Le Grand Condé au Service du roi d'Espagne* (Mémoire de Maîtrise, U. Paris IV Sorbonne, directed by M. Jean Bérenger), 22-24.

provisions.<sup>547</sup> The ratification of this critical, and reciprocally very generous Treaty had been remarkably easy, and Pierre Lenet's mission to Madrid lasted less than two months.<sup>548</sup> The Prince affixed his signature upon Lenet's return, and the Treaty of Madrid took effect on November 6, 1651.

The Treaty obliged Philip to succor "all those united with His Highness [the Prince of Condé], and particularly Bordeaux and all the province of Guienne."<sup>549</sup> In naming the city and region specifically, the agreement highlights their crucial role in the Princely Fronde. As such, Condé took great pains to ensure his Party's power and popularity within the city and province. Though he signed no treaty with Bordeaux, his role as governor and his *de facto* authority there constituted an alliance no less substantial than those with Spain or his aristocratic co-conspirators, and one which Condé was every bit as careful to portray positively. Amidst a concerted, nationwide propaganda campaign, Condé's efforts in Bordeaux stand apart for the intensity of effort, and for the consistently individualized ties his texts constructed with the municipality's corporate body. From the moment of his nomination as governor, through the final defeat of the Fronde, the Grand Condé worked to build his reputation as a paternal figure, with interests identical to Bordeaux's.

Just as the Princesse had found a year earlier, the "support of Bordeaux" required the assent of the city's political institutions and its populace equally, and the new governor immediately moved to win the Parlement's and the Jurade's cooperation. In truth, this was a relatively easy task: thanks largely to his wife and clients' efforts, the Bordelais elite took it upon themselves to establish warm ties with the Prince from the first day of the Prince's

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<sup>547</sup> AC P.xii, Treaty of Madrid, 6 November 1651, article 12.

<sup>548</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 527-532.

<sup>549</sup> AC P.xii, Treaty of Madrid, 6 November 1651, article 2.

liberty.<sup>550</sup> Condé needed only to maintain these cordial relations with the officers, which he did at every turn over the eventful summer of 1651.<sup>551</sup> In a long series of published letters, the Prince expressed his gratitude, affection, recognition, obligation, and the like, in terms identical to those used in interpersonal interactions. In short, he dealt with the corporation of the city of Bordeaux precisely as he would a human interlocutor.

Throughout his dialogue with the Bordelaise elite, all parties acknowledge that Condé serves as the city's protector or powerful friend. But, they stop short of acknowledging any direct relationship of command. Although the Prince was the provincial governor, that office's authority had hazy boundaries within the city walls - a hallmark of ancien régime political structures. And after Bordeaux's bloody struggle to oust the Duc d'Epernon,<sup>552</sup> an overt imposition on the city's fierce independence would have been a grievous error on the Prince's part. Instead, Condé positioned himself as a fatherly guardian, with goals perfectly aligned with the Parlement's and Jurade's. He repeatedly made the case that "my fortune being inseparable from yours, as it is from that of the State, we must unite all our thoughts for our conservation against the common enemy of the Kingdom."<sup>553</sup> In this one gesture, Condé unified the Bordeaux's interests with the Party's, but communicates unmistakably that his own national stature elevates his power above the city's. The judges did not disagree, and in fact appropriated the Prince's rhetoric, claiming

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<sup>550</sup> MC P.x, Parlement de Bordeaux to Prince de Condé, 16 Feb. 1651.

<sup>551</sup> *Lettres de Messieurs Les Princes de Condé et de Conty, esrites a la cour de Parlement de Bourdeaux. Du 22 Fevrier 1651* (Bordeaux, 1651); *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé esrite a la cour de Parlement de Bourdeaux. Du 16 May 1651. Portée par le Sieur de Casenave.* (Bordeaux, 1651); *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé esrite a Messieurs les Maire & Jurats de Bourdeaux. Du 16 May 1651. Portée par le Sieur de Casenave.* (Bordeaux, 1651); *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince, a Messieurs les Maire & Jurats de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1651), *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé Gouverneur de Guyenne, Escrite à Messieurs de la cour de Parlement de Bourdeaux* (Bordeaux, 1651); *Lettre de Monsieur le Prince esrite à Messieurs du Parlement: Sur le sujet de sa retraite à Bordeaux* (np, nd).

<sup>552</sup> Le Mao, *Parlement et Parlementaires*, 56-59, on the governor's role in the city, and Bordelais animosity against Epernon in particular.

<sup>553</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé...* [18 July 1651], 5.

that Condé's interests are "entangled [*meslé*]" with their own.<sup>554</sup> Further still, the Parlement approved an *arrêt* of Union with the Party, on nominally equal terms, in November. This act formally and indissolubly aligned the city with Condé, though the joint aims included a litany of Condé-centric items, including his family's security, recognition of his service, and the "reunion of the *maison Royale*," presumably in positions of power.<sup>555</sup> The Prince had Bordeaux's official support, and the implicit obedience of its political organs, but gaining popular acclaim required a very different approach.

In Princely pamphlets aimed at the city's common folk, Condé was less subtle in cultivating his paternal image, and less reserved in claiming direct power for himself. The most overt portrayal of the Party's desired hierarchy comes in the pamphlet entitled *Guienne, Victorious at the Feet of Monseigneur le Prince de Condé*: here, Condé appears as a Zeus-like "master of thunderbolts," who is "Governor of Bordeaux and all the province," and will "reign forever" over the city.<sup>556</sup> Elsewhere, the "*bons Bordelais*" cry to their Governor, "Blessed forever be the adorable hand of our cherished Savior, who has rescued us from drowning in the deluge of blood which would have inundated and annihilated this broken and divided Province."<sup>557</sup> But Bordeaux's submission, even abnegation, is not a matter of respect for the Prince's title - after all, Epernon had enjoyed no such deference. Rather, the city loves the Grand Condé as children love their father, or a wife her husband.

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<sup>554</sup> *Lettre du Parlement de Boudeaux, Escrite à Monsieur le Duc d'Orleans. Avec la Lettre Circulaire envoyée à tous les Parlements de France* (Bordeaux, 1651), 2.

<sup>555</sup> *Arrêt de la Cour du Parlement de Bourdeaux portant que les interests de Monsieur le Prince demeureront unis à ceux de ladite Cour, pour le service du Roy, la conservation de l'Estat, & le repos de cette Province*. (Bordeaux: 1651),

<sup>556</sup> *La Guyenne Victorieuse aux pieds de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé* (np, nd), 1-2. In general, I read these pamphlets as prescriptive models for the relationship that the Prince and his allies desired from the people of Bordeaux, rather than as evidence of their real feelings. And, as with the insistence on obedience in interpersonal alliances, I take them as evidence of the most threatening weaknesses the Party foresaw.

<sup>557</sup> *Le Vœu des Bons Bourdelois fait à Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, Gouverneur de Guyenne. Juxte la Coppie imprimé à Bourdeaux par Pierre du Coq* (Paris: Preuveray, 1651).

This “family romance of the Princely Fronde,” to borrow Lynn Hunt’s phrase, establishes Condé as Bordeaux’s affectionate guardian, exactly as he is to his son.<sup>558</sup> Thus, the Duc d’Enghien assures the personified Bordeaux, “My papa cherishes you, and France loves you/ In all things, you and I are but one whole/ Our hearts are united by so strong a knot.../ That there can be no doubt of your happiness.”<sup>559</sup> Elsewhere, Condé himself recognizes his fatherly obligation toward Bordeaux, especially after their “blessed” protection of his family, during his incarceration. “If Bordeaux has need of my arms/ This obligation is so powerful.../ That for her, whatever I have in this world/ Will all be employed.”<sup>560</sup> Lenet reports that this metaphorical relationship was taken literally by one Bordelais *gentilhomme*, who before going into battle told the Prince, “I will be killed, but you will see me as calm as in Church; I recommend my children to you.”<sup>561</sup> And in a more formal sense, the “notable residents of Bordeaux” proclaimed Condé “father of the People” in a letter from November, 1651.<sup>562</sup> Just as the fictive fatherhood of clientage required reciprocal service, Condé’s paternal bond with Bordeaux demands that each party work on behalf of the other - the Prince out of fatherly obligation, the city out of filial love.

Taken together, these treaties and ties paint a picture of the Party’s best-case scenario for their Fronde. In the war they hoped to fight, allies would obey without hesitation, and the Party itself would operate fluidly as an organic whole; Spain would

<sup>558</sup> Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

<sup>559</sup> *Le comble d’amour de la ville de Bourdeaux a monseigneur le Prince de Condé, avec les tesmoignages d’affection de M. le Duc d’Anguien envers ladite Ville. En forme de Dialogue.* (np, 1651), 5-6. Nearly identical passages appear in *Le Printemps des Bourdelois, Avec le Bouquet que Monseigneur le Prince a envoyé à la Ville de Bourdeaux* (np, nd).

<sup>560</sup> *Les Entretiens amoureux de Monsieur le Prince de Condé, Madame la Princesse, & de Monsieur le Duc d’Anguien, à leur premiere entreveue à Paris. Ensemble leurs communs dialogues sur la guerre de la Ville de Bourdeaux* (Paris, 1651), 6-7.

<sup>561</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 539.

<sup>562</sup> *Lettre des notables habitans de Bordeaux à Monseigneur le Prince de Condé*, nd November 1651, transcribed in Lenet, *Mémoires*, 531.

bankroll and supply their fight, then withdraw happily beyond the Pyrenees upon the conclusion of an equitable peace; and the people and political elite of Bordeaux would recognize that the Prince's goals benefitted themselves, and so support and even love him and his cause. Above all, Mazarin would be cast out of France once and for all, and the *maison Royale* would reunite and work for the health and welfare of France and its people, under the time-honored principles of personal kingship. But at the same time, the points on which these agreements "protested too much" suggest the worst-case scenario the Party feared: self-interested and fickle subordinates, unreliable and indefensible aid from Spain, and a base of operations with an independent and discordant agenda. In late 1651, there was still room to believe that the war would go according to plan. But the course of the Princely Fronde would show that the Party's fears had been dismaying well-founded.

#### *"No Middle Ground": Condéen Propaganda and the Battle for the Patrie*

Having nominally secured the alliances most necessary for its success, the Princely Party moved to convince the French political public of the benevolence and righteousness of its cause. In constructing his Party, the Prince had operated primarily within the personal framework of monarchy and political relationships. In building a nationwide movement, however, he aimed to graft that personal modality onto the community-focused, patriotic discourse of the populist frondeurs.

Condé's pamphlet campaign of 1652, especially during the Spring, mobilized the most impressive use of print at any point in the Fronde except the Siege, both in volume and in coordination. In that year, 1,150 mazarinades favorable to the Prince appeared, and perhaps 200 of those were commissioned by the Party, often with the Prince's personal

approval. The nearly 1/6 ratio of direct Party oversight of friendly presses may seem low, especially compared to earlier years when it hovered around 1/2. However, Hubert Carrier, the foremost scholar of the material history of the mazarinades, argues that this low proportion in fact demonstrates the Party's remarkable success in swaying the views of independent libelists, especially in Paris.<sup>563</sup> Such success would be needed if the Grand Condé were to maintain his authority in Bordeaux, and "hold Paris" - for the loss of either city would be fatal.<sup>564</sup> The outpouring of Condéen propaganda sought to move the people to action, to align them with the Prince's efforts, and to discredit the opposition. Therefore, Princely propaganda at this critical moment aimed to couch the Party's claims in language that would meld seamlessly with its readers' ideas and biases.

The core of the Grand Condé's assumptions had changed little over the course of the Fronde, or for that matter since Rocroi. The major premise remained the personal nature of political power, both regarding the individual who exercises it, and the obligations that he (or, less optimally, she) owed to meritorious servants. Still in 1652, several particular conclusions flowed from this general rule. First, the *estranger* Cardinal cannot rule well, for "the inclinations of blood dominate the spirit of Mazarin," and his Italian nature dictates that he "will never limit his ambition." By the same blood-borne inclinations, "*Messieurs les Princes* are so generous as to sacrifice for the good of the State even the justice of their own interests." Further, "the State" - embodied, as Condé always assumed, by the King - "is obliged by the demands of recognition to repay the glory of Princes of his own blood, which this tyrant [Mazarin] has flouted by every sort of means." All Condéen propaganda begins with the assumption that Mazarin's very being delegitimizes him and dictates his selfish,

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<sup>563</sup> Carrier, *Presse de la Fronde*, 84, 143.

<sup>564</sup> Jouhaud, *Mazarinades*, 112-114.

destructive politics. In precisely the same way, Condé's blood attaches him to the King and to France, spurs his selfless exploits, and demands recognition and compensation in proportion to his *mérite*. From all this, "it must be concluded that we would be enemies of our own good if we do not all collaborate with *Messieurs les Princes*, in order that this tyrant never be permitted to resume the administration of the affairs of state."<sup>565</sup>

The final, urgent lines encapsulate the two most significant features of the Princely Fronde's propaganda. First, it employs the inclusive "we," unifying author and audience, and forging bonds of commonality between the otherwise separate interests of the Princes and the People.<sup>566</sup> For his civil war to succeed, the Prince needed above all to dismiss the charge leveled by the Crown that his motives were selfish, ambitious, and divorced from the good of the nation and common folk. In building a community which from its inception drew together the reader and *Messieurs les Princes*, the Grand Condé hoped to elide the immeasurable social distance between himself and the audience of *roturiers*. Second, and closely related, we find an imperative call to action on the grounds of this community's shared good. By framing the fight against the tyrant Mazarin as simultaneously an act of self-preservation and generous collaboration, on both sides' parts, the text both authorizes and valorizes the Fronde. That is, because self-defense is the most basic law of nature, the

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<sup>565</sup> Mazarin returned from exile in the early days of January, 1652, only to momentarily leave again in August, in response to Condé and Orléans' vows to lay down arms in the even of his definitive disgrace. *Le Masque Levé contre la conduite de la cour: et le coup de grâce donné au C. Mazarin. Où l'Autheur fait voir dans douze Raisons invincibles, que l'établissement du repos de la France dépend de la ruine de Mazarin; et que les Francois n'ont, ny ressentiment, ny honneur, ny courage, ny force, s'ils ne levent ouvertement le Masque, pour faire une conspiration générale contre le rétablissement de ce Ministre. Dédié a Monseigneur LE PRINCE* (Paris, 1652), 11-14, 23. Though this pamphlet is more thorough and explicit than most, its self-contained expression of the totality of Condé's model of personal kingship is by no means uncommon.

<sup>566</sup> Jouhaud, *Mazarinades*, 106, employs this parsing of pronouns with regard pamphlets penned by the Cardinal de Retz in favor of the *vieille Fronde* of 1649, though the tactic has clearly been appropriated by the Condéens by 1652.

“Law of Laws,” according to one pamphlet, there could be no argument against it.<sup>567</sup> At the same time, the frondeurs would work to assure the security of France’s greatest hero and the *maison royale*, while the Prince himself fought for the innocent, oppressed, and virtuous *bons francois*. In a word, the Prince sought to unify his rebellion with the *patrie*.

But to make this claim believed, the Party’s pamphleteers would need to clear a series of argumentative hurdles, first among them explaining the Prince’s relationship to the now-major King. The end of the Regency had invalidated many frondeur arguments, rooted as they were in the misappropriation of the King’s sovereignty during his minority. Condéen allies faced this problem head-on: the Prince’s respect for His Majesty is “inviolable,” and he remains “unflinching in his *devoir*.<sup>568</sup> Yet, while Louis had technically reached adulthood, he still had not reached his “natural majority,” when he would come into full, independent use of his faculties.<sup>569</sup> More ominous still, however, Louis had been under Mazarin’s tutelage throughout his formative years - “Who raised the King? Was it not Mazarin?”<sup>570</sup> - and his spirit must now bear the imprint of the Italian’s misdirection. After all, the *Catechism of the Court* made its first tenet, “To confuse the King’s spirit, giving him evil impressions of the Princes, the Parlements, and the people.”<sup>571</sup> For this reason, Louis

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<sup>567</sup> *Question Canonique: si Monsieur le PRINCE a peu prendre les Armes en conscience, & si ceux qui prennent son party offendront Dieu. Contre les Theologiens Courtisans* (Bordeaux, 1651), 4-5.

<sup>568</sup> *La Decadence visible de la Roaute [sic], Reconnue par cinq marques infaillibles. I. par le peu d’autorité que cuex qui son interessez a la soutenir, on aupres de sa Majesté. II. Par le peu de respect que les peuples ont pour tout ce qui vient de la part du Roy. III. Par l’usage des fourbes que le Conseil fait pratiquer a sa Majesté, pour abuser de la simplicité des Peuples. IV. Par la facilité des entreprises ausquelles on porte sa Majesté sans les concerter comme il faut, pour les faire réussir a son honneur. V. Et par le secours que le Conseil luy fait emprunter des Huguenots, en les rebatissant en leurs privileges, pour faire triompher le party Mazarin avec plus de succez.* (np, 1652), 4.

<sup>569</sup> *Arrest de la Cour du Parlement de Bordeaux Portant, que tres-humbles & iteratives Remonstrance seront faites au Roy sur le sujet de la Retraite de Monsieur le Prince & des affaires presentes, avec les remonstrances faites en consequence dudit Arrest* (Bordeaux: 1651), 11.

<sup>570</sup> *La Vérité prononçant ses oracles sans flatterie* (np, 1652), in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 502.

<sup>571</sup> *Le catechisme de la cour* (Paris: Philippe Clement, 1652), 4. The alliterative parallelism between the three entities here further suggests that each has some authentic claim to speak for France at large.

still required a regent, “until the King is clearly disabused of all the evil lessons Mazarin has given him.” Before that point, “our young Monarch is a captive.”<sup>572</sup> Worse yet, as the ghost of Alexander the Great informs Louis XIV, Mazarin has “rendered himself master of your eyes, of your ears, that is to say of your whole person.”<sup>573</sup> Though the King had reached his majority, the poison of the Cardinal’s influence persisted, and only the Princes of the Blood could break the spell, by virtue of their “perfect connection to the affairs of State.”<sup>574</sup>

The evil of Mazarin’s influence on Louis consisted mainly of self-serving exploitation of the innocent French. The *Catechism* above included a Mazarinist perversion of charity as “the love of self, in which one loves his own interests above all things,” and inculcated similarly narcissistic adulterations of the Ten Commandments and Nicene Creed.<sup>575</sup> Elsewhere, Mazarin’s defining character traits were essentially a list of synonyms for “self-centered”: “pride, ambition, jealousy, avarice, envy, insecurity, impatience, audacity, together with perfidy and ingratitude, and chief among all, injustice and tyranny.”<sup>576</sup> The last two terms are particularly damning, for in the Aristotelian schema that structured early-modern political thought, tyranny was the corruption and inversion of monarchy. Likewise, an unjust spirit on the throne defied the very nature of true sovereignty: “Our Kings’ Sovereignty consists in rendering justice, and in doing every sort of good... Their

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<sup>572</sup> *Le coup de Partie qui consiste a faire un regent, jusqu'a ce que le Roy soit plainement desabusé de toutes les mauvaises impressions que le Mazarin luy donne. Où l'on voit dans une agreeable methode, & par les preuves de la raison & de l'histoire.* (np, 1652), 10.

<sup>573</sup> *L'Esprit d'Alexandre le Grand presenté au Roy pour la paix generalle & soulagement de son peuple* (Paris, 1652), 4. Recall, too, the close association between Condé and the Macedonian general – see Chapter 1.

<sup>574</sup> *Apologie de Monsieur le Prince, Pour servir de response aux calomnies de deux libelles diffamatoires, c'est a dire Du discours libre & véritable sur la conduite de Monsieur le Prince, & de Monsieur le Coadjuteur; et de la Remonstrance de la Province de Guyenne* (np, nd), 17. On Princes’ capacity for regency, see *Coup de Partie*, 9.

<sup>575</sup> *Le catechisme de la cour*, 6.

<sup>576</sup> *Les Paradoxes de l'Esloignement de Mazarin: Pour scavoir, I. S'il se tiendra toujours loin de la Cour, ou si son retour se fera dans peu de jours comme on le croit. II. Si nous devons nous réjouir ou nous affliger de son départ. III. Si son esloignement nous produira la paix ou la guerre. IV. Et si nous trouverons la fin de nos maux en ce bien tant souhaité. Avec un curieux examen de la conduite & des intentions de Messieurs les Princes & du Coadjuteur* (Paris, 1652)

sovereignty is absolute, so long as it acts for the execution of the Law, and not to destroy it."<sup>577</sup> In this sense, Mazarin's egotism not only confirmed his exclusion from the generous, virtuous *patrie*, but had corrupted the young monarch who served as its head.

Here, we encounter the Party's second hurdle: having disqualified Mazarin and explained the King's incapacity to rule, Condéén authors needed to define the relationship of the Prince's goals to those of the *patrie*. After all, it was one thing to imply the unity of the Prince and People through inclusive pronouns, but quite another to illustrate why a bourgeois of Paris or Bordeaux should take offense at the Grand Condé's under-compensation. To accomplish this, as ever, Condé relies on the logic of personal kingship.

As the *Premier Prince du Sang* and one of the *Principales Têtes de la Maison Royale*, the Prince of Condé held a unique and privileged relationship to the monarchy. The Parlement of Bordeaux had implored Louis XIV, on the eve of his majority, to "consider how Monsieur the Prince's birth, his services, and his conduct shield him from the accusations of his enemies." For when he reflects on this truth, he must surely "give an example to posterity which will make known that Kings may never suspect their Blood of intelligences with their enemies."<sup>578</sup> In a real sense, "the King should regard [Princes du Sang] as a part of himself."<sup>579</sup> And if the King were unfit to rule, which Mazarin's immoral influence had ensured, then Condé's Bourbon blood made him a "true repository of Royalty."<sup>580</sup> In this capacity, Condé was singularly qualified to rectify the harm Mazarin had inflicted, but more than that, he was authorized to speak for the transcendent ideals that comprised Royalty

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<sup>577</sup> *Les Veritables Maximes du Gouvernement de la France, justifié par l'ordre du temps, depuis l'establissement de la Monarchie jusques à présent: Servant de Response au pretendu Arrest de cassation du Conseil du 18 Janvier 1652. Dedié à Son Altesse Royale.* (Paris: Guillemot, 1652), 12.

<sup>578</sup> *Arrest... du Parlement de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 30 August 1651), 5.

<sup>579</sup> *L'innocence des armes de Monsieur le Prince, Justifiée par les loix de la conscience* (Bordeaux: G. de la Court, 1651), 8.

<sup>580</sup> *La decadence visible*, 5.

itself. So, while “the person of the King is the body of Royalty,” one pamphlet concluded, “the soul of Royalty is another thing entirely. It is the Law, Justice, public order, the order of Government, the Ancient Customs.”<sup>581</sup> In this sense, it is significant that the Duc de Lorraine called the Prince’s cabal, “the Party of Justice,”<sup>582</sup> while an anonymous pamphlet assured Condé that, “Your valor is the perfect support of our Laws.”<sup>583</sup> These moralistic abstractions were precisely the pillars that the populist frondeurs appropriated in building the *patrie* community during the Siege. Now, the Prince claims to embody the same qualities that the Parisians had decried him for opposing three years before. So, where his royal blood had pushed him to support the monarchy against the Fronde in 1649, in 1652, he argued that the same selfless logic demanded his support of the Fronde, and the frondeurs’ support for him, against the misled monarchy.

Specious as this conclusion may seem, Condé pushed his case still further. He argued that his innate connection to royalty, his past valorous deeds on behalf of France, and his present selfless endeavors on behalf of the public good, all not only authorized him to bear the mantle of the *patrie*, but positively required all *bons francois* who identified with that community to join him. Because Condé’s rebellion is “favored by all the fundamental Laws of this *Estat*, [it] must consequently be joined by all those who would not wish to be seen as enemies of their *patrie*.”<sup>584</sup> The moral force of the Fronde, as a defense of the valorous

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<sup>581</sup> *Veritables Maximes*, 14.

<sup>582</sup> *Derniere lettre de Monsieur le Duc de Lorraine à Monsieur le Prince, apportée par un Colonel de son Armée; En laquelle il declare plainement toutes ses intentions; Les sujets de son retardement; et sa marche a grandes journées vers Paris* (Paris: Antoine Perier, 1652), 3.

<sup>583</sup> *Les Palmes du Grand Prince de Condé* (Paris: Vivenay, 1652), 6. Note, again, the inclusive “our,” which subtly buttresses the explicit patriotic argument.

<sup>584</sup> *La Franche Marguerite. Faisant voir: I. Que le Roy ne peut point rétablir Mazarin: & par consequent, l'armement qui se fait pour ce dessein est injuste. II. Que les Loix fondamentales de l'Estat ne permettent point à la Reyne, d'estre chef du Conseil de sa Majesté; & que par consequent tout ce qui se fait par son avis, ne doint point estre suivy. III. Que le Roy, quelque majeur qu'il soit, doit neantmoins vivre sous la curatele, quoy que tacite,*

French community against Mazarin's depredations, means there can be no neutrality in the battle between these Manichean forces - "there is, then, no middle ground."<sup>585</sup> Further still, the spiritual dimension of the *patrie* places one's very soul at risk, should one choose not to join the Prince: "There is no true Frenchman, who is not obliged to stand one day before God, to answer for all the thefts, murders, rapes, arsons, and sacrileges that Mazarin and his men now commit and will commit everywhere, if he does not stop them, and is able to do so." But, if the national community unites as it must, there can be no doubt of its success, for "who could oppose the efforts of an infinite number of people, armed for the defense of their *patrie*?"<sup>586</sup> In defending himself on the charge of self-interest, the Prince counterattacked audaciously, even impudently. He not only united his own cause with the *patrie* and its adherents, but claimed the authority to dictate its requirements.

Despite the apparent paradox of Condé's conclusion, the personal logic that structured his assertion remained intact. If one accepted that royal blood really did impart the virtuous traits that qualified a man for the throne, then it was only a short step to claim a position of benevolent leadership for the national community at a moment of crisis. The shock of Condé's brazen argument lay not in any internal weakness in his framework, but in his individual history. The man who had commanded the 1649 Siege of Paris, which had spawned the present iteration of *patrie* discourse in the first place, would always find it difficult to portray himself as its champion. Condé recognized this Achilles heel, and attempted to address it. Still in keeping with his personal logic, he explained that his crime

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*de SAR & les Princes, jusqu'a l'age prescrit par les loix pour l'emancipation des enfans. IV. Et que pendant cette conjoncture d'affaire, SAR & Mrs les Princes & les Parlemens, peuvent commander le ban & l'arriere ban, pour terminer bien-tost cette guerre Mazarine.* (np, nd)

<sup>585</sup> *Le coup de Partie*, 18.

<sup>586</sup> *Le flambeau d'Estat avec lequel tous les Peuples de France peuvent voir comme ils sont obligez de s'unir pour l'execution de l'Arrest du 29 Decembre 1651 & de l'Arrest du 23 Juillet 1652 donnez en Parlement contre Mazarin, toutes les Chambres assemblées...* (np, nd), 19-20.

in 1649 arose from a “too-great passion to maintain Royal Authority.”<sup>587</sup> It was only his failure to discern true royalty from Mazarin’s false royalty that had led him astray - otherwise, the motive to assure the King’s authority, and with it the health of the Kingdom, had dictated his behavior then, just as it continued to drive the Princely Fronde.

If explaining the Siege had been the most difficult of the Princely Party’s obstacles, it is possible that they would have been able to credibly meld *patrie* discourse onto their movement. However, the dark shadow of the Treaty of Madrid loomed large in all of Condé’s arguments, despite his intense efforts to minimize or legitimize it. Simply put, reconciling a foreign alliance with a community defined by the exclusion of *estrangers* proved the highest hurdle of all.

Despite the obvious difficulties in legitimizing their foreign ties, the Princely Party never sought to hide them. Just the opposite, several pamphlets proclaimed this fact on the title page - the Duc de Guise unabashedly led two thousand Spanish troops into Guienne,<sup>588</sup> Parisians could read about the “state of the Spanish troops” that Condé led,<sup>589</sup> and the Habsburg Archduke Leopold wrote to the Princely Party to express his support.<sup>590</sup> Others included remarkably detailed accounts of the Spanish reinforcements within Condé’s armies.<sup>591</sup> In sum, such forthright admissions of foreign alliances suggest that Condé really did believe his actions were permissible, or at least excusable, as a result of his own mistreatment and Mazarin’s crimes against the *patrie*.

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<sup>587</sup> *La Vérité prononçant ses oracles sans flatterie*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 505.

<sup>588</sup> *L'arrivée du Duc de Guyse en la ville de Bourg, à cinq lieues de Bordeaux avec deux mille Espagnols. Ensemble l'Ordre du Roy d'Espagne, envoyée à l'Archiduc Leopold, de lever toute les garnisons de Flandres, pour assister Messieurs les Princes* (Paris, 1652)

<sup>589</sup> *Le Courier extraordinaire, apportant les nouvelles de Bordeaux, Bourg, Libourne, Tallemon, la Bastide, & autres lieux. Avec l'Estat des Troupes Espagnolles. Ensemble la démarche du Comte d'Harcourt, & la disposition de l'Armée de Monsieur le Prince.* (Paris: Chevalier, 1652)

<sup>590</sup> *La Lettre de L'archiduc Leopold à Son Altesse Royale* (Paris: Salomon de la Fosse, 1652)

<sup>591</sup> *Le Secret de la Cour* (np, 1652), in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 348.

The “soft” version of Condé’s defense excused his invitation to foreign powers by the equivalency between Mazarin’s *estranger* nature and the Prince’s own foreign alliances. Was it right to blame the Princely Party “on the pretext that they brought *estranger* troops into France; while [Queen Anne] had herself invited and protected by so many declarations and *arrêts* the most mortal enemy of the *Estat*”?<sup>592</sup> The Crown itself had brought a Spaniard into its midst, and he had done evil; Condé simply fought fire with fire by allying with Spain to correct the Queen’s mistake.<sup>593</sup> And again, where Condé’s perfectly French blood and life “never permit him to sustain any proposition that was disadvantageous to our peace,”<sup>594</sup> Anne’s Spanish blood rendered her suspect. “The Queen being Spanish... the sentiments of that nation remain with her always... Do you not know that she is French only by alliance, and Spanish by origin; and that her blood gives her a reasonable tenderness for the good of her cradle, for which she cannot be blamed.”<sup>595</sup> Again, the bodily facts of birth and blood define national attachment by directing affection. In this line of reasoning, the Spanish under Condé were the lesser of evils compared to Mazarin’s tyranny. Therefore, “let us speak clearly,” one author averred: “we hate the Spanish, but we hate Mazarin still more: and this nation [Spain] hopes to reconcile with us, she needs only to take our strong hand, for this minister to be cast out.” In the same way, if Condé had allied with nearly any other nation, it would be preferable to suffering under Mazarin’s iron fist.<sup>596</sup>

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<sup>592</sup> *Le masque levé*, 24. Authors attribute Mazarin’s heritage to Spain or Italy as needs demand. In doing so, they refer to the Spanish Crown’s control of Rome at the moment of the future Cardinal’s birth.

<sup>593</sup> In a passage too long to quote, the ghost of Alexander the Great implores Louis XIV to recognize that, whatever questionable alliance the Prince has made, Mazarin’s misdeeds have equaled and surpassed it in malice. *L’Esprit d’Alexandre le Grand présenté au Roy*, 8.

<sup>594</sup> *L’advocat general, soustenant la cause de tous les Grands de l’Estat, outrageusement offencez dans la Libelle intitulé, La verité toute nue...* (np, nd), 19.

<sup>595</sup> *L’aveuglement de la France depuis la Minorité* (np, nd), 4.

<sup>596</sup> *Le masque levé*, 24.

As if to render the Treaty of Madrid less ominous by comparison, the Party qualified its willingness to make *nearly* any foreign alliance: ties with a Republic remained beyond the pale.<sup>597</sup> This form of government, “the most perfect imitation or expression of the revolt of the Angels,” stood at odds with Condé’s implacable, embodied support for the King, and for monarchy more generally.<sup>598</sup> Accordingly, when an Englishman stepped onto the docks at Bordeaux with an offer of aid to the Party, the Prince de Conti flatly refused. “Whatever just hatred we have against Mazarin, we would in no way presume to serve alongside Republicans and parricides in order to defeat him.”<sup>599</sup> In proving that some alliances were illicit, Condé hoped to portray the alliances he had made as at least relatively licit.

Where the softer argument claimed only equivalence of faults and the lesser of evils, the Party’s stronger case proposed that foreign powers could be valid partners in the Fronde. For if Condé’s war against the Crown were valid - and the Party presumed that it had proved this - then “he may therefore with Justice avail himself of the tools of war,” including alliances with third parties. This author saw a Scriptural precedent: in David’s battle against the malevolent King Saul, he had fled into the lands of the Philistines and fulfilled God’s will by forcing Saul from the throne of Israel at the head of a foreign army.<sup>600</sup> Condé’s Spanish alliance did not detract from his generous purpose, or call into question his superlatively French status or sentiment, for “M. le Prince, far from bending his knee before Spain... has rather shown in soliciting this aid that it is by no means self-interest that

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<sup>597</sup> Condé was not remarkable in repudiating Republics during the Fronde. Carrier shows in *Le labyrinthe de l'état: Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653)* (Paris: Champion, 2004), 73-94, that all sides expressed similar distaste for any form of government, save monarchy.

<sup>598</sup> *La Decadence visible*, 3.

<sup>599</sup> *L'Estat General des affaires de Guyenne et de tout le pays de la Loire* (np, nd), 5.

<sup>600</sup> The author studiously ignores this comparison’s implication, which Condé always and vociferously denied, that the Prince hoped to actually make himself King, as David did. *Question Canonique*, 17-22.

makes him act.”<sup>601</sup> Condé had not made himself a servant, let alone a subject of Spain in asking for their aid. Rather, in seeking the swift conclusion of his war against Mazarin’s tyranny, he further demonstrated his love for France and its people.

On a still broader scale, the charge that Mazarin’s evil had geopolitical implications became a mainstay of Condéen justifications, as seen in charges that even foreign leaders sought his downfall. The Prince frequently echoed his sister’s accusation from 1650, that Mazarin had scuppered the 1648 peace talks at Münster in order to prolong the war which justified his extraordinary powers and taxation. For this reason, “Spain has no less interest than France in the ruin of this common enemy.”<sup>602</sup> Mazarin had become a supranational force, capable of unifying states who had been intractable foes for nearly two decades. Even the Holy Roman Empire, whose relations with France had only recently normalized, sought Mazarin’s demise, and the restoration of peace in Christendom. “I reiterate my promises,” Archduke Leopold assures Condé, “to aid you if need be, because your zeal serves only to assure tranquility in France, which cannot be procured without a just peace, which cannot be concluded while Cardinal Mazarin holds the rank that he usurped before His Very Christian Majesty.”<sup>603</sup> These foreign powers fought not to weaken France - which Mazarin’s continued rule would in fact accomplish<sup>604</sup> - but to assure the unity and strength of all Christian monarchies, exactly as the Treaty of Madrid had proposed. Just as Condé’s conquests in the 1640s had brought peace to Germany, his “generous combat” in the Fronde would bring peace to France, and to all of Europe.<sup>605</sup>

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<sup>601</sup> *L'advocat general*, 14.

<sup>602</sup> *La Decadence visible*, 14.

<sup>603</sup> *Lettre de L'Archiduc Leopold*, 6.

<sup>604</sup> *Le masque levé*, 6.

<sup>605</sup> *L'estat des veritez du Cardinal Mazarin apres son retour* (Paris, 1652), 5.

Throughout his Party's pamphlets, Condé demonstrated the need for his rebellion, its relation to the *patrie*, and the validity of its foreign alliances through the prism of personal kingship. With each new twist in the Fronde's tortuous tale, this concept justified the Prince's actions - at least, he claimed that it should. Indeed, the core of his arguments over 1652 had been expressed in the Parlement of Bordeaux's letter to the King in 1651:

We have considered in the first place the person of Monsieur le Prince, who is dear to Your Majesty, & should be precious to all of France. The honor of his Birth, being the *Premier Prince du Sang*; the eminent qualities that render him as commendable in Peace as he is redoubtable in War; and his illustrious and important victories, which not only expanded the *gloire* of this State, but which also reaffirmed it amidst the greatest dangers of its ruin, justly merit that the whole world take part in the conservation of the *gloire* that he has acquired by his Virtues... It is certainly strange that one of the greatest Princes in the world, who has procured the security of the *Estat* by his Victories, finds none for himself... All *bons Francois* are obliged by his valor to take part in his interests.<sup>606</sup>

The Prince's rebellion is valid, and demands the *patrie*'s support, because his inborn, constantly-proven virtues guarantee his benevolence. As a self-contained construct, this argument could stand up; it collapsed, however, when faced with the lived experiences of its audience. No matter how ironclad the logic Condé employed, or how perfect the consistency of his model, his conclusions strained the French political public's credulity. It was always a stretch to connect the Prince's rarefied goals to those of the populist *patrie*, and no amount of sophistry would make a *bon Francois* feel that Spanish troops were worthy of his nation. Mazarin, from his vantage point in 1659, at the conferences for the Treaty of the Pyrenees, offered this autopsy of Condé's Fronde: "the French generally would have joined a rebellion for the particular interests of a *Grand*, but they regard with

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<sup>606</sup> *Veritables Raisons*, 5-7. Condé had not yet allied with Spain when this text was composed.

horror anything that seems linked to Foreigners, and to Spain in particular.”<sup>607</sup> While the Princely Fronde lacked material and martial support, these could have been overcome if the French had risen as one as the Party’s tracts urged. But their arguments failed, and their rebellion failed.

### **Rebellion in Practice: Discord, Disloyalty, and Defeat**

For all the apparent strength of the Princely Fronde - powerful allies, popular support, deep-pocketed backers, and the Grand Condé’s martial and cultural heft - its threat was always chimeric, without the support of some critical mass of French people. In a moment of rare candor, one pamphlet published in the opening stages of the Princely Fronde even acknowledges this necessity: “this Conqueror cannot succeed in his enterprises unless the public finds them advantageous.”<sup>608</sup> So when Princely arguments fell on deaf ears,<sup>609</sup> the Party was starved of badly-needed support. Its noble alliances, Spanish aid, and Guiennais stronghold together allowed it to limp along after the summer of 1652 had shown its impotence, but real victory was by then out of the question.

Most obviously, the Prince lacked the material conditions for war, and consequently, he simply lost too many battles. Lenet reports that, even early in the Princely Fronde, “The Prince’s affairs were not in a prosperous state: he lacked money, and I lent him the fifteen hundred *pistolles* that had been given to me in Spain. The state of the troops was no more

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<sup>607</sup> BN MFr 7156 f. 169, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 30 August 1659.

<sup>608</sup> *L’exacte recherche des desordres que la mauvaise Conduite de Monsieur le Prince a causé dans l’Estat, depuis sa Liberté jusques à sa Retraitte...* (Paris: 1652). This pamphlet’s title - fervently royalist in appearance - tantalizingly suggests that the Princely Party pursued a program of conversion. By disguising Princely arguments under a royalist title, this tract appeals to an audience unreachable by more straightforwardly Condéen texts.

<sup>609</sup> Guy Joly reports that, as early as the winter of 1651, the Prince’s pamphlets had become manifestly less effective in mobilizing support among the Parisians. Cited in Carrier, *Presse de la Fronde*, 125-127.

favorable.<sup>610</sup> In truth, the Prince's troops had never been in excellent shape. Raised hurriedly from the towns of Guienne, and mixed with the few thousand infantrymen that Spain had supplied, the Condéen army was a hodgepodge of recruits and veterans, Princely partisans and fortune-seekers prone to desertion, all led by an insufficient number of inexperienced officers.<sup>611</sup> Moreover, neither troops nor commanders could be readily replaced after battle losses, while the hapless Prince of Conti did his cause no favors by liberally granting leaves of absence to what few officers there were.<sup>612</sup> The Party might have remedied this handicap, had Condéen coffers remained in the healthy state Henri II had bequeathed to his profligate son. But Louis II's lifelong lack of pecuniary skill, the sums he had lent the Crown (in an intense historical irony) to combat the Fronde in 1649, and the rupture with his major source of revenue since 1650 had depleted his treasury almost totally.<sup>613</sup> By June of 1652, the Party had run low on bread for its troops.<sup>614</sup> So while the Prince won some battles,<sup>615</sup> and momentarily gained the upper hand in the war of maneuver through the summer of 1652, his own war machine, absent popular support, was never built to sustain the long campaign necessary for total victory.

The Treaty of Madrid aimed explicitly to address these deficiencies, which helps to explain the Party's frustration at the constant lack of men, and especially money from beyond the Pyrenees. As early as February 7, 1652, the Prince told Lenet that it was "of the

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<sup>610</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 532. No date is given for this assessment, but the context suggests it pertains to late 1651 or early 1652.

<sup>611</sup> Fraville, *Condé au service d'Espagne*, 32.

<sup>612</sup> Condé to Lenet, 22 August 1652, transcribed in Lenet, *Mémoires*, 563.

<sup>613</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 106; Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 104.

<sup>614</sup> BN MFr 6731 f.118, Conti to Lenet, 23 June 1652.

<sup>615</sup> Though the Departmental Archives in Guienne overflow with pamphlets celebrating the Prince's victories, many of these were in fact insignificant skirmishes or indecisive engagements, which Lenet intentionally embellished for popular consumption. He used the same tactic with the Philip IV, confirmed in the editor's footnotes of his *Mémoires*, 553 n.1.

greatest necessity to be promptly supported on Spain's part," and instructed him to pressure the Spanish agent in Bordeaux for the help promised in the Treaty. Help, in sufficient quantity to matter, never arrived, and Aumale laments "this constantly-awaited gold from the Indies, those famous galleons so frequently delayed by storms!"<sup>616</sup> Though Spain did send what it could, when it could, its well-known financial straits prevented it from fulfilling the unrealistic terms of the Treaty. Moreover, Lenet had been apprised of this likelihood from moment of the Treaty's agreement: "I must remind you," a palpably exasperated Dom Luis de Haro told Lenet in autumn of 1652, "of the resistance that I offered to your requests, based on the knowledge that it would not be possible to reliably accomplish such great assistance... You responded many times that you wished it conceded, and that you would tolerate the time required, because you understood the size of your requests."<sup>617</sup> Nevertheless, the Princes sent constant reminders to Philip of their pressing need for men, munitions, and money, but never received the help they craved.<sup>618</sup>

In a similar regard, the alliance with Bordeaux, and especially with its popular elements, never lived up to its billing. This disappointment can be attributed almost completely to the rise of the radical bourgeois faction known as the *Ormée*.<sup>619</sup> This populist

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<sup>616</sup> Aumale, *Histoire*, vi: 104.

<sup>617</sup> Haro to Lenet, 8 September 1652, transcribed in Lenet, *Mémoires*, 569-570.

<sup>618</sup> In the dire two-week period at the end of February 1653, for example, both Conti (15 February) and Condé (1 March) sent reports of impending doom, absent Spain's help - see BN MFr 6731, f.169, 181.

<sup>619</sup> Though sustained discussion of the fascinating Princely-popular dynamic extends beyond the purview of the present study, the *Ormée* remains one of the most interesting, and poorly-understood aspects of the Fronde. The best analyses remain Sal Westrich, *The Ormée of Bordeaux: A Revolution during the Fronde* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); Beik, *Urban Protest*, Ch10; Jouhaud, *Mazarinades*, Ch6-7; and to a more limited extent, Le Mao, *Parlement et Parlementaires*, Ch2, and Blanquie, *Vie de Frondeur*. Ranum's *Fronde* devotes Ch7-8 to the *Ormée*, though his narrative is more useful than his conclusions, which overstate the broader, revolutionary implications of this insular event. Readers of German should consult Echart Birnstiel, *Die Fronde in Bordeaux, 1648-1653* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1985), which enjoys a sterling reputation. Both Aumale and Lenet's prejudices against this "undisciplined mob" of commoners who controlled the city during the Princely Fronde render their discussions unreliable, except as evidence of their own mindsets.

party - and it seems to have been an organized “party,” in the full sense of the word - dominated Bordeaux’s politics for a period almost exactly coterminous with the Princely Fronde. Though its origins are hazy, it had become a discernible and potent force by the summer of 1651, and fully controlled the Parlement and Jurade only a year after that. The Grand Condé attempted to win the affections of these arguably republican, certainly anti-aristocratic extremists, with exactly the degree of success one might expect.

The Ormée grew out of the ongoing frustrations with Epernon’s government, and evolved after his dismissal and Condé’s appointment, into an autonomous force for the advancement of the city’s bourgeois/artisanal class.<sup>620</sup> In their undated *Articles of Union*, the “bourgeois, residents, and inhabitants of the city of Bordeaux” banded together to secure the greatest advantage from the “troubles which have not yet ended.” Though they promised “obedience to the King” and “service to the Governor,” they swore a more fervent vow of “fidelity to the wellbeing and advantage of our *Patrie*, for whose Privileges and Franchises we will always be prepared to sacrifice our lives and our goods.” Most of the points that follow build an alliance on Christian principles, not dissimilar from or more objectionable than a confraternity’s tenets. But the most notable feature saw the city’s bourgeois claim a “deliberative voice, not only consultative, in the general assemblies of the common *Maison* of this city.”<sup>621</sup> Far from the reinterpretation of traditional hierarchies that Condé promoted, the Ormée advanced a truly radical, relatively egalitarian program.

The Prince had recognized the importance, and the danger of the Ormée from the early days of its existence. Alongside his letters of July 18, 1651, which unqualifiedly embraced the Jurade and Parlement, he wrote to the Ormistes in very different terms. “I am

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<sup>620</sup> Westrich, *Ormée*, 21-24.

<sup>621</sup> *Articles de l’union de l’Ormée en la ville de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, nd).

assured that you will continue in these kind sentiments [that you have expressed for me] until the end, vigorously pursuing for your own sake that which you have begun to undertake for mine," Condé reminded the Ormistes, with more than a hint of threat. And to drive the point home, the Prince reiterates that "it is certain that if my enemies had again been able to seize my person... you would have been the first to feel the effects of my misfortune and of [Mazarin's] violence, as you have loudly expressed your zeal and affection for me." He closes the letter with the backhanded not-quite-compliment, "Love me as much as I esteem your friendship."<sup>622</sup> Rather than the pure gratitude the Prince expressed to the city's governing bodies, his sentiments toward the Ormée are guarded, even passive-aggressive. But the closing is especially notable, in the formulaic epistolary culture of the day: rather than a typically obsequious expression of his desire to serve, Condé asks for their love in proportion to the value he places on their love. This is condescension, raised to the level of art. The Prince clearly sought to keep the Ormée's necessary, but distasteful friendship at arm's length.

The start of the Condé-Ormée relationship foreshadowed its course. Though the Ormistes were at first heartfelt in their sympathies for Condé, the Prince never returned the sentiment, explicitly and repeatedly instructing Lenet to align the Party with Ormée only because they were the city's dominant faction. "It will go better to be on their side," Condé reasoned, "than to be chased from the city. Nevertheless, we should not join this party, except in case of extremity."<sup>623</sup> All the same, the Princes needed to follow the winds of popular sentiment, for over the winter of 1651-1652, "the spirit and zeal of the people

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<sup>622</sup> *Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé Gouverneur de Guyenne, Escrite à Messieurs de la cour de Parlement de Bourdeaux* (Bordeaux, 1651), 4-8.

<sup>623</sup> Condé to Lenet, 3 July 1652, transcribed in Lenet, *Mémoires*, 556.

for the Prince had seemed to chill.”<sup>624</sup> The Ormée continued to support Condé, especially after his defeat at Agen in March.<sup>625</sup> However, he became angrier and more direct with the upstart bourgeois as they radicalized and grew threatening, especially against his friends in the Parlement. Their rivalry with the Court - filled with insufficiently zealous members of the *petite Fronde* - came to a head on June 7, 1652 when a letter from Condé arrived. He urged “all the bourgeois of the Ormée... that they take heed not to offend the members of so distinguished a body [as the Parlement]... and not to hold further assemblies without the consent of M. le Prince.”<sup>626</sup> In response, on June 9, the Ormistes stormed the Hôtel de Ville, and fought a series of street battles that killed seven.<sup>627</sup> Though the Princes momentarily pacified the city, the Ormée’s show of strength had made it the effective lord of Bordeaux.

Condé was obliged to support whatever faction held the city, as he refused to be officially acknowledged as the leader himself.<sup>628</sup> So, the Princely Party sustained a nervous alliance with the Ormée until the end of the Fronde. This queasy equilibrium hobbled the Princely Fronde in two ways: first, it constrained Condé’s range of action, and forced him to clear major decisions with the unpredictable assembly. In September 1652, for instance, he told Lenet to express his enthusiastic support for the Ormée’s plan to level the Château du Hâ, an edifice of Epernon’s power. His encrypted note, however, expresses his reservations that “this could serve as a pretext to raze Montrond, which would be a hateful thing.”<sup>629</sup> More significantly, however, a mazarinade from late 1652 reports that Condé had to beg the Ormée’s approval for his troops’ winter quarters. After explaining to the uninitiated

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<sup>624</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 532.

<sup>625</sup> Beik, *Urban Protest*, 232.

<sup>626</sup> Condé to Villars, cited in Westrich, *Ormée*, 32.

<sup>627</sup> Beik, *Urban Protest*, 235.

<sup>628</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 572.

<sup>629</sup> BN MFr 6731 f.142, Condé to Lenet, 8 September 1652.

Parisian reader what the Ormée was, the pamphlet claims that these bourgeois radicals have “a blind and furious passion for the interests of M le Prince, who makes use of them in all his plans.”<sup>630</sup> This was the second and more serious problem: Condé needed to avoid any incriminating connection to the Ormée, even as he relied on them.

Association with the Ormée was problematic for the Prince, and grew more so, because of its unthinkable political positions. Where Condé hoped to frame his argument in the unoffensive terms of personal kingship, wedded to the universally loved *patrie*, the Ormée unabashedly staked out a position well outside the mainstream. Westrich concludes that they aimed at nothing less than the “reconstruction of society” along egalitarian lines.<sup>631</sup> To this end, the *Manifeste des Bordelais* makes the Ormiste motto, “*Vox populi, vox dei*,” and brags of establishing in Bordeaux a “Democratic Government.”<sup>632</sup> This was hardly the defense of the divinely-ordained King that Condé claimed, especially having elsewhere likened republicans to Lucifer’s fallen angels. At their most radical, during the closing days of the Fronde in summer 1653, some marginal Ormistes even advocated secession from France, and the establishment of an independent republic.<sup>633</sup>

Even more troublesome than its revolutionary ideals, the Ormée tainted Condé’s efforts to plausibly claim *patrie* discourse for himself. They advanced an unmistakably populist version of this moral community, in place of the aristocratic synecdoche the Prince desired. “I maintain that the restoration of the *Estat Francois*,” the *Manifeste* protests, “may be realized only by the People. The *grands* and the magistrates are the accomplices and the

<sup>630</sup> *Courier de l’armée de Monsieur le Prince envoyé a son Altesse Royale. Apportant les particularitez de tout ce qui s’est passé entre les deux Armées* (Paris, 1652), 6.

<sup>631</sup> Westrich, *Ormée*, 49.

<sup>632</sup> *Le Manifeste des Boudelois, Contenant le recit véritable de ce qui s'est passé dans la ville de Bordeaux le xiii and xiv du passé* (Paris: Porteur, 1652), 5, 7.

<sup>633</sup> Westrich, *Ormée*, 56.

supporters of Tyranny." Further, the bourgeois assembly had passed an Ordinance against the "mazarins" of the Parlement, in which they "enjoin all the Bourgeois of the City to lend their hands and take up Arms, on pain of being declared traitors to their *Patrie*."<sup>634</sup> This divisive call, limited to the city's middle-class population, especially with an appeal to armed force, upended the most important pillars of Condé's claims, grounded in peace, inclusion, and the mystic distinction of royal blood. He had an uneasy, opportunistic-seeming connection to the *patrie* from the outset, and the patriotic platform of the Ormée - at once more credible and more radical than the Prince's - further destabilized one of the Princely Party's most needful rhetorical stances. Bordeaux had promised a reliable refuge to the Condéen faction in its hour of need, but quickly became a liability.

Just as the situation in Bordeaux was deteriorating, Condé's position in Paris crumbled, too. In April 1652, his reception by the common people of the capital had been "passionate," but the Parlement was lukewarm toward a man "still covered in the blood of the King's soldiers."<sup>635</sup> True, his pyrrhic-but-striking victory over Turenne at Battle of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, just outside the city gates, on July 2, 1652, had been a "magnificent *coup de propagande*." There, "the Parisians saw with their own eyes the man represented to them in mazarinades: the Prince-hero, exhausted and covered in blood, corresponded exactly with the personage on paper."<sup>636</sup> But the Prince squandered whatever cultural leverage he had gained from his heroic exploits at this battle not two days later, in the bloody "Assault on the Hôtel de Ville." This badly miscalculated power play not only drove the city's leaders away from the Party, but caused the Prince to appear vicious and

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<sup>634</sup> *Manifeste*, 5-7.

<sup>635</sup> Condé was able to enter Paris only after his victory at the Battle of Blénau. Aumale, *Histoire*, 154-155; includes citation of speech in Parlement by Président Amelot.

<sup>636</sup> Jouhaud, *Mazarinades*, 114.

treacherous.<sup>637</sup> His popularity eroded further when he demanded money, munitions, and quarters for his army, which of course included Spanish troops.<sup>638</sup> He remained in Paris into October, but the King's triumphal return, and especially Louis' reconciliation with Gaston d'Orléans, signaled Condé's crippling failure to hold the capital.<sup>639</sup>

The writing was on the wall from the moment Louis XIV offered an amnesty to all Princely Frondeurs who would lay down their arms and return to their *devoir*. The Party had suffered, from the first moments of its existence, from disorder, disobedience, and betrayal. Turenne and Bouillon had refused to fight alongside Condé from the day of Louis XIV's majority, and infighting within the Party was endemic throughout the Princely Fronde.<sup>640</sup> French war-weariness and the growing strength of the Crown caused an epidemic of defections in 1652. Cities and towns began to ask the Party to be recognized as neutral, rather than allies, while some turned against the Princes altogether.<sup>641</sup> Even Daugnon, who had promised in writing "to attach myself to [Condé's] interests in all cases and forever," fled the Party.<sup>642</sup> As the King pacified the realm, and made increasingly clear that he was not so weak or misled as Condéen pamphlets had claimed, he gained the cultural and material capital necessary to peel away the Party's most important members. Béguin aptly summarizes this dynamic: "It is the misfortune of the leaders of rebel parties, that one may believe he fulfills his duty by betraying them."<sup>643</sup>

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<sup>637</sup> Ranum, *Fronde*, 330-331.

<sup>638</sup> Fraville, *Condé au service d'Espagne*, 46.

<sup>639</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 580.

<sup>640</sup> Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 130; Aumale, *Histoire*, 98-99; Ranum, *Fronde*, 334.

<sup>641</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 560; *Relation véritable de la trahison tramée dans la Ville de Ligourne en Guyenne contre M. le Prince de Condé. Par les adhérents du Cardinal Mazarin, Comment découverte, & les traîtres surpris.* (Paris, 1652)

<sup>642</sup> Lenet, *Mémoires*, 612

<sup>643</sup> *Princes de Condé*, 141.

Bordeaux capitulated in July of 1653, and received a general amnesty a short time later.<sup>644</sup> By that time, all but the Prince's most dedicated adherents had received pardons and returned to the royal fold. The Duchesse de Longueville, always at the forefront of the frondeur charge, begged the King's forgiveness, and Conti rather incredibly married one of the hated "mazarinettes," as the Cardinal's nieces had been derisively labeled.<sup>645</sup> But the Prince fought on. Bankrupt and isolated, he retreated north into the Spanish Netherlands, where he led Philip IV's armies against his *patrie* for five more years. He was defeated, but the indelible mark of his rebellion would remain on French absolutism for long decades to come.

### **Conclusion: Personal Kingship is Dead, Long Live Personal Kingship**

By the latter stages of the Fronde, Condé's personal kingship had grown and transformed into a self-contained political ethos.<sup>646</sup> The "personal modality of service" had been interpreted rather narrowly under Louis XIII, as a framework for noble-crown relations and patronage.<sup>647</sup> But over the course of the 1640s and 1650s, the Grand Condé and his allies expanded on its original functions. They repurposed ideas about the King's body, and especially subjects' innate obligations, to explain complex political questions, ties to entities other than the King, and the terms of national loyalty. Personal kingship anchored the Princely Fronde's public rhetoric, and the Party necessarily pushed its implications beyond France's borders. In the end, Condé claimed that the now-capacious

<sup>644</sup> *Declaration du Roy, Portant Amnistie generale accordee à la ville de Bourdeaux* (Poitiers: Thoreau, 1653)

<sup>645</sup> Fraville, *Condé au service d'Espagne*, 51.

<sup>646</sup> I prefer "ethos" to "ideology," as the latter term connotes a level of intellectual specificity and rigor I do not perceive in the Prince's arguments.

<sup>647</sup> Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1996), 11-56. For fuller discussion of this issue, see Chapter 1, pp.22-26.

tenets of personal kingship justified his rebellion, and even valorized its patriotic implications.

But the rise of the reinvented *patrie* complicated the Prince's arguments. Where Condé proposed a congenital, individual duty to serve the King, the frondeurs imagined a community of *bons françois*, bound together by their shared duty and selfless, sentimental devotion to the abstract totality of France. Though loyalty to the *patrie* had served as an excuse to rebel before,<sup>648</sup> the Prince found it a hindrance to his cause rather than an aid, for he needed troops and gold that only Spain could supply (more accurately, could credibly promise to supply). In this effort, the political public's love for a French community defined by its violent opposition to *estrangers* complicated his equally needful quest for support at home. In short, the Spanish alliance was simply a bridge too far for the *bons françois*, and its existence cast a pall over any other claims the Party had advanced under the aegis of personal kingship. The Princely Party had stretched their model past its breaking point. Though it could accommodate each of the functions they demanded of it, personal kingship collapsed on itself when asked to simultaneously define the power relations between nobility and Crown, subject and sovereign, patron and client, and especially rebel and foreigner.

But even as the Prince failed to make his case, he demonstrated the explanatory muscle that his model could offer. The young, ambitious Sun King understandably embraced a political framework that tied subjects directly, innately, and inextricably to the person of the ruler. Moreover, Condé's failed efforts to wed his model to the frondeurs' *patrie* provided a template for combining the two discourses, such that subjects would be

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<sup>648</sup> Myriam Yardeni, *Conscience Nationale en France Pendant les Guerres de Religion (1559-1598)* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1971), 201.

seen as bound together in an abstract, morally coercive community, at the same time that their embodied loyalties bound them intimately to the King. Where Condé had anxiously attempted to sidestep or explain away the role of the King in applying personal kingship, Louis strode to center stage to inaugurate “patriotic kingship.” In Chapter 5, we examine the Royal Party’s pamphlets during the Princely Fronde, the Prince’s trial for *lèse-majesté*, and the negotiations with Spain that allowed his return. Even in defeat and in exile, the Grand Condé remained a potent figure in the imagination of the French Crown and community. In royalist mazarinades, the King turns the Princely Party’s arguments back on themselves, while simultaneously and much more successfully uniting his own cause with the good of the *patrie*. In the Prince’s trial, and even in negotiating his rehabilitation, the Crown insisted on strong, exclusive, affective bonds between subjects and their sovereign. Each episode reveals important facets of the victorious King’s demands in the wake of the Fronde, in the realms of culture, law, and diplomacy.

The defeat of the Fronde silenced the most powerful opponents of monarchical expansion, at a key moment in that expansion. But far more, subduing the rebels allowed Louis XIV to graft the most useful pieces of the frondeurs’ discourses onto the protean edifice of his absolutism. The next, and final, chapter will analyze the monarchy’s assimilation of the *patrie* and personal kingship, so that Louis could claim, in effect, “*La patrie, c'est moi.*”

## **Chapter 5 - Louis XIV, Subduing the Fronde: Patriotic Kingship and the Reinvention of Loyalty**

The Fronde's defeat strengthened absolutism in terms not just relative, but absolute. That is, it silenced the most vocal opponents of state centralization, and empowered the King by comparison; but more than that, the Crown's victory provided the cultural, legal, and diplomatic tools to expand its claims on subjects' loyalty. No less important, the Fronde's endgame gave the royal party a series of stages on which to publicize its new assertions. In the pamphlet wars of the Princely Fronde, in the Grand Condé's high-profile trial in 1654, and in treaty negotiations with Spain in 1659, the monarchy worked to reconfigure elements of frondeur, Princely, and royalist political discourses, into "patriotic kingship." In doing so, the King arrogated to himself the populist rebels' affective ties to the *patrie*, Condé's embodied interpersonal bonds, and Mazarin's statist philosophy. In combining the most useful strands of each, Louis XIV inherited from the Fronde a political power that demanded selfless sacrifice as a moral duty to the nation, by the fact of a subject's birth and body, while maintaining the King's personal discretion to act for the good of the state. The King christened the new political order in condemning Condé and his allies as "Rebels, Criminals of *lèse-Majesté*, disturbers of the public peace, and Traitors to their *Patrie*."<sup>649</sup> Their rebellion against the King, in this formulation, was legally, personally, publicly, and morally criminal. I argue that Louisquatorzian absolutism united all of these strands to command subjects' loyalties in new ways, and with greater strength than ever before.

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<sup>649</sup> *Declaration du Roy contre les Princes de Condé, de Conty, la Duchesse de Longueville, le Duc de la Rochefoucauld, le Prince de Talmont, & leurs adherens. Verifiée en Parlement le Roy y seant en son lict de Justice le 13 Novembre 1652.* (Paris: Imprimeur du Roy, 1652). Critically, the original French speaks, in difficult-to-render ways, not of *sa naissance* or *son coeur*, which would highlight the special qualities of Condé's Bourbon blood in particular. Rather, *la naissance* and *un coeur Francois* generalize the *devoir* inherent in birth for everyone, in ways that move beyond the traditional understanding of blood-borne noble virtues.

Though the following pages shift focus from the Prince to the the King, the Grand Condé remained central to the royal party's thinking. Even during his "notorious retreat and exile from France"<sup>650</sup> from 1653-1659, the Prince's ghost haunted the Palais Royal. The Prince's Fronde, his trial, and negotiations over his repatriation in the Treaty of the Pyrenees all provided opportunities for royalists to define and reaffirm the status and obligations of French subjects. These three episodes provide the focal points for the present chapter, for they demonstrate the monarchy's determination to establish the ideals of patriotic kingship in the realms of discourse, law, and diplomacy. First, during the closing stages of the Fronde, the Crown's printed counteroffensive sought concertedly to discredit the Princely Party's claims to represent the *patrie*. But more than attacking Condé, the royals built a positive case that the King's person embodied the *patrie*. Second, the trial and verdict against Condé permitted the Crown to specify the limits of subjects' behavior in lucid terms, while the process of publicizing and executing the sentence shows the ability of royal agents to act on the King's words. Finally, the Treaty of the Pyrenees pardoned Condé and allowed him to return to France under the conditions of the *status quo ante bellum*. Even in light of this apparent leniency, Condé's treatment in the negotiations between Mazarin and Dom Luis de Haro shows the new model of patriotic kingship in action. Even in defeat and *in absentia*, the Grand Condé continued to exercise an unmistakable influence on ideas of the monarchy, and of the nation.

Historians have long recognized that the French monarchy emerged from the Fronde with a strength it did not possess during Anne's regency, or even under Richelieu and Louis XIII. I argue that this added strength was not simply an increase in the King's

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<sup>650</sup> This phrase is a constant refrain in the record of Condé's trial. Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal [BA], MS 2842-2843.

power, but an altogether new kind of power - certainly “negotiated,” as the consensus view of absolutism now holds, but a different and greater power, nonetheless.<sup>651</sup> By discursively unifying the royal person with the state and the *patrie*, in a model I call “patriotic kingship,” the monarchy broadened the horizons of its claims-making abilities, as well as its authority to enforce those claims. The process of this evolution, and the first evidence of its success, came well before Louis’ “personal reign” began in 1661. The Grand Condé provided the medium through which France reimagined the monarchy, the nation, and the individual’s bond to both entities.

### **“The King Calls You in Person”: Royalist Pamphlets in the Twilight of the Fronde**

The autumn and winter of 1651 were dark days for the Crown. France had enjoyed six consecutive months of relative calm, from Mazarin’s exile and the Princes’ return from prison in February, through Condé’s retreat and the King’s majority in September. Now, with Condé scheming in Bordeaux, Habsburg troops ranged along the northern and southern borders, and Mazarin languishing in exile just across the Rhine, the potential outbreak of further civil wars cast a long shadow over the Queen’s court. The looming Princely Fronde threatened the Crown not only militarily, but ideologically: royalists worried explicitly throughout 1651 that their enemies “have used every means to conserve [the people’s] affections for themselves,” and bemoaned the reversal of fortune they had

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<sup>651</sup> In making this case, I seek to chart a middle course between “revisionist” and “post-revisionist” scholarship, reconciling the absolute power that Louis obviously claimed, and the mediated power that he exercised. The following pages reveal the genesis of major elements of absolutist discourse, which empowered (perhaps better, emboldened) the monarch to demand broader and more intimate obedience from his subjects. At the same time, I track the monarchy’s strategic retreats from such strong assertions, which so often characterized the reality of royal power under the Sun King.

experienced in the past year, as a result.<sup>652</sup> Condé might not simply win the fight, but win the argument. As the Prince prepared for rebellion, then, the royal party sharpened its own daggers, both physical and rhetorical. From September 1651 through the Fronde's defeat in the summer of 1653, the Crown deployed the full arsenal of ceremonial, legal, and ideological resources that absolutist political culture provided, in an effort to discredit Condé and rally French subjects around the throne. In doing so, they not only addressed the immediate crisis of the Fronde, but laid the foundation for a dramatic expansion of royal assertions of power after the civil war.<sup>653</sup> The royalist pamphlets of the Princely Fronde were therefore much more than *ad hoc* propaganda, and offer an early glimpse of the authority the Sun King would claim for himself, once normalcy returned to France.

Before examining the royalist mazarinades, a brief note is needed to explain my use of “the Crown,” for the King's majority had complicated the question of who, exactly, led France. After September 7, 1651, Louis XIV theoretically possessed full sovereignty, and this newly fortified, unified, and clarified royal power was a major boon to the royal party. All the same, Mazarin continued to primarily direct affairs, even during his exiles.<sup>654</sup> Still, royalist pamphlets often attribute choices to the King, and the language of my sources thus frequently requires accepting the fiction that Louis decided some issue.<sup>655</sup> Where possible, I refer to the office of the monarch rather than the person, in describing the origins of words

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<sup>652</sup> Archive des Affaires Etrangères, Mémoires et Documents Français [AAE] 876, ff.265-266, Naudé to Mazarin, Aug 15, 1651.

<sup>653</sup> It must be noted that some facets that I treat as “new” kinds of royal power were totally uncontroversial, long-accepted customs, acknowledged before, during, and after the Fronde by all (or nearly all) sides. However, the interactions of these traditional ideas with Fronde-era innovations, especially the inclusion of *patrie* discourse as a central feature, gave them new or different meanings.

<sup>654</sup> François Bluche, *Le Grand Règne* (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 317.

<sup>655</sup> Louis certainly possessed a will of his own, though this more often manifested in private, especially romantic affairs, than in the realm of public policy, in this period. On this issue, see Mazarin's remarkably frank, 22-page reproof to the amorous teenaged monarch, written in the midst of negotiations over the Treaty of the Pyrenees: Bibliothèque Nationale de France [BN], Manuscrits Français [MFr] 7156, ff. 139-151, Mazarin to Louis XIV, Aug 28, 1659.

or deeds, except in instances where Louis himself actually said or did them. So, whereas royalist texts made extensive, effective use of the idea that Louis XIV's full, adult power should bring the frondeurs to heel, Mazarin continued to wield royal power, and in fact organized the textual campaign that hid his role.

The Cardinal was slow to defend himself or the Crown in print, however. Though he closely followed Richelieu in many cases, he did not emulate his predecessor in sponsoring friendly presses until late 1651, and then only at the urging of his librarian and confidant, Gabriel Naudé.<sup>656</sup> Though he (or, Naudé, during Mazarin's extended absences) did finally support, protect, and directly oversee a few presses, Princely authors outproduced royalist pamphleteers by a factor of nearly eight during the latter stages of the Fronde.<sup>657</sup> What the royalists lacked in volume, however, they more than made up in credibility. Though Princely texts seem to have enjoyed some success between autumn 1651 and summer 1652, their audience grew narrower and more reactionary with time.<sup>658</sup> The royal party, with the newly-major King nominally at its head, had access to a panoply of ceremonial and ideological weapons, whose efficacy grew in proportion to French war fatigue. Their texts were thus Mazarin and the royal party's concerted effort to rebut the Princely Party's assertions, by reminding the public of the King's divine authority, righteous justice, and

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<sup>656</sup> On the scope and intensity of royalist propaganda under Louis XIII and Richelieu, see especially Hélène Duccini, *Faire Voir, Faire Croire: L'opinion publique sous Louis XIII* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2003), Chapters 1 & 8; Jeffrey Sawyer, *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (University of California Press, 1990), Chapter 1, and Marie-Noëlle Grand-Mesnil, *Mazarin, la Fronde, et la presse, 1647-1649* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), Introduction. Mazarin's hesitations are suggested by the absence of royal reaction in this latter study, while this question is directly at issue in Hubert Carrier, *La Presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades. La Conquête de l'Opinion* (Geneva: Droz, 1989), 145-204.

<sup>657</sup> Mazarin's *équipe de presse* consisted of around six authors, each paid between one and two thousand livres, depending on quality and quantity of production. The late establishment, and relative understaffing of government presses helps to explain the gulf in production between royalist and Princely mazarinades. Carrier, *Presse de la Fronde*, 84, 165-175.

<sup>658</sup> Ibid, 125-127, 433-434.

paternal love for his people. The Crown's final victory simultaneously hobbled Condé's rebellion, and laid the discursive foundations of Louis XIV's later authority.

Louis' first efforts to quell the civil war came in the same ceremony that confirmed his majority, on September 7, 1651. Seated on his *Lit de Justice* in the midst of the Parisian Parlement, Louis attended mass and performed the "customary ceremonies" that established him as the King of France. This was a powerful moment, and the Crown did all it could to extend the ritual's reach, publishing woodcuts that showed the Parlementaires looking eagerly and adoringly on the dynamic young monarch.<sup>659</sup> Just as publicly, the King extended an olive branch to the Grand Condé.<sup>660</sup> The Prince had retreated from Paris just days before, but his incipient rebellion had not yet reached the point of no return. The King offered pardons to the Princely Party and promised to continue Mazarin's exile, if they would lay down their arms. But word of this potential détente failed to reach Condé, who at the same time wrote to the King and the Duc d'Orléans to explain his frustration and sense of insecurity at Court.<sup>661</sup> Each side's letters passed the other's in transit, and the Princely Fronde continued unabated.

The King's offer of clemency failed to achieve its stated goal, but nonetheless did important work in the rhetorical battle that would follow. In the first place, it demonstrated Louis' royal magnanimity, for "this great Prince [King, in the latin sense of *princeps*] has

<sup>659</sup> Nicolas Picart, *L'Auguste Seance du Roy dans le Parlement pour la declaration de sa Majorité le 7. Septembre 1651*, reproduced in Hubert Carrier, *La presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades. Les hommes du livre* (Geneva: Droz, 1991), 255.

<sup>660</sup> *Les particularites des ceremonies observées en la Majorité du Roy. Avec ce qui s'est fait & passé au Parlement, le Roy seant en son Lict de Justice* (Paris: 1651); *Declaration du Roy, pour l'innocence de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé. Verifiée au Parlement de Paris sa Majesté y seant, le septième Septembre 1651* (Paris, 1651).

<sup>661</sup> *Lettre escritte au Roy par Monsieur le Prince sur le sujet de son absence a l'action de sa majorité...* (Bordeaux: Guillaume de la Court, nd [6 September 1651]); *Lettre de Monsieur le Prince a son Altesse Royale, Sur le sujet de son éloignement de la Cour* (Bordeaux: Millanges, nd [13 September, 1651]). Even if Louis' letter had reached the Prince before his departure from Paris, I would speculate that the course of the Fronde would have changed very little - Condé, it seems to me, had decided on rebellion as early as August 17, 1651.

begun to give us proofs of his Justice and prudence, and the sure signs of the happiness that all France must enjoy, as she submits to be led by so sage a monarch.”<sup>662</sup> As this author points out, mercy served to portray the King as generous, as well as powerful. He possessed not only the defining features of a benevolent ruler, but sufficient confidence in his authority to pardon a powerful and unruly subject. In this same sense, offering forgiveness implicitly reinforced the King’s dominant position, and reminded the audience that Condé was a criminal, should he decline the offer. Further, the terms Louis employed show him beginning to fuse the personal model of the monarchy with the latitude of Mazarin’s *raison d'état* philosophy. “We wish to establish,” by offering mercy to the Prince, “so perfect a union among the *Maison Royale*, that it will produce that force... without which it is difficult, even impossible, that this Crown could maintain its grandeur.”<sup>663</sup> In pardoning the Grand Condé, Louis showed himself willing to forgo the retribution that he could rightfully exercise, for the good of the Royal House, and by extension the State. Finally, and most striking, Louis speaks of “that affection and that love that his [Condé’s] birth and the rank he holds in the State strictly oblige him to have for us.”<sup>664</sup> The subject’s affective bond, rooted in his body and status and directed toward the King himself, were the most basic elements of the patriotic kingship that Louis sought to construct. From the first day of his adult reign, the Sun King built a power that focused on his person, demanded his subjects’ obedience, and permitted him a broad range of action to further the State’s interests.

As the Princely Fronde built momentum, and especially after Condé ratified the Treaty of Madrid, royalist pamphlets took a less conciliatory tone. Anti-Princely tracts from

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<sup>662</sup> ... *Ceremonies observées en la Majorité du Roy*, 7.

<sup>663</sup> ...*Pour l'innocence de Monseigneur le Prince*, 3.

<sup>664</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

the civil war aimed to accomplish three goals, which opposed and inverted the goals of Princely mazarinades. First, they needed to vilify and discredit Condé as an alternative source of authority, for his claims to stand in for the “misled” monarch could not be tolerated. Second, the King sought to claim for himself the ability to speak for the *patrie*, and thereby sever the Prince’s pretensions to do so. Finally, Condé’s foreign alliances would need to be cast as indefensibly treasonous, which would follow ineluctably once his connection to the King and *patrie* had been broken. Though the Crown expended fewer resources on propaganda than the Princely Party, the inherent cultural and institutional advantages that the King enjoyed allowed him to successfully burnish his own image, while blackening Condé’s, in the final phase of the Fronde.

Above all, the King sought to establish that he alone held the reins of State. To this end, the majority celebration of September 7, replete with the ceremony and regalia of the universally-loved monarchy, did much to reinforce his claims to undivided sovereignty.<sup>665</sup> Likewise, royal presses insisted throughout the Princely Fronde that the adult King’s power was now legally and actually whole. In making this case, in fact, the royal party acknowledged that Louis’ authority had been diminished, prior to his thirteenth birthday: “Then, was the King the King? Was he master of his Kingdom before he was master of his own will? And had he reached that fullness of age which elevates him beyond himself?”<sup>666</sup> Now, however, the adult Louis XIV’s commands are perfectly, inescapably binding on his subjects, for nine centuries of history have proven that “the Kings of France are the only

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<sup>665</sup> Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 135-136.

<sup>666</sup> *Sentimens d’un fidelle sujet du Roy*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 319.

true Fathers and the only Sovereign Judges of their Subjects.”<sup>667</sup> Royal power is the ultimate terrestrial authority, instituted by God himself,<sup>668</sup> for “Kings and Magistrates are born and placed on earth to govern peoples and [to wield] their justice with preeminence and authority.”<sup>669</sup> In sum, the late Fronde witnessed an outpouring of pamphlets that substantially echoed and even amplified Bodin’s absolutist model, and anticipated Bossuet’s *Politique* by three decades. They contended that King held the only legitimate authority in France, that his sovereignty was absolute and unitary, and that his commands carried the force of Divine will. These arguments constitute an unflinching defense of the King’s unmitigated power, without exception or appeal.

From the general principle that royal authority was divine and absolute, the Crown’s presses made clear that Condé’s denial of the King’s fitness to rule was incorrect, and in any case irrelevant. The royal party ubiquitously insisted that the adult King personally conducted the affairs of state, as he issued orders in his own name and appeared in Parlement independent of his mother or Mazarin. And with the Italian Minister absent until the early days of 1652, and again during the spring and summer of that year, the belief that Louis was a puppet for the Cardinal became difficult to sustain. Still, the Crown confronted that argument directly, in tracts that mounted a full-throated defense of Mazarin. His ministry was not only legitimate, but desirable, for the King held the choice of his ministers in his hands, as surely as any other affair of state. “Do you wish,” one author inquired

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<sup>667</sup> *Requête des Peuples de France affligez des présens troubles à Nosseigneurs de la cour du Parlement séant à Paris* (Paris, 1652), in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 466.

<sup>668</sup> *La Discussion des quatre politiques. I. Si la puissance des Roys est de droict Divin, & si elle est absolue. II. Si les Roys son par dessus les Loix. III. Si les Peuples ou Estats Generaux ont pouvoir de regeler leur Puissance. IV. Si dans l'estat ou se trouvent maintenant les affaires, on peut faire un Regent ou Lieutenant pour le Roy* (np, nd). This author takes great pains to demonstrate, by Scriptural and historical authority, that Kings hold their power by a natural, divine right.

<sup>669</sup> *L'Authorité des Roys, des Princes, des Republiques, et des Parlements, présentée au Roy dans la Ville de Pontoise par un grand Prelat* (Paris, 1652), 5.

sarcastically, “to hold that our goods, our blood, and even our lives are not under the absolute power of the King?” If this is so, as Scripture assures us, then the King “may act in anything by the forces that he may delegate to his first and faithful Minister.”<sup>670</sup> Other pamphlets drew a sharp comparison between Mazarin’s actions and Condé’s, during the Fronde: “Has Mazarin, like [the Princes], had dealings with, or signed treaties with the enemies of the State? Has he, like them, corrupted the fidelity of the subjects of the King?... Has he, like them, violated [ravy] liberty along with the Crown?”<sup>671</sup> Mazarin had simply been the leader of France at a difficult moment, and had possessed the courage to make unpopular choices for the King’s sake. But, even in the counterfactual case that Mazarin had misled the King in any particular, “it is nevertheless the King who wills it.”<sup>672</sup> Mazarin was therefore no usurper, and consequently, Condé’s claim to act as a failsafe “repository of sovereignty” could never empower him to act in the King’s name, no matter how pure his Bourbon blood. As one pamphlet admonished Parlementaires who had made similar arguments, “One struggles to reconcile that, being guards and repositories of Royal authority, some would seem to act as Usurpers.”<sup>673</sup> Only the King or his agents could legitimately command French subjects, and any other claim to do so was illicit on its face.

In asserting the King’s majesty, the royal party did not fail to explicitly denigrate the Grand Condé’s rebellion. Having countered the Prince’s claim to speak for the monarchy, the royals depicted his Fronde as parochial, selfish, and ultimately hopeless. Condé had presented his cause as a nationwide and even Europe-wide struggle, whose ultimate goal

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<sup>670</sup> *La Response du Pere Favre, Predicteur & Confesseur de la Reyne, Sur la Harangue à elle faicte par un Reverend Pere Chartreux, pour la Paix* (Paris, 1652), 4-5.

<sup>671</sup> *Requeste des Peuples de France*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 472.

<sup>672</sup> *Le Fidele Empirique ou le Puissant Hellbore d’un anti-Machiavel: Pour contenter les Mal-contents de l’Estat, & affermir la Liberté des Peuples* (Paris, 1652), 11.

<sup>673</sup> *Requeste des Peuples de France affligez des présens troubles à Nosseigneurs de la cour du Parlement séant à Paris*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 465.

was to secure peace in France and throughout Christendom. The Crown dismantled each of these claims, and painted the Princely Fronde in unflattering colors.

Royalist pamphlets emphasized the Princely Fronde's paucity of organic support outside its base in Guienne. Some reminded the audience that Condé had connived his way to an appointment as the province's governor in early 1651, which in hindsight appeared an obvious ploy to begin preparations for rebellion there.<sup>674</sup> Similarly, the King's second offer of amnesty to the Princes asserted repeatedly that their Fronde relied on Condé's power in Guienne, as the hub of domestic radicalism and the destination for foreign armies and navies.<sup>675</sup> But in Paris, the young monarch noted, when the Princely frondeurs attempted "to subjugate our court of Parlement and our city of Paris to their will... their threats and artifices were useless, and they resorted to force." In the end, the Prince "saw that the common oaths of the Parlement and the City tended toward the maintenance of our authority."<sup>676</sup> The reader sees that Condé enjoys a certain degree of support from the extremists in Bordeaux, but cannot prevail upon the more sensible Parisians, or any true *bon français*.

The Parisians' lack of sympathy for Condé, in royalists' telling, became most visible during the Battle of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. On July 2, 1652, Princely and royal forces fought a skirmish outside the eastern gate of Paris, which quickly turned against Condé. When he attempted to retreat behind the city walls, he found the gates closed and barred. The Prince saved himself and a handful of his troops only by the intervention of the Grande

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<sup>674</sup> *Advis sincere aux Bgs de Paris sur ce qui s'est passé en leur ville depuis l'an 1648* (np, 1652), 28.

<sup>675</sup> *Edict du Roy, Portant Amnistie de tout ce qui s'est passé à l'occasion des presents mouvements, à la charge de se remettre dans trois jours dans l'obéissance du Roy. Verifiée en Parlement le vingt-sixiesme Aoust, 1652.* (Pontoise: Julien Courant, 1652), 5. This rhetorical tactic runs throughout the King's many condemnations, amnesties, and ultimately the trial proceedings against Condé.

<sup>676</sup> *Edict du Roy, Portant Amnistie*, 7.

Mademoiselle, daughter of the Duc d'Orléans, who turned the guns of the Bastille against the King's troops and commanded that the gates be opened. The Crown made the most of the Prince's pyrrhic victory, pointing out that when Condé needed the Parisians' support, he found none: the Duc de Beaufort had run through Paris, pleading for help on the Grand Condé's behalf, but "women responded with shock and silence, and men looked at him, then turned their backs."<sup>677</sup> At the moment of truth, the good people of Paris loved the King more than the Prince.

Royalist mazarinades' focus on Guienne served several purposes: first, it cast the Prince as unpopular, and his movement as struggling to gain traction beyond the southwestern province. Such a characterization weakened the "bandwagon" effect of the Prince's recruitment efforts. Further, associating Condé with Bordeaux in particular served to tie him inextricably to the shocking extremism of the Ormée,<sup>678</sup> and to divorce him from the interests of the nation at large. As a result, this strategy undermined his claims to represent the interests of the French *patrie* as a whole.

Still further, the royalists argued, Condé did not truly speak for Bordeaux or Guienne, anyway. In pamphlets addressed specifically to those southwestern locales, royalist authors rebutted the case for any real "union of interests" with the Princes. In the first place, the Archbishop of Bordeaux showed that Condé's rebellion would harm the province's spiritual wellbeing: his Fronde was heretical, as rebellion against any duly instituted ruler was a sin against God.<sup>679</sup> At the same time, the secular case for Condé's

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<sup>677</sup> *Lettre du bourgeois desinteresse* (np, nd), 6-7.

<sup>678</sup> *La relation véritable, de la sedition faite à Bordeaux des Principaux Bourgeois de cette Ville par l'Assemblée de Lormiere* [sic] ... (Paris, 1652).

<sup>679</sup> *Censure de Monseigneur Illustriss. et Reverendissime Archevesque de Bourdeaux, et primat d'Aquitaine, sur un libelle fait & à Bourdeaux* (Paris: Dubois, 1652). Adding immediacy to his theological claims, the

rebellion came under equally harsh criticism. In one pamphlet, the feminine figure of Bordeaux discovered over the course of her dialogue with the royalist “Inconnu,” that her relationship with Condé was not one of love or mutual respect. Instead, it was an “adultery” against the King, in which she had been “openly prostituted to all those who want something.”<sup>680</sup> Hilariously, her suitors included the lusty Spanish, but not the more discerning English, who found that she had “lost her first luster.” More seriously, the gendered and sexualized terms employed here reinforce the image of the King’s legitimate, masculine power, while at the same time providing a ready excuse for the city’s feminine credulity. This tract portrays Bordeaux’s love for the King as natural, healthy, and righteous, whereas her union with the Prince was “a confusion of interests, an alliance of convenience, a confederation of three days... a union without proportion.”<sup>681</sup> Royalist pamphleteers drew from a deep well of traditional, patriarchal models of power relations, to remind France that loyalty to the King remained the beneficial norm, while service to the upstart Prince was fraught with risk.

Attacks on the Prince’s ties with Bordeaux hinged on the premise that his cause was not generous, as he claimed, but ambitious. Just as in the Siege, ambition remained a black label during the late Fronde. Diverging from the modern sense of a rational desire to fulfill one’s potential, ambition connoted instead hubris, or an unnatural drive to surpass one’s legitimate station in the world. In this regard, “ambitieux” served as an antonym for “genereux,” and carried all the cultural baggage that such opposition would suggest, in the

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Archbishop excommunicates all rebels, and authorizes clerics and confessors to refuse the sacraments to unrepentant adherents of the Princely Party.

<sup>680</sup> *Le Dialogue Metaphorique de l’Inconnu avec la ville de Bourdeaux. Dedié aux Irenopolites* (Paris, 1652), 10-11.

<sup>681</sup> *Ibid*, 20-22.

selflessly patriotic climate of the Fronde. With this in mind, we must read the Crown's incessant references to Condé's "measureless ambition,"<sup>682</sup> and charges that his civil war served only "to satisfy the hate and the passion of a few avaricious, ambitious, factious men,"<sup>683</sup> as severe condemnations. The feeling against a man's rising above his place<sup>684</sup> was so strong, that the over-pursuit of one's interests ultimately appeared to work against his wellbeing. Therefore, "if M. the Prince had properly recognized his interests, he would have been persuaded that there could be none greater than to live according to the duties of his birth... He would have checked the 'unrestriction [*débordement*],' so to speak, of [his desire for] favor."<sup>685</sup> Louis made the case clearest in a published letter to the Duc de Lorraine, in which denounced "the ambition which is opposed to my power [*puissance*]."<sup>686</sup> Tellingly, ambition itself is the agent behind rebellion here, and perfectly antithetical to Louis' concept of royal authority.

Whereas the Grand Condé embodied limitless ego, Louis XIV incarnated generosity and justice. Because he was a King, this was a natural fact, for "it is proper for a good and magnanimous King to have a dignified and generous heart; a lowly and weak [*lasche*] heart is not at all the heart of a King." Further, Cicero has shown that "a monarch's generosity is

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<sup>682</sup> *La vérité toute nue...* (Paris, 1652), in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 423.

<sup>683</sup> *Sentimens d'un fidelle sujet du Roy*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 315-316.

<sup>684</sup> I employ masculine pronouns here intentionally, for I read *ambition* in this era as a sin of misapplied masculinity, as suggested by the near-constant pairing of "*ambition*" with "*débordé*" or close synonyms, in my sources. In keeping with Bourdieu's observations, ambition was understood as an unchecked desire for dominance, beyond the limits (however flexible, in individual cases) imposed upon a man according to his starting place in one hierarchy or another. That is, ambition was a desire for ever-greater control, the pursuit of which itself signaled a disregard for norms, and finally, a loss of truly manly self-control.

<sup>685</sup> *Les Intérests du temps* (Paris, 1652), in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 359.

<sup>686</sup> *La Lettre du Roy escripte au Duc de Lorraine, Pour la jonction des ses armes à celles de sa Majesté*. (Paris, nd), 5.

Justice, and causing good laws to be observed.”<sup>687</sup> The author reinforces this point, and amplifies its gendered meanings, in describing the qualities proper to a ruler:

The generous man... is not at all avaricious, and never hopes to better his particular standing, but that of the public, which he prefers to his own. The generous man is never idle, rather, his life is a continual exercise and labor, in brave and virile actions, not soft and feminine acts, always for the benefit of others, which is proper to Justice.<sup>688</sup>

The mutually constructive terms of generosity, Justice, masculinity, and selfless love of the *bien public* had been the central axes of frondeur patriotism, and now become the fundamental qualities of Louis’ reign. He styled himself, as did all other Kings before him, a loving father to his people, dispensing justice with clemency and affection, rather than inflexibly enforcing the letter of the law. The King himself made this distinction, as he reluctantly condemned the Grand Condé in 1652: he had “always preferred to treat [my subjects] as a Father, rather than as a Sovereign.”<sup>689</sup> Though selfless service was an ancient virtue, it had become an indispensably central trait in political discourse since the Siege. Generous masculinity, by the final phase of the Fronde, had been firmly established as the test of claims to inclusion within, and especially leadership of the *patrie*.

Generosity was a particularly crucial quality for the monarch, as it would inform his administration of justice, understood at its most basic level as “the remuneration of good, and the punishment of evil.”<sup>690</sup> But, as in the Ciceronean citation above, “generosity” did not necessarily mean liberality or leniency in the King’s treatment of individuals, but

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<sup>687</sup> *Authorité des Roys*, 6.

<sup>688</sup> *Ibid*, 6-7.

<sup>689</sup> *Declaration du Roy contre les Princes*, 3.

<sup>690</sup> *Authorité des Roys*, 8. Note, as ever, the pecuniary connotations of the King’s duty to reward service. Though the following pages will show that Louis insisted that he could not be compelled to act in any way, the expectation of reward for meritorious service remained a powerful norm, which Louis fully understood. The best exploration of Louis’ effective use of such *quid pro quo* politics remains William Beik’s *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1985).

maintenance of the health of the Kingdom as a whole. As such, generous justice depended on the King's discernment of the truth surrounding issues before him, and on his perfect freedom to enforce his decisions. It therefore fit snugly with Mazarin's *raison d'état* philosophy. One pamphlet expressed this in terms that could have been written by Richelieu himself: "The fundamental law of Sovereignty" holds that Kings "may themselves legitimately dispense [justice] according to the demands of the good of their State and their service."<sup>691</sup> And as the merchants of Lyon made clear, this theory was no empty letter. In remonstrating against troop quarterings recently imposed upon their city, they made a concerted effort to distinguish themselves from the "criminal" frondeurs. Instead, they assured the King, "this is not so absolute a refusal that, if Your Majesty finds it necessary... we would not submit."<sup>692</sup> The Lyonnais bourgeoisie were willing to admit that the King's estimation of France's needs trumped their own desires - even when it might harm their city. So, because the royal will was, and necessarily remained absolute and unrestricted, paternal generosity became an essential trait for a good king.

The specification that generosity must reside in the "heart of a King" points to the importance of the King's individual person. But where Condé had argued that the King's recognition and gratitude should compel him to reward servants, the Crown held that the King's individual judgment freed his will, rather than constrained it. Royalist tracts maintained that, although the King was a man and subject to feelings of obligation, his unique status as the embodiment of the State meant that national considerations would always trump private sentiment. That is, both sides had come to believe that the adult King

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<sup>691</sup> *Sentiments d'un fidelle sujet*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 329.

<sup>692</sup> *Lettre des Prevost des Marchands et Eschevins de la ville de Lyon: Escrite au Roy le 27 May 1652. Contenant le sujet du refus qu'ils ont fait de recevoir le Cardinal Mazarin, & les Troupes dans leur Province* (Paris: Royer, 1652), 6-7.

embodied the State. But the Prince saw him as a man above all (albeit one with exceptional power and status<sup>693</sup>), whereas royalists emphasized the privileges of his “mystical” body, which placed him above the strictures of human law. In short, Condé hoped to deal with a man who embodied the State; royalists insisted that the State and *patrie* were personified in the King’s body. This apparently minor difference in primacy was the critical distinction between Condé’s personal kingship, and the royalists’ patriotic kingship.

Beyond giving the monarch’s judgment the force of law, rhetorically fusing the State and the King’s body imbued his person with mystical, metaphysical qualities, according to royalist pamphlets. Of course, the extraordinary properties of the King’s body and presence were no novelty: medieval tradition granted him “thaumaturgical” abilities, and even posited that his blood was so supernaturally pure as to be visibly clear and luminous, rather than red.<sup>694</sup> Moreover, the rituals surrounding royal entries, funerals, and *Lits de Justice* had added to the royal mystique throughout the Renaissance, and Louis XIII had recently made the power of the King’s presence in Parlement a legal fact.<sup>695</sup>

Louis XIV’s partisans adopted and expanded the scope of such supernatural ideas. Condé’s famous victory at Rocroi, for example, became the product of a spiritual royal presence, as “the Genius of Louis XIV guided [Condé’s] hand, leading him down inaccessible

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<sup>693</sup> On this point, Yardeni makes a useful observation: the “myths” surrounding the King became proportionally less efficacious as one drew closer to the throne. That is, for those who interacted on a daily basis with the King as a human being, Yardeni perceives that some measure of mystical reverence recedes. So, where only a handful of men could claim any level of intimacy with Louis XIV, it follows that Condé would have concerned himself less with the mythical trappings of the monarchy. Myriam Yardeni, *Conscience Nationale en France Pendant les Guerres de Religion (1559-1598)* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1971), 22. A major feature of Louis XIV’s fusion of Fronde-era monarchical models, then, was the transfer into accepted practice, even among the rarefied aristocracy, of such myths and legal fictions.

<sup>694</sup> Marc Bloch, *The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France*, trans. J.E. Anderson (Catham: McGill-Queen’s UP, 1973); Colette Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France* trans. Susan Ross Hutton (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1991), 183.

<sup>695</sup> Richard A. Jackson, *Vive le Roy! A History of the French Coronation from Charles V to Charles X* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Sarah Hanley, *The Lit de Justice of the Kings of France: Constitutional Ideology in Legend, Ritual, and Discourse* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983).

paths and opening a hundred iron doors.”<sup>696</sup> All of this in spite of his age, and the troops’ ignorance that he was even King. During the Princely Fronde, Condé was blamed for ignoring the sacrosanct presence of the King on the opposing side of his battles - “something that is unbelievable... a sacrilege.” More sinister still, during the Battle of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, Condé had supposedly turned the guns of the Bastille, “which should be a fortress for the King’s authority... against the very person of the King!”<sup>697</sup> Crucially, this author extends the sense of the King’s “person” beyond his physical presence: Louis had remained safely removed from the line of fire, as the audience (who might have been eyewitnesses to the fight) surely knew. Still, the King’s troops, banners, and agents had been targeted, and the author equates those royal symbols with the royal person itself. The metaphysical aspects of the monarchy, then, had begun to work in two directions: royalist pamphlets asserted that the body of the King held spiritual power, and at the same time abstracted his “presence” into his delegates, and even inanimate representations of his authority.

The ethereal qualities of the King’s person helped to sustain royalist claims that he incarnated the abstract *patrie* community, as well as the State. Though monarchist mazarinades promoted this idea indirectly rather than explicitly, the consistent pairing of King and *patrie* unmistakably establishes their equivalency. Throughout 1651 and 1652, pamphlets echoed the *Fidelle sujet du Roy* in framing the Fronde as a contest of Princely “rebels,” against “the *gens de bien*, the true subjects of the King, the true lovers of their

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<sup>696</sup> Nicolas Caussin, *Eloge du Roy Louis XIV. Dieu Donné* (Paris, 1651), cited in Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 141.

<sup>697</sup> *Requête des Peuples de France affligez des présens troubles à Nosseigneurs de la cour du Parlement séant à Paris* (Paris, 1652), in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 479. As noted above, it was in fact the Duchesse de Montpensier who had redirected the cannon.

*patrie.*<sup>698</sup> Louis himself employed this rhetorical strategy in his condemnation of the Grand Condé: by labeling him and his faction, in a single gesture, “Rebels, Criminals of *lèse-Majesté*, disturbers of the public peace, and Traitors to their *Patrie*,” the King established that rebels against the Crown were automatically rebels against the community.<sup>699</sup> The royal party must have been thrilled, then, to see that even those who opposed Mazarin had accepted the unity of King and *patrie*, and the equivalence of the duties that derived from both. So, the author of the *Crusade for the Conservation of the King and of the Kingdom* proclaimed that “certain *bons françois*, loyal subjects of the King, loving his Royal and sacred Person and the wellbeing of their *patrie*,”<sup>700</sup> would mount a campaign to defend both entities by ousting the Prime Minister. The net effect of all of these texts, whether sponsored by the Crown or springing from popular presses, established that the love, service, and interests of the King were inseparable from and identical to the *patrie*’s.

By unifying subjects’ patriotic and monarchical attachments, the Crown made use of another aspect of Condé’s personal model of kingship - again, with subtle but crucial changes. Where Condé spoke of his innate and inviolable “loyalty,” “fidelity,” (etc.) to the King, royal pamphlets borrowed and extended his model, with the added implications of patriotic kingship. In addition to the pseudo-contractual terms the Prince employed, royalists invoked the affective ties that united members of the *patrie* in their shared love of France. We see in the passages cited above that *bons françois* are at once “loyal subjects of

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<sup>698</sup> *Sentimens d'un fidelle sujet du Roy*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 336.

<sup>699</sup> *Declaration du Roy contre les Princes*, 10.

<sup>700</sup> *Croysade pour la conservation du Roy et du Royaume* (Paris: Guillemot, 1652), in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 353. In spite of this pamphlet’s opposition to Mazarin, it is not clear that the anonymous author was sympathetic to Condé. Guillemot had published many pamphlets since the beginning of the Fronde, nearly always of a Retzian, Parlementary, or populist persuasion (see Carrier, *Mazarinades*, 103). Further, the internal evidence of the text corroborates this: despite his distaste for the Cardinal, the author treats the King as fully possessed of his capabilities and worthy of loyalty, rather than duped or bewitched, as in many Princely mazarinades. I include it as an example of a “moderate” (that is, a partisan of neither Royal nor Princely factions) view.

the King, loving his... Person and the wellbeing of their *patrie*." By uniting these two objects, the King could claim more than simple loyalty, but love from his subjects. Further, he could do so by appealing to the fact of their inborn, embodied inclinations. Thus, the Crown everywhere decried Condé's abandoning the "duties of his birth," and lamented that the Prince had even subverted Gaston d'Orleans' "natural goodness and tenderness, totally humane and totally royal." But, anyone acquainted with the Duc "cannot doubt that on this occasion he has acted on alien [*estrangers*] impressions, and that his spirit was seduced in order to abuse the sincerity of his intentions."<sup>701</sup> Along similar lines, the King noted in his second offer of amnesty to the Princes that he had a "deep compassion for the losses and calamities that our people suffer, having felt their fidelity and affection for our service." In spite of Condé's efforts to corrupt their loyalties, Louis found "cause to hope that each of our subjects would breathe only for the obedience that is due to us."<sup>702</sup> Just as the King's generosity sprang from his royal heart, and Orleans' "natural goodness" from his royal blood, French subjects' obedience and affection lived in the very breath of their lungs. In this light, Louis' formal charge that Condé had "abnegated all the duties of birth, and all the sentiments of a French heart," and had "declared himself Spanish, in affection and interest," holds grave significance for his relationship with the King.<sup>703</sup>

Royals' hopes for French people's affective attachment were fulfilled even before the Fronde's end. When the King arrived in Pontoise in the fall of 1652, on his way to reclaim Paris from the Princely frondeurs, a company of merchants trekked from the capital to deliver professions of love and loyalty from the city's bourgeoisie, who "had never lacked

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<sup>701</sup> *Sentimens d'un fidelle sujet du Roy*, in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 315.

<sup>702</sup> *Edict du Roy, Portant Amnistie...* (26 August, 1652), 5, 8.

<sup>703</sup> *Declaration du Roy contre les Princes*, 5, 7.

for affection and fidelity for the King." Their adoration for the monarch must have been plainly visible, for the report notes that the Chancellor "approved of their affection before they had said a single thing," and assured them that "he had never known Parisians to have anything other than fidelity and love for the King's service."<sup>704</sup> When the time came to deliver their speeches, the Parisians showed that their emotions were no mere formality. One cloth merchant, "in the course of his speech, interspersed with weeping and bathed in tears, found the energy by the affection and zeal that he showed for the King's service," to proclaim that he "did not wish to live, except to sacrifice himself in the service and obedience that is due to his Majesty." Further, he claimed, "his heart spoke for a hundred thousand men who had the same affection." The author notes how "this discourse was so naturally animated, without any artifice of Rhetoric." The love of *bons françois* for their King was an organic, unaffected passion, whose roots gripped men's hearts and drove them to selfless martyrdom on the ruler's behalf. As if to confirm the speeches' patriotic implications, the author closes by revealing his hope "to give satisfaction to my *Patrie*" in reporting these events "with as much truth as affection for my *compatriottes*."<sup>705</sup>

In the pamphlets examined so far, the royal party claimed certain powers and characteristics for the King: he alone held legitimate power in France, in contrast to Condé's illegitimate claims to sovereignty. The King wielded his authority with generosity and munificence, in contrast to Condé's parochial, ambitious goals. The King could decide all matters according to his personal judgment, in contrast to Condé's arithmetic system of compensation for service. And finally, the King's person incarnated all the abstract aspects

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<sup>704</sup> *Relation véritable de ce qui s'est passé à Pontoise, en la réception des six Corps des Marchands; ensemble leurs Harangues, et ce qui leur a été respondu le Roy et la Reyne* (Paris, 1652), in Moreau, *Choix*, ii: 529-530.

<sup>705</sup> *Ibid.* 532-4.

of the State and *Patrie*, in contrast to Condé's focus on interpersonal obligations. With all these pieces in place, Condé could never justify his rebellion. Still, the Crown made sure to clarify the magnitude of Condé's crime, and the reasons that his rebellion rendered him a traitor to the King and nation. In short, the Prince's actions were treasonous because no loyalty that diverged from the King of France could ever be legitimate. The King had been broadly accepted as at once the personal, institutional, and patriotic center of the nation, and all Frenchmen and women were consequently tied to their Sovereign by mutually reinforcing bonds of obligation, law, and affection. There was, in short, no viable rationale for disobedience, let alone rebellion against the King's will.

In effect, the Crown had made its case again the Grand Condé without invoking the specter of Spain, but harshly denounced his Iberian alliance all the same. In doing so, they capitalized on the opportunity to define the subject-sovereign bond not only as a self-contained, domestic construct, but as an issue of citizenship in the real, multinational world. In this regard, it is striking that the royals would tolerate no gray area in matters of national loyalty: no one, they argued, could serve two nations. But in a case like Condé's, in which he claimed to serve France by making use of Spanish aid, true loyalty could be determined by identifying the primary beneficiary of service. Using this test, Condé's claims of ongoing attachment to France were invalid: he had provided all of the "advantages that Foreigners could wish to draw from the evils [the Prince] has caused [his] *patrie* to suffer."<sup>706</sup> By aligning himself with "the interests of Spain, against those of the State which

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<sup>706</sup> *Declaration du Roy contre les Princes*, 6-7. It is noteworthy that Louis sets *étrangers* - that is, people rather than land - in opposition to the French *patrie*. This parallelism suggests that he had accepted the evolution of the *patrie* into its community-focused iteration, as opposed to the primarily geographical sense it had held prior to the Fronde. See Chapter 2.

gave him his being,”<sup>707</sup> the Grand Condé had shown himself to be an “Enemy of his nation [païs].”

But the French public did not need to rely on the King’s word in this matter, for the Crown published Condé’s own words, from an intercepted letter to Don Luis de Haro. In the course of lamenting the pitiful state of his army (itself, a useful bit of royalist propaganda), the Prince reported that the “enemy is establishing himself, occupying my quarters, and if they accomplish their goals, will establish an unheard-of authority in France, and put themselves in a state which you and I will certainly not find pleasant.”<sup>708</sup> This passage amounts to a devastating self-indictment, for the Grand Condé succinctly expresses his common cause with Spain against their French “enemies,” and calls the King’s authority at once “unheard-of” and undesirable. The Prince had proved the Crown’s case: national sentiment was an all-or-nothing affair, and a powerful King was hateful to traitors. Condé himself drove the final nail into his rebellion’s coffin.

A single pamphlet encapsulates the royal party’s claims against the Prince: *The Coup d’état of Guienne* sought to marginalize and delegitimize Condé, at the same time that it defined and reinforced the King’s expanded authority, and his claims on subjects’ loving fidelity.<sup>709</sup> The text specifies the Southwestern province as his audience, and implicitly reminds those outside Guienne that Condé’s was not a genuinely national cause. It admonishes the Guiennais for their passivity, for “you have not dared to take up the defense of your Sovereign’s cause... The consideration of your *Patrie*’s wellbeing has not

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<sup>707</sup> Again, note the expectation that national attachment follows embodied sentiments.

<sup>708</sup> *Lettre de Monsieur le Prince de Condé envoyée a Monseigneur Dom Louis de Haros. Du Camp de S. Jeuin, ce 25 Decembre 1652. De laquelle le Roy a l’original* (Paris: Imprimeur du Roy, 1653), 5.

<sup>709</sup> *Le coup d’estat de la Guyenne présenté a Monseigneur le Prince de Condé & a Messieurs de Bordeaux, ou Remonstrance a tous les ordres de la Province / sur l’imprimée a Bordeaux* (Paris, 1651).

been able to oblige you, to this point, to sacrifice yourselves [*payer de vos personnes*]."<sup>710</sup> The King's interests are here identical to the *patrie's*, and their unitary cause demands selfless service, even martyrdom. To rouse these subjects from their stupor, the pamphlet proclaims, "Your King invites you in person to fulfill your duty... You will no longer doubt this when you see his liveries, the most considerable Officers of the Crown, and his Grand Esquire, with the Royal sword in hand."<sup>711</sup> The King's "person" now inheres in the symbols and agents he dispatches, and these should command no less obedience than Louis' physical presence, as his is the only "legitimate dominion" in France.<sup>712</sup> In contrast to his royal justice and protection, "the designs of those who have spurred [the Fronde] are too ambitious," and therefore must be opposed. For, in the end, "one cannot serve two masters," and the province must either remain French, or else submit to "these two thousand natural Spaniards who have seized the mouths of your rivers."<sup>713</sup> Ultimately, Guienne must "decide for yourselves this important battle, in which the stakes are nothing less than your conservation under the natural and legitimate dominion of the heirs of Saint Louis, or to fall under the law of a new Master, an unjust usurper, whether King [of Spain] or Duke [d'Orléans], Phillip [of Spain] or Louis [de Bourbon - i.e., Condé]."<sup>714</sup> In rebuking a single province, this pamphlet provides the Crown with a forum to cement the most important elements of Louis XIV's post-Fronde rule.

The pamphlets of the Princely Fronde constitute the royalist counterattack on the cultural battlefield of the Fronde. Their purpose was to express, and rouse popular support

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<sup>710</sup> Ibid, 4-5.

<sup>711</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>712</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>713</sup> Ibid, 9, 14.

<sup>714</sup> Ibid, 13.

for the King's preferred vision of French politics, and they served their purpose well. However, this "Fronde of Words" existed in parallel with diplomatic and especially legal battles. The struggles between Prince and Crown endured long after the civil wars had ceased and royal censors had returned to work, putting an end to the textual carnival of mazarinades. Condé was declared a criminal of *lèse-majesté* October 8, 1651, though he was not formally tried until the first half of 1654. Even then, his fate remained in limbo until the conclusion of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. Throughout the legal procedures, diplomatic wranglings, and on-the-ground experiences of post-Fronde France, the Sun King established and concertedly reaffirmed the evolution of monarchical power and Crown-subject relations for which royalist pamphlets had paved the way.

### **The Prince Formerly Known as Condé: The Trial of "Louis, heretofore de Bourbon"**

The Grand Condé's conviction for *lèse-majesté* was decided well before his trial began. Louis XIV admitted as much in a declaration of December 20, 1653: he explained that, while "his trial would make perfect" the Prince's culpability for the chaos that France had just endured, the "public notoriety" of his "open war" and "pernicious designs" against the King justified a summary declaration of his guilt.<sup>715</sup> It was a show trial, important less for its verdict than for its pedagogical value - "an example to mold opinions."<sup>716</sup> Because Condé's guilt had been publicly and legally acknowledged for over two years, Louis XIV had broad latitude to frame the trial's charges, evidence, and implementation in ways he found useful for solidifying the power he had claimed during the Fronde. He did not miss the

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<sup>715</sup> *Lettres Patentées du Roy...*, BA 2842, f.62-65v.

<sup>716</sup> Benoît Garnot, "La législation et la répression des crimes dans la France moderne (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles)," *Revue Historique* vol. 293, no. 1 (1995): 75-90, 88; Bluche, *Grand Règne*, 307.

opportunity. Where royalist mazarinades had mainly sketched the King's claims in impressionistic, "soft" terms, in the Prince's trial the Crown laid out the specific legal principles that undergirded its authority. Moreover, the efforts of royal agents to execute the sentence required that they explain and employ those principles, often to intransigent tenants, servants, and admirers of the Grand Condé. In proclaiming the reasons for the King's harsh treatment of the Prince, these agents' public addresses allow us to map the new landscape of French political culture under the recently, but undeniably ascendant Sun King. In the process of condemning Condé for *lèse-majesté*, the King defined what majesty had become, and clarified its demands on his subjects.<sup>717</sup>

The Grand Condé stood trial *in absentia* before the Parlement of Paris beginning on January 5, 1654. The venue and procedure are significant, for other frondeurs' cases had been overseen by a handpicked panel, at Mazarin's request. In these instances, the Cardinal had worried that it might be "difficult to secure justice by ordinary means."<sup>718</sup> And, though tradition stipulated that a defendant of Condé's status should be tried in a Parlement "amply attended by Dukes and Peers," this was no longer a legal necessity.<sup>719</sup> In light of other rebels' judgment by extraordinary tribunals, then, allowing the Parlement to judge the Prince spoke to the certitude of his conviction. At the same time, that court's stature

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<sup>717</sup> Peter Sahlins argues that Louis XIV's often narrow definitions of citizenship were legally unsustainable, but politically indispensable to royal power. Especially regarding the 1697 Naturalization Tax, but no less in the 1669 law against emigration, or the famous 1685 revocation of tolerance of Huguenots, Sahlins observes that "The state appropriated the law for political purposes." *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004), 56. In conjunction with James Collins' insistence on the centrality of law in defining and deploying absolutist power - see *Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany* (Cambridge, 1994) - I treat the following proceedings as legal and political exercises, in equal measure. Though Condé's sentence rested on as secure a legal footing as could be wished, the following pages will argue that the trial's features and emphases were driven far more by political than legal needs.

<sup>718</sup> BN, Morel de Thoisy MS, ff.240v-241v, quoted in Albert Hamscher, *The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653-1673* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), 108.

<sup>719</sup> Ralph Giesey, Lanny Haldy and James Millhorn, "Cardin le Bret and Lese Majesty," *Law and History Review*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring, 1986): 23-54, especially 46

made the process and verdict more public, and more instructive. So, over the course of nearly three months, Parlement heard testimony on Condé's acts of treason, received and verified written evidence of his conspiracies with Spain, and dispatched agents to publicize the charges, and later the verdict through placards and "public cries" throughout the Kingdom.<sup>720</sup> The Grand Condé's guilt was confirmed before the assembled judges, grandes,<sup>721</sup> and Louis himself on March 28, 1654.

The meaning of *lèse-majesté* itself requires unpacking, for it was at once crucial to Old Regime jurisprudence, and open to broad interpretation in the years around the Fronde.<sup>722</sup> It was roughly synonymous with treason, though as the name suggests, it focused primarily on the offender's slight against the King. Unsurprisingly, it stood at the summit of Ancien Régime jurisprudence, as a *crime énorme* (as compared to more quotidian *crimes graves* or *légers*).<sup>723</sup> Religious and familial corollaries reinforced its enormity: because the King was God's proxy on earth and the father of his nation, any attack on him became an attack against God himself, and on the power of fathers over families categorically.<sup>724</sup> But the "attack" need not be a physical one, for any sort of speech against the King, or any diminution of his honor fell under this heading. Moreover, particular transgressions, such as dueling, counterfeiting, or contravention of safe-conducts were likewise considered crimes of *lèse-majesté*, for they showed a disregard for royal

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<sup>720</sup> BA MS 2842, ff.15-15v.

<sup>721</sup> Curiously, the Duc d'Orléans found himself indisposed, and unable to attend the trial. See his letter of excuse, Jan 15, 1654, BA MS 2842, ff.247v-248v.

<sup>722</sup> Montesquieu, in substantiating his claim that "It is enough for the crime of *lèse-majesté* to be vague for the government to decline into despotism," cites a slew of overbroad applications of this charge, from the ministry of Richelieu and throughout the reign of Louis XIV. Tellingly, his omission of charges against noble Frondeurs suggests that he viewed them as legitimate uses of the law. *De l'esprit des lois*, XII, vii, cited in G.A. Kelly, "From *Lèse-Majesté* to *Lèse-Nation*: Treason in Eighteenth-Century France," *Journal of the History of Ideas* vol. 42, no. 2 (April-June 1981): 269-286, 277.

<sup>723</sup> Garnot, "La législation et la répression," 76.

<sup>724</sup> Kelly, "Treason in 18<sup>th</sup>-century France," p.277-278

orders and power.<sup>725</sup> Ultimately, historian Benoît Garnot notes that in defining all crime in France from the Wars of Religion through the Revolution, “the essence rests with *lèse-majesté*.<sup>726</sup> Because the King was *lex loquens* - the law, speaking - as well as the embodiment of the nation,<sup>727</sup> all crime in France was shaded with hues of treason.

As a result of its simultaneous power and ambiguity, *lèse-majesté* became a potent political tool for the Crown over the half-century before the Fronde. Prior to the Wars of Religion, treason's legal standing was a hazy confusion, haphazardly cobbled together from traditional and Roman law. Cases were isolated, often concerning *roturiers'* complaints or slander against the King, that would barely meet the more rigorous sense of the law that dominated after Henri IV. Under the Bourbons, and especially under Richelieu, the fog surrounding the crime's content, meaning, and implications began to clear. The first systematic theory of *lèse-majesté* came in 1632, penned by the royal minister Cardin le Bret. His treatise, and especially its revised, stricter edition of 1642, provided the Crown with “one of the vital instruments of Bourbon absolutism,” in Ralph Giesey and William Church’s joint estimations.<sup>728</sup> Charges of *lèse-majesté* became a weapon of first resort in silencing dissent from the upper echelons of society, as the spike in trials against noble conspirators under Richelieu and Mazarin attest.<sup>729</sup> As the last and most significant of the

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<sup>725</sup> The extension of “majesty” into royal orders or symbols accords with the mystical “presence” claimed in pamphlets. Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 151-164.

<sup>726</sup> Garnot, “La législation et la répression,” 76-77. This view of French legal sensibilities accords with Foucault’s observation that all punishment contained an element of royal retribution for the King’s injured power. See *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1995), 47.

<sup>727</sup> Though the present text constitutes an in-process argument for the King’s unity with the nation/*patrie* in the cultural realm, such unity was an accepted legal fiction by the mid-seventeenth century. See Kelly, “Treason in 18<sup>th</sup>-century France,” 271.

<sup>728</sup> Giesey et al, “Le Bret...”, 54.

<sup>729</sup> William Farr Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972), 321-334. Though my archival research does not extend back to this point, Church’s reproductions of several sentences during this period make no mention of the *patrie*. This absence, though not rigorously proven, suggests that labeling Condé a “traitor to his *patrie*” was a significant, even historic addition.

Frondeurs to stand accused, the Prince's conviction marks a watershed in the overlapping fields of legal history, political centralization, and Crown-noble relations, which Gieseley succinctly observes: "The noble class continued to flourish [under absolutism], but rarely - and after the 1650s never - did it dare openly defy the absolute monarch."<sup>730</sup> Condé's trial was thus the apex and the end of an era in which the Crown readily used charges of *lèse-majesté* to correct error, define acceptable behavior, and instruct the King's subjects on their duty.

With this context in mind, it becomes clear that the Grand Condé had committed the most heinous crime, against the most fundamental law in France, at a moment of historic political flux. The Crown therefore needed to define precisely what the Prince had done, and which attributes of the King's power he had sought to usurp or diminish. As the leader of the Princely Party, Condé had performed many tasks and filled many roles normally restricted to the King and his agents. In effect, he had established a shadow monarchy, with himself on its short-lived throne - what historian François Bluche has called an "anti-France."<sup>731</sup> The particular acts that royal agents chose to cite as proof of Condé's guilt therefore, mark the powers and duties that the Crown viewed as primarily defining true royal authority.

The following pages analyze Condé's trial along four rough categories: the first three - rebellion, usurpation, and treason - are subcategories of the top-line charge of *lèse-majesté*. But within and between those categories lies the fourth: the delicate rhetorical

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<sup>730</sup> Ralph E. Gieseley, "Lèse Majesty and Absolutism," Lecture in Honor of William Chuch, 1986. [http://www.regieseley.com/Lectures/Lese\\_Majesty\\_and\\_Absolutism\\_Lecture\\_for\\_WFChurch.pdf](http://www.regieseley.com/Lectures/Lese_Majesty_and_Absolutism_Lecture_for_WFChurch.pdf), accessed 20 Nov. 2013.

<sup>731</sup> Bluche, *Grand Règne*, 305. In employing this terminology, I mean only that Condé preserved traditional monarchical forms and structures, not that he wished to rob Louis of his Crown. For all of Condé's ego and ambition, I concur with Carrier that the Prince hoped to occupy something like Mazarin's role in the Sun King's regime, not the throne itself. Carrier, *Labyrinthe*, 98-101.

“shading” of the charges adds layers of depth to the proceedings. Beyond simply defining which crimes Condé had committed or what institutional powers the King claimed, the royal party took this opportunity to enshrine the cultural premises of their mazarinades in law, via perhaps the most noteworthy trial since Montmorency-Boutteville. Thus, the Grand Condé’s verdict defined not only the black-and-white issues of licit and illicit acts, but the subtle chromatics of ideal motivations for service, loyalty, and attachment to the King.

The prosecutors most obviously concerned themselves with the Prince’s rebellion. Condé had waged war against the King’s armies and authority, had besieged and occupied the King’s cities, and had “sought to abolish all the marks of the royal name and authority.”<sup>732</sup> But far more troubling, he had publicly argued that the King was in no position to issue orders at all. Condé’s Fronde was much more than an act of individual disobedience or betrayal of obligations, but an attempt to seduce as many French men and women as possible in his “debauched” rebellion.<sup>733</sup> The proofs of this element of the Prince’s crime were many and obvious<sup>734</sup> - indeed, the Princely Party itself disseminated the ideas that would ultimately render its members culpable. Condé’s disobedience, and his nationwide incitement to disobedience, were certainly the most straightforward aspects of this trial. They were also the most fundamental, for all other charges hinged on the assumption that the King’s power was absolute, and that the ties between sovereign and subject were, in the Prince’s own words, “inviolable.” In the wake of the Fronde’s chaos,

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<sup>732</sup> BA MS 2842, f. 216.

<sup>733</sup> BA MS 2842, f. 215v.

<sup>734</sup> To formally prove the Crown’s case, the Procureur-Général relied on eyewitness testimony from various battles against royal forces, as well as the documents related to his conquest of several cities. BA MS 2842, ff.70-113. Among these charges, it is noteworthy that Condé was accused of firing his cannon at the King himself (f. 92), though this is no more likely to be literally true than it was at the Faubourg Saint-Antoine.

and in contrast to Condé's debunked interpretation of personal kingship, Louis concertedly reaffirmed his monopoly on power.

If proving Condé guilty of *lèse-majesté* had been the Crown's only goal, the charge of rebellion would have amply sufficed. Indeed, if they had only wanted to prove that he had usurped monarchical authority, they might have stopped after a certain Meugin testified that "he saw all orders given in the name of Monsieur the Prince, where they are customarily given in the name of the King."<sup>735</sup> Instead, the King's prosecutors enumerated the specific usurpations of royal authority, highlighting the legal precedents they aimed to set, and the political instruction they aimed to effect.

The Prince's crimes became the negative image of Louis XIV's vision of royal power. So, where he had authorized legal proceedings in cities he controlled - even carrying out executions, and prescribing torture in some cases - the Crown reasserted its exclusive claim to administer justice in France.<sup>736</sup> Where Condé substituted his own loyalists for royal governors, functionaries, and *intendants*, the King maintained that he alone could delegate real authority to such agents.<sup>737</sup> Where Condé levied taxes or "contributions," exacted "reparations," or simply stole horses, the monarch made known that French subjects' goods could be assessed only according to the King's will, and for his use.<sup>738</sup> Where Condé had

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<sup>735</sup> BA MS 2842, f. 88b; also, f. 93b, 95b, 98b, 111.

<sup>736</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 89b, 100-100b, 108b-109.

<sup>737</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 89b, 92b, 98, 108. This would have obvious implications in ongoing questions over the administrative and clientage powers of provincial governors (often *Grands*) and royal appointees. For fuller exploration of such issues, see See Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford UP, 1986), especially chapters 1, 5, and 6; Robert R. Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1978), especially chapters 12 and 13.

<sup>738</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 14-14b, 89b-111. Condé's attempts to "tax," or as the Crown portrayed it, steal subjects' goods, appear on nearly every page of testimony against him, emphasizing the centrality of fiscal power in Louis' young reign.

issued passports,<sup>739</sup> established monopolies,<sup>740</sup> or exercised any other task reserved to the King, Louis reminded France that any attempt to sidestep or replace royal authority in any particular, no matter how minute, would be treated as treason. But the most pointed, most ironic, and perhaps most telling of the Prince's misdeeds concerned raising troops: he had encouraged villagers to volunteer "for the King's service," apparently assuming that respect for the monarch remained the most effective means to compel action - even rebellious action.<sup>741</sup> In citing the Prince's discrete crimes, and thereby reaffirming royal control over the powers Condé had usurped, the monarchy transformed cultural assumptions surrounding the monarchy into legal and institutional tenets.

As above, there was no evidentiary need to prove that Condé had allied with Spain. The Treaty of Madrid, his leadership of foreign troops, and his residence in the Spanish Netherlands were all common knowledge - literally, "*bruit commun*," as noted by the *procureurs* dispatched to formally locate and notify the Prince of the charges against him.<sup>742</sup> Once again, the specificity of charges against the Prince delineated the legal parameters of national loyalty. As suggested in royalist mazarinades, those parameters would be very strict. In fact, the crown could have made its case simply by the postmarks on Condé's correspondence, which showed him writing from foreign lands, to foreigners residing in foreign lands, during a period of foreign war.<sup>743</sup> Merely interacting with hostile entities

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<sup>739</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 14-14b, 102b.

<sup>740</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 110b.

<sup>741</sup> BA MS 2842 f.108.

<sup>742</sup> BA MS 2842, ff. 139, *passim*. In listing the evidence of his foreign alliances, the scribe himself notes that such proofs are "plus que suffisante du crime de la Rebellion." *Ibid*, f. 217.

<sup>743</sup> BA MS 2842, ff. 223b-224. The criminality of residing outside of France without the King's permission had been technically formalized in the 1629 Code Michaud - see Gieseck, et al, "Le Bret and Lese Majesty," 45. However, the law was registered by force in a *lit de justice*, under the shadow of heavy Parliamentary dissent, and it fell out of common usage after its author's death, as noted in John J. Hurt, *Louis XIV and the Parlements*:

constituted proof of a subject's duplicity. But of course, Condé's interactions had not been guileless: he had sent Lenet to Madrid to bargain for assistance in his Fronde, which led directly to Spanish control of French lands, cities, and the critical Garonne river.<sup>744</sup> Further, witnesses unanimously testified that three of the six infantry regiments that Condé had garrisoned in St. Menehould had been Spanish, in addition to a Croatian cavalry regiment. All of these facts showed, *ipso facto*, that Condé had betrayed the duties of blood, honor, and gratitude, in allying with - or, as the Crown would have it, serving - a foreign power. The message was clear and unequivocal: no obligation or aid to entities other than France and its monarch would be tolerated. All Princely casuistry on this point fell totally flat, no matter the rationale or conception of the monarchy.

The Crown's detailing of the Grand Condé's transgressions, and the image of the monarchy they constructed in doing so, methodically reinforced the points that had structured anti-Princely pamphlets during the Fronde. The King, and only the King, wielded absolute and indivisible power, embodied French justice, appointed and directed his servants, controlled his kingdom's material wealth, conducted diplomacy, commanded armies, and executed the daily functions that animated the body of the state. Finally, but emphatically, French subjects were bound to the nation and its ruler by tight, exclusive cords. As important as solidifying these points seemed in the aftermath of nationwide disorder, clarifying the logics that spurred fidelity was every bit as crucial. Condé's trial helped to accomplish this latter goal in subtle, but sustained and insistent ways. The flourishes and hyperbole that peppered the Grand Condé's trial proceedings, like epistolary

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*The assertion of royal authority* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 5-6. By renewing the Crown's claim to the Code's validity, Mazarin seems to implicitly reassert the power of royal *lits de justice* *ex post facto*.  
<sup>744</sup> BA MS 2842, ff. 89b-111.

“fidelity language,” were more than ornamental, baroque conventions.<sup>745</sup> Rather, demonizing the Prince and glorifying the King reinforced the communitarian model of masculinity, service, and patriotic attachment that dominated French political culture since the Siege.

In the Grand Condé’s trial, royal prosecutors took pains to establish the Prince’s cruel, selfish behavior, in contrast to the King’s benevolence. So where the *procurers* noted that the King acted with fatherly care for “the wellbeing of his State and the assurance of the public weal,”<sup>746</sup> Condé had wantonly ravaged France in his blind quest for power. Witnesses supplied a list, spanning two pages, of villages and towns around Roye (Somme) that the Prince had put to the torch, including the particularly bloodthirsty midnight immolation of the manor and village of Porcien.<sup>747</sup> Elsewhere under his command, troops had “stolen, pillaged, burned villages, taken prisoners, and perpetrated every sort of hostility against the King’s subjects.”<sup>748</sup> All the while, Princely armies ravaged the land. Condé himself had reported to Madrid that he could not winter at Rocroi, because “the Spanish army and my own troops have ruined the surrounding fields.”<sup>749</sup> Although the Grand Condé’s heroic, pre-Fronde reputation had emphasized his care in establishing garrisons, his Spanish career showed a disregard, even disdain for the lives of the French people he conquered. By including these inhumane acts as evidence of his guilt for *lèse-majesté*, the Crown reinforced generous behavior as a pillar of national belonging.

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<sup>745</sup> On the interpersonal and gendered functions of such language in correspondence, see Ch. 1, pp. 52-53.

<sup>746</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 71.

<sup>747</sup> BA MS 2842, ff. 91-91b, 104-107.

<sup>748</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 95.

<sup>749</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 221.

The shock of a man once regarded as France's savior, now committing atrocities against her lands and people, was compounded by the universal assumption that Condé's blood and history of service foretold a life of virtue. The King himself subscribed to this view, and deplored that his willingness to forgive the Prince had not effected a return to the "obligations to which his birth, and the benefit of so much favor [*graces*] should tightly attach him."<sup>750</sup> Elsewhere, the prosecutors expanded on this idea, noting that Condé, "being born a vassal and subject of the King, is obliged by his birth and his charges as governor to remain faithful to himself and the state, to which he is indebted. Nevertheless, he has forgotten himself to the point of treating and allying with the declared enemy of this Crown." Ultimately, he had "borne arms against the person and the interests of his sovereign, ravaging his nation and attacking his possessions, and committing all the acts of hostility that the cruelest Enemy could devise."<sup>751</sup> In these formulations, Condé has betrayed three sorts of obligation: first, his birth and duty "to himself" bound him to the King, whose "person" (clearly in the abstract sense) he has attacked. At the same time, his political role and the oaths he swore as governor constituted an explicit agreement with the King, which he has breached. Finally, he owes a debt of gratitude to the King, and basic respect for the lives and property of his fellow French subjects, all of which he has violated. National belonging had become an issue of embodied, contractual, and moral strictures.

The Prince's cruelty, and his transgressions of every loyalty he owed to France and its ruler, had made him and his followers "rebels, criminals of *Lèse-Majesté*, perturbers of

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<sup>750</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 7b.

<sup>751</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 224b-225. It should be noted that, although Condé's birth and blood carried exceptional meanings by virtue of his Bourbon lineage, these are not the terms employed for his trial. Rather, Condé's obligation to the King is the same as any other French-born subject.

the public peace, and traitors to their *patrie*."<sup>752</sup> The charges brought against them and the formal declaration of their guilt presumed that French subjects were innately bound to the King, legally bound to the state, morally bound to the *patrie* community, and obliged to act selflessly for the betterment of each of those objects. Condé's trial established these as legal facts, continuing the long evolution toward stricter and more exclusive definitions of exclusion and belonging in the *Ancien Régime*.<sup>753</sup>

The Crown always intended the Grand Condé's trial to have a far greater reach than judges and lawyers. The trial proceedings contain many asides proclaiming the importance of clarifying these issues for a broad audience: the Crown hoped "to make known the tragic effects of rebellion, the horror and the consequence of this Prince's crime, and the necessity to provide for subjects' obedience and the people's repose, by the authority of Justice and royal power, in [Condé's] punishment."<sup>754</sup> Or as Procureur-Général Nicolas Fouquet more artfully proclaimed, the verdict was "a masterstroke, a lightning bolt, which in striking a single head, brands fear and terror universally on the souls of all those who hear of it."<sup>755</sup> Publicity was a primary consideration throughout the trial, and we must therefore pay particular attention to the words of royal agents, as they announced and executed the sentence against Condé.

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<sup>752</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 214.

<sup>753</sup> On the legal parameters of national belonging, see Charlotte Wells, *Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1995), and Sahlins, *Unnaturally French*. Both of these studies center on the legal status of foreigners, and especially the *droit d'aubain* by which the King claimed the property of those who had no legal standing to bequeath property in his realm. This definition by negation is necessary, for a positive definition of citizenship did not yet exist. Indeed, I argue that the Fronde's *patrie* discourse was a preliminary, populist - and still largely exclusionary - means of thinking through such issues.

<sup>754</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 244b-245.

<sup>755</sup> Archives Nationales (AN) KK/578, f. 43. Fouquet's concern for the "souls" of French subjects again indicates that the loyalties Condé had betrayed were supposed to be a deep-seated, intensely personal fact of one's being.

The sentence itself was definite, thorough, and remarkably harsh. On March 8, 1654, orders were given that Condé be “stripped of the name of Bourbon, the dignity and privileges of a Prince of the Blood, Peer of France, and all other dignities, charges, and governments he has previously enjoyed, that the arms and insignia pertaining to his person and honor be struck and effaced, and that he be condemned to suffer death and execution, enacted by Justice.”<sup>756</sup> By removing all marks of Condé’s power from the places he controlled, and erasing even his name, Louis XIV aimed to annihilate all traces of Condé’s “person, posterity, and memory”<sup>757</sup> from the kingdom. The prescriptions of the sentence, as well as its enactment, drove this point home at every turn. So, where Lenet and other Princely frondeurs were ordered beheaded, “Louis, heretofore de Bourbon” received no such specification - stripped of all privileges, he was not entitled to an honorable, nobleman’s death.<sup>758</sup> Moreover, his “notorious absence outside the Kingdom” would no longer trouble the unity of the *Maison Royalle*, for he was no longer a Bourbon. Most immediately, all of his possessions would be assessed and liquidated. This last provision was the most straightforward, but in certain cases the most difficult clause of the sentence. Its difficulties, however, provide an invaluable window on the ways in which the Crown hoped to explain and enact its desired post-Fronde political order.

Two Parliamentary councilors, Nicolas Chevalier and Jean Doujat, along with the zealous Substitute Procureur-General Jacques Jannard, were charged with the task of inventorying the Prince’s possessions,<sup>759</sup> squaring his accounts, and searching out any

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<sup>756</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 264b-265.

<sup>757</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 214.

<sup>758</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 266-270.

<sup>759</sup> The painstaking task of noting all of the Prince’s valuables might have been avoided, if royal agents had been able to find the inventory compiled immediately after the death of the dowager Princess in late 1650. However, none of Condé’s servants or housekeepers managed to locate it, drawing the ire of the King’s men,

remaining evidence of his “honor or person.”<sup>760</sup> Wherever they went, they read and posted copies of the sentence against Condé, and administered an oath of fidelity to the leading residents, which obliged them to “render a new faith and homage to his Majesty, in the quality of a new *seigneur*.”<sup>761</sup> These tasks went surprisingly smoothly at the Hôtel Condé in Saint Germain, and even at the family’s Château in Chantilly. The three agents noted the goods, rents, or other items of value at each place, removed Condé’s liveries, and called together local notables to inform them of the King’s will and accept their promises of fidelity. The tasks were easily accomplished at these Condéen strongholds, and in most of their destinations, scattered throughout France. However, as Chevalier, Doujat, and Jannard went about their duties at Montmorency (Val d’Oise), Sancerre (Cher), and the neighboring burgs of Saint Amand (Cher) and La Chastre (Indre), they discovered some residents with “inclinations against the King’s service, to the point of having uttered indignant words against the sacred person of the Lord King and the Queen his mother.”<sup>762</sup> They did not let such insults pass.

In these towns, as elsewhere, they assembled the locals to announce the sentence and administer the loyalty oath, but immediately after doing so in all four places, Jannard took the stage to elaborate on the necessity and significance of the trial and verdict against

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who called the servants “incompetent” (BA MS 2842 ff.339-352). More likely, this was part of an intentional ploy, orchestrated by Condé’s wife, to stall the implementation of the sentence and maintain her husband’s patrimony intact for as long as possible. See Béguin, *Les Princes de Condé: rebelles, courtisans, et mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1999), 135-140.

<sup>760</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 158.

<sup>761</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 155. The specification of the King as the new, and direct *seigneur* of the Prince’s former holdings suggests the kind of unmediated control over territory and clienteles that Mousnier perceived as the hallmark of Louis XIV’s absolutism. I am not, however, arguing this point. Rather, I see this apparently ironclad claim as the Crown’s “opening bid” in the dialogues that marked the practice of royal power.

<sup>762</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 43b.

Condé.<sup>763</sup> Crucially, his speeches did not simply reiterate the former Prince's crimes, but expounded on the "shading" of the trial, promoting specific discourses regarding the King's justice and power, France's health and wellbeing, and *bons françois'* duties and motivations. In the wake of Condé's rebellion, royal agents were determined to translate the ideals of patriotic kingship from abstract principles into the vocabulary of everyday practice.

In the first place, we must regard these speeches as deliberate statements of the norms that the Crown hoped to impose on its subjects. They were explicitly intended as "a common lesson for all men, to instruct them equally to recognize the advantages of maintaining obedience, and the pain and disorder that always follow those who attack their sovereign."<sup>764</sup> Jannard's speeches all followed roughly this formula: he extolled the benefits of obedience for individuals and society, and emphasized the universal, innate loyalties that had marked patriotic discourse since the Fronde. Finally, in reminding the audience of the burdens and injuries that stemmed from Condé's rebellion, Jannard equated fidelity to the King with communal harmony. These speeches present the most potent distillation of patriotic absolutist discourse yet. Royal agents came face-to-face with French subjects, carrying the message that the King embodies the *patrie*, that he exercises perfect authority over State and community, and that subjects triply owe him obedience, by the logics of law, birth, and moral obligation to the nation and their compatriots.

On the terms Jannard employed regarding the nation and community of France, a brief note is required. The substitute *procureur-général* speaks with only one exception of the *pays*, rather than the *patrie*. However, as the following pages will illustrate, he clearly

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<sup>763</sup> Jannard's words were likely extemporaneous, or at least unscripted: where the agents specifically "read in a loud voice" the trial documents to each assembly, Jannard's speeches were always "said [dict]."

<sup>764</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 45b.

uses both terms as synonyms, in reference to a morally obligatory national community - often under threat and in need of defence, even after the Fronde's defeat.<sup>765</sup> He was not alone in this slippage - the two words were defined at either end of the century, by Nicot (1606) and the Académie française (1694), as essentially interchangeable. Though *pays* ostensibly held a more territorial connotation, and *patrie* a more moralistically abstract one,<sup>766</sup> both dictionaries use each term to define the other: Nicot lists each as a synonym for the other, and tellingly translates the latin "patriam prodere" as "trahir son païs," and its grammatical isotope "Proditor patriae" as "Qui a trahi sa patrie." The Académie, meanwhile, states directly, "Païs, Veut dire encore Patrie."<sup>767</sup> Above all, Jannard's usage shows that the terms were identical in his mind: *pays* and *patrie* are both, for him, morally obligatory entities, placed in tandem with the King, in reference to a national community of like-minded compatriots. With this caveat in mind, we turn now to Jannard's speeches.

Just as royalist mazarinades worked above all to portray the King's authority as absolute, Jannard directly and clearly tells his audiences that the King wields divine, inescapable, and ultimately beneficial power. He boldly asserts the similarities between royalty and divinity: "Kings are the images of God on earth, and the living law under which the people's peace must be maintained."<sup>768</sup> But more than a reflection of God's power, the King's actions make him comparable to God, for Louis "did not spare his own blood [i.e.

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<sup>765</sup> The trope of "*patrie en danger*" is bountifully evident in Jannard's speeches. On this refrain as foundational to the development of nationalism, see David A. Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in Early Modern France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 2001), 41.

<sup>766</sup> This distinction seems to have been situational, however, for Yardeni notes that during the Wars of Religion, "La fidelité de tous au roi se transforme de symbole d'unité territoriale et religieuse en symbole d'unité nationale." That is, when France was divided, the territorial unity normally captured by *pays* could take on a more communitarian, national flavor, bleeding into the semantic space occupied by *patrie*. Yardeni, *Conscience Nationale*, 136.

<sup>767</sup> ARTFL Project, "Dictionnaires d'autrefois," <http://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/node/17>, accessed 26 Nov. 2013. Searches for "païs" and "patrie."

<sup>768</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 377.

Condé] to procure peace for us, just as the living God did not spare the blood of his Son for the common good of men.”<sup>769</sup> Similarly, he claims that the sovereign’s clemency makes him “equal, in some sense, with Him who is the sovereign of Kings and men.”<sup>770</sup> Such equation of royalty and divinity supports the more discrete points that follow. In describing the secular aspects of royal authority, Jannard again minces no words: Condé’s condemnation will ensure “that the respect that is due to [the King’s] supreme authority would be ubiquitous, universal, and without contravention.”<sup>771</sup> The contrast with Condé’s recent disgrace “throws into sharp relief Royal authority and power, reestablished by that Justice that assures for the future the more solid establishment of your individual fortunes.”<sup>772</sup> In this sense, Condé’s crimes clarified the most significant attributes of royal power by inverting them, and further provided a forum for the young monarch to show his people the true image of majesty, in all its sanctity and force.

As Jannard’s above allusion to “individual fortunes” suggests, his depiction of royal sovereignty made use of both carrot and stick. That is, while he was happy to explicitly invoke Louis’ limitless, God-given power to punish or constrain, he simultaneously demonstrated the benefits of voluntary obedience and submission. Indeed, he cleverly tied the King’s severity toward Condé directly to the King’s benevolence in general, for both were manifestations of Justice, “who directs the hands of Kings to distribute to each according to his merits.” Although Condé’s crimes had required the King to mete out dishonor and death, “there may be no doubt that the dispensation of graces and *bienfaits* is the most agreeable [aspect of Justice], and the most harmonious with the Nature of Kings,

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<sup>769</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 46.

<sup>770</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 86b.

<sup>771</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 49.

<sup>772</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 381. See below for further discussion of the benefits of obedience to which Jannard alludes.

for they have reserved it personally for themselves, without sharing this right or authority with anyone."<sup>773</sup> This last line, though little more than an aside in the speech itself, most obviously reinforces the monarch's goodness. But beyond that, it explicitly asserts that the Crown holds a monopoly on patronage, which had been at issue in days before Condé's rupture with the Crown in 1649. In this instance, we see the Crown's agents capitalizing on the Prince's trial to address the issues of the day, at the same time as they resurrected questions from the early Fronde that had not been adequately resolved.

Though royal favor was the exclusive concern of privileged elites, *Grands* were not the only group affected by the Condé verdict, and Jannard made a point of explaining its national importance. To this end, he used an apt metaphor: "Our sovereign, who is the Physician as well as the Father of the State, seeing that the upheaval in his Kingdom began to trouble the whole, carefully sought out the cause, in order to heal this disease at its root, and stop its course." So, in Condé's case, "such violent remedies, which appear harsh, become in time... a Blessing that brings health and wellbeing proportionate to the [skill of the] physician and the honor of his cure."<sup>774</sup> In plain speech, Jannard explains that the declaration against Condé "is of the same quality - a harsh, bitter medicine, which in the end is healthful to the State, for its effect has been the calm and tranquility of the Kingdom, the end of civil war, and the beginning of a repose that has replaced the preceding troubles."<sup>775</sup> This is Jannard's major premise: Condé's disgrace is a harsh, but necessary step to assure the King of his subjects' fidelity. And reciprocally, these measures serve to

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<sup>773</sup> BA MS 2843 ff. 86b-87b.

<sup>774</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 76b. Though Jannard does not pursue this line in his rhetoric, his audience would not have missed the affinity between his framing of rebellion as a disease, and the standard trope of depicting heresy in the same terms. Both appeared as communicable, potentially epidemic, national maladies.

<sup>775</sup> BA MS 2843, ff. 88-88b.

assure subjects of their King's power, and his intention to provide peace and unity. In his own words, "This verdict, at the same time that it guarantees the King his authority, promises all French people, and those here above all, who are subject to be carried away in rebellion by foreign influences, a sure and continuous repose which will never be broken, as long as you remain obedient."<sup>776</sup>

Submitting to the King's power implied no surrender of one's liberty, and in fact would facilitate a truer freedom than Condé's licentious "movements" ever could.<sup>777</sup> Jannard made this point forcefully at Saint-Amand, in the shadow of the Condéan fortress of Montrond: "This province and this place in particular have long felt the tragic effects of this revolt, being unfree and under the power of a violent garrison and a fortress (always vulnerable against the King's authority)."<sup>778</sup> Though Condé's rebellion had promised deliverance from Mazarin's alleged tyranny, in fact the disorder that followed became its own tyranny. "But, as soon as God, who confounds all designs of the unjust and criminals, blessed the age of the King and authorized his Justice, he returned this place to its original liberty by the abolition of its slavery and the shattering of its chains, and immediately it returned and reestablished itself in its first obedience."<sup>779</sup> The dichotomy between "slavery" and "obedience" is the essence of Jannard's distinction between the Prince's

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<sup>776</sup> BA MS 2843, f. 78b. The "here" is Saint-Amand. As becomes clear below, Jannard redoubled his efforts to both seduce and coerce the residents of this hamlet, which lay in the former heart of Condé's power.

<sup>777</sup> In this statement, Jannard followed Dante's *De Monarchia*, t.1: XII.2, in claiming that true "freedom" was not the capacity to choose any course of action, but the capacity to eschew sinful or otherwise evil choices. In a word, freedom was not a lack of constraint, but precisely the discipline of a well-ordered will.

<sup>778</sup> This passage further suggests that Jannard was speaking off the cuff - I read his parenthetical remark as backtracking from an initially too-weak portrayal of royal authority during the Princely Fronde, admitting that the King, in some places and times, did not exercise the omnipotent power that he sought to ascribe.

<sup>779</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 78.

power and the King's.<sup>780</sup> Though both compel service, the former does so by brute strength and without consent or legitimacy, while the latter relies on the willful cooperation of the people, and operates with God's blessing and the constitutional weight of a thousand years of history. But above all, Jannard reminds those before him, slavery results in misery and chaos, while obedience brings unity, strength, peace, and prosperity.

Condé's rebellion, in royal agents' telling, sprang from a failure to recognize his freedom as a servant of the King. His desire to rise above his station, to surpass even the minimal limits that his status as First Prince of the Blood imposed, had caused his downfall. The Prince's dissatisfaction with his unparalleled portion of the King's authority had driven him to "measure his grandeur against that of his sovereign," but he found the comparison less flattering than he first imagined. Jannard employs a celestial metaphor to convey the principle at work: "Nature, who made the heavens, cannot suffer without violence that a planet would leave its orbit or epicycle, wishing to rise higher." In concrete terms, "Thus the Prince of Condé, that unfortunate planet, drunk on the hope and belief that he could pursue a new grandeur, [however] false and imaginary, in seeking to rise higher, fell lower... and now finds himself entirely despoiled."<sup>781</sup> The norm against ambition had proved true, and unfolded exactly as its promoters had always said: the unrestrained desire for more led to a total loss of control, and ultimately the subject's humbling fall.

In making this case, even Jannard had to admit that Condé's early career had been marked by victory, glory, and the promise of French triumph. He concedes this point, and shows a common regret with his pro-Condé audience, at the same time that he highlights

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<sup>780</sup> Charlotte Wells usefully amplifies this point, citing a case under Louis XIII whose decision included the declaration that "the service of the prince is liberty." *Law and Citizenship*, 103.

<sup>781</sup> BA MS 2842 ff. 379-379b.

the innate French virtues and loyalty for which the Prince should have been the exemplar. "Our hope that [Condé's] excellent qualities of natural devotion, united in the cradle, had caused us to conceive, spur an equally strong regret among us for his loss, and a just fury against the evil counselors who deceived him."<sup>782</sup> These evil, presumably Spanish, deceivers had "made him forget that he was born the first officer of this Crown, a public repository of the governments of many important provinces and of the better part of the Kingdom's forces (...), and the powerful, natural sentiments of his Spirit for the obligation that he has to the King and his *pays*." At every step, Condé's rank, responsibilities, power, and even emotions are (or, should have been) defined by his birth, which ties him equally and jointly to the nation of France and its ruler. These were facts of his birth, his body, and even his spirit, which no treaty or act of will could negate. Jannard directs an appeal to the Prince himself, in a long, impassioned diatribe:

Grand Prince - but this name no longer fits your crime - permit me now to arrest your spirit, which loses itself in evil madness, and beseech you to again look at yourself and at the pitiable state in which your crime has left you, to make you consider with whom, and against whom, you are engaged. Ponder for a moment that, having the honor to be born a Prince, subject, and vassal of the King who is your Master and ours, you cannot direct yourself without his permission, and still less do so against his service, and that whatever oath you have taken to the contrary, being against the law of God, your duty, and the good of your *pays*, you cannot follow it into a new crime.<sup>783</sup>

Condé's birth not only obliges him to serve France, but forbids any action or agreement that works against the nation or King's interests.

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<sup>782</sup> BA MS 2843 ff. 88b-89. The first lines of this passage are a syntactical disaster - either Jannard badly stumbled over his words, or the transcription misrepresented them. In any event, I have attempted to present their apparent meaning.

<sup>783</sup> BA MS 2843 ff. 90b-91. I have omitted Jannard's consideration of the Treaty of Madrid's legitimacy. His case, replete with Biblical references to Japheth, Herod, David, and St. Peter, unsurprisingly concludes that the Treaty was not legally binding. See *ibid*, 89b-92.

Although Condé's birth and blood were exceptional, the principle still stood that all of France owed the same duties as the Prince, and for the same reasons. Jannard made the point that Condé's treatment was equally applicable to all of his allies and followers, for Princes are no better than commoners "when they forget their duty... when the loss of control in their conduct draws the attention of this blind Justice, who does not distinguish the quality of persons when the public health is at issue."<sup>784</sup> Thus, "this law that universally proscribes revolt... condemns not only Princes, but all other subjects without distinction."<sup>785</sup> The law that defined what it meant to lack obedience, and therefore defined obedience itself, applied to princes and peasants alike. As Jannard told the residents of Saint-Amand, the "eternal liberty" that the town would "build on the ruins of its chains... must oblige them, in branding on their hearts" feelings of joy and thanks to God and to the King.<sup>786</sup> The King's agents consciously promoted the innately corporeal, emotional, and permanent logic of subjects' duties that arose from the ashes of the Fronde.

French subjects' bonds to the King attached them equally to each other. In defining the loyalties that should live in the hearts of those at Saint-Amand, Jannard suggested that the town's gratitude should "be marked every year by a general procession," a communal festival that would bring together the people as a corporate body to express their patriotic devotion.<sup>787</sup> In contrast, the Fronde had shown France "the evils that a State's divisions produce - the memory of recent days and our past ills remains with us, a fresh, still-

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<sup>784</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 45b. A case could be made in the opposite direction: Condé's exceptional status might have been a reason to treat him more leniently, as was often the case with noble (especially grandee) duelists, plotters, and rebels. The precedent for such grace was both recent, and relevant to the Prince, for his brother, sister, and many allies had received full pardons as a result of the royal amnesties that Condé had ignored. So, the Crown made sure to show that Condé's treatment was neither gentler nor harsher than the norm. Finally, because he had lost all honors and privileges in his trial, Condé was, legally, a *roturier* after March 8, 1654.

<sup>785</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 48b.

<sup>786</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 78b-79.

<sup>787</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 79.

bleeding wound.”<sup>788</sup> Division, disunity, and disorder appeared as the worst afflictions that might befall a nation, and the Crown pressed the need for unity in society as forcefully as it did any other aspect of the trial. In fact, all concerns were linked to social unity, as Jannard hints in his exhortations that his audience “remain firm, and always conserve in this town the union among yourselves and the total obedience that you should have for all that concerns the good of the State, the peace of this province, and the King’s service.”<sup>789</sup> But unity alone would not suffice - the benefits of loyalty and liberty would only be secured by active participation and service for the public good, for “We are obliged to attach ourselves to whatever concerns the public.”<sup>790</sup> More specifically, and rather more desperately, he hoped that Condé’s condemnation would “give birth to a public peace and tranquility, to which we must contribute our part by obeying, and renouncing, if we have committed them, all plots and intelligences that work against the King’s service and the good of the *pays*.”<sup>791</sup>

Unity and active cooperation within France promoted the peace and prosperity for which many now thirsted, at the same time that it served the King’s interests. As in the pamphlets of the Fronde and the Prince’s trial, service on behalf of the community of *bons françois* is always paired with, parallel to, and effectively interchangeable with service to the King. And, in the lone instance where he does use *patrie* rather than *pays*, it is once again an object of emotional attachment in need of selfless defense, placed in tandem with the monarch: Condé has “attacked the Crown, and we now see him returning, fire and

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<sup>788</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 47.

<sup>789</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 49.

<sup>790</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 91b.

<sup>791</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 92.

sword in hand, ready to disembowel his *patrie* in order to raise himself up on her ruins."<sup>792</sup> The Crown's late- and post-Fronde claims to subjects' embodied loyalty on moral grounds hinged on the fact of the King's unity with, and leadership of the *patrie* community. This assumption underpinned every claim that royal agents made in the course of executing Condé's condemnation, just as the same assumption had structured the arguments against Condé during the Fronde, and the proceedings against him in its aftermath. Unity with the *patrie* was both the mechanism by which the King had defeated Condé's claims, and the prize he claimed for his victory.

The King's authority was absolute, benevolent, and beneficial; obedience to him provided freedom, peace, and comfort; and, in contrast to Condé's ambition and self-interested infidelity, generous service to the King who incarnated the French community would bring harmony. The Substitute Procureur-Général used all of these enticements and exhortations in encouraging his audience to swear "to do Justice to the name of the King, carry out the Judgements made in his name, and to neither recognize, nor suffer the recognition any other but him."<sup>793</sup> In the near term, such compliance would speed and smooth the assessment of Condé's assets and the execution of the sentence against him. In the long term, and more crucially, these speeches and the assent of their recipients laid a cornerstone of the cultural foundations on which Louis XIV would construct his absolutist reign. The King now claimed, and took pains to enforce his claims on subjects' obedience and loyalty, in ways that were at once permanent, intimate, and actively contributive.

Of course, it would be rather naïve to assume that Jannard's speeches would translate directly into practice, and it is safe to say that some members of his audiences

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<sup>792</sup> BA MS 2843 f. 90b.

<sup>793</sup> BA MS 2842 f. 382.

accorded the King no more obedience or cooperation after them than before.<sup>794</sup> He surely knew this, as surely as he knew it was not the point. Rather, the royal party hoped to lay down a marker, to plant its flag as a starting point for the negotiations that characterized Louisquatorzian absolutism. The Crown made strong claims in dealing with the Grand Condé and in administering its decisions, during and after the Fronde. They did so not in the hope of establishing rigid rules, but precisely because they expected to bend according to circumstances. Indeed, royalist pamphlets and trial records accord the King such latitude. But the test of Louis' flexibility arrived not long after the Fronde, during the negotiations with Spain over the Treaty of the Pyrenees in late 1659. The meetings between Cardinal Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro showed the willingness of the King and his agents to retreat from parts of their well-articulated theories in order to secure a positive outcome for the Kingdom. But by the same token, the principles from which they would not budge reveal the points that seemed to them most important for the assurance of royal authority and subject-sovereign relations. In this sense, the Fronde's afterword was perhaps its most important chapter.

### **“A Monument to Rebellion”: The Grand Condé in the Treaty of the Pyrenees**

From July until November of 1659, the principal ministers of France and Spain met on the Isle of Pheasants, situated perfectly astride the two countries, to arrange peace between the most powerful monarchs in Christendom. Both Cardinal Jules Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro wanted peace, as did both kings and the people of both nations. The Franco-Spanish wars had dragged on since 1635, consuming untold numbers of lives and

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<sup>794</sup> Having said this, it should be noted that the three agents do not report any further resistance after the speeches, in the towns where they were given.

incalculable quantities of treasure. At last, peace was in sight - but it almost collapsed over the question of the Grand Condé's return to France.

The major strategic, territorial, and diplomatic questions had been addressed in a draft treaty that both sides had agreed to in June, 1659.<sup>795</sup> However, the Prince's demands, Philip IV's honor-bound obligations, and Mazarin's distrust and even hatred of Condé very nearly scuppered the talks. Although Condé ardently desired an honorable return, he also desired a sovereign territory of his own, and full pardons and restitutions for himself and all those who had followed him to Spain.<sup>796</sup> At the same time, Philip IV felt compelled to reward the service of the man who had been his "principal ally" since 1651, and constrained to honor his side of the Treaty of Madrid.<sup>797</sup> To fulfill both debts, he hoped to reward the Prince with significant gifts of land or money. On the other side of the table, Mazarin felt no love, trust, or forgiveness toward Condé, and was disinclined to accept any terms that might benefit the man who had so famously betrayed his homeland and his King. These mutually exclusive motives would not be easily reconciled, and as early as August, the Cardinal lamented to Secretary Le Tellier, "The issue of Monsieur the Prince has become an invincible obstacle to my aims."<sup>798</sup> More dire still, he worried a few days later that "Monsieur the Prince could be fatal to all Christendom, as he is willing to prevent the conclusion of this peace for the sake of his interests alone."<sup>799</sup> In the end, of course, the

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<sup>795</sup> Don Luis Méndez de Haro y Guzman, *Letters from the Pyrenees*, ed. Lynn Williams (Exeter, UK: Exeter University Press, 2000), viii-xi.

<sup>796</sup> Condé explicitly instructed both of the agents he sent to the negotiations on this point. See BN MFr 6731, ff. 276-267 (to Lenet), 286-291 (to Caillet).

<sup>797</sup> *Letters from the Pyrenees*, ix, n.10. The Spanish delegation was no less enthusiastic for the Prince's cause, and Haro at one point needed to chastise a certain Christoval for his outburst on behalf of the man who had led "the most glorious and remarkable actions that Spanish arms had accomplished in the course of the war." BN MFr 7156 f. 178, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 30 August 1659.

<sup>798</sup> BN MFr 7156 f. 58b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 19 August 1659.

<sup>799</sup> BN MFr 7156 f. 83b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 22 August 1659.

Treaty of the Pyrenees satisfied (more or less) all parties. More than that, however, its terms and the process of its agreement established standards regulating the bonds of national loyalty, and the dynamics of absolutist politics.

The Grand Condé's return, like his conviction, marked a watershed in the history of French national attachment. André Corvisier, in his classic study of the French army, states succinctly that among warrior nobles, "After the Grand Condé, defections [against France] became very rare, and were primarily committed by *aventuriers*" - mercenaries.<sup>800</sup> Likewise, the Treaty of the Pyrenees arrived at a critical point in the evolution "from citizen into subject," which Charlotte Wells has identified as the shift in legal principles of national belonging, away from a model rooted in one's choice be French, toward one premised primarily on obedience to the monarch.<sup>801</sup> At the same time, Wells points out, blood and birth became defining issues for one's inclusion in the national community.<sup>802</sup> Peter Sahlins, approaching the question of belonging from the perspective of foreigners' "anti-privileges," finds a similar trend across Louis XIV's reign. He notes increasingly strict legal principles regarding immigration, emigration, and especially the *droit d'aubain* that largely defined Frenchness in practice.<sup>803</sup> In short, the historiography of national inclusion during the early reign of Louis XIV all points to increasingly tight, durable, and intimate subject-sovereign bonds. In Mazarin's arguments against Haro, we see all of these ideas at work.

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<sup>800</sup> André Corvisier, *L'Armée Francaise de la fin du XVIIè siècle au ministère de Choiseul* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964) i: 103.

<sup>801</sup> Wells, *Law and Citizenship*, 97. Though Wells sees this shift as the King replacing the *patria* community that had dominated citizenship discourse during and immediately after the Wars of Religion (see her Ch. 3), I perceive that the King's assumption of the *patrie* during and after the Fronde accomplishes the same end. At the same time, co-opting rather than discarding such community-focused principles would maintain the important demands on a subject's service and sentiments that I have highlighted in the preceding pages.

<sup>802</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>803</sup> Sahlins, *Unnaturally French*, Ch1, especially pp. 53-65.

The first and most basic point of contention in the haggling over Condé concerned who, precisely, the Prince of Condé was. To open the debate, Haro made his case bluntly: the King of Spain “would never again find allies if, in view of the whole world, and after the promises made [to Condé in the Treaty of Madrid], he were to leave him abandoned and despoiled.”<sup>804</sup> Mazarin agreed that Condé’s personal notoriety, to say nothing of the Treaty’s inherent importance, made its terms as significant as the accomplishment of peace. However, he immediately and indignantly rejected the idea that the Prince had been Spain’s ally. Only a sovereign, he protested, could formally ally with another sovereign, and Condé was emphatically not an independent Prince.

Mazarin minced no words on this point: “There is a great difference between a sovereign prince seeking restitution for a fortress he lost, and a subject who wishes to be compensated for having taken up arms against his king in an unheard-of rebellion.”<sup>805</sup> By the evidence of Mazarin’s intense, thorough, and very long reply on this point, France placed great importance on the Prince’s status as a subject. In the talks, Mazarin often framed the issue euphemistically as the Prince having “forgotten himself” and his “duty to his sovereign”; when he lost patience, however, he called Condé a “pernicious”<sup>806</sup> rebel whom France regarded with “horror”<sup>807</sup> for “having committed the worst rebellion one could ever see,”<sup>808</sup> while those who followed him were “evil Frenchmen.”<sup>809</sup> The Prince was simply, but definitively, a French subject - albeit, one who had led an extraordinary rebellion. In all of this, Mazarin’s phrasings connote the permanence of national identity, as

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<sup>804</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 81 Mazarin to Le Tellier, 21 August, 1659.

<sup>805</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 109, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 25 August 1659.

<sup>806</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 89b, 94b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 22 August 1659.

<sup>807</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 169, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 30 August 1659.

<sup>808</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 192b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 2 September 1659.

<sup>809</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 76, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 21 August 1659.

well as the potential for rehabilitation. After all, one who “forgets himself” or his duty may be reminded, a rebel must be a subject first, and even “evil Frenchmen” remain Frenchmen.

By insisting on Condé’s subjecthood, Mazarin slammed the door on Spain’s initial demand, that the Prince be given some territory to rule - perhaps in Flanders, Calabria, or Sardinia. For Mazarin, such compensation would be unconscionable for two reasons: first, he did not trust the Prince, and was understandably skeptical of his intentions to serve Louis obediently. Indeed, he felt his circumspection was natural, and stipulated that “His Majesty... would be accused of imprudence to rely on [Condé’s] word in a matter of such importance.”<sup>810</sup> The thought that Condé might once again “fall into the same error” was never far from Mazarin’s mind, though he constantly reminded Haro that Condé’s return, submission, and perpetual obedience would smooth over that mistrust.<sup>811</sup> Second, and more importantly, giving Condé power over a place unattached to France would both weaken his ties to his King, and give him an ongoing reason for gratitude, and perhaps service, to Spain. Tellingly, when Haro pressed the point, Mazarin admitted that the French King might allow Condé to rule a territory of his own - but that in doing so, he would sever all ties with France. So, if he would “renounce France forever, and in a word become a completely naturalized Spaniard, I think the King would agree.” Here, as ever, Mazarin endeavors to render the Prince unambiguously and unmistakably, “either totally French or totally Spanish.”<sup>812</sup>

This perfectly binary national dichotomy, and the zero-sum stakes of negotiations between the two crowns defined Mazarin’s approach to the Condé question. He maintains

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<sup>810</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 69b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 19 August 1659.

<sup>811</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 197b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 2 September 1659. On Mazarin’s concern for Condé’s future military strength, see BN MFr 7156 ff. 70-71b, Mazarin to Louis XIV, 21 August 1659.

<sup>812</sup> BN M.Fr. 7156 f. 79b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 21 August 1659.

that no man can obey two masters, and at the same time assumes that a servant's gratitude for favor conditions his obligations, in keeping with his statist presuppositions. As such, any gift, payment, or other consideration from Philip IV unavoidably weakened the Prince's already-dubious devotion to Louis XIV and to France. Such a conception accords perfectly with the moral devotion, along with the implicit xenophobia, demanded by the Sun King's model of patriotic kingship. The Cardinal confirms that this is his operative assumption in his frequent pairing of King and *patrie*, especially in cases where he seeks to invoke the sentimental bond of *bons françois* to both. In this light, we must note his worry that any Spanish remuneration to the Prince might "serve as a monument of his rebellion for posterity, and will be a pernicious example to those of his condition, [encouraging them] to enter Spanish service against their King and their *patrie* in order to win similar rewards."<sup>813</sup> Mazarin consciously intended Condé's treatment to instruct French nobles, and France in general, on the bright line the Crown sought to draw between rebels like Condé, and "*bons françois*, zealous for the service of the King and for the good of their *patrie*."<sup>814</sup> French subjects under Louis XIV faced a black-or-white, French-or-foreigner, choice.

The King himself, by contrast, had an infinitely broad scope of action regarding his perception of the State's best interests. Mazarin made this point openly, both to Haro and to Louis himself. In his earliest, tone-setting letters, the Cardinal reminded the young monarch that "you are the Master, in all certainty, able to do what seems good to you." At the same time, however, he cautioned Louis that the misapplication of such absolute power would bring God's exacting judgment, as well as the earthly consequences of miserable

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<sup>813</sup> BN M.Fr. 7156 f. 94b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 22 August 1659.

<sup>814</sup> BN M.Fr. 7156 f. 234b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 10 September 1659.

subjects and advantage-seeking enemies: "I can assure you that it is a certain truth, that the Prince of Condé and many others are alert... to profit on any pretext you may give them" to again trouble the throne.<sup>815</sup> Such *raison d'état* principles were a two-edged sword, and Mazarin used the specter of the Grand Condé as a boogeyman to drive this point home. In the end, however, the King's freedom to pursue his preferred course of action allowed him to reap important advantages at the Pyrenees negotiations, and to reaffirm strict principles of citizenship, at the minimal cost (however distasteful) of pardoning his fractious cousin.

As it happened, Haro raised the point that Kings of France had often opted to pardon criminals, though his arguments backfired spectacularly. After weeks of stalemate over Spain's wish to compensate the Prince, Don Luis pursued a new line of attack in the final days of August, probably at the suggestion of Condé's agents. He reminded Mazarin that troublemaking nobles, including the recent cases of Conti, Turenne, La Rochefoucauld, and other frondeurs, had set a precedent for leniency and even liberality. Judging by these cases, Haro observed, "it is rather ordinary to forgive such crimes, and not only to obtain pardon, but even to profit from them."<sup>816</sup> Two weeks later, Haro continued in this vein, citing the 15<sup>th</sup> century case of the Constable of St. Pol to substantiate his claim that "rebellions are common in France, and those who commit them have always been re-established."<sup>817</sup> To some extent, Haro made an incisive point: the King had forgiven all of the other Frondeurs, and had afterward given high-profile commissions and favors to some

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<sup>815</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 11b-12b, Mazarin to Louis XIV, 16 July 1659.

<sup>816</sup> BN MFr 7156, f.90, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 22 August 1659.

<sup>817</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 212, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 4 September 1659.

- Conti had married Mazarin's niece in less time than it took to condemn his unrepentant brother.<sup>818</sup> Why, Haro mused, was Condé singled out for such unusually harsh treatment?

Mazarin responded angrily to these assertions, which he viewed as tending to "establish the dictum that rebellion is not a crime in France, and moreover that it is a means of bettering one's condition." In the first place, he shot back, all pardoned Frondeurs had "implored the King's clemency, and had returned to obedience with the utmost submission, without condition or any pretension beyond the honor of the King's goodwill."<sup>819</sup> The same could not yet be said of Condé, for Mazarin viewed the inordinate difficulty of the present discussions as extortion rather submission. And of course, the Prince's future obedience remained an open question. But, what of persons whose loyalty to the Crown had been purchased, such as certain combatants after the Wars of Religion, or more recently the Count of Daugnon and other middling noble frondeurs? For Mazarin, both represented a regrettable fact of politics, for otherwise "it would have been impossible to end the civil war, and to recover all the places we had lost." In short, "the King - far from having too much goodness toward such people - has always employed the greatest rigor when the good of his service has demanded it."<sup>820</sup> In all of these cases, the King had chosen to secure what seemed in his eyes the best outcome for France, by whatever means seemed suited to accomplish that goal.

Further, Haro's citation of the Constable of St. Pol illustrated Mazarin's own point nicely. In brief, "if [St. Pol] did often make peace, and if he did profit by it (...) at moments

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<sup>818</sup> Pierre Lenet, *Mémoires de Pierre Lenet... concernant l'histoire du Prince de Condé...*, eds. Champollion-Figeac and Champollion in *Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France*, eds. Michaud and Poujoulat, Série 3: II (Paris: Editeur du commentaire du Code Civil, 1838), 618.

<sup>819</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 91, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 22 August, 1659. Beyond Mazarin's obvious point about contrition, the latter half of this phrase reinforces the principle that service should spring from a selfless, even sacrificial desire to please the King and aid the *patrie*.

<sup>820</sup> *Ibid.* f. 91b.

when Kings felt constrained by the circumstances of the times, in the end, he lost his head.”<sup>821</sup> In other words, Mazarin recognized that the Crown’s ability to hold subjects strictly to their duty ebbed with the changing tides of state power. At moments of weakness, such as the aftermath of crippling civil wars, generous terms might be offered to rebels out of necessity. But, so long as this helped to pacify the realm, and so long as the former rebels did in fact return to their duty, these instances did not soften the rigid demands of national loyalty, as Condé presumed. Rather, these were exceptions to the general rule that rebellious subjects faced harsh penalties, “when [the State] had the power to do so.” And in response to Haro’s recent fondness for historical precedents, Mazarin exhumed the less-merciful cases of Biron, Montmorency-Boutteville, Cinq-Mars, and de Thou. Neither did he omit the Grand Condé’s namesake, the first Louis de Bourbon, who had escaped decapitation only by the sudden death of François II.<sup>822</sup> If the King’s judgment sometimes demanded clemency for rebels when France was weak, in better times, the same calculations demanded severity.

But the divergent outcomes that various French rebels faced was more than a simple necessity - it was a powerful asset, in Mazarin’s view. So, though he conceded to Haro’s intimation that France had recently suffered many rebellions, it had handled them effectively, and far better than Spain. In Haro’s nation, rebels met with an unyielding royal will - until their movements succeeded, at which point His Catholic Majesty was forced to agree to far greater concessions. In Spain, Mazarin stated dryly, “I have remarked that when one cannot chastise and remedy uprisings, one coddles them, as was the case with the Portuguese and the Catalans... not only offering pardons, but also new privileges and

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<sup>821</sup> BN MFr 7156, f.212b, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 4 September 1659.

<sup>822</sup> Ibid, 212b.

large payments to those with the most *crédit* in the land." And recently, Holland had actually won independence from Spain by its long rebellion! So, "if France's misfortune is that rebellions and revolts occur more often than in Spain, this is softened by the facility with which the French return to their duty, which cannot be said of the King of Spain's subjects." He concludes his harangue with the quip that, "If Spanish subjects more rarely [rebel], they never return."<sup>823</sup> Mazarin's point is clear: the absence of rebellion is not necessarily the mark of a strong monarchy; rather, the ability to cope with rebellions and to reintegrate unruly subjects signals a healthier King and kingdom. As such, France's bend-but-don't-break policy had helped to pacify the nation after the Wars of Religion, during the tumultuous reign of Louis XIII, and now in the wake of the Fronde. By contrast, Spain's rigid policy led to brittle bonds, and now the fracturing of its empire.

Mazarin's esteem for such *raison d'état*-driven policy informed his assessment of domestic policy as well as his diplomatic goals. So, when Haro began to retreat from his obdurate starting position in early September, Mazarin likewise softened his own stance on concessions for Condé: the Prince might be allowed to receive some gift, if Spain would sufficiently sweeten the pot for France. Haggling over particulars continued through early October, but in the end, all sides were satisfied by Spain's cession of several strategic cities and forts in exchange for Condé's winning important governorships for himself and his son. In addition, and most important in the Prince's eyes,<sup>824</sup> he and all his followers won an honorable return to France, and the restoration of all their goods, charges, and

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<sup>823</sup> BN MFr 7156, f. 93, Mazarin to Le Tellier, 22 August 1659.

<sup>824</sup> Condé had privately admitted to his go-betweens for these negotiations that he would sooner return without any consideration for himself (whether he understood that this might open the door to his execution is not clear), than fail to provide for the clients who had spent the past five years living "as Bohemians and Gypsies" in Spain's service. On the Prince's characterization of his and his clients' lives, see BN MFr 6731, f. 224, Condé to Haro, 23 April 1655; on his self-sacrificing protection of his clients, see *Ibid*, ff. 286-291, Instructions to Caillet, 11 May 1658.

privileges.<sup>825</sup> This arrangement allowed Philip IV to feel he had vigorously fought for Condé's interests, while the Prince returned as the governor of Burgundy, where two generations of Condéen administration had already solidified an extensive and effective clientele.<sup>826</sup> Though the exchange came at a high price in gall for Mazarin and Louis XIV, the strategic advantages they drew from it dwarfed the cost: Spain ceded the cities and strongholds of Avesnes, Marienbourg, Philippeville, and Juliers, which significantly bolstered French interests along her northern borders.<sup>827</sup> Forgiving Condé on these terms demonstrated a “sacrifice” of the King’s “individual passions” for the larger good of the state, which Mazarin had implored Louis to pursue from the talks’ outset.<sup>828</sup> Ultimately, the Grand Condé had his patrimony, honor, and even his life saved by the very policy that he had expended his patrimony, honor, and the better part of his adult life to abolish.

With the Treaty of the Pyrenees agreed and signed,<sup>829</sup> Condé returned to Court and humbled himself before the King, whom he once again recognized as his lord. He formally renounced his part in the 1651 Treaty of Madrid, and accepted the terms of the Treaty of the Pyrenees. He wrote a brief, formal, and above all humble letter to the Court: “We, Louis de Bourbon, Prince of Condé, First Prince of the Blood, etc... promise to the King never to accept from a foreign king or power,” any gift, or other “attachment to any other than His Majesty.”<sup>830</sup> And on January 27, 1660, he at last appeared in the Sun King’s presence at Aix, where he “knelt before his sovereign and declared his undying fidelity,” and received the

<sup>825</sup> The final phases of arrangements are recorded in Mazarin’s letters to Lionne (28 September, 1659), and Le Tellier (30 September and 3 October, 1659) – see BN MFr 7156, ff. 317-328b.

<sup>826</sup> See Julian Swann, *Provincial Power and Absolute Monarchy: The Estates General of Burgundy, 1661-1790* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2003); Beth Nachison, *Provincial Government in the Ancien Régime: The Princes of Condé in Burgundy*, PhD dissertation (U. of Iowa, 1992); Béguin, *Princes de Condé*, 300-393.

<sup>827</sup> BN MFr 7156 f. 359, Mazarin to Gaston d’Orléans, 26 October 1659; *Letters from the Pyrenees*, 101.

<sup>828</sup> BN MFr 7156, ff. 11-11b, Mazarin to Louis XIV, 16 July 1659.

<sup>829</sup> BN MFr 6731, ff. 309-324.

<sup>830</sup> Declaration, 26 November 1659, Transcribed in Lenet, *Mémoires*, 631.

pardon he had been promised.<sup>831</sup> Though it would be many years before he regained the full measure of royal favor, the Prince held to his promise to remain obedient, and fell squarely into place at the royal Court, even recognizing Mazarin's precedence and power.<sup>832</sup> The Princely Fronde was over.

The Grand Condé's treatment in the Treaty of the Pyrenees is doubly significant. In the first place, Mazarin insisted on the Prince's subjecthood, which bound him by tight, exclusive, and permanent links to France and its King. The vigor, and at times overt anger, with which the Cardinal defended those principles showed the importance that the Crown assigned to subjects' fidelity, in the wake of the Fronde. And yet, Mazarin had urged the King to allow the Prince to return relatively unharmed by his nearly decade-long rebellion, including five years of service to the kingdom's primary adversary. These apparently paradoxical outcomes highlight the workings of post-Fronde absolutism: the Crown made strong demands, but was self-consciously willing to give ground to its interlocutors in order to reach, or at least approach its goals. More than exemplifying major principles and processes of Louis XIV's reign, though, the case of the Prince of Condé shows one of the King's most unqualifiedly successful negotiations. The King immediately gained several important towns and fortresses, in return for which he agreed to pardon a man who would serve him faithfully and capably for more than two decades, and whose death merited a soaring eulogy from absolutism's leading proponent, Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet. The Sun King had, all at once, affirmed strict principles of loyalty on a nationally and internationally visible stage, won significant strategic advantages in the short term, and

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<sup>831</sup> Bannister, *Condé in Context*, 158.

<sup>832</sup> The final lines of Lenet's *Mémoires* rather humorously make no effort to hide the author's distaste for this outcome: "Ainsi la fortune du Mazarini, issu de la plus basse extraction, l'éleva au-dessus même d'un prince du sang royal de France, de ce prince qui fut nommé par l'histoire le Grand Condé" (632).

regained the services of one of the age's most important commanders. The Grand Condé's rehabilitation was exemplary in every sense of the word.

### **Rebellion, Pedagogy, and the Rise of Absolutism**

The lower courtyard of the Château Condé at Chantilly prominently displays a life-sized sculpture of Louis XIV. An Apollonian figure, his romanesque robes adorned with *fleurs de lis*, stands above a prostrate, writhing barbarian with one foot poised on his head. In one hand the victor bears a scepter, while the other rests casually but purposefully on a sheathed sword. The Sun King's eyes look forward, calm and perhaps even wryly amused, wholly untroubled by the muscular foe he has bested. The personified Fronde, defeated, hides his face with one arm, as if ashamed to be seen and named. Entitled *Louis XIV Terrassant la Fronde*, it is an unsubtle marker of the King's ascendancy over the forces of disorder that had plagued the early years of his reign.

Brutally appropriate as this monument's current context may be – recessed in a wall of the Condé family's waterside garden – this placement rips the piece from the context that initially gave it meaning: it was erected in 1654, in the courtyard of the Parisian Hôtel de Ville. One of the most publicly visible spaces in the French capital, this had also been the scene of the Grand Condé's July 4, 1652 assault and arson against the hesitant municipal government, perhaps the most heinous act of the Prince's life. No seventeenth-century Frenchperson, and certainly no Parisian, could have mistaken the message carried either in the piece itself, or in its placement. Keenly attuned to the symbolic vocabulary of the early modern world, viewers would have recognized that a young, dynamic King was prepared to lead France out of the dark years she had lately endured, into a bright new dawn. He

literally bore the mantle of the whole French nation on his herculean shoulders, and comfortably wielded the instruments of domestic and military authority. To *bons françois*, this work communicated the power of the King to subdue any threat to the national unity that they prized. To any remaining dissidents, it served as a reminder of the chaos that accompanied rebellion, no less than a warning of the hopelessness of opposition. Further still, its potency would have been amplified by its scarcity, for Louis XIV's beloved person was a relatively rare subject for artworks, during the 1650s.<sup>833</sup> This image, in sum, symbolized the Crown's intent to use the Fronde's memory to instruct France in the new powers the monarchy claimed.

The Grand Condé, then, was the perfect medium for such lessons. His early exploits had established him in the pantheon of French heroes, while his controversial choices during the Fronde made him the center of debates over national attachment, duty, and virtue. His resounding defeat provided the King a perfect foil: a man whose obligations were exquisitely well-defined and well-known, and who had failed just as famously to fulfill the demands of his birth, blood, and rank.<sup>834</sup> His rebellion, trial, and repatriation allowed Louis XIV to remind his subjects of how the ideal Frenchman's love and service should function, and simultaneously to demonstrate the consequences for flouting those duties. In the end, these "teachable moments" cost the King little, and may well have been the catalyst for a more positive outcome in his war with Spain than he otherwise would have achieved.

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<sup>833</sup> Peter Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1992), 45.

<sup>834</sup> Though a full discussion of Condé's service to Spain would be superfluous here, it is worth noting that his career from 1654-1659 must further have seemed tailor-made for the Crown's purposes. As a Spanish commander, he won battles just frequently enough to carry the sort of threat appropriate to an anti-hero, but suffered high-profile defeats (especially the 1658 Battle of the Dunes near Dunkirk) often enough to demonstrate the superiority of truly French arms.

The lesson itself was as straightforward in theory as it was chimerical in practice. The King now demanded selfless service as a consequence of his subjects' innate love for him, and for the *patrie* community that he embodied. But for all the hard-edged rhetoric that Condé's rebellion and trial produced, Louis showed himself willing to forgive, where it served his and France's interests. The Fronde, and especially the Grand Condé's part in the rebellion, allowed the Crown to shift the boundaries of acceptable political discourse to its great advantage. The negotiations upon which absolutism was based would begin on terms more favorable to the King. Though the Princely Fronde's arguments were definitively discredited, certain useful elements of his claims remained: the emphasis on the King's person and will, and the embodiment of virtues and patriotic responsibilities. Merged with Mazarin's statism and the populist frondeurs' *patrie* ethos, the Sun King now possessed the cultural wherewithal to plausibly make strong claims of his subjects.

### **Conclusion – The Legacy of the Grand Condé**

On March 10, 1687, Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet stood before the altar of the Cathedral of Notre Dame, facing an audience of the most distinguished and powerful individuals in France, to deliver the Grand Condé's eulogy. The Prince had earned such an honor in the years following the Fronde: after a seven-year period of royal disfavor, he had slowly won back the King's trust, and soon led French forces in the Franche-Comté against Spain in the late 1660s, and gloriously against the Dutch during the 1670s. As age and gout gradually caught up with the Grand Condé, he had turned his attention to his estates and to court, remaking himself as "a model of civilized behavior."<sup>835</sup> He served the King ably as governor of Burgundy, provided for his son's education, fulfilled his duty as a courtier, and generally comported himself as a consummate *honnête homme* in the Versailles-era mold. Condé's post-Fronde accomplishments, his elevated birth, and his enduring fame as the Victor of Rocroi, all combined to make his death into a nationally significant event, and hence an intensely politicized occasion.

The Grand Condé's funeral was the quintessence of Louisquatorzian absolutism: at the zenith of the Sun King's power, Bossuet, who most famously articulated the theory of absolutism, lauded Condé, the rebellious nobleman whose defeat had provided the conceptual means to expand Louis XIV's power. In doing so, the Bishop reaffirmed the pillars of absolutist culture to an audience of key figures within it. The Bishop's speech, more than thirty years removed from the Fronde, testifies to the persistence and power of the discourses that emerged from the rebellion, throughout the Sun King's rule.

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<sup>835</sup> Mark Bannister *Condé in Context: Ideological Change in Seventeenth-Century France* (Oxford, UK: Legenda, 2000), 200-203.

Bossuet's eulogy reinforces, point by point, the pillars of "patriotic kingship" that Louis XIV constructed from the discursive remnants of the Fronde: selfless service, patriotic affections, and embodied attachments.<sup>836</sup> Bossuet emphasized the Grand Condé's ability to "vanquish himself," and recalled his generous desire to serve the King rather than enrich himself. He praised the Prince's contributions to French glory, at war and in peace, and cast him as an instrument in the plans of "God, the Protector of France and of a King whom he has ordained for His great works." Most dramatically, he emphasized the Prince's innate, corporeal attachment to his nation and his King: the news that Louis XIV was gravely ill had sapped Condé's aged body of its very life! During the Fronde, these three ideas had been central pillars for the rebels' rhetoric. After the civil wars, the monarchy used its opponents' discourses to fortify its own power.

My dissertation has argued that the Fronde, and especially the Grand Condé's role in that rebellion, changed royal authority – not simply assured, expanded, or increased it. The Prince's actions and image provided the opportunity and conceptual materials to reimagine national sentiment, noble masculine honor, and the subject-sovereign bond. Condé effectively altered conceptions of belonging within the national community, the duty to protect others, and the norms that structured service to the King. The cliché that Louis XIV's reign responded to the legacy of the Fronde is therefore true – but not in the negative, reactionary sense usually meant. Instead, I have shown that three artifacts of the civil wars became mainstays of absolutist political culture: personalized political ties, selfless service to the nation, and affective communitarian sentiments.

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<sup>836</sup> For the speech itself, see F. Lachat, ed, *Oeuvres complètes de Bossuet* (Paris: Louis Vivès, 1862), 611-639.

My analysis of the Grand Condé's career in the 1640s and 1650s reveals pivotal, and to this point overlooked evolutions in French political culture. The following pages briefly summarize my findings, and draw out the major implications of my research. I then sketch the monarchy's application of Fronde-era discourses, across Louis XIV's personal reign. As Bossuet's laurels for Condé demonstrate, the concepts that grew up around the Prince during the Sun King's early reign endured well beyond that era. Viewing Louis XIV's reign through the prism of the Fronde, therefore, clarifies and reconfigures crucial developments in Old Regime politics.

*Building Patriotic Kingship: Statism, Personal Kingship, and the Patrie in the Fronde*

The Fronde was a product of Louis XIV's long regency, when the law and customs surrounding royal power fell into disarray. But even before the Fronde, a serious contest arose over the nature of the monarchy. Between the Battle of Rocroi and the outbreak of rebellion, the Grand Condé clung to the individuated sense of subject-sovereign relations that had dominated under Louis XIII – a model I have labeled “personal kingship.” In contrast, the Queen Regent and Cardinal Mazarin asserted the *raison d'état*-inflected concept of “statism,” which posed a subject’s obedience as a legal requirement. Condé understood his service as directed toward the King, for which the sovereign must gratefully and proportionately reward the servant; Mazarin saw those same acts as fulfillment of a subject’s duty, which the King was free to compensate, or not, as the good of the abstract state dictated. Condé’s ire on this point grew and festered, but he remained a faithful royal servant through 1649.

The Prince's fidelity to the Crown in the early stages of the rebellion provoked the rise of the *patrie*, the third major combatant in the cultural battles of the Fronde. The Grand Condé took command of the royalist Siege of Paris in early 1649. In response, the populist frondeurs unleashed an avalanche of mazarinade pamphlets, mocking him and the Italian Cardinal. Against the Prince and Prime Minister's alleged greed, errors, and effeminate dishonor, the rebels imagined a pure French community. In contrast to the literal and moral foreigners who held power, the *bons françois* who populated the "true" France would be known by their prudent, generous, affectionate service on behalf of the *patrie* and their compatriots. The *patrie*, in short, built a proto-nationalist community, which required active service from its members. Patriotic rhetoric, and the virtues it promoted became potent claims-making tools astonishingly quickly.

As *patrie* discourse developed, it remade the cultural landscape of the Fronde, and of French politics more broadly in unpredictable ways. The Crown justified its arrest of the Grand Condé and the "Prison of the Princes" in 1650, by accusing the targets of immoderate ambition. After Condé's release in 1651, the Princely Party grafted patriotism onto its personal ethos, in an effort to convince Frenchpeople that the Prince's fight against Mazarin was a benevolent, patriotic cause. Their argument collapsed, however, when stretched to accommodate Condé's Treaty of Madrid. At the same time and with greater success, the royal party asserted the King's unity with the state, and more importantly and innovatively with the *patrie*. In doing so, the King constructed a means claim from his subjects more than obedience, but loyalty and love; more than compliance, but enthusiasm and sacrifice. In condemning, and later in pardoning the Grand Condé, the Crown publicized the principles of its hybrid concepts of "patriotic kingship."

The Fronde had fostered a new mode of monarchical politics, with wide-ranging and long-lasting consequences. As the prize for victory in the Fronde, the Crown selectively assimilated useful elements of Fronde-era discourse, to construct patriotic kingship. From the Prince's personal kingship, the King retained the sense of subjects' innate, embodied national identity and duties. At the same time, he co-opted the emphasis on the King's body and "presence," though these mutated considerably in his hands. From the frondeurs' *patrie*, Louis appropriated both the sentimental style of political attachment, and the incitement to selfless service to the nation. Combined with the royal party's statism, which gave the sovereign free rein to decide all matters for the health of the body politic, France's monarchy emerged from the Fronde greatly strengthened. Louis XIV was the center of a political culture that revolved around selfless service, patriotic affections, and embodied attachments. These would prove defining features of the Sun King's rule.

### *Selfless Service and Absolutist Patronage*

*Patrie* discourse blended with statism in powerful ways. In requiring generous aid to the nation out of affection rather than obligation, frondeurs provided a mechanism by which the Crown could demand and reward service in new ways. Simultaneously, frondeur patriotism's emphasis on prudence and self-mastery encouraged the kind of civility and courtly comportment that quickly became central features of the noble *métier*.

Because noble self-concept relied heavily on royal service, changes in the logics governing the King's patronage realigned the terms of noble culture under Louis XIV. Frondeur patriotism placed renewed, urgent emphasis on self-sacrificing, self-controlled ideals – Bossuet confirms the persistence of this focus in lauding Condé's generosity and

piety as the *sine qua non* of all his other virtues. During and especially after the rebellion, these ideals accelerated the “civilizing process” already at work among sword nobles.<sup>837</sup> In conjunction with a strong, popular monarch (at least, through the 1680s), who effectively incentivized courtly civility, the changes in political culture wrought by frondeur patriotism remained and intensified. Indirectly but crucially, then, the Fronde helped to bring nobles to court, and to accept the “softer” forms of masculinity associated with that world.<sup>838</sup> This is not to say that the ideal of the nobleman as warrior became obsolete: the Grand Condé’s war-centered post-Fronde career attest to the enduring significance of the profession of arms. But the terms in which the *noblesse d'épée* construed their battlefield service had shifted, to primarily emphasize generous service to the King and nation over valor or prowess for its own sake.<sup>839</sup>

The Fronde’s emphases on moderation and generosity altered not only the ideal motivations and forms of service, but the mechanisms of reward. In place of the automatic, “arithmetic” equation of deeds to favor that Condé had advocated, Louis XIV retained full discretion over the distribution of honors. Though he did in fact regularize and personalize the disbursal of patronage to royal servants, the royal will rather than the subject’s merit normatively dictated the terms of reward. The King’s culturally unimpeded capacity to distribute favor became a significant asset, in the broad scope of his reign. The monarch might enrich and elevate families of relatively low or robe nobility - like the Colbert, Phéypeaux, Lionne, and Le Tellier houses. Indeed, the King not only granted significant

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<sup>837</sup> Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: the development of manners* (New York: Urizen, 1982).

<sup>838</sup> Lewis Seifert, *Manning the Margins: Masculinity and Writing in Seventeenth-Century France* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

<sup>839</sup> Marlies K. Mueller, “From Hawk to Dove in Seventeenth-Century French Literature,” in *Homage to Paul Benichou*, Sylvie Romanowski and Monique Bilezikian, eds. (Birmingham, Ala: Summa, 1994), 267.

pensions to these powerful advisers, but actively encouraged matches between his most influential ministers and old-line nobility, to increase their social standing along with their wealth.<sup>840</sup> Before and during the Fronde, the Grand Condé had claimed that *mérite* (defined in large part by birth) demanded reward. In the wake of the Fronde, Louis XIV made the King's thanks the only sure result of worthy acts, and favored men whose service merited recognition, even when their lineage was humble. Still, reward was expressly rational rather than arbitrary under the Sun King, who of course knew that parsimony or inconsistency with *bienfaits* would sow distress and disorder among his elite subjects. By accepting the norm of personal, regular recognition for which Condé and his noble allies pined, but subsuming it to the royal will and to demands for selfless sacrifice, Louis "reinvented the sovereign's gaze," in the early stages of his personal reign.<sup>841</sup> Condé's role in the civil wars of the Fronde had conceptually enabled the Crown to remake the system of patronage; at the same time, however, his rebellion demonstrated the need for transparent, regular reward.

### *Patriotic Affections and National Unity*

Louis claimed to incarnate the state and the French community in the Fronde's aftermath, and thereby took hold of the emotional valences of political power, as well as the legal bases of national belonging. Such claims became powerful tools, for better or worse, for the remainder of the *Grand Siècle*.

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<sup>840</sup> Sarah E. Chapman, *Private Ambition and Political Alliances: The Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain Family and Louis XIV's Government, 1650-1715* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2004); Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army Under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Roger Mettam, *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1994), 88-89.

<sup>841</sup> Jay Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1996), 151-154

In the first place, Louis' appropriation of the love that French subjects had showered on the *patrie* after 1649 reinforced the shift toward voluntary, enthusiastic support for royal power. Of course, the King's claims on subjects' love was in large part a negotiating tactic, an element of the effort to secure advantageous terms for the collaborations that typified absolutism. But it seems to have been effective, in broad strokes: though hardly untroubled, Louis XIV's reign saw far less unrest, and handled resistance far more effectively, than prior administrations.<sup>842</sup> Again, this outcome resulted as much from administrative and military innovations, and confidence in a strong monarch as from new cultural forms. The cultural foundations of patriotic kingship facilitated precisely those institutional reforms (see above, on royal appointments), and encouraged trust in Louis' policies, however. Louis' claim to incarnate the *patrie* therefore went hand-in-hand with state formation in a technical sense, at the same time as it worked to elicit adoration and devotion from French subjects, in the more abstract realm of discourse.

Beyond eliciting affection for the King, the monarchy's appropriation of Fronde-era rhetoric laid crucial groundwork for the later rise of "proper" nationalism, and informed the development of citizenship law. Over the course of his reign, Louis XIV at various moments tightened the jurisprudence surrounding the *droit d'aubain*, which effectively defined nationality. In 1669 he had outlawed emigration without royal consent, and in 1697 he imposed a legally dubious and ultimately counterproductive Naturalization Tax.<sup>843</sup>

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<sup>842</sup> William Beik, *Urban protest in seventeenth-century France: The culture of retribution* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997), especially Chapter 7; Phil McCluskey, *Absolute monarchy on the frontiers: Louis XIV's military occupations of Lorraine and Savoy* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2013) is less direct on this point, but suggests that, especially in culturally similar regions, Louis imposed order through enticement and collaboration.

<sup>843</sup> Peter Sahlins, *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004), 53-56; Charlotte Wells, *Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 99.

Though the broader trend of French citizenship expanded inclusion, many of the Sun King's most noteworthy acts narrowed the standards of belonging, and even ejected those who had once been French.<sup>844</sup> And, in keeping with the frondeurs' insistence on personal qualities as national traits, legal aliens who wished to be recognized as French in the late 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries highlighted their moral and cultural affinity to France, alongside their lineage or birthplace.<sup>845</sup> Further still, just as the frondeurs had disqualified those with undesirable qualities from inclusion in the French community, Louis worked ardently to expel heterodox religious views from his kingdom. He persecuted the perpetually ill-defined Jansenist sect, forcibly re-educated the children of Huguenot nobles, and most famously revoked the Edict of Nantes.<sup>846</sup> The motivations behind each of these acts were clearly political, though the King could justify them all as working to unify and purify his realm – just as the patriotic rebels of the Fronde had desired.

### *Embodied Attachments and the Royal Presence*

In contrast to the *patrie*'s moral community, the Grand Condé's model of personal kingship focused on the body – on birth and blood – in defining French subjecthood. At the same time, the Prince highlighted the centrality of the King's presence in the royal administration. Condé's model itself sought to impose constraints on the King's scope of actions, but Louis' adaptation of the critical elements of personal kingship altered the range of claims the sovereign could make on his subjects. In conjunction with norms regarding

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<sup>844</sup> Wells, *Law and Citizenship*, 120.

<sup>845</sup> Sahlins, 121.

<sup>846</sup> Dale Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution : From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 34-39.

patriotic love affections and selfless service, the embodied style of politics and emphasis on the royal presence served absolutism well.

Seventeenth-century medicine and culture made much of the emotional or qualitative valences of one's body, as with the universally-acknowledged humoral basis of personality, the "science" of physiognomy, or the physical purity of noble blood. Extending this belief, mazarinades from the Crown, the frondeurs, and above all the Prince had ascribed national sentiments and political attachments to the location and condition of one's birth. Condé was incomparably French by his birth as much as his deeds, Mazarin and Anne were untrustworthy for their foreign origins, and all true Frenchpeople were obliged by their innate love of the *patrie* to defend the innocent people. In each of these assertions, authors rendered national or political questions as a product of one's very being – an interior, immutable quality. After the Fronde, royal propaganda instrumentalized ideals of French subjects' enduring, innate love for the nation and its King in order to compel obedience. Grounding politics in individual bodies and blood could stabilize and solidify the relationships that ultimately animated the larger body politic.

Conceiving monarchical power as a direct link between the sovereign's body and the bodies of his subjects expanded the scope of plausible claims that the ruler could make on the ruled. Far more than the institutional, fiscal, military, or legal reforms that streamlined and regularized the Sun King's administration, the corporeal conception of the King's power over his subjects changed qualitatively the claims he levied. So, while the law was certainly an indispensable means of implementing absolutism, law alone was a poor tool to compel the kind of active or intimate obedience that Louis frequently demanded of the

French.<sup>847</sup> Playing on embodied bonds, alongside deeply-held sentiments, supported claims that led to such outcomes as forcible religious re-education, dragonnades, and an early forerunner of counterinsurgency tactics. Indeed, royal officers echoed the corporeal language of the mazarinades, royalist propaganda, and Bossuet's eulogy itself, in statements of the necessity "to attack the hearts [of the *religionnaires*, for] that is where the religion resides."<sup>848</sup> Louisquatorzian absolutism sought more than compliance, but enthusiastic, heartfelt attachment from its subjects.

As useful as such a framework could be for Louis XIV's absolutism, understandings of the King's own body evolved rapidly in the wake of the Fronde. The royal person had long been the central site in monarchical politics and noble identity, and Louis XIV famously made his physical presence the fulcrum of all courtly and governmental activities, throughout his reign.<sup>849</sup> But during and after the Fronde, the sense of the King's "person" expanded. Louis XIV's abstract presence was "fabricated" nationwide, in the monuments and markers of his power, and such representations made the King's body a quotidian constant, and "gave kingship real presence in the daily lives of his subjects."<sup>850</sup> More than propaganda, this expansion of the "sovereign's gaze" facilitated Louis' panopticistic ambition to surveil and regulate his realm – most especially, the army.<sup>851</sup> The royalist mazarinades of the Fronde, and the Grand Condé's trial had promoted the abstract

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<sup>847</sup> James Collins, *Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany* (Cambridge, 1994); Sahlins, *Unnaturally French*, 56.

<sup>848</sup> Roy L. McCullough, *Coercion, Conversion, and Counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's France* (Boston: Brill, 2007), especially 153-170.

<sup>849</sup> In a sense, Louis XIV reversed the tendency Myriam Yardeni observes, wherein those who approached the monarch more frequently, during the 16<sup>th</sup> century, were less awed by the mystical aspects of his presence. *Conscience Nationale en France Pendant les Guerres de Religion (1559-1598)* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1971), 22.

<sup>850</sup> Peter Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1992); Jeffrey Merrick, "The Body Politics of French Absolutism," in *From the Royal to the Republican Body: Incorporating the Political in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France*, Sara E. Melzer and Kathryn Norberg, eds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 18.

<sup>851</sup> Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 158-164.

conception of the King's person and presence. The royals had accused the Prince of attacking the person of the sovereign, at various moments – a nonsensical charge, if taken literally. But the idea of a diffuse, observant royal person that those pamphlets and proceedings launched, blossomed during Louis' long reign, and did much to empower it.

Each of the elements that comprised patriotic kingship originated as a much narrower, more specifically directed concept. Personal kingship dealt primarily with royal favor, statism with subjects' legal obligations, and the *patrie* with factional side-choosing during the Siege of Paris. But as they expanded, adapted, and interacted during the Fronde and in its wake, their potential to affirm and enhance royal authority became apparent. Mazarin, in keeping with his results-driven statist approach, made whatever use he could of whatever tools were available, to affirm the monarch's authority. As it happened, the Fronde provided him with powerful tools indeed, and Louis XIV reaped the rewards of their incorporation into absolutist political culture throughout his long reign.

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