Poetic Voice and Readership in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*

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Abstract

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This dissertation reevaluates the relationship between the poet and reader in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura.* By exploring the way in which Lucretius projects his own voice into his poetry, this study first identifies Lucretius' poetic voice in relation to its place in the didactic tradition, its capacity to create intertextual allusions to other texts, and its pedagogical aims (Chapters 1 and 2). The study then investigates the readership of the poem and asks to whom Lucretius' poetic voice was directed not only literarily, in terms of the internal addressee, but also historically, in terms of Roman and Epicurean readerships (Chapters 3 and 4). In doing so, I offer a reading of the *De Rerum Natura* as a didactic poem that strives to create a non-authoritative, egalitarian relationship with its readership in order to present Epicureanism to a Roman audience.

Chapter 1 constructs the definition of an author's poetic voice from previous studies of other ancient authors, synthesizing them into a paradigm for the analysis of poetic voice in the *De Rerum Natura*. Chapter 2 discusses the interpretive implications of this voice as it manifests itself through satiric elements within the didactic genre, intertextuality within the context of Lucretian "atomology," and internal dialectic throughout the text. These aspects of Lucretius' poetic voice anticipate a reader who is an active interpreter of the poetic aspects of the text, making possible a non-authoritative, egalitarian relationship between the poet and reader. Chapter 3 shifts focus from the active participation of the formal reader and turns to the active

participation of historical and philosophical readers, whether actual readers or ideal philosophical readers constructed by the text. This chapter finds that the egalitarian relationship between poet and reader explored in the first two chapters corresponds to the historical and philosophical readership as well. Chapter 4 continues to investigate the egalitarian relationship between Lucretius and his readership by closely examining the last sustained philosophical argument in the text, Lucretius' account of magnetism. The Conclusion reiterates the main points of this project and suggests further study of this relationship as it resembles the social bond of friendship.

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CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Names of authors and titles of texts are abbreviated in agreement with those listed at the beginning of Liddell, Scott, and Jones' (eds.) *Greek-English Lexicon* (1996), and Glare's (ed.) *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (2010). Abbreviations of scholarly journals in the bibliography are taken from *L'annee philologique*. I have used the original Greek and Latin in citing words and passages that occur in the original texts, and have translated familiar technical terms and commonly used words such as atoms, matter, and void. All translations of Greek and Latin are my own, unless otherwise specified. Translations of the *De Rerum Natura* appear in verse format; however, a line by line correspondence between the original language and the English has often been sacrificed for the sake of clarity. At times I have underlined particular words in quoted passages in order to direct the reader toward salient points of the discussion. Sections are labeled by chapter number, a period, and then the appropriate section number, e.g. "Section 2.3" refers to chapter two, section three. The six books of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* are labeled as Roman numerals, e.g. "book II." While there is continuity between individual sections of this study, each section is autonomous and can therefore be read independently if one so wishes. The overall narrative of this study is described in the introductory paragraph of each chapter. Chapter four is a case study of the first three chapters and therefore serves as an extended conclusion to the study as a whole.

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For friends

Introduction

Biographical Questions: Lucretius and his Readership

Famously, Jerome's translation of Eusebius' *Chronicon* provides what little information we know about the life of Titus Lucretius Carus: he was driven mad by a love-philter, wrote in lucid intervals, and then killed himself at age 43.[1] Early Lucretian scholarship was heavily influenced by this morbid anecdote. For example, in his article entitled, "New Light Upon Lucretius," J.P. Postgate (1928: 1-16) argues that the section in Lucretius' history of civilization in which the poet discusses the employment of wild beasts in warfare (5.1302-1349) makes no reference to a reality that the historical Lucretius might have ever experienced (5). Postgate therefore argues that this passage was written by Lucretius during one of his not-so-lucid intervals (7-8). Interestingly enough, Postgate does not conclude that this sort of insanity was a bad quality to possess. The "new light" to which his title refers is to understand Lucretius' insanity as a positive quality. Postgate thus upholds Jerome's biographical account and argues that this passage, as well as other similar passages like it, originated from an insane mind; he adds though that "literary excellence of a high order is consistent with [such] insanity" (16). He then proceeds to give several ancient and modern parallels in which insanity produced fine results.

One of the effects of a scanty biographical tradition and a shortage of contemporary references to Lucretius, such as those made between the Augustan poets, has been the tendency in Lucretian scholarship for scholars to take a defensive posture such as the one described above.

[1] There are three sources from which we gather what little information we have on Lucretius' life. Jerome's translation of Eusebius' *Chronicon* also mentions that Cicero emended (*emendavit*) the *De Rerum Natura* after Lucretius died. Jerome's story is usually rejected. Next, Aelius Donatus' *Life of Vergil* claims that Lucretius died on the day that Vergil put on the *toga virilis* at age 17. Finally, Cicero's *Letter to Quintus* mentions that Cicero had read Lucretius and saw many flashes of genius in his work as well as (alternatively translated, "but") exhibits great literary art (*Lucreti poemata ,ut scribis, ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis,* 2.9.3). The dates of his life are usually given as 98-55 BCE, but are generally regarded as uncertain. See Conte (1994: 155-174) for an extended discussion of this evidence.

While charming, Postgate's approach is predicated on the notion that the *DRN* is a text that needs to be defended in response to questions of authorial authenticity.[2] Of course, in the past few decades, scholarship has moved away from questioning the authenticity of the author (biographical issues) and more towards explaining unity within the work itself (literary issues). Articles such as Kenney's "*Doctus* Lucretius" (1971: 369-372) and book-length studies such as Gale's *Myth and Poetry in Lucretius* (1994) have begun to reconsider the *DRN* as a unified work composed with purposeful choices within a particular literary tradition.[3] This scholarly trend accounts for not only Lucretius' position in the ancient world's philosophical tradition, but also his position in the *literary* tradition of the Greco-Roman world. Kenney argues against the notion that Lucretius wrote independently from a literary tradition, as a mere Epicurean translator in a cultural vacuum. He points out many undeniable Hellenistic literary influences.[4] While these lines may not be strictly Callimachean, Kenney argues, they do demonstrate Lucretius' familiarity with Alexandrian poetry. In terms of Lucretius' use of myth, Gale has steered the scholarly conversation away from simple efforts to reconcile incompatible attitudes

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[2] Other early Lucretian commentators who either directly or indirectly take a defensive stance include Leonard and Smith (1952) who associate Lucretius less with Vergil, Horace, and Ovid and more with Ennius whom "the energy of the thought and emotion often triumphed over, and atoned for, [his] less finished manner of expression" (183). Bailey (1947) defends Lucretius' seeming lack of organization by saying, "we must not demand logic, but try to catch the picture" (17-18) and often refers to inconsistences as "another case of Lucretius' suspension of thought" (1512). Büchner (1936) admits that Lucretius lacks control of a logical, methodical presentation of his doctrines (6-7) and Monro (1886), in regard to an instance in which Lucretius omits the second *vel* in an "either-or" construction (*DRN* 383ff.), finds it necessary to remark, "[even] the best Latin and Greek writers have like instances" (303). The reason for the prevalence of such defensive approaches in Lucretian scholarship may or may not directly stem from a scanty biographical tradition, but, nevertheless, each of these approaches is apologetic in its own right.

[3] See also, Asmis (1983: 36-66) who argues that though Lucretius sometimes appears illogical, he is always in control of his arguments through the fusion of philosophy and rhetoric.

[4] For example, he discusses 1.926-7 and 4.1-2 (*avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius / ante trita solo*) in relation to similar imagery in Hellenistic poetry. He also argues that lines 4.1146-8 include the imagery of the net which is familiar in love poetry (e.g. *Ibycus* 6). Coupled with book IV, he argues, this imagery engages in a sustained polemic against Catullus' views of life and love. In short, while Lucretius' readership might not have recognized Greek philosophical polemic, they certainly engaged with and appreciated Lucretius' "neoteric" style. See also Brown (1982: 77-118) who discusses the evidence for the influence of Callimachean motifs and expressions in the *DRN*. He also argues against the notion that Lucretius wrote in a literary vacuum.

of myth and poetry between Lucretius and Epicurus. Though Epicurus did reject myth and poetry as educational instruments, Gale argues, Lucretius does not break from the basic tenets of Epicureanism, but uses myth in order to problematize it in ways consistent with Epicurus' rejection of it (1994: 7-38).[5] Both studies are examples of scholars treating the *De Rerum Natura* as a complex work, able to be understood on its own terms, rather than a mere translation of Epicurus' philosophy or an archaic prelude to more refined neoteric poets.

The current study engages with this more recent trend in Lucretian scholarship. It begins by exploring the question, "How does Lucretius project his own voice in his poetry?" Essentially, as the first chapter explains, exploring this question allows us to analyze Lucretius' absent biographical voice and its effects on the reader by asking further questions as, what is specific to this voice in terms of its place in the didactic tradition? How do recurrent intertextual allusions to other texts point toward and further define this voice? What is this voice's pedagogical relationship with the reader(s)? The study then investigates the readership of the poem and asks to whom Lucretius' poetic voice, in all its complexity, was directed not only literarily, in terms of the internal, formal addressee, but also historically in terms of external readers such as the Roman reader and the Epicurean student. This study thus engages with the voice of the poet *and* of the author, which is to say the poet's voice found within the text and the author's voice as it existed within the late Republic; and correlated to the poet in the poem and the author in history are the second subjects of this study, namely the addressee within the text and the historical reader(s) outside the text. Ultimately, an investigation of this sort creates four points of reference from which to analyze the poem, each point being partially related to the others: the author, the poet, the internal addressee, and the external reader(s). An approach of

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[5] For example, the myth of how fire and water came to rule is rejected and replaced with an atomic explanation (Lucr. 5.406ff).

this sort will allow us to reframe biographical questions concerning Lucretius in a way that accounts for Lucretius, the man, and Lucretius, the poet.[6]

[6] This approach is a response to Hinds' (2010: 369-385) call for studies that move between formalist and historicist readings. See also the following studies on Roman elegy that account for the generic conventions of texts, but also on the dynamics of readers reading those texts: Wyke (1989: 25-47), Kennedy (1993: esp. 1-24) for a theoretical discussion, Conte (1994: 105-28) for a theoretical discussion of genre's impact on the reader, Sharrock (1994: 1-20 and 291-7) for a " re-reading" Ovid's *Ars Amatoria*, and Lee-Stecum (2000: 177-215) on the poet and the reader in Tibullus' *Elegies.*

Chapter One

Poetic Voice

> *A poet writes himself into his book more than any other man. He reveals not only his personality, its powers and preferences. He reveals no less his experience, for the concrete details are the precipitates of his experience – the upswelling memories, conscious or unconscious, that left the deepest impress, that troubled or moved him most, that most make him the poet he is.*
>
> -W.E. Leonard (1942: 15-6)

This chapter discusses the rationality of investigating Lucretius' "poetic voice" in the *De Rerum Natura* in order to approach biographical questions concerning the relationship between Lucretius and his readership. Upon reviewing the definition of poetic voice as it is constructed from classical scholarship, the first half of this chapter focuses on poetic voice in the texts of a select group of ancient authors. The second half of this first chapter then synthesizes a paradigm from those studies in preparation for approaching poetic voice in the *DRN*. This paradigm is based not on the specific functions of poetic voice in other texts, but on the particular aspects of each text that poetic voice makes use of in order to perform those functions. The paradigm is then applied to a close analysis of the *DRN* in chapter two. The third chapter shifts focus from Lucretius' poetic voice to the poem's reader(s) and analyzes those readers – jointly termed "readership" at this point – in historical and philosophical contexts, which I term "positions." The last chapter offers a case study of the above analysis. It discusses the effect of Lucretius' poetic voice on the poem's readership in the last argumentative section of the text, and then suggests that the resulting relationship between Lucretius and his readership gives us insight into the way in which Roman social bonds are embodied in the reading of Latin poetry. The current chapter is thus the starting point for this dissertation's eventual analysis of the relationship between Lucretius and his readership in the *De Rerum Natura.*

Chapter One, Part I Introduction

Using Poetic Voice to Answer Biographical Questions concerning Lucretius

As described in the anecdote above, Lucretius is an author about whom we know very little. Readers are left to wonder whether it was a Roman insider who wrote an Epicurean poem about disengaging from the elite *cursus honorum,* or an outsider from Athens, Herculaneum, or Naples,[7] who came to Rome to convert the superstitious Roman masses and debunk their naïve views of the world. We can only speculate on such motives and toward whom, patricians and/or plebeians, they were directed. Consequently, we know very little about the political ideology to which the poem might have adhered in its historical context, 1st century BCE Rome.[8] Other questions arise from the paucity of biographical evidence such as the closeness with which Lucretius' poem participates in the Hellenistic literary tradition,[9] to what extent the work reflects Roman attitudes,[10] and, foreshadowing the current study, what sort of pedagogical relationship,

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[7] For a discussion of Epicurean schools in Naples and Herculaneum, see Konstan's (1998: 1-24) introduction to the text, translation, and notes to Philodemus' *On Frank Criticism.* For Philodemus' possible encounter with a copy of the *DRN*, see Armstrong (1995: 210-232).

[8] For the most convincing narrative that describes Lucretius' views on Roman politics as "realistically skeptical," see Fowler (1989: 120-150) on the Sisyphus passage in book III and the rise of civilization in book V. See also the bibliography in the introduction to chapter three of the current study.

[9] See Gutzwiller (2007: 26-50) on Hellenistic literary aesthetics: the Hellenistic literary tradition is exemplified by "exclusivity of readership," "self-reflexive-ness," and an "acute-awareness of the poetic past." Sedley (1998: 62-93) shows that Lucretius was an Epicurean fundamentalist, who ignored all debate and development in Hellenistic *philosophical* tradition; yet, others show that Lucretius, while ignoring the philosophical tradition, is highly attuned to the Hellenistic *literary* tradition. For example, Ferrero (1949: esp. 246) defends Lucretius' association with Hellenistic authors such as Antipater of Sidon. Kenney (1970: 366-392) points out the presence of Hellenistic influence in terms of themes, as described above. Brown (1982: 77-97) gives evidence for Callimachean influence in terms of motifs and specific expressions. For the Callimachean imagery of the swan (Lucr. 4.909-911), see Donohue (1993: 35-60). See also Knox (1999: 275-287) for "road" imagery not necessarily being Callimachean but Pythagorean.

[10] See Donohue (1993:111-135) for a complete narrative of the supposed historical Roman addressee of the poem, Memmius. See also the introduction to chapter three of the current study for bibliography on the poem's fictive and ideal readership.

authoritarian or egalitarian, existed between the Lucretius and his readership.[11] These biographical questions have formed the basis for many studies in Lucretius.[12]

This chapter lays the groundwork needed to reframe those biographical studies and present them in a more nuanced way by examining internal evidence of Lucretius' voice within his poem. This internal evidence consists of what I term the poem's "poetic voice." Poetic voice, as I define it, is the manifestation of the author's thoughts or feelings in his work, but, as I discuss below, it is more than simply an instance of an internal character speaking in a way that reflects the author's own opinions or views (self-representation). What an ancient author expresses and how that expression manifests itself through poetic voice are both contingent upon the conventions of the text's genre, the text's associations with other texts, an interaction commonly called "intertextuality," and other literary strategies that manipulate content and form within the text itself. It is through those means that poetic voice projects into the text the author's own thoughts, opinions, directions, or, quoting from the epigraph above, "his experience, for [these] concrete details are the precipitates of his experience – the upwelling memories, conscious or unconscious, that left the deepest impress, that troubled or moved him most, that most make him the poet he is." Thus, the groundwork provided by this chapter is a determination of the means by which an author's poetic voice functions.

As a paradigmatic example of poetic voice, one can think of Homer's "poetic voice" in the song of the bard, Demodocus (*Od.* 8.62-67):[13]

κῆρυξ δ΄ ἐγγύθεν ἦλθεν ἄγων ἐρίηρον ἀοιδόν,

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[11] For an in depth discussion of the egalitarian (rather than a traditional Epicurean "authoritative") relationship between Lucretius and his audience, see chapter three of the current study.

[12] For a survey of these studies, see the introduction to chapter three of the current study.

[13] For further analysis of internal audiences in Homer as evidence for actual Homeric performance, see Taplin (2000: 22-58). See also Murray (1983: 1-15), who disagrees with this view.

τὸν πέρι μοῦσ᾽ ἐφίλησε, δίδου δ᾽ ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε·
ὀφθαλμῶν μὲν ἄμερσε, δίδου δ᾽ ἡδεῖαν ἀοιδήν.

Then the herald approached as he led the good bard,
whom the Muse loved above all other men, and gave both good and evil;
of his sight she deprived him, and instead gave him the gift of sweet song.

Od. 8.62-64[14]

Following this introduction, we hear the comic story of Ares and Aphrodite followed by the tragic story of the Trojan women. At the same time, we also hear Homer's poetic voice revealing the way in which he sees his own role as bard/poet (perhaps blind), tasked to tell both comic and tragic aspects of a man's journey. In a much different genre, that of Roman comedy, we can use Plautus as another example. The comic playwright's poetic voice is said to be heard in his play, *Pseudolus,* when at one point Pseudolus himself addresses the audience and admits that he is making up his stratagem as he goes along (*Pseud*. 394-408).[15] Pseudolus compares this process to the way in which a comic poet sits down to write a script; he, too, improvises not knowing how his work will end:

sed quasi poeta, tabulas cum cepit sibi,
quaerit quod nusquamst gentium, reperit tamen,
facit illud veri simile quod mendacium est,
nunc ego poeta fiam.

Just like a poet: when he starts to write,
He seeks what doesn't exist, and then he finds it;
He makes invented fiction look like truth.
All right, I'll be a poet!

Pseud. 401-404[16]

Again, we hear a character within a work referring to the text while simultaneously suggesting something else about the reality of the author who produced that text. This subtle form of

[14] For Homer's text throughout this study, I have used Allen (1920).

[15] Barsby (1995: 70) concludes, "Though *Pseudolus* itself is not an improvised play, it is specifically written so that it shall appear to be… because, right to the end of his career, the improvisatory tradition remained dear to Plautus' heart and to that of his audience." See also Hallett (1993: 21-26) who argues that the cook's list of ingredients (in particular, *maccis,* an imaginary spice in lines 790-873 reveals that the cook represents both Pseudolus, the character, and Plautus, the poet, both literarily and literally.

[16] For Plautus' text throughout this study, I have used Nixon (1916).

authorial meta-poetics has wide-ranging interpretive implications, which are specific to each text in which it is found. For Homer, we see a hint of the performance context of ancient epic. For Plautus, we are invited to interpret the improvisation of Pseudolus as similar to the way in which the poet, Plautus, haphazardly sat down and wrote the play itself. Since poetic voice functions differently in different genres, the conclusions we draw are dependent upon the work's form as well as its content.

This approach is unique in that it accounts for the text created by the "poet" as well as the biographical reality from which the "author" speaks, and is therefore unique in the way that it addresses biographical questions surrounding texts such as the *DRN,* a text in which the Roman world from which Lucretius speaks is not immediately clear. On the one hand, the term "poetic voice" refers to the relation the *poet* has with the work, and sheds light on certain literary aspects such as the poet's influences, in terms of his generic constraints or intertextual allusions to other works. On the other hand, poetic voice also refers to the relation the *author* has with the work, and reveals his historical presence to the extent that his work reflects his actual social and historical reality, such as performance and production contexts as described above with Homer and Plautus respectively.[17] In the context of the *De Rerum Natura,* a didactic poem (I use this classification advisedly), a study of poetic voice reveals Lucretius' historical presence in terms of the relationship between teacher and student, the poet and the reader(s).

The advantage of this approach for Lucretius is that it allows us to investigate his absent biographical voice in relation to the poem's very present poetic voice. As we will see, a study of poetic voice within the *DRN* allows us to rightly position Lucretius within his literary tradition

[17] In a broad sense, the way this study uses the approach of "poetic voice" is similar to the way Hinds (2010: 369-385) describes an approach that is "in between formalism and historicism," since the approach considers each -ism in its own right and the implication that it has for the other. This approach will be further discussed as the study progresses.

while also accounting for the social and historical dimension of the work in Rome. In doing so, it enables us to view Lucretius' Epicurean physics as both a literary and philosophical system inherited from the past and, at the same time, a commentary written about contemporary social concerns. These "social concerns" in a Roman context, a topic ostensibly subordinated in the *DRN*, will be addressed in the last chapter.

The first half of the current chapter (Sections 1.1-5) contains a review of scholarship pertaining to the "poetic voice" of a select group of ancient authors. The texts chosen for the review are mostly Greek, with the exception of Catullus. This was done for two reasons. First, it was important to focus on authors who chronologically appear before or contemporary with Lucretius so as not to rule out the possibility of influence. Second, the need to consider internal evidence for biographical studies in Greek literature appears more pronounced in scholarship, and therefore lends itself more fruitfully to formulating a paradigm for our purposes.[18] The works chosen were both poetry and prose from a variety of different genres in order to fully explore a wide variety of possible means by which poetic voice functions. As scholars have investigated the means by which these authors project their own thoughts/feelings/views into their texts, they have adapted their terminology (not always termed "poetic voice") each time to respond to the form and content of each work. As a result, various terms, slightly different approaches, and variously nuanced outcomes have emerged from each study. More specifically, in Section 1.1, I show that Catullus' poetic voice subtly mixes the conventions of two different genres within his poetry book in order to function. In Section 1.2, I show that Apollonius' and Theocritus' poetic voices make use of intertextuality in order to function. Lastly, in Sections 1.3-5, I show that the poetic voice of Hesiod, Herodotus & Thucydides, and Aeschylus make use

[18] See D. Clay's (1998: 9-40) article on widespread ancient evidence for a theory of the literary persona in Greek literature.

of various other strategies (such as the creation of a persona, the establishment of narratorial authority, and multiplicity) in order to function. The purpose of the first half of this chapter is to take a closer look at the methodologies that scholars use to investigate poetic voice in these various texts, and determine how exactly this voice is able to project the author's own thoughts and feelings into the text.

The second half (Sections 1.6-8) of this chapter in preparation for approaching poetic voice in the *DRN,* synthesizes a paradigm from the studies cited in Sections 1.1-3 in order to do so. *The paradigm is not based on the effects of poetic voice in other texts, but instead on that which poetic voice depends upon ("makes use of") in order to produce those effects.* In Sections 1.6-8, I account for Lucretian scholarship that discusses those "dependents" which poetic voice makes use of, in preparation for a close analysis of poetic voice in the *DRN*, an analysis which takes place in the next chapter.

Section 1.1.

Positionality in Catullus

The first author whose poetic voice we will examine is Catullus. How does Catullus' poetic voice, a voice which accounts for the work's literary aspects as well as the author's historical presence, manifest itself throughout his poetry? Literarily, he is usually considered one of the first extant neoteric poets who adhere to certain Alexandrian tendencies such as exclusivity of readership, a focus on scholarship, reflexivity, and an acute awareness of the poetic past.[19] Historically, the biographical question at the heart of Catullan studies is whether

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[19] See Fantuzzi and Hunter (2005: 1-41) for the characteristics of Hellenistic poetry and (444-485) for its influence on Roman poets.

the author was actually in love with a woman named Lesbia,[20] or whether he simply wrote to a fictive addressee in the Hellenistic style. He is also one of Lucretius' nearest contemporaries, and similar in respect to disavowing Roman public life. While Catullus wrote short poems about love, loss, and the exploration of every emotion in between, Lucretius wrote one long dactylic poem about the rejection of love and painful emotion.[21]

First, this section analyzes c. 64 and discusses the ways in which Catullus, the author, is equated with Catullus, the poet, namely through the juxtaposition of lyric and epic. Then, I take a closer look at c. 16 in order to further distinguish the correlation between author and poet. At the end of this section, I synthesize a paradigm for an analysis of the ways in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through the juxtaposition of didactic and satire, an analysis which occurs in Section 2.1. In terms of genre, this section exposes certain similarities between the ways in which each author's poetic voice functions in their respective texts.

In c. 64 the voice of the author Catullus has often been argued as the voice of Ariadne.[22] The poem contains a story within a story. The story in the outer frame is a recollection of the marriage of Peleus and Thetis. It speaks of gods and mortals coming together a long time ago in a much longed for past. The story in the inner frame (the story within the story) is an ekphrasis

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[20] Alternatively, he might have used the name Lesbia as a pseudonym for the scandalous mistress known as Clodia Metella. See Apuleius' *Apologia.* Thanks to William Brockliss for that reference.

[21] In his *addenda et corrigenda*, Bailey (1947: 1753-1754) lists coincidences of phraseology in Lucretius and Catullus 64 (about 20). In regard to whether or not the authors read one another's work, he concludes, "The problem is not capable of certain solution, but reminiscence is more probable than accidental coincidence, and imitation of Lucretius by Catullus to my mind more likely than the reverse" (1754). The problem is compounded by an anecdote which states that Lucretius' poem was published after his death in 55 BCE, while Catullus himself died one year earlier. The issue does not concern us here since I am not comparing the two authors on the basis of imitation, but instead analyzing the way in which scholars approach Catullus' poetic voice in order to construct an approach for poetic voice in the *DRN.* The issue of imitation begs further study.

[22] For bibliography, see introduction to Fitzgerald (1995: 140-143) and the discussion below.

of a couch coverlet at that same wedding. The story on the coverlet is that of Theseus abandoning Ariadne on the shores of Crete after she has just helped him escape from the labyrinth. She gazes bitterly at her lover as he flees before her. The relationship of the characters in the inner and outer frames of the story has provoked many different interpretations, and forms the locus for this section's analysis of Catullus' poetic voice.

By comparing each couple in the two frames (Peleus-Thetis and Theseus-Ariadne), the poem juxtaposes a celebratory union of gods and mortals in the outer frame and its dark human counterpart in the inner. From another viewpoint, by comparing the theme of "longing" in each frame (a longing for a past golden age and a longing for a lost lover), the poem presents Ariadne's gaze as temporally equivalent to the nostalgic "gaze" at the wedding.[23] Fitzgerald (1991: 149ff) points out that the placement of an epyllion about a betrayed lover within a poetry book of lyric poetry about a betrayed lover invites us to read the figure of Ariadne as a metaphor for the figure of Catullus: both Ariadne and Catullus long for lovers they cannot have. This reading highlights Ariadne's curse against Theseus as being similar to the invective against Lesbia in Catullus' other poems (e.g. c. 58, 70, 75).

Fitzgerald uses the term "positionality" to describe this phenomenon. He defines it as the way that poetry "distributes differential relations to language to [both] poet and reader" (4). In other words, poetry has the capacity to assign different meanings (relations) to the same text, meanings which differ according to the perspective from which they are read (positionality). He calls each of the above interpretations a "drama of position" (1). He sums up his introduction by saying, "the consumption of the work involves a drama of position… the content of the work serves to elaborate that drama" (4). The readers then "consume" that drama. In this sense,

[23] See Fitzgerald's discussion (1995: 142-144) of Klinger (1964: 165-224) on reading this as ironic framing, making a moral point and/or engaging in the Alexandrian lyric tradition. Also, see Fitzgerald's discussion (1995: 146-149) of Bramble (1970: 21-41), who reads the frames' relationship temporally.

positionality, the inherent capacity that poetry has to produce different meanings from various positions, implies that the poem's inherent power comes not from the content of its stories, nor from a single strand of interpretive meaning, but from multiple dramas of position within the text. Following this line of reasoning, the drama of position in c. 64 plays itself out on a variety of stages, if you will: temporally, from the position of the external reader acknowledging both inner and outer frames; ironically, from the position of the moral reader judging the inner and outer frames; and bitterly, from the position of the author within the context of his own Lesbia poems.

Though Fitzgerald does not discuss the following lines, what he calls "positionality," I argue, is best exemplified in the first two lines of Ariadne's farewell address to Theseus:

> sicine me patriis avectam, perfide, ab aris,
> perfide, deserto liquisti in litore, Theseu?
>
> I am the one who has been carried off from my familial sacred place, and you, oh faithless one,
> why do you abandon me here on this deserted shore, Theseus?
>
> Cat. 64.132-133[24]

Though these lines occur in the inner frame, the outer frame of the wedding is echoed in the first and last word of the second line above (*perfide…Theseu* in the inner frame echoes Peleus and Thetis in the outer frame). In the inner frame, Ariadne questions Theseus' departure; in the line, we hear echoes of the story of Peleus and Thetis from the first lines of the marriage story in the outer frame:

> tum Thetidis Peleus incensus fertur amore,
> tum Thetis humanos non despexit hymenaeos,
> tum Thetidi pater ipse iugandum Pelea sensit.
>
> At that time, impassioned Peleus was carried off with love of Thetis,
> At that time, Thetis did not look down on human marriages
> At that time, the father himself realized Peleus must be joined to Thetis.
>
> Cat. 64. 19-21

[24] For Catullus' text throughout this study, I have used Mynors (1958).

The way in which these lines about Peleus and Thetis are constructed prefigures the distribution of sound in the lines about Ariadne and Theseus above. The polyptoton of Peleus (*Peleus, Pelea*) and Thetis (*Thetidis, Thetis, Thetidi*) conditions the reader for the sounds to be heard in the Ariadne and Theseus story (*perfide…Theseu*). Whereas Thetis does not look down (*despexit,* 20) on her love, Theseus deserts (*deserto,* 133) his love. Through sound, the text associates the two stories together and distributes to them meaning that is dependent upon the reader taking up multiple positions in relation to the text. The inherent capacity that poetry has to produce different meanings from various positions (positionality), makes a connection between the happy marriage of Peleus and Thetis and the short rendezvous of Ariadne and Theseus.

Moreover, positionality also connects these two love stories with other love stories in Catullus' lyric poems in which Catullus himself speaks in the first person. In particular, this alignment is made in Catullus' lament over his lost lover, Alfenus:

> iam me prodere, iam non dubitas fallere, perfide?
> nec facta impia fallacum hominum caelicolis placent.
> quae tu neglegis ac me miserum deseris in malis.
>
> Don't you now hesitate to betray me, to mislead, treacherous one?
> The wicked deeds of impious men are not pleasing to the gods.
> You regard such deeds with no consequence and you abandon me here, wretched in my unluckiness.
>
> Cat. 30. 3-5

Catullus addresses Alfenus as *perfide*, having just been abandoned (*deseris*) by him. The words *perfide* used to describe Alfenus and *deseris* used to describe the actions of Alfenus align this poem with Ariadne's address to her recently treacherous (*perfide*) lover after he has just abandoned (*deserto*) her in c. 64 (see above). Fitzgerald's concept of positionality provides a framework to analyze this phenomenon. In effect, Catullus' poetic voice, a voice which accounts for both the work's literary aspects as well as the author's historical presence, manifests itself not simply through c. 30's first person, but through "positionality," the capacity that poetry

has to produce different meanings from various positions, positions in this case being the abandoned lovers in c. 64 (Ariadne abandons Theseus) and the first person in c. 30 (Catullus abandons Alfenus). Literarily, Catullus' poetic voice relates meaning in one poem with meaning in another; in this case it does so by the juxtaposition of epic (Ariadne in c. 64) and lyric (the first person in c. 30).

Moreover, there is much debate in scholarship whether the identity of this first person voice in Catullus' poems is biographical, constructed, or something in between. This question has been recently summarized by Gaisser (2009: 45-71). She discusses whether we should interpret the first person biographically and/or consider it a constructed poetic persona. The problem is that the first person of Catullus is inconsistent throughout the corpus. At times he appears as defender of his masculinity (e.g. c.16), as a pathetic socialite (e.g. c. 10), as the lover of both Lesbia (e.g. c. 8) and Iuventius (e.g. c. 24 and 99), as affectionate friend (e.g. c. 50), grieving brother (e.g. c.65 and 101), self-conscious neoteric poet (e.g. c. 14 and 66), angry foe (e.g. c. 12), or even political satirist (e.g. c. 28). These various identities make it difficult to secure a biographical profile.

It is how Gaisser interprets the inconsistency of the first person in c.16 that has the most relevance to the current study. Here, Catullus makes explicit reference to himself as both the poet and the author:

> nam castum esse decet pium poetam
> ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est.
>
> Thus, it is proper for the righteous poet to be chaste.
> (I'm referring to the author himself), but it is in no way necessary for the poet's verses to be so.
>
> Cat. 16.5-6

On the surface these lines seem to confirm a complete separation of the man who writes poetry (*pium poetam*), from his constructed persona within his verses (*versiculos*). Catullus seems to be

claiming innocence even though his literary construct is lewd and lascivious. However, through a close reading this passage (especially considering the ambiguity of the word, *decet*) and others, Gaisser concludes that, "[Catullus] is only playing with the mask, not taking it off. In [c.16], he *suggests* that he is chaste, but when we read the fine print we see that he has not actually said so" (50). In the end Gaisser concludes that the persona's various aspects are not separate, but something like "the sum of the different parts played by an actor who is cast as the lover in one play [and] the villain or fall-guy in another; they are diverse yet complementary components of a single personality" (67). Gaisser thus labels the middle ground between Catullus' biography and his persona as representing an actor with a single "personality," whereas this study offers another way to view this middle ground that accounts for literary and historical aspects of Catullus' voice in terms of what I am calling "poetic voice."

In conclusion, this section has shown that Catullus' poetic voice manifests itself through the juxtaposition of lyric and epic in c.30 and 64 respectively. Catullus, speaking in the first person in c.30, is equated with Catullus, the poet, through the voice of Ariadne in c.64. Then, I took a closer look at c.16 and identified poetic voice as a product of Catullus' personality, the diverse yet complementary components of the author. In the next chapter (Section 2.1), using the approach of the above analysis as a paradigm, I analyze the way in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through positionality created from the juxtaposition of didactic and satire.

Section 1.2.

Intertextuality: The Poet's Voice in Hellenistic Poetry

The next authors whose poetic voices we will examine are Apollonius and Theocritus. How do these two Hellenistic authors' poetic voices, voices which account both for the text's literary aspects as well as the author's historical presence, manifest themselves throughout their respective texts? I start by examining discussions of the poet's voice in Apollonius and Theocritus in Goldhill's (1991) book, *The Poet's Voice*: *Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature.* In the book, Goldhill investigates how the "(self-) representation" of the poet's voice within his poetry invites questions concerning authority in language and access to knowledge, "the awareness of other poets' poetry," as a fundamental dynamic functioning within a literary tradition, and "poetry's focus on its own workings," as a means for raising particular issues regarding a poem's poetics (1991: ix-xi). In other words, Goldhill's study concerns 1) authorial self-representation, 2) intertextuality, and 3) reflexivity as means for determining the poet's voice within his own text. He attempts to provide an all-encompassing theoretical framework for these three much-studied aspects of ancient poetry. This section explores two of his examples from the Hellenistic period. Goldhill's analysis of "the poet's voice," using these examples, will contribute to our understanding of "poetic voice" within the context of the *DRN.* At the end of this section, I synthesize a paradigm for an analysis of the ways in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through intertextuality, an analysis that occurs in Section 2.2. In terms of intertextuality, this section exposes certain similarities between the ways in which each author's poetic voice functions in their respective texts.

The tripartite definition of the poet's voice according to Goldhill is well illustrated in his discussion of the Siren episode of *Argonautica* 4.883-979 (1991: 298-300). As the Argonauts

pass the Sirens, it is Orpheus' lyre that defeats them. Goldhill uses this particular passage to investigate Appollonius' voice in terms of its manifestation through a) its own self-representation, b) its associations with other poetry, and c) its reflexivity. The lines are as follows:

> ἵεσαν ἐκ στομάτων ὄπα λείριον· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ νηός
> ἤδη πείσματ' ἔμελλον ἐπ' ἠιόνεσσι βαλέσθαι,
> εἰ μὴ ἄρ' Οἰάγροιο παῖς Θρηίκιος Ὀρφεύς,
> Βιστονίην ἐνὶ χερσὶν ἑαῖς φόρμιγγα τανύσσας,
> κραιπνὸν ἐυτροχάλοιο μέλος κανάχησεν ἀοιδῆς,
> ὄφρ' ἄμυδις κλονέοντος ἐπιβρομέωνται ἀκουαί
> κρεγμῷ· παρθενίην δ' ἐνοπὴν ἐβιήσατο φόρμιγξ
>
> The Argonauts were ready to cast
> their hawsers from the ship onto the shore –
> had not Thracian Orpheus, son of Oeagrus,
> strung his Bistonian lyre in his hand
> and let the forceful melody of a quick-moving song ring out
> so that all at once their hearing might roar with the beat
> as he spread confusion. The lyre defeated the virgins' voices.
>
> Apoll. 4.903-909[25]

Goldhill frames the text as a contest between two song makers: the singing Sirens are defeated by the singing Orpheus. The self-representation of the poet's voice manifests itself here as Orpheus, the victor. This manifestation is made possible through intertextuality with Sappho: ἐπιβρομέωνται ἀκουαὶ (4.908) echoes ἐπιρρόμ- / βεισι δ΄ ἄκουαι of Sappho (fr. 31.11-12 L-P, Voigt). The intertextuality aligns the effects of Orpheus' lyre on the Sirens with the effects of desire on Sappho. Thus, along with the poet's self-representation through Orpheus, intertextuality also makes it possible for Apollonius to project his voice in the text. Lastly, the text's self-reflexivity is made manifest in the phrase, "and the [Sirens] kept uttering their unceasing/indistinct (ἄκριτος) song" (4.911). Goldhill argues that the use of the word ἄκριτος is ambiguous, meaning both "unceasing" and "indistinct." This suggests that it is an example of the text being self-reflexive in that it occurs at the end of a passage where, "both the sense of

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[25] For Apollonius' text throughout this study, I have used Frankel (1961).

literary tradition and the image of confused sound... seem remarkably pointed and acutely self-reflexive" (1991: 300). He means that on one level, we hear Orpheus defeat the Siren's unceasing/indistinct song; on another level, we also hear Apollonius outdoing his literary predecessors' unceasing/indistinct literary tradition. In his own words, he summarizes these three strands of thought in the following conclusion:

> This scene provides a wonderful model of the ways in which, at all levels of representation in the *Argonautica*, the past is *written through*. The changing depictions of the narrator and of poetic performance within the poem form a crucial element both of the narrative strategies of the epic – marking in particular the shifting criteria of inclusion and the realignment of authorization – and also of the sense of 'rupture and revival' with the literary traditions in and against which Apollonius' writing works.
>
> Goldhill 1991: 300

Through his study of the poet's voice, we see what he calls the poem's "poetic performance." We look beyond the narrator's surface description of the story in order to draw inferences about what Goldhill calls a "realignment of authorization" within a literary tradition. Thus in the text, Orpheus defeats the Sirens with his lyre in a contest of song; in the poem, the poet's voice defeats its literary predecessors, with a Lesbian lyricist as ally, in a contest of literary realignment.

In another example from his book, Goldhill (1991: 223-240) discusses Theocritus' *Idyll* 7 and points out many of the same kinds of self-representation, intertextuality, and self-reflexiveness. Theocritus frames the two singers, Lycidas and Simichidas, as competitors representing two distinct poetic traditions. The poet's own voice manifests itself through Simichidas, a learned, "new-age," multi-faceted singer, just like Theocritus. Lycidas, on the other hand, represents an old bucolic form of poetry. Simichidas thus represents a new poetic imperative with his request to create a new kind of pastoral poetry: βουκολιασδώμεσθα. Goldhill also suggests that the poem is playing with the clichés of poetic authority when Lycidas then offers Simichidas his "Hesiodic" staff. He argues that this is a manipulation of the rhetoric

of poetics. Lycidas' subsequent song is then oppositely laced with a Callimachean poetic authority. This is apparent by Lycidas' claim that he has "toiled" (a Callimachean phrase) at the poem; he is not just a mouthpiece of the Muses. Goldhill continues to point out similar incidents in which we find subtle competing poetic statements underlying the text. He draws the following conclusion:

> The programmatic journey of *Idyll* 7, then, is crucial for a discussion of the poet's voice in Theocritus. It seems to be leading us towards the establishment of a new pastoral poetics, but the songs within songs, the recession of frames, the ironic fragmentation of the programmatic statement, all seem to undercut the clear and straightforward progression of that journey, all seem to resist the direct and comprehensive – inclusive – <u>statement of poetics</u>. Perhaps we should regard this very fragmentation and polyphony as the final poetic imperative of Theocritean writing.
>
> Goldhill 1991: 240

Through this study of the poet's voice we can now interpret *Idyll* 7 more clearly as a commentary on Hellenistic poetics, a poetics of fragmentation, polyphony, and rivalries with other poetic traditions. The author's poetic voice functions in a way that makes such a "statement of poetics." Thus, in the text we find two singers taunting one another in a complex network of songs within songs; never are we quite sure who has won. In the poem, we hear two poetic voices playing off one another in a complex network of competing poetics.

Goldhill creates a theoretical framework for understanding the various strands of meaning in a text as it concerns the representation of the poet's voice in his own text and its manifestation through intertextuality and self-reflexivity. In Goldhill's terms, a poet's voice within his poetry creates a "poetic performance," enacted by the changing positions of the narrator. Through intertextuality, this performance allows for a "realignment of authorization" within the poem's literary tradition, and in turn reveals a "statement of poetics" concerning the poetics of the poem itself. Thus, the poetic voice of an author manifests itself not only through self-representation, such as a singer within a song or the embodiment of an internal character

such as Ariadne in *Cat*. 64 or Demodocus in the *Odyssey*, but also states its presence through intertextuality and self-reflexivity.

In conclusion, this section has argued that one of the ways that Apollonius' poetic voice manifests itself is through intertextuality, particularly in the Siren episode of the *Argonautica.* Apollonius, the author, is equated with Apollonius, the poet, through the voice of Orpheus. Then, I took a closer look at Theocritus *Idyll* 7 and identified Theocritus' poetic voice in the competition between Lycidas and Simichidas, a competition that embodies a poetic performance made possible by intertextuality. In the next chapter (Section 2.2), using the approach of the above analysis as a paradigm, I analyze the way in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through a poetic performance of atomic intertextuality.

Section 1.3.

The Practicality of Hesiod's Didactic Poetry

The next author whose poetic voice we will examine is Hesiod. How does Hesiod's poetic voice, a voice which accounts both for the text's literary aspects as well as the author's historical presence, manifest itself throughout his text? This issue of poetic voice has a long tradition in studies of Hesiod's didactic poetry that are instructive for the current study. A central question concerns whether we should accept a biographical view of the author, a wise rustic farmer in the archaic period, or consider the narrator's voice a constructed persona of a "wise-intellectual-farmer-poet."[26] These questions of "identity" then lead to questions surrounding the practicality of the work itself: Was it ever actually used as an instruction manual

[26] This is similar to Catullus above, but the issue is not so much a question of the author/poet's identity; instead, the focus in Hesiod is on his authority as an actual teacher as opposed to actual lover. The controversy centers around whether Hesiod was an actual archaic farming teacher (autobiographical approach) or a constructed persona created for literary purposes (*persona* approach) (Stoddard 2004: 1-6). The issue is thus extended from a question of Hesiod's identity to a question of his function as an actual teacher.

for farming? A further investigation into these and other questions will contribute to the paradigm being developed for an analysis of Lucretius' poetic voice. At the end of this section, I synthesize a paradigm for an analysis of the ways in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through similar didactic strategies, an analysis that occurs in Section 1.6. In terms of the way in which Hesiod's didactic voice manifests itself in his text, this section exposes certain similarities between the way in which Lucretius' didactic voice does so in the *De Rerum Natura.*

Stoddard (2004: 1-6) discusses the basic debate between autobiographical and persona readings of Hesiod. The biographical "romanticized" view is championed by Jaeger (1945: 72-73, 112-113) who argues that Hesiod was a simple peasant inspired by the Muse. This biographical reading is further analyzed by Snell (1953: 43) in his "diachronic evolution theory." He argues that Hesiod's relatively personalized voice is a development from Homer, and therefore Hesiod's voice represents the next step in the rise of self. The opposite view of Hesiod as a literary construct is taken up by Nagy (1982: 49-67): he attacks the biographical tradition for creating an excuse for condescending speculation as to why the poem seems to lack usefulness; he argues that scholars use the biographical approach to criticize Hesiod for his lack of actual farming knowledge. He holds that the biographical information given by Hesiod can instead be explained in terms of Panhellenic abstraction, as poets sought a mode that could be acceptable to all.

In other words, from this debate emerges a position in the middle: Hesiod was a literary construct participating in the tradition of literary history, but based on a more generalized Panhellenic historical identity. This middle ground allows us to interpret any one aspect of the poem as having significance either for the biographical tradition or for the literary tradition

(historical reality or constructed poetic reflection of that reality). Any particular aspect can be considered a part of one tradition to the exclusion of the other or it could have significance for both, depending on how one interprets the relations the text has with the poet and reader. This reader-response approach means that the reader determines the "range" to which meaning is relevant. For Lucretius, also a didactic poet, we will see the same two camps emerge concerning Lucretius as a literary construct and Lucretius as a Roman historical figure.[27]

Stoddard (2004: 15-19) also discusses the "reality vs. literature" debate in the context of the supposed quarrel between Hesiod and Perses. One representative view is that of Rousseau (1996: 62), who sees the quarrel not as an artifact of an actual quarrel between Hesiod and his brother (reality), but as a literary trope, stemming from the quarrel in book one of the *Iliad* (literature). In contrast to this view, West (1978: 34) argues that the quarrel must be grounded in historical reality since the dialectical patterns between Hesiod and Perses are actually inconsistent with traditional patterns which would make it a stylized literary quarrel. While no quarrel persists between Lucretius and Memmius, the nature of their relationship (real or constructed) is problematic in exactly the same way as the debate between Hesiod and Perses, with implications for interpreting the dialectical nature of the work: is the *DRN* actually practical, intended to teach readers Epicureanism, or literarily stylized, intended not necessarily to convert readers but to explain Epicureanism in an unconventional way?

The inconsistency of the characterization of Perses throughout the poem creates another problem (Stoddard 2004: 19-26). Two schools of thought emerge: first, the analysts, who see the poem as either composed in parts (Wilamowitz 1928: 132-135) or composed in an unorganized

[27] See Roller (1970: 246-248). He discusses Memmius as a historical person. This is discarded by Mitsis (1993: 122). See also Townend (1978: 267-283) and (1979: 101-111), who sees Memmius as a mechanism for building chronology within the poem. This is mentioned by Mitsis (1993:122). See also chapter three of the current study.

stream of thought (West 1978: 34). In this view the inconsistency of Perses implies that the work is unfinished or, at best, accidental. The other school of thought, the unitarians, see the work as purposefully constructed and explain the inconsistencies surrounding Perses as representing the "dynamic linear development of Perses' education" (Schmidt 1986: 52; followed by Clay 1993: 24-26). The inconstancy of Perses in this view reflects the actual changes the student of farming undergoes. The same questions can be applied to Lucretius: Does Memmius actually develop into an Epicurean follower as the *DRN* progresses? The answer to this question informs issues of practicality.

Thus, Stoddard's summary of scholarship on Hesiod's biography centers around three polemic debates: was Hesiod an actual farming teacher? (autobiography vs. persona), was there actually a quarrel between Hesiod and Perses? (reality vs. literature), and why is Perses inconsistent? (practical vs. stylized). Since Hesiod is a didactic poet, one's answer to these debates informs the practicality of the work for actual students. Thus, Hesiod's poetic voice, accounting for both for the text's literary aspects as well as the author's historical presence, must be approached by taking into account the biographical and didactic strategies that Hesiod makes use of in order to teach all aspects of farming.

This approach to Hesiod's poetic voice is taken by Nelson (1996: 45-53), who provides an appropriate paradigm for approaching the biographical and didactic strategies of Lucretius' poetic voice. She argues that Hesiod does not teach farming, but vividly expresses how farming feels. She concludes:

> Hesiod's is a realistic account of farming, but its realism is dramatic, not factual. It is designed not to convey an accurate picture of farming as seen from outside the farm, but to create a sense of immediate identification with the farmer himself, allowing the audience to experience the life that is determined by Zeus' seasons.
>
> Nelson 1996: 53

Throughout her argument, she focuses on how the audience gets a "feeling" (48, 50, and 52) for farming through "identification with the farmer himself" (53). The issue surrounding the practicality of the didactic poet's voice, discussed by Stoddard, is answered through this approach. The poetic voice of Hesiod is less concerned with the practicalities of teaching the poem's subject matter than it is in functioning as a conduit for expressing how farming is experienced/feels from the perspective of the author/farmer himself. This process in which poetic voice functions as enabling "identification with the author," is instructive for how we might view the function of Lucretius' poetic voice: the poem's content does in fact reveal and explain many technical facets of Epicureanism for its readership, but the poem's poetic voice enables that readership not only to know but to experience vividly how Epicureanism feels.[28] It is the task of the author to relate information, while it is the task of his poetic voice to relate the experience of that author to the reader in a way that allows for the communication of the author's "feelings" to the reader.

In conclusion, this section has shown that Hesiod's poetic voice operates in the didactic register and therefore must be defined by the degrees to which this voice provides both a practical application of its subject matter to its student-readers as well as a stylized description of what its subject matter feels like for its literary formal readers. Hesiod, the teacher, is equated with Hesiod, the didactic poet, in a way that reveals not the actual mechanics of farming but the general experience of being a farmer. In the next chapter (Section 2.3), using the approach of the above analysis as a paradigm, I analyze the way in which Lucretius, the teacher, is equated with

[28] For another approach to the way in which feeling, a negative act in Epicureanism, is embraced by Lucretius, see Olberding (2005: 114-129), who argues that Lucretius "articulates a program for remedying anxiety that better honors the complexity of human experience and promises a transformation that preserves the somatic and affective dimensions of these experiences" (114).

Lucretius the didactic poet, namely through the use of internal dialectic within the poem in order to communicate the sense of what it feels like to think like an Epicurean.

Section 1.4.

Narratorial Authority in Herodotus and Thucydides

Another useful tool for investigating poetic voice and the means by which it manifests itself can be found in the study of narratology, which has formulated certain narratological terms to describe and discuss the mechanisms that allow texts to function as *fabulae* rather than simply stories.[29] This section examines the tools that narratologists use to discuss poetic voice as I have been describing it above. At the end of this section, I synthesize a paradigm for an analysis of the ways in which Lucretius establishes his narratorial authority as an author, namely through the use of "internal dialectic," an analysis that occurs in Section 2.3. This section exposes certain similarities of how each author's poetic voice functions and manifests itself in their respective texts.

Narratology is said to have begun with the work of Genette who first distinguished between "*qui parle*?" and "*qui voit*?" and called it "focalization" (1972). Criticisms followed along with modifications to the term.[30] Most notably, Bal objects that focalization cannot be so easily separated between "who speaks" and "who perceives" and aims at distinguishing "focalization and narration" more effectively (1977: 107-127 and 1985). Bal continues to develop the theory of narratology by discussing "embedded focalizations" (focalizations within

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[29] See de Jong, Nunlist, and Bowie (eds.) (2004: xv-xviii) for a glossary of narratological terms, including *fabula*. See also Gale (1994: 123-124) for the idea that the *DRN* is a narrative poem conducted at the level of imagery: the narrative of gods and heroes is replaced with *natura* and the atoms.

[30] For example, Rimmon (1976: 33-62) criticizes the idea of focalization since it defined by the reader and what the reader knows depends on how much the he/she is told by the narrator.

focalizations) (1981a: 41-59), by distinguishing "mental acts" from the *fabula* itself (1981b: 202-210), and by continuing to redefine narrative as a "series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors" (1985: 5).[31]

In the field of Classics, de Jong (1987) famously imported this approach and applied it to Homer in her book, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad*. There she responds to Bal's idea of separating focalization and narration by arguing "every narrator is also a focalizer" (33 and 244 n. 14).[32] Continuing this line of thought, Fowler (2000: 40-63) examines instances in which focalization is disrupted in the narrative. This phenomenon occurs in Virgil's *Aeneid* when one character speaks, but another sees. It is best explained by its opposite: normal focalization. In normal focalization we expect the focalizer and narrator to coincide, but in Fowler's "deviant" focalization they do not. This is not to be confused with *explicit* embedded focalizations. Deviance is *implicit*: the narrator, or other character speaks, but someone else sees and is the focalizer.[33] In terms of poetic voice, the way in which a "narrator acts as focalizer," directing the narrative to be read from various perspectives, is characteristic of the way poetic voice functions. This implies that poetic voice does not only appear in poetry but

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[31] For a more comprehensive view on the history of narratology see Rood (1998: 294-6). Scholars have also acknowledged that narratology is not so much a literary theory as it is an organizational principle, i.e. "new words for old insights" (Hornblower 1994: 136) and that "narratology's concerns have been anticipated even though its terms have not been used" (Rood 1998: 17). Hornblower points to the specific examples of Schneider and Hunter to show how these pre-narratological scholars have been addressing the same exact concerns as more recent narratological scholars: they all deal with the question of motivation (137). The contribution that narratologists do seem to make is solving the basic problem of "restricted access:" how does a character know things that they are not supposed to know? The narrator's "role" in this light becomes clear; we are not to ask whether the narrator is telling the truth or not, but whether he or she is convincing.

[32] For example, in Homer's *Iliad* 3.191-202 as Priam and Helen look out over the walls toward the Greeks, the narrator gives us the name of Odysseus just before Helen tells Priam what his name actually is; the narrator speaks, but it is Priam who perceives. She shows how "the narrator intrudes upon Priam's embedded focalization" (Jong: 1987: 104).

[33] For example, Fowler shows the ambiguity of the word *superbum* as having both positive and negative connotations depending on how the reader interprets Virgil's poetic voice projecting itself into the narrative (2000: 47-63).

also in prose. We can identify poetic voice, defined by the phenomenon of an author implicitly projecting his voice into his work, even in prose works whose authors claim they are creating no persona, but speaking in the first person.

This can be exemplified by the study of Greek historical writers in terms of the "narratorial authority" possessed by these Greek historians. For example, Dewald (1999: 221-225) discusses what she calls the "ideologies" of Herodotus and Thucydides. This refers to a) the narrator's voice in relation to other internal narrative voices, b) its capacity to convince, and c) its "narrative rules," e.g. who is allowed a voice and who controls the shift from that voice to the voices of others. I have made the following charts to help summarize her conclusions:



Figure 1.1

The Herodotean narrator sets up shifting focalizations that alternate between his own neutral voice (1. On the chart above) and those whose *logoi* he relates (2.), creating a sort of "object" (3.) with which the audience engages (4.). The result is an *active* audience engaging with a narrator who creates a narrative object which the audience then judges as if they were watching a performance (5.).

In contrast, Dewald then compares the narratorial voice of Herodotus with the all-knowing narrator's voice of Thucydides:



Figure 1.2

Here, there is no "object" by the narrator created nor is there a distinction between the narrator and author (1.); they are one and the same. Thucydides "dominates and defines the terms by which the audience will measure all others who figure as actors within his account" (225). Instead of an object, as Herodotus creates, there only exists Thucydides' internal cognitions, fully thought out (2.). The audience merely listens (3.) and the result is that they are a more passive and less engaged audience (4.). There is a direct correlation between "narratorial authority" and the extent to which the audience is expected to participate and engage.

Another rhetorical aspect of the narrator's voice is what Hornblower calls the "self-conscious narrator" (1994: 131-166).[34] One instance in which this phenomenon occurs is when "a narrator can inspire belief in categorically uttered proposition *p* by at the same time expressing diffidence about proposition *q*." He gives the example of Thucydides' *Histories* 3.87: the narrator mentions the exact number of cavalry men and hoplites who died in the plague, but says that the metic losses could not be ascertained (ἀνεξεύρετος ἀριθμός). His uncertainty, Hornblower argues, about the metic losses (proposition *q*) encourages us to believe –or at least

[34] See also Rood's (1998) book-length study on other narrative techniques such as selectivity, interaction of speech and narrative, and manipulation of time and perspective (3-23).

be convinced – that the precisely given number of men and hoplites who died in the plague is accurate (proposition *p*). Thucydides goes out of his way to be alternately accurate in some places and inaccurate in others, for the purpose of convincing the reader of his accuracy in the places that he *is* accurate, thus establishing his narratorial authority within a literary work.[35]

In conclusion, this capacity to manipulate the audience through the establishment of the narrator's authority and the conscious use of various narratorial strategies is another aspect this study has described as part of the manifestation of an author's poetic voice. The historiographer's voice projects itself into the (historical) narrative through certain (literary) narratorial strategies, thus manifesting the text's poetic voice. This section has shown that an ancient historiographer's poetic voice manifests itself through particular narratorial strategies that inform the reader of the narrator's authority, and by extension, the extent to which his audience is expected to engage with his text, either actively or passively. In the next chapter (Section 2.3), using the approach of the above analysis as a paradigm, I analyze the way in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through a narratorial strategy of creating internal dialectic within the poem, a strategy which presents his narratorial authority in a way that expects his audience to actively engage with the poem.

Section 1.5.

The Multiplicity of Choral Voice in Aeschylus

I have discussed poetic voice in poetry and historiography. We now turn to drama, particularly fifth century Athenian tragedy. Essentially, the process of identifying the poetic

[35] This interpretation assumes that Thucydides had no way of knowing exact numbers of men/hoplite or metic losses, yet in the text Thucydides, the narrator, claims to know the exact number of men/hoplites who died and confesses that he is unsure about the number of metic losses. Hornblower essentially argues that this confession is calculated in order to manipulate the reader into trusting the narrator, and thus gives authority to the exact number he does give for men/hoplite losses.

voice of the tragic playwright is the same here as above: look beyond the story itself and ask questions regarding the source of the information provided for in the story. This section examines the way in which choral voice works as a mechanism for the poetic voice of a tragic playwright to manifest itself. At the end of this section, I synthesize a paradigm for an analysis of the way in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through the similar mechanism of "internal dialectic," an analysis that occurs in Section 2.3. This section exposes certain similarities between the ways in which each author's poetic voice functions in their respective texts.

The way in which a tragedian's poetic voice manifests itself through the chorus is best exemplified by the chorus of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon.* Here, throughout the episodes of the relatively straight-forward νόστος of Agamemnon, the voice of the chorus speaks in a puzzling array of contextual, temporal, and metrical complexities (*Ag.* 116-180). Furley (1986: 109-121) discusses how the chorus' prophecy at Aulis in the parados does triple duty in mapping the past, the present, and the future on to one another. The chorus' prophecy consists of the curse of Atreus from the previous generation, Artemis' anger in the present situation, and the deaths at Troy in the future. They are linked through a series of subtle changes in voice culminating in the mouth of the seer Calchas himself. This exposes the chorus' capacity to speak through varying degrees of temporality. Continuing this line of reasoning, Fletcher (1999: 22-49) describes this choral voice in this first stasimon of the *Agamemnon* as "an internal dialogue between an earlier and a later self," first praising the sons of Atreus for exacting penalty against the Trojans, then expressing concern for the consequences of their success. She explains the apparent inconsistency of their "mood swing" as being an inherent mechanism of their voice which permits a shift of perspective through the use of various character voices. In other words, the

chorus members do not speak in just one monolithic voice; instead, the chorus members are 1) characters within the internal dialogue of the play, 2) Calchas whom they quote, and 3) the voice of the poet, or rather, a medium for the poet to get information to us (48-49).

The idea that the tragic choral voice embodies a complex dynamic of temporality and a multiplicity of speakers (including the playwright himself) can be further discussed in terms of the play's performance context. Calame (1999: 125-153) considers the chorus a mediator between the playwright's message, the internal characters of the play, and the audience watching the performance. He engages with a body of scholarship that responds to Schlegel's (1846: 76-77) provocative suggestion that the chorus mirrors the actual audience's reaction to the play, making them the ideal embodiment of those who originally watched the play. He pushes this observation further by arguing that the chorus not only represents the feelings of the audience, but also the views of the playwright as well as the thought processes of the characters within the play. Within the text, the chorus makes an utterance using the first person, "I" or "We." This can then be understood as the ideal author. He is careful not to make the assumption that this represents the actual empirical or biographical author, but, as denoted by the use of the adjective "ideal," he argues that it has "some" relation to the actual playwright. From the other direction, the addressees of the chorus become conflated with "ideal" audience, which is still within the text of the play, but, he argues, to some extent they are connected to the empirical/actual audience as well. The chorus can function in this way because it exists in what Calame calls three "dimensions." Their position in the "ritual dimension" allows the chorus members to interact with the dramatic action on the stage, which is enabled by its historical origins as an

actual ritualized performance, allowing the chorus to literally participate in the drama.[36] The so-called "hermeneutic dimension" allows the chorus to describe and comment upon the narrative in which they are participating. The chorus reflects (in what he terms "a hermeneutic way") information about what the spectators have just seen; this activity is "reflective" in that the chorus responds with interpretive gnomic statements on events that have occurred on stage. Lastly, the "affective dimension" allows the chorus to express emotions provoked by the action occurring on stage. Accordingly, these emotions, in turn, are the same as those audience members who were provoked by the same action occurring on stage. These three dimensions allow the chorus to interact with fictive characters on stage (the ritual dimension), transmit the views of the author (the hermeneutic dimension), and reflect the emotions that an actual audience would have felt (the affective dimension).

Thus, just as Furley and Fletcher analyze the multiple registers in which the chorus speaks in regard to temporality and multiplicity within the text, Calame analyzes choral voice in terms of the interactions between the playwright, the chorus itself, and the audience. The chorus speaks, using the first person, and activates a process that takes us from the playwright, through the literary poet, to the actors on the literary stage, through the internal audience, to the actual audience outside the text. It is the choral voice that acts as a catalyst for this phenomenon to take place.

In conclusion, the tragic playwright's voice manifesting itself through the chorus in his own mimetic work is an example of poetic voice. In Aeschylus' *Agamemnon,* this voice is localized in the chorus. As has been noted, the chorus speaks on multiple levels and one of those levels is the relation the text has with the playwright. It is an opportunity for him to subtly insert

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[36] Using Plato's *Ion, Homeric Hymn to Apollo, Homeric Hymn to Hermes,* Alcman *Fr*. 1, the Arion story in Herodotus, and Demodocus' song in Homer as his sources, Herrington (1985: 1-40) confirms the origins of the chorus' ritualized performance context.

his own voice into the performance and create various levels of interpretive meaning. This section has shown that a 5th century tragedian's poetic voice can manifest itself through the chorus by means of a particular mechanism termed "multiplicity," the ability for one voice to have multiple registers. This mechanism allows the chorus members to function as a conduit for the playwright's thoughts or ideas. In the next chapter (Section 2.3), using the approach of the above analysis as a paradigm, I analyze the way in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through a similar form of multiplicity, namely the use of "internal dialectic" within the poem, a mechanism which presents the text in a way that expects his audience to treat it as if it were a performance.

Chapter One, Part II Introduction

Preliminary Discussions of Genre, Intertextuality, and Reader Participation

The first half of the current chapter (Sections 1.1-5) has reviewed select scholarship pertaining to "poetic voice" in particular texts of Catullus, Apollonius & Theocritus, Hesiod, Herodotus & Thucydides, and Aeschylus. As scholars have investigated the means by which these authors project their own thoughts/feelings/views into their texts (not always termed "poetic voice"), they have adapted their terminology each time to respond to the form and content of each text. As a result, various terms, slightly different approaches, and variously nuanced outcomes have emerged from each study. For example, in Section 1.1, I showed that Catullus' poetic voice manifests itself through the inclusion of multiple genres within his poetry book, specifically through the juxtaposition of lyric and epic. Before proceeding to the next chapter (Section 2.1), where I use the approach of this analysis as a paradigm for investigating the way in which Lucretius's poetic voice also manifests itself through the mixing of genres in

order to function (specifically through the juxtaposition of didactic and satire), a preliminary discussion of the *DRN*'s didactic genre is needed. What do we mean when we speak of the poem's "didactic genre"? The answer (or in the very least, a "work-around") to this vexed question is provided in the second half of this chapter below in Section 1.6.

In Section 1.2, I showed that Apollonius and Theocritus' poetic voices make use of intertextuality in order to function, specifically through the intertextual Siren episode of the *Argonautica* and the intertextual competition between Lycidas and Simichidas in *Idyll* 1. Before proceeding to the next chapter (Section 2.2), where I use the approach of this analysis as a paradigm for approaching the way in which Lucretius's poetic voice also makes use of intertextuality in order to function (specifically through the façade of atomic intertextuality), a preliminary discussion of intertextuality in general is needed. By what specific parameters should we assume intertextuality is constituted? A preliminary discussion of this somewhat semantic question is provided in the second half of this chapter below in Section 1.7.

In Sections 1.3-5, I showed that the poetic voices of Hesiod, Herodotus & Thucydides, and Aeschylus function in various ways in order to project each author's poetic voice into his respective texts. In terms of "practicality," Hesiod's didactic poetic voice is defined by the degree to which this voice provides both a practical application of its subject matter to its student-readers as well as a stylized description of what its subject matter feels like for its literary formal audience. In terms of "narratorial strategies," the ancient historiographer's poetic voice manifests itself through the establishment of the narrator's authority, and by extension, the extent to which the audience is expected to engage with the text. And in terms of "multiplicity," Aeschylus' poetic voice manifests itself through particular choral mechanisms that allow the chorus to function as a conduit for the playwright's as well as the audience's thoughts or ideas.

Before proceeding to the next chapter (Section 2.3), where I use the approach of those investigations as a paradigm for discussing the way in which Lucretius's poetic voice also anticipates certain responses from the audience (specifically through internal dialectic), a preliminary discussion of "reader participation" in Lucretius is needed. This discussion is provided in the second half of this chapter below in Section 1.8.

The purpose of the first half of this chapter has been to take a closer look at the methodologies that scholars use to investigate poetic voice in all its various forms, and determine how exactly poetic voice is able to manifest itself in the texts of ancient Greek and Roman authors. The second half (Sections 1.6-8) of this chapter now synthesizes a paradigm from those studies for approaching poetic voice in the *DRN*. *The paradigm is not based on the specific functions of poetic voice in other authors, but instead on that which poetic voice depends upon in order to perform those functions.* I now account for Lucretian scholarship that discusses those "dependents" which poetic voice makes use of, in preparation for an investigation of poetic voice in the *DRN*, an analysis which takes place in the next chapter.

Section 1.6.

A Preliminary Discussion of the DRN's Genre

Though most would agree that the *DRN* is categorized as a didactic poem, the precise definition of that particular genre is problematic. A list of objective characteristics of this genre has recently been compiled by Volk (2002: 25-68). She identifies four specific qualifications to which a poem must adhere in order to be considered a member of the didactic genre. These qualifications include explicit didactic intent, a teacher-student constellation, poetic self-

consciousness, and poetic simultaneity (2002: 25-68). The reason why these characteristics were chosen derives mainly from responses to such objections as, "Isn't all poetry 'didactic' in the sense that its purpose is to teach?" and "Can you name one work of poetry that is not didactic?"[37] Volk uses her four qualifications to deflect these objections by denoting specific sign-postings of didacticism within the texts themselves. Analyzing these qualifications of the didactic genre should provide us with a framework for Lucretius' poetic voice, but as we will see, modifications will have to be made in order to fully understand how poetic voice makes use of these conventions of genre work in order to function.

First and foremost, the work must contain an explicit didactic intent. Volk uses the opening lines of Ovid *Ars Amatoria* as an example (37):

> si quis in hoc artem populo non novit amandi
> hoc legat et lecto carmine doctus amet.
>
> If anyone in this crowd does not know the art of love,
> let him read this and, having read the poem, may he be an expert lover.
>
> Ars. 1.1-2[38]

Here Ovid explicitly announces that his purpose is to teach those who do not know (*si quis… non novit*) and to teach them so that they may become knowledgeable (*doctus*). In Lucretius, instead of an understanding of love, the poet explains how one will come to know atomic motion. He, too, expresses the same didactic intent:

> verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci
> sunt, per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute.
>
> Indeed, these small steps are sufficient for your sharp mind,
> steps through which you'll certainly understand everything that follows.
>
> Lucr. 1.402-403[39]

[37] The most notable objections to a definition that describes didactic poetry as simply "poetry that teaches" are the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, which are considered teaching poems but not didactic works.

[38] For Ovid's text throughout this study, I have used Kenney (1994).

[39] For Lucretius' text throughout this study, I have used Bailey (1947).

Here Lucretius announces his purpose to teach through small steps (*vestigia parva*) similar to Ovid's procedure of "*lecto carmine.*" Small steps are taken so that one can eventually understand (*possis cognoscere*) everything that follows, which is similar to Ovid's hope for the reader, "*doctus amet*." Volk's first qualification that the poem must contain explicit didactic intent is explicit in this passage of Lucretius.

Her next qualification is that the poem must include a "teacher-student constellation." Not only must the poem have explicit didactic intent, but must also include an element of what Volk calls an "intra-textual drama" between teacher and student, which she calls "the teacher-student constellation" (37-39). This takes the form of a particular addressee mentioned in the poem, e.g. Hesiod to Perses, Vergil to Maecenas, or Lucretius to Memmius. It is not enough though to simply mention the name of the addressee; there must be significant presence of a dynamic relationship that forms a "constellation." This exists for Lucretius in the following passage contained in the section just before the one previously cited:

> namque canes ut montivagae persaepe ferai
> naribus inveniunt intectas fronde quietes,
> cum semel institerunt vestigia certa viai,
> sic alid ex alio per te tute ipse videre
> talibus in rebus poteris…
>
> Therefore, just as dogs very often find the uncovered quiet spots of
> mountain-wandering wild beasts with their noses,
> after having pursued recognized animal tracks along the road,
> similarly, you yourself are able to see one thing from another all on your own.
>
> Lucr. 1.404-408

The "intra-textual drama" is pictured by Lucretius dramatizing the teacher-student constellation through the metaphor of a dog (Memmius) on the hunt to find his prey (the Epicurean doctrine).[40] This metaphor is associated with his explicit didactic intent mentioned above through the use of the word *vestigia* to denote the tracks the dog must follow to find his prey.

[40] The reason why Volk chose to label the relationship between a teacher as a "constellation" is unclear. I suppose it allows her to rule out other works which lack such an explicit connection between teacher and student.

Above in line 1.402, Lucretius used this word to describe the process by which the learner learns: he follows the "footsteps" the teacher ostensibly provides. Here in line 1.406 he qualifies and expands the student-teacher constellation by providing the paradigm for learning (like a dog on the hunt tracking "footsteps"). Furthermore, the idea of the relationship being described as a "constellation" evokes the idea of "a configuration, as of related items, properties, ideas, or individuals." Volk's second qualification that the poem must contain elements of a "teacher-student constellation" is shown here through the metaphorical expansion of *vestigia.*[41]

Volk's third and fourth qualifications can be understood together. The didactic poem, according to Volk, must have both a poetic self-consciousness and a poetic simultaneity (2002: 33-40). As we will see below, each one is predicated on the other. She defines didactic self-consciousness in contrast to Homeric self-consciousness. She admits that Homer's poetry is self-aware, but points out "the law of epic objectivity," which prevents the poet from contemplating the fact that he is a poet composing poetry; unlike the didactic poet, the epic poet is unaware of the poetic nature of his words (Volk 2002: 39). The internal Homeric bards such as Demodocus only imply Homeric commentary on the didactic nature of epic poetry. According to Volk, the qualification must be that the poem is *explicitly* meta-poetic and self-reflexive. The examples taken from Lucretius above reflect this characteristic.[42]

Her fourth qualification, poetic simultaneity, requires there to be synchrony between the process of teaching and the act of singing/writing poetry; the poet sings and teaches at the same time. Simultaneity in Lucretius is seen in the following example:

[41] Other examples of Lucretius making explicit reference to his student include instances of Lucretius anticipating his reader's suspicions, e.g. 1.370-1: "Lest that which others vainly propose cause you to be lead astray from the truth, I am constrained to forestall it."

[42] Other examples of Lucretius making reference to his poetic words include 1.21-43, 136-145, 410-417, 921-950; 2.730; 3.419-420; 4.1-25, 180-182, 909-911, 969-970; 5.335-337; 6.92-95. The evolution of poetry is discussed in lines 5.324-329, 1443-1445, and 1451, which further suggests poetic self-consciousness.

> Sed nunc ut repetam coeptum pertexere dictis
>
> But now so that I might seek to weave the beginning with words.
>
> Lucr. 1.418

Lucretius synchronizes the act of teaching with the art of writing poetry through the metaphor of weaving. Here and also in line 6.42, Lucretius uses this metaphor of weaving with words (*pertexere dictis*) to describe the nature of his didactic work. In regards to poetic simultaneity, Lucretius utilizes this image of connecting many strands of thought together to form a network through which to understand Epicureanism. This idea of weaving is fundamental to the didactic nature of the work. It weaves together the instructions for the consecutive steps one must follow.[43]

In short, Lucretius exhibits all of Volk's four qualifications.[44] He shows explicit didactic intent; in particular, he describes this process as one of the incremental steps one takes toward understanding. It is not simply enough to read (as with Ovid's *lecto carmine*), but one must actively engage with the text. Lucretius also expands on the student-teacher constellation. In particular, in order to describe the relationship between the student and teacher, he employs the metaphor of the dog and his prey. Again, this shows how Lucretius, the teacher, expects the reader to actively pursue his teachings. Poetic self-consciousness and simultaneity are also present in Lucretius through the metaphor of weaving.

These conclusions help to answer the fundamental question that Volk raises in her study, "What constitutes the didactic genre?" She admits though that there is no ancient evidence for a literary genre called "didactic." She summarizes the evidence from Aristotle's first discussion of

[43] Volk also discusses the question of whether Roman poets themselves were aware of whether or not they were writing in a specific genre. She uses Pythagoras' speech in the *Metamorphosis* to argue that Ovid and his contemporaries had some concept of didactic poetry as a genre (2002: 67). See my discussion of Lucretius' awareness of genre in Section 2.1 of the current study.

[44] Volk herself also specifically discusses these qualifications in relation to Lucretius (69-118). This is discussed further below.

didacticism in terms of the phenomenon's "mimetic" qualities. She then concludes that the ancients have little insight to add. They fail to shed light on the poet's motivation for writing didactic poetry:

> We have learned so far that didactic poetry is somehow like epic, presumably mostly as regards its metre, but that unlike epic, it is not mimetic in the Aristotelian sense. Furthermore, it is a kind of poetry in which 'the poet himself speaks', without interference from other characters. This is more or less all that we can glean from the ancient critics, and it is clearly unsatisfactory.
>
> Volk 2002: 34

Volk struggles continually with the problem of an anachronistic definition of the didactic genre. On the one hand, she realizes that the didactic genre was not its own category in the ancient world and so defining the genre has the potential for being reduced to scholars working in hindsight categorizing texts that exhibit a certain number of shared characteristics. However, she argues that the didactic genre *was* a genre that we can assume any audience would recognize as a deliberate choice on the part of the author. She concludes:

> ...as will become clear in the following section, didactic poetry is a genre very much in flux and arguably reaches its 'ideal' state (that is, 'ideal' according to my definition) only after going through a number of permutations.
>
> Volk 2002: 36

Thus, Volk attempts to solve the problem of defining the didactic genre by arguing that it developed over time in "flux" and therefore even though it did not reach its final stages until many "permutations" occurred, elements of the genre existed and can be traced leading up to that time. She calls these traces the "qualifications of the didactic genre."

The problem Volk has with defining genre arises from the hermeneutic model which she uses to define it. She defines genre using qualifications that we ourselves think of as part of that genre. In other words she argues that *x* is a part of the didactic genre because *x* is "traditionally" recognized to be part of that genre, and *x* is "traditionally" recognized to be a part of that genre because it simply appears so in texts that we label, "didactic." It is a vicious circle. It is also irrelevant to a study of poetic voice since an anachronistic model of genre does not provide the

necessary framework for analyzing a phenomenon that relies on a purposeful choice on the part of an author to insert his own voice into his work. We need another way of understanding genre that allows us to better approach the way in which the author himself viewed the potential of the generic nature of his work.

Other scholars, Conte (1994: 105-128) in particular, have found ways of describing a poem's genre though methods other than relying on taxonomical lists. Conte refuses to believe in genres as handbooks of composition (1994: 106). He describes them as a function, rather than a category. Genre's most basic function is to associate elements of content/reality and form/genre, and to put them into relation and correspondence with each other (106-107). He explains the danger in thinking of genre as a "typology founded exclusively upon recurring contents" (107): it would then function as a "recipe, a handbook of production, and not as a strategy of literary composition" (107). He then points out the problem with empirical responses to genre: "The naturalistic fallacy tends to believe that there are such things as naked facts, by contrast with literary elaboration and with culture; but, so to speak, the facts that interest us always have clothes on" (108). He proceeds to explain that "fragments" of content (which enter into a constellation with other fragments creating systematic relationships) come from a culturalized reality, which has already marked them with convention and tension (111). Genre, he says, is not a "stuffing" of fragments of content; each single fragment must "enter into constellation with others if it is to be transvalued and redefined" (108). He uses Ovid as an example:

> Ovid, for example, is a poet who is very interested in the relative nature of genres and in the possibility of using certain elements within different codes. He pivots from epic to elegy in his use of *arma* in the *Metamorphosis* and again from "epic to bucolic" in his use of *virga*.
>
> Conte 1994:108-109

Another example is drinking water vs. drinking wine. Elegiac poets drink less wine and lyric poets drink more wine. "In short, drinking water and drinking wine [are] symbols of poetics" (110), Conte concludes. Both drinking water and drinking wine are symbols having into a "systematic relationship with their own opposite… a phenomenon can become meaningful only on condition that it enters into a system" (110). These examples show how ancient poets viewed formalized literature as a product of a network of signs within a system, which we refer to as genre.[45]

In other words, genre is not simply the description of some element of reality (content) being put into a literary structure (form). Instead, since content is inherently affected by culture and thus has many relative meanings attached to it, we can best define genre as a prescriptive function that that culture-laden content possesses when it is situated in a particular form. Moreover, in terms of poetic voice, the poet activates this "function" between content and form (reality and literature) to create relative meaning for his own voice in the text. For example, Catullus in poem 64 activates the function of "loss" in the form of "epic within lyric" in order to point toward the presence of his own voice; his poetic voice overlays Ariadne's gaze. Genre is a function that allows for poetic voice to occur in such a way.

In sum Conte writes:

> …genres are matrixes of works, to be conceived not as recipes but as strategies; they act in texts not *ante rem* or *post rem* but *in re*. They are like strategies, inasmuch as they are <u>procedures that imply a response</u>, an addressee as an integral part of their own functioning, a precise addressee recognizable in the very form of the text. Every genre is <u>a model of reality</u> which mediates the empirical world. The text does not work upon the direct presence of "reality," but upon a selective representation of it. The genre, <u>a paradigm of the things to represent</u>, makes reality recognizable and meaningful by translating it into something it is not. This means that, in order to be perceived,

[45] Conte also addresses the issue of whether literature is a description of a world or a proposition for it (112). He uses both the characters of Don Quixote and Madame Bovary as examples in literature in which characters experience their worlds (chivalric adventure and scandalous passion respectively) as a result of reading literature within literature. He argues that it is literature that mediates between real life and ideal life. Thus, literature is a proposition for a world, having a prescriptive effect. If this is so, then there is all the more reason to view genre as a strategy.

> the world must take on a form, become a model of meaning; and the literary genre's communicative strategies help the reader to construct a situation or a whole imaginary world.
> Conte 1994: 112 (my emphasis)

It is the notion of a "literary genre's communicative strategies" that is important for analyzing the poetic voice of Lucretius. Since Lucretius is a poet who anticipates a specific response from his readers, we must look at these so-called "communicative strategies" within his text that allow him to connect with those readers and teach them Epicureanism by means of various ways of manifesting his own voice through the didactic genre. In Volk's terms, Lucretius wrote about Epicurean physics in the form of the didactic genre, which consists of four qualifications (see above). Using Volk's terms and Conte's approach, we can say that Lucretius wrote about Epicurean physics by placing elements of the Roman world in a specific literary form (which Volk calls "the didactic genre"), through which he utilized certain mechanism (which Conte calls "communicative strategies") centering around Volk's four qualifications. By approaching genre in this way, we can consider Lucretius' poetic voice as manifesting itself when those strategies are employed. In other words, Lucretius' poem is not *of* the didactic genre; it *uses* particular "communicative strategies," which eventually become known to later scholars as qualifications of that genre in literary history. By using this approach, we can view certain elements in the poem, such as satiric moments, as part of these strategies. This method of approach will be discussed in the next chapter (Section 2.1).

Section 1.7.

A Preliminary Discussion of Intertextuality

The current section deals with the manifestation of poetic voice in terms of intertextuality. This phenomenon describes the interaction of parts of the text with other texts, at

times importing meaning and at other times providing the structure for new meaning to occur. Just as the genre emerges as a result of certain strategic choices – that is, as a result of a associations between content and form, with which the author makes his own voice known – so too intertextuality functions in the same way.[46] In regard to the *DRN*, one trend in scholarship that has emerged related to intertextuality stems from a considerable number of Lucretian passages alluding to Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[47] This section discusses scholars' reactions to Homeric intertexts in Lucretius and concludes by describing the function of Homeric intertextuality as a manifestation of Lucretius' poetic voice.

Aicher (1991: 139-158) analyses six Lucretian "revisions" of Homer. His analysis provides "a clear corroboration of E.J. Kenney's assertion that 'a thorough examination of Lucretius' style'… would show that the poet and craftsman is consistently in evidence throughout the entire poem" (Kenney 1970: 391 in Aicher 1991: 139). His first comparison is as follows (140-142)

> Fulgor ubi ad caelum se tollit totaque circum
> Aere renidescit tellus subterque virum vi
> Excitur pedibus sonitus...
>
> Lucr. 2.325-327

and...

> αἴγλη δ΄ οὐρανὸν ἷκε, γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθὼν
> χαλκοῦ ὑπὸ στεροπῆς· ὑπο δὲ κτύπος ὄτρυνε ποσσὶν
> ἀνδρῶν·
>
> Il. 19.362-364

Lucretius describes troop maneuvers seen at a distance in order to show that things far away may seem to be still, but are actually moving. Homer on the other hand describes troop maneuvers just before Achilles re-enters the fray.

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[46] See Section 1.2 above for specific examples in Apollonius and Theocritus.

[47] Another trend is the study of Callimachean and other Hellenistic influences. These studies have attempted to locate Lucretius in the tradition of Augustan neoteric poets. For bibliography on Lucretius and Hellenistic poetry, see note 2 above. I have chosen to focus on Homeric intertextuality for the current study of Lucretius' poetic voice.

Aicher's conclusion is that Lucretius imitated Homer to "utilize [his reader's] memories of both common experience and a literary text" (Aicher 1991-1992: 141) ("the scene may be imagined as taking place again in the Campus Martius," writes Bailey, 1947: 856). Aicher denies any polemical stance that Lucretius is taking against a Homeric worldview. According to Aicher, Lucretius is simply merging the historical with the literary. It is not so clear, however, whether Lucretius is making a polemical statement or not: as we distance ourselves in Lucretius' image, being literally removed from troop maneuvering in order to see his point about the movement of distant objects, we are correspondingly removing ourselves from that Iliadic world of Achilles returning to the fray. It is not only a mere merging of the historical and literary (the Campus Martius meets the Trojan War) as Aicher argues, but a metaphorical instruction to reject the literary and embrace the philosophical, (the Trojan War meets Epicurean philosophy) I argue. That "negotiation" reveals Lucretius' poetic voice manifesting itself.[48]

In his next example Aicher discusses lines 6.145-149 and *Od*. 9.391-393 (Aicher 1991-1992: 142-144): the former is a description of hissing thunder in the clouds and the latter of the hissing poker in the Cyclops' eye. Lucretius describes thunder, the sound that occurs when two clouds full of water strike against one another in the same way as Homer describes that same sound when a hot poker is jabbed into the Cyclops' eye. The connection is that the Cyclopes were traditionally known to be the makers of Zeus' thunder. Thus, Aicher argues that Lucretius "revises" Homer by stating the correct source of thunder is the movement of clouds, not the Cyclopes. The connection is made not by an explicit statement, but by the sound of hissing each instance contains. Again, Lucretius' poetic voice is seen here in the same way as above.

In his next example Aicher discusses lines 3.18-24 and *Od*. 6.42-45 (Aicher 1991-1992: 144-147): the former is a description of the gods' dwelling place (μετακόσμια / *intermundia*) as

[48] For the term, "negotiation," in this context, see the discussion below.

seen after an Epicurean revelation, and the latter is a description of the god's dwelling place as described in the destination of Athena' journey after visiting with Nausicaa. Many have discussed this imitation (Farrington 1927: 33; Bailey 1947: 990; Wormell in Dudley 1965: 45; West 1969: 30-33; Kenney 1971: 78). Lucretius takes no issue with the description of where the gods live, but instead focalizes the description from the point of view of the external reader rather than an internal character such as Nausicaa. The reader does not look at the celestial world through the gods' (or narrator's) eyes as in Homer, but through their very own eyes. This kind of revision through re-focalization is evidence of Lucretius' poetic voice manifesting itself in nuanced ways.

In his next example, Aicher discusses lines 2.23-28 and *Od*. 7.100-102 (148-149): the former is a description of non-essential luxury and the latter is a description of Nausicaa's luxurious palace. Aicher sees this as an explicit polemical statement: Lucretius is rejecting Homeric luxury. It is in their suggested alternatives that they differ. Homer ultimately encourages sailing on to find Penelope, while Lucretius demands that philosophy is the only alternative. It is not in the mere possession of luxury that they differ; it is in their suggested alternatives.

Aicher surprisingly concludes that Lucretius' utilized relatively little allusiveness (i.e. imitation) in his style. He seems to suggest that the *DRN* lacks Virgil's density and depth of allusion. He claims that a) Lucretius must not have wanted his readers to be distracted into irrelevant poetic texts and that b) Lucretius, being truly didactic, wanted to have a clear message devoid of ambiguity and suggestion. Surprisingly, Aicher's study ends on a note of pessimism. He promotes the idea that Homeric intertexts exist in Lucretius, but that we should take note of them and not overthink their implications; after all, Lucretius was just a mere translator. While

this may be true to a certain extent, I will argue that intertextuality is an essential component of Lucretius' poetic voice.

Additionally, in order to understand poetic voice in the context of intertextuality, we must, as we did with the concept of genre, establish the way in which we will approach intertextuality. On a purely philological level, the term "intertextuality" refers to the ancient author's sources, the influence that he has undergone, or the manifestation of the desire to imitate a predecessor (Edmunds 2001: 2-18). Traditionally, it has been the work of Classical scholars simply to observe the phenomenon, but not necessarily to interpret it, as exemplified by Aicher's study above. However, the study of intertextuality has expanded to address its interpretation or, in the very least, its aesthetic value. The following two quotations epitomize the way in which theorists have responded to the challenges of earlier philological models of intertextuality, which rely on the need to provide empirical evidence before arguing for a connection between two texts:

> ...each word (text) is an intersection of words (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read... Any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the transformation and absorption of another.
>
> Kristeva 1968: 299 in Edmunds 2001: 5

According to Kristeva, a text "is constructed" as a mosaic of other texts. The author of such a construction is absent; instead, texts are constructed through the process of "absorption." This relatively broader approach to intertextuality moves beyond the need for proof (sign-postings) of authorial intent. Similarly, Derrida responds to the implications of such a view:

> ...a "text" is... no longer a finished corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces.
>
> Derrida 1979: 84 in Edmunds 2001: 6

According to this statement, a text, that is *any* text, includes in its meaning an allusion, not merely a passing influence, but an implicit or explicit allusive connection to another text or texts, which the reader must take into account either passively or actively in his or her understanding of that text. This bypasses the problem of authorial intent and sees the text as a third person participant communicating within a network of other texts.

This bypassing of authorial intent has led many to conclude with such statements as, "Poets are useful, then, for canons and for literary history but, perhaps paradoxically, not useful for the interpretation of the poems that they write. In particular, the intention of the poet is useless" (Edmunds 2001: 37). In not setting clear boundaries as to when a passage cannot be interpreted as an intertext with another text, this use of the term, intertextuality, in its broadest sense, inhibits us from definitively answering questions regarding interactions such as the one between Lucretius and Homer above: did Lucretius mean for it or did later conditioned scholars create it out of their own experiences with other texts? We must find a middle ground in order to determine not only the nature of the intertext, but also which questions must even be asked of it. I will use Hinds (1998) to find this middle ground, as discussed below.

Hinds (1998: 1-5) begins by discussing two general types of intertexts and their ambivalence. First, the so called Alexandrian footnote acts as an explicit "signposting" that an allusion has taken place. Over time these allusions become more and more integrated into the text. For example, sign-posting occurs with the use of *dicuntur* (Catullus 64.1-2), *memini* (*Fasti* 3.471-6 and Catullus 64.130-5, 143-4), and the fully integrated *imitatrix ales* (*Amores* 2.6 to Lesbia's *passer*). These poets explicitly refer to another work using those specific words to act as markers for the connection. These "Alexandrian footnotes" are notoriously absent from

Lucretius. However, this does not preclude the presence of intertextuality itself from Lucretius' work. We must look to Hind's second type of intertext: tropics of allusivity.

These are more "thematic" intertexts (Hinds 1998: 6-10). Hinds discusses themes in the story of Narcissus and Echo[49] and the trunks of Pompey and Priam.[50] The evidence for one text interacting with another is not so much based on explicit sign-postings by the author, as it is on inevitability being more likely than mere coincidence. Others suggest that it simply takes two or more scholars having the same hunch independently, or even pure intellectual instinct, to be able to conclude one text is subtly alluding with another.[51] These sorts of thematic intertexts are of a concern to us here when discussing the connection between Lucretius and Homer.

In Hind's initial example of an explicit Alexandrian footnote, the direction of the intertext is more or less clear: the allusion in the form of a "signpost" looks back to its predecessor. However, in his second example, the "trope," Hinds notes that the direction could go either way (10-16). For example, he discusses Virgil allusion to Ennius in the following lines. The Trojans seek wood for the funeral pyre of Misenus, a task set for them to accomplish before Aeneas can enter the underworld:

> itur in antiquam silvam, stabula alta ferarum;
> procumbunt piceae, sonat icta securibus ilex
> fraxineaeque trabes cuneis et fissile robur
> scinditur, advolvunt ingentes montibus ornos
>
> Into an ancient forest goes their way, high home of beasts. Down drop the pitch-pines, the ilex echoes struck with axes; beams of ash and fissile oak are cleft by wedges; they roll down mighty rowans from the mountains

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[49] E.g. Ovid *Met*. 3.499-501; Verg. *Ecl*. 3.78-9; Cat. 62.39, 42-5, 49, 53-6.

[50] E.g. Lucan 1.685-6 and Verg. *Aen.* 2.557-8 respectively.

[51] This method of identifying allusion was presented to me by Jim Mckeown in a seminar on Augustan poetry at the UW-Madison in the spring of 2007.

Aen. 6.179-182 (trans. Hinds)[52]

He finds echoes in a fragment of Ennius' *Annals*:

> incedunt arbusta per alta, securibus caedunt,
> percellunt magnas quercus, exciditur ilex,
> fraxinus frangitur atque abies consternitur alta,
> pinus proceras pervortunt: omne sonabat
> arbustum fremitu silvai frondosai
>
> They pass among the high groves, and hew with axes; they strike down great oaks; the ilex is chopped; the ash is shattered and the high fir laid low; they overturn lofty pines: the whole grove echoed with the leafy forest's din.

Ann.175-9 Sk. (trans. Hinds)[53]

Hinds asks whether we should understand, "Aeneas' intervention in an ancient Italian (Ennian) landscape as a metaphor for Virgil's intervention in archaic Roman poetry, or Virgil's intervention in archaic Roman poetry as a metaphor for Aeneas' intervention in an ancient Italian landscape" (13). The implied answer is that the intertext inherently has the capacity to work both ways. Lucretius' allusions to Homer can be understood similarly. Is Epicureanism's intervention in a Homeric storm-tossed landscape a metaphor for Lucretius' intervention in epic poetry, or is Lucretius' intervention in epic poetry a metaphor for Epicureanism's intervention in a Homeric worldview? In other words, the question of which is the metaphor, Epicurean philosophy or generic convention, is not actually the correct question to be asking. Instead, we must assume the trope can work both ways and ask, what are the ramifications of each interpretation? Accordingly, the intertexual nature of Lucretius' poetic voice is not simply concerned with a philosophical engagement with sources, nor is it simply concerned with an innovation of generic convention, but contains the capacity for both.

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[52] For Virgil's text throughout this study, I have used Mynors (1972).

[53] For Ennius' text throughout this study, I have used Skutsch (1985).

Admittedly, despite the above analysis' best attempt to avoid the poet's authorial intent, it still assumes Lucretius intended the capacity of the intertext to go both ways. The burden of proof still bothers many scholars. The objection of, "how can one assume to know the inner workings of an ancient author's choice to weave an intertext in his poem?" still looms large. Hinds addresses this very concern. First, he seeks to explain the "negotiations" that occur with allusion. He takes Thomas' (1986: 171-198) paradigm of labeling allusions as either "references" or "accidental confluences" and dramatizes the processes which make them so (Hinds 1998: 17-2). He then discusses Thomas' choice to use "reference" rather than "allusion" since, Thomas claims, a reference is a "tidy contract between author and reader while an allusion is a covert reference" (1998: 21-25). Hinds then steers the conversation away from "allusion vs. reference (covert vs. specific)" and examines the underlying assumption of each: ancient authors purposefully made choices; we assume the author knows exactly what he is doing in either case. There exists a certain level of inexactitude. Hinds ultimately aims for a more exact account of this "allusive inexactitude." In order to show how even the safest intertexts contain a certain level of inexactitude he discusses the theme of love and hate, specifically in Ovid and Catullus (25-34). He discusses the strong consensus over the explicit interaction between *Amores* 3.11b.33-4 (1-2) and Catullus 85, but then shows how weak it really is. He points out that Ovid may not be alluding to Catullus, but rather to the general *topoi* of the discourse of "love and hate." He prefers to say that there is a "pull" between Ovid and Catullus rather than an allusion (29).

After showing how the burden of proof for an intertext weighs heavy on even the most sound allusions, Hinds does not abandon the notion altogether. Instead, he proceeds to give his "exact account of allusive inexactitude." What do we do with an intertext we cannot prove

exists? Hinds finds middle ground in McKeown's reading of "*me miserum*" in Ovid as being a safe, but non-provable intertext with Propertius (1987: ad loc). He shows how McKeown struggles with the "countless negotiations" the intertext undergoes. While he explores the ramifications, Mckeown never makes definitive statements about the surety of Ovid's authorial intent to produce an intertext with Propertius. Instead, he shows how an investigation of these "negotiations" yields conclusions not concerning the author's intent, but the emotional effect that it has upon the reader. Hinds concludes that we must account for these countless negotiations "from which Ovid's poetic voice emerges" (33).

Thus, when we come across an intertext between Homer and Lucretius, it creates "countless negotiations" that push the reader to respond to the relationship between the texts. In doing so, the poet has used a mechanism (much as he does with the conventions of the didactic genre discussed in the previous section), which we call "intertextuality," to set up various negotiations for the reader to consider, negotiations which he/she must address while learning Epicureanism through poetic form. Poetic voice occurs, as we will see in the next chapter, when Lucretius engages in intertextuality.[54]

Section 1.8.

A Preliminary Discussion of Reader Participation

Since the *DRN* is a didactic poem, one whose explicit purpose is to teach its audience, its poetic voice not only manipulates various conventions of genre and presents various intertextual negotiations to the reader, but also anticipates a particular response from its readers in terms of

[54] This approach essentially views intertextuality through reader response theory. See Section 2.2. For a general discussion of the "reader response" approach to Lucretius, see Fitch (2001: 211-220) who writes a "colloquy" detailing his own response to reading Lucretius.

the participation that is needed for them to learn Epicureanism. One way to view this participation is by examining the text's rhetorical strategies, whose rhetorical purpose is to convince/teach the reader the tenets of Epicureanism. Throughout this section I use the terms "rhetoric" and "rhetorical" in a wide sense, similar to Asmis (1983: 36-66), who defines the terms as follows:

> There are two orders of arguments in Lucretius' presentation: one is the underlying logical sequence, of which Lucretius himself is always aware; the other is the order of presentation itself, which may be called "rhetorical" and which is intended to make the doctrines clear and attractive to the student. This latter order is "rhetorical" in the wide sense in which both philosophers and rhetoricians use linguistic artistry to plead their case.
>
> Asmis 1983: 37

In a way, this sort of pedagogical rhetoric is the honey in the honey-on-the-cup metaphor that Lucretius uses to describe his reasons for writing in poetic form (1.943-5). This section offers a preliminary discussion of Lucretius' rhetorical strategies, and, in particular, how his poetic voice employs them to create a certain "egalitarian power dynamic" between teacher and student, a dynamic which anticipates an active audience.

The question of to whom and in what way Lucretius is teaching his student has been summarized and reframed by Mitsis who investigates the honey-on-the-cup passage and offers a new understanding of how we should interpret it. The conventional understanding is that it represents "mutually consenting adults" in a doctor-patient power dynamic (Mitsis 1993: 112).[55] However, Mitsis is bothered by the condescending tone of treating readers as children, especially considering the Callimachean references that we assume those mature enough to understand would acknowledge (112). He then determines that the image must be in keeping with a larger system of connected imagery and with Lucretius' rhetorical purposes (114). He argues this by pointing out several passages in which the non-Epicurean (the not-yet taught) reader is compared

[55] He cites Classen (1968: 77-118), Asmis (1983: 36-66) and Lenaghan (1967: 98-127).

to a helpless child, e.g. being born into a helpless world 5.222-226 and children's fear of the dark 2.55-8, 3.87-90, 6.35-38. He questions what *rhetorical* aim there could be in condescending to his readers by calling them helpless children (1993: 111-115). He then considers the idea that this condescending tone may reflect the sort of Epicurean authoritativeness that some have argued existed in Epicurus' own time.[56] This "therapy" rested on teacher authority, reader passivity, and no dialectical interchange. But this cannot be so for Lucretius, he says, because of his "open avowal of his powers of deception" (115-119); an authoritative teacher, in other words, would never admit to his passive students that he is manipulating them.

In order to solve the issue of the paradoxical honey-on-the-cup metaphor, Mitsis then looks at Lucretius' rhetorical strategies. In particular he analyzes the addressee. He investigates how the addressee is anticipated, in order to explain Lucretius' condescending tone. He introduces the term "morality of elitism" and describes it as a rhetorical strategy that relies on the reader's sense of elitism to steer him/her into agreeing with what Lucretius describes as something with which all intellectual people would agree and into disagreeing with what he portrays as something in which only ignorant fools would believe. In terms of the current study, this rhetorical process of steering the reader is enabled by Lucretius' poetic voice.

While we, of course, will never accurately know to whom the poet is speaking, Mitsis' study of the addressee reveals how rhetorical strategies function in the poem. It is through those strategies, a manifestation of the poem's poetic voice, that we can investigate more fully to whom these strategies were directed.

Related to this is another rhetorical strategy that scholars have analyzed within didactic poetry in particular: the establishment of a particular power dynamic between poet and addressee (teacher and student), in which the process of learning takes place. In didactic poetry these

[56] Cf. Nussbaum (1986: 31-74) and the introduction to chapter three of the current study.

strategies are equivalent to "pedagogical" strategies, the persuasive ways by which Lucretius attempts to teach his readers. These can be found in the *DRN* in places where the poet asks rhetorical questions (e.g. 4.469-521, 5.379-422), interrupts with hypothetical objectors (e.g 2.931ff), employs direct speech (e.g. 3.931ff), or more subtly, as Mitsis points out above, steers the reader by catering to his/her sense of elitism. As discussed below, this relationship between teacher and student has been described as either "authoritative," the teacher being all-knowing, or "egalitarian," the teacher and student having equal intellectual capacities and abilities. The former expects an obedient, somewhat passive student. The latter, with its open invitation to participate, anticipates a reader that acts as somewhat of an interlocutor, who is a more active participant.

The issue of a didactic poet's pedagogical stance as ranging from authoritative to egalitarian has been taken up by Semanoff in an article entitled, "Undermining Authority: Pedagogy in Aratus' *Phaenomena*" (2006: 303-318). He tracks the differences in power dynamics within the works of Hesiod and Aratus. The relationship with the reader that appears in Aratus, he argues, is formed from Aratus' desire to depict a teacher whose methods of instruction match the poem's Stoic philosophical message. In other words, Aratus' innovation to the genre of didactic poetry was to embed certain Stoic ideals within his didactic poem on the movement of the stars. These ideals are in direct contrast to Hesiod's archaic world view. The poem reflects this in two ways. First, the relationship between Hesiod and Perses is antagonistic compared to an Aratus who creates a relationship based on co-operation with his unnamed addressee, carefully crafting a close rapport between teacher and student. Second, the role of teacher in Aratus resembles that of the Stoic conception of Zeus (303-318).[57] It is the former

[57] See Semanoff (2006: 315 n.17) for scholarly debate on the degree of Stoic influence in Aratus.

that most concerns us here, while the latter will remain suggestive for the extent of Lucretius' role as that of the Epicurean conception of Zeus.

Semanoff begins by comparing the first lines of Hesiod and Aratus (305-307). Hesiod uses authoritative words (imperatives) when he addresses Zeus (ἐννέπετε) and Perses (Πέρσῃ ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην) while Aratus uses egalitarian language (hortatory subjunctives) in his address to Zeus (ἀρχώμεσθα, ἐωμεν, κεχρήμεθα). Semanoff then expounds on three other examples that also show this difference. First, Aratus shows compassion for his reader when he describes the dangers at sea associated with the rising of Capricorn (*Ph.* 287-299). Aratus' empathy is activated through the shift from the optative to the indicative and from the second person to first person plural. In contrast, Hesiod is distant from his reader's emotions (307-309). Second, Aratus has faith in his student's intellect since he confidently asserts many times (*Ph.* 141-146) that he assumes his readers will have no problem identifying certain constellations. At times it seems as if Aratus' guidance is not even needed (309-312). Again, this is in contrast with Hesiod's condescending tone towards Perses (Hesiod calls him "νηπίος" throughout). Third, both Hesiod and Aratus admit their ignorance at various points. For example, Hesiod has only sailed once (*WD* 649-651) and Aratus admits he only knows the movements of constellations, not the wandering planets (*Ph.* 456-461). Semanoff argues that the reader sees Hesiod's admission of ignorance as confirmation of Zeus's ultimate authority working through the author, while Aratus' reader understands such an open avowal of ignorance as an invitation to pursue knowledge together (312-314). Thus, Aratus shows a relatively more egalitarian pedagogical stance through a series of subtle innovations to Hesiod's archetype: a) the poet-teacher expresses more compassion for his student, b) he believes in his student's intellectual

capacity, and c) through his humble admission of ignorance he creates an invitation for his student to join in the learning process (creating a sort of "learning community").

If we extend Semanoff's observations to Lucretius, we see that Lucretius continues Aratus' egalitarian pedagogical stance. Just as Aratus expressed compassion for his reader during the Capricornian storm, so, too, does Lucretius in the well-known proem of book II when he describes how sweet it is to watch a storm from the distance, taking pity on those men caught up in inappropriate concerns (*o miseras hominum mentes, o pectora caeca*!, 2.14).[58] Just as Aratus believes in his student's intellectual capacity, Lucretius also shows the same level of confidence. For example, Lucretius finds it necessary to only explain how rain works in Book VI, but not snow, wind, hail, frost, and ice since he believes the reader will easily figure these out when he knows the primary qualities of matter (*perfacilest tamen haec reperire,* 6.532). Lucretius also seems sympathetic to his reader's misconception of the presence of divine agency in the universe. He asks, "Whose mind doesn't shrink up with fear of the gods when there is an earthquake or loud thunderbolt?" (5.1218-1240). Finally, just as Aratus embodies a humble attitude of ignorance, so, too, does Lucretius when he gives several possible explanations for natural phenomena, but admits he knows not which one is true, only that one of them is true (5.526-523, 6.703-711);[59] Lucretius allows the reader to decide which is true. Thus, Lucretius continues Aratus' co-operative egalitarian pedagogical stance.

One of the ways Lucretius' poetic voice continues this stance in the *DRN* is the inclusion of what I will be terming "observed internal dialectical passages." Most of the *DRN* contains

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[58] See Fowler (2002b: ad loc.) who discusses, using ancient evidence, the three possible human responses to another's pain: pity for the other person, relief that you yourself are not that person, and fear that you could one day perhaps become that person. I, like Fowler, believe that "relief" was intended as the anticipated response.

[59] Lucretius also acknowledges and unknown "nameless element" of the soul (3.241-287). The theory of multiple explanations, a theory derived from Epicurus, is further discussed in Section 2.1 of this study.

very little dialectic, i.e. two voices resolving a conflict through dialogue. It is, of course, commonly found in Platonic dialogues. As we will see in the next chapter, this form of dialectic, where one voice splits into many, is used throughout the *DRN* and is employed by Lucretius in order to a) communicate the sense of what it feels like to think like an Epicurean, b) establish his narratorial authority in a way that expects his audience to actively engage with the poem, and c) present his narrative in a way that expects his audience to treat it as if it were a performance. Lucretius' employment of this sort of dialectic as part of the power dynamic between teacher and student allows him to create moments in which his readership can "watch" the plot and draw conclusions rather than be directly taught and passively receive conclusions. Thus, Lucretius furthers Aratus' egalitarian stance by introducing "observed internal dialectic" for a Roman audience.

Conclusion

In the first half of this chapter, I synthesized and sorted out the relevant terms associated with the approach of "poetic voice" as it is constructed in Classical scholarship. Many terms have been used: self-representation, intertextuality, reflexivity, focalization, authority, performance, multiplicity, personality, functionality, positionality, persona, etc. These terms have been discussed and fully articulated in their various contexts (Sections 1.1-5). In the second half of this chapter, I then synthesized a paradigm based not on the specific functions of poetic voice in other authors, but instead on that which poetic voice depends upon (makes use of) in order to perform those functions. In Sections 1.6-8, I engaged in preliminary discussions regarding Lucretian scholarship and those "dependents" in preparation for a close analysis of poetic voice in the *DRN*. We have found that an analysis of poetic voice in the *DRN* must

account for the conventions of the so-called didactic genre, the negotiations which intertextuality presents to the reader, and the way in which the text anticipates active participation or a passive response from the reader.

In the next chapter, I expand these observations by showing how Lucretius' poetic voice incorporates the particular elements of satire within the didactic genre, instructs the reader to interpret Homeric intertextuality through Epicurean physics, and creates subtle observed, dialectical moments in the presentation of Epicureanism to the reader. I engage closely with the *DRN* in order to fully articulate Lucretius' poetic voice, which occurs when his own voice projects itself into the text of the *DRN,* manifesting itself through the conventions of genre, intertextuality, and various other means, thus revealing the author's poetic presence alongside his historical voice, and reframing biographical questions concerning Lucretius as questions not based solely on historicity but on the intersection of history and poetry. That analysis will set the stage for chapter three's discussion of the poem's readership, which will, in turn, create an illuminating paradigm for chapter four's discussion Lucretius' poetic voice in the last argumentative section of the poem.

Chapter Two

Lucretius' Poetic Voice

I say one, two, play me do,
Let me sound as sweet as you.
Play me wide, Play me long,
Let me be your song. ♫
-Dennis Lee (1983: 118)

This chapter continues to investigate poetic voice in the *De Rerum Natura* in order to answer biographical questions concerning Lucretius and his readership. The previous chapter ultimately synthesized a paradigm for approaching poetic voice in the *DRN*, a paradigm which was based on the methodology of determining what poetic voice makes use of in order to function in various texts. This paradigm will now be applied to a close analysis of the *DRN* in the current chapter. The third chapter will shift focus from Lucretius' poetic voice to his readership and, using the so-called penetration model, it will analyze that readership in formal, historical, and philosophical terms. The last chapter offers a case study of the above analysis. It discusses the effect of Lucretius' poetic voice on the poem's readership in the last argumentative section of the text, and then suggests that the resulting relationship between Lucretius and his readership gives us insight into the way in which Roman social bonds are embodied in the reading of Latin poetry. The current chapter is thus the starting point for this dissertation's eventual analysis of the relationship between Lucretius and his readership in the *De Rerum Natura.*

Introduction

Poetic voice occurs when an author's voice manifests itself in his work, but, as we saw in the last chapter, it is more than simply an instance of when an internal character's voice within a story mirrors the author's thoughts or feelings. The manner in which it is expressed is dependent upon the genre of the text, the intertextual engagement the text has with other texts, and various other literary strategies within the text itself.[60] Now that I have defined the term, "poetic voice," and discussed its manifestation in the works of various authors, I will take a closer look at this phenomenon in Lucretius by considering how Lucretius' poetic voice manifests itself in three specific ways: through the mixing of certain generic conventions of the didactic genre ("satiric" conventions as will be described below in Section 2.1), through associating the text has with other external texts ("Homeric intertexts" as will be described below in Section 2.2), and the usage of various other literary devices that work to create an egalitarian relationship with his readership (the device of "internal dialectic" as will be described below in Section 2.3).

In Section 2.1, more specifically, I first expose as insufficient the taxonomical method of defining genre and suggest an alternative method. I challenge the taxonomical idea that Lucretius was a strict didactic poet by examining his work in the context of early Roman satire, a genre which, I argue, is important for understanding what is usually called didacticism in Roman contexts. Investigating the intersection of satire and didacticism as the locus at which an author expresses his poetic voice will allow for a better grasp of how Lucretius' poetic voice manifests

[60]The various functions of this phenomenon also differ. For an extended discussion of poetic voice and its function in a variety of authors, see the individual sections of the previous chapter (Sections 1.1-5). For example, poetic voice enacts a drama of position, as in the way that Catullus manifests his voice in the voice of Ariadne; it establishes a realignment of authority within literary tradition, as in the way that Apollonius manifests his voice in that of Orpheus; it facilitates the reader's identification with the author, as in the way that Hesiod creates a specific didactic persona that teaches not how to farm, but how farming feels; it focalizes the narrative, as in the way that ancient historians establish their narratorial authority through various rhetoric strategies; and it has the capacity to incorporate multiple levels of meaning simultaneously, as in the way that the chorus of Aeschylus' Agamemnon speak as participants in a ritual, internal characters within the play, and as the playwright himself.

itself in his work. Moreover, I briefly discuss the progression of Lucretius' use of satiric elements throughout the *DRN*, a progression which culminates in the "theory of multiple explanations." This first section discusses both the phenomenon and function of Lucretius' poetic voice.

In Section 2.2, I investigate the implications of the text's Homeric intertextuality in the context of the poem's own philosophical principles. The function of Homeric allusion throughout the *DRN* will be determined by Lucretius' own "atomic" understanding of how intertextuality functions in the universe. This intersection of Epicurean philosophy and literary intertextuality provides further evidence of Lucretius' poetic voice, a voice which accounts for both literary aspects, in this case "intertextuality," and the author's historical presence, in this case "philosophy," thus revealing Lucretius' poetic voice.

Lastly, in Section 2.3 of this chapter, I analyze various other literary devices in the text in terms of "internal dialectic" within the work that resembles a dialogue between two opposing characters on stage. This dialogue implies a narratorial authority that creates a specific relationship between teacher/poet and student/addressee. This chapter is thus a study of genre, intertextuality, and other literary devices within the text. Each component will help to define Lucretius' poetic voice by highlighting the places that Lucretius projects his own voice into the poem through these means.

Section 2.1.

Genre: Satiric Elements

This section examines Lucretius' use of particular satiric elements in teaching Epicureanism through the medium of the didactic genre. As described earlier in Section 1.6, the question of how one defines the "didactic genre" has been taken up by Volk's (2002) study of Latin didacticism. She identifies four specific criteria to which a poem must adhere in order to be considered a member of the didactic genre (25-68) and then proceeds to discuss the ways in which Lucretius adheres to these criteria (69-118). Volk is adamant that Lucretius is writing *strict* didactic poetry within the bounds of certain didactic conventions. At various points she stresses that it appears "counter-intuitive," "hardly warranted," and "perverse," to view Lucretius' text as anything else (68-69). She concedes, though, that it seems tempting to see other elements, such as epic and satire, in Lucretius, but she claims that readers usually find these instances in rare "purple patches such as proems and digressions, while the greater part of the poem, with its genuinely philosophical arguments, is dry and unrewarding" (71). Also, in regard to the ending of the *DRN*, which, unfortunately for her argument, looks nothing like a conventional didactic ending, Volk invokes the theory that the poem was not finished and claims: "It is reasonable to entertain the notion that the end of the poem, especially, might still have been modified by the author" (82 n.41).

Volk's preoccupation with defining strict conventions of didactic poetry minimizes and omits characteristics that do not fit her strict taxonomical guidelines. It is my intent to identify these characteristics and explain their presence as a means by which Lucretius projects his voice into his text. Doing so, this approach shifts the discussion from a question of *which* genre defines the text of Lucretius, a question addressed in Volk's taxonomical approach, to the

question of *how* Lucretius uses and misuses various conventions of what Volk calls the qualifications of the didactic genre.

What are the characteristics that a strict taxonomical view omits? First and foremost, there is little doubt that Volk is correct in asserting that Lucretius' exhibits her four qualifications of the didactic genre. According to Volk, the text must include a) explicit didactic intent, b) an extended teacher-student constellation, c) a certain extent of poetic self-consciousness, and d) poetic simultaneity, a term which means giving the impression of a poem in progress (2002: 25-68 and 69-118). However, she struggles to fend off the many objections pertaining to elements of the poem that do not fit her strict paradigm. For example, she acknowledges the text's explicit didactic intent, but she admits that the question remains whether Memmius, the one toward whom the intent is focused, is actually progressively learning and increasing his understanding of Epicureanism (82).[61] It seems possible that the *DRN* is an explicit didactic text that is not actually successful in getting its message across to its stated addressee, a nuance Volk does not take into account. This issue leads to questions concerning a didactic text's practicality.

She is also right to emphasize many elements of poetic self-consciousness, but she claims that the self-consciousness of a poet explicitly aware that he is writing poetry does not exist for an epic narrator, and so the *DRN* is not epic but simply didactic (86). However, there are numerous examples in Latin literature where an epic narrator also shows signs of poetic self-consciousness.[62] Thus, "didactic" and "epic" both have the capacity to utilize each other's conventions. One does not exclude the other.

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[61] See also Keen (1985:1-4) who finds no evidence that Memmius is learning or changing throughout the poem.

[62] For example, in Book IX of the *Aeneid*, the epic narrator shows the same propensity towards Volk's poetic self-consciousness when he writes of Nisus and Euryalus gaining immortality through his own *carmina* (*Aen.* 9.446-450). There is, in addition, reason to question the usefulness of Volk's qualification of *explicit* self-consciousness.

Volk is also right to resolve the issue of Epicurean philosophy written in hexameter verse by invoking studies that show Lucretius' use of poetry as being consistent with Epicurean tenets.[63] I agree that Lucretius' choice of poetry as his medium is not as problematic as scholars once thought. I would only add that, as this study will show, we should continue to question the choice of hexameter verse in a Roman context now that the hexameter question has been liberated from initial discussions of, "Why write about Epicureanism in hexameter form?" Instead, I ask, "Why this form in a Roman context?"

The characteristics that Volk's taxonomical paradigm overlooks are the following: the issue of hexameter verse in a Roman context, the intertextual relationship between Lucretius' text and Homer's epics,[64] and the practicality of the poem for teaching Epicureanism.[65] These characteristics of the *DRN,* as will be explained below, mark Lucretius' poetic voice. The remainder of this section deals with the issue of hexameter verse in a Roman context. One type of literary mode found in the same meter within a similar context is early Roman satire, particularly that of Lucretius' literary contemporary, Lucilius (160s – 103/2 BCE). This section investigates satiric elements within Lucretius' didactic poem and argues that Lucretius' poetic voice utilizes these elements to teach Epicureanism.

The relevance of satiric elements in Lucretius' didactic poetry has long been the subject of much debate in Lucretian scholarship.[66] It should be noted that I do not mean to claim

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[63] Schrijvers (1970: 87-147) shows this through an analogy of Lucretius' description of perception and Gale (1994: 138-155) through explaining that it is a rhetorical attempt to use poetry to paradoxically attack it.

[64] See Section 2.2 of the current chapter.

[65] See Section 2.3 of the current chapter.

[66] Murley (1939: 380-395), in his article "Lucretius and the History of Satire" finds many parallels between Lucretius and Lucilius, a recognized satirist. For example, both Lucretius and Lucilius attack the concept of fearing the gods and death in their poems (Lucr. 2.55-58 and *Lucil*. XV. 486-488). Both credit Epicurus with the salvation of earthly wanderers (Lucr. 5.10-12 and *Lucil*. XXV 626). Both are conscious of their didacticism, which leads

Lucretius was writing satire as such. It should, nevertheless, be obvious in view of the suggestive parallels detected by numerous scholars that satire needs to be addressed in terms of its interaction with didactic. This is especially the case, if, as Volk herself admits, there is no solid ancient evidence that the ancients themselves recognized didactic as a genre, whereas satire is attested in antiquity.[67] This is particularly relevant since we are considering Lucretius in view of his participation in Roman culture and society, which is one of the chief aims of this study.

The following analysis will illustrate Lucretius' use of satire in the first four books of his poem and its effect on his didactic purpose. Once I have established that certain elements in Lucretius' text are present and intelligible in ancient terms as satire, I will comment on the frequency of these elements throughout the text. The concept of poetic voice supports this approach since poetic voice constitutes an instance of Lucretius projecting his own thoughts and feelings into the text of his didactic narrative, in this case, through the inclusion of "satiric elements." Thus, I approach the Lucretian didactic form not as a genre in and of itself but as a kind of artifact of Lucretius' poetic voice which mixes two very real and recognized genres, epic and satire. The instances of mockery that I discuss, therefore, have their origins in satire, but in Lucretian didactic poetry these instances of mockery are a byproduct of Lucretius' poetic voice manifesting itself through the mixing of didactic and satire.

First, what is "satire" and what is meant by "satiric elements"? In an attempt to avoid a static classificatory model, such as Volk's qualifications of the didactic genre discussed above,

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them to anticipate inattention or opposition from the pupil-reader (Lucr. 4.912 and *Lucil*. XXVII 692f). Both promote the Epicurean appeal to the evidence of the senses and of reasoning (Lucr. 1.623f and *Lucil*. 9.349f). Besides these parallels, Murley offers an extensive discussion of the diatribe at the end of Book III as sure evidence for satire in Lucretius. He concludes that Lucretius has been unfairly slighted in the account of satire in terms of the birth and evolution of satire's themes and form. Furthermore, he identifies several ways Lucretius influenced Horace's satires (1939: 395).

[67] Quintilian famously claims that satire was a genre completely invented by the Romans: *satura tota nostra est* (X.1.93). Whether or not this is true is irrelevant to the current discussion; what is relevant is that the genre of satire was recognized by ancient grammarians as a distinct form.

we should approach the definition of satire not through its positive characteristics, but in terms of its "dynamic function." Rudd summarizes the function of satire as lying "within a triangle of which the apices are (a) attack, (b) entertainment, and (c) preaching" (1998: 1). I propose that the construction of Rudd's "triangle" in Lucretius centers on the specific type of attack commonly known as "mockery." Mockery is a type of playful invective (entertainment) whose purpose is to teach a subtle message (preaching); it occurs when the narrator takes on the voice of his opponent and attacks him in an ironic or hyperbolic way that impersonates his opponent's views (attack).[68]

Second, on a philological level the attack must be distinguished from a simple disagreement or anticipated objection. Markovic (2008: 83-176) and others have distinguished many types of rhetorical arguments that include various types of attacks.[69] Mockery is a type of attack that includes an extended description of the opposing view's incorrect reasoning. This is usually marked by a third-person introductory word (e.g. *aiunt, fingunt, dicunt*, etc.) followed by a string of infinitives in indirect statement. A closer look at these passages reveals not simply an attack in terms of content, but also through grammatical, poetical, and metrical structures.

Lastly on a basic level, the invective of satire creates three points of reference: a) a speaker, b) an addressee, and c) a subject of the speaker's mockery.[70] Admittedly, within the satires of Horace and Juvenal, the addressee and the object of invective overlap at times.

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[68] For the poetics of mockery, see Rosen (2007: 3-41). He establishes these poetics not on the basis of traditional recognized satiric texts, but instances of mockery from archaic iambic poetry to Roman satire.

[69] See also Classen (1968: 81-85) for the rhetorical forms that Lucretius' proofs take: mixed hypothetical syllogisms, evidence from sense perception, accumulation of observations and proofs for the same proposition, and using terminology not yet explained in order to manipulate his reader into one conclusion once the reader encounters the explanation of that terminology.

[70] For the dialectic process satire enables, see Anderson (1982: 13-49) who discusses the progression of invective from Lucilius, Horace, to Juvenal in the context of Socratic dialectic. I do not mean to place Lucretius in this development. Instead, I wish to suggest that he drew upon the tradition in general while writing his poem.

However, in the didactic context of Lucretius' poem these are always separate; Memmius himself is never attacked, only warned not to stray. The introduction of an attacked third party creates a complex dynamic between teacher, student, and the one being attacked, thus expanding and clarifying Volk's qualification of a teacher-student constellation. In the following, I investigate the attacks on Lucretius' rivals' viewpoints, their marked uniqueness within the form of the poem, and the complex dialectic they create within that form.

My first example occurs just after the proem in the first book (1.1-148).[71] This attack occurs in Lucretius' first argument. In particular, it is the initial step in the learning process that forms the basis for understanding the way in which void enables motion. The principle states that the universe consists of matter and void mixed together to create various objects with competing and complementing densities. Thus, when one object is put into an empty space, matter and void are exchanged and produce motion. Lucretius proceeds to introduce a rival theory of spatial displacement, which claims that motion is due to a shifting of places between things. According to this incorrect view an object simply switches places with the space left behind by the other; void is not involved in this process. It is important to note that Lucretius does not give a straightforward statement of that alternate position; instead, he mocks what they say:

> cederĕ squamigeris latices nitentibus aiunt
> et liquidas aperire vias, quia post loca pisces
> linquant, quo possint cedentes confluere undae.
> sic alias quoque res inter se posse moveri
> et mutare locum, quamvis sint omnia plena.
>
> Others say that water yields to the pressure of scaliferous creatures
> as clear paths open for them. This happens because they say that fish leave spaces behind them,
> spaces, into which the waters, after they yield, can somehow immediately flow back together
> again,
> and they maintain that other things are able to move themselves in the same way

[71] Line 1.148 is the generally accepted end of the first proem. However, Solomon (2004: 260-283) argues it extends to 1.502. This would make the passage under discussion (1.372ff) programmatic and further add to the argument of this section.

and so exchange position, despite how dense all things may be.

Lucr. 1.372-376

In other words, some incorrectly argue that movement occurs as the result of one object being exchanged with another (*inter se posse moveri / et mutare locum*), nullifying the need for supposing Epicurean void.

Philosophy aside, there are several structural and poetic characteristics of this passage that reflect subtle mockery. The shortening of the final "e" in *cedere* (1.372) before an "s" and another consonant in *squamigeris* is bold; it is extremely rare in Augustan poetry and Lucretius only does it some twelve times (Bailey 1947: ad loc. and Brown 1984: ad loc.). The use of the word *squamigeris* shows elements of pomposity, which may be intended to reflect the arrogance of his rival (Leonard and Smith 1942: ad loc.).[72] The subjunctives *linquant* and *possint* are most likely used because Lucretius does not accept the explanation himself (Leonard and Smith 1942: ad loc.). Brown labels these as "sub-oblique subjunctives used in reporting the rival view" (1984: ad loc.). Brown also points out the hendiadys, *inter se posse moveri / et mutare locum,* ("to move by changing places with one another"). Hendiadys, a poetic device used for showing the interchangeability and singular meaning of two verbs, is here used to describe the rival's incorrect view of spatial displacement; *moveri* and *movere* are grammatically interchangeable in the hendiadys, yet contextually impossible.

Thus, the attack on those that believe in alternate theories of spatial displacement is not simply stated, but described in a way that undercuts its logic and highlights its absurdity. The initial metrical anomaly with *cedere*, the epic combining of *squami* and *gerere* in the didactic register, the subjunctive mood of critical verbs of his opponent's position, and the ironic

[72] Ernout (1925: ad loc.) comments that the expression, "*squamigeris latices*," is doubtlessly intended to mock the pompous majesty of Ionian philosophy, "expressions poétiques employées sans doute dans une intention ironique pour railler la majesteé pompeuse de la poésie philosophique ionienne" (96).

hendiadys all contribute to the personal mockery of his opponent. He states a false explanation of his rival by refuting the argument, ridiculing those that believe it, and creating a particular situation often found in satire where satirists attack in much the same way.[73]

It is important to note that the features of style described above are not found in the following correct explanation of the interaction between matter and void. After giving two more competing views in the same light, Lucretius concludes:

> aut igitur motu privandumst corpora quaeque
> aut esse admixtum dicendumst rebus inane
> unde initum primum capiat res quaeque movendi.
>
> Either all matter must be denied motion
> or it must be said that void is mixed with things
> and from this fact, each thing seizes the beginning of movement.
>
> Lucr. 1.381-383

Lucretius provides the two inevitable outcomes that his argument has reached. The first is an illogical impossibility (1.381); it is rhetorical in nature since Lucretius obviously expects this first option to be invalid. We are left to accept the second: void is mixed with matter and thus creates movement (1.382-383). The comparisons are logical and balanced between *aut* and *aut.* Each clause includes an authoritative gerundive of obligation (*privandumst* and *dicendumst*) and the final conclusion includes a gerund (*initum…movendi*), stressing the correct view of a world without agency.[74] The tone is serious, immediate, and succinct as compared to the satiric attack on his rival described above. There is a direct correlation here between form and content,[75] which is at odds with their dissonance in the earlier satiric passage.

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[73] See Braund (1996: 26-29) for a list of places where Juvenal uses similar poetic devices throughout his *Satires*: a grand style with a lowly tone, surprise or deflation at the end of the line (discussed in a similar way in Lucretius below), enjambment, diminutives, rhetorical questions, repetition, hyperbole, etc.

[74] Ernout (1925: ad loc.) points out that the gerund in Lucretius behaves like a substantive, "gérondif pouvant avoir la valeur active ou passive, et se comportant comme un véritable substantif" (97).

[75] See Schrijvers (2007: 77-114) and Kennedy (2007: 205-225) for ways in which literary form follows philosophical content; the former with respect to the philosophy of vision (content) in the employment of analogies (form), and the latter with respect to the explanation of an infinite world (content) in a finite text (form). Both

Thus, this first example reveals Lucretius' poetic voice working to constitute the genre of didactic through the satiric element of mockery, which is associated with satire. He does this through the projection of his own voice in his text in the form grammatical, poetical, and metrical structures. In his disagreement with a rival theory of spatial displacement we found evidence of more than simply a rebuttal; we found an extended attack complete with irony and invective produced by his style. It is completely at odds with his strict logic and stern reasoning, which is characteristic of his argumentative style throughout his explanation of things.[76]

In the above example, Lucretius does not mention exactly to whom this criticized theory belongs. Romans who were well-versed in philosophy arguably would have known.[77] Not mentioning a name allows for Lucretius to maintain a wider, less specific target of attack.[78] Of course, Lucretius does not always omit the names of his rivals. There are three exceptions at the end of book I: Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras. Lucretius first disagrees adamantly with Heraclitus' competing "monist" theory of matter according to which all things have fire as their seed. Again, we see the same detailed mockery as we saw against the rival theories of spatial displacement. Here, with the explicit reference to a particular rival theorist rather than the generalized view of his opponent, Lucretius takes the opportunity to engage in a more personalized attack.

> Dicere porro ignem res omnis esse neque ullam
> rem veram in numero rerum constare nisi ignem,

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scholars work under the assumption that Lucretius (and his poetic voice) structured his work under the mandates of his own philosophy.

[76] See Hardie (1986: 86) in his discussion of Vergilian *imitatio* of Lucretius, points out that this sort of disconnect probably gave rise to the notion of an anti-Lucretius in Lucretius. He notes the contrast of these "satiric" passages with the rest of the poem.

[77] See Sections 3.2 and 3.3 for an extended discussion of Lucretius' readership in philosophical and historical terms respectively.

[78] For a discussion of similar non-specific targets of attack in Horace's *Sermones*, see Freudenberg (2001: 15-124 esp. 23-26).

quod facit hic idem, perdelirum esse videtur.
nam contra sensus ab sensibus ipse repugnant
et labefactat eos, unde omnia credita pendent,
unde hic cognitus est ipsi quem nominat ignem.
credit enim sensus ignem cognoscere vere,
cetera non credit, quae nilo clara minus sunt.

Moreover, to declare that all things are fire, and that no part
of any substance is made of anything other than fire!,
which [Heraclitus] believes, seems obvious to me to be quite irrational.
For here, his claim rests on the basis of sense perception, but elsewhere fights against those same perceptions!
and undermines them (the senses) from which all his own beliefs hang,
from which he himself has acknowleged that existence of fire which he cites.
He believes, then, that the senses correctly know fire,
but he does not believe that other things exist which are no less clear to the senses!

Lucr. 1.690-697

Lucretius attacks Heraclitus for believing in the primacy of fire (rather than atoms). He points out the irrationality (*perdelirum*) in claiming to believe the primal substance of things is fire on the basis of what we can see, when Heraclitus himself was known to have greatly distrusted sensory perception.

The passage begins with the repetition of word *ignem* in the first two lines. Lucretius is not one to practice *varatio* to the extent that later Augustan writers do. Repetition in Lucretius is noticed, but not always analyzed for some sort of synthesis of meaning.[79] Here, it functions to mock Heraclitus in his persistent claim to fire's primary elemental value, as if to say, "all Heraclitus thinks about is fire, fire, fire." The anaphora of *unde* in 694 and 695, a form of repetition, serves a different, but similar purpose. It doubly highlights the foundational flaw on which his argument rests. The repetition of *credit* in the last two lines of the quotation continues the idea in the same way by paralleling the incongruity of his argument: he believes one thing, but paradoxically also believes the opposite. Heraclitus thinks that "when we see a flame we rightly recognize it as fire, but when we see other things we do not recognize them truly as fire

[79] Ingalls (1971: 227-36) reviews scholarship on Lucretian repetition and concludes that Lucretius used repetition either for didactic purposes or because it was epic (Ennian) commonplace. This study assumes the former.

under certain conditions" (Bailey 1947: ad loc). These repetitions ultimately serve to mock and expose Heraclitus' paradoxical beliefs.

The ultimate insult comes in line 693 above: *nam contra sensus ab sensibus ipse repugnat.* Lucretius mocks Heraclitus' fight against his own senses through the use of polyptoton, *sensus…sensibus.* The polyptoton stands out among so many exact repetitions (as described in the previous paragraph with *ignem…ignem, unde…unde, and credit…credit*) and steers the reader to notice the difference in word forms. That suggestion of difference (inherent in instances of polyptoton) reinforces the inconsistency of Heraclitus' incorrect way of thinking. Furthermore, the use of two different, yet not quite antithetical prepositions (*contra* and *ab*) highlights that inconsistency as well. Where we would expect opposites we find "against" and "from." Moreover, *ipse* underlines the personal attack. But what is most significant in this line is its substance: Lucretius exposes the contradictions of Heraclitus thought, the same sort of contradiction which Heraclitus himself championed with his *obscura verba* (1.639). Lucretius succeeds in attacking Heraclitus by using Heraclitus' own style. Indeed, this is a tricky passage with repetition, rhetorical anaphora, paradox, mockery, and inconsistency. Each contributes to the mockery of the equally tricky and obscure Heraclitus. Lucretius projects his bitterness and frustration with Heraclitus through his poetic voice and the poetics of mockery.

The next philosopher Lucretius "refutes" is Empedocles. Much has been written on the influence of Empedocles on Lucretius.[80] Unlike his animosity towards Heraclitus, Lucretius maintains a more respectful stance towards Empedocles whom many argue Lucretius used as his

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[80] Furley (1970: 55-64) is the first to argue for Empedocles as a literary, not philosophical, model in Lucretius' first proem. This is further discussed by Sedley (1998: 1-34). See Garani (2007: 29-94) on Lucretius adaptation of Empedoclean uses of personification to explain scientific principles.

poetic model. Despite apparent affection for the man,[81] his disagreement with Empedocles is similar to that with Heraclitus. Both philosophers posited the primary building blocks of matter incorrectly. The former was a monist, believing in the primacy of fire (as discussed above), and the latter was a pluralist, positing a four-element theory of primal bodies.[82] Here, as above, Lucretius employs the same methods of satiric attack:

> primum quod motus exempto rebus inani
> constituunt et res mollis rarasque relinquunt,
> aera solem imbrem terras animalia fruges,
> nec tamen admiscent in eorum corpus inane;
> deinde quod omnino finem non esse secandis
> corporibus faciunt neque pausam stare fragori
> nec prorsum in rebus minimum consistere quicquam.
>
> In the first place, in their mind, while imagining void is not mixed within things,
> they still declare that there is movement and still maintain the existence of soft and porous things,
> (for example, air, sunlight, water, earth, and then animals and plants)
> even though they do not think to mix void into material of things;
> Secondly, they suppose that there is altogether no end to matter-splicing
> and they suppose that there exists no pause to the process of breaking-down,
> nor at all does there exist a smallest unit within things.
>
> Lucr. 1.742-748

The attack takes the form of two parts and roughly corresponds to Empedocles' cosmic cycle of Love and Strife, although it leaves out crucial elements of the theory. In the first four lines, there is a description of a world where void is absent, yet four porous elements (air, sunlight, water, and earth) combine to form plants and animals (1.742-745). In the last three lines, this world is then described as breaking down infinitely into its smaller parts (1.746-748). It has been noted that in Empedocles' actual theory, this process of synthesis and breakdown is controlled by the forces of Love and Strife (Bailey 1947: 728-730). No reasonable explanation can be given for Lucretius' omission of these agents of Empedocles' cycle. He either was unaware of

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[81] Cf. 1. 716-733: Lucretius describes Acragas positively, the land with which Empedocles is associated. These lines warrant a further study of their significance for the "journey motif" commonly found in Satire, e.g. Horace *Satires* 1.5, the Journey to Brundisium; 1.9, the pesky social climber on the way to see Maecenas, etc.

[82] For Empedocles four-element theory and his cosmic cycle of Love and Strife, see O'Brien (1967: 29-40), Osborne (1987: 24-50), and Trepanier (2003: 385-419) who re-evaluates the earlier discussions by taking into account new evidence from the recently discovered Strasbourg papyrus.

Empedocles' correct cosmic cycle theory or had a purpose in leaving it out. (I have not found a scholar who argues the former, likely because Lucretius' ignorance of Empedocles rests on the assumption that scholars in the 21st century C.E. know more about Empedocles than Lucretius did in 1st century B.C.E., a highly unlikely possibility.) The latter proposition implies a rhetorical purpose at which Lucretius aimed. Taken together with the previous discussion, I argue his purpose was to create the same sense of satiric irony as found in his attack on Heraclitus.

In the first four lines above when Lucretius explains Empedocles' incorrect view of denying void's existence within matter, he states this in the form of an ablative absolute, *extempto rebus inani* (1.742): Empedocles' separation of void from matter is thus reflected and mocked in the use of an ablative absolute, a form grammatically disconnected from the rest of the sentence. Also, the slow and dull spondaic rhythm of these first two lines contributes to the unlikelihood of their truth.

In the last three lines, Lucretius emphasizes Empedocles' view that matter can be separated infinitely. He repeats this three times in three lines: there is no end (*finem*) to matter-splicing (746), there is no end (*pausam*) to the breaking down of atoms (747), and there is no "smallest part" (*minimum*) into which it can be cut (748). The rising tricolon in the words to describe the main idea here, *finem*, *pausam*, and *minimum,* stylistically is antithetical to the theory that matter can be continuously broken down to smaller parts: the tricolon contains increasing grammatical units while the theory posits decreasing atomic parts.[83] Also, the similar position of the three words in their respective lines (part of the fourth foot) supports the idea that

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[83] It is true that in most texts *finem* and *pausam* would not represent increasing units because each has two syllables. However, *pausam* has an extra vowel and is therefore longer. According to Lucretius' own alphabet analogy where letters represent atoms and words represent compounds, *pausam* has more atoms/letters than *finem.* Also, metrically, the tricolon consists of long-long, long-long, short-short-long (*fīnēm, paūsām, minimūm*).

we are to compare each word for form and content. The overall effect complements the absurdity of the idea. Thus, again we hear, so to speak, Lucretius' poetic voice incorporating satiric elements by emphasizing the aural quality of his own designed and designing voice with which he speaks.

The final philosopher with which Lucretius takes issue is Anaxagoras. This third installment represents a natural progression of thought from the previous two. First, Lucretius discussed the theory that matter can be reduced to one particle, fire, as made famous by Heraclitus. Second, he discussed the theory's expansion, as made famous by Empedocles, to include four particles, which states that matter must be made of one of those four components, either earth, air, fire, or water. Lastly, in the following passage Lucretius attacks those that expand the theory even further by claiming that matter, in its various forms, can be broken down (infinitely) into smaller pieces of itself. This theory is championed by Anaxagoras and is commonly referred to as ὁμοιομερῆ (transliterated as *homoeomerian* in Latin[84]):

> principio, rerum quam dicit homoeomerian,
> ossa videlicet e pauxillis atque minutis
> ossibus hic et de pauxillis atque minutis
> visceribus viscus gigni sanguenque creari
> sanguinis inter se multis coeuntibu' guttis
> ex aurique putat micis consistere posse
> **aurum** et de terris terram concrescere parvis,
> ignibus ex ignis, umorem umoribus esse,
> cetera consimili fingit ratione putatque.
> Nec tamen esse ulla idem parte in rebus inane
> concedit neque corporibus finem esse secandis.
>
> First, that which he calls the "equal-partedness" of things,
> means that bones are clearly composed
> of small miniature bones, and flesh is clearly born
> from small miniature flesh particles;
> and blood is created from many blood drops intercoursing with themselves,
> and he even thinks that **gold** is able to consist from flakes of gold,
> and that land grows from little land pieces,
> and fire is from fire particles, water from water particles;

[84] See Sedley (1998: 48-49) on Lucretius' transliteration of Greek. I agree with his comment on "ὁμοιομερῆ": "Anaxagoras' horrible word is glaringly not at home in the Latin language; and that in turn foreshadows the fact, which Lucretius satirically develops in the sequel, that the concept underlying it is equally unwelcome (48).

and he pictures and imagines everything else to be made in that very same way.
And yet at the same time, that guy still does not concede that void within matter exists throughout any of its parts,
nor does he concede that there is a limit to matter-splicing.

Lucr. 1.834-844

There are parallels with the previous two attacks on Heraclitus and Empedocles both in terms of irregular grammatical constructions describing the irregular thought processes of his rival and in terms of the ongoing theme of void being present with matter.

Brown sees a string of archaisms and a high portion of "licenses" in the use of *pauxillis* for *parvis* (1.835) *, sanguen* for *sanguinem* (1.837)*,* the suppressed *"s"* of *coenuntibu'* (1.838)*,* the root sense of *concrescere* (1.840)*,* and the postponed *ex* (1.841) (1984: 176)*.* Where Brown sees this a manifestation of the *egestas* of the Latin language,[85] I see this as another example of a calculated choice to employ subtle inconsistencies in order to distance, alienate, and mock the theory of his rival in satiric fashion, at the same time as Lucretius uses the sonorous, and for him material, properties of the voice to do so.[86]

Lucretius also employs six uses of polyptoton in these lines: *ossa…ossibus, visceribus…viscus, sanguen…sanguinis, auri…aurum, terris…terram, ignibus…ignis, and umorem…umoribus.* I agree with Brown that this is "probably calculated to make *homoeomeria* appear eccentric and playfully to misrepresent it" (1984: 176). The repeated use of *pauxillis*, a word found predominately in comedy (Bailey: 1947: 746), adds to this playful mockery of Anaxagoras. Also, the pleonastic *posse* in 1.839 emphasizes the absurdity of the argument. I translate, "He *even* thinks that gold is able to consist of…" rather than simply, "He thinks gold

[85] For Lucretius' own admission of the "poverty" of the Latin language, see Farrell (2001: 28-51). He argues that the poverty of the Latin language that Lucretius claims should not be taken at face value. We should not equate it with inadequacy; poverty, as opposed to corrupting luxury, is positive in the Epicurean ethical system. Lucretius seems to have ironically improved the work of Epicurus, in spite of his claim of linguistic poverty.

[86] For the Epicurean theory of the physicality of sound, see Friedländer (1941: 16-34), as discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.4 of this study. Accordingly, mockery based on sound, as described above, is a physical attack by Lucretius' poetic voice.

consists of….." Furthermore, Brown notes that in line 1.843, *esse ulla idem parte*, there are three spondees and three elisions that "make the words seem as *stipata* as Anaxagoras' particles" (176). This not only provides an example of Lucretius' skill in writing poetry, it also shows his concern for delivering his opponent's message with dash of bitter mockery rather than a smear of sweet honey.

There are two other items of concern in this passage, both continuing the same line of thought found in his attack on Empedocles. In lines 839-841, Lucretius mentions three of the four elements of Empedocles' four-element theory. As examples, he uses earth (*terra*), fire (*ignis*), and water (*umor*). Where we would expect air (*aura*) as the fourth, we find gold (*aurum*). Bailey mentions that Bentley tried to emend the text to *aur<u>a</u>m,* but maintains that *aur<u>u</u>m* must be correct since *micis* is "quite impossible" with *auram*, but "exactly appropriate" with *auri* in the proceeding line. In other words it is appropriate to have flakes of gold, but not flakes of air. It was as if Bailey could not think of a replacement for flakes in order to allow for *aura*. This is a troublesome example of scholarship attempting to normalize a text in the face of such inconsistency. Recently, scholars such as O'Hara (2007: 55-76) have argued against the normalization of texts and instead have called for the integration of inconsistencies into our interpretations of those texts. O'Hara seeks to explain inconsistences as integral parts of the composition of any given text. In this light, instead of air followed by earth, fire, and water, a pattern representing a rival's theory, Lucretius substitutes gold, a word that resembles air (*aurum* and *auram*). This creates a slight disjunction in the reader's mind as to the viability of such a four part system.

Finally, the last bit of subtle mockery in the passage complements the discussion of the ablative absolute in line 1.742: *exempto rebus inani*. There he attacks Empedocles' rejection of

the idea that void exists within matter. Here, in the attack against Anaxagoras, he does it in the same way: *Nec tamen esse ulla idem parte in rebus inane* (1.843). The word *inane* is relegated to the sixth foot and in no way mixes with the matter, if you will, of the sentence.

To summarize this section on attacks against specific philosophers, I have been arguing that satire, in the form of mockery and other poetic devices, against a third party opponent brought in by the speaker to serve as a foil, is a particular manifestation of Lucretius' poetic voice. It should be noted that attacks on specific individuals are not foreign to texts in the genre usually called didactic. In *The Works and Days,* Hesiod specifically attacks "money-grubbing kings." In fact, Hunt (1981: 29-40) sees this, along with other pieces of satiric evidence, as an element of satire in Hesiod. He investigates in what sense the *Works and Days* can be called satiric. He side-steps the issue of determining satire prior to Quintilian's *satura quidem tota nostra est* (*Inst.* 10.1.93) by invoking Frye's claim that there are "narrative categories of literature broader than, or logically prior to, the ordinary literary genres" (Frye 1957: 162). Hunt then discusses the following ways that Hesiod uses satiric elements: a) the mask of provincial austerity worn by Hesiod, b) the famous lines (27-28) where the Muses explicitly admit and ambivalent vision of truth, and c) the other famous lines (649-655) where Hesiod confesses his lack of actual seafaring experience. Hunt writes:

> Indeed, part of the reader's delight in this poem derives from the gradual discovery that the poet does not subscribe to the same work ethic which he dictates for Perses. It is also clear that Perses is not meant to make the reconstruction which the audience makes. Thus, the particular pleasure of Hesiod's irony rests on shared knowledge from which Perses is excluded.
>
> Hunt 1981: 31

It seems that when there is disjunction between the primary internal addressee (Perses) and secondary external reader-pupil (actual Greek/Roman reader), Hunt sees this as creating a satiric

element; the joke is on Perses. This is not far from describing what I have argued above.[87] Instead of a divergence between the internal addressee (Perses) and external reader, in Lucretius a divergence is created between the primary internal addressee (Memmius) and the secondary addressees (Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras); the joke is on them. The external reader then becomes a tertiary learner-spectator, and this, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter, is perhaps where the didacticism, as something above and beyond the conventions of genre, enters the text. In the meantime, the satiric element of Lucretius' poetic voice complicates a taxonomical treatment of genre by its complexity and dynamism: the genre of "didactic," which is aimed at education, derives from a social and historical process of satire, expressed in language that draws attention to its material, sensuous qualities, in a dynamic triangle between physical attack, playful usage of words, and evangelical teaching, ways that elude a static and aprioristic approach of taxonomical conventions.

Thus far, I have discussed passages in Book I where Lucretius' poetic voice introduces a third party's opposing view and then subsequently attacks it through mockery. I began with those, in general, who believe in spatial displacement theory (1.370-399) and then discussed the three specific philosophers whom Lucretius attacks for their theories on the primary substance of things (1.635-920). The reason he only names his Presocratic opposition and not his expected Hellenistic opposition has been the subject of much debate. Warren (2007: 19-32) argues that Lucretius does not reflect pure Epicureanism as Epicurus himself taught it; instead, he reflects the Hellenistic philosophical tradition that occurred after the death of Epicurus in 270 BCE.[88]

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[87] See also Mitsis (1993: 111-128) who speaks of this same process in terms of the *DRN*'s persuasive, i.e. coercive, qualities.

[88] For the opposing view, see Sedley (1998: 62-93) for Lucretius' interaction (or lack thereof) with other philosophical schools. Tatum (1984: 177-89) argues that Lucretius uses the Presocratics to highlight the problem of philosophical language and then to present his own case for philosophical poetic language.

He admits that his argument is counter-intuitive since Lucretius makes surprisingly little reference to other schools of thought; most notably absent is Stoicism. This lack of explicit interaction with other schools of thought does lead one to assume Lucretius reflects pure Epicureanism, but he argues that we must remember Lucretius is not Cicero pitting Stoics and Epicureans against one another. Therefore, the absence of other philosophers is expected. He assumes Lucretius' audience's understanding of Hellenistic philosophy was limited. In other words, Lucretius was not writing to a well-informed up-to-philosophical-date audience. Memmius does not need to be persuaded against choosing another school of thought (22-6). While Warren's assessment may be true to some extent, as will be discussed in chapter three, whether or not he names his opponents, Lucretius still uses the same satiric method throughout his work. I will now continue with passages in which Lucretius does not include the name of his rival, only his rival's false theory.

Before beginning Book II, Lucretius discusses our infinite universe (1.1052-1113). In effect, this means that because the universe is infinite there can be no center. Lucretius then turns his attention to a rival theory that claimed a spherical earth-centric model of the universe where the earth is at the center of the world and matter pushes down upon it from all sides. Lucretius explains this opposing view of a spherical earth:

> …animalia suppa vagari
> contendunt neque posse e terris in loca caeli
> reccidere inferiora magis quam corpora nostra
> sponte sua possint in caeli templa volare:
> illi cum videant solem, nos sidera noctis
> cernere, et alternis nobiscum tempora caeli
> dividere et noctes parilis agitare diebus.
>
> …They maintain that living things wander around upside down,
> and yet [they maintain that] they cannot fall off the earth into the sky's lower regions,
> any more than our bodies (on their own accord)
> [are able to] fly up into the precincts of the sky:
> and that when they see the sun, we are seeing the stars of night,
> that those ones [wondering upside down] take turns with us dividing the seasons of the sky
> as well as experiencing nights equal to our days.

Lucr. 1.1061-1067

He takes his rival's view to its logical end. If one believes that everything gravitates to the center of the earth, that the universe is finite with one center, then one would have to explain how people who are on the opposite side of the spherical center do not fall off. It would also imply the absurd notion that the seasons are shared in turn by the opposite sides of the sphere.

Again, just as we have seen above, Lucretius does not simply state his opponent's viewpoint. The subtle mockery is seen in Lucretius' word choice throughout this passage. In line 1.1061, the idea is that living things walk about upsidedown on the opposite side of the earth, but the verb translated as "walk" is *vagari,* a loaded term that Lucretius elsewhere uses to denote a sort of frivolous way of leading one's life. While this is the first time he has used this word in the *DRN,* it will be seen again in the famous proem to book II[89] and in the description of souls supposedly wandering in Acheron,[90] for example.[91] This immediately associates his opponent with inconsequential wandering about. Also, the phrase *caeli templa* in 1.1064, juxtaposed with *caeli loca* two lines before, pushes the idea into mockery by referring to the regions of the sky as *templa,* a word with the sort of religious connotation Lucretius vehemently attacks throughout the poem. The mockery is also exacerbated by *sponte sua,* which extenuates the absurdity.

Aside from word choice in this passage, there is also an example of paradox as well as an imbalanced tetracolon attempting to explain a balanced sharing of day and night. The paradox occurs at the word *inferiora* at 1.1063 in a position created by hyperbaton. The word refers to *loca*, the places of the sky. These high places are thus unexpectedly described as lower. The

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[89] 2.43: *fervere cum videas classem lateque vagari.*

[90] 3.628: *possumus infernas animas Acherunte vagare*.

[91] However, Lucretius often describes *simulacra* as neutrally wandering (4.127 *passim*).

paradox of the content is complemented by the hyperbaton, which creates a jarring sense of inconsistency in his opponent's argument. Furthermore, this sense is continued in the last three lines (1.1065). His opponent's view is that the two sides of the spherical world experience both sun and stars, and day and night, in equal amounts of time. However, the tetracolon includes two cases of enjambment (1.1066 and 1.1067).[92] Thus, Lucretius describes his opponent's view of evenly divided seasons between two equal halves of a spherical earth with an unevenly divided enjambed tetracolon. The mockery is subtle and manipulative, yet highly recognizable in Latin.

The last half of this section argues that the satiric mockery within Book I, as described in the previous section, continues in Books I – IV, but is replaced in V and VI by another way of understanding multiple viewpoints: the theory of multiple explanations. In Book II, Lucretius begins by continuing his description of atoms and void by explaining atomic motion. First, atoms are in constant motion; they are never at rest (2.80-141). Next, not only are they in constant motion, but they move at extremely fast speeds through the void (2.142-166). Before he moves on to talk about atomic weight, Lucretius digresses into a satiric attack on those who believe the world was created by gods for the sole purpose of providing mankind with the substance of life:[93]

> At quidam contra haec, <u>ignari materiai</u>,
> naturam non posse deum sine numine credunt
> tanto opere humanis rationibus <u>admoderate</u>
> tempora mutare annorum <u>frugesque creare</u>,
> et iam cetera, mortalis quae suadet adire
> ipsaque deducit dux vitae dia voluptas
> et res per Veneris blanditur saecla propagent,

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[92] For a similar effect caused by enjambment, see 4.36-37. Lucretius explains how idols (*simulacra*) of dead people (*luce carentum*) sometimes rouse (*excierunt*) us from our sleep. The verb *excierunt* is enjambed so as to represent the sudden jolt we receive when being woken up.

[93] Munro and Lachmann bracket these lines on the basis of their disruption within the argument of atomic motion. They claim these lines are transposed from 5.195-234 where the argument is fully expanded upon. However, Bailey keeps these lines here stating, "Lucretius likes from time to time to break up a long argument with a digression which does not demand such strenuous thinking" (1947: 829). This idea will be taken up again in chapter three.

ne genus occidat humanum…

Yet some idiots,[94] against all this, ignorant of [the nature of] matter,
believe that nature cannot without the power of the gods,
(since nature's effects are so nicely geared toward the needs of men)
change the seasons of the year, and create the crops
and all kinds of social relations, [relations,] which divine pleasure actually persuades men to approach,
[that pleasure,] the leader of life, leads on
and entices men through the arts of Venus to renew their races,
lest the races of mankind not perish…

Lucr. 2.167-174

Lucretius here understands how others could incorrectly believe in divine influence on mankind (2. 169), but stresses after the anacoluthon in the middle of line 2.171 that it is pleasure herself who walks (*deducit*) mankind down the aisle of life.[95]

The satiric nature of this passage can be found in the last words of each of the following lines: *ignari materiai* (2.167)*, admoderate* (2.169)*,* and *frugesque creare* (2.170). First, the phrase, *ignari materiai,* is strange to many commentators. Bailey notes that the genitive, *materiai*, occurs 46 times in Lucretius always with a defining substantive, unlike here (1947: 830). Many reconstructions have been proposed and rejected. I have chosen to translate the unexpressed substantive with brackets (see above). In an attempt to normalize the inconsistency, Fowler suggests that this is a response to opponents who criticize Epicureans for ignoring the non-material (2002: 240-241). Here, Lucretius mocks them by saying *they* are the ones that are *ignari materiai:* critics say Epicureans are ignorant of non-material things such as the soul; Lucretius responds that *they* are the ignorant ones, ignorant of all things material.

Second, the *hapax legomenon*, *admoderate,* used instead of *accommodate* creates a contrast between the form of the word and its meaning.[96] While the word itself means

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[94] I.e. the Stoics whose teleology was essentially anthropocentric. They are probably not mentioned in order to widen the attack to include Plato and others who propose non-materialistic theories (Fowler 2002: 240).

[95] Since *deducit* implies marriage, allow me the mixed metaphor.

[96] Also, *accommodate* is metrically impossible.

"comfortably" or "suitably," the syncopated form of the word is strange and in effect *un*comfortable and *un*suitable. Lucretius, when describing his opponent's position, speaks in a way that mocks his rival by subtly manipulating his content within an uncomfortable form.

Furthermore, the phrase, *frugesque creare*, creates the same kind of disjunction. Fowler points out that the verb *creare* never takes *fruges* as its object except here; instead, *generare* is usually used (2002: 249). Fruit is usually "produced," not "created." This is a subtle difference in English, but in Latin the incorrect usage would be analogous to "rearing" instead of "raising" a child. Both the *hapax legomenon* and the incorrect usage of *creare* work to mock and discredit his rival's views.

Thus, in the first two books of the *DRN*, Lucretius mocks his opponents using satiric elements in the hexameters of his didactic poetry. He continues this mode of attack in Book III. In the following example, Lucretius first calls attention to the eyes and explains how they are *not* doors which the *animus* sees through. Then, in a seemingly abrupt change of subject (which many editors such as Kenney(ad loc) note as the start of a separate, unconnected section), he redefines our understanding of atomic Presocratic principles, namely the relationship between the *animus* and the *anima*, by correcting Democritus. He then recalls the eyes as a metaphor for his own, updated atomic principle.

Lucretius begins with a rebuttal against a well-known controversy in ancient philosophical thought: whether the eyes themselves see or whether they are merely portals through which the mind sees. Lucretius will argue the former: the eyes themselves receive images. After describing the cockeyed "eyes-as-portals-theory," he reminds the reader that:

> difficilest, contra cum sensus ducat eorum;
> sensus enim trahit atque acies[97] detrudit ad <u>ipsas</u>

[97] Lewis and Short cite this usage of *acies* as meaning "the pupil of the eye."

> It is difficult, when our actual senses lead us to different conclusions;
> for our senses draw us and push our attention to the pupils of our eyeballs themselves
>
> Lucr. 3.361-362

Ipsas being emphatic at the end of the line, calls our attention not only to our own eyes with which we are reading the text, but also stresses Lucretius' insistence on using the senses as a basis for evidence. This thought is similar to the satiric attack against Heraclitus when Lucretius attacks him for contradicting his own senses (1.690-691).

In order to further disprove the "eyes-as-portals" theory he employs his usual method of countering with a proof based on experiential sense perception. This proof lies in the fact that when light is flashed in our eyes, we have trouble seeing clearly:

> fulgida praesertim cum cernere saepe nequimus,
> lumina luminibus quia nobis praepediuntur
>
> For often we are particularly unable to perceive bright things in the distance,
> because our brightened eyes are hindered by brightness.
>
> Lucr. 3.363-364

The point being that if the eyes were portals, we would be able to see bright things in the distance because when we as people stand at the end of a doorway and light shines on that doorway, *we* can easily see through; thus, our eyes are different. The *figura etymologica* of *lumina luminibus*, as noted in a study of Lucretian puns by Snyder (1983: 37-41), may function in this instance as highlighting the absurdity of another's theory.

In this section, I have taken a closer look at passages from the first half of the *DRN*, passages which contain a third-person rival opponent which Lucretius seeks to attack. He attacks in the mode of subtle mockery, which is seen through the use of particular poetic devices that undercut his opponent's philosophical position. Other passages where this satiric element can be found are as follows: the description of the *magna mater* (2.600-660 esp. 600-605), the argument which claims the mind and the spirit are both material parts of the body (3.98-135 esp.

98-105), and the explanation of echoes (4.547-594). A further investigation of those particular passages would reveal similar satiric elements as have been described above.

However, it is interesting to note that Lucretius does not continue the same line of satiric attack in books V and VI. Instead, in book V Lucretius begins to employ the principle of multiple explanations.[98] Rather than refuting someone else's false theory, Lucretius expounds upon several competing theories on a particular subject and claims that any of them could be correct. Since there are an infinite number of worlds in an infinite universe, any one of those theories, he explains, is inevitably valid in at least one of those worlds. What cannot be correct is an explanation that includes divine agency.[99]

In conclusion, the satiric element of mockery is not only seen at the end of Books III and IV, but throughout Books I-IV and lessening in V and VI. Lucretius does not feel the need to employ satire in the last two books. An awareness of the presence of satiric elements and their frequency through the poem is essential for understanding the question with which we began: how does Lucretius' poetic voice manifest itself through the active manipulation of didactic conventions? He moves from mockery, as a rejection of other views, to didactic, as an acceptance of the possibility of multiple views, which is another way of saying he creates didactic out of satire. Lucretius thus predicates didactic on satire so that learning becomes a function of being open to multiple views in the realization of multiple universes. This progression, I argue, in the treatment of an opposing view, from satiric attack to conditioned acceptance, also mirrors the progression of an authoritative to an egalitarian relationship between

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[98] Cf. 5.526-533 and 6.703-711.

[99] Passages which apply the theory of multiple explanations are as follows: the motions of the stars (5.509-525), an explanations of the sun's heat (5.592-613), and the causes of nightfall and dawn (5.650-679).

Lucretius and his readership.[100] The poem encourages the addressee's own willful and active participation in the learning process.

Section 2.2.

Intertextuality: Reading Atomic Intertextuality in Lucretius

This section examines Lucretius' use of intertextuality in teaching Epicureanism through the medium of the didactic genre. Within scholarship there emerge three distinct conversations regarding this subject. One concerns Lucretius' place as a neoteric poet who engages in a complex network of allusivity, a phenonmenon commonly found in Greek Hellenistic poetry.[101] The second concerns his philosophical influences such as the connection between Empedocles' form and Lucretius/Epicurus' content.[102] Thirdly, there is considerable disagreement over the extent of epic allusion in Lucretius in terms of both Homer and Ennius. It is this last debate with which I am most concerned as it relates to Lucretius' poetic voice. An investigation into Homeric intertextuality in particular will show that Lucretius' poetic voice not only emerges from satiric elements within a didactic text (as discussed in the last section) but also through

[100] How he incorporates this strategy into his poem is through his poetic voice, a mechanism which makes use of genre in order to function, in particular by predicating didactic on satire. Cf. Section 1.1 for the way in which Catullus' poetic voice relies on genre in order to function, in particular by juxtaposing lyric and epic.

[101] For Hellenistic influences in Lucretius see Kenney (1970: 266-92) and Brown (1982: 77-118) for a general overview. See also Edmunds (2002: 29-40) on Mars in the proem to Book I as Hellenistic lover, Donohue (1993: 35-60) on Callimachus' influence in the swan song 4.909-911), and Knox (1999: 275-287) on the Callimachean origins of "narrow road" imagery throughout Lucretius.

[102] For this debate between poetry and prose in Lucretius, see Furley (1970: 55-64) followed by Sedley's (1998) book length study. For an extensive look at Empedocles' influence on the poem, see Garani's (2007) book-length study. For Philodemus' poetry and the relation it has with Lucretius' poetry and Epicurus' prose, see studies in Obbink (ed.) (1995), esp. Armstrong (1995: 210-232). Asmus (1991: 1-45) discusses Philodemus' poetic theory as an example of Epicuran literary criticism.

intertextuality, thereby providing one more instance of how his poetic voice fulfills its didactic function.

What concerns us here is what Hinds calls "thematic" intertextuality (1998).[103] This looks not toward structural intertexts/references, but thematic intertexts/allusions of content. This approach implies that moments of *thematic* intertextuality in Lucretius represent purposeful choices on the part of the author to convey certain meaning in the text (6-10). These moments of intertextuality are separate from the generic conventions associated with Volk's didacticism. They juxtapose traditional conventions of genre with authorial innovations to that genre and subsequently provide us with a unique look at the authorial interventions into the text, which is another way of saying that intertextuality provides us with a locus for examining Lucretius' poetic voice.

Where these thematic intertexts occur within the poem is another point of contention. Lucretius opens his work with a proem that lasts for the first 146 lines.[104] It contains many well-known passages such as the hymn to Venus, the honey-on-the-cup metaphor, and other introductory passages such as the caveat regarding translating from Greek to Latin and explicit instructions for Memmius to be attentive to his words. While this proem is an important repository for understanding Lucretius' poetic voice, equally rich instances of poetic voice occur in the bulk of the work. It is in these argumentative sections that scholarship is most lacking when it concerns intertextuality in the *DRN*. This inattention is possibly due to the tendency of modern readers to be more concerned with understanding Epicurean atomic physics than grasping and taking into account the form in which it appears.

[103] For a preliminary discussion of intertextuality, see Section 1.7 of this study.

[104] There does not seem to be a scholarly consensus on where the proem ends and the poem begins. Some seem to suggest a break after line 145 after the switch from the second to third person. Others begin the poem proper at line 149 with the introductory word, *principium*. The exact demarcation does not concern us here.

In order to determine the function of Lucretius' poetic voice in terms of the way in which it makes use of intertextuality, this section examines closely a particular instance of Homeric intertextuality in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*. I start by comparing storm imagery from *De Rerum Natura* book I with similar imagery in Homer's *Odyssey* book V. I then interpret this intertext by applying Epicurean atomic principles, which are explained throughout Lucretius' didactic poem. I argue that the letters that come together to create this (inter)text behave just like the atoms that come together to make up the Epicurean atomic world, and should be interpreted accordingly. The implication is that the intertext is meant to *appear* random, that is, without divine or authorial intent. The underpinning of this analysis is the often repeated analogy throughout the poem which describes the way in which atoms come together to form compounds as equivalent to the way in which letters come together to form words, the much discussed "alphabet analogy." My argument extends this analogy by suggesting that the combination of atoms into compounds not only corresponds to the combination of letters into words, but also corresponds to the manner in which those words relate to one another, including but not limited to the phenomenon we call intertextuality. This conclusion, which is predicated on the *idea* that Lucretius constructed his poem under the mandates of his own philosophy, will be instructive for understanding his pedagogical strategy of using intertextuality in general throughout his philosophical poem.

First, we start by looking at the intertextual passages in question. Then, I will discuss and extend the alphabet analogy by examining a particular passage at the start of book V of the *De Rerum Natura*. I will argue that this passage is instructive for how readers should interpret intertextuality in the poem. Lastly, we will return to the intertextual passages and interpret them

in light of the preceding argument. We will see how reading atomic intextuality in Lucretius enables the reader to imagine himself (or herself) as being self-taught.

The context of the Homeric passage in Lucretius is the proof in book I of the existence of atoms, which compose all things material in our world, and in particular, it is their invisibility on which I would like to focus. Lucretius anticipates an objection: someone, he imagines, might not accept that these atoms exist because they are made up of tiny particles that are in fact invisible. This unidentified objector wonders how Lucretius, an Epicurean known to insist on sensory perception, can claim something exists that he himself, cannot even see. As a preemptive response, Lucretius describes examples from nature that point toward the existence of these minuscule particles. Invisible atoms must exist, he says, because we can see the effects of their movements. For evidence of this, he gives the invisible force of wind on ships (we can't see the wind, but ships move), the pugnacity of unseen odors on our noses (again, we can't see smells, but we smell them), and the hidden process of water evaporation from wet clothing.

In particular, it is the invisible force of wind on ships that contains Homeric imagery. Here, in order to describe the invisibility of wind atoms Lucretius digresses into a description of a storm. He uses the wind *exemplum* throughout his philosophical poem at various points, but only here does the description stand out for its extended imagery. He points out that although we do not see wind, we know it must exist:

> Principio venti vis verberat incita corpus
> ingentisque ruit navis et nubila differt,
> inter dum rapido percurrens turbine campos
> arboribus magnis sternit montisque supremos
> silvifragis vexat flabris: ita perfurit acri
> cum fremitu saevitque minaci murmure pontus.
>
> First the [invisible] force of wind, when stirred up, beats upon the body of the sea
> and overwhelms huge ships and scatters the clouds,
> and at times, sweeping over the plains in a rapid hurricane,
> strews them together with great trees and flogs the topmost mountains
> with tree-crashing blasts: thus, the sea rages

with a harsh groan and it raves with a threatening murmur.

Lucr. 1.271-276

Lucretius' source for this storm imagery could have been a number of different works. Storm imagery is of course pervasive in ancient literature. According to Bates (2004: 295-310), who is following the scholarship tradition, it is the storm in Book V of Homer's *Odyssey* that provides the foundation for all literary traditions of storms to come (296). If this is true, I would like to explore the implications of such an allusion to Homer in Lucretius' storm passage. Other allusions to Homer, though not as numerous as they appear in Virgil or Ennius, have been detected by Bailey and especially Monro. In addition, Aicher (1991: 138-158) discusses six Homeric imitations that he calls "revisionist type-scenes," based not on word for word comparisons with the Greek, but on revision and correction of Homeric thought.[105] It is this type of intertext that I will be discussing.

The passage in *Odyssey* 5 occurs just after Odysseus, suffering mental anguish on the island of Calypso finally escapes into the sea that he has so desperately longed for, but gets caught in a storm in what turns out to be quite a turbulent sea:

ὣς εἰπὼν σύναγεν νεφέλας, ἐτάραξε δὲ πόντον
χερσὶ τρίαιναν ἑλών: πάσας δ᾽ ὀρόθυνεν ἀέλλας
παντοίων ἀνέμων, σὺν δὲ νεφέεσσι κάλυψε
γαῖαν ὁμοῦ καὶ πόντον: ὀρώρει δ᾽ οὐρανόθεν νύξ.

Thus [Poseidon] spoke and gathered the clouds, and troubled the sea
upon seizing his trident in his hands, and roused blasts
of all manner of winds, and hid with clouds
both land and sea alike; while night rushed down from the sky.

Od. 5.291-294

In Homer, it is Poseidon that disturbs (ἐτάραξε) the sea (πόντον), brings the clouds *together* (σύναγεν νεφέλας), and it is he that rouses all blasts of all manner of winds (ὀρόθυνεν ἀέλλας), while night (νύξ), personified, rushes in. In Lucretius, it is the force of wind that hits (*verberat*) the body of the sea (*corpus*), scatters the clouds apart (*nubila differt*), and flogs the land with

[105] For a detailed discussion of this article, see Section 1.7 of the current study.

tree-crashing blasts of wind (*silvifragis vexat flabris*), while the sea itself (*pontus*), personified, groans. The implications of Lucretius intertexually engaging with Homer in this passage vary greatly.

To begin, on a purely *generic* level, he could simply be borrowing imagery from his predecessor. Lucretius needed to employ the imagery of a storm (disturbance of the sea, changes in the clouds, whirling of winds, angry personifications of nature) and therefore chose Homer's epic as an obvious source. On a *philosophical* level, he is making a point about the origins of natural phenomenon; that is, it is not Homer's gods that cause cosmological disturbances to occur, but the harmless molecules of wind atoms that become excited. The atom takes the place of Poseidon as initiator of the storm. On the level of content, the import of Odysseus being caught in a storm as a narrator describes his struggles from a safe distance makes sense in Lucretius' poem, since it foreshadows a similar image within the *DRN*'s proem to book II. Furthermore, (I suppose you could say, on a philological level), the verb that Homer uses to describe Poseidon's disturbing actions on the sea is ἐτάραξε. This word holds heavy resonance for an Epicurean like Lucretius looking back at Homer since the negated noun form of this word, ἀταραξία, would become the term most associated with the school itself, the word suggesting a mental state of being completely without such divinely caused disturbances. The allusion thus makes it possible then for Lucretius to indirectly instruct us on how to reach a state of ἀταραξία: realize that it is not Poseidon that disturbs but it is actually just the harmless force of wind. From the perspective of authorial intent, all these are possibilities.

As described below, it becomes even more complex when we extend this metaphor to other passages where wind is mentioned. When we apply it to these other passages, we are left wondering if we should always, sometimes, or never apply the same metaphor of wind as a

substitute for the Homeric divine. The following investigation expressly articulates these negotiations presented to the reader. I look at one extended example of an instance in which the reader is confronted by such negotiations.

First as explained above, lines 1.271-297 represent the first occurrence of wind in the epic. In the process of explaining the characteristics of atoms, Lucretius realizes that someone might be skeptical since atoms, according to Lucretius, are so tiny that they cannot be seen with the naked eye (*quod nequeunt oculis rerum primordia cerni,* 1.268). He uses wind to show that imperceptible-to-the-eye wind atoms do exist. Thus, wind causes storms. This is the first of many instances in which wind is the agent, the ultimate causer of *res* and substitute for divine agency. If I am right in suggesting that Lucretius is "revising" Homer by substituting wind for Poseidon in the storm passage above, the next logical step would be to examine other "wind" passages in Lucretius in order to examine whether this revision still applies.

The next instance of wind occurs line 1.899. Lucretius stresses that the nature of all things can be reduced to atoms and void. He anticipates someone disagreeing by pointing out that fire breaks out in the forest when wind rubs the branches together. This suggests that fire is hidden deep within the wood somewhere. However, Lucretius counteracts this by saying it is the seeds of fire atoms, not fire itself, that is ingrained in the wood. Here, wind represents the primary cause of fire in the forest. This is true in the objector's argument and Lucretius' counter response. In either case, it is wind that causes fire. In the objectors argument it causes fire to come out of the branches while in Lucretius' argument it causes the seeds of fire to come out. Thus, wind, not the gods or any other process, is the ultimate cause of fire.

Wind occurs next in line 2.766. One of Lucretius' first principles is that "nothing is completely destroyed into nothing." Therefore, something of matter must remain after it only

seems to be completely destroyed. That something is the atom. The atom is unchanging. By this logic, characteristics of the atom that change are not part of the atom; they are secondary qualities. This includes color. Atoms cannot technically have color because the atom's color can change. One of the ways Lucretius shows this is through the image of the sea turning white with foam when the wind hits it. Here, wind causes the color of the sea to change. Lucretius goes on to give another example of how light (*luminis ictu* 2.808) also has the ability to change the color of things, e.g. the peacock's tail. Thus, wind, not the object's innate properties, causes its color to change.

The next instance occurs in line 3.19. In the proem to Book III Lucretius describes what people see after they adhere to Epicurean philosophy: the immortal abodes of the gods. He describes the abodes as completely untouched by wind, rain, or snow. Nothing impairs their peace of mind (3.18-24). Here, wind is symbolized as a potential disturbance by which the gods remain unaffected. This parallels its symbolism in 1.271ff. Thus, wind causes disturbance (from which the gods are free).

Again, in line 4.443 wind is shown to have a causal effect. Here, Lucretius debunks many optical illusions (4.353-468), e.g. how the sun seems to touch mountains and how colonnades seem to vanish into a point. One of these illusions is how the stars seem to go against their natural course in the sky amid the backdrop of moving clouds (these clouds are moved by wind) (4.443-446). It is wind that starts this process of deception. Wind causes illusions.

In all the examples given above, wind is the causer of many phenomena that people tend to associate with the gods. The Homeric intertextual nature of the word drives us to push the association further. If Lucretius is redirecting our understanding of why things happen in the

world, from divine agency to the agency of wind, inevitably the reader wonders, "But, from where does wind come? Who/What causes it?" Here, we see the intertextual negotiation occurring. If we were to continue, we could still push our inquiry even further and determine from where exactly wind comes in Lucretius' explanation of images and the cosmos in Books IV – VI.

In fact, many times throughout the text the reader is encouraged to grapple with such negotiations based on the extent to which any one allusion asks him or her to compare or contrast the generic and philosophical aspects of Homeric parallels. Each instance can be negotiated in the same way described above. I am arguing that the poet is less concerned with the importation or creation of meaning in the text, but rather with the process of negotiating multiple meanings to which the reader actively pursues the definitive answer. This can be further substantiated by examining how Lucretius himself, assuming he is a proponent of his own atomic philosophy, understood intertextuality in literary texts. Since Lucretius invites us to analyze textual phenomenon in terms of Epicurean physics, i.e. the letters of words are like atoms coming together to form the material world, we can position intertextuality in this context. I end this section with an attempt to do so. Broadly speaking, these possibilities of meaning embody the problematic interpretive nature of intertextuality in general. For intertexts without explicit sign-postings, speculation is as close to certainty as scholars can get. However, Lucretius, I would like to argue, is a special case. In the spirit of what Stephen Hinds calls, "a more exact account of allusive inexactitude," the last part of this paper takes a step back and reads intertexuality in Lucretius through Lucretius' own atomic principles, by extending the alphabet analogy to include not only words as compounds of atoms, but also the function of those words as equivalent to the function of atoms. To do this, I use as evidence a particular passage at the

beginning of book V in the *De Rerum Natura,* to show where Lucretius directly invites us to extend the analogy as such.

I pause for a brief moment to discuss the alphabet analogy and cite precedence for extending it. The analogy reads as follows:

> namque eadem caelum mare terras flumina solem
> constituunt, eadem fruges arbusta animantis,
> verum aliis alioque modo commixta moventur.
> quin etiam passim nostris in versibus ipsis
> multa elementa vides multis communia verbis,
> cum tamen inter se versus ac verba necessest
> confiteare et re et sonitu distare sonanti.
> tantum elementa queunt permutato ordine solo
>
> For the exact same [atoms] build up the sky, the sea, the earth, the rivers, the sun,
> as well as crops, trees, and living creatures,
> but only when they are moved and mixed with different things in different ways.
> Indeed scattered about in my verses
> you see many letters common to many words,
> and yet you must admit that verses and words
> are unlike both in sense and pronouncement of their sound.
> So powerful are the letters of words able to be, by a mere change of ordering.
>
> Lucr. 1.819-26
> (Repeated with variation: Lucr. 1.196-8, 822-7, 912-20, 2.688-94)

This analogy has inspired many scholars to search out parallels between the *DRN*'s philosophical content and its literary form, i.e. between atoms and literature. For example, Kennedy (2000: 205-220) discusses how the Epicurean explanation of an infinite universe is provided through the medium of a finite text. Schiesaro (1994: 81-107) connects the theory of palingenesis (the repeated destruction and reconstitution of atoms throughout time) with the excessive repetition throughout the poem. Both Schrijvers (1978: 77-114) and Friedlander (1941: 16-34) discuss extending such analogies and the limitations thereof. All these scholars work under the assumption that Lucretius nuanced his work according to the atomic principles of his own philosophy, to some extent. Working under the same assumption and taking the next plausible step, I now draw a similar connection between content and form with respect to Epicurean principles of atomic movement throughout time and intertextuality between two works.

The passage that I will be using to discuss intertextuality occurs just after Lucretius praises Epicurus as a godlike being, and states in summary form how his own work has progressed up to that point: from atoms and void, to compounds of atoms and void, to the mortal compounds of human beings, to *simulacra* and their epistemological functions, and now to the make-up of the cosmos (5.1-90). Next, he gives a sort of syllabus for the upcoming book V (5.91-234). This syllabus functions as a sort of "preamble" for the remainder of the book. First, our world is mortal and will be destroyed one day. Second, there is no overarching divinely determined connection among things in our world. Thirdly, gods do not dwell in our world. Lastly, and this is where I would like to focus your attention, the gods *did* create the world, but they did not create it with humanity in mind.

Since these four preliminary statements act as a contextual introduction for the rest of the book, I suggest that we consider them as a sort of literary introduction as well, in terms of how intertextuality functions. The main idea is that the world has been progressing without any divine force controlling it. His argument rests on the fact that something must have come before the gods. Since nothing comes from nothing, the gods must have received their ideas from somewhere. Thus, he asks a series of rhetorical questions highlighting this, and follows up with the obvious alternative view: it was *natura* that gave the gods a paradigm for creation:

> exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa
> notities hominum divis unde insita primum est,
> quid vellent facere ut scirent animoque viderent,
> quove modost umquam vis cognita principiorum
> quidque inter sese permutato ordine possent,
> si non ipsa dedit specimen[106] natura creandi?
>
> Furthermore, from where did this pattern for synthesizing things come?
> From where came the initial notion of mankind, which would have had to have been first
> implanted in the gods' mind?
> From where came what the gods themselves first wished and imagined?
> How was atomic motion ever learnt by those gods?

[106] *speciem* OQ

> How were the shifting orders between atoms ever learnt by the gods?
> if nature herself did not first produce a model for creation?
>
> Lucr. 5.181-186

On the surface, Lucretius points out that everything must come from something. This even includes what stimulates the gods to act; it is impossible that their intentions came out of nowhere. What concerns us here is the language that he uses to describe "intentionality coming from somewhere": *exemplum gignundis* (a pattern for synthesizing this), *notities*[107] *hominum* (the initial notion of mankind), and *specimen…creandi* (a model for creation). I suggest that we add to this list the same intertextual process in which his work participates. His own work must have come from somewhere; there must have been a pattern, i.e. an *exemplum, notities, or specimen¸* on which his work is modeled and thus intertextually engages with.

The lines directly following this passage support this addition. Here, Lucretius articulates how atoms have randomly come together over time (unaided by divine powers) to produce everything that we see around us, including the very text you see before your eyes:

> namque ita multa modis multis primordia rerum
> ex infinito iam tempore percita plagis
> ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri
> omnimodisque coire atque omnia pertemptare,
> quae cumque inter se possint congressa creare,
> ut non sit mirum, si in talis dispostituras
> deciderunt quoque et in talis venere meatus,
> qualibus haec rerum geritur nunc summa novando.[108]
>
> For there have been so many kinds of atoms, moving in so many ways,
> driven on by blows, time and time again, even until now,
> moved by their own weight, coming together to be carried along,
> to unite in a variety of ways, and try out various positions,
> with the result that they create all things through their interactions, having all come together.
> This means that it is not a wonder that atoms have fallen into such arrangements
> and undergone such movements,

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[107] *Notities* is a translation of πρόληψσις (Bailey: ad loc.).

[108] Note: "Grammarians and editors are concerned to show that the gerund is always transitive in meaning and argue that in such cases the gerund has a subject other than the subject of the sentence" (Bailey 1947: 649). Bailey notes that the ablative gerund in Lucretius is commonly uses it the passive sense (1.312, 1.533, 1.902, 4.1068). He agrees with Castiglione that the best solution is to translate it substantively. Following this advice, I translate as "the process of reinvention."

> and have resulted in the particular arrangements in which the totality of *this present work* is being produced, and in the process of renewal.
>
> Lucr. 5.187-194

Lucretius describes how atoms have been driven on throughout time. This process has culminated in "the particular arrangements in which the totality of this present work (*haec rerum… nunc summa*) is being produced (*geritur*), thus forever in the process of renewal, or we could say "innovation" for *novando*). It should be noted that these lines are almost an exact repetition of lines at the end of book 1's explanation of atoms:

> sed quia multa modis multis mutata per omne
> ex infinito vexantur percita plagis,
> omne genus motus et coetus experiundo
> tandem deveniunt in talis dispositturas
> qualibus haec rerum consistit summa creata.
>
> But because there are so many atoms that have been shifting in so many ways throughout the universe,
> time and time again, and are carried along, driven by blows
> and by experimenting with all kinds of movements and unions,
> until at last they haphazardly fall into such arrangements
> that have resulted in the particular arrangements in which the totality of *things* has come into existence, having been created.
>
> Lucr. 1.1024-1028

What is substantially different is the phrase *ex infinito* in book I, and *ex infinito iam tempore* in book V. There is also the inclusion of the word, *nunc* in book V. The passage from Book I is broad; the passage under question in Book V refers specifically to the didactic poem that the reader is presently reading, as emphasized by the additions of *iam tempore* and *nunc*.

Thus, in book V, atomic motion, beginning with *natura,* evolves into the material world, creating *exemplum*, *notities*, and/or *specimen*, that later generations use for reproduction, until the whole process reaches the text you are reading before your eyes on the page. Intertextuality, i.e. the way in which a text interacts and is built upon other texts, is an extension of way in which atoms interact and are built upon one another; at least, that is how Lucretius instructs us to see it so. This direct correlation between atoms and poetic devices leads us to conclude that the

function of each process is the same. The countless possibilities that intertextuality creates are not meant *to appear* to have one specific purpose guided by overarching divine/authorial intent. Instead, we, as students of didactic poetry, are to assume that instances of intertextuality are the result of random movements of texts interacting with one another, experimenting (*experiundo*) with all kinds of movements and unions. The definitive meaning of intertextuality is thus subordinated to the random process by which it functions. The reader is expected to consider this process for its own sake, not to look for specific intentional meaning, but to account for themselves the countless possibilities of meaning it creates.

The approach and conclusion of this analysis contribute to our understanding of intertextuality in Lucretius and is suggestive for understanding the Epicurean student, in particular Lucretius' Epicurean student, as an "auto-didact," (one who learns on his own without the need of an authoritative teacher).[109] The connections made by intertextuality are not meant to appear to have one specific purpose guided by authorial intent; instead, the reader should view each instance of intertextual negotiation as the result of random movements of texts interacting with one another over time. Returning to the intertextual passages in handout 1 and 2, for some, one could argue, the intertextual implications of storm imagery in hexameter poetry go unnoticed. These readers simply appreciate the storm as a mere analogy used to prove the existence of invisible atoms. For others, the passage is considered for its Homeric imports into Lucretius' poem, such as the import of the sort of excitement found in Homeric epic, a bit of honey on the cup, if you will. Still for others, the passages ignites a subtle philosophical debate between Homeric and Lucretian world-views, which gives these readers a sense of intellectual pride for having noticed the thematic *figura etymologica* of Poseidon ἐτάραξε and Lucretius ἀταραξία. Still, other somewhat cynical readers charge Lucretius as being paradoxical, satiric, or

[109] For the term, "auto-didact," in an Epicurean context, see Erler (1997: 79-92).

even insane since he argues against superstitious views that believe in personified gods causing storms to occur on the sea, yet undercuts his own argument by personifying that same sea, as it groans and threatens. It might do us best not to look for a specific meaning, but instead, acknowledge that the intertext possesses the capacity to produce several reader-dependent responses.

In conclusion, by reading intertextuality in the *De Rerum Natura* through Lucretius' own atomology, i.e. through the extension of the alphabet analogy, Homeric intertextuality in the *DRN* creates a situation for the Epicurean student to consider independently, i.e. not to look for specific intentional meaning from an authoritative source but to account for themselves the random movements of atoms/letters, experimenting with one another over time, and to then consider the philosophical juxtaposition they may create. The pedagogical dynamic created by this "façade of random intertextuality" is one in which the learner learns indirectly, is asked, not told, what to think, and ultimately, through much practice, step by step, through *Lucretius'* atomology, is encouraged to learn a way of thinking independent of authoritative sources. These observations reinforce the conclusion to previous section: the poem encourages the addressee's own willful and active participation in the learning process.

Section 2.3.

Presenting Internal Dialectic to the Reader

In the first two sections of this chapter, I discussed the manifestation of Lucretius' poetic voice by investigating what Lucretius makes use of in order to function, in particular the conventions of genre and the phenomenon of intertextuality. I have shown that Lucretius' poetic voice manifests itself in the form of satiric elements that mock his philosophical opponents.

These opponents then become a third party character against whom both poet and reader jointly ally, an alliance which could not have occurred without such mockery. In terms of intertextuality, I argued that Lucretius' poetic voice equates Homeric intertextuality with Epicurean atomology, thereby giving instructions for the reader to treat intertextual moments as random occurrences. This instruction for how to "read" intertextuality through the lens of Epicurean atomic physics ultimately provides the reader a means to experience a particular way of thinking independent of authoritative sources. In these terms, the function of Lucretius' poetic voice is to direct readers to an alternate third party and present to those readers a learning environment in which they make judgments themselves about alternative views in general.

The current section examines Lucretius' use of another literary device that the text employs in teaching Epicureanism through the medium of the didactic genre.[110] I analyze the way in which Lucretius, the author, is equated with Lucretius the poet, namely through a literary device, which I am terming "internal dialectic," within the poem in order to a) communicate the sense of what it feels like to think like an Epicurean, b) establish his narratorial authority in a way that expects his audience to actively engage with the poem, and c) present his narrative in a way that expects his audience to treat it as if it were a performance. These functions raise questions concerning Lucretian pedagogy. By "pedagogy," I do not refer to the poem's didactic conventions, but to the actual relationship between teacher and student. It seems, despite the authoritative Epicurean philosophical tradition in which he wrote, Lucretius created a poem that

[110] Cf. Section 1.3 for the way in which Hesiod's poetic voice, through literary strategies that speaks to the work's practicality for its readership, communicates the sense of what it feels like to think like an archaic farmer, Section 1.4 for the way in which the poetic voices of Herodotus and Thucydides, through various literary strategies that establish narratorial authority, reveals the extent to which the audience is expected to engage with the work, and Section 1.5 for the way in which the poetic voice of Aeschylus functions through multiplicity in the voice of the chorus.

encourages an egalitarian relationship between teacher and student.[111] Moreover, the conclusions of the last two sections, i.e. satire as an indirect form of learning for the student and atomic intertextuality as an invitation for readers to independently interpret, contribute to the dynamics of the egalitarian relationship between teacher and student.

Complementing those observations, there occur at times two voices emerging within the text, voices which I term "observed internal dialectic." Invitations to the reader to experience this form of dialectic occur in many forms throughout the work. These include rhetorical questions,[112] passages which are initiated by an objector's response to his argument,[113] and even one example of direct speech.[114] I focus instead on actual instances of internal dialectic rather than the invitations to do so. Actual internal dialectic resembles both Socratic dialectic[115] as well as a dialogue between characters usually seen on stage.[116] An investigation into passages where two voices seem to speak to one another in the text will contribute to our understanding of Lucretius' overall poetic voice and the dynamics it creates between Lucretius and his readership, a topic which will be further explored in the next chapter.

The first example of internal dialectic occurs in Lucretius' first basic argument. In order to demolish "fear and darkness of the mind" (*terrorem animi tenebrasque*, 1.146), the reader must accept that "nothing magically comes from nothing" (*nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus*

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[111] For a description of an "egalitarian relationship," see Section 1.8.

[112] For example, see the criterion for truth in 4.469-521 and the origin of thunderbolts in 5.379-422.

[113] For example, see the explanation of seeds of fire in trees in Lucr.1.897-900 and the discussion of sensation in 2.931.

[114] See the speech of nature in 3.931ff.

[115] For the meditative aspects, closely akin to Socratic dialectic, of the poem, see Clay (1983: 128-149), and studies by Erler (1997), and Reinhardt (2002).

[116] For internal evidence within the text on Lucretius' familiarity with theater, see Taylor (1952: 147-155) on 4.973-983.

umquam, 1.150). The insinuation here is that people become fearful when they think things actually *can* come from nothing. They might not realize that they subscribe to this false belief, but Lucretius' proceeding argument reveals that this assumption actually underlies many fears which cause displeasure. He points this out by juxtaposing two scenarios, one that is formed from reasoning that embraces false views and another that is formed from reasoning that correctly embraces Epicurean views. In the first scenario, he tells of a horrible world that would exist if everything actually came from everything (1.159-169). He then paints an idyllic world where nothing comes from nothing (1.170-179). The construction of these two scenarios begins from reasoning that originates from two distinct positions. He then continues to provide another terrifying scenario in which everything comes from everything (1.180-187). This is followed again by a peaceful world in which nothing comes from nothing (1.188-198). As a result of this back and forth movement, the reader encounters two voices, constructing two distinct scenarios, in a way that resembles a dramatic dialogue between two people. The following chart shows these two voices side by side:[117]

> For if things came out of nothing, all kinds of things could be produced from all things. Nothing would need a seed. Firstly, men could rise from the sea, scaly tribes from the earth, and birds could erupt from the sky; cattle, other farm animals, and every kind of wild creature would fill desert and cultivated land alike, with no certainty as to birth. Nor would trees be constant in bearing the same fruit, but they would interchange: all would be able to bear any. Seeing that there would be no bodies apt to generate each kind, how could there be a constant unchanging mother for things?
>
> Lucr. 1.159-168

> But as it is, because every kind is produced from fixed seeds, the source of everything that is born and comes forth into the shores of light is that in which is the material of it and its first bodies; and therefore from this reasoning it is not possible that all things are born from all things, because in particular things resides a distinct power. Besides, why do we see the rose put forth in spring, corn in the heat, grapes under persuasion of autumn, unless because each created thing discloses itself when at their

[117] The formatting of the text is done in a way so as to visually represent the two voices. Translation is Bailey (1942).

> own time the fixed seeds of things have streamed together, while the due seasons are present and the lively earth safely brings out things young and tender into the shores of light?
>
> Lucr. 1.169-179

> But if they came from nothing, suddenly they would rise at uncertain intervals and at unsuitable times of the year; naturally, for there would be no first-beginnings to be restrained from generative union by the unfavorable season. Nor furthermore would time be needed for the growth of things, for seeds to collect, if they could grow from nothing; for youths would leap forth suddenly arising out of the earth.
>
> Lucr. 1.180-187

> But manifestly none of these things takes place, since all things grow little by little, as is proper, from a fixed seed, and in growing preserve their kind; so that you may infer that every kind grows and is nourished from its own proper material. Add to this that without fixed seasons of rain in the year the earth cannot put forth her cheering fruits, nor furthermore can living things kept apart from food beget their kind and preserve life; so that you may more readily believe many bodies to be common to many things, as we see letters to be common to words, than that anything can exist without first-beginnings.
>
> Lucr. 1.188-198

The reader hears two sides of an opposing argument. One side is based on proper reasoning and is reasonably feasible, even pleasurable, and the other is based on incorrect notions and therefore absurd.

Lucretius' argumentative style in this section resembles a dramatic dialogue between two characters on stage. Thus, the singular text produces multiple voices. This multiplicity is also a characteristic of 5th century tragic choral voice.[118] There, the one voice can speak on multiple levels. Here, the one voice speaks on two distinct levels: a correct vision of the world based on true notions and an incorrect vision of the world based on false notions. Just as the tragic chorus is thought to have developed from one body of chorus members to a chorus leader stepping out from that body and interacting with it,[119] so, too, does Lucretius' voice split in the same way. This is also characteristic of non-tragic choral performances. Alcman gives us the most explicit

[118] For the multiplicity of choral voice, see Section 1.5 of the current study.

[119] See Herington (1985: 1-40) for a more detailed account of these origins.

example of how the monadic voice of the chorus splits and becomes several voices. The following is Herington's commentary on fragment one:

> But at line 39... something amazing happens: the chorus begins to sing to itself, and about itself. Individual personalities emerge with extraordinary vividness from among the group of ten-dancers... We have their names; we learn of their beauty, especially of their leader Hagesichorus.
> Herington 1985: 21

Within the text of Lucretius, I argue that the same phenomenon is present. Two voices emerge: one describing how the visual evidence proves nothing comes from nothing and the other contemplating what it would be like if things did come from nothing. Lucretius "sings," and two individual personalities emerge.

In order to determine the evolution of this phenomenon throughout the work, I will focus on instances of internal dialectic in book VI. By comparing the dialectical passages from book I and book VI we can determine how, if at all, the "characters" participating in the dialectic develop in regards to their understanding of Epicurean principles.

The example from Book VI of "internal dialectic" that I will be using for purposes of comparison to Book I is Lucretius' argument on the origins of the thunderbolt. He attempts to prove its materialistic origins by disproving the incorrect notion that thunderbolts come from Jupiter. Similar to the way that he challenged his reader to consider the possibility that something could come from something in Book I, here he challenges his reader to consider thunderbolts actually coming from Jupiter (6.387-422):[120]

> But if Jupiter and other gods shake the shining regions of heaven with appalling din, if they cast fire whither it may be the will of each one, why do they not see to it that those who have not refrained from some abominable crime shall be struck and breathe out sulphurous flames from breast pierced through, a sharp lesson to mankind?
> Lucr. 6.387-392

> Why rather does one with no base guilt on his conscience roll in flames all innocent, suddenly involved in a tornado from heaven and taken off by

[120] Translation is Bailey (1942).

fire? Why again do they aim at deserts and waste their labour? Or are they then practicing their arms and strengthening their muscles? And why do they suffer the Father's bolt to be blunted against the earth? Why does he himself allow this, instead of saving it for his enemies?

Lucr. 6.393-400

Why again does Jupiter never cast a bolt on the earth and sound his thunder, when the heaven is clear on all sides? Does he wait until clouds have come up, to descend into them the blow of his bolt? With what purpose again does he strike the sea? What has he against the waves, the mass of water, the swimming plains? Furthermore, if he desires that we be on our guard against the thunderstoke, why does he neglect to provide that we may see it when it is hurled? If however he wishes to crush us unawares with his fire, why does he thunder from that quarter, so that we can avoid it, why gather the darkness first with crashings and growlings? And how could you believe him to shoot in many directions at once? Or would you make bold to say that this never is done, never many blows made at one time?

Lucr. 6.401-416

In fact, this is often done and must be done, that as showers and rain fall in many regions, so at one time many thunderbolts fall. Lastly, why does he shatter holy shrines of the gods, and even his own illustrious habitations, with the fatal thunderbolt, why smash fine-wrought images of the gods and rob his own statues of their grandeur with a violent wound? And why does he generally attack high places, why do we see most traces of his fire on the mountain-tops?

Lucr. 6.417-422

The "character" in the left column states what we do not see happen: in short, thunder does not strike on the basis of a god's judgment for wrongs done. The "character" in the right column says what actually happens when thunderbolts come from the sky: thunder strikes randomly. There is no concluding statement on the lesson the reader should learn. Instead, by dramatizing his argument in the form of an observed internal dialectic Lucretius' readership is allowed to draw its own conclusions.[121]

In order to fully understand instances of internal dialectic throughout the *DRN* we can analyze them in relation to one another. They create an ongoing dialogue between two voices,

[121] Another passage where internal dialectic occurs is 5.1194-1240.

which Memmius, and, by extension, the external reader observe and use to form their own judgment. Admittedly, this judgment is coerced in many ways, similar to the satiric attacks in Section 2.1 above. The point is that a situation is created where the learner learns independently. At the same time, because of this push for the reader to become self-taught, the two voices also correspond with the learner's internal meditative mechanisms, i.e. the two voices represent the learner reasoning with his/her internal self.[122]

Of course, I do not mean to claim that an inserted piece of dramatic dialogue exists independently within Lucretius' didactic poem. I argue instead that the two interact with one another in an interesting way. Hutchinson argues that the origin of poetry books, such as that of the *DRN* can be found in the intellectual mechanisms of prose. One of those mechanisms in the use of dialogue:

> The use of dialogue to enhance the presentation of technical subject-matter has connections with the drama of instruction in didactic poetry; it also affects to introduce ordinary speech into a literary work. It helps in the presentation of opposed points of view, and produces a complex relationship of work and writer.
>
> Hutchinson 2008: 248

She points out that we see this in Varro's *De Re Rustica* and many other works (2008: 247-250). Thus, the dialogue form within poetry is not unique to Lucretius. This dialogue form in Lucretius is yet another manifestation of Lucretius' poetic voice. We must take into account both the satiric and epic intertextual aspects (see above) along with instances of internal dialectic when considering Lucretius' overall poetic voice.

Conclusion

Thus, the discussion of Lucretius' poetic voice, in terms of a) satiric elements within the didactic genre, b) the interpretive implications of reading intertextuality through Epicurean

[122] A discussion of these internal meditative mechanisms is outside the bounds of this study, yet demands future consideration.

atomology, and c) instances of observed internal dialectic has evolved into a discussion of the relationship between student and teacher. The egalitarian mode of that relationship, which I have concluded exists within the text on the basis of close analysis of the aforementioned aspects of Lucretius' poetic voice, raises the question, "What significance is there for an egalitarian mode of teaching in a Roman context?" I end this chapter with a short commentary on a section of text from book V that will, I hope, on the one hand, help explain this paradox and, on the other, initiate a series of questions that will lead into the next two chapters.

Lucretius' begins to discuss human anthropology at line 5.772ff. When he discusses humans at 5.837, he explains how "random creation" and "survival of the fittest" operate and then gives a history of communities and civilizations. In the section immediately following (5.1120-30), there is an explanation of how kings first arose. First, there were men that stood out above the rest (*qui praestabant et corde vigebant*); they began to divide (*divisere*) things (*res*), and those things then became the replacement for what was formerly known as honor (*honorem*). Then, people started to follow those who had the most things (*sequuntur divitioris*). From there came the desire for fame (*at claros homines voluerunt*). Here, the passage in question begins:

> at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentes
> ut fundamento stabili fortuna maneret
> et placidam possent opulenti degere vitam,
> ne quiquam, quoniam ad summum succedere honorem
> certantes iter infestum fecere viai,
> et tamen e summo, quasi fulmen, deicit ictos
> invidia inter dum contemptim in Tartara taetra;
> invidia quoniam ceu fulmine summa vaporant
> plerumque et quae sunt aliis magis edita cumque;
> <u>ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum</u>
> <u>quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere</u>.
>
> But people wanted to be famous and powerful, so that their fortune would stand firm on a strong foundation and so that they could live a peaceful life in affluence – in vain, since, as they struggled to reach the highest rank, they made their pathway perilous, and sometimes envy struck them nonetheless, like a bolt of lightning, and hurled them down contemptuously from the heights into vile Tartarus; for envy, like lightning, usually scorches the highest peaks and whatever is elevated above other things; so that <u>peaceful subjection is much better than the desire to hold sway over nations and rule kingdoms</u>.
>
> Lucr. 5.1120-1130 (trans. Gale 2009)

My focus here is the last two lines of the passage. They have been analyzed in great detail for the political message that Lucretius is trying to make concerning the relative merits of involvement in and detachment from society.[123] However, in light of our earlier discussion, I would like to consider these lines in the context of Lucretius' pedagogical stance. In the last two lines above, Lucretius posits that early man discovered how "peaceful subjection" (as Gale translates) is better than holding sway over others, due to reasons stated in lines 5.1120-1128. I suggest that we can draw a parallel between this passage's political message and the relationship between Lucretius and his readership, a relationship already determined to be "egalitarian" as described throughout this chapter. Both challenge the notion that all aspects of Roman society were based on an axis of active and passive social structures in which the active position in that structure is always ideal. This forms the basis for the following two chapters.

[123] See Fowler's (1989: 120-150) introduction for bibliography on Lucretius and politics.

Chapter Three

Lucretius' Readership:[124]

The fact is that movements of critical thinking between formalism and historicism, may fairly be said to define the range of possibility within which all literary reading occurs.
-Hinds 2010: 371

In fact, reality is nothing but a totality of perceptions determined by cultural codes and is therefore itself a construction, even if one at a different level from literature. The empirical world, in order to be perceived, must of necessity be translated into something it is not – into a model of reality, endowed with a meaning and therefore with a form. Genre functions as a mediator, permitting such models of selected reality to enter into the language of literature; it gives them the possibility of being 'represent.'
-Conte 1994: 125

If we are to give a historicist account of [ancient] works, we have to do more than simply join the dots between features internal to the text and external reference points; we need, rather to grasp, (as best we can; this, I concede, is also an elusive quest) the nature of the particular form of textuality in question, and ask what kind of (phantasmatic, or kaleidoscopic) 'history' is being projected.
-Whitmarsh BMCR 2012.02.54

The first two chapters of this dissertation began investigating the relationship between Lucretius and his addressee in the 1st century B.C.E. poem, *On the Nature of Things.* On the surface, an authoritative narrator's voice, through the genre of so-called "didactic poetry," expounds upon Epicurean physics to a silent, seemingly passive, childlike narratee; yet an investigation of the ways in which Lucretius' poetic voice functions through various conventions of genre, intertextuality, and other literary devices in order to teach those Epicurean principles, it was found that the poem actually encourages the addressee's own willful and active participation in the learning process, creating a relationship between Lucretius and his addressee that I termed "egalitarian" as opposed to authoritative.[125] Both Lucretius and his Greek philosophical model Epicurus, require from their students a strict, passive adherence to a specific set of atomic

[124] This chapter refers to different aspects of the relationship between Lucretius and his readership by using the following terminology: the *narrator* tells the *narratee* the "story" of Epicurean physics; the *poetic voice* engages with the *addressee* through the didactic genre's conventions, creating a "*fabula*" (for terms, see Jong 2004: xvi-xviii); the *poet's voice* speaks directly to *historical readers* in 1st century BCE Rome; and the *Epicurean voice* teaches philosophy to *philosophical readers*. Lucretius' *readership* refers jointly to the addressee, the historical reader, and the philosophical reader. See also, Chart 3.1 at the end of this introduction.

[125] The use of the word "egalitarian" stems from Semanoff (2006: 303-318), who contrasts Hesiod's authoritative positioning toward Perses, and Aratus' egalitarian stance toward his addressee. See also Sections 1.8 for a discussion of this study.

principles;[126] however Lucretius alone, by using didactic poetry as a medium, employs a series of literary devices, which encourage the addressee's active participation. This active participation is the subject of the current chapter. In particular, I shift focus from the active participation of the "formal" addressee and turn to the participation of historical readers as well as philosophical readers; in order to do so, I position the active participation between Lucretius and his readership in the context of the so-called "penetration model" of Roman society,[127] thereby further developing a paradigm for understanding the relationship between Lucretius' poetic voice and his readership, a relationship I continue to discuss in the final chapter of this study.

Introduction

Participation within the Penetration Model of Roman Sex and Society

In order to discuss Lucretius' readership, one needs a model that addresses that readership in formal, historical, and philosophical terms concurrently. This introduction suggests that we meet the necessity for such a model by using the so-called penetration model of Roman society. The original penetration model for Roman society stated that the physiological male always plays an active, insertive role while engaging in sexual acts, while the Roman physiological female (or effeminate male) always plays the passive, receptive role; all else is

[126] See Nussbaum (1986: esp. 69) for the way in which 3rd century Epicurean philosophy relies on controlled therapeutic environments supervised by an authoritative leader. Also, for an accessible narrative on the way in which Epicureanism requires strict passivity, numbs one's intellect, and discourages critical debate, see Nussbaum (1994: 13-16, 45-47, 130-132, and 137-139).

[127] For what began as a study of humor and sexual invective against Roman women in Roman literature and what would become the basis for the penetration model, see Richlin (1992: esp. 57-80) .

deviant.[128] Others then argued that the model also applies to Roman society as a whole even when treated metaphorically and, in effect, extending its meaning beyond its original sexual reference.[129] For example, using the penetration model as a paradigm for understanding social hierarchies in different Roman spaces (the theater, the Forum Augustus, and the Roman house), Fredrick expands the model as follows:[130]

> In this essay then, "penetration" is defined most fundamentally as the encroachment of one's body upon one's social self. We can regard a wide variety of grating, piquant, agonizing, delightful, or otherwise unignorable physical sensations as penetrating: the pungency of saffron, the spectacle of bears devouring a still-living man, the humiliation of forced oral copulation, the seductive rhythm of an Asiatic-style oration, the pain of a severe beating, starvation.
>
> Fredrick 2002: 237-8

This updated model increases the possible referents to the penetrator and/or the penetrated. According to this model then penetration includes any activity in which the movement (or potential movement) of an object (or idea) crosses (or threatens to cross) the boundaries of a body physically (or psychologically as we will see below). The act of penetration loses its specificity and appears in a variety of contexts. The resulting implication of this and other studies like it is that Roman society on a variety of levels functions on a point along an active/passive scale, revealing a "penetration model" in which the penetrator, acting either sexually, spatially, psychologically, metaphorically, or simply actively is the ideal role to play in most contexts.[131]

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[128] For a study of Latin terminology identified with the penetration model, see Parker (1997: 47-65). For the penetration model in the context of Roman elite male-male ideologies, see Williams (1999: 160-224).

[129] For the need to augment and nuance the penetration model, see Corbeill (2010: 220-233, esp. 230) and (2006: 439-456, esp. 451-454), which contain other examples from recent scholarship on the nuancing of Richlin's penetration model. For a specific example, see Fredrick (2002: 236-264) below.

[130] Fredrick (2002: 236-264) argues that Roman space was characterized not by a stationary but a sliding binary scale within certain zones, such as the dining room, which were strongly marked by confusion as elite bodies were threatened by an array of pleasures; other zones, such as the theater, were properly distributed along a scaled model of penetration.

[131] For the related "theory of social penetration" in the field of social psychology, see Altman and Taylor (1973: 25-58), whose theory states that interpersonal relationships develop through a graduated series of "self-disclosures"

The model is especially revealing for an Epicurean poet such as Lucretius. Since Epicurean physics states that the process of sensation is carried out by invisible sensory films (visual, auditory, olfactory, or mental) striking the body *physically*,[132] in the realm of Lucretius' poem, according to the expanded penetration model described above, Epicurean poets with their poetry "penetrate" the ears and minds of their then "penetrated" readers.[133] It would then seem that the poet always plays the active role and the reader the passive; however, the egalitarian relationship between Lucretius and his addressee discussed in the last two chapters, suggests that Lucretius is not always the penetrator, nor the addressee penetrated; instead, each actor in the model takes a turn performing an "active" and "passive" role alternatingly, revealing a "reciprocating modification of the penetration model" within the poem.[134] Since reciprocation deviates from the ideally dominant model, we could call it, "deviant penetration."

Thus far, this study has only been concerned with the relationship between Lucretius' poetic voice and the poem's "addressee," and the way in which each alternatingly participates. In a theoretical sense, this study's hitherto approach has been a "formal" analysis of the

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(verbal and nonverbal), initiated by each party in the relationship. Most recently, scholars have used this theory to show how interpersonal relationships work differently in online environments since the processes of self-disclosure in cyberspace have been quickened by and mediated through social networking sites. For example, see Pennington (2008: 1-25). The interdisciplinary relevance of this chapter's "penetration model" and Altman's "theory of social penetration" begs future consideration.

[132] For Lucretius' explanation of invisible films (*simulacra*) moving away from objects and hitting one's pupil, thus producing sensation, see DRN 4.26-215. For the physical nature of these films and how they penetrate the body to produce both positive and negative sensation and thought, see DRN 4.216-238 (vision), 524-548 (sound), 615-632 (taste), 673-705 (smell), and 722-748 (thought). For the perceptual relativity of this process, see Graver (1990: 91-116) who discusses the usage of *interfodiunt* to describe how *simulacra* physically penetrate the senses (98-99).

[133] Cf. Juv. 1.1-13: the narrator bemoans the physical torture (*vexatus totiens*) that he endures from being made to listen to hours of recitation by long-winded poets. The poets consume (*consumpserit*) his whole day. The marble itself is tormented (*convolsa marmora*) by these poets. This physical penetration by an orator of his audience, albeit a metaphoric and hyperbolic act, supports the expansion of the penetration model to include the reading of and listening to texts as an act of penetration. Cf. Horace complains in the final lines of his *Ars Poetica* that, when an author has once grabbed on to someone, he holds him fast and kills him by reading to him, like a leech that will not let go until it is full of blood.

[134] For a similar "reciprocating" model in the context of *amicitia,* see Oliensis (1997: 151-171).

relationship between Lucretius and his addressee within the confines of the text and limited to that one aspect. In order to pursue other aspects, e.g. historical and philosophical aspects of their relationship, and whether or not that relationship still reflects a "reciprocating penetration model," we must consider the reader who is not simply an addressee, but who is both a social being in 1st century BC.E. Rome and a philosophical student of Epicurean physics. The current chapter discusses the active participation of the readers in those philosophical and historical contexts and shows how the relationship between Lucretius and his readership in all contexts reflects a reciprocating penetration model.

The context of their relationship has been discussed independently by scholars using a number of different approaches: philosophical, historical, therapeutic, political, and socio-economic. Philosophically, Lucretius, the Epicurean sage, teaches students both then and now. For example, Classen (1968: 77-118) shows how Lucretius uses primarily psychological rather than logical forms of argumentation in order to spread the Epicurean message to Roman and non-Roman readers alike. Kleve (1979: 81-85) thinks that Lucretius presents a strict account of Epicurean physics with no concern for an ethics that would apply to a Roman audience, only to those interested in Epicureanism. Sedley (1998: 62-93) asks and responds, "Does the *De Rerum Natura,* the most brilliant philosophical composition to survive from its period, reflect the highly charged atmosphere of mid first-century BC Italy? Amazingly, it does not" (65). Conte (1994: 1-34) is interested in the nondescript "ideal reader," docile, teachable, and "one willing to collaborate with the text's intentions to the point of letting them remodel him" (31). The second chapter of Baron's dissertation (1986: 89-128) uses reception theory to discuss how Lucretius' rhetorical relationship with the reader in Book II transcends local contexts, teaching

Epicureanism to Roman and non-Roman readers alike. In each of these studies, the focus is on the relationship between Lucretius and his reader in philosophical terms.

Alternatively, one could also argue that historically, Lucretius, the Roman man, does address both elite and non-elite 1st century B.C.E. Roman audiences. For example, Mitsis (1993: 111-128) argues that Lucretius is writing to a sophisticated Roman audience by showing how the addressee is anticipated, condescended, treated, and referred to by Lucretius in his didactic strategies. He finds that Lucretius continually controls the mood and response of the reader by taking advantage of "the morality of [Roman] elitism" (126). Reinhardt (2010: 203-228) suggests that Lucretius is writing to a specific non-elite Roman audience by pointing out colloquialisms throughout the text. Each study taken together suggests Lucretius had both elite and non-elite Roman readers in mind. Also, Asmis (1983:33-66) discusses the connection between the poem's rhetoric and the rhetoric associated with Roman schools of thought. Clay's (1983: esp. 212) book points out many of the ways Lucretius fully recasts and refashions the Epicurean system for a Roman audience, considering Memmius the "mock reader" for that audience. Howe (1951: 57-62) discusses that while Lucretius claims to be the first Roman writer to record the philosophy of Epicurus (1.922-950 and 5.335-337), Latin prose writers such as Amafinius were spreading Epicureanism in Italy at about the same time and therefore there was indeed demand for Roman adaptations of Epicureanism. Cole (1998: 3-15) boldly suggests that the seduction of Mars by Venus (1.31-40) allegorically represents the seduction of Pompey in 59 B.C.E. by his new wife whom he had recently fallen in love; see also 5.381 for a possible reference in "*pio nequiquam…bello*" to the civil wars of the 1st century BCE.[135] The subject matter of the work calls for a separation from political and historical matters. Also, the degree to

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[135] The number of datable references to the *DRN* is but one (Cicero *Q. Fr.* 2.10(9).3 = 14.3 (Shackleton Bailey), in which Cicero praises Lucretius for his combination of art (*ars*) and inspiration (*ingenium*)).

which the work reflects 1st BCE Rome is unclear mainly because the work itself claims close ties to its Greek predecessor, "walking in Epicurus' footprints." Historical Rome seems relevant to the relationship between Lucretius and his reader, but is in no way directly referred to in the poem.

Therapeutically, one could argue that Lucretius, the Hellenistic philosopher-doctor, treats Memmius (and you), the sick boy-patient. For example, following Nussbaum's (1986 and 1989) work on the "therapeutic" traditions from which Lucretius' philosophy is derived, Kilpatrick (1996: 68-88) discusses Lucretius' therapeutic aims by analyzing what "therapy" would have meant to a Roman audience. He shows how "common ground between ancient medicine and philosophy (natural science) was well-documented, and should have been clear to Lucretius' [Roman] contemporaries" (83)… and that Lucretius associates "medical ideas familiar to his Roman contemporaries with methods of Epicurean counseling" (88). Segal (1990: 68) in a discussion of the realities of death writes, "Lucretius probably draws on what must have been common experience among his readers, who, in a time before hospitals or nursing homes, would have watched over a dying person and discussed among themselves his or her last moments."

Another way one could view the relationship between Lucretius and his Roman reader is socio-politically: Lucretius, the political (de-)activist, urges Forum goers to disengage. Despite the objection that Epicureanism is inherently a-political (see 2.11-13, 3.59-64, 995-1002, and 5.1120-1135), Nichols (1972: 13-24) argues that Lucretius' poem *is* political since *religio* and the state were one and the same; when he attacks one, he attacks the other. See Fowler (1989: 120-50) for exceptions for when an Epicurean could actually become involved in politics (e.g. *Plut*. 465F = U. 444) and for the idea that Lucretius held a "realistically skeptical view of social institutions" (149). Schiesaro (2007: 55-58) discusses the politics of the plague at the end of

book VI and argues, "at many junctures in their history Romans would have had cause to see their current situation mirrored in Lucretius' reinterpretation of [Thucydides'] plague" (57). Furley (1978) notes, "As an Epicurean, Lucretius would unquestionably prefer the institutions of the [politics] to the violence of anarchy" (172).

Furthermore, socio-economically, Lucretius, the client, "in the hope of obtaining the pleasure of sweet friendship" (*sperata voluptas* / *suavis amicitiae,* 1.140-1), teaches/advises Memmius, his dear, sweet patron "with faithful zeal" (*studio…fideli,* 1.52). Townend (1978: 267-283) collects what scholars have pieced together of Lucretius' supposed historical addressee: Gaius Memmius L. filius, "the orator and lover of poetry, who was praetor in 58 B.C., went to Bithynia in 57 as propraetor, with Catullus in his retinue, was obliged to leave Italy in 54 as a result of an unusually blatant piece of [consular] electoral corruption, and is last heard of in 51 B.C., when Cicero is involved indirectly in Memmius' project to develop the site of Epicurus' original school in Athens [*Fam.* 13.1.3-4 = 63.3-4 Shackleton Bailey]" (267). Suffice to say, he was a man of the 50s. See also Roller (1970: 246-248) for Gaius Memmius as Lucretius' patron from whom he eventually fell from favor. For the opposite view, see Bignone (1945: 159) who sees Gaius Memmius and Titus Lucretius Carus as equals.

Each position (philosophical, historical, therapeutic, political, socio-economic) from which the relationship between Lucretius and his readership can be framed has been carefully investigated. Overall, there seems to be a trend from historical to formal readings over the last century; rarely though, do these studies consider their findings in light of another's approach. Instead, this scholarship has produced a fragmented image of their relationship. There is an opening in the body of this scholarship that calls for an analysis of Lucretius and his readership that moves between different ways of approaching the text. This chapter, as well as the next,

provides that analysis by attempting to reconcile the studies mentioned above, which consist of a variety of nuanced philosophical and historical approaches, by showing how the relationship between Lucretius and his readership, in whatever context, consistently reflects a reciprocating penetration model. However, the problem of considering jointly the different contexts of their relationship is twofold: what is at stake in the connection between formalism and historicism and between historicism and Epicurean philosophy?[136]

First, approaches that shift from generic formalism to Roman historicism have evoked significant debate in modern scholarship. For a specific discussion, see Hinds (2010: 372-377) who juxtaposes formalist and historicist interpretations of Propertius' *poem* 1.21-2 and, in particular, the identity of Gallus. A strict historicizing reader sees Gallus as a lost kinsman of Propertius in the Perusine struggle, yet that reader is faced with critical inconsistences between the two poems. On the other hand, a formalist reader sees Gallus as Propertius' literary predecessor (who was named Gallus), yet this reader is faced with historical inconsistences. Hinds promotes critical thinking that moves between these two ways of approaching the text, which "verily defines the range of possibilities, within which all literary reading occurs" (371). See also Whitmarsh's response (BMCR 2012.02.54) to Martzavou's (BMCR 2012.02.20) criticism of his recent book on narrative in the genre of Greek Romance. He defends the book's "more nuanced historicism" and argues that "literary historicism need begin with and be founded upon literary criticism."

In the context of this study the question arises, "Does a reciprocating penetration model based on the alternating participation between Lucretius and his didactic addressee (the result of a formalist reading in chapters one and two of the current study) still apply to a penetration model based on the same sort of "participation" between Lucretius and his *Roman* reader (the

[136] For the terms, formalism and historicism, see chart 3.1 below.

historicism of the current chapter)?" Section 3.1 of this chapter argues that Lucretius invites us to view the egalitarian relationship between poetic voice and addressee as functioning similarly to the relationship between the poet and his Roman readers, thereby validating thematic connections made between textual phenomenon and historical commonplace. I first discuss the link between text and atoms (the letters as atoms analogy) within the *DRN*. Then, by analyzing instances of "struggle" (*certamen, certo,* and *contendo*) throughout the poem, I argue that the so-called "equal struggle between the atoms" is a metaphor for "social *ἰσονομία*" in the first century B.C.E.[137] Thus, the poem makes a link between atomic metaphysics and socio-historical ethics, and therefore allows us to view the relationship between Lucretius and his Roman reader as a "equal struggle between social individuals." While the first two chapters of this study found a reciprocating penetration model existing between Lucretius and his addressee, in terms of "alternating participation," this section finds a similar penetration model existing between Lucretius and his Roman reader in terms of "a balanced struggle."

Second, the shift from Epicurean philosophy to Roman historicism, i.e. from atomic physics to Roman ethics, is another issue.[138] We again ask, "Do penetration models based on 'alternating penetration between poetic voice and addressee' and 'a balanced struggle between

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[137] ἰσονομία is usually translated as "equilibrium" and refers to the "equal distribution of things in the whole universe" (Bailey 1964: 261). Epicureans use it to explain the existence of multiple worlds (261) and the mortality of those worlds compared to the immutability of the universe (278); things may be created or destroyed, but the sum total remains the same since atomic combinations in the universe are evenly distributed.

[138] Asmis (2008: 141-157) argues that physics and ethics are integrated through the notion of *foedera naturai,* which are a set of rules that establish the boundaries and powers for every aspect of the universe. Humans too are then subject to these rules and in recognizing this, humans can attain true happiness, like to the gods. In a Roman context, this means humans shifting their position from the socio-political order to the natural order of things. Her whole argument rests on the fact that all of nature, not only the metaphysical atoms, void, and *simulacra* but the astrological sun, moon, stars, biological animals, monsters, humans, all of nature is subject to the same *foedera naturai.* The implication is not only that the biological *does* behave like the metaphysical, but that the biological *should* behave like the metaphysical; humans should ethically act like atoms. See also Gale (1994: 123-124) for the idea that the *DRN* is a narrative poem conducted at the level of imagery: the narrative of gods and heroes is replaced with *natura* and the atoms. See also Cabisius (1984: 109-120) who attempts to reconcile the paradoxical problem created by the use of *social* metaphors to explain *non-social* atoms and their cycles.

the poet's voice and his historical reader,' still apply to a penetration model based on some sort of 'participation' between Lucretius and his *Epicurean* reader?" Section 3.2 of this chapter argues that the concept of metaphysical space (philosophy) and the Roman reader's sense of social space (historicism) are encouraged to be thought of as one and the same. By analyzing overt references to "space" (*spatium, locus, and regio*), I show that the poem encourages the Epicurean reader to view metaphysical and social space not only as ontologically but causally related; the reader is not only taught the true nature of space, i.e. void, but also taught the correct way to position oneself within that space. This section finds a reciprocating penetration model existing between Lucretius and his philosophical reader in terms of that reader's "active manipulation of space."

Thus, the egalitarian relationship between poet and addressee determined in the first two chapters also corresponds to the relationship between poet and historical reader as well as poet and philosophical reader. This relationship, which is defined in formal, historical, and philosophical terms,[139] between Lucretius and his overall readership, in terms of the penetration model discussed above, represents a "reciprocating modification of that model." The implications of this observation are discussed in the conclusion to this chapter and the next.

[139] For these terms, see Chart 3.2 below. See also Hinds (2010: 203-369-388) for a further description of formalism and historicism in Classics. See Gallagher and Greenblatt (2001) for "New Historicism", and for a specific example see Kennedy (1993) who writes, "The real issue confronting any cultural historian of antiquity, and any critic of contemporary culture, is, first of all, how to recover the terms in which the experiences of individuals belonging to past societies were actually constituted and, second, how to measure and assess the differences between those terms and the ones we currently employ" (40).

	Type of Approach	Lucretius' Voice	The Poem's Readership	Characterization of Behavior between Lucretius and his Readership associated with the Penetration Model after being applied to each Approach
The Relationship between Lucretius and his Readership	Formalist	Poetic Voice (Chapters 1-2)	Internal Addressee	**"Alternating Participation" through conventions of the didactic genre**
	Historicist	Poet's Voice (Section 3.1)	Roman Reader	**"Balanced Struggle" between the atoms and between persons**
	Philosophical	Epicurean Voice (Section 3.2)	Epicurean Reader	**"Active Construction" of Metaphysical and Social Space**

Chart 3.1

Terms used to describe the relationship between Lucretius and his readership, the types of approaches that this study uses to define that relationship, and the type of penetration experienced in each of those contexts For other terms associated with these approaches, see Chart 3.2 below.

Formalism	Historicism	Philosophical
Literary Context	Social Context	Philosophical Context
Artistic structure	Social Space	Metaphysical Space
Text-only	Historical Context	Epicurean Physics
sub specie aeternitatis	Cultural Anthropology	Atoms and the Void
Purely Poetic	Cultural Poetics	Explanatory Poetry
Intrinsic Thought	Cultural Materialism	Materialism
Aesthetic Readers	The Historicizing Reader	Epicurean Students
Form and Genre Driven	Description of Ethics	Atomic Principles

Chart 3.2

The names for these ideas and concepts associated with Formalism, Historicism, and Philosophical approaches have been culled and expanded from terms found in Hinds (2010: 369-385).

Section 3.1.

The Equal Struggle between Atoms and Readers

The first two books of the *DRN* lay the foundations for understanding Epicurean atomic physics: Lucretius states general atomic principles,[140] explains atomic movement,[141] describes atomic shape,[142] and then details other characteristics of these atoms.[143] In particular, their movement in relation to one another becomes an important detail throughout the poem. Lucretius first describes this interaction through what has become one of the most celebrated explanatory metaphors of the *DRN*. He asks the reader to imagine dust motes illuminated by light entering through a crack in a dark, dusty room:

> multa minuta modis multis per inane videbis
> corpora misceri radiorum lumine in ipso
> et velut aeterno certamine proelia pugnas
> edere turmatim certantia nec dare pausam,
> conciliis et discidiis exercita crebris;
>
> You will see many tiny bodies embroiled in many ways
> throughout that empty space (void) and within those light rays;
> just as if those tiny bodies were displaying war and battles, caught in an eternal struggle,
> struggling in squadrons, never stopping,
> kept hard at work with repeated meetings and partings.
>
> Lucr. 2.116-120

We are to imagine atoms, which are in fact invisible, as moving ceaselessly through the void, engaging in an eternal struggle, constantly clashing into one another as one might see soldiers indiscriminately fighting on a distant battlefield. Their ceaseless movement is felt in the quadruple alliteration of the first line (*multa minuta modis multis*). Their "eternal struggle" (*aeterno certamine*) is drawn out by the use of *figura etymologica* (*certamine… certantia*).

[140] 1.483-634: Atoms are solid, eternal, indivisible, and immutable.

[141] 2.62-332: Atoms move incessantly with a certain velocity downward, slightly swerving at undisclosed times.

[142] 2.333-729: Atoms vary in shape, thereby having different effects on the environment; the number of different shapes is not infinite, but the number of atoms of each shape is infinite; and the variety of atomic combinations of each shape account for what we see on the earth.

[143] 2.730-1022: For example, atoms are colorless and without sensation.

Asyndeton (*proelia pugnas*) stresses the "restless movement of the motes" (Leonard and Smith 1941: 324). The analogy between dust motes and atoms is then made complete in the description of the motes as "hard at work with repeating meetings and partings" (*conciliis et discidiis exercita*), in that it uses the same technical language as used to describe atomic motion.[144] What is clear is that Lucretius uses what is familiar to his historical readers to describe the movement of atoms; what is not immediately clear is whether or not familiar space (dust motes floating in the *inane*) is used as a mere analogy for atomic space or whether the analogy is meant to serve as a link: the process that occurs in one is a reflection of the other.

The problem is compounded by the use of *inane* (116), usually meaning "metaphysical void," but here also referring to the familiar "air" (though usually "*aera"* is used for "air") through which the dust motes are moving, not technically through the "void" (*inane*). Bailey notes that, "strictly of course the motes are moving in air, not in void" (1947: 323). Leonard and Smith reassure us that, "Lucretius is not using [*aera*] here in its strict philosophical sense" (1941: 323). Monro goes as far as to point out that in subsequent lines (2.151, 158), Lucretius actually contrasts the difference between *aera* and *inane* (1886: 126), but rationalizes Lucretius' misuse of *inane* here by pointing out that later poets such as Ovid and Virgil often use *inane* when they mean *aera*. Using Monro's evidence but coming to a different conclusion, I see this rather as an invitation to view metaphysical and social space on the same plane. When Lucretius says that the motes are moving through the void, he means to suggest to the reader that there is no distinction between the metaphysical void (*inane*) he has been describing and the social space

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[144] For example, *concilium* and *discidium* are used to describe the interactions of atoms in lines 1.183, 220, and 2.97.

(*aera*) he is now using to describe it.[145] The ceaselessly struggling atoms are presented in terms of social space.

Lucretius evokes the image of the struggling atoms again when he describes the different shapes of atoms, combining and departing from one another at a "balanced" rate:

> sic aequo geritur certamine principiorum
> exfinito contractum tempore bellum.
>
> So, since a balanced struggle of the atoms is waged,
> war is entered upon and continues throughout infinite time.
>
> Lucr. 2.573-574

Here, the eternal struggle (*certamine*) of the atoms is balanced (*aequo*).[146] Neither side is winning. They are engaged in a war that is described as "being entered upon" (*contractum*). Leonard and Smith (1941: 365) note that *contractum* is commercial in origin and is therefore connected to the image of *foedera naturae.* If this is correct,[147] then the atoms entering upon a "contractual war," so to speak, is equivalent to the same way all "treaties of nature" are entered upon. These treaties (*foedera*) govern not only the atoms, but extend to all of nature, including human interaction.[148] Lucretius, again, through the language he uses to describe atoms, invites us to view the balanced struggle between atoms as a mirror image of what is occurring in the socio-historical world.

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[145] On the assumption that Lucretian analogies not only describe reality but reflect it (as if the analogy itself was a *simulacra*), see Schiesaro (1994: 81-107) and more broadly his larger study (1990) entitled, *Simulacrum et imago. Gli argomenti analogici nel* De rerum natura*.*

[146] See O'Brian (1967: 29-40) and Osborne (1987: 24-50) for Empedocles' cosmic cycle, which consists of a two cycle cosmic alternation between the periods of love and strife and an equal amount of time for each cycle. Sedley (1998: 1-34) argues that the reason why Lucretius mentions "the folly of believing in the transmigration of souls in line 1.116 (a seemingly random example) of the proem is because he is interacting with Empedocles' proem: Lucretius is in debt to Epicurus as founder of his philosophy, but to Empedocles as founder of his genre. However, the influence of Empedocles on Lucretius' "war of the atoms" is unclear since Lucretius discards the idea of Love and Strife fueling the cycle; instead, as I argue below, the influence is more historical.

[147] The *OLD* cites the following associations with the verb, *contrahere*: a business agreement, a marriage, a loan, a battle, or an alliance of friendship; and the noun *foedera*: a law imposed by nature, a marriage between two people, a formal agreement between states, and a bond of friendship/hospitality. The association of a "*contractum bellum*" with Lucretius' larger vision of "*foedera natura*" is accordingly correct.
[148] Cf. Asmis (1983: 36-66) on the extent to which *foedera naturae* applies.

What is the significance of a "ceaselessly balanced struggle" in socio-historical 1st century Rome? At the time of Lucretius' writing (circa 50's BCE), his historical world was engaged in its own "balanced" civil war, which must have seemed at that point to go on forever. Commentators point to one specific passage that seems to be referring to Rome's civil wars. In (5.91-508), Lucretius describes the formation of our world (earth, water, air, light, sky), how our world is still in its infancy (5.324-350), and how it will one day end in apocalypse only to be reborn anew (5.351-508). It is here that he describes the "equal and balanced struggle of the atoms" coming to an end:

> Denique tantoque inter se cum maxima mundi
> pugnent membra,[149] pio nequaquam concita bello,
> nonne vides aliquam longi certaminis ollis
> posse dari finem?
>
> In the end, as the chief components of the world so furiously
> fight one another, inflamed with ungodly war,
> don't you see that some kind of end to their long struggle
> looms large?
>
> Lucr. 5.380-383

Here, their long struggle (*longi certaminis*), before described as "eternal and balanced" is given an end (*finem*).[150] The historical undertones of this passage are felt through the use of *pio nequaquam,* ungodly war. Costa (1984: 76) notes that, "We regularly find *impius* (or an equivalent) used of civil war."[151] Leonard and Smith (1942: 678) also suggest that this image is of the civil wars of the 1st BCE. Gale (2009: 138), however, sees this "unpious war" not as a reference to Rome's civil wars, but as a reference to the *Iliad* (*Il.* 20.1-152), when the gods descend from Olympus and join battle with each other. Gale's interests, though, are concerned

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[149] In the context to this passage, *membra* refers to the body of the earth (terrai corpus), moisture (umor), the breath of the winds (aurarum animae), and heat (vapores). See 5.235-236.

[150] In subsequent lines Lucretius gives two ancient examples of when this rare event occurs: the story of Phaethon (cf. Ovid's *Metamorphosis* 1.750-2.238) and the Flood (cf. Ovid's *Metamorphosis* 1.253-347).

[151] For example, Aen. 1.294, 6.613, Hor. C. 3.24-25, Lucan 1.238.

with "the heroization of atomic matter" and how "nature and the atoms stand in for the gods and mythical heroes of epic poetry" (1994: 117-24 and 2000: 232-40). One aspect that that interpretation does not account for is that this passage includes a frustrated longing (*nonne vides*) for those struggles to end, reminiscent of the work's first proem when Lucretius asks Venus to tame Mars and ask for peace (1.31-40).[152] While Homeric influence on this passage is likely, the historical allusion between atoms struggling in an ungodly war and Romans struggling in a civil war is also present.[153] Thus, as in the passages above, Lucretius invites his historical readers, who were engaged in their own endless civil war, to view themselves as these very atoms struggling in a balanced and eternal war with one another.

Moreover, it is not simply atoms that are engaged in this balanced struggle with one another. As Lucretius continues to describe the apocalypse, he describes the compounds of atoms (earth, air, fire, and water) also in a balanced struggle:

> tantum spirantes aequo certamine bellum
> magnis <inter se> de rebus cernere certant,
>
> [Earth, air, fire and water] breathing out so vast a war, equal in their struggle,
> they tuggle and tackle one another for greatness.
>
> Lucr. 5.392-393

Here, Lucretius is describing that rare apocalyptic moment when all comes to an end. The interlocking word order of line 392 highlights the struggle with which the elements are engaged in a balanced war (*aequo certamine*) as they toggle and tackle (*certant cernere*) one another.[154] The passage provides us with evidence that the behavior of atoms in a balanced and eternal

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[152] Cf. Hardie (1986:157-240) on Lucretius and the *Aeneid,* esp. (193-219) on Lucretius' assimilation of military conquest into his view of intellectual conquest.

[153] In support of this allusion, see also Penwill (1994: 68-91 esp. 76-77), who demonstrates several other images associating Lucretius' poem with Rome's historical wars: the Venus' processional opening, Venus overcoming Mars (Patriotic founders), the *graius homo* heroic journey, and his use of Ennius.

[154] Note the *figura etymologica* as above.

struggle is the same as that of their compounds, also engaged in a balanced and eternal struggle.[155]

Thus far, I have argued that the struggle of the atoms is not only exemplified by the struggles between human beings in their own lives, but that the struggles of human beings are exemplified by the *aequus* and *aeternus* struggle of the atoms. Lucretius gives us both an example for how to understand atomic relations, while at the same time gives us an example for how to understand social relations through the image of atomic interaction. This is more explicitly expressed in the passages where Lucretius discusses the struggles of men directly. In each passage below, "*certamen*" and/or "*certo*" are used to describe interactions between humans, just as these two words were used to describe the interactions of atoms. It is not just a circle of exemplification but of instantiation; they are the same phenomena "struggling," so to speak, at different levels.

The first passage that comes to mind when thinking of men struggling in the *DRN* is the proem of book II. The narrator describes himself sitting safely at a distance watching men struggle, in vain, against one another:

> suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri
> per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli.
> sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere
> edita doctrina sapientum temple serena,
> despicere unde queas alios passimque videre
> errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae,
> certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
> noctes atque dies niti praestante labore
> ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri.
>
> Sweet is it too, to behold great struggles of war
> in full array over the plains, when you have no part in the danger.
> But nothing is more gladdening than to dwell in the calm regions,
> firmly embattled on the heights by the teaching of the wise,

[155] For the Trojan war as a "*certamen*," see Lucr.1.475. For existence of hand to hand combat, which started "*certamina*" amongst early peoples, as coming before the invention of spears, see Lucr. 4.843. For the invention of iron as the enabler of "*aequi certmina,"* see Lucr. 5.1296. This evidence provides further proof that Lucretius invites his readers to view the struggle of the atoms as a mirror image of the historical world.

> whence you can look down on others, and see them wandering hither and thither,
> going astray as they seek the way of life,
> in strife matching their wits or rival claims of birth,
> struggling night and day by surpassing effort
> to rise up to the height of power and gain possession of the world.
>
> Lucr. 2.5-13

Lucretius describes how men struggle against one another in terms of their wits (*ingenio*) and their birth rights (*nobilitate*). He finds this this type of struggle (*certamina*) utterly appalling:

> o miseras hominum mentis, o pectora caeca!
> Ah! miserable minds of men, blind hearts!
>
> Lucr. 2.14

He calls the hearts of these men "blind," using the word *caeca.* The word has already been used by Lucretius to refer to the invisibility of the atoms (*primordia caeca*). It is true that in Latin the word can be used literally to mean "invisible" or metaphorically to mean "blind," in the sense of being ignorant. However, the equivalent word for "invisible" in Epicurus' Greek is "ἄδηλος." This word is not used metaphorically in Greek, only literally. Epicurus calls the atoms ἄδηλος, but would not use the same word to mean "ignorant," as the double meaning of *caeca* allows. So, when Lucretius uses *caeca* to refer to both invisible atoms and the blind hearts of men, he subtly associates men with atoms; both struggle against one another. This is another instance of Lucretius inviting us to view the atomic world as a reflection of our own lives.

Another instance of men struggling is in the description of two lovers attempting to join themselves together through the process of love-making. A voyeuristic Lucretius looks at such a attempt and responds:

> nequiquam, quoniam nil inde abrader possunt
> nec penetrare et abire in corpus corpore toto;
> nam facere interdum velle et certare videntur;
> usque adeo cupide in Veneris compagibus haerent,
> membra voluptatis dum vi labefacta liquescent.
>
> It is all in vain because they cannot scrape away [any of their desire] at that point,
> nor is one of their bodies able to enter in and disappear in the whole of the other's body;
> for at times [the lovers] seem to be trying and struggling to do this;

so eagerly are they stuck in the fetters of she whom they call, Venus,
as their arms and legs become unsteady by the power of her pleasure.

Lucr. 4.1110-1114

Similar to the passage above, Lucretius describes this type of struggling between one another as negative (*nequiquam*). It is in no way balanced (*aequus*) as we saw in the struggle of the atoms; instead, they try to penetrate (*penetrare*) and go into (*abire*) one another's bodies completely (*toto*).

Again, in book V there is another instance of men struggling against one another in an incorrect way, a way that is different from the balanced struggle of the atoms. In the history of civilization, Lucretius describes how civilizations were first created after the death of primitive man (5.925-1010).[156] These earliest communities first arose after language and fire where discovered (5.1028-1090), and finally, an increase in wealth led to the rise of kings within what were, more or less, equal communities:

at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentis,
ut fundamento stabili fortuna maneret
et placidam possent opulenti degree vitam,
nequiquam, quoniam ad summum succedere honorem
certantes iter infestum fecere viai,
et tamen e summo, quasi fulmen, deicit ictos
invidia interdum contemptim in Tartara taetra;

Men selfishly wished to be famous and powerful,
so that their prosperity be maintained on a stable foundation,
and they in turn would lead a peaceful life because of their extra supplies;
But it was all in vain. Struggling to rise to the highest office,
they ended up making the path of their journey dangerous for themselves.
Although being on top, envy, like lightning, strikes
and scornfully cast them down into what they call, Hell.[157]

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[156] Some see Lucretius' as progressivist in that he saw the world as harsh and lacking pleasure in the beginning, but through natural progression (and the teachings of Epicurus) life got better. Others see Lucretius as a primitivist in that he saw the world past its prime and proceeding downhill. See especially commentators on Lucr. 5.988-1010. Both Gale (2003) and Campbell (2003) describe Lucretius as both primitivist and *non*-progressivist. For the earlier discussions of this dichotomy, see Beye (1963: 166) and Furley (1978: 1-27). By acknowledging that Lucretius, unlike Epicurus, struggled to incorporate Epicurus' interventionist teachings into a natural progression of history, Furley argues that the progressive vs. primitive dichotomy is irrelevant for understanding Lucretius' views; instead, he argues that Lucretius proposed a non-moral progression assessed by moral criteria drawn from hindsight. For the earliest bibliography on the subject of progressivist vs. primitivist, see Furley (1966: 1 n. 1). The current argument agrees that the question is irrelevant and offers a different binary focus: atoms vs. humans instead of past vs. present.

[157] See Lucr. 3.966 where Lucretius explains that *Tartarus* does not actually exist.

Lucr. 5.1120-1126

Here, arrogant men struggle to go beyond others in an unfair/unbalanced (*ad summum… honorem*) way, to a point where lightning strikes them, seemingly in an attempt to cosmically balance the equation.[158] The connection between this passage and the image of atoms struggling is felt especially in the use of *fundamentum* to describe the impetus for power, "so that their prosperity be maintained on a stable foundation" (1121). This word is used throughout the *DRN* in association with atoms: the hardness of atoms (1.573), the bedrock of an immortal atomic structure beneath things since nothing dissolves into nothing (2.863), the incorrect idea that the soul rests on an immortal foundation (3.586), and in a general sense, the foundation of all belief (4.506). Thus, the reader has learned that the only *fundamento stabili* is the atom, not men's *fortuna*. The use of the word, *fundamentum,* in this passage, similar to the function of *inane* in the first passage discussed above, signals to the reader a connection between humans and atoms. These *reges* struggle against one another *incorrectly*, unlike the atoms.

Other than instances associated with atoms and men, instances of struggle include tree branches when they struggle with one another to rise up from the ground (5.787), birds when they struggle with one another over food, and clouds just before a tumultuous rainstorm is produced.[159] It seems that men are not supposed to "*certare*" with each other; only atoms in their eternal collision wars, branches when they grow, birds when they eat, and clouds when it rains. This begs the question, what are men supposed to do? My last example shows that the answer to this question concerns the kind of struggle in which men should engage, one which

[158] Commentators note that lightning and envy are often related (Livy 8.31.7 and Ovid Rem. 369-370) (Bailey 1947: 1112); see also Horace 2.10.9-12 (Leonard and Smith (1942: 738). The connection between physical lightning and human psychology (envy) is another approach that could be taken in conjunction with this chapter (i.e. atomic physics' connection with human psychology and vice versa). See Konstan (1973: 1-82) for a general review of Epicurean psychology.

[159] See also, 3.779: there is no such thing as a group of immortal souls struggling over a soon to be born child.

results in an egalitarian relationship, since that relationship mirrors the balanced and equal relationship between the atoms.

In the only passage where Lucretius directly addresses his relationship with Epicurus, he describes it as a sort of struggle:

> te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc
> ficta pedum pono pressis vestigial signis,
>
> I follow you, O glory of the Greek race,
> in your deepest footprints firmly now I plant my footsteps,
>
> Lucr. 3.3-4

The following two lines can be translated in one of two ways:

> non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem
> quod te imitari aveo;
>
> I'm less desirous of struggling with you than because, on account of love,
> I long to imitate you
>
> or…
>
> It's not so much because I desire to struggle with you on account of love,
> but because I long to imitate you
>
> Lucr .3.5-6

Bailey gives each option as a possibility in his commentary, but translates using the first. The first translation above takes *quam* closely with *quod… aveo*, meaning "than." *Propter amorem* being inside the clause, "the construction is '*quam quod te propter amorem imitari aveo'* (Kenney 1971: 75). The second takes *quam* closely with *ita*, meaning "as." *Propter amorem* being outside the *quod… aveo* clause, the construction is "*non tam quod tecum certare cupio quam quod te…aveo*." The difficulty arises in part from the absence in Latin of a present participle of *esse*, which could here convey a parallel causal idea behind *cupidus* (Leonard and Smith 1941: 421), as Monro points out "*cupidus* = *quod cupio*" (1886: 178). I would like to note that *amor* and *cupidus* are used synonomously in 4.1101 and 4.1115 in the description of the two lovers having sex, trying to physically join with one another in vain. Both *amor* and *cupidus* are

negative throughout the poem. Even though most scholars translate the above passage using the first example given, so that Lucretius does not want to struggle at all with Epicurus but instead imitate him on account of love, I argue that we should take *ita… quam* as correlating, not as comparative conjunctions: Lucretius does not want to struggle with Epicurus on account of love but struggle with him because he wishes to imitate him. If I am correct, this kind imitation is the only kind of positive struggle Lucretius gives as existing between individuals; all other examples are of incorrect struggle. It provides us with a proper understanding of the reciprocating penetration model in the socio-historical context of the poem: just as atoms struggle with one another in a neverending balanced war, so too must humans find balance, in this case through imitation, with one another.

In Section 2.2, I argued that the instructions for how to interpret intertextuality within the *DRN* are given in Lucretius' explanation of atomic movement: "the way in which one text interacts and is built upon another text, is equivalent to the way in which an atom interacts and is built upon another atom." The "letters as atoms" analogy not only extends to "words as atomic compounds," but also to "letters as atomic movement and interaction." In essence, I argued that there is a direct correlation between the text and atomic physics. In a very similar way this section, through a study of "struggle," has argued that there is also a correlation between atomic physics and the historicity of the text, in terms of the way in which atoms interact with one another and humans form proper (or improper) social bonds with one another. Therefore, there is a correlation between formal (letters as atoms), philosophical (*letters*/atoms struggling), and historical (*humans*/atoms struggling) contexts.

More specifically, this section has argued that Lucretius invites us to view the egalitarian relationship between his poetic voice and addressee as functioning similarly to the relationship

between the poet and his Roman readers, thereby validating and reinforcing thematic connections made between textual phenomenon and historical commonplace. I first discussed the link between text and atoms (the letters as atoms analogy) within the *DRN*. Then, by analyzing instances of "struggle" (*certamen, certo,* and *contendo*) throughout the poem, I argued that the so-called "equal struggle between the atoms" is a metaphor for social behavior in historical Rome, and therefore the poem makes a link between atomic metaphysics and socio-historical ethics. This allows us to view the ideal relationship between Lucretius and his Roman reader as a "equal struggle between social individuals."

More broadly, this analysis allows us to view the ideal relationship that Lucretius proposes to his Roman reader as "balanced," just as he described the relationship of atoms to one another. In terms of the reciprocating penetration model between Lucretius and his readership, this type of penetration, an equally "balanced struggle," between Lucretius and his Roman reader, complements the 'alternating penetration" found between Lucretius and his addressee: balanced and alternating, each context reflects a reciprocating penetration model between Lucretius and his readership. This model is further reinforced in the next section.

Section 3.2.

Metaphysical Instructions on How to Situate Oneself within Social Space

The previous section, through a study of *certare* and its noun equivalents, revealed a correlation between atomic physics and Lucretius' historical readers. This section addresses the correlation between Epicurean philosophy in general (as presented in the *DRN*) and readers interested in that philosophy. I show that the same penetration model that is based on 'an alternating penetration between poetic voice and addressee' and a model based on 'a balanced

struggle between poet's voice and historical reader,' still applies to a model based on Lucretius and his "Epicurean reader," i.e. one that is focused on learning Epicureanism. This section looks at the conceptualization of metaphysical space and compares it with the Epicurean reader's own sense of social space. The reader is not only taught the true nature of the void, but also taught the correct way to manipulate that space, revealing a reciprocating penetration model between Lucretius and his philosophical reader in terms of the reader's "active manipulation of space." This Epicurean reader is concerned with the practicality of the work and discovers it through the reconciliation of Epicurean metaphysical space and the reader's own sense of social space; he/she is given instructions on how to think about his/her own social space.

One can compare this idea of being able to choose one's position in social space to the way in which Lucretius describes how language developed in the history of man (5.1028-1090). Language developed through non-teleological processes.[160] This means that signifiers organically developed from the needs of each and every thing that has a name; no one entity created it for others to mimic. The point seems to stem from a rebuttal against a Stoic deterministic views. Lucretius comments:

> *sentit enim vis quisque suas quoad possit abuti.*
> For everyone feels to what purpose he can use his own powers.
>
> Lucr. 5.1032-1033

In other words, even the development of language is predicated on a much larger program of non-teleological thinking and human free will: the world is the result of a series of experiential joinings and dis-joinings over time. That larger program of thought also applies to, as we will see, Lucretius' description of space. Space can be thought of as non-teleological; both language and space are in our power to construct.

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[160] Holmes (2005: 527-85) discusses language as a non-teleological process (as opposed to a process of fabrication), and argues that Lucretius meta-poetically represents that process in the *De Rerum Natura*.

The language used to describe space determines how it is conceptualized.[161] There are three words that I have isolated for further investigation: *spatium, locus,* and *regio.*[162] In the first two books, it is Lucretius' primary goal to correct his reader's false sense of space: there is an unhampered space called the "void" (*locus est intactus inane vacansque*, 1.334); there is no third substance, only matter and space, which is called "void" (*locus ac spatium, quod inane vocamus,* 1.473). The second part of understanding Lucretius' "void" is realizing that it is infinite. He offers the following scenario toward the end of book I as a way to explain the true sense of space:

> Praeterea si iam finitum constituatur
> omne quod est spatium, si quis procurrat ad oras
> ultimus extremas iaciatque volatile telum,
> id validis utrum contortum viribus ire
> quo fuerit missum mavis longeque volare,
> an prohibere aliquid censes obstareque posse?
> alterutrum fatearis enim sumasque necessest.
> quorum utrumque tibi effugium praecludit et omne
> cogit ut exempta concedas fine patere.
>
> Furthermore, if all that we call space were indeed finite,
> and someone was to run up to its boundaries,
> to its farthest ends, and throw a whistling spear,
> would you have it that that spear, hurled with might and main,
> goes on whither it is sped and flies afar, or do you think that something checks and bars its way?
> For one or the other you must needs admit and choose.
> Yet both shut off your escape and

[161] See De Jong (2012: 39-54), who discusses the relationship between literary space and historic space in the *Iliad,* particularly the space created by the famous wall on the battlefield at Troy (*Il.* 12-13-33). See also De Jong (2012: 39-53), where she discusses the prevalence of historic space in the *Homeric Hymns* in the form of cult sites. See Klooster (2012: 55-76) for the propensity for the Argonauts to alter and re-order the historic landscape in the *Argonautica.* Rood (2012: 121-159) discusses the correlation between power and the knowledge of geographic/historic space in Herodotus and Thucydides. Rehm (2012: 307-324) discusses the mechanism behind Aeschylus' transformation of mythological to historic space in the *Oresteia.* Similar can be found in the scholarship on Plato's *Phaedrus* (the city, not places and trees, teach Socrates, Catullus' poems (historic Rome invades lyric space) and Martial's poems (cramped space). For an introduction to the study of space in the ancient world, see Broder (2010: 827-837). In particular, there is a focus in scholarship on the so-called "Peutinger Map." For a study on how this map has generated much interest in the Roman conception of space, see Talbert (2010).

[162] For the most part Lucretius does not create any special distinction between each one. *Spatium* is at times used temporally, e.g. the *simulacra* are formed in a very short amount of time (*brevi spatio*) (4.149) and over time (*longo spatio*) drops of water wear away a stone (4.1285).[162] However, I focus on how these three words (*spatium*, *locus*, and *regio*) are used *spatially*. For the relationship between time and space (time being epiphenomenal on space), see Hardie (1986).

> constrain you to grant that the universe spreads out free from limit.
>
> Lucr. 1.968-976

Lucretius explains that even if the dart hits a barrier, evidently proving that the universe is finite, inherent in the situation of a "barrier," there is the implication that there is something beyond that barrier to which the dart was supposed to have flown. The proof thus states that there exists void and the size of it is infinite (*exempta…fine*).[163] This fundamental spatial principle is the basis for all that follows.

Coupled with this "metaphysical" view of space as the "void" is its textual equivalent. Three times Lucretius uses the phrase, *inde* loci, meaning "next" (5.443, 741, 791) as a rhetorical "sign-post." This rhetorical use of the locative in the context of a poem defining space and location, invites us to view the text as a microcosm for metaphysical space.[164] This is further substantiated in another one of Lucretius' "sign-posts" that he uses before explaining downward motion:

> Nunc locus est, ut opinor, in his illud quoque rebus
> confirmare tibi, nullam rem posse sua vi
> corporeum sursum ferri sursumque meare.
>
> Now is the place in this work, I suppose, to prove this also to you,
> that no bodily thing can of its own volition
> be carried upward or move in that direction.
>
> Lucr. 2.184-186

The word "*locus*" is used here in terms of rhetorical space. The same word is used for philosophical space, as shown above. This synchronizes the space of the text and the space with

[163] Somewhat contradictory, the space of the sea is infinite (1.1002) (6.620-22) and the space our world is infinite (2.1044, 53). Both statements suggest that the idea of infinity is not always used literally, but at times hyperbolically. Where Bailey considers these sorts of contradictions troublesome (see especially his discussion of the magnet), I consider each in their own context.

[164] See Kennedy (2000: 376-396) for challenge that Lucretius faces in attempting to write a theory of everything within a finite poem.

which the philosophical reader is concerned. It invites us to connect formal and philosophical frames through the language of "space."[165]

Moreover, another example of Lucretius referring to space is in the proems to books I, IV, and VI. In the first two he famously places himself in the Hellenistic literary tradition in terms of going through paths not yet trodden (*avia Pieridum peragro* loca *nullius ante / trita solo* (1.926-7 and 4.1-2). The language that Lucretius uses to define metaphysical space and textual "literary" space is identical. We are invited to think about space in terms of both metaphysical void and rhetorical text.

But what are actual spaces like in the *DRN*? What is at stake when there is movement in social space? Is space always defined and stable? Most importantly, what is the Epicurean reader's relationship with space? And more broadly, how does the conceptualization of space between Lucretius and his Epicurean reader add to our understanding of the relationship between Lucretius and his readership as a whole? In general, what is the connection between the philosophical education of the Epicurean reader and the general experience of the Roman social reader?

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[165] This connection between rhetorical space and action space is further substantiated by the pseudo-Cieronian rhetorical handbook, *Ad Herennium.* As analyzed by Yates (1966: 1-26), the correct procedure for memorizing large complex amounts of information is as follows: Go into a quiet place and map out in your mind all the different parts (*loci*) of that place. Whatever you are trying to memorize, take image-objects (*simulacra*) from it and place them consecutively in the various *loci* throughout the real/imagined place. When recalling what it is you are memorizing, invoke the image where you have assigned its *simulacra* at its respective *loci.* You will easily be able to move in whichever direction you please from *locus* to *locus.* Two examples are given: 1) a good friend of yours lies in bed; he is very sick and holds frog testicles in one hand and wax tablets in the other. This is an image for remembering a lawyer who is recalling his client's legal situation. It allows him to remember that his client is accused of killing a man with poison, that there were witnesses (*testes* means both testicles and witnesses), and there was an inheritance at stake (it was written on the wax tablet). 2) In order to memorize "iam domum itionem reges Atrides parant" imagine a) a bloody Plebean named Domitius raising his hands to heaven while he is lashed by the patrician Marcii Reges, remembered by the phrase "Domitius-Reges," which sounds like "iam domum intionem reges." Also, imagine b) two famous tragic actors are backstage putting on their Agamemnon-Menalaus costumes. This helps you remember "Atrides parant," in sound but in the action of the content. This memorization technique discussed in a contemporary rhetorical handbook reinforces the plausibility of connections made between rhetorical space and actual space in the *DRN.*

We find that actual space, i.e. space not in the abstract (infinite void) but in terms that refer to actual physical places, occurs in the *DRN* as a large area usually defined by two distinct points. We see sheep at a distance (2.316f), a torch race at a distance (2.78f), military legions at a distance (2.323f); and the Nile rises at a distance far inland at the time of mid-day (6.723f). Actual space is described as not only "distant" but also desolate. This includes deserted space where some incorrectly think is the haunt of fauns, as their voices echo loudly throughout (4.580-594, esp. 577, 580, 591); desolate woods where music was first learned from natural sounds (5.1387); and in the rhetorical question, why would gods strike their thunderbolts in desolate places (6.396) and lofty spots (6.421)? In none of these examples is space constrained or cramped, trespassed or transgressed.[166] Space, as described above in terms of infinite void, is thus complemented by distant and desolate expanse. There is ample room for movement and manipulation on the part of the reader.

Another type of actual space, besides those that are distant and desolate, are places that some think religious or magical, but in actuality are not so. One such instance is the discussion of the *magna mater* in book II.[167] Lucretius describes how the goddess is carried throughout the streets suspended in the air, symbolizing how the earth independently floats in the universe (2.600-650). He then takes this image of the *magna mater* procession and redefines its meaning. Another instance where he does this is in his introduction to Empedocles. Here he describes Empedocles' home of Acragas as exceedingly magical and wonderful (*quae cum magna modis*

[166] See Rimell (2008: 19-50) for space in the epigrams of Martial and the satires of Juvenal as cramped and full of trespassed boundaries.

[167] For a discussion of the *magna mater* found in Pompeii, see Clark (2003: 73-94) who provides evidence for the presence and widespread awareness of this cult in the 1st century.

multis miranda videtur / gentibus humanis <u>*regio*</u> *visendaque fertur*, 1.726-7), but ultimately eclipsed by the philosopher himself. Thus, the space is redefined and debunked.[168]

So far we have conceptualized space in the *DRN* in terms of infinite void, distant, desolate, free and clear, non-trespassed, and critically redefined. Lucretius' world is an expansive, maneuverable, tactile space that also elicits debate and discussion. This space is also ideally stable throughout the poem. For example, where the world is located is very stable. The earth rests easily in the middle of the universe like a head on a body (5.534-533 esp. 534). All things move downward (1.1062f and 2.184ff where this is explained in more detail), which keeps us stabilized on the ground. The earth is stable. We are not moving or floating. Space is ideally in a grounded state.[169] It is the density of the world that allows it to be stable. Space contains constantly moving atoms bouncing off one another, forming interval spaces specific to each bounce encounter (2.92, 99). There is also a perfect mixture of matter and space in our world. This is exemplified by the sun's rays during the sunrise, not moving through empty space, but through a pleasant mixture of matter and void (144ff, esp. 156f). Also, thought occurs because there are an infinite number of *simulacra* traveling in the world, to which the mind can call its attention at any time (4.722-822, esp. 786 and 798). The earth is not a solid; it consists properly of just the right amount of mixture of invisible elements.

If readers should act like atoms, which I have argued Lucretius suggests they do in the previous section, the question in this section remains, "What should the reader be doing in this wide open space, in which Lucretius stresses not only the importance of its stability but also its manipulability?" Using the following examples taken from books II through VI, I argue that the

[168] Other examples include strange places commonly thought to have magical powers: Avernian places (6.738-839 esp. 6.738, 742, 745, 747, 755, 756, 818, 820, 823, 832, 833). Also, religious rites are performed in particular places (in vain) (5.1161-1240 esp. 1164).

[169] The exception that proves the rule is the world during an unstable apocalyptic period.

readers should be finding the right space, the sweet spot so to speak, in the pleasant mixture of atoms and void that make up our world. It is not about internal feelings but about external positioning. We do this in order to fully experience Epicurean pleasure.

Firstly on an atomic level, Lucretius says that atoms are not sentient, i.e. they do not feel. Instead, it is their position in space that matters. After atoms have been disturbed, they move back to their proper space and pleasure results:

> Praeterea, quoniam dolor est, ubi materiai
> corpora vi quadam per viscera viva per artus
> sollicitata suis trepidant in sedibus intus,
> inque locum quando remigrant, fit blanda voluptas,
> scire licet nullo primordia posse dolore
> temptari nullamque voluptatem capere ex se;
>
> Moreover, since pain is experienced when bodies of matter,
> -after being disturbed by some external force throughout one's soft fleshy parts and limbs-
> tremble out of place within their particular home in the body,
> and then, when they settle back in their proper place, comforting pleasure comes to pass.
> You may now realize that the atoms themselves cannot be worried by any pain,
> and can find no pleasure in and of themselves.
>
> Lucr. 2.963-968

The point is that atoms themselves are not sentient. They feel no pain or pleasure. It is their position in space that matters. In the next example, Lucretius hopes that his readers will be content with their space:

> Si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur
> pondus inesse animo, quod se gravitate fatiget,
> e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde
> tanta mali tam quam moles in pectore constet,
> haut ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus
> quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper,
> commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit.
>
> If only men, to the degree that they feel
> a weight in their mind, with which they wear themselves down,
> could learn too from what cause that weightiness comes to be, and whence
> so great a burden of pain comes to lie upon their breast,
> only then they would not spend their lives, as now for the most part we see them,
> not knowing what each one of them wants, and forever seeking
> a change of place, as though he could thus lay aside the burden.
>
> Lucr. 3.1053-1059

Again, space is a critical aspect of Epicurean pleasure. In this context, he criticizes those that interact with space incorrectly, thinking that space alone allows for freedom from pain. On a more personal level, the next example occurs at the end of book IV. Lucretius describes the best way to have sex so that the semen can go to the proper place:

> et quibus ipsa modis tractetur blanda voluptas.
> id quoque permagni refert; nam more ferarum
> quadrupedumque magis ritu plerumque putantur
> concipere uxores, quia sic loca sumere possunt
> pectoribus positis sublatis semina lumbis.
>
> And in what way even the enticing act of love is performed,
> that too is of great importance; since for the most part
> it is thought that wives become pregnant particularly when they mimic behavior of wild beasts
> and move in the manner of quadrupeds, because the seeds can thus take up their position
> when the breast is below and the loins are raised.
>
> Lucr. 4.1263-1267

Proper spatial awareness is critical for the reproduction of human life. It is also true for life's first beginnings on earth when, in a suitable spot, the earth first produced *mortalia*:

> tum tibi terra dedit primum mortalia saecla.
> multus enim calor atque umor superabat in arvis.
> hoc ubi quaeque loci regio opportuna dabatur,
> crescebant uteri terram radicibus apti;
>
> Then it was then that the earth first gave birth to the race of animals.
> For much heat and moisture abounded then in the fields,
> thereby, wherever a suitable spot or place was afforded,
> there grew up wombs, clinging to the earth by their roots.
>
> Lucr. 5.807-810

Positioning is not only a key element for the obtaining of pleasure as we saw in the first two examples, it is also a key component in basic building blocks of life, as we have seen in the last two examples. Finally, there is an example from book VI. In the middle of the sea, sometimes, a fresh spring bubbles up, becoming a welcome spot for sailors:

> quod genus endo marist Aradi fons, dulcis aquai
> qui scatit et salsas circum se dimovet undas;
> et multis aliis praebet regionibus aequor
> utilitatem opportunam sitientibus nautis,
> quod dulcis inter salsas intervomit undas.
>
> Even as there is a certain kind of spring located within the saltwater sea of Aradus,
> which bubbles up with fresh water and divides the saltwater all around it;

and in many other spots too the salty sea affords
a advantageous opportunity for thirsty sailors,
because amid the saltwater it spews out fresh water.

Lucr. 6.890-894

In this last example, there are spaces of fresh water within the infinite expanse of sea. In the context of the conceptualization of space, this symbolizes the notion that space is determinant for Epicurean pleasures, a welcome spot for us thirsty sailors.

Thus, in Lucretius' vast universe – distant, desolate, and possessing a mixture of things moving all over the place – there is the sense that space is defined, and there is a push toward stability. But, how do we as humans actually position ourselves in space? What is the reader to do? Lucretius describes the answer to this question as an exertion of one's free will through a manipulation of space. In his famous description of the swerve where he describes the reader's capacity to exhibit volition, i.e. possess free will,[170] he employs the language of space in his poetry. The swerve is described in the following passages. Note the language of space:

Illud in his quoque te rebus cognoscere avemus,
corpora cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur
ponderibus propriis, incerto tempore ferme
incertisque locis spatio **depellere** paulum,
tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis.

When the first bodies are being carried downwards
straight through the void
by their own weight, at times quite undetermined
and at undetermined spots they **swerve** a little from their path:
yet only just so much as you could call a change of trend.

Lucr. 2.217-220

Even though that it is unclear at this point whether the unexpected swerve (*depellere,* 2.220) is a product of human free will or not, Lucretius makes it very clear that the mechanism which allows this process to occur is a manipulation of space (*locis spatio*, 2.220). The question of free will is then taken up 30 lines later:

libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat,

[170] While there has been considerable debate on the correlation between the swerve and free will, this study assumes that the correlation exists.

unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas,
per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluptas,
declinamus item motus nec tempore certo
nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens?

Whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth,
whence, I ask, is it wrested from fate,
this will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us,
and **swerve** likewise in our motions neither at determined times
nor in a determined region of place, but just where our mind has carried us?

Lucr .2.256-60

Here again, even though it is unclear at this point *how* the unexpected swerve (*declinamus,* 2.259) is a product of human free will, Lucretius makes it clear that the key mechanism is a manipulation of space (*regione loci,* 2.260).

…sed ne res ipsa necessum
intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis
et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,
id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum
nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo.

But that the very mind feels not some necessity within
in doing all things,
and is not constrained like a conquered thing to bear and suffer,
this is brought about by the tiny swerve of the first-beginnings
in no determined region of place and at no determined time.

Lucr. 2.289-293

Lucretius reiterates his focus not on *how* the swerve functions, but *where* it functions in space. Thus, it is the slight movement of space that defines free will. Coupled with the analysis at the beginning of this section, we can conclude that this movement occurs in a space that is expansive and dense with a mixture of invisible moving particles. These particles move through space and their positive position determines pleasure. This position is relative. What matters is the reader's manipulation of space by means of the swerve. This conceptualization of space is nowhere more significant than in the last few lines of the work. Here, Lucretius' famous plague is depicted as a corruption of space:[171]

[171] The plague has been interpreted in a number of ways. Commager (1957: 105-118) points out what is a physical narrative in Thucydides is a moral issue in Lucretius: physical ills are described with psychological vocabulary, clinical phenomenon as emotionally motivated actions, and medical data as ethical commentary. He concludes that the plague is a metaphor for the life that Lucretius warns against, yet limits his conclusion by stating, "Only an

omnia conplebant **loca** tectaque quo magis aestu,
confertos ita acervatim mors accumulabat.
multa siti prostrata viam per proque volute
corpora silanos ad aquarum strata iacebant
interclusa anima nimia ab dulcedine aquarum,
multaque per populi passim **loca** prompta viasque
languida semanimo cum corpore membra videres
horrida paedore et pannis cooperta perire,
corporis inluvie, pelli super ossibus una,
ulceribus taetris prope iam sordeque sepulta.
omnia denique sancta deum delubra replerat
corporibus mors exanimis onerataque passim
cuncta cadaveribus caelestum templa manebant,hospitibus
loca quae complerant aedituentes.

They would fill all places, all houses; and so all the more, packed in stifling heat, death piled them up in heaps. Many bodies, laid low by thirst and rolling forward through the streets, lay strewn at the fountains of water, the breath of life shut off from them by the exceeding delight of the water, and many in full view throughout the public places and the streets you might have seen, their limbs drooping on their half-dead body, filthy with stench and covered with rags, dying through the foulness of their body, only skin on bones, wellnigh buried already in noisome ulcers and dirt. Again, death had filled all the sacred shrines of the gods with lifeless bodies, and all the temples of the heavenly ones remained everywhere cumbered with carcasses; for those places the guardians had filled with guests.

Lucr. 6.1262-1275 trans. Bailey

Diseased bodies lie on top of one another. All places are cramped with their boundaries being crossed. This is a stark contrast to the positive space we have seen throughout this section. However, the reader has learned that space and one's position in that space is critical to the poem's ultimate message: achieving a state of pleasure by freeing oneself from pain. The reader ultimately achieves this pleasure through an active manipulation of space to avoid such painful and diseased places.

incorrigibly symbolic imagination appears to be at work, not a calculated mental effort: there is nothing approaching the definitive austerity of an allegory" (118). P. Fowler (1997: 112-118) pushes his conclusion further by arguing that not only is the plague a symbol for life, but also represents a culminating "test" (117) for the Epicurean learner to see whether or not he has learned how to manage and react to such disturbing atrocity; to "write his own ending." Sedley (1998: 160-165) disagrees and asks, "But where have we been taught how to remain happy through severe and even terminal physical suffering?" (162). See also Müller (1978: 197-221) for a comparison of all six endings of each book. In this light the plague is simply like all other endings with Lucretius' books: "a confrontation between the truth discovered in the book and the customary ignorance of man" (197). For a summary of both minor and major divergences from Thucydides, see Bright (1971: 607-632). For a discussion of Lucretius' Epicurean revision of Thucydides' plague narrative, see Foster (2009: 367-399).

If I am correct in arguing that the philosophical reader, i.e. one who is learning Epicureanism, is encouraged to and taught how to actively position himself in familiar space, the question remains whether actual historical space is ever described not in philosophical terms, as has been alluded in this chapter, but in actual social terms. First, how would one define a social space in the text? Is it a description of a place with the potential to be a full of people? or must this description of space already have people in it? more than two persons or does one count? Do these people have to be interacting? I define descriptions of social space as space in which social activity occurs, activity which includes the presence of social bonds. Second, if the views in this chapter are correct, these social spaces must be subject to Lucretius' "instructions for self-positioning," as described above. The following survey of social bonds shows this to be the case.

First, the human bond of love is given much attention in book IV. Lucretius makes it very clear that only humans can cause human seed to rise up (no bestiality).

> namque alias aliud res commovet atque lacessit;
> ex homine humanum semen ciet una hominis vis.
>
> For one cause moves and rouses one thin, a different cause another;
> from man only the influence of another human stirs its own seed.
>
> Lucr. 4.1039-1040

Moreover, in book V, Lucretius makes it a point that the semen of men and horses (*veterino semine equorum*) cannot mix to create a centaurs. This impossibility is also mentioned at 2.922. Women are noted to be attracted sexually to men as well. Lucretius says a woman does not *always* fake organism; sometimes she enjoys it (*nec mulier semper ficto suspirat amore*, 4.1192). Men can be attracted to boys or women:

> sic igitur Veneris qui telis accipit ictus,
> sive puer membris muliebribus hunc iaculatur
> seu mulier toto iactans e corpore amorem,
> unde feritur, eo tendit gestitque coire
> et iacere umorem in corpus de corpore ductum.

> Thus, then, he who receives a blow from the darts of Venus,
> be it a boy with girlish limbs who smites him,
> or a woman darting love from all her frame,
> inclines to that whereby he is smitten and strives to join with it
> and cast forth the moisture drawn from one body into the other.
>
> Lucr. 4.1052-1056

The "self-positioning" of the reader in relation to love is one where he is taught where to position his *semen*: towards the object that causes it to stir. Lucretius, not only speaks of lustful attraction, but also refers to a man's wife and children. This bond is highlighted at death. Lucretius reminds us, we will no longer come home to our wife and kids.

> iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta, neque uxor
> optima nec dulces occurrent oscula nati
> praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent.
>
> Now no more shall they glad home welcome thee,
> nor thy good wife and sweet children run up to snatch the first kisses,
> and touch thy heart with a silent thrill of joy.
>
> Lucr. 3.894-896

The self-positioning that is implied here is positioning oneself in the act of coming home to family. This positioning is thought of as ideal. Also, man's unhappy bond with the seers is addressed throughout:

> et merito. nam si certam finem esse viderent
> aerumnarum homines, aliqua ratione valerent
> religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum.
>
> And justly so: for if men could see that there is a fixed limit
> to their sorrows, then with some reason they might have the strength to stand against
> the scruples of religion, and the threats of the seers.
>
> Lucr. 1.106-109

Here, Lucretius exhorts the reader literally to stand up against (*obsistere*) seers, to position themselves physically in front of them. The bond of a mother and her child is also mentioned. As a way of explaining how a mother knows her own child like no other, Lucretius gives the following analogy of a doe, bereft of her baby deer-child:

> at mater viridis saltus orbata peragrans
> quaerit humi pedibus vestigial pressa bisulcis,
> omnia convisens oculis loca si queat usquam

conspicere amissum fetum, completque querellis
frondiferum nemus adsistens et crebra revisit
…
nec vitulorum aliae species per pabula laeta
derivare queunt animum curaque levare:
usque adeo quiddam proprium notumque requirit.

But the mother bereft wanders over the green glades
and seeks on the ground for the footprints marked by those cloven hoofs,
scanning every spot with her eyes,
if only she might anywhere catch sight of her lost young,
and stopping fills the leafy grove with her lament
…
nor yet can the shapes of other calves among the glad pastures
turn her mind to new thoughts or ease it of its care:
so eagerly does she seek in vain for something she knows as her own.

Lucr. 2.355-358 and 364-366

Here, Lucretius describes the bond between mother and child as one of unity. The positioning that separates is to be avoided. Lucretius also discusses how men often break the bond of friendship with other men because they want to avoid death.[172]

hunc vexare pudorem, hunc vincula amicitiai
rumpere et in summa pietatem evertere suadet.
nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis
prodiderunt, vitare Acherusia temple petentes.

[Fear] persuades one man to besmirch his honor, another to burst the bonds of friendship
and in fine to overthrow his natural ties.
For often ere now men have betrayed country and beloved parents,
seeking to shun the realms of Acheron.

Lucr. 3.83-86

[172] This history of the world and of man (5.783-end) includes also social places as evidenced by social bonds. In regard to social bonds in the early times, at first there were none. At first they had no communal bonds (nec commune bonum, 5.958-9), customs, or laws between one another (neque ullis moribus…nec legibus uti, 5.958-9). Their only household guests were wild boars coming to ravage their homes (hospitibus saevis, 5.987). Men and women then got married (et mulier coniuncta viro concessit in unum, 5.1012) and then began to soften (mollescere). Utilitarian friendship then began to form between neighbors (amicitiem coeperunt iungere… finitimi, 5.1019-20). After languages developed through natural processes (5.1029-1090), certain men started to get smarter (ingenio qui praestabant, 5.1107) because they stood out among the rest. These men were called kings (reges, 5.1109), but were quickly put to death. Replacing these men were magistrates, laws, and ordinances. The timelines becomes somewhat disrupted at this point. Religion spreads, uses for metals were discovered, wars became frequent, yet poetry and the arts flourished during these times. One is tempted to interpret these wars as subtly referring to Lucretius' own time. However, there is no sense of "now" in this section. It is all nostalgic.

This bond again is discussed in terms of how the reader should position him/herself in relation to friends and Acheron. Most tellingly, Lucretius describes how men often try to flee themselves:

> exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille,
> esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque <revertit>,
> quipped foris nilo melius qui sentiat esse.
> …
> hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit,
> effugere haud potis est, ingratis haeret et odit
>
> The man who is tired of staying at home,
> often goes out abroad from his great mansion, and of a sudden returns again,
> for indeed abroad he feels no better
> …
> In this way each man struggles to flee from himself: yet, despite his will he clings to the self,
> which, we may be sure, in fact he cannot escape, and hates himself.
>
> Lucr. 3.1060-1062 and 1068-1069

Actual social space in the *DRN* is described in a way that couches it in terms of a specific balance of self-positioning between social bonds. Whether it is lustful love, conjugal love, parental love, brotherly love, or one's bond with oneself, the instructions for the bond are given in terms of a particular positioning in relation to each.

This section has argued that the concept of metaphysical space (philosophy) and the Roman reader's sense of social space (historicism) are encouraged to be thought of as one and the same. By analyzing overt references to "space" (*spatium, locus, and regio*), I have shown that the poem encourages the Epicurean reader to view metaphysical and social space not only as ontologically but causally related; the reader is not only taught the true nature of space, i.e. void, but also taught the correct way to position oneself within that space. Several specific examples of social bonds directly referred to in the poem have been interpreted accordingly. The conclusion reinforces that a reciprocating penetration model exists between Lucretius and his philosophical reader in terms of that reader's "active manipulation of space."

Conclusion

This chapter has reinforced the argument set forth in the first two chapters of this dissertation, namely that the relationship between Lucretius' poetic voice and his readership, in terms of the extent to which each member of that relationship actively participates in formal, philosophical, and historical contexts, represents a reciprocating version of the penetration model discussed in the introduction to this chapter. The poem's poetic voice in the first two chapters was shown to manifest itself by means of the conventions of the didactic genre, the façade of random atomic intertextuality, and the literary device called "internal dialectic," with the result that an egalitarian relationship with the readership is formed. That same relationship was found to exist, in different terms, between the poem's historic voice (the poet's voice) and the Roman reader as well as the poem's philosophical voice and the Epicurean reader. These two readers (Roman and Epicurean) are different from the poem's addressee in that they live in an actual world rather than existing as simply a textual phenomenon.

In essence, the relationship between Lucretius and his readership reflects a reciprocating penetration model in terms of its formal, historical, and philosophical contexts. Formally, Lucretius's poetic voice and his addressee fit this model through "alternating penetration;" historically, Lucretius' poet's voice and his historical reader fit it through "a balanced struggle;" and philosophically, Lucretius and his Epicurean reader through the reader's instructions on how to actively "self-position" oneself in metaphysical space. Thus, using a reciprocating modification of the penetration model as a means to simultaneously read the active participation of each of the poem's many readers reveals an overall egalitarian relationship between Lucretius and his readership. That relationship, which is defined in formal, historical, and philosophical

terms,[173] between Lucretius and his readership, will now be analyzed within the last argumentative section of the poem.

[173] For these terms, see Chart 3.2 above. See also Hinds (2010: 203-369-388) for a further description of formalism and historicism in Classics. See Gallagher and Greenblatt (2000) for "New Historicism" and for a specific example see Kennedy (1993) who writes, "The real issue confronting any cultural historian of antiquity, and any critic of contemporary culture, is, first of all, how to recover the terms in which the experiences of individuals belonging to past societies were actually constituted and, second, how to measure and assess the differences between those terms and the ones we currently employ" (40).

Chapter Four

The Magnetic Relationship between Lucretius and his Readership

> *For as soon as [Epicurean] reasoning, springing from my godlike soul, begins to proclaim aloud the nature of things, the terrors of the mind fly away, the walls of the world part asunder, I see things moving through the void. The majesty of the gods is revealed, as well as their peaceful abodes.*
> -Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* 3.14-18

The first three chapters of this dissertation focused on "poetic voice" and "readership" in the *De Rerum Natura.* Chapters one and two determined that the function of poetic voice in Lucretius' didactic poem is to communicate instructions for understanding the relationship between Lucretius and the internal addressee. More specifically, it was shown that this function makes use of the conventions associated with the poem's genre, its allusions to other works (intertextuality), and various other literary strategies, to manipulate content and form in a way that instruct the internal addressee to participate actively in his reading of the poem. Chapter three then explored the effect of poetic voice on other readers, – jointly termed "readership" – namely the historical and philosophical readers who were identified by reading the poem from Roman and Epicurean positions. In order to study these three positions (formal, historical, and philosophical) concurrently, chapter three used the penetration model of Roman society, considering the active participation of the poem's readership in terms of that model. It was shown that poetic voice instructs all of the poem's readers – its "readership" – to actively participate from their respective positions. Moreover, it was determined that the poem's readership is consistently instructed to actively participate in a reciprocating modification of that model, reinforcing what was termed an overall "egalitarian" relationship between Lucretius and his readership. The current chapter continues to investigate that egalitarian relationship. It does so by exploring the way in which that relationship presents itself in the last argumentative

section of the poem, namely the explanation of a magnet's seemingly unexplainable attractive forces.

Introduction

Magnets in Lucretius

As anticipated above, this chapter focuses on the creation of an egalitarian relationship between Lucretius and his readership in the *DRN*. Specifically, this section examines that relationship as it occurs in the *DRN*'s explanation of a magnet's attractive properties (6.906-1089). It determines that the function of poetic voice in this passage is to communicate instructions for understanding the relationship between Lucretius and his readership as one in which there is "mutual attraction," just as magnets are mutually attracted to one another (*mutua contra*, 6.1984).[174] More specifically, Section 4.1 shows that in order to communicate those instructions, first, poetic voice makes use of the poem's generic conventions by associating content and form through various literary devices;[175] second, poetic voice makes use of intertextuality by associating magnetic properties with human behavior; and lastly, poetic voice makes use of *intra*textuality, which further associates magnetic properties with human behavior.[176] Through literary devices, intertextuality, and intratextuality, the poem's poetic voice instructs the readership to behave in a way that is equivalent to that of a magnet's active pull toward iron, a process which, in the context of didactic poetry, forms an egalitarian

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[174] There is debate whether the ancients understood the pull between a magnet and a piece of iron as a "mutual pull" towards one another or as a "one-way pull" from the magnet only. See Wallace (1996: 178-179). It will become clear in the following close reading of Lucretius' explanation of the magnet, that the pull is mutual in the *De Rerum Natura.*

[175] "Content" refers to the explanation of the magnet and "form" refers to the way in which that content is presented in the form of didactic poetry. The correlation between content and form is an artifact of Lucretius' poetic voice.

[176] The term, intratextuality, refers to the relationships *within* a text. See the introduction to Sharrock and Morales (2000) for a complete overview.

relationship between teacher and student. The conclusion to this study discusses the egalitarian relationship between Lucretius and his readership and then suggests further study of this relationship in terms of its significance for understanding the Roman bond of friendship.

Section 4.1.

Poetic Voice and Readership in the Magnet Explanation

The *De Rerum Natura* ends with a materialistic explanation of the magnet's attractive properties.[177] The reader has learned much at this point in the poem: the nature of atoms, their movements through the void, their collisions with other atoms, and their ability to congregate with one another. The reader has also learned the slow process of world-creation through atomic collisions over time, the role of humans as mortal participants in the cosmic scheme, and the inevitability of death by dissolution into lifeless atomic parts. This reader has also learned the mechanics of vision, smell, touch, sound, as well as well as the realities of love, the pointlessness of fear, and the dangers of erotic ecstasy. After the reader has learned the nature of all these things, the *De Rerum Natura* culminates in the materialistic explanation of the magnet, a seemingly trivial point in light of the preceding philosophical program.

[177] The magnet explanation is the last *argumentative* section of the *DRN*. Following this explanation, Lucretius discusses pestilences and the plague in Athens as an epilogue. The explanation of the magnet is Lucretius' final argumentative section of the poem before the final discussion the plague, and is therefore a relevant passage around which to establish a case study concerning poetic voice. For the importance of "endings" in Classical works, see Roberts and D. Fowler (eds.) (1997), esp. P. Fowler's (1997: 112-138) influential article on Lucretian conclusions, in which she argues that the lack of moral closure in the plague passage at the end of book VI serves as a test to the reader, "laying the burden of resolution on the internal reader, the Epicurean convert" (137). The current study argues that a similar test is presented to the reader by the poem's poetic voice. This "test" occurs in the last *argumentative* section of the poem, the explanation of the magnet. See note 171 above for bibliography on the plague in Lucretius.

Perhaps not surprisingly, little scholarship has been written on Lucretius' explanation of the magnet and its attractive properties.[178] No one has yet to posit a reason why Lucretius would feature it so prominently at the end of his didactic poem. Why is it that a poem, whose ostensible purpose is to free mankind from the fear associated with religious superstition, comes to a climax with the inner workings of such a strange phenomenon as iron moving on its own accord toward a piece of rock (*lapis hic ut ferrum ducere possit*, 6.907) mined from a particular part of the world known as "Magnesia"? The easy answer is that the magnet is the most mystifying natural phenomenon, which in turn causes the most fear due to the wonder it makes men feel (*hunc homines lapidem mirantur*, 6.910), and therefore is apropos at the end of book VI, a book which offers materialistic explanations for lightning, noxious springs, and the like. Was it that the magnet was more feared and harder to explain with materialism than anything else in the 1st century BCE, and thus suitable as the culminating piece?

A better interpretation is needed that accounts for its prominent position in the unified *DRN*. First, I argue that Lucretius' poetic voice in this passage, through various literary devices associated with the conventions of poetry, instructs the reader to associate form with content. This instruction to associate form with content anticipates an active addressee of the poem. Second, I then argue that Lucretius' poetic voice, through intertextuality, instructs the historical reader to consider the magnet explanation as a metaphor for human behavior, namely inspiration and mutual attraction. This instruction anticipates an active historical reader of the poem. Thirdly, I argue that Lucretius' poetic voice, through *intra*textuality, i.e. associating meaning in one part of the text with meaning in another part of the same text, instructs the philosophical

[178] See Wallace (1996: 178-189) for a survey of magnet passages in ancient literature. Most attestations of magnets in ancient literature appear in scientific contexts, e.g. Pliny's *Naturalis Historia*, 34.42 or in rhetorical contexts as an *argumentum a fortiori,* e.g. Cicero's *Divinatione* 1.40.86 (182). There are three instances in which the magnet is used as a metaphor (183): Plato's *Ion* 533d, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon* 1.17, and an epigram by an unknown author in the *Palatine Anthology* (12.152). These instances will be discussed below.

reader (the "Epicurean student") also to consider the magnet's property of attraction as a metaphor for human behavior, namely love. Thus, in the explanation of the magnet, poetic voice, making use of generic conventions, intertextuality and intratextuality, instructs the poem's readership in formal, historical, and philosophical terms, to participate actively from their respective positions.

To begin, there are four main preliminary principles from the first five books of the *DRN* with which one must be familiar in order to understand the atomic mechanics of magnets:[179] effluences (4.217-29), the mixture of atoms and void in all things (1.329-69), the relativity of effects caused by effluences (4.469-78), and the mechanics of sense perception through different pore shapes (4.643-72).[180] Lucretius reviews these principles in the lines leading up to the explanation of the magnet. He says his review of principles is necessary and tells his reader that he must approach this explanation (*rationem,* 6.918) of the magnet "in exceedingly long, roundabout ways" (*et nimium longis ambagibus est adeundum,* 6.6.919). These preliminary principles are reviewed in lines 6.921-997, and occur just prior to the magnet explanation. I consider these lines as part of the explanation as a whole, and I suggest that the use of the word *ambages* invites further interpretation of the passage than a surface reading allows.

The first preliminary principle one must grasp is the theory of effluences, which states that atoms stream from all things in a constant flow of copied images of the thing itself. Note the use of polypoton, periphrasis, and asyndeton:

> usque adeo omnibus ab <u>rebus res</u> quaeque <u>fluenter</u>

[179] The importance of this passage is further substantiated by this review of philosophical principles, almost as if it were the start of a new book, or perhaps a final test.

[180] The understanding of each of these principles also relies on the understanding of the general atomic principles of atoms, Lucr. 1.146-482; the solidity, eternity, and indivisibility of atoms, Lucr. 1.483-634; the composition of the universe as a mixture of atoms and void, *Lucr.* 1.951-1113; atomic motion within the universe, *Lucr.* 2.62-332; atomic shape, *Lucr.* 333-729; and other atomic properties, *Lucr.* 2.730-1022. This confirms that the magnet

> fertur et in cunctas dimittitur undique partis
> nec mora nec requies interdatur ulla fluendi,
> perpetuo quoniam sentimus et omnia semper
> cernere odorari licet et sentire sonare.
>
> So true it is that from all things each [image of that] thing fluidly is carried forth,
> and disperses in every direction around;
> There is no delay, no rest to interrupt the flow,
> Since we constantly feel it, and we can at all times
> see all things, smell them, and perceive their sound.
>
> Lucr. 6.931-935

Godwin (1986: ad loc) notes that, "the polyptoton of *rebus res* is deliberate, to show the little *res* peeling off the whole *res*." The idea is that the word *res* is itself and an effluence of *rebus*. The internal, formal reader is invited to associate form with content. Godwin (1986: ad loc) also notes that the periphrasis, "*fluenter fertur*,"[181] despite the line break between these two words, conveys, "the graceful stream of *simulacra.*" Again, form reflects content in that the periphrasis describes visually the even dispersal of the effluences in all directions (*dimittitur undique*). And finally, Godwin (1986: ad loc) also notes the asyndeton in line 6.935 highlights the simultaneity of all the senses (*cernere, odorai…sentire, sonare*). Form reflects content in this case through the rapid repetition of infinitives highlighting the rapid succession of effluences all at once striking the senses. Thus, in the first preliminary discussion before explaining magnets, Lucretius' poetic voice, making use of poetic devices (polyptoton, periphrasis, and asyndeton), instructs the reader to associate form, the intricate structure of hexameter poetry, with content, his explanation of the magnet. This instruction to associate form with content anticipates an active formal reader of the poem.

Poetic voice also instructs the addressee to make the same association of content and form in Lucretius' second preliminary discussion before explaining magnets. Here, Lucretius

[181] Instead of *fluentur,* the text offers "*fluenter fertur*."

reiterates that all matter, even the hardest of substances, contains air within. Commentators call this principle "porosity."

> denique per dissaepta domorum saxea voces
> pervolitant, permanat odor frigusque vaposque
> ignis, qui ferri quoque vim penetrare sueëvit,
> denique qua circum caeli lorica coeërcet,
> morbida visque simul, cum extrinsecus insinuatur;
> et tempestate in terra caeloque coorta
> in caelum terrasque remotae iure facessunt;
> quandoquidem nihil est nisi raro corpore nexum.
>
> Again, voices fly through stone partitions in houses,
> Smell penetrates and cold and the heat of fire,
> Which is wont to pierce too through the strength of iron.
> Again, where the breastplate of the sky closes in the world all around,
> <the bodies of clouds and the seeds of storm enter in>,
> And with them the force of disease, when it finds its way in from without;
> And tempests, gathering from earth and heaven,
> Are absorbed naturally and disappear in heaven and earth;
> Since there is nothing but has a rare texture of body.
>
> Lucr. 6.951-958

There are several ways in this passage in which form reflects content. First, as Godwin (1986: ad loc.) notes, there is interlocking assonance in the phrase, ***vo**ces* *per**vo**litant* *permanat* (vo-, per-, -vo, per-). Accordingly, this resembles visually the content of *simulacra* flying rapidly through stone partitions. Second, the alliteration of "*d*," which occurs in line 6.951, returns in the next line within the word, *odor.* Consequently, similar to the first example, the "*d*" sound has re-emerged after the *saxea*, which occurs between the two lines. This represents the content of "voice *simulacra*" (the "*d*" sound) penetrating stone (*saxea*) partitions. Thirdly, the way in which tempests naturally come and go through the process of mixture and separation (*nexum*), discussed in lines 6.956 and 6.958, is described by chiastic polyptoton: *in terra caeloque* and *in caelum terrasque*. This chiasmus represents the word, *nexum,* which is used to describe the

mixing and separating of storms as they come and go. Thus, Lucretius' poetic voice, through interlocking assonance, alliteration, and chiastic polyptoton, associates form with content.[182]

Again, this same association is also encouraged in Lucretius' third preliminary discussion before explaining magnets. Here, Lucretius reiterates that the effect of particular *simulacra* on the senses is relative to each thing they strike. He gives an example of the sun *simulacra* having different effects on different surfaces:

> Huc accedit uti non omnia, quae iaciuntur
> corpora cumque ab rebus, eodem praedita sensu
> atque eodem pacto rebus sint omnibus apta.
> principio terram sol excoquit et facit are,
> at glaciem dissolvit et altis montibus altas
> extructas[que] nives radiis tabescere cogit;
>
> There is besides, that not all bodies, which are thrown
> Off severally from things, are endowed with the same effect of sense,
> Nor suited in the same way to all things.
> First of all the sun bakes the ground and parches it,
> But ice it thaws <and> causes the stones piled high
> In the mountains to melt beneath its rays.
>
> Lucr. 6.959-964

Lucretius' poetic voice in this passage associates form and content in two ways. First, as noted by Godwin (1986: ad loc), the tmesis of *quae-cumque* in the first two lines mirrors the idea of *simulacra* being thrown off severally from all things (*iaciuntur*, 6.959). Second, also noted by Godwin (1986: ad loc), the hard sounds of "t," "c," and "q" in line 6.960 literally sound like the hardening of the earth by the sun's rays, while the soft sound of "s" in the following two lines sounds like the softening of the snow as it melts (onomatopoeia).[183] So far, I have discussed three passages within Lucretius' explanation of the magnet. In these passages I have shown that

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[182] Cf. Amory (1969: 145-148) who first discusses the active formal reader of the poem.

[183] The magnet explanation contains several other instances of form reflecting content, but for the sake of space I have not included extended discussions. Other instances include but are not limited to 6.946 (hysteron proteron, representing the quickness with which food is spread through the body), and 6.949 (repetition of the word, *sentimus*, the first with a short –i and the second with a long –i representing the different ways different people feel when they are hit by the same *simulacra*). Godwin notes instances of form reflecting content more than any other commentator See also Ernout (1925: ad loc.) to a certain extent.

poetic voice, making use of literary devices of didactic poetry, instructs the formal addressee to associate form and content. Making this association is a form of active participation.

Furthermore, in the process of explaining the magnet, Lucretius pauses to reiterate the fact that all things are made up of a mixture of matter and void; all things are porous. This allows for matter that is less dense to pass through other matter that is denser. This atomic property explains the mechanism by which internal air within iron can aid in pushing itself into the void created by a nearby magnet's destructive effluences. Physics aside, Lucretius' poetic voice associates this property with human behavior in the following passage through polyptoton:

> principio fit ut in speluncis saxa superna
> <u>sudent</u> umore et guttis <u>manantibus</u> stillent.
> <u>manat</u> item nobis e toto corpore <u>sudor</u>,
> barba pilique per omnia membra, per artus.
> diditur in venas cibus omnis, auget alitque
> corporis extremas quoque partis unguiculosque.
> frigus item transire per aes calidumque vaporem
> sentimus, sentimus item transire per aurum
> atque per argentum, <u>cum pocula plena tenemus</u>.
>
> First of all, in caverns the rocks above
> <u>sweat</u> with moisture and trickle with <u>oozing</u> drops.
> Likewise <u>sweat</u> <u>oozes</u> out from all our body,
> The beard grows and hairs over all our limbs and members,
> Food is spread abroad into all the veins,
> it increases and nourishes even the extreme parts of the body, and the tiny nails.
> We feel cold likewise pass through bronze and warm heat,
> We feel it likewise pass through good and through silver,
> <u>when we hold full cups in our hands</u>.
>
> Lucr. 6.942-950

In the example above, water, which is less dense, is able to pass through rocks, which are denser. Rocks sweat (*sudent*) with oozing (*manantibus*) drops of moisture, just like sweat (*sudor*) oozes (*manat*) from the body. Polyptoton is the form in which several associations with the body in this passage are made. These associations are demonstrations of identical phenomena. This is the first instance in which Lucretius' poetic voice suggests to the formal reader that he associate magnetic properties with human properties.

In addition, an association with the body is also made in Lucretius' preliminary discussion of the relative effects of different *simulacra* on various things. The following example is given as a prelude to describing this process as part of the magnet explanation:

> umor aquae porro ferrum condurat ab igni,
> at coria et carnem mollit durata calore.
> barbigeras oleaster eo iuvat usque capellas,
> effluat ambrosias quasi vero et nectare tinctus;
> qua nihil est homini quod amarius fronde ac[ida] extet.
> denique amaracinum fugitat sus et timet omne
> unguentum; nam saetigeris subus acre venenumst;
> quod nos inter dum tam quam recreare videtur.
> at contra nobis caenum taeterrima cum sit
> spurcities, eadem subus haec iucunda videtur,
> insatiabiliter toti ut volvantur ibidem.
>
> Moreover, the moisture of water hardens iron fresh from fire,
> But skins and flesh it softens when hardened in the heat.
> The wild olive as much delights the bearded she-goats as though
> It really breathed an effluence of ambrosia and were steeped in nectar;
> And yet for a man there is nothing that grows more bitter than this leaf.
> Again, the pig shun marjoram, and fears every kind of ointment;
> For to bristly pigs it is deadly poison,
> Though to us it sometimes seems almost to give new life.
> But on the other hand, though to us mud is the foulest filth,
> This very thing is seen to be pleasant to pigs,
> So that they wallow all over in it and never have enough.
>
> Lucr. 6.968-978

Thus, what is good for she-goats is bad for man, what is bad for pigs is good for man, and what is bad for man can sometimes be good for pigs. Association with the body is used to explain a key atomic property needed to understand the magnet passage. As in the example above, the materialistic explanation of magnetic properties is explained through analogies to the body. Thus, I have shown that Lucretius' poetic voice associates the form of the text with the content of the text through various literary devices; in addition, Lucretius' poetic voice also associates these same literary devices with the human body. Accordingly, the properties of the magnet are equal to the properties of the human body.

Morever, at the start of the explanation of the magnet, Lucretius describes an image that exemplifies the power of the magnet, an image which many commentators associate with a passage from Plato's *Ion.* Here is the passage from the *DRN:*[184]

> hunc homines lapidem mirantur; quippe catenam
> saepe ex anellis reddit pendentibus ex se.
> quinque etenim licet inter dum pluresque videre
> ordine demisso levibus iactarier auris,
> unus ubi ex uno dependet supter adhaerens
> ex alioque alius lapidis vim vinclaque noscit;
> usque adeo permananter vis pervalet eius.
>
> This stone astonishes men,
> because it often makes a chain out of little rings hanging from it.
> For you may sometimes see five or more
> hanging in a string and swayed by a light breeze,
> where one hangs from another attached beneath it,
> and one from another learns the stone's power and attraction:
> to such a distance does its power hold force, oozing through and through.
>
> Lucr. 6.910-16

The image of the magnetic rings hanging from one another is reflected in the two monosyllables hanging like individual rings at the end of a line: …*pendentibus ex se* (6.911) Godwin (1986: ad loc). Also, the equal passing of power from one ring to another is represented by phrasing of "one ring hanging from another" is represented by two uses of polyptoton: *unus ubi ex uno* (6.915) and *ex alioque alius* (6.915) (Godwin ad loc.). The polyptoton evokes the chain of rings. Moreover, Ernout describes *vim vinclaque* (6.915) as hendiadys, which complements the magnet's power in the sense that *vim* and *vincla* become one, like the rings. Lastly, Lucretius' poetic voice constructs the form of the text to reflect the content of the magnet in the way that he constructs the last line quoted above: "to such a distance does its power hold force, oozing through and through" (6.916). He constructs this line with interlocking alliteration and assonance: *per-mananter v-is per-v-alet.* Godwin describes the interlocking sounds as a "steady

[184] No Lucretian scholar or commentator, to my knowledge, argues that Lucretius directly alludes to Plato here. However, commentators all acknowledge, in their own terms, that Lucretius' imagery mirrors that of Plato's imagery, as discussed below. In terms of this dissertation's approach to intertextuality the allusion to Plato is one of many intertextual negotiations presented to the reader by the façade of intertextuality.

stream of power running through the string." He also notes the spondaic *permananter* as "expressive of the extended chain." Thus, similar to the discussion above, Lucretius' poetic voice instructs the formal reader to actively associate form with content.

I have argued that Lucretius' poetic voice in explanation of the magnet, through literary devices (polyptoton, assonance, alliteration, chiasmus, etc), instructs the reader to associate form with content. As discussed throughout chapters one and two of this study, this instruction to associate form with content anticipates an active addressee of the poem. I now show that Lucretius' poetic voice, through intertextuality, instructs the historical reader to consider the magnet explanation a metaphor for human behavior, namely inspiration and mutual attraction. This instruction will also be shown to encourage the historical readers to actively participate in their own terms.

Commentators of Lucretius note that there are two traditions which Lucretius could have drawn upon (intertextually) for the passage cited above (6.910-916): early physicists and/or later philosophers.[185] Early physicists include Thales who thought the magnet had a soul, and other Presocratics who covered the topic at length. Later philosophers include Plato in the *Ion* 533d and *Timaeus* 80c, and Cicero in the *De Div.* i. 39.86, who record the phenomenon as a metaphor for inspiration and divination respectively.[186] Commentators have exhaustively compared Lucretius' explanation of the magnet with the explanations of Presocratic physicists,[187] but scholarship has only begun to consider the implications of the magnet in terms of the philosophical tradition of Plato as well as other traditions from which this image could have been

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[185] See Bailey (1947: ad loc.).

[186] See Bailey (1947: 1691) and Leonard and Smith (1942: 839) for a discussion of the magnet in the works of the Presocratics: Thales in Aristotle, *De anima* 405a 19-21, Democritus in Diogenes Laertius, IX.47, and Empedocles in Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 1.221.

[187] See Wallace (1996: 178-187) for the most up-to-date scholarship on magnets in antiquity.

drawn.[188] There is a need to further analyze the implications of these influences in terms of intertextuality.

Broadly speaking, in Plato's *Ion*, the magnet is used as a metaphor for Platonic theories of inspiration. In Lucretius, the magnet itself is analyzed in terms of Epicurean material physics in order to debunk what usually astonishes (*mirantur*) men. I suggest that Lucretius' poetic voice, in addition to constructing form to reflect content as discussed above, also intertextually engages with the topos of the magnet metaphor,[189] and thereby instructs the reader to keep in mind the interpretation of the magnet as a possible metaphor.

The context of the magnet passage from Plato's *Ion* is a discussion of a phenomenon that has been troubling the rhapsode Ion. Ion is complaining to Socrates that he is only good at reciting Homer (530c-531a). Socrates is trying to help him figure out why he is not good at reciting the works of other rhapsodes, but only the works of the great Homer. This problem is unique in the artistic world, as Socrates points out, because rarely do painters only know about one great painter (531a). Once one knows the art of painting, he/she knows about painting in general, not just one particular painter; the same is true for sculptors (531a-532d). But the fact remains that Ion is only good at reciting Homer even though he has studied the art of epic poetry broadly. The way this singularity of Homeric knowledge is possible, Socrates deduces, is as follows:

> ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο **τέχνη** μὲν οὐκ ὂν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου εὖ λέγειν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, **θεία δὲ δύναμις** ἥ σε κινεῖ, <u>ὥσπερ ἐν τῆι λίθωι ἣν Εὐριπίδης μὲν Μαγνῆτιν ὠνόμασεν</u>, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ Ἡρακλείαν. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ λίθος οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους **ἄγει** τοὺς σιδηροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ **δύναμιν** ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις ὥστ' <u>**αὖ δύνασθαι**</u> ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἡ λίθος, ἄλλους ἄγειν δακτυλίους, ὥστ´ ἐνίοτε <u>ὁρμαθὸς μακρὸς</u> πάνυ σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων

[188] See Reinhardt (2004: 27-46) for possible allusions to Plato throughout the *DRN*. In particular, he investigates Lucretius' use of the "riddled jar" metaphor of the soul. He argues that by using this image Lucretius is not necessarily alluding to Plato's riddled jar in the *Gorgias,* but is alluding to the same topos. His conclusions are consistent with the current study.

[189] For use of the term topos, see note above on Reinhardt (2004: 26-46).

> ἤρτηται· πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου ἡ **δύναμις ἀνήρτηται**. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Μοῦσα ἐνθέους μὲν ποιεῖ αὐτή, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνθέων τούτων ἄλλων ἐνθουσιαζόντων **ὁρμαθὸς** ἐξαρτᾶται. πάντες γὰρ οἵ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ΄ **ἔνθεοι** ὄντες καὶ **κατεχόμενοι** πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα…
>
> For, as I was saying just now, this is not an **art** in you, whereby you speak well on Homer, but a **divine power**, which moves you like that in the stone which Euripides named a magnet, but most people call "Heraclea stone." For this stone not only **attracts** iron rings but also imparts to them a **power** whereby they in turn are able to do the very same thing as the stone, and **attract other rings**; so that sometimes there is formed quite a long chain of bits of iron and rings, suspended one from another; and they all **depend for this power** on that one stone. In the same manner also the Muse inspires men herself, and then by means of these inspired persons the **inspiration** spreads to others, and holds them in a connected chain. For all the good epic poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as **inspired and possessed**…
>
> Plato *Ion* 533d[190]

The power of Plato's magnet is a metaphor for the inspirational power of the muse.[191] The muse moves the poet with her divine power and that power is then passed on to the audience forming a chain of inspiration. In the same way, the magnet attracts iron rings with its power and that power is then passed on to other iron rings, forming a connected chain. Bailey (1947: ad loc.) and Godwin (1986: ad loc.) both note subtle differences between Plato and Lucretius such as Lucretius' addition of the ring "swayed by a light breeze." I am not suggesting that we interpret the magnet passage in Lucretius as a direct allusion to Plato. What I would instead like to argue is that the magnet passage in Lucretius alludes to the topos of using the magnet as a metaphor for human behavior. In Plato's *Ion* this "human behavior" is the act of poetic inspiration, a mechanism which connects the muse, the poet, and the audience. In the *DRN*, a poem which rejects such superstitious nonsense, the "human behavior" is the teaching of Epicurean philosophy, a mechanism which connects Epicurus, Lucretius, and the poem's readership.

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[190] Text is Murray (1996). It is interesting to note that Murray (1996: 113), commenting on this passage in her commentary on Plato's *Ion,* quotes the magnet passage from Lucretius (Lucr. 6.910-916) and states that Lucretius "imitated" Plato.

[191] On the surface it seems that Plato's dialectic, the methodical mode of Socratic questioning, is antithetical to inspiration, the non-methodical mode with which Ion seems to have come to know Homeric poetry. See Carter (1967: 111-121) for the way in which these two modes are in fact complementary. See also Lowenstam (1993: 19-32) for the way in which dialectic and inspiration are complementary.

The topos of the “magnet as metaphor for human behavior” is attested in two other passages from antiquity. The first is a comment made by Satyros in Achilles Tatius’ *Leucippe and Clitophon* (late 2nd century CE). Satyros, early in Clitophon’s intricate plot to woo Leucippe, gives him advice about the nature of love. He points out that love can even occur between two inanimate (non-human) objects:

> ἐρᾷ γοῦν ἡ μαγνησία λίθος τοῦ σιδήρου· κἂν μόνον ἴδῃ καὶ θίγῃ, πρὸς αὑτὴν εἵλκυσεν, ὥσπερ ἐρωτικόν τι ἔνδον ἔχουσα. καὶ μή τι τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐρώσης λίθου καὶ ἐρωμένου σιδήρου φίλημα.
>
> There is a stone of Magnesia that has a strong desire for iron. If she but sees and barely touches a piece of iron, she draws it to herself, as if by the power of an erotic fire within. This is a marvelous kiss between erotogenric stone and erotopathic iron.
>
> Achill. 1.17[192]

Lucretius, of course, predates this passage and therefore could not have directly alluded to it. What is relevant is the existence of the “magnet as metaphor for human behavior” topos that existed in antiquity, a topos which Lucretius’ readership would have recognized at the start of the explanation of the magnet. The other instance of the magnet as metaphor topos is an epigram from the Palatine Anthology 12.152: “Heraclitus from Magnesia, for whom I long, it is not iron which is drawn by the stone, but my heart by your beauty.” Though the epigram lacks context, the topos is clearly present.

So far, in the magnet passage we have seen Lucretius’ poetic voice manifest itself through literary devices that associate the form of the text itself with both the magnet and the human body, and through the association the magnet with the larger topos of the magnet as a metaphor for human behavior. Underlying Lucretius’ magnet explanation, which describes the attractive forces between two iron rings, is this topos, which describes some kind of connection between two individuals. In the *Ion* this connection is inspiration and in Achilles Tatius it is erotic love. Lucretius’ poetic voice, making use of this topos in order to function, suggests to the

[192] For the text of Achilles Tatius, I have used Garnaud (1991). Translation is Reardon (2008).

reader that the following magnet explanation should be understood as a metaphor for human interaction.

Lastly, the language that Lucretius uses throughout this passage *intra*textually refers to lovers in three specific places. These references encourage the reader to view their own human position as equivalent to the magnet. The phenomenon of the magnet is described in amatory terms in the following three passages. First, Lucretius says it is not a stretch of the imagination to realize that iron rings of *simulacra* can fall into the void and cling to magnets:

> quo minus est mirum, quod dicitur esse alienum,
> corpora si nequeunt e ferro plura coorta
> in vacuum ferri, quin anulus ipse sequatur;
> quod facit et sequitur, donec pervenit ad ipsum
> iam lapidem <u>caecisque in eo compagibus haesit</u>.
>
> Therefore it is the less strange, since it is led on by its particles,
> If it is impossible for many bodies, springing together from the iron,
> To pass into the void, but that the ring itself follows;
> And this it does, and follows on,
> Until it is has now reached the very stone and <u>clung to it with hidden fastenings</u>.
>
> Lucr. 6.1012-1016

Bailey notes that the phrase, *compagibus haesit,* is taken directly from book IV's discussion of lovers trying to cling to one another with hidden fastenings (4.1205). Although Lucretius in book IV is denying the existence of such hidden fastenings between lovers, the reference in the magnet passage to lovers is no less clear. The reader associates magnetic forces with human behavior. Next, Lucretius reports that he has seen iron rings repulsed from one another:

> exultare etiam Samothracia ferrea vidi
> et ramenta simul ferri <u>furere</u> intus ahenis
> in scaphiis, lapis hic Magnes cum subditus esset;
> usque adeo fugere a saxo gestire videtur.
>
> Further, I have seen Samothracian iron rings leap up,
> And at the same time iron filings move in a <u>frenzy</u> inside brass bowls
> when this Magnesian stone was placed beneath:
> Thus, one can see the iron desires to flee the stone.
>
> Lucr. 6.1044-1047

The use of the word, *furere*, to describe the action taken by iron rings bouncing around in a bowl draws a connection between the atomic forces of the magnet and human behavior, in this case that behavior is erotic love. This word is also used to describe love's madness in book IV (*inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit*, 4.1069).

Lastly, in the last section of Lucretius' explanation, he gives several similar examples of other materials that cling to one another that are similar to the magnet:

> glutine materies taurino iungitur una,
> ut vitio venae tabularum saepius hiscant
> quam laxare queant compages taurea vincla.
>
> Wood is united only by a bull's testicle-glue,
> so that the veins of boards more often break and gape
> before the bindings of the glue will loosen their joinings.
>
> Lucr. 6.1069-1071

Note the language used: *compages,* which is the language of lovers from book IV, and *vincla,* which is the language used in the proem to book I where Mars is seduced by Venus. These associations encourage the reader to view human behavior in terms of the attractive forces of magnets, or the forces of other similar binding substances such as glue from a bull's testicles.

Conclusion

Lucretius' poetic voice, instructs the addressee to associate form and content in the magnet explanation, thus anticipating an active addressee. This section has also argued that Lucretius' poetic voice, through engagement with the magnet topos, invites historical readers to interpret the magnet passage as a metaphor for human behavior, the type of behavior associated with inspiration and attraction. Also, Lucretius' poetic voice, through intratextuality, encourages readers to consider the "behavior" of magnets as a metaphor for the type of behavior associated with erotic attraction. Taken together, in terms of the penetration model, the relationship between Lucretius and his readership is one that reflects a reciprocating modification of that

model, which in turn resembles an egalitarian relationship in the context of didactic poetry. This observation reinforces the arguments made throughout the intital chapters of this study.

Conclusion

Poetic Voice and Readership: Friendship?

The first chapter of this dissertation discussed the reasons why poetic voice is a useful approach to study the relationship between Lucretius and his readership. It constructed the definition of poetic voice from various studies in classical scholarship. The chapter then synthesized a paradigm from those studies in preparation for approaching poetic voice in the *DRN*. This paradigm was based on the particular aspects of each text that poetic voice makes use of in order to perform its function. In order to perform that analysis, chapter two discussed Lucretius' poetic voice in terms of satiric elements within the didactic genre, the interpretive implications of reading intertextuality through Epicurean atomology, and particular instances of observed internal dialectic. Chapter three shifted focus from the active participation of the "formal" addressee and turned to the participation of historical readers as well as philosophical readers; in order to do so, I positioned the active participation between Lucretius and his readership in the context of the so-called "penetration model" of Roman society, thereby further developing an all-encompassing paradigm for understanding the relationship between Lucretius' poetic voice and his readership. In short, the relationship between Lucretius and his readership reflects a reciprocating modification of the penetration model in terms of its formal, historical, and philosophical contexts. Formally, Lucretius's poetic voice and his addressee fit this model through "alternating penetration;" historically, Lucretius' poet's voice and his historical reader fit it through "a balanced struggle;" and philosophically, Lucretius and his Epicurean reader fit it through the reader's instructions on how to actively "self-position" oneself in metaphysical space. Thus, the egalitarian relationship between poet and addressee determined in the first two chapters corresponds to both the historical readers and philosophical readers of the poem as well.

The last chapter continued to investigate the egalitarian relationship between Lucretius and his readership by exploring Lucretius' poetic voice in the last argumentative section of the text. In conclusion this study now suggests further study of this relationship in terms of Roman social bonds; in particular, it reframes that relationship as the foundation for a future analysis of friendship in the text.

One of the broad questions circulating in the scholarship of Lucretian studies regards the biography of Lucretius (see introduction). Who was Lucretius? More importantly, how should we define the relationship between Lucretius and his internal, addressee, Memmius? Is it any different than the relationship between Lucretius and his external, Roman reader or between Lucretius and the Epicurean student-convert? Many of these readers overlap, but other times they do not, creating much room for scholarship in this area. Underlying these studies of Lucretius' readership are other issues such as Roman patronage: Lucretius the client teaches Memmius his patron; and issues of the didactic form in which their relationship exists: Lucretius and Memmius, in this regard, are impersonal stylized literary artifacts in the tradition of Hesiod and Perses.

My dissertation narrowly explored this broad question of Lucretius' readership. It did so by examining the ways in which Lucretius projects his own voice within his poem, a manifestation termed "poetic voice." Poetic voice, in this sense, within didactic poetry functions in a way that communicates, making use of the conventions of genre, intertextuality, and various other literary devices, to the poem's readership, in formal, historical, and philosophical in terms, instructions for how to understand the relationship between Lucretius and themselves. This relationship was determined to be egalitarian. But what is the significance of this egalitarian

relationship in a Roman social context? What makes Lucretius' text unique and not simply a translation of Epicurus?

As chapter three began to discuss, another way we can view the egalitarian relationship between Lucretius and his readership is by using the penetration model. In doing so, that relationship then represents a "reciprocating modification of the penetration model." This modified model is also the basis for Oliensis' (1997: 151-171) article on Roman friendship. She discusses the connection between a lover at a beloved's doorstep (*paraklausithyron*) and clients crowding together at the doorstep of a patron (*salutatio*); the former, penetrator-penetrated, the latter, penetrated-penetrator. She argues that the doorstep (*limen*) is a special place for a relationship to flourish that "circumvents" the seeming rigid opposition between penetrating and being penetrated, having the phallus and lacking the phallus" (168). Taking Oliensis' circumvention of the rigid penetration model as a basis for identifying friendship, this study ends by suggesting that the egalitarian relationship between Lucretius and his readership, in terms of the penetration model of Roman society, represents another "*limen"* for the bond of Roman friendship to flourish.

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