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**FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES**

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**1958-1960**

**VOLUME IX**

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**BERLIN CRISIS,  
1959-1960;  
GERMANY;  
AUSTRIA**


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**DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE**

**Washington**











**Foreign Relations of the  
United States, 1958–1960**

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**Volume IX**

**Berlin Crisis  
1959–1960;  
Germany; Austria**

*Editors*                    David M. Baehler  
                                     Charles S. Sampson

*General Editor*        Glenn W. LaFantasie

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# Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. A statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Title IV of the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351 *et seq.*), added by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991.

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts which contributed to the formulation of policies and records providing supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

The volume presented here, originally compiled and prepared as a book manuscript in 1981 and 1982, meets all the standards of selection and editing prevailing in the Department of State at that time. This volume records policies and events of more than 30 years ago, but the statute allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

### *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a triennial subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the final 3 years (1958–1960) of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This subseries comprises 18 print volumes totaling more than 16,000 pages and 7 microfiche supplements presenting more than 15,000 additional pages of original documents.

In planning and preparing this 1958–1960 triennium of volumes, the editors chose to present the official record of U.S. foreign affairs with respect to Europe, the Soviet Union, and Canada in five print volumes. Volume IX presents documentation on U.S. policy toward Berlin following the four-power Foreign Ministers Meeting, May 11–August 5, 1959, with particular attention to the abortive summit conference in May 1960; U.S. relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria; and U.S. policy toward the German Democratic Republic. Volume VII (in two parts) of this subseries presents documentation on U.S. policy toward Western Europe and Canada; Volume VIII documents the record of U.S. policy during the first part of the Berlin crisis through the Foreign Ministers Meeting; and Volume X (in two parts) documents policies toward Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Finland, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

### *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The original research, compilation, and editing of this volume were done in 1981 and 1982 under the Department regulation derived from Secretary Kellogg's charter of 1925. This regulation prescribed that the *Foreign Relations* series include "a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities," presuming that the records of the Department of State would constitute the central core of documentation presented in the series. The Department of State historians have always had complete and unconditional access to all records and papers of the Department of States: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized (lot) files of the policymaking levels; the files of the Department of State's Executive Secretariat, which comprehended all the official papers created by or submitted to the Secretary of State; the files of all overseas Foreign Service posts and U.S. special missions; and the official correspondence with foreign governments and with other Federal agencies. Any failure to include a complete Department of State record in the

*Foreign Relations* series cannot be attributed to constraints or limitations placed upon the Department historians in their access to Department records, information security regulations and practices notwithstanding.

Secretary Kellogg's charter of 1925 and Department regulations derived therefrom required that further records "needed to supplement the documentation in the Department files" be obtained from other government agencies. Department historians preparing the *Foreign Relations* series since 1954, including the editors of this volume, fully researched the papers of President Eisenhower and other White House foreign policy records. These Presidential papers have become a major part of the official record published in the *Foreign Relations* series.

Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other Federal agencies including the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. All of this documentation has been routinely made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. Thanks are due to the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library for their assistance in preparing this volume.

Department of State historians have also enjoyed steadily broadened access to the records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joints Chief of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Selective access has been obtained to the records of several other agencies in order to supplement the official record in particular *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Completion of the declassification of this volume and the final steps of its preparation for publication coincided with the development since early 1991 by the Central Intelligence Agency, in cooperation with the Department of State, of expanded access by Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from among those records still in the custody of that Agency. The Department of State chose not to postpone the publication of this volume to ascertain how such access might affect the scope of available documentation and the changes that might be made in the contents of this particular volume. The Department is, however, using this expanded access, as arranged by the CIA's History Staff, for compilation of future volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series.

The statute of October 28, 1991, requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of all the major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the United States Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. These



new standards go beyond the mandate of the prior Department of State regulations for the preparation of the series and define broadened access to the records of other government agencies. The research and selection of documents for this volume were carried out in 1981–1982 in accordance with the existing Department regulations. The editors decided not to delay publication to conduct the additional research needed to meet the new standards, but they are confident that the manuscript prepared in 1981–1982 provides a fully accurate record. The List of Sources, pages XI–XVII, identifies the particular files and collections used.

### *Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume IX*

In selecting documents for this volume, the editors placed primary consideration on the formulation of policy by the Eisenhower administration and on the most significant U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with foreign governments. The memoranda of discussions and policy papers of the National Security Council with respect to basic U.S. policies toward East and West Germany and Austria have been presented as fully as possible. The editors had complete access to and made use of memoranda of discussion at National Security Council meetings and other institutional NSC documents included in the Whitman File at the Eisenhower Library, as well as more informal foreign policy materials in that file and in other collections at the Eisenhower Library. These Presidential files were supplemented by NSC and White House documents in Department of State files.

During the years 1959–1960, the Department of State participated actively in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Berlin, West Germany, and Austria. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter advised President Eisenhower and took part in the deliberations of the National Security Council. The Department of State prepared and coordinated exchanges of views and negotiations on policy matters with the German and Austrian Governments. The editors had complete access to all Department of State files: the central decimal files; the special collections of the Executive Secretariat (which document activities of Department principals); the various specialized decentralized (lot) files originally maintained by Department policymakers at the bureau, office, and division level; and the Embassy files of the pertinent U.S. Missions abroad.

The editors have selected from among these Department of State documents memoranda of conversation between Secretary Herter and his counterparts in West Germany and Austria and the Mayor of West Berlin, internal U.S. Government policy recommendations and decision papers relating to such important topics as the status of Berlin, U.S. policy on German reunification, and the maintenance of Austrian security and neutrality. The editors also selected telegrams that document the important reports and policy recommendations of U.S. representatives at the Mission in Berlin and the Embassies in Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

In addition to Department of State, White House, and National Security Council records, the editors had access to a body of declassified JCS files at the National Archives. Copies of classified JCS materials were obtained from the Joint Staff on a request basis. The editors selected documents that indicated the policy recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding various major foreign affairs policies.

The editors also selected key National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates relating to the area documented in this volume. These documents were available from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. The amount of material omitted because it was unrelated, however, is not accounted for. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first unnumbered footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries

## VIII Preface

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of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

### *Declassification Review*

The initial declassification review of this volume in 1981 and thereafter resulted in the decision to withhold more than 15 percent of the documents originally selected primarily because of the continued sensitivity of the Berlin question. Following reunification of Germany, a second declassification review reduced the amount withheld to less than 4 percent of the documents. The remaining documentation provides a full account of the major foreign policy issues confronting, and the policies undertaken by, the Eisenhower administration in areas covered in this volume.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; or
- 9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

*Acknowledgements*

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, in particular David Haight, who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon, Charles S. Sampson collected, selected, and edited all the compilations presented in this volume except for that on Austria, which was done by David M. Baehler. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the editorial and publication process. Althea W. Robinson, Rita M. Baker, and Vicki E. Futscher did the copy and technical editing and Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Natalie H. Lee, Chief) oversaw the production of the volume. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

**William Z. Slany**  
*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

January 1993



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## Unpublished Sources

### Department of State

*Indexed Central Files.* The principal source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central files of the Department of State. Many of the documents were selected from the following files:

396.1: International Conferences  
396.1-GE: International Conferences at Geneva  
396.1-PA: International Conferences at Paris  
396.1-WA: International Conferences at Washington  
462A.62B41: Trade between West and East Germany  
611.00: General U.S. foreign policy  
611.62A: U.S.-West German relations  
611.63: U.S.-Austrian relations  
662A.62B: West German-East German political relations  
711.11-EI: President Eisenhower  
762.00: German political affairs  
762.0221: German occupied territory  
762A.00: West German political affairs  
762B.00: East German political affairs  
762B.5411: Overflights of East Germany  
763.00: Austrian political affairs  
763.5-MSP: U.S.-Austrian Mutual Security

*Lot Files.* Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows.

Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327

Diaries of Ambassador David K.E. Bruce for the years 1948-1974.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences for the years 1956-1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559; Lot 64 D 560

See under Washington National Records Center.

EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291

Files of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, for the 1950s.

Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 64 D 187

Secret telegram summaries prepared by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1958-1960.



## XIV List of Sources

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### INR–NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, including NIEs and SNIEs for the years 1958–1960.

### JCS Files

Documents obtained upon request from the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject, country, and chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957–1961.

### Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the Secretary of State and heads of government and foreign ministers for the years 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary's and Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collection of the minutes of the Secretary of State's daily staff meetings for the years 1952–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master files of National Security Council documents, correspondence, and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top Secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## **Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas**

### Dulles Papers

Records of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959.

### Herter Papers

Papers of Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State and then Secretary of State, 1957–1961.

### Project Clean Up

See under White House Office Files.

**Staff Secretary Records**

From the White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, 1952–1961, including records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., and Christopher H. Russell.

**White House Office Files**

Several White House Office collections, including Project Clean Up.

**Whitman File**

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name Series, Dulles–Herter Series, DDE Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administration Series, and International File.

**National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.****Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State****OSS–INR Intelligence Files**

Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, and the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, 1941–1961.

**Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland****Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State****Conference Files: FRC 83–0068****Lot 64 D 559:**

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences for the year 1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

**Lot 64 D 560:**

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences for the years 1958–1959, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

**Record Group 319, Records of the Department of the Army**

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Communications Center Files (formerly located at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania).

**Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense****OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698**

Country files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for the year 1958.

**OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170**

Country files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for the year 1960.

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*Note:* The Department of State takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these memoirs nor does it endorse their interpretations.

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# List of Abbreviations

**ABC**, atomic, biological, and chemical

**ADN**, Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (General German News Service)

**AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission

**AFL-CIO**, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations

**AFN**, Armed Forces Network; Office of North African Affairs, Department of State

**AFP**, Agence France Presse (French News Agency)

**ALO**, Allied Liaison Office

**Amb**, Ambassador

**AmConGen**, American Consul General

**ANZUS**, Australia, New Zealand, United States

**AP**, Associated Press

**APO**, Army Post Office

**A/S**, anti-submarine

**ATO**, Allied Traffic Office

**BASC**, Berlin Air Safety Center

**BBC**, British Broadcasting Corporation

**BENELUX**, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg

**BER**, series indicator for position papers prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Berlin

**BNA**, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State

**BRIXMIS**, British Military Liaison Mission

**CA**, circular airgram

**C**, Counselor of the Department of State

**Cahto**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Herter while away from Washington

**CC**, Central Committee

**CDU**, Christlich-Demokratische Union, (Christian Democratic Union)

**CENTO**, Central Treaty Organization

**CF**, Conference File

**CG**, circular airgram; Commanding General

**ChiComs**, Chinese Communists

**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency

**CinC**, Commander in Chief

**CINCEUR**, Commander in Chief, Europe

**CINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific

**CINCUSAREUR**, Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe

**COB**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Command, Berlin

**COCOM**, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group

**CONUS**, continental United States

**CPD**, series indicator for telegrams from Camp David

**CP(SU)**, Communist Party (of the Soviet Union)

**CSC**, Coal and Steel Community

**CSU**, Christlich Soziale Union

(Christian Social Union)

**C-VR**, Council-Verbatim Record

**DA**, Department of the Army

**DDR**, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)

**Deldi**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference

**Deptel**, Department telegram

**DGB**, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union)

**Didel**, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference

**Dir Gen**, Director General

**DM(E)**, Deutsche Mark (East)

**Dulte**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington

- E**, Bureau of Economic Affairs,  
Department of State
- EAC**, European Advisory Commission
- EC**, series indicator for telegrams from  
the Commander in Chief, Europe
- ECA**, Economic Cooperation  
Administration
- ECM**, electronic countermeasures
- ECOSOC**, United Nations Economic  
and Social Council
- EDC**, European Defense Community
- EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs,  
Department of State
- EEC**, European Economic Community
- EFTA**, European Free Trade Area
- EGR**, East German Republic
- Embdes**, Embassy despatch
- EmbOff**, Embassy officer
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs,  
Department of State
- EUR/SOV**, Office of Soviet Union  
Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs,  
Department of State
- EURATOM**, European Atomic Energy  
Commission
- FAA**, Federal Aviation Administration
- FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Fed Rep**, Federal Republic
- FIG**, France, Italy, and Germany
- FM**, Foreign Minister
- FMLM**, French Military Liaison  
Mission
- FMW Ref**, Foreign Ministers Meeting  
Washington, reference
- FonMin**, Foreign Minister
- FonOff**, Foreign Office
- FonSec**, Foreign Secretary
- ForMin**, Foreign Minister
- FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany
- FTA**, free trade area
- FY**, fiscal year
- FYI**, for your information
- GA**, General Assembly
- GARIOA**, Government and Relief in  
Occupied Areas
- GDR**, German Democratic Republic
- GER**, Office of German Affairs,  
Department of State
- GER/GPA**, Officer in Charge of  
German Political Affairs, Office of  
German Affairs, Department of State
- GFR**, German Federal Republic
- GFY**, German fiscal year
- GNP**, gross national product
- GOF**, Government of France
- GPA**, Officer in Charge of German  
Political Affairs, Department of State
- GSFG**, Group of Soviet Forces in  
Germany
- HGP D**, Heads of Government Meeting  
Paris, document
- HMG**, Her (His) Majesty's Government
- HQ**, headquarters
- IAEA**, International Atomic Energy  
Agency
- IBRD**, International Bank for  
Reconstruction and Development
- ICA**, International Cooperation  
Administration
- ICJ**, International Court of Justice
- IDO**, International Disarmament  
Organization
- IRBM**, Intermediate range ballistic  
missile
- IS**, International Staff
- ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for International Security  
Affairs
- IZT**, interzonal trade agreement
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JSSC**, Joint Strategic Survey Committee
- K**, Khrushchev
- L**, Office of the Legal Adviser,  
Department of State
- L/EUR**, Assistant Legal Adviser for  
European Affairs, Department of  
State
- LS**, Division of Language Services,  
Department of State
- M**, Office of the Under Secretary of  
State for Political Affairs
- MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory  
Group
- MAP**, Military Assistance Program
- MC**, Military Committee
- MinPres**, Minister President
- MLM**, Military Liaison Mission
- MOD**, Minister of Defense
- MP**, military police; Member of  
Parliament
- MSP**, Mutual Security Program
- MVW US Del MC**, Macmillan Visit to  
Washington, U.S. Delegation,  
memorandum of conversation
- mytel**, my telegram
- NAC**, National Advisory Council;  
North Atlantic Council

- NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NBC**, National Broadcasting Company
- NCO**, noncommissioned officer
- NEACC**, Near East Arms Control Committee
- Niact**, Night Action; communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
- NMM Ref**, NATO Ministerial Meeting, reference paper
- Noforn**, no foreign dissemination
- Notal**, not to nor needed by all addressees
- NSC**, National Security Council
- NYT**, *New York Times*
- OAS**, Organization of American States
- OASD/ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
- OCI**, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
- OECD**, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- OEEC**, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
- OMV**, Osterreichische Mineralverwaltung (Austrian Mineral Administration)
- OSD/ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- ourtel**, our telegram
- P**, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
- PermRep**, Permanent Representative
- PL**, Public Law
- PM**, Prime Minister
- POLAD**, Political Adviser
- Polto**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
- QBAL**, Quadripartite Berlin Airlift
- RA**, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
- reftel**, reference telegram
- rep**, representative
- RIAS**, Rundfunk in Amerikanische Sektor (Radio in the American Sector)
- RM/DOC**, Réunion de Ministères des Affaires Etrangères/Document (Conference of Foreign Ministers/Document)
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State
- S Bahn**, Strassenbahn (streetcar)
- SAC**, Strategic Air Command
- SACEUR**, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- S/AE**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Affairs
- S/P**, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- S/S-RO**, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- SC**, United Nations Security Council
- SEATO**, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
- SecDel/MC**, Secretary's Delegation/memorandum of conversation
- SecState**, Secretary of State
- Secto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington
- Secy**, Secretary
- SED**, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
- SERB**, Soviet External Relations Branch
- SHAEF**, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Europe
- SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
- SNIE**, Special National Intelligence Estimate
- SOV**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
- SovEmb**, Soviet Embassy
- SPD**, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)
- STRAC**, Strategic Army Corps
- SUNFED**, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development
- SVE/MC**, Secretary's Visit to Europe/memorandum of conversation



## XXII List of Abbreviations

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- SX**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Army, Europe
- SYG**, Secretary-General
- TAC**, Tactical Air Corps
- TASS**, Telegrafnoe Agentsvo  
Sovitskogo Soiuz (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
- tel**, telegram
- Tocah**, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Herter while away from Washington
- Topol**, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
- Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State when he is away from Washington
- Tousi**, series indicator for telegrams to USIA missions
- tttd**, temporary travel document
- U**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- U/CEA**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Communist Economic Affairs
- UKDel**, United Kingdom Delegation
- UN**, United Nations
- UNESCO**, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly
- unn**, unnumbered
- UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
- UNRWA**, United Nations Relief and Works Agency
- UPI**, United Press International
- USA**, United States Army
- USAF(E)**, United States Air Force (Europe)
- USAREUR**, United States Army, Europe
- USBER**, United States Mission at Berlin
- USCINCEUR**, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
- USCOB**, United States Command, Berlin
- USDel(M/C)**, United States Delegation (memorandum of conversation)
- USEP**, United States Escapee Program
- USG**, United States Government
- USIA**, United States Information Agency
- USIB**, United States Information Board
- USMLM**, United States Military Liaison Mission
- USRO**, Office of the United States Mission to European Regional Organizations
- USUN**, United States Mission to the United Nations
- US/VR(S)**, United States/Verbatim Record (Summary)
- VOA**, Voice of America
- Vopo**, Volkspolizei (Peoples' Police)
- VP**, Vice President
- WE**, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
- WEU**, Western European Union
- WG**, working group
- W/MSC**, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Affairs Security Coordinator
- WWG**, Washington Working Group

# List of Persons

*Note:* The identification of persons in this list is generally limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. All titles and positions are American unless other indicated. Where no dates are given, the individual usually held the position throughout the period covered by the volume.

- Achilles, Theodore C.**, Counselor of the Department of State from March 1960  
**Adenauer, Konrad**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany  
**Afritch, Josef**, Austrian Interior Minister, July 1959  
**Akalovsky, Alexander**, Department of State interpreter  
**Allen, George**, Director of the United States Information Agency  
**Alphand, Hervé**, French Ambassador to the United States  
**Amrehn, Franz**, Deputy Mayor of Berlin  
**Anderson, Robert B.**, Secretary of the Treasury  
**Andronikov, Constantin**, French interpreter  
**Armitage, John A.**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Barbour, Walworth**, Minister in the United Kingdom  
**Battle, Laurie C.**, Representative from Alabama  
**Baudissin, Georg Graf von**, German Representative to the Four-Power Working Group  
**Beaumarchais, Jacques de**, Chief of Cabinet to the French Foreign Minister  
**Becker, Loftus E.**, Legal Adviser, Department of State, until August 1959  
**Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr.**, Consul General in Austria  
**Berding, Andrew H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs  
**Bernau, Phyllis D.**, Personal Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles  
**Bishop, F. A.**, Deputy Secretary of the British Cabinet  
**Black, Eugene**, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
**Blankenhorn, Herbert A. von**, German Permanent Representative to NATO  
**Blessing, Karl**, President of the Bundesbank  
**Bock, Fritz**, Austrian Trade Minister  
**Boegner, Jean-Marie**, Diplomatic Adviser to President de Gaulle  
**Bohlen, Charles E.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from December 1959  
**Bolz, Lothar**, Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic  
**Brandt, Willy**, Governing Mayor of Berlin  
**Brentano, Heinrich von**, German Foreign Minister  
**Brook, Sir Norman C.**, Secretary of the British Cabinet  
**Brosio, Manlio**, Italian Ambassador to the United States  
**Bruce, David K. E.**, Ambassador to Germany until October 1959  
**Bulganan, Nikolai Aleksandrovich**, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union until March 1958  
**Burgess, W. Randolph**, Permanent Representative to NATO  
**Burke, Admiral Arleigh A.**, Chief of Naval Operations  
**Burns, Findley Jr.**, Political Officer at the Mission at Berlin from August 1958

## XXIV List of Persons

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- Caccia, Sir Harold A.**, British Ambassador to the United States
- Calhoun, John A.**, Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, September 1958–September 1960
- Cameron, Turner C., Jr.**, Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from September 1958
- Carbonnel, Eric C.M. de**, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry
- Carstens, Karl**, Head of the Political Section, German Foreign Ministry, from September 1959; thereafter Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs
- Cash, Frank E., Jr.**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Chapin, Frederick L.**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until March 1959
- Clay, General Lucius D.**, former U.S. Commandant, Berlin
- Couve de Murville, Maurice**, French Foreign Minister
- Cowles, Cal**, ICA Program Officer in Austria
- Cumming, Hugh S., Jr.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Debré, Michel**, French Prime Minister from January 1959
- de Courcel, Geoffrey C.**, Secretary General of the Presidency of France from January 1959
- de Gaulle, Charles**, French Prime Minister, June 1958–January 1959; thereafter President of France
- de Leusse**, *see* Leusse
- Denny, Admiral Sir Michael**, Chairman of the British Joint Services Staff to the United States
- Dillon, C. Douglas**, Under Secretary of State
- Dirksen, Everett M.**, Senator from Illinois
- Dixon, Sir Pierson**, British Representative to the United Nations
- Douglas, James H.**, Secretary of the Air Force until December 1959; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Douglas-Home, Alexander Frederick**, British Foreign Secretary from July 1960
- Dowling, Walter C.**, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from December 1959
- Drinkall, John K.**, Western Department, British Foreign Office
- Dubs, Adolph**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1959
- Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand**, Head of the Eastern Department, German Foreign Ministry
- Dulles, Allen W.**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Dulles, Eleanor L.**, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of German Affairs, Department of State, until October 1959
- Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State until April 1959
- Eckardt, Felix von**, State Secretary, Federal Republic of Germany
- Eddleman, General Clyde D.**, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, from April 1959
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States
- Eisenhower, Major John S. D.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President from October 1958
- Erhard, Ludwig**, German Minister of Economics
- Etzel, Franz**, German Minister of Finance
- Farley, Philip J.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy from March 1958
- Fechter, Rudolf**, Eastern Department, German Foreign Ministry
- Fessenden, Russell**, Acting Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, from June 1959
- Figl, Leopold**, Austrian Foreign Minister until May 1959

- Freers, Edward L.**, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State  
**Fulbright, J. William**, Senator from Arkansas
- Galloway, William J.**, First Secretary of the Embassy in Austria until March 1959  
**Gates, Thomas S., Jr.**, Secretary of the Navy until June 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense, June–December 1959; thereafter Secretary of Defense  
**Gerstenmaier, Eugene**, President of the Bundestag  
**Gibson, William M.**, Director, Office of International Conferences, Department of State, from January 1959  
**Globke, Hans**, Federal State Secretary, Federal Republic of Germany  
**Gomulka, Wladislaw**, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party  
**Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J.**, Staff Secretary to the President  
**Graf, Ferdinand**, Austrian Defense Minister  
**Gray, Gordon**, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until June 1958; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from July 1958  
**Green, Howard C.**, Canadian Minister of Public Works until May 1959; thereafter Secretary of State for External Affairs  
**Greene, Joseph N., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until October 1959  
**Grewe, Wilhelm C.**, German Ambassador to the United States from February 1958  
**Gromyko, Andrei Andreivich**, Soviet Foreign Minister  
**Gronchi, Giovanni**, President of Italy  
**Grotewohl, Otto**, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic  
**Grubyakov, A. M.**, Senior Assistant to the Soviet Foreign Minister  
**Gufler, Bernard**, Assistant Chief of Mission at Berlin
- Hagerty, James C.**, Press Secretary to the President  
**Haider, Erich**, Special Assistant to the Austrian Chancellor  
**Hakort, Guenther**, Head, Economic Department, German Foreign Ministry  
**Halleck, Charles**, Representative from Indiana  
**Hamlett, Major General Barksdale**, U.S. Commandant, Berlin  
**Hammarskjöld, Dag**, United Nations Secretary-General  
**Hancock, Patrick F.**, British Representative to the Four-Power Working Group  
**Hare, Raymond A.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from January 1960  
**Harriman, W. Averell**, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union  
**Hartmann, Edward**, Austrian Minister of Agriculture  
**Harvey, Constance R.**, Officer in Charge of Italian-Austrian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**Hase, Karl-Gunter von**, Press Officer, German Foreign Ministry  
**Haymerle, Heinz**, Political Director, Austrian Foreign Ministry  
**Heeney, Arnold D. P.**, Canadian Ambassador to the United States from April 1959  
**Helmer, Oskar**, Austrian Interior Minister to July 1959  
**Herter, Christian A.**, Under Secretary of State until April 21, 1959; thereafter Secretary of State  
**Hertz, Paul**, Berlin Senator for Economic Affairs  
**Herwarth, Hans von**, German Ambassador to the United Kingdom  
**Heusinger, General Adolf**, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr  
**Heuss, Theodor**, President of the Federal Republic of Germany until July 1959  
**Hickenlooper, Bourke B.**, Senator from Iowa  
**Hillenbrand, Martin J.**, Director, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from September 1958  
**Hodes, General Henry I.**, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, until March 1959  
**Home**, *see* Douglas-Home  
**Hood, Viscount Samuel**, Minister of the British Embassy in United States

## XXVI List of Persons

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- Hope, C. Peter**, Head, News Department, British Foreign Office  
**Houghton, Amory**, Ambassador to France  
**Hoyer Millar**, *see* Millar  
**Humphrey, Hubert H.**, Senator from Minnesota
- Irwin, John N. II**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until January 1959
- Jackling, R. W.**, Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States  
**James, Alan G.**, Assistant Chief, Report and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until November 1959  
**Jandrey, Frederick W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until April 1958  
**Jebb, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn**, British Ambassador in France until 1960  
**Johnson, Lyndon B.**, Senator from Texas  
**Joxe, Louis**, Permanent Secretary General, French Foreign Ministry, until July 1959; Secretary of State to the Prime Minister until January 1960
- Kamitz, Reinhard**, Austrian Finance Minister  
**Kearney, Richard D.**, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State  
**Kessel, Albrecht von**, Chargé of the German Embassy in the United States  
**Kharlamov, Mikhail A.**, Director of the Press Office, Soviet Foreign Ministry  
**Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyeovich**, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers from March 1958  
**Klein, David**, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Germany until March 1960; thereafter First Secretary  
**Klein, Gunther**, Berlin Senator for Federal Affairs  
**Knight, Ridgway B.**, Deputy Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, from August 1959  
**Kohler, Foy D.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, February 1958–December 1959; thereafter Assistant Secretary  
**Krapf, Franz**, German Minister in the United States  
**Krebs, Max V.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until June 1958; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
**Kreisky, Bruno**, Austrian Foreign Minister from July 1959  
**Kroll, Hans**, German Ambassador to the Soviet Union from May 1958  
**Kusterer, Hermann**, interpreter, German Embassy in the United States  
**Kuznetsov, Vasili Vasilevich**, Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Laloy, Jean**, Director, European Affairs, French Foreign Ministry  
**Lampson, Edward T.**, Acting Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until January 1960  
**Laskey, Denis S.**, Principal Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
**Lay, James S., Jr.**, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council  
**Label, Claude**, Minister Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States  
**Legendre, Michel**, Deputy Director, Central European Department, French Foreign Ministry  
**Lejins, Nora M.**, Assistant Chief, Division of Language Services, Department of State, until October 1958  
**LeMay, General Curtis**, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force  
**Lemmer, Ernst**, German Minister for Posts and Telecommunications  
**Leopold, Kurt**, German Economic Representative in Berlin and head of Treuhandstelle  
**Lightner, Edwin A., Jr.**, Assistant Chief of Mission at Berlin, from June 1959  
**Lipschitz, Joachim**, Berlin Senator of the Interior  
**Lisle, Raymond E.**, Deputy Director, Office of German Affairs, Department of State, until September 1958

- Lloyd, Selwyn**, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until June 1960; thereafter Chancellor of the Exchequer
- Lodge, Henry Cabot**, Representative to the United Nations
- Long, Edward T.**, Special Assistant, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, October 1959; Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, December 1959
- Looram, Matthew J.**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Lubke, Heinrich**, President of the Federal Republic of Germany from July 1959
- Lucet, Charles**, Minister of the French Embassy in the United States
- Lyon, Cecil B.**, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in France from March 1958
- Macmillan, Harold**, British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
- Macomber, William B. Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
- Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich**, Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom
- Malinovsky, Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich**, Soviet Minister of Defense
- Mann, Thomas C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until April 1958; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
- Markushin, Lieutenant Colonel M.F.**, Soviet Deputy Commandant in Berlin from February 1958
- Martin, William Mc.**, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
- Matthews, H. Freeman**, Ambassador to Austria
- McBride, Robert H.**, Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until September 1958; thereafter Director
- McCloy, John J.**, former High Commissioner for Germany
- McCone, John A.**, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
- McElroy, Neil H.**, Secretary of Defense until December 1959
- McFarland, James H.**, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until March 1960
- McKiernan, Thomas D.**, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until January 1960
- McSweeney, John M.**, Acting Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1959
- Menshikov, Mikhail Alekseevich**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
- Merchant, Livingston T.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, November 1958–August 1959; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Meznik, Friedrich**, Chief, Press Bureau, Austrian Federal Chancellery
- Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich**, First Deputy Chairman, Soviet Council of Ministers
- Millar, Frederick Hoyer**, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President
- Moch, Jules**, French Representative to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference
- Morgan, George A.**, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from April 1958; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning from August 1959
- Mountbatten, Admiral Louis**, British Chief of the Defense Staff and Chairman, Chief of Staff, from July 1959
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959
- Nixon, Richard M.**, Vice President of the United States
- Nolting, Frederick E., Jr.**, Deputy Representative to NATO
- Norstad, General Lauris**, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe; also Commander, U.S. European Command, from September 1958

## XXVIII List of Persons

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**Nunley, William T.**, Acting United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

**Ollenhauer, Erich**, Head of the German Social Democratic Party

**Oncken, Dirk**, First Secretary of the Western Department, German Foreign Ministry

**O'Neill, Con D. W.**, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

**Ormsby-Gore, William David**, Minister of State, British Foreign Office

**Pauls, Rolf**, German Embassy in the United States

**Pella, Giuseppe**, Italian Foreign Minister

**Persons, Major General Wilton B.**, Assistant to the President from September 1958

**Pervukhin, Mikhail Georgievich**, Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic from February 1958

**Pitterman, Bruno**, Austrian Vice Chancellor and leader of the Socialist Party

**Platzer, Wilfred**, Austrian Ambassador to the United States

**Quarles, Donald**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until May 1959

**Raab, Julius**, Chancellor of Austria

**Rae, Saul F.**, Canadian Minister in the United States

**Rau, Heinrich**, German Democratic Republic Minister for Foreign and Inter-German Trade

**Rayburn, Sam**, Representative from Texas; Speaker of the House

**Reinhardt, G. Frederick**, Counselor of the Department of State until January 1960

**Reinstein, Jacques J.**, Director, Office of German Affairs, Department of State, until July 1958; Counselor of the Embassy in France with rank of Minister from June 1959

**Riddleberger, James N.**, Director of the International Cooperation Administration from March 1959

**Roberts, Sir Frank**, British Permanent Representative to NATO

**Schaerf, Adolf**, President of Austria from May 1959

**Scherpenberg, Albert H. van**, State Secretary, German Foreign Ministry

**Schmid, Carlo**, former Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party

**Segni, Antonio**, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, July 1958–January 1959; Prime Minister, February 1959–February 1960; thereafter Foreign Minister

**Seydoux, François**, French Ambassador to Germany

**Smirnov, Andrei Andreevich**, Soviet Ambassador to Germany

**Smith, Gerard C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

**Smith, James H.**, Director of the International Cooperation Administration

**Soldatov, Aleksandr Andreevich**, Head of American Countries Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry

**Spaak, Paul-Henri**, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**Staats, Elmer B.**, Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board

**Stabler, Wells**, Officer in Charge of Italian-Austrian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from May 1959

**Steel, Christopher**, British Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

**Stikker, Dirk U.**, Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO

**Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, July–August 1960; thereafter Director

**Straneo, Carlo Alberto**, Director General of Political Affairs, Italian Foreign Ministry

**Strauss, Franz-Josef**, German Defense Minister

**Strauss, Lewis L.**, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission until June 1958; Secretary of Commerce, November 1958–June 1959

- Sullivan, Charles A.**, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, February 1959; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, October 1960
- Thompson, Llewellyn E.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Thurston, Raymond L.**, Consul General at the Embassy in France from April 1958
- Torbert, Horace G.**, Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until September 1958
- Trimble, William C.**, Counselor of the Embassy in Germany until April 1958; Minister until February 1959
- Troyanovski, Oleg Antonovich**, Soviet translator
- Twining, General Nathan F.**, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until September 1960
- Tyler, William R.**, Counselor for Political Affairs in the Embassy in Germany from April 1958
- Ulbricht, Walter**, Chairman of the Socialist Unity Party
- Vaucelles, Pierre de**, French Alternate Representative to the United Nations
- Vigderman, Alfred G.**, Deputy Director, Office of German Affairs, Department of State, from November 1958
- Vinogradov, Sergei Aleksandrovich**, Soviet Ambassador to France
- Vockel, Heinrich**, German Representative in Berlin
- Wadsworth, James J.**, Representative to the General Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests
- Waldheim, Kurt**, Austrian Foreign Minister
- Walters, Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel after April 1960) Vernon A.**, Staff Assistant to the President until May 1960
- Waugh, Samuel**, President of the Export-Import Bank
- Weber, Heinz**, German interpreter
- Wellington, Rebecca G.**, First Secretary of the Embassy in Germany until March 1959
- Wells, Alfred W.**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from September 1959
- White, Ivan B.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from March 1959
- White, General Thomas D.**, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
- Whitman, Ann C.**, President Eisenhower's Personal Secretary
- Whitney, John Hay**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom
- Williamson, Francis T.**, Director of Research-Analysis for Western Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1959
- Winckler, Jean-Claude**, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States
- Winzer, Otto**, Deputy Foreign Minister, German Democratic Republic
- Yakubovski, General Ivan Ignatievich**, Commander in Chief, Soviet Army Group, German Democratic Republic
- Zakharov, General Matvei Vasileevich**, Commander, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
- Zakharov, Major General Nikolai F.**, Soviet Commandant in Berlin
- Zedtwitz, Paul**, Counselor of the Austrian Embassy in the United States
- Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich**, Head, Soviet Delegation to the U.N. Disarmament Committee
- Zulueta, Philip F. de**, Private Secretary to Prime Minister Macmillan





# Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960

## AUGUST–DECEMBER 1959: THE STATUS OF BERLIN FOLLOWING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE; THE WESTERN SUMMIT DECEMBER 19–21, 1959

### 1. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, August 10, 1959, 1 p.m.

294. Paris pass Thurston and Finn and USRO. Chancellor showed great pleasure and relief when informed President prepared visit Bonn.<sup>1</sup> I think it well to assess situation in which he now finds himself compared with even few months ago.

Internally, his leadership, though still dominant, has suffered from recent performance on issue Presidency. German people have not brushed off his vacillations as quickly or completely as he had hoped and expected. Very fact he exploded bombshell on eve of slack summer political season caused unusual echoes of confusion and criticism to reverberate, without any available issue of domestic significance giving opportunity to divert public attention and reassert his influence. Am not suggesting Adenauer's political star will further decline but certainly is not presently at zenith.

Externally, his prestige has undoubtedly suffered. The Soviets were ready and did capitalize on this. Moreover, the state of Anglo-German relations, already unsatisfactory, was further exacerbated by derogatory glee expressed in British publications over the Chancellor's daisy-

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Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Noform. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, Rome, and Vienna.

<sup>1</sup> At 10 a.m. Washington time, August 9, the White House announced that the President would visit Bonn in the course of his trip to London and Paris August 26–September 7.

plucking Presidential antics. His frequent and indiscreet references to British "softness" in dealing with Soviets, his conviction that their tactics reflected appeasement spirit, fear lest Macmillan had made secret concessions in Moscow, and other suspicions, coupled with reports of how he was regarded in certain English circles as a tiresome, stubborn, arrogant and unrealistic old foggy, overcame his usual sense of caution and his innate politeness. He does not understand British mentality and character, although genuinely admiring the race and in particular, Winston Churchill. Per contra, if the British are in an appeasing mood it certainly does not extend to their transactions with Adenauer, nor have their negotiations with him been distinguished by grace or tact. Especially since the Heuss visit,<sup>2</sup> the Germans, so desirous of being liked, have realized that the British have long memories, and ineradicable pride and prejudice.

It is, therefore, with heightened alarm and resentment that Adenauer has lately viewed what he thinks is British effort to influence United States Government to establish a new and dangerously naive Anglo-Saxon policy regarding SovUnion. Normally, he would have turned to de Gaulle for comfort and understanding. But now such support has partially failed him, for the General has made it quite apparent that the Franco-German entente is all very well, but on some matters France's position is unique. Perhaps, Adenauer sorrowfully feels that often there is one who loves and another who lets himself be loved.

As consequences of such preoccupations and misgivings, although as devoted as ever to the cause of European integration, he may yearn more than ever for American good will and sympathy, but feels less certain than in past few years of its being extended to him.

President's visit will afford valuable chance to soothe Chancellor's apprehensions. I would recommend for consideration, instead of any formal agenda items, the President's approach in talks with Adenauer should be reassuring on broad aspects of Western unity, and that he reassert support for basic policies we have hitherto followed, and with which Chancellor personally identifies himself. I do not think there are specific outstanding issues between US and Germany needing attention in relatively short time prescribed for conversations. The old gentleman likes to talk and will not be backward in presentation, including his views on Chinese population growth and Siberian dust bowl.

The better the atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding on fundamental aspects of East-West relations, the greater the benefits will be, not only with regard to Adenauer's own attitude, but also in ex-

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<sup>2</sup> President Heuss paid a State visit to the United Kingdom beginning October 20, 1958.

posing and refuting Soviet campaign directed against him personally and against Fed Rep as member Western Alliance.

We must bear in mind that one of Moscow's principal aims continues to be to drive wedge between Adenauer and his allies, particularly ourselves. The mode of this political offensive is directly related to Communist propaganda line hailing the forthcoming visits<sup>3</sup> as dawn of new era in East-West relations, and as golden opportunity for mankind (chiefly due to unremitting efforts of SovUnion) to end cold war. Soviet propaganda, of course, is also emphasizing that extent of dedication to cause of peace of individual governments and statesmen is revealed by degree to which they rejoice over implications of visits as defined by Moscow. Any doubts or lack of enthusiasm are exploited by Moscow as clear evidence of opposition to cause of peace, and thus of desire to perpetuate cold war in order fulfill aggressive aims. SovUnion is obviously trying to pin onto Adenauer label of frustrated and embittered supporter of continued East-West tension and revanchist policies.

For months there have been rumblings and grumblings in Germany, and much criticism abroad, of Adenauer and the obduracy of his political conduct. However, I do not personally know of a single major incident having occurred for years, where, after he has freely expressed his own opinion, he has not aligned his political action to conform to that decided upon by the United States Government. Age has not blunted his combativeness, and neither has it lessened his conviction that there are only two great powers in the world, the US and the USSR. He chose long ago partnership with the former, and although he may at times fear bankruptcy he will remain determined to assume his share of the liabilities. Speculations about his senility are, in my opinion, baseless, nor do I find him more difficult to deal with now than in the past.

I think it likely he feels the course of events of recent months has brought about an impairment of his prestige and position in councils of the West. I do not believe he feels this goes as far as disavowal of his policies, but he may fear we consider him not sufficiently aware of new opportunities to be explored. Therefore, it would seem important that President's visit Bonn serve to remove doubts Adenauer may entertain on this score, and make clear to world opinion (especially Kremlin) that efforts to brand Adenauer as aggressor and isolate him from his allies have failed and will fail.

Adenauer will certainly want to discuss Khrushchev's visit to the United States in context of possibility serious examination possibility new disarmament negotiations, matter which is dear to his heart. He

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<sup>3</sup> Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September and the President's anticipated return visit to the Soviet Union.

will also look for assurance that United States remains firmly committed to NATO and that conversations between the President and Khrushchev will not lead to any alteration in basic US attitude to general problem of Western security in Adenauer's mind ghost of "Radford Plan" episode in 1956<sup>4</sup> has never been fully exorcised. He will certainly appreciate utmost frankness from President, and I am sure he will in any case be greatly encouraged by mere fact that President has been willing to give him opportunity express his views in private conversation.

Bruce

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<sup>4</sup>Documentation on the "Radford Plan" incident in the summer of 1956 is in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. IV, pp. 84 ff.

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## 2. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 21, 1959, 2 p.m.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

The President next said that the indications are that Adenauer, after showing reason initially, had since become very inflexible in his attitudes during the last couple of weeks. Mr. Herter said he is both inflexible and deeply suspicious. Fundamentally he is approaching his problems from a domestic political standpoint—he is fearful of the large Socialist vote in East Germany. In fact, Mr. Herter believed that Adenauer for that reason does not want a reunified Germany even though he continues to call for reunification publicly, as he must.

The President commented that if Adenauer is really fearful of reunification, he should be favorable to steps short of full reunification. Mr. Herter said the West Germans would like to have contact with the East Germans, without recognizing them, limiting contacts to the technical level, and having the Western countries represented in any committee that is set up. The President asked Mr. Herter whether all this means that we are just going to take an adamant and negative stand. He asked what ideas we have.

Mr. Herter said that the crux of the matter is that the Soviets want to destroy our protection of West Berlin. He thought it might be useful for us to tell Khrushchev that we have no desire to stay in West Berlin in perpetuity. That is why we wish to find some solution in Germany. The President asked what can be done that Adenauer will accept. Mr. Herter thought we should try to get an arrangement which would carry us over the German elections in the fall of 1961. Thereafter, contacts between the West Germans and East Germans might prove possible to work out.

Mr. Herter said there are two matters of principle involved. The Soviets are trying by pressure to get us out of our rights in West Berlin. They are also trying by pressure to get us to reduce our troops in West Berlin. The President said that if Khrushchev wants to liquidate the occupation he should agree on free elections in Germany.

The President said he would like to meet with the State Department representatives on Monday or Tuesday and have from them a working paper that he can use for each of the capitals he is going to visit. Behind that there should be a paper indicating just what are the limits to which we can go in talking to Khrushchev. Mr. Herter said he really thought that for the time being the best thing for us to do is to get a two-to-three year modus vivendi. The President said we must have our own position with respect to the Soviets on Germany very clear and with this in mind consider how we can best talk with Adenauer, Macmillan and de Gaulle.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

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### 3. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, August 21, 1959.

#### SUBJECT

Some Basic Factors in the German Situation

In addition to the various points made in the several papers prepared for the President's talks with Adenauer, you may wish to have the

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2159. Secret. Drafted by Hiltenbrand and sent through Merchant. The source text was initialed by Kohler, Merchant, and Calhoun and bears the notation: "The President and the Secretary read, 8/26."

following general considerations in mind in discussing the German situation with the President. There are certain persistent psychological and political factors which color the situation in the Federal Republic and are a necessary part of any realistic approach.

1. We must assume that the Federal Government will be unable to keep any secrets. Sooner or later (usually sooner) everything leaks in Bonn. This is due to a combination of indiscipline and intrigue in the Foreign Office and deliberate policy on the part of the Chancellor's press office headed by von Eckhardt. No matter what the protestations that secrecy must and will be observed, sad experience in Geneva and elsewhere has shown that this is beyond the capacity of the Federal Government. One or more of the numerous correspondents resident in Bonn will always get the story.

2. The German Foreign Office is in a sad state of leaderless disarray, full of faction and intrigue. Various schools of thought propound their own views and attempt to manipulate their acceptance, cutting each other's bureaucratic throats in the process. Foreign Minister von Brentano has lost the respect of his staff and has shown an incapacity for having his views accepted by the Chancellor or doing anything effective in support of them.

3. Since the end of World War II, Chancellor Adenauer has nurtured a deep-seated fear that the United States and the Soviet Union would one day get together and carve up the world, including Germany, to suit their own interests. This is an irrational, almost pathological, factor; acceptance of it as a reality is the only explanation for the intensity of the Chancellor's reactions to such developments as the Radford Plan incident. On the eve of bilateral discussions between the President and Khrushchev, it is likely to be at a point of acute hypersensitivity.

4. The Chancellor obviously fancies himself as a person who knows how to deal realistically with the Soviets. Somewhat patronizingly, he has managed to give the impression during recent months that other Western leaders, with some exceptions, are less wise in the ways of the Soviets and, therefore, inclined to be less firm in standing up to them. Despite the possible basis in fact which the conduct of the British may have given the Chancellor for his attitude, there is no reason for Western leaders to have any inferiority feelings vis-à-vis Adenauer on this subject. The Chancellor has been influenced by the historical illusion which has more than once led German leaders to believe that they have some special faculty for understanding Russians and getting the better of them. Although Adenauer would be the last to favor a so-called "Rapallo mentality", his superiority feelings on the subject derive partially from the same basic tradition shared by Rathenau and other German leaders of the "1920's". However, his own record of negotiations

with the Soviets in the single example provided by the post-war period is not conspicuous for its success. Many feel that the agreements arising out of the Adenauer visit to Moscow in 1955 represented considerably less than a diplomatic triumph. Some experts believe that the weaknesses evidenced by the representatives of the Federal Republic at that time has been an important factor in subsequent Soviet conduct towards West Germany.

5. A persistent factor in Adenauer's and von Brentano's thinking has been a complete lack of self-confidence in the capacity of the West Germans to stand up against any political or psychological blandishments from the East should they be exposed to them. This has resulted in a lack of willingness to consider any institutionalization of contacts with the East Germans, short of recognition, which, on a theoretical basis, might seem to be of inevitable advantage to the West with its superior political and economic attractions. This lack of self-confidence derives principally, it would seem, from recollection of German susceptibility in the past, particularly during the Nazi period, to political aberrations. Cutting across it, of course, are internal political considerations based on the Chancellor's conviction that the SPD (the principal opposition party) has now become thoroughly unreliable in its leadership and cannot be counted on not to sell out to the East.

6. Despite these negative factors and the general lack of confidence in the strength of the Federal Republic evidenced by its own Government, when all is said and done, the situation in the Federal Republic is basically healthy and provides realistic ground for optimism as to both the political and economic future of the country. The Bundestag as a legislative body has grown in collective stature and in the quality of its individual membership during the relatively brief period of its existence. Considering the magnitude of the post-war problems faced by the Federal Government and the need to construct a new bureaucratic tradition out of the ruins of the previous regime, and to recruit personnel under difficult conditions, the inadequacies of the present Federal executive should not be overemphasized. All in all the Federal Republic is actually and potentially one of the soundest and strongest members of the European Community, whose continuing support and loyalty is vital to American interests.



4. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, August 25, 1959, 5 p.m.

434. Ref Embtel 413.<sup>1</sup> Van Scherpenberg sent for me this morning to say Chancellor had instructed him give me summary 13-page personal letter from Khrushchev, but he was not authorized to give full text. Letter had said no publication of text would be made by Soviets and it would be left entirely in Adenauer's discretion whether he published it. This he has not yet decided.

Van Scherpenberg stated it differed from recent Soviet notes and letters in that it was in terms such as customarily are used only from person to person, and its language was unusually courteous in spite of the sternness of some of its contents.

It started off with an historical review of Soviet-German relations which are now at a turning point. Khrushchev remarked that, if statements by Chancellor and other FedRep statesmen that they have no territorial claims against the Soviets are true, then there are only ideological differences between the two governments. (Scherpenberg commented that the implications of this portion are unclear.)

The letter goes on to point out there are two independent German states. Adenauer has not been willing to accept this situation, but it does no good to ignore reality.

Then there were references to the militaristic and revanchist tendencies of the West Germans. FedRep is the strongest power amongst the capitalist nations of Europe and is able to build a strong army, which facts the Soviets recognize. But even if FedRep military strength and that of Allies are added together, they will not be able to match Soviet Armed Forces. In this connection, there was bragging about Soviet military power and references to missiles and rockets.

Khrushchev mentioned Hitler's demands for more breathing space for Germany and said recent developments in the FedRep demonstrate this is not necessary.

If FedRep and Adenauer personally do not subscribe to revanchist ideas, then what prevents them signing a general peace treaty to legalize

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2559. Secret; Noform; Limit Distribution; Priority. Repeated priority to London, Paris, Moscow, and Rome. Copies were given to the President, Herter, and Merchant on their arrival in Bonn on August 26.

<sup>1</sup> Dated August 24, telegram 413 from Bonn reported that Smirnov had delivered a 13-page letter from Khrushchev to Adenauer and that the Foreign Ministry had given the Embassy in Bonn only a very general outline of the contents. For full text of the letter, August 18, see *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 586–593. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2459)

present state of affairs and tranquilize other peoples as well as their own?

No one should believe FedRep would become socialist or East Germany capitalist against the wish of their own people.

Adenauer's government has done everything to prevent a settlement of the Berlin question, although it has no rights, legal or otherwise, to deal with Berlin. As long as there is no peace treaty with Germany, as long as occupation lasts, as long as in West Berlin, the "Center of the GDR" foreign troops remain, it will always be easy to create conditions leading to catastrophe. Then followed another appeal to accept reality. The conclusion of a peace treaty would bring reunification into the realm of practicality. If Adenauer wants reunification, he must change present policy.

It is purely an internal question whether Germany develops along capitalist or socialist lines. Invitation to other nations to mix in this affair is dangerous and could lead to war.

If Adenauer desires to leave solution such questions to institutions where capitalist states have 3 votes and socialists only 1, this is absurd and unacceptable. Under the circumstances, the Soviets have reason to believe Adenauer does not want reunification but wishes to continue the cold war. If this were not true, Chancellor would make contacts with GDR to achieve results. As USSR has often said, unless Chancellor accepts such contacts with GDR no reunification is possible. Therefore, he should accept formation of an all-German commission.

USSR has never refused reunification but it must be reached by agreement between two German states.

Khrushchev accuses FedRep Delegation at Geneva of having been foremost in objecting to an all-German commission.

Regarding rearmament, FedRep is more interested in Equipment of Bundeswehr with missiles and nuclear weapons than in reunification. USSR has already warned FedRep and now repeats the dangers of this.

Talks between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev are imminent. The main forces directed against the Soviet Union are stationed in Germany, France and England. This means in the event of war the front line would be in FedRep and she would suffer the brunt of USSR attacks. Khrushchev appeals to Chancellor to overcome his prejudice against GDR and other socialist countries and to establish normal relations with his neighbors. (Scherpenberg finds this reference obscure, so far as it applies to GDR.)

If all this fails, USSR will have to make separate peace treaty with GDR. Another appeal to Chancellor to make his contribution to finish cold war. [*sic*]

Paper ends by referring to prospective talks between US and USSR. Language is approximately, "We attach great importance to forthcoming talks with President Eisenhower. Perhaps we find ourselves on edge of historical turning point in relations between two blocs which might lead to rapprochement and guarantee of peaceful co-existence between all states." USSR cannot limit itself to talking to President about maize and cucumbers but will address itself to unsolved problems of the world.

Most important unsolved problem is to liquidate remains of last war. USSR convinced basis required for mutually acceptable agreement can be found. For its part, it will do everything possible to contribute to such end.

**Bruce**

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## 5. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/1

Bonn, August 27, 1959, 9:35 a.m.

### PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

August–September 1959

#### SUBJECT

Private Meeting Between President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer<sup>1</sup>

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

President Eisenhower

Martin J. Hillenbrand

*Federal Republic of Germany*

Chancellor Adenauer

Heinz Weber (interpreter)

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Goodpaster on August 28. The conversation took place at the Palais Schaumburg.

<sup>1</sup> President Eisenhower arrived at Wahn Airport at 6:30 on August 26. Following ceremonies at the airport, in which he reiterated U.S. support for Berlin, the President proceeded to Bonn where he was briefed by Ambassador Bruce. August 27 was spent in meetings with Adenauer before the President departed for London at 5:10 p.m. For text of the airport statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, p. 608; for the President's account of the visit to Bonn, see *Waging Peace*, pp. 416–418; for Major Eisenhower's account, see *Strictly Personal*, pp. 240–243; Bruce's account of the visit is in Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Additional documentation on the President's trip to Europe is in volume VII, Part 2.

In the private meeting lasting approximately ninety minutes between President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer which took place this morning, the Chancellor began by saying that he wanted to give the President a short survey of the situation in Europe and in NATO. He noted that he had recently had a lengthy conversation with General Norstad and Secretary General Spaak at the home of the Netherlands permanent representative, Stikker, at Lake Como. This conversation was between friends and took place, as Spaak had said, as in a family circle. President had seen yesterday evening, Adenauer continued, how the Germans regarded him and the United States. The area between the airport and the bridge over the Rhine entering into Bonn was populated largely by industrial workers. These had evidenced no difference in attitude towards the President than the population of Bonn itself. The Chancellor mentioned that the policy of his Government continued to be supported by a majority of the German electorate according to recent public opinion polls. As a matter of fact, a recent public opinion poll had shown that the CDU had the support of 51 per cent of the population of the Federal Republic. Such a high level of support was unique in a period prior to elections. The Chancellor predicted that, unless something quite unexpected happened, the CDU would win the Bundestag elections in 1961. This would mean a continuation of the policy of the present Government.

The Chancellor went on, saying that he would like to make a few remarks about the personality of Khrushchev. He assumed that he could talk as frankly on this subject to the President as he had been able to John Foster Dulles. This would also apply to what he later would have to say about General de Gaulle. In the autumn of 1955, the Chancellor continued, he had spent six days (mornings, afternoons, and evenings) in Moscow speaking to the Soviet leaders.<sup>2</sup> At that time, of course, Bulganin was the head of the Soviet Government, but he had also had ample opportunity to observe Khrushchev. One of the main points made by Khrushchev to Adenauer was that the Germans should help him. Khrushchev expressed fear of the United States and of Communist China, but did not mention any other European countries. As to Red China, he alluded to the rapid rate of population growth, pointing out that the already huge population of 600 million was increasing each year by some 12 million. A good illustration of Khrushchev's character, according to the Chancellor, was provided by the very long letter which he had received a few days ago from the Soviet leader.<sup>3</sup> He (Adenauer) had the impression that this had not been drafted in the Foreign Ministry but

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<sup>2</sup> Regarding Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, p. 573.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 4.

largely by Khrushchev himself. The latter stated that, as a realist, Adenauer should recognize the facts of life. The point was emphasized that while, in the past, Russian-German relations had had their good periods and their bad periods, the good periods were obviously of great advantage to both countries. Economic cooperation between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union could only be beneficial to both. In his letter Khrushchev went on to say that ideological differences should play no part between Adenauer and him and that the remains of the last war should be removed and the way opened to harmonious relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. He boasted that the Soviet Union was stronger than the United States and all its Allies counted together. However, although the world was no longer at a point where the Soviets could be threatened, he (Khrushchev) and the Chancellor had witnessed too much horror in their time to want to intimidate each other.

Adenauer noted that Khrushchev's letter did contain a very strong personal and human touch. He had not yet answered it but had himself prepared a draft of a possible reply.<sup>4</sup> As the President knew, it had been agreed between the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn and the German Foreign Ministry that the exchange of correspondence would only be released by common agreement. Before sending his reply, Adenauer first wanted to have his discussion with the President. His reply was likewise couched in a reasonable and moderate tone. It made the main point that the tensions in the world are not caused by the remains of the last war, as claimed by Khrushchev, but by competition in armaments. If controlled general disarmament could be achieved, this would be a decisive factor. The atmosphere thereupon would be relaxed, and it would be possible to settle other issues. Adenauer said that he would make the point that he who has the strongest weapons is not necessarily the greatest statesman. The greatest statesman will be the one who liberates the world from the pressure of mounting terror and armaments.

The President said that this was the line which he expected to take with Khrushchev. If he wanted to be the great man of his time, not just another Lenin or Stalin, he should relieve the world of these tensions, thus contributing toward permanent progress. This would be the main theme of what he would say to Khrushchev, the President repeated, with, of course, all sorts of different variations.

Adenauer continued that, in his draft reply, he also made the point that who is strongest in the world is not of interest to him, because if there were war, the victor would not enjoy the fruits of his victory. The President commented that there would be no victor in a future war.

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<sup>4</sup> For text of Adenauer's reply, August 27, see *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 593–595.

The Chancellor noted that it was typical of Khrushchev that, despite the prior agreement on the subject, he had now published his letter. The President said he would merely suggest to the Chancellor that, in his reply, he note this fact before going on to questions of substance. The Chancellor said that, when Ambassador Smirnov came in yesterday to tell the Foreign Office that the letter of Khrushchev would be published after all, he was obviously very embarrassed when it was pointed out to him that this was in violation of the agreement that the exchange would not be released without mutual consent. This unreliability was typical of Khrushchev, the Chancellor pointed out, together with his deep-seated conviction that Communism will win the world under Soviet leadership.

The President commented that, when someone is deceitful and breaks his word to achieve some specific gain thereby, we can understand his motivation if he is a Communist. But what did Khrushchev gain by conduct of this kind? Adenauer said that the letter from Khrushchev was very cleverly drafted. Its release was obviously intended to influence German public opinion during the visit of the President. In response to the President's query, the Chancellor said that, as far as he knew, the communications of Khrushchev to Macmillan and de Gaulle<sup>5</sup> had not so far been published. As a matter of fact, the letter to de Gaulle was in a different form. It seemed to be essentially a memorandum. As to the nature of the communication to Macmillan, the Chancellor was not aware of its contents but knew only that it had been received.

[Here follows discussion of General de Gaulle and Algeria.]<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Macmillan transmitted a copy of Khrushchev's August 12 letter to the President under cover of a brief personal letter dated August 18, after seeking his permission to do so. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) On August 20, Macmillan wrote to Adenauer telling him of the letter and indicating that it did not offer any new Soviet proposals. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, attached to a note from Hood to Herter, August 20)

The communication to de Gaulle was an aide-mémoire delivered by Vinogradov on August 16. Representatives of the French Embassy briefed Kohler on its contents on August 20, noting that it alluded to a summit meeting, disarmament, Berlin, and Germany. (Memorandum of conversation, August 20; *ibid.*, Central Files, 1/8-2059)

<sup>6</sup> Following the private meeting, the Heads of Government were joined by their Foreign Ministers and other advisers at 11:05 a.m. In addition to discussing the communiqué, the expanded meeting went over the same points that had been discussed in the private session. A memorandum of the larger conversation (US/MC/2) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449.

6. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, August 29, 1959, noon.

Secto 21. Pass Defense—OSD for Secretary McElroy, OSD/ISA for Knight and Barringer, JCS for Generals Twining and Picher from Secretary Gates.

Memorandum of conversation Secretaries Gates and Irwin with Defense Minister Strauss, 1100–1300 hours, August 27. Mr. Strauss carried the conversation for the first hour or more outlining his views on Berlin, disengagement, disarmament and general German problems. He opened the discussion with Berlin. He felt the Soviets would claim they had guaranteed status quo for Berlin and would then seek a price from the Western allies. He feels Mr. Khrushchev understands he cannot adhere to his original demand. Believes British will seek a new approach. Mr. Strauss firmly opposed to a Soviet free city plan or to establishing a joint committee with equal vote. He felt the equal vote procedure meant eventual defeat for the West since democratic representatives would not present a uniform position as compared to the disciplined Communist representatives. He was apprehensive that either the free city or joint committee approach would create uncertainty in Germany leading to a soft German line, neutrality, anti-NATO propaganda, et cetera.

He thought the United Kingdom would propose some form of disengagement. Disengagement appears senseless to him, regardless of what form it takes. He believes any effort toward disengagement would lead to German neutrality and the neutrality of Europe and Berlin would be forfeited as a by-product.

Mr. Irwin outlined our firm Geneva position that there could be no treaty with a divided Germany. He questioned Strauss regarding his view on disengagement and its relation to the question of inspection.

Mr. Strauss responded that inspection is not the same as disengagement. He volunteered that Germany would never be an obstacle to a realistic general disarmament proposal. Disarmament must be on the basis of forfeiting "Military Equivalence" on both sides. This does not mean necessarily equal areas but military capability. Regarding inspection he could not accept a Western area of inspection whose boundaries coincided with the frontiers of West Germany. In addition, the Eastern inspection area must include some part of the USSR. Inspection of a sat-

elite area alone as Poland, Czechoslovakia would not suffice. Germany would be destroyed by bombers from the USSR.

Switching to a discussion of nuclear weapons, Mr. Strauss said that Germany had met NATO requirements and had overcome many problems in relation to nuclear storage for the US, UK, Canada, Germany, et cetera. He now requested that the execution of US-German nuclear stockpile and technical agreements<sup>1</sup> not be delayed nor discontinued to meet any Soviet demands or negotiating gambits. If delayed this may become a bargaining point in the East-West negotiations. He felt during Presidential discussions either the UK or Mr. Khrushchev might attempt to block the atomic agreements. He feels prompt implementation is the best response. Mr. Strauss said he is most anxious that the West not fall into some disarmament trap. There was plenty of area for negotiations if the USSR were really sincere, but under present circumstances negotiations were dangerous.

Mr. Irwin assured him that we feel the greatest danger is the lack of firmness.

Mr. Gates pointed out that statements by the Vice President reaffirmed there was no change in our determination nor intention.

Mr. Strauss then pointed out improvement on the German military front. The firm platform of the FRG was to meet its military commitments. This program has popular support. He quoted statistics regarding German polls on support of present Government and its policies which show significant improvement. In this year's current poll, 71 percent in favor. The problem of conscription has disappeared. These gains could only be destroyed if an East-West agreement were developed at German expense.

Mr. Irwin asked if this improved political position would permit the extension of conscription beyond the 12-month period.

Strauss responded that after the elections in 1961 he favored extending the 12-month conscription to 18 months. At the present time a longer period was not alone a political problem but one of billeting additional forces and of attempting to train the large reserve of untapped manpower.

There was then a discussion by General Heusinger outlining German Army plans for 36 brigades of 5–6,000 men organized into 12 divisions. Seven divisions will be ready this year and all 12 divisions at somewhat reduced strength by end 1960. Two major requirements were long service volunteers and the difficulty of training areas which is

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<sup>1</sup>Presumably Strauss is referring to the agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense, signed at Bonn on May 5, which entered into force on July 27. For text of this agreement, see 10 UST 1322.



chronic in Germany. At war strength with reserve formations furnishing necessary support, he visualized the armed forces at 800,000.

Mr. Irwin asked what would be optimum proportion of long-term volunteers to conscripts when the army is at full strength. The general felt a 50–50 division would be proper proportion. This would permit necessary conscript training. The manning problem is somewhat more difficult for the Navy and Air Force because of the technical training requirement.

Mr. Strauss discussing Air Force problems stated he wanted two types of aircraft, a light tactical fighter, perhaps the G–91 for close air support and reconnaissance and a more sophisticated aircraft, the F–104, for a fighter-bomber. He feels manned air defense makes no sense, for Germany. Aircraft reaction time will be too late. For air defense he is interested in the Nike and the Hawk. He will purchase and build some 200 F–104s, may later lift this total to 350.

Strauss stressed strong desire to have US F–104 units stationed in Europe on a rotational basis, if original US plan to permanently station F–104 units in Europe cannot be implemented. These units, rotated to Germany, would be invaluable in speeding training and insuring quality of German units. Strauss referred to the tremendous assistance US F–84 units had proven in training German Air Force.

Mr. Gates stated the Air Force does not intend to base 104s in Europe but he will look into the problem of rotating 104 units.

Mr. Irwin explained that the problem would be difficult for the Air Force due to maintenance, spare parts, etc. Mr. Strauss developed at some length the advantages that would accrue if the 104 could be standardized in Europe with Canada, Germany, perhaps Belgium and the Netherlands operating one aircraft. He is opposed to the N–136, states the Belgian military are also opposed to it.

Strauss requested Tartars for Baltic destroyers (stated useless in Baltic otherwise). Requested equipment for four destroyers during 1960–1961 and four additional destroyers during 1962–1963. Germany would consider possibility of tartar production if this schedule proves impractical from a US standpoint. Gates stated we would review this. Strauss made following additional requests: increase delivery of F–84F spare parts, particularly most commonly required spares. Germans also require more spares for M–47 tanks. Made a point that readiness was impaired.

General Heusinger stated his primary requirements were anti-tank weapons, defense against low flying aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft. He is interested in US Army development of reconnaissance drones and would appreciate information. He mentioned a US Army

unit scheduled for Europe which we understood is equipped with drones in a user test stage.

Finally, Strauss requested US assistance in lifting restrictions on German production although he recognizes we are not a member of WEU.

**Herter**

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## 7. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/28

Bonn, August 27, 1959, 1 p.m.

### PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

August–September 1959

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

Secretary of State Herter

*Federal Republic of Germany*

Foreign Minister von Brentano

#### SUBJECT

German Relations with Eastern Europe; Berlin Problem

Both before and after Chancellor Adenauer's luncheon, I had the opportunity of talking to von Brentano for at least an hour and a half. During that time we covered 1) the Algerian situation (see memorandum of conversation with Ambassador Grewe);<sup>1</sup> 2) relations between Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia; 3) the thinking of the German Government on a long-range solution to the Berlin problem.

With respect to von Brentano's desire to establish diplomatic relations and conclude non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia, he told me that domestic political considerations had been the determining factor with the Chancellor and the latter had refused to go along with the Foreign Office recommendations. He himself was still

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449. Secret. Drafted by Herter and approved in S. The conversation took place at the Palais Schaumburg.

<sup>1</sup>A copy of this memorandum of conversation (US/MC/27) is *ibid*.

keen to go ahead and hoped that possibly we would land our influence in this direction. I told him that while I felt that such a move would be a desirable one, I did not think that it was a matter that we could raise unless the Chancellor took the initiative because of its domestic political implications in Germany. Von Brentano had explained that there were approximately ten million refugees from Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany in Germany and that any move toward agreement with Poland and Czechoslovakia would be an indication on the part of the Federal Government that that Government had abandoned any hope of restoring these refugees to their original homesteads.

On the matter of a long-range settlement for Berlin, von Brentano was more forthcoming than he had been in Geneva. He was very frank in saying that he believed the relationship between West Germany and East Germany could be settled if it were not for the emotional problems involved in a settlement of the Berlin question. He likewise repeated what we had earlier been led to believe was the Chancellor's position, namely, that the West German Government would not wish to enter into any agreement regarding Berlin which in any way weakened West Germany or involved moves tending toward neutralization of West Germany. In other words, West Germany would not wish to make any sacrifice in connection with a Berlin settlement.

Von Brentano then went on to say that he felt that if we could get a moratorium for three years, which would carry through the next German elections, and in the interim period begin to work out some status for Berlin which the Berliners as well as the Russians might accept, this would be a desirable thing. He envisaged some kind of free or guaranteed city with U.N. responsibility made an important element in the settlement. I told him that I thought it was very important for the President to get the Chancellor's thinking on this whole subject, if possible before the Khrushchev visit, and von Brentano said he would try to get this delineated as thoroughly as possible the next day before the Chancellor returned to Italy and then write me a personal and confidential letter on the subject.

Von Brentano volunteered that he felt it of the greatest importance that Anglo-German difficulties should be patched up and that he would be urging the Chancellor in the strongest terms to pay a visit to England before mid-September.

## 8. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/3

Bonn, August 27, 1959, 3 p.m.

### PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

August–September 1959

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

President Eisenhower

*Federal Republic of Germany*

Chancellor Adenauer

Dr. Heinz Weber (interpreter)

#### SUBJECT

Berlin and Germany, Algeria, German Relations with Eastern Europe

The Chancellor received President Eisenhower at 3:00 p.m. August 27, 1959 for a second private conversation.

The President then indicated that he had been questioned again and again at his Press Conference<sup>1</sup> about new possibilities the West or Germany were thinking about to better their position with respect to Berlin and reunification. To this question, the President had repeatedly replied that this had to do with a matter which mostly affected the Germans. He asked the Chancellor if he had any new ideas which could be studied, pursued, and offered in order to bring about a better situation, guarantee protection to Berlin, and make progress in reunification.

The Chancellor said he would answer this question most frankly. He knew and understood that no one could or should carry on a nuclear war over these questions. For him, this matter was really a human and not a national problem. He would like to see the people in the Soviet Zone lead a freer life. This he had publicly declared many times and he took it seriously. For him, it was a matter of human beings and not one of frontiers. He hoped the President would understand that on the last mentioned matter (frontiers) he could only speak publicly with the greatest caution as refugees and other groups in the Federal Republic put nationalistic feelings above human problems.

The Chancellor noted that the USSR had signed the Human Rights Convention but paid no heed to these rights. He had spoken personally

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Weber, approved by Goodpaster on August 30, and translated by the Embassy in Bonn. The conference took place at the Palais Schaumburg.

<sup>1</sup> For a transcript of the President's press conference at noon, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 609–616.

to many people who had fled the Soviet Zone and, although much was over-exaggerated, it could nevertheless be said that conditions in the Soviet Zone did not reflect the provisions of the Convention. He wondered if he should approach the three Western Powers with carefully-studied materials asking them to make an effort to see that human rights be respected in the Soviet Zone. Thereby people in the Soviet Zone might be helped and moreover a political goal achieved. He doubted that the population would in the long run be in a position to withstand constant pressure used and wondered whether it might not capitulate one day.

In Berlin the situation was very different. The USSR has recognized that the Three Powers have occupation rights there. Therefore, he requested the Three Powers to stand on their international rights in Berlin. These measures could only be successful when we should succeed in achieving universal relaxation of tension through disarmament.

President Eisenhower had given to understand in their morning meeting that he was skeptical about Soviet readiness to bring about successful disarmament. A certain skepticism was not out of place but he thought it not completely out of the question that the Soviets too were ready for a relaxation of tension. He did not believe the Soviets would begin a war, for they too according to his interpretation wanted a peaceful settlement of problems. Therefore, the West on its side needed very great patience but must simultaneously remain strong too.

President Eisenhower then stated that, in the disarmament question, there has been one decisive consideration for the US—mutual and effective inspection. Only in this way could real confidence exist that an agreement would really be maintained. Up to now, all efforts on this question had come to naught. He was not skeptical about Soviet willingness to talk about this question but he had serious doubt that it would be possible soon to reach agreement on inspection.

The Chancellor said Khrushchev is serious about his seven year plan. When Mikoyan was in Bonn in spring 1958,<sup>2</sup> he spoke to him about the apparent contradiction in the Soviet economy. Mikoyan replied that Stalin in his last years would not consider any changes or other plans, and in this period everything had remained as before. Now, this situation had to be overhauled. With this reply, Mikoyan had tacitly admitted economic difficulties.

The Chancellor said he followed the development in the USSR as well as he could and had gained the impression that the Soviets up to now had not overcome their economic difficulties. These must be overcome; otherwise the system could not maintain itself. The solution of

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<sup>2</sup> Mikoyan visited Bonn April 23–26, 1958.

this task would be easier for the Soviets if they did not spend so much money for armament.

Regarding control, he had spoken many times with Secretary Dulles but was not always in complete agreement. He wanted to emphasize that he knew nothing about nuclear disarmament but he had certain conceptions about conventional disarmament. Secretary Dulles had always thought it would be extraordinarily hard to control whether the Soviets really kept the agreed maximum of 2.5 million troops as they actually had 3.5 million. In his opinion, this was not the decisive consideration. He thought it more important to control factories where heavy weapons, munitions therefor, and airplanes were manufactured. Such control, in his view, would not be easy to carry out. If the Russians wanted to have another million soldiers running around with weapons, this was not bad.

The Soviets feared the U.S. A dictator simply cannot understand that someone who possesses power will not use it. Therefore he fears being attacked someday by the U.S. The Germans lived 12 years under a dictatorship and experienced how much a dictatorship can change human mentality. The London negotiations of the UN Disarmament Commission had gone along very well until the Soviets suddenly brought negotiations to the breaking point because in the meantime they had developed their Sputnik.

*[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]*

When he combined all these different factors—the necessity before which Khrushchev saw himself of doing more to improve the USSR living standard, the indispensable unity of the West, and finally the possibility of a technically feasible control—then he came to have a certain optimism which was supported moreover in that Khrushchev possesses enough sound human understanding to propose another way when he sees he cannot advance on his originally chosen way.

Khrushchev would get out of his difficulties, however, if he should succeed in getting the Federal Republic or Western Europe under his control and make European economic potential his own. With it, he could improve living conditions in the USSR (with a low living standard even a small advance meant much) and then Khrushchev would also incline to the idea that over time the U.S. would become tired, the tax burden would become too great, and at last the U.S. would give up.

The President said he agreed fully with the Chancellor's statement and a lengthy analysis of developments disclosed certain factors which could lead to a gradual change. But he thought more about the immediate future and especially about the two parts of Germany and Berlin. In this connection, he wished to ask the Chancellor a specific question. He asked if the Chancellor thought it politically and practically feasible and

if it would be in harmony with his general conception if contacts with the Soviet Zone, i.e., with the Germans in the Soviet Zone, were to be increased so that without the Soviets being aware centripetal instead of centrifugal forces would be at work. He knew there were certain limits. The Federal Republic did not wish to recognize the Soviet Zone, which also was not politically bearable and in the public mind would seem to be capitulation. If it succeeded in awakening forces of the kind described in both parts of Germany, then this might demonstrate a new way of handling the problem in the immediate future.

To this, the Chancellor remarked he had discussed this question with Mr. Dulles when the latter was last in Bonn.<sup>3</sup> It had then developed that Secretary Dulles and the gentlemen with him were not sufficiently informed about the actual situation in the Soviet Zone. Had they really known how things really looked there, they never would have posed the question. The Chancellor emphasized that it is not that contacts do not exist because one does not want to have anything to do with these people. If he were convinced one could do something to help the population of the Soviet Zone, he would immediately consider taking up contacts, but this would not do any good. What the Federal Government can do is being done. For example, means are given to Catholic and Evangelical churches to maintain their churches. For the people in the East Zone, however, it is exceedingly difficult and dangerous to maintain contacts or accept gifts. The Chancellor again assured that the Federal Government does what it can. Mr. Dulles was not fully familiar with the situation. When he told Mr. Dulles that people from the Soviet Zone could not legally enter the Federal Republic, he had referred to the agreement made with the Soviets in Paris after ending the blockade according to which free travel should be unhindered between both parts of Germany.<sup>4</sup> It was probable that enough was not done to put these provisions into effect and make full use of our rights. Then U.S. and British patrols watched the roads to Berlin and for this purpose watchtowers were erected along the roads. Gradually, however, this (system) went to sleep and is wholly forgotten. The Chancellor again promised to do everything which the Federal Republic is in a position to do. For him, this is not a prestige matter. But he had no great hopes. Therefore, as heretofore, great patience was required.

As for Berlin, the city is very strongly supported by the Federal Republic and, for example, there is no more unemployment there. As soon as the Soviets wish to begin something new with Berlin, the answer of the Three Western Powers must be a decisive "No." He did not believe

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<sup>3</sup> Dulles visited Bonn February 7–9, 1959.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.

that the Soviets would let it come to war over Berlin. For the most extreme emergency, but only for it, there is still another possibility. In his November 1958 note<sup>5</sup> Khrushchev made an alternative proposal to change Berlin to a free city under four power and UN guarantee. But then the three powers would give up their rights in Berlin. Therefore, it must be carefully studied, if and when occasion arises, when one could admit such an idea.

President Eisenhower asked if Khrushchev when he spoke of free access to West Berlin, could not have thought of giving up a corridor ten or two miles wide to the Federal Republic so that, so to say, this corridor would belong to the Federal Republic. The Chancellor said no. President Eisenhower repeated that it would have then to concern the right of access and not the right of ownership of this corridor. The Chancellor agreed with this view but pointed out that the right of access would be guaranteed by the Four Powers and the UN.

President Eisenhower renewed his proposal of contacts. In Geneva<sup>6</sup> the USSR proposed the establishment of an all-German Commission which was rejected by the Three Western Powers. The Chancellor had now spoken of difficulties in establishing contacts. Perhaps there is another possibility to draw out the marionette government of the Soviet Zone in one way or another. He thought for example of exchanging certain groups for three months. Especially he thought in this connection of factory managers, farmers, professors, school principals, or doctors and lawyers too. If such a proposal were made, people in the Soviet Zone would have to show their colors, and on the other hand, the West through its handling of this matter would display greater flexibility. At his reception by the populace, banners were displayed asking help to liberate the seventeen million people in the East Zone. Seventeen million people there and fifty in the Federal Republic, however, must also make their influence felt. The Chancellor said he would gladly have this proposal studied<sup>7</sup> and therefore at the moment would reserve his position.

President Eisenhower pointed out that the Communists, in choosing their people for exchange groups of this kind, would select only 100 percent party-line people who were then to pursue subversive activity

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding the Soviet note of November 27, 1958, see vol. VIII, Document 72.

<sup>6</sup> For documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May 11–August 5, see volume VIII.

<sup>7</sup> On November 16, Chancellor Adenauer transmitted to the U.S. Embassy a "Memorandum Concerning the Strengthening of Contacts between the population of the Federal Republic and of the Soviet-occupied Zone." On November 25, the memorandum was transmitted to Washington as an enclosure to despatch 833 from Bonn, and, on December 21, Calhoun sent a copy to the White House. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Germany, vol. III)



during their stay in the Federal Republic. In the further course of this exchange program certainly, however, people would also come over here who did not stick to the line. These people would then be a channel through which truth would enter the East Zone. He could of course not guarantee full success of this suggestion, but one would thereby show somewhat more flexibility. The West must show more activity. The Soviet Zone regime should be placed continually before decisions so that the powers there must say "Yes" or "No" to different proposals. The basic idea is that one should say to these people: "We are ready to show ourselves; you show yourselves".

The Chancellor said he had spoken with young people who were sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment and then after an early release had come to the Federal Republic. When one heard what these people have experienced, one wishes to avoid anything which might expose anyone to such danger. He would have the President's proposal thoroughly examined as to its feasibility. The Chancellor informed the President then of a telegram he had received from the German Embassy in Washington. It reported on a conversation of an Embassy member with a member of the French Embassy. According to this conversation, de Gaulle intended to concentrate in his upcoming conversations with the President on the Algerian question. Questions affecting NATO, for example, tripartite directorate and atomic weapons, were not to be raised unless the President himself brought them up. In the telegram, the trip of de Gaulle to Algeria was reported as well as the necessity to support France in the UN vote. Finally, reference was made to the various dangers resulting from France's defeat in the vote. The Chancellor then said he thought it right to send de Gaulle a letter to inform him he had spoken with the President about Algeria and believed that in a quiet and objective conversation de Gaulle and the President could reach an understanding. Details of his conversation with the President would not be disclosed.

President Eisenhower said that the Algerian problem had been studied for a long time. The American Ambassador in Paris had spoken thereof to de Gaulle and earlier Mr. Dulles had. He was aware of the seriousness particularly of this question and knew what it meant for de Gaulle and France. It was a serious and ticklish matter. He had no objections if the Chancellor wrote such a letter and said he believed the Chancellor knew that he would listen carefully and wish good will to French views. There were difficulties, however, that must be put aside. These questions will be the substance of de Gaulle's and the President's talks. The President suggested that the Chancellor emphasize the extraordinary great interest of the U.S. in NATO and point out that with respect to NATO the Algerian question must be solved. The Chancellor said de Gaulle was above all a psychological problem. He had spent 12 years out

of things as had the Chancellor. For this reason, the Chancellor believed he understood him. He had the impression he could help de Gaulle jump his own shadows.

President Eisenhower recalled that he had taken the viewpoint that progress had to be made before he would be prepared to go to a Summit Conference. He asked the Chancellor if his was the right posture. The Chancellor replied affirmatively.

President Eisenhower then introduced the question of establishing diplomatic relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Chancellor said Czechoslovakia was not interesting but Poland was. He had declared on various occasions that any future German Government must have good relations with Poland. But he and the Cabinet were of the opinion that establishing relations during the Geneva Conference was impossible since then this would have been the only result of the Conference, provided that the Poles really would have wanted this. In the course of his last visit with de Gaulle, he asked him for his views on this matter as good relations exist between Poland and France. In de Gaulle's view, he was completely under Moscow's thumb, but it would have a good effect with the Polish people. He was seeking now an opportunity to send the President of the German Red Cross, who was in Poland a year ago, to Poland again perhaps in connection with the indemnification for injustices done in the invasion of Poland. He hoped he would soon be able successfully to find such an occasion.

President Eisenhower asked if the Chancellor was satisfied with the tempo and type of the German forces buildup. The Chancellor said "Yes" and that what had been promised would be accomplished—12 divisions as planned would be established by 1961.

President Eisenhower remarked that American forces were stationed all over the world and this had major financial effects, especially through heavy requirements for foreign exchange balances. The U.S. hoped some countries would be in position to equip their own military forces to a greater extent, especially "immobile forces" so the U.S. could be relieved of some of the burden. At the establishment of NATO, one started with the idea that U.S. divisions should only remain in Europe until European military forces existed. Events had taken a different course. The President referred in this connection to questions which are again and again raised by the Congress.

The Chancellor said that expenditures during the last stage of the German buildup are especially high—for budget year 1959/60 they are 13 billion Deutsche marks—but he was prepared to study what can be done in this matter after 1961.

## 9. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/20a

Sussex, England, August 29, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

### PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

August–September 1959

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

President Eisenhower  
Secretary of State Herter  
Deputy Secretary Gates  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Irwin  
Mr. Berding  
Mr. Hagerty  
General Goodpaster  
Major Eisenhower  
Mr. White

*United Kingdom*

Prime Minister Macmillan  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Sir Norman Brook  
Ambassador Caccia  
Sir Anthony Rumbold  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
Mr. Blye  
Mr. de Zulueta  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Wilding

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

With the conclusion of the discussion of the subjects of the previous day, it was suggested that the British participants would be very interested in the President's appraisal of the discussions with Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn. The President replied that his record was not complete because the afternoon session, which he had assumed would be with the Chancellor on a private basis for only five minutes, had continued for one and a half hours without the presence of his U.S. interpreter. Mr. Herter added that it might be some time before we had an approved record because the German interpreter would have to clear his notes with the Chancellor who was returning to Italy. Mr. Herter said that the Bonn discussions were of interest because they had introduced a new element of possible acceptance by the Germans of a "Free City of Berlin". (It was later made clear that the Soviet proposal for a Free City was of course unacceptable.) Brentano had spontaneously referred to the long run possibility of the Berlin problem being settled by the adoption of some sort of free city solution. He also mentioned a UN guarantee.

The President said that the Chancellor had regarded the German question as one susceptible only to a long-term solution, requiring lots of patience with the possibility of a gradually growing interchange of

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and approved in S and by Goodpaster on September 2. The conversation took place at Chequers, the Prime Minister's summer home.

persons and communications. The President in reply said that this was fine but what do you do tomorrow? At the moment we are standing on the status quo. The United States was prepared to help but over time our rights in Berlin would become less clear. The Germans therefore should propose a plan. He had suggested to Adenauer that the latter should suggest how West Germany could work out with East Germany a better exchange back and forth of persons. Adenauer had responded that experience had indicated this was dangerous, with East Germans being punished for contacts with West Germany. The President continued that he then suggested a cultural exchange, six persons for six, recognizing that initially West Germany would receive determined Communists but that if this process was maintained over time, it would gradually have an influence among the people in East Germany.

The President said that he had told Adenauer that he was getting tired of standing pat and that Adenauer had agreed to have his experts study the possibilities of a larger interchange of persons.

The President had pointed out to Adenauer that we had been firm in saying “no” to the Soviets but that it was important to know what the West German Government was going to say in the future.

Secretary Herter said that he had talked the same day with Foreign Minister Brentano,<sup>1</sup> indicating that the United States was tired of a negative attitude and inquiring what the Germans proposed. Brentano replied that it was important to have a breather to get over the next national elections. The Secretary had then told Brentano that it was important the latter have a talk with Adenauer about the adoption of a more positive approach. The President suggested that it would be most helpful if we could think up a program to suggest to Adenauer because if the Germans themselves didn’t move, this thing could become progressively more difficult. Prime Minister Macmillan interposed the observation that up to now the Germans had assumed that we would pull their chestnuts out of the fire and that we should be searching for a *modus vivendi*, a term which he much preferred to that of a moratorium.

The President said that Adenauer had stressed that the thing he was interested in was the humanitarian aspects of the twenty million people in the East Zone.

The President questioned whether the United States could be expected to keep troops in Europe forever. Adenauer’s attitude was that if you’re going to establish a neutral zone, don’t make it Germany. When the President raised the question of a corridor to West Berlin, Adenauer said that the other side would never agree. He then mentioned, how-

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 7.

ever, that Khrushchev had proposed a Free City for Berlin arrangement which could be considered as a last resort. Foreign Minister Lloyd interjected to say that if the Germans were contemplating a Free City their emphasis had changed. Prime Minister Macmillan said that this discussion leads on to the question of getting a moratorium; that it had looked to him at one time as if the Soviets would accept this but that the question had then arisen about the status of Berlin at the end of the period. There seemed to have been a change in the Soviet position on our rights after the moratorium.

The President pointed out that our policy had been that changes in the Berlin situation could only be made by mutual consent and that we should not go back on this. Secretary Herter added that an interim arrangement involves the danger that we have undermined or given up our position. The Prime Minister said that his interpretation was that at the end of a moratorium our position on rights would be the same as it had been at the beginning; but he recognized that in a sense the more passage of time would make some change in the situation and that it might have been for this intellectual or theoretical reason that the Russians had declined to commit themselves as to the position at the end of the agreement. The President said that we have a genius for getting in a hole but to protect ourselves we are always having to defend Matsu or some other out of the way place. Prime Minister commented that our cards on the table in the case of Berlin are not good ones. The President replied that any place around the Soviet perimeter, Khrushchev is in a position to move. He recalled that the previous day he had talked with the Queen Mother who had emphasized that "we must be firm". She said this was her own conviction. Foreign Minister Lloyd added, certainly, we have to be firm on essentials. The President pointed out that in his last message from Khrushchev, the letter had said that "we must clear up the residue of war". He, the President, wanted to point out that the division of Germany was one of the residues of war, which should be cleared up.

Prime Minister Macmillan then inquired as to what the United States thought would happen in the next stage of the Berlin problem. Secretary Herter replied that we don't want rights in perpetuity in Berlin, but want them admitted until such time as the situation could be changed by mutual agreement. The Secretary pointed out that Gromyko in the discussions in Geneva had given away his hand regarding the Soviet expectation of an East German takeover of Berlin after any moratorium.

Prime Minister Macmillan then inquired as to our appraisal of the coming visit with Khrushchev. The President replied that he would expect with the visit, and with Khrushchev's family accompanying him, there was the potential to make an impression on the Soviet leader. The

President, therefore, was anxious that they be received well. When the Prime Minister inquired whether there was something in this visit which he would interpret as leading to a Summit, the President replied that without progress, he, the President, would not go to a Summit. After a brief general discussion as to what would constitute "progress," the President said that if Khrushchev suggested the U.S. and USSR agree between themselves on some form of progress, the President would decline to make such an agreement but would hope that when Khrushchev returned to his own country and thought it over, he might issue a public statement which would make a Summit possible. In this manner the allies could react as they had a right to do. Macmillan inquired as to what Adenauer had to say about a Summit. The President replied that Adenauer had concurred in his belief that progress was necessary before a Summit meeting should be held. The President expressed the belief that Khrushchev would avoid embarrassing either the President or the United States while in the latter country and made the observation that "if we stall long enough, maybe this will constitute a moratorium".

[Here follows discussion of the President's forthcoming talk with General de Gaulle.]

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## 10. Editorial Note

During President Eisenhower's visit to Paris September 1–4, the question of Berlin arose briefly during discussions on other topics. On September 2, the President noted that he and General de Gaulle were in agreement on Western policy and, on September 4, Secretary of State Herter and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville expressed similar views. Memoranda of these conversations (US/MC/26 and US/MC/35) are printed in volume VII, Part 2, Documents 131 and 135.

**11. Letter From Secretary of Defense McElroy to President Eisenhower**

Washington, September 19, 1959.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During your discussion with Chairman Khrushchev on Berlin, it may be that he will refer to, or that the opportunity will arise when you may wish to speak to, the right of the Western Powers to fly to Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet. I am writing to advise you of the present position with respect to future flights.

As you will remember, we made two C-130 flights in April 1959 to Berlin at altitudes above 20,000 feet. Further flights were suspended temporarily because of the Geneva Conference. At the close of the Conference, the resumption of flights was discussed with the Secretary of State. Although opposed to occasional probing flights that might appear to the Soviet Union, as well as to certain of our allies, primarily to be provocative, he was agreeable, subject to your approval, to high altitude flights on a routine basis as part of our regular Berlin supply operation, provided that the flights could be explained reasonably on economic and logistic grounds.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff re-studied this question, advised that the flights are justified on economic and logistic grounds and recommended that the flights be resumed. I am enclosing their memorandum to me of August 19, 1959,<sup>1</sup> with which, except as to timing, I concur.

Chairman Khrushchev should be familiar with the desirability of operating jet transports at high altitudes. He flew to the United States in a Tu-114 whose normal cruising altitude is between 25,000 feet and 35,000 feet. The Soviet Union has three other jet or turbojet transports, all of which cruise well above 25,000 feet.

However, of even greater importance in my view than the economic and logistic justification of the C-130 is that the United States uphold the principle of its right to fly to Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet. Even though a C-130 operates most efficiently at an altitude above 20,000 feet, it is perfectly possible to fly them less efficiently below 10,000 feet. The basic point for ultimate decision is one of policy rather than economic desirability.

I am sending this to you via the Secretary of State so that he may add such comments as he may wish.

Respectfully yours,

**Neil McElroy**

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Not attached to the source text. A copy of the memorandum (JCSM-338-59) is *ibid.*

## 12. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 17, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Khrushchev's Visit to the United States<sup>1</sup> and Related Matters

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador  
Mr. Rolf F. Pauls, Counselor, German Embassy  
Mr. Robert Murphy, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

After an initial exchange on the Soviet moon shoot,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Murphy said that the visit of Khrushchev to the United States was in the nature of an experiment. We did not know what its historical effect would be, and perhaps it might be proved that we were wrong in inviting him. However, nothing had so far happened to indicate that this would be the case. The visit up to now had come off pretty much as expected. One point of some interest, Mr. Murphy continued, was Khrushchev's alacrity in bringing along his family. We had at first not thought about inviting them during the original discussions with Menshikov. When the suggestion was later made, Khrushchev agreed and brought not only his wife but also his two daughters, a son, and a son-in-law. We had the impression that Mrs. Khrushchev generally had a good influence on her husband. She seemed well disposed and was studying American history and English. However, Mr. Murphy had the impression that the son-in-law, who is editor of *Izvestia*, was an ardent and completely committed Communist.

Ambassador Grewe commented that the first two days of the visit seemed to have run off satisfactorily from the Western point of view. The public reception was appropriate, and Khrushchev's performance yesterday at the Press Club presumably gave a fairly adequate impression of him. Mr. Murphy added that he had been told that the Soviet interpreter did not literally translate everything which Khrushchev had said (apparently he had a certain latitude to use his own judgment in modifying statements). Ambassador Grewe noted in this connection that Khrushchev's reference at the airport to "our common enemy in

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/9-1759. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Murphy on September 23.

<sup>1</sup> Additional documentation on Khrushchev's visit to the United States September 15–27 is in volume X. During their first meeting on September 15, the President and the Chairman briefly discussed Berlin along the lines indicated in the memorandum printed here. A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, Document 109. For the President's account of the discussion on Berlin, see *Waging Peace*, pp. 446–449.

<sup>2</sup> Lunik II was launched on September 12.



World War II—Germany” had been translated without specific mention of Germany.

Mr. Murphy said that, in their initial conversation, Khrushchev and the President had touched on Germany and Berlin in general as subjects for future discussion. There was no indication of any change in position. There would be no fixed agenda for the Camp David conversations, but the two heads of governments would go over the whole gamut of problems. The emphasis would be on informality, and all that was attempted by the Secretary and Gromyko yesterday was an enumeration of topics together with their possible sequence.

In their initial conversation, the President had said with respect to Berlin that our position was that we had assumed certain responsibilities after World War II. While the present situation was admittedly abnormal, until the United States could discharge its responsibilities to the German people it could not accept unilateral action on the part of another party. The United States could not abandon its responsibilities until an acceptable settlement had been achieved.

To this Khrushchev had responded, according to Mr. Murphy, that the Soviets had not raised the issue of Berlin as such but rather the question of a peace treaty to end the state of war with Germany. The achievement of such a peace settlement would settle the Berlin problem. He would want to discuss this in detail with the President, and it would be good if they could work out some common language recognizing the existence of two German states rather than attempting to bring about a socialist or capitalist solution by force. If one speaks of sympathies, Khrushchev continued, each knew where the sympathies of the other party were. It would be well to recognize the facts. This would not mean juridical recognition of the GDR, but recognition of the state of fact that actually exists. The Soviets do not contemplate unilateral action, Khrushchev added, although he accused the United States of taking unilateral action in Japan affecting Soviet interests. However, the problem of ending the effects of World War II had to be solved after fourteen years. If they tried hard enough he was certain that the two countries could find a way out which would not involve a loss of prestige.

In response to Ambassador Grewe’s query as to whether we had obtained the impression that Khrushchev would make specific proposals on Berlin, Mr. Murphy said he did not know, that Khrushchev had so far had nothing new on the subject. Ambassador Grewe asked whether any indication had been received as to whether the Soviets would emphasize other problems than Germany and Berlin. Mr. Murphy said that disarmament and nuclear testing seemed to be important to the Soviets. We would want to talk to them about the Far East, especially Laos, Tibet, and Indian frontier questions. We had told them this. We would like to do a little probing, for example, relative to Sino-Soviet relations about

which no one knows very much. Khrushchev will presumably raise the question of United States bases and our alliances throughout the world. We will take the position that no change is possible on these until actions are taken which would create confidence in the situation. The President will be prepared to give him a little history lesson as to the causes of our policy such as the Berlin blockade and the Korean War.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's question, Mr. Murphy said that the Soviets seemed to have brought along a considerable number of experts—over twenty from various ministries. The entire party was a large one numbering about seventy, although Menshikov had originally talked in terms of twenty. However, we could not draw conclusions, as Grewe had implied, regarding special Soviet interests from the composition of the experts who had come. The omission of military people on their part was obviously intentional. We had offered to let Khrushchev see some of our bases but he was not interested. The element of reciprocity with respect to the President's return visit was obviously involved. As to this latter point, the President was holding the date of such a return trip in suspense. His personal guess, Mr. Murphy added, was that because of various commitments in terms of visiting heads of governments (Italian, Mexican and Guinean), the visit would not take place, in any event, before November. The winter climate was a problem but the intensive cold in the Soviet Union came only in December. With reference to visits to countries other than the Soviet Union, Mr. Murphy continued, the great problem was that as soon as one country was suggested, a dozen other countries immediately took the position that if they were not visited too it would bring about a political crisis.

Mr. Murphy asked Ambassador Grewe whether, since the end of the Geneva Conference, he or the German Government had developed any new ideas on the subject of Berlin. The Ambassador commented that, in the case of Berlin, it was difficult to find any new ideas. In response to Mr. Murphy's question as to whether he thought the Soviets had started the Berlin crisis last November because of East German or Polish pressures, Ambassador Grewe said that nobody really knew, but he, personally, did not believe that East German pressure was sufficiently important in itself to cause a crisis of the kind which had developed. He thought that the primary consideration for the Soviets was the usefulness of Berlin in forcing favorable developments elsewhere. After all, Khrushchev's visit to the United States was one such by-product, from the Soviet point of view. Moreover, if such effects could not be achieved in other areas, Soviet interests in any event dictated a change in the Berlin situation itself.

Mr. Murphy indicated that, at one point, some people had thought that Polish pressure had had something to do with the Soviet action, but this, he had been told, was probably not the case. Ambassador Grewe

said he likewise believed this unlikely. While the Poles wanted the Oder–Neisse line accepted, they opposed a separate peace treaty with the GDR which would exclude for a lengthy period any possibility of recognition of the Oder–Neisse line by the Federal Republic. In response to Mr. Murphy's question, Ambassador Grewe stated that the Federal Republic would make further efforts to improve its relations with Poland. This might not involve any immediate establishment of full diplomatic relations. However, any change in the Federal Republic's position on the Oder–Neisse line in the near future was unlikely, both for internal political reasons and because it would be unwise to recognize a definitive boundary before negotiations on East–West issues had started. Until then, there would be no occasion for adequate counter-concessions by the Soviets, especially on German reunification and Berlin. In response to Mr. Murphy's question, Ambassador Grewe said that the average West German does not accept the Oder–Neisse line as a fact but he is not particularly ardent in protesting against it. The refugee groups were the best organized lobby in the Federal Republic. Their leaders, however, had very obscure concepts and were not very realistic in their objective. Mr. Murphy noted that his information was that the Poles had moved into the Eastern territories in substantial numbers, about 5 to 6 million. Ambassador Grewe said that this was the case, but that they had not been able to fill up all the gaps or completely to restore a normal situation, particularly in Pomerania.

Ambassador Grewe asked whether the United States envisaged private talks taking place at Camp David between the President and Khrushchev. Mr. Murphy said that the talks would be on a very restricted basis, with perhaps four or five participating on each side. If specialized subjects came up, the experts could be brought in within a relatively short time. The attempt would be made to have the talks on as intimate a basis as possible. Mr. Murphy added that he hoped Ambassador Grewe would assure his Government that there would be no plan on the part of the United States to make any concessions. Ambassador Grewe commented that he had noted no signs of nervousness in Bonn. He hoped this condition would continue, and that there would not be alarming press reports to change the atmosphere. Mr. Murphy observed that some 1,200 correspondents were now accredited to follow the trip in one way or another. The press situation should be easier to control at Camp David. One aspect of the situation, of course, was how the Soviets would handle their own press. In response to Ambassador Grewe's request that arrangements be made for prompt transmission of information to the German Embassy during the Camp David talks, Mr. Murphy said that we would do our best. He honestly did not look for any complete reversal or change of attitudes. The results of the talks

would have to be allowed time to seep in. Perhaps when the President made his return trip, if he did, more would be possible.

Ambassador Grewe said that the danger, as he saw it, was that public opinion in the United States might be affected by Khrushchev's reiteration of the peace theme and his campaign against the Federal Republic. He said he had noted a somewhat greater disposition in this country to listen to references to the World War II alliance than before. Perhaps the public was becoming somewhat bored by the difficulties of the German problem. Mr. Murphy commented that he had not noted such a tendency, and, in fact, public opinion polls seemed to show the contrary. In any event, the Department did not feel itself to be under public pressure to make concessions. What effect Khrushchev was having on public opinion we did not, of course, yet know.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's question as to what he thought the impact of the talks might be on a possible summit meeting, Mr. Murphy said that the President continues to maintain that a formal summit meeting must be justified by some prospect of real progress to avoid possible subsequent disillusionment. He would make this clear to Khrushchev.

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### 13. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 26, 1959, 9:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The President  
 Vice President Nixon  
 The Secretary  
 Amb. Lodge  
 Amb. Thompson  
 General Goodpaster  
 Major Eisenhower  
 Mr. Kohler

*USSR*

Chairman Khrushchev  
 Mr. Gromyko  
 Amb. Menshikov  
 Mr. Soldatov  
 Mr. Troyanovski

The President opened the conversation by saying we were prepared to examine all problems in a reasonable way but he made a distinction of the problem of Berlin. This problem touched our people deeply and not just the Government and himself. If we could ease tension with respect to this problem we could make progress on other questions. We do not want to perpetuate the present situation in Berlin and keep our Occupation Troops there forever. We hope to find a way out with honor. Khrushchev's statement that he was prepared to take unilateral action if necessary had alarmed our people.<sup>1</sup> If some statement could be made on this question we could make progress on others up and down the line, such as on disarmament. We did not like the present situation and agreed it should be corrected, but this should be done on a reasonable basis consonant with our responsibilities to the people of West Berlin and to our own security. Berlin had become a symbol. If tension on this problem could be removed we could make progress. Perhaps the trouble was that we had not met since 1955.<sup>2</sup> He inquired what Mr. Khrushchev thought.

Khrushchev said in general he was in agreement but he inquired how could the Soviet proposal to establish a free city of West Berlin reflect upon the security of the United States. He did not attach strategic importance to Berlin. Whether we had ten thousand or a hundred thousand troops there was of no importance.

The President said he agreed. Khrushchev said that the question of prestige was involved.

The President said this was true but there was also the effect upon our whole position.

Khrushchev said that they approached the Berlin matter not directly but from the fact that it was necessary to end the state of war with Germany and conclude a peace treaty. This was the main problem. He wanted agreement with us and our Allies to sign a peace treaty and thus settle the Berlin problem. If this were done the German revanchists would be paralyzed or at least contained. This would calm Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. He would like to know what the President thought of this. He said we were maintaining an abnormal situation and a state of war in Germany because of the position taken by Adenauer. It would be better not to encourage him in this respect. The important thing was that there were two German States and he saw no prospect of uniting Germany in the near future. For the time being there would have to be two German States and it was better to end the state of

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<sup>1</sup> Presumably the President is referring to Khrushchev's statement on November 10, 1958, that the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic if the Berlin problem were not resolved. See vol. VIII, Document 24.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Geneva Summit Conference July 18–23, 1955.

war. The question of the recognition of the German Democratic Republic could be avoided. The United States could sign a peace treaty with West Germany and the Soviets could sign a treaty with both Germanies and this problem of recognition could be avoided. He understood that Berlin and the German problem had become a symbol involving prestige. Therefore we should try to come to terms about the period of time during which the Germans would be encouraged to reach agreement. He did not think they could do so but we would be released of certain responsibilities. After this period we could proceed with the peace treaty. He did not believe that any of the Allies wanted German unity, including de Gaulle and Macmillan. Although de Gaulle himself would not say it straight out, those around him said it would be even better if there were three or four Germanies. The British said that if there were one German State the balance in Europe would be upset. This was true because no other country in Europe could stand up to a united Germany.

The President interjected that the United States and the Soviets could.

Khrushchev said he meant in Europe. He said, of course, that even if Germany were unified it would be no menace to the Soviet Union or the United States but it might involve our two countries in a war. He suspected that Adenauer did not want Germany united. His support was mainly Catholic while East Germany was mostly Protestant. If Germany were united probably the Socialists would come to power. Why should we quarrel about reunification when the Germans themselves did not want it? He even suspected that there was no great enthusiasm for German unification in the United States.

The President said he did not know what these European leaders thought about reunification on the short term but on the long term he thought that they were agreed; that the East and West Germans were brothers and that to keep them apart was not in the best interest of a peaceful world. To review the situation, war had brought about an unnatural situation among us all. It had brought up quarrels. From what Khrushchev had told him at the breakfast table<sup>3</sup> a more liberal attitude has developed in the Soviet Union than existed in the time of the Generalissimo. He pointed out that this heavy burden of armaments was very dangerous. If they were to be statesmen, they had to resolve these problems. Berlin was a residue of the war, so was the division of Germany. The question was how could we resolve all these problems, such as lasting disarmament, et cetera. His own concern was that the

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<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of the President's conversation with Khrushchev at breakfast on September 26 is in volume X, Document 129.

tension over Berlin was a great obstacle. He did not mind if the Soviets made a treaty with the East Germans if they did not thereby affect our position in Berlin.

Mr. Khrushchev replied: "I agree with you, Mr. President. I can assure you that I come with wide powers from the Soviet Government to improve relations between our countries and with you personally." He went on to say that the present Soviet Government does not agree with all of the things that were done by Stalin. The President, of course, would know the positive measures the Soviet Government had taken; for example, with respect to the position of Molotov and the policies with which he was associated. As Ambassador Thompson must have told the President, the present Soviet Government is strong and supported by the people. They have reduced the police force and abolished political concentration camps. They had replaced Serov<sup>4</sup> as head of the secret police. Serov himself was an honest man but it was felt that his replacement was desirable to avoid any association with the previous Beriya<sup>5</sup> regime. He had been replaced by a man who had worked with the Komsomol organization and had no previous experience in police work.

Mr. Khrushchev then referred to the President's earlier statement that he had no objections to a peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR provided U.S. rights in Berlin were unaffected. The President must realize that this is an impossible condition. The maintenance of these rights would be prejudicial to the Soviet moral position. Consequently, they could not agree to such a condition however much they might have liked to do so. The communiqué issued in connection with the President's recent visit to West Germany<sup>6</sup> had said that the people of West Berlin should remain peaceful and prosperous. The Soviet Government agreed with this and the most stringent guarantees could be worked out to ensure these conditions for West Berlin. The West Berliners could continue their life as they wished. Mr. Khrushchev saw no difficulties in working this out. He said the Soviet Government was prepared also to agree to some period of time which might be needed to take the edge off the Berlin question so that there would be no injury to U.S. prestige. He said the Soviet Union seeks no territorial, material or prestige advantage in this connection. They want to settle on a mutually advantageous basis.

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<sup>4</sup> Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, Chairman of the Soviet Committee on State Security, April 1954–August 1955.

<sup>5</sup> Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria, Chairman of the Soviet Committee on State Security until 1953.

<sup>6</sup> For text of this communiqué, August 27, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1959, p. 905.

Mr. Khrushchev continued that he agreed with the President that the question of West Berlin, even the all-German question, was only a part of the whole picture, albeit an important part. The principal problem is disarmament. If that could be settled, future generations would be grateful to the President and himself. If agreement were reached both would be noted in history if only for that alone. He concluded that he was gratified at the President's approach and had the impression that his position was close to Mr. Khrushchev's own position.

The President noted that Mr. Khrushchev apparently believes that we—the American people, and our allies—attach too much importance to the Berlin question. However, if no agreement were reached, the lack of agreement would keep the Berlin question hanging over and then it would be difficult to deal with the bigger problems such as disarmament. If we could devise a method for this, then we could make a beginning on broader problems. The American people have the impression that we are in the shadow of some kind of—he did not want to say ultimatum—but at least some threat of unilateral action. This was a bad situation and the American people would not understand going on to other problems if this were not resolved. It would be tragic if peaceful efforts foundered on this less important question.

Mr. Khrushchev said that it might be useful if he would try to explain the Soviet position and how it developed. For many years the powers had been conducting negotiations on disarmament. The U.S. seemed to regard the Soviets as being too rigid. The Soviets on their part regarded the U.S. as operating from "positions of strength", as indeed had frequently been publicly stated in the U.S. Consequently, many international problems simply became frozen up. As a result of international conditions the Soviets always found themselves in a minority position in the UNGA and other bodies. This did not represent the real state of international affairs. It led to difficulties in the relationships between our two countries. Because the Soviets finally saw no prospect of coming to an agreed settlement, they decided to seek to terminate the state of war with Germany, if possible in agreement with the US; but if the U.S. refused they decided to take certain action on their own. This governmental decision is still in force. Are the Soviets justified in taking it? They think they are. The U.S. promoted and concluded a peace treaty with Japan on an unilateral basis, as a result of which the Soviets were pushed out of Tokyo. This action gives the Soviets a right to act similarly in Europe. This would only be tit for tat. The U.S. had acted unilaterally; the Soviets could do the same.

The President asked whether the Soviets did not participate in the negotiations of the Japanese Peace Treaty?

Secretary Herter stated that the Soviets had participated, but stressed that there was no valid comparison between the two questions.



The Soviets had participated in the discussions of the Japanese Peace Treaty and had then refused to sign the treaty, though it was signed by 41 other nations. The Soviets had not been in occupation of Tokyo. Their rights had been fully reserved. He would repeat that there was no comparison between the two questions.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he had represented the USSR at San Francisco in the negotiations of the Japanese Peace Treaty. No account had been taken of Soviet views at that conference.

Secretary Herter repeated that 41 nations had agreed and signed and only the USSR had held out.

Mr. Khrushchev said that Secretary Herter was engaging in arithmetical exercises again. It did not matter if 80 nations had signed the Japanese Peace Treaty. This did not make law for the USSR.

The President repeated that no Soviet rights had been affected by the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Mr. Khrushchev said he would tell the President frankly that if he had been in charge of Soviet decisions at the time, the USSR would have joined in the Japanese Peace Treaty. He felt Soviet rejection had been a mistake. However, the Americans certainly had not been saints. They had acted unilaterally. The Soviet representation in Tokyo was deprived of its juridical position and left hanging between heaven and earth.

The President said he would agree that we were not saints. (Mr. Khrushchev interjected, "Try to be.") The President continued that we had both made mistakes in the past. However our present purpose was to improve matters. He did not consider it profitable to rehash the position. Frankly, the Japanese Peace Treaty was a question about which he would confess he did not know too much.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he agreed it would not be profitable to debate past events. He would, however, point out that even today the U.S. was not supporting Soviet claims in Sakhalin and the Kuriles. He repeated that it had been a stupid mistake for the Soviet Union not to sign the treaty. Even granting it was true that Soviet rights had been reserved, in fact the U.S. now tends to support the Japanese claims against these rights. The Soviets had taken part in the war against Japan on the direct request of the U.S. He did not say that there was no Soviet interest in participating, but would stress this was done at specific U.S. request. The U.S. was at war with Japan and suffering heavy losses. However, he would agree that it was not useful to debate about whose fly bit whom and where in the past.

Referring to the Berlin question Mr. Khrushchev said that if the Soviets had indicated a time limit last year, he must say that this was the result of the high-handed attitude of the U.S. toward the USSR which had led the Soviets to think that there was no alternative. However, he

was interested in improving our relations. The Soviets have certain objectives with respect to Germany but they want to achieve these peacefully, and without damage to U.S. prestige.

The President said that he thought the discussion had been useful in clarifying the respective positions. Maybe it would now be useful to ask our people to do a short memorandum on what we could propose. The Soviet side might want to do one, too. Of course it should be noted that these discussions were not committing our allies. He would suggest that we break up for a half hour or so for the preparation of the paper. He personally wanted to see the doctor. Mr. Khrushchev replied that as to the Soviet side they had fully expounded their position but would be interested in knowing more specifically from the U.S. side what the U.S. wants and what it considers not acceptable. Maybe he and the President could take a walk while Secretary Herter and his aides were working on a paper.

The President commented that it was not a very good day outside—the fog had not lifted and no helicopters were flying. He was suggesting only that a very brief paper be prepared in order to get more precise ideas as to what might be a solution.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed with the President's suggestion. If the President would excuse his frankness, he wished to comment somewhat further. He had no doubt about the President's sincerity and appreciated the personal effort he was making. He hoped these feelings were reciprocal. However, he did see some difference in the positions of the two leaders. All of the USSR shared his, Mr. Khrushchev's, views. However, behind the President he could see that there were elements which might make it difficult for the President to put solutions into effect. It was possible that he was wrong in this. The President replied that on such questions as a peace treaty he did have a Senate and others with whom he had to work. Mr. Khrushchev said he also had a parliament. He asked the President not to throw stones at Soviet democracy.

The President resumed, however, saying that he believed that the American people were nearly 100% behind him in seeking just settlements. The meeting broke up at 11:15 a.m.

## 14. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 27, 1959, 11:45 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Joint Communiqué

### PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The President  
Mr. Akalovsky

*USSR*

Mr. Khrushchev  
Mr. Troyanovsky

The President, referring to the question of a joint communiqué, stated that in view of the fact that Mr. K was to have a press conference in the afternoon, he believed that a joint communiqué, would not be necessary, unless, of course, the Chairman thought that it would be useful to have one. He said that if Mr. K preferred to have a communiqué he would be willing to discuss it.

Mr. K replied that he believed it to be useful to have a joint communiqué. His press conference statement, he said, would be in the spirit that had been mentioned last evening in their conversation. Yet this was only one aspect of the situation, and a joint communiqué would have a soothing effect on world public opinion at large.

The President said that, since the talks had been very informal and had covered a variety of subjects without any specific order, he would not object to having a short statement as to what had been accomplished. Such a statement could be made public at the time preferred by Mr. K—before his speech, before his departure, or at any other time.

Mr. K agreed that the statement should be short and in general terms, since no specifics had been discussed. As a matter of fact, the respective positions on certain points had not been clarified. For instance, he said, he did not know what the President's position was on disarmament. As to the time of publication, he believed that perhaps it would be best if he could read the communiqué at his press conference.

The President said that yesterday<sup>1</sup> he had stated that the US was not trying to perpetuate the situation in Berlin while Mr. K had agreed not to force the Western Powers out of Berlin. Mr. K had also agreed to have more frequent meetings between himself and the President or between the respective Foreign Ministers. Thus, a general improvement of the

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1463. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on October 12.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 13.

atmosphere could be reported, which would be conducive to more useful negotiations.

Mr. K replied that this was correct. Yet there was one point he wanted to make clear. As far as Berlin was concerned, the statement should be such as could not be understood to mean that the Soviet Union and the US were in favor of prolonging the occupation status there and that the two countries were giving up the idea of a peace treaty. He said that he wanted to reiterate the Soviet position once again: the Soviet Union wanted to do everything in a friendly manner with the US, its allies and the allies of the Soviet Union in order to find a solution to the German problem. The settlement of the German problem would be brought about by a peace treaty and by doing away with the vestiges of war. If the Soviet Union should encounter no understanding on the part of the United States, it would have to seek unilateral action with its allies. He said that he also wanted to reiterate that the question of a time limit was not one of principle. Yet it was clear that some day a settlement would have to be reached. If the solution of the German problem were connected with the unification of Germany, this would be an unrealistic approach and would indicate a lack of desire to reach a settlement, since, in that case, it would be put off indefinitely. The two sides should not wait for German unification and should join their efforts to reach a settlement as soon as possible. Mr. K then said that without a thorough exposition of the US positions on the German problem and disarmament, it would be difficult for him to report to his Government and say where the barometer pointed—to clear, changing, or stormy.

The President replied that he did not see any reason for assuming that the needle was pointing at “stormy”. As far as German unification was concerned, the President stated that he had no formula for it and that he did not know when it could be brought about. He said he realized that the situation in Berlin was uneasy, but his and Mr. K’s predecessors had set it, perhaps unwisely, and now it was necessary to cope with it. The United States was prepared to seek a solution which would be satisfactory to everyone—to the Soviet Union, to its allies, and to the people of Europe in general. However, this was very difficult to do and required great patience. The President pointed out that he was not talking of a long distant future. Efforts should be exerted to bring about a solution as soon as possible, and if no fixed date were set, this could be done. Referring to the question of disarmament, the President said that the Soviet plan was still under study. Although this problem had been discussed at many previous conferences, the United States was willing to study the Soviet plan thoroughly and also to study any other plans, including its own. The US would be willing to apply new efforts in order to make progress in this field, because it believed that no real solution of

any problem could be reached so long as there was not some progress in general disarmament.

Mr. K agreed and said that he believed that the prospects for moving forward were greater in the field of disarmament than in any other field, especially because the respective positions on Germany had become rigid as a result of the various commitments undertaken by the two sides, while in the field of disarmament there were no such barriers. However, Mr. K said, he wanted to point out again that the words "peace treaty" meant the same thing in all languages.

The President then suggested that the respective staffs start working on the text of the communiqué.

Mr. K agreed, but said that there was one additional point he wanted to raise, namely, that of the President's return visit to the USSR. He stated that he had thought about this and had come to the conclusion that it would perhaps be better to have a heads of state meeting in the second half of November or early December with the President going to the USSR either late in May or early in June next year. He thought that the President, as well as his family, would enjoy their trip much more when the weather was good and everything was in full bloom. The beautiful scenery and the wonderful scent of blooming trees might help the President and himself in their talks.

The President replied that spring might be better for him since that would enable him to have some rest in the interim. As far as a heads of government meeting was concerned, the President said that he could not commit anyone except himself. As he had repeatedly stated, he would be willing to go to such a meeting if there was some progress which offered prospects for certain results. He said that a situation where he would not have to act under duress could be regarded as progress. His feeling now was that duress no longer existed.

Mr. K inquired what the President meant by duress.

The President replied that duress was a situation where one party intended to take unilateral actions without regard to the other countries concerned. He said that he did not want to conjure any fears, but that this had been the feeling of our people and of our Government until now. Yet, on the basis of the understanding reached between Mr. K and himself, he felt that duress no longer existed and therefore he would be willing to go to a meeting at the highest level.

Mr. K said that this was not the way the Soviet Government had understood the situation and that it had never intended to create a situation of duress.

The President replied that it was this way that the American Government and the American people had understood the situation. Perhaps it had been just one of the misunderstandings which had to be cleared up. The President suggested that, on the basis of what the two sides had said in these talks, they should consider the situation changed at least that much.

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## 15. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 27, 1959, 12:15 p.m.

### SUBJECT

President's Report of His Private Session with Khrushchev

### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Mr. Dillon  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Gates  
Mr. Kohler  
Gen. Goodpaster  
Mr. Hagerty  
Mr. Berding

Following a private session with Chairman Khrushchev<sup>1</sup> the President came into Secretary Herter's room where most of the American group was gathered and reported on the results of this conversation.

The President said that Khrushchev wanted a communiqué. He said this should be item by item as respects Berlin. We would not say that we would make permanent the occupation status in Berlin. We were both ready to negotiate on a Berlin settlement which would be acceptable to West Berlin, to East and West Germany and to the European countries. The President said it had been made clear that there would be no summit meeting under any kind of duress. He simply would not participate under such conditions. He had agreed with the Chairman that

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1463. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the White House on October 12.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 14.

disarmament was the most important single problem. He said that Mr. Khrushchev had explained that the two governments had understood differently the Soviet initiative in Berlin last November. The U.S. had mistakenly thought that Khrushchev was delivering an ultimatum. The President reported that he had said he would not go to a summit meeting if what he and the Chairman said, at least among themselves if not publicly, did not make clear that there was no aspect of duress. He said that he added that he could not comment for or commit his associates. The President said Khrushchev had replied that without regard to a date the Soviets would negotiate to get a solution to Berlin which would be acceptable to all concerned. Khrushchev had added that the Soviets regarded a peace treaty as the "right way". The President commented that he saw no choice but to resume negotiations so long as we in fact say we do not seek a perpetuation of the situation in Berlin; clearly we did not contemplate 50 years in occupation there.

The President said he had told Khrushchev that he would rather have a summit meeting for negotiations on the subject of disarmament if we were both ready to negotiate on this question. In this sense he had made Berlin a catalyst.

Finally the President reported that he and Mr. Khrushchev had agreed that his visit to the Soviet Union would take place in May or June.

There was some general discussion as to the broad lines of a communiqué indicating the President and Secretary's views that this should cover the following lines:

1. General disarmament is the primary problem.
2. On Berlin we would seek a solution acceptable to all the people concerned.
3. There had been no agreements of substance.
4. Our understanding on the negotiations that they should be honestly and earnestly free of threat.
5. The Moscow visit will take place next spring.

## 16. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 27, 1959, 1:45 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Joint Communiqué

## PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The President  
 The Secretary  
 Amb. Lodge  
 Mr. Kohler  
 Mr. Irwin  
 Amb. Thompson  
 Mr. Merchant  
 Gen. Goodpaster  
 Mr. Akalovsky

*USSR*

Chairman Khrushchev  
 Mr. Gromyko  
 Amb. Menshikov  
 Mr. Soldatov  
 Mr. Troyanovsky

[Following the morning meeting beginning at 11:45 a.m.,<sup>1</sup> and lasting for some 20 minutes, on September 27, between the President and Chairman Khrushchev, the U.S. side prepared a draft communiqué, enclosed as U.S. Draft (Tab 1). After this had been approved by the President, Secretary Herter and aides went over the text with Foreign Minister Gromyko and aides. Following their discussions, which began about 12:40 and ended shortly after 1:00, a new draft was prepared which represented the results of the minister-level discussions, including bracketed language representing points not yet agreed; this is attached as Joint Draft (Tab 2). The Joint Draft was presented to the President and Chairman Khrushchev at 1:45 p.m. It was reviewed by the principals in the presence of Secretary Herter and Foreign Minister Gromyko and other aides on both sides.]<sup>2</sup>

After reading the Joint Draft, Chairman Khrushchev asked for the elimination of the first parenthetical phrase reading “but that there would be no fixed time limit on them”. He confirmed that he had agreed substantively to the language included in this sentence. However, he felt inclusion in the communiqué of the parenthetical phrase would lead to difficult and embarrassing interpretations. In particular it would be claimed as a “great victory for Adenauer”, who had spoken of spinning talks and negotiations out for as much as eight years.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1463. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the White House on October 12.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 14.

<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text.



The President said that it might be possible to consider omitting the whole sentence provided he said to his own American people that there was, in fact, to be “no fixed time limit”.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he could confirm such a statement if the President made it.

The Secretary then commented to the President that the omission of this important phrase could be very dangerous.

Gromyko, taking the other tack, said that the inclusion of this language might allow negotiations to go on for as much as fifty years or more.

Mr. Khrushchev then proposed that the entire sentence be omitted. The President would make this statement publicly but separately and Khrushchev would confirm publicly his agreement to the President’s statement.

The President then said the thing that bothered him was that this sentence represented exactly what had been agreed between himself and the Chairman and that he could not understand why the Chairman was not willing to say so in the communiqué.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he did not want the language in the communiqué since this would enable Adenauer to use it for his own purpose.

The President then said that actually without this sentence he saw no use in having a communiqué at all. Except for that sentence the rest of the communiqué was a collection of generalities.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he thought the communiqué was important for its tone and its mention and highlighting of the important question of disarmament and the like. If there were no communiqué he thought we would run the risk of many false interpretations of what had happened during the talks.

The President then summarized, saying that at first he had thought that there should be no communiqué at all. Later he had agreed that a communiqué should be prepared when Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted one. However, the sentence in question was the nub of their agreement. He did not see why the inclusion of the statement in the communiqué would be of any special use to Chancellor Adenauer.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the language might be used to justify the indefinite prolongation of negotiations.

Mr. Gromyko added that moreover a statement by the President of the United States, confirmed by Chairman Khrushchev, was just as strong as the communiqué.

The President commented that he still could not see why he and the Chairman should not make this statement together rather than separately.

Mr. Khrushchev said that if a statement were to be included in the communiqué, he would have to introduce a number of minor amendments and thus prolong the discussion. The parenthetical phrase stating that there would be no fixed time limit was firm and specific, whereas the beginning of the sentence, to the effect that “negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely” was much less clear and firm.

The President pointed out that this language to him was directly connected with a question of a summit meeting, as he had told Mr. Khrushchev earlier that day. He did not know what he would be able to say to his allies on this subject.

Mr. Khrushchev repeated that the President could make this statement and that he would not deny it.

The President then continued that he would have to make a statement giving his own interpretation of the meaning of the communiqué in this respect.

Mr. Khrushchev said that each party would then have to give its own interpretation. He said the Soviets wanted a summit meeting but felt that such a meeting would not be useful unless there were a mutual desire for it.

The President then said he would agree to the dropping of the sentence from the communiqué but would use the language in a press conference. He repeated, however, that he did not understand Mr. Khrushchev’s unwillingness to include the sentence in the communiqué.

Mr. Gromyko then brought up the question of the final parenthetical sentence saying it would not represent accurately his proposal. He offered two alternative insertions: either that the language should say “all questions *arising between the two countries* should be settled” etc., or that “*all outstanding international questions*”.

The Secretary indicated that we preferred the latter formulation and the President indicated his assent to this language. (At this point, Mr. Akalovsky overheard Mr. Gromyko explaining to his own group that the interpretation which the Soviets would give to “international questions” would not include matters which the Soviet Union regarded as internal in nature, i.e. presumably Taiwan, etc.)

Amended versions of the communiqué as finally agreed were then given to Messrs. Hagerty and Berding for issuance in Gettysburg. The meeting terminated shortly after 2:00 p.m. and the President and Chairman Khrushchev and party departed by motorcade for Washington. The draft of the final communiqué, as issued, is attached as Tab 3.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed but see footnotes 6–8 below.

[Tab 1]<sup>4</sup>

### COMMUNIQUÉ

Chairman Khrushchev and President Eisenhower have had a frank exchange of opinions at Camp David. In some of these conversations United States Secretary of State Herter and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as other officials from both countries, participated.

Chairman Khrushchev and the President have agreed that these discussions have been useful in clarifying each other's position on a number of subjects. The talks were not undertaken to negotiate issues. It is hoped, however, that their exchanges of views will contribute to a better understanding of the motives and position of each and thus to the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

The Chairman and the President agreed that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. With respect to Berlin, an understanding was reached, subject to the approval of France and Great Britain, the other two occupying powers in Berlin, that negotiations would be reopened with a view to achieving a solution satisfactory not only to the four occupying powers but also to the people of West Berlin and others directly concerned. It was further agreed that these negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely but that there would be no time limit on them.

In addition to these matters, useful conversations were held on a number of questions affecting the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. These subjects included the possibility of expanding trade in peaceful goods. With respect to an increase in exchanges of persons and ideas, substantial progress was made in discussions between officials and it is expected that certain agreements will be reached after further negotiations.

Finally it was agreed that an exact date for the return visit of the President to the Soviet Union next spring would be arranged through diplomatic channels.

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<sup>4</sup> Secret.

[Tab 2]<sup>5</sup>

### JOINT SOVIET-UNITED STATES COMMUNIQUÉ<sup>6</sup>

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N.S. Khrushchev, and President Eisenhower have had a frank exchange of opinions at Camp David. In some of these conversations United States Secretary of State Herter and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as other officials from both countries, participated.

Chairman Khrushchev and the President have agreed that these discussions have been useful in clarifying each other's position on a number of subjects. The talks were not undertaken to negotiate issues. It is hoped, however, that their exchanges of view will contribute to a better understanding of the motives and position of each and thus to the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States agreed that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. Both governments will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem.

In the course of the conversations an exchange of views took place on the question of Germany including the question of a peace treaty with Germany, in which the positions of both sides were expounded.

With respect to the specific question of Berlin, an understanding was reached, subject to the approval of the other parties directly concerned, that negotiations would be reopened with a view to achieving a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace. It was further agreed that these negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely (but that there would be no fixed time limit on them).<sup>7</sup>

In addition to these matters useful conversations were held on a number of questions affecting the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. These subjects included the question of trade between the two countries. With respect to an increase in exchanges of persons and ideas, substantial progress was made in discussions between officials and it is expected that certain agreements will be reached in the near future.

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<sup>5</sup> Secret.

<sup>6</sup> With the exception of the changes mentioned in footnotes 7 and 8 below, the text of this draft is the same as that of the agreed final communiqué.

<sup>7</sup> Last clause objected to by Mr. Gromyko. [Footnote in the source text. The last sentence including the parenthetical clause was not included in the final communiqué.]

(The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President agreed that all questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation.)<sup>8</sup>

Finally it was agreed that an exact date for the return visit of the President to the Soviet Union next spring would be arranged through diplomatic channels.

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<sup>8</sup>Suggested by Mr. Gromyko. [Footnote in the source text. In the final communiqué this paragraph reads:

["The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States agreed that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation."]

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## 17. Editorial Note

During his press conference at 11 a.m. on September 28, President Eisenhower reported that, in addition to the statement on Berlin in the joint U.S.-Soviet communiqué (see Tab 2, Document 16), he and Khrushchev had agreed to reopen negotiations on Berlin. The negotiations would not be prolonged indefinitely nor would there be a time limit placed on them. For text of this statement, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 694–702.

The Embassy in Moscow transmitted a copy of this statement to Gromyko on September 28. (Telegram 1014 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–2859) On September 30, the Soviet press carried Khrushchev's statement that the President had correctly characterized the content of the agreement reached at Camp David.

**18. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, September 28, 1959, 7:20 p.m.

694. Following is text of message for delivery from the President to Chancellor Adenauer. Advise date time delivery.

“September 28, 1959.

Dear Mr. Chancellor: I know how interested you are in the results of my meetings with Mr. Khrushchev. I expect very shortly to send you a summary of all that occurred and follow that up with my more considered personal impressions of the man and what the visit so far may have accomplished.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, however, I want to send you immediate word concerning my discussions with Mr. Khrushchev regarding West Berlin. I do so particularly because some confusion seems to have arisen out of one question posed in my press conference this morning.<sup>2</sup>

At the outset let me say that I made the situation of Berlin and the removal by the Soviet Government of any appearance of a threat or time limit to the settlement of this problem the touchstone of my talks with the Chairman. Indeed, the fact that we did not cover the list of items which we had informally agreed we would try to cover at Camp David was due to the prolongation of our discussions on the subject of Berlin and my insistence that any hint of duress must be specifically removed before I was prepared to talk about anything else.

Mr. Khrushchev finally accepted the fact of our determination to insure the security and freedom of the people of West Berlin. This I told him was a responsibility and an obligation which we had accepted and from which we would not be driven. I told him that we were prepared to resume negotiations on the Berlin question subject, of course, to agreement by the others directly concerned—the British, the French, and yourself. I told him that we would negotiate in good faith for a solution which would assure the freedom and security of West Berliners. I said that we had no intention of prolonging those negotiations indefinitely but that we would not enter upon them if there was to be any time limit fixed for their conclusion. He agreed to this and I so stated publicly this

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/9–2859. Confidential; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Merchant, cleared in draft by the President, and approved by Calhoun.

<sup>1</sup> The summary, also sent to Macmillan and de Gaulle, was transmitted under cover of a brief personal note on September 30. (Telegrams 714 and 715 to Bonn; *ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 17.

morning. Mr. Khrushchev also assured me that he would publicly confirm this understanding, and I am momentarily awaiting word that he has done so.

The problem of a divided Berlin, as you and I have agreed, is like the problem of a divided Germany, abnormal and unjust. The logical solution is the reunification of Germany and this remains our objective. But the attainment of that objective may, and it seems probably will, be postponed for a considerable time and I feel that we must seek a firm arrangement under which the people of West Berlin are secure in their freedom and from any harassment against themselves, their economy and their communications, and are not interfered with in their movement to and from the city and the Federal Republic. Such an arrangement or solution we will do our best to find, one that is fair to all, so far as this may be achieved within a divided Germany. Meanwhile, I know I don't have to tell you after our talks in Bonn last month that the United States is resolved together with its Allies to safeguard the freedom and security of the people of West Berlin, so long as this may be necessary.

With warm regard, from your friend, Dwight D. Eisenhower."

Observe Presidential Handling.

**Herter**

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**19. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)**

Washington, September 30, 1959, 10:20 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

4. I then indicated to the President that I had been giving some thought to possible usefulness of the Council and its machinery with respect to issues which may have arisen out of his talks with Mr. Khrushchev. I said that it seemed to me that the only one which at the moment was pertinent was the issue of Berlin and German unification. I reminded him of paragraph 44 of NSC 5803,<sup>1</sup> together with NSC Action 1858.<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Top Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Document 243.

<sup>2</sup> NSC Action No. 1858 was taken at the 354th Meeting of the National Security Council; see Document 242.

I said to the President that at least some new ideas might come out of Planning Board discussions and that should this prove to be the case we could prepare a discussion paper which I would clear with him before taking it to the Council.

The President then said that I should discuss this with Secretary Herter and should indicate to him that there were possibly some alternatives. Under present circumstances and as a result of the talks with Mr. Khrushchev we were no longer in a situation with respect to the Russians in which they were saying “take our solution or war.” He said we must remember that Berlin is an abnormal situation; that we had found it necessary to live with it; and that it had come about through some mistakes of our leaders—Churchill and Roosevelt. However, he felt that there must be some way to develop some kind of a free city which might be somehow a part of West Germany, which might require that the U.N. would become a party to guaranteeing the freedom, safety, and security of the city which would have an unarmed status except for police forces. He reiterated that the time was coming and perhaps soon when we would simply have to get our forces out. In any event, he thought well of seeking alternatives and authorized me to proceed.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

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## 20. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

Bonn, September 30, 1959.

[Here follow six paragraphs discussing Bruce’s conversations with other officials.]

The Chancellor asked me to come and see him, so I did at 5:15 p.m. He told me he wanted to talk to me as his friend Mr. Bruce and not as Ambassador. Whenever he uses such a phrase, I know he is going to express fears about U.S. Government policy and some individuals connected with it. I know this is a way for him to let off steam, and am careful about what I report concerning such conversations since he requests me to regard them as private.

He observed that from his study of the communiqué,<sup>1</sup> press comments and his letter from the President,<sup>2</sup> he thought a new manner in

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Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> See Tab 2, Document 16, and footnotes thereto.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 18.



diplomacy had emerged in the United States. Were Dulles alive, he observed, Khrushchev would never have been invited. The German Ambassador to Moscow Kroll had reported a great rise in Khrushchev's prestige at home and in uncommitted countries because of his American tour. (I have read a good many of Kroll's reports and have little confidence in his judgment, although in this respect it is probably correct.)

The Chancellor then asked me an extraordinary question: "Are Mr. Herter's eyes not too kind?" When I explored this query, I found what he had in mind was the fear of Herter being too gentlemanly to engage Khrushchev or Gromyko in rough and tumble debate. I told him that in my opinion Herter was fully capable of taking care of himself under all circumstances. He had a long political career in Massachusetts where toughness in speech and action is requisite to success. Moreover, I thought his rebukes to Gromyko at Geneva were sharper and more effective than any I heard from other Foreign Ministers.

The Chancellor then got onto the subject of the Soviets wanting financing, instruction and technical assistance for building chemical plants. He understood the Dupont Company in the U.S. was considering accepting some working arrangement with them. I told him I was not specifically informed but hoped this was not true since, especially at this time, I would think it inadvisable. It is evident that the Russian economy has become widely self-sufficient, but to change at this juncture our attitude toward trade relations with them would seem to me ill timed and in some respects dangerous. He said he was in agreement and had no intention of permitting German firms to participate. Industrialists, he thought, were as a class lacking in political acumen.

He fixed me with a genial eye and said he had committed an indiscretion while the President was here<sup>3</sup> by telling Eisenhower he hoped he would refuse to accept my resignation as Ambassador and that I would remain here indefinitely. The President seems to have answered this was beyond his control—he would like nothing better, but it was up to the Chancellor and not himself to persuade me. I got out of that one by saying that, happy as I had been in Germany, I simply must go home and next month seemed the logical time. He wagged his head and said we would talk about it further later.

[Here follow two paragraphs describing Bruce's activities for the rest of the day.]

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<sup>3</sup>See Documents 5 and 8.

## 21. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 1, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Camp David Talks and Aftermath

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador  
The Secretary  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

Ambassador Grewe said he wished to express the satisfaction of the Federal Republic at the energy and persistence with which the President had dealt with the Berlin problem during the Camp David talks. His Government did not think that the pressure on Berlin was really eliminated, but was good to have a certain period of time in which the problem could be met more quietly. The President's press conference on Monday<sup>1</sup> had caused some confusion among journalists here and in Germany, but on the whole the German reaction had been relatively quiet, largely due to the President's letter to Adenauer<sup>2</sup> and to the Merchant briefing.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, an undercurrent of restlessness continued, and efforts should be made to calm this. It was therefore important that the German Government know American thinking, especially if any new proposals were in prospect.

The Secretary responded that we had neither worked out new proposals nor discussed any. The President had merely said that the situation is abnormal, that we had no desire to maintain occupation rights deriving from the war indefinitely, but that we would not be pushed out. In the final communiqué<sup>4</sup> issued at Camp David an important item was the reference to achieving a solution in accordance with the interests of all concerned, particularly in connection with the absence of any time limit. The Secretary added that Chancellor Adenauer had sent the President a very nice letter<sup>5</sup> in reply to the President's communication.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's query as to whether this meant that the United States envisaged entering the next conference with the

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Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by S on October 7.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 17.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 18.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Merchant's briefing of the Ambassadors from the other NATO countries on September 29 is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany.

<sup>4</sup> See Tab 2, Document 16, and footnotes thereto.

<sup>5</sup> In this September 30 letter, Adenauer thanked the President for his summary of the talks with Khrushchev. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/9-3059)

Soviets with the last Western proposals made at Geneva, the Secretary said that he found it hard to work out in his mind how a summit meeting would go. Who, for example, would be the personalities involved? Perhaps there would be a new Government in the United Kingdom. Perhaps Lloyd would be replaced. (The Secretary noted that Lloyd had told him at Geneva that he had been much happier as Defense Minister than as Foreign Minister.) Butler appeared to want the job; Ormsby-Gore was also a possibility. No one wants to get out on a limb until we know who we will be talking with. There were accordingly no new proposals yet, and certainly none would be put up to the Soviets without the consent of the Allies.

Ambassador Grewe asked whether the American Government felt itself to be under any real pressure to put up new proposals. The Secretary replied that, as of now, it did not. He had talked to the French Foreign Minister earlier today<sup>6</sup> and the French had no new proposals. It was hard, in fact, to see from where new proposals could come. When he was last in Bonn,<sup>7</sup> the Secretary continued, he had asked whether von Brentano had any ideas as to how the West could seize the initiative. The German Foreign Minister had promised to write him a personal letter after consulting with Chancellor Adenauer, but so far nothing had been received. Ambassador Grewe commented that it was hard to conceive of any new ideas emerging in the next few months; the field had been pretty well exhausted during the intensive work prior to and at Geneva.

The Secretary said that Gromyko had raised with him the question of whether we were going to talk about a security zone in Central Europe or disarmament in a limited area. The Secretary added that he had indicated that we did not want this brought up at Camp David, and that we would only discuss such security arrangements in the context of an over-all plan for German reunification. In the view of the Soviets, disarmament and the German problem are apparently closely linked together. They show fear that someone may appear in Germany with a more martial bent than the present leadership. One cannot be certain, of course, whether this stems from real conviction or is merely an act. When Mikoyan saw Secretary Dulles last January the letter had said that, if Germany were to be reunified, the Soviets would obviously have a right to certain assurances relative to the united Germany. Perhaps the Soviets had built too much hope on this with respect to restricting German military activities, the Secretary added.

Ambassador Grewe said he was in a position to state that the von Eckardt remarks in a recent press conference,<sup>8</sup> which had widely been

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<sup>6</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, 396.1/10–159.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 7.

<sup>8</sup> Not further identified.

interpreted as an indication that the Federal Republic now had an open mind on new ideas for a Berlin settlement, had been taken out of context. The Federal Republic has no such ideas, and von Eckardt's statement was not intended as an invitation to come forward with new ideas.

Ambassador Grewe continued that the German Embassy here had received a report from Ambassador Kroll in Moscow which was interesting in that it threw light on the strange conduct of Khrushchev at Camp David in refusing to put anything in the actual communiqué about the absence of a time limit on negotiations. After talking with various people in Moscow, Ambassador Kroll had come to the conclusion that Khrushchev first wanted to obtain the approval of the Party Praesidium before making this commitment. Hence his resort to an oral statement after returning to Moscow. The Secretary commented that this might be the case, but noted that Khrushchev had been in Moscow only a short time before his full confirmation of the President's press conference statement.

Ambassador Grewe said his Government was interested as to our ideas about the possible timing of a Summit meeting. Did we envisage such a meeting as the next step, or did we anticipate a prior meeting at some other level? The Secretary replied that he had been thinking about this and also had discussed the subject with the President. The President's feeling is that there might now be a Summit meeting, but he had no precise thoughts so as to the timing. There had not yet been any discussion with our Allies. We would have to come to some conclusions about where and when a Summit might be held and what should be talked about at it. It should presumably not seem to take place on the initiative of any one country. All these things still needed to be arranged. As to subjects for discussion, the two principal ones would be disarmament and the German and Berlin problem. As to the method of conducting negotiations, it seemed probable that the heads of governments would agree that their Foreign Ministers should get together, say 3 or 6 months later, to carry on. The Secretary could not visualize anything else unless the British or French came up with some new ideas. The big safeguard, the Secretary continued, is the language in the communiqué that the solution to be achieved must be in accordance with interests of all concerned. This formula was used in order to avoid discussing the troublesome problem of specific participants. In response to Ambassador Grewe's question, the Secretary said that a Summit meeting must obviously include a discussion of Berlin. We would, of course, like to have this in the context of the over-all German situation. The Soviets want to talk about it in the context of a peace treaty. Likewise, in response to an inquiry by Ambassador Grewe, the Secretary indicated that we would not push a previous meeting of the Foreign Ministers. He said that he would like to have this postponed as long as possible. The

Soviets have never pushed for a resumption of the Geneva Conference, the Secretary noted. After all, Gromyko has maintained that the Foreign Ministers cannot settle anything anyway. It is, of course, difficult to see how the Summit could really settle the Berlin question. The Secretary said that he imagined heavy pressures would come from the East Germans who appear to be making life miserable for the Soviets in the sense of insisting that their situation be regularized. Ambassador Grewe expressed the opinion that the East Germans were really not strong enough to influence the Soviets against their will.

In response to a question by the Secretary as to whether the Germans had any new thoughts on relations with the Poles, Ambassador Grewe said that recent reports had indicated a stiffening of the Polish attitude. This was reflected not only in their harsh response to Adenauer's recent gesture,<sup>9</sup> but most significantly in indications that they would demand as a prerequisite to the establishment of relations a formal recognition of the Oder–Neisse line by the Federal Republic. This, of course, made by overtures difficult.

Returning to the possible Summit meeting, Ambassador Grewe asked whether the United States had considered what might be the role of the Federal Republic if Germany and Berlin were to be discussed. Would it be similar to that at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' conference? The Secretary said we had not yet considered this point. He hoped that the discussion could be kept at a high level of generality, and that it would be open for us to say that any specific proposals would have to be talked over with our German allies. Ambassador Grewe indicated that the Geneva situation, from the German point of view, was not too satisfactory. All the important discussions were held at private meetings at which the Germans were not present.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's question, the Secretary indicated that the Summit meeting might take place before the President's visit to Moscow but that no specific time had been set or even discussed. One factor was the difficulty which the President had in leaving Washington when Congress was in session. In January, for example, he had to make a number of important speeches, such as those on the State of the Union and the Budget. Therefore, it seemed like it would have to take place either before January or later in the spring, that is, in December or say March. Apart from the general difficulty in the President's getting away while Congress was in session, next year was an election, and Congress would try to adjourn by convention time in July.

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<sup>9</sup> Presumably reference is to the speech Adenauer made on August 31, in which he stated that the new Germany would some day be a good neighbor of Poland, a gesture which was rebuffed by the Polish Government.

Likewise in response to a query by Ambassador Grewe, the Secretary said that it might be desirable to have a Western Summit meeting before any Summit meeting with the Soviets. He did not know where a Summit meeting should be held. Geneva seemed to be “jinxed”. However, it had the facilities; moreover, the local police were used to handling the considerable security problems involved. The conversation terminated with an exchange regarding the general difficulty involved in making suitable security arrangements for a visit such as that made to this country by Chairman Khrushchev.

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## 22. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, October 8, 1959, 4 a.m.

350. Reference: ourtel 348 to Department, 306 to Bonn.<sup>1</sup> This is part two of three-part message.<sup>2</sup> At 11 a.m. Wednesday Mayor Brandt called in USBER liaison officer, confirmed to him briefly substance ourtel 346 to Dept 304 to Bonn<sup>3</sup> and said after preliminary conference with Senat he favored repetition of Tuesday’s action to remove newly hoisted East German flags. Uniformed police commander Duensing under orders prepare for action lasting from 3 to 5 p.m.; only flags flying on S-Bahn stations proper to be removed, no removal to be attempted of flags from large installations (rail yards, repair shops) where strong resistance encountered yesterday and where terrain made police operations difficult. Brandt said that stronger resistance likely to be encountered today but he felt West Berlin authorities should not yield after only one attempt. If

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.04/10-859. Confidential; Niact. Received at 12:48 a.m. Repeated to Moscow, priority to Bonn, Paris, and London.

<sup>1</sup> Dated October 8, 3 p.m., telegram 348 from Berlin transmitted a summary of the legal position of S-Bahn property in West Berlin. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> The three-part message consisted of telegram 348 (see footnote 1 above), telegram 350, and telegram 351. In telegram 351, also dated October 8 and transmitted at 5 a.m., Lightner reported that the British and French were unwilling to make a personal démarche to the Soviet Commandant about the raising of the flags, but agreed to send Zakharov a message asking him to put an end to such activities. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 346 from Berlin, October 7, reported that the new East German flags that had been raised in West Berlin over S-Bahn property had, in some cases, been removed by police, but that in other cases attempts to remove the flags had been repulsed by East German railroad workers. (*Ibid.*, 762B.04/10-759)

force again encountered they would be in position address Allies with formal report bringing to their attention situation that East was carrying out on West Berlin territory activities unconnected with safeguarding S-Bahn services. Senat documentation would show East utilizing S-Bahn territory as base of operations against West Berlin. Brandt said he hoped contemplated action could be accomplished without bloodshed although police had of course insisted on permission to shoot if attacked. Removal of 70 percent of East German flags would make clear West Berlin intent not to tolerate provocation of population by displaying East German emblem.

At 12:30 Berlin Senat, avoiding press, met at undisclosed location to take final decision. According Senat Protocol Chief Klein Senat after one and half hour meeting about evenly split on advisability of taking further action, with Governing Mayor casting deciding vote to go ahead with plan as outlined above.

As result of political advisers meeting late morning Chairman (British) Liaison Officer communicated orally to Governing Mayor at 2:15 p.m. following message from Commandants: 1) Commandants would appreciate being immediately informed of Senat's decision re further action against flags; 2) Commandants suggest that before taking further action Senat consult with them. Brandt immediately said he abiding by wish of Commandants and would therefore call off action planned for 3 p.m. since there no time for consultation with Commandants prior to 3 p.m. Possibility that action might be taken later in afternoon was countered by Brandt with argument he would not favor action during rush hour and lasting until after dark.

Commandants met with Brandt and Amrehn at 4 p.m. Since General Hamlett absent I as Acting Commandant attended meeting accompanied by General D'Orsa (CG Berlin Command). Deputy Commandants and PolAds also present.

Mayor reported on Tuesday's events saying in regular Senat session question of flags was discussed; since population would regard raising of flags as provocation police were instructed remove them. Senat wanted to repeat action on Wednesday but postponed it when informed that Allied Commandants wished to be consulted. However, Brandt said, even if police were to take no action trouble might develop because numerous West Berliners, especially workers, had sent messages to City Hall announcing intention remove flags. Berlin DGB had addressed letter to him saying that if Senat did not take action it would have to bear responsibility for disturbances arising from possibility that West Berlin workers would take matter in hand. Workers at Siemenstadt Electrical Works sent message threatening remove East German flag in S-Bahn installation Siemenstadt.

Brandt said there was even more important side to this problem. Yesterday's incidents disclosed most serious state of affairs inasmuch as East Germans had resorted to violent action against West Berlin police. Information received during course of Wednesday indicated that several hundred Kampfgruppen in civilian clothes were brought to S-Bahn installations, demonstrating that Communists able to bring on short notice large numbers of subversive elements into West Berlin with clear intent of making trouble.

Commandants told Brandt they would draw attention of Sov Commandant to this situation. It was felt that *démarche*, even if it did not produce desired result, would benefit allied position with public opinion if Communists were given warning that if they did not cease their provocation full responsibility for anything that happened would be on them. Furthermore, Mayor Brandt had indicated that under any circumstances further police action should not be undertaken until tomorrow morning since it not desirable conduct police action at night. No further police action was to be taken until result of protest ascertainable, except for maintenance law and order.

It was then agreed that Governing Mayor would issue following statement to press.

*Begin text.* Governing Mayor Willy Brandt and Mayor Amrehn discussed this afternoon with three Allied Commandants in Berlin question of flying of new DDR flag on S-Bahn stations and other S-Bahn property. Mayor Brandt explained to three Commandants that flying this flag within territory of West Berlin was regarded by people of West Berlin as provocative and was widely resented. He added S-Bahn had been used to introduce into West Berlin gangs of trouble-makers from the East. The Berlin Senat will continue to maintain the closest contact with three commands re this question. In meantime, Berlin Senat expresses hope that people of West Berlin for their part will avoid any act which might lead to an undesirable incident. *End text.*

As of 11 p.m. Wednesday only one unconfirmed incident reported that of some twenty West Berliners removing flag from Wilmersdorf Station.

**Lightner**



**23. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

Berlin, October 8, 1959, 9 p.m.

354. From Timberlake.<sup>1</sup> I arrived Berlin by night train morning seventh for long scheduled two-day visit. Had previously arranged courtesy call on Mayor Brandt which took place 0945 this morning.

After exchange usual pleasantries, I noted problem created by East German flags hoisted over S-Bahn installations and asked Mayor's views on seriousness situation and what measures might be taken (to remove flags).

Brandt said East German action provocative, dangerous to maintenance law and order and, in his opinion, against all interests in Berlin. We reviewed chronology events so far, noting Commandants then meeting,<sup>2</sup> after which I asked Brandt his estimate possibility renewed resistance in event police action removing flags renewed. He said would expect renewed and possibly stronger resistance.

He added might be feasible send one of existing joint (German and American manned) patrol jeeps along with German police squad to stand by but not participate in action to remove flag if such course eventually decided upon. In his view such presence Allied Force member might emphasize serious allied view of problem and persuade East Germans take no action against West German police.

I said it seemed East Germans were now in good position play a waiting game and could make their point simply by keeping flags flying duration anniversary celebrations. I said question taking action is, of course, problem coordination on Allied as well as German side. I added, as personal observation, that I assumed, should workers from West Berlin remove flags (as letter from DGB to Brandt indicated), police would, of course, have to intervene because such an overt threat to law and order could not be tolerated.

Brandt replied by stating Senator Lipschitz, who as Interior Senator controls police, had been called back from vacation and arrived this morning. He added, somewhat cryptically, that Lipschitz might be in

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-859. Secret. Received at 6:10 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Clare H. Timberlake, Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in Bonn.

<sup>2</sup> At the Commandants' 4-hour meeting on October 8, the United States strongly urged authorization of West Berlin police action to remove East German flags from S-Bahn property before the end of the day. The British and French Commandants stated they could not take such action without governmental permission and the French stressed the risk of provoking clashes. (Telegram 353 from Berlin, October 8 at 9 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-859)

position "Play both cards, police and those who feel provoked by East German action."

I endorse strong position taken by US Reps Commandants' meeting and believe we should continue press for agreed tripartite action to remove flags before it becomes too late. Seems evident (see USBER tel 353 to Dept) that wraps must be taken off Brit and French Reps (particularly latter) before we can expect them agree to what we consider minimum adequate response to this challenge.<sup>3</sup>

**Lightner**

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<sup>3</sup> At midnight on October 8, Lightner reported that since 8 p.m. East German workers had removed all the flags from the S-Bahn property in West Berlin. (Telegram 359 from Berlin; *ibid.*, 762B.04/10–859).

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#### **24. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, October 9, 1959, 12:29 p.m.

2846. Following for delivery is letter from President to Prime Minister Macmillan. Advise date time delivery.

"October 9, 1959.

Dear Harold: You will recall that in my account to you of my conversations with Mr. Khrushchev<sup>1</sup> at Camp David I said that I had made it clear to him that as far as a Summit conference was concerned I could make no commitments without prior consultation with the others concerned. Accordingly I should like very much to learn your present thoughts with respect to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal that a Summit meeting be held before I visit the Soviet Union in the Spring. I am also writing in this same vein to President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer.<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/10–959. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted in EUR, cleared by Goodpaster and in draft by Herter, and approved by Calhoun.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 18.

<sup>2</sup> Texts of these letters were transmitted in telegrams 778 to Bonn and 1548 to Paris, both October 9. (*Ibid.*, 611.62A/10–959 and 396.1/10–959)

As a result of my discussions with Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David I now have, as I indicated to you earlier, fewer objections to a Summit conference. The appearance of threat and duress in negotiating on the Berlin problem has in my opinion now been sufficiently altered that I, for my part, would feel able to meet jointly in such a conference with the Soviet Chairman. Although Mr. Khrushchev certainly did not modify any of the substantive positions of the Soviet Government regarding Berlin, German reunification, disarmament or other major international questions during our talks, there was sufficient indication of a change of tone to lead me to believe that further exploration would now be desirable. Indeed I believe we would be assuming a heavy responsibility if we now refused to meet him at the Summit.

I know you will agree with me that in such a meeting we on our side must clearly be united regarding the limits which our national interests place upon us. There is a possibility that we will find ourselves under severe pressure to accept proposals dangerous to our interests under the threat of a total breakdown of negotiations. This is a pressure under which we were placed at Geneva. I have no doubt about the West's ability to resist it. If it proves that no acceptable agreements can be worked out at the Summit, however, I now believe we will be better able to win world support of Western positions than if we refused to meet at all.

Knowing that you feel that a Summit meeting should be held, we must therefore now consider the complicated question of a timetable which will permit the preliminary inter-allied consultation clearly required.

I feel that there would be some advantage to a Summit meeting in December, which, if agreements in principle are reached, would make it possible to hold more detailed negotiations at the Foreign Minister or expert level before the Spring. If a meeting is held in December it would have to precede the NATO Ministerial Meeting scheduled for December 15, and therefore should probably commence near the beginning of the month.

I believe that we should meet with our French and German colleagues before a Summit meeting. For my part, I should be delighted to act as host to a pre-Summit meeting in the United States with our Western colleagues but would be prepared to go to Europe before the conference with the Soviets depending on the site selected for that conference and on what seems to be the most convenient arrangements for the others.

I await with the greatest interest your views on these questions, including possible sites for our meetings.<sup>3</sup>

With warm regard,

As ever, Ike."

Observe Presidential Handling.

Herter

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<sup>3</sup> On October 12 and 13, respectively, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor replied to Eisenhower's proposal. Both agreed with the idea for a summit meeting by December and the need for prior Western consultation. (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) In a letter dated October 8, de Gaulle addressed himself to the question of a summit, noting that if future Soviet behavior indicated a desire to improve international relations, he would be prepared to meet at the summit. (*Ibid.*)

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## 25. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, October 14, 1959, 1 p.m.

377. Reference: ourtel 331 to Bonn, 371 to Department.<sup>1</sup> Last week's GDR flag provocation in Berlin has produced experience and lessons that require careful weighing. No one here is complacent about episode. Mistakes were made; success achieved; and we were lucky protest worked.

Further analysis of last week's events and several conclusions we draw therefrom are set forth below. Later telegram outlines USCOB and USBER's views on how we plan proceed meet future situations of this kind.<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-1459. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Dated October 12, telegram 371 from Berlin reported that the British Commandant, Major General Rohan Delacombe, had protested the raising of the flags to the Acting Soviet Commandant on October 12 and that the latter stated that he would inform General Zakharov of the protest. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/10-1259)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 378 from Berlin, October 14 at 4 p.m., Lightner noted that plans were made to meet two kinds of situations: 1) requiring emergency police action with no time to notify the commandants, and 2) situations where disturbances had not yet commenced and there was time for consultations with the commandants. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/10-1459)

West Berlin leaders in retrospect divided on wisdom of forceful action to remove flags in face danger of serious clashes. Majority public and some newspapers, however, favored hauling down flags. Initial police action widely criticized in press and by public for poor planning, failure follow through, and lack coordination with Allies. Subsequent allied protest to Sovs hailed and credited with lowering of flags October 8. There little overt indication of public unrest (only six flags removed by irate public), but trade unions received numerous expressions of discontent that flags not removed; Brandt's appeal for maintenance law and order may have put damper on flag removing actions planned by workers.

Members Berlin Senat in private conversation admit: 1) Senat decision on removal of flags taken almost haphazardly, and without thorough study all available facts; 2) police action not well staged; 3) once decided upon, action should have been carried through forcefully; 4) Senat decision taken without adequate consultation allied authorities.

Berlin leaders, who recognize need for future coordination of policies and plans, point to following positive aspects of police action October 6: 1) Senat has given clear indication where it stands on flag issue; 2) demonstration by Communists that they have capacity create serious trouble in West Berlin has emphasized necessity maintain Western forces here; 3) Western Commandants have clarified responsibility over S-Bahn installations in West Berlin.

On other hand it should be noted Commie propaganda, despite fact flags came down in West Berlin three days before they did in East Berlin, has with certain effectiveness stressed theme Allied Powers and West Berlin Government either unwilling or unable take unified, decisive, and rapid action.

In further appraising situation we note that previously on major GDR holidays (May 1, May 8, Oct 7, Nov 7) flags identical with FedRep flag flown S-Bahn installations West Berlin. Introduction new GDR flag last week was designed to emphasize sovereign status claimed for GDR. Appearance new flag in West Berlin was accompanied by prior assembly East German strong-arm squads prepared exploit any ensuing incident to show West Berlin constitutes serious problem which must be solved quickly. Action underlined contention that "Berlin is capital of GDR and West Berlin lies on GDR territory."

Adoption new flag and its display must have been purposeful steps in implementation Soviet policy for Germany. Whether Soviets directly involved in tactical decision display flag West Berlin is not clear; this aspect of incident might have developed more from GDR handling of matter than from joint GDR-USSR policy decision. In any case, once project was launched there was no reason for Sovs to stop it so long as GDR was

successfully getting away with it. That Western Commandants' Oct 7 protest brought results within twenty-four hours shows that Sovs presently unwilling to connive in provocation against West Berlin past a certain point.

In order to make absolutely clear to Soviets and GDR that no nonsense will be countenanced in future, we pressed for Delacombe's follow-up démarche which he made October 12. It is view of USCOB and USBER that this commits Commandants authorize prompt police action if GDR flags rehoisted in West Berlin. This will be basic in our planning.

This telegram sent USAREUR and CINCEUR through military channels.

Lightner

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## 26. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, October 16, 1959.

### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. Reinhardt, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Kohler, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter said he had brought the group in to discuss summit meetings and trips with the President. He showed the President suggested letters to Adenauer, de Gaulle and Macmillan<sup>1</sup> regarding a summit meeting in December. After reading the drafts the President thought we must stress that, until we know the West has achieved a concerted viewpoint on major problems, we cannot hold a summit meeting to consider these problems. He therefore asked whether we are thinking of making some kind of agreement on Berlin at a summit meeting; he asked what the State Department thinks we should do about Berlin.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 22.

<sup>1</sup> Drafts of these letters and the texts as revised by the Department of State following this conference with the President are attached to a memorandum from Merchant to Herter, October 15, in Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10-1559. For the letter to de Gaulle, see Document 27.

Mr. Herter thought our main aim should be to get Khrushchev to agree to put a moratorium on this issue for a couple of years. The President said he would have no objection to new measures in Berlin and Germany. He commented that, for example, it is time to pull out some of our forces now located in Europe. He cited the balance of payments difficulty the United States is experiencing at the present time. He thought we should get tough with Britain, Germany and France to get them to take up more of the load. Mr. Herter said there is some indication of British thinking of shifting from emphasis upon missiles and aircraft back toward conventional forces, although he doubted that they would increase their forces on the continent of Europe. The President suggested for example making the Europeans furnish the Commander for the European NATO Command, and simply leaving one of our divisions there. He commented that the United States, after all, paid for most of the air bases and other infrastructure, and has paid the whole cost of atomic weapons. He thought we should put no more military assistance into Europe. They are now able to support themselves.

Mr. Herter commented that Berlin is something of a symbol. It would be practical to cut our force in Berlin, but it should not appear that we are being forced out by the Soviets. He thought that the best time to consider a cutback in forces would be in connection with disarmament talks.

The President asked why we could not, for the Western meeting, go to Geneva a few days ahead of a summit meeting. Mr. Merchant said it would be humiliating for Adenauer to be in Geneva for the Western meeting and then have to leave as the summit began. Paris would be better for the Western meeting.

The President asked again whether the State Department had any ideas concerning the substance of an interim agreement on Berlin. Mr. Herter replied that they think we should simply try to buy time. The President said that if we assume that the Soviets are not going to be so generous as this, we must then consider where we want to be for the next ten years. The East Germans can stop all economic connection with West Berlin. They could make West Berlin a dead weight on us. In his opinion, the Western world made a mistake in 1944 and 1945 and must now find a way to pay for it.

The President next asked as to meeting in Bonn rather than in Paris. Alternatively, he said it might be possible to have General de Gaulle here for his state visit in November, having Adenauer and Macmillan come here at the end of this visit for four-power talks, and having the Geneva meetings follow immediately. I pointed out that one complication is that de Gaulle feels committed to go to England first, and cannot visit there until after the Queen has had her baby next spring. The President suggested that the State Department people get word to Macmillan

that the British should tell de Gaulle that, because of the Queen's condition, the British are not pushing their claim to have him visit Britain first. He said that what he really wants to find out is, while Germany is divided, what solution for Berlin would Adenauer accept. Mr. Herter said the Germans believe they might maintain the status quo with us supporting them. Mr. Merchant added that the Germans are showing themselves more and more rigid, with Adenauer less and less accessible, and with a consequent inability to negotiate. The President said this makes clear to him that we should have a Western summit meeting first to review all this and see if we can find any basis for going on to a summit meeting. Mr. Herter said that Couve de Murville had said to him in confidence that the British, French and U.S. should be talking about Adenauer; he is worried over Adenauer's rigidity. The President said on this basis a period of two days just prior to a summit meeting would not be enough to concert Western views. Mr. Herter said he thought we should start up a working group on summit questions at once. The President agreed, but added that we obviously need to have some period of time between the two meetings, and should have a Western summit meeting as early as possible. He said he is thinking of the next six or seven years. Do we have anything to say concerning disarmament, an interim plan on Berlin, etc. He thinks we are being a little unrealistic and impractical in thinking merely of a moratorium.

Mr. Herter said he thought we could work out some kind of a status for a "guaranteed city" for West Berlin. He added that the Soviets probably will not let West Berlin become a part of West Germany.

The President recalled that de Gaulle<sup>2</sup> had told him that Adenauer really does not want reunification. Mr. Herter said that in fact we seem to be the only ones who really do want reunification. He said the British are optimistic regarding the basis for a settlement for Berlin, but he saw no reason for their optimism. The President suggested that the British should go to see Adenauer and convince him. In further discussion the President said that we should have a Western summit meeting here in the next week if we are to be ready for a summit meeting in Geneva in December. He added that if we are simply going to stand on the status quo there is no reason for a summit meeting. He commented that he thought that he could strike a bargain on his own with Khrushchev if he were to try to do so, but he knew our allies would not accept his acting unilaterally. He said he thought the Foreign Ministers must come to Washington immediately and we must find out if there is any possibility of going to Geneva with an agreed program. Mr. Merchant said the West

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<sup>2</sup> Documentation on the President's visit to Paris September 1–4 is in volume VII, Part 2.



could agree quickly on a Berlin position based on a moratorium, but that Khrushchev would not accept it. (He commented that the British for some reason think that he would accept it, but no one else does.) The President recalled that he has not rigidly committed himself to a summit meeting. He sees no use in going to a summit meeting if we are simply exposing ourselves to insults by Khrushchev. He added that the U.S. should not have to take the primary part as regards European security measures. The European countries should do so. Mr. Herter said that the Germans want to be able to say that they had to yield to their allies.

The President acknowledged that we are in the situation where we have two million people in the middle of Eastern Germany, with responsibility for them resting right here. He would like to see how this could be resolved.

Mr. Herter said he could try to arrange a Foreign Ministers meeting. The President commented that if this is not done there should be a Western summit, with a prior state visit by de Gaulle if necessary. The shortest way would be to meet in London. In any case, this is the next essential. We would tell our allies that with all the many questions that exist concerning the summit, its timing, agenda, and differing viewpoints on major questions, it is of critical importance that there be a Western summit meeting at the earliest possible date. He said he would go within a week, or anytime thereafter. The only alternative he could see would be for the Foreign Ministers to meet in Bonn so that they would have access to Adenauer. While he would prefer to have the summit meeting here, he was prepared to go to Europe. He did not want to go to Bonn. After further discussion, it was agreed that Paris would be the most suitable spot. The President said this would be a strictly business meeting with no social affairs, no ceremonies, etc. The State Department group undertook to redraft the letters in the foregoing sense.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

## 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, October 16, 1959, 4:30 p.m.

1651. Following is text of message from the President for delivery to General de Gaulle. Advise date time delivery.

"October 16, 1959.

Dear General de Gaulle: I am glad to have your views on the summit meeting as contained in your letter of October 8<sup>1</sup> and you will have had also an opportunity to study our conclusions as stated in my letter of October 9<sup>2</sup> which crossed yours. I think our views are essentially very close. My own feeling is that we owe it to the free world and to ourselves to take every opportunity to explore further the attitude of the Soviets. However, I feel strongly that we cannot do this until we know that we have a concerted point of view among ourselves, and I know from your October 8 letter that you agree with the need for close coordination of the Western views.

I personally continue to believe that my recent exchanges of views with Mr. Khrushchev, while I repeat they have not led thus far to substantive changes of positions on the part of the Soviets, have caused a slight thawing of the international freeze. I think that we have achieved a certain momentum. I agree with your conclusions that it is too early to assume that the Soviets will in fact make concessions; however, I likewise conclude that we should probably have a better chance of getting something from Khrushchev if we do not permit him to disengage from conversations with us for too long a period of time.

One reason that I regard an early meeting with you, Mr. Macmillan and the Chancellor desirable is the fact that I am convinced we wish to be certain our evaluations of the possibility of reaching a *modus vivendi* on Berlin (to which we should give priority consideration) with the Soviets at a summit meeting are the same. It seems to me that when the Foreign Ministers adjourned their sessions at Geneva in August there

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/10-1659. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted in EUR, cleared by Goodpaster and in draft by Herter, and approved by McElhiney.

Similar messages were also sent to Bonn and London for delivery to Adenauer and Macmillan. Copies of these messages are *ibid.*, 396.1/10-1659 and 611.62A/10-1659. During the afternoon of October 16, Herter held conversations with Caccia, Alphand, and Krapf; read them the texts of the letters; and briefly discussed what they expected their governments' reactions would be to them. Memoranda of these conversations are *ibid.*, 396.1-PA/10-1659 (Caccia and Alphand) and 711.11-EI/10-1659.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 3, Document 24.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 24.

was still a wide gulf between us and the Russians. I agree that the elements of an agreement and the position of the two sides were clearly revealed. On some of the less important elements of our positions there was a varying measure of agreement. But on the vital question of where we would stand with respect to our rights at the end of the period we made no progress at all in spite of heroic efforts by the Western Ministers. I do not think we should underestimate the difficulties with which we are likely to be confronted when we take up this thorny subject again in a formal negotiation, and I believe you fully concur in this view.

Another point on which we must reach agreement among ourselves revolves around the problem of dealing with suggestions that the summit meeting should include representation of countries other than the four which met at Geneva in 1955. Since the subject of disarmament is almost certain to come up, the other side will very likely propose the admission of other participants in our meeting, citing the precedent of our acceptance of the Committee of Ten for Disarmament. The Soviets can in any event be expected to raise the question of East German participation. I think we must make every effort to keep the meeting on a Four Power basis as we did at the Summit conference in Geneva in 1955.

Both the question of what we would talk about at a summit meeting and the possible differences as to the desirability, composition and dates indicate to me that we—you, Mr. Macmillan, Chancellor Adenauer and myself—must get together at the Heads of Government level at the earliest possible moment. I have reviewed my own schedule and find that with some readjustment I could free myself for the purpose for a few days in Europe at the end of this month. Paris would seem to me to be the logical place to meet in light of the difficulty which you would presumably find in visiting either London or Washington in advance of your state visits. For my part Paris would be entirely acceptable. I stress that I would envisage such a meeting as involving no ceremonies, no social affairs, and devoted purely to business. Under these circumstances, I hope such a meeting would not impose an undue burden on you.

With the pressure of time under which we are laboring I have asked Secretary Herter to take this matter up at once with Ambassador Alphand and with the British and West German Ambassadors as well. If you agree in principle, I think we can leave the arrangements to be worked out by them through diplomatic channels.

With warm regard,

Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower."

Observe Presidential Handling.

**Herter**

28. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin**

Washington, October 16, 1959, 7:47 p.m.

199. Your 353, 377, 378, 384, 385; Bonn's 739.<sup>1</sup>

1. Department concurs in Berlin's analysis of flag incident and plans for handling future attempts along similar lines.

2. Essential that no more half organized countermeasures be undertaken by West Berlin police which serve only to embolden Communists and undermine West Berlin morale.

3. Agree that Allied troops should not participate in actions unless police clearly unable to handle situation. Knowledge that troops alerted and on stand-by basis may prove sufficient in certain circumstances to obviate their actually participating in countermeasures.

4. Further major incidents of this type must be anticipated and insofar as possible advance agreement reached on actions to be taken.

5. Agree that new flag incident would require no new protest and that US should press for removal of flags in all "3 zones",<sup>2</sup> after submission by Lipschitz of detailed operational plans for evaluation.

6. Believe thorough review of past incidents of similar nature such as invasion of West Berlin by East German "goon squads" to break up political rallies would be helpful in outlining courses of action and eliminating future errors.

**Herter**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-1559. Confidential. Drafted by McFarland; cleared by Hillenbrand, Lampson, and Gleysteen; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 377 from Berlin is printed as Document 25. Regarding telegrams 353 and 378, see footnote 2, Document 23, and footnote 2, Document 25, respectively. Telegrams 384 and 385, October 15, and 737, October 14, all dealt with various aspects of the flag-raising incident. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-1559 and 762.0221/10-1459)

<sup>2</sup> The three zones were: 1) exterior of buildings which could be seen from the street; 2) rear of S-Bahn buildings; and 3) buildings not traversed by the public.

**29. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, October 20, 1959.

## SUBJECT

Western Summit Meeting

## PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy

M. Claude Lebel, Minister, French Embassy

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Alphand handed to the Secretary General de Gaulle's reply to the letter from the President<sup>1</sup> proposing a Western Summit Meeting in Paris at the end of this month. After reading the letter the Secretary said that it posed numerous questions. He thought it was relatively clear except at the end where he was not certain what the reference to General de Gaulle's being happy to see the President at any time meant. He inquired whether this meant de Gaulle would be happy to see the President as an individual but did not believe there should be a four-power meeting in the near future. Ambassador Alphand replied in the affirmative.

In embroidering somewhat on de Gaulle's letter Ambassador Alphand interpreted the General as meaning that a Western Summit Meeting at the present time would precipitate things and would not succeed in relaxing tensions. With regard to a Summit Meeting now with the Soviets, Ambassador Alphand opined that de Gaulle believed it would either fail and thus increase tensions or would result in concessions on the part of the West. Therefore the French thought it was better to wait and see. So far the Soviets had only words not deeds and had made only one very small concession in lifting the time limit on Berlin negotiations. Ambassador Alphand thought that de Gaulle believed that it was dangerous to give public opinion the false impression that there was a real relaxation. The Secretary referred to the fact that we have problems resulting from leaks on the story of a Western Summit Meeting and the fact that the President was holding a press conference tomorrow.<sup>2</sup> In

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/10-2059. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by McBride and approved in S on October 21.

<sup>1</sup> See Documents 27 and 30.

<sup>2</sup> For a transcript of the President's press conference on October 22, which includes several replies to questions about a summit meeting, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 732-742.

response to a question he said we have no word from Bonn as to the German attitude on a quick Western Summit. He also referred to a story to the effect that de Gaulle was planning to invite the Foreign Ministers of the other powers to Paris at the end of October.

Ambassador Alphand said that this story was false and indicated he realized we were in a difficult position because of tomorrow's press conference. The Secretary asked if de Gaulle had discussed this matter with Chancellor Adenauer. Ambassador Alphand replied that he did not know if there had been any de Gaulle–Adenauer talks on this subject. The Secretary said that the previous German position had been to the effect that they had no objection to a December Summit Meeting with the Soviets if adequate preparations were made. Mr. Kohler noted that we had telephoned Bonn but as yet had no indication as to what the German attitude would be on the quick Western Summit. Ambassador Alphand said he assumed that the President would simply say that he did not have word from all of his allies yet on their attitudes since we had in fact received no reply from Bonn.

Mr. Kohler noted that this matter was also on the agenda for the NATO meeting tomorrow and that the matter had been discussed in NAC last week.<sup>3</sup> He said the North Atlantic Council was probing hard for information and was already way ahead of the principals.

With regard to de Gaulle's reply to the President, the Secretary noted that the time envisaged for a possible Summit Meeting—May or June—was precisely the time when the President was planning to go to the Soviet Union. Ambassador Alphand expressed the view that a Summit Meeting with the Soviets just before the President's visit to the Soviet Union might not be a good thing. The Secretary agreed with this view.

The Secretary inquired regarding de Gaulle's plans for visiting the United Kingdom. Ambassador Alphand said he thought this visit would take place quite soon and added he had certain personal indications regarding possible dates for de Gaulle's visit here which he would discuss with us. He thought de Gaulle envisaged the timetable something as follows: State visit to London, State visit to Washington, Western Summit, and finally Summit with the Soviets subject to Soviet good behavior in the meantime.

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<sup>3</sup> A report on the discussion by the North Atlantic Council on October 14, during which several members expressed a strong desire for consultations on a summit meeting, was transmitted in Polto 620 from Paris, October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/10–1459) The discussion on October 21 showed that all members favored a summit, but wanted advance consultations before any decisions were taken regarding discussions with the Soviet Union. (Polto 670 from Paris, October 21; *ibid.*, 396.1/10–2159)

Ambassador Alphand asked if we did not think there had been an increase of tension again recently and mentioned the incident involving a member of the US Embassy in Moscow,<sup>4</sup> the Berlin flag incident, and Soviet behavior in the UN. The Secretary said that he believed we could expect ups and downs in our relations with the Soviets. He said the immediate problem was what to advise the President to say on the subject of a Western Summit at his press conference tomorrow. He summarized that de Gaulle appears to see a succession of meetings with no particular dates being fixed for any of them at the present time and the Soviets being put under observation in the meantime. Ambassador Alphand said this appeared to be true and stressed de Gaulle's view that a Summit Meeting with the Soviets now could only bring bad things for the West.

Mr. Kohler said that the difference between the UK, German and French views on a Summit meeting with the Soviets would seem to argue even more strongly for the need for a Western Summit. He noted that it was difficult to attempt to reconcile all of these views by correspondence. Ambassador Alphand said that if we had a Western Summit now it would give the impression that there would be a Summit with the Soviets shortly thereafter. The Secretary said that this was not necessarily the case. He also noted that press leaks and not any official statements were what gave us a problem now since these had indicated possible dates for Summit meetings.

The meeting concluded with an agreement that Ambassador Alphand would say nothing to the press regarding his call.

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<sup>4</sup>On October 16, Russell A. Langelle, attaché at the Embassy in Moscow, had been forcibly detained by Soviet authorities for 1 hour and 45 minutes. For text of the U.S. protest of this incident, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 2, 1959, p. 632.

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### 30. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Eisenhower

Paris, October 20, 1959.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am struck by the urgency of your desire for a relaxation of tension between the East and the West. In this respect, my sentiments are completely in accord with yours. Especially since, in the

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Presidential Handling. The source text is a Department of State translation. Handed to Herter by Alphand for delivery to the President during the meeting described in Document 29. The French text of this letter is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

event of a world war, France would be threatened most directly and immediately with death, in view of her position in Europe, her responsibilities in Africa, and the as yet incomplete state of her military power.

However, allow me to tell you frankly that, considering the purpose you and I want to accomplish and the extreme dangers to which my country is exposed, I have strong reservations about what benefit could be obtained at this time from a summit conference. I should even be afraid that we might compromise many things by plunging into this meeting while, to my knowledge, there is still no chance of a satisfactory agreement among the participants on any of the subjects that might be brought up.

As a matter of fact, among these subjects I see only one that has led to sufficiently explicit negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France to permit a summit conference to consider it without unfortunate improvisations. That subject is Berlin, as brought up by Mr. Khrushchev, interminably discussed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Geneva, and, you write me, made almost the sole topic of your talks at Camp David. But, however thoroughly the problem has been explored, its solution appears more uncertain than ever. It is true that at the time of the Geneva conference, and later at your insistence, Mr. Khrushchev declared that, without withdrawing any of his demands, he was not fixing any deadline for accepting them. However, he has in no wise changed what he wishes to obtain. The very fact that the West has consented to discuss this so long and on so many occasions can but confirm him in his determination and hope of succeeding.

I wonder what, in this situation, a summit meeting at this time could accomplish besides highlighting a fundamental disagreement between East and West or surrendering more or less to Soviet claims to Berlin. In the first case, the cold war would very likely be aggravated; in the second, the world might consider such a retreat on the part of the West the beginning of a series of retreats, and the firmness of the Atlantic Alliance would suffer grave consequences. In any case, the relaxation of tension would undoubtedly be jeopardized.

On the contrary, since this easing of tension is sought by us, and if it is also desired by the Soviets, it may during the coming months develop in deeds and thoughts—provided the two camps do not first come face to face on burning questions. No problem is more pressing than that of Berlin. In my opinion, it is only after the world has had a period of relative calm, in which East and West have been on better terms and have promoted contacts without trying to settle in the heat of passion what can only be dealt with calmly, that a summit conference can be held under satisfactory conditions from the psychological, and consequently the political, standpoint.



As regards France, for example, during the present United Nations session, at which certain members are desirous of commencing debates on various subjects wherein they plan to display their ill will toward our country, the French Government and people will observe Soviet conduct closely. As for me, I should certainly not participate in a summit conference with Mr. Khrushchev at a time when his representatives in New York were speaking out against my country or joining those who were. On the other hand, if on that occasion the Russians displayed genuinely conciliatory attitudes we on the French side might draw encouraging conclusions therefrom. Likewise, as I have already written you,<sup>1</sup> the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union concerning the affairs of Southeast Asia (India, Quemoy, Laos, etc.) or the Middle East, or Africa, will enable us Western powers to obtain a clearer picture of their intentions. Meanwhile, moreover, contacts of the kind made by Mr. Nixon in Russia or Mr. Khrushchev in the United States may add to our information. Until then, there is really nothing pressing for us in regard to Berlin, for, unless the Soviets deliberately wish to create a crisis the situation during the coming months may very well remain what it has been for the past fourteen years. In conclusion, I propose contemplating the principle of holding a summit conference at the end of May or in June. I shall make the same suggestion to Mr. Harold Macmillan. We should thus have the necessary time to obtain information, and then reach agreement without haste. Furthermore, by that time the paramount question, that of disarmament, could have been studied thoroughly enough to form the subject of a positive examination by the eventual Areopagus.<sup>2</sup> In the event that all three of us should agree on this procedure, we might so inform Moscow and announce it publicly. It would then remain for us to determine whether an improvement in the political climate would gradually provide chances of success. However, we of the West would also have to make serious preparation for the meeting.

In this regard I, like you, am of the opinion that a leisurely preliminary meeting between the Western powers, with Chancellor Adenauer participating would be necessary in order to define precisely our common position on the various problems, particularly that of Berlin. However, I think it would be premature to hold this conference now, in view of the amount of time we should allow ourselves before the summit meeting and our reasons for not provoking hasty conjectures on the part of the public. It seems to me that early spring would be the best time for the Western powers to reach sober agreement. Meanwhile, any talks that each of us might have with others, without prejudice to our consul-

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<sup>1</sup> See footnote 3, Document 24.

<sup>2</sup> Summit meeting.

tations through Ambassadorial channels, would facilitate matters for us. Among other opportunities I myself hope to have is my visit to London in the near future and, if you are willing, one that I should be happy to pay you in Washington. Need I tell you that, if it should suit you to come to Paris at any time, the conversations held there would give me and the French Government the utmost pleasure and would be of extreme interest to us.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my very sincere friendship.

Charles de Gaulle<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### 31. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, October 21, 1959.

#### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter  
Mr. Hagerty  
General Parsons  
General Goodpaster

Secretary Herter showed the President a report of Adenauer's views regarding summit and pre-summit meetings,<sup>1</sup> together with a letter to the President from de Gaulle<sup>2</sup> rejecting the idea of a pre-summit meeting within the next few weeks, and a summit meeting in December. He said that the British feel it is very important to have a Western summit meeting as soon as possible.<sup>3</sup> De Gaulle's suggestion—for a summit

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 23.

<sup>1</sup> In the October 21 report, Adenauer agreed with the President on the need for discussions among the Western states before an early Four-Power summit. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/10-2159)

<sup>2</sup> Document 30.

<sup>3</sup> In a brief note dated October 17, Macmillan warmly supported the President's suggestion for a Western Heads of Government meeting to precede an early Four-Power summit. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

meeting in May or June—does not fit at all well with what he knows the President's schedule is for visiting Russia.

The President, on reading de Gaulle's letter, said that he evidently sees any agreement or action on Berlin as a "retreat." However the President felt we must look for an acceptable solution in this area. He said he had noted in this connection a report of a statement by Khrushchev that he would not agree to the incorporation of West Berlin in West Germany.

Mr. Herter said he understood that Mayor Brandt of Berlin would not mind what political setup was decided on so long as the economic arrangements were such as to assure the freedom of West Berlin from East German domination. In response to a question by the President, Mr. Herter said he expected to have any suggestions the British have within the next few days. The President said that Macmillan ought to go to see de Gaulle with a view of convincing him that we really need the Western summit meeting. He commented that de Gaulle puts disarmament quite low on the list of topics for consideration. Disarmament can only proceed through mutual agreement, and he did not think we can hold the stand of insisting that the Soviets have got to show good faith by unilateral deeds before we make any agreements or concessions.

He commented that he does not think that the Queen's condition should necessarily delay de Gaulle's visit to Britain. He also commented that we have gone a long way to support de Gaulle on Algeria and it is quite unrealistic to think that we can put the Russians on probation. The President thought we should be showing signs of action. Otherwise Khrushchev will have reason to think that we are simply stalling, and the situation will drop back to what it was a few months ago.

Secretary Herter showed the President a proposed draft of a reply to de Gaulle.<sup>4</sup> The President thought it was focused too much on a summit meeting and thought it should be tied more to the need for the development of an agreed Western program and approach on disarmament, Berlin and other questions.

Mr. Herter asked if State could have the President's permission to keep Ambassador Bruce informed on these exchanges. The President said that they might do so through sending the gist or a summary of his letters, but should not send a copy of the letters. He did ask that a copy of his letter to de Gaulle be sent to Macmillan with a request that Macmillan try to arrange a session with de Gaulle. He then commented that the fact that the Russians see us taking these actions, including a Western summit, shows them that we are trying to act in good faith.

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<sup>4</sup>Not further identified. For the final text, see Document 32.

The President asked for a comment to be brought into the letter to the effect that a Western summit meeting might serve as an opportunity to bring up to date, and review, our NATO posture. A comment might also be made that such a meeting will assist us to avoid any tendency for our relations with the Soviets to shift toward a bilateral basis.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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### 32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, October 21, 1959.

1703. Following is text of letter from President for immediate delivery to General de Gaulle. Advise date time delivery.

“October 21, 1959.

Dear General de Gaulle: I have received your letter of October 20<sup>1</sup> with regard to my suggestion for an early Western Summit meeting. I understand the reasoning behind your letter; however, I must say that I cannot, in all frankness, agree with all the conclusions which you reach regarding timing and other matters. I have certainly tried in all my contacts with both Western and Soviet leaders to describe accurately the American determination that we should not retreat or surrender on any vital point. But to show a readiness to negotiate is not to demonstrate weakness.

As I mentioned before, I believe that we have achieved a somewhat better atmosphere in East-West relations and I believe that we would be derelict in our duty if we of the West did not promptly explore further the possibilities for producing an agreed program for making some significant steps toward disarmament as well as a *modus vivendi* on Berlin in the light of their action in removing the time limit for Berlin negotiations.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/10–2159. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Drafted in EUR, cleared by Goodpaster and by the President and in draft by Herter, and approved by Calhoun. The time of transmission does not appear on the source text.

<sup>1</sup>Document 30.

I am certainly not seeking to impose any fixed date for a summit meeting with the Soviets although I had previously suggested the possibility of December. I would not envisage in any event that a summit meeting would lead to any extended series of concrete agreements.

I do believe that the views of Prime Minister Macmillan, Chancellor Adenauer and yourself are sufficiently diverse so that an early meeting among the four of us becomes more rather than less urgent. In any case I do not believe such a meeting should be put off until the spring. To do so, and thus to present to the world a picture of Western inaction, would not, in my view, lead to a more forthcoming attitude on the part of Mr. Khrushchev. On the contrary I fear it would lead to a renewed hardening of his attitudes. Therefore, I conclude this is another reason bespeaking a reasonably early meeting among the four Western leaders.

I see no real reason why an early Western Summit would lead to harmful speculation in the press and in public opinion regarding an immediately following meeting with the Soviets. Indeed this would be one of the questions to be discussed by Western leaders. I now suggest that a Western Summit should take place well before the mid-December NATO ministerial meeting. I think that the four of us should consider among ourselves our present thinking about the NATO posture in advance of that meeting.

I believe that our correspondence, like our thorough and frank discussions in Paris, have revealed a large community of views in these vital matters. I feel confident we can iron out these purely procedural matters so that a fruitful Western coordination can occur before we attempt any discussions with the Soviets.

With warm regard,

Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower."

Observe Presidential Handling.

**Herter**

### 33. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, October 23, 1959, 2 p.m.

406. Paris for Embassy and CINCEUR Thurston and Finn. This is part one of three-part message. Ref: ourtel 346 to Bonn, 392 to Dept.<sup>1</sup> Commandants accompanied by deputies and POLADs met for four hours Oct 22 to attempt to resolve issues left undecided by POLADs Oct 17. Mayors Brandt and Amrehn attended first part of session and Commandants heard Brandt give not too strong presentation his views on various questions relating to handling GDR flags if flown West Berlin November 6–7 (see part two).<sup>2</sup>

In addition basic disagreed issues Commandants discussed other matters on which substantial agreement was reached (see part three).<sup>3</sup>

Gen Hamlett forcefully outlined our position as follows:

1. Flying of GDR flags on S-Bahn property in West Berlin is far more than disturbance of law and order—it is direct challenge to allied sovereignty in West Berlin.

2. Allied position and prestige vis-à-vis Communists would be seriously impaired by failure to live up to Commandant's own commitment to prevent GDR incursion West Berlin territory.

3. We should effect removal of all flags. Any GDR flag, irrespective of S-Bahn "zone" in which it flies, represents challenge to our sovereignty.

4. Police should be committed in sufficient force to insure success of operation.

5. During police action allied troops on alert should be visibly present in various parts of city (not, however, at actual scene of police actions as Lipschitz suggested).

6. If police find themselves unable to handle job, allied troops should come to their assistance. Allies cannot afford entrust sole defense of allied sovereignty to West Berlin police [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2359. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:25 p.m. Sent also to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 392 from Berlin, October 19, reported that no agreement had been reached at a tripartite Political Advisers meeting on October 17 on either an analysis of the flag-raising incident or on what steps should be taken by the police in future incidents of this type. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/10-1959)

<sup>2</sup>Telegram 407 from Berlin, October 23 at 3 p.m., reported that Brandt favored another approach to the Soviet Commandant before the November 7 celebrations and that any flags should be removed at once by West Berlin police and this action supported by the Western Commandants. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/10-2359)

<sup>3</sup>Telegram 408 from Berlin, October 23 at 3 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

7. Every effort should be made to avoid bloodshed. For example, tear gas and fire hoses would be employed, and firearms used only if our side absolutely pushed to limit.

Gen Hamlett urged Commandants agree make tripartite recommendation to governments embodying these points.

British and French Commandants agreed more than law and order involved and that some action called for. They were unwilling specify extent of that action until more information available on a) intentions and capabilities GDR, b) capabilities West Berlin police, with and without allied forces' assistance, and c) effectiveness West Berlin police plan. French in particular were insistent these points and we gained strong impression they seriously worried lest other side commit really large numbers of hoodlums who might prove too much for combined police and allied military to handle.

Question of making advance commitment re use of allied forces discussed at length but no agreed tripartite position reached. British were particularly reluctant to go along with any recommendation re use of allied troops. In fact British reluctance to take position on use of troops and removing all flags seemed based on abhorrence of situation that might result in spilling of blood. British pointed out disastrous consequences allied prestige worldwide if bloody incidents arose over "mere matter of flags", whether involving West Berlin police or allied forces.

British not convinced by U.S. arguments that a) effective action in any conceivable contingency could not be guaranteed unless authorization obtained for use of allied troops if such became necessary and b) best means preventing bloodshed was to prepare for strong decisive measures which in themselves might dissuade other side from embarking on aggressive action. British also unconvinced by U.S. argument that despite our distaste for bloodshed, even this unfortunate possibility preferable to position we would be in if we failed to take flags down.

In short despite agreement some kind of action required, tripartite position Oct 22 basically not advanced beyond that reached Oct 17. French, whose acting Commandant said he personally agreed necessity committing allied troops if necessary, apparently favor limited number of flag-removal targets because they fear we do not have capability of tackling more. British evidently want flag removal operation with only safe targets because they want avoid violence. One British suggestion, for example, is that if police encounter resistance they should withdraw, and then several days later police should cut S-Bahn—which act would serve to reestablish fact of allied sovereignty over S-Bahn terrain.

With respect to Commie intentions and capabilities, capabilities are of course considerable but key to problem is intentions. Our analysis of

intentions being reported by separate telegram<sup>4</sup> those qualified to judge on American side here consider that West Berlin Police, numbering 13,000, have capability remove all flags from all three zones unless other side is prepared undertake major operation entailing grave risks which we seriously doubt Soviets would countenance. (During week Oct 11, 117 flags were involved, of which total of six were in zone three.)

Revised Lipschitz police plan now being studied on priority basis by allied public safety and military officers. First glance indicates good many deficiencies but we have confidence they can be corrected.

We have considered here advantages and disadvantages unilateral action in event impossible get British and French agree to decisive action but conclude importance maintaining allied unity outweigh all other considerations.

Decisions now appear to be up to governments. Due to necessity clear cut instructions to all three Commandants, recommend Dept's approach to British and French be made soon as possible.

Assume on basis para. 3 Deptel 199,<sup>5</sup> that U.S. Government agrees our position re use of troops.

In view of responsibilities outlined Executive Order 10608, May 5, 1955,<sup>6</sup> USCOB requires instructions through military channels re employment U.S. Forces. He therefore requesting instructions.

**Lightner**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 413 from Berlin, October 23 at 7 p.m., reported that the East Germans had clearly been "under wraps" since Khrushchev's visit to the United States, but still had many opportunities for provocations and incidents in West Berlin. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>5</sup> Document 28.

<sup>6</sup> For text of Executive Order 10608, "United States Authority and Functions in Germany," see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 16, 1955, pp. 792–793.



**34. Letter From Foreign Minister Brentano to Secretary of State Herter**

Bonn, October 23, 1959.

DEAR CHRIS: When a few days ago Ambassador Bruce called on me, he recalled on your behalf the conversation we had in Bonn on 27 August 1959.<sup>1</sup>

I did not forget about that conversation. I reported on it at the time to the Federal Chancellor, and I also discussed it with my closest collaborators. May I try now to inform you of the result of my considerations, and in doing so, I ask you to consider this letter as a confidential and personal contribution to the discussion which is intended to help prepare the forthcoming conferences.

It is perfectly clear to me that the attitude of the Soviet Union during the Geneva Conference as well as in all the talks since then and in all the statements made since then offers no grounds for assuming that the Soviet Union might be ready to change its viewpoint in the German and Berlin questions. In his latest letter, too, to Chancellor Adenauer, Premier Khrushchev reiterated the well-known theses.<sup>2</sup> He demands the conclusion of a peace treaty with two German States which should then be left free to conduct negotiations about a rapprochement or a union; he writes that such a peace treaty would also be a prerequisite for a change in the abnormal situation of the city of Berlin which according to him should be given the status of a free city.

I am sure we are agreed that a final solution to the Berlin problem can only be found when the division of Germany is terminated. We also agree—and you emphasized that viewpoint with great earnest in our conversation of 27 August—that the situation in Berlin is dangerous. Berlin's isolated position in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany offers the Soviet Union the opportunity to exert a constantly growing pressure and perhaps also by deliberate individual actions to undermine the status of Berlin step by step. The threat concerning the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Moscow and Pankow probably finds its explanation only in the intention of the Soviet Union to evade by means

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Eyes Only; Personal and Private. The source text is a translation. Delivered by the German Embassy at noon on November 6.

<sup>1</sup> Bruce saw Brentano on October 14, and in a brief telegram reporting on the meeting stated that the German Foreign Minister would soon be writing Herter a personal letter on Berlin. (Telegram 745 from Bonn, October 15; *ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/10-1559) For a record of the meeting on August 27, see Document 7.

<sup>2</sup> For text of this October 15 letter, see *Moskau Bonn*, pp. 595–600.

of such a treaty its commitments resulting from the Four-Power agreements regarding Berlin. The status in public and international law of the so-called German Democratic Republic would not be changed by such a separate treaty, nor is it within the intentions of Soviet policy to change that status for the purpose of giving an increased freedom of action to that pseudo-State. It is rather quite obvious that the Pankow authorities are thus to be given the task of impairing and ultimately blocking access to Berlin while pointing to their alleged rights of sovereignty.

I could easily imagine that in this context the Pankow authorities would be instructed at first to respect the rights of the Western allies in Berlin as well as the free access and supply requirements of the Western forces in Berlin. This would mean that in the first phase at least the acts of interference would be limited to the communications between the Federal Republic and Berlin. You are sufficiently familiar with conditions in Berlin to know that this would paralyze the economy of West Berlin. The very existence of the two and a quarter million West Berliners depends upon the unrestricted maintenance of their communications with the Federal Republic. The consequences of a blockade of Berlin would be immeasurable. Berlin's economy would collapse in a very short time, and economic and political chaos would ensue.

I need not remind you of the numerous attempts we jointly made in Geneva to secure for Berlin the status quo at least in its essential substance. I may only recall that as late as 28 July the three Western Foreign Ministers made a joint proposal<sup>3</sup> of which we were all convinced that it went to the limit of what is practicable—if not perhaps beyond. This proposal, too, was rejected and answered by a counter-proposal<sup>4</sup> which, as your delegation rightly stated, was compatible with the Western ideas on this subject only in one point, namely, the question of the nuclear armament of the forces stationed in Berlin, while according to your delegation it seemed unacceptable in twenty-three other points.

Today I wonder whether it was at all wise to make that proposal. Foreign Minister Gromyko had certainly learned by then that a meeting between the Soviet Premier and the United States President was imminent. There can be little doubt that under these circumstances he was neither prepared nor authorized to agree to a reasonable compromise.

The West has certainly lost ground by the proposals it made in Geneva. The Soviet Union maintained its rigorous standpoint from the first to the last day. It is in keeping with Soviet negotiation tactics to pocket concessions offered without ever honouring them by counter-concessions. In future negotiations concerning Berlin, therefore, the point of

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<sup>3</sup> See vol VIII, Document 488.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, Document 489.

departure of the West will be weaker than it was before the beginning of the Geneva Conference. In later negotiations, too, the Soviet Union will, as she did in Geneva, carefully analyze all the earlier Western proposals, single out the various proposals and offers and set them over against her own unchanged demands. Thus the negotiating margin will be necessarily narrowed down to the detriment of the West.

I wanted to make these short preliminary remarks before answering your question as to whether the Federal Government was in a position to develop ideas and make proposals of its own. After careful consideration and examination I believe I can give no positive answer.

I am convinced that we agree on the fundamental demand that the freedom of Berlin must under all circumstances be maintained. In saying this I am not thinking only of the two and a quarter million people in Berlin. The incorporation by violence or successful blackmail of Berlin into the communist sphere of power would be a human tragedy defying description. In saying this I am also thinking of the credibility of our joint policy as reflected in cooperation within NATO. All the countries in Europe, whether large or small, would have to fear that they might sooner or later suffer a like fate. I well remember a conversation I had in December last with our Danish colleague, Foreign Minister Krag, in Paris when we discussed the Soviet ultimatum of 27 November 1958.<sup>5</sup> He told me very earnestly that he clearly realized the immense danger that this note had brought to the fore. But, he added, if ever the two million Berliners were abandoned, the question would be put in a small country like Denmark as to when the moment would come of abandoning three million Danes. May I also remind you that our British colleague, Selwyn Lloyd, dealt with such considerations in the meeting of the Council of Ministers, the tenor of his statement being as follows: If we give up Berlin, the question will soon be asked, "Who will be the next?" I know that no one in the Atlantic Community even plays with the idea of abandoning Berlin, least of all the United States. I need not tell you with what interest and also with what gratitude we have read the statements made until very recently by the President of the United States and by yourself. Only a few weeks ago some outstanding exponents of United States public life were our guests here in Bonn,<sup>6</sup> who had a long and I believe fruitful conference with their German partners. In these conversations, too, there was not a single American who would

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<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, Document 72.

<sup>6</sup> Presumably a reference to the American-German Conference held at the beginning of October in Germany under the auspices of *Atlantik Brücke* which included Dean Acheson, McCloy, Conant, U.S. Senators and Representatives, and American scholars.

not have stood unequivocally and unreservedly for maintaining and securing the freedom of Berlin.

I see no possibility of making to you any German proposal that would have to fulfil two conditions:–

For one thing it would have to go beyond the proposals made in Geneva, for even the far-reaching concessions offered in Geneva were rejected as insufficient by the Soviet Union. And on the other hand, such a proposal would have to secure the maintenance of Berlin's freedom, that means that the essential substance of the present status of Berlin should not be changed.

This, then, is the dilemma facing us:–

The present status of Berlin is unsatisfactory; we all know that. But in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union we must realize clearly that any *change* of Berlin's status will necessarily be a *change for the worse*. This holds good even for the proposals we made in Geneva, and it would apply all the more to any new proposals going even further in meeting Soviet demands.

I have, of course, also considered the question of whether the existing status could possibly be replaced by a completely new agreement with quite different contents. Our respective collaborators and we, too, discussed this possibility, as you may remember, before and during the Geneva Conference. I am thinking of our considerations whether Berlin might be placed under a guarantee of the United Nations. I believe, however, we all were agreed that a United Nations guarantee could at best be given *additionally* but could not *replace* the guarantee of the three Western allies which is expressed by the physical presence of allied forces in Berlin. All of us surely realize that a United Nations guarantee, even if given, would never be sufficient. Any violation by the Soviet Union of obligations undertaken would at best start the clumsy United Nations procedure. But before even a resolution could be adopted accomplished facts would have been created. And we know that the United Nations are incapable of action and will continue to be so as long as the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries oppose any suggestion to equip the United Nations with an executive branch however weak it may be.

Permit me in this context to indulge in a few considerations concerning the German question. I realize that the Soviet Union is not prepared at present even to discuss an acceptable solution to the German question. It is very bitter for me to state that for this reason we can at present in no way expect to advance the problem of reunification even by one step. The All-German Committee, so frequently referred to, is certainly no instrument for reaching that objective.

I sometimes have the impression that the formula of “reunification” may have caused a certain confusion; if so, we Germans are to a certain degree responsible for this. The real issue is not the reunification of two separated parts of Germany. Rather does the solution of the German question, i.e. the restoration of Germany as one State, presuppose that the people in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany should be given back their right of self-determination. The so-called German Democratic Republic is not a State created and maintained in accordance with the desire of one part of the German people. What has happened and is happening to this hour in that part of Germany is nothing but the partial accomplishment of the imperialist aims of the Soviet Union which, incidentally, has never denied, nor does she deny today, that she is interested in keeping what she possesses without abandoning her aim of expanding her possessions westward. It is one of the most stupendous political lies of our time that the Soviet Union presents herself to the world as a protagonist against colonialism and as speaking for the allegedly oppressed peoples in their struggle for self-determination while having simultaneously reduced to the lowest level of colonials many millions of people in central and eastern Europe who used to live in freedom. Thus, the Soviet-occupied zone is in fact an area to whose inhabitants the right of self-determination is denied by those who in the United Nations loudly and insistently advocate the right of self-determination for the Negroes in Cameroons. The Soviet system of terror would collapse within 24 hours if the Government at Pankow were not backed by the Red Army.

For this reason there exists no possibility of discussing “reunification” with the representatives of that system. Indeed, their task and their mission only consist in maintaining the present system in the Soviet zone of Germany and in making the Federal Republic ripe for the assault of communism. I am informed that only a few days ago, when the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Austria were in Moscow,<sup>7</sup> Mr. Khrushchev stated with cynical frankness that while reunification was a matter for the two German States to settle, it could only be accomplished by the Ulbricht Government superseding the Adenauer Government in the Federal Republic.

You will perhaps say, when reading these lines, that my position is rigid. You will perhaps remind me that international conferences are imminent on whose outcome war or peace, life or death may possibly depend. I am aware of this situation and also of the immense responsibility resting on us all. And I know that the United States Government has a particular responsibility, for it represents the strongest Power of

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<sup>7</sup> Chancellor Raab and Foreign Minister Kreisky visited Moscow October 5–15.

the free world and cannot forget its primary responsibility to its own people while meeting its political and moral commitments to other parts of the world. I would answer that you are surely right but that the maintenance or the loss of freedom is at stake for us. Please do not think that I overrate the part of Germany in the present world-wide political conflict. But we should not forget that the future of the German people is closely linked to that of its neighbours and allies. We can uphold the freedom of the 52 million inhabitants of the Federal Republic only if the Atlantic alliance system can be preserved. Should mistaken political decisions abandon Germany to bolshevism, the rest of the European continent would within a short period share the fate of Germany. The gigantic accretion of power which such a development would accord to the Soviet Union, would create a new situation for the whole world. It passes the power of imagination to assess the effects of the enlargement of the Soviet potential by more than 200 million people in Europe and the productive capacity of this highly developed continent.

May I revert once more to the problems which will face us during the forthcoming conferences:-

It seems as if the Soviet Union herself is interested in a relaxation of tension or at least in a relaxation phase. The chief reason for this may be Moscow's realization that the Seven Year Plan can only be carried through if other burdens are cast off. This may provide a real chance for disarmament talks. And therefore I personally think that this question should be the first and perhaps even the only one to be placed on the agenda of the first summit conference. In such disarmament negotiations it will be shown whether the Soviet Union is really prepared to cooperate in common measures in this field. I do not want to conceal from you my impression that the disarmament proposal submitted to the United Nations by Premier Khrushchev does not seem to be an honest one.<sup>8</sup> It does not look like an act of good faith to speak of disarmament but at the same time to indicate that controls should only become effective once disarmament has been carried out. But, of course, the attempt must be made. And in this connexion it would also be possible to ascertain whether the Soviet Union is sincere. It could be proposed to her to defer the Berlin problem, since the Soviet Union herself denies that her Note of 27 November 1958 was in the nature of an ultimatum. It might be proposed to her to confirm the existing status Berlin, perhaps for a period to be agreed, as we suggested at the time in Geneva. Such a proposal could be made on the grounds that the solution of political problems, i.e., the Berlin question and, later, the German question, would be

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<sup>8</sup> For text of Khrushchev's address on disarmament before the U.N. General Assembly on September 18, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1452–1460.

more easily possible after initial arrangements and measures had been agreed in the disarmament field. If the Soviet Union rejects such a proposal, it will follow that no serious readiness for negotiations exists. We shall then perhaps have to face a serious crisis, but we shall not be able to avoid it by not wanting to see it.

This letter has turned out longer than I wanted it to be, but I hope you will nevertheless give it careful attention. I want to repeat that it contains my personal opinion and is meant for you personally. I should much appreciate hearing from you what you think of it. It goes without saying that I am willing at any time to come to Washington so that we can talk this matter over privately and frankly.

With sincere regards in friendship,  
Yours as always,

von Brentano<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Printed from the translation that indicates that Brentano signed the original German language copy.

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### 35. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, October 26, 1959, 7 p.m.

812. Paris for Embassy, CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. I am seriously concerned that at this time we are still without agreed tripartite position deal with another flag incident Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

Fully concur with General Hamlett's October 22 statement our position (Berlin's 406 to Department).<sup>2</sup> In my view, it would be politically disastrous to have repetition indecisive October 6 developments. Moreover, given stated Western position and commitment following first

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, Paris, and POLAD USAREUR Heidelberg.

<sup>1</sup> Bruce discussed the flag incident with British officials on October 25 and recorded in his diary that the British favored a "much softer line" than did the United States. (*Ibid.*, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)

<sup>2</sup>Document 33.

incident (Commandants' talking paper to Zakharov, Berlin's 367 to Department),<sup>3</sup> it seems to me we would suffer irreparable loss prestige and find most difficult maintain our present position Berlin, vis-à-vis both Berliners and Soviets, if we stood aside while GDR goons rehoisted their flags with impunity, or we pretended we were really dealing with situation by selecting arbitrarily to be brought down some number flags fewer than those hoisted. This happened last time. Some flags were lowered, but Communists just as quickly rehoisted them. Problem is essentially one of principle—demonstrating Soviets our determination meet provocative challenge our position in Berlin.

Given present international political climate and Berlin's assessment of West Berlin capabilities (Berlin's 415 to Department),<sup>4</sup> there would seem be no better time than present for us take strong measures prevent Communist flouting our authority. As I see it, there probably has been no time in recent past, nor can we count on many occasions in future, when we will be able deal as effectively as we now can with challenge this kind in Berlin, without incurring serious risks either to ourselves or cause of peace. If there is any validity alleged peace aims USSR, unlikely Soviets would now take risks war or even drawing world attention need Western forces in Berlin.

*[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

In this connection, consider it absolutely essential Berlin be given tripartitely agreed instructions soonest to reply questions raised by Berlin police—scope of operation; authorized weapons and allied garrison support (Berlin's 415 to Department). Afraid if we wait until details French allegedly seeking provide, we will find ourselves without operational plan at most critical moment.

**Bruce**

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 367 from Berlin, October 9, transmitted the text of a 4-paragraph talking paper which the British Commandant would use in his meeting with the Soviet Commandant on October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-959)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 415 from Berlin, October 25, reported that Lipschitz had submitted a 111-page estimate of the situation in West Berlin containing a description of the 107 S-Bahn installations, an estimate of police forces required for various types of incidents, and methods to effect blocking the S-Bahn system to prevent reinforcements from arriving from the Soviet part of the city. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/10-2559)



**36. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Eisenhower**

Paris, October 26, 1959.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It seems to me, since our conversations in Paris and Rambouillet, despite the few differences which may have arisen later in the matter of dates, that you and I quite agree on the essential points.

A summit conference between you, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Macmillan, and me may inaugurate some practical arrangements between East and West on the main issues: general disarmament, Germany, assistance to underdeveloped countries, non-interference by any State in the internal affairs of another, etc. Such an outcome would indicate an initial easing of tension among the four participants and would perhaps serve to moderate the evil intentions of certain others, for example Communist China. If such were the case, there is reason to think that the world climate, which thus far has been one of cold war, would change appreciably; then, with psychological factors affecting policy, later developments favorable to peace would probably follow.

However, holding a summit conference that would be limited to banal declarations of a general nature without positive results would have a disappointing effect. Uneasiness would be all the greater if the conference were to bring out the basic antagonism between Soviet Russia and the West. Lastly, the spectacle which in such case would be presented of disagreement between the Western Powers, particularly with regard to the German question, or, worse yet, their more or less resigned and disorderly retreat, would be a severe blow to our Atlantic Alliance.

The summit conference should therefore not be an improvisation. It should be prepared. This can be done, first, by improving the [international]<sup>1</sup> climate, particularly through contacts like those you yourself made so successfully at Camp David. Moreover, it was with the same intention that I recently invited Mr. Khrushchev. However, above all, the chances of success of the meeting of the Areopagus will be contingent on a preliminary effort by the Western Powers to present a united front on definite, firm positions.

As for the time at our disposal, I note that you have induced Mr. Khrushchev to declare publicly that he was not setting a definite time limit on his goals with respect to the Berlin matter. And how indeed—

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. The source text is a Department of State translation. A copy of the French language text is *ibid*.

<sup>1</sup> All brackets are in the source text.

without assuming the responsibility for a world war—could he impose his demands when we are aligned solidly against him? Moreover, the Chairman of the Council of the Soviet Union has hastened to accept my invitation to come to France, and it appears unlikely that he will want to create a crisis before that. In short, it is clear now that Mr. Khrushchev desires the Conference very much, and that we have time to prepare for it properly.

That is why I agree readily to your suggestion for a preliminary meeting in Paris between you, Mr. Macmillan, and me, to be devoted chiefly to work, with Mr. Adenauer joining us when we discuss Germany. In view of the contemplated visits in the near future in London and Paris, the meeting in Senegal of the Executive Council of the community, the meeting of the [North] Atlantic Council, the discussion of our budget before Parliament, etc., I should be at your disposal and at Mr. Macmillan's and, for the study of the German question, at the disposal of Mr. Adenauer, from December 19. We could, at that time, outline a Western agreement. After which our governments would work out the entire position we would uphold at a Summit Conference.

Thereafter, the attitude of the Russians in United Nations debates, and in matters concerning Asia and Africa, the talks my government and I shall have with Mr. Khrushchev—which will probably be in March—and doubtless other occasions will enable us to see more clearly the general direction the Soviet Union will take. On the basis established by the preliminary work of our governments and their exchanges of views, we would then be in a position about April to invite Mr. Khrushchev, jointly, to come to a Summit Conference. Before opening the conference, we would have another meeting of the Western Powers to establish definitively our common position. Thus, we would have prepared as carefully as possible for this very important meeting and kept the initiative at all times.<sup>2</sup>

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my loyal friendship.

**C. de Gaulle<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> On October 28, President Eisenhower wrote to de Gaulle accepting the December date for a Western summit and informing him that he would have Herter inaugurate talks with the British, French, and West Germans in Washington in preparation for the meeting. (Letter transmitted in telegram 1787 to Paris, October 28; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/10-2859)

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**37. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower**

Washington, November 2, 1959.

## OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. Hagerty (for initial discussion), General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Secretary Herter next referred to the problem he foresees in preparation for the Western Powers meeting and the summit. He will shortly meet with the three Ambassadors in Washington to begin the preliminary work. He proposes to express to them our impatience over their intransigence in telling the President where he is to go and what kind of meetings he is to attend. He will stress that we are carrying the tremendous burden of Western defense and that we do not appreciate the rather cavalier attitudes being displayed. Secretary Herter sees the purpose of the Foreign Ministers meetings as determining what topics are to be recommended for discussion in Paris and at the summit, and also for considering what the purpose of a summit meeting should be. The French seem to want a grand confrontation on all major issues involving the East and West, the British a series of meetings, almost for their own sake.

The President said that the prospect of a series of meetings requires something new in our governmental organization. He feels it is wrong for the President to engage personally in debate and conference with representatives of other countries. Mr. Herter recalled the President's statement, which he thought very logical and effective, that he would go anywhere at any time to advance the cause of peace.<sup>1</sup> The President confirmed this, but commented that summit meetings were not in his opinion necessarily the best way of advancing the cause of peace.

Mr. Herter said that the French had wanted to conduct the Foreign Ministers session on a tripartite basis. Adenauer has sharply disagreed, and has likewise disagreed with any intent to hold German participation to questions limited to Germany.<sup>2</sup> He stresses that his chief interest is in disarmament. The President said he saw the logic of this but felt that

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup> For text of the President's remarks along these lines at his press conference on October 28, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 747–757.

<sup>2</sup> According to telegram 855 from Bonn, October 31, Adenauer had, on October 30, sent de Gaulle a "fairly acid" letter rejecting the idea of limiting German participation in the Western summit meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/10–3159)

there may be specific questions elsewhere in the world which involve only the three powers.

Mr. Herter then said that, regarding Berlin, the President, in his talks with Khrushchev, had said that we would seriously negotiate. It looks as though the British favor some kind of short-term interim solution to carry us over the period of the German elections. Our thinking runs toward a longer-range solution, effective until German reunification, possibly involving something like a "guaranteed city." The Germans and the French may simply take the position that they will say nothing about these matters. The President commented that, if they do, they may be taking on the responsibility for the future of Berlin and West Germany.

Secretary Herter next raised the question of disarmament. The possibility of thinning out forces in Europe requires consideration. He said he had discussed this with General Schuyler a few days ago<sup>3</sup> and that General Schuyler expressed strong opposition. In fact, Secretary Herter thought we may have to make a virtue of necessity, since he understands Defense feels they may have to remove some major units from Europe. He recalled a plan prepared by General Norstad for inspection against surprise attack that involved zones to the east and west of the Iron Curtain through Germany, and inspection of military forces in these zones by ground and air means.<sup>4</sup> If this inspection proves successful, there would then be a thinning out on each side of the line. The French opposed this scheme. Mr. Herter said he has had discussions with General Schuyler as to the true role and function of the NATO "shield" of thirty divisions, arguing that any attack in Europe which involves the commitment of these shield forces would in fact inevitably lead to all-out conflict. The President said the basic trouble here is the German contention that we are really only talking about Germany. Mr. Herter felt that we should begin talking with our allies on this general topic. He recognized that bitter resistance to change may be evoked, and that leaks by the French and Germans, having very unsettling effects in Europe, must be anticipated. The President said he did not think he would take the proposal for thinning out at the present time. He felt that we should have this in the back of our mind as something to be achieved through disarmament agreements. If we can reach agreement on total strengths, for example, we could then let the "thinning" be the indirect result. Secretary Herter commented that on the broad question of disarmament it may be possible for us to delay action until January or February at which time technical studies might be started. But in the

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<sup>3</sup> No record of Herter's discussion with General Cortlan van Rensselaer Schuyler, SHAPE Chief of Staff, has been found.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

meantime we must start with something concrete, something that can be put down. He understood this to be the President's line of thought.

The President said this is true. He then went on to comment that there is general agreement that we cannot inspect with full effectiveness against atomic weapons. We must therefore start on other things, and this is why he has previously given attention to the means of delivery of such weapons. He recognizes we perhaps cannot inspect completely against missiles, but naval units and aircraft can be subjected to inspection. This was in fact the purport of his Open Skies proposal.<sup>5</sup>

He said he hoped the Secretary could get some real agreement in principle with our allies on this matter. He suggested that we concentrate very hard on what is good for the United States. He thinks there has been too much sensitivity over what our allies want in this field.

Secretary Herter said that General de Gaulle had also suggested two further items—the first on interference in each other's affairs, and the second on aid to underdeveloped countries. He thought it essential to clarify just what the French mean by this prior to the Western summit meeting. He asked if the President will want to talk about our balance of payments problems. The President said he thought he would leave that to Secretary Anderson at the NATO meeting. Secretary Herter said that this is a very technical question and a very complex one. He added that the only people who seem to understand it are the British.

The President commented that the best way to pave the ground for reducing our forces in Europe seems to him to be to ask the Europeans in very strong terms why they are not producing the forces required for the defense of the area. We should be able to pull ours out. Secretary Herter suggested that we should keep a small number of our forces in Europe as a symbol of our good faith. The President said we should put squarely to the Europeans the question of what they are willing to do toward paying the costs of our forces in Europe. He recalled that we came over to Europe to give them a chance to form their own forces for their own defense. Mr. Herter commented that we are carrying the bulk of the infrastructure, new weapons costs, etc.

Secretary Herter said that he thought the Germans should take some action on their own to halt the talk that they are a nation committed to a "revanchist" policy. Polish and Soviet propaganda continues to stir up this point, asserting that the West Germans want to regain by force the territory they lost in the East. When the President was in Europe Adenauer said he was giving consideration to actions that

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<sup>5</sup> For text of Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, made at the summit conference on July 21, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 450–453.

would allay this but has since done nothing about it. A friendly gesture by Adenauer to the Poles would help a great deal.

Considering his schedule generally, the President said that December is a bad time for him to go to conferences. He has the State of the Union message and the Budget Message very much on his mind at that time. The President said that de facto he is cancelling the social schedule, simply because it is not possible to schedule events such as the diplomatic dinners, the Supreme Court dinner, etc. He asked that the State Department develop a good diplomatic position, and get it prepared and coordinated before the Western summit meeting. The meeting should be held largely to show solidarity. While he can attend that, he will not have the time to thresh out matters in full detail.

The President said he would make Mr. Murphy his Special Assistant for the trip. He said he would also perhaps wish to take the Assistant Secretary of State for the Mid-Eastern area. He said he plans to keep his party as small as he can. He mentioned that he will send his military aides out on advance trips for the visit. He wishes to have Major Eisenhower as his personal aide to look after personal demands.

On each major topic, the President hoped the Secretary would thrash out with the Foreign Ministers just what the West is prepared to do—on disarmament and Berlin/Germany, for example. Mr. Herter said the problem will come if some of the Ministers say they will not discuss it. The President said they would be taking a great responsibility.

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*Brigadier General, USA*

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### 38. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 3, 1959, 1 p.m.

433. Paris for Embassy and CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Deptel 1869 Paris, 950 Bonn, 3561 London.<sup>1</sup> Commandants evening Nov 2 agreed inter alia authorize West Berlin police use pistols in accordance

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.04/11-359. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:03 a.m., November 3. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, priority to Paris, London, and priority to POLAD USAREUR.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 1869 to Paris, November 2, expressed the Department's concern over the continued lack of agreement among the Commandants in West Berlin about what to do in the event of future flag-raising episodes. (*Ibid.*, 762B.04/10-3059)

existing police regulations, i.e., self-defense only. Authorized Reserve Force B to carry carbines in addition to pistols. No firearms, pistols or carbines to be used by either group except as above or on orders of Commandants who will be closely supervising operations in committee. In response to question by US Commandant British and French Commandants stated they now had full authority authorize police use weapons if necessary. We consider this satisfactory solution this problem.

On question use of allied troops Commandants agreed that if police overwhelmed, Western troops would take necessary action to restore public order including use of firearms if required. US Commandant said that in foregoing situation he would use all his resources at whatever locations required and assumed other Commandants prepared do same. There was no contradiction. In light of London's 2359 to Dept<sup>2</sup> and other statements by British Commandant we believe no further need raise question use British troops on S-Bahn properties.

In addition Commandants approved police operational plan for removal of flags with certain modifications on timing. Commandants also agreed cutting of S-Bahn considered most serious matter justified only under conditions of extreme urgency when security Western Berlin itself in jeopardy. Therefore no action permitted except as specifically ordered by Commandants whose orders would be carried out by allied troops.

Commandants were informed highpoints Gen. Hamlett's afternoon meeting with Gen. Zakharov (ourtel 432 to Dept).<sup>3</sup> They stressed importance giving no publicity to new letter to Sov Commandant before Nov 7. French Commandant made particular plea for secrecy expressing hope no leaks occur Bonn or allied capitals. We agreed but indicated would have to inform Brandt letter delivered and could not expect press would omit speculation substance Hamlett call on Zakharov once call confirmed. (As of noon Nov 3 we have not had to confirm.)

**Lightner**

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2359 from London, November 2, reported that the Foreign Office had given the British Commandant full authority to remove East German flags in West Berlin without restriction on the weapons to be used. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/11-259)

<sup>3</sup> Dated November 2. In the meeting, November 2, Zakharov maintained that the flag raising incident was within the competence of the East German Government, but stressed that everyone was interested in peace and that he could see no reason for the Western Commandants' anxiety. (*Ibid.*)

### 39. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 10, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

#### SUBJECT

Foreign Minister von Brentano's Letter to the Secretary and Preparations for a Summit Meeting

#### PARTICIPANTS

Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador  
The Secretary  
Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

In a conversation which also covered the subject of vested German assets (see separate memorandum),<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Grewe began by apologizing for the delay in the delivery of the letter dated October 23, 1959,<sup>2</sup> to the Secretary from Foreign Minister von Brentano. The delay was caused, according to Ambassador Grewe, by the peculiar way in which the letter had been sent to the German Embassy here. Since the letter had been written, Dr. Grewe continued, the German view had changed a little regarding a possible agenda for an East-West Summit. The Federal Government did not believe that disarmament should be the only item discussed at such a Summit; it would obviously also be necessary to deal with the Berlin and German question.

The Secretary commented that the Summit agenda was one of the things we had wanted to talk about in the preparatory Four Power discussions. This was a complicated question. The subject of disarmament, for example, was a tremendous one. We have received various proposals on the subject, and the Coolidge Group<sup>3</sup> is making a thorough study of our position. We did not know yet when an East-West Summit meeting could take place. President de Gaulle would presumably want it to come only after the Khrushchev visit to France. Another question was the relationship of the Ten-Power Disarmament talks to an East-West Summit. If these talks started before the Summit, it would not be very long before guidance would be required from the Heads of Governments. Therefore, we tended to prefer having the East-West Summit before the Ten-Power talks began.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/11-1059. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on November 18. A 2-page briefing paper, drafted by Hillenbrand and initiated by Herter, November 9, is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Document 34.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a committee headed by Charles A. Coolidge to review U.S. disarmament policy.



At an East-West Summit, the Secretary continued, it seemed certain that the Soviets would begin with their German peace treaty proposals. There were two possible approaches to a Berlin arrangement: to seek either a temporary or a more enduring agreement. The Secretary noted that he was sorry that Foreign Minister von Brentano felt, as indicated in his letter, that the West had weakened its position by the proposals made on July 28 at Geneva.<sup>4</sup> This indicated that von Brentano did not wish further to discuss the possibility of some temporary arrangement. If the arrangement were not to be temporary, then it must be designed to last until German reunification. What kind of a solution would fill this need? If a solution cannot be found, then we must sooner or later count on the Soviets making a separate peace treaty with the East Germans.

Ambassador Grewe said his Government was always prepared to discuss possible solutions with its Allies, but it did not see anything new which could be done. He himself had tried to examine the range of possibilities and had come only to a negative conclusion. The difficulty with the Western proposals at Geneva was that the Soviets would use them as a starting point in the next round of negotiations. The Secretary commented that he did not see where we could give any further in terms of the Geneva approach.

As to the Spaak dichotomy between a Summit meeting with full preparations and one with no preparations, Ambassador Grewe stated, the Federal Government considered it impossible as well as dangerous to try to solve the big problems at one Summit meeting. However, the conclusion could not be drawn from this that careful preparations for an initial meeting were not necessary. The Secretary noted that, since we do not know precisely what the Soviets will propose at a Summit meeting, it was obviously too much to expect that the Western Heads of Governments could come up with all the answers within a period of four or five days. One problem with reference to a series of Summit meetings, the Secretary continued, was that if the first such meeting were to take place, say in April, it would be problematic when the next could take place. It would certainly not be advisable to have it in the heat of the American election campaign, and a new administration in this country must have a little time to organize itself. This seemed to mean one Summit per year, Ambassador Grewe commented. The Secretary observed this probably also meant that the Foreign Ministers would have to contemplate another meeting on their part.

Bonn was quite happy with the proposed preparations for the December Western Summit meeting, Ambassador Grewe stated, and had authorized full participation by the German Embassy here. The Secretary observed that the Four Powers would have a problem with NATO.

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<sup>4</sup>See vol. VIII, Document 488.

Spaak would be in Washington next week.<sup>5</sup> He (the Secretary) had recently talked with the Norwegians and the Belgians.<sup>6</sup> They wanted us to lay our disagreements before NATO and let it iron them out. How can this be done? Yet the NATO countries have a right to be consulted, since they are involved in the NATO guarantees as they relate to Berlin. It would be difficult to discuss these problems around a big table. We did not know precisely what Spaak had in mind, but he would undoubtedly expect a frank airing of all these matters in the NATO meeting. The Secretary noted that it now seemed as if the NATO Foreign Ministers would reconvene in Paris on December 22, and that he had indicated his willingness to stay over for such a meeting. Agreement must be reached on Summit philosophy, as well as on what might usefully be discussed at that level. If a reasonable meeting of minds could be obtained during the Paris meetings, the Four Western Powers would have a basis for continuing their studies in preparation for the East-West Summit.

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<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of Spaak's conversation with the President on November 24 is in volume VII, Part 1.

<sup>6</sup> A memorandum of Herter's conversation with the Norwegian Ambassador, also on November 10, is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/11-1059. The conversation with the Belgians has not been identified further.

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#### 40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, November 14, 1959, 5:36 p.m.

2057. Paris for USRO. As announced Secretary met with French, British, and German Ambassadors on November 4.<sup>1</sup> It was agreed (and confirmed by governments) they would constitute steering group to meet periodically as developments warrant for exchange of views on matters relating to Western and East-West summits. Also agreed working level representatives of Embassies and Department should meet regularly for preliminary discussions. First such meeting held November 10 by Kohler (Chairman), Hood (UK), Lebel (France), Krapf (Germany), and assistants. Following is summary this meeting.<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/14-1459. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dubs and McSweeney on November 13, cleared with Fessenden and Vigderman, and approved by Kohler who signed for Herter. Repeated to London, Moscow, Rome, and Bonn.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of Herter's conversation with Ambassadors Grewe, Alphand, and Caccia on November 4 is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

<sup>2</sup> No other record of this meeting has been found.

*Timing of East-West Summit.* U.S. and British expressed preference early summit but recognized their views conditioned by timing Khrushchev visit to Paris. French indicated de Gaulle especially concerned that East-West summit should convene after Khrushchev Paris visit and apparently thinking in terms May rather than April. U.S. noted schedule events and Presidential commitments in practice fixed May 17 as terminal date and that we would prefer aiming at April 20–25 for commencement East-West summit. U.S. further indicated postponement summit to late spring makes it impractical to consider another summit before new administration installed.

*Disarmament.* U.S. believes East-West summit should precede convening date ten-power disarmament group on grounds this would present opportunity for heads of government consider general principles and convey guidance ten-power group. French took position it might prove awkward tackle complex disarmament questions without having had ten-power group explore issues first.

*Summit Philosophy and Agenda.* U.S. expressed view East-West summit could take place without a formal detailed agenda as long as adequate advance effort made by West to control public expectations. This would permit discussions wide range of subjects without raising composition problems. British stressed view coming summit should be first of series. While believing international differences could only be resolved gradually, British believe possibility exists reach interim agreement on Berlin at coming conference. French felt summit should be thoroughly prepared to ensure some concrete result. Both French and Germans expressed view problems surrounding Berlin and Germany should be under-played in hope status quo could be maintained. Also their view that this aim might be facilitated by giving question disarmament prominence.

*Composition.* All agreed East-West summit should be restricted to participants 1955 Geneva summit.

U.S. undertook provide to others preliminary estimate Soviet intentions re summit as basis further discussion.

Next meeting probably early next week at which time it hoped French will be prepared clarify de Gaulle's proposals for summit discussion internal interference and aid to underdeveloped countries.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

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<sup>3</sup> At their second meeting on November 17, Kohler, Hood, Lebel, and Krapf discussed the timing of a summit meeting, its agenda, disarmament, NATO liaison with the working group, and working documents for further discussion. (Telegram 2096 to Paris, November 18; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/11-1859)

#### 41. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 13, 1959.

##### SUBJECT

Recent Conversation Between Shepard Stone and Chancellor Adenauer<sup>1</sup>

##### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Shepard Stone, The Ford Foundation, New York City  
The Secretary  
Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

Mr. Stone said that he had asked to see the Secretary in view of the opportunity which he had recently had in Bonn to speak confidentially with Chancellor Adenauer. He (Stone) had, of course, also seen the Chancellor with Mr. McCloy at the time of the *Atlantik Bruecke* meetings in Bonn about a month ago.<sup>2</sup> Although he had intended to return to the United States directly from Vienna, the Chancellor had sent him a message asking him to stop by Bonn for a private conversation. Mr. Stone noted that his friendship with the Chancellor dates back more than ten years.

Dr. Adenauer was in fine physical and mental shape when he saw him last week, Mr. Stone observed. However, the Chancellor said that he was greatly disturbed about two developments: (a) the departure of Mr. Murphy from the Department of State,<sup>3</sup> and (b) signs of a changing US attitude towards its European commitments. On the first point, according to Mr. Stone, the Chancellor particularly stressed a report which he had received from a German Ambassador to the effect that the American Ambassador in the same country had told him that Mr. Murphy was not going to Bonn because of policy differences with his superiors. Ambassador Bohlen's return to the Department of State as a Special Assistant to the Secretary was also cited as a sign of an allegedly changing US attitude towards Germany and the East-West problem. Mr. Stone said that he tried to do all he could to reassure the Chancellor that no such political significances should be read into Mr. Murphy's resignation, but he believed that some suspicion remained in the Chancel-

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Herter.

<sup>1</sup> Stone served in the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 34. No record of McCloy and Stone's meeting with Adenauer on this occasion has been found.

<sup>3</sup> On October 28, the White House announced Murphy's resignation.

lor's mind and that he was convinced that there was more here than met the eye. One favorable factor, Mr. Stone noted, was the announcement, on the same day as his conversation in Bonn, of the President's intention to take Mr. Murphy with him on his trip to India and points en route. The Chancellor had asked Mr. Stone to discuss the situation when he was in Washington, and to let Felix von Eckhardt, Head of the Federal Press Office, know by letter of any conclusions which might be drawn.

On the second point, the Chancellor said he was troubled by the impression which seemed to be growing that American strength in Europe would be weakened if certain developments took place. The Secretary had, in his recent meeting with the British, French and German Ambassadors,<sup>4</sup> pointed out certain difficulties which the US was experiencing in its balance of payments. The Chancellor recognized that obviously Europe had to do more to bear the burden of common defense, but the Soviets would obviously take advantage of any weakening in the American posture and would seize the initiative to take advantage of such weakness. To give an impression of weakening was particularly dangerous prior to a Summit meeting. In fact, the Chancellor continued, there was too much talk in Europe generally about American financial and other weaknesses. He wondered whether something could not be done to show that the US is still convinced of its own destiny. Mr. Stone commented to the Secretary that the Chancellor's impressions were confirmed by his own experience in traveling around Europe.

On the general subject of the forthcoming Western and East-West Summit conferences, the Chancellor said he wanted to make clear that, despite his high evaluation of his relationship with President deGaulle, this did not mean that Germany was willing to give up its interest in major political problems since it was indubitably affected by all such problems. Any idea that deGaulle could speak for Germany was wrong. In response to his firm letter objecting to the French position,<sup>5</sup> the Chancellor said he had received a satisfactory reply from President deGaulle and that he considered the incident practically closed. However, Stone commented, the Chancellor was undoubtedly left with a residue of suspicion of the French, and perhaps of the US, with respect to their desire to exclude Germany. It would be fatal, Mr. Stone stated, to have the Germans feel that they are not considered a full member of the Western Alliance, and that this full membership is not of vital concern to the US. It would be a serious error for the US to adopt the position that we are prepared to accept President deGaulle as a spokesman for all of Europe.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 40.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 37.

Mr. Stone said that the Chancellor had mentioned that he was frequently being asked whether he had any new proposals to make. The Germans could not be in the position of asking the Allies to diminish their rights in Berlin, the Chancellor observed. He did say that the Federal Government had prepared certain plans, but these were known only to four members of the Government: himself, Globke, Krone, and Schroeder. Although he did not disclose what these plans were, the Chancellor suggested that Stone might consult subsequently with Dr. Globke who would outline them to him. In a subsequent conversation with Globke, Stone continued, he did get a somewhat confused as well as incomplete account of these proposals. As far as he could make out they amounted to the following:

The Western Powers should propose that elections be held within five years in each of the two parts of Germany. The first question to be posed to the electorate would be "Are you in favor of German reunification?" A UN Commission could be introduced to supervise this plebiscite to ensure its freedom. A further question to be posed would be "If you are in favor of German reunification, do you want to join the Warsaw Pact or NATO?" If the vote favored entry into the Warsaw Pact, then Western Germany would be demilitarized. If the vote favored entry into NATO, then East Germany would be demilitarized and NATO troops would be banned from this area. In commenting on these proposals Dr. Globke said that there was, of course, no doubt as to how the Germans would vote in such a plebiscite if they were free to express their convictions. Moreover, there was no idea that the Soviets would accept such a proposal.

In summarizing his impressions of the Chancellor's position, Mr. Stone said that he was impressed by the Chancellor's statement that the Germans would not propose anything which would diminish Allied rights in Berlin. On the other hand, the implication was left that, if the Allies made such proposals, then obviously the Germans would have to consider them.

The Secretary said he could assure Mr. Stone that Mr. Murphy's resignation was not in any respect motivated by alleged policy differences, nor did Ambassador Bohlen's return to the Department have any connection. The Secretary outlined some of the factors which in his view had influenced Mr. Murphy's decision. He suggested that Mr. Stone would be justified in writing von Lokhardt along these lines. Mr. Stone said that he would, accordingly, write a discreet letter on this subject. However, he also thought it would be a good idea if Mr. Murphy would write to the Chancellor himself. The Secretary said he would pass on this suggestion upon Mr. Murphy's return from leave.

The Secretary said that the Chancellor had some basis for concern on his second point. The American Government was faced by a difficult

problem in its balance of payments situation. The Secretary of the Treasury was particularly disturbed. The Secretary noted that he (the Secretary of State) was making a speech on Monday before the Foreign Trade Council in New York<sup>6</sup> in which he would give some statistical data and try to allay some of the fears which had been aroused. One of the difficulties was that the discussion of this subject within the US Government had received too wide a circulation. The Secretary recalled that the President had in the back of his mind his own experience. When he went to SHAEF in 1951, in response to a press conference question, General Eisenhower had said that he expected American forces would be back from Europe by 1954. For five years the President had annually raised the possibility of bringing back American troops from Europe, but had been advised this would be impossible. There could, of course, be no worse time than the present, the Secretary observed, for carrying out such a program.

Mr. Stone said he would like to suggest that, in his speech, the Secretary might include the point that, regardless of these admitted problems, there could be no doubt about the basic reliability of the US, that when the chips were down we would be there carrying out our commitments. The Secretary said that we hoped to give reassurance of this nature at the NATO Ministerial Meetings in December. It was good to hear that the Germans were prepared to do more to share the burden; it was essential they do so. A noteworthy fact, the Secretary continued, was that our balance of payments deficit comes fairly close to our dollar outlay affecting the balance of payments due to stationing of troops overseas. There were, of course, other more purely economic factors involved, such as our tendency to price ourselves out of the market with a resultant outflow of American capital to establish factories overseas.

Mr. Stone said that a number of far-sighted Europeans like Jean Monnet had been giving thought to this problem. Monnet had, in fact, talked to the Chancellor about it. The general feeling among these people was that Europe was in a position to do much both in the way of assistance to underdeveloped countries and in the way of taking measures to strengthen the US exchange position.

The Secretary observed that, when it comes to undermining NATO, General deGaulle is the real culprit. At some point he must be told off. He still dreams of France as being the dominant power in Western Europe. If Adenauer's suspicions in this respect have been allayed, he is overly optimistic. President deGaulle is still actively thinking in terms of tripartitism. Mr. Stone observed that the best people in France hope we

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<sup>6</sup> For text of Herter's address to the National Foreign Trade Council, November 16, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 7, 1959, pp. 819–823.

do not give in to deGaulle, and believe that his policy would be disastrous both for Europe and for France.

The Secretary referred to the Chancellor's remarks to Mr. McCloy during their earlier meeting, at which Stone had likewise been present, that he could not come forward with his proposals because of the German Foreign Office. On that occasion, Mr. Stone added, the Chancellor had launched into a bitter attack on the Foreign Office and its leading personalities such as von Brentano, Scherpenberg and Duckwitz. Stone had received the definite impression that the Chancellor was thinking of bringing back Ambassador Grewe from Washington to replace Scherpenberg. The Chancellor certainly did not pay any attention to Foreign Minister von Brentano. At one time when he was still in the Foreign Office, Hallstein<sup>7</sup> had had a certain influence over the Chancellor, and the Chancellor did respect Grewe as a man who knows his facts. Stone said he had received the impression that von Eckhardt might be sent to Washington as Ambassador to replace Grewe. The Secretary noted that, on a number of occasions, we have "needled" the Germans regarding their negative attitude and asked them to come up with some new ideas. We did not see how they could refuse to do some thinking about problems of primary concern to them. The Secretary then cited two examples of the impotency of von Brentano and the Foreign Office to carry through policies in face of the Chancellor's refusal to give him any authority as well as the Chancellor's capacity to change his mind rapidly.

The conversation concluded with Mr. Stone's observation that Willy Brandt had seen the Chancellor a number of times recently and had apparently been impressing on him the undesirability of any suggestions from the Federal Republic which would have the effect of diminishing the Allies' rights in Berlin.

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<sup>7</sup> Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community.



**42. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter**

London, undated.

DEAR CHRIS: You may be interested to have on a confidential basis my personal impression of my trip to Paris.<sup>1</sup> I was warmly received, the press in general was approving, and the General, Debre and Couve were very friendly. I think both sides felt that the timing of the visit had been good, and that we must not only establish confidence in one another's political outlook, but also let it be seen that it had been established. From what I have heard from Paris since my return I gather that the French have been very pleased by the atmosphere of the visit.

On political objectives in Europe, we agreed that we must keep the balance between the West and the U.S.S.R. and not countenance any disengagement or neutralisation plans which would weaken our position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. I was struck by the French fear of what would happen in Western Germany after Adenauer's departure and their desire for speed in associating West Germany with other countries of Western Europe. I made it clear to them that from a political point of view we had always welcomed the Common Market, and that I welcomed steps to keep the Six together, such as the development of political consultation. I think that they were genuinely relieved to hear this and surprised that I should have said it so categorically. I did, however, say that all would be spoilt if these associations were exclusive, i.e. if the Six politically consulted among themselves and then refused to consult with Britain and their other allies; more use of W.E.U. was one way of doing that so far as Britain was concerned; but it should all be within the N.A.T.O. framework. I said that I was very ready for W.E.U. to go to Paris from London, so that the same British individual could represent us on W.E.U. and N.A.T.O. and so prevent any gap opening between the two. The French said that this would suit them but they did not want to offend the Belgians. The Belgians have reservations because they are very anxious to get the Six to go to Brussels and are afraid that a move of W.E.U. to Paris might prejudice this objective.

With regard to economic matters, the French said that the liberal trade policies of the Six, to which they were committed, should make arrangements between the Six and the other countries of Europe easier. We agreed however that a difficult problem still remained. I said that the Seven were a means to the end of keeping Western Europe liberal in

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Transmitted to Herter under cover of a brief note from Caccia, November 16.

<sup>1</sup> Lloyd visited Paris November 11–12.

its trade outlook, and we were conscious of the need to have regard to your position. On cooperation in arms production, we expressed good intentions but recognized the importance of your part in this and the possible significance of your having to diminish your help.

On disarmament, we expressed our anxiety about delay in your establishing your position, and our hope that when you have done so you would have a genuine consultation with us. We feared the public reaction to the failure of the Ten-Power Group to meet early in the New Year. (May I say that I hope you will soon be able to let us know how your thinking is progressing, and at least what, if any, is the area of doubt or disagreement.)

Deliberately I did not get involved in N.A.T.O. problems, but the mood was one of cooperation rather than finding and exploiting difficulties.

I therefore hope that the visit will have done some good, not only for Anglo-French relations but in a much wider context.

On Summitry, we did talk about dates and agenda, I emphasizing what I think is the United States/United Kingdom position, that the meeting should take place as soon as practicable after Mr. Khrushchev's visit to France, without too rigid an agenda.<sup>2</sup>

With warm personal regards,

Selwyn<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>On November 16, representatives from the British and French Embassies also briefed the Department of State in more detail on Lloyd's visit to Paris. Both agreed that the talks had gone well. (Memorandum of conversation, November 16; Department of State, Central Files, 033.4151/11-1659, and telegram 2078 to Paris, November 17; *ibid.*, 033.4151/11-1759)

<sup>3</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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#### 43. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter

London, undated.

DEAR CHRIS: I send you the same sort of confidential account of our talks with the Germans as I sent to you about my visit to Paris.<sup>1</sup> It was a

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Transmitted to Herter under cover of a brief note from Caccia, November 23.

<sup>1</sup>Document 42. Adenauer visited London November 17–19.

fairly satisfactory meeting: the Chancellor's two preoccupations were disengagement and concessions over Germany and/or Berlin. We went carefully over our position on disengagement, i.e. the United Kingdom Government did not believe in it, but we did favor the idea of geographical areas where there could be inspection and limitation of armaments, for example, the Arctic, or indeed Antarctica where we are near a treaty involving certain restrictions. The only schemes of that nature which we favored in Europe were the 1957 anti-surprise attack proposals<sup>2</sup> and the Western peace plan of May 1959,<sup>3</sup> with both of which the Germans had agreed.

On Germany and Berlin, we stated that our position was as it was at the end of the Geneva talks last summer. At one state the Chancellor seemed to think that this was going too far but he was altogether very confused about Berlin. At one time he seemed to want it as a separate item for the Summit, but Brentano was very helpful in keeping him straight.

There was some plain speaking about this constant distrust suspicion and unpleasant remarks and innuendos about the Prime Minister. Harold was pretty tough with him, and Adenauer's entourage said that it was a good thing. I have the feeling that no one in Germany speaks out to him any longer.

On our side, we said that we welcomed the Six coming closer together in everything, but we stressed the danger if the Six became an exclusive organization, politically or economically. If that happens, there will be a split in N.A.T.O., and the W.E.U. treaties cannot survive. Adenauer professed to accept this, and his press conference was good on this point. The Chancellor had no suggestion to make about disarmament. On the date and preparations for the Summit his views seemed to coincide with yours and mine.

The public and the press behaved well, and I think the visit can be judged to have been as successful as we could reasonably expect.<sup>4</sup>

With warm personal regards,

Selwyn<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The proposal was made by Secretary Dulles to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee on August 2, 1957; see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 839–845.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Western Peace Plan, May 14, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 624–629.

<sup>4</sup> Additional details on Adenauer's visit to London were provided in telegrams 2671 and 2683 from London, November 20 (Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A41/11–2059), and telegrams 2691 from London and 989 from Bonn, November 21 (*ibid.*, 033.62A41/11–2159).

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

#### 44. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 27, 1959.

##### SUBJECT

Coming Summit Talks

##### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Sol Rae, Canadian Chargé d'Affaires

Mr. J.S. Nutt, Canadian Embassy

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, BNA

Mr. K.A. Byrns, BNA

The Canadians asked that Mr. Kohler fill them in on the preparations for the summit meeting.

Mr. Kohler said that we were a little unhappy about the reports from the other Western nations that they are not being consulted about what is going on in connection with the coming summit meeting. We seek to allay this feeling. We are most anxious to consult, but at the moment there is little to consult about. The Secretary has had one meeting with the Ambassadors of the other three countries<sup>1</sup> (the "Steering Group"), but actually they have not as yet got their teeth into the subject. The discussions have been mostly procedural. After a comparison of schedules, it has become apparent that there are only two dates suitable for a summit meeting. The first one of these would be in the middle of April, which in a way is unfortunate, as April 17, Easter, falls in this period. As far as this date is concerned, the best that can be figured out is for the Foreign Ministers to spend a long Easter week-end in Paris, finalizing the preparations for the summit meeting. The final session of the NATO Council will probably then fall on April 18 or 19, and then, adding one day for consultation of the heads of the Western governments, the summit meeting with Russia would start about April 20–21. This makes a tight schedule for the President, as he must be back in Washington on April 27 to meet the King of Nepal.

Mr. Kohler said that the other possible date for a meeting would be sometime in the first half of May. We think this is too close to the President's visit to Russia. We believe there should be a more "decent" interval between the summit meeting, and the President's visit, so probably April is a firm date.

We do not want to repeat the Geneva type of discussion, and we therefore plan to leave West Germany out, which she is willing to accept

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/11-2759. Secret. Drafted by Byrns and initialed by Kohler.

<sup>1</sup>See Document 40.

in order to keep out the East Germans, and of course it depends on the plans of the other side, the USSR.

The setting of the date for the summit meeting gave us a problem, too, because DeGaulle was supposed to come here in April. We suggested to him that he come earlier. He said, however, that this would be inconvenient, but that it would be entirely satisfactory to him to come at some much later time.

The U.S. concept of the summit is that it would be almost an agendaless meeting. The British share our view. The French are more formalistic, but have no instructions. This type of meeting would require some very simple formula, like saying that the four heads of government will meet to find solutions to problems. It is natural that Berlin and Germany should be an agenda item. Germany has wanted to soft-pedal this, saying this item should be secondary, but Khrushchev is coming to the meeting to push for a peace treaty. This answers the German question and means that the Berlin and German item will certainly be on the agenda. If Khrushchev comes with the Russian peace proposals, this automatically means that we come forward with ours also, and this in turn automatically puts Berlin and Germany on the agenda. Essentially, this does not require any preparation to speak of. We have been through this for months and, although it will be necessary to review our position, it is doubtful that there will be much change. It is premature to make this review at this time, and almost impossible to prepare a fall-back position, because as soon as a fall-back position is prepared it leaks, and thereupon immediately becomes no longer a fall-back position.

Mr. Kohler continued by saying that a tough question to place on the agenda for the summit discussions is disarmament. It has been our concept that the summit might be our kick-off place for this topic, but there would not be enough time at the summit to get far with it, as it is a very complex subject. After agreeing in principle with our allies, we would table our own disarmament proposals. These should be broad and profound and discuss the general principles. Delay in the summit date beyond that originally envisioned has raised a question in connection with disarmament. We cannot start working in the Ten-Power Group until the middle of March. It will be quite a hassle to get the U.S. position between AEC, Defense, and State, and then for us to get a position with the other countries will also be difficult. We do not see how this could be accomplished before March 17, but that of course is a month before the summit date. We do not know, however, whether to go ahead with the Ten-Power Group or postpone until May. Moch<sup>2</sup> of

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<sup>2</sup>Jules Moch, French Representative at the U.N. Ten-Nation Disarmament Commission.

France wants to go ahead. The Italians do also. Italy probably does not want the disarmament subject to go to the summit where she will not be present. The British felt at first pressure to go ahead, but as yet they have no instructions. We are a little torn about the question of going ahead or delaying, as we think the discussions coming shortly on the heels of or at the same time as the summit meeting put us in the peculiar position of talking disarmament in two places at one time. Mr. Kohler said we would welcome the Canadians' views.

Mr. Rae replied that as far as Canada's position is concerned, they would like to give it a bit of thought. If you leave the meeting over until after the summit, until May, that is pretty late.

Mr. Kohler said there is also the psychological aspect. You open up your Ten-Power disarmament discussions with the U.S. submitting broad proposals and then turn around and go to the summit and the Ten-Power Group has already stolen the thunder. We don't want to scoop the summit. The French have thought of two possible agenda items—non-interference in internal affairs and aid to underdeveloped countries. The French have no instructions on their position. The big problem, however, is the relationship of the disarmament group to the summit group.

Mr. Rae said that there seems to him to still be a need for having consultations. Canada hopes that there will be a stage where the Western summit powers will be still formulating their problems and where Canada and the other NATO countries could step in early enough to be of some help, and also to get the pattern of their thinking. It would be helpful if Canada and the others could come in at an early stage. Mr. Kohler assured him that it is our firm intention before we go to the summit to get the ideas of Canada and the other Western nations.

Mr. Rae said maybe the countries have read more into the meeting of the "Steering Group" than there really is. Mr. Kohler agreed with this, saying that the fact is we have loads of time. The December 19 date is not of much importance now, as it was thought that the summit meeting would be in the latter part of February, but now that it is moved back to April we have sufficient time. Mr. Rae believed that even so, it would be helpful for the Council to get some ideas of our thinking.

Mr. Kohler agreed that the U.S. would feed anything meaningful into the Council. However, we believe that there will be nothing much of substance. We see the results of the four-power discussions as being merely one paper containing (1) procedure, (2) broad analysis of the Soviet intentions, (3) the Berlin and German problem (about which positions have already been prepared), and (4) disarmament.

Mr. Rae asked if Mr. Kohler could say that there is no real change in position on the Berlin and West German problem and Mr. Kohler said

that there was no change. We would table our proposals as a counter to Khrushchev's peace proposal. In fact, the four powers have not reviewed the Berlin and German proposals, and see no need to do so. We think, however, that the disarmament talks may lead to some more refined proposals which could be woven into the Western peace plan, but we can do this by December 19. Mr. Rae asked if the North Atlantic Council could do anything to help. Mr. Kohler said probably not. Britain is now re-examining disarmament proposals. We have the Coolidge group. We hope there is still reliance on our 1957 proposals. Perhaps we could sort of back into this problem by having NATO examine and discuss the Khrushchev proposals, but there is little that can be done. Mr. Rae said his Government thought one of the problems that could be dealt with profitably in the North Atlantic Council would be the nature and scope of the summit meeting. Mr. Kohler said we have gone about as far as we can go at present, as the French lack instructions. We are becalmed. Mr. Rae then asked whether the North Atlantic Council could not add the summit conference as one of the items for its agenda. Mr. Kohler agreed that the Council could.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

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#### 45. Editorial Note

Chancellor Adenauer visited Paris December 1–2 for talks on questions of mutual concern. In a general meeting during the afternoon of December 1, and at a private meeting with General de Gaulle on the morning of December 2, the Chancellor developed his ideas on a summit meeting and European security, and listened as the French President expounded his views on the same questions. For Adenauer's account of these conversations, see *Erinnerungen, 1959–1963*, pages 15–21.

On December 4, Guenther Klein paid a courtesy call on Ambassador Dowling and reported that the Chancellor felt de Gaulle's position on Berlin was firmer than that of Macmillan. (Despatch 902 from Bonn, December 7; Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/12-759)

46. **Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower**

Washington, December 2, 1959.

SUBJECT

Resumption of High Altitude Flights in the Berlin Corridors

On September 25,<sup>1</sup> I wrote you on the above subject just prior to your talks with Khrushchev at Camp David, advising against raising the subject with him at that time unless the talks appeared to take an especially favorable turn.

In the interim, a number of developments have occurred which have persuaded me to give my support to the resumption of high altitude flights at the earliest practicable date.

1. The British now favor an approach to the Soviets on high flights in the belief that the latter might be more reasonable on the subject. British European Airways would like to operate its Viscounts at higher altitudes for reasons of safety.

2. The French intend to introduce Caravelle jet service to Berlin soon. Successful conduct of high flights by US military C-130s might persuade the French to operate Caravelles at appropriate altitudes above 10,000 feet, strengthening our claims that such flights are necessary from the standpoint of economy and operational characteristics of modern aircraft.

3. The Soviet desire to divert public attention from Berlin as evidenced in their instructions to the East Germans to remove their separatist flags from West Berlin October 8 and to refrain from displaying them November 7 materially reduces the likelihood that they would resort to harassment of our C-130s should we resume and maintain regularly scheduled high altitude flights.

Since 1956, although we have frequently proclaimed our right to unrestricted use of the Berlin air corridors, we have in fact been unable or unwilling to exercise that right in the face of Soviet protests and harassment and of British objections. To continue to insist upon our right but to refrain entirely from exercising it places unacceptable limitations upon us and amounts to tacit acceptance of a unilaterally imposed Soviet ceiling on the corridors. Acceptance of one such restriction might

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Initialed by the President.

<sup>1</sup> Herter's letter of September 25 enclosed a copy of McElroy's letter of September 19 (Document 11) and recommended that the President not raise the question of high altitude flights with Khrushchev. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)



encourage the Soviets to attempt to impose others until an intolerable and dangerous situation could result.

Voluntary Western establishment of minimum limitations on our own use of the corridors would be another matter, however. Western controllers in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) have acknowledged that unrestricted Allied use of the corridors would present the Soviet Zone with certain difficult air traffic control problems and effectively lock non-Allied air traffic over much of East Germany. Clear provision for non-Allied cross corridor traffic should go far to meet possible legitimate Soviet concern for air safety and to justify the operation before Allied public opinion.

For the foreseeable future and with the type of aircraft envisaged (the turbo-prop C-130 and Viscount and the pure jet Caravelle) the plan outlined in the enclosed memorandum appears feasible. We are asking Embassy Bonn, the U.S. Mission Berlin and USCINCEUR for their comments on an urgent basis. If they indicate that the technical problems are insurmountable, we will, of course, have to re-examine the whole concept. However, since the basic idea was first suggested by USBER and has been studied and approved in principle by Defense/JCS and FAA, it is believed that technical details can be worked out in Germany without great difficulty.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the proposed formula for resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin corridors (described in the enclosed memorandum and illustrated on the map which is also enclosed),<sup>2</sup> and authorize discussion of the proposal with the British and French provided we obtain the expected endorsement from the various consultations listed above. As soon as we have tripartite agreement, I will seek your approval to inform the Soviet authorities through appropriate channels of our intention to resume and maintain high altitude flights in the Berlin corridors.

**Christian A. Herter**

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<sup>2</sup>Neither printed.

47. **Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State**

Bonn, December 5, 1959, 3 p.m.

1081. Although my conversations with German officials have been limited thus far to courtesy visits,<sup>1</sup> I am impressed with degree of concern re U.S. policy which seems to permeate their consideration of world situation today. Implicit or explicit nervousness re Berlin and U.S. presence in Europe has been evident in every instance.

In protocol visit following my presentation of credentials, President Luebke launched immediately into discussion of Berlin question, pointing out danger to Berlin–FedRep relations of any GDR–Soviet treaty, which he understood we prepared to accept. Brentano pointed out U.S. position was, rather than acceptance, simply that West could not prevent treaty if Soviets determined this course, and Luebke urged that we must be firm this issue.

Brentano and other officials of foreign office, while expressing complete confidence in U.S. intentions, nevertheless have dwelt on critical importance next twelve months to Western Alliance, and have stressed need for Western unity above all else.

Adenauer, in alluding to Under Secretary Dillon's visit,<sup>2</sup> mentioned Spaak's reference to possible U.S. military withdrawal from Europe, and said that he was anxious to have early discussion with me on whole range of questions to be taken up at summit. (Brentano had privately urged me to attempt reassure Chancellor, which I shall continue to endeavor to do.)

**Dowling**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/12–559. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Dowling was commissioned on November 7 and presented his credentials on December 3.

<sup>2</sup> Documentation on Dillon's trip to London, Bonn, Paris, and Brussels December 7–14 is in volume VII, Part 1.

## 48. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 8, 1959.

### SUBJECT

Summit Meeting

### PARTICIPANTS

*British Embassy*

Ambassador Caccia  
Minister Hood  
Mr. Greenhill  
Mr. Logan

*Department of State*

Secretary of State Herter  
Mr. Kohler, EUR  
Mr. McSweeney, SOV

*German Embassy*

Ambassador Grewe  
Mr. Pauls  
Mr. Osterheld

*French Embassy*

Ambassador Alphand  
Minister Lebel  
Mr. Winckler  
Mr. Manet

The Secretary opened the discussion saying he wished to introduce an extraneous subject. A telegram from the President at Karachi<sup>1</sup> referred to a *New York Times* despatch from Bonn alleging United States intent to withdraw its forces from Europe. The Secretary wished to make the following statement:

"1. There have been press reports alleging that the U.S. will eventually withdraw its forces from Europe.

"2. These reports represent a totally false conception of how the U.S. assesses its long-range security interests and of our commitment to NATO.

"3. As long as the Soviet threat exists and as long as our collective defense effort continues, American troops will remain an effective part of the military shield in Europe. There will be no withdrawal.

"4. We also believe that certain NATO nations have a special obligation to examine their respective contributions.

"5. Although we believe that their proportional contributions should be increased, we have never hinted that this would involve U.S. withdrawal."

Ambassador Alphand said he was grateful for the statement. He did not know the origin of the *Times* story but suggested that it might have developed as speculation based on press comment in the United

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-859. Secret. Drafted by McSweeney and approved by S on December 11.

<sup>1</sup> President Eisenhower was in Karachi on December 8 as part of his "good will" tour. The telegram under reference has not been found.

States recently regarding balance of payments, etc. In response to Lord Hood's inquiry, the Secretary said the remarks he had just made would not be published. Ambassador Grewe was assured that a copy of the remarks would be given each of the Embassies at the end of the meeting.

The Secretary then proceeded to discuss the record of Washington consultations (HGP D–O/1).<sup>2</sup> With regard to timing, he assumed that the dates April 21 to 26 were acceptable. He mentioned the undesirability of publishing the terminal date of the conversations since it might be that the meetings would conclude earlier than that time. In fact, the President's available time should be considered as April 21 to 25 since he must be back in Washington on the 27th.

The Secretary mentioned that the 10-nation disarmament group preparatory work will be going on at the same time as the pre-summit preparations and he would hope that these discussions could take place in the same city for purposes of coordination. He said that Washington has been suggested and this would be agreeable to the United States if the others so desired, although we would be ready to consider any other city that might appear more convenient to the others.

The question of consultation with NATO, the Secretary said, presents a difficulty as regards the possibility of premature disclosure of substantive matters in view of the gap between the Western summit in December and the East-West summit in April. The first meeting therefore should not deal with substance but rather leave this for preparations which would take place early next year. He felt that NATO would be satisfied if it had the feeling it was being filled in from time to time during the preparatory interval. Ambassador Caccia said that while the U.K. is doubtful about the United States suggestion for a Spaak representative in the Working Group, the U.K. felt that something of substance must be said to NATO. Ambassador Grewe asked if the recent Geneva experience was not a good example since NATO seemed to be satisfied with the method used then. The Secretary mentioned that the Foreign Ministers had taken turns in discussing problems with NAC. Ambassador Alphand noted the difference between discussions with the Soviets and the deliberations of a Working Group since in the latter case you would not want to give advance information of subjects proposed to governments for consideration. While NATO must be kept informed, he felt the Working Group governments could say something

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<sup>2</sup>No copy of this draft report has been found. The report as revised by the working group in light of the comments made at this meeting, HGP D–O/1b, December 10, comprised three sections: I) Procedures and Arrangements, II) Scope, and III) Annexes, of which there were six. (Department of State, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany) Another copy of the report, with only two annexes, was circulated as NMM Ref–1/102, December 8. It was intended for the use of the NATO Ministerial Meeting delegation. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1554)

without saying everything and that the decision as to the content of the reports could be made on a day to day basis. Ambassador Caccia pointed out that the regular weekly meetings of NAC would be available to receive reports which, as Minister Hood pointed out, could become more frequent as time goes on. The Ambassador said that the U.K. would prefer that the Spaak liaison officer idea not be pressed since this arrangement would deprive the participants of the power of choice of the kind of reports that should be made to NATO.

Commenting on the section entitled *Psychological Factors*, the Secretary mentioned that caution is necessary in order not to give the impression that we are going to the summit without hope of success and so assume blame for a conference failure. We should state the fact, which is that "we just don't know". Instead of being very pessimistic we should steer a middle course. Ambassador Alphand suggested a minor revision of the last paragraph to the effect that efforts would be directed toward keeping public expectations in balance rather than limiting public expectations. On the question of disarmament the Secretary raised the matter of timing of the 10-nation group in relation to the summit. Noting, however, that the announcement of the 10-nation group referred to its beginning work early in the year, he suggested that Western consultations should begin about February 1. If it were decided at Paris to begin the 10-nation negotiations prior to the summit, this would permit six weeks for Western consultation before convening the 10-nation group, on or about March 15.

Regarding the section entitled *Germany, Including Berlin*, the Secretary said that the list of questions which had been proposed was in no way an attempt to pre-judge the issues. We hoped that the Western summit would go far enough in providing answers, even if negative, so that the Working Group could have a clear picture of the scope of its activities. Ambassador Alphand suggested that Annex III on this subject be designated an American paper; in this case the French reservation to the Annex could be withdrawn. This would be advisable to avoid any indication of a split among the four nations. After it was agreed that this could be done, Ambassador Alphand said that the questionnaire included in Annex III cannot, in the French view, form a basis for discussion by the Heads of Government; Paris thinks the questions unjustifiably lead to the conclusion that a new status for Berlin is possible. When the Secretary suggested that it would certainly be within the President's rights to introduce these questions for discussion, Ambassador Alphand conceded that this was so. Ambassador Grewe said that the Germans were reluctant about the questionnaire because the essence of the paper indicated that it is possible to find a new Berlin solution, whereas this question has been discussed for a long time without any new solutions being found. The Germans feel that to commit experts to

finding some new solution would be dangerous. The Secretary reiterated that there was no attempt to prejudge the issues and that the United States hoped for discussion of these questions even if the answers proved to be negative. Ambassador Caccia pointed out that to exclude consideration of the questions raised would also pre-judge the results of Heads of Government consideration. Ambassador Alphand said that this was something the Heads of Government would have to decide for themselves.

The Secretary noted the French suggestion for discussion of East-West relations and pointed out that an arrangement which would avoid rivalry in arms shipments to newly emergent and neutral nations could be a profitable field for discussion and even agreement.

In response to the Secretary's inquiry regarding the French item on aid to underdeveloped areas, Ambassador Alphand said that the French do not propose discussion of the substance at this time. They wish only to have the Annex included as part of the record.

The Secretary presented a draft interim report to NATO<sup>3</sup> which, after minor amendment, it was agreed could be presented orally to NAC December 9 by the United States Permanent Representative on condition that the statement would not be circulated as a NATO document but that a text would be available with the Secretary General for examination by NAC members. The Secretary then suggested that the "record of consultations", after appropriate editing, might be circulated to NATO a day or two before the Ministerial meeting to form the basis of an oral statement which, he hoped, could be made by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. He felt that if we can distribute something it will give the NATO members a feeling of participation which they would not get from an oral presentation alone. Ambassador Caccia said he would put forward the question of a Selwyn Lloyd statement to London. It was agreed that the "consultative group" would meet December 9 to undertake the task of editing the paper. Ambassador Alphand had reservations about the extent to which the content of the record of consultations could be made available and suggested that the edited version should be limited to the body of the record excluding Annexes. He mentioned that there will be a NATO Ministerial Meeting subsequent to the Western Heads of Government meeting at which perhaps fuller explanation could be given. He did agree, however, that something must be said to the Ministerial Meeting next week which is more than the sketchy report to be presented to NAC December 9. Lord Hood suggested that some of the An-

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<sup>3</sup> A copy of this report was transmitted in Topol 1082 to Paris, December 8 at 8:42 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 740.5/12-859)

nexes could not be considered dangerous. It was agreed that the content of the edited paper will be determined by the “consultative group”.

Ambassador Alphand reverted to portion A of the record of consultations regarding timing. He said he had instructions from Paris which contained the French view that recommendations concerning the date and place of the East-West summit are not within the competence of the Washington representatives. The record of consultations, therefore, cannot properly contain precise proposals. In any event, the French are not sure that Geneva is the best site for such a conference in view of its unhappy history. It was suggested and agreed that the section regarding date and place should be alerted to indicate that it was a United States proposal.

At the Secretary’s request, Ambassador Caccia reviewed London’s suggestion regarding the handling of press at the Western summit. This proposal involved determination by the four participants of the basic press line, which would be conveyed to the press officers of each of the delegations just prior to the end of each meeting. The subsequent individual briefings by delegations would then be uniform and in accord with the agreed line.

It was agreed that, with respect to today’s meeting, the press should be informed simply that it had to do with continuing preparations for the Western summit meeting.

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#### 49. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 11, 1959.

##### PARTICIPANTS

Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Wilhelm G. Grewe, Ambassador of Germany

I lunched alone with Ambassador Grewe at the German Embassy this noon shortly before his departure for Bonn and Paris. He told me at the outset that he was anxious to talk to me because he had become increasingly disturbed during the past month with what he termed a

trend in American policy with respect to Berlin. I asked him what he meant. He said that from reports he had of the Working Group increasing emphasis seemed to be placed on the finding of a new status for West Berlin. This in turn he deduced rested on the acceptance of the improbability of German reunification for the entire foreseeable future and a consequent growing willingness to accept the status quo.

I told him that I thought his fears were greatly exaggerated. I said that it was true that reluctantly we had come to the conclusion during the past year that reunification was not an imminent possibility. I said that this belief had been forced on us largely by European opinion including Germany. I also noted in passing that we still differed with the Chancellor on the efficacy of the exertion of more influence toward the East by the GFR through exchanges and other measures with the GDR and through a more active policy with respect to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

I then turned to Berlin. I said the essential point was that we had not thought under present circumstances or under any conceivable new arrangement of withdrawing US forces from Berlin. This is the essential protection of West Berlin and we will remain there as long as the situation requires and we are wanted. This being the case I said I thought doubts and fears were totally unjustified.

I went on to say that we saw two possible arrangements with respect to Berlin. The first was an interim agreement with the Soviets on the terms contained in our last offer at Geneva. This involved maintenance unimpaired of our occupation rights. I said I did not think we could consider going beyond the terms of our last Geneva offer with the possible exception of accepting a modest reduction in allied forces if this alone stood in the way of reaching this agreement. I pointed out that in my view there was an important gain for all of us in the formulation which was the clarification of the rights of civilian access. The second possible approach I said was to find some new arrangement resting on a basis other than occupation rights but retaining as its essential element the presence of American troops in West Berlin. I said I thought we would be derelict if all of us did not rack our brains to see if we could find some such formula. For our own part I said we have not yet found one, but we intend to continue to search since with the passage of further time the validity of our occupation rights would come increasingly into question before world public opinion. He noted and I agreed that the effect of a change of status might be to create difficulty in securing a renewal of the NATO guarantee. This I said would have to be assured in advance.

Finally I said that it seemed to us that at the Summit meeting Berlin should be approached in the context of the discussion of German reunification and that it seemed logical to me that we should open the Summit



as we had opened Geneva with an effort to secure Soviet acceptance of the Western Peace Plan and then only discuss Berlin in isolation, if we run into a Soviet stone wall as could be expected. I said that I thought it would be a mistake to pick up where we left off at Geneva. He agreed. The Ambassador seemed on the whole reassured by what I had said.

I then asked him when the Germans would have specific proposals for consideration on disarmament to the discussion of which they attached so much importance. He admitted that they had no ideas formulated yet insofar as he knew. In fact a recent Bonn report said they would await the availability of the Coolidge report and an opportunity to review it before they put down any ideas of their own on paper. I told Grewe that in my view primary stress on disarmament might be an effective tactic but that to me armaments essentially were symptoms of political tensions, not the reverse. He agreed wholeheartedly and added that this was a point on which he had a recurring bitter disagreement with the Chancellor.

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## 50. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, December 15, 1959, 1 p.m.

1653. Following comments are inspired by receipt today of record dated December 7 of Washington consultations for use at Heads of Govt meeting Paris.<sup>1</sup> US position papers on problems raised have not been received.

It seems almost certain that at summit meeting question of German reunification cannot be resolved and that there is very little likelihood that problem of Berlin can be settled. (French Amb informs me that at his recent meeting with de Gaulle, Adenauer indicated he thought Western Allies had already gone too far in their Geneva proposals and that their offer should be withdrawn.) In my opinion two chief motives Sovs had in raising Berlin question were to clear way for separate peace treaty with East Germany and for gradual neutralization and eventual takeover of West Berlin.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1559. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, Document 48.

In these circumstances maximum we can probably hope for at summit meeting is to obtain tacit agreement for an indeterminate period to leave Berlin situation basically as it now is with an understanding that both sides would endeavor to undertake unilaterally to reduce friction there. This would only be possible if Sovs could also be brought to agree to refrain for time being from concluding a separate peace treaty. This in my opinion unlikely unless we have an agreed policy and make a determined effort to prevent this. In any event believe it would be helpful in inducing West Germans to adopt a more flexible attitude for Western powers to discuss realistically situation that will exist if Khrushchev carries out his present threat to conclude separate treaty.

In first place once such treaty is concluded Sovs and East Germans will have means of pressuring neutral and other non-NATO govts to adhere to such treaty and mere passage of time will result in a growing acceptance of East German regime. Sov position is that such treaty would end our occupation rights in Berlin. It is probable that Sovs would give instructions to East German regime at least at first to avoid incidents and allow relatively free passage for troops and supplies of occupying powers. Nevertheless probability of serious incidents, possibly caused by local East German initiative, is very great. Moreover Sovs would undoubtedly decline any responsibility in connection with incidents which would arise and we would be obliged to deal with East German authorities which again over period of time would go far toward tacit recognition. It is of course also clear that separate treaty would greatly hamper eventual efforts to bring about reunification Germany, which although clearly not now in the cards could in time become possible. Without attempting an exhaustive examination in this message of disadvantages of separate treaty, seems clear to me that one of our major tactics at summit meeting should be to reduce possibility this development. It should be noted that a settlement of Berlin problem might enhance possibility of separate treaty in event (a) that such settlement involved our giving up our occupation rights or (b) was sufficiently satisfactory to Sovs that they would feel impelled to make separate treaty with a clause reorganizing a special regime in Berlin although in latter event some of disadvantages of separate treaty would be diminished or disappear.

If a summit meeting or President Eisenhower's visit to Soviet Union do not result in any developments advantageous to Sov Union I think it unlikely that steps for separate treaty would be taken by Sovs immediately but I am inclined to believe that Khrushchev will not defer such action for any considerable time unless we can devise proposals which will induce him to forego his obvious determination to carry out his declared policy in this respect. The foll are not considered policy proposals but merely suggestions which might be explored or might stimulate

other proposals, their primary purpose being in the first place to prevent recurrence of a Berlin crisis and in the second to keep German question from becoming even more frozen than it now is. In his desire to maintain improved atmosphere and to explore possibility of disarmament, Khrushchev may be induced to give us further time if West can come up with some imaginative proposals even though these may not be very practical.

1. On assumption that one of primary Sov considerations is their concern over frontier situation in Eastern Europe, we might consider negotiating for adequate compensation including an undertaking for a given period of time not to conclude a separate peace treaty. The establishment by West Germany of relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and unilateral declarations by France, Britain and the US that in an eventual peace treaty with a reunited Germany they would not advocate any change in the existing German frontiers.

2. If the West Germans could be brought to accept some kind of all-German committee for purpose of examining problem of reunification we might propose such a step be combined with an undertaking in part of Sov Union to agree to free elections at end of given period of time, say seven years. If in meantime Germans themselves had not been able to resolve problem of reunification. Such package might include drafting terms of peace treaty which would be concluded at end of period with Germany reunited either by all-German negotiations or by elections upon their failure to agree.

3. Sovs might be deterred from separate treaty and/or from action affecting status of West Berlin by some indication as to what Western reaction might be. For example, Sovs have indicated great concern that we might turn over authority in West Berlin to West Germany. Although it is dangerous to make threats there are other possible actions we could take which might at least be mentioned in passing in discussing this problem.

Also wish to suggest that at summit conf we should be prepared to have thorough discussion of problems raised in international field by conflict of ideologies. Believe such discussion should go far beyond suggestions contained in French paper on problem of non-interference.

**Thompson**

**51. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State**

Bonn, December 17, 1959, 8 p.m.

1170. Paris for Secretary. I have now had opportunity for further talks with Brandt and Chancellor re Berlin and German question. Latter made obvious effort to avoid any discussion his specific views, and perhaps clearest indication his feelings re summit conference was to remind me that it had already receded from earlier suggested dates to April or May, and that were it to be postponed any further it would probably not be possible to hold it in 1960. From Krapf, who was here from German Embassy Washington for few days early in week, and from Carstens in Foreign Office, I gather there has been no particular change in Chancellor's views on either Berlin or reunification (although they both indicate that he has not confided his views to anyone recently). I can only surmise, therefore, that Adenauer intends in effect to leave initiative to General de Gaulle before coming out with his own proposals. In any event, he seemed somewhat more relaxed than occasion my first call on him, and at end of long, hard day seemed extraordinarily fresh and alert.

On other hand, Brandt, with whom I lunched yesterday, has been most forthcoming. While in good spirits, he expressed apprehensions re possible Western moves at summit which could weaken West Berlin's ties with FedRep. As in Berlin, Brandt made point of his agreement with Chancellor, and reiterated his insistence Western Powers should not revive Western proposal, tabled final stages Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, as basis forthcoming East-West summit discussions. Instead, he suggested as minimum that we revert to indivisible package plan, preserving link between Berlin problem and reunification Germany. There was also some discussion whether, as tactical move, Western Powers might be well advised base their opening position on June 20, 1949 agreement,<sup>1</sup> which terminated blockade and dealt with questions German reunification as well as Berlin access.

Referring Khrushchev's latest pronouncements on Soviet peace treaty proposal,<sup>2</sup> Brandt said he recognized Soviets would almost surely sign separate peace treaty with East German regime eventually.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1759. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, priority to Paris, Berlin, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062-1065.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably reference is to Khrushchev's speech in Budapest on December 1 in which he again stated that a peace treaty with East Germany was the only solution to the Berlin problem. For text of his speech, see *Pravda*, December 2, 1959.

He appeared appreciate that in last analysis Western Powers could do nothing prevent such action. He seemed to feel, furthermore, that any new arrangement, no matter what nature, would not have result of mitigating pressure on Berlin for long, and that therefore present status was hardly likely to be improved upon.

Dowling

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## 52. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

December 18, 1959.

### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Kohler  
General Goodpaster  
Mr. Hagerty

The President opened the discussion by asking what decisions it was thought would need to be reached in the Paris meetings, were the Heads of Governments supposed to agree, for example, on the time, the agenda, and the basic policy positions for a summit meeting. Mr. Herter said he did not envisage much work on policy positions. At this stage, the development of these should be left to working groups, particularly if we try to set our new positions. These would leak to the press, and we would lose any benefit from them. He thought the agenda should be stated in very general terms. He outlined a series of topics, which included "aid to the underdeveloped countries." The President said he had reservations about this formulation. First, he thought it should read "relations with the underdeveloped countries," inasmuch as all the obligation should not be on the side of the industrial countries. He agreed that disarmament should be a major topic for discussion.

Regarding Berlin, he asked if there has been any softening on the part of Adenauer. Mr. Herter said there had not—that there had been a

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 30. The conference took place on the train taking the President from Toulon to Paris for the Heads of Government meeting.

hardening of German attitude, in fact. The Germans and French are taking an adamant stand. The President said that he felt he committed the U.S. at the Camp David talks to discuss the Berlin and German questions seriously, and he intended to do so.

Mr. Merchant commented that the State Department feels we should not resume our negotiations on Berlin and Germany on the basis of the last position we had put forward in Geneva. Instead, we should start again from our "peace plan for Germany."<sup>1</sup> The President said he liked, in principle, the idea of a proposal for a plebiscite.

He asked whether it was envisaged there would be any talk on nuclear testing at the summit. Mr. Herter said he thought not. The French said they will walk out of the summit meetings if there is discussion of testing. The President said he is getting a little weary of the stand some of the European countries are taking, and that we might find ourselves walking out on some occasions.

The furor caused by Gen. Twining's statement was next discussed.<sup>2</sup> The President read through the statement and said it looked alright to him, although he saw that an interpretation could be read into it that Gen. Twining was calling on the military authorities to exert pressure on the political echelons of government.

Referring to his meetings in Paris, the President said he would want a list of topics on which he should be prepared to talk at the Three-power and the Four-power meetings. On the topic of disarmament, he said he saw some merit in the proposal for the five Western countries included in the UN committee of ten to meet separately to develop a Western position.

The discussion next turned to bilateral questions. Mr. Herter said Chancellor Adenauer was likely to raise the question of German assets. The Germans are proposing that, by Executive Order, the President transfer funds on paper from the repayments due the Garioa account to the German assets account. The President said that the manner in which such a transfer is made is an internal question with which the Germans have no proper concern, and that he would propose to follow the treaty process. Mr. Herter suggested that the President might tell General De Gaulle of his exchange of letters with Khrushchev regarding the threatening situation in the Far East, following the Camp David talks.<sup>3</sup> The President agreed that this could be mentioned.

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<sup>1</sup> See footnote 3, Document 43.

<sup>2</sup> Text of Twining's statement to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council December 10, is printed in vol. VII, Part 1, Document 233.

<sup>3</sup> The President's letter to Khrushchev on September 29 and the Soviet Chairman's reply on October 12 are printed in vol. XVIII, Documents 321 and 327.

Regarding the discussions in the NATO meetings of the preceding few days, Mr. Herter said that these had gone very well. Mr. Merchant reported that the 10-year planning project has been laid on. MC 70 has not been explicitly placed under review, but implicitly is to be restudied in the process of evaluating future requirements. Present cost sharing practices also are to be reviewed.<sup>4</sup>

The President gave Mr. Herter a thumb nail appraisal of the jobs being done by the U.S. Ambassadors he had just seen. He thought Rountree, Bunker and Walmsley<sup>5</sup> were doing a fine job. He thought that Byroade<sup>6</sup> works too hard and is something of a worrier. He was not favorably impressed in Rome.

The President asked that Mr. Herter put someone to work on an evaluation of the significance of the President's trip. The questions uppermost in his mind, and the points to be developed, concern the advances that have been made in the free world's interests by the trip, the great friendship for America that he found, the appeal and tremendous acceptance of the notions of peace, the question as to what work we must do in order to advance the prospect of peace, in freedom and with justice, and the great reservoir of knowledge on the part of the people visited that the U.S. is with them in aspirations and concern. Primarily his trip was a trip of peace and good will. It has given him, however, some knowledge of the needs of the people in these areas. He has now seen the squalor and primitive living arrangements. He was greatly impressed by the tremendous dedication of the governments of these countries to the improvement of the living conditions of their people.

Coming back to the meetings in Paris, he asked for succinct papers covering the date for the East-West meeting, the subjects for that meeting, and the stands we should take on each subject. Mr. Herter reiterated that he would have working groups develop the stands we should take. However, some broad guidance from the Paris discussions would be most valuable.

G.

*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>4</sup> Documentation on the discussion of MC-70 in the North Atlantic Council is in volume VII, Part 1.

<sup>5</sup> William M. Rountree, Ambassador to Pakistan; Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador to India and Nepal; and Walter N. Walmsley, Jr., Ambassador to Tunisia.

<sup>6</sup> Henry A. Byroade, Ambassador to Afghanistan.

**53. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, December 17, 1959, 5 p.m.

1683. German Amb, who has just returned from Bonn, told me Chancellor well satisfied his meeting with de Gaulle.<sup>1</sup> Amb said de Gaulle had assured Chancellor French would make strong effort prevent Khrushchev from making propaganda out of his visit to France. Amb agreed with me that there were many signs that Khrushchev would attempt make deal with de Gaulle and particularly to split Germans and French but said Germans were convinced attempt would not succeed. Amb pointed out Khrushchev did not control situation in Algeria which was one of primary French interests and he thought there was little he could offer French.

Amb said Chancellor was obsessed with necessity of winning '61 elections in order prevent disaster for Germany and all he had accomplished thus far. For this reason Chancellor could make no concession on Berlin, which was an issue clearly understood in Germany and rest of world, and Chancellor would insist that if Berlin were to be discussed it should be within framework of the broader German problem. When I suggested that Chancellor should also take into account effect on elections of failure to make any progress at summit meeting and consequent likelihood of Sov conclusion separate peace treaty, Amb said he fully agreed but inquired what US thought could be done to head off separate treaty. I replied I thought Germans were in best position to answer this since their interests would be primarily involved. I added however that it seemed to me personally possible that a package offer could be devised involving inter alia creation of all-German committee with commitment for elections (along lines our Geneva proposal) at end of fixed period if committee failed to bring about reunification. I pointed out that while commitment for elections might not be worth much it would gain considerable time and I thought Sovs would adhere to agreement not to conclude separate treaty if this were made part of package. To my surprise Kroll expressed great interest in working out something along this line and urged that I submit it to my govt. (Kroll has always been unwilling to make suggestions to Chancellor which he thinks latter might not welcome.) Kroll said Chancellor thought only field in which progress could be made at summit was disarmament but he agreed with my estimate that it was unlikely that sufficient progress could be made on dis-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1759. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Received December 19 at 2:53 p.m. Repeated priority to Paris, London, and Bonn.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 45.



armament at summit meeting to relieve Khrushchev of necessity of carrying out his threat to conclude separate treaty. With respect to disarmament Kroll said Chancellor would not accept any arrangements which discriminated against Germany and was for this reason opposed to disengagement schemes.

Kroll thought an added reason for coming up with something positive at summit meeting was to support Khrushchev against his opposition and he pointed out that Khrushchev was capable of reversing his present policies and taking a hard line if occasion warranted. While we both agreed Khrushchev is very much in control here now, we believe policies are at least discussed in presidium and there are doubtless many who are concerned at effect of Khrushchev's policies, particularly in domestic field, on future of party. I pointed out an additional factor was current strain in Soviet-Chinese relations and Khrushchev's desire to remain unchallenged leader of Communist bloc. We also agreed that should Khrushchev for any reason disappear from scene in near future, Sov regime would turn toward tougher policy. In my opinion this is less a question of individual personalities than natural play of power factors within Soviet Union. It takes strong leader like Khrushchev to depart from established policies of past, to which chief elements of power, party, military, and police, automatically tend to gravitate.

Kroll said Brentano had little to do with West German policy toward Sov Union and indicated this handled by Chancellor and himself. Despite his lack of modesty I believe Kroll does in fact have considerable influence on Chancellor where Sov affairs are concerned.

**Thompson**

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#### **54. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State**

Paris, December 21, 1959, 1 p.m.

Cahto 13. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Following is based on interpreter's summary of first meeting of President alone with de Gaulle,

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/12-2259. Secret. Received December 22 at 3:11 a.m. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

Adenauer and Macmillan. Meeting was held at Elysee morning December 19 and lasted about one hour and a half:<sup>1</sup>

Four agreed on need for summit meeting and that Western Powers should extend invitation to Soviets. There was discussion as to whether any agenda items should be mentioned in invitation. President proposed merely “disarmament and related questions”. There was some feeling on part of de Gaulle and Adenauer that specific mention should be made of Germany. This was not finally settled and it was left that staffs would look into matter further. There was discussion along lines that following subjects could well be brought up: 1. Aid to underdeveloped nations; 2. Germany, and more specifically Berlin. There was general agreement Western Powers should attempt coordinate positions before going to summit and that there should be meeting of four Western Powers immediately prior to summit. Also, it was agreed Western Powers concerned should attempt work out something in ten-power disarmament committee and develop common position therein which would enable them to be in better position to face Khrushchev.

Discussion timing conference then ensued. After some discussion de Gaulle indicated he would like come to U.S. prior to summit meeting. April 19–22 were indicated as probable dates for de Gaulle visit to U.S. President said he would attempt have King of Nepal’s visit moved up to April 22–23. Summit conference would then be held on April 27–May 1. Macmillan said he could even continue on May 2 but not beyond as he had Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting May 3–14. All parties agreed Soviets should know there would be fixed termination date for conference. De Gaulle said he would have liked to have summit conference in May, while Mr. Macmillan would have preferred mid-April. Subject to checking, there was general agreement on April 27–May 1 and it was also agreed there would be a Western summit April 26.

Discussion then centered around place of summit meeting. Macmillan spoke in favor of Paris, but with understanding there would be other summit meetings and place might have to rotate. If it was felt summit meeting in Moscow at a later date would present insurmountable problems, then we should fall back on Geneva. President indicated he had no strong feeling one way or the other. Adenauer stated that this was not a concern of his. It was decided to have staff explore feasibility proposing Paris now and holding meetings in Moscow, Washington and London later. If this proved impractical, Geneva would be the answer.

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<sup>1</sup> Two more extensive records of the meeting are *ibid.*, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany, and *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1/1–760. For accounts by the participants in this and the following sessions, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1959–1963*, pp. 23–28; Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pp. 101–115; de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, pp. 234–237; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 508–509; and Walters, *Silent Missions*, p. 304.

Matter of Germany and Berlin was then taken up. President said he felt we must study situation to see what could be done if Soviets attempted to starve out Berlin while technically respecting our right of access to our garrisons there. Chancellor became quite emotional and stated that Berlin was a symbol and yielding there would have fatal results for West. There was exchange of views on this subject. President, who stated he was not considering our legal rights in Berlin but merely wished to study what could be done practically if Soviets, while respecting letter of agreements, created difficulties for the livelihood of the Berliners. President was not able obtain specific reply from Chancellor on this point.

It was agreed all these matters would be discussed further in plenary meeting in afternoon.

Herter

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## 55. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/7

Paris, December 19, 1959, 11 a.m.

### MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Paris, December 19–21, 1959

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Reinhardt  
And other advisors

*Federal Republic of Germany*

Foreign Minister von Brentano  
Mr. van Scherpenberg  
Mr. Carstens  
And other advisors

*France*

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
M. de Carbonnel  
M. Lucet  
And other advisors

*United Kingdom*

Foreign Minister Lloyd  
Mr. Hoyer-Millar  
Ambassador Jebb  
And other advisors

#### SUBJECT

Procedural Aspects of Western Summit

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1569. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared with Reinhardt, and approved in S on December 21. The meeting took place at the Quai d'Orsay.

In their discussion of procedural aspects of the current four-power meetings,<sup>1</sup> the Foreign Ministers:

1. Agreed that a drafting party will meet at 9:30 Sunday morning (December 20) to work on a summit communiqué. The four Foreign Ministers will, during their meeting at 11:00, consider their product.

2. Left open the time of release of a three-power communiqué on the resumption of disarmament negotiations, the text of which had been agreed at the working level by the three delegations concerned.

3. Agreed to a 5-power meeting at 3:15 p.m. on Monday (December 21) of the Foreign Ministers of the Western countries to be represented in the 10-power disarmament talks. The four Foreign Ministers concerned would then meet at 5:00 p.m. on Monday to review the work of the conference and to discuss the report to be made to NATO on December 22 and any other matters still outstanding.

4. Left open the text and precise timing of the deliveries of the notes to the Soviet Union suggesting a date and place of a summit conference. It was assumed that the views of the Heads of Government and Chiefs of State would have to be taken into account before final decisions could be made on the text.

5. Took note of Secretary Herter's statement that the President would raise with the other Heads of Government or Chiefs of State the possibility of having the four Foreign Ministers also attend the afternoon meeting scheduled for Sunday at Rambouillet.

6. Agreed that the three powers concerned should send similar instructions to their Ambassadors at Moscow regarding the position to be taken in any discussion at the time of delivery of the Soviet notes. The instructions should take account of the possibility that the Soviets might raise the question of GDR participation.

7. Took note of von Brentano's request that the Federal Republic have an observer present at the 5-power preparatory talks for the 10-power disarmament committee session.

8. Agreed that the focal point of preparations for the East-West summit and the 10-power disarmament committee should be in Washington, but left open the possibility of having a separate working group to discuss summit items other than disarmament and the German problem involving Berlin meet elsewhere. It was agreed that the summit preparations in Washington would be handled by a continuation of the Consultative Group which has had the responsibility for preparations for the present meetings.

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<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Ministers also discussed proposals for wider economic consultations among the developed countries. A memorandum of this part of the conversation (US/MC/10) is *ibid.*

9. It was tentatively agreed that Couve would be the principal spokesman for the four at the NATO Ministerial meeting on Tuesday. Only an oral report would be made. He suggested that the other Foreign Ministers should have the primary responsibility for answering questions.

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**56. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State**

Paris, December 21, 1959, 1 p.m.

Cahto 12. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Following is report first plenary session heads of government with foreign ministers and experts present (present on U.S. side in addition to President and Secretary—Merchant, Kohler, Goodpaster, Walters). Meeting held in Elysee at 4:00 p.m. December 19 and lasted slightly over an hour.<sup>1</sup>

De Gaulle opened reporting morning talks between four chiefs of state or heads of government and interpreters.<sup>2</sup> They had discussed arrangements for East-West summit; De Gaulle noted Macmillan had commonwealth conference and President scheduled receive King of Nepal. He, himself, has Khrushchev in March and visit to Queen early April. He would like visit U.S. before summit and as soon as possible after Easter. Consequently, he had proposed Western participants meet on April 26, then with Khrushchev for five or six days until May 2. As to place Geneva had been most prominently mentioned. However, Macmillan had suggested Paris on theory there would be series summits which take place in various capitals. Macmillan considered this better than Geneva.

On agenda De Gaulle said President had pointed out they should be cautious since Khrushchev has tendency go from one subject to an-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-2159. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 10:38 a.m. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting, which included the Foreign Ministers and senior delegation advisers (US/MC/6) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1569. Among those attending for the United States were Merchant, Kohler, Goodpaster, and Walters.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 54.

other to conversations are not too precise. However, it seemed there should be some definite items and disarmament, underdeveloped countries, non-interference in internal affairs and, naturally, Germany had been mentioned.

As to disarmament, De Gaulle stated this was big subject. Obviously there were no great possibilities of coming to grips with it at summit but it could be discussed in general terms. Adenauer had suggested progress and savings could be effected and diverted for aid to underdeveloped countries. Macmillan had talked about U.K. disarmament proposals. Finally there was possibility of arranging for some control of vehicles and war heads (*vehicules et fusees*).

On underdeveloped countries, De Gaulle continued, it has been suggested we should get underway with some better organization among western countries and then at meeting with Khrushchev may be some limited proposals could be made. These might, for example, include such things as technical cooperation and financial aid in Nile development or in the field of public health.

It had been agreed among four De Gaulle stated that these matters should be studied, including how disarmament economics should be transferred to benefit underdeveloped countries and also suggestion as to aid projects. In any event, five-power group would be preparatory work in field of disarmament, perhaps being able to base itself on report of Coolidge commission.

On Germany, De Gaulle concluded four had centered on Berlin. It was agreed juridical status and western rights in Berlin should not be brought into question. It was also agreed governments should plan measures in event interference western access to Berlin. Finally it was agreed developments with respect to Germany depend on intentions of Khrushchev. We should ask him frankly what his intentions are. If he indicates that he will create difficulties then this means that he does not want a *détente*. We should put him up against a wall and tell him it is up to him to make any proposals he may want to put forward, since Khrushchev raised the question.

President said De Gaulle had given accurate account. Couve reported on work of Foreign Ministers with respect to:

- (1) Communiqué of heads of government;
- (2) Invitation to Khrushchev to be drafted by Foreign Ministers tomorrow and submitted to heads of government for approval, together with proposed instructions to Ambassadors in Moscow;
- (3) Further preparations for East-West summit; especially establishment five-power disarmament committee and continuation of work under direction of Secretary of State and Ambassadors in Washington.

President expressed approval report of Foreign Minister meeting emphasizing agreement with simple agenda formula.

Macmillan asked whether agenda items should not be mentioned in invitation to Khrushchev. He proposed Foreign Ministers be asked to submit alternate drafts, one containing mention agenda items and other just the simple formulation, so heads of government could choose. He suggested letters to Khrushchev should also explain why Paris proposed as site instead of Geneva.

President raised publishing letters to Khrushchev, saying he supposed Ambassadors would consult with Soviets with respect to release data.

Macmillan said was difficult resist press pressure for prompt publication of letters. Public interest is great and content of communication almost certain to leak; President said he had only meant we should get Soviet agreement to our going ahead with publication even though only a couple of hours after delivery.

Secretary suggested item which De Gaulle referred to as non-interference in internal affairs had better be phrased in any type of communication to the Soviets in general terms such as "East-West relations" since the terms "non-interference" might raise Soviet arguments.

President supported Secretary's suggestion. He added there was basically considerable difference between Soviets and western views on meaning of this term. For example, Khrushchev considered as interference any mention of status of Eastern Europe or Chinese Communist attacks on Formosa.

Debre said in connection with this item French thought potential problem was that of arms traffic, particularly to new countries in Africa. As had once been done with respect to the Middle East, French considered it desirable there might be some system of restriction and control on arms deliveries. They considered such a system should be limited to non-committed countries.

De Gaulle supplemented this by pointing out such countries as Turkey would be exempted in application of such a system.

President commented this idea was complicated by question of Red China. Khrushchev could not speak for them and the Red Chinese could, of course, break any system that might be set up.

Macmillan referred to post-war allied agreement re NEACC. This system had broken down when Soviet bloc delivered arms to Middle East. He agreed it would be useful to have the Washington group study this proposal. There was no doubt such arms deliveries to new countries were source considerable trouble. There was also tendency these countries play one side against the other in seeking arms supplies.

De Gaulle then referred to suggestions which President had made for improvement Western cooperation in handling economic questions.

President said that this was clearly important problem but that the U.S. was not seeking new big organizational structure. We had been thinking of using OEEC expanded to include U.S. and Canada and with provision allow Japan to be associated. He said Soviets saw question of aid as field for competition. Consequently, it was important we get better organized among ourselves before we talk to Soviets. He went on to point out U.S. had carried big load in this field. He recognized France and Great Britain had special interests and special activities in their own community and commonwealth, respectively. U.S. and Germany able to be more flexible.

De Gaulle then turned to Chancellor Adenauer and, after addressing him as "my very prosperous friend", asked his views.

Adenauer replied: "We are in favor."

Macmillan said U.K. agreed to use OEEC machinery for study of what actually being done and by whom in aid to underdeveloped countries, and then to consider what machinery might be best set up among us. After we have done this, he continued, question of principle then arises as to whether we ask Russians to join.

President then asked whether we were agreed OEEC should be used for this purpose, to which Prime Minister indicated assent.

President added he was more negative than his colleagues on taking this subject up with Soviets. He repeated they see this as field of competition rather than as cooperation. However, he said that if we got ourselves well organized, then we might put it up to them.

Secretary added we do not contemplate OEEC as an operating body in this field. Original convention setting up OEEC as instrumentality for administration of Marshall Plan contained many provisions which were not applicable today. Number of changes would be required, maybe new charter of some kind.

Macmillan asked whether concept was OEEC would be instrument for making initial studies and we might then go on to something bigger. Secretary answered in affirmative.

President said he had suspicion that examination would bring out extent of burden which the U.S. carrying, not only with respect to aid to underdeveloped countries but as respects the cost to U.S. of maintaining deterrent force for free world. In this connection, he pointed out simple percentages GNP did not really reveal total burden country carrying.

De Gaulle said preparatory work would make ideas which had been put forward clearer and more precise. He then said there remains question of Germany. This is most serious question facing us. What we do in this respect and influence this may have in German public opinion



will have a decisive effect with respect to advance of communism in Europe.

President commented we could not allow discussion of Germany to degenerate at meeting with Khrushchev as it had in Geneva. President then raised question re Sunday schedule. He said he had thought general pattern was Heads of Government would meet in morning alone and then meet with Foreign Ministers in afternoon. He thought this was useful. Considerable indecisive discussion ensued within and amongst the four delegations.

Adenauer then intervened with a statement which the reporting officer did not understand, except for frequent repetition of the word "communism."

De Gaulle then proposed Heads of Government might meet tomorrow afternoon at 4 p.m. and have their Foreign Ministers join them with a restricted number of advisers at 5 p.m.

President pointed out this would leave considerable idle time between lunch and 4:00 p.m. and made counterproposal Heads of Government might start their afternoon work tomorrow at 2:30 and be joined by their Foreign Ministers at 3:30. This was agreed.

**Herter**

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**57. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State**

Paris, December 22, 1959, 11 a.m.

Cahto 17. Eyes Only Ambassadors. Following report is based on interpreter's summary of tripartite meeting held at Rambouillet Sunday morning<sup>1</sup> among President, Macmillan and de Gaulle:

De Gaulle asked what attitude three Chiefs of Government should be with Khrushchev at summit. He himself felt and others agreed we should not let Soviets tax us with abnormality of Berlin situation, but if they raise matter we should point out real abnormality is creation artificial state by Soviets, namely the GDR. It was felt we should not allow Soviet take "holier than thou attitude" but should not raise Germany

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-2259. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, and London.

<sup>1</sup>December 20.

and Berlin unless they do. If they do we should indicate we regard their attitude on Berlin as test their real desire for relaxation of tensions. President felt we should be careful not make this appear to be ultimatum. Others agreed. It was agreed we should hold to July 28 offer.<sup>2</sup> Macmillan felt we should not go back on this offer. He felt Soviets had been close to accepting it in Geneva and perhaps Khrushchev wanted to reserve for himself acceptance that offer, particularly since Khrushchev wanted summit meeting very badly.

De Gaulle then asked for views on borders of Germany. Macmillan refused to be drawn into discussion saying it would become problem only after German reunification. He whispered to Debre "you don't really want reunification do you?" and Debre nodded and added "Not quite yet."

De Gaulle indicated that French not in great hurry for this but Western Powers must never give appearance abandoning Berlin or Germany. They must support Adenauer. German prosperity and political conditions in Germany were very fragile. French and British appeared feel maintenance status quo best solution for Germany's frontiers at the time. President said permanently divided Germany source of difficulties in Europe. De Gaulle said Adenauer had once hinted to him he might accept Oder–Neisse border but not prior 1961 elections in view large number refugees in Fed Rep. It was bargaining card Chancellor would not want play until final settlement.

On disarmament it was agreed attempt would be made to achieve some results particularly in field of control and verification over means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

De Gaulle raised question of Africa. French were favorable to evolution to self-determination and were attempting guide them along this path in sensible manner. Guinea had already achieved its independence. Cameroons would be independent shortly as would Mali and Madagascar, but these countries were moving with the West. We should endeavor prevent this evolution towards freedom from taking place in a manner against the West. Debre said that they had every indication of concerted Soviet effort in Africa. This proved by very large number of leaders they were bringing to Soviet Union and training there to return to their countries to assume positions of leadership. It was important Western Powers concert their policies in dealing with Africa. Others agreed. There was discussion by Macmillan of situation in some British areas where there were large white populations. Both he and de Gaulle pointed out situation relatively simple in those areas with large homo-

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<sup>2</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 488.

geneous native populations, but where there were large white populations problem was quite different.

De Gaulle then asked President to describe his impressions of his recent visit to India and Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> President stated he had been favorably impressed by President Ayub and his efforts on behalf of his countrymen. He spoke also of Nehru's evolution in thinking and his attempts to rationalize Chinese Communist aggression as being Chinese aggression rather than Communist aggression. He mentioned Nehru's speech at the civic meeting in New Delhi as having been quite constructive. President also indicated some concern with situation in Afghanistan. He concluded by saying that he had expressed to both Nehru and Ayub hope India and Pakistan would be able work out their differences and, instead of facing one another, "face north".

There was an extremely brief reference to Laos and it was generally agreed situation there had improved recently. Debre expressed conviction efforts should be made to keep things calm there and not to excite the people. President remarked situation of these landlocked countries was difficult.

Macmillan vehemently expressed his concern lest situation in Europe develop into economic warfare between Common Market and outer seven. If this were to happen it might compel British to withdraw from NATO. De Gaulle asked Macmillan whether he still believed Common Market intended to wage economic war against Britain; Macmillan did not reply directly. De Gaulle then pointed out Common Market had liberalized many of exchanges not only among themselves but also with Britain. Macmillan indicated that this concern more with future than with present. It was indicated there would be conference of the 6 and 7 in January with United States and Canada also attending and hope was expressed that this conference would find ways of preventing an economic and trade split.

President then spoke of his concern over European air defense and delay in accepting General Norstad's proposals.<sup>4</sup> He spoke of difficulty of defending such a small area in compartmented fashion. De Gaulle said these matters should be considered from point of view of Alliance and also from point of view of interested nations. President expressed his concern on this matter and spoke at some length in support of NATO.

**Herter**

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<sup>3</sup> The President visited India and Pakistan December 8–14.

<sup>4</sup> Documentation on Norstad's proposals for an integrated European air defense is in volume VII, Part 1.

58. **Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State**

Paris, December 21, 1959, 9 p.m.

Cahto 15. Eyes Only for Ambassadors. Following is based on interpreter's summary of meeting of four Heads of Government plus Debre and interpreters at Rambouillet, December 20, 2:30 p.m.

De Gaulle asked Chancellor to give others idea of state of mind of people of Fed Rep. Chancellor said people of Fed Rep were fully cognizant of dangers which world communism represented for freedom everywhere. Previously they had been able visit parents and relatives in East Zone and vice versa but this no longer the case. Border was "like a wall". Nevertheless several thousand refugees still cross into West Germany every week and from them people of Fed Rep obtained good idea of what was going on in East Zone. However, there were people in Social Democratic Party who so anxious get to power they play game of Communists. Furthermore, East Germans pouring propaganda into Fed Rep at extraordinary rate, more than a million pounds of leaflets and pamphlets a month. Communist Party outlawed in Fed Rep not as result of repressive measures by govt but as result of decision of constitutional court. As result Communists engaging in vast operation of subversion throughout Fed Rep, concentrating particularly on intellectuals, students and trade union movement.

Chancellor said that he gravely concerned by inroads that Communists making among intellectuals and in universities. Whole Communist effort centrally directed and all its activities coordinated to promote Soviet arms. In Western world countermeasures engaged upon in haphazard fashion; something should be done on our side to provide same kind of centralized counteraction. Several universities in US had been doing research into attraction communism held for these intellectuals and this might provide some basis for effective counteraction. If other members of Chiefs of Government were agreed he would like to submit written proposal for measures which he thought should be taken by Western Powers. Others agreed and Chancellor said he would send this proposal forward to them.

De Gaulle then asked Chancellor what situation was in so-called GDR and indicated that Chancellor had good sources of intelligence for his reply. Chancellor said that population bitterly hostile to regime but had no weapons and could do nothing.

History of Soviet Union and satellites showed many cases where small armed minorities held under their sway large hostile populations. Chancellor said that state was conducting a drive against Protestant and Catholic Churches throughout East Zone as they were bastions of resistance to Communist regime. Churches had been particularly effective in preventing youth from undergoing Communist "jugendweihe" ceremony. Chancellor said that rather surprisingly youth of East Zone had not yet been taken in by blandishments of Communists. President Eisenhower said Khrushchev had told him he needed ten more years of indoctrination before he could risk elections in GDR.<sup>1</sup>

De Gaulle asked Chancellor what he thought of present situation in Poland. Chancellor replied that Poland was just another satellite state and that leaders of Poland today were "Khrushchev's men." Chancellor said that once Germany reunified he deeply convinced friendly relations with Poland absolutely essential.

Chancellor said nations of Europe should make effort to conciliate differences between countries of Common Market and Seven. He hopeful that conferences which would be held in January with participation of 6 and 7 as well as US and Canada might have helpful results.<sup>2</sup> Certainly no intention on part of countries of Common Market to divide Europe into two economic blocs. Free countries should be united as far as possible.

In answer to a question by de Gaulle Chancellor said Germany would be willing participate in programs of assistance to underdeveloped countries but he felt these programs should be thoroughly coordinated in order to be effective and to prevent free countries from competing with one another or being blackmailed by recipient countries.

**Herter**

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<sup>1</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Dillon's visit to Paris January 11–16, 1960, for the economic discussions leading to the creation of the OECD, see vol. IV, pp. 63–64.

**59. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State**

Paris, December 21, 1959, 9 p.m.

Cahto 16. London and Bonn Eyes Only for Ambassadors. Following based on interpreter's summary of bilateral conversation between President and Chancellor Adenauer which took place late afternoon December 20:<sup>1</sup>

Chancellor spoke of Khrushchev's liking for long speeches and letters. President mentioned Khrushchev's tendency to blame Stalin for things which had gone wrong. In answer to question by Chancellor President spoke at some length about his impressions of his visits to various countries on his trip. The Chancellor said that he regarded Nehru, whom he has met twice, as the greatest "actor" he had ever met in his life. President indicated that Nehru's thinking had evolved somewhat in last few years. President also indicated some hope that India and Pakistan might be able to compose difficulties over Kashmir and said he has expressed this hope to President Ayub and to Prime Minister Nehru. The President then said that he felt that more personalities of Western world should travel to these countries, not too often admittedly that would cheapen their position, but enough to let their well-being. Chancellor said he also thought this a good idea and mentioned that he intended to visit Japan in March. He said that he felt that President's visit had been an outstanding success and noted that he had been greeted by huge crowds everywhere he had been. President commented that he too felt that visit had had a plus value and his impression had been that these large friendly crowds were trying to express their attachment to the West. It was important that we give peoples of these countries impression that we were just as interested in them and their welfare as in any other peoples in world.

President then mentioned callousness of Russians in dealing with peoples citing remarks made by Marshal Zhukov in 1945 about removing leaders and intellectuals and remainder of population would prove docile. Chancellor said that Germans had recently had intelligence to effect that a large meeting of Soviet General Staff had been held to discuss whether there was any advantage in going to war or not. Marshal Zhukov had been unanimously invited and had come but he left meeting before Khrushchev's arrival. German intelligence had been that de-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/12-2159. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London and Bonn.

<sup>1</sup> For Adenauer's account, see *Erinnerungen, 1959–1963*, p. 28.

cision of Soviet Staff was that no advantage to be gained by resorting to war. President commented that this was an interesting report.

Chancellor then noted there were three matters he wished to discuss with President. First of these was request by Turks for temporary \$60,000,000 loan, partly from US and partly from Federal Republic. Turks were reliable allies and maintained large forces and he was favorably disposed towards them, but he wished to know what US position on loan was. President attempted to reach Mr. Anderson but he had just checked out of hotel on way to airport. He said that he would have matter looked into and would let Chancellor know. Chancellor said that if US were agreeable he would do everything on his side to push matter forward. President presumed that US and Federal Republic were each being asked to put up \$30,000,000. Chancellor said he would be grateful for any information President could give him on this matter.

Chancellor said that second matter about which he wished to speak to President was question of German assets in US. President said that this matter had been complicated by fact that at time Federal Republic had been set up there had been agreement that was supposed to have settled matter but in fact it had not done so. Chancellor said that if anything could be done on this matter it would be very helpful to him politically. Many people in Germany were saying that we had been allies for many years and that private property was supposed to be regarded as holy and yet nothing had been done on this score. President said that matter had been made more difficult for him by fact that there was group in Congress who opposed any restitution of assets. Nevertheless he would have matter looked into again so that he could see what might be done. Chancellor expressed his gratitude for this expression of President.

Chancellor said that third thing about which he wanted to speak to President was General de Gaulle. He was not as stubborn as he might appear. He did have difficulties with French Army which had been in Algeria a long time and was much more influential in France than US or German armies were in their own countries. President said that Mr. Bourguiba had expressed this belief to him in Tunis<sup>2</sup> and he had mentioned it to General de Gaulle who had said that he had complete control over army. General de Gaulle had this same difficulty on all matters relating to defense as well as to Algeria said the Chancellor. He added that General de Gaulle was a great man and we could not do without him in Europe.

President then voiced his concern to Chancellor regarding difficulties which French were creating in NATO particularly re General

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<sup>2</sup>The President visited Tunisia December 17.

Norstad's plan for integrated air defense. President spoke at some length on military need for such defense and need to get away from nationalistic considerations in order to create a more effective collective defense. Chancellor said that difficulty was not personal with General Norstad and that General de Gaulle had spoken to him several times of his high regard for the General. President expressed hope that Chancellor would convey his concern to General de Gaulle if he had occasion and mentioned that General de Gaulle had agreed to receive General Norstad to hear technical details of air defense plan. Chancellor expressed hope that this matter would be worked out following President's talk with General de Gaulle and Gen Norstad's briefing. He said that he had seen General de Gaulle after this morning talk with President<sup>3</sup> and while General de Gaulle had not told him subjects that had been discussed he had appeared very pleased with his talk with President.

Chancellor then thanked President for giving him this opportunity to talk with him and said he felt meeting Western Powers had been very useful.

**Herter**

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<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of the President's conversation with de Gaulle at 10:15 a.m. on December 20 is in vol. VII, Part 2, Document 151.

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## 60. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State

Paris, December 22, 1959, 2 p.m.

Cahto 18. Eyes Only for Ambassadors. Following is summary of half hour Four Power plenary at Elysee 10:30 a.m., Dec. 21:<sup>1</sup>

De Gaulle opened by saying discussions had gone very expeditiously and there apparently remained very little to be discussed. He

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-2259. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Bonn and London.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of the conversation at the meeting (US/MC/18) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1569.



would summarize results of talks to date. Four Heads of State or Government considered that danger of the Communist menace is as great as it has ever been. However, they agreed that note should be taken of pronouncements of Khrushchev relating to relaxation of tensions and peaceful coexistence. For this reason they agreed meet with him. As to substance Four had discussed Germany and had decided their positions should be very reserved, especially re Berlin; West must not do anything that would result in Berlin's falling into hands of Soviets. In this respect positions taken by four Foreign Ministers at Geneva still valid. In summary, as far as German problems concerned, it felt that new approach to solution would be possible only after there had been a relaxation of international tension. In any case four Heads of State or Government had no great expectations as to what might be accomplished at forthcoming summit meeting re German problem.

Re disarmament principals had agreed that Five Powers should start work in near future. They had taken note of British proposals, also of proposals put forward by French for control of missiles and delivery systems.<sup>2</sup> On this score too, they had no illusions as to any great progress being made.

Four principals had taken note of Adenauer's idea diverting savings which might be accomplished from disarmament for aid to underdeveloped countries. It agreed that question of aid to underdeveloped countries was very important matter. Principals decided study ideas put forward by United States on this subject. In meeting with Khrushchev, they decided to study possibility of putting forward concrete proposals to him such as development of Nile and cooperation in field public health.

Four principals also recognized need to study relationships between European organizations and other principal trading countries and for this purpose agreed discussions should take place between selected countries already members of OEEC, as well as United States, Canada and Japan.

President said de Gaulle had given admirable summation of discussions.

Macmillan agreed with President's approval of summations but said he wanted to sound note of caution re question of linking disarmament economies and aid to underdeveloped countries. He agreed these matters should be studied. However, study of possible proposals to be

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<sup>2</sup>The British and French proposals under reference here have not been identified further. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy met at the Quai d'Orsay 3:15–4:40 p.m., December 21, to confirm these decisions and to adopt plans for the future discussion of disarmament in preparation for a summit meeting. (US/MC/12; *ibid.*)

made to Khrushchev such as development of Nile should be handled very cautiously. Leaks that such matters were under consideration could cause considerable difficulties.

De Gaulle agreed that care was necessary and studies re aid to underdeveloped countries should be conducted with discretion. Much would depend in this connection on atmosphere surrounding East-West summit. If it proved propitious make proposals to Khrushchev, it was quite soon enough announce them after they had been put forward at summit.

De Gaulle said it remained only to express to President views of others as to how valuable his good will visits to various countries had been in support of Western cause. In this connection he mentioned names of all countries the President had visited to date and expressed certainly his forthcoming visits to Spain and Morocco<sup>3</sup> would also be very useful.

President said that one particular thought had become imbedded in his mind during his trip. This was the anxiety of great populations of the countries he had visited not only to achieve a peaceful life and some rise in living standards, but even more to live in freedom. Signs had greeted him everywhere proclaiming "peace with freedom" indicating that, without freedom, other things had little value. This feeling reflected basic ideals of West. If Western leaders were intelligent these populations would turn to US. He would suggest Western leaders travel to those countries not for purposes undertaking negotiations or conducting business but to show our interest in their lives and their freedom. He realized from his own experience that this could be burdensome, but he was sure it was helpful. Obviously such travels should be undertaken within reason, but at least frequently enough to remind populations of underdeveloped countries of our interest in them. De Gaulle expressed appreciation for President's statement and said he had taken note of suggestion. He repeated how useful he considered President's travel had been but mentioned in this connection: "Of course you are strong—that doesn't hurt anyone."

Macmillan said he wanted to raise a practical point. He assumed Western notes delivered to the Soviets this morning by Ambassadors in Moscow.<sup>4</sup> Possible that date proposed for East-West summit meeting might be agreeable to Khrushchev. To avoid a lot of later consultations between various capitals, he would suggest fall back date be fixed which acceptable to Western Heads of State or Government.

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<sup>3</sup> The President visited Spain December 21–22 and Morocco December 22.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 61.

President said he had discussed this with Macmillan earlier this morning<sup>5</sup> and agreed his suggestion. He had reviewed his own forward engagements and found it would be possible to meet about May 15, following termination of Macmillan's commonwealth conference.

De Gaulle indicated suggested date in May would please him since it would allow him make more leisurely visit to United States.

Adenauer indicated that while he not particularly involved he believed that once date for East-West summit settled, be possible adjust other dates of lesser importance to this.

The meeting concluded with President, Macmillan and Adenauer expressing thanks to de Gaulle for hospitality and able conduct of the discussions.

**Herter**

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<sup>5</sup> While there is no record of Macmillan meeting with the President during the morning of December 21, the U.S. Delegation chronology for December 20 shows that they breakfasted together at the U.S. Embassy on that day. Presumably this is the time at which the subject was discussed. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1577)

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## **61. Editorial Note**

During the morning of December 21, representatives from the three Western Embassies in Moscow presented to Foreign Minister Gromyko letters inviting Chairman Khrushchev to a summit meeting beginning April 27, 1960. The text of the note and instructions to the embassies were transmitted to Moscow in Sectos 39 and 40, December 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-2059)

On December 25, Khrushchev replied that this date was inconvenient and suggested either April 21 or May 4. A further exchange of letters on December 29 and 30 achieved agreement for the summit meeting to begin at Paris on May 16. For the texts of the four notes, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pages 947 and 949–950, or *Dokumente*, Band 3, 1959, pages 805–806, 812, and 831–832.

62. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/16

Paris, December 21, 1959, 5 p.m.

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Paris, December 19–21, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Kohler  
And other advisors

*German Federal Republic*

Foreign Minister von Brentano  
Mr. van Scherpenberg  
Mr. Carstens  
And other advisors

*France*

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
M. de Carbonnel  
M. Lucet  
And other advisors

*United Kingdom*

Foreign Minister Lloyd  
Mr. Hoyer-Millar  
Sir Anthony Rumbold  
And other advisors

After discussing the report to be made to the NATO Ministerial Council tomorrow on the communiqué dealing with new economic proposals (covered in separate memorandum), Couve reviewed the oral report on other aspects of the Western Summit which he had agreed to make on behalf of the Four to the Council.<sup>1</sup> He proposed to follow the main points of the communiqué bearing on the East-West Summit and the letter to Khrushchev, adding some of the supplementary information contained in the agreed instructions to the three Ambassadors in Moscow.<sup>2</sup>

Couve then invited the NATO representatives present to express their views as to the consultative procedures which should be established with NATO for the next round of preparatory work. Ambassador Burgess said it was important to give the impression that there would be full consultation. The situation at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' confer-

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1569. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on January 7, 1960. The conversation took place at the Quai d'Orsay. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 53 from Paris, December 22. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-2259)

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the report to the North Atlantic Council meeting on December 22, see vol. VII, Part 1, Document 245; the memorandum under reference has not been identified further. For text of the special communiqué on the new economic proposals, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 576–577.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the summit communiqué, see *ibid.*, pp. 946–947; regarding the letter to Khrushchev and the instructions to the Ambassadors in Moscow, see Document 61.

ence had been fairly satisfactory, with two reports being submitted to the Council each week and with individual Permanent Representatives going to Geneva from time to time to provide a human as well as a written link. Lloyd noted that it would be difficult to get over the next four months without the press trying to manufacture differences between Western Powers. It is important to warn NATO not to expect too much too soon from the Powers charged with the preparatory work. It would probably be necessary to make continuing noises to keep NATO happy. As to the idea of commuting Permanent Representatives, he could not be enthusiastic at the thought. The preparatory work which would be taking place in Washington was not the same as a conference of the Geneva type. CENTO and SEATO might also ask to send representatives to keep in touch with the work in Washington. The Secretary said that the consultative process should be worked out between the German and other members of the Working Group. Lloyd said it would be best to give NATO a weekly report. This would make the organization happy, even if the report said nothing more than that there had been no progress. Von Brentano opposed the idea of a weekly report, saying that a report could only usefully be made when the Working Group had reached some conclusions. As Couve had pointed out yesterday, a report to NATO would inevitably leak. Lloyd came back to the idea of having a weekly report to keep NATO happy. It was obviously necessary, however, to get away from the idea that, prior to important negotiations with the Soviets, the NATO organization could be given the entire Western position. A formula to the effect that NATO would be kept frequently and regularly informed should suffice. Couve agreed.

The Secretary raised the question of the U.S. draft<sup>3</sup> (which had been circulated yesterday) of the proposed directive to cover the next phase of preparatory work on Germany and Berlin. He noted that the communiqué issued by the Heads of Government and Chiefs of State had

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<sup>3</sup> This draft reads:

"The President of France, the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany agree that representatives of their four Governments, under the guidance of the Secretary of State of the United States and the Ambassadors of the other three countries, should begin work in Washington sometime in January, at a date to be agreed, on the next stage of preparations for the East-West Summit. While the report of this Working Group will be submitted ad referendum to Governments, the four Heads of Governments and Chiefs of State believe that the representatives designated to serve as members should enjoy the full support of their Governments so that meaningful results can be achieved.

"In arriving at their recommendations the consultants should be guided by the relevant discussions during the present series of four-power meetings. In examining the Western position as it relates to the problem of Germany including Berlin, the Working Group should be free to consider whether there exist feasible new initiatives, consistent with their basic commitments, which would serve to advance Western interests." (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, France vol. 2)

referred to the “necessary directives” for this purpose, yet no such directives had been issued. Von Brentano expressed concern about the draft. He had no objections to the first paragraph and to the first sentence of the second paragraph. However, he felt that the language in the second sentence of the second paragraph might be dangerous, particularly if it came to public attention. After the Secretary had outlined the difficulties experienced during the preparatory work for the present meeting, with particular reference to the lack of instructions, or instructions barring representatives from substantive discussions, which some of the participants had had, Couve gave assurances that, during the next phase of work, the French representatives would have more latitude to engage in substantive discussions. Lloyd said that it should not be necessary to point out that no one intended to abandon the basic Western position. The Western Peace Plan at Geneva<sup>4</sup> had proved more of a propaganda success than he had anticipated. He hoped the Peace Plan could be dusted off and looked at to see if any “presentational ornamentation” could be added. It was desirable that the West come to the Summit with some constructive proposals.

The Secretary stated that, although this was not in writing, the Heads of Government and Chiefs of State had directed the Steering Groups to accomplish this. Couve commented that he assumed the Steering Group would begin work in Washington early in January and establish various sub-groups as required. He envisaged one group on disarmament, which had already been provided for, another on Germany and Berlin, and a third on East-West relations. This last might actually require further sub-groups to study such matters as arms control, propaganda and non-interference. The latter might meet in Paris or London as it would be difficult for the continental countries to have too many experts absent in the U.S.

Von Brentano said he agreed that any proposals made in the Working Group would have to be thoroughly examined. It was the duty of each Government to properly inform and instruct its representatives. During the preparations for the present Western Summit in Washington, there had simply not been time to do this, as far as the Federal Republic was concerned. He intended to strengthen the staff of Ambassador Grewe by sending experts from Bonn. However, he still felt there was no need to formulate a directive as in the last sentence of the proposed draft. This point should actually be self-evident. He reported that it was understood that the Working Group would have to study thoroughly any proposals submitted to it.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 43.

The Secretary said that, with this clear understanding, he could agree that it might be better not to have a formal directive in writing, in view of the possibility of leaks.

Von Brentano asked whether the Foreign Ministers should try to set a time and place for them to meet to discuss the results of the Working Group. He did not believe it would suffice if the Foreign Ministers merely met a few days before the Summit meeting. The possibility must be envisaged of having, at an earlier point, to discuss the progress of the Working Group and to give it new directives. The Secretary said this might prove desirable, but the problem of heavy commitments made setting a specific date at this time impracticable. It was agreed that the possibility would be left open of having a special meeting of the four Foreign Ministers should this be required to resolve a deadlock in the Working Group.

MEETING OF THE CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED  
STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE,  
AND THE SOVIET UNION (SUMMIT  
CONFERENCE), MAY 16, 1960

DECEMBER 1959–MAY 1960: PREPARATIONS FOR THE  
SUMMIT CONFERENCE

63. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the  
Department of State

Moscow, January 1, 1960, 1 p.m.

1773. Eyes only Secretary and Chiefs of Mission. Because of importance of subjects discussed I am reporting last night's Kremlin reception in detail to best of my admittedly hazy recollection. Press were present and will have reported developments at dinner which noteworthy chiefly for cracks at Rockefeller and Adenauer and implication that Soviet Union is considering further reductions in troop strength because of their increased firepower due to modern atomic weapons. Dinner did not break up until shortly before 2 a.m. when as usual party moved room for dancing. I was on point of leaving when Khrushchev, who was watching dancing, sent aide to invite my wife and myself to join him. French Ambassador and his wife came up at this time to pay their respects and Khrushchev invited the four of us to come with him into next room. This was a new room furnished in modern style complete with fountain filled with colored plastic rocks. Luigi Longo Italian Communist, had been standing with Khrushchev and came into room with us. Doors had closed behind us and there was no one else present except Security Officer and [interpreter?]. Shortly afterwards Kozlov and Mikoyan joined us. Khrushchev invited us all to sit down at one of the numerous tables. Noticing our embarrassment at presence of Longo he asked if we could not for this one evening consider him simply as an Italian and not as a Communist. Longo, who does not speak Russian,

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:54 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn. Attached to a copy of telegram 1774 from Moscow (see footnote 2 below) which was initialed by the President.



took virtually no part in ensuing conversation. Later on after Khrushchev had toasted other foreigners present he proposed toast to Longo. I suggested he drink to Longo and we would drink to Italy. This was accepted in good part. As we were walking into room Khrushchev told me he had planned invite me with my family including children to his house on January 2, unfortunately his wife was ill with high fever and he could not carry out his plan but he hoped if she had recovered by week from Sunday we would come then. Khrushchev sent an aide to invite British and German Ambassadors to join us but was informed they had already gone home. He remarked that German Ambassador was probably offended by his remarks. I said I had also not liked some of his remarks but Khrushchev passed this off by saying we could still talk and understand each other. He said he was exceedingly pleased by his trip to US<sup>1</sup> and that President Eisenhower had simply overwhelmed him with his personality. He added that if only President could serve another term he was sure our problems could be solved. He said he had also formed good impression of Secretary Herter but he did not like Vice President Nixon. I told him I was sure he had made wrong appraisal of Vice President who was staunch advocate of our system just as Khrushchev was firm advocate of his. I said nevertheless I was certain Vice President was one of those who were sincerely trying to work out our problems with Soviet Union and I tried to give him some examples from my own experience illustrative of Vice President's character, but by this time an alcoholic haze had settled over entire company as result toasts and I did not get very far. What follows must be interpreted in light of this atmosphere. Khrushchev repeatedly and solemnly asserted his desire for peace which he said was absolutely essential if we did not all wish commit suicide because of awful nature of modern weapons. He said they had 30 bombs earmarked for France which was more than enough to destroy that country and I believe he mentioned figure of 50 for either Britain or Germany. When my wife inquired how many he had for us he said this was a secret. When I proposed a toast to success of meeting May 16 Khrushchev said it was essential to reach agreement for otherwise if we let Adenauer lead us down wrong path he would conclude separate peace treaty with East Germany. This would end our rights in Berlin. If we then wished to attack Soviet Union we would all be destroyed. I asked if this meant they would attempt to throw us out of Berlin. He said no, but it was the East Germans who would deny our access and as they were allies they would be supported by Soviet Union. He made some reference to our access being blocked both by land and

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<sup>1</sup> For documentation on Khrushchev's discussions with the President during his visit to the United States September 15–27, 1959, see Documents 12–16.

by air and added they would only be doing what we had done in Japan. I of course disputed this. Later on he mentioned that on his trip to France he would try to make this situation clear. When subject came up for about third time French Ambassador asked if Soviet Union would block our access to Berlin, to which Khrushchev vehemently replied "no" and that they would never attack us. All of his bellicose remarks were interspersed with protestations of his desire for peace and an accommodation. Kozlov and I had vainly tried several times to break up party and finally succeeded shortly before 6 a.m.

If Khrushchev's remarks were taken literally we would be back where we were before Camp David. I do not think they were meant in this manner however nor do I think from way he spoke that he was probing to find our reaction. Rather I think his purpose was to impress upon us seriousness of situation as he sees it. At end of conversation I told him privately I felt it my duty as Ambassador to be sure that he had no misunderstanding and that if they attempted force us out of Berlin we would fulfill our responsibilities to people of West Berlin. He said West Berlin was of little importance to them, and why did we attach so much importance to it. I said this was because we had given our word to people of West Berlin and bound to fulfill that obligation. He said several times that press had suggested to him that we sit down and try to solve Berlin problem and he said Soviet Union was fully prepared to take account of fact this had to be done without affecting our prestige.

I tried without success to get him to say why Berlin was so important to him, but he only replied "because it was surrounded by East Germany." At an earlier point in conversation he said something to effect that Berlin question was one of geography which he intended make use of.

As fact of our long conversation will be known I believe that French Ambassador and I should fully inform our British and German colleagues and tell our other NATO colleagues merely that Khrushchev had repeatedly expressed his desire for peace but had maintained standard Soviet position on question of Germany.

I hope we can keep presence of Longo from becoming known.<sup>2</sup>

**Thompson**

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<sup>2</sup>In telegram 1774 from Moscow received at 11 a.m. on January 1, Thompson added some details that were provided by the French Ambassador, who felt that Khrushchev had not fixed any date for the solution of the Berlin problem. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

**64. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, January 2, 1960, 3 p.m.

1779. Eyes only Secretary and Chiefs of Mission. I note that Department circular telegram 853 December 26<sup>1</sup> states in paragraph 5 that we consider summit meeting will be essentially probing operation in which Soviet attitude toward German reunification will be pretty much acid test of Soviet intentions. In my view Soviet attitude toward German reunification already crystal clear. There is however some doubt as to Soviet intentions regarding Berlin and I assume it is this that Department had in mind. I suggest we should keep in mind that this will also be probing operation on part of Soviets and Western policy much less clear than Soviet. I believe Khrushchev seeks a *détente* of long duration and a real measure of disarmament if this can be had without jeopardizing Communist empire in Eastern Europe. If our policy at Paris summit meeting is to be as preparation so far would indicate, it seems probable Khrushchev will conclude that we are determined to break up Communist bloc and that a real relaxation of tension is not possible. Moreover if our position is that at most we will renew our Geneva offer, which was known to be unacceptable to Soviets at time of Camp David, or that we can only solve Berlin problem in connection with German reunification, it seems to me Khrushchev would have sound grounds for accusing us of bad faith since at Camp David we undertook in effect to secure agreement of our allies to further effort solve specific problem of Berlin. As Department aware, even before my New Year's conversation with Khrushchev<sup>2</sup> I was convinced that in absence of new major proposals on our part Khrushchev would carry out his threat to conclude separate peace treaty and proceed on basis that our rights in Berlin had been extinguished. It is of course true that Khrushchev has reason to want to give us this impression. It is also true that he has a large vested interest in maintaining a *détente* as well as economic and other reasons for wanting a long period of relaxation. My best judgment is that as things are now shaping up Khrushchev will, after summit meeting, start the process of negotiating a separate peace treaty with East Germany. It is probable, particularly as there is an indication of hope of progress in field of disarmament, that process of negotiation and ratification will be

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/1-2660. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

<sup>1</sup> Circular telegram 853 transmitted a summary of the events at the Paris Heads of Government meeting December 19–21, 1959. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-PA/12-2659) For documentation on this meeting, see Documents 54–60.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 63.

drawn out for some time in order for him to gauge developments in this and other fields. I believe that Khrushchev is under strong pressure from East Germans to do something about Berlin problem. (German Ambassador tells me he has specific evidence of this.) There is probably also some support for an aggressive policy within Soviet regime and I think it can be assumed that Chinese would strongly support such action. I had the impression on New Year's Eve that Khrushchev was to some extent talking for benefit his colleagues and this impression was even stronger at luncheon which he gave the Vice President during latter's visit here.<sup>3</sup>

Khrushchev must be conscious of the relationship between his handling of this problem and his leadership of Communist bloc. Khrushchev has shown strong interest in American elections. Foreign policy declarations of Democratic Party leaders and his own views on VP Nixon could lead him to conclude that he has little to hope from next administration and that best time for bold action would be in period following national conventions and before election.

On balance I am so convinced that in absence of agreement on Berlin Khrushchev will carry out his threat to conclude a separate peace treaty and allow our rights in Berlin to be challenged that I believe we should reappraise with our Allies the advantages and disadvantages of various courses open to us. These would seem to me to be as follows:

1. A firm stand of refusing to make any further attempt to solve Berlin problem. This is the course on which we appear to be embarked and if it is to be followed I suggest that serious effort should be made to enable Khrushchev to accept it without too great loss of face. I find it difficult to suggest a formula but we might, for example, argue that Berlin problem would be easier to solve after further progress had been made in field of disarmament in which we have great hopes; and we might urge that consideration of Berlin problem be postponed on this basis. We might also consider threatening to break off disarmament talks if Khrushchev nevertheless proceeds to challenge our rights in Berlin.

As indicated above, I believe this course will sooner or later lead to such a challenge. Khrushchev will probably try to ensure that East Germans not interfere with British, French and American access other than exercise of nominal control by East Germans. He would probably, however, allow East Germans to harass population of West Berlin and gradually strangle West German access. It is my view that if in such a situation we should use force to maintain West German access or to

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<sup>3</sup>For documentation on Vice President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union July 23-August 4, 1959, see volume X.

carry out a massive aid program for West Berlin, Soviets would at least allow East Germans to use force to counter such move. In such an event we would surely be on brink of war. I should think however that most likely outcome would be that West Germans or West Berliners would have to try to negotiate a settlement with East Germans. I very much question whether terms they could get would be as good as could be obtained by our negotiating with Soviets now.

Whatever the merit of this analysis it seems to me absolutely clear that before going into a summit conference we should insist upon full agreement with our Allies including West Germany as to how we would handle East German pressure on West Berlin. This should have effect of bringing about at least some increased flexibility on part of West Germans as well as to enable us to gauge where French and more particularly British would stand when chips were down.

2. A second possible course would be a serious attempt to reach agreement with Soviets on West Berlin. It would of course not be necessary that this actually be concluded at summit and it could take form of a further meeting of Foreign Ministers following such summit. I believe key to solution is question of maintenance of our occupation rights since Khrushchev seems to consider that this blocks his separate peace treaty. It is barely possible that Khrushchev would at least defer conclusion of separate treaty if we could reach an oral agreement on a determined effort by both sides to reduce friction and tension in Berlin area, but I am fully convinced Khrushchev will maintain his position that he will not sign any agreement which reaffirms or continues our occupation rights. Possibility of such deferment would be greatly enhanced if there were favorable developments at summit meeting in other fields.

3. Another possible course of action would be a fresh approach to whole German question which had sufficient attraction to Khrushchev to at least get him to postpone action on West Berlin while it was being explored. One such proposal would be to extend period in our Geneva Peace Plan,<sup>4</sup> or some similar scheme, to provide that there would not be a showdown by free elections for an extended period of time such as 7–10 years. I realize this would be difficult and possibly impossible to sell to Adenauer, and there is considerable doubt whether Khrushchev would accept it. While Adenauer should know German people I can't help suspecting that he exaggerates probable effect of reunification issue on German elections. I wonder if some way might not be found either covertly or by persuasion of West Germans for a public opinion poll to be taken which would give us a clearer appreciation of situation.

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<sup>4</sup>See footnote 3, Document 43.

4. Another possible approach might be in field of disarmament, particularly if this involved a step by step reduction in our forces in Germany and opened up possibility of our eventually giving up our bases there. Khrushchev would be particularly interested in any limitations on West German armament and would, I believe, be quite prepared to balance this by similar limitations in East Germany as well as in Poland and Czechoslovakia. While effects on NATO of any such steps would doubtless be serious it seems to me we might seriously consider whether or not we should attempt to get a price for some of our wasting assets.

I am conscious that this is a pessimistic message and that it could even be said that it smacks of defeatism. I should therefore like to conclude by reiterating my view that because of the evolution which is rapidly taking place within Soviet Union developments are in general going our way and will eventually lead to a situation in which a real accommodation with Soviet Union may become possible. The present apparent trend of our policy with respect to Germany seems to me to be leading to a situation which will force a premature showdown which could well result in a reversal of present evolution in Soviet internal and external policies. Question of East Germany is of course closely related to that of other satellites. My general view is that here, too, a period of relaxation is more likely to lead to concessions to democratic forces within satellites and thus to possibilities of eventual freedom, than would a situation of tension which could in end only lead to freedom by revolution—and for present at least there is no reason to suppose that revolution would end any differently than it did in Hungary.

**Thompson**

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**65. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

Berlin, January 11, 1960, 8 p.m.

564. Chancellor Adenauer, who arrived in Berlin today for 2-day visit,<sup>1</sup> this afternoon addressed specially convened House of Represent-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.13/1-1160. Official Use Only. Also sent to Bonn.

<sup>1</sup> A more detailed report on Adenauer's visit to Berlin, January 11-13, was transmitted in despatch 429 from Berlin, January 16. (*Ibid.*, 762A.13/1-1660)

atives, his first address before Berlin Deputies since mid-blockade in 1949.<sup>2</sup> Chancellor reviewed situation since then, saying Berlin had made good use of FedRep's DM 12 billions in aid and that recovery has demonstrated to world that political freedom basic prerequisite for progress and prosperity.

Paying tribute to Allies, especially United States, Adenauer said: "Our strength would never suffice to ward off assaults from East and preserve freedom in Europe. There should be less criticism, especially in West Germany, of Western Allies, and more understanding and gratitude."

Chancellor cited Paris declarations Dec 14 and 16, 1958,<sup>3</sup> saying they made clear Western determination preserve Allied position and rights in Berlin and should be heeded by all countries, including Soviet Union. Chancellor was profoundly skeptical that any improvement of Berlin status could be achieved at summit, saying any change in status could only be for worse. It clear that Khrushchev's intentions are to have Berlin and West Germany fall into hands of Communists. Main Western aim should be to maintain Allied rights in Berlin. "Any change would represent surrender of freedom to tyranny. Further demands and surrenders would follow." Sov threats should not be feared too much for Khrushchev knows that in case nuclear war nothing would remain of USSR.

Chancellor strongly expressed his view that Western July 28 Geneva proposals<sup>4</sup> null and void because they were rejected by Sovs. He emphatically agreed with Mayor Brandt that at Geneva West "went to limit of what is bearable." Nothing could be worse than to resume negotiations where they broke off after Sov rejection.

Chancellor stressed German love for peace and freedom, saying despite many wrongs committed in past great majority of Germans not for conquest and fighting but for peace. He claimed for Germans right of self-determination, which USSR willing accord peoples of Africa and elsewhere.

Adenauer warned that peace is not one-sided matter but can be accomplished only if all want peace and relaxation of tensions. He said: "We want peace but freedom also. And we value freedom because we experienced lack of freedom in Nazi period. It was then we learned what a danger for all mankind an unfree people can be."

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<sup>2</sup> For full text of Adenauer's remarks, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 48–52.

<sup>3</sup> For texts of these declarations, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 600 and 602–603.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 488.

Chancellor warned that 1960 will bring new dangers and that wisdom, vigilance and national unity essential. Unity especially necessary because "we all stand on very thin layer" and must be of one mind on matters affecting future of Germany and Europe. Re Berlin policy he fully endorsed Mayor Brandt's 5-point declaration January 7 (Berlin's G-174 to Bonn, G-188 to Dept).<sup>5</sup>

In conclusion, Adenauer thanked Berliners for upholding freedom's banner and promised Berlin it could count on full assistance from FedRep.

In reply Brandt pressed point that some improvements in access should be sought in negotiations. Mayor also stressed that close FedRep-Berlin relations had developed with concurrence supreme Allied authorities in city.<sup>6</sup>

**Lightner**

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<sup>5</sup> Dated January 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-860) For text of this declaration, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 22-24.

<sup>6</sup> For text of Brandt's reply, see *ibid.*, pp. 53-55.

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## 66. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting

Washington, January 15, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of unrelated subjects.]

### *II Preparations for the Summit* (Raised at State initiative)

Mr. Merchant stated that a great deal had been agreed among the British, French and ourselves regarding the forthcoming Summit meeting. He outlined the dates of the various meetings, including CENTO and SEATO in April and May and the composition of the main and sub-

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Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that this was a Department of State draft, which had been cleared with Merchant, but not cleared by the Department of Defense.



groups<sup>1</sup> which were working on the preparation for the Summit. He stressed the Italians' excessive claim to participate in every important group and the difficulties which this position had made for us, particularly among the small countries who were concerned about the possibility that the four Western heads of government would agree to a series of Summit meetings when they themselves thought there would be only one Summit meeting. Their concern was the establishment of a "Directorate" within NATO. At the conclusion of the NATO meeting in December these difficulties had been resolved and agreement had been reached on three general topics to be discussed at the forthcoming Summit: (1) disarmament; (2) Germany, including Berlin; and (3) East-West relations.

Mr. Merchant then outlined the composition and plan of the preparatory working groups as set forth in Mr. White's memorandum of January 14 to the Acting Secretary (Tab A).<sup>2</sup>

Admiral Burke wondered whether there would be any results from the disarmament group before the Summit and said he would anticipate a change in the Soviet position about a week before the Summit. Mr. Merchant commented that the first task is to get an allied position before March 10, when the disarmament group meets.

### *III Berlin Contingency Planning (Raised at State initiative)*

Mr. Merchant said he would like to refer to Berlin contingency planning in the broadest possible spectrum, not just the military. As the Joint Chiefs knew, the basic forum for this planning was the tripartite group established in Washington under the chairmanship of Mr. Murphy and including the British and French Ambassadors. A few days ago the French proposed that all planning be centered in Paris under General Norstad.<sup>3</sup> The State Department felt that this did not make sense so we have informed the French that we would call a meeting of the tripartite committee in the near future. At the present time we have under way a review of the status of the planning and we wanted to remind the British and the French that we consider it necessary to bring it up to date. In this connection on the non-military side there are only a few items remaining concerning which there is some disagreement. The State Department's general feeling is, however, that it would be desirable to

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 111.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This memorandum described the various summit preparatory working groups and outlined a schedule of meetings for the spring beginning with a Western Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington April 13–14, and ending with the SEATO meeting at Washington May 31–June 2.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Hillenbrand's conversation with Winckler on January 4 during which this proposal was made is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–460.

bring the Germans a little more into the planning and this we would discuss with the British and the French.

[1-1/2 pages of source text not declassified]

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## 67. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 15, 1960, 5:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Canadian Views on Arrangements for Preparation for Summit Meetings

### PARTICIPANTS

The Hon. A.D.P. Heeney—Canadian Ambassador  
Mr. Sol F. Rae, Canadian Minister  
The Hon. Livingston T. Merchant—Acting Secretary  
Edward T. Long—M  
Mr. Wharton D. Hubbard—BNA

Ambassador Heeney, accompanied by the Canadian Minister, S.F. Rae, called on the Acting Secretary at 5:30 p.m., Friday, January 15, 1960.

The Ambassador stated he had received a telegraphic instruction from Canadian External Affairs Minister Green, telling him to call on the Department to explain Canada's views regarding the arrangements for the preparation for the forthcoming Summit Meeting. He gave Mr. Merchant two copies of a paraphrase of the telegraphic instruction<sup>1</sup> and added that he had also received a telephone call that day from Mr. Green emphasizing his concern about this subject. Mr. Heeney pointed out that a similar action was being carried out simultaneously by the Canadian High Commissioner in London and by the Canadian Ambassador in Paris. (Copy of the Canadian paraphrased telegraphic instruction is enclosed.)

Mr. Heeney opened by saying that Mr. Green was preoccupied with the question of the full utilization of the NATO Council mechanism in preparing for the Summit and believed strongly that this was the best

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/1-1560. Secret. Drafted by Hubbard, initialed by Merchant, and approved in M on January 26.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed. This 7-paragraph paraphrase described the Canadian position on presummit working groups [text not declassified].

way in which the entire NATO could be carried along to an effective presentation of the NATO position vis-à-vis the Soviets at the Meeting. This was also the position of Prime Minister Diefenbaker, he said, and the latter might feel obliged to discuss this in the Canadian House of Commons, now in session, if he were questioned on it by Mr. Pearson, Leader of the Opposition.

In describing the Canadian preoccupation, Mr. Heeney began by referring to de Gaulle's letter of September, 1958,<sup>2</sup> proposing the establishment of a Tripartite Directorate for NATO, and to Diefenbaker's emphatic rejection of that idea. The Canadian Ambassador stated this was still the view of the Canadian Government.

*[6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

Ambassador Heeney said the Canadians were well prepared to accept the primacy of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States as the Western Big Three because of their great responsibilities. They also accepted the necessity of Germany being represented on the Working Group of Four discussing Berlin and the general German problem. But this was as far as the Canadians were prepared to go with regard to according special status to Germany and they did not wish to see the Committee of Four concept, inclusive of Germany, extended to the consideration of other problems. *[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

*[1 paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified]*

Mr. Merchant said he thought that this situation was, unfortunately, a matter of confusion and misunderstanding—one which had occurred because of action taken, ironically, to obtain a diametrically different result than that represented by the anxiety of the Canadian Government. This misunderstanding was attributable to two factors.

A good many NATO partners had complained of being left out of things, and Italy was a good example. It was thought that Italy would be mollified by being included in the Working Group of Five—and furthermore, there was merit in her pretensions. Thus, in trying to propitiate Italian demands, and completely inadvertently, the unfortunate illusion seemed to have been gained that this constituted some sort of fundamental change in the NATO mechanism. Mr. Merchant thought that perhaps it might have been better for the United States to forewarn the other NATO Members of the reasons for this step. Mr. Merchant also pointed out that these arrangements had been made at a time when only one Summit Meeting was anticipated and not four, as subsequently became the case. The fact that there were to be four, and not just one, may have given the impression that these procedures were to be permanent. This was not the case.

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<sup>2</sup>For text of de Gaulle's memorandum of September 17, 1958, see vol. VII, Part 2, Document 45.

Another factor concerned the Working Group of Four. Mr. Merchant said there had been a suggestion made at the Council which had been accepted by the United States for a number of reasons:

1) Because of the nature of Khrushchev's gambit, the first and principal topic of consideration was the problem of Berlin and the general question of the future of Germany. It was only natural that Germany should be included in the body set up to consider this subject—and this is how the Working Group of Four had come into existence.

2) In the course of its deliberations, the Working Group of Four had agreed to meet again — irrespective of formal NATO Council meetings—because of the nature of the problem and discussions. But its agenda would remain that of Berlin and Germany.

3) The idea of a Committee of Four had been thought possibly superior to the utilization of the Big Three in considering the German problem for it would obviate the feeling of a de facto tripartite directorate—De Gaulle's original idea.

To pull this background picture together, Mr. Merchant said the United States believed that the Working Group of Four, dealing with the German question, was legitimate, and that this was also the case with the work of the Working Group of Five. Furthermore, since Germany naturally had a very real interest in the disarmament question, and because it seemed best to avoid the creation of any unnecessary, new groups concerning Germany and disarmament, and since three of the Five sat on the Four, this appeared to be a useful way in which to keep the Germans informed in the general disarmament proceedings. There was not, of course, any tie between the two groups except within the NATO Council context. To reiterate, Mr. Merchant said the Five was the sole group concerned with actual work on general disarmament and it would not report to the Four but to the NATO Council.

Mr. Merchant also took the occasion to point out, lest any outside partner believed that its security in disarmament matters was being decided by the Five, that the agenda of this group concerned General Disarmament, a rather ephemeral subject to begin with. There might not be a great deal, in fact, to report to the NATO Council and, finally, to delineate the picture on these two Working Groups possibly more clearly, it could be said that the findings of the Five would naturally be reported to the Four, but as individuals and not as a Group. There was no thought on the part of the United States of establishing a supervisory or intermediary function for the Four.

To finish, Mr. Merchant touched on the third Working Group, that envisaged for East-West Relations. The Italians had questioned the advisability of the Germans sitting in with the Big Three on this matter—thus ostensibly extending the scope of the work of the four powers sitting together from the original agenda of Germany and Berlin. The

United States considered this point well taken and Germany had been persuaded to withdraw from the Group of Four on the question of East-West relations. What remained was the Big Three plus a NATO representative. [9 lines of source text not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Heeney thanked Mr. Merchant for his résumé of the American view of these questions and reiterated that the chief concern of the Canadian Government in this matter was that the ad hoc nature of the Committee of Four be clearly recognized and that no de facto situation should come about even though inadvertently, whereby a screen or supervisory group would be erected between the other NATO partners and the Western Big Three.

For his part, Mr. Merchant said he was glad to have had such a frank discussion with Mr. Heeney. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Both Messrs. Merchant and Heeney agreed that it was not necessary or advisable to make any official, public pronouncements on procedural arrangements developed during the pre-Summit negotiations.

The meeting came to an end at 6:15 p.m.

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## 68. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 18, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Organization of Summit Preparations

### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Manlio Brosio, Italian Embassy  
Minister Carlo Perrone-Capano, Italian Embassy  
Mr. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs  
Mr. McBride, WE  
Mr. Stabler, WE

Ambassador Brosio called at his request and referred to the strong statement which had been made by the Italian representative to the

North Atlantic Council on January 13.<sup>1</sup> Italy now seemed to be facing, the Ambassador said, the organization of a Quadripartite Directorate. [15 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Kohler said that we were very conscious of Italy's problem and in deference to Italian views some adjustments had been made in the organization for Summit preparations. The disarmament group was to be the sole group for the preparations for the Ten-Power Conference and the Summit Meeting. The Germany-Berlin Group seemed to be acceptable because it was limited to that subject alone.

Ambassador Brosio pointed out that the inclusion of Germany in the direction of the preparations, but not Italy, was responsible for the trouble. [10 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (10 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Kohler repeated that we had great sympathy with the Italian position but that in all frankness he could not react favorably [1 line of source text not declassified]. Speaking of our concept of the approach to Summit preparations, Mr. Kohler pointed out that the immediate subject which involved war or peace was Germany and Berlin. It was this subject which had led to the Summit Meeting. Although disarmament was a highly important subject, in fact it took second place to Germany and Berlin. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we have done everything, short of abrogating the special responsibilities of the Three for Berlin and Germany, to resist the creation of special hierarchical positions in NATO. We have done more than probably any other country to consult in NATO. We have resisted French efforts to create a Directorate and we did not propose to create a Four-Power Directorate. In any event, the Italian idea of adding Italy to the Four, thus apparently creating a Five-Power Directorate, was not the answer.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that Germany was not being included in the Working Group on East-West Relations. He said that the East-West Relations question was incidental but that no Head of Government could meet with Khrushchev without talking about it. We had no doubt that President Gronchi would unilaterally discuss this subject with Khrushchev.<sup>2</sup> We had not been consulted on positions which Gronchi would take, although we were sure that the preparations would be sound and solid with respect to the Alliance. Although it was true the East-West Relations item was incidental to the Summit, all the NATO Governments should be concerned with its preparations and a common posi-

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<sup>1</sup> A report on the North Atlantic Council discussion of the schedule of meetings and arrangements relative to a summit meeting was transmitted in Polto 1315 from Paris, January 13. The views of the Italian Permanent Representative at the meeting followed the same lines as those presented by Ambassador Brosio. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-IS/1-1360)

<sup>2</sup> Italian President Gronchi visited the Soviet Union February 6-11.

tion should be reached in NATO. It was for this reason that it was proposed that a NATO observer should attend meetings of the East-West Relations Working Group to represent overall NATO interests.

[16 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Kohler pointed out that he was in no way questioning President Gronchi's visit, but was only endeavoring to point out that the East-West Relations question inevitably came up whenever these meetings occurred, even though it might not be the principal subject.

Ambassador Brosio said that Italy does not question US motives or imply that it is US policy to up-grade Germany and down-grade Italy. However, whatever the intentions, the fact was that this was the way the situation was developing. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

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## 69. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, January 22, 1960, noon.

1343. Brandt has sent me copy of undated, unsigned memorandum given SPD Chairman Ollenhauer January 13 by Soviet Ambassador Smirnov, complaining lack proper understanding essentials Soviet proposals Berlin by certain members SPD executive and particularly Mayor Brandt. (Copies of memorandum as well as Brandt's comments thereon being forwarded by despatch.)<sup>1</sup>

In essence, memorandum, which purports represent views "responsible circles Soviet Union", restates without substantive modification Soviet proposals Berlin and threatens that, unless serious consideration given Soviet formula, Moscow intends conclude peace treaty with Pankow, which would then completely change basis for achieving Berlin solution. Specifically, it says peace treaty would give GDR "absolute sovereignty over its territory and airspace. Therefore, obvious this would mean end to uncontrolled ties between West Berlin

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, London, and Paris.

<sup>1</sup>Transmitted as enclosures to despatch 1148 from Bonn, January 23. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/1-2360) For text of the memorandum, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 69–71, or Embree, *Soviet Union and the German Question*, pp. 220–224.

and Federal Republic and all means access would come completely under GDR control. If West then decided return to question West Berlin, it would have to conduct negotiations directly with GDR." Memorandum then warns that "if Brandt thinks possible ignore sovereign rights GDR, as well as rules it would establish on access, he erring seriously. For, in accordance with its obligations as an Ally, Soviet Union will give GDR all necessary support defense its sovereignty." In view these considerations, hoped West Berlin leadership would "look at situation realistically" and consider acceptable solution West Berlin problem.

Interesting Soviets decided at this date use Smirnov-Ollenhauer-Brandt channel put this message across. (Brandt reportedly convinced one purpose exercise drive wedge between him and SPD leadership.) Perhaps most significant aspect memorandum is that at this juncture Soviet formula for dealing with Berlin question remains unchanged in all essentials.

*For Berlin:* Should Brandt query you as to whether SPD should reply document, suggest you avoid taking any position pending further consideration.<sup>2</sup>

Dowling

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<sup>2</sup>On January 22, the Mission at Berlin reported that Brandt had called in representatives of the three Western Powers to discuss the memorandum. Brandt felt, and the three representatives agreed, that no reply should be made to the memorandum. (Telegram 588 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2260)

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## 70. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, January 24, 1960, 10 p.m.

1358. Paris for USRO, pass to Thurston and Finn. Ref: Deptel 1559.<sup>1</sup> I am fully aware of the difficulties inherent in working out a generally

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/1-2460. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, Ottawa, and Berlin.

<sup>1</sup>Dated January 22, telegram 1559 to Bonn reported that in a conversation with Herter on January 22 Alphand had stated that the four-power Steering or Coordinating Committee should be dissolved. This would solve the problem of representation on the committee, and the West Germans could be informed of summit preparations informally. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-PA/1-2260)



acceptable procedure of national participation in pre-summit consultation. However I wish to point out certain factors which seem to me important with regard to the Federal Government, whose political incarnation, for our purposes, is the Chancellor.

The solution proposed by Alphand is certainly ingenious but, from the German point of view, transparent: it amounts to reducing further the role which the Federal Government will play in the preparations for the summit. We can be certain that the Chancellor will not like it at all and that, given his nature, he will draw conclusions from our acquiescence in it which will feed his already lively sense of suspicion, and his doubts about our ultimate intentions. I must emphasize that my concern is not with Adenauer's feelings, but with their likely effect, in terms of our long-range interests, on US-German relations, and on relations within the Western Alliance generally.

The effect of their proposed solution on Adenauer must be assessed against the present background of a) sustained Soviet attempt to discredit the Chancellor (whatever Khrushchev's protestations) and his policies, b) the Chancellor's own sense of increasing isolation within the Western camp in the face of the Soviet campaign, c) the impact on Western opinion of the recent anti-semitic manifestations in terms of the FedRep's prestige and popularity, d) the low ebb of Anglo-German relations, and e) the Chancellor's own congenital inclination to suspect the worst.

Even if, as seems to me possible, the Chancellor accepts the proposed solution without going through the roof, I am convinced that his silence should not be taken as a sign that he is not disturbed by, and resentful of, it. To what extent this state of mind may breed future difficulties in reaching a united and solid Western negotiating position at the conference table is a matter of judgment. I confess that I am apprehensive.

There is a further point which seems to me important: the more Adenauer feels that what he considers to be Germany's special interests and justified claims are ignored in preparations for the summit, the less he will be likely to associate himself with, or consider himself committed by, Western decisions and positions. I realize that this same argument is valid for, and used by, all other NATO members, but here we have to deal with a country whose attitude is of immediate and critical importance to the outcome of negotiations on Germany and Berlin, and East-West relations. I take it to be in our interest to commit the FedRep to sharing responsibility for Western decisions, and to reduce as far as possible any inclination on its part to dissociate itself from the Western positions, on the ground that it has been excluded from adequate participation in the formulation of such positions. It is surely in the na-

ture of the Chancellor to be particularly sensitive to the foregoing considerations.

Should it nevertheless be decided that we have no alternative to going along with the French suggestion, it seems to me that we might in our own interest, at least get the French to shoulder the principal responsibility. I suggest that the French be asked to inform the Federal Government, in the name of the three powers, of course, of the decision taken, and of the reasons therefor. I should of course prefer suggestion of Ambassador Steel that we leave to plaintiffs in this case onus of pushing Germans aside; but in any case I am concerned to divert Adenauer's immediate reaction away from US, feeling as I do, that he will be especially wounded and incensed that US should appear to have joined in this maneuver without regard for his position.

**Dowling**

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## 71. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 26, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Preparations for the Summit: Germany and Berlin

### PARTICIPANTS

M. Jean Laloy, Director of European Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Foy Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

M. Laloy came in for an informal talk which lasted nearly an hour. The subject matter was mainly the work on Germany and Berlin. The following were high points.

(1) M. Laloy wanted to know how we felt about the maintenance of present rights in Berlin as against a new juridical basis. I reminded him that the President had agreed at Paris<sup>1</sup> that we should stand on our present rights and confirmed that this was our fixed policy.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/1-2660. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler.

<sup>1</sup>For documentation on President Eisenhower's conversations in Paris December 19-21, 1959, with Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer, see Documents 54-60.

(2) M. Laloy asked about our position on possible recognition of the GDR. I told him that unfortunately we had to recognize the fact of the existence of the GDR since it was clear we were not prepared to use force to liberate it. However the United States would certainly not recognize the GDR either *de facto* or *de jure* since it was clear we could not be a party to recognizing as legitimate in any way the Soviet partition of Germany.

(3) M. Laloy was unhappy about the US paper analyzing the contingencies which would face us in the event of an impasse with the Soviets on Berlin and unilateral action on their part.<sup>2</sup> He felt its introduction in quadripartite meetings would shock the Germans and raise their suspicions. He felt that the implication of the paper was that the consequences of an impasse were so fearful as to counsel serious concessions to achieve a *modus vivendi*. I told him that the intent of the paper was rather to present startlingly and provocatively the need for more effective contingency planning to lend conviction to the strong position we expected to take at the Summit. We felt that it was important that the Germans be brought more into this exercise since it lacked reality unless they also took preparatory measures. I said we would welcome any suggestions they might put forward for modification of the presentation.

(4) M. Laloy inquired about our rejection of the recent French proposal to concentrate political and military contingency planning in Paris.<sup>3</sup> I told him that I had not studied this proposal personally since I had been absent at the time of its presentation. I understood, however, that our peoples' reaction had been that instead of creating new machinery the important thing was to reactivate and push on with the existing machinery. In a sense this was what had led to the preparation of such papers as the one discussed in the paragraph above. He said that the French objective in putting forward the proposal had been precisely the same as ours, that is, to make contingency planning more effective. They had felt this could be done better close to General Norstad who would have to carry in any event a great deal of the load. They had not made the proposal out of any desire to enhance the prestige of Paris—they had too many meetings coming up there now in fact. I promised to review the French proposal and let him have my further views.

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<sup>2</sup> The paper under reference has not been identified with certainty. Possibly it is a 9-page summary paper, dated January 15, which considered the consequences of the Western Powers' failure to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on Berlin. (Attached to a memorandum from Kohler to Merchant, January 19; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1960)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 66. On January 18, Hillenbrand told the First Secretary of the French Embassy, Gilles Currien, that this proposal had been discussed with Department of State officials including the Acting Secretary of State who concluded that there was no need to centralize planning in Paris. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1860)

72. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, January 28, 1960.

SUBJECT

Berlin

I. Present Prospect

1. *Prospect.* If we stand on our last Geneva offer at a Summit Khrushchev will, in the view of Ambassador Thompson, go for a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

This view is supported by the intelligence community. NIE 11-4-59<sup>1</sup> says: "If they (the Soviets) decide that further progress is impossible by comparatively mild methods, they will probably make the separate peace treaty". INR's Intelligence Report #8167<sup>2</sup> suggests that the final Western position at Geneva would not meet the "minimum" Soviet requirement "that it cannot be construed as constituting Soviet recognition in perpetuity of Western rights and access arrangements with respect to Berlin, (i.e., it must) stipulate nothing concerning rights . . . If some sort of agreement on Berlin or Germany satisfactory to Moscow did not eventuate before much time had passed, the USSR would probably move to sign a separate peace treaty . . ."<sup>3</sup>

Ambassador Thompson suggests that although Khrushchev would probably wish to draw out the process of negotiating a separate peace treaty, he could conclude that the best time for bold action would be in the period between the US national conventions and the US election.

2. *US. Soviet action* which purported to expunge Western rights in Berlin would represent an evident and major set-back to the US, in view

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Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through EUR, M, and S/S. The source text was initialed by Smith and Calhoun and bears a notation that Merchant saw it. Copies were also sent to Bohlen, Reinhardt, and Hillenbrand. Attached to the source text was a note from Calhoun to Merchant, suggesting that the differences between this memorandum and Kohler's response (see attachment 1 below) should be reconciled before it was submitted to the Secretary of State. Merchant wrote on the note that he believed Herter should see the whole file as it stood rather than one agreed text.

<sup>1</sup>Dated February 9 (presumably Smith saw a preliminary draft). A copy of this 79-page paper, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964," is *ibid.*, INR-NIE Files.

<sup>2</sup>Dated December 2, 1959. A copy of this 11-page paper, "Possible Soviet Position on Berlin and Germany at a Summit Conference," is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS-INR Intelligence Files.

<sup>3</sup>Ellipses in the source text.

of the extent to which the President's prestige has been committed to the prevention of such action. It would make further US efforts to secure a US-Soviet détente through visits and meetings between Heads of State incongruous. The current tack of US policy would be widely considered to have failed.

3. *Allied Attitudes.* I doubt our allies would be willing to use substantial force to prevent the East Germans from performing present Soviet functions regarding access.

(a) The *British* made clear their attitude on this point last year during "contingency planning."

(b) You will recall *Adenauer's* adverse reaction to the prospective use of force in his last 1958 talk with Mr. Dulles,<sup>4</sup> and his September 1959 indication to the President<sup>5</sup> that in the most extreme emergency even the possibility of a free city under UN and four power guarantee could be considered.

(c) The *French* stance seems clearly based on the assumption that the Soviets are bluffing; there is little in past French conduct (e.g., during the recent Berlin flag-flying incident)<sup>6</sup> to indicate that they are any more prepared for a showdown than our other allies.

4. *Probable Result.* Given the President's view (as made clear during "contingency planning" last spring) that any action regarding Berlin must be allied action, these attitudes would probably lead to avoidance of force and a Western accommodation with the East Germans on access. The crumbling of our previous position on this issue under pressure would hardly strengthen our future position in Berlin or enhance US prestige. Against the background of a US election in which our foreign policy is bound to figure prominently, domestic charges that we had suffered a major defeat would compound the damage to our position abroad.

## II. Alternatives

5. *German Unity and Disarmament.* The possibility of avoiding unilateral Soviet action through negotiations on disarmament or German unity does not seem promising. The Germans would not go along with any basic change in our policy on German reunification, and the Soviets would hardly be persuaded to inactivity by minor changes. Nor is there any likelihood of such rapid or substantial progress in disarmament as

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<sup>4</sup> Presumably Smith is referring to Dulles' talks with Adenauer February 7–9, 1959; see vol. VIII, Documents 164 ff.

<sup>5</sup> For documentation on Eisenhower's conversations with Adenauer at Bonn August 26–27, 1959, see Documents 5 and 8. There is no record of any discussions in September between them.

<sup>6</sup> For documentation on the Berlin flag incident in October 1959, see Documents 22 ff.

would be likely to induce the Soviets to hold back on an East German peace treaty.

6. *New Berlin Status.* In the long run, the alternative to Soviet unilateral action would seem to be an agreement which met both the Western requirement for continuing Three Power military presence in and access to Berlin and the Soviet requirement for legal change in Berlin's "occupation status." The President seemed interested before the Paris meeting<sup>7</sup> in the possibility of a new status for Berlin. In his discussion with the other Heads of Government he seemed to be paving the way for such a proposal by stressing the vulnerability of our present position in Berlin to creeping pressure. Adenauer's and de Gaulle's reaction made clear how vigorously they would object to any such proposal now. The Chancellor showed particular sensitivity to its possible effect on his position in the forthcoming German elections.

7. *Holding Action.* Neither standing on our Geneva position, nor discussing German unity and disarmament, nor proposing an immediate change of status thus seem very promising means of forestalling Soviet unilateral action. This suggests the possible desirability of a 1960 "holding" action, which would (i) "freeze" the situation in Berlin until after the US and German elections, (ii) begin somewhat to accustom our allies to the long-term possibility of a new status.

This holding action might consist of a tacit agreement to put Berlin on ice for eighteen months or so, by setting up a Four Power working group to consider means of reducing frictions in Berlin and report back in late 1961. If the Soviets wished some temporary explicit agreement, we could also propose concomitant unilateral declarations by both sides on the order of solution "C" in the London Working Group report,<sup>8</sup> i.e., declarations to avoid disturbing activities and maintain freedom of access, but without any mention of troop reductions or attempt to conclude the kind of formal and comprehensive agreement that would have to deal with the "rights" issue.

8. *Procedure.* If our allies agreed, Ambassador Thompson could be instructed to convey a Presidential proposal to Khrushchev for a tacit temporary "freeze" before the May Summit. Such a personal approach might appeal to Khrushchev's desire for direct high-level dealings.

In suggesting this unarticulated "freeze" to Khrushchev the Presidential message could indicate the difficulties of substantive negotiations until after the US and German elections. The President could also

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<sup>7</sup> For documentation on President Eisenhower's meetings with de Gaulle, Macmillan, and Adenauer in Paris December 19–21, 1959, see Documents 54–60.

<sup>8</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 270. Solution C of the section on Berlin suggested various declarations that might be made during an interim cooling off period by any or several of the powers involved in the Berlin crisis.

refer to the hopeful beginnings at Camp David, and suggest the need for patience in such difficult matters.

Other channels would simultaneously be used, as indicated in paragraph 10, below, to make clear to Khrushchev the deadly serious view that the US would take of any unilateral Soviet action in the meantime.

If agreement on the freeze could thus be reached before the Summit, the Summit meeting could soft-pedal Berlin and perhaps come up with enough sweetening from other sources—e.g., one or more modest “token” steps toward disarmament—to save face all around.

9. *Our Allies.* In suggesting this procedure to our allies the President would indicate that the US position in post-“freeze” negotiations would be for his successor to determine but that he personally would not exclude from the range of possible alternatives a change of status which maintained the Western military presence in and access to Berlin if a *détente* was otherwise developing.

In seeking thus to pave the way for some eventual shift in the allied position, we might:

(a) remind the Chancellor of von Brentano’s suggestion to you on August 27, 1959,<sup>9</sup> that “if we could get a moratorium for three years, which would carry through the next German elections, and in the interim period began to work out some status for Berlin which the Berliners as well as the Russians would accept, this would be a desirable thing”, and von B’s further statement that “he envisaged some kind of free or guaranteed city with UN responsibility made an important element of the settlement”;

(b) emphasize to de Gaulle that the alternative to such a “freeze”, in our view, might have to be negotiations for a definitive settlement of the Berlin question at the forthcoming Summit—leaving it to him to appreciate the advantage of postponing such a difficult and decisive negotiation until he had made more progress on nuclear matters and possibly toward an Algerian settlement;

(c) expose our allies, as now intended, to some of the nastier aspects of a rigid line on Berlin by reactivating contingency planning and by seeking West German participation in such planning.

10. *USSR.* To sell Khrushchev a deal which thus deferred the end of occupation status without any troop cuts or ceiling in the meantime, we will need not only the unspoken *carrot* of possible post-“freeze” progress but also the explicit *stick* of a deterrent concept, projecting US reactions to any unilateral Soviet move in the meantime. We could devise various means—preferably on a non-attributable basis, such as press leaks or a “Foreign Affairs” type article—for doing this in a way that would avoid the counter-productive effects of governmental threats but

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<sup>9</sup> See Document 7.

create a convincing if muted background to Khrushchev's consideration of our proposal. It could be pointed out through such means that unilateral Soviet action would spell the end of the current détente and might involve such specific US countermoves as:

- (a) suspension of further high level visits by US and Soviet government officials;
- (b) slowdown on the program for increased exchanges and cultural contacts between the US and USSR;
- (c) backing away, for the same reason, from any significant steps toward trade relaxation;
- (d) slowdown in disarmament negotiations, since we would not wish to conclude major new agreements with the USSR at the very time it was denouncing existing agreements;
- (e) a greater US arms build-up, on account of the more threatening Soviet policy reflected in the Berlin crisis;
- (f) increased consideration of "nuclear sharing" with our allies, similarly to heighten the free world's state of military readiness;
- (g) retaliatory moves against Soviet shipping on the high seas and step-up in propaganda to Eastern Europe.

#### IV. [*sic*] Conclusion

11. *Implementation.* If such a program commends itself, you may wish to:

- (a) discuss its broad outlines with the President;
- (b) direct that this proposal (i) be included in planning for the Adenauer and de Gaulle visits to the US, (ii) be made the subject of consultation with the UK at an appropriate stage;
- (c) direct State-CIA planning of a comprehensive program for floating a "deterrent concept", designed to deter unilateral Soviet action which would purport to expunge our rights in Berlin.

**[Attachment 1]**<sup>10</sup>

#### **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, January 29, 1960.

SUBJECT

Berlin

I have noted and passed the attached memorandum dated January 28 on the subject of Berlin in order not to delay or impede its considera-

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<sup>10</sup> Secret. Sent through S/S and M. The source text was initialed by Kohler and Calhoun and checked by Merchant. Copies were also sent to Merchant and Smith.



tion by the Secretary. However, I disagree with the analysis and recommendations in several fundamental respects, notably:

(1) The intelligence analysis and Ambassador Thompson's suggestions are dated. Since then, despite lack of any alteration in fundamental positions, there have been suggestions emanating both from Khrushchev and from Ulbricht that the Soviet side is not anxious to precipitate another crisis of the type provoked by Khrushchev in November 1958. Steps could of course be taken to enhance this reluctance, e.g., by disabusing Khrushchev as to US weakness during the post-convention period and reviving and strengthening contingency planning. I agree that we must prepare for unilateral Soviet action and that it might come. However, it is in my opinion too early to reach a firm estimate that it will inevitably come.

(2) The reactivated contingency planning and its extension to include the Germans would give us a real test of the firmness of our allies. I am not willing at this stage to accept the estimate in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the attached.

(3) My present view is that the way out of an impasse at the May Summit on Berlin, if we stand firm and united there, will be agreement on some machinery to continue a negotiating posture, e.g., Deputy Foreign Ministers' arrangement and/or agreement on another East-West Summit.

(4) I have carefully considered a pre-Summit unilateral US approach to Khrushchev and believe it would be a mistake. I believe Khrushchev would consider it a breach of faith and/or a sign of weakness and that we would be unable to allay the suspicions of our allies, especially the Germans. Moreover, it would put us at the mercy of Khrushchev if he chose to publicize; and, in any event, would involve serious risk of most embarrassing leaks.

(5) I consider us committed to pursue negotiations and discussions with our allies in the Germany–Berlin Working Group much further before developing firm unilateral US initiatives. I should not object of course to putting into this forum for consideration an appropriately worded version of the S/P memorandum.

[Attachment 2]<sup>11</sup>

**Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for  
Policy Planning (Smith) to the Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs (Merchant)**

Washington, February 1, 1960.

SUBJECT

Berlin

I agree with a number of points in Foy Kohler's thoughtful comment on the S/P Berlin proposal:

1. I agree that the Soviets would not welcome another Berlin crisis, and favor floating a deterrent concept and pushing for a tacit temporary freeze to make them even more hesitant. But I doubt (and I gather the intelligence area does not believe) that the Soviets will delay indefinitely in the absence of progress toward agreement. That is why I would favor using the time gained through a freeze to accustom our allies to the possibility of an eventual change of status.

2. I agree that revived contingency planning will give us a firmer line on allied attitudes about the use of force. The Chancellor's past remarks to the President and Mr. Dulles and British attitudes during the last contingency exercise, however, give a fairly good clue.

3. I agree that machinery for continued negotiating may be an important element of a tacit freeze. But we may need more: a private approach (perhaps not beforehand, for the reasons Foy suggests) to Khrushchev to make clear why a temporary stand-still is needed, an agreed deadline for the continued negotiations—e.g. the Working Group to report back to a Summit in late 1961, and perhaps some reciprocal declarations on the order of London Working Group Solution "C".

4. I agree that a unilateral US approach or proposal, in the absence of allied agreement, would be a mistake. I intended that we should only propose a tacit temporary freeze with allied consent.

5. As to the next step: I should think that the general approach ought to be discussed with the President (perhaps when the Secretary inquires of his present view as to the juridical question) before being put to our allies. If it *is* to be put to our allies, I wonder if—instead of this being done in the Working Group—it might not be made the subject of a high level discussion, perhaps during the planned Adenauer visit. Floating the deterrent concept might, however, be initiated immediately by CIA and ourselves.

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<sup>11</sup> Secret. Sent through S/S. The source text was initialed by Calhoun and Smith. A copy was sent to Kohler.

**73. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State**

Bonn, February 2, 1960, 5 p.m.

1428. Paris also pass USRO. Deptel 1625.<sup>1</sup> Upon receipt this morning of Polto 285 sent Dept Polto 1494,<sup>2</sup> I consulted Brit and Fr Amb. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

I then learned that von Brentano was leaving at three p.m. for party conference in Wiesbaden, thence for London for WEU meeting, and when nothing had been heard from Seydoux at one o'clock I decided to see Minister on personal basis.

In response my query whether decision reached on Steering Committee, von Brentano said Chancellor, after first refusing to consider dissolution, had finally agreed most reluctantly to go along with Western proposal. Brentano said he had pointed out to Adenauer that basis of collaboration with US was mutual trust, rather than form of consultation, that US could be relied upon to continue close working relations with FRG on summit preparations, and that Ger participation could continue on informal basis provided this concession made to form. Adenauer, he said, was apprehensive, not only re participation, but also re Ger public opinion.

In conclusion, Brentano said FRG was making this further sacrifice in order eliminate difficulties in NATO. But this was limit to which they could go and he trusted no further concessions would be asked of them.

Upon my return to Emb, Seydoux came to tell me he had finally been told by Paris he could not "associate himself" with representations at ambassadorial level but that he could send Embassy officer to FonOff "today or perhaps tomorrow" to inquire re Ger decision.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 374.800/2–260. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Paris and London.

<sup>1</sup> Dated January 30, telegram 1625 to Bonn informed the Embassy that if the question of the dissolution of the Steering Committee were not raised at the North Atlantic Council meeting on February 1, then the three Ambassadors at Bonn should raise the issue with Brentano on Tuesday. (*Ibid.*, 374.800/1–2960)

<sup>2</sup> Dated February 1, this telegram reported that no word had been received from the West Germans by 8 p.m. on February 1. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–PA/2–160)

I told Seydoux of my talk with Brentano, pointing out that I had made no representations but had merely inquired re Ger views. I have also informed Steel.<sup>3</sup>

**Dowling**

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<sup>3</sup> In a subsequent telegram on February 2, Dowling reported that Brentano had made it clear that the Chancellor was not prepared to yield on German participation in a Foreign Ministers meeting in April or on a Western summit in May. Brentano also indicated that Adenauer was "dismayed and even angered" by the lack of tripartite support for the Federal Republic on this issue. (Telegram 1432 from Bonn; *ibid.*, 374.800/2-260)

On February 3, Burgess reported that German NATO Permanent Representative Gebhardt von Walther had also reported Federal Republic agreement to the dissolution of the Steering Committee with the same proviso, that consultations would be as full as possible, and specifically that the subject of disarmament would be included. (Polto 1505 from Paris, repeated to Bonn as Polto 288; *ibid.*, 375.5/2-360)

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#### 74. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 2, 1960, 8 p.m.

1433. Reference: White/Dowling letter January 20.<sup>1</sup> Subject: Berlin aid program. My understanding is that Department will actively seek authorization for 6.75 million dollars for Berlin for FY 61 providing 4 million dollars for hospital and contingently 2.75 million dollars for East Zone projects. In absence of a new emergency likely that funds for East Zone projects for FY 61 can be met through reprogramming of existing counterpart accounts.

However, I am concerned about the possibility no aid for Berlin will be included in FY 62 budget. I feel strongly it would be unwise abruptly to cut off aid program here after FY 61. West Berlin cannot be compared with countries enjoying full national sovereignty for purposes of Mansfield amendment. Under present arrangements we have sovereign responsibilities in West Berlin.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.5-MSP/2-260. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> This letter reported on the status of the Mutual Security Program for Berlin as summarized in this telegram and asked for Dowling's comments on the timing and means of presentation of the cuts to the Germans. (*Ibid.*, 762A.5-MSP/1-2060)

Any decision to terminate program is almost bound to become known; whether officially conveyed, publicly announced or the result of a leak, repercussions would be unfortunate.

This kind of news coming on eve of summit meeting would be blown up out of all proportions in Berlin and Western Germany and indeed in East. Berliners and leading Germans, including the Chancellor, watch our every move for its bearing on our determination to stand by Berlin. Envisions [*Evidence?*] of diminishing interest would be interpreted as signifying U.S. decision to abandon Berlin and Berliners. It is my considered view, therefore, that budgetary planning for FY 62 at this stage should clearly be based upon decision appropriate level of Berlin aid will be maintained for FY 62 level, to be determined on basis of project or projects for West Berlin to be submitted, as well as maintenance of approximately present level of aid for East Zone projects. Extent to which reprogramming makes unnecessary use of appropriated funds as compared with authorization can be left for determination at later date.

I should like to stress in this connection minimal cost of the program in terms of our direct responsibilities in Berlin as well as massive aid which now contributed by Federal Republic which in last budget in direct budgetary contribution amounted to some 269 million dollars exclusive of some 18 million dollars for the direct maintenance and support of our forces in Berlin.

With regard to East Zone projects I have already made my position clear in recent letter to Hillenbrand.<sup>2</sup>

**Dowling**

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<sup>2</sup>Not found.

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## 75. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 5, 1960, 6 p.m.

1468. Paris pass USRO. Adenauer will be unhappy re nature of further Summit preparations outlined Deptel 1658.<sup>1</sup> As reported in my tele-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/2-560. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and Ottawa.

<sup>1</sup>Dated February 3, telegram 1658 to Bonn transmitted a draft schedule of the April 13–14 sessions at the Foreign Ministers meeting, which had a session on disarmament first and did not include the West Germans. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-PA/2-360)

gram 1432 (sent Department only), Brentano was explicit in saying Germans could accept no changes in Foreign Ministers and heads of government meetings, and this was also made clear by von Walther in Paris (Polto 288) as condition for German acceptance demise of Steering Committee.<sup>2</sup>

I would hope therefore that if proposal decided upon, it could be put forward to Chancellor in positive sense as giving satisfaction to Italians and smaller NATO powers without impinging too much upon our prior commitment to him re quadripartite meetings. To do this, it seems to me following would be required:

1. Rescheduling of proposed meetings of Foreign Ministers so that first and second would be quadripartite on Germany including Berlin, these to be followed by meeting of three with Spaak, then that of five on disarmament, and series concluded with meeting of Six with President.
2. Renewed assurance of full if informal consultations with Germans on disarmament and East-West relations prior to Foreign Ministers meetings.
3. A binding commitment to him that if above schedule of Foreign Ministers meeting accepted we will hold fast to original concept of meeting of heads of government on quadripartite basis.

I believe further that foregoing must be presented to Chancellor as US suggestion at least simultaneously with approach to British and French, rather than proposal already agreed to tripartitely. This would give him feeling of being consulted instead of being faced with fait accompli. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

I do not mean to imply changes indicated above would make proposal palatable to Adenauer. At best, it might elicit counter-proposal or perhaps even reluctant consent, rather than flat rejection and strong reaction which any tripartite proposal as outlined reference telegram would most surely bring.<sup>3</sup>

**Dowling**

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 73.

<sup>3</sup> Following further comments from London, Paris, and Rome on the schedule of sessions, the Embassy in Bonn was instructed on February 11 to see the Chancellor and suggest a schedule that had the first Foreign Ministers meeting discussing Germany including Berlin, followed by a five-power meeting on disarmament. (Telegram 1739 to Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/2-1160) Dowling met with Adenauer on February 15, informed him of this draft schedule, and assured him that the four-power Western summit meeting in May would not be affected by any arrangements for the Foreign Ministers meeting. The Chancellor agreed to the schedule, saying that he saw advantages to all concerned. (Telegram 1544 from Bonn, February 15; *ibid.*, 396.1-WA/2-1560)

**76. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, February 8, 1960, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summit Preparations—Germany including Berlin

I showed the President the paper setting forth the six principles to govern the allied position in connection with Berlin which has been tabled by the French<sup>1</sup> as having been agreed to during the meeting of the three Western Heads of Government in Paris in December. I told the President that our own records of the tripartite meeting,<sup>2</sup> as well as the records of General De Gaulle's summary thereof at the following day's meeting,<sup>3</sup> did not indicate as rigid a position as the attached memorandum would warrant. The President told me he thought he had made it clear that the United States would not give up its rights or be forced to give up its rights, or volunteer to give up its rights, unless arrangements were made that all parties concerned felt would give greater strength to the position of Berlin over a period of years than is the case with the present situation.

He then discussed at some length his worries about the possibility of a slow strangulation of West Berlin through acts of the GDR which would not necessarily be in contravention of our agreements with the Soviets. Accordingly, he felt perhaps a more solid arrangement assuring the economic access of Western Berlin to the West might possibly be worked out. He likewise asked that he be given a condensed briefing paper on the juridical position of Berlin with particular application to civilian rather than military access to the West.<sup>4</sup>

I told him I did not feel we were in a position to recommend to him any specific proposals at this time, but that before the visit of Chancellor Adenauer we might have recommendations as to what it would be most advantageous for him to discuss with the Chancellor in this field.

**C.A.H.**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/2-860. Secret. Drafted by Krebs. The conversation took place at the White House.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Designated II WWG/5.3, this paper provided for the maintenance of the Allied juridical position in Berlin, Western military forces in the city, Allied responsibilities with regard to reunification, existing links between Berlin and the Federal Republic, freedom of communication with the city, and that any agreement on Berlin could not be denounced except by mutual consent.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 57.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 60.

<sup>4</sup> A 1-1/2-page paper responding to this request was transmitted to the President on February 19 by Secretary Herter. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1160)

77. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State

Rome, February 13, 1960, 7 p.m.

2882. Paris also for USRO and Thurston. Highlights of official Gronchi-Khrushchev talks<sup>1</sup> given us by Straneo (Foreign Ministry Dir Gen of Pol Affairs) in following terms. (He expected Alessandrini<sup>2</sup> in Paris would be instructed to give report soon to NAC.)

Khrushchev spoke throughout with semblance of full conviction in Communist theory and with great confidence in Soviet economic and military power, in certainty of eventual triumph of "socialism" and in logical strength of current Soviet negotiating positions. He said in effect that, if West agrees on desirability of reducing international tensions, necessary and obvious first step is liquidation of consequences of world war; change in present frontiers is unthinkable; East German state exists and fact should be recognized; Berlin should in its entirety be incorporated into GDR; nevertheless as real concession to West USSR had been able to persuade GDR to agree to West Berlin being free city (with elimination of propaganda and reduction of troops to symbolic force) and to USSR controlling access routes, as to which USSR prepared to give appropriate guarantee.

Khrushchev said he knew Gronchi had in mind to propose entire Berlin as free city. This would never be acceptable since it would mean liquidation of Socialist regime in East Berlin. USSR, while sympathizing with policies of foreign Communist parties, because of correctness of their policies, does not interfere in internal affairs of other states. Confident of superior strength of their forces, USSR will not agree to any measures which mean cancellation of Socialist gains. President Eisenhower had admitted situation in Berlin was abnormal. If solution not found at forthcoming summit meeting, USSR will turn over control of access to GDR.

Reunification, according to Khrushchev, is impossible concept; there could be confederation of two Germanies and, if this was achieved, peace treaty could be made with confederation. If this solution not possible, separate treaties should be concluded with each of two Germanies. Khrushchev said he planned to proceed on this line; that US had objected; and that he had said to President Eisenhower that US had

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.00/2-1360. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Bonn.

<sup>1</sup> Italian Prime Minister Gronchi visited the Soviet Union February 6-11.

<sup>2</sup> Adolfo Alessandrini, Italian Permanent Representative to NATO.



acted unilaterally in concluding peace treaty with Japan, that USSR had gone along and that he did not see why West should object now if he proceeded unilaterally with GDR.

As sidelight on “symbolic” forces in West Berlin, Khrushchev said he had no firm views on exact numbers. For his part, he had told President Eisenhower he would prefer to see Western forces number one hundred thousand because all forces in West Berlin would at once be taken prisoner in case of war; to which President Eisenhower had agreed.

On disarmament, Khrushchev agreed that it was important to get on with discussions but, if West was trying to give disarmament precedence over German questions as trick to maintain status quo, he was not such a fool as to fall into trap. Disarmament negotiations would last at least four years—Americans thought longer—and he would not accept postponement of settlement of Berlin and German questions.

Gronchi stressed difficulty of settling these questions without consent of peoples concerned saying for example, solution could not be imposed on people of West Berlin. Khrushchev replied he had no intention of doing this. Germany had attacked USSR, had come close to Moscow and Berlin had eventually been occupied; Berlin’s status must be settled in framework of liquidation of war without consulting people.

On substance of disarmament, Khrushchev said Americans were most illogical. When he proposed nuclear ban, US said this was inequitable because USSR would retain preponderance in conventional force. Now that the Soviets were reducing latter, West refused to follow suit. Nevertheless he was prepared to proceed in both fields at the same time. He was prepared to accept control and inspection within certain limitations in agreed zones. He referred at one point to proposal, which he said he had made but which Straneo could not identify, for limitations in zone consisting of both Germanies and France. Khrushchev said important step in reducing international tension would be withdrawal of all US forces from Europe and said that, in exchange, Soviet troops would be withdrawn from non-Soviet European countries in which they were now stationed, which he identified as including only Hungary, Poland and East Germany. In response to specific questions from Embassy officer, Straneo said there had been no mention of proposal made some time ago for nuclear-free zone in Balkans and Italy or (except in context of general US withdrawal from Europe) to stationing of missiles in Italy.

In economic field, Khrushchev said US economy would be surpassed by end of seven year plan, that plan had been based on conservative estimate and that first year showed overall results one percent better than predicted. Strength of Soviet economy enabled USSR to help underdeveloped countries such as India and they would do this regardless of social systems of such countries. USSR would not extend aid in

cooperation with West because USSR could not afford to have its principles compromised by association with exploitation of these peoples by Western capitalism, as he chose to describe our aid program.

Zellerbach

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**78. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, February 16, 1960, 1 p.m.

2147. German Amb called on me today to ask my opinion of his analysis current situation of Berlin and German problems. He read from written document which he is presumably submitting to his govt. Main points follow.

1. Khrushchev wishes to settle these problems by negotiation rather than by ultimatum and unilateral action but is unwilling to wait indefinitely.

2. Khrushchev desires appointment of all-German commission to deal with reunification problem. If such commission were appointed it is unclear whether he would insist upon a provisional Berlin solution or would be willing to leave matters as they are.

3. It is unclear whether Khrushchev would accept any Berlin solution which did not provide for the end of occupation status.

4. If Khrushchev does not get a Berlin solution or important step toward solution German problem he will proceed with separate peace treaty although it unclear how quickly this would be done.

5. Ulbricht recently mentioned possibility Sov bloc concluding peace treaty with East Germany and Western Powers concluding peace treaty with Western Germany. It is unclear what Khrushchev position is on this problem.

I told Amb I agreed generally with his analysis subject to full comments. With respect to point 5 it appeared to me Khrushchev's position was clear as Sovs had frequently mentioned this possibility which

clearly was unacceptable to West. With respect to point 2 I thought his attitude on Berlin question would depend upon how far West would go toward a solution of over-all problem. For example, if commission was obliged to complete its work by early fixed date he would obviously be less insistent on Berlin solution.

From subsequent discussion it was clear that Amb's personal view is that best way to avoid showdown on Berlin and gain time is to agree to some sort of all-German commission although he would prefer to have it in form of technical talks or meeting of delegations. I gathered however that he was very dubious that Adenauer would agree to such solution.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

I told Kroll I thought that in determining its policy West should carefully examine alternative courses of action in event agreement not reached at summit and Khrushchev proceeded with separate treaty. Amb fully agreed. I expressed personal observation that it appeared to me Adenauer, suspecting weakness on part of West—particularly Brit and US—was attempting to offset this by being unduly rigid which would make difficult coordination of Western position. Amb indicated he personally agreed with this observation.

Thompson

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## 79. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 16, 1960.

### SUBJECT

April Foreign Ministers' Meeting

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy

M. Claude Lebel, Minister, French Embassy

Mr. William J. Porter, AFN

Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Alphand, who was seeing the Secretary on another matter, asked if he could raise the U.S. proposal for the Four Power For-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/2-1660. Confidential. Drafted by McBride and approved in S on February 20. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 3435, February 16 at 9:02 p.m. (*Ibid.*)

eign Ministers' meeting regarding which Mr. Kohler had informed Mr. Lebel and Lord Hood the day before.<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Alphand said that the decision to have the Foreign Ministers' meeting consist of representatives of the U.S., U.K., France and Germany had been taken during the Western Summit in Paris in December by the four. He thought that the decision, if any, to change this framework should be taken also by the four or at least tripartitely. He said that the new U.S. proposal had come without warning and that the French Government had been confronted with a *fait accompli* because of the fact that we had consulted with the Germans, Canadians and Italians and had instructed Ambassador Burgess to talk to Spaak before or simultaneously with consultation with the British and French. He said that the French Government objected to this procedure. He thought that if each of the four who had originally made the decision regarding the Foreign Ministers' meeting propose some different proposition to others without prior consultation, the result would be chaotic.

The Secretary said that he thought our proposal was logical in relation to the groups which were now engaged in preparatory work. Since it seemed most likely that disarmament questions would arise at the Summit, it was difficult to envisage discussions of disarmament items without the presence of the Canadians and Italians. Ambassador Alphand said that he agreed with the Secretary's point and that the French objections were more to the absence of prior tripartite consultation than they were to the substance of our proposal. The Secretary said that our proposal had been merely intended as a suggestion and as a basis for the comments of others. Ambassador Alphand reiterated the French objection to the procedure which had been followed and that it would be difficult for us, for example, if France were to make suggestions to others directly without consultation with us. He added that if the British, for example, were to make certain proposals to others it would likewise be difficult both for the French and for ourselves.

Passing to the substance of the proposal, Ambassador Alphand said that the French agreed with much of the substance of our suggestion but objected to one point and that was to the presence of Mr. Spaak. He said the French view was that Spaak had no authority in the East-West relations committee. He said he presumed it was the presence of a NATO representative on this committee which led us to propose the inclusion of a NATO person during the April Foreign Ministers' meeting. He stressed that the French did not think that this meant Spaak should

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<sup>1</sup>Memoranda of Kohler's conversations with Lebel and Hood, with Ambassador Brosio, and with Rae on February 15, during which he presented the U.S. proposal for the sessions at the Foreign Ministers meeting, are *ibid.*, 396.1-PA/2-1560.

be present during the April Foreign Ministers' meeting and that on the other hand it only placed the French in an embarrassing position since they would have to make known their objections to Spaak's presence.

Reverting to the procedure, Ambassador Alphan said that the French Government hoped this method of operation would not be applied by us in the future. He then said that insofar as this particular proposal was concerned, it was acceptable to the French except for the Spaak problem. The Secretary inquired if the French were planning to make known their opposition directly to Spaak, to which Ambassador Alphan replied in the affirmative. The Secretary said that in this general connection we had felt it desirable to proceed as we had because in the past there had been certain difficulties in making progress. The Secretary referred to the fact that when we had hoped that the French would be willing to take the initiative in approaching the Germans with regard to the abolition of the Steering Group, the French had been unwilling to help and had left us to bear the brunt of this operation, even though we had already taken the lead with the Germans on previous difficult occasions.

The Secretary said that we had included Mr. Spaak in order to solve the problem of NATO consultation which we considered was an important one. He said he thought the inclusion of Spaak would take care of this problem and that we did not see readily any alternative possibility. Ambassador Alphan then referred to the East-West relations committee meeting in Paris<sup>2</sup> and the fact that the NATO observer thereon did not make reports directly to the NATO Council. The Secretary pointed out that it was agreed there would be reports to NATO only on the basis of the agreement of the three. Ambassador Alphan repeated that the US suggestion for the presence of a NATO representative at the April meeting had not been accepted by his Government.

After repeating again that the French Government hoped this procedure could be avoided in the future, Ambassador Alphan said that another problem at the April meeting was the need for certain tripartite discussions. He said he realized that the US proposal was designed to do at the ministerial level what is now being done in the preparatory committees. Nevertheless, he thought that a problem was posed because provision was not made for tripartite consultation and we were already engaged in tripartite discussions on much more important subjects. The Secretary agreed that our objective was simply to lift the level of the committees now meeting and to have them meet at the Ministerial level.

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<sup>2</sup>See Document 112.

Pursuing the matter, Ambassador Alphand asked if, in effect, the role of Spaak would be that of an observer. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. Ambassador Alphand said he assumed our thought was that Spaak would give his views, if asked. He inquired as to whether there could be tripartite meetings without Spaak on other subjects. The Secretary said that we never excluded tripartite talks on any subject and they could, of course, be held although we hoped that they would not be advertised. Ambassador Alphand pointed out that after all the three countries were the ones who would be facing the Soviets and that they would have to have practical coordination of their views at the ministerial or ambassadorial level. He added that there would also have to be coordination on an agenda. The Secretary agreed and Ambassador Alphand concluded that he would report back to Paris on this subject.

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## 80. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 18, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Donald Cook, Chief of the London Bureau, *N.Y. Herald Tribune*  
Assistant Secretary Andrew H. Berding

### SUBJECT

Background Conversation

Mr. Cook concentrated his first questions on the new passes issued by the Soviet Union to U.S., U.K., and French military liaison officers in East Germany.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary said he did not consider these passes the equivalent of the Soviet threat to turn over all control of access to Berlin to the East Germans, but it was one step short of that. We will now seek to find out what the main purpose of the Soviets is in issuing these new passes. We are discussing what to do with the British and the French. We may have to close our military mission in East Germany and require

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Official Use Only. Drafted by Berding and approved by Herter. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the question of passes for the Western Liaison Military Missions in East Germany, see Documents 283 ff.

the Soviets to close out their missions in West Germany. We are now evaluating the utility of our missions. (Mr. Cook said his information was that our missions are not very useful in gathering information in East Germany and that we get better information from other sources.) The Secretary agreed with Mr. Cook that the British had hoped to reach some accommodation by going along with the Soviet passes, but the French and ourselves are opposed to accepting them. However, agreement between us and the British on a position concerning the passes is now a question of wording rather than of substance. We cannot permit this matter to drag out any longer, and need to make our position clear soon. The U.S. position is that we cannot accept the passes as presently drawn up. We do not consider that this move by the Soviets is sufficient to warrant calling off the Summit Conference with Khrushchev. We have been embarrassed by the fact that the newspapers have discussed this matter before we were in position to take it up with the Soviets. We intend to take a firm stand and will be much interested to know the Soviet response to our stand.

Mr. Cook commented that the British are willing to accept *de facto* recognition of the East German government and therefore are willing to agree to such steps as the passes which move in the direction of ever greater *de facto* recognition. The Secretary said he was glad that the question had arisen with regard to passes and not on access over the Autobahn.

Mr. Cook commented that there seems to be a gradual move toward the acceptance of actions which would constitute more recognition for the East German government. He mentioned that correspondents were previously able to go to Berlin with military automobile tags and passes and now they have to have East German government visas. Some correspondents already had 30 or 40 such visas.

The Secretary said that the East Berlin government is breathing down Khrushchev's neck all the time to get Khrushchev to take further action to bolster the prestige of the East German government.

The Secretary said that Khrushchev's position with regard to Berlin as the Summit Conference approaches is fairly hard. Certainly the statements Khrushchev has made would seem to make it very difficult for him to take anything but a hard position. On the other hand the Soviets may be seeking to build up an atmosphere in advance of the conference and there could be no telling what they will actually do at the conference itself. Such has been their method of maneuver at times in the past. It would be surprising if a Berlin agreement could be reached at the Summit. As to whether Khrushchev would take some unilateral action following an unsuccessful summit conference, it is possible that he might seek to do so in the period between the national conventions and the elections, when he might feel that there was a lack of unity in the

Western camp. In this respect however Khrushchev would be vulnerable if it is obvious that there has been some degree of negotiations on Berlin at the Summit.

On disarmament, the Secretary said he thought we would get a Western disarmament position by the time we meet with the Soviets in March. This position would include nuclear disarmament. There have been different lines of approach between the five Western members of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee. The Secretary talked to the British delegate, Ormsby-Gore, after the Secretary's talk at the National Press Club<sup>2</sup> today, and they agreed that anything concerning disarmament was extremely complicated since one problem led to many others. The French delegate, Moch, has been inhibited because of his restricted instructions.

The Secretary said he did not know what the French attitude would be, following the French atomic explosion in the Sahara, with regard to suspension of nuclear testing. The Secretary expected to be in Paris on May 12 for a Foreign Ministers meeting preceding the Summit Meeting. He thought the Summit would last about one week. It is questionable whether the Summit Meeting could start all over again from the beginning of the Geneva conference last summer. However there is every likelihood that Khrushchev would present a proposal for separate peace treaties for two Germanies, which would mean that the Summit Conference would start with the beginning of the Geneva conference.

It is possible that the Summit Conference will arrive at nothing more than certain general principles, and then pass these on to the Foreign Ministers to work out concretely.

Mr. Cook asked if we would be willing to settle for a temporary agreement on Berlin at the price of our de facto recognition of the East Berlin government. The Secretary said no, and we would never come anywhere near this. He recalled that Gromyko had suggested at Geneva that we sign a separate peace treaty with the East German government and that Gromyko would not regard this as de facto recognition and we could call it something else.

In answer to a question as to whether we had any date in mind for the settlement of outstanding issues with the Soviets, the Secretary said there was one date and that was the Berlin [*German*] elections in 1961. Adenauer has been inhibited in agreeing with Western proposals because he does not feel he can make any concessions prior to the German elections. Our hope therefore has been that we could find something in the way of a temporary agreement which would get over that hump

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<sup>2</sup> For text of Herter's address to the National Press Club and the question-and-answer session that followed, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 7, 1960, pp. 354-361.



until a new German government came in which would perhaps be willing to take more chances. Adenauer is pretty much of a one-man government. We had the experience at Geneva of seeing von Brentano propose something and then Adenauer completely reverse him. In some respects it is like dealing with the Russians in that it is a one-man government.

Mr. Cook prospected the idea that we might find de Gaulle winding up everything for the West by making a deal with Khrushchev when Khrushchev visits Paris next month. The Secretary agreed that this was a possibility and agreed with Mr. Cook that de Gaulle's statement last year with regard to the Oder–Neisse boundary<sup>3</sup> was a far-reaching one which would have drawn great wrath upon us if we had made it. The Secretary agreed with Mr. Cook that de Gaulle's statement in a letter to Khrushchev<sup>4</sup> with regard to the Yellow Peril was likewise a far-reaching one. He granted Mr. Cook's supposition that we might find the diplomatic situation entirely changed by the time we got to Paris for the Summit Conference. But we might well be glad to have de Gaulle try to settle the difficult question of Germany and Berlin if he could.

The conversation closed with Mr. Cook expressing his admiration for the outstanding job being done by Amb. Whitney. The Secretary concurred.

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<sup>3</sup> For text of de Gaulle's press conference on March 25, 1959, at which this statement was made, see *Statements*, pp. 41–51.

<sup>4</sup> Not identified further.

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## 81. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 24, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Preparations for Discussion of Germany Including Berlin at Summit

### PARTICIPANTS

German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe  
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

Ambassador Grewe said he was going to be away a week at Squaw Valley but felt it desirable to have a prior discussion with Mr. Kohler

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2–2460. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and initialed by Kohler.

regarding the present state of preparations for Summit discussion of Germany including Berlin. He referred to the Reston article in this morning's *New York Times* relative to a possible proposal for a plebiscite to be made at the Summit.<sup>1</sup> He described it as unfortunate that this had to appear in the newspapers before any decision had been taken on it. After referring to the press line which the Department spokesmen were taking at the noon briefing, Mr. Kohler noted that this kind of thing always seemed to go on. That was why we thought that, if any new positions were to be developed by the West, they could be discussed safely only just prior to the Summit. Ambassador Grewe then referred to the "unfortunate" article of Drew Middleton in this morning's *New York Times* referring to the Four-Power Working Group. Mr. Kohler noted how people tend to suspect that much more is going on in the way of discussions and preparations—particularly of a Machiavellian character—than is actually the case. Actually if they thought about it, people would realize that the Western position is pretty much established and that spectacular initiatives could scarcely be expected to emerge from the Working Group exercise.

Ambassador Grewe said he felt it was now necessary that the countries in the Working Group come to an understanding with respect to the basic direction in which the negotiations with the Soviets should go. There were really only three major alternatives, he observed: (a) maintenance of the status quo; (b) an interim arrangement based on the status quo involving agreement on the exercise of Western rights; and (c) a new legal basis for the Western Powers in Berlin. The Western Powers should now agree on their position in order to avoid press speculation regarding disunity as well as to avoid public statements implying that they were taking different positions.

Mr. Kohler commented that, in the Four-Power Working Group, much of the discussion had revolved around the French paper on principles.<sup>2</sup> There could be no doubt about the US position. We want, for example, to bring the Germans closer to tripartite contingency planning. It appeared that we and the Germans might have slightly different estimates of what would happen if the Western Powers stand pat at the Summit. We felt that there was a prospect, under these circumstances, of a real crisis. We were prepared to face such a crisis, but we must also be sure that the others were prepared to do so. Ambassador Grewe agreed that this should be cleared up, and emphasized that the Germans did

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<sup>1</sup> *The Washington Post* also had an article on the plebiscite on February 24, by John Hightower.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 76.

require some knowledge of tripartite contingency planning in order intelligently to evaluate the situation.

Mr. Kohler mentioned that, in one way, the Germans had already participated in a phase of contingency planning. He recalled the discussion of recent years with the Germans over the necessity for adequate authority in the Federal Republic to take alert measures. It was hard to persuade anyone that the West was adequately and seriously prepared when the necessary legal basis for emergency measures did not exist in the Federal Republic. Although we might well come back to French Principle No.1 on maintenance of the present juridical position in Berlin, we were not prepared to freeze on it now. If this were done, the Working Group could disband now, and its work be transferred to the Contingency Planning Group. We have the impression, Mr. Kohler continued, that the Germans think all we need to do can be confined to the declaratory field. We do not feel quite that comfortable about the situation. Our Ambassador in Moscow feels the Soviets would go ahead and sign their peace treaty in the absence of a *modus vivendi*, or some machinery for continuing negotiations, although not before President Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union. In the case of the military pass incident we have given evidence of our basic attitude. We saw an analogy in the situation to the problem of access to Berlin, but it was only with some difficulty that we got the other countries to come along. At the same time, Mr. Kohler pointed out, we feel committed by the Camp David communiqué to negotiate with the Soviets on Berlin. That does not mean negotiations on the basis of the Soviet free city proposal, or on the basis of their peace treaty proposal, but it does seem to imply a willingness to explore the possibility of a *modus vivendi* or of the establishment of some continuing consultative machinery. We also want to explore the possibility of keeping a unified front among our Allies, Mr. Kohler continued. We all suspect, for example, that the British may be less willing to face up to a new crisis than the others. They apparently believe there are possibilities for finding another legal basis for our staying on in Berlin. We are prepared to explore this possibility with them and with the Germans and the French. We do not believe at this point that there are any such possibilities, but we must go through this exploratory process with the British if they are to be brought around. Therefore, we believe we must go through the exercise in the Working Group. We will not change our position unless something really better emerges. The fact, for example, that, until yesterday's Working Group meeting,<sup>3</sup> there was great deal of confusion about the applicability of the

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<sup>3</sup>The U.S. summary record of the seventh meeting of the Working Group on Germany and Berlin (II WWG/9.7) on February 23 is in Department of State, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany.

NATO guarantee to Berlin under various circumstances illustrates the need for a full exploration of the facts. Ambassador Grewe agreed that the Western Powers have apparently been operating under a misconception as to the relationship of the NATO guarantee to continuing occupation of the city, and said he also agreed with Mr. Kohler's general appreciation of the situation. He would like to see the Working Group discuss possible proposals even if they were not realistic. This was the purpose of the German paper of yesterday.<sup>4</sup> [5 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Kohler said that we had no surprises up our sleeve. He agreed that it was desirable to lay any proposals which might now exist on the table so that they could be examined and the pros and cons agreed. We must know that our Allies are really firm, he continued, and not just paying lip service. Ambassador Grewe said that his Government did not feel happy about the prospect of a crisis with the Soviets, but could not see what would be gained by postponing a crisis through some sort of interim agreement to last for a year or so. He felt that there were some reasons why the Soviets might be reluctant to go ahead and sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR. It would, for example, prejudice an all-German peace treaty. It was difficult to say, of course, Mr. Kohler noted, but we are inclined to believe that we can forestall such action by the Soviets if a reasonable *modus vivendi* can be found. If not, if the Western Powers seem unwilling even to go back to their Geneva formula, Khrushchev's commitment to his own people, to the East, and in terms of his own prestige, is such that he will probably be obligated to go ahead. Mr. Khrushchev was not quite comparable to Mr. Stalin, and did not have the same measure of arbitrary control that the latter had. While he had much greater flexibility than we, of course, he did not have complete maneuverability. Moreover, a basic principle of our own contingency planning was to be prepared for the worst. Apart from mere declarations, Mr. Kohler continued, our whole attitude here should remove apprehensions in Bonn. Ambassador Grewe said that up to now nothing had happened which might disturb Bonn. They were concerned that no real progress had taken place in the preparatory talks so far, and would like to know what the others had in mind. Mr. Kohler noted that we could speed up things, of course, simply by accepting the French principles, after which the Working Group could pack up and go home.

Ambassador Grewe said that it was obviously unrealistic to expect to go to the Summit and refuse to discuss Berlin. This did not mean,

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<sup>4</sup> Not found. According to the record referred to in footnote 3 above, the paper was designated II WWG/1.11 and concluded that the status quo in Berlin was preferable to any change now considered possible.

however, that the West must take the initiative in making proposals. Since the Soviets had precipitated the Berlin crisis, it was up to them to make proposals. Mr. Kohler responded that this was essentially a tactical question. Once the Soviets did make proposals, the West would have to know what they could accept and what they might wish to make in the way of counterproposals.

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**82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower**

Washington, February 26, 1960.

**SUBJECT**

Resumption of High Altitude Flights in Berlin Corridors

The discussions which we have been conducting with the British and French regarding the resumption of high altitude flights in the Berlin air corridors have now brought agreement on the procedures to be followed in resuming such flights. A summary of the agreement is enclosed. The Departments of State and Defense find this agreement satisfactory.

In approving the tripartite discussions, you had requested that your authorization be sought before the Soviet authorities are notified of our intentions and flights are actually resumed.

I therefore recommend that you authorize the notification to the Soviet authorities and the resumption of high altitude flights as provided for in the enclosed tripartite agreement.

**Christian A. Herter**

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. According to another copy of the memorandum, both it and the enclosure were drafted by McKiernan on February 19. The source text bears Goodpaster's handwritten notation: "President approved, 26 Feb 1960."

[Enclosure]<sup>1</sup>

SUMMARY OF TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON RESUMPTION OF  
HIGH ALTITUDE FLIGHTS IN THE BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR

1. The Three Powers (United States, United Kingdom and France) will notify the Soviet Union, as soon as possible and through the British Air Safety Center, that they intend to resume high altitude flights (above 10,000 feet) in the Berlin air corridors on a routine scheduled basis. The notification will contain no date for the first flight.

2. The notification will be accompanied by a simple announcement to the Soviets of the Three Powers' willingness to participate in talks about air safety in the Berlin corridors if the Soviets so desire. This matter will not be pursued further if the Soviets do not ask for talks. However, tripartite technical discussions will be undertaken immediately in Berlin preparatory to suggesting to the Soviets, in the event such talks do take place, that the Berlin Air Safety Center be permitted to exercise positive control over all corridor flights.

3. The first high altitude flight will be carried out no later than thirty days after notification to the Soviets. An exception would be made only if mutually agreed air safety talks with the Soviets are proceeding so satisfactorily that the Three Powers would not want to jeopardize the final outcome by insisting on high altitude flights shortly before concluding an imminent agreement.

4. If the Soviets give a flatly negative reply shortly after receipt of the tripartite notification, the first high altitude flight can take place about twenty-four hours thereafter. If no reply is forthcoming from the Soviets ten days after notification, the first flight can take place twenty-four hours thereafter. If there are discussions with the Soviets which drag on inconclusively, the first flight will take place not later than the thirtieth day after notification.

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<sup>1</sup> Secret. Prepared in the Department of State.

83. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Formulation of U.S. Position on Berlin

1. The preparation of our position on Berlin for the Summit presents difficult problems both in terms of having the strongest and most realistic negotiating posture vis-à-vis the Soviets and in terms of maintaining unity among the four Western Powers principally concerned. Although in view of the problem of leaks, we will want to consider carefully how and when we eventually present our position, we are now at a point of time where we should start moving towards decisions based upon a realistic evaluation of possible courses of action.

*Position of Other Western Powers*

2. The German and French representatives in the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin have confirmed that their governments will favor a rigidly inflexible position based on the principle that no change in the juridical status of Berlin can be contemplated. Chancellor Adenauer is engaged in a major propaganda effort committing his Government publicly to such a position, which is described as alone being capable of meeting the minimum requirements of the Western Powers. Neither the French nor the Germans have made explicit what they expect the outcome to be of negotiations with the Soviets into which the Western Powers bring such a position, and there is little evidence that they have given much thought to what might follow a breakdown of negotiations with the Soviets.

3. The Germans have, of course, only a fragmentary knowledge of Allied contingency planning for the event of unilateral action by the Soviets in signing a peace treaty with the GDR and in turning over check point controls to the GDR authorities. We are, accordingly, pressing to get to them additional information regarding existing Western contingency plans.

4. The British, on the other hand, have tended to conceal their position, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. They have not tabled a single paper in the Working Group [2 lines of source text not declassified].

*Possible Courses of Action*

5. After sifting out the realistically possible from the merely theoretically conceivable, we see the courses of action indicated below as

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2960. Secret. Drafted by Hiltenbrand; sent through S/S; and initialed by Kohler, Calhoun, and Herter.

open for consideration. How great a role the element of rational choice will actually play in determining whether negotiations with the Soviets succeed or break-down remains to be seen. There is obviously a point beyond which the Western Powers cannot go, but a final choice of position should presumably involve weighing both the possible developments under specific courses of action not only against each other but against a failure to arrive at any agreement with the Soviets on Berlin.

a. *Temporary Geneva-Type Arrangement*

A proposal for an interim arrangement on Berlin to last for a specified number of years might proceed along the lines of the Western Geneva proposal of July 28,<sup>1</sup> perhaps with certain modifications or additions. On the difficult issue of "rights" the British [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] seem prepared to accept an oral assurance by Khrushchev at the Summit that the Soviets will not take unilateral action, purporting to end Western rights, at least until after negotiations at the end of the period of the interim agreement for a more lasting settlement have broken down. There seems to be agreement among the other three countries that the Western Powers cannot safely go beyond the July 28 proposals in any important respect. (It will be recalled that the Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva agreed on certain minor fallback positions for use in the event that the Soviets appeared to be prepared seriously to negotiate on the July 28 proposals.—Geneva telegram Secto 414 of July 29, 1959.)<sup>2</sup>

Despite earlier efforts by Adenauer to claim that the July 28 proposals were effectively dead, the German paper submitted to the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin<sup>3</sup> contemplated falling back to them as a final position through a series of tactical proposals by the Western Powers which, in effect, would constitute a series of demands for improvements of the status quo in Berlin. The French list of six principles to govern a Berlin settlement, which constitutes their chief contribution to the Working Group so far, is compatible with the July 28 proposals.

We have ready a streamlined version of the July 28 proposals in the form of a suggested Four-Power declaration.

b. *Solution C of the April 1959 London Working Group Report*<sup>4</sup>

This recommendation of the London Working Group, which has never formally been approved by Governments, could theoretically be adapted either as a permanent solution to the Berlin problem or as a temporary solution. While fully reserving the respective positions of the four Governments with respect to the juridical aspects of the problem,

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<sup>1</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 488.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, Document 490.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 81.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 8, Document 72.



it proposes a series of declarations involving the GDR as well as the Soviets and the Western Powers which would permit effective maintenance of the Western position but also permit the Soviets to turn over de facto responsibilities for access to the GDR. However, de facto or de jure recognition of the GDR would not be granted.

Thus, the GDR authorities would issue a declaration that they would observe existing access procedures. The USSR would associate itself with this declaration. The Four Powers would declare that they would not engage in inflammatory propaganda and/or use or threaten to use force to overthrow existing arrangements. The German Federal Republic and the East Berlin authorities would make similar separate declarations. A UN special representative in Berlin might observe execution of one or more of these types of declarations.

A draft agreement embodying this proposal has been prepared.<sup>5</sup>

c. *Guaranteed City*

This proposal has been discussed extensively within the Department and represents perhaps the most acceptable arrangement on Berlin which can be devised involving a change of juridical basis for the Western presence in Berlin. (Another type of proposal starting out from this premise which has been given consideration is that of a UN trusteeship arrangement, but this has been held less desirable.) While the President is generally familiar with its contents, the guaranteed city proposal has never been discussed with Defense or put forward to our Western Allies. In essence, it involves agreement by the Four Powers to guarantee the security of Western military and civil access to West Berlin, with the Western Powers agreeing simultaneously to suspend the exercise of their occupation rights so long as the agreement was otherwise being observed. The West Berlin authorities would be empowered to request that foreign troops up to a stated ceiling be stationed in West Berlin and each Western power would agree to supply and maintain any forces so requested. Full and unrestricted access for these troops would be guaranteed. The agreement would be registered with the UN and a representative of the UN Secretary General might observe its fulfillment.

A draft convention has been prepared embodying the guaranteed city proposal.

d. *A Tacit Temporary Freeze*

This is essentially the approach favored by S/P in Mr. Smith's memorandum to you of January 28, 1960.<sup>6</sup> The precise modalities would depend both on substantive and tactical decisions still to be made, but the essential thought is that, since neither standing on our Geneva position, nor discussing German unity and disarmament, nor proposing an immediate change of status seem very promising means of reaching Allied agreement and/or forestalling unilateral action by the Soviets, a holding action in 1960 would be preferable. This would have as

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<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Document 72.

objective freezing the situation in Berlin until after the US and German elections and beginning somewhat to accustom our Allies to the long-term possibility of a new status.

S/P has suggested that this holding action might consist of a tacit agreement to put Berlin on ice for 18 months or so, by setting up a Four-Power Working Group to consider means of reducing frictions in Berlin and to report back in late 1961. If the Soviets wished some more temporary explicit agreement, it is suggested that we could also propose concomitant unilateral declarations by both sides on the order of Solution C in the London Working Group, without mentioning troop reductions or attempting to conclude the kind of formal and comprehensive agreement which would have to deal with the "rights" issue.

e. *Delaying Action Without Specific Substantive Arrangement*

We might try simply to reach agreement on some machinery to continue a negotiating procedure, for example, at the level of the Foreign Minister, Deputy Foreign Minister, and/or agreement on another East-West Summit, without pressing for a more formal kind of interim arrangement. On the other hand, the Western Powers would obviously have to be prepared to deal with Soviet refusal to delay indefinitely on Berlin in the absence of any progress toward agreement.

f. *All-German Sweetening for Some Interim Arrangement on Berlin*

Some experts have expressed the view that Berlin is primarily a lever which the Soviets are using to obtain other objectives of more basic importance to them. Hence, they reason, if some proposal can be made which promises movement towards the achievement of these other objectives, the Soviets may be willing to ease their pressure on Berlin.

(i) One of the "other objectives" is usually stated in terms of enhancing the status of the GDR so as to move towards de facto dealings, although not necessarily recognition, as part of a process of freezing the status quo in Central Europe. The memorandum which the British gave us last fall proposed, for example, sweetening the July 28 Geneva proposal by permitting all-German talks under the cover of a Four-Power Group.

(ii) A second possible kind of sweetening would involve changes in the Western Peace Plan. Ambassador Thompson in Moscow has suggested that an extension of the time period in that Plan from 7 to 10 years<sup>7</sup> to prove to the Soviets that there would not be a showdown by free elections for an extended period, while the mixed German committee provided for in the Peace Plan presumably would be in operation, might provide such sweetening.

(iii) Other proposals with the same purpose have stressed that Western initiatives relating to Central European security arrangements might provide such "sweetening". Ambassador Thompson has suggested that US troop reductions in Germany, and particularly limitations on West German armament might constitute a suf-

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 64.

ficiently fresh approach to the all-German question to have enough attraction to Khrushchev to at least get him to postpone action on West Berlin while it was being explored.

g. *Mitigated Breakdown of Negotiations*

Given a failure to find any basis for agreement on Berlin, it might conceivably be possible, at the Summit or at some subsequent point, to achieve some sort of tacit understanding with the Soviets so that the bald effects of their signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR might be mitigated to the extent of preserving the Western powers' position in Berlin without an explicit new agreement and thus avoid a major crisis, threat to the Western position, or blow to Western prestige. This might involve, for example, some of the elements of Solution C (see paragraph 5c above) probably, although not necessarily, without their being embodied in formal declarations. Such an arrangement could subject the Western Powers to strong erosive pressures to deal with the GDR, but it might under certain circumstances be preferable to an absolute breakdown of negotiations, unqualified signature of a peace treaty between the Soviets and GDR, and the execution of our contingency plans.

h. *Complete Breakdown of Negotiations with the Soviets*

This would presumably precipitate the situation for which Western contingency plans have been prepared, i.e., to cope with the possibility that the Soviets will proceed to the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR and turn over all checkpoint controls to the GDR authorities. In order to inject a further element of realism into German evaluation of the situation, we are trying to obtain British and French approval for transmission to the Germans via the Four-Power Working Group of (1) the basic three-power paper of April 4, 1959<sup>8</sup> and (2) a study of the possible development of the situation in the light of Berlin contingency planning.<sup>9</sup>

It seems unlikely that the Western Powers would wish to enter the Summit deliberately intending to force a breakdown of negotiations and hence the probable entry into effect of their contingency plans. They may, however, find the Soviet position so unreasonable that a breakdown of negotiations at some point becomes impossible to avoid.

*Conclusions*

6. We should now move toward a decision as to the course of action on which the United States should endeavor to obtain agreement among its Allies. As indicated above, internal staff work within the Department is well advanced and cannot go much further in the absence of such a decision. We have carefully worked out drafts covering those possible courses of action involving specific proposals, and the process of refinement is continuing.

7. Although a final tactics paper for the Summit can only be worked out later, it does not seem too early to conclude that the Western

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<sup>8</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 255.

<sup>9</sup> Not further identified.

Powers will have little to gain from pressing for a complete resolution of the Berlin question at the May meeting. Given the pressures and rigidities of the moment, the Western Powers would probably stand to benefit more from postponing a final settlement until these rigidities and pressures can be mitigated by the passage of time.

8. This temporizing approach might perhaps be more acceptable to the Soviets if some gesture could be made in the all-German field. However, German and French resistance to such a gesture may prove adamant. The forthcoming visit of Chancellor Adenauer<sup>10</sup> could provide an occasion for raising the possibility, in the hope that by placing it within the context of the Berlin problem in all of its developing aspects—including Berlin contingency planning—he may show some resiliency.

#### *Recommendations*

9. That the Department further study the development of a Western position aimed essentially at postponing a showdown on Berlin at the May Summit by offering the Soviets sufficient inducement, as well as deterrent, so that they will not feel impelled immediately to take action which fundamentally affects the Western position in Berlin. This will involve a flexible approach intended to take advantage of tactical possibilities which might develop.

10. That this position include a willingness to consider an interim arrangement and/or set of unilateral declarations along the lines of Solution C of the London Working Group Report, plus continuing negotiation or discussion of the Berlin question at a different level, if such an arrangement seems more likely to provide a basis for freezing the essential status quo in Berlin than one patterned after the Geneva proposals of July 28.

11. That we consider using the visit of Chancellor Adenauer in an effort to obtain his agreement to (or at least to start him thinking about) somewhat more flexible Western tactics in dealing with the Berlin situation so as to make more likely a development of the Berlin problem along the lines described above.

12. That in the Four-Power Working Group, we take no final positions but continue, until a more intensive period of preparations between the Adenauer visit and the mid-April meetings of Foreign Ministers, to develop useful background materials, to attempt to bring to the Germans information concerning Western contingency plans, and to study all relevant aspects of the basic requirements which must be met to maintain our essential position in Berlin.

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<sup>10</sup> See Documents 86–94.

84. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 8, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant,  
Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Gates,  
Mr. Douglas, Mr. Irwin,  
General White,  
General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

At this point the remainder of the group (except for Mr. Douglas and Mr. Irwin, who came in a few minutes later) joined to discuss a new development regarding our plan of action to institute high level flights to West Berlin.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Herter recalled that we had, with some difficulty, obtained the agreement of the British and the French to sending a message to the Soviet commanders in Berlin on the initiation of these flights. Almost immediately, there was a serious leak of information to Joseph Alsop who wrote a column about it, highly accurate except for his indication that this note had in fact actually been sent. Concurrently Secretary Douglas was considering the matter for the first time, and had major questions as to the desirability, for operational reasons, of initiating such flights. The JCS concurred that initiation was neither necessary nor desirable for operational reasons.

Mr. Herter recalled that the State Department, when this whole question was raised some months ago, had taken the position that they would interpose no objection if Defense made a firm statement that there was an operational necessity for these flights and that the flights would be conducted on a regular basis. Defense had made such a statement, State had gone ahead with consultations with our allies, and now we find that the U.S. is somewhat out on a limb. He anticipated some problem with the British and French if we now change our stand. The President said he thought we should simply tell them that we made a mistake and do not wish to compound it. He said the only reason he would see for going ahead is that we feel there is a need to take some action respecting Berlin that would show our independence. Mr. Gates said there had been a lot of publicity about our new intentions following

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, State Dept. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum for the President, March 8, which sets forth the position on high altitude flights to Berlin as related by Secretary Herter, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/3–860.

the leak, and Mr. Herter said it would look like backing down in the face of Soviet pressures by the Soviet press. The President said the matter is simple in his judgment. Until the action of sending the note to the Soviets has been taken, the whole matter is in a study phase.

Regarding the question of operational need, General White said that there would be an operational requirement for flight at altitudes above 10,000 feet if another airlift had to be instituted to Berlin. The President said this consideration had been very much in his mind. However, he thought that we have made clear our right to do so and that if the necessity for an airlift arose, we would at that time do whatever we needed to do. He added that if this change in position causes the State Department any distress, the Secretary of State could tell the British and the French that the President, on considering the matter, had decided there is no operational necessity.

General White said he should add a further view of the JCS—that they believe this is the time to start flights at altitudes above 10,000 feet if we are going to do this at any time. This would be a cold war tactic. The President said that these considerations fell outside the military sphere, and were of concern to the State Department. He reiterated that the Secretary of State might say that on final review of the question of operational need, following the President's return from South America, he decided not to initiate this action.<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

**A.J. Goodpaster<sup>3</sup>**  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>2</sup> At 6:10 p.m., Merchant telephoned Ambassador Heeney to inform him that the high altitude flights to Berlin had been postponed until such time as operational considerations required. (Notes on a telephone conversation, March 8, attached to a March 10 note; *ibid.*, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany) Presumably, similar calls were made to the British, French, and West Germans. Secretary Herter reiterated this position at his press conference on March 9; for the transcript of the conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 28, 1960, pp. 487–493.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

85. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 11, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Norstad, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

General Norstad said he was much interested in Adenauer's visit and forthcoming discussions with the President, specifically on the matter of disarmament and possibilities for control and inspection. From a military standpoint he thought a system of control and inspection could be instituted covering a portion of West and Central Europe. This would utilize mobile inspection groups with total personnel coming to something like 1500. The techniques of the President's Open Skies proposal,<sup>1</sup> using advanced photography, would be included. Also there would be overlapping radar nets, with Western radars located as far east as Poland, and Communist radars located in Western Germany. It is necessary to designate a specific area to which these techniques would be applied. He thought they could give effective inspection, which would let us know what is going on where that might have appreciable military significance. The system would give substantial relief from the danger of surprise surface attack which is very much on the minds of the Europeans, and could thereby reduce tensions without loss of security.

General Norstad thought that the minimum area for such a project should include Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, Belgium, Holland and Denmark. We would have with the Russians joint inspection teams, with each party having the right to go anywhere in the area upon notification to see what is happening there.

The President thought that after such a system had been proved out, it would be possible to do some thinning out. General Norstad thought the proposal is itself very attractive to the West and to the uncommitted countries. After twelve to eighteen months' experience with it, we could consider some thinning out. He said the Secretary of State, Mr. Eaton and the UK authorities are for it. Defense Minister Strauss of Germany personally said he would support it. Adenauer is the problem. Adenauer says it does not go far enough, stating that it should be applied to all of the Communist bloc and all of NATO. General Norstad

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted on March 15 by Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup> For text of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, July 21, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 447–448.

thought, however, that Adenauer may be brought around to this, with the idea of having it taken up at the summit meeting rather than through the disarmament conference. He thought that the President should take this up with Adenauer, feeling that the President should be able to jar Adenauer. If this is done, others can follow up with other authorities. The reports from France are that the French technical authorities may oppose the proposal, and take a very tough line, stating that any such scheme would lead toward neutralism. However, there is a report from Bonn that at the last meeting of Adenauer and de Gaulle, one of them talked about inspection within a limited area and there was some indication that the two were in agreement on this.

The President said the proposal seems to be one of picking an area, and establishing within it a common inspection system which is least objectionable in terms of the numbers of its participating personnel but gives an effective safeguard. There would be no reduction of forces until the system has been proved out. He thought Adenauer's first question would be to ask what would be the ratio of forces in East Germany to those in West Germany. General Norstad said that in the initial stage each side would announce its force levels and their locations, thus providing a "military blueprint." He said he had not discussed this matter specifically with the Belgians, the Dutch, or the Danes. He said it should be kept simple. However, it might be possible to add Alaska, Siberia and perhaps some of the northwest U.S.

The President asked if Mr. Eaton will be taking this up with the other members of the Western five of the disarmament group. General Norstad said he would not. However, Mr. Green of Canada is strong for the proposal, but has cautioned that it is best not to raise it at a low level. General Norstad said Mr. Herter is enthusiastic about the idea of the President talking to Adenauer about this. Adenauer has a great liking for the President and the United States, and he felt the President could convince Adenauer this system would in fact give better security.

The President said that security reasons are only part of the story. At the present time Adenauer is thinking almost wholly in terms of local politics in Germany. General Norstad agreed that for political reasons there must be areas included in the scheme additional to West Germany. Also, it should not be put forward as a way to reduce forces, but rather to give an added degree of security which will permit changes to be made in our forces. The President said the big value in his mind is that it would get a system of inspection started. General Norstad suggested that with regard to detail, Adenauer could be advised to talk to General Norstad. The President said he would stress that this is a practical inspection scheme. If, after eighteen months, it is working well, then the West could see what next it might do. General Norstad thought the scheme might have as an incidental effect the bringing about of a better



atmosphere regarding Berlin and Germany. The President thought the trouble with the scheme is that if Adenauer wants to interpret it as an indication that the Americans are getting weary of staying in Europe, he can and will do so. General Norstad advised stressing that it is a measure of added security, and recalled the President's dedication to European security—specifically that he came to Europe to set up NATO, disrupting his personal life, in order to bring added security to that area.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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**86. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State**

Bonn, March 11, 1960, noon.

1743. As reflected mytel 1716<sup>1</sup> Chancellor remains firm, and in fact rigid, in his view re negotiations on Berlin at summit conference. To my query, during conversation March 8, as to whether German people were prepared to face up to situation which might prevail if no summit agreement possible on Berlin and Khrushchev should proceed with separate peace treaty with East German regime—with danger that might entail for Berlin access—Adenauer replied that Dulles had once set out for him successive steps which Western Allies might have to take to maintain Berlin access in that contingency, and he had assured late Secretary of full support of Federal Republic and German opinion, up to and including use of military force. These assurances, he said, were still valid.

When, in reply to Chancellor's oft repeated view that emphasis in summit discussions should be shifted as soon as possible from Berlin to disarmament, I suggested as personal view that if conversations began with Berlin, sequence would more logically be Berlin-German unification-disarmament, he agreed. He evaded issue, however, when I went on to say that, again in my personal view, best way to move discussion from Berlin to German unification would be some new and perhaps

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Dated March 9, telegram 1716 from Bonn reported on Dowling's conversation with the Chancellor on March 9, during which Adenauer said he would like to discuss the summit meeting, German assets, his trip to Japan, and anti-West German propaganda during his visit to the United States. Dowling guessed that the Chancellor would also want to discuss his concern about the "parlous state" of the Western alliance. (*Ibid.*)

bolder proposal for all-German talks, although it seemed evident he was aware I had found some agreement for this thesis in Foreign Office.

While there has been, therefore, no change in Chancellor's views since conclusion of Geneva Conference, I think it evident there has been significant movement in German public opinion, and that Adenauer, attuned as he is to domestic implications of changing moods of his people, has been confirmed in rightness of his firm attitude. One way of putting it might be to say that Germans having at some time in recent past faced fact that unification will be possible only in distant future, have fastened upon Berlin as symbol of their frustration and are determined that it shall not be lost to them. In this frame of mind they accepted fully Chancellor's theory, generally endorsed by Brandt, that any change in Berlin status can only be for worse.

Evidence of this attitude is, I believe, to be found in unanimity of all parties on this issue, which, as Department is aware, is first time such agreement has been possible on any one aspect of German foreign policy. This unanimity is, I am sure, most important recent development for future of German foreign policy, and its validity cannot be denied by differences among parties on detailed aspects of handling of this policy.

I think it not improbable that this stauncher attitude on Berlin has found its roots in, and has been fed by, upsurge of nationalism which has been so apparent in German reactions to critical attitude British press, Western criticism of antisemitic incidents, and general outburst re German-Spanish military talks.<sup>2</sup> This reaction, only beginning to be audible, is to effect that in whole of post-war period Germans have demonstrated their attachment to ideas and ideals which Atlantic community, and notably United States, have advocated. Why then, they ask, should Germans, 15 years after close of hostilities, be regarded as second-class members of this community which they consider they have loyally supported and to which they have so ardently desired to belong.

If this analysis be in any way correct, then I think it must be concluded that we are rapidly approaching end to that era of complete dependence of Germans upon us, which some of us have affected to deplore, and that we shall soon be faced with an independence which, if not heeded and guided to our interest, may contain elements of grave danger.

Department repeat as desired.

**Dowling**

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<sup>2</sup> During November 1959, Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella visited Bonn and discussed with German officials the use of Spanish military facilities in the event of war.

## 87. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 14, 1960.

### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Secretary Dillon, Mr. Dowling, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Hillenbrand,  
General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter said that Chancellor Adenauer wants to see the President alone for a while during his appointment tomorrow.<sup>1</sup> The President said he would do this, and would listen to the Chancellor who seems increasingly confirmed in the rigidity of his attitudes. He thought he was going to have to tell Chancellor Adenauer that the American people are not going to be disposed to subordinate themselves and their objectives to those of the Chancellor. Mr. Herter commented that the difficulty for the President in relation to the summit is that it is our objective to attempt to have meaningful negotiations, and we are in fact committed to the Russians to do so, but that Adenauer takes the stand that certain topics should not even be discussed. The President stated strongly that he would decide what the United States would or would not discuss at these meetings.

Mr. Herter said that the Chancellor is going to raise the matter of German assets. He handed the President a one-page summary memorandum which he suggested the President give to Adenauer.<sup>2</sup> After discussion the President said he felt the State Department should hand Adenauer the memorandum. Although we have supported the principle of honoring private property, and returning the private German assets, we have a treaty signed with the Germans which says that we owe them nothing.

Mr. Herter than gave the President a briefing memorandum<sup>3</sup> on points Chancellor Adenauer is likely to raise; and also a suggested statement<sup>4</sup> that could be given to the press after the meeting between the two men. The President read these with care. Mr. Dillon said that, with regard to aid to the underdeveloped nations, the Germans are really doing

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted on March 15 by Goodpaster.

<sup>1</sup> Chancellor Adenauer visited the United States March 12–24; see Document 248.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 254.

<sup>3</sup> A copy of this 4-page memorandum is in the Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Germany vol. 3.

<sup>4</sup> A copy of this 4-paragraph suggested statement is *ibid.*, Whitman File, International File. For text of the statement as issued after the President's meeting with Adenauer on March 15, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 363.

very little in a form in which help is useful, i.e., in long-term loans. Most of what they are doing is simply financing their own exports on a very short-term basis. Secretary Anderson stresses this point. The President said he thought he would tell Adenauer if he wants to brighten up the German reputation, which has suffered recently because of the Jewish incidents, the approach to Spain on bases, etc., long-term loans would be an area in which the Germans could do something worthy and effective.

Mr. Herter also suggested that the President bring up the Norstad plan for control and inspection of a limited area in Western Europe, with the view of getting Adenauer to talk to Norstad about this. The President thought this scheme might be carried on the west to the Rhine plus the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. He thought the Germans should be accelerating their military build-up. There is no reason why they could not go to twenty divisions. In addition, they should be supporting some of our costs in Germany, and some of those of the United Kingdom. Erhard is trying to get the best of both worlds—western collaboration plus a rapidly growing financial reserve—and we are carrying the main burden of defense. Mr. Herter said he thought the British would be quite worried about any greater re-armament of Germany.

The President said that Berlin seems to him to be the key. This is an abnormal situation. He does not see how we could support the economic life of West Berlin if civil access were restricted. The Soviets and East Germans could observe the letter of existing commitments and still starve West Berlin, since, the rights pertaining to the economic life of the city are very cloudy.

Mr. Herter said the problem is that the Germans are unwilling to explore any alternatives to the present status of Berlin. Mr. Dowling stated that German opinion insists upon the retention of occupation rights, and holds strongly that any alternative status for West Berlin would be less desirable than the present one. Should there be an attempt to shock West Berlin, the West Germans would in his opinion subsidize and support the city, even to include an airlift. The President commented what a mistake it had been to give Thuringia to the Soviets without assured access to Berlin. He came back to the point that he does not understand what he could do if access to West Berlin were restricted for civil transit. Mr. Dowling reiterated that the Germans would pay for an airlift, but Mr. Herter commented that our military people say that an airlift could not begin to handle West Berlin needs. The President commented that he thought the German Republic would be better off with UN control of Berlin, with the UN guaranteeing access. He recalled that at one time Brandt had favored this but had then changed his mind. Mr. Herter said that the question gets deeply mixed up with the 1961 elections, which are the primary thing in Adenauer's mind at the present time. Mr. Dowling commented that the West Germans look on West

Berlin as a part of West Germany. They say that abandonment of 2-1/4 million people in West Berlin raises a question as to whether we would abandon the population of Norway which is of similar size. The President commented that the Norwegians had not brought this on themselves by initiating an aggressive war.

Mr. Herter observed that Adenauer is being subjected to continuing propaganda attack, of a most bitter personal nature, by the Russians. The President said that our situation is that the West, except for Adenauer, thinks we should explore alternatives on Berlin. Adenauer will not touch this, and the allies are therefore divided. For our part we stand by our position insofar as it is a matter of not being thrust out by force. Adenauer is not being realistic with regard to the threat of starving Berlin out, however.

Mr. Herter suggested that the application of the principle of self-determination may help to solve our questions in West Berlin and East Germany. The President recalled that Khrushchev had said he had agreed to self-determination in East Germany, but only after ten years of preparing for it. Mr. Herter said that Khrushchev had talked of self-determination in Pushtunistan when he recently visited Afghanistan<sup>5</sup> and that perhaps this could be applied in East Germany.

The President commented that the possibilities in the Berlin situation are such that this is something over which a war could occur. Mr. Dowling said the German people are very firm on this matter. He commented that a spirit of nationalism seems to be growing quite fast in Germany. By 1961 we will find the Germans very strong militarily and beginning to push on some of their objectives. Mr. Herter commented that this is a very dangerous development, especially in connection with the unsettled status of the East German frontiers. Mr. Dowling said there are no longer any Germans in Western Poland; nearly seven million of them were moved out at the close of the war. He thought the President should talk to Adenauer and press him very hard on this. He regarded this matter most seriously and said it could be a cause of war. Mr. Herter suggested that the question of the eastern frontiers may be a reason for the Soviet drive for a peace treaty, which would purport to settle the border question.

Ambassador Dowling suggested that there are two things to push Adenauer on—the border question and the matter of recognizing Eastern Germany. He did not think that it would be wise to push Adenauer hard on the subject of Berlin.

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<sup>5</sup> Khrushchev visited India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan February 11–March 5.

The President asked Mr. Herter to tell Von Brentano that the President and the Chancellor should meet with Mr. Herter and Von Brentano present. Mr. Herter recalled the Chancellor's request for a few minutes alone with the President. Mr. Dowling suggested thirty minutes for their private discussions.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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## 88. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 14, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Various Subjects in the Context of the Impending Visit of Chancellor Adenauer

### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe, Federal Republic of Germany  
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, GER

Ambassador Grewe called to learn from Mr. Merchant something of the atmosphere prevailing in Washington on the eve of the Chancellor's visit.

Mr. Merchant said that he saw the Chancellor's visit as an opportunity to reassure him on the fundamentals of U.S. policy. There is no lack of firmness in the U.S. Government as concerns the forthcoming summit meeting but we do want, for negotiating purposes, a little bit of flexibility. We expect to make clear that our attitude toward NATO and Germany is unchanged. We have not been persuaded by anything that Khrushchev has said that there is any change in his purpose or tactics. We are not going to weaken on Berlin. We will maintain troops there as long as they are required, and the people of Berlin want them there. As long as our troops are there, there will be freedom of access for our forces, the relationships between Berlin and the Federal Republic will

remain as they are, and the people of Berlin will continue to live in freedom. This seems a better statement of our position than merely restating that we will maintain our rights in Berlin. We shall in the coming negotiations seek to improve the present situation.

Mr. Merchant assumed that the President will also canvass the subject of disarmament with the Chancellor.

Mr. Merchant went on to say that on the subject of high altitude flights to Berlin we found on re-examination that the technical basis for such flights did not stand up. For that reason we made the decision not to launch such flights because we could not contemplate high altitude flights which rested on a purely political basis. If operating requirements for such flights should develop we will certainly fly at levels over 10,000 feet because the right to do so indubitably belongs to us.

Ambassador Grewe agreed but deplored the psychological repercussions of the recent discussions of this matter in the press. Mr. Merchant rejoined that while the newspaper stories had indeed been unfortunate, in the serious business of foreign policy one should not be influenced by leaks and press comment. In the long run the matter would straighten itself out. Ambassador Grewe inquired whether the French and British had shared our views in the discussions which took place in connection with the prospective high flights and the ultimate decision not to launch the flights. Mr. Merchant assured him that they had shared our views all the way. Mr. Merchant reiterated that if the situation should change because of differences in types of aircraft or volume of traffic we would not hesitate to exercise our rights. The Chancellor should have no doubts on this score.

Ambassador Grewe then adverted to the proposals of July 28, 1959, made at Geneva on the problem of Berlin. The Germans have been re-examining these proposals. There was perhaps a difference of view in the evaluation of the tolerability of particular proposals. This could be only decided by a practical examination of each proposal. Since the Working Group has not reached the stage of settling on proposals for Berlin, there was still considerable uncertainty in the German mind on this point. Mr. Merchant responded that we expected to go back to Khrushchev on the problem of a divided Germany. If that were to be solved no problem would exist. If we are forced to talk about Berlin we have no inclination to begin on the basis of the July 28 proposals. Since the Soviets had not accepted these proposals we would have to make a new start. Mr. Merchant thought the July 28 proposals went to the limit of what we could agree to but he continued to believe that the proposals as a whole were good ones. They were relatively limited and well worth the price if we could get in exchange clear-cut guarantees on civilian ac-

cess to Berlin since civilian access was a weak point in the Western position in Berlin.

Ambassador Grewe said that the time problem in any agreement with the Soviets was the most serious. If, for example, such an agreement were by its terms to last for 18 months only it would really be dangerous. There would be no assurance what would happen after the agreement expired. The people in Berlin would be calculating how much survival time they had left and the Soviets would be alert to exploit this uncertainty to the full.

To Ambassador Grewe's request for information on the contents of the letter delivered by Ambassador Menshikov to the President,<sup>1</sup> Mr. Merchant responded he was not at liberty to say anything.

Ambassador Grewe reminded Mr. Merchant that it had been agreed that there would be informal talks among the three Western Powers and Germany in Washington at the Ambassadorial level at the time the Germans had agreed to the fading away of the Summit steering committee. Mr. Merchant acknowledged that procedures should be set up to arrange for such talks.

Finally Ambassador Grewe touched on the subject of the return of the German vested assets, pointing out that the matter had taken an unfavorable turn. He was very worried about the subject as a source of controversy between the two Governments. He thought it was better to have it out than to leave it indefinitely pending. He thought it was poisoning the atmosphere. There were many disturbing articles in the German press. It was particularly disturbing in the light of recent incidents which tended to suggest some psychological estrangement between Germans and Americans. A settlement of the assets issue might provide needed moral support to the Germans as evidence that we have put aside any prejudices against the Federal Republic. It would be a valuable psychological help.

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<sup>1</sup> On March 8, Soviet Ambassador Menshikov delivered to the President a letter from Khrushchev, dated March 3, that expressed concern about the United States giving atomic weapons to its Allies. A copy of the letter is *ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.



**89. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, March 14, 1960, 6 p.m.

902. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re: conversation with Adenauer.<sup>1</sup> At lunch today Adenauer sent for me to join him in corner of room and said fol on summit mtg:<sup>2</sup>

1. "We need someone at summit who can talk for six days. What envisage is six days of talk and then all questions referred to Foreign Ministers."

2. He then, with great feeling, expressed his dismay at atmosphere of "unrest" which he had found here in New York in connection with Berlin question. He had talked with Rockefeller, Harriman, McCloy, Javits,<sup>3</sup> and they all manifested unrest. He recalled that President Eisenhower had recently wanted to change legal status of Berlin. All these things worried him.

3. I said that insofar as I knew attitude of the administration (and I thought I did know it) there was virtually no room for compromise at all on the Berlin matter, that we had made a pledge of honor to the people of Berlin and that as a matter of fact all our pledges all over the world hung on this one and that if we broke our word in one place we would shake confidence in ourselves everywhere. Nothing could be a greater victory for the Soviet Union than to maneuver us into a position where we had to break our word.

4. I told him what I had told Khrushchev in Moscow:<sup>4</sup> that any American Government has a minimum of flexibility in an election year. What I told Khrushchev was true, and it was equally true when I told it to him (Adenauer). There would be no politician running for office in this country in 1960 on the platform that he wanted to sacrifice Berlin, or wanted to break our word toward Berlin.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.13/3-1460. Secret; Priority.

<sup>1</sup> Adenauer visited New York on March 14 as the first stage of his trip to Japan.

<sup>2</sup> Lodge telephoned Herter at 3:55 p.m. to give him a summary of the meeting with Adenauer. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, CAH Calls)

<sup>3</sup> Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, and Senator Jacob K. Javits.

<sup>4</sup> Lodge conferred with Khrushchev in Moscow on February 8, during a 2-week visit to the Soviet Union. In their conversation, Khrushchev stated that Berlin was the most burning question at issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. For a more extensive account of their meeting, see telegram 2098 from Moscow, February 9, in vol. X, Document 146.

5. I added that the Americans to whom he had talked, while all eminent men, could not speak for the administration and that I felt that on this matter I knew what the administration thinking was.

6. I do not feel I dispelled his skepticism.

7. Clearly one motive for his trip is to stir us up and to reassure himself. Perhaps President should know of this in view of lunch tomorrow (Tuesday).<sup>5</sup>

Lodge

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<sup>5</sup>See Documents 90 and 249.

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## 90. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 1 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Aerial Inspection Plan

### PARTICIPANTS

President Eisenhower; Chancellor Adenauer of Germany; (Mr. Charlick, LS, Interpreter)

Before the luncheon there was a brief exchange between the President and the Chancellor on the topic of the President's painting. The Chancellor also repeated a humorous remark about how highly a New York press photographer valued a picture of Mr. Adenauer and Mr. Ben-Gurion together.

During the luncheon, the President and the Chancellor exchanged impressions about the Vatican. The Chancellor asked what Mr. Eisenhower thought of the elaborate ceremonial there, and both agreed that there could be somewhat less of this. The Chancellor compared the personalities of the present Pope and his late predecessor. There followed some good-humored exchanges about the meaning of traditions and customs in general.

President Eisenhower then said that he had a serious topic to discuss. This was, to offer to the Soviets a plan for continuous aerial inspection, divorced from any disarmament aspects, and operating in selected regions. It would be in the nature of a try-out, to see if it would be work-

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. The meeting was held in the White House. Drafted by C. Charlick, Department of State interpreter, and approved by the White House on March 28. Another copy of this memorandum in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File, is initialed by the President.

able during a given period. At the outset the President said that he did not necessarily always mean to involve Europe in such a program, that if the Soviets, for instance, would open some part of Siberia, he would be willing to offer all or part of Alaska. The Soviets would then be faced with the necessity of either accepting or refusing the plan.

The Chancellor, after a moment's reflection, answered, "I would do it," and after a further pause, "It's a good idea," and "I do not believe 'they' will agree to it, but I would do it, nevertheless."

The President then went over the plan again, saying that "If we had one or two or three such areas, say, Siberia or Alaska or Central Europe," the aerial inspection could be tried out apart from any disarmament, to see if it would work. Nor would it be a valid objection that the plan would require excessive personnel. With modern infra-red techniques an aerial camera could locate the flower basket before them from a height of 50,000 feet.

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## 91. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 4 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Germany and Berlin

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	
Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic	
Heinrich von Brentano, Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic	
Under Secretary Dillon	Ambassador Grewe
Under Secretary Merchant	Mr. Felix von Eckardt
Ambassador Dowling	Dr. Karl Carstens
Counselor Achilles	Mr. Franz Krapf
Assistant Secretary Kohler	Dr. Franz-Josef Bach
Assistant Secretary Berding	Mr. Peter Limbourg
Mr. Hillenbrand, GER	Mr. Karl-Guenther von Hase
Mr. Vigderman, GER	Mr. Heinz Weber
Mr. McKiernan, GER/GPA	Mr. Hermann Kusterer
Mr. Miller, GER	
Mrs. Lejins, LS	

Foreign Minister von Brentano opened the discussion (before Chancellor Adenauer's arrival) by referring to the preparation of the Western position on Germany and Berlin for the Summit meeting. He said that clear alternatives—or better, an agreed position—should be prepared for consideration at the Western Foreign Ministers' meeting. The Western Powers might differ regarding certain nuances, but it was better to have a common position, even an unsatisfactory one, than to enter the Summit discussions in disagreement with one another. One of the questions on which an agreed position must be developed for presentation to the Soviets is "What is the legal basis of the Western Powers' presence in Berlin?"

Secretary Herter replied that we had prepared a number of papers covering varying alternative approaches to the Berlin problem but that we had taken no positions. The British had submitted no papers at all. The Germans had made their own position clear. The Secretary understood that they did not want to go beyond the Western proposals of July 28, 1959, and that they thought the existing situation was the best which could be achieved. He agreed that the Soviets should not be allowed to split the Western Powers. We had dealt with the problem at Geneva<sup>1</sup> and could do so again. The alternatives which the United States had mentioned were for discussion only.

The Secretary said that we had studied the legal aspects of the Berlin situation very carefully and had found that the access rights of the Allied garrisons were clear but that the legal basis of civilian access was muddy because the 1949 agreements (i.e., the New York Agreement of May 4 and the Paris Four-Power communiqué of June 20)<sup>2</sup> had merely confirmed a situation which had not been clear before. We had always been concerned about this and feared that the Soviets might concentrate on the attrition of civilian communications rather than Allied access.

Foreign Minister von Brentano concurred that the situation would be dangerous if the Soviets should accept Allied rights of access but contest the right of civilian traffic. He agreed that the 1949 agreements were not entirely clear but added that the Paris communiqué called for the improvement of civilian access and that this provision had never been implemented. The Soviets might now say that they want some sort of treaty settlement of the civilian access question. There is no telling where negotiations on this subject would end. In any case, an attempt would be made to intrude the "GDR" into the negotiations, and an agreement to which the GDR was a party would involve the de facto

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<sup>1</sup> For documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May 11–August 5, 1959, see volume VIII.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. III, pp. 751 and 1602–1065.

recognition of the GDR. While there is a legal distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* recognition, there is small difference from a political point of view and even *de facto* recognition would bring a severe psychological reaction in Germany.

The Foreign Minister considered that it would be a false starting point for discussions if the Western Powers allowed German civilian access rights to be put in question. These rights were confirmed by pre-1949 precedents. The Western Powers can only start by taking the position that the 1949 agreements confirmed German access rights. They can negotiate about the enforcement or implementation of these rights, but there is no basis for negotiation about the rights themselves.

Secretary Herter agreed it would be wrong to create any doubts about the situation. The matter had never come up directly at Geneva. There the Western Powers had spoken of access rights in general, without distinguishing Allied from civilian. However, he felt the question should be explored to determine what rights would exist *vis-à-vis* Pankow after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR.

Foreign Minister von Brentano admitted that such a treaty would complicate the situation despite the fact that the treaty, which the Soviets would in effect be concluding with themselves, could not affect any existing rights. However, the moment one acknowledges any doubt about civilian access, the negotiating partner becomes the GDR rather than the Soviet Union. The purpose of the peace treaty would be to make the GDR a negotiating partner with the Western Powers. The Soviets might agree that Allied rights do not depend on Pankow, but maintain that this is true only of Allied rights. We must consider whether we are ready to discuss the question on this basis. Before making their July 28, 1959 proposal to the Soviets, the Western Powers all agreed that the primal (*originaere*) rights of the Allies could not be affected by an interim Berlin agreement. They agreed that no distinction should be made between Allied and civilian access rights. They also agreed that Allied rights would be reserved and remain valid after the expiration of an interim agreement.

The Foreign Minister then recapitulated his remarks (for the information of Chancellor Adenauer, who joined the meeting at this point) as follows: Allied primal rights should not be allowed to come into question; otherwise the Western Powers must deal with the GDR. It was agreed at Geneva that the legal situation was unambiguous, although the civil access situation was never clear. There were provisions in the Paris communiqué regarding improvement of civilian access, but these were never carried out. There is a great danger in considering the legal

basis of the Western position in Berlin to be doubtful; this legal basis cannot be a subject for negotiation.

Chancellor Adenauer referred to the dangers of a temporary agreement, saying that the principle *rebus sic stantibus* would operate against the West. To conclude a contractual arrangement for one, two, or three years would mean constant blackmail thereafter. A contractual arrangement would bring insecurity and uncertainty; there would be a bad effect on the Berlin population, and large numbers would leave the city.

The Chancellor said that the Paris communiqué of 1949 expressly mentioned the civilian population and confirmed pre-blockade civilian traffic even if this traffic was never clearly defined. Traffic is a factual concept; the technical term "traffic" was used but legal rights were created. The Western Powers had protected civilian access via the *Autobahn* before 1949. Furthermore, the Western Powers had themselves taken, in notes to the Soviets, the position that civilian traffic was covered by access rights. The communiqué which was issued after the White House meeting that morning<sup>3</sup> mentioned the need of the consent of the Berlin population for any agreement reached on Berlin. This consent would not be forthcoming if civilian access rights were not upheld in the agreement. In taking such a position, the Western Powers would lose Berlin's trust and get nothing in exchange from the Soviets. De Gaulle had told the Chancellor that he would never accept this; therefore Western unity would also be jeopardized.

Secretary Herter agreed, but pointed out that the Federal Republic and West Berlin had already adapted themselves to various East German measures before the Geneva conference. The West Germans had subsidized the payment of highway and waterway tolls and had dealt similarly with other harassments. If the Soviets quit their functions with respect to Berlin, there would be more tariffs, fees, etc., designed to undermine Berlin's economic life. Between whom would discussions of such matters take place?

Chancellor Adenauer replied that there was no connection between the tolls and subsidies for Berlin. Berlin always needs support from the West and it depends on its transport for the import of supplies and the export of goods. The Cabinet had considered the tolls question carefully and decided that the payment of the increases was only fair reimbursement for the cost of maintaining roads and waterways.

The Chancellor digressed to say that he had only recently heard how the Berlin situation had originally come about. At the time of the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had had three civilian

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<sup>3</sup>For text of the joint statement issued following the morning conversations, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 363.

advisers who worked on the question of Berlin. However, the three Heads of Government had a heavy program, and their time was entirely taken by generals discussing more urgent military problems. At the end of the Conference, the Heads of Government had merely asked the three civilian advisers whether they had agreed with one another. The latter said they had agreed, and that was it. The legal position of Berlin was only roughly outlined. The problem was one of reasonable interpretation of the sketchy agreement. Things went well until the blockade. General Clay had then been ready to restore surface access by force, but an airlift was finally decided upon. If traffic to Berlin was not admissible under the agreement, the same would be true of the airlift. However, the airlift was in harmony with Allied rights, as the Soviets later admitted. Therefore the legal position of Berlin is clear, although the terms of the Yalta agreement with respect to Berlin are not.

Secretary Herter said that Berlin was being discussed because the Berlin issue was likely to arise at the Summit in the form of Soviet insistence on the necessity of a separate peace treaty with the GDR. If the issue does arise, the discussion will be picked up from the beginning, not the end, of the Geneva meeting. The Secretary added that he was sorry if there was any misunderstanding about our position on Berlin. When the Working Group had started work, we had jotted down a series of alternative proposals. Perhaps we had thus given a false impression that our position was changing. Our study of alternatives does not commit us to anything; one of the advantages of such studies is that they often reveal the unsoundness of some proposals. We mean to reject any idea which is not good. We wished to correct any false impression that the discussion in the Working Group denotes a weakening of our position. The Secretary hoped that any atmosphere of uncertainty could be dispelled in the various Western meetings before the Summit.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he personally had never believed that the United States was taking a weaker position. However, he had been surprised that this thought had been expressed to him by many of the Americans he had just met in New York.<sup>4</sup> These comments might, of course, be election year rumors.

Secretary Herter replied that the best symbol of our position was our Berlin contingency planning. We had carried this planning to the point of envisaging preparations for war over Berlin. The Secretary added that he did not know whom the Chancellor had seen in New York, but that he was glad that the Chancellor had come to Washington to learn the facts.

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<sup>4</sup>See Document 89.

Chancellor Adenauer then pointed out that half of the time for preparation for the Summit, which began with the Western Summit last December, had already elapsed. He raised the question whether the Western Powers would be able to work out a completely agreed position by mid-May. He asked whether the Secretary, as coordinator of Summit preparations, would try to expedite these preparations.

Secretary Herter said that he agreed completely that preparations should be speeded up. Referring to the agreement of the President and the Chancellor that morning that disarmament was the most important item, he said that he hoped we would have a better idea in the next three weeks what line the Soviets will take and what the possibilities of serious negotiation are.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Following the consideration of Germany and Berlin, the discussion then turned to German assets, German aid to underdeveloped countries, and [*text not declassified*]. See Documents 254 and 255.

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## 92. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Summit

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant

Before dinner at the German Embassy, I had the opportunity of a few words alone with the Chancellor. He spoke of his visit to Mr. Dulles' grave and his long and admiring association with the former Secretary. I then brought up the question of preparations in advance of the Summit dealing with the question of Germany, including Berlin.

I said that I felt sure from his talk with the President earlier in the day any worry he may have had concerning the firmness of our position on Berlin had been dissipated. I said that in the last analysis, the security and freedom of the people of West Berlin depended upon the presence

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.



there of American troops, and that it was their presence there rather than any legal theory on which their presence presumed to rest that was the essential factor in the situation. I went on to say that we considered it important that the Four-Power Working Group on this topic be able to consider freely all possible alternatives to the existing arrangement. In addition to the possibility that an agreement might be reached on a more secure and effective arrangement, there was the great negative value of such an examination to which Secretary Herter had referred in the afternoon, namely, that it would expose and familiarize all of us in detail with the particular weaknesses and pitfalls in variants which the Soviets or outsiders might suggest. Moreover, I said, they believed we could best assure a solid Four-Power position if all of us, and particularly the pragmatic British, looked at every conceivable alternative before arriving at what might well be the conclusion that existing arrangements were the best and that no alteration in them should be considered. Accordingly, I concluded, we hoped that the representative of the Federal Republic on the working group would be instructed to participate in such a broad review.

The Chancellor listened attentively and gave some impression of understanding the point and agreeing, but we were interrupted by the arrival of other guests before he had the opportunity (or chose) to make any oral comment.

After dinner, Mr. Hillenbrand and I talked on the same subject to Dr. von Brentano, and I went over substantially the same ground with him. He indicated sympathy but made no commitment.

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### 93. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960.

#### SUBJECT

Summit Preparations on Germany and Berlin

#### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Karl Carstens, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany  
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

Dr. Carstens began by saying that the inclusion in the joint statement issued by the President and the Chancellor<sup>1</sup> of a provision that there could be no solution to the Berlin problem without the consent of the city's population had made a deep and favorable impression on Chancellor Adenauer.

Mr. Kohler said that, with respect to the development of the Western positions for the Summit, if one really knows that one's mind is made up in the direction of being firm, it is then possible to relax a little and to consider the possibility of some flexibility in tactics. We hoped that the Chancellor would now feel this way and would be willing to explore every possibility to see how the West can best come out of the present Berlin crisis. Dr. Carstens observed that he had to admit that the German position was to a large extent determined by psychological factors, i.e., by fear of the reaction which would take place in Berlin and the Federal Republic if the Western powers made certain concessions. Mr. Kohler commented that we owe it to ourselves as well as to the people to attempt to provide some guidance for public psychology. If one keeps preaching that if something is lost then everything is lost, people begin to believe this. If the generalization is not true then one has merely created an unnecessary public opinion obstacle. Dr. Carstens noted that this rigidity did not come initially from the Federal Republic but from Berlin itself. For example, Mayor Brandt has maintained that any change in the legal status of the city would merely increase the appetite of the Soviets and encourage them to press harder for a free city solution. Yet a few days ago, Mr. Kohler commented, Mayor Brandt had attacked the Federal Government for not having probed the Soviets more on the Smirnov memorandum<sup>2</sup> especially with respect to that portion which indicated that the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic might in certain respects be closer. Dr. Carstens conceded that the initial reaction of the SPD to the Smirnov memorandum had been more negative than later; this shift had been largely due to internal SPD political considerations.

Mr. Kohler said that when last August the President visited the Chancellor in Bonn<sup>3</sup> the latter had made certain remarks which had caused us to wonder. At this point Mr. Kohler quoted from the German record of conversation made by Dr. Weber<sup>4</sup> (which had subsequently been made available to us) indicating that the Chancellor did not believe

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<sup>1</sup> For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 363.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Smirnov memorandum, January 13, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 69-71, or Embree, *Soviet Union and the German Question*, pp. 220-224.

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on President Eisenhower's visit to Bonn August 26-27, 1959, see Documents 5 and 8.

<sup>4</sup> Document 5.

it was possible to consider fighting a nuclear war over Berlin, and that, as a last resort and under certain conditions, the West might consider a solution based on the Soviet free city proposal.

Dr. Carstens said he had never seen this record and, therefore, was unable to comment on it. He had arrived in the Foreign Office only after the visit in question.

We consider it essential, Mr. Kohler continued, that we think this situation through to the end. The German position in the Working Group has been that we must stand pat and cannot go back to the July 28, 1959 proposals.<sup>5</sup> If this is our position then we must see where it will take us. We must, in fact, be prepared for all-out war if the Soviets do not back down. The Germans say that they do not believe the Soviets want to go to war. This is not quite enough, Mr. Kohler observed. We do not think they want war either, but we must be prepared for this ultimate resolution if that is the price. If we have not gone through this exercise and come to firm conclusions, the Soviets will not believe that we are so prepared. Just to say so will not suffice. In view of the grave issues involved we want the Working Group to probe deeper into the problem. It is not just enough to say that we will not budge. We must weigh the various possibilities and then draw conclusions as to their relative acceptability. Dr. Carstens said that he agreed essentially.

Mr. Kohler went on to say that even if we revive the July 28 proposals we may again end up at the same point. We will be firm on this, but we do not just wish to say that we will stand pat without having considered the possibilities in terms of our contingency planning. If, at a time of crisis, everybody backs down and puts pressure on us to accept the free city proposal, this would obviously be a fiasco. Dr. Carstens said that, as far as the Federal Republic was concerned, a clear answer could be given. When this question comes up the Chancellor usually refers to a conversation which he had in Bonn in February 1959 with the late Secretary Dulles.<sup>6</sup> The latter reviewed with the Chancellor a number of steps contemplated under the contingency planning of that date leading up to a possible use of force on the Autobahn. The Chancellor reports that he answered Secretary Dulles by agreeing that the Western Powers should proceed step by step. Dr. Carstens said he concurred in believing that the Germans must think this through and envisage the measures that they must take. This in any event was something that should be done, no matter what proposals eventually were submitted to the Soviets. Mr. Kohler commented that our bargaining position would be enhanced by making clear that we are prepared for the worst.

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<sup>5</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 488.

<sup>6</sup> Dulles visited Bonn February 7–9, 1959.

Speaking personally, Dr. Carstens said it was obvious that the Western Powers must be prepared to talk about something at the Summit. This would presumably include disarmament and East-West relations. As to discussion of the latter, Mr. Kohler observed, we did not think much would come of it. In response to Dr. Carstens' query, Mr. Kohler said that the paper which Jean Laloy had submitted to the Working Group in Paris<sup>7</sup> did not seem too useful. After all, the Western Powers were not going to change the Soviet world outlook or Soviet support of Communist parties in other countries. The West should not give the Soviets a chance to say they agree with the West, when such an agreement would be patently phony. Dr. Carstens commented that the idea of "tolerance" was unacceptable; West Germany could not be expected to accept this formulation with reference to the all-German problem, but he thought that the idea of talking to the Soviets regarding common goals was not bad from a tactical standpoint. There must be something to talk about at the Summit apart from Berlin. Mr. Kohler added that if one could apply the concept to the free exchange of ideas, we might get somewhere. But the Soviets want peaceful coexistence only outside their own borders. Perhaps the West could find some formulae which would give it a propaganda advantage in the world, Dr. Carstens observed. Mr. Kohler said that he would not object to formulating our own ideas and advancing this, but any agreed paper would be a fraud. In response to Dr. Carstens' query, Mr. Kohler indicated that he believed that Laloy had some thought of an agreement with the Soviets.

Dr. Carstens said it might be useful to think about this some more. To get back to the main theme, he continued, once it had been accepted that Germany and Berlin would be included among the items to be discussed at the Summit, it became obvious that such a discussion could not be avoided. However, the Federal Republic found some difficulty in going back to the July 28 proposals. He admitted, when Mr. Kohler pointed this out, that the Germans in the Working Group had actually criticized every point in the July 28 proposals, but added that it had to be realistically recognized that the whole proposal could not just be dumped. Dr. Carstens' personal view was that we should reproduce at least part of the July 28 proposals. The Germans were particularly worried about the time element and the provision on subversive activities and propaganda. It might be possible to improve the proposals to make them more advantageous to the West, for example, in the field of access.

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<sup>7</sup> Presumably reference is to a paper on noninterference in the internal affairs of states submitted by Laloy to the Working Group on East-West Relations on February 8. A copy of this paper was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1184 from Paris, February 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/2-960)

Mr. Kohler said he thought that this was essentially a tactical matter. We could say that Geneva is dead, but in the last analysis we would probably have to honor the July 28 proposals. However, we are not certain that other possibilities should not be reviewed. Perhaps a persuasive all-Berlin proposal could be drawn up. The one made at Geneva got nowhere; it might be improved. Dr. Carstens noted that such a proposal could be defended before public opinion.

When we said we agreed that the situation in Berlin is abnormal, Mr. Kohler said, we were talking about a different kind of abnormality than the Soviets. He then mentioned that, when the Working Group started its present series of meetings the German representatives had indicated they were going to give the Group a full inventory of ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin. He also thought that such a study was being prepared on access arrangements between the Federal Republic and the GDR. Dr. Carstens said he did not know about the latter. The former was being prepared but had proved more difficult to complete than anticipated. He noted that, in formulating access proposals, the West always referred to a previous date. Perhaps it would be better to try to spell out the specific content of access. Mr. Kohler observed that the British frequently referred to the fact that there existed all sorts of arrangements and negotiations on access between East and West Germany. All German traffic was controlled by the East Germans, for example. We did not believe that the Federal Republic's answer to this had been adequate. Dr. Carstens said, that as far as private trade was concerned the British and French likewise accepted GDR regulations. However, the question of official contacts and travel would have to be studied further.

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#### 94. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 16, 1960.

##### SUBJECT

US-USSR Economic Strength; Aerial Inspection Zone; Self-Determination and Berlin Plebiscite

##### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany  
Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe  
Mr. Weber, Interpreter

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant and approved in S on March 24. The conversation took place after dinner at Secretary Herter's residence.

Secretary Herter  
Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon  
Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant  
Ambassador Walter C. Dowling

[Here follows discussion of U.S.–USSR economic strength. For text, see Document 257.]

The Secretary then changed the subject by saying that there was one matter which the President had discussed alone with the Chancellor the day before<sup>1</sup> on which he wished to satisfy himself that there was a common understanding between us. He said that the Chancellor would recall that the President had spoken to him about the desirability of promptly and seriously examining, with a view to presentation to the Soviets, a proposal for an inspection zone in Europe which would include but not be confined to Germany, linked with the offer of an inspection zone covering Alaska and a part of eastern Siberia. The Secretary went on to emphasize that this would not be a disarmament measure but that it would serve the purpose of gaining experience with inspection methods and probing the extent of Soviet good faith.

The Chancellor reacted violently and said that in his conversation with the President there had been no mention whatsoever of an inspection zone in Europe. The only talk had been concerning one in Siberia and Alaska which he thought would be useful as a test of Soviet intentions and if accomplished might be valuable by reason of the great capability of modern cameras from the air.

The Secretary said that there must be some confusion and asked Mr. Merchant to report what the President had told him of his talk with the Chancellor immediately after the White House luncheon. The Chancellor continued to deny that in his recollection the President had ever mentioned Europe or a zone affecting Germany. He made clear that such a proposal was objectionable to him. The Secretary concluded this phase of the conversation by reiterating that a misunderstanding obviously existed and suggesting that the Four-Power Working Group might be charged with an examination of these ideas. The Chancellor neither agreed nor disagreed with this suggestion.

At this point the question of self-determination came up in the context of the Chancellor's Press Club proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin prior to the Summit.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary said that we should consider this matter by looking further ahead to the wider application of self-

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 90.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Adenauer's address to the National Press Club at 2 p.m. on March 16, during which he proposed a plebiscite for West Berlin to answer the question of whether the Berliners wanted their present status changed, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 515–518.

determination. There was no doubt that a vote held in West Berlin on the maintenance of the present position would be a free vote and overwhelming in favor of the maintenance of existing arrangements. But we all know that an unsupervised vote in Communist-held territory would produce an impressive vote quite contrary to the true wishes of the inhabitants. This argued for inviting supervision, as for example by the United Nations, over any expression of popular will in western territories in order that the principle of such impartial supervision would apply to any plebiscite in Eastern Germany or in East Berlin.

The Chancellor reacted violently against this suggestion. Any election in West Berlin would, of course, be fair and free. The three Western Military Commandants could certify this. It would be derogatory of democracy if outside neutral supervision were asked. Moreover, there would be no time for arranging it before the Summit, and he visualized his proposal for a vote at Berlin as necessary before the Summit in order to confront Khrushchev with the evidence of how the West Berliners overwhelmingly felt. The argument continued but the Chancellor was adamant in his point of view. At one point, he said in effect that votes and plebiscites would never accomplish the freeing of the Soviet sector of Germany. This would come through what he described as political actions. The Chancellor also made some obscure reference to the acceptance of the original boundaries of Germany, but it was not exactly clear what he meant.

Throughout the discussion of the last two topics Dr. von Brentano frequently interrupted the Chancellor to argue with him, but with no apparent success. On several occasions, the exchanges were so rapid as to leave the interpreter far behind. Dr. Grewe was largely silent throughout, but it was perfectly apparent that the Chancellor's advisers would have modified substantially many of the Chancellor's statements, had they been able to do so.

The group broke up shortly after 11:30 and the Chancellor departed in a friendly mood. There seemed little doubt, however, that he was extremely disturbed by the inspection zone proposal and by the suggestion of any modification of his limited plebiscite proposal to be confined to West Berlin and conducted before the Summit meeting in May. What also seemed to emerge was the concentration of the Chancellor on maintaining the status quo in West Berlin and his relative lack of interest as of any practical concern in measures designed to keep the emphasis on the reunification of Germany in the impending negotiation.

95. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, March 17, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter  
General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Secretary Herter then went on to say that he had spent a very bad evening with Adenauer the night before.<sup>1</sup> He had given a very restricted dinner for Adenauer, following which the Chancellor became very difficult and contentious in his discussion. Adenauer started with a long argument on what the Soviets are going to be able to do to the West, economically, premised on a report that had reached him that the Soviets will pass the United States in economic output by mid 1965. He had mentioned this the night before to Bruce, Dowling, Allen Dulles, Clay and McCloy, all of whom told him that his information was quite erroneous.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Mr. Herter said that last evening Adenauer had asserted that the President had not mentioned Central Europe as an area to be covered by the Norstad Plan.<sup>3</sup> The President commented that he had said that Central Europe plus perhaps Siberia and Alaska would be included. He commented that the interpreter at the luncheon, where he had discussed this, had in other instances failed to give a complete translation. He was very clear that he had mentioned it, however.

Mr. Herter said that the Chancellor had asked if the United States would support his idea for a quick referendum.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Herter had replied that we would certainly support the principle of self-determination, which was a basic element in U.S. foreign policy. The Chancellor then made clear that he had no interest in bringing East Germany into reunification with West Germany at all. He said that reunification is not practicable, and referred to the Socialist voting strength in East Germany. Mr. Herter said Von Brentano stayed after Adenauer left for half an hour to try to put things on a better plane. Mr. Herter said it is clear that Adenauer has become extremely suspicious, and ready to believe any rumor that the United States is doing something against the interest

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 18. The source text indicates the conference took place after the NSC meeting.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 94.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 254.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 90.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 94.



of himself or his party. The President commented there are clear signs of growing senility particularly in Adenauer's tendency to focus on a single point, with loss of perspective on the whole range of considerations.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

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## 96. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 17, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Chancellor Adenauer's Proposal for a Plebiscite in West Berlin; German Participation in Contingency Planning

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Franz Krapf, Minister, German Embassy

Dr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter

Secretary Herter

Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant

Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

The Secretary began by reading to Foreign Minister von Brentano a proposed statement<sup>1</sup> expressing his regrets over the unfortunate incident which had occurred earlier today at the National Gallery of Art (the press had reported that someone had drawn several swastikas over the Chancellor's signature in the Gallery's guest book). Von Brentano expressed his thanks and commented that it was stupid to say, as the UPI report had done, that only members of the Chancellor's own party or a press photographer had had the opportunity to draw in the swastikas.

Von Brentano said that he had had a further discussion with Chancellor Adenauer and Ambassador Grewe before their departure for the West Coast, and he had a number of points to make in extension of the conversation with the Chancellor at the Secretary's home yesterday eve-

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on March 25. See also Document 97.

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

ning. With reference to the proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin first made yesterday by the Chancellor in his speech at the National Press Club, the Germans were now thinking not in terms of a formal highly-organized plebiscite but rather in terms of an action to be prepared by the political parties in West Berlin. A more formal type of plebiscite involving an elaborate machinery and with implied juridical as well as political connotations could scarcely be arranged in time to precede the Summit meeting. Moreover, it might be considered as prejudging a subsequent plebiscite in East Germany. A cable had been sent to Bonn for repetition to Berlin requesting reactions from the local authorities and Foreign Office representatives in the city. Von Brentano said that he was certain his people in Berlin would get in touch with the American authorities there to exchange views.

The Secretary said that when he first heard of the proposal the reports had appeared a little confused. It had seemed that the Germans intended to ask the occupying powers to conduct the plebiscite. Now, as he understood it, the Germans were thinking in terms of something to be arranged by the people of Berlin themselves. If it were carried out, he could only hope that the outcome would be as pronounced as in the 1958 elections.<sup>2</sup> Von Brentano commented that, if his people in Berlin had any doubts about the outcome, they would obviously not want to have the action initiated. There was no question but that 96% of the population would still favor the present regime, but perhaps their total participation might be less than in 1958. These factors would have to be considered in arriving at a decision.

Another question which he had discussed with the Chancellor, von Brentano continued, was the desirability of bringing the Federal Republic more intimately into Allied contingency planning. The German Government would like to bring its Defense Ministry into the picture where its cooperation was desirable, and the Chancellor had asked that instructions be issued to this effect.

Mr. Kohler commented that we have tried to bring the Germans more closely into contingency planning. As an example of legitimate German interest in the subject he pointed to the discussions over alert measures in the Federal Republic. Legislation on this subject has not yet been enacted. Action of this type is relevant in proving the seriousness of Western intentions. Von Brentano said he fully agreed. It was unfortunate that the two-thirds majority required in the Bundestag to amend the basic law was not in sight. The SPD was taking a very rigid position. This made it very difficult for the Federal Republic which, he believed,

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<sup>2</sup> Regarding the outcome of the December 7, 1958, West Berlin elections, see vol. VIII, Document 99.

was alone among the NATO countries in lacking emergency powers legislation. After his return to Bonn he intended to make another effort, and would conduct personal discussions with the opposition. In the past the Foreign Office had exercised restraint in this matter and left it largely to the Ministry of the Interior. If the Foreign Office had intervened actively, it would perhaps have looked as if the Government feared that war was imminent.

Returning to the plebiscite proposal, the Secretary said that a difficult aspect would be the formulation of the specific question to be put forward in such an informal plebiscite. He was sorry that the Chancellor on the previous evening had seemed annoyed when the thought was expressed that the procedures used in such a plebiscite might set the pattern for a plebiscite in East Germany. We still believed that the answer to Soviet emphasis on a separate peace treaty should be a proposal for a plebiscite in East Germany.

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## 97. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 17, 1960.

SUBJECT ·

Norstad Plan

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 96.]

During a conversation also dealing with other subjects covered in a separate memorandum,<sup>1</sup> von Brentano raised the question of an inspection zone or zones which the President had discussed with the Chancellor at lunch on Tuesday.<sup>2</sup> Von Brentano said that he had been briefed on the 1957 disarmament discussions, and as he understood it there were four proposals under consideration relating to inspection zones: (a) the US had said it would be prepared, if the Soviet Union were willing to permit inspection in its own territory, to permit similar inspection in the

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on March 25.

<sup>1</sup> Document 96.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 90.

US and Canada; (b) if this were not acceptable to the Soviets, then the US was prepared to set aside certain less extensive areas of the US, Alaska and the Soviet Union, for the same purpose; (c) a similar zone of inspection might be set aside in Europe stretching to the Urals and including all of Western Europe; (d) possibly a more limited zone of inspection in Western Europe could be discussed. A specific proposal on this was never actually made at the conference, but it had been thought that this might include an area within the longitude parallels 5°–35°.

As to the last of the foregoing proposals, von Brentano continued, he was not competent to discuss the technical or military aspects, that is, whether the development of new weapons demanded a revised concept of the appropriate area to be involved. This was a matter for the experts. But other developments since 1957 had been such as to make some other delimitation of area desirable; at least the question should be raised. The doubts of the Federal Government did not proceed from false considerations of prestige, but it had to be said that his Government found the 5°–35° proposal very bad and distasteful. If you cut out a part of Free Europe, principally Germany, then he feared that a psychological development would begin which would nourish the neutralization of Germany. The public would think that an inspection zone proposal was the first step towards this objective. He did not believe it to be compatible with the NATO concept of equality, and it would lead to the disintegration of that organization. If one asked how this could be claimed relative to the introduction of technical measures alone, he could only reply that, if there were some NATO countries with such inspection measures and others without them, this would introduce an unhealthy element of discrimination. It would obviously have an effect on US troop deployment, or at least on the willingness of the US to keep the necessary equipment for its troops within the area. Therefore the Federal Government would strenuously object to such proposals and request that they not be tabled in the disarmament negotiations.

The Secretary said that it was not the intention to table such a proposal in the disarmament negotiations. We wanted to talk with the German authorities first. The President thought that such a proposal might be a test of Soviet good faith as to whether they were really willing to accept inspection. The question of specific areas to be involved could be discussed. The President was thinking of having this subject raised in the Four-Power Working Group and not in the disarmament group. We know, the Secretary continued, that the Federal Republic has always opposed carving out a special area to include the Federal Republic because of fear that it might lead to neutralization. The President was thinking that the Soviets probably would not accept such a proposal but it would be a good gesture, a sort of combination of the open sky proposals of 1955 supplemented by certain aspects of the 1957 proposals.

After noting that the 1957 proposals also envisaged certain measures of ground inspection, von Brentano observed that such a proposal would set up a dangerous reaction if the area in question turned out to be nearly identical with the Federal Republic. The Soviets would reenter as inspectors. The West should do nothing to encourage neutralization sentiments in the Federal Republic. Any measure which discriminates against any member of the Alliance must also be avoided. These considerations were basic to the reaction of the Chancellor yesterday evening.<sup>3</sup> If the Four-Power Working Group wants to consider such a proposal and discuss the pros and cons, this, of course, could be done, but he wanted the Secretary to know the reasons why the Federal Government would not accept such a proposal and would insist on extending the area involved. To speak very frankly, von Brentano added, we all know that thoughts of this kind and some going even farther are entertained in certain British circles. Such thoughts would find further nourishment in this proposal. He was not speaking of his good friend Selwyn Lloyd, but of certain other British leaders. The Federal Government considered it as highly dangerous to seek to ease tensions through such measures which would lead not to relaxation but rather to heightened tension.

The Secretary commented that relief of tension was not the most important aspect. Our objectives related to surprise attack and the defense of Europe. We had no fixed ideas as to the area to be involved and certainly no discrimination against the Federal Republic was intended. We would like to find out how, from the viewpoint of military judgment, such a proposal would benefit the West. The best man to provide such a judgment would be General Norstad. Von Brentano agreed that it would be a good thing to get his views, since no one else's views could be more pertinent. The Secretary repeated that we would like to get from General Norstad a military appraisal of the value of such a zone. Von Brentano said that, if such an appraisal were obtained, the military authorities of the Federal Republic would have a basis on which to provide their own comments. The Secretary noted that Norstad would presumably consult fully with them.

Von Brentano observed that the danger is that should the fact of such discussions become public the result would inevitably be dangerous speculation. Unfortunately, it is difficult to avoid leaks in democracies. In his own experience if he had a very secret paper and left it lying open unmarked on his desk no one would be interested. However, if a paper were marked Secret it was bound to leak out. It would be very bad, he reiterated, if it leaked out that such a proposal were being

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 94.

discussed. The Secretary commented that we have a saying that if you want something to leak you should mark it Secret.

This was a matter, he continued, which the President wanted to have discussed, and we ought to move ahead with it quickly. We could see value in such a proposal not in the disarmament conference but possibly at the Summit. It might in this context provide an acid test as to whether the Soviets mean what they are saying.

Mr. Kohler raised the question in connection with procedure whether it would not be better, before discussion in the Four-Power Group, to ask Norstad for his views. This would put us in a better position to consider the matter quadripartitely. Von Brentano agreed. Mr. Merchant commented that certainly Norstad would not recommend anything which would have the effect of weakening NATO. Von Brentano said he would ask General Heusinger for his views. Mr. Kohler suggested that we raise the matter privately with the British and French and, if they likewise agreed, then Norstad could be asked for his views. Von Brentano said that there was no need for formal discussions. When Norstad was asked we could at the same time suggest that he obtain the views of his closest collaborators, i.e., the French, British and Germans. Mr. Kohler noted that this would, of course, all be without any commitment on anyone's part.

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## 98. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 17, 1960.

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Arthur Sylvester, *Newark News*  
Jack Leacacos, *Cleveland Plain Dealer*  
Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary

In response to questions the Secretary said that the Summit Conference might well open with Khrushchev's proposal for separate peace treaties with the two Germanies. The Secretary confirmed that we had

been thinking about proposing an internationally supervised plebiscite on this subject in Germany. We have particularly in mind East Germany. Khrushchev has been emphasizing the right of peoples to self-determination. In his speech at Kabul recently he went way beyond former statements and talked about Lenin's principles of nationality and said that all peoples are entitled to self-determination. This idea, we believe, should also be applied to East Germany.

As for Adenauer's proposal at the National Press Club for a plebiscite in West Berlin, this took us by surprise. Adenauer's idea that the plebiscite should be conducted by the occupying powers is not a good one, since it would not be regarded by world opinion as a free vote. The election of December, 1958, which had the effect of a plebiscite did not involve the three Western powers and was conducted by the municipality. It probably would be difficult to arrange this before the Summit meeting. Another difficulty would be what question would be submitted to the people in the plebiscite?

*Off the record*, the Secretary said there had been a considerable discussion with Adenauer on this subject at the dinner at the German Embassy Wednesday night. Adenauer was adamantly opposed to a suggestion that he invite an international body of observers to observe such a plebiscite in West Berlin. It was pointed out to him that this would set a good precedent so that a similar group could observe a plebiscite in East Germany. It was mentioned to him that the Russians said that the elections in 1958 had been conducted at the point of allied bayonets. Adenauer objected to the idea of foreign observers. He also seemed to demonstrate no interest at all in the idea of a plebiscite in East Germany.

*Still off the record*, the Secretary said that another surprising after dinner conversation had occurred with Adenauer getting into a vigorous argument with men like John McCloy, Al Gruenther, David Bruce, Red Dowling and others who are good friends of the Chancellor. The argument developed out of Adenauer's statement that by 1965 the Russians would have surpassed the United States economically. The others advanced many arguments to show that this was not possible, but Adenauer did not seem convinced. *End off the record*.

The Secretary said that Adenauer's attitude is conditioned by what seems to be his determination to run again in the elections next year. Feeling that Mayor Brandt of West Berlin will be his rival candidate, he feels he has to maintain a stronger stand on Berlin than Brandt himself. Even though Berlin is not a part of West Germany, Brandt does qualify under the constitution as a candidate.

As for the Summit Conference, it is possible to expect something to be done with regard to disarmament, depending on what happens in the disarmament discussions in Geneva. If certain agreements are

virtually reached, they might be firmed up at the Summit. The same thing might be true with regard to the suspension of nuclear testing. East-West relations will also be discussed, but there is no agenda for the Summit. As for Berlin, Adenauer greatly fears that if we start at the Summit where we left off at Geneva, we will make further concessions. He does not want any change in the status of Berlin at all. If the Russians raise the matter of separate peace treaties, the Summit Conference will probably start from the beginning of the Geneva Conference.

As for what deGaulle's attitude will be at the Summit, we will know more about that after Khrushchev's visit to Paris.<sup>1</sup> This will be an interesting meeting, with a couple of Tartars clashing head on. It is likely that deGaulle will talk turkey to Khrushchev. DeGaulle believes that Khrushchev's attitude toward Berlin will be an acid test of whether he wants anything to come out of the Summit. The Russians have adopted only a minimum of an attitude on Algeria, which is surprising because the Arab States have ganged up on this issue.

The Secretary admitted that there was much unfinished business after the conversations between the President and deGaulle in Paris last September,<sup>2</sup> but the matter of France's participation in NATO is going better.

The question of the East European satellites might be raised by the western powers at the Summit Conference. This would be related to the idea of self-determination as expressed by Khrushchev. We are still holding conversations on this subject.

As to whether the Germans will be in the wings at the Summit Conference as they were at the 1955 Summit, the Secretary said he did not know. The President is expected to get to Paris early on Sunday, May 15, but we do not yet know whether Adenauer will come to Paris for a conference with him and Macmillan and deGaulle. Much will depend on whether the lines of the Western positions are clear enough by that time. There will be a Foreign Ministers Meeting in Paris a couple of days before the Summit.

As to Khrushchev's statement that neither side should rock the boat before the Summit Conference, the Secretary commented that despite this statement Khrushchev has said adverse things himself which have tended to rock the boat. The Secretary said our decision on the high altitude flights to Berlin had nothing to do with the Summit Conference. Likewise it was not a quid pro quo for the Soviet decision on passes for the Liaison Missions.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Khrushchev was scheduled to visit France March 23–April 3.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 10.

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the question of passes for the Allied Military Liaison Missions to travel in East Germany, see Documents 283 ff.



Informed by Mr. Sylvester that he had been quoted following a meeting on the Hill as having told a Congressional committee that we were prepared to recognize East Germany in exchange for a free corridor to West Berlin, the Secretary said this was not true. There had been something like this informally tossed around in the Defense Department; the proposal would have been for a hundred kilometer-wide corridor and if the Soviets refused that, we would fall back to sixty kilometers; but the Secretary said he had not entertained any such idea himself, and he did not know what Defense's quid pro quo would have been.

The Secretary acknowledged that the Soviets could always put effective indirect pressure on West Berlin through an economic squeeze. The President has said that the situation in West Berlin is abnormal, and this was misconstrued; but the fact is the situation is abnormal in that Berlin lies one hundred ten miles inside hostile territory. Nevertheless, the spirit of the people is wonderful; there is a great deal of new building going on, including the construction of speedways through and around the city.

The Secretary said that something on the Middle East might come up at the Summit, perhaps in the nature of a proposal by the Russians for an arms embargo. The Russians might also propose a guarantee of the status quo in the Middle East. That would raise the question of the border between Israel and neighboring States. The Arabs would scream at such a proposal. We ourselves would go as far as anybody to keep the peace, but we don't know what our attitude will be on this question as yet.

The 1950 Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East<sup>4</sup> still stands as far as we are concerned. The question of an arms embargo might also be raised with regard to Africa, and in either case produces a real headache because the nations of those areas, particularly the new nations, would claim that any embargo on arms shipments to them was an infringement of their sovereignty. Ben Gurion did not raise with us the question of United States arms supplies for Israel.

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<sup>4</sup> For text of this declaration, May 25, 1950, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, p. 2237.

**99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, March 19, 1960, 4:53 p.m.

7068. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Following text of letter from Secretary to Selwyn Lloyd sent you for your information. Original of letter will be given Ambassador Caccia by Secretary at 4:00 p.m., March 20.  
"March 19, 1960.

Dear Selwyn: We have now concluded our talks with Dr. Adenauer and Herr von Brentano and I would like to give you a brief account of the discussions at the White House and here in the State Department. Except for the Chancellor's proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin (which I shall comment on later) the visit produced no surprises. The range of subjects covered is fairly accurately reflected in the joint statement which was issued after the meeting of the President and the Chancellor at the White House.

As you might expect, the Chancellor both publicly and privately emphasized the importance he attached to the disarmament question. He thinks that the Heads of Government must do everything in their power to make progress in this field. He plainly does not think we can rely on the Ten-Power Group at Geneva to make the progress he considers necessary. We can all certainly agree that the topic is of paramount importance.

The Chancellor, laying stress on the unity of the German political parties on the Berlin and German questions, reasserted his willingness to back up the firmness of the German position with their willingness to face the dangerous consequences which such an attitude might force us to face. For our part, we developed two points in response. The first was that we did not intend to withdraw American forces from Europe until substantial progress has been achieved toward a workable disarmament program. Until that occurs we would not even discuss the matter. The second was that the American flag would be flying over Berlin as long as present conditions continued and no agreement acceptable to the Federal Republic and West Berlin had concluded. At the same time we have been stressing to the Germans that starting from this basis, it should be possible to consider realistically the various alternatives open to the West.

The Chancellor's public proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin not only caught us by surprise; it was a new idea to his entourage and his

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/3-1960. Secret. Drafted by Herter and Vigderman on March 18, cleared with Kohler, and approved by Arthur R. Day in S/S.

Embassy here. Since he made the proposal the Germans have been having second thoughts. They are now thinking in terms not of a plebiscite to be conducted by us, but rather by the political parties in Berlin. This would make the plebiscite a less formal measure, with fewer juridical overtones, and have the advantage that it could more easily be arranged before the Summit meeting takes place. That method would also avoid prejudging the modalities of a possible plebiscite in East Germany.

We have taken no position on the plebiscite idea. Even in its modified form we can see certain disadvantages which need to be carefully weighed. First off, the question to be put in a plebiscite would have to be very carefully formulated indeed. Secondly, while we have little doubt on this score, there is always the possibility that the plebiscite result might be less than overwhelming on our side. But most dangerous of all is the implication that the results of the plebiscite are designed as a form of pressure on us, rather than the Soviets, that it somehow gives us less freedom of action than we might otherwise have. Finally, a plebiscite conducted on the Western side might harm the public acceptability of future possible proposals on our side for plebiscites in East Germany and East Berlin. In any case, we expect the Germans to lay their proposal before us in the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin, where we can all have a go at the advantages and disadvantages of the idea.

We discussed General Norstad's plan for a zone of inspection with the Chancellor a bit and then had longer talks on this subject with Herr von Brentano. The Germans advanced their usual line on the undesirability of proposing plans to the Soviets which covered limited zones, since these tend to lead to the neutralization in a political, as well as a military sense, of the area covered.

After considerable discussion, Brentano was at least able to agree that it would be a good idea to consult General Norstad on the military value of a zone of inspection. Once we have an appraisal from him, the Germans will have a basis on which to provide their own military comments. I think this represents a measure of progress in getting forward with the idea, although one cannot be too optimistic considering the firmness of the German position. Von Brentano made quite clear that the Germans would oppose any zone limited to a European area constituted principally by Germany. We agreed that it was very especially necessary to avoid any leak to the effect that this idea was even being considered.

We told Brentano we had no fixed ideas on the area which should be included in the zone of inspection although we always included Alaska and a portion of Siberia in the discussions. We also told him that we are interested primarily in safeguards against surprise attack and the defense of Europe. The Soviet are not likely to accept any proposal we

make, but it will provide a good test of whether they are interested in inspection zones. After General Norstad's comments are available, we think this problem might be canvassed in the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin.

You will, of course, be getting further details of our talks through the regular channels. I have only tried to mention in this letter what seemed to me to be the highlights. As you can see, the talks, while certainly useful, produced no particular new developments in connection with our Summit preparations.

With warmest personal regards,  
Most sincerely, Christian A. Herter."

**Herter**

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#### 100. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, March 21, 1960, 8 p.m.

753. Paris for Embassy, CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Ref: Dept's 2014 to Bonn.<sup>1</sup>

Mayor Brandt called in my British, French colleagues and myself afternoon March 21. He told us he had received letter from Chancellor March 18 re plebiscite proposal. Adenauer stated reason was to strengthen the Western position at summit. Chancellor mentioned that subsequently idea of less formal arrangement with action to be taken by political parties in Berlin was discussed in Washington.

Brandt then summarized his reply to Chancellor's letter (now en route) which also includes views of Senat and both political parties. Main points as follows: Senat ready to hold a plebiscite in West Berlin if

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2160. Secret. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Dated March 19, telegram 2014 to Bonn summarized Herter's conversation with Brentano on March 17 (see Document 96) and stated that Adenauer's proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin (see footnote 2, Document 94) contained certain disadvantages that would have to be weighed carefully before any final decision could be taken. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1960)

Western Powers should desire it. Berliners themselves would be prepared to sponsor plebiscite on their own if it appeared situation required such action.

Re technical problem of holding plebiscite in West Berlin on such short notice, special law would have to be adopted but this could be rushed through in about 4 weeks. Proposed text of such law, with question to be posed in plebiscite omitted, has already been drafted.

Brandt said in letter to Chancellor he deplored lack consultation before Adenauer made proposal. Furthermore, difficult to understand need for plebiscite without background regarding Chancellor's conversation with President and SecState. (Brandt told us his impressions were there nothing in Washington talks indicating such a need.)

Brandt's letter further referred to importance of carefully considering theme, time and form of any plebiscite. Impression must be avoided that Germans mistrusted their allies, nor must plebiscite appear to ask Berliners who their occupiers should be.

As to form, Brandt told Adenauer it should be "formal plebiscite" not "public opinion" poll conducted by political parties. Latter would have two disadvantages: (1) Would be compared to sort of thing that goes on in a "peoples' democracy" (2) It would be impossible to achieve as good results percentage-wise. Under any circumstance it difficult obtain voting participation of 93 percent as in December 1958 elections. A vote under party sponsorship without formal voting lists might result in significantly weaker participation.

Brandt also wrote Chancellor that irrespective of plebiscite before summit, Berliners were planning to use events of May 1 to register an impact on world opinion. Various schemes under consideration to augment normal activities, including participation of representative groups from public life who might be called upon to show their support for the cause.

Brandt also told Adenauer he assumed Allies at summit would keep their word that no agreements would be made against will of Berliners. This also pointed to conclusion it preferable to have plebiscite, if any, after rather than before summit.

Brandt said he would keep us informed of any further communications with Chancellor and would be glad to hear anything we might have from our governments.

After others left I informed Mayor of substance reftel saying that Dept felt plebiscite idea needed to be carefully studied before any decision made. Brandt himself had mentioned several disadvantages and it was obvious this was particularly delicate problem which seemed put us in position answering question whether we for or against sin. Brandt agreed saying he too was in that predicament and that his letter, while

expressing negative views, had carefully avoided taking definitive position. He said he dared not do so as he would not give Chancellor opportunity, "if things don't go right at summit," of accusing him (Brandt) of having blocked plebiscite proposal. (Adenauer under these circumstances would claim pre-summit plebiscite would have forced Allies to take stronger position.)

Other leaders both parties queried today expressed many same points, CDU unenthusiastic, SPD more critical. Some expressed unhappiness about Berlin newspapers which reacted too enthusiastically too soon (Berlin's 649 to Bonn, 746 SecState)<sup>2</sup> but said that virtual disappearance of plebiscite subject from press over weekend may indicate editors having second thoughts.

**Lightner**

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<sup>2</sup>Dated March 18, telegram 649 from Berlin to Bonn reported that all the Berlin papers had reported variably on Adenauer's proposal for a plebiscite while the East Berlin press regarded it as a bluff. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/3-1860)

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## 101. Editorial Note

During the debate on the Mutual Security Act of 1960, Secretary of State Herter testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on February 17, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 22, while Assistant Secretary of State Kohler made similar appearances on March 16 and 24. As part of their statements to the committees and in response to questions from their members, Herter and Kohler described the position of the United States on Germany and Berlin, the forthcoming summit conference, and the question of high altitude flights to Berlin.

For the testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee, see U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Mutual Security Act of 1960* (Washington, 1960), pages 1-34 and 903-926, *passim*; for the testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, see U.S. Senate, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Mutual Security Act of 1960* (Washington, 1960), pages 5-42 and 191-229, *passim*.

102. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter

London, March 24, 1960.

DEAR CHRIS: It was very good of you to send me your impressions of Dr. Adenauer's visit, which I read with the greatest interest.<sup>1</sup> I am most grateful.

Harold Caccia has also told me of his talk with you.<sup>2</sup> The visit cannot have been easy to handle and it was disappointing to hear that Dr. Adenauer seemed to be still so full of suspicions.

I agree about the several objections which you mention to Dr. Adenauer's proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin, the worst being certainly that it would have the effect of restricting our freedom of manoeuvre. In addition it seems to me that the Russians might conceivably retaliate against a Western plebiscite by holding a rigged plebiscite in East Germany which would be used to justify the incorporation of East Berlin into the D.D.R. But our impression is that German official thinking is also unenthusiastic about the plebiscite idea. Certainly Dr. Carstens, who passed through London on March 21, made no secret of his dislike of it. He said that he had been entrusted by Adenauer with the task of formulating the question to be put to the West Berliners but had found it beyond his wits. It may be therefore that the Germans will not wish to pursue the matter very vigorously in the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin.

As regards the possibility of a zone of inspection, I agree that the best way to proceed would be first to seek General Norstad's comments from the military angle. I hope that you will be able to persuade the French to agree that General Norstad's comments should be sought. But I suggest that our national military authorities need not be consulted until the Governments have received these comments. If and when we get a military appreciation from General Norstad I agree that the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin would then be the best forum in which to begin discussing the political aspects. There is obviously still a lot of work to be done on this and I imagine that we may not be in a position to consider any concrete project at our meeting in April.

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Attached to a note from Caccia to Herter, dated March 24, which stated that Caccia had been asked to pass it on to the Secretary of State.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted in Document 99.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably Herter had briefed Caccia on the talks with Adenauer on March 20, when he gave him a copy of the letter to Lloyd (see source note above), but no record of this meeting has been found.

In view of the importance of avoiding any leak to the effect that an idea of this kind is even being considered, perhaps this would not matter.

With warm regards,

Yours ever,

Selwyn<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### 103. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates

JCSM-123-60

March 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

Reduction of Berlin Garrison (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), subject as above, dated 15 March 1960, requesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-examine their views and recommendations contained in JCSM-264-59 of 8 July 1959, in order to provide the Department of Defense with guidance regarding the required size of the allied garrison in Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have re-examined their memorandum to you of 8 July 1959 on this matter, and have concluded that the opinions and recommendations set forth therein remain valid.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no fundamental change in the threat to the freedom and safety of Berlin. Recent developments, including statements of Mr. Khrushchev, do not indicate any modification to the long-term objectives of the Soviet Union with respect to Germany and Berlin, nor do they foreshadow any lessening of Communistic control in East Germany. Under such circumstances any reduction in the

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Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 320.2 Berlin. Top Secret.

<sup>1</sup>A copy of the ISA memorandum is *ibid.* For JCSM-264-59, see vol. VIII, Document 428.



size of the Berlin garrison would symbolize a decrease in the interest of the Western powers in Berlin, which would lead inevitably to an erosion of their already insecure position. Therefore, the current size of the U.S. Berlin garrison represents a minimum balance of force to maintain our objectives there.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
**Arleigh Burke**<sup>2</sup>  
*Chief of Naval Operations*

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<sup>2</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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#### 104. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, March 26, 1960, 9 p.m.

767. After official luncheon for Secretary Gates<sup>1</sup> March 25 Mayor Brandt asked me to his office. He told me his letter to Adenauer on plebiscite matter (ourtel 753 SecState, 656 Bonn)<sup>2</sup> had crossed one from Chancellor in which latter had urged Brandt accept plebiscite idea and to eschew advice from certain influential critics who Brandt said Chancellor had identified. (As reported ourtel 762<sup>3</sup> identified critics as “The Americans”.) Brandt said he had made no substantive reply to this letter. However, he had now received another letter from Chancellor mailed in Honolulu and written after receipt Brandt’s letter (ourtel 753). Chancellor referred to apparent disagreement “over details” and urged Brandt do nothing to hinder plan pending opportunity sit down together and go over whole thing after Adenauer’s return.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–2660. Secret. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup>Secretary of Defense Gates was in Berlin as part of a tour of U.S. military installations in Europe prior to the NAC Defense Ministers meeting in Paris at the end of March.

<sup>2</sup>Document 100.

<sup>3</sup>Dated March 25, telegram 762 from Berlin reported that Brandt did not seem to want a formal reply to his request for Allied views on the plebiscite and that Adenauer had written to Brandt imploring his support for the proposal and that he not be misled by American opposition to it. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3–2560)

Brandt, who is obviously on spot, told me he knows of no one who favors the plan besides Adenauer himself. In addition to entire Berlin Senat, he mentioned President Luebke (now visiting Berlin), Chancellor's Berlin representative Vockel, and even Chancellor's "great eminence" Globke as being opposed to plan. Even Fonoff apparently opposed although they have to be very careful what they say. This evident from attitude of Professor Carstens, Foreign Office representative who had accompanied Adenauer to Washington, with whom Brandt had just discussed subject at length.

Brandt then referred to same point he made to me March 21: difficult position he would be in if there is no plebiscite because of his opposition and if summit decisions leave many Germans unhappy. Adenauer would crucify him. Therefore, Brandt said, after discussing problem at length with his friends he decided go ahead with preparation technical matters that would be necessary for a formal plebiscite so that Adenauer could not later accuse him of having sabotaged idea from beginning. Necessary law to authorize plebiscite already drafted and can be acted on in one day. Preparation election lists and other details which will take about three weeks to complete will be handled by Senator Lipschitz.

Upon Chancellor's return to Germany, Brandt will meet with him and do his best to talk him out of holding Berlin plebiscite. If not successful, he will suggest some alternatives to plebiscite. Brandt has already given some thought to alternatives and will continue to. Right now he is thinking seriously but as last resort of suggesting to Chancellor that Berlin Parliament be dissolved and new elections held. This would avoid many pitfalls involved in plebiscite and would be comparable in every respect to December 1958 election. Brandt cited Carstens as having reminded him world outside of Germany only dimly aware '58 election and its significance; hence new election at this time would demonstrate in timely way allegiance of Berliners to Western cause. According to Brandt, one objection to this idea voiced by Lipschitz who doubts wisdom playing around with basic system of representative government itself, even though in a good cause.

If he does not succeed changing Chancellor's mind, Brandt says he will have to go along but will then remind Chancellor that matter should be taken up with three ambassadors in Bonn as Brandt would not be willing carry out plebiscite if Allies object. Brandt does not see how Adenauer could take exception to this in view many occasions Adenauer himself has referred to Allied-German partnership in Berlin.

I asked Brandt if it did not seem evident that Chancellor's position frankly based on using this method to guarantee fulfillment recent pledges received from President Eisenhower. Brandt referred to letter from Chancellor in which Adenauer stated reason for his proposal was

“to strengthen Western position at the summit.” I recalled Brandt’s own views that plebiscite might well be taken as sign Germans did not trust their allies and said I believed there was indeed risk plebiscite idea might boomerang in big way when full significance brought home to British, French and American peoples. Brandt said this was just the point that troubled him.

Brandt, of course, has his own political position and future to consider but I have impression he will make sincere effort convince Chancellor to give up plebiscite idea. In meantime I doubt there is much U.S. or Allied representatives can do to assist. In fact as indicated ourtel 762 I believe we should avoid becoming involved between Chancellor and Brandt. Such intrusion could easily boomerang on us.

Lightner

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## 105. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, March 28, 1960, 2:45–4:15 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Summit Negotiations

### PARTICIPANTS

*British Side*

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan  
Sir Norman Brooks  
Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia  
Mr. C.D.W. O’Neill  
Mr. Philip F. de Zulueta

*U.S. Side*

The President  
Under Secretary Dillon  
Assistant Secretary Kohler  
General Goodpaster

During the discussion of nuclear test questions between the President and the Prime Minister, the President had commented, in speculating on Soviet motives with respect to that conference, on the importance which he felt the Russians attached to a confirmation of the post-war German borders, and of the real fear they have of a reunited, armed

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1618. Secret. Drafted by Kohler, approved in U on April 5, and in the White House on April 20. Further documentation on Macmillan’s visit to the United States March 26–30 is in volume VII, Part 2.

Germany. In this connection, he had cited the many placards he had seen during his recent visit to Germany<sup>1</sup> demanding the return of the lost East German provinces. The Prime Minister had cited the statements on the German borders already made by General de Gaulle,<sup>2</sup> and had suggested the possibility that this subject might be explored in connection with the forthcoming May Summit meeting. After the conclusion of the nuclear test talks, the President reverted to the subject, referring to the strong statements made to him by Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev during his visit here, and to the fervent remarks on the border question made to him just a few days ago by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jaroszewicz.<sup>3</sup> The President said he felt we could not really afford to stand on a dime for the next fifty years. He believed the time would come when we should make a statement on the border. He knew the Germans would not like this. He acknowledged that we must not destroy West German morale. However, the fact of the matter was that the borders could be changed only by war. The Prime Minister commented that this might be an important consideration to the Soviets. If anything could be gotten in return for such a statement, he thought it might be worthwhile.

The President agreed that this was not a thing which we should let the Russians have cheaply. However, he thought it would be good to be prepared as to what we would propose to say. We could then keep such a statement ready in our trading bag, and pull it out at a certain time in the negotiations. He recognized that it might prove to be premature to bring it out at the Summit.

The Prime Minister said that in view of the Western democratic processes, press pressures and leaks, he felt that it would be necessary for the Heads of Government to a great extent "to play it by ear". The process of preparations, the drafting of position papers, were dangerous operations and it was very difficult to try to reach fall-back positions in advance.

The President agreed, saying it seemed there was always someone with a good friend who was a journalist, and then headlines were inevitable. Moreover, despite repeated efforts, it had been proved to be almost impossible to track down responsibility for such leaks.

Mr. Dillon remarked that some of our officers in the Department had in fact felt that concessions in other areas, specifically with respect to the nuclear agreement, might be valuable in exchange for some

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<sup>1</sup> See Documents 5 and 8.

<sup>2</sup> For text of de Gaulle's statement on German borders, given at a press conference on March 25, 1959, see *Statements*, pp. 41-51.

<sup>3</sup> Jaroszewicz visited the United States beginning March 23.

reasonable Soviet position on Berlin. He indicated that the Department was considering such possibilities.

The President pursued this thought, commenting that if we were willing to take a moratorium of perhaps two years on nuclear testing, the Soviets might be expected to do some kind of a similar moratorium with respect to Berlin.

The Prime Minister then turned to the subject of the adamant German position, recalling the efforts the President had made during the Western Heads of Government meeting at Rambouillet<sup>4</sup> to persuade the Germans and French to face up to what would happen if an impasse were reached at the Summit, and the Soviets carried out their threat to conclude a separate treaty and put the East Germans in charge. He recalled Adenauer's reference to the sending of armed columns through to Berlin in such circumstances. He said the British do not intend to engage in such a movement of armed forces, and indicated his assumption that the US felt likewise.

The President replied that if Khrushchev maintains that his treaty brings an end to our rights, then we do intend to go through to Berlin with armed forces. However, he said, the real weakness of the position in Berlin relates to the question of civilian supplies. Berlin is now a big industrial city. The Soviets have no obligations with respect to Berlin's trade, sources of supply of raw materials, and the like. He said he had told de Gaulle and Adenauer it was all right to stand on the "juridical position", but had tried unsuccessfully to get them to answer the question as to what we do when the Soviets move.

Mr. Macmillan said he thought that de Gaulle's strong stand was a rather formalistic position intended to keep the Germans from accusing him of weakness. However, he thought that in the last analysis de Gaulle might not be as tough on this question as he now seemed.

The President said we must keep in mind the danger that if we let the Germans down they might shift their own position and even go neutralistic. He was very worried about who would then hold the central bastion in Europe.

The Prime Minister indicated that he did not share the President's views. He pointed out that the Germans had now had an effective military build-up and were accustomed to it. He expressed the opinion that in fact the Germans now liked playing soldier again and would not likely change their role.

The President said flatly that he would take a strong Germany. He pointed out that the West was afraid of a strong Germany only when there was a weak Soviet Union. Now the central problem was the

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<sup>4</sup>See Document 58.

strength of the Soviet Union. He commented that this would probably not be the case if Hitler had not committed so many blunders.

Prime Minister Macmillan then said that he personally thought the West and Berlin would be better off under a "free city" arrangement or other variant plans which had been considered by the Western powers. However, he recognized that such an arrangement was not obtainable, and said if you can't get that then there is no choice but an interim arrangement.

The President said that frankly he did not see how a city like West Berlin, surrounded by hostile elements who could hamper and harass at will, could long survive.

The Prime Minister said that in any case it was important not to get ourselves into a ridiculous position which we cannot maintain.

The President commented that on the other hand it would be a serious blow to the entire Western position if we showed ourselves to be weak in Germany.

Mr. Dillon said that we had some hope that the Germans might be more forthcoming in considering the Berlin problem following the Adenauer visit and the President's conversations with him. We would perhaps have a test of this in the sessions of the Working Group on Germany beginning next week.

The President then reported on his conversation with Chancellor Adenauer with respect to inspection zones. He said he had referred to zones not only in central Europe but also outside, specifically suggesting the possibility of Alaska and parts of Siberia, but emphasizing that no change in force levels would be involved. He said the Chancellor had seemed to be in hearty agreement, but the following night at Secretary Herter's he had blown up and even asserted that there had been no mention of a zone in central Europe. Mr. Dillon supplemented the President's statement by saying that subsequently, however, German Foreign Minister von Brentano had agreed that the question could be discussed in the quadripartite working group, and that General Norstad's military opinion could be sought.

The President said that some kind of arrangement like this, versions of which have been under discussion at various times for some years, might be a very useful product of the Summit.

The Prime Minister strongly agreed, saying that this was why he was so anxious to achieve a nuclear agreement to show that something concrete in the way of cooperation in settlements could be achieved. The President assented, saying that he had thought it might be possible to get something specific in the disarmament field and that the zonal inspection plan seemed like a possibility.

Mr. Dillon commented that the Soviets appear to be seeking not something specific in this field at the Summit but rather some kind of subscription to general ideas or principles of agreement which would clearly be undesirable.

The Prime Minister then turned to the subject of tactics and procedures, saying he felt the preparatory groups had given no thought to this aspect of the Summit preparations. He thought that you would get nowhere in the kind of vast plenary sessions which had been held in Geneva in 1955. Even the so-called "private sessions," he said, had about a thousand people. The whole procedure was then reduced to formal speeches made around what looked like a boxing ring. He felt that this was a subject we must think about. Mr. Dillon agreed and pointed out that tactics and procedures would be the main subject for discussion among the three Foreign Ministers on April 12.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

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#### 106. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, March 29, 1960, 8 p.m.

4442. Further to London's 4708<sup>1</sup> to Dept and Embtel 4415<sup>2</sup> I summarize Couve's description of Khrushchev visit to Paris. There were three meetings between de Gaulle and Khrushchev which in effect were two because the meeting the first day was short and consisted mainly of pleasantries. The second day there was a two hour meeting on the subject of Germany. Couve had seen the memorandum of conversation as prepared by the interpreter and corrected by de Gaulle the substance of which is as follows: General de Gaulle opened the conversation. He said that he did not agree with Khrushchev's fear of Western Germany. That

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6151/3-2960. Secret. Repeated to London.

<sup>1</sup> Dated March 28, telegram 4708 from London reported that de Gaulle had told the British Ambassador that there had been no meeting of the minds in his first conversation with Khrushchev on Germany. (*Ibid.*, 641.51/3-2860)

<sup>2</sup> Dated March 28, telegram 4415 from Paris reported that Laloy had briefed Lyon on the first meeting between de Gaulle and Khrushchev, most of which was devoted to Germany. (*Ibid.*, 651.61/3-2860)

while he hoped unification would come he realized there were now two Germanies which could not be one unless the Soviets agree and that Western Germany was of course much the stronger and more important. It was of prime importance that Western Germany remain with the West for without that there would be no balance in Europe with the probable result of war. Khrushchev did not agree and said that probably he will make a peace treaty with East Germany. De Gaulle replied of course that he could not stop Khrushchev from making a separate treaty but he wondered what it would avail him. France would not recognize the East German Government. The notable point in Couve's mind was that there was relatively little mention of Berlin which he thinks is further proof that it is not Berlin but the whole German problem that concerns Khrushchev.

[Here follow four paragraphs on the talks about trade and disarmament and on the atmosphere in France during Khrushchev's visit.]

Houghton

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#### 107. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, March 31, 1960, 11 a.m.

1880. Embassy telegram 1743, Embassy airgram G-488.<sup>1</sup> I am increasingly disturbed by frustration evinced FedRep, in press and non-official circles, at failure Germany's allies, particularly U.S., to rally to its support in face of sustained defamation campaign orchestrated by Soviets and evoking, for obvious historical reasons, widespread echoes in West. Communist propaganda is tirelessly representing FedRep in terms which, it seems to Germans, have made considerable impression on world opinion and partially succeeded in recreating moral isolation of immediate post-war period. In this atmosphere Western reaction to anti-semitic incidents, Spanish bases issue, etc., has led Germans to question whether any amount of "good behavior" can restore them to equal status in Western society. More thoughtful members of American

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-3160. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1743, March 11, is printed as Document 86. G-488, March 12, transmitted an assessment of the current German mood. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1260)



press corps here have confirmed that disillusion is spreading among younger Germans, and have expressed view that we should take steps reassure German public opinion of our continued confidence in German democracy.

I would hope therefore that administration leaders would seek early occasions such as White House press conference, to express appreciation political and spiritual integrity of German democracy and FedRep's growing contribution to free world.

It would be particularly useful if the Secretary would consider devoting some remarks this subject in his April 4th NAB speech.<sup>2</sup>

**Dowling**

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<sup>2</sup>Based on this telegram and a strong recommendation by EUR, Secretary Herter's speech in Chicago was revised to include a new section repudiating Soviet charges against Adenauer and praising the Federal Republic of Germany as a worthy and respected ally. (Memorandum from Berding to Herter, March 31; *ibid.*, 762.00/3-3160) For text of Herter's speech to the National Association of Broadcasters at Chicago, April 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1960, pp. 635–640.

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### 108. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, April 4, 1960, 7 p.m.

4601. Couve in unusually loquacious mood this morning described in considerable detail Khrushchev conversations at Rambouillet.

1. *Germany*. Khrushchev on his own initiative raised again the German question. In much the same fashion as before he said he thought that a peace treaty should be signed with both Germanies leaving it then to them to work out their salvation. Failing this, he would sign a treaty with East Germany. De Gaulle reiterated that he could not prevent the Soviets signing a treaty with East Germany but he could see no good reason for it and once again stated that France would not recognize East Germany. He, de Gaulle, felt that there was no reason why the situation should not remain in its status quo. Khrushchev placed somewhat more weight on Berlin than in his previous conversations. De Gaulle again stressed his belief that for a proper balance in Europe Germany must be with the West.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.13/4-460. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

[Here follow paragraphs 2–9 in which Houghton reported Couve de Murville's summary of the discussion on disarmament, Africa, China, aid to less developed countries, non-interference in internal affairs of other states, trade, the communiqué (for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 396–398), and de Gaulle's opinion of Khrushchev.]

10. *Conclusion.* In conclusion Couve said that both sides agreed they want a détente. The difference being the French want a détente leaving the German situation in status quo whereas the Russians want a détente based on a settlement of the German question. *Comment:* After long discussions it would appear fundamental positions of both parties remain unchanged.

Houghton

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### 109. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, April 5, 1960.

#### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

Secretary Herter said he wanted to discuss further with the President the latter's desire to send a message to Khrushchev suggesting a mode of procedure at the summit meeting—based essentially upon having very limited meetings among the top four, followed by enlarged meetings with Foreign Ministers present to receive the guidance of the Heads of Government. Mr. Herter suggested that the President send a draft of what is proposed for Khrushchev to Macmillan and de Gaulle, now together in London,<sup>1</sup> to consider. He said that some of his advisers—specifically Merchant and Bohlen—have some reservation over the idea, their concern being that Khrushchev might take this to mean that the President has some major projects that he has in mind to settle in this way. Mr. Herter said he is not so concerned on this point as they are, and the President indicated no concern himself.

Mr. Herter said that although there is no set agenda for the summit meeting, the subjects that are expected to come up are rather clearly de-

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 6.

<sup>1</sup> De Gaulle paid a State visit to the United Kingdom April 5–8.

fined: disarmament; Germany and Berlin; perhaps nuclear testing; and East-West relations.

The President then made editorial revisions to the proposed text of the message to Khrushchev.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Herter said that at the last summit meeting in Geneva one of the major problems had to do with press relations. Initially the President tried to keep private the discussions of the top four. Others of the group leaked accounts of the meetings to the press, generally colored in their own way. Finally, each one had to have his own press officer put out the story in his own national version. Mr. Herter thought it would be highly desirable to have one man designated to brief Mr. Hagerty on the proceedings. He suggested that this be Mr. Bohlen, who, with his knowledge of Russian and French, would have an excellent understanding of the full proceedings.

With relation to other procedural questions, Mr. Herter said he expected to have an opportunity to discuss these with the other Western Foreign Ministers, who will be here on April 13th, principally for this purpose.

After re-reading the message, the President asked the Secretary to go ahead and send it under a covering note to Macmillan and de Gaulle. He recalled that he had discussed this matter with Macmillan.<sup>3</sup> They had both thought there would be value in de Gaulle, Macmillan and the President meeting early each day, perhaps for breakfast, and then meeting with Khrushchev at 10 o'clock, with the Foreign Ministers coming in at 11. He thought this procedure would prove whether Khrushchev really wants to negotiate or not. He recognized, as an alternative, which he worked into the message to Khrushchev, the idea that after the meeting of the Heads of Government each would instruct his own Foreign Ministers separately prior to the latter getting together to prepare documents and work out specific studies.

The President thought there should be only one formal dinner during the meetings, which it would be appropriate for General de Gaulle to give as the host. Each Head of Government could have the other three in for tea or cocktails in the late afternoon in a very informal session running from something like 5:30 to 6:30.

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<sup>2</sup> Copies of the draft letter to Khrushchev and the draft letters to Macmillan and de Gaulle, all with the President's handwritten corrections, are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. For text of the letters as delivered to Macmillan and de Gaulle, see Document 110.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 105.

2Mr. Herter said he would plan to have present at the summit Mr. Merchant, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Kohler, Ambassador Thompson, also Secretary Irwin from Defense, perhaps Mr. Eaton, and, if appropriate, Mr. Wadsworth on standby plus a Departmental German expert, Mr. Hiltenbrand. There was then discussion concerning Ambassador Dowling, and Ambassador Whitney, and it was agreed both should be present on standby.

[Here follows discussion of possible trips by the President to Africa and Portugal.]

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**110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, April 5, 1960, 8:53 p.m.

7505. Deliver following letter from President to Prime Minister informing Department time of delivery. (Deliver simultaneously with similar letter to de Gaulle in separate telegram.)<sup>1</sup>

*Begin verbatim text.*

April 5, 1960.

Dear Harold: Pursuant to our conversations here in Washington the other day concerning the procedures to be followed at the Summit Meeting, with particular regard to the size of those meetings, I think it might be well if this question were clarified in advance with Chairman Khrushchev.

I propose therefore to send a letter to him along the lines of the enclosure to this letter if you and General de Gaulle agree that this is desirable.

There is a further matter which I think it might be well for us to take up through diplomatic channels with Chairman Khrushchev which

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/4-560. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Sweeney; cleared by Kohler, Calhoun, and Goodpaster; and approved by Herter.

<sup>1</sup> This letter was transmitted in telegram 7506 to London, April 5 at 8:54 p.m. It was similar to the letter to Macmillan, but stressed that de Gaulle's views would be particularly valuable since he was the Western leader with the most recent contact with Khrushchev. (*Ibid.*)

derives from my own constitutional responsibilities. This has to do with reaching preliminary agreement on the probable duration of the Summit Meetings. If you agree I should like to have it made clear to him that the length of time I can be absent from this country is limited—in the present instance I must consider the fact that I plan to leave early in June for my visit to the Soviet Union as well as the probable early adjournment of Congress this year. I propose to have our Ambassador at Moscow suggest to Chairman Khrushchev that we should agree the Paris meetings should end by the close of the week of May 16.

I am communicating with General de Gaulle in the same sense and should be grateful for an early indication of your reaction to both of the foregoing suggestions.

With warm personal regard,

As ever, Ike. *End verbatim text.*

Following is text suggested letter to Khrushchev which will be enclosure to foregoing.

*Begin verbatim text.*

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have been giving thought to the question of how best we can arrange our meetings at Paris in May to provide for the most fruitful kind of discussion.

Having in mind the experiences of previous heads of government meetings, I have come to the conclusion that very large meetings, with numerous advisers present, are not conducive to the kind of free and frank exchange of views that I would hope could take place among us next May. Therefore, I should like to see the greater portion of our time devoted to meetings in which the minimum adequate number of persons would take part.

Since, as I recall our conversations at Camp David, you and I agreed that at the forthcoming Summit meeting it would be more useful to conduct our meetings on a discussional rather than a negotiating basis, some such method as this would seem to be applicable.

I suppose that we will be expected to have at least a full plenary session at the end of our meetings; possibly even at the beginning as well. I am prepared to proceed on this basis.

Aside from formal requirements, our personal meetings on the other days might be arranged differently, perhaps along the following lines. We could plan—the four of us, each with an interpreter—to meet in private session for an hour or so each morning. Our Foreign Ministers could either be meeting separately at this time or plan to arrive at the meeting place about an hour after the main meeting had begun. They thus would be available to join with us each day, perhaps with one or two other advisers, when our private conversations had reached an appropriate point. The somewhat enlarged meeting could provide the

four of us opportunity to outline daily to our Foreign Ministers the areas in which we are at the moment interested and give them the necessary instructions on which they might prepare detailed analyses. Alternatively, this information might be conveyed to each Foreign Minister by his own head of government if you and the others should deem such a course preferable.

In general, I think we would do well to plan on one meeting a day. This would give all of us adequate time for reflection between our meetings and for such staff work among our delegations as might be helpful. This would, of course, not prevent us from regathering more frequently as circumstances might make desirable.

I have made suggestions along these lines to President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan whose reactions were favorable.

I should be grateful for an indication of your views in this matter as well as any thoughts you may have on other aspects of our forthcoming meeting.

Sincerely, *End verbatim text.*

Observe Presidential Handling.

**Herter**

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## 111. Editorial Note

Following the completion of the Heads of Government meeting at Paris December 19–21, 1959 (see Documents 54–60), the United States, the United Kingdom, and France continued their consultations on problems relating to a summit meeting. Initially this coordination was done in the Washington Steering Committee (sometimes referred to as the Coordinating Committee or Group of Four), which in January 1960 established three working groups.

The first was the Working Group on Germany Including Berlin which met in Washington beginning January 25, and included delegations from the United States (Kohler, Head of Delegation), the United Kingdom (Hood, Head of Delegation), France (Laloy, Head of Delegation for the first two meetings and then Winckler), and the Federal Republic of Germany (Grewe, Head of Delegation). The Working Group met 16 times between January 25 and April 9 when it submitted a report

to the Foreign Ministers. U.S. Delegation records of these meetings (II WWG/9.1–9.16) are in Department of State, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany. The Working Group reported regularly on its progress to the North Atlantic Council, and accounts of these meetings with the Council and some additional documentation on the Working Group are *ibid.*, Central Files 762.00 and 396.1–PA. For the report of the Working Group, see Document 115; for a memorandum of the Foreign Ministers' discussion of the report, see Document 123.

The second group established was the Working Group on East-West Relations which began work in Paris on February 5. Composed of representatives from the United States (Lyon), the United Kingdom (Brimelow), France (Lucet), and the International Staff of NATO (Boeker), this Group was further divided into two subgroups. The first, which devoted its discussions to aid to underdeveloped countries and noninterference in the internal affairs of states, met at Paris, while the second, which considered contacts between East and West, met at London. No complete record of the meetings of these subgroups or the Working Group itself has been found, but telegraphic reports on their sessions, summaries of their reports to the North Atlantic Council, and drafts and final copies of their working papers are in Department of State, Central File 396.1–PA. For the final report of the Working Group, see Document 115; regarding the Foreign Ministers' Consideration of the report, see Document 126.

The third group established was the Working Group on Disarmament. Composed of representatives from the United States (Eaton), the United Kingdom (Ormesby-Gore), France (Moch), Canada (Burns), and Italy (Martino), this Working Group began meeting daily in Washington on January 18. After 3 weeks, the deliberations of the Group were transferred to Geneva and coordinated with the participation of the five countries in the work of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee. Documentation on its activities is incomplete, but telegraphic reports on some of its meetings and other documentation relating to it are in Department of State, Central Files 396.1–PA, 396.1–WA, 396.12, 396.12–GE, and 396.12–WA. The report of the Working Group is printed as Document 112; for a memorandum of the Foreign Ministers' discussion of the report, see Document 124.

With the establishment of the three Working Groups and under pressure from other NATO states to expand its composition, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed to allow the Steering Committee to come to an end on February 2. Regarding the dissolution of the committee, see Document 73.

## 112. Paper Circulated in the Department of State

FMW REF-3/102

Washington, April 7, 1960.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12-14, 1960

### AGREED FIVE-POWER REPORT OF APRIL 5 ON DISARMAMENT

#### *Summary of Discussions of the Conference*

1. The conference began its discussions in a good atmosphere and entered directly into examination of the Western and Soviet general disarmament plans<sup>1</sup> without wasting time on procedural wrangles. There have been few recriminations within the conference itself although the Soviet group have used press conferences as an occasion for criticism and propaganda. The Western delegations for their part have consequently found it convenient to brief the press fully.

2. Both sides adopted a similar approach during the general debate which has been taking place. Neither side was anxious to allow the plan of the opposition to occupy the center of discussion. Accordingly both plans have been examined concurrently, and specific measures in each plan have been compared. Both sides have sought clarification by an extensive use of questions.

3. The Western questions have been primarily aimed at bringing out the unreality and lack of precision in the Soviet plan and, in particular, the lack of balance between measures of conventional and nuclear disarmament, the lack of clarity on the question of control and the rigidity of the timetable. They also noted the absence in the Soviet plan of provisions for arrangements to preserve world peace in a disarmed world. The Soviet bloc have naturally responded by pointing to the absence of timetable in the Western plan, the absence of any reference to the elimination of foreign bases and the alleged emphasis placed by the West on studies as opposed to concrete disarmament measures in the first stage. They have further aimed at demonstrating that the Western plan is a partial plan and consequently, in contrast with the Soviet plan,

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1628. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Western disarmament plan submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 16, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 68-71; for text of the Soviet plan, submitted to the United Nations on September 19, 1959, see *ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1460-1474.



does not satisfy the requirements of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 1378.<sup>2</sup> They have also tried to expose the lack of connection between the various stages of the Western plan without at any time, however, directly commenting on the language linking the second and third stages.

4. The Soviet bloc have tried to demonstrate that the General Assembly Resolution No. 1378 and, in particular, the paragraph referring to general and complete disarmament, constituted the only terms of reference for the conference. The Western delegations for their part agreed that the General Assembly Resolution taken as a whole and with all its qualifying clauses (particularly those calling for agreement on measures leading towards this goal and stipulating that such measures should be under effective international control) was part of the documentation of the conference, and reaffirmed their support for that resolution in its entirety, but pointed out that the Ten-power Committee was set up by a directive of four foreign ministers in September 1959.<sup>3</sup>

5. The tactics of the Soviet bloc within the conference have given a negative and critical role to the satellites, who have demonstrated with extreme rigidity their attachment to the Soviet plan and their inability to accept that the Western plan is directed towards general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Delegate has attempted to reserve for himself the role of unofficial chairman of the conference and has tried to give an appearance of reasonable flexibility and willingness to listen to, if not to accept, the arguments of the West. The tactics of the West (in addition to the programme of questioning described above) have been to try to exploit this difference of approach between the Soviet delegation and the satellites and to show the Soviet bloc that the Western delegations are united in their serious desire to achieve progress in disarmament. In conformity with these tactics Western delegates have given a careful picture of the Western plan, of the way in which it provides for balanced disarmament and national security and the flexibility of its timing. A good deal of attention has been paid to showing the reasonableness of the Western attitude towards control, and the functions and constitution of an international disarmament organization have been sketched out.

6. So far both sides have been drawn by the course of the discussion to concentrate mainly on conventional disarmament; and the Western position on nuclear disarmament including the means of delivery has not been fully exposed. The Soviet plan has been criticized by the West, however, for its failure to deal with this subject except in the third stage.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of this resolution, November 20, 1959, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, p. 1281.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the September 7, 1959, directive, see *ibid.*, pp. 1259–1260.

7. On April 1 the US Delegate made a statement<sup>4</sup> in which he indicated that, while the West were prepared to work patiently on measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the Soviet plan would not meet that objective. The representative of the USSR replied on April 4<sup>5</sup> with a parallel rejection of the Western plan and challenged the bona fides of the US Government in the present conference.

8. In the course of discussions on control it appeared that the Soviet Union agreed on a certain number of general principles.

(I) The principle of the creation of an international disarmament organization.

(II) The control of each measure of disarmament from its beginning until its end.

(III) The maintenance of control after the completion of measures, in order to prevent back-sliding.

(IV) The principle of declarations on force levels and conventional armaments.

(V) The control of the amounts of conventional armaments or of forces to be reduced i.e., the difference between the amounts existing before the reduction and those existing after the reduction.

(VI) International inspectors.

9. In fact these statements of principles, of which the majority are not new, do little to alter the fundamental Soviet position on control. Thus according to Mr. Zorin's declarations:

(I) Control will in principle affect only the amounts of forces or armaments subjected to measures of reduction but not the amounts existing before or after the reduction. He has moreover so far avoided any precise statement on the more important armaments.

(II) Although the link between measures of disarmament and of control has been affirmed there are signs that the principle is not fully accepted by the Russians. Thus Mr. Zorin has continually insisted on the need to avoid abstract discussions on control. According to him everything depends on the measures subjected to control. It is only "when we are in agreement on disarmament measures that we shall touch on the corresponding measures of control".

10. He has also insisted on timing, in particular on the timetable of four years for the application of the plan as a whole. Disarmament measures are thus liable to be applied without measures of control having been properly worked out.

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<sup>4</sup> Made at the 14th session of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. A report on this session was transmitted in Deldi 53 from Geneva, April 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/4-260)

<sup>5</sup> Made at the 15th session of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. A report on this session was transmitted in Deldi 58 from Geneva, April 5. (*Ibid.*, 396.12-GE/4-560)

11. In addition Mr. Zorin has declared that if aerial photography is to be carried out over the whole of the territories of states, this cannot be attempted until after the completion of the disarmament process. The only exceptions would be the control of discontinuance of nuclear tests and the prevention or surprise attacks in limited zones on the lines of previous Russian proposals.

12. Finally his remarks have been focused primarily on measures in the field of conventional disarmament. His intention is clearly to direct negotiations toward a study of the first stage of the Khrushchev plan,<sup>6</sup> i.e., towards reduction of conventional forces, while giving the impression of certain concessions in the field of control, but only after agreement on the entire framework.

13. Force levels: there appears to be agreement in principle on the maintenance of a balance on force levels during the process of force reductions, both among the ten powers and the other states which would attend a world conference on disarmament.

14. Conventional disarmament: The Soviet bloc appear to consider that a measure of conventional disarmament should start the disarmament process. This needs to be tested further and if it should mean no more than a willingness to accept as a starting point a force ceiling at or about 2.5 for the United States and USSR (with corresponding arrangements for armament deposits) it would not in the framework of the Western plan be far away from the Western position. However, so far there has been no indication that the Soviet bloc have such willingness.

15. Disarmament conference: There is a measure of agreement on the proposition that a world disarmament conference must take place before any far-reaching disarmament by the great powers.

There are difference of view on timing and scope, however. The Western delegations believe that some measure of disarmament by the great powers can safely precede the world conference; they further emphasize the need for agreement among "militarily significant states". The Soviet bloc on the other hand believe that a complete disarmament treaty should be signed and ratified by the 90 odd states of the world before any significant disarmament measure is undertaken.

16. Nuclear disarmament: The Soviet bloc object to the measures of nuclear disarmament proposed in stages I and II of the Western plan. They have expressed their willingness to advance their own stage III proposal for an (uncontrollable) ban on the use of nuclear weapons to stage I. They have also re-introduced previous proposals for an undertaking not to be the first to use the bomb and for the discontinuance of nuclear tests. But they have refused to be drawn on any practical

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<sup>6</sup>The Soviet plan referred to in footnote 1 above.

programme for the controlled prohibition of production or for the reduction of existing stockpiles.

17. Foreign bases: The Soviet bloc have harped on the need to eliminate foreign bases and have not been moved by Western arguments that:

(I) No real strategic distinction can be drawn between foreign and home bases, and

(II) In any case, on the completion of demobilization and reduction of armaments, no forces or equipment would remain to maintain any kind of base.

18. Peacekeeping machinery: There has been disagreement on measures to enforce the peace after the achievement of disarmament. The Soviet bloc reject both the concept of an international peace-enforcement authority retaining the only armed forces in the world and less clearly the concept of the retention of national forces sufficient to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter. They argue that in a disarmed world aggression will be impossible and in any case the provisions of the Charter are adequate.

19. Studies: The Soviet bloc object in principle to the initiation of joint studies without prior commitments on disarmament although the Soviet position is not clear or consistent. They have recognized in some field the need for preparation in advance of a disarmament treaty. They have also recognized that technical planning may be needed before a treaty can be put into force. This confusion appears partly to arise from their rigidity on the question of a timetable.

20. Timetable: Although the Soviet bloc have indicated some readiness to be flexible about the four year timetable included in the Khrushchev plan, they have insisted on the need not only for a fixed time limit for the whole process of disarmament in accordance with a single treaty, but also fixed time limits for each stage within the whole. This timetable is in any case only effective after the completion of the world disarmament conference.

21. Armaments: The Soviet position on the link between force reductions and armament reductions is not altogether clear, probably because they are unwilling to accept such a link which would entail more far-reaching control. The Soviet delegation have also criticized the Western proposal for storing surplus armaments in internationally supervised depots on national soil on the grounds that they could too easily be recovered if an act of aggression were contemplated—they maintain that destruction is the only true safeguard.

22. Collection of information: The Soviet bloc have been hostile to all Western proposals for collection of information prior to the introduction of measures of disarmament, even though it has been pointed out to them that this position is not consistent with earlier Soviet proposals.

The Soviet bloc have maintained, in the face of careful Western explanations, the thesis that any verification beyond immediate verification of a measure of reduction could only serve the purpose of espionage.

23. Ratio of forces: The Soviet plan speaks of maintenance of a ratio between the different services during the process of force reductions. No effort has been made to show how this could be practicable or how it should be controlled.

24. Space vehicles and missiles: The Soviet bloc have not in the conference itself developed any position on space vehicles or missiles. In a press conference, however, the Soviet spokesman made some comments suggesting that because of the Soviet advantage in these techniques this was not considered a subject for negotiation.

*Possible Soviet Tactics before the Summit*

25. The conference has so far not advanced beyond the general debate stage and it is early to predict its further course. At some date fairly soon, however, either or both sides may decide to switch from general discussion of the two rival plans to more concrete discussion of specific topics. In the case of the Soviet bloc an attempt is already developing to lure the West into:

(I) A definition, in Soviet terms, of the terms of reference of the conference and the task it has to fulfill; and

(II) An agreement on the principles, taken direct from the Soviet plan, on which a disarmament treaty must ultimately be based.

It is possible that they may also, as it becomes plain to them that the Khrushchev plan as it stands is not negotiable with the West, revert to earlier Soviet partial proposals.

26. The immediate aims of the Soviet bloc appear to be:

(I) To maintain their public posture as champions of general and complete disarmament as described in the General Assembly Resolution No. 1378.

(II) To get the West to agree to certain "disarmament principles" which would form the basis of a treaty, such principles would then be presented for endorsement at the Summit and later represented as being equivalent to the Khrushchev plan and consequently available to blackmail the West in the later course of the negotiations.

(III) To make the Western delegations responsible for rejecting the concept of a general and comprehensive disarmament plan and for moving towards discussion of what they would call partial disarmament measures.

27. Western tactics between now and the end of April, when the conference will go into recess, must depend upon the objectives which the Western heads of governments decide to aim at the Summit meeting. No Western delegation has at present any precise instructions on these objectives.

**113. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State**

Bonn, April 6, 1960, 8 p.m.

1919. 1. Mayor Brandt has informed me privately of his 5 April meeting with Chancellor Adenauer concerning latter's proposal for West Berlin plebiscite before summit conference. Meeting began with one hour private conversation between Brandt and Adenauer which was conducted in friendly atmosphere but did not change viewpoints either party. Brandt disagreed especially with Adenauer's thesis that it was Germany's duty to bind Allies by means of plebiscite to their original occupation rights. Brandt maintained that Berliners could only be asked to express their views on political freedom and ties to West. Using arguments already reported, Brandt tried in vain convince Adenauer drop plebiscite plan. Adenauer argued that only France could be considered completely reliable on Berlin question while US, and especially UK, positions subject to change under Soviet pressure.

2. Brandt and Adenauer were then joined by Brentano, Lemmer, Globke, Vockel, Amrehn and Berlin officials Albertz and Berning. Enlarged meeting covered similar ground. Adenauer delivered lecture on world affairs reminding his listeners that in United States during second half of previous year, there had been tendency to give up original legal status and replace it by new treaty with Soviets. Chancellor said he was facing summit conference with concern since not all participants have same nerves as Khrushchev. Cabinet had discussed plebiscite question earlier that day but no decision reached because plebiscite is regarded as Berlin matter. Relationship of Berlin to Federal Republic is not question but, rather, whether the occupation rights should be given up or not. It was not necessary to place plebiscite question before Allies for decision. In any case, Herter was not opposed to it. Goal must be that Berlin disappears from negotiations at forthcoming summit conference. Chancellor said he could and would only advise Berlin to carry out the plebiscite as soon as possible.

3. Minister Lemmer spoke against suggestion that political parties serve as initiators of plebiscite. He maintained that Berlin was in principle ready to carry out plebiscite, but one must still determine proper time. Brentano reported that position United States Government was clear and unmistakable but no one could predict exactly course of summit conference.

Because Khrushchev had better nerves, Germany could not know in advance how others would conduct themselves. De Gaulle's standpoint was clear, but when talks became tough, it was possible that one of Allies would make a compromise proposal which could be extremely dangerous for Berlin.

4. After further discussion, Brandt stated agreement reached on three points:

(1) Federal Government advice is that a plebiscite should be held. It is, however, responsibility of Berlin Senat to decide whether this recommendation should be followed.

(2) Plebiscite by political parties is undesirable, and this possibility no longer considered.

(3) Principle of self-determination should be applied to Berlin, although parties disagree re timing or question to be posed to Berlin electorate.

5. Brandt went on to say in meeting he was not as optimistic as Chancellor about value of plebiscite. Brandt pointed out that Commandants apparently have certain reservations about plebiscite and are concerned that it in part at least is directed against Western Powers. Moreover, if plebiscite is confined to West Berlin alone, one must reckon with the possibility that on same day, as has already been announced, a plebiscite will be carried out in East sector Berlin and in Soviet zone.

6. Adenauer repeated his arguments favoring plebiscite, saying since Eisenhower had acknowledged Berliners have right of self-determination, they should make use of this privilege.

7. Amrehn said that Berlin had been in danger since the Khrushchev note of 1958,<sup>1</sup> but it was necessary to have strong allies. No decisive step should be taken without agreement or toleration of United States. Berlin would, according to Amrehn, only irritate the Allies by carrying out plebiscite at this time. Amrehn also expressed doubts that plebiscite as presently conceived would have an important impact on world public opinion. It was important to maintain not only occupation rights in city but also status quo and ties to Federal Republic. Chancellor repeated his concern about unpredictable atmosphere at forthcoming summit conference and warned again about possible weaknesses in allied position. In any event, it was up to Berlin Senat to decide whether or not to carry out this plebiscite, but he, the Chancellor, was not as optimistic as representatives from Berlin.

8. Brandt also advised me that he intends at special Senat session evening 6 April to recommend Senat issue declaration referring to assurances President Eisenhower and Allied spokesmen that any future agreements affecting Berlin will be based on principle of self-

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<sup>1</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 72.

determination. Will quote from 15 March Eisenhower–Adenauer communiqué<sup>2</sup> and state that Senat has confidence in word of its allies. Senat prepared carry out plebiscite if so requested by allied authorities in accordance with stipulated timing, method and formulation question to be submitted to electorate. In any case, if plebiscite to be held, it must be in consultation and in full agreement with Allies.<sup>3</sup>

**Dowling**

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<sup>2</sup> For text of the joint statement issued by the President and the Chancellor on March 15, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 363.

<sup>3</sup> On April 7, Brandt briefed the three Western Political Advisers in Berlin along these same lines and told them that the Berlin Senat had discussed the plebiscite question at length on April 6 and issued a 10-point report which stated that it was ready to hold the plebiscite prior to a summit meeting if the Federal Government, in accordance with the three Western Powers, should desire it. (Telegram 795 from Berlin, April 7; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–760)

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#### **114. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower**

London, April 8, 1960.

MY DEAR FRIEND: Thank you very much for your letter of April 5,<sup>1</sup> with which you enclosed a draft letter to Mr. Khrushchev about how to conduct the Summit.

As you know from our talks at Camp David,<sup>2</sup> our ideas are very much in line on this. The great thing is to avoid a repetition of the enormous meetings which were held at Geneva last time, and to get down to meetings of a manageable size where discussion and negotiation can really take place.

I think that it is difficult at this stage to be very precise about the exact arrangements for the Summit, although I quite understand your

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Attached to a note from Caccia to Herter, dated March 8, which stated that it was a copy of a letter that had been delivered to the President on that day.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 110.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 105.



feeling that it should not last more than six days. I certainly agree that we ought to have some meetings of Heads of Government only and that our general plan might be for the Heads to meet in the mornings and the advisers to have meetings in the afternoons. Whether we shall want the Foreign Ministers with us will I imagine depend rather on how the Conference proceeds.

I would hope that any plenary session at the beginning of the Conference could be limited to purely formal matters, including perhaps a speech by President de Gaulle as the host. I think that we should try to avoid giving the Russians an opportunity for a propaganda speech at the opening of the Conference.

As regards the restricted meetings of Heads of Government, with or without Foreign Ministers, I feel that it would be better if the interpretation could be organized centrally, probably from a box, interpretation could then be either consecutive or simultaneous as we preferred, and the great advantage would be that we should know that all of us were having the same translation. I am not sure that President de Gaulle agrees about this and he may prefer whispered interpretation. The second point is that I am sure that there ought to be adequate records of a meeting of this sort with the Russians, and I would therefore suggest that each Head of Government should be accompanied by one private secretary or note taker. Their task would, of course, be made much easier by a central arrangement for interpretation.

I have discussed your letter briefly with President de Gaulle and he seems to be in general agreement with the line which you advocate and with which I so much agree. We both feel, however, that there would be something to be said for the three Foreign Ministers, who are meeting in Washington next week, having a word together about the arrangements and perhaps reaching agreement on the draft of a letter which you would then send to Khrushchev as the host at the Foreign Ministers' meeting. I am rather in favor of this plan myself, because de Gaulle will, after all, be the host at the Summit and it would, I think, be wiser for him to be closely associated with any letter which you send to Khrushchev on this subject.<sup>3</sup>

With warm regard,  
As ever,

**Harold Macmillan**<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> President de Gaulle replied to Eisenhower's letter on April 9, agreeing on the need for small meetings but feeling that the duration of the summit meeting should not be limited. The French President stressed that "these few problems" could be examined when he visited the United States April 22–24. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**115. Paper Circulated in the Department of State**

FMW REF-2/110

Washington, April 9, 1960.

REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON  
GERMANY INCLUDING BERLIN

Summary

1. The Four Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin has met in intensive session in Washington from April 4 to April 9, 1960. Prior to this period certain preparatory work was done during February and March by representatives of the British, French and German Embassies meeting with representatives of the Department of State.

2. In organizing its report, the Working Group has considered that the Four Power Meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled to take place in Washington April 13-14, 1960 would wish to review the conclusions reached so far and to issue such directives for further work as their discussion might show to be necessary. The Working Group has also had in mind the need for consultation with NATO and recommends that this report be forwarded to the North Atlantic Council in order to assist in NATO discussion of the forthcoming Summit Conference which it understands is to take place primarily during the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in Istanbul early in May.

3. As a logical starting point, the Working Group has prepared an estimate of probable Soviet negotiating intentions on Germany and Berlin at the East-West Summit Meeting. This is attached as Annex I.

4. There is attached as Annex II a discussion of the question of Germany containing certain recommendations to the Ministers.

5. Annex III contains a discussion of the Berlin question, together with the conclusions of the Working Group following upon its analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various possible approaches to an agreement on Berlin.

6. In view of the key role which the tactics of the West will play at the Summit, the discussion of this subject which follows provides a convenient synthesis of, as well as logically deriving from, the more detailed discussions and conclusions reached by the Working Group.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1628. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The paper consisted of a cover sheet, summary, a paper on the tactics on Germany including Berlin at a summit meeting, Annex I (a 6-page paper entitled "Probable Soviet Negotiating Intentions on Germany and Berlin"), Annex II (a 5-page paper entitled "The Question of Germany" which had a 3-page attachment describing a proposal for a plebiscite in Germany), and Annex III (a 3-page paper entitled "The Berlin Question" which had a 3-page attachment on the reunification of Berlin and a 2-page attachment on a modus vivendi for West Berlin). Only the summary and paper on tactics are printed here.

TACTICS ON GERMANY INCLUDING  
BERLIN AT THE SUMMIT

1. The Working Group assumes that, from the Western point of view, discussion of subjects at the Summit should preferably be in the following sequence: (a) general opening statements; (b) disarmament; (c) Germany including Berlin; and (d) East-West relations. The general mood of the Summit will to some extent be influenced by the amount of agreement already reached or in prospect in the disarmament field. If the situation in this field is favorable, it would give the Western Powers a certain leverage to use in persuading the Soviets not to press too hard on the Berlin issue. However, the precise tactical interrelationship of the various subjects at the Summit can only be determined later in the light of the actual situation.

2. The aim of the Western Powers at the Summit Conference should be to eliminate the threat which the Soviet Union is exerting on Berlin without sacrificing the basis of their general policy in Germany (reunification in freedom and European cooperation). To reach that goal the Western Powers have three essential methods at their disposal:

- a. To induce the Soviets to lift the threat to Berlin by means of agreements in other fields;
- b. To maintain the present situation as it is by providing for continuing discussions;
- c. To reach a *modus vivendi* on Berlin which, without altering the essentials would be mutually acceptable;

3. The tactical approach of the West might accordingly proceed as follows:

- a. On the assumption that the Soviets start out by insisting on the necessity of a peace treaty with the two Germanies, the Western Powers would resubmit their Western Peace Plan.<sup>1</sup> (See Annex II)

- b. When the Soviets reject the Western Peace Plan, as may be anticipated, the Western Powers would advance their proposal for a plebiscite to be held in West and East Germany and in all Berlin. (See Annex II)

- c. When the discussion turns to Berlin proper, the Soviets will presumably reiterate the desirability of their "free city" proposal. The Western Powers would normally wish to start by restating their standard position that the only lasting and real solution to the Berlin problem must come within the framework of German reunification.

- d. At this point it might be tactically advantageous for the West to put forward an all-Berlin proposal (see Annex III), even if such a proposal is considered non-negotiable.

- e. If the Soviets reject the proposal mentioned in 3.d., the Western Powers should not proceed to further discussions without making it

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<sup>1</sup>For text of the Western Peace Plan, May 14, 1959, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 624–629.

clear that under prevailing circumstances the present situation in Berlin is tolerable and that from their point of view no change is necessary.

f. It might be possible to secure an agreement—perhaps no more than a tacit one—to preserve the existing situation for a period of time during which an attempt might be made to achieve progress towards a more formal agreement. One way of doing this might be to seek agreement at the Summit to remand the task of further negotiation to a subordinate group (perhaps Deputy Foreign Ministers), which would report back to a future meeting of the Heads of Governments. This might be accompanied by certain reciprocal declarations intended to reduce tensions, for example, to maintain unhindered access to Berlin, to avoid inflammatory propaganda, and to refrain from unilateral action affecting the rights of others. Such a remitting to a subordinate group by the Heads of Governments would presumably require some sort of directive which might be essentially procedural in nature. This would have to be drafted with great care to avoid the implication that Western rights in Berlin would be in any way affected during the period prior to the meeting of Heads of Governments to which the subordinate group would be reporting. The Western Heads of Governments might likewise wish to make a statement at the Summit stressing the essential conditions which they believe should govern any Berlin arrangement. If the Foreign Ministers agree, the Working Group in its next session could attempt to draft such a directive, the possible reciprocal declarations, and the Western statement of essential conditions.

g. In the light of the Soviet attitude as it becomes manifest at the Summit, the Western Powers might explore the possibility of concluding an acceptable *modus vivendi*. One possible development is (as suggested by Ambassador Smirnov in Bonn)<sup>2</sup> that the Soviets will attempt to resume the discussion of an interim solution for Berlin at the point where the Geneva discussions broke off, stating that, while the Western proposals of July 28<sup>3</sup> were not entirely satisfactory, they are willing to consider whether certain further changes could not be made which might make possible an agreement. In any event, the Western Powers would at this stage have to be prepared to discuss certain substantive proposals along the lines of the July 28 proposals, possibly improved by certain provisions aimed at ameliorating the existing situation in Berlin and safeguarding access thereto. A provision might also be envisaged committing all parties to refrain from any acts inconsistent with the terms of the agreement.

4. If it seems that an impasse has been reached and that the Soviets will proceed to take unilateral action purporting to end their responsibilities in the access field, the Western Powers might wish to consider making a proposal involving a series of interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin access, propaganda, etc., aimed at achieving a freezing of existing access procedures with ultimate Soviet responsibility being maintained although implementation might be by the East

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<sup>2</sup> For text of Smirnov's remarks to the Foreign Press Association at Bonn on March 22, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 560–561.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 488.

German authorities (along the lines of London Working Group Solution C of April 1959).<sup>4</sup> If the Foreign Ministers agree, the Working Group could in its next phase undertake to further refine a proposal along these lines.

5. If the Soviets refuse further discussions, the Western Powers will have to consider how, while still at the Summit, they might best bring to the attention of the Soviets the serious results which unilateral action on their part might have. The Western Powers might likewise consider at this point the desirability of a Berlin plebiscite in the Western sectors of the city in order to provide a starting point for ensuing developments.

6. Some believe that a tactical question which might arise is whether, and if so at what point, the West should express willingness to discuss the principles of a peace treaty with Germany either in a deputy or expert group if it appears at some point during the Summit Conference that a Western offer to discuss peace treaty principles might tip the balance in favor of preventing Soviet unilateral action directed at the Western position in Berlin. There are some important objections to such action by the Western Powers, as indicated in the discussion of advantages and disadvantages in Annex II.

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<sup>4</sup>See footnote 8, Document 72.

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## 116. Editorial Note

In accordance with the schedule worked out in consultations among the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the Foreign Ministers of those three countries, their counterparts from the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Canada, and the Secretary General of NATO met in Washington, April 11–14. On the first day, Secretary of State Herter met with Secretary General Spaak. See Document 117.

On April 12, Herter met with Foreign Secretary Lloyd at 11 a.m. while at about the same time Spaak was discussing the NATO scientific program with Presidential Adviser Kistiakowsky. At 2:15, Herter talked with Foreign Minister Brentano and, at 3:10, with Lloyd and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. While this latter meeting was proceeding, Brentano discussed various economic matters with Under Secretary Dillon. At 5:45, Herter was briefed by Couve de Murville on Khru-

shchev's visit to Paris. Memoranda of these conversations, except for the Spaak-Kistiakowsky and Brentano-Dillon talks, are printed as Documents 120-122. Memoranda of the other two conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624.

On April 13, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany met at 10 a.m. At 1 p.m., Merchant discussed the progress of the Foreign Ministers' meeting with Canadian officials at a lunch at the Metropolitan Club. At 2:15, Herter and Foreign Minister Segni met in Herter's office to discuss U.S.-Italian relations. Memoranda of this conversation are printed in volume VII, Part 2, Documents 267-270. At 3 p.m., Lloyd, Couve de Murville, and Foreign Minister Green joined Herter and Segni for a discussion of disarmament. Memoranda of the conversations at 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. are printed as Documents 123 and 124. A memorandum of Merchant's conversation with the Canadians is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624.

The Foreign Ministers meetings concluded on April 14. At 11 a.m., Herter, Lloyd, and Couve de Murville met with Spaak. In the afternoon, Herter and Green discussed U.S.-Canadian relations at 2:15, and at 3 p.m. Under Secretary of State Dillon met with Segni to review economic matters of mutual concern. A memorandum of the morning conversation is printed as Document 126; memoranda of the conversations with Green and Segni are in volume VII, Part 1, Documents 311-315, and Part 2, Documents 271-272, respectively.

The most extensive collection of documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1623-1630. It includes schedules, background papers, briefing papers, summary cables of the proceedings, memoranda of conversations, and copies of the reports of the working groups. A smaller amount of documentation, confined mostly to material on Berlin and Germany, is *ibid.*, Central File 396.1-WA.

117. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/6

Washington, April 11, 1960, 2:15–3:15 p.m.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

SUBJECT

NATO Relation to Summit Preparations

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Mr. Merchant—M  
Mr. Bohlen—S/B  
Mr. Kohler—EUR  
Mr. Tobin—RA

M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary  
General, NATO  
M. Andre Saint-Mleux, NATO  
International Staff  
M. Alexander Boeker, NATO  
International Staff

1. *East-West Relations*

The Secretary opened with the remark that he had not yet seen anything solid coming out of the East-West relations group.<sup>1</sup> M. Spaak replied that it was difficult to find good proposals since all the suggestions put forward have dangerous aspects. He observed that while it would be difficult to have an agreed statement of general principles, perhaps a “code of good conduct” could be agreed. He realized, however, that the negotiators would need great latitude with respect to its presentation.

M. Spaak later raised the question as to how the West would respond if Khrushchev tried to insert the “principles of peaceful co-existence” into the communiqué. Mr. Bohlen pointed to the adverse impact of such a declaration having either regional or universal application, which Spaak countered with reference to possible difficulties vis-à-vis public opinion if we failed to meet such a Soviet initiative. Mr. Bohlen said that if a declaration is in order we are thinking in terms of a Western rather than an agreed statement. Mr. Spaak admitted the difficulties involved but thought it important to determine how to respond in order to make our position clear to public opinion. Mr. Bohlen thought that the riposte to a Soviet peaceful co-existence initiative would not be too diffi-

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624. Secret. Drafted by Tobin, initialed by Kohler, and approved by M on April 16 and by S on April 20. The conversation took place in Secretary Herter’s office. Two other memoranda of conversation (US/MC/2 and US/MC/4), which cover NATO long-range planning and MRBMs, are not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>1</sup> See Document 111.

cult. We could use the common propaganda device of identification, pointing out that peaceful co-existence equals cold war.

M. Spaak next presented his views on various other topics in the East-West relations field, namely a declaration of non-interference, control of arms shipments, joint aid to underdeveloped areas, and exchanges. The "contras" far outweigh the "pro's" with regard to a declaration of non-interference; there would be adverse consequences as to activity of Communist parties in the West, and the situation in Eastern Europe. Control of arms shipments presented great dangers, for it would open the way to Soviet proposals for control of arms supply to members of security pacts—to which the Secretary and Mr. Bohlen remarked that the Soviets had already made it quite clear that they would intend to apply such an agreement to countries such as Turkey and Iran. The Secretary also remarked that such a proposal would be directed toward Africa, and this would raise the Africans "up in arms" against us for trying to control their national behavior.

M. Spaak indicated there was a difference of opinion within the Council on the desirability of joint aid to underdeveloped areas. Exchanges did not seem to him to be a very pertinent topic for the summit negotiations. The Secretary pointed out that the Soviets contribute little or nothing to the various UN agencies dealing with aid to underdeveloped areas; and as their recent resolution introduced in ECOSOC shows, they have a propaganda aim in tying their contributions to underdeveloped areas to arms reduction.

## 2. *Disarmament*

M. Spaak suggested the desirability of some concrete proposals in the field of disarmament. The Secretary responded that as we saw at the Geneva meeting, the Soviets constantly seek to get us committed to a set of general principles, it seems purely for semantic reasons. For our part, we would like to see certain concrete steps. Unfortunately, the only precise suggestions we can think of for the Summit are related to the nuclear test suspension negotiations, and encounter opposition from General de Gaulle. M. Spaak thought it important that the West demonstrate to public opinion that its disarmament plan means effective progress.

## 3. *Germany and Berlin*

It was generally agreed that Khrushchev was bound to raise the question of Germany/Berlin at the Summit. The Secretary assumed that Khrushchev would begin with a proposal for a peace treaty with the two Germanies, which would bring us to the position at the opening of last summer's Geneva conference. All present seemed to think that we would go through the same negotiating cycle as the Geneva conference



but perhaps, as Mr. Merchant suggested, with the initial Soviet emphasis on the peace treaty telescoped in time.

M. Spaak observed that the Council had shown understanding as to the slow pace of preparations by the Working Group on Germany and Berlin, but it would now like to have a report as the basis for discussion at Istanbul.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Kohler assured him that such a report would be made to NAC by the Foreign Ministers meeting here this week, in time for the Istanbul meeting.

#### 4. *NAC Consultation and the "Agency" Question*

M. Spaak raised a question, which he thought might come up at Istanbul, whether the Summit negotiating powers wish to negotiate only for themselves or for all of NATO. The Secretary and his advisers were emphatic in stating that we could negotiate only for ourselves. M. Spaak alluded to the fear expressed by some members of NATO that summit discussion of such questions as non-interference or arms control might give the impression that the Big Four were deciding the affairs of others among themselves. The Secretary acknowledged that this is one of the great dangers of the Summit, which must be avoided. Our intention is not to commit others, and if agreements are reached at the Summit they can only be binding upon ourselves.

M. Spaak then pointed out that while some governments feared they would be bound without their consent, others seemed inclined to favor a certain delegation of negotiating authority to the Western Governments participating in the Summit. Mr. Bohlen responded that many questions, such as contacts or trade, are primarily bilateral in nature, and are really not susceptible of negotiation at the Summit. He assured M. Spaak that the members of NATO need have no worry on the score of a three-power common front to which the other members would be bound. The Secretary in this connection observed that the only question which was uniquely pertinent to the Four negotiating powers was Berlin and Germany. Mr. Merchant thereupon pointed out that NATO has a special responsibility with regard to Berlin, to which the Secretary responded that the negotiating powers at the Summit could of course not commit NATO automatically should they make any changes in the status of Berlin.

Mr. Bohlen referred to a proposal which had been advanced that the four Summit governments would agree to consult in case of a threat to the peace. He explained that the underlying idea is that they would get together only in times of crisis, when there seemed to be an

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<sup>2</sup> Documentation on the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting at Istanbul May 2–4 is in volume VII, Part 1.

imminent danger of war, but that there would be no intent to establish four-power machinery to settle all international questions.

Mr. Kohler commented that it would of course be useful for the three in going to the Summit to go there with the knowledge of the views of all the NATO allies, but that they certainly would not go in any sense as agents of their allies.

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### 118. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/3

Washington, April 11, 1960, 2:15–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Norstad Plan

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Merchant—M

Mr. Bohlen—S/B

Mr. Kohler—EUR

Mr. Tobin—RA

M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary  
General, NATO

M. Andre Saint-Mleux, NATO  
International Staff

M. Alexander Boeker, NATO  
International Staff

Mr. Merchant mentioned discussions we have already had with the British, the Germans and the French on the inspection zone plan originally put forward by General Norstad, and our intention to seek General Norstad's recommendations at this juncture. We look toward a possible summit presentation of such a plan in order to test Khrushchev's intentions, and also to make some tangible beginning towards preventing surprise attack and adopting zones of inspection. We do not know if the Four will agree to this, or what General Norstad will recommend. If the Four agree, we would of course bring the subject up for discussion in NAC. If we propose it, it would probably be in conjunction with some other area, perhaps Siberia and Alaska, to avoid any implication of discrimination against Germany.

M. Spaak said this conforms with his idea that if you wish to talk disarmament at the Summit you must propose something concrete like

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Tobin and approved in M on April 16. The conversation took place in Secretary Herter's office.

this plan which is precise and manageable. He has always been hostile to any narrow plan which discriminates against Germany, but something like the Norstad plan is needed in order to have a test case in the field of control and inspection. The extent of the area is to his mind secondary. He sees no connection between such a plan as General Norstad's, and disarmament and neutralization such as were involved in the Rapacki plan.<sup>1</sup> If it succeeds, it might however open the way to later progress in phased and controlled disarmament. We should nevertheless put it forward only if we can avoid the political hazards involved.

In this connection, Spaak thought that it was important that the communiqué to be drawn up at the Istanbul meeting should express confidence in the Federal Republic as a loyal ally. Such a statement would publicly present the attitude of the entire alliance, in line with the Secretary's remarks in his address on April 4,<sup>2</sup> to which Mr. Bohlen had referred.

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<sup>1</sup>The Rapacki Plan, first proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in a speech at the U.N. General Assembly on October 2, 1957, and subsequently renewed through diplomatic channels, called for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany. A memorandum of conversation between Secretary Dulles and Rapacki on the plan, October 16, 1957, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXV, pp. 671–677.

<sup>2</sup>See footnote 2, Document 107.

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## 119. Memorandum of Conversation

US/Del/MC/21

Washington, April 12, 1960, 11 a.m.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

#### SUBJECT

De Gaulle Visit to London

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624. Secret. Drafted by Swihart and approved by M, U, and S on April 19, 20, and 21, respectively. The meeting took place in Secretary Herter's office. The Foreign Ministers also discussed briefly 13 other topics. Memoranda of these parts of the conversation (US/Del/MC/10–23) are *ibid.*

## PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

Secretary Herter  
 Under Secretary Dillon  
 Mr. Merchant  
 Mr. Kohler  
 Mr. Farley  
 Mr. Swihart

*United Kingdom*

Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
 Ambassador Caccia  
 Lord Hood  
 Sir Anthony Rumbold  
 H.C. Hainworth  
 S.J.G. Cambridge  
 A.C.I. Samuels

Mr. Lloyd said that normally after a visit such as De Gaulle's,<sup>1</sup> he would have written the Secretary about it. Inasmuch, however, as he was to be shortly on this side, and also as he had given "Jock" Whitney a run-down, he had awaited until now to go into more detail. De Gaulle said that with respect to the Summit and the disarmament field, we ought to start with rockets and strategic aircraft. He suggested this to Khrushchev who thought it was a good idea. De Gaulle suggested also that at the Summit we should endeavor to reach agreement as to the control of means of delivery and the establishment of some sort of control commission. Apparently De Gaulle envisaged some means of inspection to make it impossible to place a missile in an aircraft. The Secretary remarked this would seem to require that an inspector be on each aircraft and, for that matter, on every ship at sea. Mr. Lloyd confessed that he could not easily see the value to all of this, but he wished us to know that when De Gaulle discussed this matter in London, Harold Macmillan suggested that De Gaulle discuss his ideas further with the President, when he comes to Washington. The Foreign Secretary reported that De Gaulle said that Khrushchev had talked a great deal about Germany and that De Gaulle had understood that Khrushchev would be favorably disposed to some sort of two-year interim settlement of the Berlin problem. If the West were unable to agree, however, then Khrushchev would sign a treaty with the GDR. Khrushchev was fuzzy whether the latter represented an ultimatum or not, but Khrushchev did say that he did not see how the West could prevent his signing such a treaty. De Gaulle felt that Khrushchev was a politician who did depend on some sort of public support. It was De Gaulle's feeling that at the Summit, it would be desirable to reach first some agreement about disarmament. There was some discussion between De Gaulle and Khrushchev about the supply of arms to other areas, but it was most vague. Mr. Lloyd felt that De Gaulle has come pretty far along in the field of disarmament and feels that Khrushchev might drop the Berlin issue for definite results in the disarmament field. The Secretary

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<sup>1</sup> For two other accounts of de Gaulle's visit to the United Kingdom April 5-8, see Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pp. 193-194, and de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, pp. 246-250.

inquired whether there had been any discussion about cooperating in aid to the underdeveloped countries. Mr. Lloyd said there was very little. Mr. Lloyd felt it was a good thing that the meeting between De Gaulle and Khrushchev had taken place and that De Gaulle will now have less of a chip on his shoulder. According to De Gaulle, Khrushchev seemed ill at ease whenever the subject of China was mentioned.

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## 120. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/5

Washington, April 12, 1960, 2:15 p.m.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

#### SUBJECT

Summit Preparations

#### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Dr. Karl Carstens, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany

German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe

Dr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter

The Secretary

Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant

Mr. Philip J. Farley—S/AE

Mr. Richard H. Davis—EUR

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

After an initial exchange of pleasantries, von Brentano said that he had read the various papers prepared by the Working Group on Germany including Berlin<sup>1</sup> and had the impression that in general they were good and convincing. However, a few questions still had to be

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-1260. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand, initialed by Merchant and Davis, and approved in M on April 15 and S on April 19. The meeting took place in Secretary Herter's office.

<sup>1</sup>See Document 115.

discussed. He did not wish to mention them all on this occasion, but pointed out, for example, that the all-Berlin proposal discussed by the Working Group had created certain difficulties with Berlin officials with whom it had been discussed. Von Brentano noted that he personally was sympathetic to the idea of advancing such a proposal at the Summit. He also expressed the hope that some better term could be found to describe the Western objective relative to Berlin than a *modus vivendi*, which seemed to imply more a state of affairs or a condition rather than a legal status, but he himself could not think of any better term at the moment. These were all minor matters, von Brentano continued. The most important thing was that the Western Powers should find a basis for a common language in Paris so that they would speak to the Soviets in one voice. He asked the Secretary whether he believed, as did von Brentano, that the Western Powers would be successful in arriving at such a common language. The Secretary said he was more and more encouraged to think that this objective could be achieved, and it was certainly our hope that it would be. Von Brentano commented jocularly that, since the subject of the Sixes and Sevens was not going to be discussed at the Summit, this would make it easier for the West to reach agreement. The Secretary said that he had talked to Lloyd earlier in the day<sup>2</sup> and the subject had not been raised. Von Brentano noted that he was prepared to talk with Lloyd on this subject and referred to two very good conversations with the Danish and Austrian Foreign Ministers which he had recently had. However, he noted that they had not employed the same arguments which the British apparently had used in the US.

Returning to the Working Group preparatory meetings, the Secretary said that he had the impression that the Working Group on Germany and Berlin had come to a good understanding and that, within very small limits, the Western positions were identical. Ambassador Grewe observed that if the Foreign Ministers only stuck to the results of the Working Group the situation would be fine.

Von Brentano said that one question which required very careful study was that of keeping NATO informed. The Western Powers undoubtedly had an obligation to do this, but if too many details were provided, assurance would be lacking that these details would not become known outside of NATO. It was especially important, therefore, not to say much about tactics, although the Council could be informed of the general purposes, goals, and difficulties of the Western Powers. The Secretary said he agreed completely on this; it was never contemplated that NATO would get the Western tactics paper.<sup>3</sup> Von Brentano added

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 119.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 115.

that perhaps Spaak could be informed on a personal and confidential basis.

In response to von Brentano's question as to the Secretary's thoughts on the subject of East-West contacts, particularly whether he thought agreement could be reached on a common formula, the Secretary said that this had to be discussed thoroughly. Of all the subjects suggested as possible topics for the Summit, we could not see much use in raising any of them. However, since the French had taken the lead in this field we did not wish to prejudge the matter until Couve had had a chance to state his position. Nevertheless, we frankly did not see much prospect for useful discussions with the Soviets in this area. We had examined the various topics which the Working Group had been studying. It might be desirable to explore some with the Soviets if we could be sure they would work out a way we wanted, but all contained dangers as we saw it. On the subject of Berlin, we cannot be certain of the Soviet attitude, but there was an intimation in the de Gaulle–Khrushchev talks<sup>4</sup> that, if we make a little headway on disarmament, the Soviets might be willing to put off action on Germany and Berlin for a period of some two years under some sort of *modus vivendi*. This was somewhat different from what Khrushchev had said to Gronchi<sup>5</sup> and in Indonesia.<sup>6</sup> He seems to blow hot and cold, and we could never be quite sure what he would say next. Von Brentano noted that Khrushchev had to a large extent limited his freedom of action by the speeches he had made. There was a question whether he had done this intentionally. The Secretary observed that we did not know whether Khrushchev was actually strong enough internally so that he could commit himself on a separate peace treaty to the extent that he had and still not move ahead on it. Von Brentano commented that he continued to be anything but polite to the Federal Republic. The Secretary said that the Soviets were undoubtedly engaged in a deliberate campaign against the Federal Republic. It was hard to tell whether this was essentially for domestic reasons or to split the alliance. The latter objective was the probable one, but it seemed to have had the reverse effect. Von Brentano agreed with this and said that particularly with reference to the French-German relationship Khrushchev seemed to overestimate the possibilities of sowing dissension. The Secretary confirmed that our impression also was that the Soviets had had little effect on France's attitude to the Federal Republic. De Gaulle's attitude had been sober and firm, as well as that of the French

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<sup>4</sup> See Documents 106 and 108.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 77.

<sup>6</sup> For text of Khrushchev's remarks at a press conference in Indonesia on February 29, see *Pravda*, March 1, 1960; an extract pertaining to Germany is also in Embree, *Soviet Union and the German Question*, pp. 229–231.

people and press. The Secretary said he also believed that de Gaulle's visit to the United Kingdom had been important and apparently a great success. Von Brentano commented that it was especially important coming prior to the Summit Conference.

The Foreign Minister said he was convinced that, during the Summit Conference, Khrushchev would provoke at least one serious crisis. He wondered how long the Secretary believed the Summit would last. The Secretary observed that that was Khrushchev's technique. He opened in a good spirit, then provoked a crisis, and then eased off again at the end. The duration of the Summit was of interest to us since the President had promised to visit Portugal after the meeting. It was necessary to give the Portuguese a definite date. It was hoped that we could tell Khrushchev that the Summit should last only one week. The President would like to be in Lisbon on Monday of the following week. Von Brentano noted that a NATO meeting was scheduled for the 22nd and 23rd. The Secretary said he assumed that this would be on Monday if the Conference ended over the weekend. We did not know, of course, if Khrushchev would agree to fix a limit on the Conference. This still had to be worked out. Another difficulty was that the President would only be arriving in Paris on Sunday, May 15. We were not sure of the exact time. We may, therefore, wish to suggest that the East-West Summit not begin until Monday afternoon so that part of Sunday and Monday morning might be reserved for the Western Summit. Von Brentano commented that one day should suffice for the Western Summit if proper preparations were made. The Secretary said that he would be getting to Paris two days earlier and that if von Brentano were there preliminary talks between the Foreign Ministers could be held. Von Brentano said he would be arriving in Paris on either the 13th or 14th.

Von Brentano asked the Secretary whether he thought, as the Working Group had suggested in one place, that the Foreign Ministers might carry on after the Summit on the basis of directives issued by the Heads of Government. The Secretary said that would depend, of course, on what actually happened at the Summit. This was a possibility but he hoped they would not be in for another Geneva-type of conference.

The Foreign Minister asked about the composition problem, noting that the Soviets might raise the possibility of introducing other participants into the conference, especially the GDR. The Secretary observed that this was going to be a difficult problem. The Summit Conference could not be turned into something like the UN where Foreign Ministers sometimes had to wait two weeks to speak. We would aim at keeping the Summit participation to the original four members. Von Brentano said that he hoped the "macabre spectacle of Geneva" would not have to be repeated unless it were urgently necessary. The Secretary stated that, if there were to be a series of Summit meetings, one danger was that



other countries would object that the Four Powers were trying to run the rest of the world. It was necessary to avoid giving this impression. As far as Berlin was concerned, there was no question as to the primary responsibility of the Four Powers. In the disarmament field, it was clear that the Soviets and the U.S. were the primary possessors of the important weapons. When it got beyond this to more general questions affecting the interests of others, we could not give the impression that we were disposing of those interests without their having had any say.

The discussion at this point moved on to the subject of the Nuclear Testing Conference.<sup>7</sup> In response to von Brentano's query the Secretary said the Soviets seemed to be prepared to make meaningful concessions involving successful controls over their own territory. We could not tell, of course, whether they would actually sign on the dotted line. The Secretary and Mr. Farley provided certain detailed information bearing on the Nuclear Testing Conference. The Secretary observed that there were still many problems to be solved. He doubted if the treaty would be signed at the Summit. When von Brentano raised the question of whether there was not a danger that the Soviets would simply shift their testing to Red China, the Secretary and Mr. Farley pointed out the provisions in the draft treaty intended to take care of this point.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Nuclear Testing Conference then going on at Geneva.

<sup>8</sup> At 3 p.m., Brentano discussed the German position on the Common Market external tariff acceleration with Under Secretary Dillon. A memorandum of this conversation (US/MC/24) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624.

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## 121. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/9

Washington, April 12, 1960, 3:10 p.m.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

#### SUBJECT

Tripartite Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Summit Preparations

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–1260. Confidential. Drafted by Dubs and approved by M on April 20 and S on April 21. The conversation took place at the Department of State.

## PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom

Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador to the United States

Sir Anthony Rumbold, Assistant Under Secretary of State

(Participants continued in Attachment A; Advisers to the delegations are listed separately in Attachment A)<sup>1</sup>

At the outset of the meeting, the Secretary indicated that there were numerous organizational and procedural matters to be resolved with respect to future meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the Summit itself. Various Working Groups have submitted preliminary reports and the task of the Foreign Ministers was to determine where further analyses are required and to issue guidance to the Working Groups for their continued work preparatory to the NATO meeting in Istanbul.

*Further Meetings of Foreign Ministers*

Secretary Herter presumed that the next meeting of Foreign Ministers would take place in Istanbul on Sunday, May 1. He proposed the following schedule of meetings with which there was no disagreement.

SUNDAY, MAY 1

10:00 a.m.—Germany and Berlin (Quadripartite)

5:00 p.m.—Disarmament (Five-Power)

8:00 p.m.—Tactics and Procedures (Working dinner—tripartite)

M. Couve de Murville stated that he was uncertain of his arrival time in Istanbul on May 1, but was sure that if he were not present in time for the morning meeting, in which case he would be represented by Mr. Lucet, that he would be available for the meeting in the afternoon.

Mr. Lloyd said that the British would make arrangements for the working dinner, presumably at the old British Embassy which is now the Consulate General.

*Division of Responsibility for Reporting to NATO*

Secretary Herter noted that the three Ministers might divide responsibility among themselves with regard to reporting to NATO on the three broad categories of subjects which will be discussed at the Summit. The U.S. might take on disarmament, the U.K. might report on Germany and Berlin and France East-West relations. Mr. Lloyd said that he would rather take on disarmament and that the U.S. might assume responsibility for presenting the problem of Germany and Berlin. Secretary Herter indicated that this was agreeable to him and M. Couve de Murville did not object to assuming responsibility for East-West relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

There was a brief discussion regarding the length of the NATO meeting which is now scheduled to continue from May 2 through the morning of May 4. It was indicated that the morning of May 4 is being held in reserve in the event that the discussions are protracted.

Mr. Lloyd noted that he has to leave Istanbul on May 3 for the Commonwealth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at London.

#### *Working Group Reports*

Secretary Herter suggested that the reports, which would be revised in the light of the April Foreign Ministers discussions, might be submitted to Governments and to NATO in accordance with the following proposed schedule:

Disarmament—April 26  
Germany and Berlin—April 22  
East-West Relations—April 22

Secretary Herter noted that there appeared to be agreement that the content of reports to NATO should deal only with substantive matters and not tactics. No disagreement was expressed by M. Couve de Murville or Mr. Lloyd. Mr. Lloyd wondered whether the Western Disarmament delegation would be reporting on the basis of past negotiations at Geneva or whether it would also attempt to project into the future. Secretary Herter commented that the Disarmament delegation might isolate certain points for discussion at the Summit and that it would be valuable to receive their views on such points.

There was general agreement with a statement made by M. Couve de Murville that the work undertaken by the Working Groups between April 15 and the May meetings would depend upon the decisions taken and the guidance given by the Foreign Ministers in their April meetings. With respect to the disarmament report,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lloyd suggested that the Foreign Ministers receive confirmation at the Five-Power meeting on April 13 regarding the nature of the report the Western delegations at Geneva might submit to the Foreign Ministers preparatory to the Summit meeting.

#### *Over-all Coordination*

Secretary Herter suggested that the Quadripartite Group might take on the task of preparing a paper on over-all Western strategy and tactics. The Quadripartite Group was suggested in light of the understanding that Chancellor Adenauer would attend the Western Heads of Government meeting just prior to the Summit. Mr. Lloyd appeared to question whether Chancellor Adenauer would attend. Mr. Kohler indicated that the Germans understand that we are committed to Chancellor

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<sup>2</sup> Document 112.

Adenauer's participation as a result of German agreement to disband the Four-Power Group which had concerned itself with general Summit matters prior to the Western Heads of Government meeting at Paris in December. Secretary Herter indicated that there was an obvious reason for Chancellor Adenauer's being present in view of the importance of the question of Germany and Berlin in the Summit discussions. There appeared to be no disagreement with having the Quadripartite Group assume responsibility for over-all strategy and tactics. Mr. Lloyd asked about a possible meeting with the Italian and Canadian Foreign Ministers on disarmament just prior to the Summit meeting. Following a brief exchange, it was noted that such a meeting should not be encouraged.

#### *Meetings of Foreign Ministers at Paris*

Secretary Herter said that he would be available for discussions at Paris on May 14 and 15. However, he did not want to force matters and could leave on May 12 and be available in Paris on May 13. M. Couve de Murville suggested that it might be a good idea for the Foreign Ministers to meet on May 14 and that the Heads of Government might meet on Sunday, May 15. M. Couve de Murville commented that the three Foreign Ministers might meet on the morning of May 14 and then meet with Foreign Minister von Brentano in a quadripartite meeting in the afternoon. The Foreign Ministers could meet again on Sunday morning, May 15, leaving Sunday afternoon for a meeting of the four Western Heads of Government and their advisors. Monday morning, May 16 would be held available for a meeting of the Western Heads of Government and they could meet again in the afternoon if required after their first meeting with Khrushchev. While Chancellor Adenauer could attend the Sunday afternoon meeting, he presumably would not be expected to attend other Western Heads of Government meetings once the Summit Conference got underway.

#### *Press Statements*

The three Foreign Ministers were in accord that an agreed press statement should be drafted at the close of each of the Foreign Ministers meetings here in Washington in preference to issuing a formal communiqué.

#### *Summit Arrangements*

Secretary Herter commented that since the French would be acting as hosts at the Summit that M. Couve de Murville might work out procedural arrangements with the Soviets prior to the Summit meeting. Such arrangements would presumably deal with the rotation of the chair, etc. M. Couve de Murville stated that as he saw it, there would be two types of meetings: those restricted to the Heads of Government, which would present no problem since everybody would speak in turn and, secondly, enlarged meetings for which it would be wise to refer to precedents. Mr.

Lloyd said that he did not know what type of meetings would take place but felt that President de Gaulle would certainly be expected to chair an official opening of the Conference. Secretary Herter assumed that there would be plenary sessions at both the beginning and end of the Conference. Mr. Lloyd expressed the opinion that if the meetings were restricted to four, eight or twelve persons, there might not be any need for a rotating chairmanship.

*Type of Meetings*

Secretary Herter stated that insofar as the three Western Heads of Government were concerned, they seemed to prefer restricted meetings. This might raise difficulties with respect to the impressions coming out of the meetings. The President has suggested that the Summit be more in the nature of discussions rather than negotiations. The view had also been expressed that the Heads of Government would meet in restricted sessions and then issue guidelines to their Foreign Ministers, who would carry on discussions in the afternoon in the presence of advisers. M. Couve de Murville noted that the French were broadly in favor of discussion-type meetings but that he was not sure that the restricted meetings of Heads of Government would last a short time, say one hour. Secretary Herter questioned whether the President would want to sit in on actual negotiations since protracted discussion would invariably get into details. The President envisaged that the Foreign Ministers should carry on any detailed discussions. In response to a question by Mr. Lloyd, Secretary Herter stated that he foresaw that the restricted meetings might consist of only the Heads of Government and interpreters. M. Couve de Murville commented that the French had been thinking in terms of a whispering interpretation and thought that each Head of Government would be accompanied by two interpreters, one of whom would give either a whispering or a consecutive interpretation. The other interpreter would be available to take care of the record since an accurate record of these meetings is considered essential. Mr. Lloyd said that he did not believe it would be very efficient to have two interpreters present and not the Foreign Ministers since the Heads of Government would be faced with the problem of issuing guidelines to the Foreign Ministers after the restricted sessions. He agreed that it would be desirable that the Heads of Government have one meeting by themselves. Secretary Herter noted that it was desirable to agree on the types of meeting that might be held in order that such views could be conveyed to Mr. Khrushchev fairly soon. Mr. Couve de Murville stated that it was difficult to make suggestions without knowing precisely what the details of the meetings would be. He did not visualize much coming out of the meetings in the way of negotiations. Each Head of Government would expose his Government's views and that these were certainly well known. Secretary Herter stated that the essential point

was that the Heads of Government would not be making firm commitments in their restricted sessions without having questions studied further by the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Lloyd agreed that the Heads of Government could meet with only interpreters the first time, but questioned whether this should serve as a pattern for the rest of the meetings.

Following further discussion, there seemed to be general agreement that a formal opening of the Conference could not be avoided. It was suggested by Mr. Lloyd that the Heads of Government might hold their first plenary session at 12:00 noon on May 16 and follow this with a restricted meeting beginning at 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon. The Foreign Ministers would hold themselves available during this first restricted session. The three Foreign Ministers also appeared to be in general agreement that arrangements should be made for simultaneous translations during any enlarged meetings. M. Couve de Murville assumed that a whispering translation would work all right for the restricted discussions, assuming, of course, that another interpreter would be available to maintain the record.

Secretary Herter indicated that he would attempt a second draft of a letter to Khrushchev<sup>3</sup> regarding procedural matters, taking into account the discussions that had taken place today.

#### *Length of Meeting*

Secretary Herter noted that the President was planning to stop over in Portugal on the way home from the Summit and that the U.S. side hoped that the Summit would close by Saturday, May 21 or Sunday, May 22 at the latest, since the President was planning to leave for Portugal on Monday morning. Mr. Lloyd expressed concern lest the West give the impression that they were cutting off the Summit discussions. He wondered whether it wouldn't be possible for the President to return to Paris after his trip to Portugal. M. Couve de Murville said the French were in agreement with the British views, but also in agreement in principle that the Conference should end May 21 or 22. Secretary Herter felt that it might be possible for the President to return if considered essential. There appeared to be agreement that the visit of the President to Portugal could be announced and the terminal date of the Summit left open for the moment.

#### *Entertainment*

Secretary Herter indicated that the President had expressed the hope that entertainment could be restricted to one dinner by the host government and that any remaining functions might be limited to cocktail parties by the other delegations. Further discussion indicated that the French and British were in agreement with regard to restricting

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the first draft letter to Khrushchev, see Document 110.

entertainment. The consensus was that it would be left to the host government to decide whether the one formal function might be a luncheon or a dinner. This would not, however, exclude bilateral dinners or luncheons, as the individual heads decide. Mr. Lloyd expressed opposition to cocktail parties and wondered whether arrangements could not be made to have drinks available after each afternoon session since this might preclude the necessity of cocktail parties by delegations. M. Couve de Murville said that such arrangements could be made. He indicated that the question of entertainment might be one subject which he would discuss with the Soviets prior to the Summit.

#### *Expanded Participation*

All three Foreign Ministers agreed that the Western powers should resist any possible move by Khrushchev to expand participation in the Conference.

#### *Future Summits*

Secretary Herter noted that a good deal of talk had taken place with respect to future Summit meetings and that this question might well arise at the May Summit meeting. It was generally agreed that this question would be put aside until it was seen how the coming Summit would work out.

#### *Subjects to be Discussed*

Secretary Herter recalled that the Soviets had generally mentioned four topics for discussion: disarmament, Germany and Berlin, East-West relations and nuclear testing, in the event that no agreement had been reached on a treaty by the time the Summit convened. Asked what the French reaction would be if nuclear testing were discussed, M. Couve de Murville stated that the French would not participate in such discussions since they were not involved in the present negotiations regarding the discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing. M. Couve de Murville implied that the French Government would not provide facilities for side talks, suggesting that such talks might be held in the Soviet Embassy. Secretary Herter commented that if this subject was raised, it would presumably be in side talks in which the French would not participate.

#### *Order of Subjects*

Secretary Herter suggested that the order of topics at the Summit might be disarmament, Germany and Berlin and East-West relations. Mr. Lloyd questioned whether the topic of general relations between states might not be discussed first, and it was his impression that President de Gaulle and Macmillan had thought this might be a good idea. The rationale behind this view was that if the Western powers could commit Khrushchev to working toward a *détente*, he would be less apt

to take a firm position on Germany and Berlin. Secretary Herter felt that the West would look foolish if they began their discussion on the theme of a *détente* and then were later faced with a bust on the question of Germany and Berlin. M. Couve de Murville commented that the general idea was that a *détente* could not continue if the Soviets were tough on Germany and Berlin. Secretary Herter suggested that more thought be given to this question and that a discussion of this subject could again be resumed within the framework of over-all tactics at the Summit.

#### *Possible Schedule of Meetings*

M. Couve de Murville stated that the French were thinking in terms of six meetings of the Heads of Government: two meetings on Germany and Berlin, one on disarmament, one on East-West relations and one or two meetings for a conclusion, including the problem of a communiqué. Secretary Herter indicated that the U.S. side was thinking along similar lines.

#### *Size of Meetings*

After a discussion, it was generally agreed that for the opening and plenary sessions, five persons from each side would sit at the conference table with an additional five persons for each delegation seated behind.

#### *Record of Conference*

Secretary Herter suggested that the custom has been for each delegation to take its own notes. The problem of keeping verbatim minutes only brings more persons into the room. M. Couve de Murville commented that at the conversations between the Heads of Government, no verbatims would be necessary. Their experience with the Khrushchev-de Gaulle talks indicated that very good records could be kept when only a few persons were present. He emphasized again, however, if there were to be whispering translations, that another interpreter would have to be present to take notes for the record. At more formal and enlarged meetings, arrangements can be made to take verbatim notes.

There was agreement that the delegations should compare notes in order to ensure that they are consonant with one another.

#### *Conference Communiqué*

It was agreed that it would be desirable for the three powers to work in advance on a tripartite basis in drafting a communiqué for the Conference. This could best be done perhaps at Paris after the Istanbul NATO Meeting.

#### *Public Information Policy*

Secretary Herter stressed that it would be important for the three Western powers to correlate their public information policy in preparation for the Summit. The trust of such a coordinated policy would have



four basic aims: (1) to promote a beginning on practical arms control, (2) to defuse Berlin, (3) to enhance cohesion of the free world, and (4) to clarify policies toward the Communist bloc. He then read U.S. document FMW D-1/3,<sup>4</sup> indicating that copies would be distributed in order that the other delegations might give further thought to this matter. M. Couve de Murville suggested that one of the principles which had been stressed by Secretary Herter might be changed from arms control to controlled disarmament in order to avoid the impression that the Western powers desire control without disarmament.

### *Nuclear Safeguards*

The Secretary said that he wanted to take this occasion to raise the question of safeguard measures to keep nuclear power reactors from furnishing fissionable material for weapons use. The Indians, despite their protestations regarding nuclear weapons, will not go along with the application of safeguards to their power reactors. They are now discussing a power reactor project with a number of potential reactor suppliers, including the Soviet Union as well as the U.S., U.K., and France. The French have supported safeguards in the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna just recently. The Secretary hoped that France would also maintain a common policy with the U.S. and the U.K. on safeguards vis-à-vis India.

M. Couve de Murville said that he understood the position of the United States and the United Kingdom was that they would not sell a reactor without safeguards. Mr. Lloyd said that the U.K. was taking this position and would do so so long as other states took the same position. He thought that if the Western powers stood together the Soviet position would be exposed. The Secretary said that the principles and procedures for safeguard operations have been provisionally agreed by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and could by agreement be applied to an Indian reactor obtained from a member of the Agency. Consistency in the application of safeguards is important. He recalled that the agreement between the U.S. and Euratom called for the maintenance of safeguards standards and procedures by Euratom which would be consistent with those of the IAEA.

M. Couve de Murville said that he understood the U.S. and U.K. position. France has as yet not taken a position on application of safeguards to bilateral reactor sales outside the International Atomic Energy Agency. He recalled that Dr. Bhabha had argued that acceptance of safeguards by India, when safeguards are not applied to the major atomic

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<sup>4</sup> A copy of this paper, "Pre-Summit Information Policy," is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1629.

powers, would be discriminatory and inconsistent with India's sovereignty and dignity.

*Agreed Press Statement*

Following discussion there was agreement that the following press statement would serve as guidance on reporting to the press on today's meeting.

"The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Washington on April 12 to discuss questions relating to the meeting of the Chiefs of State and Heads of Government which begins in Paris, May 16.

"They reached agreement on certain general matters relating to the Summit and noted with satisfaction the state of the preparatory work of the several working groups which will be reviewed in detail in the meetings later this week.

"The Ministers confirmed the desire of their governments to approach the Heads of Government Meeting in a constructive spirit. They emphasized the need to solve outstanding problems by negotiation and not by force or unilateral action. They expressed the desire of their governments to negotiate reasonable solutions to these problems in the interest of world peace.

"The North Atlantic Council will be informed of the present Washington discussions and consulted as preparations for the Paris meeting proceed."

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## 122. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/7

Washington, April 12, 1960, 5:45 p.m.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12-14, 1960

#### SUBJECT

Khrushchev Visit to France and de Gaulle Visit to London

#### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

M. Couve de Murville, French Minister for Foreign Affairs

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/4-1260. Confidential. Drafted by McBride, initialed by Kohler, and approved by S on April 20. The conversation took place in Secretary Herter's office. A brief summary of this conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 4316, April 13 at 3:46 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1625)

M. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, EUR  
Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

After a brief reference to the instability of the political situation in Italy, M. Couve de Murville proceeded to discuss with the Secretary the Khrushchev visit to France along the lines he had previously briefed Ambassador Houghton.<sup>1</sup> He stressed there were no results to the de Gaulle–Khrushchev discussions and concluded these represented a further part of the classical East-West dialogue. Disarmament, Germany and Berlin, aid to underdeveloped countries, possible embargoes on arms deliveries, and the African situation had been the subjects of discussion. He said Khrushchev had mentioned two years as the period for an interim Berlin settlement, and this of course posed the issue of where we would be after two years if we accepted an interim arrangement. Couve opined that it would be satisfactory provided our rights remained untouched after the termination of an interim settlement. In any event he did not believe we should go beyond the Geneva proposals of July 28, 1959.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary and Couve agreed that the Soviets would open the Summit Conference by presenting again their German peace treaty proposal, and repeat their belief that the German question was one to be settled by the two Germanies. They agreed that thereupon the Soviets would indicate that, failing all else, they would reluctantly be obliged to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

The Secretary asked if during the de Gaulle–Khrushchev talks, the question of Germany's eastern frontiers had been mentioned. Couve replied in the affirmative and said that de Gaulle had repeated his previously publicized view that the present eastern frontier of Germany should remain fixed at the Order-Neisse. He said that in the context of a statement that all German boundaries should remain unchanged. He specifically referred to his opposition to Anschluss with Austria or changing the German-Czech frontier.

Couve discussed briefly his negotiations with Gromyko over the communiqué.<sup>3</sup> He made three points, first that Gromyko had added language to the French draft stressing that disarmament was the number one problem in the world. He said the French gladly accepted this suggestion. However, he had been less keen on the Soviet references to the peace treaty which had been added as well as language regarding a European security system.

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<sup>1</sup> See Documents 106 and 108.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 488.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the joint Franco-Soviet communiqué, April 3, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 396–398, or Embree, *Soviet Union and the German Question*, pp. 141–143.

In the disarmament discussion, Couve noted that de Gaulle had raised with the Soviets the question of nuclear disarmament in terms which he was aware we did not like, i.e., that stress should be laid on eliminating nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, i.e., missile systems. Couve said Khrushchev had added to de Gaulle's suggestions both airplanes and submarines. He said the French had concluded from Khrushchev's emphasis on planes that perhaps the Soviet missile development was not so far along as Khrushchev had publicly stressed, and that they retained a fear of manned aircraft. Khrushchev had repeated his insistence on the abolition of foreign bases in general.

Finally, there had been a discussion of the Communist Chinese situation. Couve said Khrushchev had said Communist China was "a friendly country" and there were no particular outstanding problems between China and the Soviet Union. Couve said he thought this was probably true now and that the China problem was really one for the future. The Secretary agreed that the real difficulties with China lay ahead. Couve said Khrushchev had stressed that China did not have any expansionist tendencies though he had also mentioned the great population increase in that country.

On the British visit, Couve said the British Government had done a magnificent job with the arrangements, and that de Gaulle had been particularly touched by the depth of the public demonstration which the British had made. He said it had been a great popular success in both countries. The Secretary congratulated Couve on the excellent speech which de Gaulle had made to Parliament in Westminster Hall.<sup>4</sup> It was agreed that an effort should be made so that de Gaulle's speech to the U.S. Congress later in the month could be made in the same fashion, without interruption for translation.

Finally, Couve mentioned that de Gaulle was not anxious nor in a hurry to repay the Khrushchev visit, and that the French return visit would probably occur in the spring of 1961. De Gaulle did not want to go to the Soviet Union this year. The Secretary indicated he agreed the spring of next year would be a better time. There was then a brief discussion of certain aspects of summit tactics along the lines of the earlier tripartite meeting on this subject.

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<sup>4</sup> For text of de Gaulle's address to both Houses of Parliament, April 7, see the *Times*, April 8, 1960, p. 8.

## 123. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/8

Washington, April 13, 1960, 10 a.m.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

#### SUBJECT

Germany and Berlin—Western Position at Summit

#### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Foreign Secretary Lloyd, United Kingdom

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, France

Foreign Minister von Brentano, Federal Republic of Germany

(Full list of delegations on last page)<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Ministers, under the Secretary's chairmanship, discussed the Report of the Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, dated April 9, 1960 (FMW REF–2/110)<sup>2</sup> using as an outline the Working Group's list of points which might be considered by the Foreign Ministers (FMW REF–2/111a).<sup>3</sup>

#### *Report to NATO*

The Foreign Ministers agreed that NATO should be given the Working Group Report as amended in the light of the Foreign Ministers' comments but without the section on tactics, that this report might be discussed in the NATO Council and at the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Istanbul, and that no further report in NATO by any of the Four Powers should be necessary.

#### *Summit Tactics*

The Foreign Ministers approved the basic approach of the Working Group in its discussion of tactics on Germany including Berlin at the Summit. Foreign Minister von Brentano noted, however, that his

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–1360. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan, initialed by Merchant, and approved in M on April 18 and S on April 20. The conversation took place in the Conference Suite at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2214, April 13 at 9:46 p.m. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/4–360)

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>Document 115.

<sup>3</sup>Not found. A copy of a draft of this paper (FMW REF–2/111) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1629.

agreement was subject to his comments on some of the substantive parts of the Report.

#### *Plebiscite in Germany*

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Western Powers should be prepared, at an appropriate time during the Summit meeting, to advance a proposal for a plebiscite in all of Germany on the relative merits of Western and Soviet ideas about a peace treaty. Foreign Minister von Brentano said that the Germans welcomed the Working Group's proposal, liked its form and the wording of the questions, and believed that emphasizing the principle of self-determination in such a manner would have a good effect on public opinion.

#### *Reunification of Berlin*

Foreign Minister von Brentano said that the Federal Government and the Berlin Senat welcomed the idea of a proposal for the reunification of Berlin in principle but that he had some comments to make on the text drafted by the Working Group. First, he believed that the preamble should not speak of developing Berlin as a link between the separated parts of Germany but rather should mention the reunification of Berlin as a first step towards the reunification of Germany. Otherwise, the Soviets might reply that the Western Powers had accepted the Soviet contention that a solution of the Berlin problem is possible outside the context of German reunification. Second, he believed that the proposal would have to be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the Four Powers to take up negotiations on the question of Germany on the basis of the Western Peace Plan when the proposal came into effect. Third, he believed that paragraph 8 of the proposal should be redrafted to eliminate the possibility of its being construed to mean that the NATO guarantee for Berlin would no longer be in effect. Fourth, he believed that there should be a provision to the effect that the Four Powers would act only on the basis of the Vienna arrangement, i.e. that decisions would be taken by a majority and that the Soviets would not have veto power.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that he was then reading the Working Group's proposal for the first time, but that it suggested certain problems to him. It seemed to suggest the creation of a "third German state" which would be a link between the other parts of Germany, a system which would be quite different from our objective for Germany. It had nothing to do with reunification and would only end the occupation status. In fact, the occupation status was mentioned only in paragraph 8, and then in terms which implied it would disappear. While he understood the tactical intent of the proposal, he felt that its effect on public opinion would be minimal and that the suggestion for a change in Berlin's status promised no gains but entailed real risks. He had expected only that we would maintain our usual position of insist-

ing on the unity of Berlin; the detailed draft proposal went much too far. He concluded that he was perhaps giving this matter too much attention, for such a proposal would not be put forward at the Summit, but that he considered it dangerous to let such a document be circulated in NATO.

Secretary Herter said that the proposal should be considered a purely tactical one designed to point up the division of Berlin. It would be put forward only after the question of German reunification had been discussed at the Summit. The immediate questions were whether the Four Powers wished to use the all-Berlin theme and, if so, what changes should be made in the Working Group's draft. He agreed with Foreign Minister von Brentano's comments regarding the preamble and paragraph 8 and added that paragraph 8 should make it clear the Western Powers would retain their rights.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said he agreed with the French Foreign Minister that this was not the type of paper likely to be studied at the Summit but that he believed it would be useful nonetheless to have such a paper on hand. He was not happy about paragraph 8 and agreed with the German Foreign Minister's suggestions.

Foreign Minister von Brentano reverted to the French Foreign Minister's comments and said that the proposal could be interpreted as a proposal for a three-part division of Germany and consequently an abandonment of Germany's present status. He therefore wished to reiterate his suggestions that the preamble should be redrafted and that the proposal should be accompanied by a Four-Power declaration of readiness to resume negotiations on Germany on the basis of the Western Peace Plan.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should revise its draft proposal in the light of the foregoing comments and that the proposal, thus amended, might be included in the report to NATO on the understanding that it was not meant to advance this proposal at the Summit but merely to prepare a stand-by all-Berlin paper.

#### *Additional Working Group Tasks*

Secretary Herter noted that the Working Group had inquired whether it should draft:

- a) a directive for possible use at the Summit to remand the task of further negotiations to a subordinate body;
- b) possible reciprocal declarations which might accompany agreement on such a directive; and
- c) a version of its paper on the essential conditions of a *modus vivendi* for West Berlin suitable for presentation to the Soviets.

These would only be stand-by papers for possible use and would be discussed at Istanbul.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that he found the Working Group's question an enigma. He agreed with respect to part a). Part b) was very mysterious—declarations on what and by whom? Part c) looked alright but was also a little mysterious.

Assistant Secretary Kohler explained that the Working Group had had two alternative tactical approaches in mind. One was a *modus vivendi*; the other some continuing machinery for discussions, as in the case of the Austrian peace treaty. The list of essential conditions for a *modus vivendi* was for internal use by the Western Powers only. The question was whether it should be rewritten for tabling with the Soviets or possible other use. If the alternative of continuing discussions is chosen, there will have to be some sort of Summit directive plus statements to the effect that neither side will disturb the existing situation while further discussions are in progress.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd noted that he was pleased to see that the deputies of the Foreign Ministers might carry on these discussions.

Foreign Minister von Brentano said that he agreed that the Working Group should complete all the tasks mentioned, although he did not like the term "*modus vivendi*". He believed that the Working Group, as a fourth task, should also attempt to improve the Western proposal of July 28, 1959, which has never officially been made to the Soviets. The July 28 proposal did not specify what its duration would be or make it clear that original Allied rights would remain unaffected after its expiration. Moreover, such a proposal should deal more clearly with the question of traffic to and from Berlin.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that he wished to pose the question of what would come after the Summit, which could result in failure, agreement on a new Summit, or something else. He saw two possibilities. The first was a discussion of Berlin, as at Geneva, with the objective of reaching a temporary arrangement. In this case, the task is to decide the principles to be safeguarded, i.e. how to maintain our position in Berlin. The second was a discussion of Germany, in which the principles of a peace treaty could provide a conceivable basis for discussion. However, he considered that it was not good to go on discussing with the Soviets the question of Germany as a whole. Such discussion would be completely useless and hopeless. It would also be bad because it could only generate ill-feeling and would do nothing to prepare the political and psychological conditions for an eventual agreement on Germany. He was therefore reluctant to agree to task a) if the idea was discussions of the German question by the Foreign Ministers between Summit meetings. The Geneva discussions had done no good and had only made the situation more difficult. If a rapprochement was to come on Germany, it would come only in an atmosphere of *détente*. However,



he had no objection to the Working Group completing the suggested tasks as a hypothetical study.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that he thought such a hypothetical study could do no harm.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should complete the tasks suggested on the understanding that there would be no commitment regarding any specific course of action.

At the end of the meeting, Foreign Minister von Brentano reverted to his dislike of the term “modus vivendi” which, he said, implied a factual situation without a legal basis. Since there is a legal basis, he would prefer a designation which confirms Western rights, e.g. “Essential Conditions for the Exercise of Western Rights”. Secretary Herter and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville suggested “temporary arrangement”. Foreign Minister von Brentano replied that he also objected to the term “modus vivendi” because it implied an “interim” or time-limited arrangement. Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that “interim” had been interpreted at Geneva to mean “until reunification”. It was agreed that the Working Group should try to find a more suitable term.

*Unilateral Declarations to Permit East Germans to Exercise Soviet Access Functions*

Secretary Herter said that paragraph 4 of the tactics section of the Working Group Report dealt with a highly complicated proposal (i.e. Solution “C” of the April 1959 London Working Group Report)<sup>4</sup> which had not been put forward at Geneva. He doubted whether it would be profitable to ask the Working Group to do more on this subject.

Assistant Secretary Kohler explained that “Solution C” was designed to maintain the status quo while at the same time permitting the East Germans to take over Soviet access functions. The proposal was a fall-back position which had never been fully agreed. It envisaged unilateral Soviet and East German declarations regarding access and unilateral Western declarations regarding continuing rights and responsibilities. There had never been much enthusiasm for this proposal, and one of the unresolved questions was whether maintenance of free access would be assured by United Nations observers or by a Four-Power conciliation commission, as preferred by the French.

Foreign Minister von Brentano said that, despite his efforts to understand it, he had been unable to find his way through “Solution C”. The numerous brackets were particularly confusing. If the Working Group wished to study the question further, he would not stand in the way of a further refinement of the proposal. However, if they did so, they should do so very discreetly and there should be no public

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 8, Document 72.

discussion, for a unilateral GDR declaration would make the GDR in effect a partner to an agreement. Furthermore, unilateral declarations amount to less than a firm agreement. The idea of a United Nations arbitrator might also be objectionable.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd stated that he considered this a low priority task.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should refine the proposal, but that the proposal should not be included in the report to NATO.

### *Principles of a Peace Treaty*

Foreign Minister von Brentano stated that the preliminary draft principles of a German peace treaty approved by the Foreign Ministers April 30, 1959<sup>5</sup> could provide a starting point for peace treaty discussions at an appropriate time. However, he would object to discussing them at present because there is no representative of a freely-elected German government who can participate in the discussions. Furthermore, the Soviets might raise certain questions, the discussion of which would be disadvantageous to the Western Powers. For example, the discussion, outside the context of the Western Peace Plan, of the future military status of Germany would be not only undesirable but also dangerous. As a tactical maneuver, the Western Powers might respond to a Soviet peace treaty proposal that they do desire a peace treaty but on the basis of their own principles, the first of which is that the peace settlement should be freely negotiated with and signed by an all-German government. Only if the Soviets accepted this first principle could other aspects of a treaty be discussed.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that he was opposed to such public polemics. He also saw a contradiction between an offer to discuss the principles of a peace treaty and the rejection of the Soviet thesis that the conclusion of a peace treaty is the proper approach to the question of Germany. The inopportune questions which might arise included not only the future military status of Germany but also the question of the German Eastern border. The Western Powers might discuss peace treaty principles among themselves, but they should not report such discussion to NATO and they should not envisage the possibility of discussion of the subject at the Summit.

Secretary Herter said that the Western Powers had intended to discuss the principles of a peace treaty at Geneva only in connection with

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<sup>5</sup>For the preliminary draft principles of a German peace treaty, see *The New York Times*, May 20, 1959, p. 15.

progress on the Western Peace Plan. He doubted that an occasion for the discussion of the subject would arise at the Summit.

*All-German Discussions*

Foreign Minister von Brentano said that the Federal German Government rejected so-called “all-German” discussions, which it considered very dangerous. He said that the SPD had withdrawn its “Germany Plan”,<sup>6</sup> which had envisaged such discussions, because it was now convinced of the danger of them. He felt that the Western Powers should not go beyond the Geneva formulation, namely that there should be Four-Power negotiations to which German representatives could be invited.

The Foreign Ministers agreed to remove the brackets on page 5 of Annex II of the Working Group report.

*Future Meetings of Working Group*

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should continue its work in Washington, completing any tasks required for the Istanbul meeting, and might also meet in Paris on May 9–10 to do any other work required before the Western Summit if this should be required in the light of the Istanbul meetings.

At the end of the meeting the Foreign Ministers agreed on a brief press release.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For the SPD plan on Germany, March 18, 1959, see *Dokumente*, Band 1, 1958–1959, Zweiter Halbband, pp. 1207–1222. The Embassy in Bonn transmitted the text of the plan as an enclosure to despatch 1440, March 23, 1959. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–2359)

<sup>7</sup> For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1960, p. 399.

124. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/25

Washington, April 13, 1960, 3 p.m.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12-14, 1960

SUBJECT

Foreign Ministers Meeting on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

Additional Attendees Listed at Tab A<sup>1</sup>

*U.S.*

Secretary Herter  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Farley

Foreign Minister Couve de  
Murville  
Ambassador Alphan  
Mr. Lucet

*Canada*

Secretary Green  
Mr. Robertson  
Ambassador Heaney

*U.K.*

Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Ambassador Caccia  
Mr. Hainworth

*Italy*

Foreign Minister Segni  
Ambassador Brosio  
Ambassador Straneo

*France*

Secretary Herter extended a welcome to the group and expressed the hope that today's discussion would be worthwhile. He said that the agenda for the meeting was a nebulous one. We hoped to discuss the progress made to date at Geneva, to concert our assessment of the existing situation and discuss the moves we might make between now and the Summit. He assumed that all delegations had available the Five Power report<sup>2</sup> prepared by our Geneva delegations and that this could serve as the basis for the discussion. The first point to note was the sharp difference of opinion between the East and West on the manner of proceeding in negotiations. The Soviets were sticking so far on the need to

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-1360. Confidential. Drafted by Spiers, initialed by Merchant, and approved in M on April 16 and S on April 21. The conversation took place in the Conference Suite at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Document 112.

agree on general principles<sup>3</sup> at the outset. The Allies on the other hand consistently stressed the need to agree on first measures which could constitute a real beginning toward the ultimate goal. The Western powers have resisted seeking agreement on general principles which could be differently interpreted by the two sides since this would not represent any meaningful advance. We continue to hold that our plan represented the most practical approach, although we were willing to discuss any proposals presented. The Soviets have recently made a switch in tactics in suggesting adoption of the UN resolution<sup>4</sup> as a basis for discussion: this is curious in view of the last paragraph of this resolution which speaks of agreement on specific measures toward the goal of complete and general disarmament. He felt that our own approach was precisely in accord with this paragraph. He suggested that we now discuss the position we had reached and any difference of opinion we might have on the assessment.

Mr. Couve de Murville agreed that our problem was to discuss whether we should seek among ourselves to redefine our general goals or to stick with the position we had taken until now. He had begun to wonder how we should orient the discussion in Geneva in the future. He himself agreed that all we could really hope to do is to define certain concrete practical steps which we can take now. We had not yet succeeded in making clear our own program of action and he hoped that the session today would result in some clarification of our ideas.

[2 paragraphs (1/2 page of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Lloyd said that four points had arisen in the discussion so far: (1) The wisdom of trying to put forward a Western counter-statement of principles; (2) Whether we should continue to concentrate attention on specific agreements which could be reached; (3) The suggestion that Hammarskjöld be invited to Geneva; and (4) What could the Summit accomplish on disarmament. He said that the British Delegation had prepared a paper relevant to the first two points. He felt strongly that we must not remain at a relative disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. We needed to introduce a reply to the Soviet paper on general principles. His own inclination was to put forward a statement which would deal both with general objectives and the specific matters on which we proposed immediate discussion. Secretary Herter said that the U.S. had been thinking along similar lines and had sent this morning to Geneva a proposed counter-statement of our own for comment by our delegation.

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the Soviet proposal on the principles for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva on April 8, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 79–80.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the U.N. resolution of November 20, 1959, on general and complete disarmament, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, p. 1281.

(Tab B) Mr. Lloyd read the U.K. suggestion (Tab C). Secretary Herter said that this statement runs extraordinarily close to the one we ourselves had prepared. Regarding the suggestion of inviting the Secretary General, he agreed with the Italian view. He felt that it would only lead to confusion if the Secretary General addressed the meetings before the recess. He had been in touch with the Secretary General and was aware of his preoccupations. The U.S. side had been doing some work on this question and hoped to have a working paper that could be distributed to the other participants before the Istanbul meeting. He felt it was undesirable, however, to raise this matter in the negotiations at this time since it would make it more difficult for us to focus on the key issues we wished to highlight. He doubted that the Secretary General would be willing to discuss anything other than the general question of relationship between the IDO and the UN and it would not be productive to raise this matter in the negotiations now. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

M. Couve de Murville said that he felt the U.K. draft was a good one in principle. It placed emphasis on the practical steps on which agreement could now be reached. Although he did not feel that the Soviets were making a great impression on public opinion with their plan, he felt that we ourselves should pay more attention to this aspect. He approved of the first paragraph in the British paper as a simple, straightforward and readily understandable statement of the Western objectives. He did not wish to get into a detailed discussion of the remainder of the paper and suggested that it should be turned over to the delegations in Geneva for study and advice. He felt that it was desirable to aim for a Western proposal which could be put forward at the Summit on certain specific measures which could be carried out immediately. He suggested that we obtain the views of the Geneva delegations on this matter as well. He did not feel capable of engaging in a detailed discussion of this matter and wished only to stress French emphasis on nuclear disarmament. We could not very well omit proposals on control of nuclear weapons from the first steps. He noted that this took a secondary place in the British paper.

Sig. Segni said that he accepted the proposal of Mr. Lloyd that a Western draft be developed. However, its text should be carefully worked out and studied. He also agreed that we should attempt at the Summit to reach some kind of detailed agreement and not just agreement on principles.

Secretary Herter agreed that the U.K. draft should be sent to Geneva for study by the delegations at once. He felt we should make every effort to get an agreed Western counter-statement before the recess. At the same time, we should press the Soviets on their indications of flexibility so that we could do as Italy suggested at the Summit. He thought

that the British draft should be studied together with the U.S. draft which he said he would circulate at the present session. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Herter recalled Khrushchev's statement at the UN about partial measures.<sup>5</sup> He was convinced that the Russians know as well as we do that our approach is the more practical one. He felt that it was still possible that they would change their tactics before the recess. Mr. Lloyd said that he felt there was agreement that we should attempt to develop a Western counter-statement for tabling before the recess and that we would proceed to get the advice of our experts in Geneva on the contents of such a statement as well as on the specifics we might propose at the Summit. M. Couve de Murville said that he had received a proposed text from Moch of a similar statement which they would make available to the others as soon as possible.

Secretary Herter said that we would want to consider at the Istanbul meeting exactly what we should do at the Summit, in the light of whatever progress we are able to make in Geneva between now and then. Sig. Segni said that he would like to have another meeting of the five Foreign Ministers just before the Summit to consider the specific proposals which might be put forward there. If this were discussed at Istanbul, the danger of press leaks would be great. Therefore, he favored postponing final decisions until the last possible moment. Secretary Herter thought that this suggestion had merit but that the matter should be decided at Istanbul rather than now. He agreed that there was a great danger of any decisions worked out so far in advance becoming public property.

[4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Herter said he continued to doubt that this would serve a useful purpose. He said he wished to digress for a moment on a rather discouraging aspect of the arms control problem which had occurred to him in connection with the French emphasis on control of delivery systems. He said that he had consulted an experienced American Army engineering officer on the possibility of concealing as many as a hundred missiles in violation of an arms agreement. The officer had advised him that he could guarantee concealment and that the only risk he would run of detection would be if there were an informer. He felt that problems like this emphasized the need for an international body with sufficient strength of its own to make cheating on the part of a would-be violator unprofitable. Thus he felt that our stress on the need for peacekeeping institutions in the context of total disarmament was sound and must be maintained. Recapitulating the discussion so far, he said that it appeared to be agreed that we

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<sup>5</sup> For text of Khrushchev's speech to the United Nations on September 18, 1959, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1452–1460.

would instruct our delegations to develop a paper for tabling before the Summit so that the Russians would not have the last word. In response to Mr. Green's suggestion that we concentrate on working out limited areas of possible agreement, Secretary Herter said that he felt that this had been our approach all along and that it continued to be a sound one.

Referring again to the question of the Secretary General, Mr. Lloyd said that he had discussed the problem in general terms with Hammarskjold last Sunday. The Secretary General was going to Geneva to the Law of the Sea Conference<sup>6</sup> and had said that he would like to sit in on a session of the Ten Nation Committee. He had made no mention, however, of making a statement. Hammarskjold had said that it would be dangerous if the IDO developed without any connection with the UN. His own preference was for a close connection. However, all he wanted was assurance that the two bodies would not be completely independent. Lloyd had assured him that we foresaw that the IDO would be established "within the UN framework". He had said frankly that he did not feel that we could agree on a specific subordinate relationship to the Security Council in view of the Soviet veto or to the General Assembly as presently constituted, where a two-thirds vote is required. This could be a matter of life and death and we could not submit to the arbitration of these bodies. It was clear that Hammarskjold had not thought the problem out himself and he had little to say about Lloyd's observation. He felt, however, that Mr. Green had a sound fundamental point—that we must not let the Soviets get away with posing as champions of the UN.

Secretary Herter asked whether there were any other matters which ought to be discussed. The present group was to meet again Sunday, May 1, in Istanbul, and would have another report from the delegations in Geneva at that time. Mr. Lloyd raised the question of a press line. Secretary Herter read a suggested draft prepared by the Canadians. After an exchange of views, a statement was agreed on the basis of the Canadian draft (Tab D).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the Law of the Sea Conference March 17–April 26, 1960.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. For text of this statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 400.



**Tab B<sup>8</sup>**

DRAFT FIVE-POWER PAPER ON DISARMAMENT

The Five Western Powers,

*Believing* that measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time,

*Believing* that the Ten-Nation Committee should, through mutual consultations, explore avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitations and reduction of all types of arms and armed forces as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations,

*Propose* that early agreement be reached on the implementation of the following measures under appropriate international control:

(1) Prohibition against placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction, as an initial step toward insuring the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only;

(2) Prior notification of proposed launching of missiles as an immediate step to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation;

(3) Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production to non-weapons uses, in order to halt the further increase and to begin the reduction of present stocks of nuclear weapons as an initial step toward the final elimination of these weapons;

(4) Establishment of initial force level ceilings of 2.5 million for the US and USSR, and of force level ceilings for all militarily-significant nations to go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of further force level ceilings of 2.1 million for the US and USSR, as an initial step toward the reduction of national arms forces to levels required for internal security and the fulfillment of UN charter obligations;

(5) Deposit of agreed quantities and types of modern armaments in internationally-supervised storage depots, as an initial step toward the final reduction of armaments to the level required for international security and the fulfillment of UN charter obligations;

(6) Establishment of appropriate measures to give participating states greater protection against surprise attack, as an initial step toward the achievement of an open world in which all nations are safeguarded against surprise attack.

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<sup>8</sup> Confidential.

Tab C<sup>9</sup>

DISARMAMENT "PRINCIPLES" TO BE PUT FORWARD BY THE  
WESTERN POWERS AT THE SUMMIT

1. The final goal is general and complete international disarmament, covering all States and all types of forces and weapons, to the levels required by internal security and fulfillment of obligations under the United Nations Charter; and the maintenance, by international machinery, of international law and order in a disarmed world.

2. The disarmament process must:

(a) be balanced and comprehensive so that no country or group of countries obtains, at any stage, a significant military advantage;

(b) give equal security to all; so that international confidence is progressively increased;

(c) be effectively controlled throughout, to ensure that disarmament obligations are carried out and that there is no evasion.

For the carrying out of this process thorough preparatory work is required, and international control machinery must be established to function as disarmament measures are put into force.

3. For obvious practical reasons disarmament must take place by stages, each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible; but no fixed timetable for the whole process can be laid down in advance.

4. Immediate detailed consideration should be given to:

(a) reductions of the armed forces and armaments of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and certain other States, together with the associated measures of control, to which the States represented on the 10-Nation Committee might agree at once, pending the negotiation of general disarmament measures affecting other States;

(b) the establishment of a ban, with appropriate controls, on the stationing of weapons in orbit or in outer space.

5. Preparations for the further measures of disarmament should also begin immediately. Special attention should be paid to the particular problems of agreeing upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to the transfer, under control, of fissionable material from military to peaceful uses, and to the control of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Consideration should be given, in addition, to interim measures to give States better protection against surprise attack and increase international confidence during the early stages of general disarmament.

6. The disarmament process must be started as soon as possible, in order to build up international confidence, and provide experience of the technical and practical problems of international disarmament and control.

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<sup>9</sup> Confidential.

**125. Memorandum of Discussion at the 441st Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, April 14, 1960.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.] Mr. Dillon said the meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Washington on Germany and on Control of Armaments had been very satisfactory. Agreement on Germany and on Berlin had been reached in approximately an hour. An agreement had been reached on a tactical approach to deter unilateral Soviet action against Berlin by an interim agreement or by an agreement to continue the Berlin discussions in some other forum after the conclusion of the Summit Meeting. As a move to counter the Soviet idea of separate peace treaties with East Germany and West Germany, the West has agreed to propose a plebiscite in East and West Germany on whether the Germans prefer the Western or the Soviet approach to a solution of the German problem. Mr. Dillon said this tactical approach would provide us with an excuse to emphasize self-determination. He added that we had switched our policy line from reunification to self-determination. These two terms meant about the same thing in practice but self-determination was more palatable in various countries such as India. The Vice President asked what question we would ask in connection with the plebiscite. Mr. Dillon said the Germans would be asked whether they preferred the Soviet or Western approach to the question of a peace treaty with Germany. Secretary Gates said there would be difficult problems of East-West agreement on the plebiscite referees. Mr. Dillon did not expect the Soviets to agree to the plebiscite proposal, which was largely a propaganda maneuver. The West Germans were enthusiastic about the plebiscite approach. Mr. Dillon reported that the West Foreign Ministers had also agreed that a proposal to reunify Berlin would be desirable, except that the French have some reservations on the ground that such a step might lead to a third German state. The Germans are opposed to any proposal for an all-German discussion of German questions because they fear the implication of recognition of the GDR.

Turning to Control of Armaments, Mr. Dillon reported that the Western Foreign Ministers had also agreed on what to do in the Disarmament Conference. The West would work out a concrete statement on armaments control to put forward at the Conference.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. has pre-

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting.

<sup>1</sup>For text of this statement as submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva on April 26, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 700–701.

pared a draft statement which emphasizes specific steps such as prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in space, prior notification for the launching of missiles, cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons, establishment of initial force level ceilings, the placing of certain armaments in internationally-controlled storage depots, and measures for protection against surprise attack. The Western Foreign Ministers agreed to refer the preparation of a concrete joint Western proposal on armaments control to their delegations at Geneva. Mr. Dillon believed the West was making some progress in the Geneva negotiations by emphasizing the necessity of taking concrete steps for the control of armaments in contrast to the Soviet insistence on talking only about general principles of disarmament. The world reaction to the Western proposals has been favorable because we appear to be ready to take the initial steps towards disarmament. Mr. Dillon added that all the NATO governments would be given an opportunity to express their views on this and related questions at the Istanbul meeting of the NATO Council on May 2, which would be preceded by another meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers on May 1.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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## 126. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/26

Washington, April 14, 1960, 11 a.m.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

#### SUBJECT

East-West Relations—Western Position at Summit

#### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd, United Kingdom  
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, France  
Secretary-General Spaak, NATO  
(Full list of delegations on last page)<sup>1</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/4-1460. Confidential. Drafted by Heyward Isham of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and approved in M on April 20, U on April 21, and S on April 22. The meeting was held at the Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The three Foreign Ministers under the Secretary's Chairmanship and with the participation of NATO Secretary-General Spaak discussed the East-West relations agenda item, proceeding from the questions the Working Group had posed for decision (FMW REF 4/107) on the basis of its interim report (FMW REF 4/101–109).<sup>2</sup>

In introducing this topic the Secretary voiced our concern that summit discussions on the East-West relations topic might be interpreted as having repercussions upon other states. We would have to make it clear to all that in discussion of this topic we had no intention of resolving problems directly affecting the foreign or internal policies of other nations not represented at the summit. The Secretary then turned to the individual sections of the report and questions thereupon.

*Soviet Proposals and Suggested Responses*<sup>3</sup>

The Secretary proposed and the Ministers agreed that the Working Group paper was acceptable and that the Group should be instructed to keep alert for evidence of additional proposals the Soviets might advance in this field.

*General Aspects of East-West Relations*<sup>4</sup>

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that the Working Group paper and draft declaration of principles was a good starting point. Secretary-General Spaak said that the North Atlantic Council considered this question of great importance and that the majority of the Council felt that it should be useful for the Western representatives at the summit to oppose their own conception of peaceful co-existence to Khrushchev's. To attempt to draw up a four-power document that would be subject to equivocal interpretation would be unwise. Some members favored the idea of seeking agreement on a set of rules of good international conduct. In any case, the Council thought that the summit negotiators should be allowed full freedom to determine how, when, or in what form this subject should be treated. Foreign Secretary Lloyd expressed his satisfaction with both the Working Group and the NATO draft declarations and suggested the Group be instructed to draw up an improved draft. Although it was premature to decide on just how the Western heads would make use of such a document, it would be useful to have some clear statement which was mutually acceptable.

The Secretary concurred with Mr. Lloyd's remarks. He inquired of Mr. Spaak whether he correctly understood the sentiment of the NAC as to the futility of attempting to reach any joint declaration of principles

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<sup>2</sup> Copies of these papers are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559. The report of the Working Group is printed as Document 115.

<sup>3</sup> The paper on this topic was FMW REF-4/109.

<sup>4</sup> The paper on this topic was FMW REF-4/101.

with the Soviets. M. Spaak confirmed that the opinion of the majority of the Council was that it would be extremely dangerous to propose a joint declaration. A statement of Western principles, however, would be valuable in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Soviet peaceful co-existence concept. Mr. Lloyd observed that if the Russians agreed to our draft it would thereby become a joint declaration. The Secretary questioned the likelihood of their agreeing to our position, to which Mr. Lloyd replied that the Soviets would be bound to want to work on the draft with a view to having a common declaration. We should be aware of this likelihood at the start.

M. Couve de Murville, expressing agreement, pointed out that the statement would of necessity become a conference document and thus be subject to discussion and attempted amendment by the Soviets. As to M. Spaak's previous remark, M. de Murville said that the ideas in the Western declaration would be in practice used wherever the Heads of Government thought fit, for example, in their explanations to Khrushchev of the falsities and limitations of peaceful co-existence. There was, however, no intention to propose a joint statement designed to gain Soviet concurrence.

The Secretary suggested that the Working Group be instructed to refine the Western declaration for further discussion at the Istanbul meeting with a view to having it ready for use as appropriate by the Western heads but not as a formal conference document. The Ministers agreed with this recommendation. Before leaving this subject Mr. Herter asked Mr. Lloyd whether there was a new UK draft on a code of international conduct. Mr. Lloyd answered in the negative.

#### *Restrictions on Arms Deliveries*<sup>5</sup>

M. Couve de Murville put forth the French belief that the idea of limiting arms deliveries came up automatically under the noninterference heading since it constituted one of the most characteristic and dangerous forms of interference in the affairs of third countries. He said the problem was increasingly becoming a general one, referring to the Middle East, Guinea, and more recently Latin America. He acknowledged that the detailed Working Group study had brought out very great difficulties, particularly that of distinguishing justified from unjustified arms shipments (e.g. to Africa) and of rejecting Soviet attempts to make any such agreement apply to Turkey and Iran (e.g. the proposals made when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited England in 1955).<sup>6</sup> Moreover a great many countries which did not themselves produce

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<sup>5</sup> The paper on this topic was FMW REF-4/102.

<sup>6</sup> For documentation of Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to the United Kingdom, April 18-27, 1956, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XXVII, p. 655.

certain arms, like Switzerland, would be placed in a difficult position if unable to purchase arms abroad. Notwithstanding the difficulties he still thought it would be useful to bring up the subject at the summit.

The Secretary stated that we saw more dangers than advantages in raising this subject, since we were in no position to make specific proposals in this field. Moreover, we could not seek to restrain other countries from delivering weapons, for example, Belgium to the Congo. He inquired of M. Spaak as to NAC feeling on this point. M. Spaak said that there had been no NAC discussion of this subject since the report had not been transmitted to the Council, but speaking personally, he saw great difficulties in any attempt to devise limitations on weapons deliveries that would apply to certain states and not to others. Mr. Lloyd observed that public opinion would expect this subject to come up and we must be prepared to deal with it. He mentioned the tripartite undertaking of 1950 to exercise restraint vis-à-vis arms deliveries to the Middle East.<sup>7</sup> He added that if it was known the subject would come up it was not a bad idea to bring it up yourself.

The Secretary questioned the likelihood of its being raised in any serious manner, since Khrushchev, when speaking of this subject on previous occasions, had always interposed conditions that were clearly unacceptable from the viewpoint of our alliances and our relations with other nations. M. Couve de Murville said that public opinion would be surprised if this topic were not raised. The Secretary rejoined that we feared that the whole balance of public opinion might be turned against us if this question were raised without having any prospect of agreement. Mr. Lloyd said that no decision needed to be made today, but that we should have a clear-cut idea of our position. The Secretary said we certainly must have a clear-cut idea if we intended to raise the subject ourselves, but that we saw no useful outcome from doing so from the public opinion viewpoint. Mr. Lloyd said that a formula on self restraint in arms deliveries was the only safe thing we could live with. M. Couve de Murville added that the main thing was to take a sound and reasonable position that could be explained to public opinion. Restraint worked in two ways and he saw no danger in the West bringing up this very natural question between countries that have major responsibilities affecting the maintenance of peace. The Secretary, reiterating his concern that raising this subject would lead to real dangers, called on Mr. Bohlen to speak.

Mr. Bohlen pointed out that it had not been possible to devise a position that would meet the criteria mentioned by M. Couve de Murville.

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<sup>7</sup> For text of this declaration, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, p. 2237.

Also, the U.S. had many more collective security and bilateral arrangements than the Soviet Union, and the Soviets would turn this proposal against us in order to limit our freedom of action at little cost to themselves. Their 1957 proposal for a Middle East arms embargo<sup>8</sup> broke down over their insistence on including Turkey and Iran. As regards public opinion, a proposal that would be designed clearly to restrict the Soviet area of activities while leaving ours unaffected would not be persuasive. Finally, African countries in need of arms would naturally look to obtaining them from their former metropole.

M. Couve de Murville observed that this discussion raised the question of the very nature of the Summit Conference. There would be no time at the summit to go into great detail on any subject; in any case he envisioned no commitment which would violate the engagements of the U.S. to the defense of the free world countries; and finally it was altogether normal that the question of arms deliveries should arise when the Cold War was discussed. Indeed, the summit would not be complete if there were no mention of arms deliveries, in view of the major impact these have on international relations. M. Spaak pointed out the danger of other countries (e.g. Czechoslovakia) entering to provide substitute sources of weapons whenever Western powers refrained. He also commented that Turkey would protest if NATO were not included in any arrangements made of this kind. The Secretary said he doubted the usefulness of returning this question to the Working Group since it had been thoroughly canvassed, and suggested it be reserved for determination by the Heads of Government. Mr. Lloyd queried whether there was disagreement on the formula, presented in paragraph 11 of the Working Group paper.<sup>9</sup> Although the Working Group had been unable to reach agreement on the desirability of raising this subject, he urged that if the Western heads were forced to do so, the best possible formula would be needed. The Secretary said he saw no harm in this approach. Mr. Lloyd said the language could be made clearer to cover Mr. Spaak's point.

The Secretary noted that the role of purveying arms throughout the world was not an agreeable one, but that we had been forced into it by the security situation of the free world. He agreed with Mr. Bohlen that raising the question would open up a field in which the Soviets would have a great advantage. He referred to our support of regional arms limitations agreements under the OAS and stated that the U.S. would be prepared to cooperate with African States if they agreed among themselves to avoid uncontrolled arms competition.

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<sup>8</sup> For text of this proposal, see *ibid.*, *Current Documents*, 1957, pp. 761-762.

<sup>9</sup> Paragraph 11 of FMW REF-4/102 suggested a draft declaration on the supply of arms to local hot spots.



Mr. Lloyd suggested that the Working Group be instructed, first to review the formulation over the undertaking of self restraint in arms deliveries and, second, to develop the idea of the Four Powers declaring their readiness to cooperate with any regional arms control schemes that might be worked out. The Secretary agreed. Mr. Lloyd proposed that the Ministers suspend judgment on this question and reserve it for consideration by the Western Heads, but reiterated his view that we should be prepared with the best defensive position if the question is raised. The Secretary agreed, stating that in this case the subject should be met head on.

*Non-Interference*<sup>10</sup>

The Secretary reviewed the limited success of past efforts to define non-interference given the Soviet Government's refusal to be bound by actions of the Communist Party. M. Spaak, noting again that the Council had not seen the working paper on this subject because of insufficient agreement in the Working Group, said that NAC opinion was divided and not all countries had spoken. Among those who favored seeking some no-interference agreement were Italy and Greece, while Denmark and Norway entirely disagreed and considered dangerous and illusory any statement on this subject to which the Soviet Government would be a party. M. Couve de Murville observed that only third countries were envisioned under this subject and that it was natural for each country to think in terms of its own Communist Party problem. He admitted that he did not particularly recommend the approach set forth in paragraph 6a. of the working paper and was prepared to leave it aside.<sup>11</sup> Mr. Lloyd said he thought it should be included in the statement of principles. M. Couve de Murville said that it was already in both drafts.

*Aid to Less Developed Countries*<sup>12</sup>

M. Spaak reported that the NAC was not agreed on the advisability of proposing joint assistance to the less developed countries. Several countries expressed forceful views in opposition to this idea with only Norway advocating a positive initiative in this field. The majority thought there was little chance the Soviets would accept this form of cooperation, that there were many dangers involved, but that if there was a desire for increased collaboration it should take place through the UN specialized agencies or possibly in terms of a very limited and precise project.

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<sup>10</sup> The paper on this topic was FMW REF-4/102.

<sup>11</sup> Paragraph 6a of FMW REF-4/102 presented a draft declaration by the Four Powers for mutual consultations when crises developed in various areas of the world.

<sup>12</sup> The paper on this topic was FMW REF-4/105.

Mr. Dillon summarized the U.S. position opposing an initiative on this subject at the Summit in view of (A) the continued conflict of Soviet political purposes with our own throughout the world, (B) the possibility of affording new openings for the extension of Soviet influence to areas from which they are now excluded, (C) the implication that Soviet aid programs were being given a stamp of approval on an equal basis with our own and, (D) the ease with which the Soviets could reject this initiative in view of past denunciations over cooperating with imperialist aid programs designed to perpetuate colonial exploitation. He said that the U.S. agreed with the Working Group's counter proposals in case this subject were raised, noted that Khrushchev also had referred to channeling savings effected by a disarmament agreement to the less developed nations, and referred to the debate on the proposed UN agency SUNFED, to which we had objected for reasons quite apart from those connected with Soviet aid programs.

M. Couve de Murville pointed out that this matter raised the same question as that posed by the proposed arms restriction agreement. At the summit particular cases should be studied and, like arms deliveries to sensitive areas, this question was one of the forms of the Cold War which public opinion would expect to be raised. While recognizing the political, practical and psychological dangers involved, he thought it nevertheless important to demonstrate our ability to effect rational cooperation with the USSR. He acknowledged, however, that the U.S. had a special position since its aid effort was the greatest, just as its Military Assistance Programs were the most extensive in the Alliance. This question could be reserved for the Chiefs of State to decide. In any event, no great consequence either for good or for bad could follow from raising this subject. He added that in recent months Soviet delegations in international conferences (ECOSOC and UNESCO particularly) had been stressing the savings that might be applied to the less developed countries if a disarmament agreement were reached. He suggested consultations so that the Western powers would adopt a similar position in these various bodies to counter the Soviet propaganda move. The Secretary agreed that this was a good suggestion and added that all the major governments had committed themselves to the same principle.

#### *Trade and Economic Questions*<sup>13</sup>

M. Couve de Murville said that this was essentially a bilateral question, although some reference to it should be made in the communiqué. The Secretary observed that U.S. policy was limited by congressional legislation in this field and our part in any general declaration on commerce would be limited by legal inhibitions on certain trans-

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<sup>13</sup> The paper on this topic was FMW REF-4/104.

actions. Mr. Dillon interposed that the extension of credits was to be kept particularly in mind. M. Couve de Murville noted that the French had a trade agreement with the USSR as did the U.K. and all contingencies would need to be covered in any communiqué statement. The Ministers agreed that the Working Group might consider appropriate language for this communiqué.

*Cultural Exchanges and Freedom of Information*<sup>14</sup>

The Ministers agreed that the Working Group should review its draft of a proposed communiqué statement.

*NATO Consultation*

M. Spaak brought up the question of reports of these meetings being made available to NATO before the Istanbul meeting if possible. The Secretary stated that agreed papers on Berlin and Germany were to be distributed to the NAC early next week. M. Spaak expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement. The Secretary said that we had prepared a think piece on what we hoped to achieve from the Summit, and would distribute it shortly to the French and British for consideration as a basis for reporting to the Istanbul meeting.<sup>15</sup> Mr. Lloyd said that Ormsby-Gore would be going to Paris on April 26 to report on disarmament to the NAC. The Secretary said that Mr. Eaton would be going to Istanbul.

There was discussion on the text of a press statement with Mr. Lloyd and M. de Murville advocating a listing of the subheadings discussed under East-West relations, and the Secretary opposing this on the grounds that press curiosity would immediately be aroused and disagreements might come more quickly into public view. The communiqué was redrafted after mutual consultation.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> The paper on this topic was FMW REF-4/103.

<sup>15</sup> Transmitted to the British, French, and West Germans on April 22; see Document 133.

<sup>16</sup> For text of the communiqué, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 401.

## 127. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 15, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Summit Procedures

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State

M. Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister

M. Alphand, French Ambassador

Mr. Foy Kohler, Assistant Secretary

At the close of his conversation with the Secretary today the French Foreign Minister brought up the subject which had been previously discussed on a tripartite basis with respect to the kind of meetings which might take place at the Summit and the President's intentions as regards his projected letter to Soviet Chairman Khrushchev on this subject.

The Secretary replied that he had talked with the President about this matter.<sup>1</sup> The President had indicated that he would do nothing about any communication with Chairman Khrushchev on Summit procedures until after he had talked with President de Gaulle. After that the President would probably want President de Gaulle to handle any procedural communications with Khrushchev. M. Couve de Murville, after indicating his satisfaction at the Secretary's statement, commented that it was clear that President de Gaulle wanted to have most of the meetings strictly limited to the four Heads of Government and interpreters. He realized that Selwyn Lloyd did not want this. However he thought that the meetings would probably start off this way and then if changes were indicated they could be made at any time.

The Secretary indicated his agreement. He then went on to say that while the President would not write Mr. Khrushchev on procedures he might send him a letter regarding his plans to visit Lisbon on May 23, saying that if the conference is still continuing he would ask the Vice President to replace him in Paris during the final phases.<sup>2</sup> This the Secretary pointed out related only to the President's own plans.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/4-1560. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler and approved in S on April 20. A memorandum of the conversation on atomic cooperation is printed in vol. VII, Part 2, Document 164.

<sup>1</sup> Herter sent the President a memorandum on April 14 suggesting that de Gaulle write the letter to Khrushchev. At the bottom of the memorandum the President wrote that he agreed with the suggestion. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series) No record of a telephone conversation with the President, who was in Augusta, Georgia, has been found.

<sup>2</sup> The letter was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 2102, April 16, for delivery to Khrushchev. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

The Foreign Minister agreed to this but said he hoped we would not announce the Lisbon visit in such a way as to suggest that we were setting a terminal date to the conference. He went on to ask whether he and the Secretary would be expected to accompany the Chiefs of State to Gettysburg during President de Gaulle's forthcoming visit. The Secretary replied that we probably would not know the answer until the last minute though probably the Foreign Ministers would not go up to Gettysburg since the President liked to take his guests up there on a personal basis.

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## 128. Letter From Secretary of Defense Gates to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, April 15, 1960.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: At a recent meeting of the Quadripartite Germany-Berlin Working Group, the question of the size of the Allied garrison forces in Berlin was raised. In order to provide the Department of State with current views on this subject, the JCS were asked to re-examine their previous views and recommendations on this subject (JCSM-264-59, 8 July 1959), which had been transmitted to you by letter on 15 July 1959.<sup>1</sup> As a result of this re-examination, which was completed on 25 March 1960, the JCS have concluded that the opinions and recommendations set forth in JCSM-264-59 remain valid.<sup>2</sup>

I agree with this reaffirmation of the JCS, and join with them in stating that I perceive no fundamental change in the threat to the freedom and safety of Berlin. Recent developments, including statements of Mr. Khrushchev, do not indicate any modification of the long-term objectives of the Soviet Union with respect to Germany and Berlin, nor do they foreshadow any lessening of Communist control in East Germany. Under such circumstances a reduction in the size of the Berlin garrison would lessen, perhaps critically, the capability of the Allied forces to

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1560. Secret. Attached to the source text were a note to EUR dated April 19, asking that it draft a reply, and the reply dated April 25, which stated the views expressed by Gates would be taken into account during the forthcoming discussions on Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 428. The cover letter was actually dated July 13.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 103.

cope with Communist inspired civil disturbances including the ability to protect U.S. personnel and their dependents. Such a reduction would also symbolize a decrease in the interest of the Western Powers in Berlin and could lead to an erosion of their already insecure position.

I strongly believe that the U.S. and Allied forces in Berlin should be maintained at their present strengths, which represent a minimum balance of force to maintain our objectives there.

Sincerely yours,

**Thomas S. Gates**

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**129. Message From the British Ambassador (Caccia) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, April 19, 1960.

DEAR CHRIS: Before the Foreign Secretary had received from the United States Embassy in London your letter of the 17th April<sup>1</sup> he had sent me a message asking me to put to you orally the following points about procedure at the Summit. These points had arisen as a result of a discussion between himself and the Prime Minister of the draft which had been shown to us in Washington last week. I should hope to have an opportunity of seeing you as soon as convenient, but I think that in the meantime you may find it useful if I send you this summary in writing.

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have four main points. First, they are convinced that the paramount consideration should be to avoid a repetition of the last Geneva Summit Conference when there were large numbers of people present at almost all the meetings, and the four Heads of Governments spent their time making prepared speeches for public consumption.

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Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Personal and Secret. The source text bears Herter's initials. On a memorandum to Goodpaster from Calhoun, April 19, which transmitted another copy of the message, President Eisenhower wrote: "To Sec State, This is in general what I believe should be done. DE".

<sup>1</sup> No letter dated April 17 has been found; however, in an undated letter transmitted in telegram 7843 to London, April 18, Herter informed Lloyd that summit procedures would be discussed at the highest level in Washington over the coming weekend. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA/4-1860)

Secondly, while detailed negotiation should be done by the Foreign Ministers and advisers, in the last resort agreements will probably only be brought to finality by the Heads of Governments themselves. Consequently, the meetings of Heads of Governments may not in practice be confined to discussion. They may also have to do some negotiation at some stage.

Thirdly, they think that the normal pattern of meetings should be one in the morning of three or four a side (Heads of Governments, Foreign Ministers and one or two notetakers each). Such meetings could then be followed by meetings of Foreign Ministers or advisers, and the final decisions might be made at meetings of Heads of Governments only, if this seems appropriate. The advantage of this procedure will be:—

(a) It would avoid the waste of time in the Heads of Governments reporting to the Foreign Ministers about what has happened in their restricted meetings.

(b) More important, it would mean that the Foreign Ministers would know what has actually happened between the Heads of Governments. It would be very difficult for the Foreign Ministers to do their own work and guide the meetings of advisers without this knowledge. Even if a verbatim note is taken of the private meetings of Heads of Governments, there is always in practice a twenty-four hour lag before it is duplicated, checked and circulated.

(c) It would mean that the Foreign Ministers had a clear guidance for their work and knew exactly what was in the minds of the Heads of Governments, whilst leaving plenty of time each day for informal meetings between the Heads of Governments themselves.

Fourthly, they believe that it really will be essential to have some form of central interpretation. Whispering is inconvenient and may lead to misunderstanding. By the same token it will also be necessary to be sure that when the four Heads of Governments meet alone there is some form of record.

If agreement can be reached between us and with the French on these points we would favor sending a letter to Khrushchev in advance. So far as we are concerned it would be equally agreeable if such a letter were to come either from the President from whom we believe the idea originated, or from General de Gaulle as representative of the host Government on this occasion. Such a letter might enable us to get the Russians to agree in advance not to have large propaganda sessions with which Khrushchev is familiar from his last experience at Geneva, and this we believe would be a real advantage.

Yours sincerely,

**Harold Caccia**

**130. Editorial Note**

On April 20, Under Secretary of State Dillon addressed the AFL-CIO Conference on World Affairs in New York on the issue of American foreign policy. He explained the U.S. position on Germany and Berlin and reiterated that the United States would not negotiate under duress. For text of his address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1960, pages 723-729.

On April 21, Secretary of State Herter reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western preparations for the summit meeting. He reviewed the discussions of the three working groups (Germany and Berlin, disarmament, and East-West relations), speculated on the Soviet position and tactics, and indicated the Western position on Berlin. For text of his report and related questions raised by the committee, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, volume XII (Washington, 1982), pages 225-243.

Two days later, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Andrew H. Berding addressed a district conference of Rotary International at Atlantic City, New Jersey, on the U.S. approach to a summit meeting. In developing the U.S. position, he stressed the differences between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on the questions of disarmament, Germany including Berlin, and East-West relations. For text of his address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1960, pages 729-734.

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**131. Telegram 689 From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State**

Ottawa, April 21, 1960, 4 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/4-2160. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]



**132. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin)**

Washington, April 21, 1960.

DEAR JACK: As you know, it is now planned to discuss the concept of an inspection zone in Central Europe in the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin. The Department of State, after consultation with the German, British, and French Governments, proceeded to request the views of General Norstad on past European zonal proposals and on any views of his own as to an acceptable proposal for inspection in the European area.

We have now received General Norstad's views, a copy of which is attached. The Department of State, although not necessarily subscribing to all the specifics in General Norstad's proposal, sees considerable merit in his ideas. We further feel that it would be desirable to be in a position to present a proposal along these lines at the forthcoming Summit meeting.

As a first step toward obtaining the agreement of our Allies to this, we are submitting General Norstad's views to the Four-Power Working Group here in Washington. In presenting his views, we will explain that the United States Government has no fixed ideas or conclusions on the specifics of the proposals but that we believe a proposal along the general lines suggested by General Norstad is desirable and merits consideration for use at the Summit. We will suggest that the matter be further discussed at the Four Foreign Ministers' meeting in Istanbul, May 1. Depending on progress in these Four-Power discussions, we also have in mind proceeding as promptly as possible to consultation on a broader basis with the other NATO powers.

In preparation for these further discussions of the proposal, it is desirable that we now develop a United States Government position on General Norstad's views. It would therefore be appreciated if we could receive the views of the Department of Defense on General Norstad's proposals. It is hoped that these views can be provided as promptly as possible.

Sincerely yours,

**Livie**

[Enclosure]<sup>1</sup>

### GENERAL NORSTAD'S VIEWS ON A EUROPEAN INSPECTION ZONE PROPOSAL

The various proposals of the past decade for establishing an internationally controlled zone in Europe have each contained features which made them unacceptable to the West, at least from the military standpoint. For example, the Eden plan of 1955<sup>2</sup> envisaged a demilitarized zone which was too narrow to be of practical value in the rapidly moving situations of modern warfare. Furthermore, originally it would have used the boundary between East and West Germany as a line of departure, an aspect of the plan which appeared to sanction a divided Germany and was clearly unsatisfactory. The Rapacki Plan, in its 1958 modification, advocated a limited denuclearized zone in Central Europe which would essentially have deprived the NATO nations of their nuclear shield while leaving the massive forces of the Soviets poised within striking distance of Western Europe. At best it was dependent on confidence that the Soviets would carry out the terms of an agreement which could not be controlled or enforced. As for the recent Soviet disarmament proposals, it is not necessary to cite their ambiguity and impracticability.

The Western Nations are searching for and require measures which will maintain and guarantee security while reducing dangerous tensions. It was to this end that the 1957 Disarmament Conference in London<sup>3</sup> discussed the establishment of an inspection and control system in various areas involving Europe, the Soviet Union, North America and the Arctic. From the military point of view, this was a satisfactory approach to the problem of security, and the present suggestions on control and inspection in the European area are related to the general discussions which took place at that time.

The basic thoughts on this subject were outlined to the NAC in June, 1957, and, since that time, a zonal system of military inspection and control focusing on Central Europe has been under study at SHAPE. The points hereafter outlined derive from this study. Six criteria were established as essential to any plan of this nature to be put forward by the West at this time:

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<sup>1</sup> Secret. Transmitted from Paris in Polto 4800, April 15. (*Ibid.*, 600.00121/4-1560) A copy of these views was given to the British, French, and West Germans at a meeting of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin on April 21.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the Eden Plan, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. V, p. 291, footnote 4, and p. 301.

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the 1957 London Disarmament Conference, see *ibid.*, vol. XX, pp. 664 ff.

1. It should strike public opinion in the West and central countries as an easily understandable and workable first step towards easing of tensions;

2. It should not prejudice adversely existing Western positions on Germany, Berlin or disarmament;

3. At same time, it should not be wholly dependent upon acceptance of broader Western objectives by the Soviets;

4. It should deliberately be framed to avoid any provisions requiring a change in the basic power balance between the West and the USSR at this stage;

5. It should serve a useful purpose by itself and abate tensions without further steps;

6. If found workable in practice over a period of time, it could lay the groundwork for consideration in the future of other proposals bearing on European security.

Following immediately are the main features and operational elements recommended for a control and inspection system in Europe:

A. Mobile ground inspection in as large an area as possible between the Atlantic and the Urals, but to include as an irreducible minimum the two Germanys, Poland, Czechoslovakia, BENELUX, and at least a part of Denmark, or the equivalent.

B. Aerial inspection over an area not less than that covered by ground inspection.

C. Overlapping radar stations, one line to be maintained by West on Eastern perimeter of inspection and vice versa.

D. Scope of Inspection:

(1) Exchange of information on types and location of existing and firmly programmed forces.

(2) Verification of this information.

(3) Advance exchange of information as to movements.

(4) Periodic reports by mobile teams on grounds and from aerial reconnaissance.

(5) Each side to have its own line of communications.

(6) Teams to have full access to areas of military significance but no right of entry into private buildings.

(7) No technical inspections of equipment or access to nuclear storage depots themselves.

E. Size of inspection group:

(1) Not to exceed 3,000 inspectors (total both East and West), including staff.

(2) This would not include personnel for radar installations or aerial reconnaissance.

F. Nature of Inspection Teams:

(1) Mixed East/West teams operating throughout entire inspection area (no line down the middle of Germany).

(2) Reports to their military superiors and possibility to appropriate UN organ (need to avoid any recognition of Warsaw Pact or East German regime).

*Conclusions:*

1. Danger of surprise surface attack should be greatly reduced if not eliminated.
2. Some increased security against surprise air attack would be achieved.
3. No surrender by NATO of its assets in maintaining deterrent and protecting Western Europe.
4. Soviet knowledge of NATO deployments would not constitute significant loss.
5. Inclusion of countries other than Western Germany, plus the device of mixed teams, would help make clear that plan involves no abandonment of goal of German unity.
6. Successful operation of this system could also lead to further steps in direction of effective control and reduction of armament.

This rough outline obviously offers wide latitude for change; yet, the basic military purpose of the proposal should not be compromised. The danger of a surprise attack from within the zone subjected to inspection must be reduced substantially. It is recognized that a control and inspection system operating in the minimum zone indicated would not provide protection against surprise by air weapons launched from areas outside the zone. This fact does not invalidate the merit of the system proposed, which undertakes to provide no more and no less than a reduction of the chance of surprise attack from the zone agreed upon. If such a system should prove itself, it is not unrealistic to hope that it would become the nucleus of broader action to mitigate even greater dangers.

133. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

OUR SUMMIT PURPOSES

Introduction

1. *Need to Define Our Purposes.*

We have a fairly good idea of what the Soviets hope to obtain from the May meeting. We should be equally clear as to our own aims—over and above the negative one of frustrating Soviet purposes. *It is now time to mature our own Summit philosophy.*

2. *Danger of Leaks.*

As we do so, we should redouble efforts to *prevent leaks*. Leaks prejudice diplomacy's changes and hence increase the risk of conflict.

3. *Raising Our Sights.*

We must overcome any tendency to look on the Summit as something of a chore, whose maximum result would be to leave us no worse off than we were before.

This is too modest an aim and would be too negative a result for such an important international meeting.

We should look upon the coming talks with the Soviets as a chance to achieve, or at least to champion, *four affirmative purposes.*

Our First Purpose:

A Small Beginning Toward Practical Controlled Disarmament

4. *Specific Steps.*

We should press for Summit progress toward controlling the arms race. We should propose *limited measures, which would reduce the risk of war by miscalculation.* Our proposals for prior notification of launchings of space vehicles and for safeguards against surprise attack are examples of such limited measures. These measures would not radically alter the military situation, but they could help to avert an unwanted conflict, while we seek more extensive disarmament.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/4–2260. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. On April 21, Smith sent a copy of this paper to Herter for transmission to the President. On the following day, Herter transmitted copies of the paper to Couve de Murville, Lloyd, Brentano, and General de Gaulle under cover of a brief note explaining that it was the paper he had mentioned at the meeting on April 14 (see Document 126) and that it had been read by the President.

5. *General Disarmament.*

The importance of any Summit discussion of *general disarmament*, on the other hand, will probably be its effect on world opinion. With this in mind, we should emphasize that progress toward general disarmament will have to go hand in hand with *progress toward open societies*. While recognizing that this is for the Soviet Union to decide, we should stress that support of closed societies hinders the achievement of disarmament.

Our Second Purpose:  
Deterring Communist Action Against Berlin and  
Paving the Way for an Eventual Acceptable Solution

6. *The End in View.*

Our second major purpose at the Summit should be to seek an arrangement—explicit or tacit—to *preserve the existing situation in Berlin for a period of time*. During this period we could try to progress toward a more formal and definitive solution regarding Berlin.

7. *The Means.*

To this end, we might seek either *a temporary agreement or very general Summit directive to a subordinate group, which would negotiate and report back to Heads of Government*. In this latter case, *reciprocal declarations* to avoid provocative actions, e.g., interference with unhindered communication to Berlin, might also be exchanged at the Summit, in an effort to reduce tensions over Berlin during the period of negotiation that would then lie ahead, *without our trying to work out a formal agreement*, with all the attendant semantic and legal difficulties.

8. *Deterrent.*

Success in this effort to “de-fuse” Berlin would only be possible if we made clear the grave view that we would take of any Communist action which threatened our access and purported to destroy our rights. We should emphasize, at least privately to Khrushchev, that any such action would seriously *prejudice prospects for détente and for early disarmament*. The Soviets seem to set some store on pushing for détente and on reducing their military burdens. They might prefer to have relaxation of tensions with progress on arms control than to have their own way over Berlin—if we made clear at a Summit that they could not have both.

Our Third Purpose:  
An Increase in the Confidence and Cohesion of the Western Alliance

9. *Our Goal.*

The Communists traditionally use any international encounter to air their confidence in the ultimate triumph of their system. If they run

true to form at the Summit we should *go them one better*. We have good reason to do so.

10. *Military Strength.*

*Our position is strong in the military field.* Our strategic deterrent is highly effective, and will remain so. The USSR, in spite of its missile boasts and accomplishments, is quite conscious of the restraint that this strength imposes on its aggressive designs.

11. *Non-Military Strength.*

Freedom's priority claim to the future in *non-military competition* was never so clear as during President Eisenhower's recent journeys through Asia and Latin America.<sup>1</sup> The peoples of these areas just do not want totalitarianism; they know that their independence will die if the Free World does not thrive. Our countries can rightly enter the Summit with confidence that our three spokesmen of the free world represent the tide of history.

12. *Our Posture.*

We should use the Summit to *manifest that confidence*—to Khrushchev, to our own peoples, and to the world as a whole.

If the Soviets initiate a propaganda exchange at the Summit, we should stress our view that the future belongs to governments and ideologies firmly based on the principle of *self-determination*.

We should make clear that we *welcome the intensified peaceful competition* with Communism which lies ahead.

We should call on free peoples everywhere to mount the *increased effort* that this competition will require.

If we can use the Summit thus to *mobilize the moral and physical energies of the free world* for the coming serious economic and ideological struggle, this alone will have made the Summit worthwhile.

Our Fourth Purpose:  
Clarification of Our Posture Toward the  
Communist Bloc in a Period of Apparent "Thaw"

13. *Need for Clarity.*

We need to make clear at the Summit that the Western Powers are in deadly earnest, despite the moral difference between their system and that of the Soviets, in their desire to find *ways of controlling the risk of nuclear war*. We also need to make clear that this *moral difference* is not being narrowed in any way by the Summit dialogue.

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<sup>1</sup> The first trip took place December 4–22, and the second February 23–March 3, 1960.

#### 14. *Our Behavior.*

Our behavior should thus reflect the fact that we have come to the Summit in a businesslike attempt to *reduce the risk of war*—not to confuse our peoples by *meaningless gestures*. We want to make progress—on disarmament and on Berlin—which would make the forthcoming period of struggle a somewhat safer time for mankind. We want to maintain a friendly and courteous mien in seeking such progress; we do not want to gloss over the absence of progress or the difference between freedom and totalitarianism.

### Conclusion

#### 15. *Affirmative Purposes.*

There are thus *four affirmative purposes* that we should set for ourselves at the Summit:

(1) Forward movement toward controlling the risks of the arms race;

(2) “De-fusing” Berlin;

(3) Enhancing *free world confidence* and cohesion;

(4) Clarifying our countries’ *posture toward the Bloc* in a period of apparent “thaw”.

#### 16. *Affirmative Stance.*

We should make clear, starting right now and through the Summit, that *we do have these affirmative purposes* and that we welcome the Summit as an opportunity to prosecute them. We should not give the impression that the Summit is something that the Soviets invented or that we have been dragged into against our will. We should be ready to take the initiative, *in proposing that another Summit be held*, to receive the Berlin negotiating group’s report if such a group is set up—or earlier if a threat to the peace or an opportunity for significant progress arises.

#### 17. *Outcome.*

If we can gear our actions at the Summit to these affirmative purposes, we will—while effectively seeking to reduce the risk of war—enhance *worldwide respect for the Western alliance*: its firmness, its clarity of purpose and its claim to the future. This kind of *moral victory* should help us to strengthen peace and get on with free men’s efforts to remain free, whether or not we succeed in reaching agreement with the USSR.

#### 18. *Execution.*

*Our final preparations for the meeting should reflect these purposes* and our representatives should concert on pre-Summit public information, as well as on Summit style and substance, with this in mind.



**134. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

Berlin, April 22, 1960, 7 p.m.

817. Paris for Embassy, USRO, CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Morale of West Berlin's political leadership has not noticeably fluctuated during past three months. It reached what was probably lowest point since Nov 1958 earlier this year in connection with public disagreement between leading figures of West as to whether Western Geneva offers were to be considered as still valid at summit. International developments since then (especially Apr 13 Foreign Ministers' meeting<sup>1</sup>) have restored attitude approaching cautious optimism, without however alleviating lingering doubts as to what future may hold for city. Polemical leadership continues, as in past, to express greater degree of confidence in their public statements than they evidence in their private remarks.

Sense of uncertainty of West Berlin leaders concerning fate of Berlin is not caused by apprehensions that West has any intention of going back on its fundamental pledge to maintain freedom of West Berlin, but by misgivings about possible slippage in Western position in protracted negotiations with Sovs. West Berlin leaders believe that accommodation to Sov point of view on question of allied rights or FedRep West Berlin relations could impair—in the long run if not immediately—city's political and economic welfare.

In absence of any foreseeable possibility of restoring its position as German capital, Berlin's future now seen in terms of an industrial, cultural and intellectual center, with a mission of preventing consolidation of Communist control in East Germany. Possible imposition of curbs on freedom of expression in Berlin is therefore regarded with particular sensitivity as likely to remove an important aspect of city's *raison d'être* and thus leading to eventual intellectual and political stagnation and decay.

Although outwardly economic behavior of population shows few if any signs of lack of confidence and West Berlin's prosperity continues at post war record levels, there is continuing pervasive concern, especially among wealthier residents of West Berlin. The "business as usual" attitude of managerial and entrepreneurial groups is based on intangible factors of sentiment and spirit and on tangible advantages of busi-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/4-2260. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 123.

ness profit but there is no doubt they still [*will?*] carefully evaluate results of summit in future planning.

Broad public is adopting generally confident wait-and-see attitude toward summit. Confidence is especially high among labor groups which show no signs of modifying their uncompromising opposition to Soviet zone "socialism". However, all strata of population appear carefully to scrutinize all Western moves. Actions on part of Allies giving impression that fundamental re-examination of Western commitment to Berlin is in offing, or even failure to react forthrightly to Sov-GDR moves against Berlin, would very likely substantially affect general morale picture.

SovZone morale is subject of immediately following telegram.<sup>2</sup>

Detailed evaluation of West Berlin and SovZone morale (our despatches 637 and 654)<sup>3</sup> being pouched.

Lightner

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<sup>2</sup> Document 292.

<sup>3</sup> Despatch 637, April 16, reported on the GDR in the pre-summit period (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-1660); despatch 654, April 22, reported on West Berlin morale on the eve of the summit (*ibid.*, 396.1-PA/4-2260).

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### 135. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, April 23, 1960, 1 p.m.

2613. During courtesy call on Gromyko to which I took Bohlen<sup>1</sup> former made following points in ensuing discussion on forthcoming summit.

1) Disarmament. He expressed Soviet "disappointment" at lack of progress in 10-nation Geneva talks but expressed some optimism on test ban discussions. In regard to disarmament discussions at summit he

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/4-2360. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Bohlen, who arrived on April 23, was visiting Moscow as the guest of Ambassador Thompson.

expressed hope that any decisions reached there would not be merely vague in character and susceptible of different interpretation but would be “concrete” and capable of being translated into action.

2) Somewhat longer discussion occurred re Germany and Berlin with Gromyko repeating all familiar Soviet positions in regard to peace treaty and need to do away with “occupation regime” in West Berlin. Gromyko was quite frank in saying Soviet aim was removal Western forces from Berlin asserting at same time Soviet and East German willingness give any necessary “guarantees” for preservation of existing social, economic and political structure in Western Berlin. During discussion Bohlen told Gromyko as personal view that he saw little possibility of any agreement at summit on this subject if Soviet position remained as stated by Gromyko. Gromyko in closing made one reference to possibility of interim agreement for West Berlin without going into any details.

Although positions in regard to Germany and Berlin were frankly stated and firmly maintained conversation was entirely calm and objective with no attempt by Gromyko to impute US motives.

Thompson

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### 136. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Camp David, April 24, 1960.

#### OTHERS PRESENT

General de Gaulle, Mr. Claude Lebel, Lt. Colonel Vernon Walters

The President opened the conversation by asking General de Gaulle whether he had had an opportunity to read the papers<sup>1</sup> which

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1631. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters.

<sup>1</sup> President de Gaulle was on a State visit to the United States April 22–29. At their first meeting on April 22, Eisenhower handed him three papers: the first, entitled “United States Strategic Force,” dated March 21, and the third, entitled “Summit Procedures,” undated, are *ibid.* The second paper is printed as Document 133. For additional documentation on de Gaulle’s visit, including a memorandum of the conversation of April 22, see vol. VII, Part 2, Documents 165 ff.

the President had given him on the day of his arrival. General de Gaulle said that he had read the papers. With regard to the first one relating to the deterrent capabilities of the United States, he was taking note of it. With regard to the one on the summit procedures, he had read it and was in agreement with it and would write the letter to Khrushchev and set forth the summit procedures as the Western powers understood them. His thought was that on the opening day they might hold a short session of about an hour to agree on general principles (Chiefs of Government session). Thereafter on every day they would meet every morning with Ministers and Ambassadors and leave the afternoons free for bilateral contact. On Monday, the final day, a major session could be held with all of the delegations present.

The President said that he felt we should not put a final date on the conference before it starts, but that he would have no objection to having such a final session on the last day of the conference, whenever that might be. General de Gaulle said that that was what he meant; he did not mean Monday to be the last day necessarily. He did believe, however, that the President had some commitment in Portugal and also could not remain outside of the United States for a great length of time. The President said that he had promised to go to Portugal as he had not been there since 1951. The Portuguese were a little touchy because he had been to Spain last December<sup>2</sup> and had spent the night there, so he had agreed to go to Portugal, but if it were necessary he could return to Paris from Lisbon, and return directly to the United States from Paris if the summit meeting lasted a few days more. If he had to return to the United States because of pressing government business, Mr. Nixon might come over and head the United States delegation.

General de Gaulle said that this would be agreeable to him but, as the President knew, Mr. Khrushchev did not like Mr. Nixon. The President said that this might not be bad. When Mr. Nixon had gone to Russia,<sup>3</sup> the President had told him to take his cue from the Russians. If they were courteous he should be equally courteous, and if they were sharp to behave in like manner. When Mr. Khrushchev had talked roughly, Mr. Nixon had talked back to him and Mr. Khrushchev had not liked this. The President explained that Mr. Nixon was so close and so loyal he could send him over to the summit if he himself had to return. The President said that he had also mentioned this possibility to Mr. Khrushchev in a letter.<sup>4</sup> The Vice President had acquired extraordinary experience

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<sup>2</sup> Regarding the President's visit to Spain December 21–22, 1959, see *ibid.*, Document 318.

<sup>3</sup> Vice President Nixon visited the Soviet Union July 23–August 2, 1959. See vol. VIII, Document 481.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 127.

during the past eight years and the President had made every effort to ensure that he was fully aware of all that was going on and able to assume any responsibility if called upon to do so.

The President then asked General de Gaulle if he had read the “think” paper he had given him, and General de Gaulle said that he had. On Berlin and Germany, General de Gaulle felt we should say that this should be left aside for the time being (at the summit). We should tell Khrushchev that the settlement of these problems required a more relaxed atmosphere, and we should first endeavor to see what could be done in other areas. With regard to cultural, touristic, student and other exchanges, he said that he felt we should offer to increase these and asked whether the President would have any difficulty in accepting larger numbers of Russians in the United States. The President replied that he would not have any difficulty in so doing, and we could well propose to the Soviets to double whatever the present figures were, or even triple. The advantage of this was that if the numbers exchanged were very small, it was easy for the Russians to send only a few well indoctrinated party members, but if the numbers were large, this was much more difficult for them. General de Gaulle said that he entirely agreed with this and that we could look into making some such proposal, and also give a hint that if all went well with such a program we might think about greater trade.

With regard to disarmament, General de Gaulle wondered how we might take this up with the Russians. The President said that the basis for any sound disarmament program must be effective mutual inspection. His feeling was that we might propose some area, perhaps Germany east of the Rhine, Holland and Denmark on our side and perhaps other areas in Turkey or Iran so as not to put the finger too much on Central Europe, and then try and see whether we could effectively and mutually inspect the corresponding areas on the Russian side and on our side. He would be quite agreeable to including Alaska and parts of North Eastern Siberia also. It was essential to develop techniques of inspection and find out whether the Russians would really allow effective inspection.

General de Gaulle said that he agreed that effective inspection was vital but he wondered whether it would be possible to perhaps agree to prohibit delivery of nuclear weapons by missile and strategic aircraft and then inspect to see that these means of delivery were not being used.

The President said that that would involve inspection of all parts of the Soviet Union and he did not believe that the Soviets would agree to this. He had made his “Open Skies” proposal<sup>5</sup> at Geneva in 1955 and

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<sup>5</sup> For text of the “Open Skies” proposal, made on July 21, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, p. 447.

Khrushchev had rejected this as being “espionage” and merely for overflights. It was also essential to find out whether teams could operate in an effective manner on the ground. He doubted very much whether Khrushchev would ever agree to this, and that is why he had proposed something more modest, namely trying to see whether effective inspection could be obtained for a given area and then if that worked out move on to the next step. General de Gaulle said that he agreed with the President that any effective disarmament program would have to move by step, but he thought of his idea after Khrushchev had told him in Paris that the Americans talked about disarmament but did not really want to disarm and that Khrushchev had said that if delivery vehicles were banned, he would agree to inspection. General de Gaulle did not believe that he really would, but it might be useful to put the proposal to him so as to embarrass him. He was talking vaguely of disarmament and trying to shift the onus for lack of progress to the West.

The President said that if Khrushchev were really willing to allow effective inspection, we might be able to go along, but his experience with the Russians since 1945 had led him to doubt their good faith. They might agree to inspection and then say that this only meant one flight of a plane from Leningrad to Kiev per week. They were saying, “let us disarm first and then check afterwards.” General de Gaulle said that this was exactly what Khrushchev had said to him in Paris. This could not be done and he agreed with the President that effective inspection was essential. The President said that what he was seeking in a given geographic area was to determine whether such inspection could be done properly and whether there was good will on the part of the Russians. If this proved to be the case, we could then move on to the next step. But if he could be convinced that Khrushchev would really allow inspection of all launching sites and strategic air bases, he might be willing to develop our inspection techniques as we went along.

General de Gaulle said we might think about how we could put this to Khrushchev at the summit. As the President knew, there were various disengagement plans such as the Rapacki plan<sup>6</sup> which the Soviets either had put forward by themselves or else had had the Poles put forward. The basic aim of these plans was to neutralize Germany, and if this were done it would not be to our advantage, because if Germany were neutralized up to the Rhine there would be very little space left to the West, whereas if Poland and Czechoslovakia were neutralized there was still an immense space behind them. The President said that of course he understood this, and he was not going to accept such plans.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 1, Document 118.

His thought was again to check the feasibility of inspection in a given area and Soviet good faith.

General de Gaulle then said that we should think about what we would say on Berlin if Khrushchev brought this matter up as he surely would. His feeling was that we should say that this matter required a better atmosphere and we should see what could be done through disarmament and other means to create such an atmosphere. The President agreed with this and said that we should say that we were in favor of self-determination of all these peoples. Khrushchev said that he was trying to clear up the vestiges of the war, but the situation prevailing in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and East Berlin were also vestiges of the war. We should say that we were in favor of a referendum supervised by the United Nations to let these people express themselves. Of course Khrushchev would say that we were the slaves of Adenauer and jumped when he cracked the whip. Adenauer was our ally and we would not let him down. Nevertheless, during the two years "moratorium" on Berlin which Khrushchev had mentioned to General de Gaulle, it was to be hoped that after his elections he could be a little more flexible. General de Gaulle said that he had told Khrushchev that the West would not allow itself to be forced out of Berlin, and if he mentioned this two-year period following which an agreement would have to be reached with the German Democratic Republic, that would not do either as it would be a threat. The President said that he had made it quite plain to Khrushchev in that same room at Camp David, with only an interpreter present, that he would not go to any summit hat in hand or under any threat or time limit and that Khrushchev had agreed to raise the time limit and threat, but that when he had told Gromyko and Menshikov they had become very agitated. Nevertheless the Soviets had agreed that the President could say that there was no threat or time limit at his press conference and that Khrushchev would confirm this upon his return to the Soviet Union, and that this was what had actually happened.

General de Gaulle said that we might remove a thousand men of the garrison or some small gesture of this type, but refuse absolutely anything that would alter our legal right to be in Berlin. He had told Khrushchev that the West would not allow itself to be pushed out of Berlin. Khrushchev had not gotten excited and said that after this two-year period he would have to sign a treaty with the German Democratic Republic. The President again reiterated his position against negotiating with any kind of a time limit or threat suspended over us, and General de Gaulle agreed with this.

General de Gaulle then said that he wondered if anything could be said at the summit concerning deliveries of weapons to smaller oriental countries. Khrushchev had told him that when he was in England with

Bulganin, Selwyn Lloyd had said that a little bird had spoken to him saying that weapons were being delivered to Yemen, to Nasser and to Syria. Khrushchev had replied to Selwyn Lloyd that many birds had told him that weapons were being delivered to Turkey, Iran and Iraq (which was still pro-Western at that time).

The President said that we knew that a great deal of equipment had been delivered to Nasser and that the Soviets were talking of arms deliveries to Guinea and we were keeping our eye on this. We had delivered weapons to small states on the edge of Communist power such as Iran, Vietnam and Korea that had been directly threatened by the Soviets. We could prove that we had not been aggressive and it was therefore very difficult to equate their arms deliveries and ours. However, perhaps something could be worked out on a regional basis in Africa or in Latin America. General de Gaulle said that it would be difficult for us to give no arms at all to our friends and the President replied that he meant weapons other than those to maintain law and order. President Alexandri of Chile had proposed general disarmament for Latin America and the United States had supported this. Possibly, as he had said, something might be worked out on a regional basis.

The President of France then said that he knew that the President was not enthused by the idea of something being done for the underdeveloped nations jointly with the Soviets, but he wondered if it might not be possible to attempt some specific program such as the development of the Nile Valley or the eradication of tuberculosis in India, for which each of the four nations, or others if they joined, could provide some doctors, medicine and money. The President said that our experience was that the Soviets had refused to have any part in the various programs that the United Nations had undertaken—preplanning studies, Children's fund, and others. They had finally furnished a small quantity of fissionable material to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna but experience had shown that either they refused to participate, or if they did participate in a very small way they felt that this small participation gave them all sorts of rights and wanted to send in large numbers of personnel for subversive purposes. However, perhaps on some specific limited objective something could be done. General de Gaulle said that he made the suggestion because Khrushchev had told him that he would go along with a program of this type.

The President said that he had promised General de Gaulle that he would get him back to Washington by 5 p.m., and the interview concluded and it was agreed that they would meet on Monday, the 25th, with the Foreign Ministers in the President's office. The President of the United States and the President of France then left Camp David for Washington after agreeing to allow the Press Secretaries to say that at



the conclusion of General de Gaulle's visit there would be a brief communiqué.<sup>7</sup>

**Vernon Walters**<sup>8</sup>  
*Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army*

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<sup>7</sup> For text of this communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 16, 1960, p. 771.

<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### 137. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 25, 1960.

#### PRESENT

The President  
Secretary Herter  
Under Secretary Dillon  
Ambassador Houghton  
General Goodpaster  
Colonel Walters

General DeGaulle  
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
Ambassador Alphand  
Mr. de Courcel  
Mr. Lebel

The President opened the conversation by saying that in their talks on the previous day,<sup>1</sup> General DeGaulle and he were agreed on procedures for the summit; that General DeGaulle would write Mr. Khrushchev setting this forth and that they were in hopes of finishing by Sunday, but if not, the President might return from Portugal for the meeting. They had agreed that disarmament would be the major subject for discussion though there was a slight difference of approach between our way of approaching it and General DeGaulle's. General DeGaulle wished to propose the prohibition of certain delivery systems for nuclear weapons with appropriate inspection which would be world-wide and open Russia completely to inspection. He himself, in the light of Khrushchev's rejection of his open skies proposal at Geneva in 1955, wanted to start out more modestly with a limited area in which inspection techniques could be tested.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1631. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters. The conversation took place at the White House.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 136.

Secretary Herter then said that this would be tantamount to opening the whole of the Soviet Union to inspections, and General DeGaulle nodded agreement.

The President said he could see no objection to making this proposal although he was not very optimistic about it being accepted, but that his proposal was something in the nature of a fallback position. General DeGaulle said that of course if the proposal were agreed to, a group would have to be set up to study the means of implementation and techniques in inspection would have to be developed, but that there would have to be a series of phases for implementation. General DeGaulle said that when he had proposed this to Khrushchev, he had said he would agree to any kind of inspection providing it was reciprocal anywhere. Secretary Herter asked whether this covered nuclear weapons and the President said that it did not; it involved delivery systems, as both he and General DeGaulle were agreed that the weapons themselves could easily be hidden, but it related only to the means of delivery. General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev had spoken of missiles, aircraft, and launching sites, both fixed and mobile, which he understood to cover submarines. The President then said that he did not see any reason why this should not be proposed. General DeGaulle said that he felt we could not propose nothing, nor could we propose everything as the Russians did, but we must propose something substantial, and this type of proposal would have a great effect on public opinion and would do to the credit of the West.

The President said that in the field of contacts, he and General DeGaulle were agreeable to proposing that we might double present contacts, and if need be, triple them. We would have no difficulties in this field. He had once asked Mr. Hoover, head of the FBI, whether it would greatly increase his problem if we allowed in 10,000 Russian students instead of 40, and Mr. Hoover assured him that it would not. Secretary Herter pointed out that we had offered the Russians to exchange a large number of students and that they had found this awkward and had finally come up with 23.

General DeGaulle then said that though we might agree to increase exchanges, this did not mean that we would necessarily buy two or three times as much from them. For instance, France purchased a million tons of petroleum a year from them. Such a proposal did not mean France would be obligated to buy two million tons. Nevertheless, he said, Khrushchev always comes back to the subject of an increase in trade between the East and West. The President said that if we agreed on other things we could look into the problem of increasing trade.

Secretary Herter pointed out there are certain legislative limitations such as the Johnson Act.<sup>2</sup>

The President pointed out that if this type of provision were included in a formal treaty and it were ratified by the Senate, it would have over-riding effect and be the supreme law of the land. Secretary Dillon pointed out that what the Soviets were really after was long-term credits and that the Johnson Act limited these. Secretary Herter said he had one concern in this respect. If a declaration came from the summit advocating greater commercial exchanges, this might encourage other nations to send trade missions to Moscow and would, in turn, give the Soviets an opportunity to send large numbers of people to other countries to carry out subversive activities.

The President said that any statement covering an increase in East-West trade would have to be drafted very carefully.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that the real problem lay in the fact that the Soviets really don't have much to sell, and they have trouble in paying for what they do buy. Secretary Dillon said that the Soviets were driving for credits but we would rather see such credit, as it were available, go to help non-communist, under developed nations. General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev admits that they don't have much to sell now, but says that they were developing at a high rate and in a few years will have a great deal to sell. The President expressed the view that the most we could do at the summit would be to appoint a committee to study what could be done to expand East-West trade, but that the matter of social and cultural exchanges would be no difficulty. General DeGaulle and the French Foreign Minister expressed their agreement.

On the matter of Germany, General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev had told him that Berlin constituted a dangerous situation. There was still fire in the ashes of World War II and this might flare up if not settled; that we must regulate the status of East Germany and West Berlin. He would never allow either of them to belong to Adenauer, but he did not insist that West Berlin be a part of East Germany. It could become an international city under the United Nations' control with guaranteed access. General DeGaulle said he told Khrushchev that if we divided Germany permanently in this manner; if he treated Berlin as something apart; he would be rekindling that fire and creating, at least on the German side, a reason for war. He said he had asked Khrushchev why he

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Johnson Debt Default Act, signed April 13, 1934, which prohibited financial transactions with any foreign government in default of its obligations to the United States. (48 Stat. 574) It was amended on July 31, 1945, to exempt foreign governments who were members of both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development from some of its provisions. (59 Stat. 516)

brought up matters of this type if he really wanted relaxation of tensions. After all we had lived with the present situation in Berlin for 15 years; there was no reason why we could not go on for a further number of years.

General DeGaulle said that when he told Khrushchev this bluntly he became less urgent and said that they could go along for two years, at the end of which, if no settlement had been reached, he (K) would have to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, but in the meanwhile there would have to be some temporary arrangement on Berlin. General DeGaulle said that he had told Khrushchev that if he was trying to tell us that we would have to get out of Berlin at the end of two years the answer was "no go", and that as for his temporary arrangement on Berlin this would depend on what he was trying to put into it.

The President said that he felt that the background or theme we should operate against is that we believe in the self-determination of peoples, and that we feel they should be allowed to express themselves freely concerning their own future; peoples of Berlin, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or other areas, and if we stress this constantly it will require considerable acrobatics on the part of Mr. Khrushchev to prove that he was right in trying to dispose in a dictatorial fashion of the people of West Berlin and East Germany. We should stress that we believe in this. General DeGaulle replied that we did believe in this, but he did not. The French President said that in order to relax tensions, if we made these proposals early in the Conference, it would prevent the discussion on Berlin and Germany from becoming venomous and acrimonious later on.

General DeGaulle then said that in this same framework we might see if something could be done jointly to assist the under-developed nations. Even if we only accepted in principle and leave to a committee the task of working out the specific implementation.

The President pointed out that the Soviets have not supported such projects financially when undertaken under the aegis of the UN. For instance, their quota of the Special Fund was 15 million dollars and Secretary Dillon stated that they had only put in one million dollars. Their performance with regard to the Children's Fund was similar.

General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev had expressed pessimistic views regarding the U.S. disposition and then, pirating the President's proposal of 1953,<sup>3</sup> he said he had proposed using part of the savings on

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<sup>3</sup> Reference presumably is to Eisenhower's proposal for the reduction of armaments made in his address, "The chance for Peace," delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953. For text of this address, in which he proposed a limitation of the sizes of the military forces of all nations, a commitment by all nations to limit their production of materials devoted to military purposes, and the international control of atomic energy to promote its peaceful use, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179-188.

disarmament to assist under-developed countries. The President again expressed doubts regarding the Soviet's disposition to do anything substantial, and General DeGaulle again expressed his desire to make some proposal in this area and try and work out the details.

Secretary Herter said that he was just a little concerned regarding the order in which the topics were discussed at the summit because if we reached agreement on a number of these things the Soviets might then become very tough on Berlin at the end of the Conference.

General DeGaulle said that we should seize the initiative and say to the Russians "have you come here to seek a detente or not". If so, let's talk about disarmament and exchanges and perhaps joint assistance in the under-developed nations. We will, nevertheless, talk about Berlin, but perhaps not so violently.

Secretary Herter expressed concern again concerning the Soviet's taking such earlier agreements as might have been reached for granted, and then become difficult on Berlin. General DeGaulle said that we should make it clear that all of the agreements were tied together and that if the Conference broke up over Berlin, anything that had been agreed earlier would not hold. For this reason he favored small meetings. On the first day, perhaps, the four chiefs of government alone and later the foreign ministers would join them. He felt that they should hold their meetings in the mornings, leaving the afternoons free for bi-lateral visits and exchanges, and at the end a large meeting could be held with ambassadors and other members of the delegation. He felt that private contacts with Khrushchev were effective. Both the President and General DeGaulle agreed that Khrushchev talked in a more reasonable fashion when he was alone and that the presence of other Soviets seemed to make him more intransigent. The President indicated that he would go to Lisbon on the 23rd, but might return if the Conference had not concluded. General DeGaulle said that he had hoped they might be finished by Saturday night, particularly if they had restricted meetings.

The President then asked about a communiqué<sup>4</sup> and General DeGaulle said he was agreeable either way. The President said there was only one thing he would like to see included in the communiqué, and that was General DeGaulle's statement of September 16, 1959 on Algeria still stood, and he could use the occasion to reaffirm his support for the General's statement. General DeGaulle said he did not like to use the word Algeria, but in his speech to Congress<sup>5</sup> he would express his belief that nations have the right to self-determination in democracy.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 136.

<sup>5</sup> For text of de Gaulle's address before Congress on April 25, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 16, 1960, pp. 771–773.

The President said that sections of our press were indicating that General DeGaulle had hardened his stand and he knew this was not so in light of what the General had told him, and was merely seeking an occasion to reaffirm his support. General DeGaulle said that the last time he had told the President in advance that he would make the statement and the President had then expressed his support. He would make a statement to this effect in New York tomorrow and if the President wished to indorse, that it would be fine. Secretary Herter then asked about the communiqué and the President recalled that they had indicated on the previous day that a brief communiqué might be forthcoming.

General DeGaulle said that such a communiqué might say that these conversations had been useful in defining the position that they would take in common to go to the summit for the purpose of achieving a relaxation in the international situation. The President said he thought that would be helpful.

General DeGaulle indicated that he would pay a final call on the President the following morning with Madame DeGaulle, and the President said that he would receive them in the residence.

Secretary Herter again expressed concern that if in order to achieve relaxation of tension we gave Khrushchev everything he wanted early and then he got tough on Germany at the end, this would not be good. General DeGaulle said there was a gamble involved and this was that Khrushchev did want to be known as the man who had relaxed tensions and that we would indicate that if the Conference broke up over Berlin, that nothing that had been agreed previously would stand. Secretary Herter said that we should not announce anything until the final communiqué, and General DeGaulle agreed with this and said that everything should remain open and connected until the final communiqué.

It was then agreed that Secretary Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville would meet immediately after lunch and work out a communiqué. Both the President and General DeGaulle expressed their agreement in advance to whatever communiqué was worked out by the Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister.

**Vernon Walters<sup>6</sup>**  
*Colonel, U.S. Army*

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<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**138. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower**

Washington, April 26, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

General de Gaulle, Colonel Walters

The President asked General de Gaulle whether he had read Khrushchev's speech at Baku<sup>1</sup> and General de Gaulle said he had. The President said that one thing that bothered him about these speeches of Khrushchev's is that having taken these extremely firm positions he found himself obliged to abide by them. General de Gaulle said that he did say these things, but he was not sure he really meant them, and he did feel that sometime during the conference we would probably have to say "No" to Mr. Khrushchev, and the President nodded agreement.

On taking leave of the President, General de Gaulle said "Now that I have seen you I have even greater confidence in our cause." The President replied, "We shall be standing together."

**Vernon Walters<sup>2</sup>**  
*Colonel, U.S. Army*

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Walters on April 27. The conference took place in the Red Room at the White House when de Gaulle called to say goodbye.

<sup>1</sup>For extracts of Khrushchev's April 25 speech at Baku, in which he reiterated the maximum Soviet demands on Germany and Berlin, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 404–406.

<sup>2</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**139. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State**

Tehran, April 28, 1960, 9 p.m.

Secto 15. At lunch April 28 Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd had brief discussions, in prospects with particular reference to possibility interim

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–2860. Confidential. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris. Secretary of State Herter was an observer at the CENTO Ministerial Meeting at Tehran April 28–30.

agreement on Berlin. Lloyd expressed view Khrushchev in absence any such agreement at Summit would almost surely renew pressure on West Berlin in months following President's visit to Soviet Union and said in consequence he considered it preferable to seek interim agreement corresponding to our July 28 Geneva proposal for term of 3 years or possibly even 2. He stated however essential in any such agreement provision should be made for full maintenance our rights at expiry agreement. Secretary indicated general agreement noting importance bridging German elections. Secretary also mentioned that it had been agreed with De Gaulle in Washington that if question détente and disarmament came up at Summit in advance discussion Germany and Berlin West must be firm that Summit results should be considered in totality to avoid possibility early days of conference might go relatively well and then Khrushchev take tough line on Berlin at conclusion. Lloyd agreed and remarked that in his view psychological pressure more on Khrushchev than on West to achieve something tangible at Summit. Both Secretary and Lloyd agreed it would be tactically wise to delay discussion with Khrushchev of nuclear test matter at Paris until last stages of Summit since this appeared to be one area in which Soviets generally interested in securing agreement.

**Herter**

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#### 140. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/3

Istanbul, May 1, 1960, 10 a.m.

#### NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Istanbul, May 2-4, 1960

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary

Mr. Livingston T. Merchant

*United Kingdom*

Selwyn Lloyd

Sir Anthony Rumbold

*France*

Couve de Murville

M. Lucet

*Federal Republic of Germany*

Heinrich von Brentano

Karl Carstens

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and approved in S on May 2. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 47 from Istanbul, May 1 at 11 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-IS/5-160) The conversation took place at the German Consulate General.



## SUBJECT

## Summit Purposes and Tactics

At Dr. von Brentano's request, the four Foreign Ministers met with one adviser each (as above) in restricted session.

Dr. von Brentano opened the discussion by saying that he had discussed with Chancellor Adenauer the paper entitled, "Our Summit Purposes"<sup>1</sup> which Secretary Herter had sent privately to him, Selwyn Lloyd, and Couve de Murville about ten days ago. He said that this paper in certain respects had disturbed the Chancellor and himself. He said further that he agreed with the general introduction but felt that in two respects the paper disregarded the agreed conclusions of the Four Power Working Group.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. von Brentano continued that his first point related to paragraphs 6 and 7. The Chancellor was concerned over the use of the phrase "to preserve the existing situation in Berlin for a period of time." He felt that any interim agreement was dangerous unless it was explicitly stated that the period would run until the reunification of Germany. Dr. von Brentano said that his second point related to paragraph 8 and the reference to using as a deterrent against Khrushchev taking a harsh line on Berlin a statement of our unwillingness to continue discussions on disarmament or otherwise consider that an atmosphere of détente was developing. He thought this was an inadequate deterrent to face Khrushchev with if he expressed his determination to take action to void our rights in Berlin or otherwise impair our position.

Dr. von Brentano said that he had prepared a letter on these points<sup>3</sup> to the Secretary which he hoped to have delivered today with carbon copies to Couve de Murville and Selwyn Lloyd.

The Secretary replied that on the first point he hoped that it would be possible for the four Ministers to discuss in the meeting today<sup>4</sup> the very important question of the period which might be considered for a temporary arrangement on Berlin. This related to the question of what we regard as the best outcome of the Summit if Khrushchev presses us on Berlin. Should we seek to defer the matter to further negotiations at a lower level or should we seek agreement on a specific directive from the Heads of Government?

The Secretary said on the second point he thought there was a misunderstanding on the part of the Germans. Our paper only intended to

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<sup>1</sup> Document 133.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 111.

<sup>3</sup> A translation of this May 1 letter was transmitted to the Department of State in an unnumbered Secto airgram on May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-1S/5-360)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 141.

say that, as a matter of tactics at the Summit, if in those discussions Khrushchev attempts to declare that our rights are invalid our reaction should be that under these circumstances it would be ridiculous to hold a discussion of disarmament at the Summit. This is a different matter from the question of our contingency planning which contemplates the use of force to maintain our position if the Soviets actually physically move against us in West Berlin.

Dr. von Brentano agreed that the question of an interim agreement should be further discussed in the larger meeting to follow the present restricted meeting. He said that he believed all four agreed that an interim agreement was acceptable, along the lines of the July 28 Geneva proposal with some improvement, but that it was likewise recognized that the setting of any time limit for it short of enduring until reunification of Germany was very dangerous.

Mr. Lloyd said that he had not thought the U.S. paper on Summit purposes in any way altered the quadripartite paper on tactics which had been agreed on in Washington<sup>5</sup> from which he then read relevant passages to which von Brentano nodded agreement. Mr. Lloyd then noted that he understood the North Atlantic Council would be interested in discussing this question of an interim agreement.

The Secretary observed that Couve de Murville would recall that at the White House meeting with General de Gaulle<sup>6</sup> it had been agreed that all subjects discussed at the Summit would be inter-locking and that there would be no agreement on any single item until the results of all the discussions were available for incorporation in a comprehensive communiqué.

Dr. von Brentano then said that, if all agreed that the tactics paper still stood unmodified, then his fears on our Summit purposes paper disappeared.

This was confirmed, with the Secretary noting that our Summit purposes paper had been drafted several weeks ago primarily with a view to placing a positive cast on our approach to the Summit.

Couve de Murville then reverted to Dr. von Brentano's second point. He said that he had never assumed that direct action by Khrushchev against West Berlin would result only in our saying that "this spoils the détente." (All agreed.)

Couve de Murville said that, on von Brentano's first point, at Geneva the four Western Powers had agreed to the proposal of July 28 which was contemplated for a stated period of years provided that at the end of the period our rights remained unaffected. He asked if Dr.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 115.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 137.

von Brentano was now proposing that we could only agree to an interim agreement provided it lasted until the reunification of Germany.

Dr. von Brentano said that it was theoretically possible to accept an interim arrangement for West Berlin for a stated period of years provided at the end of the period the status quo as to rights prevailed.

Mr. Lloyd noted that the Working Group supplemental report<sup>7</sup> touched on this point and provided that our rights must remain unchanged at the end of the period.

The Secretary then suggested the use of the word "interim" in connection with an arrangement for Berlin was a bad one. "Temporary" might be better.

Mr. Couve de Murville suggested that we use the term "arrangement" to which all agreed.

Dr. von Brentano then said he had one more question. He wanted to know if it was still intended as had been discussed at the Western Summit meeting in December to hold another Four Power Western Summit meeting in Paris in May.

M. Couve de Murville responded that this had been discussed in Washington and the thought was that, since the President will only arrive in Paris on the morning of May 15, it would be best to hold such a Four Power Western Summit meeting early in the afternoon of the 15th. He asked if this was generally agreeable. Mr. Lloyd confirmed that it would be, as did Dr. von Brentano.

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<sup>7</sup>The Supplementary Working Group Report, dated April 21, included a 3-paragraph cover sheet, and drafts on 1) Possible Improvements in Western Proposals of July 28, 1959; 2) a Draft Directive and Declaration; 3) Essential Conditions for an Arrangement for West Berlin; 4) Solution "C": London Working Group Report; and 5) Proposal for Reunification of Berlin. (Department of State, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany)

141. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/7

Istanbul, May 1, 1960.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Istanbul, May 2-4, 1960

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

*United States:*

The Secretary  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Kohler

*German:*

Mr. Heinrich von Brentano  
Mr. Karl Carstens  
Mr. Rudolf Fechter

*Great Britain:*

The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, M.P.  
H.E. Sir Frank Roberts  
Sir Anthony Rumbold, Bt.

*French:*

S.E.M. Couve de Murville  
M. Lucet  
M. de Leusse

SUBJECT

Preparations for Discussion of Berlin at the Summit

As Chairman, von Brentano began by observing that the principal task of the Foreign Ministers at today's meeting was to discuss a supplementary report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany, including Berlin.<sup>1</sup> He said that he had a few initial observations to make. As to paragraph (c) of the July 28 Western proposals at Geneva dealing with access,<sup>2</sup> he wished to suggest new language which would get away from the idea that, under present practices, access to Berlin was completely free and unrestricted. He suggested wording as follows: "Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, water and air shall be established ('restored' in German Embassy, Washington version) and guaranteed for all persons, goods and means of communication, including those of the Armed Forces of the Western Powers stationed in Western Berlin. The procedures effective May 1, 1960, shall be improved, with a view to facilitating communications". Von Brentano said he did not wish to reach agreement on precise wording among the Ministers;

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on May 3 and approved by M on May 10 and S on May 11. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 46 from Istanbul, May 1 at 8 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-IS/5-160) The conversation took place at the German Consulate General immediately after the one reported in Document 140.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 7, Document 140.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 488.

this could be discussed further by the Working Group. He also suggested that paragraph (d) of the Geneva proposals might be modified to avoid inclusion of the words “seriously affect the rights and interests of others”. He felt that this would give the Soviets a pretext for continuous attempts to intervene in West Berlin.

The Secretary commented that the present suggested language was better than that in the original bracketed portions of the Working Group report. However, the use of “restored” or “established” with reference to Allied traffic, which was moving better now than it had some time ago, had to be questioned. Lloyd said he agreed with this point. Von Brentano cited statistics relating to harassment of German travelers, but did not comment on the aspects of Allied travel.

Couve observed that details of this sort were obviously not going to be discussed at the Summit. The Heads of Government would have to designate some other body to implement in detail the decisions on principle which might be taken by them. Von Brentano said he knew that all of these details could not be considered at the Summit. The object was to obtain agreement on the goals for post-Summit discussion.

The Secretary raised the possibility that the Soviets might utilize the provisions for limitation of force levels, non-stationing of nuclear weapons, and the ban on certain activities, in order to make claims to a right of inspection. Lloyd said that he thought the Western position on this would be absolutely clear. We would not admit such a claim as having any relevance to an agreement between Governments. Couve noted that the Western proposal had envisaged a quadripartite commission to serve as a disputes mechanism. Von Brentano stated that the Western refusal at Geneva to put the question of troop levels in Berlin on a contractual basis had been intended precisely to avoid giving the Soviets any pretense for asserting inspection claims.

With reference to “negotiating” at the Summit, the Secretary noted that the memorandum written by the President<sup>3</sup> recalled his conversation with Khrushchev emphasizing that the Summit should be used for purposes of discussion rather than negotiation. In response to the Secretary’s query, Couve said that the French had not thought of putting this point into the communication to go from DeGaulle to Khrushchev regarding procedural arrangements. Lloyd said he hoped it had not been included, since he could not understand the real difference between discussion and negotiation. The Secretary pointed out the essential difference is whether or not the details of agreements are worked out. Couve observed that, in any event, no treaty was going to be made at the Sum-

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<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to the President’s letter to Khrushchev transmitted in Document 110.

mit. At most there might be agreement on general principles. Lloyd said that he concurred in the view that the heads of Government could only arrive at "heads of agreement".

Von Brentano asked the other Ministers how they felt the Summit preparations on Germany including Berlin were to be handled in the NATO meeting. The Secretary said that his impression was that the proposed Western tactics would not be given to the North Atlantic Council. The only new thing which had apparently been raised in the NATO discussion was the Dutch question as to the implications of the Western plebiscite proposal. He noted that he had been designated to speak on behalf of the four on the general subject. Actually, there was very little to talk about.

Referring to the specific points raised by von Brentano, Couve said he took note of them with sympathy and agreed they would have to be referred to the Working Group for further consideration. What could be done in that body would probably not be the last word, and even if the drafts were not completed before the Summit it would not matter.

The Secretary asked what our major objective should be at the Summit with respect to Berlin. Should the issue be referred to another body on the basis of a general directive with the idea of merely continuing negotiations, or should the aim be more specific, directed at an interim arrangement? Von Brentano commented that this would be difficult to answer now. It would depend on what happened at the Summit. The Secretary conceded that this was correct, but made the point that the West should have a little sense of where it would like to direct the discussion.

Lloyd said that if Khrushchev admitted that the Western status in Berlin would be the same at the termination of a specific period of time and if this period of time were satisfactory, it might be better to have that than merely continuing negotiations over which the Soviet threat would still be hanging. The Secretary commented that, in our discussion of this subject, it would be better to avoid the term "interim". Couve added that even if Lloyd's two assumptions were met, a post-Summit meeting would still be required to arrive at a special arrangement. Once the principle were accepted by both sides, there would be no urgency in arriving at the specific arrangement which would have to be discussed with no time limit on the negotiations. The time consumed in the process would be added to the period of the arrangement, and this would give the West more time to "defuse" the Berlin problem. The Secretary said he could not help but think of the last Summit meeting in Geneva. The day after it ended there was disagreement as to what had been agreed. The meeting of Foreign Ministers which followed labored under this disagreement. Von Brentano said that we must take the experience of the first Summit

into account, of course, but nothing could be done about that now. It was necessary to proceed as Couve had said and to make the attempt.

In response to the Secretary's query about the German brackets on the all-Berlin proposal attached to the Supplementary Working Group Report, Dr. Carstens (speaking for von Brentano) said the Germans thought it would be useful to have the all-Berlin proposal give emphasis to the need to resume negotiations on German reunification. Otherwise the Soviets could say that the West had agreed to something along the lines of their free city proposal. The inclusion of the German language would preserve the Western position that the real Berlin solution must be in the context of German reunification. Lloyd observed that this proposal was essentially a propaganda exercise. The Ministers had not agreed to use it. It was unlikely that it would be put forward at the Summit. He agreed that the Working Group could discuss it further. The Secretary reminded the other Ministers that NATO expected to receive the draft proposal since it knew the Working Group was elaborating one. The Western powers did not want to give NATO a draft with brackets around certain language. Lloyd commented that the Four could say it was still being worked on. In any event, he felt that giving it to NATO might create a false impression. Sir Frank Roberts (the British Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council) said that his impression was that the other NATO countries were not expecting more than they had already received in the form of the Working Group Report. The Secretary said it was agreeable to him to let the matter drop. If the question were raised in NATO, it could be said that the Working Group was still elaborating the text.

Von Brentano said its use or non-use was really a matter of tactics. The Ministers did not need to decide today if it were to be put forward or not. He did not believe there was any substantive difference on paragraph one; the only question was whether there was ample reference to reunification. After an exchange on possible wording between Lloyd and von Brentano, the latter suggested that if language could be added indicating that the unification of Germany is and remains the Western objective and that the unification of Berlin would provide a first step in that direction, the brackets could be eliminated.

Lloyd said he understood that there was also a point to be made about the "essential conditions" paper. There had been some discussion in the Working Group whether or not this should be put forward at the Summit. Von Brentano said this would depend on developments which could not be decided on today. The Secretary observed that it might prove helpful in clarifying a directive with respect to future negotiations.

Von Brentano asked whether the four Foreign Ministers should plan to meet again before the Summit. He suggested that such a meeting

might perhaps take place on the afternoon of Saturday, May 14. After a further exchange, it was tentatively agreed that the four Foreign Ministers would meet in Paris on May 14 at 3 p.m. at the Quai d'Orsay.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of the line which the four countries would take in answering press inquiries. It was agreed that they would say that they had discussed the work of the Working Group and were in complete agreement with respect to the continuing proceedings of the Working Group. They would also say that they had reviewed the Report to be made to NATO. As to the internal Turkish situation, the Ministers agreed that, if pressed to make a statement, they would simply say that they had come here for the NATO meeting, and would refrain from comment about the internal situation in the country. The Secretary noted that we might be under somewhat heavier pressure than the others because of what had happened in Korea.

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#### 142. Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Istanbul, May 2, 1960, 1:30 a.m.

Secto 48. Five FonMins met 5 p.m. on disarmament. Lloyd in chair called for comments on Geneva Delegations report of April 28.<sup>1</sup> Secretary said he appreciated reasons for declining publish April verbatims May 15 as reported para 7, but felt our refusal might cause us embarrassment and new opportunity for Soviets step up propaganda content their speeches no longer available. Urged release. Agreed UK would advise Soviets in Moscow West now prepared concur release April verbatims May 15 or whenever ready.

Green then made long prepared statement. *[11-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

*[1 paragraph (13-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

Segni said Soviets have shown no interest in reaching disarmament agreements as contrasted with propaganda. Will continue same line at Summit in effort show West is reluctant disarm. We cannot meet their generalities by general principles of our own, since ours appear weaker

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1652. Secret. Drafted by Farley. Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this 7-page report, which reviewed the discussion of disarmament since the April 5 report (Document 112), is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1676.



than Utopian Soviet plan and we cannot risk getting committed to agreements in principle which would hamper our defensive preparations. By continuing to focus on specific measures, we guard our defense position, offer practical and immediate progress in contrast with vague Utopian Soviet scheme, and continue Soviet scheme, and continue to test Soviet intentions and be ready when they shift and turn to practical agreements.

Segni suggested advantageous table new proposals not already rejected by Soviets but consistent with Western plan<sup>2</sup> and publicly appealing like 1955 Open Skies proposal, would undercut Soviet shift to Soviet partial measures which are dangerous to NATO. New proposals should be worked out with great secrecy to enhance public impact. Allies with greatest defense burden must decide what can be done. Italians have ideas which might be submitted at appropriate time such as FonMins meeting at Washington on eve of Summit.

[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary said we have double task of considering what is to be done at Summit and what we are to say to NAC tomorrow. Underlying problem in both cases is lack of Western unity. Prime example is Deldi 146<sup>3</sup> on which four countries agree and French do not. French split on this problem gave concern particularly because he believed strong possibility reasons involved were related to possibility of French proposal at Summit on control of nuclear delivery systems. He urged Couve to explain precisely French ideas since U.S. was bewildered when it tried to study and understand French ideas. He understood French proposed relying on control of nuclear weapons delivery to deal with nuclear threat. However, U.S. has many delivery systems such as artillery, mortars, ships, and missiles and planes of various ranges. Control of all these delivery methods is extremely complex and difficult and is clearly a measure for the final stage of disarmament. If Western deterrent to be preserved this cannot be advanced as initial proposal. Urged avoidance divisions in Western camp which Soviets can exploit and frank exploration Western positions to talk out and settle differences.

Sec recalled NATO fully informed Western disarmament plan and course of negotiations. If new tack to be taken at Summit we should warn NATO allies and not leave them to learn from newspapers.

Couve said French position not new. After initial differences French finally accepted Western plan on understanding essential idea of

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<sup>2</sup>For text of the March 16 Western general disarmament plan, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 696–699.

<sup>3</sup>Dated April 29, Deldi 146 transmitted a draft paragraph for Western tactics on disarmament at the summit. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12–GE/4–2960)

nuclear disarmament would be included. Concept of control of delivery systems as way to achieve this also not new and discussed by De Gaulle with Western leaders and in speeches. Since nuclear weapons cannot with assurance be eliminated French turned to possibility controlling systems for delivering nuclear weapons. While recognized many systems of delivery exist essential ones to control are strategic systems which can deliver weapons capable of destroying whole countries or world. These are systems with range of ICBM, IRBM, strategic aircraft, ships and submarines. If way could be found to deal with such systems this would accomplish nuclear disarmament as French meant it. Of course measures to achieve East-West balance of conventional armaments and forces would have to accompany. Soviet not necessarily stronger than West in conventional field in view economic and population resources of West. Thus critical question is whether control of means of delivery is still feasible. French did not know answer but thought study should be made and no danger in proposing it provided clearly conditioned on finding satisfactory means of control.

Sec expressed agreement with much of Couve's statement but demurred at bringing into first stage something requiring complete inspection. By so doing and jumping over present Western first stage measures we would lose opportunity test Soviet willingness agree and good faith in implementing initial measures before going to radical final stage measures.

Lloyd made familiar point we are conducting both public relations exercise and probe of possibilities real disarmament program. Apropos world opinion expressed regret Western slowness in tabling counterproposal to Soviet principles paper<sup>4</sup> though he recognized this slowness price of obtaining coalition unity. His personal assessment was our public record will stand examination and not as bad as some had said. We should not go back to further argument on generalities at Geneva. Summit should direct ten-power talks to get down to specific measures. Force levels might be one. This might be linked with something nuclear, perhaps cut-off and reconversion fissionable materials. Might also be combined with French idea of studying control of delivery means. He thought French idea would require degree of control associated with final stage measures but preferred that any turn down for that reason come from Soviets. He stated and Couve agreed that French view was their proposal conditioned on complete control. Lloyd also suggested surprise attack and international control organ as other specific measures.

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<sup>4</sup> For text of the Soviet principles proposal, April 8, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 699-700.

Sec agreed would be useful if Summit could give directive for concentration on specific measures. Pointed out that this was burden of Deldi 146 to which French had not agreed. Couve said difficulty for French was that early measures included cut-off and some transfers fissionable materials without commitment to nuclear disarmament which for them were directly linked. They had stated in NAC that their acceptance cut-off in second stage is linked to final elimination nuclear weapons in third stage.

Lloyd said that approach in Deldi 146 apparently acceptable if five could agree on which specific measures could be negotiated. Sec emphasized that in U.S. view cut-off and reconversion nuclear stocks constitute most important first step to be taken. Lloyd suggested this be coupled with French proposal as subjects for study of required controls. Sec said U.S. thought cut-off perhaps easiest measure to control. Although some small scale production by centrifuges might be difficult to detect we already know and could monitor major producing plants in U.S., Soviet Union and U.K. Other specific measures identified by U.S. in specific measures paper<sup>5</sup> discussed but not tabled at Geneva could be also put forward. While control of means of delivery must be studied at some point it is most complicated problem and not suitable for initial stage. By proposing study of such a measure we would run risk of becoming to some extent committed in principle.

Lloyd said he understood French did not propose to ban delivery means initially but only to control them. Sec warned again of feasibility hiding 100 ICBM's. Couve conceded that if this was result of study then French proposal not feasible.

Lloyd then reviewed list of specific measures in paper prepared for tabling on basis Deldi 69.<sup>6</sup> Points accepted in substance except nuclear item. International control organ and machinery for maintaining international peace also added as points.

Lloyd repeated suggestion cut-off and conversations be coupled with French proposal. Referring to luncheon conversation he interpreted French position as in first step inspection missile sites and airfields to see whether nuclear weapons being put on board and as second step destruction delivery vehicles if possible. Secretary spoke further of complexities and difficulties controlling delivery systems. Couve

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<sup>5</sup>Not identified further.

<sup>6</sup>Deldi 69, April 6, reported on the seventh session of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/4-660) Presumably the correct reference is to Didel 69, April 12, which transmitted to the U.S. Delegation a draft statement on the principles for general disarmament. (*Ibid.*, 396.12-GE/4-1360)

emphasized French concept only included long range vehicles not artillery or anti-aircraft. Sec urged French to spell out ideas precisely.

Lloyd said that as spokesman for Five before NAC on May 2 he would review situation on 10-Power talks along lines report to NATO.<sup>7</sup> Continuation this fruitless debate on generalities is not enough and Summit should if possible give directive to turn to specific measures. In reviewing possible specific measures he would gloss over difference of view regarding nuclear item. Green pressed for Summit directive for secret meetings. Lloyd brushed this aside as unsuitable for Summit directive and something which could be worked out among delegations.

Agreement reached that further preparatory work in disarmament for Summit should be completed in Paris by representatives from five delegations, time of meeting to be set after NATO May 2 discussion.

Lloyd suggested line with press should avoid any reference to substance and simply explain Five met in anticipation NATO discussion of disarmament preparations for Summit. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

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<sup>7</sup> A summary of Lloyd's report to the North Atlantic Council was transmitted in Secto 54 from Istanbul, May 2. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1652)

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### 143. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/8

Istanbul, May 2, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

#### NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Istanbul, May 2-4, 1960

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary

Mr. Merchant

Mr. Hillenbrand

*Germany*

Heinrich von Brentano, Federal

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Karl Carstens, Assistant

Under-Secretary of State

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on May 3 and approved in M and S on May 10. The conversation took place in Herter's suite at the Istanbul Hilton Hotel. A summary of this memorandum was transmitted in Secto 51 from Istanbul, May 2 at 6 p.m. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-IS/5-260)

## SUBJECT

## Norstad Plan

The Secretary opened by saying that he had read von Brentano's letter<sup>1</sup> which had been received on Sunday discussing the American statement of Summit goals, and he could assure the Foreign Minister there was no need for any concern.

*[5 paragraphs (1/2 page of source text) not declassified]*

The Secretary recounted the history of the Norstad Plan as deriving from the original American Open-Skies proposal. This had led to a discussion of possible areas to be affected in various parts of the world. The Open-Skies proposal, as such or in modified form, might conceivably be discussed at the Summit. With disarmament talks at a standstill, there is something very appealing about this proposal. The Soviets, of course, call it inspection without disarmament. *[7 lines of source text not declassified]* General Norstad had not taken the initiative in the present instance. He had been asked for his military views and he had stayed within legitimate limits.

*[7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]* In response to the Secretary's query as to whether the Germans objected to any zone in Europe, von Brentano said that a proposal might be accepted with a definition of the area to be affected which did not discriminate against certain countries, such as was the case with the large zone included in the 1957 Western Disarmament package.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Norstad Plan was really three years old, going back to the London Disarmament talks when all variants of possible zonal proposals were under consideration by the West. *[16-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

The Secretary said the idea should not be referred to as the Norstad Plan but as a zonal plan. Von Brentano commented that it would be best to avoid the term "zone" entirely. The approach in the Norstad Plan paper, he continued, would not be so dangerous politically if it did not start out by attempting to fix the area involved. If the definition in the paper had stopped with "Atlantic and Urals", he thought it might be considered by the Five-Power Western Disarmament Working Group. *[3 lines of source text not declassified]*

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 140 and footnote 3 thereto.

<sup>2</sup> For the Western disarmament package of 1957, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 1296–1301, 1309–1311, and 1316–1323.

144. Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, May 11, 1960, 4:10 p.m.

G-65. Deptel 533 to Berlin, rpt info to Bonn 2399. Following is text of letter from Mayor Brandt to Secretary handed U.S. Delegation to NATO Ministerial Meeting in Istanbul

*Begin Text.* Berlin-Schöneberg, 26 April 1960.

His Excellency

Christian A. Herter

Secretary of State

Washington 25, D.C., USA

Dear Mr. Secretary: If I write to you today shortly before the beginning of the summit conference in Paris, I do so first of all in order to thank you again for the decided rejection by the American Government and the American people of the claims made by the Soviet Union in regard to Berlin and presented in the form of an ultimatum. To this attitude of the United States, it already took up during the blockade of Berlin, we owe that our freedom was maintained.

Only by means of your generous assistance granted to Berlin during the past years and by the protection you have afforded to this city it was, and still is possible to do the reconstruction work of which you got an idea in the summer of the past year and which to a great extent represents a German American team-work.

We are well aware that your assistance of the capital was granted to a people, whose fault essentially contributed to the situation which today is the subject of international disputes. But we have honestly been endeavoring to put our life on a new basis.

Please allow me to submit to you again in brief before the summit conference our opinion of the questions concerned. When doing so, I feel sure that we agree in regard to the most essential items.

Berlin hopes that at the summit conference in Paris and on the occasion of further conferences of the responsible statesmen of the major powers the international problems will be brought closer to a solution in order to come to a relaxation of the tension prevailing in the world.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1160. Official Use Only. Drafted and approved by Hillenbrand and cleared by Calhoun. Also sent to Bonn. On May 2 the Mission reported that the Berlin Senat Protocol Chief had also delivered a copy of the letter to it on April 29. (Airgram G-352; *ibid.*, 396.1-PA/5-260) On April 27, Brandt wrote a similar letter to McCloy, who forwarded a copy of it to Dillon on May 2. (*Ibid.*)

I trust, however, you will understand that I resist tenaciously the obvious aim of the Soviet policy to enforce a special solution for Berlin without preparing the way for the real possibilities of a solution of the German question and the more essential international problems. As long as the Soviet Union denies the German people the right to self-determination the present status of Berlin must remain unchanged, since only in this way the two and a quarter million people of West Berlin are guaranteed the maintenance of their freedom. Should the Soviet Union enforce the continuation of the division of Germany, a change for the worse of the status of Berlin in accordance with the Soviet demands would lead to new additional conflicts in Germany and Europe.

We agree with you that a final settlement of the Berlin question is only possible in connection with the German question, with which it is inextricably entangled. We should, therefore, be pleased if the German people for the purpose of the realization of this aim would be given an opportunity to make use of its national right to self-determination.

We feel sure that a false decision of the West in the Berlin question would have disastrous effects. It would not only affect the people of Berlin and the people of the Soviet occupied zone of Germany. It would also entail a shifting of the power in Europe in favor of the Soviet Union securing for the latter a strong initial position for a future settlement concerning the whole of Germany. In addition to this a success of the Soviet Union in the Berlin question would be prejudicial to the whole western policy.

In the event of an interim agreement on Berlin being seriously discussed at the summit conference, two basic prerequisites should in our opinion be observed at any rate:

1. The original occupation right of the three Western Powers and the supreme responsibility resulting therefrom must continue in force, as only in this way a dangerous weakening of general western interests will be avoided and the personal freedom of the people of Berlin and the maintenance of their democratic rights is secured.

2. Within the framework of the supreme authority of the three Western Powers the close linking West Berlin has achieved during the past twelve years by the integration in the legal and financial system of the Federal Republic and its belonging to the currency and economic area of West Germany must continue.

These two prerequisites are the keystones of our life in freedom. From these prerequisites also results the right to the unhampered traffic routes between Berlin and the Federal Republic. As regards this item, it would, however, be advisable to conclude additional agreements for safeguarding the surface traffic, and the traffic by sea and by air in order to do away with obscurities and to remove difficulties. Moreover, noth-

ing should be done by which this city is divested of its function to be meeting place of the people from both parts of Germany.

On the occasion of his address to the Berlin House of Representatives on 11 January 1960<sup>1</sup> Federal Chancellor Dr. Adenauer has expressly associated himself with this opinion of the Berlin Senate regarding the Berlin question as summed up above in a few items. I may assure you that the people of Berlin place unswerving confidence in the Government of the United States and the American people.

Next week Senator Dr. Paul Hertz will stay a few days in Washington and—I hope—meet you when you are back from Istanbul. He will gladly be at the disposal of your staff for a discussion of the questions we both have at heart.

My best compliments to you,  
Yours sincerely, Willy Brandt. *End text.*

**Herter**

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<sup>1</sup>For text of this address, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 48–52.

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#### **145. Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State**

Istanbul, May 2, 1960, 9 p.m.

Secto 52. For the Under Secretary. Paris for Ambassador Houghton. As you will have seen from Secto 48<sup>1</sup> I pressed Couve very hard to find out exactly in what terms French proposed to raise at Summit control of nuclear vehicles and in particular whether De Gaulle intended to make a proposal or only suggest this area an appropriate one for examination and study. Couve was not explicit in his replies to my questioning. At end of meeting I had an opportunity to talk to him alone and made perfectly clear the risks inherent. I told him that if at the Summit De Gaulle in effect proposed the ban on strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons when he was the only one of the four who lacked their possession he would make himself a laughing stock before the world. Couve

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396. 1–IS/5–260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant. Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Document 142.



took all this in surprisingly good spirit and acknowledged the validity of my point. At tripartite dinner later in the evening he gave no evidence of resentment over my frankness. There is no doubt in my mind that French intransigence at Geneva is directly related to De Gaulle's concept of acting independently of his allies in raising at the Summit matters on which he has acquired fixed ideas.

**Herter**

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#### 146. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 5, 1960.

##### SUBJECT

Interview with Senator Hertz

##### PARTICIPANTS

Douglas Dillon, Acting Secretary  
Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador  
Paul Hertz, Berlin Senator for Economic Affairs  
Alfred G. Vigderman, GER

Senator Hertz thanked the Acting Secretary for his recent speech on Berlin and Germany.<sup>1</sup> He went on to comment on the Chancellor's proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin. It was the Senat's view, said Senator Hertz, that while a plebiscite might one day be useful, it would be wrong to hold one now. In the first place, the voters of West Berlin had expressed themselves most forcefully on the side of the West when they last had an opportunity to vote on December 7, 1958.<sup>2</sup> They had another opportunity, which they took the best advantage of, in connection with the demonstration on May 1, 1960, to show where their sentiments lay. The Berliners know that dangerous times still lie ahead of them, and that the forthcoming negotiations with the Russians will be difficult, but they are quite prepared for what lies ahead.

Senator Hertz explained that he had come to the United States at Governing Mayor Brandt's instance. On the same mission, the Mayor

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Vigderman and approved in U on May 11.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 130.

<sup>2</sup> West Berlin elections took place on December 7, 1958.

had sent Senator Lipschitz to Paris and Mayor Amrehn to London. The task of all three Berlin officials was to express the Berlin Government's confidence in the attitude of the West and to use the visits as an indication to the Berlin population of that undiminished confidence. The Berliners' frame of mind was one of calmness, firmness and confidence.

The Acting Secretary replied that he had been happy to make the speech to which Senator Hertz had alluded. Our policy had been expressed in the speech in language which all could understand. It had been approved before delivery by the Secretary and the White House.

The Acting Secretary, at Senator Hertz's request, described the accusations concerning the violation of Soviet air space made by Khrushchev in his speech of today.<sup>3</sup> We assumed that the plane which he alluded to as having been shot down was one of our weather sampling planes which was missing under circumstances which suggested it was the plane referred to. The Acting Secretary said that Congress was already reflecting the general indignation that our unarmed and helpless planes should be shot down when we were exerting ourselves to rescue Soviet sailors from shipwreck.

Senator Hertz then referred to the favorable economic developments in 1959 in Berlin which could be ascribed to the generally favorable world economic conditions, aid from the Federal Republic and other sources, and the hard work and good morale of the Berlin population. If there were no interference with traffic to and from Berlin, the upward trend in Berlin economic conditions could be expected to continue.

He went on to hope that the West would not have to make any concessions which would endanger the liberty of the Berliners. The Acting Secretary assured him that no one has the slightest intention of doing that. When Senator Hertz wondered how long the present situation might continue, the Acting Secretary speculated that we might have to live with Communist pressure in varying forms for perhaps twenty or thirty years. Senator Hertz replied that if we can maintain the present economic situation in Berlin, and keep the spirits of the Berliners high, all Communist efforts will be in vain. He said that the Communists had recently taken to publishing a daily newspaper in West Berlin. It had a very small circulation and no influence whatsoever.

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<sup>3</sup> For text of Khrushchev's May 5 speech to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 409-412.

**147. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State**

Paris, May 6, 1960, 8 p.m.

5193. Geneva for Eaton. Department pass Defense for Irwin. Noform from Thurston. Embtel 5142.<sup>1</sup> There were no surprises in General Norstad's two-hour session with Chancellor Adenauer yesterday.<sup>2</sup> Except for initial allusion by Adenauer to Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech and airplane incident, discussion was devoted entirely to European control and inspection plan. Von Brentano, Strauss and Heusinger were present, as well as Ambassador Dowling.

Norstad spoke from briefing charts and carefully stressed military advantages of plan. Chancellor was very attentive throughout and interrupted frequently with questions and observations of both political and military import. These were all of a critical or negative nature. Norstad avoided being drawn into discussion of political factors, including those relating to German domestic politics. Despite fact that throughout discussion Chancellor took uniformly unfavorable position, atmosphere was friendly and relaxed and Adenauer made point of his friendly feeling towards and respect for SACEUR. At very end of session Adenauer expressed his gratitude to Norstad for coming and said that it had given him "food for thought." Meeting broke up on note struck by Strauss that plans of this kind will be requiring continuous consideration and that further discussion of this one might well take place at some time in the future. Full account of discussion being air-mailed to recipients this message.<sup>3</sup>

**Houghton**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.00121/5-660. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Geneva.

<sup>1</sup> Dated May 4, telegram 5142 from Paris reported that Brentano would discuss the inspection plan for Central Europe with Norstad on May 5. (*Ibid.*, 600.00121/5-460)

<sup>2</sup> The meeting took place at Bonn on May 5.

<sup>3</sup> An 8-page memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/5-560.

148. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 9, 1960.

SUBJECT

Pre-Summit Meeting Subjects

PARTICIPANTS

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs  
Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador  
Rolf F. Pauls, Counselor, German Embassy  
Alfred G. Vigderman, Deputy Director, GER

Ambassador Grewe called on Mr. Kohler just before his departure for Bonn and Paris in connection with the forthcoming Summit meeting.

Mr. Kohler handed the Ambassador a copy of the State Department release of May 9 on the shooting down of an unarmed American aircraft over the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

At Ambassador Grewe's request, Mr. Kohler elaborated on some of the facts involved in the incident. He said that the United States had reason to know that the plane had been losing altitude. The plane could have had an engine flame-out. The builders of the plane have looked at the Soviet photographs of the wreckage. They are convinced that these photographs are not photographs of the plane they built. Finally, the Soviet Union has decorated five aviators in connection with the plane incident. All these facts suggest that the plane was not brought down by a Soviet rocket and that the Soviets have evolved this dramatic story to lessen the fear of the Soviet people of penetration of Soviet air space by foreign aircraft. We do not think the plane was shot down at 60,000 feet. At that altitude the pilot could only have saved himself by use of the ejection seat. The Soviets acknowledge that the pilot came down by parachute.

Turning to the release, Mr. Kohler explained it as an effort to turn the incident to positive advantage by pointing out that it was intolerable to us that means should be developed in secret which could later present us with a military ultimatum. As far as Khrushchev's handling of the incident is concerned, while we are not quite sure of his intention he seems to be preparing his people for something less than a success at the Summit. If he does not gain ground at the Summit Khrushchev will, no doubt, rebel against the agreement to hold intimate meetings and insist on large ones so that he can extract the maximum propaganda advantage.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-960. Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and initialed by Kohler.

<sup>1</sup> For text of this release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1960, pp. 816-817.

On a different subject, Mr. Kohler said that it had been agreed at Istanbul that the Working Group on Germany and Berlin will meet in Paris on May 13, although there did not seem to be anything to do except to review the existing work. Ambassador Grewe expressed himself as satisfied with the comprehensive quality of the work the group had already done. Mr. Kohler said it had been likewise agreed at Istanbul that the French would be responsible for briefing the Germans in Paris. To Ambassador Grewe's question whether there would be any meetings of the Western Foreign Ministers in Paris, Mr. Kohler said that none had been planned, but such meetings could not be ruled out.

Ambassador Grewe asked whether we saw any connection between the plane incident and the recent shift in the Soviet hierarchy. The Germans and the French think that Khrushchev reinforced his position by bringing his own people into positions of more prominence. But the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* had a different view, considering that the new people were not loyal to Khrushchev. Mr. Kohler said that we could not agree with the view of the Swiss newspaper and agreed rather with the French and German assessment.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Pauls asked whether the Stalinists in the Soviet Union had forced Khrushchev to handle the plane incident sternly as a means of retreating from the policy of *détente*. Mr. Kohler replied that many factors were at play. Khrushchev is clearly having internal trouble. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

On contingency planning, Ambassador Grewe asked whether there was anything to the rumor that there is something less than complete agreement among the three powers. Mr. Kohler assured the Ambassador that the April 1959 three-power paper<sup>2</sup> was completely agreed. There were, of course, further steps to be taken in elaboration of these papers. We should be prepared for the possibility of having to put this planning into effect. We may well face a crisis after the Summit, particularly as Khrushchev was pretty well committed to certain courses of action. In this connection, Mr. Kohler hoped the Germans were working on their alert problem.

Mr. Kohler then adverted to the Norstad plan, saying that for the time being we were deferring further steps, because of the German assessment of the political questions involved. We continue to believe, however, that when a military advisor says that military security will be enhanced by certain actions, it is the job of the diplomat to find a way to accomplish them. We have always considered that we should start any plan of mutual inspection with a large area. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

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<sup>2</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 279.

## 149. Memorandum of Discussion at the 444th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 9, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

### 2. *Preparation for the Summit Meeting*

Mr. Gray said that Mr. Merchant would make an oral report on preparations for the Summit Meeting.

Mr. Merchant said the Secretary of State and his party attended a meeting of CENTO in Teheran before going to the NATO meetings in Istanbul. The CENTO representatives were quite interested in the Summit Meeting, particularly in the briefings on that meeting given by Mr. Herter and Mr. Lloyd. The CENTO representatives gave their full support to the position of the Western participants in the Summit Meeting and expressed satisfaction at the extent to which they had been taken into the confidence of the West. Both in the CENTO meetings and in the NATO meetings, Mr. Herter gave rather full exposition of U.S. space activities and developments. As a result of this exposition, Mr. Herter's listeners sat open-mouthed; apparently they had little realization of the fact that the USSR is not far ahead of the U.S. in space activities.

Mr. Merchant reported that the Secretary of State and his party reached Istanbul for the NATO meeting in a tense atmosphere. Istanbul was a dead city since a total curfew was in effect. The situation, however, appeared to be under control. The Sunday before the opening of the NATO meeting had been devoted to meetings concerned with preparations for the Summit. In the morning U.S. officials met with U.K., French, and German officials.<sup>1</sup> In the afternoon the five Western foreign ministers of the countries represented on the Western side of the Disarmament Conference met to review the state of disarmament and the possible course of disarmament discussions at the Summit.<sup>2</sup> It was agreed at this meeting that the efforts of the USSR to pin the West down to general principles on disarmament—which Mr. Merchant preferred to call meaningless generalities—should be resisted. An effort will be made by the West to have the Summit Meeting direct the Disarmament Conference to address itself to practical disarmament measures. Further work among the Western representatives will be required just before

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on May 13.

<sup>1</sup> See Documents 140 and 141.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 142.

the Summit Meeting, since some difference of opinion exists on the extent to which control of delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads should be emphasized in a disarmament settlement. The French have raised the idea of controlling such delivery vehicles but Mr. Herter, despite his best efforts, was unable to extract from the French exactly what they have in mind. If control over such delivery vehicles is to be discussed at the Summit, some refinement of the problem will have to be developed this week. Mr. Merchant then reported that representatives of the U.S., the U.K. and France met the Sunday evening before the NATO meetings began, on tactics and procedures related to the Summit Meeting.<sup>3</sup>

Turning to the NATO Meeting itself, Mr. Merchant said that most of the sessions were devoted to reports by the Western foreign ministers on preparations for the Summit. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd led the discussion on disarmament along the lines which Mr. Merchant had just described. The NATO Council completely endorsed the general approach to disarmament favored by the West; that is, the inauguration of specific disarmament measures on which progress might be made and the avoidance of the semantics of general principles. Some of the NATO foreign ministers questioned the wisdom of the French proposal regarding the control of delivery vehicles as a substitute for a cut-off of the production of fissionable material. An unexpected dividend of the disarmament discussion in the NATO Council was a statement by Mr. Lange of Norway strongly endorsing the view that the peace of the world depends on the effectiveness of U.S. deterrent power.

Mr. Merchant said he would, at this point, like to interrupt his narrative for a moment to speak of the nuclear testing problem. There had been no discussion either in the CENTO or NATO meetings of nuclear testing except for a brief report by Secretary Herter and side conversations between Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Herter in which it was agreed that it would be wise to defer substantive discussion with Khrushchev on nuclear testing until late in the course of the Summit Meeting. Khrushchev's interest in nuclear testing appears to be genuine; therefore, it seems desirable that the West not discuss this matter too early. The French, who are not taking part in the nuclear testing conference, say that any Paris discussions on this subject should be held outside French premises.

Returning to the NATO Council meeting in Istanbul, Mr. Merchant said that Secretary Herter had briefed the Council on the problem of Germany and Berlin. We expected that the USSR would open its campaign regarding Germany by proposing that separate peace treaties be

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<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of the conversation among Kohler, Lucet, and Rumbold on May 1, (US/MC/1) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650.

concluded with East Germany and with West Germany. The West would counter this move by re-introducing the Western peace plan for the unification of Germany which had been advanced during the Geneva Conference last summer. The USSR was almost certain to reject the Western peace plan, whereupon we would table a plebiscite proposal under which the UN would conduct a plebiscite in East Germany, West Germany, and Berlin, asking whether the people of these areas preferred a peace treaty with the unified Germany or with separate Germanies. Mr. Merchant anticipated that the Summit Meeting would engage in considerable skirmishing regarding Germany and would eventually discuss Berlin as a somewhat separate problem. The three Western foreign ministers and the West German Government are agreed on tactics regarding Berlin. It is felt that the short duration of the Summit Conference will make impossible detailed negotiations regarding that city, so that the likely outcome is a directive by the Summit Meeting to a lower level working group to continue the Berlin discussions. In general, the Western Powers appear willing to accept the 1959 Geneva proposal for an interim agreement on Berlin, with its essential point that the Western rights of access to Berlin shall remain unimpaired. No Western government wishes to tamper with Western rights of access.

Mr. Merchant said that a third Summit subject reported upon to the NATO Council concerned East-West relations. Several tripartite working groups had prepared reports for the Western foreign ministers but these reports did not contain very many proposals holding out promise for successful negotiation at the Summit. Some of the French proposals on East-West relations turned out to be troublesome for the U.S. and the U.K.; a final decision on these proposals will await the President's meeting with de Gaulle and Macmillan next Sunday. The French are proposing some form of East-West economic cooperation in under-developed areas, a proposal which has obvious unacceptable aspects. If de Gaulle continues to push forward this proposal, we may suggest that a logical way for the Soviets to contribute to under-developed areas would be for them to increase their contribution to UN organizations dealing with such areas. The French have also suggested an agreement on limiting the shipment of armaments to sensitive areas. This suggestion also has obvious dangers from the standpoint of U.S. policy. The U.S. and U.K. might have no objection to a general discussion at the Summit of the limitation of arms shipments to sensitive areas, but would not wish to conclude an agreement with the Soviets which would prevent the shipment of arms to such countries in the Middle East as Turkey and Iran. The French have also suggested that the Summit meeting might issue a declaration of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The U.S. has no particular liking for a declaration of this kind because the Sino-Soviet Bloc gives such an entirely different interpretation to the



term “non-interference”. Mr. Merchant said that other aspects of the East-West relations problem such as cultural exchanges, radio jamming, exchange of publications and East-West trade were, in the opinion of the U.S., subjects for bilateral negotiation rather than for Summit discussion. It was generally expected that the Soviets at the Summit would insist upon measures to lessen discrimination against Soviet trade and would seek long-term trade credits. Concluding his remarks on the East-West relations problems, Mr. Merchant said the general temper of the NATO Council had been in the direction of strongly supporting U.S.–U.K. views rather than the French proposals.

Mr. Merchant reported that the NATO Council had evinced definite satisfaction at the extent to which consultation between the U.S., the U.K., and France on the one hand and the other NATO governments on the other hand took place during the period preparatory to the Summit Meeting. The NATO Council, in general, supported our positions and requested that consultation be continued. Mr. Spaak had performed very ably in the NATO meeting. No discordant notes had been produced by the meeting. Mr. Merchant felt the final communiqué of the NATO Council meeting<sup>4</sup> had created a phrase which was capable of considerable exploitation, i.e., “détente, like peace, is indivisible.” The communiqué also pointed out the anomaly of Soviet action in professing peace and simultaneously attacking the German Government and putting pressure on Greece and Iran.

Mr. Merchant said the NATO Council showed considerable enthusiasm for the ten year plan project proposed by Secretary Herter last December. In the future the NATO Council would be devoting a great deal of time to this project, which has given NATO a sense of continuity.

Mr. Merchant noted that Paris will shortly be the scene of meetings of a Four-Power Working Group on Berlin and Germany, a Five-Power Working Party on Disarmament, a Three-Power Working Party on recommendations as to tactics, and a meeting of the three Western heads of government on Sunday—all prior to the Summit Meeting. In conclusion Mr. Merchant said the alliance was solidly behind U.S. objectives and was not apprehensive as to the results of the Summit Conference.

The President said he wished to bring up a specific question which had been disturbing him; that is, the readiness of the West Germans to extend a credit of \$1 billion to the Russians. If it were true that the Germans intended to extend such a credit, he was quite shocked. Mr. Merchant said he was not in possession of any information which would verify this rumor. The President wondered why the West Germans

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<sup>4</sup>For text of the final communiqué, May 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1960, p. 840.

would think of offering such a line of credit to the Russians in the light of Soviet attacks on West Germany. Mr. Merchant said the source from which the information about this credit came was inclined to exaggerate. In any event, whatever credit the West Germans offered to the USSR would be commercial, not government, credit and would probably be only a fraction of \$1 billion.

The President concluded discussion of this item by remarking that the Summit Meeting would not be a Sunday School picnic.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>5</sup>

Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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<sup>5</sup> The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2232, approved by the President on May 13. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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## 150. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, May 10, 1960.

### OTHERS PRESENT

The Vice President, Secretary Herter, Secretary Merchant, Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter noted that there had as yet been no request by Adenauer to see the President, but that such a request is always a possibility. The President said he would see Adenauer if he so requests, but only on his request, since the time on Sunday when he and Adenauer will both be in Paris is so limited. The President next asked whether Mr. Herter thought the President should make a courtesy call on de Gaulle on arrival. The Secretary said he would look into this with the French. He also referred

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

to an idea of calling on Khrushchev which he had apparently earlier talked to the Secretary about. Mr. Herter said his first instinct had been that it was a good idea but now he had second thoughts along the lines of a reservation expressed by the President—that it might be taken as a gesture of weakness on the President's part.

Turning next to the question of procedure at the summit meeting, Mr. Herter suggested that at the first meeting Mr. Bohlen be used as the note-taker. The President approved this, saying he would like this inasmuch as he valued Mr. Bohlen's judgment on the matters that would be under discussion. The President then wondered whether it might be a good idea to have Khrushchev come around to the American Embassy residence after the first day's meeting—say at about 4 PM. Mr. Herter thought this would be a good thing to do and the President asked him to arrange it. I noted that the plan for the first meeting suggested that for the initial hour, when the Chiefs of State are meeting alone, they should deal with procedures for their meeting rather than substantive questions. Mr. Herter said that in fact he understands that de Gaulle thinks the first thing to do is to put squarely to Khrushchev whether he wants a *détente* in East-West relations. After further discussion, the President said it would be most helpful to the conference if the Foreign Ministers could somehow make enough progress to put specific documents, including issues and disagreements, before the main meetings.

Mr. Herter next stated that the most important paper in the material prepared by the President was a draft key-note statement. The President read through the statement, suggesting changes and additions.<sup>1</sup> In particular, he wanted to say that the use of force or the threat of force would lead to such serious consequences in the Berlin situation that none of the participants should even think of it. He thought the statement was excellent, although a little long. He would like to see it held to about ten minutes, considering the amount of time that will be needed for consecutive translations. Mr. Kohler commented that de Gaulle wants to avoid a series of set-piece speeches, but since Khrushchev is likely to make one anyhow, there would be value in the President's making one. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the order of seating would probably be such that, with de Gaulle as Chairman for the first meeting, the President will speak last and would have a chance to adjust his remarks to those of Khrushchev. Mr. Herter said that there had been prepared good detail papers for the conference, for example on Berlin and Germany. He was

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<sup>1</sup> On May 9, Herter transmitted to the President a briefing book and a book containing papers for the summit. In a covering memorandum, Herter explained that these papers would form the basis of discussion on May 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-960) The second item in each was a draft keynote statement. Copies of the papers in both books are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1675 and 1674, respectively.

not clear as to how these could best be used, however. The President said that he thought a good course would be to start from the beginning of the meeting on drafting the communiqué. The Heads of State would have this draft before them each day, and could gradually resolve issues and add to it. Without such a document, they would talk aimlessly and get nowhere. The Foreign Minister should, each day, add whatever area of agreement had been achieved to the communiqué. Mr. Herter said it would also be necessary to bring in stated disagreements reached among the Foreign Ministers. He added that he did not know if Khrushchev would follow the procedure proposed by the President.

Mr. Kohler commented that there would have to be some mention of a subject in the meeting with Heads of State or Gromyko would not even be willing to talk about it in the Foreign Ministers sessions.

The President next commented on a discussion he had had the previous night with Speaker Rayburn,<sup>2</sup> who had said he was sorry the President had announced he should leave the summit and have the Vice President take over, inasmuch as this seemed to be a purely political move. The President said he had told Speaker Rayburn that the purpose of this was to avoid the necessity for recessing the summit meeting if he should have to return to the United States, and that if the summit went on for a few days after his visit to Lisbon and (if necessary) brief return to the United States, he (the President) would go right back. Mr. Rayburn said he had entirely missed this point in the press reporting of the President's decision. The President said he would try to clear this up at his press conference the following day.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Herter next referred to a procedural point. Nuclear test suspension is an area in which the Soviets are interested. The French will not participate in this, and a meeting on this would have to be held in the British, Soviet or American Embassy. [10 lines of source text not declassified]

In reading through more of the papers, the President asked as to whether we have a good definition of peaceful co-existence. Mr. Herter said he doubted the efficacy of trying to reach an agreed definition because the words will be misinterpreted by the Soviets, and instead favored a Western statement of the principles by which we seek to live in international affairs.

With regard to disarmament, Mr. Herter said that his group is working on a proposal for laying down a specific number of atomic

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<sup>2</sup>The President met with Rayburn at 5:30 p.m. on May 9. No other record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup>For a transcript of President Eisenhower's press conference on May 11, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, pp. 403-414.

weapons—perhaps stated in terms of the number of Hiroshima-size weapons—to be removed from stockpiles.

The President noted, with regard to the subject of trade, that the proposal was not to discuss this matter. Mr. Herter thought it should be avoided to the extent possible, but noted that the French will probably want to mention it.

The President said he thought Mr. Khrushchev would probably try by his department to force the conference along the lines he wants. He thought the Western leaders should all quietly say that they cannot and will not negotiate on such a basis. With regard to the plane, he thought that perhaps the best course is to chuckle about it and turn the subject off.

Mr. Nixon said he anticipated that Khrushchev will try to keep the President talking about the plane and concurred in the idea of finessing the subject. He thought it would be useful to leave some air of mystery about it and to imply that we know a good deal more than he thinks we know in relation to the whole U-2 project. The President said he thought he would perhaps let Khrushchev talk as much as he wanted to about the plane, and then quietly suggest that he should come around and talk privately to the President about it.

Mr. Herter asked if he might brief General de Gaulle on the material obtained from this project and the President approved his doing so. Mr. Nixon suggested it might be wise to let de Gaulle know of this plan right away and Mr. Herter said he would tell Alphand the same afternoon.

Mr. Herter reported that we are still in some disagreement with the French on their proposal to inspect “means of delivery.” He does not think that this is a vital question threatening the conference. The President recalled that he had suggested inspection of designated areas as a means of testing the technique but that de Gaulle had come back to “means of delivery” without hesitation. The President thought that the real point is that the nub of the question of peace is to prepare for open societies. When he is in Russia he is thinking of stressing this point, through explaining our own system, and why we like it.

The President concluded by saying that he was having prepared, and thought he might throw at Mr. Khrushchev, a memorandum giving clear evidence of their spying in our country, the volume of this and many specific instances, etc.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Herter agreed that this could be quite useful.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>4</sup> Presumably reference is to an undated paper entitled “Espionage Activities Within the US.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

**151. Memorandum for the President's Personal Secretary  
(Whitman)**

Washington, May 11, 1960.

This morning in the Mansion the President was breakfast host to a group of Republican Senators. A list of those attending is attached.<sup>1</sup> The President joined his guests at 7:45, and the meeting concluded with press photos on the North Portico steps at 9:00.

The discussions revolved entirely around world affairs, with the emphasis on the coming Summit meeting. The President said that, while no one should expect great or far-reaching achievements, he was nonetheless hopeful that some useful progress could be made. He indicated that, at the least, we could probably expect agreement to meet again in another year. He thought most of the Summit discussions would relate to disarmament, inspection, and the elimination of nuclear tests; and in that general context we might try to have the basic Berlin question discussed. He also thought we might get something done by way of a joint investigation into the matter of nuclear explosions under the 4.75 level.

The President said this would be a fairly long meeting. He reminded the group that the language barrier, and the accompanying need for continuous translations, literally multiplied the time normally consumed on the same subject matter in English. In this connection, the President again brought up the possibility that he might have to return to Washington "for a day or two" should major legislation decisions confront him. He specified that approval of routine bills would be no trouble, but that close questions of veto always require extensive consultations with interested Executive Branch officials.

On the Summit Conference itself, in a response to a question by Senator Javits, he said he did not think the recent theatrical behavior of Mr. Khrushchev would set the tone of the meeting; that the United States would not be encumbered by the U-2 incident; and that Khrushchev is much too smart to believe this was the first time such a flight has occurred. Senator Cotton asked if Khrushchev is more a "front man" and less a ruler than was Stalin. The President said Khrushchev is a "strong man" and as close to an absolute dictator as current conditions in Russia will permit. He said Menshikov and Gromyko exert strong influence over Mr. K, and that on some items discussed while here,

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed. Attending were Senators Dirksen, Aiken, Kuchel, Schoeppel, Carlson, Bennett, Case, Bush, Beall, Cotton, Hruska, Allott, Martin, Cooper, Javits, Prouty, and Brunsdale.

Khrushchev felt he had to check with some one or some group back in Moscow.

Senator Javits asked about relationships among our allies, and the President indicated they are first-rate; Adenauer and de Gaulle get along very well, de Gaulle recognizing that Adenauer must constantly speak for a united Germany; Macmillan is sincere, and not politically motivated, in urging greater flexibility in Western dealings with the Soviets. On de Gaulle, the President said he and the French President are personal friends—a relationship dating back to World War II when Roosevelt and Churchill despaired of getting along with de Gaulle and assigned General Eisenhower the task of working with him. In that task, the President recalled that one of his first acts after the liberation of Paris was to call on de Gaulle—taking it on himself at the time to hail de Gaulle publicly as the “Provisional President of France”. This, he said, is an action de Gaulle appreciated enormously, and one he repeatedly recalls in his talks with the President.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

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## 152. Current Intelligence Memorandum

OCI No. 0064/60

Washington, May 11, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Implications of Khrushchev's Press Conference Remarks

1. Khrushchev's statement on 11 May<sup>1</sup> that the aircraft incident has changed his estimate of President Eisenhower raises some urgent questions regarding the Soviet premier's intentions and attitude toward the summit meeting and the basic issues to be discussed in Paris. The purpose of this memorandum is to place these remarks in perspective and to assess the three principal interpretations of his motivation which suggest themselves to OCI analysts at first reading.

2. Khrushchev's remark was made during an impromptu news conference held while he was inspecting a display in Gorky Park in

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1669. Secret; Noforn. The source text bears Herter's initials.

<sup>1</sup>For a transcript of Khrushchev's remarks at a press conference on May 11, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 420–423.

Moscow of what is purported to be parts of the downed aircraft. In response to a question posed by an American correspondent as to whether Khrushchev's estimate of the President formed at Camp David had changed, the Soviet premier replied, "It has, of course." When asked if he still wants the President to visit the USSR, Khrushchev hesitated and then launched into a rambling reply to the effect that his "hopes" in the President had not been "justified" and that "I am in a difficult position." He asked the reporters to "imagine" what his welcome would have been if the USSR had sent reconnaissance aircraft over the United States just before his visit last September. Toward the end of his reply, however, he seemed to draw back from the implications of his initial reaction and added that American journalists and tourists "can testify to the discipline and reserve of our people." Presumably referring to the reception the President will receive in the USSR, Khrushchev said "there will be no excesses." "I have heard of no incidents against Americans."

3. Khrushchev has alluded to this problem of Soviet public reaction in a private talk with Ambassador Thompson on 9 May.<sup>2</sup> He said one thing about the effects of the incident bothered him—that the Soviet public was concerned and "some people" might show their resentment during the President's visit. He added that, of course, the Soviet authorities did not want any such thing to happen and that they intended to receive the President as a guest.

4. The first interpretation that suggests itself is that Khrushchev's remarks in an impromptu exchange do not bear the marks of a considered statement of policy or intentions. It seems unlikely that his offhand response signals an abrupt shift in his attitude toward the summit or the President's visit. In view of his deep personal commitment to the summit meeting, to the importance of high-level exchanges, and to the policy of "peaceful coexistence," it is difficult for us to believe that this remark was intended as a provocation designed to force the President to withdraw from the Paris meeting and cancel his scheduled trip to the Soviet Union.

5. Khrushchev's handling of the aircraft incident up to this point suggests that, while he certainly intends to extract the maximum political advantage, he does not wish to slam any doors or to upset at the last

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2771 from Moscow, May 9, Thompson reported remarks made to him in private by Khrushchev at a Czech reception that day along the lines summarized in the following sentences. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5-960) In telegram 2772, May 9, he commented further that in public statements at the reception the Soviet Chairman had stressed "with great force" that if the Soviet Union signed a treaty with the German Democratic Republic, any attempt by the West to use force to gain access to Berlin would be met by force. (*Ibid.*)



minute his long campaign to bring the Western leaders to a meeting under what he considers highly favorable conditions from his viewpoint.

6. Khrushchev's remark would seem to undermine to some extent the position he took in his Supreme Soviet speeches on 5 and 7 May<sup>3</sup> in which he carefully avoided attributing direct responsibility for the aircraft incident to the President. However, in his present mood of arrogant confidence mixed with resentment toward the United States, it probably was difficult for a man of Khrushchev's temperament and flair for histrionics to suppress an off-the-cuff reaction of this kind.

7. The second interpretation would follow the line that Soviet exploitation of the incident has set in motion a chain reaction which has gone beyond Khrushchev's control and now jeopardizes the attainment of the goals he has set himself at the summit. Khrushchev's treatment of the plane incident has forced the Western powers to take countermeasures which can only have the effect of hardening the West's position at the summit and rallying America's partners behind Washington's lead. Should this, in fact, be Khrushchev's reading of the present situation, his remarks take on a more ominous aspect and raise the possibility that he is deliberately attempting to provoke the President to take a stand that would at least preclude his visit to the USSR, if not result in the postponement or cancellation of the summit meeting. The logic of the interpretation of Khrushchev's motivation would lead to the conclusion that he now considers that it would be better to avoid a summit confrontation under present conditions and that he is out to place the blame on the United States for wrecking the summit.

8. The third view of Khrushchev's latest move is that there has been some major, but still unidentified, development inside the Communist bloc which has forced Khrushchev to throw over his entire design for the summit and abandon his *détente* policy. The most obvious source of such a challenge would be an unequivocal ultimatum from the Chinese Communists confronting Khrushchev with the choice of abandoning his peaceful coexistence line or facing the consequences of some extreme action on the part of Peiping which would make an open rupture in the Sino-Soviet alliance virtually unavoidable. It would seem that in order to make such a challenge stick, the Chinese would have to threaten nothing short of an early military action that would almost certainly involve American forces in the Taiwan Strait.

9. While the fragmentary reports on Khrushchev's remarks available so far do not permit us to make any firm judgment, it would seem that we can, with fair degree of confidence, rule out the third (Chinese)

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<sup>3</sup> Regarding the May 5 statement, see footnote 3, Document 146. For excerpts from the May 7 statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 415–417.

alternative. The second interpretation (chain reaction out of control) poses the always difficult problem of judging Khrushchev's real reaction and estimate regarding Western moves and intentions. We are inclined to doubt, however, that the American response to the aircraft incident has either caught Khrushchev by surprise or caused him to reappraise the prospects for obtaining some satisfaction at the summit meeting. One must always take into account his tendency to overexploit what he considers an advantage over his opponents and his histrionic flair.

10. Our immediate judgment is that the first line of interpretation (an off-the-cuff remark not intended as a major policy statement) remains the most likely explanation. The next few hours should provide some additional clues. It will be important, for example, to study the version of Khrushchev's remarks disseminated by TASS and the Soviet press. One possible straw in the wind suggesting that Moscow is already engaged in some fence-mending is a report from NBC Moscow that unusually heavy press censorship was imposed on 11 May.

**Huntington D. Sheldon<sup>4</sup>**

*Assistant Director  
Current Intelligence*

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<sup>4</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**153. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State**

Paris, May 12, 1960, 1 p.m.

5276. From Ambassador Thompson.<sup>1</sup> All signs now appear to point to Khrushchev's intention of trying to extort maximum propaganda advantage from summit rather than attempt at serious negotiation.

I believe this represents a change in attitude, chief basis for which was probably his conversation with de Gaulle on visit to France and

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1260. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.

<sup>1</sup>Thompson was in Paris to prepare for the summit meeting, May 16.

many Western statements indicating there would be no progress on Berlin question at summit as previously reported, I suspect that pressures within bloc and within Soviet Union may have also played a role. I believe Khrushchev's strategy will now be to develop maximum strain within Western Alliance but that he will probably not actually precipitate crisis over Berlin until after American elections. It seems likely to me that there is more prospect of some progress at summit than Khrushchev realizes, even though it may not be great, and he may have believed that in view of strong position he had taken it would end in humiliating defeat for him which could seriously jeopardize his position as leader of Communist bloc. I suggest West should open summit talks by an effort to establish basis for serious negotiation.

Khrushchev's remark to me at Czech reception<sup>2</sup> about President's visit and his public statements on this subject are another indication that cold war is on again. I have little doubt that Khrushchev hopes President will cancel his trip.

It is likely that Soviet military have again raised objections to [omission in the source text] own plane. It would be difficult for him and for Russian people not to live up to their reputation for hospitality and this would be embarrassing in midst of all-out campaign against U.S. He also may be concerned that despite Soviet ability to organize heckling it would probably be impossible to prevent widespread show of interest and even friendship of Russian people for U.S. For these reasons I recommend that no decision and no further statements on President's trip be made until President comes to Paris.

**Houghton**

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<sup>2</sup>See footnote 2, Document 152.

## 154. Telegram From the Delegation at the Summit Conference to the Department of State

Paris, May 13, 1960, p.m.

Secto 4. At meeting today of Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin<sup>1</sup> Laloy distributed text of French translation new Soviet proposal on Berlin handed to French by Soviet Ambassador Paris May 9 at same time as Khrushchev letter to de Gaulle.<sup>2</sup> Proposal has obvious relationship both to Soviet proposal of July 28, 1959,<sup>3</sup> and to Smirnov memorandum given to SPD leader Ollenhauer January 13, 1960.<sup>4</sup> Laloy said he assumed proposal is follow-up to de Gaulle-Khrushchev March conversations on Berlin and stressed desirability of preventing any leaks of its existence or contents to press.

USDel translation from French follows:

*Begin text.*

Proposals of Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government favors proceeding immediately to the signature of a peace treaty with the two German states. However, since such a solution of the problem raises objection on the part of the Western Powers, the Soviet Government, which as always strives to achieve concerted action on the German question among the four principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition, is prepared meanwhile to agree to an interim solution. This interim solution would consist of the signature of a temporary (provisoire) agreement on West Berlin, suited to prepare conditions for the ultimate transformation of West Berlin into a free city and the adoption of measures leading to the preparation of the future peace settlement. In this connection the Soviet Government proposes the following:

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1360. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, and Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> The meeting took place at 3 p.m. at the Quai d'Orsay. Laloy, Kohler, Rumbold, and Carstens headed the four delegations. A memorandum of the conversation at the meeting (US/MC/3) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664.

<sup>2</sup> On May 8, Khrushchev sent letters to Macmillan and de Gaulle, which were delivered on the following day, suggesting that the United States was not interested in the success of the summit conference. A copy of the letter to Macmillan, which according to Herter was the same in substance as that to de Gaulle, was transmitted to the President as an enclosure to a May 15 memorandum from Herter. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series) For an extract from the letter and Macmillan's reply on May 10, see Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pp. 198-200. No copy of the letter to de Gaulle or any reply he might have made has been found.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 489.

<sup>4</sup> For text of this memorandum, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 69-75.

1. To conclude a temporary agreement for two years relating to West Berlin. The agreement would include approximately the same list of questions as those which had already been discussed in 1959 by the Foreign Ministers at Geneva and, without bringing any radical change to the actual status of West Berlin, would, however, open the way to the elaboration of a new and agreed status for the city corresponding to peace time conditions.

The temporary agreement should envisage the reduction of the effective strength of the forces of the Three Powers in West Berlin, which reduction could take place progressively in several stages. It would likewise be suitable to put in writing the intention expressed by the Three Powers not to place in West Berlin any kind of nuclear weapons or missile installations.

The agreement should moreover include a commitment to take measures to prohibit the use of the territory of West Berlin as a base of subversive activity and of hostile propaganda directed against other states. Measures concerning the prohibition of subversive activities and of hostile propaganda with respect to West Berlin might likewise be envisaged under an appropriate form.

In the accord account would also be taken of the declarations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR concerning the maintenance of the communications of West Berlin with the outside world in the form in which they exist at present for the duration of the temporary agreement.

The engagements concerning the GDR could in that event take a form which would not signify diplomatic recognition of the GDR by the Western Powers who would be parties to the agreement.

To supervise the fulfillment of the obligations flowing from the temporary agreement regarding agreed measures in West Berlin, and to take, in case of necessity, measures assuring the fulfillment of the agreement reached, a committee could be set up composed of representatives of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

2. At the same time that they conclude an agreement on West Berlin, the Four Powers will make a declaration inviting the two German states to take advantage of the interim period fixed by the agreement in order to attempt to arrive at a common point of view of the German question. Contact could be established between the two German states by means of the creation of an all-German committee or under some other form acceptable to them.

In formulating these proposals, the Soviet Union proceeds from the thought that, if the German states refuse to engage in conversations with one another, or if, at the expiration of the temporary agreement, it becomes clearly evident that they are not able to come to an understand-

ing, the Four Powers will sign a peace treaty with the two German states or with one of them, as they would judge it desirable. Of course, if the GDR and the GFR succeed in reaching an agreement, there will be no obstacle to the conclusion of a single peace treaty for all of Germany. Moreover, measures will be taken in order to transform West Berlin into a free city. As far as the statute of the free city of West Berlin is concerned, the USSR would prefer to elaborate this in common with France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In proposing the transformation of West Berlin into a free city the Soviet Union does not in any way wish to damage the interests of the Western Powers, to change the present mode of life in West Berlin or to attempt to integrate this city within the GDR. The Soviet proposal derives from the existing situation and tends to normalize the atmosphere in West Berlin while taking account of the interests of all parties. The creation of a free city would not damage the economic and financial relations of West Berlin with other states, including the GFR. The free city would be able to establish as it pleases its external, political, economic, commercial, scientific and cultural relations with all states and international organizations. Completely free relations with the external world would be assured to it.

The population of West Berlin would receive sure guarantees of the defense of its interests, with the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United States, of France and of the United Kingdom assuming the required obligations in order to guarantee the precise execution of the conditions of agreement of the free city. The Soviet Union states that it also favors participation of the UN in the guarantees given to the free city. It goes without saying that, in the event of the reunification of Germany, the maintenance of the special situation of the free city of West Berlin would no longer have any basis.

**Herter**

155. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/6

Paris, May 14, 1960, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Merchant  
Ambassador Houghton  
Ambassador Eaton  
Mr. Farley  
Mr. McBride

*France*

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
Ambassador Alphan  
M. Lucet  
M. Moch  
M. Legendre

SUBJECT

Disarmament—French Missiles Control Proposals

M. Couve de Murville opened the meeting suggesting that there should be an exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and delivery means. The Secretary noted that we and the French have exchanged papers.<sup>1</sup> Couve referred to the French paper and said that the last two pages contain a proposal which could be made. The Secretary asked if, before passing to the final two pages of the French paper, he could refer to the last sentence of paragraph two on the first page which refers to the problem of control and of making a study of this problem of control. He assumed there would be no commitments made in advance of this study. Couve said he would rather put it that any commitments would be conditional on the outcome of the control study.

The Secretary said that we had been troubled by the idea of making even conditional commitments to abolish nuclear weapons delivery systems prior to studying control and making sure this problem could be taken care of. Couve summarized the US position as wanting control and inspection without disarmament. He said the US position was that

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by McBride, cleared by Farley, and approved in S on May 16. The conversation took place at the Quai d'Orsay. Secretary Herter arrived in Paris on May 13 for discussions preliminary to the summit conference. In a conversation on May 13, Farley went over the same ground with Lucet. (Memorandum of conversation (US/MC/2); *ibid.*)

<sup>1</sup> A copy of the U.S. paper, entitled "World-Wide Missile Site and Air Base Inspection," was handed to Alphan at a meeting with Herter on May 10. (Tab A to a memorandum of conversation, May 10; *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA 5/1060) The French paper has not been identified further.

there could be no commitment in advance even on the assumption the outcome of the control study would be satisfactory. He said the French view on the other hand was that there could be a commitment on nuclear disarmament in advance on the basis of a satisfactory outcome of the control study.

The Secretary said there was another difference. In the Western disarmament plan,<sup>2</sup> it had been agreed to propose first steps in which the control problem was the simplest. This would determine whether or not the Soviets were operating in good faith and avoid a battle of words at the Summit. Therefore, our approach had been that it was better to pick out some relatively simple things; however, the French had selected the most complex issues where the controls would be most difficult to apply. Couve said that the French paper followed the US approach to the nuclear testing problem, but he noted we had been at these discussions for two years with relatively little result. The Secretary referred to the six points advanced by Lloyd in Istanbul. The Secretary inquired if it were the French intention to exclude consideration of other measures beyond those in their paper. Couve added that, as he had said in Istanbul, there was no intention to eliminate consideration of cutoff nor conventional disarmament.

Couve then said that, if the French tabled their paper, the US could indicate its understanding that the points raised therein were third stage measures and came at the end of the disarmament scale. The Secretary said he had been under the impression that the French were re-drafting their paper. Couve replied that the re-draft would not alter their basic position. Couve said the US at the Summit could give its views on control and the danger of hiding certain things.

The Secretary asked if the French paper had in mind the Chinese problem. Couve said this would depend on whether or not China adhered to the proposal. He noted the importance of nuclear disarmament in connection with China.

The Secretary said he felt that if we went the whole hog in nuclear disarmament, as the French were proposing, without an international control organization, it would be impossible. Couve indicated agreement. The Secretary said he feared jumping into a dismantling of the one deterrent we had. Couve said the Soviets had this same deterrent; to which the Secretary replied that, if we eliminated the existing stalemate, we would change the whole existing balance of power. Couve said that all of the foregoing was true and should be stated by us.

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<sup>2</sup>For text of the March 16 Western disarmament plan, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 696-699.



Ambassador Eaton inquired if the French paper were a spelling out of certain phases of the Western plan. Couve said he considered it an addition to the Western plan addressed to the question of nuclear delivery means. He recognized that the Western plan covered other things as well such as conventional disarmament and the organization to be established. Ambassador Eaton asked if it were the French intention to table this as a separate paper. Couve replied that the French contemplated tabling this separately as an addition to the Western plan. The Secretary noted that it leaps from stage 1 to stage 3 of the Western plan. Couve said that only satellite control would be involved now, and that implementation of all of the measures would be dependent on the outcome of the control study. The Secretary noted that this would mean the elimination of surface vessels, planes, submarines, etc., and the destruction of existing stocks. He asked when this ban on construction would begin. Couve replied that all of this would be coupled with the Western plan.

The Secretary asked for confirmation of his understanding that nothing would happen until the study of controls was completed. Couve said that this was a correct understanding. Couve added the French thought we should concentrate on strategic rather than tactical weapons. Ambassador Eaton said if the French paper were a separate document, that was a different problem from its being fitted into the Western plan. Couve said that the Western plan had already been tabled and rejected, and that it was planned to table the French paper as an additional document. The Secretary referred to the danger that the Soviets would accept this paper and reject the Western plan. The Secretary said we could never accept this paper by itself. Couve said we should so state, and that he did not believe there was any difficulty in our making such a statement when the French put their paper in. The Secretary said he remained concerned that the Soviets would accept solely the French paper as the basis for resuming the Geneva negotiations.

Couve then said he thought the Soviets would raise the question of disarmament principles. The Secretary said this boiled down to one thing—the Soviets want complete disarmament with no controls. Couve agreed we should stick to the points in our principles paper, but remarked he thought Khrushchev would be embarrassed if we accepted his own proposal. The Secretary pointed out that in our principles paper we say we should begin with specific measures, and ones relatively easy to put into effect. By taking the French paper, we give the Soviets a choice of several proposals. Couve agreed there should be no disarmament without control, and that we should see what was possible and undertake such disarmament as is controllable. The French were talking about a long period of study and negotiation, and believed everything should be in the hands of the international body.

The Secretary said that, if the French tabled the paper, we would have to say that it appears to be a refinement of stage 3 of the Western plan, and that we could consider it only as a part of this plan. He asked again what we should do if Khrushchev accepted only the French proposal. Couve admitted he didn't know the answer. The Secretary said it would be awkward if we split on this issue. Couve asked wherein lay the danger of the French paper. The Secretary added that it omitted conventional disarmament, the international control body, etc. Couve repeated that the French plan committed us only to a study. He said we could speak our piece also on conventional disarmament and the international body.

In response to a further remark from Ambassador Eaton, Couve said that the French proposal was both separate and a part of the Western plan. If the Soviets accepted it there should be a continued effort to get discussion also of the remainder of the Western plan. The Secretary asked if the French intended to table this at the Summit or in Geneva. Couve said it was to be submitted to the Summit. In response to a question from the Secretary, Couve said it was not planned to discuss this with the Italians or the Canadians in advance or with NATO. The Secretary said we had both been part of a five-man team at Geneva and it would be difficult for the French to table an entirely new proposal at the Summit, and would leave the others in an awkward position. Couve said it had always been envisaged that we would discuss disarmament at the Summit. The Secretary said that the best which could result was a directive to three of the five Western nations. The Secretary said it would be unfortunate if the directives to the US and French delegations were different.

The Secretary stated that the French had lifted the nuclear portions of stage 3 of the Western Plan and promoted them to stage 1. Couve said everything was conditional on control. The Secretary said it should also be conditional on the rest of the disarmament package. Couve said the US should so state if that were our view. He thought it would take many years to carry out the French plan. The Secretary believed it was a question of emphasis. Couve thought public opinion generated pressures for nuclear disarmament, which should be responded to so long as it was not too risky. The Secretary expressed fears that the Soviets would jump on nuclear disarmament and attempt to get a commitment in this field. Couve said the only commitment would be to study the possibilities. In the meantime the Geneva talks should go forward on the rest of the package. The Secretary said that, at least, there would be a commitment to study this aspect. Couve said he thought the Soviet reaction to the French proposal would be that it was more of the same, that is, control without disarmament. The Secretary said he was still worried that the

Soviets, for propaganda purposes, would profess an interest in the French proposal.

On another topic, Couve said, in response to the Secretary's question, that the de Gaulle–Khrushchev meeting on Sunday, May 15, had been undertaken at Soviet initiative, and was, to the best of his knowledge, for courtesy purposes only. He could not say whether disarmament would arise at that meeting. With regard to the Summit agenda, Couve said it was always the French intention not to begin with Germany, but with disarmament and East-West relations. However, he thought Khrushchev might insist on starting with Germany and Berlin. He said the French did not believe we should engage in procedural battle. If he insisted, we should let Khrushchev begin with Berlin and Germany. He would see that deadlock had quickly developed, at which time we could pass to other things and revert to Germany at the end. The Secretary made it clear that if a deadlock on Berlin and Germany developed at the outset, we could make no commitments on other subjects.

Reverting to the French missile paper, the Secretary said he was still worried about the Soviets accepting it. Couve averred that, if this were the case, the US could insist on going ahead with other aspects of the Western plan which we thought necessary. The Secretary remarked this might leave us alone, and make it appear we alone were blocking progress in disarmament. Couve said this would not be the case if others supported us. In response to the Secretary's question, Couve said the French would give us support on the need for progress in other aspects of disarmament.

The Secretary said he could still see inescapable embarrassment. He had thought the agreement reached at Istanbul was to put forward some specific measures and not something along the lines of the French proposal. Furthermore, if there were some new plan along these lines, we felt a commitment to so inform the Italians, Canadians and NATO.

Couve said that the problem was that the Soviets had a plan,<sup>3</sup> the West had a plan and both had been tabled and rejected at Geneva. The problem was therefore to give the Geneva Conference some new terms of references which were beyond either of the previous plans. M. Moch noted that Khrushchev had said in France that the Western plan was unacceptable as it represented no disarmament. Therefore, a move was needed to break the Geneva deadlock.

The Secretary stated that if the French plan were merely for study then it was similar to the Western plan except that it placed greater emphasis on the nuclear features. Couve repeated that it adopted a similar

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the Soviet principles for general and complete disarmament, April 8, see *ibid.*, pp. 699–700.

approach to ours in the case of the nuclear testing problem except for the moratorium feature. The Secretary said it was different in that potentially it called for the scrapping of weapons, and would be seriously embarrassing if picked up by the Soviets out of the whole package proposed by the West, and this were the only instruction to the Geneva Conference. Couve said that instructions to the Geneva Conference should not be limited to the French plan. He thought a special technical committee for the study of the French plan could be established and the ten-power group could continue separately along current lines.

The Secretary concluded that if the French were determined to proceed along this line, the US would have to reserve its position vis-à-vis the Canadians and Italians, as well as NATO, and reserve the right to talk to them. If the French table this document, we will have to determine what lines we will follow. This matter would have to be discussed with the four principals on Sunday afternoon. Whether or not this issue would come up on Monday in the Summit itself was, of course, uncertain.

Moch repeated that in the disarmament field, the Soviets would raise the question of general principles. In this field, we should stick to the agreement we have already reached, the Secretary thought. Couve said the Soviets would repeat their proposal for general and complete disarmament under conditions we had already refused.

There then ensued a brief discussion of force levels in conventional disarmament. The Secretary noted that we had not tabled force levels for other countries. The Soviets had said they would reduce from 3.7 to 2.4 million but the question of verification remained open. Couve said the stumbling block for us here also was the control question. The problem of reserves was also unsettled the Secretary pointed out, noting there was no agreed definition on reserves. Ambassador Eaton said the Soviets had agreed to permit verification only of the reduction itself not of remaining men. Moch referred to the gap between the 2.1 and 1.7 million figures for the US and the Soviet Union which had been discussed at Geneva. There was mention of the problem of China in connection with conventional disarmament, and Couve and the Secretary agreed that the Soviets had always insisted on parity for the Chinese with themselves and the US. In discussion of existing conventional forces, Couve said the French now had about 1,000,000 men under arms. He thought the satellites probably had about 1,000,000 men under arms also. Moch thought it might be possible to reach agreement on conventional disarmament on a figure somewhere between 2.1 and 1.7 million. Couve said he doubted this issue would be discussed in detail at the Summit.

Couve pointed out again his view that what the Soviets would raise at the Summit in disarmament would be the general principles problem.

He also said again he thought the worst possible thing from the Soviet viewpoint would be for us to accept this idea.

Couve asked if the Secretary had seen the new Soviet paper on Germany which they had given to the French.<sup>4</sup> The Secretary replied in the affirmative and thought it did not add much to their 1959 proposals except that it provided for a two-year period for an interim agreement whereas they have previously spoken of a year-and-a-half. The Secretary asked if Mr. Bolz were coming to the Conference and Couve answered in the negative. Couve said there had been some pressure from the Soviets to have an East German delegation on the grounds there would be one from West Germany. He added that we need not worry about Bolz as he had no visa. Couve added that in Luxembourg at the recent meeting of the Community of Six Foreign Ministers, he had been obliged to convince Brentano, who wanted to remain in Paris throughout the Summit Meeting, that he should return to Germany after the talks with the Chancellor.

The Secretary reverted to the problem of handling the French missile paper. Couve said the three Heads of Government should discuss this on Sunday evening. He asked if there were anything else which should be discussed tripartitely, such as Germany. The Secretary thought that, as of now, we had firm agreement on this subject. Couve thought the Soviets would open the discussion of Germany at the Summit with their peace treaty proposal, but would not stick on this long because they knew the Western position already. The main discussion on this item, Couve thought, would revolve around an interim agreement for Berlin and how to achieve one without prejudicing our position. The Secretary said we could not tell how the first hour on Monday with the four Heads of Government alone would proceed, but believed not too much could be discussed because of the time element and the double consecutive translation problem. Couve thought discussions at this session would be entirely on conference procedures.

The Secretary, in conclusion, referred to the US paper which he had given Alphan in Washington on on-site inspections to help prevent surprise attack. Couve said he had read this. It was, he said, an open skies proposal and he wondered if it had any zonal limits. The Secretary answered in the negative and said it was intended to cover everything without zonal limits. Couve said the French had no objection to the paper. Moch said Khrushchev would call the US proposal control without disarmament. Couve referred to the US open skies proposal in 1955 which covered the US and USSR. The Secretary referred to the discussions in 1957 of various zonal suggestions. Moch concluded on this

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 154.

point saying that he was sure Ambassador Eaton would agree that the essential was that whatever Summit directive on disarmament might be sent to Geneva, it should be clear and not subject to months of haggling over interpretation.

At the end of the meeting, the Secretary inquired whether the French thought Khrushchev wanted a short-term *modus vivendi* on Berlin. Couve said he thought it was unlikely. The Secretary said that the conclusion of the 1959 meeting in Geneva represented our last position on Berlin. Couve thought Khrushchev probably wanted some result from the Summit to justify its having been held, and perhaps it did not matter to him much in what field and that he hoped to take something back with him either in the Berlin or disarmament field.

The meeting adjourned at 12:20 p.m.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> At the end of the conversation, Merchant spoke to Alphand and Lucet about the French proposal. According to his memorandum of the conversation, the discussion went as follows:

“Following the break-up of the bipartite meeting with the French on disarmament, I told both M. Lucet and Ambassador Alphand that the French proposal on means of delivery and their decision to present it as a proposal at the Summit was to us a matter of utmost seriousness. I said that they were proposing to offer controls over weapons which they did not possess. Moreover, the controls necessary were so far-reaching and complicated that we would never contemplate this project in any other phase of the Western disarmament plan than in stage 3. Finally, I said it seemed to me that it opened up the very real possibility that the President would have to repudiate de Gaulle’s proposal in front of Khrushchev. Both of them deprecated the seriousness of the matter, but I did not feel that their hearts were in the defense of the proposal.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664)

156. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/28

Paris, May 14, 1960, 3 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Foreign Secretary Couve de Murville  
Foreign Minister von Brentano

(See additional list at end of memorandum.)<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Foreign Ministers' Meeting—Germany and Berlin

After welcoming the Foreign Ministers, Mr. Couve de Murville reported that the Soviet Embassy had requested the French to admit a GDR delegation during the Summit meeting. The Soviets justified their request by saying that there was a West German delegation in Paris. The French had replied that they saw no need for the presence of a GDR delegation. They assumed the matter would rest there. Khrushchev might, however, raise the matter again on Monday. The Czechs had previously requested, without success, that the French issue visas to a GDR delegation. The other Ministers concurred in this course of action.

Mr. Couve de Murville then referred to the new Soviet proposal for an interim agreement on Berlin, which had been distributed in the Working Group on Germany including Berlin the day before.<sup>2</sup> He explained that the Soviet Ambassador had called on de Gaulle to deliver a message from Khrushchev and had left the Soviet paper at the same time. It was believed that the paper had been given to de Gaulle because Khrushchev had discussed the question of an interim agreement with de Gaulle and had said that a paper would be provided later.

Mr. von Brentano noted that the proposal corresponded to the Soviet proposal of July 28, 1959<sup>3</sup> but that it contained additional negative

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Hillenbrand, and approved in M on May 16 and S on May 20. The conversation took place at the Quai d'Orsay. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 9 from Paris, May 14 at 9 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1460)

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 154.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 489.

aspects. For example, the purpose of the interim agreement was stated to be the establishment of a free city of West Berlin and the failure of the suggested all-German committee to make progress would be followed not by new negotiations, as called for in the earlier proposal, but by the conclusion of a peace treaty or peace treaties. The new proposal seemed to represent a complete presentation of maximum Soviet demands.

Mr. Couve de Murville said he found little new in the proposal. It was a little more specific than the Soviets had been at Geneva, but the problem of what would come after the expiration of the agreement remained.

Mr. Lloyd commented that the whole basis of the discussion of an interim agreement on Berlin at Geneva had been that negotiations would be resumed after the expiration of the agreement. In this sense, the new proposal was a step backward.

Mr. von Brentano agreed that the key question was that of the duration of the agreement and what would come after it. Under the new proposal, Soviet demands would have to be met. When the agreement expired, a free city would be established and the Western Powers would have obligations with respect to a peace treaty.

Secretary Herter circulated copies of a preliminary analysis which the U.S. had made of the points of difference between the earlier Soviet proposal (that of July 28, 1959) and the new one.<sup>4</sup> He thought the Soviets were probably trying to make concessions on some minor points, but their position on the major points would make agreement impossible.

Mr. Couve de Murville said that what was of decisive importance in the Summit discussion was not the precise number of troops, etc., but rather the question of what would happen at the end of an interim agreement. The other Foreign Ministers concurred.

Secretary Herter said that there remained two questions to be dealt with: first, the question whether there should be an interim arrangement for a term of years or continued negotiations in another forum; and second, the polishing up of the Western proposal of July 28, 1959. He noted that the Working Group had prepared a draft directive and declaration.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Lloyd said it was unlikely that Khrushchev would agree to the referral of the Berlin question to another body without any discussion at the Summit of the substance of an interim arrangement.

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<sup>4</sup> This analysis was transmitted in Secto 5 from Paris, May 14 at 1 p.m. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1666)

<sup>5</sup> The draft directive and declaration were included in the Supplementary Report of the Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, April 21. (*Ibid.*, EUR/SOV Files: Lot 64 D 291, Germany)



The Secretary observed that the Soviet readiness to accept a two-year agreement might have some tactical significance. Khrushchev might wish to move quickly away from the subject of a peace treaty. He might thus hope to evade the plebiscite question.

Mr. von Brentano said that the new Soviet proposal contemplated a final rather than a temporary agreement on Berlin. Recalling that the Western Powers had modified the term "interim agreement" to "arrangement", he commented that the Three Powers, if they discussed the new proposal with the Soviets, would in effect be talking about a definitive solution. It was not desirable to discuss Berlin on this basis.

Mr. Lloyd noted that the Soviets would probably publish their proposal and that it would then be necessary for the Western Powers to comment on it. He was not suggesting that the Western Powers publish an alternative proposal of their own, but rather that they prepare arguments against the Soviet proposal. For example, they might ask what would happen with respect to East Berlin.

Mr. Herter referred to the "Essential Conditions of a Berlin Arrangement"<sup>6</sup> which the Foreign Ministers had already approved and said that these were, in effect, the Western argument.

Mr. Couve de Murville said he understood that the Western Powers could not put forward a counterproposal, but that they should not discuss the Soviet proposal in detail. The main question for discussion at the Summit was whether or not there was agreement on basic principles.

Mr. Lloyd replied that he felt that it was necessary to have arguments against the Soviet paper. The Western Powers should also have their own paper on a Berlin arrangement ready, certainly not for tabling early in the Summit discussions but for possible later tactical use.

Mr. von Brentano agreed that, if the Soviet proposal were published, the Western Powers should not publish a counter-proposal of their own but should put forward arguments against the Soviet proposal.

With respect to the revision of the Western proposal of July 28, 1959, Secretary Herter noted that the Working Group had revised the last sentence of paragraph (e) to read "The rights of the Western Powers in and relative to Berlin and access thereto shall remain unaffected by the conclusion or eventual modification or termination of this agreement" and that the British and French had raised the question whether this sentence was necessary at all.

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<sup>6</sup>The essential conditions paper was also included in the report cited in footnote 5 above.

Mr. Lloyd said it would be better to leave the sentence out if there were a real possibility Khrushchev were ready for such an arrangement, but that it would be better to leave the sentence in if the paper were simply put forward as a propaganda gesture at the end.

Mr. Couve de Murville agreed that it was essentially a question of tactics. Basically, he said, the Western position was their July 28 paper.

Mr. von Brentano agreed that the sentence might be left out if there were a possibility of real discussion, but that this question should not be prejudged and that the sentence should be left in at this time.

Secretary Herter said that Mr. Lloyd had raised an important question, namely what Western arguments could be made publicly as soon as the new Soviet proposal is published. At his suggestion, the Foreign Ministers agreed that the Working Group should prepare such arguments.

Mr. Lloyd said that points which might be included were that Berlin cannot remain a "free" city without the presence of Allied troops, that the Soviet proposal prejudged what would happen when the agreement terminated, and the Western arguments on an all-German committee (which he believed were well presented in the Secretary's speech of August 5, 1959).<sup>7</sup>

With respect to an all-German committee, Mr. von Brentano said it remained his Government's view that the German question should be discussed among the Four Powers, with German consultants to be called on as necessary.

Following the discussion of Germany and Berlin there was a brief exchange of information on the arrangements for the Western Heads of Government and the East-West Summit meetings.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> For text of Herter's closing statement at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, August 5, 1959, see *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 676-683.

<sup>8</sup> An 11-line memorandum of this part of the conversation (US/MC/29) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664.

**157. Memorandum of Conversation**

US/MC/14

Paris, May 14, 1960, 5 p.m.

**MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT**

**PARTICIPANTS**

*United States*

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Merchant  
Ambassador Wadsworth  
Mr. Farley  
Mr. Spiers

*United Kingdom*

Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
The Hon. C.D.W. O'Neill  
Mr. J.A. Thomson  
Mr. A.C.I. Samuel

**SUBJECT**

Nuclear Test Negotiations

The Secretary said he understood that Mr. Lloyd felt that Wednesday would be too early for a meeting with the Soviets on suspension of nuclear tests. He said that the timing of such a meeting was of no great moment to us but that we had to reckon with the fact that even as early as Wednesday or Thursday we may not be on speaking terms with the Soviets. Mr. Lloyd agreed that we should suggest a meeting before the atmosphere clouded further. Gromyko was coming to the British Embassy tomorrow and he would suggest a meeting either Wednesday or Thursday and see how Gromyko reacted. For his part he would like to get on to a subject on which there was a chance of making progress. Therefore, on second thought, he thought that Wednesday would be satisfactory. He would suggest that the meeting take place at the British Embassy. They would arrange for a table which would seat four on each side. The Secretary suggested that two or three more might sit behind. Mr. Merchant suggested that the meeting be held at the Foreign Minister level. Mr. Lloyd felt it would be better to get together immediately with Mr. Khrushchev, and if necessary a further meeting of the Foreign Ministers could be arranged for Thursday. The Secretary agreed, observing that Gromyko would probably have no more leeway than Tsarapkin has had to deal with the issues involved.

The Secretary suggested that there were three major problems: (1) the length of the moratorium, (2) the quota, and (3) the composition of the Control Commission. With respect to the first point, the U.S. position was that the maximum would be two years. Mr. Lloyd suggested

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by Farley and Spiers on May 15 and approved in M and S on May 17. The conversation took place at the U.S. Embassy.

that the duration could be related to the length of the research program. The Secretary said that this would be dangerous since there had been a great deal of talk about the research program going on for five years. We felt that two years would suffice for preliminary results from the research program. The moratorium should start with the date of signature, as was contemplated in the March 29 communiqué.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Lloyd agreed and asked for the U.S. position on dealing with the quota. Did we want one quota or two? The Secretary said that he saw no sense in insisting on a quota to be applied below the threshold. Perhaps we could seek agreement that there would be a few inspections for experimental purposes. These would not be provided for within the treaty. Mr. Lloyd agreed, saying that these inspections could be represented as part of the research program. He asked for the U.S. position on the number of inspections above the threshold. The Secretary referred to the RAND report<sup>2</sup> as relevant in this connection stating that it was the first hopeful scientific breakthrough we had had in these negotiations. This was something which would be helpful to us in achieving Senate consent to ratification.

Mr. Lloyd asked how we would propose to handle the negotiations and whether we wished to suggest re-spacing of the control stations to the Soviets. The Secretary reviewed the major conclusions of the RAND report, citing the reductions in the numbers of unidentified events which might be achieved through rearrangement of the stations and addition of either four or nine new stations to the present twenty-one. Mr. Lloyd said that a quota of four inspections would be justified if we were to add 9 stations. Ambassador Wadsworth noted that we could expect Soviet resistance to the addition of stations, although they may be willing to accept such a departure from the Experts' report if this were the price of a low quota figure.

Mr. O'Neill suggested that it might be wise not to let the Soviets know about the RAND recalculations and that we should not propose a rearrangement or addition of stations until and unless we had reached a final impasse on the quota figure. The first problem was to get the Soviet reaction to our proposal for 20 inspections. Mr. Lloyd disagreed and said that our dealings with Khrushchev would be helped if we gave him all of the facts and figures. Otherwise we would succeed only in feeding his suspicions. Mr. Farley noted that the report was in the public domain

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<sup>1</sup> For text of the March 29 communiqué, issued at Camp David by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 734–735.

<sup>2</sup> For text of "Capabilities and Limitations of a Geneva Type Control System," April 15, see U.S. Congress, 86th Session, *Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Test Ban: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation*, pp. 99–101.

and that the Soviets had had an official attending the Joint Committee hearings at which the RAND report was described. Mr. Lloyd said that Khrushchev would probably be prepared to take a practical approach to the matter. Ambassador Wadsworth said that we would have to be prepared to add stations in the U.S. if we were suggesting additions in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Lloyd asked what number of experimental inspections we would seek below the threshold. Ambassador Wadsworth suggested the figure of 10. Mr. Farley said that in view of the fact that there was no real basis for regarding inspections in this area as a deterrent, we should not seek inspections as a matter of right but rather by agreement in the context of a joint study of the possibilities of improving inspection techniques.

The Secretary said that another possibility would be to lower the threshold. There was no reason that we had to stick with the present figure of 4.75. For example, with the addition of some stations and a quota of 10 inspections we might agree to a threshold of 4.4, which would correspond to 5 kilotons.

Mr. Lloyd said that assuming Khrushchev had agreed, say, to 6 inspections and a respacing or addition of stations, would we be prepared to discuss Commission composition. Ambassador Wadsworth said that we had to consider the effect of the composition on voting procedures where a two-third majority was provided for in the treaty. Parity in this instance would amount to a veto. Mr. O'Neill said that this was relevant only in connection with voting on the budget, where we were ready to accept a veto. Mr. Lloyd said that he himself favored a veto on the budget total. If there were no budget the treaty would fall. He asked what the U.S. estimates of costs of the system would be. Mr. Farley said that, disregarding the high altitude system, we have previously envisaged an installation cost of between three and five hundred million dollars with yearly operating costs running at perhaps 10 percent of this figure. Last week we had gotten a new estimate which anticipated a cost of up to five hundred million just for the installation of 22 posts in the Soviet Union. This was probably a highly inflated estimate and we felt that the original figure would be more accurate. Mr. Lloyd said that costs on this order did not alarm him. He asked whether the Russians would be likely to raise the composition question here. Ambassador Wadsworth said that he thought a final decision on this question would have to be reached at a high level, although the details could be worked out in Geneva. Mr. Lloyd said that there were two possibilities: 4-4-3 or 4-4-4. Mr. O'Neill said that he preferred the former and original party unanimity on voting the scale of contributions and total budget. Mr. Lloyd said that he felt if we were to indicate to the Soviets here that we

could settle on this basis this would loosen Khrushchev up on the other points. He asked what other problems remained.

Ambassador Wadsworth described the position on staffing which was still a major issue. The Secretary said that we should not get into discussion of this but should limit ourselves here to the fairly simple issues. Mr. Lloyd agreed. He said that we should try initially to get agreement on a quota of 20, on the length of the moratorium, and on a 4-4-3 Control Commission composition. The negotiators at Geneva would be left to work out details. He then asked if there was anything likely to come up in connection with the research program, noting that the President at his last press conference had spoken in terms of jointly conducted nuclear tests. The Secretary explained the proposals that we had sent to our delegation regarding the conduct of experiments in the research program and how the terms of the Atomic Energy Act<sup>3</sup> required us to resort to the "black box" idea. This was a dilemma since there was also a problem in connection with yield measurements. Both sides will need to know the yield of a particular device before results of experimentation can be considered valid. If internal examination of the devices used cannot be allowed, instrumentation will be required which would be useful for purposes of weapons development.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that his senior scientific adviser at Geneva felt that the simplest solution to the problem would be for the three parties to sit down and develop a new design, starting from scratch. Mr. Farley noted that this would probably not solve the problems since technically a device became Restricted Data as soon as it was conceived. Furthermore, there was the problem of accurate yield prediction. Mr. O'Neill wondered what the position would be if British devices which did not incorporate information received from the United States were used. The Secretary said that he thought the law would not apply in this case. Mr. O'Neill said that he did not think that the U.K. classification system would require automatic declassification of devices disclosed to the Soviets. The Secretary speculated that this might be the solution to the problem we faced. Mr. Farley said that there were other provisions of the law which might make it difficult to use even these devices within the United States. The Secretary suggested that we both look more closely into the possibilities and problems of this approach.

Ambassador Wadsworth noted that a further unsolved problem related to high altitude tests, recalling the February 11 position<sup>4</sup> that we

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and its revision of 1958, see 60 Stat. 755 and 72 Stat. 276.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Wadsworth's February 11 statement to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, pp. 33-39.

would agree to ban tests up to altitudes for which effective controls could be agreed. The Secretary described the practical difficulties and costs of the satellite system which had been outlined by the experts in 1959. His own feeling was that we should establish a control system applicable to about 100,000 kilometers and forget about the rest. Mr. Lloyd asked whether in this case we would make a declaration of intention not to test beyond this altitude. The Secretary thought we might. Ambassador Wadsworth said that he preferred the position we had contemplated last August of incorporating the satellite system into the treaty but leaving to the Control Commission the decisions as to whether or not it should actually be installed. Otherwise we would be accused of retreating again from an agreed technical report. Mr. Lloyd said that he did not think we should get into a discussion of this matter with Khrushchev. He agreed with the Secretary that the best approach would be to forget about high altitude tests beyond 100,000 kilometers, simply saying that we would not test in outer space if others did not.

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**158. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) and Foreign Secretary Lloyd**

US/MC/16

Paris, May 14, 1960.

[Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**159. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower**

Paris, May 15, 1960, 11 a.m.

**OTHERS PRESENT**

Secretary Herter, Secretary Gates, Major Eisenhower, General Goodpaster

The President began by saying that he had been considering the whole U-2 question, and that in his opinion the U-2 is now a dead

issue—it is obsolete. Mr. Herter mentioned that General de Gaulle had been briefed on the material derived from this operation and had been most appreciative, commenting that it must go on.<sup>1</sup>

Regarding the question of Berlin and Germany, Mr. Herter said that a Soviet paper had been sent to de Gaulle,<sup>2</sup> and is being very carefully studied. On disarmament, there is a problem with the French, who show signs of submitting a separate paper on control of delivery means, which is a wholly different approach from the work done in Geneva. With regard to the open skies idea, Mr. Herter said his people are giving attention to the concept of inspection of the type in the Norstad plan, extended to the whole world. They are also studying the proposal for the United Nations to do the overflying, and provide assurance against surprise attack.

The President said what he especially liked about the Norstad plan was that it was limited, and would be a good testing ground for development of inspection procedures.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

The President then asked the Secretary what subjects he thought would come up for principal consideration at the Western Four-Power meeting in the early afternoon. Mr. Herter thought that, with Adenauer there, the main question would be that of Berlin and Germany. The President asked the same question regarding the Three-Power meeting, and Mr. Herter said that is planned for procedures and tactics for the summit.

Mr. Herter reverted to the problem raised by the French disarmament proposal, which he termed embarrassing to the West. The French have given no notice of this to NATO, and it is essentially a new project. We have had to reserve our position on it as a result. Mr. Gates suggested that we should directly challenge de Gaulle on this. The President said he had no disagreement with it in concept. The question is phasing, and the specific measures by which we carry out the proposal. The idea is deficient in that it omits consideration of the essential practical considerations.

Mr. Herter said the British will talk with the Soviets about arrangements for discussions on nuclear testing. He and the British both thought the meeting should be held at the British Embassy, perhaps on Wednesday or Thursday at 5 PM.

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<sup>1</sup> Officials from the Embassy in Paris briefed de Gaulle on the U-2 program during the morning of May 14. A report on the briefing was transmitted in telegram 5328 from Paris, May 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5-1460)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 154.



The President said he is of the view that he should see Khrushchev bilaterally early in the sessions—immediately if Khrushchev brings up the U-2 question.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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### 160. Editorial Note

During the morning of May 15, Khrushchev paid a visit to de Gaulle at the Elysée Palace. Accompanied by Gromyko, Ambassador Vinogradov, and Minister of Defense Malinovsky, Khrushchev launched into an attack on the United States, and handed de Gaulle a declaration that stated that unless President Eisenhower publicly apologized for the U-2 incident, announced that those responsible would be punished, and stated that no U.S. spy planes would overfly the Soviet Union again, he would take no part in the summit conference.

For two accounts of this meeting, see de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, pages 260–261, and *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, pages 452–453. A copy of the declaration was transmitted in Secto 14 from Paris, May 16. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1666)

## 161. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/9

Paris, May 15, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

## PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The President  
 Secretary Herter  
 Under Secretary Merchant  
 Colonel Walters

*United Kingdom*

Prime Minister Macmillan  
 Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd  
 Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
 Sir Anthony Rumbold

*France*

President de Gaulle  
 Prime Minister Debre  
 Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
 Mr. Andronikov (interpreter)  
 Mr. Stakovich (interpreter)

*Federal Republic of Germany*

Chancellor Adenauer  
 Foreign Minister von Brentano  
 Dr. Carstens

## SUBJECT

Meeting of Western Chiefs of State and Heads of Government with Chancellor Adenauer

General de Gaulle said that they were met together to discuss problems of Germany and Berlin which would be taken up at the Summit if there were a Summit. He wished to welcome them to this meeting.

The President then said he felt that inasmuch as the Chancellor was present he might wish to suggest subjects for discussion.

Chancellor Adenauer said that this was a problem of general interest and that there were two points relating to policy. First, the problem of Germany as a whole and the problem of Berlin. Khrushchev had tried to separate the Berlin problem from that of Germany as a whole. The Soviet purpose was to dominate all of Germany and we should remember that if this were to occur it would upset the whole equilibrium in Europe. This matter had been exhaustively discussed by him, the Foreign Ministers, and in the NATO Council. He would like to emphasize his strong feeling that Khrushchev should not be allowed to make Germany and Berlin the principal subject of this Summit meeting. He felt

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters and approved in M on May 15 and in S and the White House on May 16. The conversation took place at the Elysée Palace. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Cahto 6 from Paris, May 16 at 6 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.0221/5-1660) For two other accounts of this conversation, see de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, pp. 261-262, and Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1959-1963*, pp. 48-51.

that we should put major emphasis on disarmament. The German problem is not the only problem in the world. There are others in Korea, Red China and elsewhere. These can only be solved through progress in disarmament because only by such progress can we establish the atmosphere of confidence and trust which is essential.

General de Gaulle then noted that the Chancellor had made two particular points, namely that the Western powers not allow Berlin to become the chief topic at the Summit meeting, but that disarmament should be the major topic. If progress were made on disarmament, this could lead to a *détente*. He had pointed out that the Soviets wished to dominate Germany and thereby enhance the position of the Soviet bloc.

The President then said he would like to ask whether the Chancellor had read Khrushchev's latest proposal on Berlin,<sup>1</sup> and, if so, did he have any comments.

General de Gaulle said that this was the one relating to a temporary arrangement at the end of which there would have to be a change in the status of Berlin, and if Khrushchev obtained our agreement to this even tacitly he would have part of the cake.

The Chancellor jokingly said he did not know whether this was really Khrushchev's last proposal. There had been several of these last proposals. He fully agreed with General de Gaulle that at the end of two years Khrushchev would have part of the cake.

The President said that in this paper of Khrushchev's he did note one element which seemed new to him, and this was the fact that Khrushchev seemed willing to concede that West Berlin could make any political-economic arrangements that it wanted with other countries (except of course military arrangements). At Geneva he had been unwilling to agree to this and this seemed perhaps one advance by Khrushchev.

General de Gaulle said that at Geneva, where he had not been present—he felt Khrushchev had not excluded relationships of the free city with outside states and organizations but he had made it quite plain that he would not allow West Berlin to belong to the German Federal Republic.

The President said that he had read this paper rather hurriedly on the plane and the Secretary added that it was an English translation from a French translation of a Russian original.

General de Gaulle said he felt what Khrushchev wanted was a city which would belong to no one and accepted the fact that it would not belong to the German Democratic Republic.

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 154.

The President said that he had understood in this latest note that Khrushchev had withdrawn his objections to a political link with the Federal Republic.

General de Gaulle said that he felt Khrushchev had made it plain on many occasions that he would not allow the city of West Berlin to belong to the Federal Republic but in any case they could ask him.

The President said that the worst part of the paper was the end of it where it was indicated that at the end of the two-year period there must be a new status for the city.

The Chancellor said that he was very fearful that if there were any such two-year undertaking that there would be a flight of people and capital from West Berlin, that the city would be weakened both in its economic life and in its spirit, and would no longer have the same will to resist pressures from the East.

The President said that he would like to ask one question which bothered him, and it was this. If, for instance, we are unable to find a satisfactory solution for the Berlin problem over a period of ten years and we maintain our juridical rights, what could the East do to strangle West Berlin economically by tightening down on communications and trade by means short of war. Khrushchev could allow us to maintain our juridical position but create great difficulties for the city itself.

The Chancellor replied with some animation that the President had spoken of a ten-year period. This was very different from the two years proposed. The great difference lay in the fact that in ten years it is probable that some decision will be taken on disarmament and if that is so, the situation in Europe will be completely changed both for the East and for the West. In such an atmosphere the same importance will not be attached to Berlin. There is a great difference between ten years and two years. The situation in ten years will be very different from what it is now. Khrushchev was using West Berlin as a lever in the cold war to impair the prestige of the free world. In an atmosphere of *détente* resulting from progress on disarmament it would be relatively easy to solve the Berlin problem.

The President said that perhaps he had not made himself sufficiently clear. He would withdraw the mention of the ten-year term, but we must face practical facts, whether it was over one, two or five years. If we maintain our juridical position in Berlin and keep our troops and supply them, what would happen if the Soviets were indirectly to try to strangle the city, using all possible means while technically leaving open our single access to the city. This is a practical problem we have to face.

The Chancellor said he did not believe that Khrushchev would start a war by strangling Berlin. He also believed that Khrushchev knows that in such a war there would be neither victor nor vanquished. In two

speeches he had made great promises to the Soviet people and he himself was deeply committed to an expansion of the Soviet economy. If he were unable to do this, it would produce unforeseeable consequences for him. It was well to remember that he was first of all a Russian Nationalist and only after that a Communist. The Chancellor apologized for mentioning this, but Khrushchev knew that the Americans were not as ill-informed concerning the Soviet Union as he had thought, and he did not believe that Khrushchev would do anything that would jeopardize the existence of Russia. He was confident that Khrushchev would not start a war over Berlin.

General de Gaulle said that in seeking to arrive at a relaxation of tensions it was logical to start talking about disarmament. If he really wants a *détente*, progress can be made. If not, he can harass us on the issue of Berlin.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that he would like to know what the answer was to the President's question. We had a legal right to keep our troops in Berlin and to supply them and the population we are supposed to be occupying. The President had asked what would happen if by measures short of war such as saying the railroads were not working, the canals had fallen in, that the roads and bridges were in poor repair, pressure was put on West Berlin.

The President said he agreed. He would like to know what our rights were. Did they include the right of West Berlin to make a living? He felt that we might be able to keep the channel for the supply open but that the city could be put in a difficult economic situation.

General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev could indeed do this but he could not do it if he wants a *détente*. We should stand on our rights. He shared the Chancellor's belief that any backing down in Berlin would be a grave blow to the prestige of the West.

The President said he shared that belief but was trying to figure out what we could do. Any soldier in facing war would have to seek another answer. By what means could we keep the people of Berlin healthy, happy and prosperous? He agreed that we are not weakening in our position in maintaining our juridical rights. Khrushchev must want relaxation of tensions. Otherwise he could not see a real answer on the problem of Berlin.

General de Gaulle said that the geographical situation of West Berlin is very awkward but we had lived with it for a long time and we could still live with it.

The President said that he didn't know about anybody else, but he himself was getting older. General de Gaulle replied "You don't look it."

The Chancellor said that he agreed with General de Gaulle. If Khrushchev really wants a *détente*, Berlin will not be an acute problem.

If he does not, it can become very disagreeable. He had recently made a trip to Japan and he hoped he would have occasion to talk to them later about it. People in Asia were following very closely what was happening between East and West and any loss of prestige for the West, in Europe in particular, would have grave repercussions in Asia.

General de Gaulle said that he did not like the intimation that in two years the status of Berlin had to be changed. To accept a practical arrangement, leaving our rights untouched, was something else again.

Prime Minister Macmillan inquired what was meant by the statute of Berlin (he had misunderstood "status" to mean "statute"), and General de Gaulle explained this.

The Prime Minister then went on to say that the last Soviet proposal was impossible. At Geneva the West had proposed a temporary arrangement following which the discussion would continue, and this had been better. It had not been bad.

The Chancellor said he would like to remind Mr. Macmillan that the status of Berlin was rather clearly set forth in the treaties signed in New York in May 1949 and Paris in June 1949,<sup>2</sup> ending the Berlin blockade. The Soviets undertook clear obligations thereunder and if they were now able unilaterally to repudiate these, what faith could we have in any new arrangement with them.

The President wondered whether Khrushchev had brought up with any of them the question of the borders of Germany. Not long ago he had seen the Deputy Prime Minister of Poland<sup>3</sup> in Washington who had indicated that if the United States would guarantee the borders of Poland, this would lead to a great lessening of tension. The President said that he could not discuss this without speaking with his ally, the Federal Republic, but he wondered if the matter had been brought up with any of the others. The Deputy Prime Minister had implied that the Berlin situation would be eased and relations with the Federal Republic improved.

General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev had indicated to him that it would be nice if the Western powers were to recognize the German-Polish border, but that it did not make any real difference if they did not. France hoped that at the opportune time it would be possible to improve relations between Poland and the German Federal Republic. General de Gaulle then said they were all aware of the fact that the Summit meeting itself was open to question.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of the May 5, 1949, New York agreement, see *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. III, p. 751; for text of the June 20, 1949, Paris agreement, see *ibid.*, pp. 1062-1065.

<sup>3</sup> Jaroszewicz visited the United States beginning March 23.

The President said that it looked as if Khrushchev was trying to put him in the dock and General de Gaulle said he had already started trying.

General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev would talk to Mr. Macmillan in the meantime<sup>4</sup> and they would meet later.

The President asked whether they thought he would go through with his threat. He hoped that no one was under the illusion that he would crawl on his knees to Mr. Khrushchev.

General de Gaulle smiled and said that no one was under that illusion.

The President wondered whether he would go immediately to Moscow or not.

General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev would be seeing Mr. Macmillan this afternoon and they would all meet thereafter but he felt the sense of responsibility for the conference.

The conference then concluded.

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<sup>4</sup>See Document 163.

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## 162. Memorandum for the Record

Paris, May 15, 1960.

General de Gaulle came up to the President after the meeting<sup>1</sup> and said that Khrushchev had been in that morning with Marshal Malinovsky.<sup>2</sup> They had created a veritable scene. He had said that this was an act of aggression and that his people would be united in resisting it as they had been in the war against Germany. Mr. Debre said that he gathered that Khrushchev was trying to put himself in the same position as the President when he had said that he would not go to the summit under a threat (on Berlin) and that he indicated that he regarded these

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>1</sup>See Document 161.

<sup>2</sup>For a more detailed description of the conversation, see Walters, *Silent Missions*, pp. 340–341.

overflights as a threat to him and would not go to the summit unless the President understood that they would be discontinued, and was therefore referring more to an undertaking for the future really than a demand for punishment for those responsible in the past. As the President and General de Gaulle were going down the stairs, General de Gaulle indicated that Khrushchev had said he would defend himself against any attack, and the President said he had no intention of attaching anyone. General de Gaulle indicated that Khrushchev had said that he would attack the bases from which these overflights started and the President remarked that bombs can travel in two directions.

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### 163. Editorial Note

At 4:30 p.m. on May 15, Khrushchev, again accompanied by Gromyko, Vinogradov, and Malinovsky, paid a visit to Macmillan and reiterated the demands he had made in his conversation with de Gaulle during the morning (see Document 160), but did not leave a copy of the declaration with the Prime Minister. For Macmillan's account of this meeting, see *Pointing the Way*, pages 202–203. After Khrushchev left, the British briefed both French and U.S. officials on the conversation. No record of the British briefing has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library.

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### 164. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Paris, May 15, 1960, 4:30 p.m.

#### OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. Bohlen, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Merchant,  
Mr. Kohler, General Goodpaster

During lunch I had a call from Mr. Achilles, who was then in Couve de Murville's office, reporting that Khrushchev's meeting with de

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Gaulle had been entirely devoted to a six-page statement,<sup>1</sup> the key part of which was a statement that unless the United States is ready to condemn such actions as the U-2 flight with respect to the Soviet Union, renounce such acts in the future, and punish those responsible, the Soviet Government would not take part in this summit conference.

This was discussed during the four-power Western session at 2:30,<sup>2</sup> and was expected to be the main subject of conversation in Mr. Macmillan's meeting with Khrushchev scheduled at four o'clock.

Mr. Herter, in referring to this, said that we are confronted with Mr. Khrushchev's threat to withdraw from the summit conference. The President said we must consider whether it would be better to break the conference off ourselves. Ambassador Thompson stated that we need a better posture on which to break it off than the matter of spy flights.

Mr. Merchant said de Gaulle had told Khrushchev he did not think he should bring this matter into the summit conference but should take it up with the Americans. He went on to say that all countries conduct espionage, including Russia and France. He added that if this matter were to come to war, he wanted Mr. Khrushchev to know that France as an ally would stand with the United States. Mr. Merchant added that the press already seems to have some knowledge of this. To a question by Mr. Herter, Mr. Kohler stated that there had been no approach whatsoever by the Soviets. The President commented that Khrushchev is trying to see how our allies react to this pressure.

The President asked for the ideas of the group as to why Khrushchev had not done this five days ago. Mr. Herter asked Mr. Bohlen whether he thought Khrushchev had come here simply to break off the summit conference. Mr. Bohlen said that, considering the content of the document, and the fact that it was delivered in writing, he felt the Soviets had in fact made a decision to break off the conference. Mr. Merchant said that brings us back to the question of choice whether the President should break it off, or Khrushchev. Mr. Bohlen went on to say that since the *démarche* is in writing, it is clear that Khrushchev plans to put this on the table. He certainly is aware that the President could not accept it, and therefore really intends to break off the conference.

Mr. Thompson came back to the point that Khrushchev may be taking a reading with our allies to test their resolution on this. He said that Khrushchev is vulnerable at home over his impulsiveness, and that we should say that we could not negotiate with a man who uses language of this kind in a serious conference.

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 163.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 162.

The President said that if the Soviets simply want a four-power statement that we deplore and denounce espionage, he would have no objection to this. We will not go beyond that to foreswear specific activities unilaterally, however.

Mr. Merchant said that all things considered, it would be better to have Mr. Khrushchev walk out of the conference than the President. Mr. Herter suggested that, in the morning, if Khrushchev raises this question, the President should invite him over for discussions. Mr. Bohlen said that if this is our intention, we should get word to the Russians at once, letting them know that we have received knowledge of this *démarche*, that we cannot consider it as presented, and that if they present it the United States will have to stand behind its past operations.

The President said that the intelligence people, he thought, had failed to recognize the emotional, even pathological, reaction of the Russians regarding their frontiers. Mr. Bohlen said he felt the intelligence people had been aware of this but thought the pilot would never be taken alive by the Soviets.

Mr. Bohlen said there seems to be a need to have a statement ready for the President to give if required. The President said he thought it could be quite simple. Everybody knows there has been espionage throughout history. For the Russians to demand that we foreswear espionage while knowing that we are the victim of their espionage is completely unacceptable. Mr. Thompson suggested that we add that we are prepared to discuss overflights and espionage in general. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The President said that, in the right circumstances, he would be quite willing to renounce the use of the U-2, whose use is at an end so far as he is concerned. Mr. Bohlen said that if this is the case, we might state in such a statement after a break-up of the conference that indeed we were ready to discontinue the use of the U-2. He thought we should bring in the matter of the UN, proposing that the Security Council of the UN undertake the flights to guard against surprise attack. The essential points are two—first, that we could not respond to a threat, and second, what might have been done had there been serious consideration of this at the conference. Mr. Bohlen thought that the Russians are trying to get us to “grovel” or to assert a legal right to overfly (which they will challenge as untenable).

The President said that espionage is simply a practice that has been carried on throughout history. It is up to the affronted country to defeat spies attempting to operate against them.

**A.J. Goodpaster<sup>3</sup>**  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**165. Memorandum of Conversation**

US/MC/7

Paris, May 15, 1960, 6 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The President  
Secretary Herter  
Under Secretary Merchant  
Col. Walters

*France*

General de Gaulle  
Prime Minister Debré  
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
Mr. Andronikov

*United Kingdom*

Prime Minister Macmillan  
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd  
Sir Derek Hoyer-Millar  
Sir Anthony Rumbold

SUBJECT

U–2 Plane; Summit tactics; disarmament; Berlin

General de Gaulle opened the meeting by saying that we were face-to-face with the incident. He suggested that perhaps Mr. Macmillan talk about his discussion with Khrushchev earlier in the afternoon.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Macmillan suggested that, as General de Gaulle had seen Khrushchev first,<sup>2</sup> he might give them his impressions.

General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev had been calm but obviously intent. He emphasized that just as the President had said he could

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters and approved in M on May 15 and in S and the White House on May 16. The meeting took place at the Elysée Palace. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 5 from Paris, May 16 at 5 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) For recollections of this meeting by the principals, see Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 554–555; Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pp. 203–204; and de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, pp. 262–263.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 163.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 160.

not go to the Summit under threat, so he could not go under a threat. He said that his sovereignty had been violated and wondered if the U.S. really wanted a *détente*. He had said that the President must make a statement condemning these overflights and indicate they would not occur in the future, as well as punish those responsible for past overflights. But he did indicate that he would appear for the meeting at 10:00 Monday morning.

The President said that he was the only one that Khrushchev had not sought out in person to make his complaint.

Mr. Macmillan said that he had asked Khrushchev why he had not seen the President, and he had replied that he had not been asked. Mr. Macmillan went on to say that Khrushchev had said very much the same thing to the British that he had said to General de Gaulle, only he had not left a note with the British but he did have his interpreter read the text. Mr. Macmillan had told Khrushchev that such incidents prove the need for these meetings, and that after some talk and some threats of a not particularly violent nature Khrushchev had made the following points. He had admitted that we all carry on espionage but felt that when we were caught we ought not to admit it or say that it is right. He had then told Mr. Macmillan some story about his boyhood when he had been caught trapping sparrows, the upshot of which seemed to be, "when you're caught don't admit it."

The President had said that he could not negotiate under a threat, and the President added that this threat related to a blockade of Berlin.

Mr. Macmillan said Khrushchev went on to say that governments should not say they were doing this sort of thing and he wanted some expression from the President. Mr. Macmillan said that he had the impression that Khrushchev had in some way been put in a bad political situation at home. He said that Khrushchev, while talking, had looked frequently at Marshal Malinovsky and Gromyko as though seeking support for what he was saying. Usually, in previous meetings, it was the other way around.

The President said he had never said it was right. He had emphasized that it was distasteful and disagreeable but said that we had to have information in order to defend the free world and ourselves against surprise attack. It was not legal, it was not right. He was damned if he was going to be the only one at the conference to raise his hand and promise never to do again something that everybody else was doing, particularly when we had hundreds of Soviet spies in the U.S. and they were carrying out espionage of a most flagrant type. He did not know how it was in their countries but certainly there was a great deal of it in the U.S. We had caught a spy with all his signal equipment. We knew with whom he was communicating and it had taken us two to three years to collect all the evidence against him. We were certainly as much

victims as criminal in this matter. He was prepared to say that spying was illegal, distasteful and wrong if all said it. We could not protect the free world and the U.S. unless we made efforts to collect information. We had been caught. However, the U-2 was now almost obsolete. But he was not going to pledge not to take measures to defend ourselves and fulfill our obligation to our people to insure their safety.

General de Gaulle said that there was an additional question of the fact that probably in a year or so reconnaissance satellites would be in a position to take photographs. We have no guarantee that some of Khrushchev's satellites have not taken photographs. General de Gaulle thought we might say we would look into the whole broad question and see what could be done. This was a suggestion we might put forward.

Mr. Macmillan said he felt there was a misunderstanding as to what Secretary Herter had actually said, and it had been badly written up in the press. The actual text of what the Secretary had said was then read.<sup>3</sup>

The President said that he was prepared to say we had not said we would fly the U-2 again over the Soviet Union. He had said we would protect ourselves and we will.

The Secretary said we were quite ready to see if we could work something out to protect ourselves and to protect them against surprise attack.

Mr. Macmillan said that there was a face-saving element involved here in the Russian note.<sup>4</sup> The text of what purported to be the Secretary's statement was not correct.

The President said he thought we all know our own attitude but the question is what would our tactic be if Khrushchev opens the meeting tomorrow morning with a blast. How would we go about answering it?

Mr. Macmillan felt that an important element was the fact that the Russian note said that "two days later the President confirmed that flights over the Soviet Union have been and remain the deliberate policy of the United States."

The President said that he had not said that, and read aloud the transcript of what he had actually said.<sup>5</sup>

General de Gaulle thought that if Khrushchev comes out with a violent blast at the opening we should indicate that "everyone does this, you, the Soviets do it too," and Khrushchev would then go into his

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<sup>3</sup> For text of this May 9 statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp 418–420.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 160.

<sup>5</sup> For a transcript of the President's press conference on May 11, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pp. 403–414.

routine. He will undoubtedly read the letter for the third time. There was general agreement that he probably would.

Mr. Macmillan asked whether Khrushchev had spoken to the press regarding the Khrushchev-de Gaulle talk? He himself had told Khrushchev that he would not talk to the press and that Khrushchev had said this was all right. He felt that it was good that Khrushchev had not made this public as he was not committed publicly before his own people.

The Secretary indicated that the Soviets had issued a two-sentence release<sup>6</sup> which indicated that Khrushchev had met with General de Gaulle and they had discussed procedures and matters relating to the Summit conference.

The President indicated that some of our press people were aware of this Russian note.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said they had been told to say nothing on it.

The President then said that if this is in the morning newspapers he for one would not be at the 10:00 meeting the following morning.

General de Gaulle said that Khrushchev was aware of this fact and had indicated that he is coming in the morning.

Prime Minister Debre felt that there would be at least 24 hours thereafter in which to think this matter over.

General de Gaulle said they would meet, the four of them, alone with their interpreters and note-takers in the morning, and we could see what happens then and decide what to do.

The President felt that it would be better if they could settle this among the four of them rather than throw it into a larger meeting. When he came to the Summit meeting he knew that Khrushchev would take this matter up. If he had brought it up at the first meeting of the four, the President had planned to say that this concerned only two of them. But now Khrushchev had gone to both General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan on the matter. He could, however, still offer to see him in the afternoon.

General de Gaulle said he had told Khrushchev that there was absolutely no relation between this incident and the need for relaxing tensions. He said that it would be fine if the President wanted to offer to see Khrushchev alone.

The President said that he now felt it might be best to settle it in the presence of the four since Khrushchev had already seen the other two,

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<sup>6</sup> Not found.

but if the others preferred he would be quite ready to see Khrushchev alone in the afternoon.

General de Gaulle then asked Mr. Macmillan whether he had asked to see Khrushchev.

Mr. Macmillan replied that he had not. Khrushchev had quite suddenly asked to see him and he did not even know what the subject of the discussion was going to be.

Mr. Debre commented that Khrushchev had come early in order to carry out his operation.

General de Gaulle said that he had told Khrushchev that they had intended to meet in the mornings and they would leave the afternoons free for bilateral talks.

The President then said that he would tell Khrushchev that he would be glad to see him but that if he walked out of the conference the President felt he would have to say something or did they feel it better if all of them said something together?

General de Gaulle said that if Khrushchev walked out all of them should say something, but that, of course, would not prevent the President from adding anything he wished. General de Gaulle said jokingly that for his part he would not say anything in favor of Khrushchev's walking out.

Mr. Macmillan said that his impression is this. Khrushchev has said many harsh public things but he had not made this statement publicly and is therefore not committed in the eyes of his own people. This is an advantage. He had constantly referred to Gromyko and Malinovsky as though looking for approval. He had made no effort to see Mr. Macmillan alone and the Prime Minister felt he was probably on the spot politically. Khrushchev had mentioned the President several times in friendly terms. He had committed himself to a *détente* and was perhaps under criticism within his own country. He had agreed at Camp David not to push the time limit on Berlin. He might, on the one hand, decide to seek a friendly talk with the President in order to find some formula such as the President had referred to. Something face-saving and then carry on with the discussions, or he may be switching tactics and leave the conference in a great scene in response to pressures at home, in which case it is probable that he will go ahead on a separate treaty with the GDR. We should be prepared for either of these alternatives and try to keep him on the former track if we could do so without any loss of our own dignity. Mr. Macmillan repeated that Khrushchev had referred constantly to Gromyko and Malinovsky (and he, Macmillan, had never seen him do this before).

General de Gaulle pointed out that Khrushchev had said that the President had indicated that Khrushchev had made a threat on Berlin,

but it wasn't a threat. And now Khrushchev says that the President was threatening him with further overflights. Perhaps both threats could be withdrawn and that would be a way out.

The President said that he was not threatening Khrushchev. We know well the main targets. Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kuibyshev, etc. We were merely trying to protect ourselves against a surprise attack. He lives in a closed society, we live in an open one where it is easy to find anything out. Everything is published in our newspapers, even our intentions. We have an obligation to find out what he was doing. Someone had to take the risk, we took it and got caught in this case. This was an unarmed plane. It was really a powered glider. Otherwise it could not have flown at such great heights. Mr. Khrushchev is well aware of this.

General de Gaulle said that he understood this feeling. This was merely a tactic of Khrushchev. Perhaps if the U.S. would promise not to overfly him, then he would promise not to make a treaty with the GDR.

The President smiled and said he would buy that.

The President said that we felt that this note had been drafted for publication; for propaganda purposes in case he decided to use it. He may not. The others nodded. The President then said perhaps the best thing would be for him to make a prepared speech as words seem to be important to Khrushchev. He then read from Mr. Herter's statement on the U-2 and General de Gaulle underlined the words, "in the absence of Soviet cooperation."<sup>7</sup>

The President said that we had not said that we would continue the flights.

Mr. Macmillan said that the press had reported this whole matter of the President's and the Secretary's statements very badly.

The President said that he would prepare a reply covering all points and give a copy to Khrushchev if necessary.

General de Gaulle said that he would like to go back to Mr. Herter's statement concerning the absence of Soviet cooperation and said that if Soviet cooperation *could* be obtained there would be no need for such activities.

The President and the Secretary both said this was what we had proposed in the open skies proposal in 1955 and we would propose it again at this Summit.

General de Gaulle interjected, "If there is a Summit."

The President said that he was sure his invitation to Moscow would not be renewed.

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<sup>7</sup>See footnote 3 above.



General de Gaulle said that first we must talk to Khrushchev regarding the need for relaxing tensions and then disarmament and perhaps a beginning of cooperation in aid to under-developed countries. Khrushchev of course would speak of Germany first.

The President said that in connection with the matter of disarmament there was a French proposal on missiles and the question of its connection with the Western plan. The U.K. had proposed a compromise draft.<sup>8</sup> He wondered whether General de Gaulle had seen the U.K. draft. He felt that they might ask the Foreign Ministers to try and work out an agreement. As far as he was concerned the U.K. text seemed acceptable to him.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said he hoped the officials could meet tonight.

The Secretary said that Lucet, who was representing France, and we had reserved our position on some points.

Foreign Minister Couve said that he felt that the experts should get together first and then the Ministers. The real question was whether to try to put the plans together or bring up the French proposal separately.

General de Gaulle said that if the Soviets take up the Western proposals, fine; if they refuse, that would be all right with us.

The Secretary said that we had six specific points of disarmament to take up and we were willing to discuss them separately if the Soviets agreed.

The President said that if a plan of the type suggested by the French were put up, he would like to see it put up by *all* of the Western powers. If the Soviets were to reject it, then we could consult and try to modify it in some way.

General de Gaulle said Khrushchev would undoubtedly pull out his old U.N. plan<sup>9</sup> and we would put up our Geneva plan.<sup>10</sup>

Mr. Macmillan said that at that point we could try to pull out three or four general measures to take up separately.

The Secretary indicated that Khrushchev will try to get us to talk principles and not details and then issue a directive.

General de Gaulle said that they could not handle details at the Summit. They could only propose that certain things be studied.

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<sup>8</sup> During a brief meeting at noon, Lucet, Eaton, and O'Neill discussed a draft British proposal on the control of nuclear delivery systems. A memorandum of this conversation (US/MC/4), with text of the British proposal attached, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664.

<sup>9</sup> For text of Khrushchev's address to the United Nations, September 18, 1959, on general and complete disarmament, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1452–1460.

<sup>10</sup> For text of the Western proposal on general disarmament, April 16, see *ibid.*, 1960, pp. 68–71.

The Secretary expressed some concern that if this study on missiles and other means of delivery were to be isolated, that might enable Khrushchev to say that he had succeeded in banning the bomb. He would hope that all the specific measures could be taken up and that we could work out something along the lines of the U.K. draft.

General de Gaulle then turned to Mr. Macmillan and said, "How far will you go on Berlin and how far will you not go?"

Mr. Macmillan did not reply.

The President said that on Berlin he thought we could talk about some possible reductions in the level of forces. He wondered if we should talk to Khrushchev on the basis of his paper,<sup>11</sup> leaving out of course the last part which would lead to a treaty with the GDR.

General de Gaulle said he felt we should not even tacitly accept a change in the status of Berlin in two years.

The President said he would not accept anything for two years that would reduce our rights in any respect. If a formula could be found maintaining all the essentials, and at the end of two years providing for a plebiscite instead of a free city then perhaps he might accept.

General de Gaulle smiled and said that this was not in the Soviet paper.

Mr. Macmillan said that on the basis of his past tactics Khrushchev will try and start on the basis of our Geneva plan and move on from there.

The President said that the Chancellor had emphasized that there was a great difference between a two-year period and a ten-year period.<sup>12</sup> He seemed to feel that beyond ten years everything would be wonderful or Berlin would be gone. He could not see the difference between two or five years. We should try and ascertain exactly what Adenauer was thinking. The President said he did not believe we could go on forever just saying, "No," taking a completely negative position in which there was certainly a breaking point, on a situation which we are all agreed, is fundamentally a weak one.

General de Gaulle said that he felt that when Adenauer spoke of ten years he meant keeping the status quo indefinitely.

The President said that he had raised certain practical points that had not been dealt with.

General de Gaulle inquired what these points were.

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<sup>11</sup>See footnote 4 above.

<sup>12</sup>See Document 161.

The President replied that they involved progressive harassment of the economic life of Berlin while not actually violating our access, and the Chancellor had not answered these practical problems.

General de Gaulle asked, "What answer could he give?" It depended on what the Soviets really wanted. If they wanted a *détente*, they would not torture the people of Berlin and we don't need to make undue concessions. The Chancellor had indicated this morning that Berlin had stocks that would enable it to carry on for a year.

The Secretary pointed out that these stocks were foodstuffs, not raw materials.

General de Gaulle said that on the other hand if Khrushchev did not want a *détente* he would go ahead and harass Berlin and sign his treaty with the GDR.

The President said that he would like to be in a position where we had plans for such a contingency.

General de Gaulle said that we all knew that the situation at Berlin was awkward and that if the Soviets wanted to create difficulties and make trouble it was easy for them to do so here. The whole question came down to whether or not they wanted a *détente*. This was a test.

The President said that Khrushchev had told him that he needed ten years to educate the people of the GDR so that they would vote for communism in a truly free election.

The President said that the Chancellor thought he was weakening on Berlin. He was not, he was merely trying to ascertain what the Chancellor was thinking so he could prepare for it.

General de Gaulle said that the Chancellor could not answer the President because it depended on the Soviets.

The President said that it was sometimes not right to refer to the mistakes of those who had disappeared but that in 1944 the military fighting in France and Western Germany had pled for a military occupation capital at the junction of the Soviet, U.S. and U.K. zone (the French zone had not yet been set up) of a cantonment type, and they were told to keep quiet, this was political, Berlin was the traditional capital and that if orders came from the occupation authority other than from Berlin they would not be carried out. But he had lost.

General de Gaulle said that he had also lost, he had not had the hearing then that the President had had, nor did he have it now, but he had been opposed to using Berlin as the capital of Germany.

The President said, "But now we have to live with it."

General de Gaulle ruefully agreed.

Mr. Macmillan said that he would now like to revert to an earlier point where de Gaulle had said that it would be bad for the morale of the West to lose Berlin. He agreed, but it would be worse to say that we

would defend it against a squeeze and then find out that we could not. Hence, it was worthwhile trying to find some solution. Two years' delay would give us an opportunity to seek such a formula.

The President said that he agreed with General de Gaulle that the real point was whether or not the Soviets wanted a *détente*. They could starve Berlin and reduce the Berliners to the position of Arab refugees in Jordan but if this were done, then public opinion in the West would force us to do something better than we were doing now.

Mr. Macmillan said that he agreed but he thought we would have to play the game as it was laid out now.

The President said he felt it would be fatal to weaken now.

Mr. Macmillan said he did not feel that for Berlin to become a United Nations city was such a terrible fate.

The Secretary said that this could be explored but not settled at the Summit.

Mr. Macmillan said that if we could gain two years for talks this would be an advantage.

General de Gaulle then asked what about the peace treaty with the GDR?

The President said that we could not prevent the Soviets from doing what they wanted, particularly as we had signed a treaty ourselves with the Federal Republic, but we could not accept their assertion that all our rights on Berlin would be eliminated by such a signature.

Mr. Macmillan said he would agree with that and inquired whether it was just West Berlin that was involved and he was informed that we had spoken of the whole of Berlin but the Russians had referred only to West Berlin. He said that two years would be useful in seeking a formula but the threat remained at the end of that period and the question that we faced was what could we offer in return. There was a brief discussion of the possibility of an all-Berlin solution. The conference then concluded at 7:40.

**Vernon A. Walters**<sup>13</sup>  
*Col., U.S. Army*

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<sup>13</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

166. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Paris, May 16, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Prime Minister Macmillan, Secretary Herter, Mr. de Zulueta, General Goodpaster

The President, following his breakfast with Mr. Macmillan, asked for me to join them because of questions in connection with his handling of the U-2 incident in the Four-Power meeting scheduled later in the day. He had obtained from Mr. Krebs a copy of brief notes prepared by the State Department but did not think this was satisfactory.<sup>1</sup> I told him that an altogether different paper had been drafted during the night in response to his request, by State Department representatives, and had just been delivered to me. He took this paper and began discussion of it with Mr. Macmillan, with Secretary Herter who joined at about this time, and myself.<sup>2</sup>

The President said one thing was very clear in his mind and that is until we get to satellites, we will not do this kind of overflying any more. Mr. Herter said he thought it would be possible for the President to condemn all forms of espionage, thus going some distance toward meeting another of Khrushchev's points. Mr. Macmillan said the principal point he had gained in Khrushchev's talk with him relates to the threat—which Mr. Khrushchev says is constituted by our statement that we will continue overflights. If he correctly understood that we are not continuing overflights, he thought the clarification of this point might be of great value in the discussion with Mr. Khrushchev.

There was then detailed redrafting of the statement, with more and more White House and State Department officials joining in the discussion up to the time of departure for the Elysee Palace. This was the statement that the President delivered, with minor further additions, during the meeting.<sup>3</sup>

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 27. For two other accounts of this conference, see Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pp. 204–205, and Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, pp. 273–274.

<sup>1</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of this paper with several notations on it by President Eisenhower is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the statement as given at the plenary meeting of the Heads of Government at 11 a.m., see Document 168.

**167. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State**

Paris, May 16, 1960, 10 a.m.

Cahto 3. Eyes only for the Acting Secretary. Mounting evidence suggests Soviets intend wreck conference at opening session on U-2 issue. Please inform Vice President. This morning's meeting which at Khrushchev's request has been transformed into three a side and not four heads alone with interpreters as planned should be decisive. Macomber authorized inform leaders of above.

**Herter**

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND  
BILATERAL AND TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS,  
MAY 16–20, 1960

168. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/26

Paris, May 16, 1960, 11 a.m.–2:10 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT

Pre-Summit Problems Among the Four Powers

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

President Eisenhower

Secretary Herter

Secretary Gates

Mr. Bohlen

Colonel Walters

Mr. Akalovsky

*United Kingdom*

Prime Minister Macmillan

Secretary Lloyd

Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar

Sir Anthony Rumbold

Mr. Zulueta

Two Interpreters

*France*

President de Gaulle

M. Debre

M. Couve de Murville

M. Maillard

M. Andronikov

M. Lourie

*Soviet Union*

Mr. Khrushchev

Mr. Gromyko

Marshal Malinovsky

Two Interpreters

One Note Taker

*President de Gaulle:* We are gathered here for the Summit Conference. Yesterday I received a statement from one of the participants, Mr. Khrushchev, which I conveyed verbally to the other participants, President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan. Does anyone therefore wish to say anything?

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–1660. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bohlen and Akalovsky and approved by the White House on May 18 and in 5 on May 20. The meeting took place at the Elysée Palace. A summary of the discussion at the meeting was transmitted in Cahto 7 from Paris, May 18 at noon. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1665) For other descriptions of the meeting, see Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, pp. 555–556; Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pp. 205–207; de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, pp. 263–265; Khrushchev *Remembers: The Last Testament*, pp. 454–455; Walters, *Silent Missions*, pp. 342–346; and Bohlen, *Witness to History*, pp. 467–468.

*Khrushchev*: I would like the floor.

*President Eisenhower*: I would also like to make a short statement.

*President de Gaulle*: Perhaps we should hear President Eisenhower first.

*Khrushchev*: I was the first to ask for the floor and I would like my request to be granted. Permit me to address you with the following statement.

A provocative act is known to have been committed recently with regard to the Soviet Union by the American air force. It consisted in the fact that on May 1 a United States military reconnaissance aircraft invaded the Soviet Union while executing a specific espionage mission to obtain information on military and industrial installations on the territory of the USSR. After the aggressive purpose of its flight became known the aircraft was shot down by units of the Soviet rocket troops. Unfortunately, this was not the only case of aggressive and espionage actions by the United States air force against the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the Soviet Government was compelled to give appropriate qualification to these acts and show up their treacherous nature which is incompatible with the elementary requirements of the maintenance of normal relations between states in time of peace, not to speak of it being in gross contradiction with the task of lessening international tension and creating the necessary conditions for the fruitful work of the Summit Conference. This was done both in my speeches at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and in a special note of protest sent to the United States Government.<sup>1</sup>

At first the U.S. State Department launched the ridiculous version that the American plane had violated the borders of the USSR by accident and had no espionage or sabotage assignments.<sup>2</sup> When irrefutable facts clearly proved the falsity of this version the U.S. State Department on May 7 and then the Secretary of State on May 9<sup>3</sup> stated on behalf of the United States Government that American aircraft made incursions into the Soviet Union with military espionage aims in accordance with a programme endorsed by the United States Government and by the President personally. Two days later President Eisenhower himself confirmed that execution of flights of American aircraft over the territory of the Soviet Union had been and remained the calculated policy of the

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<sup>1</sup> See footnote 3, Document 146. The May 10 note is printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, May 30, 1960, pp. 852–854.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the May 5 Department of State statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1960, pp. 412–413.

<sup>3</sup> For texts of the May 7 and 9 statements, see *ibid.*, pp. 417–420.



United States.<sup>4</sup> The same was declared by the United States Government in a note to the Soviet Government on May 12.<sup>5</sup> Thereby the United States Government is crudely flouting the universally accepted standards of international law and the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter under which stands the signature of the United States of America also.

The Soviet Government and the entire people of the Soviet Union met these declarations of leading statesmen of the USA with indignation as did every honest man and woman in the world who displays concern for the destinies of peace.

Now, at a time when the leaders of the governments of the Four Powers are arriving in Paris to take part in the Conference, the question arises of how is it possible to productively negotiate and examine the questions confronting the Conference when the United States Government and the President himself have not only failed to condemn this provocative act—the intrusion of the American military aircraft into the Soviet Union—but, on the contrary, have declared that such actions will continue to be state policy of the USA with regard to the Soviet Union. How can agreement be sought on the various issues which require a settlement with the purpose of easing tension and removing suspicion and mistrust among states, when the Government of one of the great powers declares bluntly that its policy is intrusion into the territory of another great power with espionage and sabotage purposes and, consequently, the heightening of tension in relations among states?

It is clear that the declaration of such a policy which can be pursued only when states are in a state of war dooms the Summit Conference to complete failure in advance.

We, naturally, take note of the declaration by the United States Government of such a policy and state that in the event of a repeated intrusion by American aircraft into the Soviet Union we shall shoot these planes down.

The Soviet Government reserves the right in all such cases to take the appropriate retaliatory measures against those who violate the state sovereignty of the USSR and engage in such espionage and sabotage regarding the Soviet Union. The USSR Government reiterates that with regard to those states that by making their territory available for American military bases become accomplices in aggressive actions against the USSR, the appropriate measures will also be taken, not excluding a blow against these bases.

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<sup>4</sup> For a transcript of the President's May 11 press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61* pp. 403–414.

<sup>5</sup> For text of this note, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 425.

In this connection it is impossible to ignore the statement by President Eisenhower to the effect that under the threat of a peace treaty with the GDR he could not take part in the Summit Conference, though what he called a threat was merely the declaration by the Soviet Government of its firm resolve to do away with the vestiges of war in Europe and conclude a peace, and thus to bring the situation—particularly in West Berlin—in line with the requirements of life and the interests of ensuring the peace and security of the European nations. How then can the Soviet Government take part in negotiations under conditions of an actual threat emanating from the United States Government which declared that it would continue to violate the USSR borders and that American aircraft had flown and would continue to fly over the Soviet Union's territory? The United States Government has thereby declared its intention to continue unheard of and unprecedented actions directed against the sovereignty of the Soviet state which constitutes a sacred and immutable principle in international relations.

From all this it follows that for the success of the Conference it is necessary that the governments of all the powers represented at it pursue an overt and honest policy and solemnly declare that they will not undertake any actions against one another which amount to violation of the state sovereignty of the powers. This means that if the United States Government is really ready to cooperate with the governments of the other powers in the interests of maintaining peace and strengthening confidence between states it must, firstly, condemn the inadmissible provocative actions of the United States air force with regard to the Soviet Union and, secondly, refrain from continuing such actions and such a policy against the USSR in the future. It goes without saying that in this case the United States Government cannot fail to call to strict account those who are directly guilty of the deliberate violation by American aircraft of the state borders of the USSR.

Until this is done by the United States Government the Soviet Government sees no possibility for productive negotiations with the United States Government at the Summit Conference. It cannot be among the participants in negotiations where one of them has made treachery the basis of his policy with regard to the Soviet Union.

If under the obtaining conditions the Soviet Government were to participate in negotiations clearly doomed to failure, it would thereby become a party to the deception of the nations, which it has no intention of becoming.

It stands to reason that if the U.S. Government were to declare that in future the United States will not violate the state borders of the USSR with its aircraft, that it deplores the provocative actions undertaken in the past, and will punish those directly guilty of such actions, which would assure the Soviet Union equal conditions with other powers, I, as

Head of the Soviet Government, would be ready to participate in the Conference and exert all efforts to contribute to its success.

As a result of the provocative flights of American military aircraft and above all as a result of such provocative flights being declared national policy of the United States of America for the future with regard to the socialist countries, new conditions have appeared in international relationships.

Naturally, under such conditions we cannot work at the Conference, we cannot because we see the positions from which it is intended to talk with us: under the threat of aggressive reconnaissance flights. Espionage flights are known to be undertaken with reconnaissance purposes with the object of starting a war. We therefore reject the conditions which the United States of America are creating for us. We cannot participate in any negotiations and in the solution of even those questions which have already matured, we cannot because we see that the United States have no desire to reach a settlement.

It is considered to be a leader in the Western countries. Therefore the Conference would at present be a useless waste of time and a deception of the public opinion of all countries. I repeat, we cannot under the obtaining situation take part in the negotiations.

We want to participate in the talks only on an equal footing, with equal opportunities for both one and the other side.

We consider it necessary for the peoples of all the countries of the world to understand us correctly. The Soviet Union is not renouncing efforts to achieve agreement. And we are sure that reasonable agreements are possible, but, evidently, not at this but at another time.

For this, however, it is necessary first of all that the United States admits that the provocative policy it declared to be by a policy of "unrestricted" flights over our country, is condemned, that it rejects it and admits that it has committed aggression, admits that it regrets it.

The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that if not this Government of the United States then another, if not another then the next one would understand that there is no other way out but peaceful co-existence of two systems, capitalist and socialist. Either peaceful co-existence or war which will result in a disaster for those who are pursuing aggressive policy.

Therefore, we think that some time should be allowed to elapse so that the questions that have arisen should settle and so that those responsible for the determining of the policies of a country would analyze what kind of responsibility they placed upon themselves having declared an aggressive course in their relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Therefore we would think that there is no bet-

ter way out than to postpone the conference of the Heads of Government for approximately six–eight months.

The Soviet Union on its part will not lessen its efforts to reach an agreement. I think that the public opinion will correctly understand our position, will understand that we were deprived of the possibility to participate in these negotiations.

However, we firmly believe in the necessity of peaceful co-existence because to lose faith in peaceful co-existence would mean to doom mankind to war, would mean to agree with the inevitability of wars, and under the circumstances it is known what disasters would be brought by a war to all nations on our planet.

I wish to address the people of the United States of America. I was in the USA and met there with various sections of the American people and I am deeply convinced that all the strata of the American people do not want war. An exception constitutes but a small frantic group in Pentagon and supporting it militarist quarters which benefit from the armaments race gaining huge profits, which disregard the interests of the American people and in general the interests of the peoples of all countries, and which pursue an adventurous policy.

We express gratitude to President de Gaulle for the hospitality and rendering us the possibility to meet in Paris, the capital of France. We also appreciate the efforts of the Government of Great Britain and of Prime Minister Macmillan personally.

We regret that this meeting has been torpedoed by the reactionary circles of the United States of America by provocative flights of American military planes over the Soviet Union.

We regret that this meeting has not brought about the results expected by all nations of the world.

Let the disgrace and responsibility for this rest with those who have proclaimed a bandit policy towards the Soviet Union.

As is known President Eisenhower and I have agreed to exchange visits. Last September I made such visit to the USA. We were greatly gratified by that visit, the meetings and talks we had in the United States, and for all this we expressed our appreciation.

The President of the USA was to make a return visit to our country. Our agreement was that he would come to us on June 10. And we were being prepared to accord a good welcome to the high guest.

Unfortunately, as a result of provocative and aggressive actions against the USSR there have been created now such conditions when we have been deprived of a possibility to receive the President with proper cordiality with which the Soviet people receive welcome guests. At present we cannot express such cordiality to the President of the USA since as the result of provocative flights of American military planes

with the reconnaissance purposes there are created conditions clearly unfavourable for this visit. The Soviet people cannot and do not want to be sly.

That is why we believe that at present the visit of the President of the USA to the Soviet Union should be postponed and agreement should be reached as to the time of the visit when the conditions for the visit would mature. Then the Soviet people will be able to express proper cordiality and hospitality towards the high guest representing the great power with which we sincerely want to live in peace and friendship.

I believe that both President Eisenhower and the American people will understand me correctly.

The Soviet Government states that on its part it will continue to do its utmost to facilitate the relaxation of international tension, to facilitate the solution of problems that still divide us today; in that we shall be guided by the interests of strengthening the great cause of peace on the basis of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems.

*President Eisenhower:* I have a short statement to make.

I had previously been informed of the sense of the statement just read by Premier Khrushchev.

In my statement of May 11th and in the statement of Secretary Herter of May 9th, the position of the United States was made clear with respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a world where nations distrust each other's intentions. We pointed out that these activities had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. As is well known, not only the United States but most other countries are constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union.

There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, through official statements, threatened continued overflights. The importance of this alleged threat was emphasized and repeated by Mr. Khrushchev. The United States has made no such threat. Neither I nor my government has intended any. The actual statements go no further than to say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility to safeguard against surprise attack.

In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.

I have come to Paris to seek agreements with the Soviet Union which would eliminate the necessity for all forms of espionage, including overflights. I see no reason to use this incident to disrupt the conference.

Should it prove impossible, because of the Soviet attitude, to come to grips here in Paris with this problem and the other vital issues threatening world peace, I am planning in the near future to submit to the United Nations a proposal for the creation of a United Nations aerial surveillance to detect preparations for attack. This plan I had intended to place before this conference. This surveillance system would operate in the territories of all nations prepared to accept such inspection. For its part, the United States is prepared not only to accept United Nations aerial surveillance, but to do everything in its power to contribute to the rapid organization and successful operation of such international surveillance.

We of the United States are here to consider in good faith the important problems before this conference. We are prepared either to carry this point no further, or to undertake bilateral conversations between the United States and the USSR while the main conference proceeds.

*Macmillan:* I naturally deplore that after the long and painful ascent to the Summit we now find this dark cloud upon us. I quite understand the feelings that have been aroused by this incident, but I would like to appeal to you and make two points. 1) What has happened, has happened; 2) We all know that espionage in one form or another is a disagreeable fact of life and also that most forms of espionage involve violation of national sovereignty.

The weight of Mr. Khrushchev's argument and his unwillingness to take part in the Conference were based on his statement that these overflights have been and will be in the future the calculated policy of the United States. If this were the case I would understand his feelings and sympathize with his arguments. But the President has clearly stated that these overflights have been suspended and will not be resumed. If the Conference is to continue, as I hope it will, it will not be under, as Mr. Khrushchev puts it, any threat of continuance of these flights. I am glad Mr. Khrushchev did not propose abandonment but postponement only. However, I would suggest to him, as the French proverb goes, that "What is postponed is lost." (Macmillan quoted this proverb in French.) A long delay after all our efforts would dim the great hopes that have been placed, in our country and throughout the world, on this Conference. Could we not make note of these statements and put them aside for study in their written form and in the meantime get on with the Conference after a short recess rather than to make a hasty decision now without opportunity to study these statements? The President's statement was as carefully thought out as was Mr. Khrushchev's. If we do not

do this I feel postponement will itself bring great harm to the cause for which we have worked so hard.

*De Gaulle:* A few words in regard to the problem raised by the incident, with reference to the statements of the President, Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Macmillan, before turning to the substance of the problem.

I would make one observation. The Conference was called for the 16th of May and it is indeed the 16th of May. The overflight occurred on May 1. In between would it not have been possible to raise this question in the manner it has just been raised? In this case the questions would have been settled, or possibly not, but at any rate we would have known where we stood and that would be better than the present uncertainty.

Now as to substance, this incident arose from the state of international tension and the sharp differences which exist between the two camps, both possessing terrible means of destruction and guided by differing ideologies. This in fact was the chief reason for this Conference. It still exists and even more than ever the plane incident underlines the need for this Conference. It would be unfortunate if after all our efforts to come together we parted without considering those at all. Overflights, whether by aircraft, missile or satellite, are of course a serious matter and they increase tensions. But the concept of these overflights is bound to change and they are bound to become a natural phenomenon. There is now a Soviet satellite which is going through the skies around the world and it crosses through French skies 18 times a day, of course higher than a plane. But this development will become second nature to us and I wonder if this should not be taken into consideration and discussed. In reality these satellites can take photographs and tomorrow they may be in a position to launch terrible destruction. We should examine this question in its proper framework, that of disarmament and international tension. We should consider these two questions here at the Summit and France will be prepared at an opportune moment to make a proposal on this subject. It would not be a service to humanity to separate on the basis of a local incident. Especially after the President has made his declaration that flights will be suspended, there is no reason for taking a decision to suspend the meeting. Let a day go by while we consider the statements made here and then I shall reassemble the Conference or not, depending upon the views of the delegations. I am in Paris and you have done me the honor to be here. I will stay in contact with the delegations.

*Khrushchev:* Gentlemen, I have listened attentively to the statement of President Eisenhower and I note with some satisfaction that there will be no more flights. However, I do not understand if this means only for the duration of the Conference or in general. The President said there was some misunderstanding on our part but here I have a note from the United States which states that this was done and would continue. The

question is, does President Eisenhower's statement mean that the United States has revised its former policy and admitted that the previous policy was wrong? This should be stated out loud for world public opinion to hear so that the world would know that the basic policy announced by the Department of State and later by President Eisenhower would not be carried on. It is not satisfactory if this is said only in a small room since the threat was made before the whole world. President Eisenhower expressed no regrets for this aggressive act. On the contrary, he spoke of its necessity and thus attempted to justify if not condone it. Naturally, we cannot agree to this. The President referred to free countries or skies, I do not exactly remember which. This is not the first time that we have heard of open skies. I heard it in Geneva in 1955. At that time we declared categorically that we were opposed to it, and I can repeat it now. We will permit no one, but no one, to violate our sovereignty. A government should be master in its own country and this applies equally to the Soviet Government. If we should reach disarmament and it is real, then we would stand for open skies, open lands, open waters both for tourists and intelligence gatherers. Then there would be no weapons and no need for espionage, but as long as arms exist our skies will remain closed and we will shoot down everything that is there without our consent.

*De Gaulle:* Does this include satellites?

*Khrushchev:* As for sputniks, the United States has put up one that is photographing our country. We did not protest; let them take as many pictures as they want. But our latest sputnik has no photographic equipment. It contains a space cabin designed to test the condition for manned flights, and at the next or one of the next stages of this program we will put a man in space.

*De Gaulle:* France has nothing to fear from photography.

*Khrushchev:* France has nothing to fear from the United States, which is its ally, any more than Poland has anything to fear in this respect from the Soviet Union, nor has China anything to fear from the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union anything to fear from China. If the United States was an ally of ours we would not be afraid of it. Let the United States come into the socialist camp and join the Warsaw Pact and we would welcome her flying over our territory.

*De Gaulle:* We have no fear of any photographs whatsoever.

*Secretary Herter:* There has been no English translation of this exchange.

*Khrushchev:* All right, since there was no English translation we better have it now because my friend, Mr. Macmillan, might consider there had been discrimination.



The President had mentioned bilateral talks. This idea is always good. We bear too great a responsibility and we are, at least the Soviet Government and I, for reducing international tension and ensuring peace. I am ready to meet, but frankly I am skeptical of reaching agreement on the basis announced by President Eisenhower. We are grateful to President de Gaulle for the efforts he proposed to make to create conditions which would permit the Conference to continue. We also are in favor of this but on condition that the suspension of flights would not be temporary but for always, and this should be announced publicly so that the world would know because of its previous knowledge of the threat. If this is the case we are ready to attempt to reach such a solution. The recess is all right but how long—for how many hours or days? It is hard to say. We could exchange views, give time for reflection and we might cool off. Paris has many wonderful shady chestnut groves where we can sit and think and perhaps something good would come out.

In regard to President de Gaulle's remark that it would have been better to have settled this question before coming here, between the first and the sixteenth, we handed a note of protest to the United States Government for this purpose. The answer was that this was and will continue to be United States policy (Gromyko interjected to say that the note said it was deliberate policy). We decided to come to Paris nevertheless to present our position so that it would be understood. We want to find a solution and the best solution of this incident would be—I don't know whether I should use this expression—but we don't understand what devil pushed you into doing this provocative act to us just before the Conference. If there had been no incident we would have come here in friendship and in the best possible atmosphere. I recall that at Camp David both the President and I said to each other "my friend", and now these two friends have collided in the skies. Our rocket shot the thing down. Is this good friendship? (Raising his hands above his head): God is my witness that I come with clean hands and a pure soul.

*De Gaulle:* Mr. Khrushchev referred to a devil giving advice to the United States unfavorable to the Soviet Union. There are many devils in the world and it is the job of this Conference to exorcise them. Mr. Khrushchev thinks bilateral contacts are good. That had always been part of our program. We have come here not only to meet in plenary sessions but also to talk among ourselves. We need time and should not take any definitive decisions, at least until we have had a chance for reflection. We might recess until tomorrow and in the meantime we could exchange views and make contacts. I am at your disposal. We may be able to agree to meet tomorrow morning or postpone the meeting until later. In the meantime, I urge that there be no unilateral declarations to the press if we want to proceed with our work. These would serve no good purpose but would merely complicate our tasks.

*President Eisenhower:* I agree, Mr. Chairman. I want, however, to answer one specific question raised by Mr. Khrushchev. He asked what is the sense of my statement that these flights were not to be resumed. He also referred to the fact that there will be another government and the next one. He is correct in this. (Khrushchev interjected "And another government after that" and "Nor am I eternal.") My words regarding the suspension of flights meant not merely for the duration of the Conference but for the entire duration of my office. I cannot speak for my successor and I do not know what decision the next President will make. However, the flights will not be resumed not only for the duration of the Conference but for the entire duration of my office.

*De Gaulle:* I take note of the President's statement.

*Khrushchev:* This is all right for you as an ally of the United States but for us it is not enough. There is no reference to the condemnation or regret for the insult publicly made to us. In regard to President de Gaulle's remarks on publication, we want to publish the statement. This is not a Heads of Government meeting as agreed but a preliminary meeting to determine if conditions exist for a Conference. The United States has stated its policy publicly and we wish to inform public opinion of our position. We may change the form and make it a governmental declaration rather than a declaration to the Summit Conference, but we will publish. Otherwise the world will not know.

*De Gaulle:* Previously the Soviet position had been made clear before the Conference. It had been expressed by Mr. Khrushchev, Marshal Malinovsky and Mr. Gromyko, and now we have heard Mr. Khrushchev's statement. If this statement is published little would be added to what is already known of the Soviet position and it would not contribute in any way to the work of this Conference, since it contains remarks unfavorable to participants here. So I don't see what would be gained.

*Macmillan:* Mr. Khrushchev raised two points of importance regarding Mr. Eisenhower's statement. The first is that the flights are not to be resumed, not only for the duration of the Conference but in general. President Eisenhower has made this quite clear. The second point justly advanced by Mr. Khrushchev was that since we all are here in private Mr. Khrushchev's declaration should become public. Perhaps the best way to deal with this is to consider this matter during adjournment to see which is the best method to deal with this question.

*Khrushchev:* I want to be correctly understood. If we do not publish our declaration our Soviet public opinion will be confused. They will think that the United States has forced the Soviet Union to its knees by our coming to Paris and engaging in negotiations in the face of the threat. This is insulting to us. We don't want to aggravate relations. They require a great deal of improvement anyhow. However, please under-

stand that our internal policy requires this, which is very important to us. It is a matter of honor.

*Secretary Herter:* I would like to ask a question which the President might not like to ask himself. There are two matters. The first is the memorandum concerning the incident, and the second is the withdrawal of the invitation to the President to go to Russia. Is it the intention of Mr. Khrushchev to make both of these public after the meeting?

*Khrushchev:* I intend to publish my full statement as made here. Please understand this—how can I invite as a dear guest the leader of a country which has committed an aggressive act against us. No visit would be possible under present conditions. How could our people welcome him? Even my small grandson would ask his grandpa: “How could we welcome as an honored guest one who represents a country that sends planes to overfly and which we shot down with a rocket?” Both I and my guest would be in a false position. I don’t want to put myself or my guest in this equivocal position. Later on, when passions have calmed down, the visit could be possible.

*Macmillan:* What will be published and when?

*Khrushchev:* All I said in my original statement today; our subsequent exchanges could be released by mutual agreement.

*Macmillan:* I would ask Mr. Khrushchev to publish only the memorandum given to President de Gaulle and read to me. This would be in our common interest and would also satisfy the problem of public opinion in his own country. The President could then publish his statement. Both positions would be made clear without adding acrimony or the new controversial subject regarding the invitation. In such a case better arrangements could be made for agreed publication at the end of the Conference when the atmosphere was clearer. This would be an equitable way to proceed if we want to get on with our work.

Or perhaps I could suggest another solution. Since the second part of the declaration contains an additional point, namely that of adjournment, perhaps it could be possible to publish it leaving out the reference to the President’s visit while leaving in the reference to adjournment. The question of making public the statement regarding the invitation could be decided later.

*De Gaulle:* I took note of the two suggestions made by Mr. Macmillan. However, even if only the first part is published I ask myself what effect this would have, and whether the Conference would be able to go on, because the first part contains the categorical statement that the Soviet Union refuses to participate in the Summit Conference unless there was a great change in the climate, and Mr. Khrushchev himself does not believe that that change is probable. If all participants want the Conference to go on there should be no statement published at this stage. Now

we should take note of the statements and decide the question of publication at the end. If the statements are published now this would do away with the possibility of another meeting. Mr. Khrushchev refers to public opinion. He should remember that other countries have public opinion also. We should allow ourselves time for reflection and clarification before making any decision. It would be improper to make decisions now. I have already suggested a 24-hour recess to which I understand we all agree. We could use this interval to establish contacts, reflection and then decide the question of publication.

*Khrushchev:* I must inform public opinion at home, and world opinion as well. I am sorry that there are differences among us. The insult to our country has been made public. It has not been made to your country. You are all members of NATO and the United States is the leader. We are alone and are obliged to express our opinion in regard to the conditions which would permit the Conference to work. I intend to publish my statement and I have no objection to others doing likewise; they all have the same right. The United States as leader of NATO has made its threat public and we have been insulted, but we are not prepared to come as poor relatives among NATO members to ask for mercy and to beg your leader not to violate our frontiers flying over our territory. We will defend ourselves and our honor with force if necessary and we have the necessary force. Our policy is based on respect for your sovereignty and we want you to respect ours. I am very sorry about the situation. We would like to do everything possible to contribute to the success of this Conference, but we cannot do anything because no prejudice should be done to any of the parties. As to bilateral talks, we would agree if any other party would want them.

In regard to the second part of my statement, it does not refer only to the invitation. However, I have on my desk thousands of letters and telegrams from workers and citizens requesting me to postpone the invitation to the leader of a nation that has not only violated our sovereignty but has even insulted us by stating that it would continue such acts. Our people cannot indulge in hypocrisy and receive as a distinguished guest the representative of a country that has declared such policy and its intention to continue it.

*De Gaulle:* There would seem to be nothing more at the present time than to take note of what has occurred and to draw the necessary conclusions. I am always at your disposal for as long as necessary. In these conditions the only thing we can do is adjourn.

*Macmillan:* It would be desirable to fix a time for the meeting tomorrow because the press might think that the Conference has broken down, which it may. We may reach agreement by tomorrow so we should leave the door open.

*Khrushchev*: As I have said, this is not the beginning of the Summit Conference as agreed. That has not started yet. We regard this meeting as a preliminary one, dealing with procedural matters and I also said that I would not participate in the Summit Conference until the United States has publicly removed the threat it has imposed.

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### 169. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Paris, May 16, 1960, 3 p.m.

#### OTHERS PRESENT

Messrs. Herter, Merchant, Houghton, Bohlen, Thompson, Kohler, Berding, Smith, Achilles, Gates, Irwin, Hagerty, Major Eisenhower, General Goodpaster

The President reviewed briefly the course of the morning's meeting in which Khrushchev had been completely intransigent and insulting to the United States and had presented impossible demands. The President said that these were wholly unacceptable.

Mr. Bohlen and others suggested that the President should quickly make a full statement, on the assumption that the Soviets were going to do so.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Hagerty suggested that in addition to this statement, Mr. Bohlen should brief the press on just what happened.<sup>2</sup>

There was discussion as to whether there were to be any further meetings, during which the consensus seemed to be that Macmillan suggested that provisionally it be planned to meet at 11 AM tomorrow; General de Gaulle entertained this suggestion without taking a position on it.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. For another report on this meeting, see Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, pp. 274–275.

<sup>1</sup> For text of this statement, which was released to the press at 3:30 p.m., see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, 1960, pp. 904–905.

<sup>2</sup> For a transcript of the press briefing, which was held by Bohlen and Hagerty at 4:40 p.m., see *Background Documents*, pp. 47–56.

The President said that the net effect of Khrushchev's remarks pertaining to his trip to Russia was that the invitation was withdrawn. The President said that simply saved him the necessity of turning it down given the nature of the statement the Russians had made.

The President asked that a statement be prepared at once, and suggested that Mr. Bohlen take the lead in drafting it.

The President said that deGaulle had really warmed his heart last evening when, after their discussion with Macmillan, he told the President that "no matter what happens, France as your ally will stand with you all the way."

**A.J. Goodpaster<sup>3</sup>**  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**170. Telegram From the Delegation at the Summit Conference to the Department of State**

Paris, May 16, 1960, 8 p.m.

Secto 19. At meeting this afternoon with Couve and Lloyd to discuss present situation, Secretary made clear that as result of Khrushchev's statement this morning,<sup>1</sup> there was now no point in President talking privately with latter. Khrushchev had crossed Rubicon this morning. He could not retreat from his ultimatum which the President had made clear he could not accept. We saw no purpose in further quadripartite meeting tomorrow. It was clear that Khrushchev had been determined even before arriving to torpedo meeting.

Couve said that fact latter part of Khrushchev's statement was rougher than earlier part communicated to De Gaulle and Macmillan yesterday indicated new instructions had apparently been received

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1660. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 168.

from Moscow. However, he knew that already last Saturday Russians had made their plans to leave Paris tomorrow.

Lloyd thought effort should be made to arrange further quadripartite meeting to make clear it was Khrushchev who was refusing to attend. Couve and Secretary felt Khrushchev's statement this morning and his decision to publish it made it amply clear he refused to attend. It was left for De Gaulle to decide whether to call meeting tomorrow morning (at which Soviets would presumably not appear) or to send word to Khrushchev he proposed to call one and ask whether Khrushchev would attend. Answer would presumably be no. Secretary stated that President would of course attend if tomorrow's meeting were actual Summit Meeting but would not if it were merely another like this morning's to discuss whether or not there would be one.

Lloyd inquired whether Khrushchev's reference to the Summit Meeting being postponed 6 to 8 months could be interpreted as an intention to maintain the status quo, including that in Berlin, for that period. Couve thought this probable. Thompson suggested that the Soviets would need time to complete an East German Treaty and would want to take time to complete preparations and to keep pressure on the West. It was agreed that the three Western principals should take the opportunity of their presence here to discuss the new situation, and particularly its applicability to Berlin, tonight or tomorrow but that care should be taken there be no hint of concern over Berlin. Lloyd asked the United States attitude toward a 6-8 month adjournment of Summit Meeting and the Secretary replied that while we would presumably always be glad to meet whenever there was any prospect of useful negotiations, the President could not at this time commit his successor.

It was agreed that the Secretary, Couve and Lloyd would report to NAC on May 18.

**Herter**

171. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/17

Paris, May 16, 1960, 5 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Kohler

*UK*

Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd

SUBJECT

Berlin Situation

Following today's meeting of the three Western Foreign Ministers at Quai d'Orsay,<sup>1</sup> British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd approached Secretary Herter and spoke with some emotion about the possibilities of trouble over Berlin after the breakdown of the Summit conference. He said that it was unthinkable that the British Government should ask the British people to go to war over a question of the formalities of access of West Berlin when on a commercial basis the West Germans were dealing on a very large scale with the East Germans. The Secretary rather demurred at the strength of his statement but did refer to the discussions in the Western quadripartite Heads of Government meeting yesterday<sup>2</sup> when President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan had been unable to get any kind of satisfactory response either from Chancellor Adenauer or President de Gaulle as to their estimate of what might happen if the Soviets harassed access to Berlin over a period of some years.

Mr. Lloyd then resumed this theme saying that honor required that the Western allies make clear that they were not prepared to go to war for the sake of a stamp on travel documents.

Mr. Kohler interjected that the question of a stamp was not the issue and that we should be careful not to refer to the question in these terms.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on May 18. The conversation took place at Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 170.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 161.



Mr. Lloyd retorted that the stamp was not the issue, the only issue was Western access to the garrisons in West Berlin and as long as this continued satisfactorily we could not bring about a conflict over a question of procedures connected with access.

The Secretary refrained from comment or commitment and the conversation on this subject terminated at this point.

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## 172. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/18

Paris, May 16, 1960, 6 p.m.

### MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Hillenbrand

*Germany*

Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe

#### SUBJECT

Summit Situation

In response to Ambassador Grewe's initial inquiry, Mr. Kohler said that the Summit Meeting appeared to be fairly definitely dead. One question which the three Foreign Ministers might put up to the Heads of Government was whether it would be a good idea for President de Gaulle simply to summon a meeting of the Summit Conference tomorrow morning. If the Soviets, as seemed likely, refused to come to such a meeting, it would help the West to dramatize their withdrawal. Mr. Kohler noted that the President had made clear he would not see Khrushchev alone or attend another so-called pre-Summit meeting with him. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the Soviet and American press releases

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on May 17. The conversation took place at the U.S. Embassy. For another German view of the reasons for the summit collapse, see Grewe, *Ruckblenden*, pp. 437-439.

of this afternoon<sup>1</sup> corresponded very largely to the statements made by Khrushchev and the President at the meeting this morning.

Mr. Kohler confirmed that no definite departure time had yet been set for the President. There was a general feeling on the Western side that there should be a NATO meeting with all three Foreign Ministers present. Probably the best time for this would be Wednesday morning. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] While there was some speculation in the American Delegation as to what the Soviets might do next, such as moving on Germany, there was no conclusive evidence pointing one way or the other. Ambassador Grewe noted that the Soviet Press Officer, in answer to an inquiry this afternoon, had said that it was not certain that the status quo on Germany and Berlin would be preserved during the period of 6 to 8 months which the Soviets had said should elapse before another Summit meeting.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's question as to American thinking about Soviet motivation, Mr. Kohler said there was no question but that Khrushchev's basic statement had been written in Moscow. It was still not possible to arrive at any definite conclusions, but there was a general feeling that the Soviets had begun to realize that they were not going to get anything on Germany and Berlin. The recent speeches by the Secretary and Under Secretary Dillon,<sup>2</sup> as well as reports about Western firmness and unity as manifested in the Four-Power Working Group and elsewhere, had presumably confirmed this impression. There was also no doubt that the Soviets were very annoyed by the penetration of their territory made by our plane. This had apparently strengthened elements in the Soviet Union which opposed what they regarded as Khrushchev's soft policy. The Soviets might also have thought that the incident provided a good opportunity for dividing the Allied front. The West now had to drop its Summit preparations and work harder on contingency planning, Mr. Kohler noted. Ambassador Grewe said that his theory was that the Soviets were trying to change the sequence of events. Now the peace treaty would come first, then the crisis, and finally the Summit meeting during the climax of the American electoral campaign. He felt that the two urgent problems for the West now were how to react to Soviet signature of a peace treaty with the GDR and how to strengthen contingency planning.

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<sup>1</sup> For text of the President's statement released after the meeting, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 429-430; for text of Khrushchev's statement at the meeting which was released to the press by the Soviet delegation during the afternoon on May 16, see Document 168.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Herter's address to the National Association of Broadcasters on April 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1960, pp. 635-640; regarding Dillon's speech on April 20, see Document 130.

In reply to Ambassador Grewe's question, Mr. Kohler indicated that he thought the American public would support the President's position unanimously. The break-down of the Summit might mean an intensified defense effort on our part, with more funds being made available for military expenditures.

Ambassador Grewe asked whether there was any inclination to attempt to salvage the Summit meeting. Mr. Kohler said the British were reluctant to think that it had come to an end. However, since the publication of Khrushchev's statement, they probably felt it was hopeless. They were naturally anxious that everything be done to make it clear that the Soviets were responsible for the collapse.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's question as to whether a tripartite Western statement were planned, Mr. Kohler indicated that this had not been specifically discussed. The others had been informed yesterday of the President's intention to make a public statement if the situation required. This question might be discussed by the Heads of Government this afternoon.<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Grewe said he thought it was necessary to have such a tripartite statement. Mr. Kohler agreed it would be useful and asked whether the Ambassador felt that a NATO statement should also be made. Ambassador Grewe said something was needed for tomorrow. If a statement were issued, it would be useful in providing guidance for a possible later NATO statement.

Ambassador Grewe asked when the President might be expected to leave Paris. Mr. Kohler said it had not really been discussed, but his own advice would be that the President should stay longer than Khrushchev. If the latter left on Tuesday afternoon, that would mean the President might remain until Wednesday morning. Ambassador Grewe indicated that Foreign Minister von Brentano would be back in Paris tomorrow and would be at the disposition of the other three if wanted. Mr. Kohler said he probably would wish to stay on for the Wednesday NATO meeting. While not suggesting that a formal Ministerial Council be convened, it might be useful to suggest that such Foreign Ministers as could make it come to Paris for the Wednesday session. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, is already in town.

Mr. Kohler noted that some people actually seemed to be experiencing a certain amount of relief. Laloy of the French Foreign Office estimated that the West had gained 6 to 8 months on Berlin, since he assumed the Soviets would not move during this period. Mr. Kohler said he did not believe we could assume this automatically to be the

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<sup>3</sup>No meeting of the Heads of Government took place during the afternoon of Monday, May 16. Since Hillenbrand drafted the memorandum of conversation on May 17, presumably he was referring to the meeting at 3 p.m. on that day. See Document 178.

case. He was inclined, however, to think that the Soviets had overplayed their hand. The West might not come out too badly as far as public opinion was concerned. Ambassador Grewe injected this would be the case at least in the United States. Mr. Kohler said he thought also in other countries.

Mr. Kohler concluded by mentioning that both de Gaulle and Macmillan had given gratifyingly strong support to the President on the overflights question. The meeting this morning had been held in a tense atmosphere. There had been no handshakes, only curt nods of greeting.

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### 173. Editorial Note

According to his own account, Prime Minister Macmillan met in turn with each of the other Heads of Government, beginning at 6 p.m. with President de Gaulle. At 7:15 p.m., he talked with President Eisenhower, after which he discussed the summit conference with Khrushchev. For Macmillan's account of these meetings, see *Pointing the Way*, pages 207–208. The meeting with Eisenhower is mentioned briefly in Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, page 275. For Khrushchev's account of his conversation with Macmillan, see *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, pages 459–460.

174. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Paris, May 17, 1960, 8:45 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter  
General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter discussed with the President a message received from the State Department setting forth a proposed line of action in the United Nations Security Council should the Soviets take the U-2 case there.<sup>1</sup> The President noted that the suggestion regarding Open Skies is for "reciprocal inspection." He said he would be willing to have the proposal made to apply to "all nations that will accept such inspection."

Mr. Herter said he thought the matter was one that he ought to raise with the British and French, to see if they would be prepared to join with us in making the proposal in the UN.

Mr. Herter also reported to the President that he had received a request from Mr. Dillon, with reference to the stopping of overflights by the U-2, or any further information top Administration people in the United States could be given on this matter, since it is being made to look like a reversal of a policy.

Mr. Herter said that some reports of top-level French opinion were being received regarding the performance of Mr. Khrushchev. Their evaluation is that the Red Chinese are behind this, with insistence upon a hard line. The President said he had received reports that Mr. Khrushchev's performance has left the American people infuriated and staunchly behind him. The Secretary concluded by saying that he had had a call from Selwyn Lloyd. Khrushchev's attitude during Macmillan's call on him the previous night<sup>2</sup> was just the same as in earlier meetings—in fact, all he did was read his memorandum to Macmillan again. He did tell Macmillan that he planned to stay around Paris for at least a couple of days, indicating that he wanted to avoid any impression that he was the one breaking up the summit conference.

G.  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 27.

<sup>1</sup>Tosec 17 to Paris, May 17. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1666)

<sup>2</sup>See Document 173.

175. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/37

Paris, May 17, 1960, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Invitation to Khrushchev for First Summit Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President  
Secretary Herter  
Colonel Walters

France

President de Gaulle  
M. Couve de Murville  
M. Andronikov

U.K.

Prime Minister Macmillan  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Mr. Zulueta

The President began by speaking of the large amount of construction he had seen in the Paris area.

General de Gaulle said that the center of Paris was heavily built but that there was a great deal of construction underway in the suburbs. He said he had not seen the President since Washington and he had really been struck by the tremendous amount of construction in New York, and that this new construction was light and airy and did not suffocate the city. San Francisco was also a great city, and New Orleans was visibly forging ahead.

At this point General de Gaulle was handed a press release<sup>1</sup> concerning an impromptu press conference Khrushchev had held on the sidewalk in front of the Soviet Embassy in which he had said he was going home but would hold a press conference before he went.

The President said that when Khrushchev had begun his personal attack on him he had been inclined to let his Dutch temper get the better of him but he had decided to say nothing and not even look at Khrushchev. The President said that both he and Mr. Macmillan had been greatly impressed by the skill and dignity with which General de Gaulle had handled an extremely awkward situation. It could not have been handled better.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5-1760. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Walters and approved by Goodpaster on May 18 and in 5 on May 20. The conversation took place at the Elysée Palace. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 37 from Paris, May 17 at midnight. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-PA/5-1760) For two other brief accounts of this conversation, see Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, p. 208 and Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 556.

<sup>1</sup>Not further identified. Regarding the press conference, which took place at 9:25 a.m., see *Cmd.* 1052, p. 10.

At this point Mr. Harold Macmillan, accompanied by Mr. Zulueta, arrived and joined the two Presidents.

General de Gaulle said that he might call the conference and if Khrushchev did not show up he could make a statement saying that it was obvious that the Summit conference could not be held.

Mr. Macmillan said he felt this was the most dignified way to bring the conference to an end, as they could not stay around Paris indefinitely as they all had work to do.

General de Gaulle asked what would happen if Khrushchev came and began going over his statement again.

Mr. Macmillan said that he could make perfectly clear that they were there to discuss only matters that had been agreed for discussion at the Summit.

The President said he agreed with this.

Mr. Macmillan repeated that he felt this was the most dignified way to conclude the matter. He wondered whether they could not call in the Foreign Ministers to help draft a statement which President Eisenhower had suggested be made.

The President and General de Gaulle agreed to send for the Foreign Ministers and this was done.

General de Gaulle again asked what they would do if Khrushchev came and said he wanted apologies.

Mr. Macmillan said he could be ruled out of order, that they had met to discuss matters of substance.

The President said he felt Khrushchev was in effect challenging his right to be there. We had never been guilty of aggression, and if there was anything aggressive it was Khrushchev's enormous spy network in our country.

General de Gaulle said that the Soviet delegation had asked for the main hall at the Palais de Chaillot for a press conference by Khrushchev this afternoon.

The President said that General de Gaulle might say that he had taken note of Khrushchev's statement at the preliminary meeting yesterday, and since the United States delegation refuses to state that the U-2 overflight was an act of aggression it followed that the Soviets could not attend.

Mr. Macmillan said he did not like this as it would put the onus on the President. If a Summit meeting was called to discuss matters on the agenda and Khrushchev refused to attend this would, from our point of view, be a positive way of handling the matter.

The President said he was somewhat disturbed at General de Gaulle's suggestion that Khrushchev might come and make another scene.

General de Gaulle said that this would be unfortunate and again offered to call the meeting this afternoon to study the questions which were on the agenda and had been agreed by the four participants. If Khrushchev accepted they could meet at 5:00. If he said no, he could not come because he had not received excuses, he could note his refusal and declare the conference adjourned and at 6:00 the Western powers might issue a statement.

Mr. Macmillan thought this would be a good idea.

The President said that he was somewhat fearful that Khrushchev might say he would come because the statement of the President about halting the over-flights constituted in effect an apology. He might be clever enough to do this.

General de Gaulle expressed great doubt that Khrushchev would come.

The President said General de Gaulle could make it clear in the invitation that the meeting was not another preliminary meeting but an actual Summit meeting.

General de Gaulle said that he could do this and if Khrushchev still refused we could see what we would then do. He felt it would be better if the invitation were issued before lunch, and if Khrushchev did not come they could then issue a statement.

Mr. Macmillan expressed the hope that such a statement would indicate that the Paris meeting could not be held but not necessarily exclude the whole idea of future summits and that the meeting was simply adjourned.

The President said the statement could say that the present Paris conference could not take place, and that in this situation this conference was "terminée."

Mr. Macmillan thought that they might meet again at 3:00.

General de Gaulle agreed with this.

The President said there were some possibilities for us to do some smart things ourselves. It might be smart not to reply until after he holds his press conference.

General de Gaulle said that in the statement it could be indicated that the three other powers were ready to go ahead with the Summit talks but that Khrushchev was not.

At this point Secretary of State Herter, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and Foreign Secretary Lloyd joined the meeting.

General de Gaulle said that although he did not personally believe it, the Soviet delegation might decide to go ahead with the Summit without discussing the U-2 incident. He did not feel this was imaginable in any way, but he felt that the three other powers should be ready to state



why the conference could not go ahead and prepare our position on what we would do. General de Gaulle said he was perfectly ready.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed with him that he should send a message to all the delegations, including the Soviets, saying that the meeting of the previous day would not be considered as having worked on the Summit but was a preparatory meeting, and that at 3:00 today a Summit meeting would be held to discuss those subjects which had been agreed by the participants in bilateral conversation for discussion at the Summit and only these matters would be discussed.

General de Gaulle understood that the President and the Prime Minister agreed with the thought that this be done at 3:00 this afternoon. The Russians would reply either that they could not unless they got apologies and then he would state that the meeting could not take place, or the Soviet delegation would reply that they would come and join the negotiations. If they started out to make a statement on the incident again, he would say that this subject was not on the agenda and if they refuse to go any further he would likewise take note that the meeting could not be held.

The President said there was a possibility that they were clever enough, since their position was well known, to state that his acceptance constituted a recognition by us that we had committed an act of aggression and an apology. The wording of General de Gaulle's invitation should make it plain that this was not the case. After some thought the President said that perhaps he was being overcautious.

General de Gaulle said he could make it quite clear that this meeting was being held to discuss items on the agenda for the Summit, not other questions like the U-2 incident.

The President said that after thinking the matter over he was sure if the Soviets wanted to "validate the line" that his acceptance was an apology they would have to do this in their acceptance to General de Gaulle in writing. The President went on to say that Mr. Herter had brought up a matter that was worthy of consideration. Since it was well known that there had been bilateral talks between General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Macmillan and himself,<sup>2</sup> the issuance of a call for a meeting at 3:00 might indicate that there had been some change in the situation since yesterday. This was not the case. He felt that in drafting the summons for the 3:00 meeting care should be taken to indicate that there had been no change.

Mr. Macmillan said that General de Gaulle indicated on the previous day that we should give ourselves 24 hours to think things over.

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<sup>2</sup>See Document 173.

Mr. Herter still expressed concern lest there arise a feeling that there had been some change behind the scene since yesterday.

General de Gaulle said that he could say that in view of the statements at the preliminary meeting he nevertheless felt it necessary to verify if a Summit meeting would be held to discuss questions on the agenda, and he therefore asked them to come to the Elysée at 3:00 to discuss those subjects which had been agreed for inclusion at the Summit.

The President said that we would agree with that but it might be simpler to say that in the light of the agreement at the preliminary meeting to hold a session on the following day, General de Gaulle could say he was calling the first Summit meeting.

Mr. Herter hoped that it could be made clear that there had been no change in the situation.

General de Gaulle said there had been no agreement on the previous day that a Summit would be held.

Mr. Macmillan said that this was true. He said that if Khrushchev did not appear we could consider this as adjourning the conference. He hoped that any statement would be carefully drafted to make it clear that this Paris meeting could not be held without excluding the idea of conferences in the future.

General de Gaulle said he would merely take note of the fact that a conference could not be held at this time under these conditions.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville then read out a draft invitation to Khrushchev, the wording of which would be the same to the other two Chiefs of Government:

"Having noted the statements made during the preliminary meeting of the 16th of May, I consider it necessary to ascertain whether the Summit conference can begin the examination of those questions we had agreed to discuss.

"I suggest that we meet today, the 17th of May, at 3:00 p.m. at the Elysée, with President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan to discuss these questions."

General de Gaulle said that they could ask the Foreign Ministers to prepare quickly a statement that could be issued by the three of them if there were no meeting.

Secretary Herter said a joint statement, and the others agreed.

There was some discussion of the possibility of publishing this letter. General de Gaulle said that while they were not courteous we should be and not publish it before we received an answer.

The President said he could merely indicate that he had received an invitation from General de Gaulle to attend a first Summit meeting at 3:00 to discuss matters that had been agreed for inclusion in the agenda.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd asked where the Foreign Ministers could meet, and General de Gaulle replied at the Quai d'Orsay. It was agreed they could bring several advisers.

General de Gaulle then said that if Khrushchev was coming he would notify them. If not, they could still meet and note that he was not there and possibly meet again after his press conference.

Mr. Macmillan felt that the statement should be ready for issuance about the same time as Khrushchev held his press conference. Otherwise, we would have the difficulty of catching up with him.

The President suggested that we might meet at 3:00 and have the statement ready at that time.

General de Gaulle agreed, as did Mr. Macmillan, and the meeting then concluded.

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#### 176. Telegram From the Delegation at the Summit Conference to the Department of State

Paris, May 17, 1960, midnight.

Secto 28. As agreed by Western Heads of Government at their 10:00 a.m. meeting May 17,<sup>1</sup> three Western Foreign Ministers met 11:00 a.m. same day at Quai d'Orsay to prepare draft communiqué to be issued by three Western Heads of Government in event Soviet refusal participate in summit meeting.

Discussion centered on French draft which generally acceptable to Secretary except for language which implied acceptance of Khrushchev proposal that best way out of present situation is to "postpone the conference of the Heads of Government for approximately 6–8 months." Ambiguity eliminated from agreed text which being wired separately.<sup>2</sup>

During meeting Lloyd asked why President could not say he was sorry about U-2 incident and try to remove this as obstacle to summit

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1760. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow. A more detailed memorandum of the conversation at this meeting (US/MC/32), with French, British, and agreed tripartite communiqué attached, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 175.

<sup>2</sup> The cable in which this was sent has not been identified. For text of the agreed communiqué, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 431.

meeting. Secretary replied he could not say he was sorry for good reason he was not. Moreover, he did not believe he could specifically commit President to attend summit meeting with Khrushchev in view insulting language which latter used and the atmosphere created thereby.

Following agreement on draft text Secretary referred to invitation which de Gaulle was addressing to four Heads of Government for formal summit meeting at 3:00 p.m. May 17 and then read text of proposed statement that President should make to press explaining acceptance of this invitation (text sent separately).<sup>3</sup>

Commenting on text Lloyd expressed hope that statement would not become publicly known until after Khrushchev had replied to de Gaulle invitation. Secretary replied he felt it essential issue statement as soon as possible after approval by President in order avoid any misunderstanding or give Soviets grounds for accusing US of misleading them.

**Herter**

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<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 430–431.

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## 177. Editorial Note

Following the Heads of Government meeting at 10 a.m. (see Document 176), President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan visited the British Embassy, Marnes la Coquette, where the President had lived when he was the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, and finally, about 1 p.m., the President returned to the U.S. Embassy. According to Bohlen, he and some other members of the U.S. Delegation then had dinner with the President, after which they discussed the prospects of the conference. For Bohlen's account of this discussion, see Bohlen, *Witness to History*, pages 468–469. No other record of this discussion has been found although the dinner (called a lunch) is mentioned in Eisenhower, *Strictly Personal*, page 277.

178. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/43

Paris, May 17, 1960, 3 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PRESENT

*United States*

The President  
Secretary Herter  
Secretary Gates  
Mr. Bohlen  
Colonel Walters  
Mr. Akalovsky

*United Kingdom*

Prime Minister Macmillan  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Sir Anthony Rumbold  
Mr. Zulueta

*France*

President de Gaulle  
Prime Minister Debré  
M. Couve de Murville  
M. Andronikof  
Note Taker

*USSR*

Absent

SUBJECT

The Problems of Convening the Summit

President de Gaulle opened the meeting by saying that he was privileged to see the Western participants present and that he had to note the absence of Mr. Khrushchev. He said that Mr. Khrushchev had informed the press that the Soviet position was known and that so long as there were no apologies he could not attend any meeting. However, he had said that if President de Gaulle wanted to see him, he would meet with him.

M. Couve de Murville said that the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy had telephoned to find out what was the purpose of the meeting.<sup>1</sup> He said that if the question was to discuss what had been discussed yesterday, then the meeting would be acceptable, but not before five p.m. because Mr. Khrushchev had had no lunch. However, if other questions were to be discussed, then Mr. Khrushchev could not attend.

The President referred to and read a portion of his press statement issued this morning,<sup>2</sup> in which he said that he assumed that acceptance

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–1760. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S and by the White House on May 31. The conversation took place at Elysée Palace. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 10 from Paris, May 18 at 8 p.m. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–PA/5–1860) For four other accounts of this conversation, see Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, pp. 209–210; de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, p. 265; Walters, *Silent Missions*, p. 347; and Bohlen, *Witness to History*, p. 467.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding this telephone conversation and subsequent ones with the Soviet Embassy during the meeting, see *Cmd.* 1052, pp. 12–14.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1960, pp. 430–431.

by Mr. Khrushchev of the invitation to this meeting would signify his abandoning the conditions he had advanced.

President de Gaulle remarked that thus the situation was quite clear.

The President said Mr. Khrushchev's refusal to be at this meeting indicated that he did not want to attend the Summit meeting but rather a meeting at which a debate like the one yesterday would take place.

President de Gaulle agreed and said that this being so the Summit Conference could not convene and discuss the topics contemplated for it. Therefore there was no Summit meeting and in fact it had not even started.

The President then mentioned that the Foreign Ministers had prepared a statement to be put out.<sup>3</sup>

Prime Minister Macmillan wondered whether it would be proper to take this course. He said he understood that Mr. Khrushchev had stated that he would not attend the Summit meeting because of conditions, but that he would come to continue yesterday's debate. He agreed that we could not engage in such a debate, and understood why President Eisenhower refused to do so. However, he felt that we should put Mr. Khrushchev to the test. Mr. Khrushchev had called off his press conference and had said that he would be prepared to see de Gaulle. That atmosphere should be utilized, and therefore perhaps President de Gaulle could see him, emphasize what responsibility he is taking upon himself, and explain to him that the statement by the President published yesterday<sup>4</sup> should be adequate to meet his point. In such a case, there could be another meeting tomorrow and, after due deliberation of the situation, a final decision could be taken. The declaration drafted by the Foreign Ministers should not be put out hastily on the basis of telephone conversations. It was necessary to exercise great patience, particularly in view of public opinion reactions.

President de Gaulle observed that Mr. Khrushchev had read a part of his statement to him the day before yesterday when he called upon him.<sup>5</sup> At that time Mr. Khrushchev was told that the statement contained conditions which were totally unacceptable. Yesterday Mr. Khrushchev had read his statement again plus an additional part which aggravated the situation seriously.<sup>6</sup> Mr. Khrushchev was asked yesterday not to make his statement public and he did it nevertheless. Then it was suggested to him that a meeting should take place this morning at

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<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 431.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 429–430.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 160.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 168.

11:00 o'clock, and he said that this was unacceptable to him. After that, a meeting at 3:00 p.m. was suggested, and he has not arrived to attend that meeting. Thus the present meeting, to which, in accordance with the agreement reached among the Western powers this morning,<sup>7</sup> the other three participants had been invited to discuss topics for the Summit, is being attended now only by two invited parties while the third one has refused to come unless the Summit meeting was not a Summit meeting but rather a continuation of the unpleasant debate of yesterday. We could not be accused of lack of patience; after all, we have waited a long time. Should we now begin a new operation of seduction? So far such attempts have failed. Yet we must think of the future, not only about the present situation. In this situation of uncertainty we cannot think about the future, whereas Mr. Khrushchev is doing so, and therefore we are in a weaker position. Mr. Khrushchev had said that he would see President de Gaulle, and he, President de Gaulle, did not want to say that he would not see him; however, that would not be a Summit meeting but rather a visit by a Head of Government to the Head of State of the country he was visiting.

The President recalled that this morning it had been agreed to seek an early but graceful end. He said that if President de Gaulle wanted to see "this man" he would not object, of course, but he felt that this might be an imposition on President de Gaulle's patience. However, if the other parties so wished, he would be prepared to wait a few hours before we publicized the declaration. He was here for the purpose of the Summit Conference, and was at the disposal of the other participants. Yet one should remember that not only the personal dignity of the participants but even more the dignity of the Governments represented here were involved. There would be no point in protecting this situation. Yet, the President said, perhaps President de Gaulle could set a time and perhaps another meeting could be arranged for tonight. The President observed that Mr. Khrushchev had insulted him personally but that he had no personal feelings about this, because he did not care what Mr. Khrushchev called him; so no one could accuse him of impatience. But now the situation seemed to be imposing on President de Gaulle's patience.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that there were three reasons why he would venture to urge the postponement of the publication of the declaration. First, Mr. Khrushchev should be asked to send a written reply to President de Gaulle's invitation, because telephone calls were not sufficient. We should have something for the record. This was a serious matter which would be discussed for years, and we should be able to

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<sup>7</sup>See Document 175.

explain the events when we came home. If his written reply was negative, then perhaps President de Gaulle, if he wanted, could make one last plea. The second reason was that everyone—i.e., President Eisenhower, Mr. Khrushchev, and himself—were in Paris and this was an awkward situation. We have the right to ask for a written reply to the formal invitation sent by President de Gaulle this morning to complete the record so that the whole picture could be there. And thirdly, Mr. Khrushchev had canceled his press conference, and we should see what that meant.

President de Gaulle said that the question arose in his mind as to what would happen if Mr. Khrushchev stayed around for a week, taking sightseeing trips, walking down the streets, etc. Would we stay here that long, too?

Prime Minister Macmillan replied that he was thinking only of today and tomorrow.

The President noted that the question was whether after two days of work and waiting we should give this man one more opportunity to change his mind. Would we not look ridiculous in that case? The President said that he was not too settled on this point, as he was the aggrieved party. However, if we continued waiting, our own press would start criticizing us.

President de Gaulle said that Mr. Khrushchev had been given many occasions already and that he might never have enough occasions.

M. Couve de Murville reported that he had just received a new reply from the Soviet Minister at the Embassy, which rectified the first one. The new text contained the following question: "Is the 3 p.m. meeting to discuss questions the solution of which will permit the Summit meeting to take place?" He also stated that he had asked the Soviet representative for a written reply to de Gaulle's invitation.

The President said that the Soviet question was precisely what we did not want to talk about, because this was the matter of the same incident that had been discussed before. Therefore he felt that if Mr. Khrushchev put this in writing, that would be the end of the Conference.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that this new message supported his own position, because there had been three press statements and each of them was different. Therefore it would be wiser to await further development.

President de Gaulle observed that the West, too, should make it clear where it stood and indicate what its thinking on the situation was.

The President emphasized that if there should be a meeting to discuss with Mr. Khrushchev only the possibility of holding the Conference, then it would have to take place without the President, because he was the object of Mr. Khrushchev's hatred and insults.



Prime Minister Macmillan said that President de Gaulle could reason with Khrushchev. It was necessary to exert every possible effort in order to prevent the leftist elements from saying that we have failed to do everything in our power to get this Conference going.

M. Couve de Murville reported the text of a new message from Mr. Khrushchev, which inquired whether the meeting called by de Gaulle was for the purpose of ascertaining "whether the conditions for the holding of a Summit meeting have been fulfilled."

Prime Minister Macmillan noted that this wording did not say "conditions of the Soviet Government."

The President stated that Mr. Macmillan apparently wished Mr. Khrushchev to say clearly that he would not come so that he could quote that statement in the House of Commons.

President de Gaulle said that Khrushchev would never say such a thing. He stated that he had indicated how far he personally and the French Government could go and then read the text of a communiqué which the French Foreign Ministry had prepared and which was not to be put out as a joint communiqué, but rather a statement of his own. He then read the following text:

"General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, suggested to President Eisenhower, Chairman Khrushchev and Mr. Macmillan that they should meet with him on May 17 at 3:00 p.m. in order to consider with him whether the Summit Conference could begin studying the questions it had been agreed to discuss.

"The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain were present. The absence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union was noted. General de Gaulle took note of the fact that in these conditions the anticipated discussions could not take place."

President de Gaulle then raised the question of a joint communiqué. He said that perhaps a sentence could be added to the French unilateral communiqué stating that the President of the United States, the President of the French Republic, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain would publish a joint communiqué tomorrow morning. If Mr. Khrushchev should yield in the meantime we could then see what to do. If not, a communiqué would then be published which would recognize that there was no Summit meeting; in any case the world knew that this meeting had been called by President de Gaulle and it should be informed that only two of the invited parties had come to attend it. The question of the joint communiqué could perhaps be reserved until tomorrow as an extreme limit, but it should be resolved early in the morning because this situation could not go on indefinitely.

M. Couve de Murville reported that there had been another message from the Soviet Embassy, this time in reply to his request for an

answer in writing. It stated that Mr. Khrushchev did not intend to reply in writing and in turn asked for an answer to his previous inquiry on the telephone. Couve said that the person who had talked to the Soviet representative had indicated that the invitation clearly stated that the meeting was for the purpose of discussing the questions on the agenda of the Summit meeting. The Soviet reply was that Mr. Khrushchev did not quite understand what this meant.

The President then said that perhaps it would be better to publish the French communiqué now and say that a joint communiqué would be published tomorrow morning.

Prime Minister Macmillan then raised the question of the wording of the French invitation and wondered whether Mr. Khrushchev could not argue that it implied the possibility of discussing his own point. He also said that perhaps it would be useful to say in the communiqué that the three Western participants would meet tomorrow morning. Otherwise the press would ask why the joint communiqué was going to be published tomorrow rather than tonight.

The President expressed the desire to have this statement to be put out by President de Gaulle contain an indication that this meeting had been convened for substantive discussion and not a debate of conditions for the Summit meeting.

President de Gaulle pointed out that his text contained such a statement.

The President observed that, of course, he personally was protected by his press statement this morning, in which this point had been made clear, to which President de Gaulle said that no one would be deceived because the texts were very clear.

The President said that of course we knew that Mr. Khrushchev was a liar, but perhaps Mr. Khrushchev could find some people who would believe him.

Couve de Murville at this point suggested that perhaps the best way to handle this situation was to read to the press the two replies Mr. Khrushchev had transmitted.

President de Gaulle noted that these messages had been conveyed by telephone and that therefore they could be easily denied.

Prime Minister Macmillan then reviewed the events of this afternoon, in particular the sequence of Soviet telephone messages, and again emphasized that we must have something for the record to explain what has happened.

President de Gaulle noted that Mr. Khrushchev had not even replied to him personally but rather had a third person call someone at his office.

The President stated that President de Gaulle had invited Mr. Khrushchev to this meeting and that the latter had not even been courteous enough to reply and had only called through a third person. We have been here since three p.m.; there have been these telephone messages going on, and it was obvious that on this basis the Conference could not start. Khrushchev in effect had refused to come.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd interjected that Khrushchev did not refuse but had rather asked us what the purpose of the meeting was.

The President wondered why Mr. Khrushchev had questioned this meeting rather than come to attend it.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested that Mr. Khrushchev be given a written reply as to the nature of this meeting.

The President observed that Mr. Khrushchev had asked what kind of meeting this was, so it was obvious that he was not prepared to come to a Summit meeting.

Couve de Murville reported that there was a new message on behalf of Mr. Khrushchev asking by what time he could have a reply to his request for clarification as to the nature of this meeting.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested that this reply could be made either in the form of a letter from President de Gaulle, or President de Gaulle could invite Mr. Khrushchev and explain to him the situation.

President de Gaulle stated that as to the first suggestion, he had no intention of writing to Mr. Khrushchev in view of the latter's failure to reply to his letter. As to the second suggestion, this was a Byzantine method, and we all knew how the Byzantine Empire had ended. He then listed Mr. Khrushchev's three conditions, and said that in spite of the fact that they had been publicized by Mr. Khrushchev, he had written him, by extreme good will, and invited him to come to this meeting. Mr. Khrushchev had failed to reply and had merely asked through a third person by telephone three times in succession whether the conditions for the Summit meeting had been fulfilled. It was true that he did not refer to his own conditions, but it was obvious that this was what he meant. So, President de Gaulle continued, this was enough, and he would publish his communiqué because he had the right to take note and state publicly that Mr. Khrushchev had not attended the meeting. He then said that as an extreme concession he would agree to have the joint communiqué published tomorrow morning. It would then be up to Mr. Khrushchev to bring about a change in the situation because only he could do that. President de Gaulle then said that he had just received the text of a press statement by Khrushchev, given to the press by Kharlamov, his press officer, which read as follows:

"I am ready to participate in a meeting with President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan, and President Eisenhower to exchange

views on whether conditions have materialized to start the Summit Conference. If the United States has really come to the decision to condemn the treacherous incursion of American military aircraft into the airspace of the Soviet Union, publicly express regret over these incursions, punish those who are guilty, and give assurances that such incursions will not be repeated in the future, we would be ready on receipt of such assurances to participate in the Summit Conference."

Prime Minister Macmillan commented that now he was satisfied because this statement gave us sufficient background and the fish was back on the hook.

The President suggested that the procedure proposed by President de Gaulle should be followed.

President de Gaulle said that he would publish his communiqué and that he believed that the joint communiqué should also be published at this time because Khrushchev had now put the dots over the "i's".

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested that it would be more seemly to wait until tomorrow, as had been proposed by President de Gaulle originally.

President de Gaulle replied that if the final communiqué was to be published tomorrow, then the morning press would have only Khrushchev's statements and none of ours. People would wonder what decision had been taken by us here.

The President expressed the opinion that this was not so important as far as public opinion in our country was concerned but that he still preferred that the communiqué be made public tonight.

Prime Minister Debré interjected that Mr. Khrushchev was making his statements to the press, so they could not be left unanswered by us.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested that each Delegation make statements to the press tonight but that would be done through spokesmen rather than in the form of communiqués. He then said that this development was the collapse or nearly collapse of a policy that had been pursued persistently by his Government for two years. The situation would have grave consequences and could bring us even close to war. He expressed the hope that the three statesmen present here would prefer to reply to Mr. Khrushchev's spokesman through their own spokesmen tonight and sleep on this until tomorrow morning. Every word said here would be part of history and therefore it would be much better to reflect on this until tomorrow morning. Mr. Macmillan said that this was the most tragic day of his life and that if Mr. Khrushchev did not change his mind, public opinion in his country should be prepared for this grave situation.

The President pointed out that if the publication of the joint communiqué was postponed until tomorrow morning, he would put out through his office a statement that would be much harsher.

Prime Minister Macmillan said this was the right thing to do and that his Delegation would do the same, but on the basis of spokesman-to-spokesman. He then again suggested that there be another meeting tomorrow.

President de Gaulle said that as far as meeting tomorrow morning was concerned, as was suggested by Prime Minister Macmillan, that would be all right with him, but that meeting would not be a Summit meeting but rather to discuss other business of interest to the three parties. He then again raised the question of when the joint communiqué should be published.

Prime Minister Macmillan suggested ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

The President pointed out that this would be five o'clock in the morning in the United States and that this would be a very inconvenient time for our press.

Prime Minister Macmillan observed that statements by the respective spokesmen to be made tonight would fill the papers tomorrow.

President de Gaulle then asked what could happen between midnight and ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

The President stated that even though perhaps he should not take up this subject himself, he was wondering whether, if individual press statements were to be made, the problem would not change and become in effect a personal row between Mr. Khrushchev and himself. He said that this would be all right with him personally because he could take care of himself, but that this would not be a sign of unity of the three Western powers and of their resentment of Mr. Khrushchev's attitude. He thought that allied unity was one of the most important things to come out of this meeting. Thus, he said, he was sorry to disagree with Mr. Macmillan's argumentation.

Prime Minister Macmillan stated that in his view the text of the final declaration was a noble document, moderate, and reflecting the sentiments of those present here. However, he would want the world to know that this statement had been thought over by us and it was not the result of a hasty decision, so perhaps the press could be given tonight another, preliminary communiqué which would describe the events of today, mention President de Gaulle's invitation, Mr. Khrushchev's replies and conditions, etc., and then say that this was a very serious development which was being studied by us and that we would make public our considered opinion tomorrow morning. This would give the world an idea of what has happened and also indicate that we were de-

liberating on what has happened. It would also indicate that we would meet tomorrow to make our decision.

President de Gaulle stated that he was glad that Mr. Macmillan approved this text, because he himself liked it. The text contained no polemics. We in the West did not engage in polemics with the Soviets. However, if we issued another, preliminary communiqué, that would lead to polemics, there would be a battle of communiqués, and the impact of our solemn statement would be lost. Our statement that the hopes for the Summit were dashed would lose its effect. He wondered whether this procedure was a good one to follow. So far Mr. Khrushchev was the one who had been unpleasant and insulting while we have refrained from saying harsh things to Mr. Khrushchev publicly. We had invited him to reserve the secrecy of the Summit and he had refused to do so by releasing his statement. We had been restrained, so why should we now lose the advantage that we have gained from our attitude so far by engaging in this series of communiqués? President de Gaulle also noted that the communiqué did not state that the Conference was over.

At that point a new message was brought into the room indicating that Mr. Khrushchev was not having a press conference today and that he was not leaving Paris today.

Prime Minister Macmillan apologized for insisting on his point but emphasized that this was something that was tremendously important to them. He stated that he would hate to see a communiqué decided upon six or seven hours before the actual event. If the communiqué should be published tonight, then we should meet again and put out a communiqué that would reflect exactly the situation prevailing at that time. Mr. Khrushchev had not broken off the Conference; he had asked whether conditions for the Conference existed, which was a different thing.

President de Gaulle said that if something new were to happen between now and eight p.m. tonight, then we could meet, but otherwise we would meet in a vacuum, without Mr. Khrushchev, and would look rather awkward to the world. So a time should be set for the publication of the communiqué, which would be observed unless something new should have happened in the meantime.

The President asked Mr. Macmillan whether he still preferred to wait until tomorrow morning, to which the latter replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Herter asked whether or not this meant that Mr. Macmillan wanted another meeting.

Prime Minister Macmillan replied that there would have to be another meeting anyway to discuss other questions.

President de Gaulle noted that this would be a different meeting not related to the Summit and dealing with "our affairs."

Prime Minister Macmillan observed that Mr. Khrushchev had changed his plans now and that he now might accuse us of breaking up the Conference. This was a very grave matter, because a long cold war with all its inherent difficulties and dangers could result from it.

President de Gaulle pointed out that the situation would be the same tomorrow as today, and that the prospects of cold war would not change between today and tomorrow.

Prime Minister Macmillan again apologized for insisting on a point that was not shared by his colleagues. He said that in his country the failure of this Conference would be the greatest blow since World War II. In all churches prayers had been read for the success of this meeting and now the hopes of the people had been dashed. This could not be accepted easily. Perhaps by grace of God Mr. Khrushchev might change his mind. Although it was true that he had placed unacceptable conditions, Mr. Khrushchev had not yet broken up the Conference. In any case, the joint communiqué could be published tonight at ten p.m. unless there was no new development. The Foreign Ministers could meet at 9:30 p.m. to review the situation.

President de Gaulle reiterated that the communiqué did not state that the Summit Conference had ended; it simply said that the Conference had never started, so the door for future meetings was not closed.

The President interjected that Mr. Khrushchev had indicated that he would not go to a Summit Conference before next January 21.

President de Gaulle replied that by that time Mr. Khrushchev himself may not be around.

The President once again reviewed the developments of today and noted that this man had been asked to meet here at eleven o'clock. He had said that this was not acceptable; so we had waited for four hours, until three o'clock. Even then he failed to show up. Thus our patience was running out. However, if dignity required such an action, the President said, he would be willing to meet with President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan here at ten p.m. to issue the joint communiqué and thus make the occasion more formal.

President de Gaulle said that obviously if there was a new development by that time a meeting of that sort could take place.

Prime Minister Macmillan stated that he liked the President's idea and that such a meeting would take only five minutes but would give the declaration much more weight and dignity.

After a brief exchange, it was decided that it would be best for both the principals and the Foreign Ministers to meet tonight at 9:30 and, if nothing had occurred in the meantime to change the situation, to issue the joint communiqué.

(Whereupon at 5:05 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.)

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**179. Telegram From the Delegation at the Summit Conference to the Department of State**

Paris, May 17, 1960, midnight.

Secto 25. At final meeting three Western Heads of Government evening May 17,<sup>1</sup> Lloyd reported he had invited Gromyko to UK Embassy before dinner and spent more than an hour talking to him.<sup>2</sup>

Lloyd stated he raised question of U2 and said that the Soviets bore responsibility for wrecking conference.

Lloyd then told Gromyko regarding nuclear test talks, UK-US had hoped for progress at summit but in light developments Paris this proved impossible. He inquired of Gromyko what ideas he had on this matter. Gromyko replied that progress only possible by instructions to delegations at Geneva.

Lloyd then raised question of disarmament and original expectations that constructive directive to participants' delegates would emerge from summit.

He reported Gromyko in reply delivered lengthy speech, reasonable in tone. It contained, however, nothing of substance and in effect was propaganda exercise.

Lloyd said he then remarked on interest he found in Khrushchev's statement regarding postponement summit conference for six or eight months. He asked if Soviet interest in such was in effect genuine and whether in interval Soviets intended to avoid increase in tensions.

Gromyko replied that in this intervening period, Soviets intended no action which would increase tensions or make trouble. They would await another summit.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1760. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Bonn.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 180.

<sup>2</sup> For another brief account of this talk, see Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, p. 211.



Lloyd said then he threw fly over Gromyko by observing that he had seen press statements to effect Khrushchev was returning to Moscow via East Berlin and wondered whether purpose was there to sign peace treaty with GDR.

Gromyko replied that he had nothing to add beyond what Khrushchev had said at Baku.<sup>3</sup> Namely, that if no agreement were reached it would be necessary for Soviets to sign peace treaty with GDR. (In questioning of Lloyd following meeting, Lloyd said his interpretation of this was that it was repetition standard Soviet doctrine and not necessarily to be construed as intention to conclude German peace treaty in immediate future.)

In summary Lloyd said his conversation with Gromyko had been on whole friendly and not grim. Essentially, however, he considered it propaganda exercise by Gromyko with only real significance lying in statement Soviets intended no actions in months immediately ahead designed to increase tensions.

**Herter**

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<sup>3</sup>See footnote 1, Document 138.

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### **180. Telegram From the Delegation at the Summit Conference to the Department of State**

Paris, May 17, 1960, midnight.

Secto 26. At meeting of three Western Heads of Government, 9:30 p.m. May 17 at Elysee Palace,<sup>1</sup> de Gaulle reported that he had been informed Khrushchev would pay him final call at 11 Wednesday morning, hold press conference 3 p.m.,<sup>2</sup> and depart Paris 11 Thursday morning.

De Gaulle said question of tripartite communiqué (text telegraphed separately Exhagerty four)<sup>3</sup> remained to be agreed. This was done promptly and issued 10 tonight Paris time.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1760. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup>For another brief account of this meeting, see Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, p. 211.

<sup>2</sup>For a transcript of Khrushchev's press conference, see *Background Documents*, pp. 56–68.

<sup>3</sup>For text of the communiqué, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 431. The Exhagerty four cable has not been found.

In response to inquiry, President said he intends to depart Paris Thursday morning paying morning farewell call on de Gaulle prior departure.

It was further agreed three Western Foreign Ministers would meet at Quai d'Orsay at 11 a.m. May 18, and that three Western Heads of Government would meet at Elysee at 5 p.m. for final consideration subjects on summit agenda and situation arising from its failure to convene.

De Gaulle attended by Debre and Couve de Murville; Macmillan by Lloyd, Hoyer Millar and Rumbold; and the President by the Secretary, Secretary Gates, Whitney, Houghton and Merchant.

Macmillan stated he planned to depart for London Thursday morning. Lloyd reported on talk with Gromyko before dinner as reported separately.<sup>4</sup>

Following meeting French said Khrushchev's evening letter to de Gaulle re non-attendance summit meeting this afternoon and de Gaulle's succinct reply were being released to press.<sup>5</sup>

**Herter**

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 179.

<sup>5</sup> Following this meeting, Kohler briefed Grewe on its substance and on the substance of Lloyd's conversation with Gromyko. A memorandum of their conversation (US/MC/21) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664.

**181. Memorandum of Conversation**

US/MC/34

Paris, May 18, 1960, 11 a.m.

**MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT**

**PARTICIPANTS**

*United States*

*France*

The Secretary of State

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville

*United Kingdom*

Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd

(List of additional participants attached)<sup>1</sup>

**SUBJECT**

Berlin Contingency Planning

The Foreign Ministers agreed that, in the light of developments in connection with the meeting of the Chiefs of State and Heads of Government, it would be prudent to have a further look at Berlin contingency planning.

A special tripartite working group was instructed to prepare immediately a brief report which the Foreign Ministers might submit to the meeting of the Heads of Government at 5:00 p.m.

To M. Couve de Murville's suggestion that all planning activities might henceforward be centralized in Paris, the Secretary replied that it was considered preferable to continue to coordinate planning through the Washington Ambassadorial Group. This was especially true because Ambassador Lodge had just referred to planning for possible action in the United Nations.

Mr. Lloyd said that more attention should be given to the problems which would be created by harassment of civilian access, a possibility which troubled the Germans very much. The Foreign Ministers agreed that this matter should be given study jointly with the Germans. On Mr. Kohler's suggestion, it was agreed that there might be preliminary work in the Washington Ambassadorial Group, to be followed by detailed planning, as necessary, at Bonn and by "Live Oak".

M. Couve de Murville stated that it would be advisable not to let it be publicly known that renewed attention was being given to Berlin contingency planning.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan and approved in S on May 20. The conversation took place at Quai d'Orsay. See also Documents 182 and 183.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

## 182. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/35

Paris, May 18, 1960, 11 a.m.

### MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

#### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
Mr. Merchant  
Ambassador Burgess  
Ambassador Eaton  
Mr. McCone  
Mr. Achilles  
Mr. Irwin  
Mr. Berding  
Mr. Farley  
Mr. McSweeney

*United Kingdom*

Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
Sir Anthony Rumbold  
Sir Gladwyn Jebb  
Sir Frank Roberts  
Mr. Con O'Neill

*France*

M. Couve de Murville  
M. de Courcel  
Ambassador Alphand  
Ambassador de Leusse  
M. Lucet  
M. Legendre

#### SUBJECT

Disarmament

M. Couve de Murville said that Ten-Power disarmament talks are scheduled to resume in Geneva on June 7 and asked what the Western approach should be. The Secretary said it was difficult at the moment to foresee what events would intervene and what the atmosphere would be on June 7. The United States would want to think further during the period about the French proposals for control of nuclear delivery systems. Couve said he thought it would be a mistake for the West to take the initiative in postponing or suppressing the June 7 talks. The Secretary agreed that this would require very careful thought.

Mr. Lloyd said he hoped agreement could be reached regarding the new French proposal and its relationship to the Western disarmament

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Confidential. Drafted by Farley and approved in S on May 20. The conversation took place at Quai d'Orsay. See also Documents 181 and 183. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 33 from Paris, May 18 at 5 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1860)

plan. The Italians and Canadians would have to be brought into further discussions of this question. The Secretary agreed and pointed out that the Western disarmament working group would reconvene at the end of May in Geneva and could take up this question. Couve remarked that if we adhere to the position that disarmament talks should resume on June 7, we should do so with no illusions as to their outcome. It might thus be useless to put down any new plans or take new steps. The Secretary agreed that the prospects were bad, but thought that propaganda considerations might justify new Western moves. Lloyd agreed that we should continue to look for ways to maintain a good public posture.

The Secretary said it seemed agreed the working group should reconvene in Geneva on May 30. The three governments could meanwhile keep in touch with each other since he could not conceive of a meeting if a Berlin crisis should intervene. Mr. Gates said he conceded that it might be desirable to resume negotiations but thought a time limit might be set if indeed the talks are futile and the atmosphere bad. Lloyd said that as a practical matter the UN General Assembly set a final date. There were bound to be weeks and weeks of debate on disarmament at the UN and the ten-power talks could hardly go on simultaneously. Couve pointed out that the end of July was really the probable recess point since August vacations would take up the period between then and convening of the UN.

Lloyd raised the question of having the ten-power talks public. Eaton said he personally preferred this. Couve pointed out that the talks at present are virtually public in view of extensive press briefings and later release of verbatims. Lloyd said that if there were a chance of fruitful private negotiation, he would want to continue privately. In the present situation, however, he thought we would gain by public sessions. Eaton said that this would let the press see for themselves the repetitious and static position of Zorin and the satellites. Lloyd summed up by saying that there was an initial consensus and that the three governments should consider the matter further and the working group could discuss it after May 30. If the idea still seems sound an approach could be made to Zorin. The one obstacle might be the Canadians, since Mr. Green had urged secret sessions. Couve pointed out that private sessions could always be held if useful.

183. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/36

Paris, May 18, 1960, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Participants

*United States*

The Secretary of State

*France*

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville

*United Kingdom*

Foreign Secretary Lloyd

(List of additional participants attached)<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Report to NATO

The Foreign Ministers agreed that they would attend a meeting of the NAC on May 19 at 11:00 a.m. and report briefly on the developments of the past few days. It was anticipated that questions would be asked on disarmament and on Germany including Berlin. The Secretary undertook to deal with the former subject, Mr. Lloyd with the latter.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Official Use Only. Drafted by McKiernan and approved in S on May 20. The conversation took place at the Quai d'Orsay. See also Documents 181 and 182.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

**184. Telegram From the Delegation at the Summit Conference to the Department of State**

Paris, May 18, 1960, 8 p.m.

Secto 38. According to French official source Khrushchev farewell call on de Gaulle, accompanied by Malinovsky and Gromyko, lasted 45 minutes.<sup>1</sup> Tone was calm and courteous. De Gaulle raised no matters of substance. Khrushchev reiterated position on non-attendance Summit with harsh criticism of President Eisenhower in relation to airplane incident which made Summit impossible and set back policies Khrushchev had been working on. Particularly regretted Summit breakdown as regards disarmament since he had been prepared present many “constructive” proposals which would now be submitted to 10-nation group at Geneva. No mention was made of Berlin.

**Herter**

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1666. Confidential. Drafted by McSweeney and authorized by Kohler. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.

<sup>1</sup>A memorandum of Bohlen’s conversation with de Courcel (US/MC/19), from which this summary was made, is *ibid.*, CF 1664. Khrushchev made the call during the morning of May 18.

185. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/30

Paris, May 18, 1960, 4:30 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary  
Secretary Gates  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Irwin  
Mr. Kohler  
Mr. Hillenbrand

*France*

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
Ambassador Alphan  
M. Jean Laloy  
M. Bruno de Leusse  
M. Geoffrey de Courcel

*United Kingdom*

Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd  
Sir Derek Hoyer Millar  
Sir Gladwyn Jebb  
Sir Anthony Rumbold  
Mr. John Drinkall  
Mr. Killick  
Mr. Thompson

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Planning

Couve opened the meeting by saying that the paper prepared earlier in the day by the Tripartite Working Group<sup>1</sup> summarizing the present state of Berlin Contingency Planning was a good one and that there was not really much for the Ministers to discuss. The Secretary said he had one point to make, namely, that the language in Section V of the paper relevant to plans for a Berlin airlift should not be construed to mean that a decision had already been taken to mount such an airlift but merely that the relevant plans for one existed.

As to the paragraph on UN action, Couve made the point that a decision on submission of the Berlin problem to the UN could only be taken in the light of the circumstances at the appropriate time, particularly the state of public opinion and the general atmosphere. Lloyd noted that at that time the Governments would also have to consider whether they wished to carry the action over into the General Assembly.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on May 20. The conversation took place at Elysée Palace. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 39 from Paris, May 18 at 9 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1860)

<sup>1</sup>See Document 186.



In response to Lloyd's query as to whether any thought had been given as to what the UN might do if an appeal were made to it, both the Secretary and Couve noted that planning had been done on this and that the Working Group paper stated what the objectives of an approach to the Security Council would be. Couve said that he wondered whether the matter should not be further studied in Washington. The Secretary pointed out that considerable work had already gone into the agreed portions of the contingency planning paper dealing with the role of the UN.

There was some discussion of where the further planning called for in Sections IV and V of the paper should take place. It was agreed German participation in some aspects of this planning would be required and the Secretary's suggestion was accepted that the Washington Contingency Planning Group be given authority to call in the Germans whenever necessary. Couve pointed out that this was quite normal. Mr. Kohler noted that the basic coordinating responsibility for contingency planning should remain with the tripartite group in Washington, and no dissent from this was expressed.

The Ministers agreed that it would be most unfortunate if it became publicly known that the Western Powers were currently reviewing their contingency planning. Both Lloyd and Couve implied that this might limit the amount of information which it would be desirable to give to the Germans.

Couve reported that he had seen von Brentano earlier today, and the latter had requested that a meeting of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin be held in Paris before the departure from here of the various delegations. It was agreed that such a meeting should be held on May 19. The Secretary suggested that the need for further study of the subjects indicated in Sections IV and V of the Contingency Planning paper might be indicated to the Germans at the meeting.

The Ministers agreed that Couve should present the conclusions of the Contingency Planning paper to the Heads of Government and recommend that further planning relating to indirect countermeasures and possible harassment of German civilian access be approved.

**186. Telegram Secto 40 From the Delegation at the Summit Conference to the Department of State**

Paris, May 18, 1960, 9 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-1860. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. 6 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**187. Memorandum of Conversation**

Paris, May 18, 1960, 5-6:20 p.m.

**MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT**

**PARTICIPANTS**

*United States*

President Eisenhower  
Secretary Herter  
Secretary Gates  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Kohler  
Colonel Walters

*France*

President de Gaulle  
Prime Minister Debre  
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
(note takers, interpreters)

*United Kingdom*

Prime Minister Macmillan  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
Sir Anthony Rumbold  
Sir Gladwyn Jebb  
Mr. de Zulueta

**SUBJECT**

Report to NATO: Berlin; Disarmament

President de Gaulle opened the meeting by saying that there was a serious question now—whether photographs should be taken of the meeting. The President indicated his agreement, asking whether a

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved by S and the White House. The conversation took place at the Elysée Palace. See also Document 188. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 12 from Paris, May 19 at 9 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1960) For Macmillan's account of this meeting, see *Pointing the Way*, p. 212.

fourth chair should be left vacant! On investigation by Couve de Murville it was found the photographers were not yet ready so the picture taking was postponed until later.

President de Gaulle then opened the meeting proper by saying that the Heads of Government had asked the Foreign Ministers to meet, and proposing that they now be asked to report as to the results of their meeting.

Couve de Murville, who had been designated as spokesman by the Foreign Ministers, reported that they had met this morning and again this afternoon to examine three questions. First was the question of reporting to NATO. This was simple and it had been decided that the Foreign Ministers would meet with NAC at 11 o'clock tomorrow and report to them fully and exactly what had happened. The two other questions were Berlin and disarmament. With respect to Berlin the Foreign Ministers had discussed what to do if communications were disrupted, especially in connection with the conclusion of a separate peace treaty by the Soviet bloc with the GDR. Contingency planning had been going on for some time and the Foreign Ministers had asked the experts to meet and review this planning in the light of present circumstances. The experts had submitted a report. Subject to reservation as to the circumstances which might prevail and to government decisions to be taken at the time, the report indicated that contingency planning was generally in satisfactory shape and the Foreign Ministers had confirmed its applicability. However additional planning would be required, particularly in two fields. In the event of a threat of disruption of allied communications the question arose as to the action which might be taken in the United Nations. This question had been studied and would be further studied in Washington. The second question was related to that which had been raised in the Heads of Government meeting by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, being connected with the problem of the supply to the civilian population of West Berlin in the event of a rupture of communications. This could become a difficult problem. It presented a complicated issue which would have to be considered in detail in cooperation with the Germans whose participation would be needed both for the counter measures which might be taken, mainly against the GDR, and for logistic and financial support of the effort to supply the population of West Berlin.

Finally, M. Couve de Murville said, the Foreign Ministers had reviewed the disarmament situation. They had agreed that the Ten Power Meeting in Geneva should be resumed on June 7 unless something new should happen before that time which would call for reconsideration. Consequently, it had been agreed that the five Western participants would meet in Geneva on May 30 to consider and prepare the Western positions.

President de Gaulle then reviewed the Foreign Ministers' report. As regards NATO, he said, this was a matter of routine business to inform the members of NATO what did—or what did not—happen at the Paris meetings. As regards Berlin he referred to the measures which were to be taken in case of a disruption of communications to supply the civilian population of West Berlin and inquired what kind of measures the Ministers had in mind.

M. Couve de Murville said this problem had two aspects. First was the question of the stocks in Berlin, and, second, the means of transport of supplies to Berlin from the FRG. Both aspects must be considered. At present stocks of foodstuff were sufficient for about six months and it should be considered whether anything further needed to be done. As regards transport, in the last resort in the event of a complete blockade the only feasible means of supply would be by airlift. However this would not be as easy as it was twelve years ago since Berlin had a larger population and much higher requirements.

President de Gaulle then asked a question with respect to the counter measures contemplated, to which the French Foreign Minister replied that these would be economic measures which could be applied mainly against the GDR.

President Eisenhower said he thought the great problem that we would face would be a succession of little events, annoying but none important or dramatic enough in itself to arouse public opinion. Such tactics would pose very difficult problems. The allies would never be able to take strong measures unless the free world could be brought to recognize that an injustice was being done. We would be up against the necessity of making a decision "either to fish or cut bait," but in a situation where the world might not understand. This seemed to indicate, he continued, in the light of the experiences of the last few days, that the three powers should be much closer together not only as regards specific problems but as regards the clearing away of smaller problems between themselves which sometimes distracted their attention from the main problem which probably for some time would be the question of Berlin. In this situation the three powers must speak with one voice.

President de Gaulle agreed that the situation would probably not be that of an actual blockade but more likely harassment, in which case economic counter measures would probably be the most effective means of acting against the GDR. He inquired whether the Foreign Ministers had considered any specific measures of this kind.

M. Couve de Murville replied that the Foreign Ministers had a rough idea but that the experts had not yet studied the problem in detail because they had worked mainly on the question of allied communications and focused particularly on the question of disruption of those.

Prime Minister Debre commented that even in this case it might be that economic measures would be the more effective.

The French Foreign Minister resumed by pointing out the further factor that allied communications are guaranteed by agreements with the Soviets which provide some basis for action while all the civilian traffic between the FRG and Berlin is under control of the East German authorities.

President de Gaulle then noted that two years ago when Khrushchev first made his threat to Berlin the three governments had agreed to a whole series of measures which could be taken immediately and inquired as to the status of these. To this M. Couve de Murville replied that these measures had been reviewed. President de Gaulle then resumed, saying again that, if we were not faced with an abrupt crisis, economic measures would probably be the best.

President Eisenhower agreed that the Working Groups needed to consider all possible measures to ensure the supply and health of West Berlin.

President de Gaulle then referred to the Foreign Ministers report with respect to disarmament, mentioning the meeting of the Ten to resume in Geneva on June 7. Secretary Herter observed that the five Western Powers would meet a week before. General de Gaulle then asked if the President or the Prime Minister had any new proposals on disarmament or whether they were standing on their established positions. The President indicated that the latter was the case as far as he was concerned.

Prime Minister Macmillan commented that he understood that a paper was being worked on by the disarmament experts in an attempt to harmonize the positions of all three.

President de Gaulle then referred to the current Paris meetings and the crisis which had arisen in connection with them. He said that while this had been rather bad, perhaps the meetings had not been entirely unprofitable. The three were perhaps clearer as regards the future and as regards their relationship with the USSR. Perhaps the future was a little clearer also as respects Khrushchev. President de Gaulle had the impression that these meetings had not exactly benefited Mr. Khrushchev's own position. On the other hand, he thought that the three Allies had displayed wisdom and firmness. He thought that this had had a good effect not only so far as they themselves were concerned but with respect also to others.

The President stated that he did not know what the future might hold. It might be that this would be the last meeting of the three while he was still President of the United States. If it were the last, he wanted to say that it had been a great privilege to work with two such colleagues

and to express his esteem and admiration, and even affection, toward them.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that he associated himself with the remarks of the President. He wanted to express his thanks to President de Gaulle for the way he had presided over their meetings. There had been some disappointments, but he wanted to thank President de Gaulle for the way he had brought them through these disappointments. He believed that the experience had brought the three much closer.

President de Gaulle then terminated the meeting by saying goodbye to both "mes amis."

At this point the photographers finally descended on the meeting room en masse.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> As the President was leaving the Elysée Palace, he and de Gaulle continued the conversation along the following lines:

"The President said that in respect to this closer consultation between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, they should be able to set up an effective mechanism without having recourse to large ponderous machinery.

"General de Gaulle agreed, and said that it was important to set up something permanent that would operate effectively on a long-term basis. With the close friendship existing between the Chief of Government of the three nations at the present time, things would be easy, but they must set up something that would work on a permanent basis whoever the principals might be. General de Gaulle said, 'With us it is easy; you and I are tied together by history.'

"The President said that this was true and that he was confident that appropriate means to maintain this close contact could be found.

"General de Gaulle said that within the next few weeks he would write both the President and Mr. Macmillan and make specific proposals in this respect.

"The President said that he would also like to be able to give his ideas on this subject to General de Gaulle, and the General agreed.

"General de Gaulle said that he had not seen the President to thank him for the wonderful welcome he had received in the United States.

"The President asked how Madame de Gaulle was, and the General said she was very well, but she had kept on the sidelines during the Summit Conference; but he wished the President to know how much he and Madame de Gaulle had enjoyed seeing the President and Mrs. Eisenhower in Washington. If he might say so, they represented a family which was the way families ought to be and this was true of John and Barbara also.

"The President thanked General de Gaulle for his words, and said that later this year he was going to make two major speeches. One would be concerning the family as the basic element of Western civilization, and the other would relate to the necessity of not growing soft. He would be close to the end of his term, and therefore these speeches might have a greater impact than if he had made them earlier in his term.

"The President said he felt that the meeting in Paris had not been a complete failure, because he felt that the unity of the West was perhaps now stronger than ever before.

"General de Gaulle agreed with this completely.

"The President then took his leave of General de Gaulle, who accompanied him to the door of the Elysée." (Memorandum of conversation, May 18; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

188. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, May 18, 1960, 5–6:20 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

President Eisenhower  
Secretary Herter  
Secretary Gates  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Kohler  
(Colonel Walters)

*United Kingdom*

Prime Minister Macmillan  
Foreign Secretary Lloyd  
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar  
Sir Anthony Rumbold  
Sir Gladwyn Jebb  
Mr. de Zulueta

*France*

President de Gaulle  
Prime Minister Debre  
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
(note takers, interpreters)

SUBJECT

US-UK-French Cooperation

(*Note:* The exchange of views recorded in this memorandum took place between the discussion on Berlin and the discussion on disarmament, reported in a separate memorandum of conversation.)<sup>1</sup>

President Eisenhower said, however, that he was thinking of something more. He said to the extent that could be presently foreseen we would be faced with a more critical and tense situation in our relations with the USSR. If these relations should become worse over a considerable period of time he wondered if the cooperation within the working groups was a close enough relationship between us. He felt that we needed in some way to be closer together at the top governmental level. He said that he and Prime Minister Macmillan had been discussing this question for the past hour and that he had thought about it for a long time. He felt we needed some method, without derogation of NATO, for more frequent communication between ourselves, possibly between the Foreign Ministers. The three powers had a very special responsibility

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Kohler. The conversation took place at the Elysée Palace. See also Document 187.

for Germany and it was important that none of us should be operating in a way not in consonance with the others.

President de Gaulle commented that he had been concerned about this question for a long time. He recalled that nearly two years ago he had written to the President and to Prime Minister Macmillan about the need for closer coordination of our policies.<sup>2</sup> At the time there were the problems of Syria and Iraq and Jordan. Today it was the problem of Berlin. Perhaps later we would be faced with other critical problems. He had thought that it would be possible to organize our relations more effectively, develop common strategic thinking and plans, and the like. However we were still where we were when he had written two years ago and if an abrupt crisis should arise the situation could be serious. He recognized that in such questions as that of Berlin it might be said that we already have an organization to deal with such problems in NATO; but NATO is limited in its capacity to take quick and effective action. We needed a method of being able to act quickly.

President Eisenhower said he thought that there was justification for developing a closer cooperation between the three powers since they were the ones who came out of the last war with specific responsibilities in specific areas. This gave them every reason to work more closely together.

Prime Minister Macmillan said he agreed with what the President had said. He felt the three powers ought to have machinery able to act quickly and perhaps somewhat more broadly. It was important that the three remove any difficulties between themselves so that they could really rally the West. He commented that the three met here today and would then go away. He believed they would be able to act quickly if they had to. He then cited Khrushchev's statement and his press conference this afternoon,<sup>3</sup> repeating the Soviet threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR, which would bring to an end the Allied rights in Berlin, and Khrushchev's statement that such a treaty was ready and could be signed whenever the Soviets decided. Thus, it was possible that a crisis might arise at any time. Consequently, it was necessary to strengthen the sense of unity generally between themselves. In fact, he felt that this sense of unity had been strengthened by the current meetings and was perhaps the most important result of the meetings. He recalled that he had discussed this question of closer cooperation with General de Gaulle at Rambouillet.<sup>4</sup> Originally it had been General de

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<sup>2</sup> De Gaulle's letter to Eisenhower and Macmillan, September 17, 1958, is printed in vol. VII, Part 2, Document 45.

<sup>3</sup> For a transcript of Khrushchev's press conference including his statement on the U-2 and the summit conference, see *Background Documents*, pp. 56-68.

<sup>4</sup> During the Heads of Government meeting at Paris December 19-21, 1959.



Gaulle's idea and in this respect the three were of a like mind. It was true that the Foreign Ministers already met frequently and maybe it would be better if they met even more frequently. However, he felt they might broaden their consultations, not meeting just to discuss specific problems but to try to get a real unity of view. President Eisenhower interjected the comment that this was not possible to achieve by directives, to which the Prime Minister agreed.

President de Gaulle said that a series of arrangements had been tried from time to time during the past couple of years, but satisfactory organizational machinery had not yet been found. We had agreed that the Embassy Counselors should meet every month, without informing NATO or Spaak that this was going on. He had recently sent a military representative of considerable value to the standing group in Washington. This representative had tried to work closely with his American and British colleagues but had become rather disheartened and the results had not amounted to much. Of course, it must be recognized as a fact that organizations exist, such as NATO and SEATO, which resist the development of new organizational patterns. In any event, while the three seem to agree on the general idea, it had not been possible to find a practical means to implement this agreement. He did not want to say things which would sound unpleasant, but felt that we should learn from history and that we could talk freely and frankly among ourselves. For example, at the time of the Egyptian crisis the West was in complete disarray; perhaps in a new crisis over Berlin the same would be the case.

President Eisenhower said that the meeting might note that the Foreign Ministers were meeting again in Washington on May 31 at the time of the SEATO conference. They could have discussions then and perhaps it would be possible to require them to meet about every sixty days or even more often. He was convinced that we could find a way to do this without arousing suspicions of others. He recognized this might require even more travel on the part of the Foreign Ministers. However, if our consultation was maintained at too low a level, he feared that many things simply would not get done. In fact, the Heads of Government might meet more frequently, too—preferably without creating any complicated apparatus which would arouse suspicion or alarm. He was not proposing that the three powers set up a directorate to run the world. However the three had specific responsibilities and things to be done—matters to be considered between themselves particularly. He added that the procedure he suggested might cause some anguish to the Foreign Ministers but he would point out that his own Foreign Minister, in terms of the amount of travel he would have to do, would be at a two-to-one disadvantage with respect to each of the others!

President de Gaulle said that the Heads of Government must pay tribute to their Foreign Ministers who, in fact, seemed to be all over the

place. He saw Secretaries Herter and Selwyn Lloyd frequently in Paris and knew they were in Istanbul and many other places. The world truth was here in this room. If that could be organized, the rest would come naturally.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said he thought that the Foreign Ministers do not prepare their work carefully enough, and the President at this point indicated this agreement. Mr. Lloyd felt the Foreign Ministers should prepare their agenda more carefully. At present their meetings were perhaps too casual. It would be better if they developed specific plans for their consultations so that they could inform the Heads of Government of the results.

President de Gaulle said that since the President and the Prime Minister had referred to this matter, he would ponder it and make specific proposals to both. He said he would write them in the near future on the subject. His letter would be in the same spirit as the one he had sent two years ago, but developed with greater precision. If times were good, this would perhaps be only an academic exercise; but if a crisis should arise, such a plan might be the basis for our salvation.

Prime Minister Macmillan said he believed that all knew what they would like to do, but clearly they needed a more organized system with agenda, positions, etc. He indicated that he would be glad to receive President de Gaulle's ideas.

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**189. Telegram From the Delegation at the Summit  
Conference to the Department of State**

Paris, May 18, 1960, 9 p.m.

Secto 37. One of most noticeable phenomena during summit developments of past days has been extremely strong support given to US positions by all members French Delegation from General de Gaulle down. De Gaulle's firm attitude towards Soviet Union has of course long been abundantly clear, and this is reflected not only throughout French Government but in press and public opinion as well. While de Gaulle has served as "impartial chairman" of meeting, he has made it obvious throughout, through his actions and through his entourage that he has favored policy firm resistance to Soviet aggression be it at the conference table or in Berlin or elsewhere.

As result role de Gaulle has played during these days, it is widely thought here that France's international prestige has not been higher in a long time. Embassy will of course be reporting more fully and precisely on results of summit breakdown in France, but delegation did wish to inform Department of firm and strong part which de Gaulle played throughout.

Herter

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**190. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Embassy in Portugal**

Paris, May 19, 1960, 6 p.m.

77. Eyes Only for Merchant. Personal for the President.

"Dear Mr. President:

"I have just returned from a two-hour session with the North Atlantic Council in which Couve, Selwyn and I delivered a full report on the events of the past days.<sup>1</sup> After our report practically every member of the Council rose to express a solidarity with us and particularly to voice in the most glowing terms their appreciation for the dignity and restraint which you showed in the face of provocation together with just the right combination of determination and conciliation. The support was unanimous and you will have seen the communiqué<sup>2</sup> which the Council on its own initiative decided to issue confirming this.

"Faithfully yours, signed: Chris."

Herter

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1960. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State as Cahto 11. The source text is the Department of State copy. Another copy of the telegram bears the notation "President saw" in Goodpastor's writing. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series) President Eisenhower stopped in Lisbon following his departure from Paris at 7:45 a.m.

<sup>1</sup> Detailed reports on the NAC meeting which lasted from 11 a.m. to 12:35 p.m. were transmitted in Poltos 2306, 2307, and 2319 from Paris, May 20 and 23. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1666)

<sup>2</sup> For text of this communiqué, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 432.

191. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/27

Paris, May 19, 1960, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

Mr. Hillenbrand

Mr. McKiernan

Col. Schofield

Mr. Dubs

*United Kingdom*

Sir Anthony Rumbold

Mr. Killick

Mr. Drinkall

*France*

M. Laloy

M. de Leusse

M. Senard

*Federal Republic of Germany*

Dr. Carstens

Ambassador Grewe

Dr. Fechter

Mr. Rueckriegel

SUBJECT

A Possible USSR–GDR “Peace Treaty” and Berlin Contingency Planning  
(Meeting of Working Group on Germany including Berlin)

After thanking the other delegations for their keeping the Germans fully informed of the developments of the past few days, Dr. Carstens stated that Khrushchev may shortly take measures leading to an eventual separate “peace treaty” with the GDR and that it would be useful for the Working Group to exchange views on four points: (1) Can we prevent a separate treaty, (2) What is our legal position regarding such a treaty, (3) What would be the probable consequences of the treaty, and (4) What can we do to prevent unfavorable consequences?

Regarding Soviet intentions, Sir Anthony Rumbold referred to a statement made by Gromyko in his meeting with Lloyd on May 16 [17]<sup>1</sup> indicating that there was no change in the Soviet position. Gromyko had said that conditions might have “matured” for a summit meeting in six or eight months. Meanwhile, Gromyko had continued, the Soviets would systematically follow a policy of reducing tension but if others increased tension the summit would be endangered. In response to

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan on May 20 and cleared by Hillenbrand. The meeting took place at the Quai d’Orsay. A summary of this meeting was transmitted in Secto 48 from Paris, May 19 at 6 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/5–1960)

<sup>1</sup> See Document 179.

Lloyd's specific question about Soviet intentions regarding a peace treaty, Gromyko had said that the Soviet position remained as expressed by Khrushchev at Baku and that he, Gromyko, had nothing to add to it.

M. Laloy said that preparations for a Warsaw Pact meeting indicated that the satellites had been taken by surprise by summit developments. Mr. Hillenbrand said that we had information which confirmed that this was the case, for example in Hungary.

M. Laloy said that it was evident the Soviets did not want to force the situation just now, but that one could expect them to use the U-2 incident as a point of departure for harassment of Berlin on the grounds that it is a center of intelligence activity. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Sir Anthony Rumbold considered that the West might exploit propagandistically, in order to combat unilateral Soviet action on a peace treaty, Khrushchev's frequent statements in the past about the need for four-power discussions of a peace treaty, relating them to his statement that no discussions at the summit have yet taken place.

Dr. Carstens expressed doubt that the West could do anything now to deter Khrushchev from concluding a separate peace if he decided to do so, but added that the Germans had been considering the possibility of an indirect approach. For example, some prominent figure like Nehru might be persuaded to tell Khrushchev that Soviet unilateral action could not fail to increase tension. Sir Anthony Rumbold commented that the idea of an approach through Nehru should not be excluded, but that there was also another method. During the forthcoming Security Council discussion of the U-2 incident, the West might introduce a phrase into a resolution calling upon all states to do nothing to increase tension. There was general agreement that there was little hope of dissuading Khrushchev by a direct approach. Dr. Carstens and M. Laloy also emphasized that the Western Powers should not allow themselves to be blackmailed by acting as if a separate peace treaty was dangerous to them.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that we would have a new situation if it was clear that Khrushchev was ready to move ahead, but that a mere statement in his Berlin speech on the following day<sup>2</sup> to the effect that negotiations for a peace treaty have begun would not necessarily require the approach to the Security Council contemplated in agreed Berlin contingency planning. There was general agreement on this point.

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<sup>2</sup> For extracts of Khrushchev's speech in Berlin on May 20, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 433–434.

M. Laloy said that the legal arguments with respect to a USSR–GDR peace treaty are strong on the Western side and weak on the Soviet side. Mr. Hillenbrand concurred and stressed the importance of reiterating that a peace treaty cannot extinguish our rights. The Soviets had consistently stated that the peace treaty would have this effect. The US had published a memorandum<sup>3</sup> refuting this contention and was prepared to rebut a Soviet counterargument.

Dr. Carstens said there were really two arguments that the Western Powers could make: first, that the treaty would be meaningless since no such state as the GDR exists to negotiate it; and second, that the treaty could not affect Allied rights. M. Laloy and Mr. Rumbold thought the latter argument was the more effective and Mr. Hillenbrand concurred that there was little understanding of the former argument among the neutrals. Dr. Carstens agreed that it might be preferable to concentrate on one strong argument, but added it should be made clear that one part of Germany cannot negotiate for all of Germany.

Dr. Carstens did not consider that the treaty need necessarily involve an immediate change in the access situation, but he thought that it might have an impact on some neutral countries, which might be brought to adhere to it and to recognize the GDR because they would regard the division of Germany as final. He cited Finland and India as examples. Sir Anthony Rumbold said he saw no greater danger of recognition of the GDR after the treaty than before it, for the treaty would not change political circumstances. M. Laloy agreed and said that the difficulties of a German solution had been obvious for some time. Dr. Carstens suggested that in the case of India the Western Powers might tell the Indian Government that it is Khrushchev who is responsible for the failure to reach an agreement on the German question and that he should not be paid a premium, in the form of recognition of the GDR, for his having obstructed a solution. Dr. Carstens considered that it would be better to have the Three Powers rather than the Germans do this.

Sir Anthony Rumbold mentioned that both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lloyd had discussed the German question during the recent Commonwealth Conference at London.<sup>4</sup> He believed Nehru understood the Western position. The British had also been briefing the Commonwealth countries in the past few days, and he personally thought that Ghana, for example, understood the Western position. The British were making constant use of the machinery and channels of the Commonwealth for briefing on Germany. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the Three Powers would, of course, do whatever they could in persuading

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<sup>3</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 118.

<sup>4</sup> The Commonwealth Conference met in London at the beginning of May.

the neutrals not to accept the division of Germany, but he thought that the Germans might be more effective in persuading some of them because of the importance of their economic relations with the Federal Republic. Experience with the Hallstein Document<sup>5</sup> had been successful. He asked whether the Germans had given any thought as to how a separate peace treaty with the GDR would affect the Federal Republic's relations with the USSR. Dr. Carstens replied that the idea had not been considered, and that he could not express any views. However, the Federal Republic would make its case forcibly to the USSR through diplomatic channels. M. Laloy said that the French had also briefed the French Community on the German question, stressing the absence of a real German solution rather than the question of recognition of the GDR. The French had found that the political arguments were better understood than the legal ones.

Dr. Carstens said that he wished to raise a matter which he understood President Eisenhower had mentioned during the meeting of the Western Heads of Government,<sup>6</sup> namely, what we would do if civilian access to Berlin were hindered. M. Laloy replied that it had been agreed at yesterday's Foreign Ministers' meeting<sup>7</sup> that planning for this contingency should be undertaken on an urgent basis, with attention, for example, to the question whether there were economic counter-measures which the Federal Republic might take. Sir Anthony Rumbold added that the Ministers had agreed that the appropriate response would be selective economic counter-measures, the burden of which would fall most heavily on the Federal Republic. Dr. Carstens agreed that the possibility of economic counter-measures should be studied, but he expressed doubts about the effectiveness which they might have on the GDR in view of the great development of the East German economy since the blockade.

M. Laloy said that it had been agreed that planning would be initiated at Washington where the overall question of counter-measures would be studied, but that the details regarding their application in Germany would be planned at Bonn. The State Department would call the meeting in Washington soon to get discussion of this question started. Sir Anthony Rumbold said that the first job would probably be to determine what form harassment might take. Ambassador Grewe commented that cold economic warfare against West Berlin is already going on. For example, the GDR has blacklisted certain West Berlin firms and

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding the March 16, 1959, report by Walter Hallstein on economic cooperation in Europe, see vol. VII, Part 1, Document 52.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 185.

<sup>7</sup> See Documents 181–183.

refuses to document shipments for them for passage through the Soviet Zone. He said it would be hard to apply counter-measures in interzonal trade in such a case, for the procedure under which shipments to and from Berlin, on which West-Berlin depends, is a part of the interzonal trade system.

Dr. Carstens said there had been some consideration in the German Foreign Office of the question whether a treaty might be concluded between the Western or all the NATO powers and the Federal Republic if the Soviets made a separate peace treaty with the GDR. The treaty with the Federal Republic would not be a peace treaty, but rather one in which the signatories would undertake: (1) the obligation to do everything possible to obtain a just peace treaty for Germany based on the principle of self-determination, (2) not to conclude a peace treaty with any separate part of Germany, and (3) not to recognize the validity of any peace treaty concluded with a part of Germany. Other states would then be asked to accede. There would thus be a counter-pressure on the neutrals which would enable them more effectively to resist Soviet pressures to get them to accede to the Soviet-GDR peace treaty. M. Laloy and Sir Anthony Rumbold expressed strong reservations about the idea of such a treaty. They pointed out that the Western Powers had already undertaken obligations of precisely this sort, that these obligations were well-known, and that the new treaty with the Federal Republic, coming as it would together with a separate USSR-GDR treaty, would inevitably be regarded as a separate peace treaty itself. The resulting confusion might only weaken the Western position with respect to the peace treaty. Dr. Carstens said that these objections had been expressed by some of his colleagues, and he was inclined to agree with them. Mr. Hillenbrand inquired whether the suggested treaty would have any function except as an attempt to neutralize the neutrals. Dr. Carstens replied that it could also re-emphasize common Western policies on Germany. M. Laloy said that in his opinion the statements which the Western Powers would make if the Soviets should conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR should be sufficient to accomplish these purposes.

Dr. Carstens inquired whether there would be any possibility of the group's meeting once more in case Khrushchev's Berlin speech indicated that serious trouble were imminent, but the meeting concluded without any clear understanding on this point.



## REPORTS ON THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

### 192. Editorial Note

Each of the Heads of Government related his version of the failure of the summit conference in public statements delivered soon after the conference ended. Premier Khrushchev gave his picture in a lengthy address in East Berlin on May 20, placing the blame for the collapse of the summit on the United States. For extracts of his speech, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960* pages 433–434. On the same day, Prime Minister Macmillan reported to the House of Commons on the events in Paris, May 16–19, stating that, despite his efforts, Khrushchev had not attended meetings subsequent to the one on May 16. For text of Macmillan's statement to the House of Commons, see *H.C. Debs.*, volume 623, columns 1641–1646. On May 31, President de Gaulle, in a broadcast to the French nation, gave his version of the abortive summit, stressing that the U–2 flight, while at least ill-timed, was not sufficient reason for the Soviet Premier's behavior. For text of de Gaulle's broadcast message, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1960*, pages 42–46.

President Eisenhower reported to the nation on the summit conference on May 25, emphasizing that he had assured the Soviet Union that U–2 flights would not be continued but that this had not been enough for Khrushchev. The President described the events as they unfolded in Paris, stressed the solidarity of the British and French at the conference, and concluded that Soviet intransigence was responsible for failure of the summit. For text of President Eisenhower's address, see, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pages 437–445.

On May 27, 31, June 1, and 2, Allen Dulles, Secretaries Herter and Gates, Dillon, and Bohlen testified at hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on events incident to the summit conference. For the proceedings on May 27, June 1, and 2, see U.S. Senate, *Events Incident to the Summit Conference: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations* (Washington, 1960). For text of the full hearings, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, volume XII (Washington 1982), pages 251 ff. For the report of the Committee on the hearings, see U.S. Senate, *Events Relating to the Summit Conference: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations* (Washington, 1960).

### 193. Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 24, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

#### 2. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

Mr. Dulles said that while it was difficult to predict the future actions of Khrushchev, certain developments since the Soviet Premier departed from Paris might shed some light on the current Soviet position. Apparently at the time Khrushchev left Paris he was undecided on his future course of action and wished to leave the door open to various alternatives. In his relatively moderate speech on Friday,<sup>1</sup> Khrushchev had re-assured the West that he did not intend to revert to the hard Stalin line in foreign policy. This re-assurance to the West had been a disappointment to Khrushchev's East German audience. Khrushchev's speech had been postponed a whole day, suggesting that cooler second thoughts might have prevailed after the departure of Khrushchev from Paris. On Khrushchev's return to Moscow, the customary homecoming speech was omitted for the first time in several years. Soviet propaganda is now echoing Khrushchev's Berlin speech, making harsh comments on the President and the Administration and insisting that because the American people are peace loving, a new Summit Conference can be held six to eight months from now. The massive Soviet jamming of the Voice of America, which began early last week, has now been abandoned in favor of a more selective jamming; in fact, jamming has been reduced from about eighty per cent to about twenty per cent of VOA broadcasts. There are no indications that the projected reduction of Soviet military forces will be cancelled. *Pravda* has stated that there will be no increase in the Soviet military budget. Khrushchev's promise to delay concluding a treaty with East Germany was more explicit than necessary. Accordingly, from all the above facts Mr. Dulles had the general impression that Khrushchev was attempting to prevent a worsening of the international situation. Mr. Dulles thought it was possible that Khrushchev was covering his rear while dealing with problems in the USSR and in the Soviet Bloc. Mr. Dulles added that he had just heard that the U.S. C-47 plane forced down in East Germany and its passengers were being returned by the USSR.<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on May 25. For another account of the discussion on the summit, see Kistiakowsky, *Scientist*, pp. 333-336.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 192.

<sup>2</sup> The C-47, its passengers, and crew were released on May 25.

Mr. Dulles felt that the collapse of the Summit Conference was bound to have repercussions in the Soviet Union and was sure to affect Khrushchev's position in some way. Much would depend on Khrushchev's ability to dominate the Russian leaders who fear a détente with the West. Khrushchev has undoubtedly felt pressure from these leaders and has made concessions to them in the past. Mr. Dulles recalled that at Paris Khrushchev had openly stated that his handling of the U-2 incident was influenced by the internal politics of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people, Mr. Dulles continued, have been led to believe that their prosperity is related to a détente with the West. There is reason to believe that Khrushchev may have serious problems within the Kremlin and that a controversy over the handling of the U-2 incident took place in the Soviet hierarchy. Mr. Dulles believed that the Soviet leaders decided early in May to play up the U-2 incident and to call off the visit of the President to the USSR. On May 12 or 13, after the U.S. had issued its statement<sup>3</sup> indicating that reconnaissance overflights of the USSR had high-level U.S. approval, the Soviet leaders apparently decided to wreck the Summit Meeting. One indication of an early Soviet decision to cancel the President's invitation to visit the USSR is the fact that the magazine, "USSR", was supposed to carry in its next issue an article welcoming the President but on May 6 the presses were stopped and new pages were printed to replace the welcoming article.

[4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] In any case, it was clear that the USSR had decided to call off the President's visit as early as May 6.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

3. *Statements Regarding the U-2 Incident and the Recent Military Test Alert (NSC Action No. 2231)*

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

The President then referred to the events leading up to the break-up of the Summit Conference. He said that a week prior to the scheduled opening of the Summit Meeting, the Soviet Ambassador had called on General de Gaulle to discuss Summit procedure. General de Gaulle had asked the Ambassador whether the USSR really intended to have a Summit Meeting. The Ambassador had replied that not only did the USSR intend to have a Summit Meeting but believed the forthcoming meeting would be a fruitful one. The President said that on Sunday, before the opening of the Summit Meeting, Khrushchev had made no effort to see him but had called upon Macmillan and De Gaulle to show them a letter containing the Soviet demands upon the U.S. This letter

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<sup>3</sup>For text of this statement, May 9, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 418–420.

formed the basis of Khrushchev's speech the next morning, although Khrushchev had added four or five pages of personal abuse to the letter. Secretary Gates said the Khrushchev letter had already been translated into French at the time Khrushchev called upon de Gaulle, suggesting that Khrushchev was ready to release the letter to the French press.

The President said the idea that we could have done anything to save the Summit Conference was ridiculous. Moreover, the idea that the alert called to test our long-range communications facilities wrecked the Conference was also ridiculous.<sup>4</sup> The President recalled that at the Cabinet Meeting on May 12 he had told the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that he would cancel the reconnaissance over-flights of the USSR.<sup>5</sup> In Paris it was quickly apparent that Khrushchev did not want only a cessation of the flights; he wanted a cessation of the flights plus an apology plus punishment of those responsible for the flights. Khrushchev's action was taken in order to scuttle the Summit Conference. The President thought it was undesirable to talk too much about what is going on in the Soviet hierarchy because we can only guess at what motivates the Russians. The President, however, felt sure that Khrushchev deliberately decided to blow up the Summit Conference, knowing that he (the President) could not accept the demands Khrushchev made. The President believed that during any investigation, Administration officials should be calm and clear but should not be expansive and should not permit the investigators to delve into our intelligence system.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

#### 4. *Policy Issues in the Post-Summit Environment*

Mr. Gray said he understood Secretary Herter was prepared to discuss this subject. Secretary Herter said he had tentatively jotted down a number of policy issues. A problem we will be having with our allies was pointed up by an ambassador who visited him yesterday and asked for his views on the possibility of the ambassador's government taking the initiative in suggesting the re-opening of discussions with the USSR.<sup>6</sup> He had told the Ambassador it would be better to let the dust settle; any overtures by the West for a re-opening of discussions with the USSR would be regarded by the Soviets as a sign of weakness. Secretary Herter believed that the strength of the alliance lay in its unity and that we should stick to the statement we had made in Paris, that at a suitable

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<sup>4</sup> The alert took place on May 15.

<sup>5</sup> The minutes of the Cabinet meeting of May 12 are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series.

<sup>6</sup> Secretary Herter was referring to the Italian Ambassador to the U.S. [Footnote in the source text. A memorandum of Herter's conversation with Brosio is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-2360.]

time we would be ready to discuss the world situation with the Soviet Union. The President agreed that since the USSR took the responsibility for scuttling the Summit Conference, we should leave the initiative to the Soviets. Khrushchev had said in Paris that the dust had to settle before further discussions could take place. Khrushchev had even referred to our elections and had indicated that he might prefer to deal with the next U.S. Government or even with the government after that.

Secretary Herter said another issue involved the question whether we should take any abrupt action which might be considered unfriendly. He had in mind particularly East-West Exchanges. It was the feeling in the State Department that exchanges of visits between high officials of the U.S. and high officials of the USSR should be called off while the visits of ordinary citizens of either country should not be affected. In this connection, the next planned exchange of high officials involved a trip by Mr. Stans to the Soviet Union and a visit by Kosygin to the U.S. The President believed the general rule was this: We went to the Summit Conference to improve the world situation; the Summit Conference was broken off; but by and large the situation is now about the same as it was before the break-up of the Summit Conference. Most of the remarks made by Khrushchev in his Monday speech that had not appeared in the letter which he showed De Gaulle and Macmillan the day before had referred to him (the President). After Khrushchev's long tirade, when the Secretary of State asked him when the cancellation of the President's visit to Russia would be announced, Khrushchev took off and explained the whole thing over again. Khrushchev made his cancellation of the visit personal. Accordingly, the President felt that if the Soviets desired to send a high official to visit the U.S., we should consider receiving him. Mr. Dillon said it had already been arranged that Kosygin would visit the U.S. Mr. Staats<sup>7</sup> said Kosygin was coming here before Mr. Stans visited the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup> The President said that in that case he believed it was desirable to wait and see whether Kosygin came. He thought we did not have to formulate a general policy but should be able to handle high-level visits on an ad hoc basis. Secretary Herter said he understood that in any case we would not for the present interfere with the visits of lesser officials or with the travel of private citizens.

Secretary Herter said another issue was the question of resumption or continuation of the nuclear test agreement negotiations. The scientists

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<sup>7</sup> Elmer B. Staats, Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board.

<sup>8</sup> Kosygin was scheduled to attend a textile convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, early in June, but his visit was canceled by the Soviet Union. Maurice Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, was scheduled to visit the Soviet Union at the end of May and in early June, but his visit was also canceled.

in Geneva were continuing their international discussions without interruption. He believed that we should continue these negotiations.

Another issue concerned disarmament. The representatives of the Five Western Powers involved in the disarmament negotiations are meeting on May 30 and an East-West disarmament meeting is scheduled for June 7. Secretary Herter believed we should maintain our position with respect to disarmament and continue to participate in the Geneva negotiations, although he believed these negotiations would prove to be sterile and futile, with the USSR stubbornly adhering to its position in preparation for bringing the matter up as a propaganda exercise in the UN General Assembly this fall. The President agreed with the views expressed by Secretary Herter, saying that the Soviets not the U.S. should be the ones to make the nuclear test negotiations or the disarmament negotiations futile.

Mr. McCone said the nuclear test suspension negotiations differed from the disarmament negotiations in that a mere extension of the nuclear test talks keeps the U.S. in a strait-jacket. He felt we ought to press for decisions on nuclear testing. If no agreement is reached, the USSR can keep us at the conference table indefinitely while the moratorium on nuclear testing continues. Secretary Herter agreed that the nuclear test suspension negotiations did bring up the whole question of the moratorium on nuclear testing. He also agreed that the U.S. could not continue the Geneva negotiations indefinitely because such a continuation would mean that the USSR is obtaining a moratorium on nuclear testing without giving up anything in return. The President said we must eventually set a time limit for completion of the nuclear test negotiations.

Secretary Herter felt we must continue contingency planning with respect to Berlin, particularly with respect to the possibility that the Soviets might put pressure on the Berlin economy. The President believed it would be desirable to ask for an intelligence estimate on the possibility of Soviet pressure on the Berlin economy. He had raised this question with Adenauer but had not been able to elicit a satisfactory response. The President wondered what the Soviets could do to Berlin as a city while remaining within the letter of the international agreements respecting Germany and Berlin. The Berlin airlift of 1949 had barely kept the population of Berlin alive. The President did not know what action we would take if the Soviets cut off Berlin's trade and restricted all transportation to one road. Adenauer always says we must preserve our juridical position. The President felt that we might end up preserving our juridical position while losing Berlin.

Secretary Herter said that economic counter-measures to be taken by the West in the event of Soviet pressure on Berlin's economy were very important. We must have a clear understanding with our allies whether or not they will take economic counter-measures against the

Soviet Bloc even at the sacrifice of their trade with East Germany. Mr. Gray asked whether Mr. Merchant's Contingency Planning Group was studying this economic question. Mr. Herter answered in the affirmative. Mr. Gray then reminded the Council that when the existing Berlin crisis first arose, a Contingency Planning Group had been constituted under the Chairmanship of Mr. Murphy, who had been succeeded by Mr. Merchant.

Secretary Gates said he had spent two hours on Saturday going over the military contingency planning for Berlin. Unhappily, he found this planning in an unsatisfactory state because the military planning depended at every stage on political decisions which had not yet been made. There was not even a specified commander for Berlin, the appointment of such a commander being dependent on political decisions. Thus while military plans exist, they are, in Secretary Gates' view, really ineffective because so much time would be required to obtain political decisions in the event of Soviet action against Berlin. Secretary Gates wondered whether some political decisions could not be obtained in advance.

Secretary Herter said that if we pressed the British too far in connection with political decisions, the British were inclined to begin thinking over much about the possibility of general war over Berlin. The President said Macmillan had said to him: "Do you want the British to go to war for two million of the people we twice fought wars against and who almost destroyed us?"

Secretary Herter believed the Communists would be increasingly aggressive in the Far East during the coming period, particularly in North Vietnam, North Korea, and the Taiwan Strait. The Russians would probably encourage diversionary Communist activity in the Far East and we should be particularly alert for any signs of such activity.

Secretary Herter then turned to the question of enhancing Free World strength. He said he did not know what the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind but he felt that any action showing that we are maintaining and increasing our military strength would be very helpful from the standpoint of foreign policy. Secretary Gates said he had been taking the position that the Defense position was not prepared on the assumption that the USSR would make any significant concessions at the Summit Conference. He believed the Defense budget, as currently approved by the President, was satisfactory, subject of course to continuing review. He saw no need to step up the production of long-lead time items although more maintenance and operations funds could be spent to improve our defense posture. We might also be able to increase the strength of our deployed forces.

The President did not believe it would be desirable to increase the strength of our deployed forces. He said we were trying to be stable in

our military planning and to have a ten year military program. We should not get excited every time Khrushchev is guilty of worse than usual deportment. He would have no objection to any quiet actions which would improve our military posture but he did not want to take any military action of a more dramatic nature which could be regarded as being caused by the break-up of the Summit Conference. Secretary Herter said he did not have any panicky actions in mind. The President said that before the break-up of the Summit Conference, he had agreed to eighteen more Atlas squadrons and to an increase in Polaris missiles. He felt we should continue these programs and perhaps quietly strengthen them.

Secretary Anderson noted that Administration officials had testified that we would be ready if war came tomorrow. If we should now take military actions which could be attributed to the break-up of the Summit Conference, we should be admitting weakness and causing concern to our allies. Secretary Gates agreed but added that some actions to improve our defense posture could be accomplished quietly with maintenance and operations money. He would not, of course, go to Congress and ask that the deterrent forces be doubled or anything like that. General Twining said our forces were in a better state of readiness at the present time than they had ever been in.

Secretary Herter said our NATO partners are showing an extraordinary degree of solidarity with us at the present time. He hoped a decision on Polaris for NATO would soon be made. Such a decision should be helpful to us from the standpoint of our own contributions to NATO.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Mr. Washburn said USIA had been studying world opinion since the break-up of the Summit Meeting. It appeared that both the USSR and the U.S. had lost some of the world's confidence as a result of the Paris meeting, but the USSR had lost more of the world's confidence than the U.S. World opinion appeared to be worrying a great deal over what would happen next. Mr. Washburn thought world opinion might be re-assured if the President in his TV speech<sup>9</sup> could say we intended to press forward toward an easing of world tension, to continue disarmament negotiations, and to help rebuild U.S. leadership. Secretary Herter said the statement issued by the Three Allies at the end of the Summit Meeting appeared to cover this matter.<sup>10</sup> The President said he disliked saying that we had lost leadership. We ought, of course, to be

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<sup>9</sup> See Document 192.

<sup>10</sup> For text of this statement, May 17, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 431.



developing our position of leadership, but we should not imply that we had lost it because Khrushchev walked out of the Summit Meeting.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

The Vice President noted that in terms of world opinion and U.S. opinion any discussion which concentrated primarily on the past would induce people to think about the past rather than about the future and about the real culprit in Paris, namely Khrushchev. The only way to focus attention on the future instead of the past was to change the subject of public discussion from the break-up of the Summit to Khrushchev's probable actions with respect to Berlin, the Near East, the Far East, and Africa. We should focus attention on what Khrushchev may do in the future and what we are going to do to counteract his moves. We should talk about the future instead of the past.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

*The National Security Council:*<sup>11</sup>

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral statement by the Secretary of State as to the position which the U.S. should take on various policy issues.

b. Noted the President's approval of the following U.S. positions in the post-Summit environment:

(1) The President went to the Summit meeting in an effort to achieve some improvement in the international situation. Despite the break-up of the Summit meeting by Khrushchev, the international situation should be considered by and large to remain essentially as it was before the Paris meeting.

(2) U.S. allies should be advised that the initiative for further high-level meetings to improve the international situation must come from the Soviets, since Khrushchev scuttled the Summit meeting and efforts by our allies in this regard would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

(3) In general, the United States should continue its policy regarding the East-West exchange program, including agreed exchanges of high-level officials. Any change in that program should be the result of Soviet initiative, thereby placing the onus for change on the Soviets. In the event of such change consideration of the exchange of high-level officials should be on a case-by-case basis.

(4) The United States should maintain its current position on the reduction and control of armaments, and should be prepared to continue participation in the Geneva negotiations on that subject. If the negotiations should prove futile, it should be clearly the responsibility of the Soviets for causing this result.

(5) The United States should continue to seek completion of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing, but should make clear that these

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<sup>11</sup> Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 2238, approved by the President on May 26. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

negotiations and the U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing cannot go on indefinitely without decision. The United States should determine at what time or at what stage of these negotiations it should seek to place a time limit on their duration.

(6) The United States should continue its studies and preparations for possible contingencies relating to Berlin, since Khrushchev, despite his recent speech disavowing action on Berlin for six or eight months, may still make some unexpected move, possibly an effort to put pressure on the Berlin economy. It was noted that the State-Defense-JCS-CIA planning group, under the chairmanship of Under Secretary of State Merchant, was engaged in a restudy of Berlin contingency planning, including the possibility of economic pressures on Berlin.

(7) The United States should be on the alert for the possibility of aggressive Sino-Soviet Bloc activity in the Far East, especially by the Chinese Communists.

(8) The military program as currently approved by the President continues to provide for an adequate defense posture in the post-Summit environment. However, certain operational steps to improve the state of readiness of U.S. forces should be considered in the ordinary course, but any changes deemed necessary should be undertaken quietly without unnecessary publicity.

(9) The reconnaissance satellite program should be reviewed in connection with expediting achievement of an operational capability as soon as feasible, but no programs are to be undertaken on a crash basis until scientific analysis demonstrates real promise of success. If an issue is raised as to whether development and use of reconnaissance satellites is a provocative act, Khrushchev's statement might be quoted in which he said that he was aware of the U.S. satellite photographing the USSR, that he had not protested and that it could take as many pictures as we wanted.

c. Noted the President's request that the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology consult with the Department of Defense with regard to the feasibility of expediting the reconnaissance satellite program, and report the results to the President.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

#### 194. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting

Washington, May 26, 1960.

[Here follows a list of the 36 officials present.]

Following the silent prayer, the President recalled Mr. Khrushchev's reference at the Summit meeting about "God as my witness." The President pointed out that Khrushchev had been very active as a youth in the Orthodox Church and had won prizes for his church work.

The President told the Cabinet that this meeting had been called so that they all might have an intimate account of events at the Summit and the Administration's interpretation of them.

The President wanted to point out something not yet in print as regards the U-2, namely that a rocket might have been a near miss and perhaps have caused a flameout, thus putting the plane in trouble. However, it was fairly certain that the plane had not been actually hit by a missile. For one thing, had the pilot bailed out at 70,000 feet he would have frozen to death; also, the bullet holes that showed in the photographs certainly were not put in at 70,000 feet.

The President also wanted to emphasize, regarding the "cover" story, that perhaps there was a lesson here to count to 10 before saying anything at all. But he would not take this aspect too seriously, and if critics wanted to say this was a blunder, that would be their privilege. It was a cover story put out under assumptions that later proved incorrect. The President was certain that the Russians had made their decisions as to what they would or would not do prior to arrival in Paris. They had deliberately arrived in Paris on Saturday instead of Sunday, and had prearranged engagements for talking to our Allies. The question might be asked, the President went on, as to why they had come to Paris at all. Perhaps it was in an effort to split our Allies from us. Certainly their papers were all arranged in advance. The President speculated as to what might have been the outcome had he done the unthinkable thing of agreeing to Khrushchev's demands in the hope of keeping the conference going. To have done that would have opened the way for a continuing vilification throughout the meeting and an outcome of no accomplishment whatsoever.

The President repeatedly stressed the support given him by the British and the French, and he believed that the 3 countries were never so close together as they are now. He spoke in detail about

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. For another account of this meeting, see Kistiakowsky, *Scientist*, pp. 337–338.

Mr. Macmillan's cooperative attitude, quite the opposite of the stories in the New York papers about a rift between British and the Americans. The President explained that Mr. Macmillan wanted no part of any appeasement attitude and that his only interest had been in holding the door open for a few more hours, something that would facilitate his handling in Parliament of the expected collapse. The time worked out for issuing the communiqué<sup>1</sup> on the failure was mutually satisfactory to all concerned.

Following the breakup, the President said, there had been time for the Allies to consider what might be future problems and to speculate as to Khrushchev's motives. It seemed clear that the U-2 incident was not the cause of the great switch since Mr. Khrushchev himself had spoken of knowing for so long about the U-2 flights. The President told of Mr. Khrushchev's jest to Mr. Macmillan on paying his farewell call. Khrushchev had said he supposed that Macmillan wondered why the Marshal was always with him, and that was because perhaps the Russian people felt that Macmillan was such a skilled diplomat he could twist Khrushchev around. The Marshal was there to see that Mr. Macmillan didn't, Khrushchev exclaimed! The President regarded this as some of Mr. Khrushchev's humor but with perhaps just a little truth in it, for Khrushchev's self-confidence might not be as great as it was when he visited the U.S.

Sec. Anderson took note of the fact that the Russians had cancelled a story that was to appear in the forthcoming issue of "USSR"—the English-language magazine published by the Russians for circulation in the United States like our Russian-language "America." He wondered if this fact could not be made public. The President thought it might be looked at for that purpose. Allen Dulles said that Khrushchev's first statement about the U-2 was on May 5th and that the cancelling occurred on May 6th. This might have been done because of the way in which Russian officials in this country interpreted Khrushchev's remarks, although it was more likely that the cancellation was by direction from Moscow.

The President commented that some of his colleagues were of the opinion that the Russians were not so much concerned by the U-2 as they were of the prospect of his visit to Russia, so they seized upon the U-2 as a means of getting out of it. He thought it significant that Khrushchev insisted upon the opportunity to make the opening statement at the Monday morning meeting<sup>2</sup> even though the President had discussed with De Gaulle a procedure whereby the President would

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<sup>1</sup> For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 431.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 168.

open the meeting with his statement on discontinuing the U-2 flights. Khrushchev had proceeded to make, practically word for word, the same assertion that he had made privately to De Gaulle the day before about the U-2, then went on to treat in the same way and at about the same length the subject of the President's plan to visit Russia and the need for cancelling it.

At the President's request, Mr. Merchant then recounted for the Cabinet the background for the Summit meeting. He said the story really began in November, 1958, with Khrushchev's speech on Berlin<sup>3</sup> and the intent to make a separate treaty with East Germany. The story progressed throughout all the various discussions and international visits up to this spring when it probably became an important part of Soviet thinking that there was a unanimity of views among the Allies finally developed as the Summit approached.

Mr. Merchant recounted in detail the visits of Khrushchev with De Gaulle and Macmillan on the eve of the Summit, the President's decision as to his position, and the statement to be made, the expansion of the Monday morning meeting so that Malinovsky could attend, and the 3-hour Monday meeting of the four delegations. Mr. Merchant stressed that De Gaulle had asked all of the participants to reflect on the situation for 24 hours without making any public statement that would freeze positions. Mr. Khrushchev refused and gave his statement to the press Monday afternoon. On Monday evening, Macmillan called on Mr. Khrushchev but without result.

Mr. Merchant recounted events of Tuesday, noting that Khrushchev had rushed back from his rural tour after receiving the written invitation to the Tuesday afternoon Summit (not U-2) meeting. Then had followed the ludicrous series of phone calls from the Russian Embassy until finally Khrushchev had replied in writing that he would come to a conference only for the purpose of receiving an apology from the President. Thereupon followed the meeting of "The Three" to consider the communiqué.

On Wednesday there occurred the final meeting of "The Three" when it was agreed to go ahead with the nuclear ban and the disarmament talks. Simultaneously, Mr. Khrushchev was holding his theatrical press conference which had the effect of strengthening the Allied position. Mr. Merchant spoke too of the solidarity and the stoutness of the French and the British which was very clear throughout the sessions. On Thursday, as the top officials were leaving Paris, the Russians made no effort at any level to re-establish communications with our people.

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<sup>3</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 24.

The President noted how Khrushchev had made so much of a point of our "threat" against Russia, even though we had not stated that we would continue the flights and had made it clear to Khrushchev. He had used the curious logic that since the United States had refused to confer under any ultimatum about Berlin, he could not confer under the U-2 threat.

Mr. Bohlen, as preface to his remarks, emphasized how everything had to be guesswork as far as Russian thinking was concerned. Mr. Bohlen said three things stood out: it was clear during March and April that Khrushchev realized he would not get at the Summit what he wanted regarding Berlin, that there was within Russia opposition not to the policy itself but to the personal emphasis given by Khrushchev to his handling of foreign policy, and that the U-2 incident was probably a catalytic agent in view of the traditional great sensitivity of the Russians to any violation of their air space. Mr. Bohlen took note also of the extensive criticism of Khrushchev by the military, many of whom resented the dismissal of Zhukov, the reduction in force, the pension cut-offs, etc. Mr. Bohlen said that these things could not quite be sorted out, but it could be concluded that the Russians had seized upon the U-2 as a reason for sabotaging the conference. Without the incident, they might not have been able to preclude a conference and would have gone through the motions of one up to reaching a fruitless end. Mr. Bohlen thought it very significant that the statement Mr. Khrushchev had given to De Gaulle<sup>4</sup> was not changed by even a comma when it was presented at the Monday meeting. This was obviously a "set" piece that he had brought with him from the Kremlin.

As to why he had bothered to come to Paris, Mr. Bohlen believed that Khrushchev thought he would find someone so anxious to have a Summit Conference that there would be pressure put on the President. Khrushchev's bitterness and expressed disappointment in De Gaulle and Macmillan provides a basis for this view.

Mr. Bohlen concluded by remarking that there had been no change of policy set forth by Khrushchev either in his press conference or subsequent speech in Berlin. However, it was possible that meetings were taking place even now in the Kremlin which could bring a change in policy. Mr. Bohlen thought that efforts designed to split the Allies could well be expected.

The President remarked on Mr. Hagerty's belief that there would be some value in publishing the President's originally planned opening statement which carried the date of May 11th.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Merchant said that

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 160.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 150.

Mr. Herter was considering this and that there might be merit in doing so after consultation with Messrs. Macmillan and De Gaulle. The President said that he was not urging that this be done, but it might be a way of setting forth some solid views on the way to make progress toward reduction of tensions.

The President then invited questions from the Cabinet members. Mr. Benson<sup>6</sup> asked if there had been any subsequent direct word from Mr. Khrushchev to any of the 3 Allied leaders. The President replied in the negative. Mr. Rogers<sup>7</sup> inquired about any psychological interpretation of Khrushchev's press conferences. Mr. Bohlen commented on how Khrushchev had been willing to hold a press conference anywhere, any time. He thought Khrushchev was a wonderful actor who was careful not to commit himself to any action even while indulging himself in great invectiveness. Mr. Bohlen noted that some of the vulgarity of Khrushchev's comments had been tidied up by the translators.

Sec. Seaton<sup>8</sup> inquired whether there was any basis for Khrushchev to miscalculate the unanimity of the Allies. Mr. Bohlen thought that the Russians always miscalculated in this regard. Perhaps the Russians had not expected De Gaulle or Macmillan to succeed in pressuring the President into accepting the Russian U-2 demands, but they might well have expected that this could isolate the United States from its Allies. The President confirmed that neither of the Allied leaders had made any effort to get him to change the tenor of his reply in any way. Sec. Seaton asked what might be the basis for Khrushchev to expect an Allied divergence. Mr. Bohlen replied that the only possible basis would be the critical stories that appeared in some places in the European press with regard to the U-2 incident. Because of their own practices, the Russians invariably interpreted newspapers of the free world as reflecting somehow an official position.

Dr. Glennan<sup>9</sup> asked if any information had been picked up of any Russian criticism of the Russian government, particularly as to its failure to prevent the U-2 penetration. Mr. Bohlen replied that if there had been any such criticism, it was being kept very secret. Sec. Anderson asked if Malinovsky should be regarded as a spokesman for the Russian military. Mr. Bohlen thought not, for he is regarded basically as a political general even though he had a good wartime record. Mr. Bohlen referred to Khrushchev's jest to Macmillan and commented that of course Khrushchev would never doubt his own ability to handle Macmillan.

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<sup>6</sup> Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson.

<sup>7</sup> Attorney General William P. Rogers.

<sup>8</sup> Secretary of the Interior Fred A. Seaton.

<sup>9</sup> Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration T. Keith Glennan.

Mr. Bohlen speculated that Khrushchev kept Malinovsky and Gromyko at his side in order to provide two witnesses who could subsequently testify to the Soviet Council that Khrushchev had not deviated by a single word from agreed positions. Mr. Bohlen recalled that in April it had been Khrushchev who had insisted on having strictly private talks with De Gaulle. He added that the Russian system, except for a period of Stalin's rule, is one where an approved policy cannot be changed by an individual, much as is the custom in the U.K. as regards policies approved by the British Cabinet.

There was brief reference to the United Nations' 7-2 vote in support of the United States.<sup>10</sup>

[Here follow five paragraphs on U-2 flights and congressional hearings.]

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<sup>10</sup>On May 26, the U.N. Security Council voted 7-2 against a Soviet resolution condemning the United States for the U-2 flight.

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## 195. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

No. 8311

Washington, July 25, 1960.

### I. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR AT THE CONFERENCE

#### A. *Original Soviet Intentions Regarding the Summit*

Before attempting to dissect the motives underlying Khrushchev's behavior at the Paris conference, it is essential to understand Soviet objectives and expectations regarding the summit conference as they existed prior to the U-2 incident on May 1. Khrushchev probably never regarded the summit conference as a benign encounter of East and West, designed primarily to prolong and deepen the atmosphere of détente following his trip to the US; rather, he envisaged the conference as an opportunity for advancing Soviet foreign policy interests.

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Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS-INR Intelligence Reports. Secret; Noform. No drafting information appears on the source text. OIR No. 8311 consists of a cover sheet, table of contents, summary, analysis, and a chronology of events. Only the analysis is printed here.



Khrushchev's foremost summit objective was an interim Berlin agreement advantageous to the USSR. Khrushchev had in mind a Berlin agreement which would serve as a first step toward an Allied withdrawal, help insulate the GDR from West Berlin's disruptive influence, and directly or indirectly promote the "two Germanies" concept. Other objectives included: agreement on the major points still at issue on a nuclear test ban, to be approached essentially in a spirit of mutual accommodation; a directive to the ten-power disarmament committee calling on it to negotiate on the basis of Soviet proposals; and an acknowledgment by the West, either symbolic or explicit, of the permanence and legitimacy of the communist bloc, and of the USSR's full and equal voice vis-à-vis the West in world affairs.

Khrushchev, for some time at least, was probably confident of his chances of attaining or making progress toward these goals. Probably the basic reason for this confidence (and an important factor explaining the timing of his Berlin initiative) was his conviction that the USSR's military position is improving rapidly as a result of Soviet advances in missilery and his power-conscious belief that political concessions on the part of the West should flow from the USSR's increasing power. In his first major foreign policy review after his visit to the US (October 31 speech to the Supreme Soviet),<sup>1</sup> Khrushchev argued that the "main reason" for the recent improvement in the international atmosphere "lies in the growing might and international influence of the Soviet Union"; i.e., "a more reasonable understanding of the balance of forces on the international scene is gaining ascendancy in the West," with the result that the West is recognizing the bankruptcy of its policies of "position of strength," "roll-back," and "intervention" in the affairs of communist bloc states.

The significance of some other developments was probably misinterpreted by Khrushchev and gave him an overly high degree of confidence of scoring a gain on the specific issue of Berlin. These seem to have included the negotiation at Geneva in 1959 on an agreement limited to Berlin, after NATO in December 1958 had declared that the issue of Berlin could only be solved in the context of German reunification; the unconcealed willingness of British leaders to negotiate a new status for Berlin; Khrushchev's invitation to visit the US, which some Soviet foreign experts—writing for a limited domestic audience—interpreted as designed to avoid a showdown over Berlin; and the Camp David agreement to resume talks on Berlin. Khrushchev's praise for President Eisenhower in the months following the US visit suggests that Khrushchev also misinterpreted the President's evident desire to im-

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<sup>1</sup> For text, see *Pravda*, November 1, 1959, or *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XI, no. 44, pp. 3–11.

prove US-Soviet relations and came to believe the President was amenable to a new agreement on Berlin. The intimations of several influential journalists in the US press (Walter Lippman in particular) during the winter of 1959–60 to the effect that the US and the UK were lined up against the Germans and the French in desiring a compromise Berlin solution probably reinforced this impression.

During late March and April, however, there were a series of developments which probably dampened somewhat Khrushchev's hopes of obtaining an interim Berlin agreement on his terms. Khrushchev received no encouragement in this regard during his talks with General De Gaulle in late March and early April; Khrushchev himself publicly assessed his trip to France as only "fairly successful." Later, in his speeches while touring the US and Canada April 22–29, De Gaulle took the line that the Berlin problem was insoluble at the summit and that the summit conference should create an atmosphere of détente to lead to a later solution of controversial issues. Secretary Herter and Vice President Nixon took the same general position in their speeches on April 4 and April 23,<sup>2</sup> respectively, maintaining that Soviet threats against West Berlin could ruin the chances for arms control agreements and that the summit conference should "de-fuse" the Berlin threat. This approach was reflected in press accounts of the April 12–14 Western foreign ministers' conference. In another foreign policy pronouncement on April 20, Mr. Dillon discussed summit issues in firm tones, although he also stated that "we are willing to consider interim arrangements."<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet press and Khrushchev personally, in his April 25 Baku speech,<sup>4</sup> reacted vigorously to these developments. It is possible that Khrushchev's real interpretation of these events was that the West was following the same pre-summit tactics as he was; i.e., stating its maximum position on the Berlin issue in order to buttress its negotiating position at the summit. However, soundings conducted in Washington by Ambassador Menshikov in early April and Yuri Zhukov (head of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Relations with Foreign Countries) during April 19–27 indicate that Khrushchev was concerned (from the point of view of both the USSR's interests and his personal prestige) that he might return from the summit empty-handed.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of Herter's speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1960, pp. 635–640; for text of Nixon's speech, see *The New York Times*, April 24, 1960, p. 58.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1960, pp. 723–729.

<sup>4</sup> For extracts, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1960, pp. 404–406.

*B. The U-2 Incident: The Soviet Decision To Exploit It*

The summit conference probably would have taken place had the U-2 incident not occurred. However, Moscow's decision to exploit the incident and later to demand a US capitulation as its price for participating in the conference stemmed from a complex of factors, including some not directly related to the incident.

Moscow's most fateful move on the U-2 incident was its decision—taken sometime between May 1 and May 4—to exploit the failure of the mission. The Soviet Government could have chosen to deny all knowledge of the aircraft (as it did in the case of several other US aircraft which have disappeared near the Soviet border) or otherwise to play down the incident until the summit conference was under way, if its only concern was to engage the West in negotiations in Paris. In choosing the opposite course—giving maximum publicity to the incident at the Supreme Soviet after a lapse of four days, and laying a trap, so to speak, for the US—the Soviet Government was undoubtedly aware that this action would have a serious effect on the summit conference, whether the US denied Khrushchev's charges (with a consequent spiraling series of charges and countercharges) or defended the flights. On May 6 the Soviet Embassy in Washington instructed Cuneo Press, publisher of the magazine *USSR*, to cancel extensive advance coverage of the President's trip to the Soviet Union; this indicates that as of May 5 or 6, the Soviet Government or at least elements thereof, foresaw the possibility that its airing of the U-2 incident would at least result in a cancellation of the President's trip.

As for Moscow's motives in taking this decision, probably the most important factor was its desire to exploit the downing of the U-2 and capture of the pilot to its advantage. The Soviets wanted to get the US to renounce aerial reconnaissance missions directed at the USSR; this would be of considerable strategic importance to the Soviet Union, particularly in view of the fact that the USSR had no assurance of being able to shoot down other U-2's, that the construction of Soviet ICBM sites may well be entering a new, intensified phase in the coming months, and that such a renunciation of U-2 flights by the United States could be used to agitate against the future use of reconnaissance earth satellites. In addition, Moscow almost certainly calculated at this time that exploitation of the incident would enable it to cast doubt on the integrity and peaceful intentions of the US and to buttress its long-standing campaign in third countries against US overseas bases.

As noted above, the Soviet Government between May 1 and 4 undoubtedly weighed the possibility that all-out exploitation of the air incident might result in the rupture of the summit conference which it had labored so long to bring about. The lessening prospect of a victory on Berlin or on other issues at the summit, as the Soviets evidently viewed

it, was an important factor in the Soviet decision to exploit the U-2 incident and play the summit conference by ear. Moscow probably calculated that if the conference failed to materialize, relatively little would be lost and the way would be clear to press the U-2 incident. If the US Government, in the face of strong evidence supporting the Soviet charges, could be brought to renounce the flights and if the conference then took place, so much the better from the point of view of Soviet summit objectives, as Moscow would gain an important psychological advantage at the conference. Khrushchev probably had the latter objective in mind when, in his May 7 speech,<sup>5</sup> he all but invited President Eisenhower to disassociate himself from the flights. It is unlikely, however, that Khrushchev would have been satisfied if the President had merely disavowed this particular U-2 overflight: as indicated by his May 9 speech at the Czech Embassy,<sup>6</sup> Khrushchev would have argued that the US Government's inability to control the activities of its "militarist" generals posed a threat to peace, and would have pressed for a general renunciation of such flights.

Internal bloc politics probably also influenced the Soviet decision to exploit the air incident, although the degree of this influence is difficult to measure at the present time. Perhaps most important was the fact that Communist China's long-standing but submerged dispute with Moscow over the latter's foreign policy had erupted in the open in late March and April with the publication by Peiping of two major articles which were highly critical, albeit obliquely, of Soviet foreign policy.<sup>7</sup> While the scope of this dispute is considerably broader than the question of the Paris summit conference, Khrushchev's original pre-summit approach—his public praise of the President, his agreement to exchange visits with the President, and his cultivation of a *détente* atmosphere—was one important source of the dispute. These circumstances were probably an important consideration in Khrushchev's mind in weighing the pros and cons of pressing the U-2 issue. In taking this decision, Khrushchev may have calculated that if the U-2 incident helped him pull off a coup at the summit, this would justify his foreign policy approach which the Chinese have criticized; and if the summit failed to materialize as a result, this would give him time and greater maneuverability to adjust Moscow's relations with Peiping.

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<sup>5</sup> For excerpts from the May 7 speech, see *ibid.*, pp. 415–417.

<sup>6</sup> For text of this speech, see *Background Documents*, pp. 12–17.

<sup>7</sup> For texts of the articles "On Imperialism As the Source of War in Modern Times and On the Way For All Peoples To Struggle for Peace" and "Long Live Leninism," see *Red Flag*, March 30 and April 19, 1960.

There is no evidence that Khrushchev opposed the decision to exploit the U-2 incident. Indeed, the manner in which Khrushchev raised the incident suggests an attempt on his part clearly to associate himself with this decision; and he quite obviously enjoyed himself when, in his May 7 speech, he presented evidence to buttress the charges he made on May 5.<sup>8</sup>

At the same time, Khrushchev was, and still is, politically vulnerable on a number of other counts. The harvest for which he had assumed nearly direct responsibility in 1959, had been bad; and there had been other troubles in Kazakhstan, with which region his "virgin lands" program had closely associated him. There had been troubles of one sort or another in the leadership group. Kirichenko, a former protégé of his, was demoted, and a major reorganization undertaken, although apparently at Khrushchev's initiative. Khrushchev, moreover, had run into opposition at least among the military in connection with the announced 1.2-million-man troop cut and the apparently increased reliance on missile weapons which his military program called for. Here, too, Khrushchev apparently felt compelled to resort to shifts among high-ranking personnel.

Thus, it is quite possible that Khrushchev, faced with actual or potential domestic criticism of his conduct of Soviet affairs and with the prospect of no tangible gains at the summit, welcomed the U-2 incident as a means of scoring personal success. It is also likely that the Soviet military were especially eager to exploit the U-2 incident.

### C. *The Decision To Demand US Capitulation as Summit Price*

While realizing the possible grave consequences for the summit conference of the decision to exploit the U-2 incident, the Soviet leadership evidently believed as late as May 9 that there was at least a 50–50 chance that the conference would take place. On that day, Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov delivered to President De Gaulle an aide-mémoire setting forth Soviet proposals for an interim Berlin agreement.<sup>9</sup> It is unlikely that Moscow would have so tipped its negotiating hand on the Berlin issue if it had already concluded that negotiations would not take place.

It is not entirely clear what this Soviet estimate was based on. Moscow may have interpreted the Department's May 7 statement on the U-2 incident<sup>10</sup> as an indication that the President would disassociate

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<sup>8</sup> For extracts of Khrushchev's May 5 speech, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 409–412.

<sup>9</sup> See Document 154.

<sup>10</sup> For text of this statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 417–418.

himself from the flight, express regret, and eventually renounce further reconnaissance flights. (Presumably the May 9 memorandum was delivered to De Gaulle before the Department's May 9 statement on the U-2<sup>11</sup> had been issued.) On the other hand, Moscow at this point might have been willing to go ahead with the summit with less than the "condemnation" of these "provocative acts," renunciation of such flights in the future, punishment of those "immediately guilty," and expression of regret which Khrushchev finally demanded of the US. Probably both of these suppositions are true.

The Soviet decision to retract the President's invitation to visit the USSR and to demand a US capitulation on the U-2 issue as a precondition for holding the summit was evidently made sometime between May 9 and May 13. It seems almost certain that this decision was made before Khrushchev left for Paris on May 14. There is considerable evidence that the decision was made as early as May 11.

It was on the latter day that Khrushchev held his famous "impromptu" press conference in Gorki Park.<sup>12</sup> (TASS did not publish the text of the press conference for another 24 hours, most likely in order to edit and clear it.) Although Khrushchev left the door ajar, he all but disinvited the President on this occasion. Moreover, in discussing the air incident, he implied that condemnation of the air intrusion and renunciation by the US Government of "such methods" were preconditions for an improvement in international relations. Khrushchev stated that the U-2 incident should not be placed on the summit agenda, which is consonant with his later position that the summit conference could not begin until the US acceded to Soviet demands regarding the incident. He then went on to say that he would go to Paris on May 14, that it would not be his fault if the conference did not take place as this would "depend on our partners," and that he could live without a summit conference. The publication of Khrushchev's press conference in the Soviet press on May 13 was a signal for a new, even greater wave of protest meetings in the USSR which continued unabated until the conference broke up.

There may have been some flexibility in Khrushchev's demands—presented first to De Gaulle on May 15 and then at the summit conference on May 16—for US renunciation, condemnation, expression of regret, and punishment of the "immediately guilty." However, Khrushchev probably believed that there was only a small chance that the US would give sufficiently to meet whatever the minimum Soviet demands might have been. Thus, there was a definite shift in Soviet

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<sup>11</sup> For text of this statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 418–420.

<sup>12</sup> For a transcript of this press conference, see *The New York Times*, May 13, 1960, p. 4.

tactics and summit expectations between May 8–9 (when the Berlin aide-mémoire was presumably transmitted from Moscow and was delivered in Paris) and May 11–13.

It is likely that the basic factors determining Khrushchev's final position at the summit were the same reasons—discussed above—motivating the Soviet decision to exploit the U-2 incident in the first place. At the same time, it seems probable that the Department's May 9 statement—the new element introduced in the picture between May 8–9 and 11–13—was an important factor in Moscow's decision to adopt its final summit position. For one thing, the statement deprived Khrushchev of any illusion that the President would disassociate himself from the U-2 incident. Second, the US declaration that it had regularly been conducting aerial reconnaissance since 1956, and the widely-accepted implication that the flights would continue, conveyed the distinct impression of Soviet military vulnerability. This made it all the more important, from Khrushchev's point of view, to press the issue of aerial reconnaissance in order to force the US to renounce these flights and to suffer a diplomatic defeat. Indeed, the US statement laid Khrushchev open to domestic criticism of mismanagement of the U-2 incident on the grounds that he had publicized the flights—and Soviet vulnerability—without being certain of being able to stop the flights by military means. Against the background of his other troubles, Khrushchev may have estimated that his handling of the Paris meeting could well in the final analysis prove a crucial test in the maintenance of his power, even though he had no organized opposition in the hierarchy at the moment. In sum, the May 9 statement probably had the effect of crystallizing the final Soviet position and may have caused Khrushchev to up his price for a summit conference.

# MAY–DECEMBER 1960: STATUS OF BERLIN FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

## 196. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 23, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Meeting of Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin

### PARTICIPANTS

Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant, Chairman

Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/P

Mr. Edward T. Long, M

Mr. Herman Skofield, S/S–RO

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, GER

Mr. James H. McFarland, Jr., GPA

Mr. Graham Martin, U

Mr. Robert P. Terrill, U/CEA

Mr. Edwin M. J. Kretzmann, P

Mr. Francis T. Williamson, REU

Mr. Stephen Palmer, UNP

General Fields, Dept. of Defense—JCS

Colonel Fawell, Dept. of Defense—JCS

Colonel Brannon, Dept. of Defense—JCS

Colonel Tyler, Dept. of Defense—OSD/ISA

Colonel Schofield, Dept. of Defense—OSD/ISA

Mr. Irwin, Dept. of Defense—OSD/ISA

Mr. James Lay, NSC

Mr. Critchfield, CIA

Mr. Merchant opened the meeting by stating that it was a good idea to get together at this time, as JCS and Defense had requested, in order to review Berlin contingency plans. He gave a brief summary of developments in Paris where the three Western Foreign Ministers had considered the plans and problems May 18 and had briefed the three Heads of Government later the same day.<sup>1</sup> As a result, we had been given two new planning directives:

1. To study further indirect measures, both economic and military, which might be useful or necessary.
2. To study the problem of harassment of civil access which could become serious. The President himself had expressed concern and was

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5–2360. Secret. Drafted by McFarland and approved in M on June 2. The source text bears Merchant's initials.

<sup>1</sup>See Documents 181 and 185.



anxious that the Western Powers consider what could be done to counter such harassment. The Heads of Government meeting gave authority to press ahead on these two problems and on other aspects of existing planning.

Mr. Merchant noted that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had made it plain that referral of the Berlin problem to the United Nations would depend on circumstances existing at the time such action might seem appropriate. Selwyn Lloyd added that the Governments would also have to decide whether they wanted to take the matter beyond the Security Council to the General Assembly. Secretary Herter emphasized that the existence of QBAL plans implied no commitment to their automatic implementation.

In connection with two new directives, the State Department considered it desirable to call a meeting of the Ambassadorial Group within the next week to secure tripartite agreement to bringing in Ambassador Grewe, since the bulk of the possible measures in response to harassment of civilian access would fall on the Federal Republic. After this meeting the work would be subcontracted to a Working Group in Bonn.

Mr. Merchant declared that we shouldn't draw much comfort from the Khrushchev Berlin speech.<sup>2</sup> We must keep our plans up to the minute. We should be prepared for another 180° turn by Khrushchev on Berlin at any time.

General Fields agreed with Mr. Merchant's analysis and outlined the reasons why the JCS had asked for this meeting. He raised the problem of whether other U.S. agencies are aware of or can be quickly informed of what we plan to do on a world-wide basis to meet specific challenges.

He distributed copies of a list of possible measures, pointing out that the list was not to be considered complete but that it represented the best compilation JCS had.<sup>3</sup> Individual items listed had been picked out of plans submitted. They were arranged loosely into logical groups, for example, "actions to demonstrate firmness." It was felt the various sections of the list should now be arranged sequentially in order that all concerned might know how long it would take to bring off any particular exercise contemplated.

Mr. Merchant agreed with the necessity of notifying other governmental agencies which might have a role to play or which should be kept informed and asked if anyone had prepared such a list of agencies.

General Fields stated that at such time as the Soviets signed a separate peace treaty with the GDR it might be necessary to review our plans

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 192.

<sup>3</sup> A copy of this 24-page paper, JCS 1907/267, is in Department of State, JCS Files.

on industrial mobilization. Such a review would require the participation of the entire government. (After the close of the meeting Mr. Lay asked to be kept advised of any developments which might require or render advisable review of industrial mobilization plans.)

Mr. Merchant noted having seen General Palmer's report (EC 9–10390)<sup>4</sup> giving the current status of Live Oak planning.

General Fields was encouraged by the report from General Palmer. It contained two heartening statements. Both air and ground planning were now in such a state that they could, if necessary, be implemented at once. General Palmer has directed U.S. commanders to be prepared to implement the plans.

General Fields asked Mr. Merchant for his impressions of the amount of support we might expect from the U.K. and France, should it be necessary to implement the Berlin contingency plans.

Mr. Merchant replied that he had the definite feeling that there was absolute Allied solidarity on the point that to let Berlin fall would be damaging in the extreme to our world-wide positions. Lloyd had put it well by asking, "If Berlin goes, who goes next?" On the other hand, he did not believe it was possible to persuade any of our Allies to take in advance decisions to go to war on the basis of predetermined plans any more than we would be willing to do so.

At the NATO meeting (May 19)<sup>5</sup> interest was expressed in the status of contingency planning. It might be useful to consider giving NAC a progress report. This should be on the check list of things to do. Mr. Merchant added a word of caution on the need to avoid all publicity on meetings of the kind presently taking place.

Mr. Irwin reported that U.S. Live Oak representatives had informed him that from the beginning the British had regarded Berlin contingency planning (more elaborate measures) as a planning exercise only and had no enthusiasm for implementation of these measures. The French seemed more inclined to support the plans as measures which might be implemented.

Mr. Smith asked whether it was not clear that the British did not like the issue of the stamping of documents as the point at which to implement the plans.

Mr. Merchant replied that we had eliminated the issue of stamping by the positive act of handing over sections of our travel orders at the checkpoints.

Mr. Merchant was called away temporarily.

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<sup>4</sup>Not found.

<sup>5</sup>Detailed reports on the Council meeting on May 19 were transmitted in Poltos 2306, 2307, and 2319 from Paris, May 20 and 23. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1666)

Mr. Hillenbrand stated that he thought the British might be willing to accept as a definitive cut-off point the maintenance of present procedures by the GDR. He doubted they would in the final analysis accept the "peel-off" procedures. The reservation of their position on the final paragraph suggested by the French for inclusion in the statement to be made to the Soviets was revealing on this point.

*[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]*

Mr. Hillenbrand observed that the Paris report represented about as far as we could realistically expect to go. Mr. Irwin agreed.

Mr. Hillenbrand asked General Fields what actions he envisaged for the proposed Working Group.

General Fields stated that it should start with the check list he had just distributed and expand it if possible. The Group should also consider what other Government agencies should do. The Group should be convened as soon as possible. Colonel Fawell would represent JCS.

Mr. Irwin asked what action Western controllers in BASC were authorized to take in the event of the signing of a separate peace treaty between the USSR and GDR or the withdrawal of the Soviet Controller from BASC.

Colonel Brannon read the statement which the Western Controllers are to make.<sup>6</sup> Colonel Schofield pointed out that the U.S. Controller is authorized to make the statement immediately. The British and French Controllers are not. They would need the specific authorization of their Governments.

There was a discussion of the need for practice and coordination exercises by the tripartite forces which would be participating in the various measures contemplated. The various units had already been designated by General Norstad. It was agreed that practice maneuvers could be conducted without being provocative if desired or could be conducted with the specific aim of showing determination to maintain access, should this be desirable.

Mr. Smith observed that before the training exercises were held a political decision would be required as to the timing.

Mr. Irwin conceded that this might be true but hoped there would be no decision not to hold the exercises.

Mr. Merchant, having returned, observed that it would be logical for General Norstad to put the matter of such exercises up to the Three Governments and noted that the Department of State as well as the British and French would want to consider the timing and situation prevailing at the time the exercises were scheduled to commence.

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<sup>6</sup>Not further identified.

There were no other points to be discussed. Mr. Merchant asked Mr. Hillenbrand to undertake to assemble the Working Group within the next few days. The first meeting is to take place May 25 at 3:00 p.m.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> No record of a meeting of the Working Group on May 25 has been found.

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## 197. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 9, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Situation After Collapse of Summit Conference

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Ambassador Grewe, German Embassy  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

Ambassador Grewe said that he had asked for this meeting with the Secretary primarily to review the situation after the collapse of the Summit Conference. However, he had an initial point to make relating to German dissatisfaction with the apparent degree of participation contemplated for the Federal Republic in Western contingency planning on Berlin. He noted that the French and British Ambassadors had met with Mr. Merchant on Tuesday,<sup>1</sup> and that he had been called in at a later point of the discussion to be informed of the decisions which had already been taken. This was not the type of consultation on contingency planning which the Federal Government had hoped for. The Germans thought they had received assurances in Paris that they would be brought more fully into Allied consideration of the subject. There was no intention to deny the basic Three-Power responsibility in this field, but the Federal Republic would like to participate more fully in discussion of subjects of

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/6-960. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on June 15.

<sup>1</sup> At the meeting on June 7, agreement was reached that the three Embassies at Bonn should study the problem of possible GDR/Soviet harassment of civilian access to Berlin, that the Federal Republic should participate in the study, and on what the terms of reference for the study group should be. (Telegram 2592 to Bonn, June 9; *ibid.*, 762.0221/6-960)

such vital concern to it. It was difficult for him (Grewe) to ask the right questions when confronted merely with decisions previously taken when he had not actually shared in the discussions leading up to those decisions. Hence, Ambassador Grewe continued, he hoped that, in the future, German participation would be more adequate.

The Secretary said that he assumed that Ambassador Grewe knew what the position of the United States on this subject was. [1 line of source text not declassified] He was under the impression that the Federal Government had been pretty much brought up-to-date on Western contingency planning after the Paris talks. An area still requiring intensive study was that of harassment of civilian access and of the economic countermeasures which might be taken in reprisal thereto. The problem of a possible Eastern attempt slowly to strangle the Berlin economy was one to which no one seemed to have the answer. Attrition of this kind might create a situation of a very serious nature. The Secretary noted that the old Quadripartite Working Group on Germany including Berlin could be convened at any time if the Germans felt this would be useful.

Ambassador Grewe said that [2 lines of source text not declassified]. He thought it would be a good idea to revive the Four-Power Working Group to study various aspects of the separate Peace Treaty problem. He thought it was overly optimistic to assume that the Western Powers would now have a protracted respite on Berlin. All that Khrushchev had indicated was a period of six to eight months, the Secretary commented. Ambassador Grewe observed that the German Ambassador in Moscow had called attention to the fact that Khrushchev's statement of June 3<sup>2</sup> had continued to lay stress on the necessity of a Peace Treaty and had threatened to go ahead with its signature if the Summit Meeting did not take place after the period which the Secretary had indicated. The Secretary said that it was difficult to understand why Khrushchev had specifically picked out a period of six to eight months. From the U.S. point of view, this was the most impossible time to expect the Government to be able to enter into the kind of discussions apparently envisaged. Ambassador Grewe commented he did not take this particular time period too seriously. The Secretary said it was not to be excluded that the Soviets would make overtures to the newly elected President before he actually assumed office, perhaps through a neutral country. As far as discussion of the Peace Treaty was concerned, the Secretary continued, he would ask Mr. Kohler to convene the Quadripartite Working Group as soon as feasible to discuss this.

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<sup>2</sup> For a transcript of Khrushchev's press conference at Moscow on June 3, see *Pravda*, June 4, 1960, or *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XII, no. 23, pp. 3–8.

Ambassador Grewe gave the Secretary a copy of a German Intelligence Report (attached)<sup>3</sup> containing certain points allegedly made by Khrushchev in a meeting which took place on May 20, 1960, of the augmented East-German Politbureau, relating to the reasons for the failure of the Summit Conference. After reading this report, the Secretary commented that the last sentence was corroborated by little pieces of evidence which had come to our attention that the Soviets had instructed their representatives abroad to try to be as friendly to Americans as possible. This was being done to the point of embarrassment. Ambassador Grewe noted that the Soviet Commandant in East Berlin had come to West Berlin for the U.S. Armed Forces Day Observance, even though Khrushchev was leaving East Berlin at the same time. The Secretary said that an element in the situation might well be Khrushchev's bitter personal feeling towards the President, whom he had built up in terms of their personal relationship. The U-2 incident might have exposed him to criticism at home. The Secretary went on to say that we are on the alert for possible Soviet probing operations elsewhere than in Berlin. We had noted a build-up in the Quemoy–Matsu area, and there had been heavy shelling of a ship in the Channel. However, this did not mean that something was necessarily imminent. Perhaps trouble was being brewed for the occasion of the President's visit. The whole question of the Soviet relationship to China was still not clear. He recalled a French newspaper article based on interviews with a number of prominent Frenchmen which appeared before the American delegation left Paris. Of those queried, two-thirds mentioned Chinese pressure as having had something to do with Khrushchev's state of mind in Paris. It was hard to come to any conclusions, but certainly China was the one country that seemed to have thoroughly enjoyed what happened in Paris.

Ambassador Grewe said that the German view was that Chinese pressure was one element but not the decisive one in the situation. Criticism of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union was directed not so much at the substance of his policy but rather at the manner in which he was carrying it out, for example, his consorting with Western capitalists. The Secretary noted that we had received the impression in Paris that the decision on the Summit was made before Khrushchev arrived in Paris. Ambassador Grewe pointed out that the Intelligence Report which he had given the Secretary indicated that the Conference might have gone on under certain conditions. There was no evidence that this was the case, the Secretary commented. The President had offered to have a bilateral meeting with Khrushchev to discuss their dispute on the ground that this was not a part of the Summit Meeting proper. In this response, Khrushchev did not mention this offer nor did he do so at any

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<sup>3</sup>Not printed.

time during his stay in Paris, although he has referred to it more recently.

The Secretary went on to say that he agreed that it would be foolish to assume that the present Berlin situation will drag out indefinitely. The East Germans were obviously disappointed that the Soviets had not agreed to move ahead when Khrushchev was in East Berlin.<sup>4</sup> Ambassador Grewe commented that his personal theory had actually been that the whole episode in Paris was intended to reverse the order of events, that the Soviets would go ahead and sign their separate Peace Treaty and thus create a crisis situation which would lead to the convening of a new Summit Meeting under heavy pressures, perhaps during the American electoral campaign when the U.S. Government would be most distracted.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

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<sup>4</sup> Khrushchev visited East Berlin following the collapse of the summit conference.

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## 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, June 28, 1960, 9:30 p.m.

2754. Re Paris tel 6039.<sup>1</sup> French Embassy has approached Department to stress need at present time to make certain that Occupying Powers are doing all they can to ensure avoidance of actions in Berlin which might unnecessarily provide Soviets with pretext to claim Occupying Powers have defaulted on their rights. French accordingly believe British, US and French Embassies Bonn, assisted by Berlin Missions as appropriate, should engage in study of following points:

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-2360. Confidential. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Paris, London, Berlin, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 23, telegram 6039 from Paris reported that de Leusse had discussed various problems relating to Berlin with an Embassy officer, including Western control over Berlin legislation, strong opposition to meetings of Bundestag or Bundesrat in the city, and control of secret agencies. (*Ibid.*)

In commenting on this telegram, the Embassy in Bonn hoped that the United States would not support the French regarding the meetings of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, pointing out that the Soviet Union could always find reasons to harass Berlin, and that it was not the time to show signs of weakness or retreat. (Telegram 947 from Bonn, June 24; *ibid.*, 762.0221/6-2460)

1. General attitude of FedRep authorities. Although Chancellor and FonOff aware of nuances, other Federal Ministries apparently assume greater degree of FedRep jurisdiction exists in Berlin than is actually case. French also fear that with Brandt possible SPD candidate, 1961 German political campaign may deteriorate into competing effort by CDU and SPD to emphasize links between FedRep and Berlin.

2. Attitude of Occupying Powers towards links between FedRep and Berlin. French believe that in past three Powers have perhaps been overly anxious to avoid displeasing Germans and Berliners.

3. Precise information to be developed on:

- a. Mantelgesetz procedure.
- b. Other relevant Berlin legislative procedures.
- c. Public manifestations of Federal power in Berlin, such as presence of Federal ministries, Presidential visits, meetings of legislative bodies, etc.
- d. Other activities in Berlin which might give Soviets pretext to challenge occupation status.

Embassy representative said French attached importance to foregoing exercise but did not necessarily believe it had to be done on crash basis. Indicated similar approach being made to British FonOff.

Departmental officer noted that history past ten years has shown differing emphasis between three Occupying Powers as to desirable relations FedRep and West Berlin. Pointed out there was no difference in principle regarding desirability avoiding giving Soviets any unnecessary pretext to claim Occupying Powers actually not behaving as such, although it was a fact that if they wanted to start trouble, Soviets or GDR could always find pretext somewhere in Berlin. Opinion was expressed that study of kind envisaged by French could serve useful purpose in assembling basic facts regarding existing practices in areas indicated. However, at this point we would presumably not wish to take specific position on details until review of findings completed and recommendations of Embassy and Berlin Mission available for consideration.

*For Embassy Bonn:* Assuming British concur, Department authorizes participation in tripartite study along lines indicated drawing on Berlin Missions as required. Assume French will raise matter in Bonn and provide further details as to what they have in mind. We are aware that Embassy and USBER are informed regarding existing Berlin legislative and administrative procedures, but French seemed to feel need for fuller details. French motives for study are presumably those indicated reftel, although immediate concern apparently aroused by experience in case of water management law. Tripartite study referred to



Deptel 587 to Berlin<sup>2</sup> could presumably be incorporated in broader Embassy review. No reference made by French Embassy representative to so-called “secret activities” mentioned by de Leusse, and this is obviously area where tripartite consideration seems inappropriate.<sup>3</sup>

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup>Dated June 15, telegram 587 to Berlin suggested the need for a tripartite study in Berlin concerning the supervision and review process of local legislation. (*Ibid.*, 962A.7301/6–260)

<sup>3</sup>The first meeting of the tripartite study group took place on July 4 at Bonn. Following discussion of the three items outlined by de Leusse (see footnote 1 above), the Embassy in Bonn asked the Department of State for further instructions on these questions and reiterated its view that approach to the West Germans concerning the meeting of the Bundestag in Berlin would inevitably involve the United States in German domestic political squabbles. (Telegram 29 from Bonn, July 5; *ibid.*, 762.00/7–560)

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## 199. Editorial Note

On June 29, the Policy Planning Staff completed work on PPS 1960–2, “The Future of Summitry,” which was transmitted to President Eisenhower on July 14 for consideration. This 22-page paper listed 13 possible advantages to holding summits and 11 disadvantages, before concluding that it was generally in the interest of the United States “to avoid summit meetings and pursue our objectives by other means, including negotiations at other levels. The exceptions would be where either urgency or probability of agreement were very great.”

On September 6, the President returned the paper to Secretary Herter for revisions, in particular expanding two sections on disadvantages under the headings “Doing Something” and “A Gesture in Lieu of Substance”, one section on advantages under the heading “Dangers of Direct Contact”, and eliminating section 11 of the disadvantages entitled “The Heritage of Paris.” The revised paper, dated September 15, was transmitted to the President on September 19. The memorandum of transmittal bears the following notation:

“Sec State,  
“To me this seems a good summation of advantages and disadvantages, as well as a guide to future effort.  
“DE”

A copy of PPS 1960–2 is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/7–1460; a copy of the revised paper, September 15, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.

## 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, July 8, 1960, 9:17 p.m.

83. Your 57.<sup>1</sup> Our basic concern in examining all issues re relationships FedRep–Berlin including Radio Law is maintenance status and security Berlin. We concur we must be constantly alert any FedRep actions which might undermine our legal position in Berlin (although we remain unconvinced by French and British arguments law in present form might so do). On other hand we must also be constantly alert Soviet efforts undermine our position, which at this time are largely in area psychological cold warfare. Principal Soviet target at moment appears be Berlin population's feeling association with rest free Germany and sense forward movement through developing ties with FedRep. Since these are probably basic to West Berlin's morale and since we cannot maintain our position in long run without confidence Berliners, we see considerable danger in this instance in appearing allow Soviets rather than ourselves be judges what is or is not compatible with special status Berlin. We are further concerned that Soviets might follow up any successes they score in politico-psychological field by blows aimed at equally vital economic relations between FedRep and Berlin.

We are rather surprised that French and British on balancing two factors mentioned above do not share our view of dangers interference in Federal process, which could not be kept from public and on Berlin aspect of which Western Powers have already taken public position. Such interference would inevitably be regarded as yielding to anticipated renewal Soviet objections and disadvantages are greater than any dangers of beclouding Berlin's legal status by permitting law to be passed and applied in Berlin by Berlin legislature under Mantelgesetz procedure.

We find French and British attitude all more difficult understand because of firm public position French and British took in their notes Dec. 16<sup>2</sup> (if there were any underlying "assumptions" or "understandings" on their part they did not communicate them to Soviets or for that

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7–160. Confidential. Drafted by McKiernan; cleared with Hillenbrand, McSweeney, and Wehmeyer; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Dated July 7, telegram 57 from Bonn reported on a quadripartite meeting on July 7 at which a Federal Republic law which would have made Berlin the seat for a Federal Radio Corporation was discussed with firm opposition to it registered by the French. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/7–760)

<sup>2</sup> For text of the British note, December 15, 1959, see *Dokumente*, Band 3, 1959, p. 774. A similar note was sent by the French. For text of the analogous U.S. note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1960, pp. 7–8.

matter to Germans and ourselves) and because of your view that interference in legislative process would be unsuccessful at this late stage in any case. We are not of course objecting to removal Berlin clause from bill if this results from action by Federal Govt.

We do not exclude possibility that proposed Deutschlandfunk, like any other Federal agency operating in Berlin, might at some time contemplate or take some specific action which Allied authorities might find incompatible with Berlin's status or security. We have reserved adequate powers for Allied Kommandatura deal with such excesses and we should not hesitate recommend their use if we thought it necessary.

We expect convey foregoing views to British and French here. You should take same line.

Dept studying considerations involved in Berlin Bundestag meeting in light latest Khrushchev statement.<sup>3</sup> We also hope have Embassy's views shortly re any measures necessary assure review of Federal legislation in time prevent difficulties of type which have arisen in other cases, e.g. Water Management Law.

**Dillon**

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<sup>3</sup> For a transcript of Khrushchev's press conference at Vienna, July 8, during which he stated that the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic if the Bundestag met in Berlin, see *Pravda*, July 9, 1960, or *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XII, no. 27, pp. 10–11.

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## **201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, July 13, 1960, 9:55 p.m.

203. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation.<sup>1</sup>

When Alphand called on Secretary July 13 on Congo, he raised question Bundestag meeting in Berlin. He said Khrushchev Vienna

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.21/7–1360. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by McBride and cleared in S/S. Repeated to Bonn and London.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this memorandum is *ibid*.

speech<sup>2</sup> on this subject had not changed French position of opposition to holding such session. French still considered meeting could serve as pretext for Soviets pressing forward on separate peace treaty for East Germany. He thought we could meet allegations not holding meeting was sign of weakness by concurrently making strong statement regarding Western rights in Berlin. He said he thought three Western powers should approach Germans to influence them not to hold session which French thought would have very serious repercussions.

Secretary said he thought holding these meetings in Berlin had become routine affairs. He believed Germans had reached no decision yet but were discussing matter. Secretary asked if French had already given their views unilaterally to Germans yet. Alphand replied French had not spoken to Germans as they wished establish tripartite position first. Secretary noted if Germans did not hold session, they would presumably say they had acted on advice of Western powers. He concluded that we should discuss this matter further.

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 200.

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## **202. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, July 15, 1960, 9:47 p.m.

G-30. Following are our preliminary views re Bundestag meeting Berlin in light of Khrushchev Austrian press conference threat.<sup>1</sup> While we believe they will remain applicable in situation likely obtain in next few months, we will of course wish review situation as it develops, particularly as Soviet threat to take counteraction may intensify or weaken or even change form.

Decisions to hold meetings of Bundestag, Bundesrat, and Bundesversammlung in Berlin or have Federal President visit Berlin have been

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/7-1560. Confidential. Drafted by McKiernan; cleared with Kohler, Merchant, Hillenbrand, Kearney, Vigderman, Armitage, and S/S; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 3, Document 200.

taken solely on initiative of Federal authorities. We have not encouraged these manifestations although we have naturally sympathized with objective of stressing symbolic roles of Berlin as German capital and show-window of democracy, which is entirely in accord with our own general policies and objectives in Germany. Allied intervention such matters has been and should be limited to decision whether these meetings or visits compatible with status or endanger security of Berlin.

Three Powers have long since decided such meetings and visits do not in fact conflict with special status of Berlin as area under Allied occupation. This is confirmed by series precedents since first Berlin Bundestag meeting 1954.

Neither have these meetings in past in any way endangered security of Berlin. They have been conducted in orderly and dignified way. They have, to be sure, been objects of Communist propaganda attacks but this has meant little in situation where mere existence free Berlin has been object of incessant vituperation. Such threats as have been contained in this propaganda attack in past have proven empty. Deputies have previously encountered no difficulties in transmitting Soviet Zone by road and rail (where, contrary Khrushchev's apparent impression, they have always been subject GDR controls).

Whether Khrushchev would actually translate his threatening remarks into action by concluding separate peace treaty if Bundestag meets in Berlin is question to which we can have no certain answer at this time. However, if Soviets conclude separate peace treaty, it will be for more fundamental reasons. Bundestag meeting would be occasion rather than cause. Soviets already have numerous pretexts for treaty if they care use them.

Moreover, discontinuance, on basis of Soviet threat of treaty, of activities which are now accepted as usual could have serious adverse effect on security of city and our position there. In effect only alternative Khrushchev threat offers is choice of ways in which Soviet objectives are to be accomplished. Part of motivation of Soviet separate peace treaty agitation may be Soviet belief treaty can facilitate attrition of Federal Republic–Berlin relations, which are second only to Allied presence as guarantee of free Berlin's survival. It is questionable whether Soviets could make much immediate progress in this direction if Allies and Germans prepared maintain firm resistance against attempts enforce any provisions of treaty concerning Berlin. If on other hand Allies and Germans can be frightened or bluffed by threat of treaty into altering various aspects of Berlin situation to suit Soviet purposes, Berlin's security can be quickly and effectively undermined.

On basis above we do not believe we can or should object to Bundestag meeting on security grounds.

Prestige and psychological factors involved Radio Law issue (our 83)<sup>2</sup> are also involved here. We cannot allow Soviets to overrule our decision as to what Federal activities are and are not compatible with special status of Berlin, all the more so when we are patently unable oblige Soviets to restrain activities in Soviet Sector which unquestionably conflict with city's status. We could expect any precedent of such overruling to be followed by increased Soviet demands which, if acceded to, would rapidly reduce us to impotence in Berlin.

Furthermore, we cannot afford appear weak in face of specific Soviet threats, for we would then undermine Berlin's spirit of resistance, jeopardize faith in us on which not only maintenance of Berlin but also firmness of our alliances depends, and encourage increasingly serious threats.

Should Federal authorities decide cancel Bundestag meeting because of recent Khrushchev threat, we would probably not urge them reconsider. However, we believe that it would be difficult for Soviets and for general public avoid inference Federal Republic's moral support for Berlin was lessening or Federal Republic's actions were being unduly influenced by Soviet threats.

Embassy is requested communicate above views to British and French.

Decision on timing of communication above views to Germans will be made following report of French and British reactions.

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup>Document 200.

**203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria**

Washington, July 23, 1960, 7:10 p.m.

161. Your 158 and 180.<sup>1</sup> Department deeply appreciative your handling of delicate matter of Gromyko memorandum.

If you have not already done so, you may wish make following points to Kreisky.

Document contains nothing new merely reiterating old Soviet "free city" proposal for West Berlin, which is unacceptable because under existing conditions the rights of US, UK, and France to remain in Berlin with unhindered communications by surface and air are essential to continued protection of freedom of West Berliners, a responsibility solemnly accepted by the Three Powers and a responsibility they are resolutely determined to discharge. About this there should be no doubt whatsoever.

Basic solution of Berlin problem can only be found in context of German reunification. US Government remains ready to discuss German problem at any time with Soviet Government in any appropriate forum on the basis of any proposals genuinely designed to insure reunification of Germany in freedom. US Government continues to regard solution of all-German problem as essential to a lasting settlement in Europe. As Austrian Foreign Minister aware, Western Powers spent many weeks at Geneva in 1959 discussing with Soviets possible *modus vivendi* on Berlin. Agreement could not be reached, the Soviet position to date seems offer no basis for satisfactory arrangement. Lack of success of these efforts largely due Soviet refusal meet our offer of concessions with concessions on their part. If West makes concessions, Soviets must also. And we cannot regard as concessions offer perhaps to withdraw a few of a number of demands which were unacceptable and not legitimate from the start.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–2060. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash in GPA on July 22; cleared with Davis, McBride, Stabler, Hillenbrand, Merchant, and S/S; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> During Khrushchev's visit to Austria June 30–July 8 (see Documents 326 ff.), Gromyko gave Kreisky a memorandum for Brandt which repeated the Soviet view on Berlin and reiterated the Soviet proposal for a free city guaranteed by the United Nations. Telegram 158 from Vienna, July 18, transmitted a translation of the memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–1860) Telegram 180 from Vienna, July 20, reported that Ambassador Matthews had discussed the memorandum with Kreisky on that day. Kreisky stated that he thought no opportunity should be lost to discuss the situation with the Soviet Union and indicated that he had passed the memorandum on to Brandt and Adenauer. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/7–2060) Regarding the memorandum, see Document 207.

We can unfortunately put little faith in “new Four Power guarantee” of type envisaged at time when Soviets demonstrating so clearly their capacity to go to any lengths to repudiate their solemn engagements just as soon as it no longer suits their purposes to honor such obligations.

Our evaluation of Soviet purposes causes us to conclude that Soviets regard any new arrangement for Berlin as merely a way station on the road to a complete take-over. We have no reason to believe they are prepared to meet concession with concession but, on contrary, are merely attempting to weaken and undermine Western position to the point where a complete take-over is possible.

If Berlin has become a focus of international tension, it is because Soviet Government deliberately threatens to disturb existing arrangements at present in force there, arrangements to which Soviet Government is itself a party.

US Government has, of course, no intention whatsoever of provoking armed conflict. However, Soviets know full well that if they or East Germans resort to force to prevent exercise of legitimate Allied rights, thus endangering freedom and security of West Berlin, US will have no choice other than to respond in any way necessary to honor its commitments and obligations to Berlin.

FYI. While Dept would not wish encourage Kreisky to act as intermediary with Soviets on this question, nevertheless it would be useful if he conveyed to Soviet Ambassador his impression our determination and firmness on Berlin.<sup>2</sup> End FYI.

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup>On July 25, Matthews reported that Kreisky had left Vienna for Paris and would then go to Sweden, not to return to Austria until the end of August. (Telegram 201 from Vienna; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2560) There is no evidence to indicate that Matthews took the matter up at that time.



**204. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (White) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, August 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

Bundestag Meeting in Berlin

1. The French have now joined in supporting the new British formula regarding the Bundestag meeting in Berlin. This formula is as follows:

“It seems important that the three Powers, if and when their opinion is asked by the Federal Government about a Bundestag meeting in Berlin this autumn, should give similar replies.

“Could we say something to the effect that the matter is of course for the Germans to decide but that a possible way out of the dilemma might be for the Bundestag, after the summer recess, to decide in principle on a meeting in Berlin during the present session but to leave the date undecided?”<sup>1</sup>

2. Our initial reaction, as given to both the British and the French, was that it did not seem that such a formula faced-up to the basic issue involved and would not avoid giving the impression that the Western Powers were retreating before Soviet threats. The more considered views of the Department were promised, and it is accordingly now necessary that we formulate our position for official transmission to the British and French.

3. Although the British formula is ingenious, it does not seem to meet the basic requirements of the situation as set forth in the Department’s Airgram G–30 of July 15, 1960 (copy attached at Tab A).<sup>2</sup> Nothing has happened in the past two weeks which would indicate that the reasoning in this airgram does not remain the only realistic basis for a firm attitude in relation to Khrushchev’s threats on the subject. Our response to the British and French should accordingly be to urge that instead of the formula proposed, an appropriate tripartite position would be as follows:

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/8–260. Secret. Drafted by Hiltenbrand; concurred in by Davis, Armitage, McKiernan, and Boster; and sent through Calhoun and Merchant who initialed.

<sup>1</sup> The British made this proposal on July 27 and on August 1 Lebel told White of the French support for the proposal. Memoranda of these conversations are *ibid.*, 762A.00/7–2760 and 762.00/8–160.

<sup>2</sup> Document 202.

a. The question of whether or not a Bundestag meeting is to be held this fall in Berlin is one for decision by the appropriate German authorities, i.e., presumably the Bundestag itself after such consultation as it may wish with the Federal Government.

b. Should the Federal authorities decide to hold the meeting in Berlin, we would not consider that this would be incompatible with the special status of Berlin as an area under Allied occupation or endanger the security of Berlin in such a way as to warrant negative Allied intervention.

c. If the meeting is held in Berlin, the Occupying Powers would ensure that public security in the city would be maintained in such a way as to permit the orderly holding of the meeting.

4. There have been press reports that Adenauer and de Gaulle discussed the subject during their recent meeting Rambouillet, coming to the conclusion that the meeting should not be held in Berlin. However, the French Embassy here has been unable to provide us with any information on this point.<sup>3</sup>

5. A further factor which tends to confuse the situation as well as to lead to a certain disingenuousness in statements of motives is the strong probability that the Germans and the French, as well as the British, have a highly exaggerated impression of the incapacity of the American Government, due to electoral campaign and impending change-over of administrations, to deal effectively with any crisis over Berlin. We have, of course, tried to give assurances on this subject at our level but, as you know, when people like the Chancellor and de Gaulle get a fixed idea in their heads, remonstrances to the contrary have little effect.

6. It seems probable, therefore, that early British and French acceptance of our position is unlikely and that we will be subjected to a continuing series of approaches in order to obtain our agreement to something like the British formula. Although tripartite unity in matters of this kind is something eminently to be desired, it may well be that, in the last analysis, more good than harm would result from the giving of differing advice to the Germans when they ask. If it were to become generally known that the United States had not opposed a German decision to hold the Bundestag meeting in Berlin, but that the decision had been taken on other grounds, this would probably at the very least be psychologically useful vis-à-vis the Soviets during a period when it will be important to convince Khrushchev that our intentions remain firm. One difficulty with this, however, could be that Adenauer is disposed not to

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<sup>3</sup> For Chancellor Adenauer's recollections of the visit to France July 29–30, see *Erinnerungen, 1959–1963*, pp. 59–67. In the conversation referred to in footnote 1 above, Lebel stated that he had no information on whether de Gaulle and Adenauer had discussed this question. For the Department of State's analysis of this meeting and that between Adenauer and Macmillan August 10–11, see vol. VII, Part 1, Documents 120 and 121.

have the meeting in Berlin, whereas the Berlin contingent headed by Brandt will push to have the meeting held this fall. While it is always possible that the question might become a public issue, we doubt that Adenauer would risk an open dispute with Brandt unless he could convincingly state that a decision had already been taken by the Western occupying powers.

7. In the likely event that the British and French find they cannot accept points (a), (b) and (c) in Paragraph 3, we might suggest that agreement merely to stop with point (a) would be preferable to their proposed formula. We would indicate, however, that if the Germans continue to press for some further expression of Allied views, or try to give the impression that opposition on their part to holding the Bundestag meeting in Berlin is based on advice received from the Western Allies, it might be necessary to bring all three points to the attention of the Federal Government.

8. In the event that the British and the French continue to give their views to the Germans on this subject without reference to tripartite agreement to stop with point (a), we would presumably be free to communicate such views unilaterally as we might consider desirable.

9. It is accordingly recommended that you approve the position outlined in Paragraph 3 above for initial transmission to the British and French; and the fall-back position in Paragraph 7 above for use in the eventuality indicated.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Herter initialed approval of the recommendation. According to telegram 297 to Bonn, August 11, the Department of State informed the British and French Embassies that the British formula did not face up to the basic issue. The Embassy in Bonn was instructed to inform the British and French there. (Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/8-1160)

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**205. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, August 2, 1960.

Since, as you know, I will be leaving the Department to attend the Aspen Institute seminar, and will be gone somewhat over two weeks, I

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Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and sent through S/S. attached to a memorandum from Calhoun to Merchant, dated August 4, which stated that the Secretary of State had approved the proposals put forth under numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 and had charged Merchant with establishing the committee to re-examine contingency plans. Calhoun suggested that the interdepartmental committee might be the appropriate vehicle for the re-examination

should like to set down the subjects with which I have been involved prior to my departure.

1. *Powers Case*<sup>1</sup>

I believe this is in good shape and the chief consideration I would think is not to rush out into any line of pre-trial propaganda which Powers' statements at the trial might blow up. In other words, I think we should wait and see what develops at the trial and handle it from the propaganda point of view in the light thereof.

I think there should be a committee set up, possibly with Mr. Davis as its head, which would examine immediately material as it emerges from the trial and get out quickly the necessary proper propaganda guidance both at home and abroad.

2. *Berlin*

The subject which I think could be the most dangerous and serious is of course Berlin. We of course have no certainty that recent indications of Soviet intention possibly to bring on a Berlin crisis before the termination of the six to eight months period originally set by Khrushchev may merely be a continuance of pressure in the current war of nerves on general rather than specific grounds. It would, however, be extremely imprudent to assume that this is merely bluff. If it turned out the Soviets did intend some move in regard to Berlin, particularly during our Presidential campaign, we would be caught dangerously short.

I would, therefore, suggest that immediate attention by State and Defense should be given to our contingency plan for Berlin and, as soon as practicable, some form of discussion with the British, French and West Germans. In reviewing the contingency plan on Berlin, which as far as I can gather is still that drawn up in April 1959,<sup>2</sup> I believe insufficient attention has been given to the desirability of having a military probe if necessary done by air. I understand that there is concern in the Pentagon that this might indicate our willingness to accept an airlift as against attempting to free, by military force if necessary, the land routes to Berlin. There is also some question I believe as to the feasibility of air cover within the confines of the corridor. The first of these objections I do not consider valid. There is no reason to believe that we will have to abandon our rights on the ground or intention to enforce them simply because in the initial phases of the Berlin crisis we choose the form of communications most advantageous to us for a military probe of Soviet and GDR intentions. Furthermore, an air probe should not in any way delay military preparations for ground action.

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<sup>1</sup> Reference is to the trial of Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U-2 plane.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 255.

In the event of a Soviet turn-over to the GDR of all control functions or access to Berlin, in the air as well as on the ground, I think we would have every advantage of making a test in the air. It would offer by its very nature, and based on the precedent of the Berlin blockade, the easiest "out" for the Soviets if they so desired. We would also have the best chance of winning an air battle in the event real resistance was encountered. By their very nature air operations are easier to control than shooting engagements on the ground. It could therefore contain less danger of automatic progression to general war than any ground engagement. We could of course completely reserve our position in regard to land communications and would not in any sense be committed merely to a renewal of the air lift. However, since the problem is only that of supplying the Western garrisons and not, as I understand it, that of the civilian population in the opening phases of the crisis, we could gain time while other world-wide measures could be developed and put into effect. If blockades were extended to civilian traffic to Berlin, we could then on better basis initiate land probe.

As to the technical feasibility of jets in the corridor, I am not competent to judge how limiting this factor is, but it should not be impossible to fly air cover to a convoy of transports as a first move. In the event of armed resistance there would be no necessity or even desirability of scrupulously respecting the limitations of the corridor since we would have been subjected to an act of aggression.

In any event, I would suggest that you should appoint a committee at once to re-examine the various aspects of the contingency planning on Berlin. If the Soviet attitude turns out to be mere bluff, we have only lost a certain number of man hours in study, but we would be better prepared to deal with a possible crisis this autumn.

With further reference to Berlin, there have been some suggestions current in the Department as to the best way of conveying to Khrushchev a convincing demonstration of our determination in this matter, particularly in light of the doubts he expressed in Austria to Kreisky on this score. I doubt if a communication from the President to Khrushchev would be the best method of doing this. In the first place, it might be construed as a US initiative to open up the channel of personal communication broken off by the Summit events. Secondly, it might afford Khrushchev an opportunity while leaving the threat hanging to cast an element of uncertainty in regard to his intentions which would not help us very much. Thirdly, any written communication, particularly in the present circumstances, would be considered by the Soviets to have a propaganda angle which might reduce its effectiveness. On balance, if there is any continuing evidence of Soviet threats in regard to Berlin, I believe an instruction to Thompson to talk to Khrushchev following his return to Moscow would be the best. He could either be

brought home on consultation and have an interview with the President, which might enhance the effectiveness, or I believe an instruction from the President would be an acceptable alternative. Any such move would have to be checked out with the British, French and West Germans.

Needless to say, if there is any urgent need for me to return to Washington I can be back from Aspen within a day.

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**206. Letter From the Assistant Chief of the Mission at Berlin (Lightner) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)**

Berlin, August 8, 1960.

DEAR FOY: In recent weeks I have been impressed by the apparent conflicting influences of two antithetical philosophies that seem to shape U.S. and Allied policies and actions relating to Berlin. (Actually these philosophies underlie our relations with the Soviet Union on a global basis, but I am looking at the problem from the Berlin angle.) One philosophy takes the form of extreme caution to avoid doing anything that the Soviets might construe as "provocation" for taking strong action in Berlin, such as signing a separate peace treaty with the East Germans. In the course of implementation, particularly when tripartite agreement is involved, this philosophy frequently produces very defensive results. This was recently illustrated by the last-minute French demand to delete two innocuous sentences from the note on the Bundeswehr and by the handling of the UPI story about the Berlin intelligence report of imminent military action against Berlin.<sup>1</sup> To deny knowledge of such a report was all right but it was most disappointing here in Berlin to read that a top intelligence source in the administration gave his assurance that our

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-860. Secret; Official-*Informal*. Copies were also sent to Dowling, Tyler, Freers, Lyon, Barbour, Merchant, Bohlen, Berding, and Hillenbrand. Attached to the source text was a reply from Merchant, August 15, which stated that he knew "of no one in the State Department or across the river who subscribes to the philosophy you fear of trying to avoid provoking the Soviets."

<sup>1</sup> For text of this August 8 note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 29, 1960, p. 348. Documentation on the drafting of the note is in Department of State, Central File 762.00. The UPI story under reference has not been further identified.

estimate was that the Soviets had no intention of taking any such action at this time. Surely we might have been expected to have seized this opportunity to go on to say that we of course had to assume that such plans existed, that our troops in Berlin were constantly on the alert and would effectively defend Berlin in the event the other side were so foolhardy as to embark on such a venture.

I am not suggesting that the West is in any position to wield a “big stick”, but I do suggest that too much caution causes many observers in Berlin to fear that the West may be operating under the misapprehension that major Soviet strategy is seriously influenced by so-called “provocations” on our part. Sitting here in Berlin where nearly every week several incidents occur which could at any time be blown up to serve as “provocations,” one is impressed by the danger that Soviet knowledge of our fear-to-provoke will stimulate rather than deter the kind of move we seek to forestall.

Recognition of this danger would lead to greater acceptance of the second philosophy that I mentioned at the beginning of this letter. This is the continuing, urgent need to impress upon Khrushchev and his followers the fact that despite the U.S. election campaign, the sometimes divisive interests of the Allied powers, the changing power relationships in the world, etc. etc., the U.S. will go the limit to carry out its pledges to stand by Berlin. Possibly the main deterrent to major Sov/GDR harassment of our position in West Berlin and to other action designed to produce a “solution” of the Berlin problem remains Soviet respect for our strength of purpose here. Recent reports citing important Soviet and GDR leaders as doubting our willingness to go all the way for Berlin are alarming because if true they could lead to a tragic miscalculation. They point to the need right now to demonstrate that we are as determined as ever and will defend Berlin whatever the cost.

Many recent U.S. statements on Berlin have been favorably received here (statements by both Presidential candidates, statements by the Department’s spokesman and notes to the Soviet Government). Unfortunately, the good effects of Linc White’s recent statement,<sup>2</sup> refuting the East German blast about the Potsdam agreement were somewhat offset in Berlin by the unfortunate impressions created by newspaper stories out of Washington the same day claiming that State Department officials believed Khrushchev was not bluffing when he warned he would sign a separate peace treaty if the Bundestag should meet in Berlin. (Why the hell we have to tell the world when we think Khrushchev is bluffing and when he is not bluffing is a mystery to me.) However, I am not really primarily concerned with Berlin reactions to U.S. policy but

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<sup>2</sup> For text of White’s August 2 statement, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, p. 123.

rather with the possibility of Soviet miscalculation of our capabilities and determination to defend Berlin.

Under constant pressure from the East Germans to solve the Berlin problem, Khrushchev might even decide to let them make a power play here if he came to believe the reports that we and our Allies were incapable of moving decisively to hold Berlin against concerted East German effort. Gromyko's statement to Kreisky as reported in Vienna's 156, July 18<sup>3</sup> ("no one would fight over the signs . . . passes . . ."),<sup>4</sup> can't be laughed off. East Germans also are very cocky and may doubt our readiness to go the limit on the Berlin issue. (I refer to several recent intelligence reports, including a fascinating one quoting a high SED official Otto Winzer and indirectly a group of British Labor MPs.) We felt the observation of the new Ceylonese Ambassador in Moscow to Mrs. Thompson (Moscow's 36, July 6)<sup>5</sup> was a most timely message. You recall he expressed the view that the West should take steps to convince the Soviets they were prepared to fight for Berlin because the Soviets did not now believe this was true.

With conditions deteriorating in East Germany we must assume Ulbricht may be all the more persuasive in his current talks with Khrushchev to try to get the latter's approval for a move against West Berlin. It is vital for us at this time to make sure no one doubts the fact of our determination to go down to the line with them on the Berlin issue.

If I were to come up with a few specific suggestions as to what we ought to do beyond what we are already doing to convince the Soviets of our determination, I would suggest consideration be given to the following overt moves: 1) give immediate consideration to Mayor Brandt's suggestions to the Commandants at their meeting on July 12 for an Allied statement reiterating our position on a separate peace treaty.<sup>6</sup> He suggested the following points be made: a) Allied rights in Berlin would not be affected in any way by a separate peace treaty; b) the Allies in any event intend to continue to exercise their rights; and c) a separate peace treaty with the "consequences" stated by the Soviets could constitute a threat to world peace. (It might be a stronger and more timely statement if it were to be made by the U.S. alone, possibly by "the State Department spokesman.") 2) At some stage it might be desirable to consider addressing a diplomatic note in very serious vein to the Soviet Government explaining in clear-cut terms the danger to world peace that would

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Department State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1860)

<sup>4</sup> Ellipses in the source text.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-660)

<sup>6</sup> The Mission at Berlin reported on this meeting in telegram 30, July 13. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/7-1360)



be involved were the Soviets to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to withdraw from control of the access routes to Berlin.

I started this out as a draft telegram, but somewhere along the route decided it would be more appropriate to send as a letter, particularly in view of the present policy to restrict the telegraphic traffic. I am, however, taking the liberty of sending copies of this letter to a rather larger list than usual.

Sincerely yours,

E. Allan Lightner, Jr.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 207. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

No. 8330

Washington, August 25, 1960.

### INCREASING COMMUNIST ATTENTION TO BERLIN<sup>1</sup>

[Here follows a 2-page abstract of the report.]

#### *Khrushchev, Ulbricht Threats*

In a Vienna press conference on July 8, Khrushchev introduced a new element of pressure into the Soviet Union's stance on Berlin by alluding to a date when the USSR might sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR. The threat—combining a precise date with an imprecise Soviet newspaper correspondent about the “best solution . . . for West Berlin.”<sup>2</sup> In his reply Khrushchev first reiterated the standard Soviet position that a peace treaty with “the two German states” would automatically solve the problem, and then continued:

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Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS–INR Intelligence Reports. Secret; NoForN. No drafting information appears on the source text.

<sup>1</sup>See also IIB–309, *Recent East German Developments Relating to Berlin*, August 25, 1960. [Footnote in the source text. IIB–309 has not been found. According to another footnote in the source text, this report was based on information available through August 11.]

<sup>2</sup>All ellipses are in the source text.

We have information from West Germany that an idea is now developing there to hold the Bundestag meeting in September in West Berlin. This is done for purposes of provocation. Perhaps we should think it over with comrades Grotewohl and Ulbricht and with representatives of other socialist states which took part in the war against Hitlerite Germany. Perhaps the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR should be timed to the convening of the Bundestag in West Berlin. And then all the Bundestag deputies would have to receive visas from Grotewohl in order to be able to return home to Bonn from Berlin.

Earlier in his Austrian visit, Khrushchev had privately made an almost identical statement to Austrian officials regarding the Bundestag meeting and a separate bloc–GDR peace treaty. In making his threat, Khrushchev clearly sought to alarm the West by raising again the spectre of unilateral Soviet action on Berlin without, however, binding the Soviet Union to an unalterable course of action in the future or suggesting that such a course of action was in train at present.

The communist desire to retain the element of imprecision in the separate peace treaty threat was shown by East German treatment of party leader Walter Ulbricht's statement on the Bundestag meeting, made at a July 19 press conference<sup>3</sup> attended by Western reporters. Western press sources reported Ulbricht to have said that negotiations to sign a peace treaty if the Bundestag met in Berlin in September were "under way at the moment." On the afternoon of the press conference, the East German radio, too, broadcast excerpts which quoted Ulbricht as saying rather cryptically that negotiations were under way "in the spirit" of Khrushchev's Vienna statement. However, Ulbricht's assertion was completely excised from both East German and Soviet published accounts of the press conference. The East German text of the conference, published in *Neues Deutschland* on July 20, contained the following reply from Ulbricht in answer to the question about the Bundestag meeting:

... You all know that there have already been some Bundestag sessions in West Berlin which served the purpose of waging psychological warfare against the GDR, the Soviet Union, and countries in the socialist camp. . . . I should like to state quite unmistakably that neither the Bonn Bundestag nor the Bonn authorities have anything to do with West Berlin. West Berlin lies on the territory of the GDR and is a part of its territory. You know our point of view. I can do without presenting it to you in detail here. We shall not deviate from it. We are sitting at the long end of the lever—everyone should consider that. And if it should be required the GDR Government will take the necessary measures at the appropriate time. You are all certainly aware of Premier Khrushchev's answer to a similar question in Vienna . . . .

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<sup>3</sup>For text of this statement and a transcript of the press conference, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, pp. 69–87.

The transformation of Ulbricht's remarks from "negotiations are under way at the moment" to "necessary measures will be taken at the appropriate time" was designed to bring his position on the Bundestag session into line with that of Khrushchev and thereby to retain the flexibility inherent in the ambiguous Khrushchev formulation. Neither Ulbricht nor Khrushchev mentioned the consequences of a separate peace treaty in referring to the Bundestag session in Berlin.

In oblique recognition of the worrisome value of the unfulfilled threat to conclude a bloc–GDR peace treaty, Ulbricht, at his press conference, went so far as to claim for the first time that some in the West are seeking to goad the bloc into signing a separate peace treaty. He asserted: "*We have the impression that certain aggressive circles in Bonn and West Berlin cannot wait for West Berlin to become a demilitarized free city and thus are striving to accelerate the conclusion of a peace treaty.*" (*Neues Deutschland's* emphasis)

The volume of Soviet and East German follow-up propaganda on the Khrushchev and Ulbricht remarks regarding the Bundestag has been slight. Commentaries have been couched in vaguely threatening tones, but there has been no elaboration of Khrushchev's Vienna formulation; instead, Soviet and East German comment has concentrated on attempting to justify the Soviet position.

#### *Gromyko Memorandum*

In early July, during Khrushchev's visit to Austria, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed a memorandum on a German peace treaty and Berlin to Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky.<sup>4</sup> The memorandum, whose ultimate recipient was intended to be West Berlin Mayor Brandt, divided itself into two parts—one expository, the other minatory.

The expository section of the Gromyko memorandum consisted of a straightforward repetition of the standard, maximum Soviet position on Germany and Berlin as embodied in the Soviet draft German peace treaty of January 10, 1959,<sup>5</sup> and elaborated upon by Soviet spokesmen on innumerable occasions since that time. The conclusion of a peace treaty with the "two existing German states" and the establishment of "Free city of West Berlin" on the basis of such a treaty, the memorandum asserted, would represent a sacrifice on the part of the GDR "on whose territory West Berlin is located." The memorandum also portrayed a value, but idyllic future for the free city under the guardianship of the Big Four, a special commission, and the UN. The threat of a separate GDR–bloc peace treaty was also reiterated and the consequences of such a pact for Allied access to Berlin were delineated. The memorandum

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 203.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 124.

made no mention of an interim settlement limited to Berlin, such as was discussed at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1959 and about which Moscow submitted its most recent proposals in a May 9 message from Khrushchev to De Gaulle.<sup>6</sup>

The memorandum, however, was not written to repeat well-known and thoroughly unacceptable Soviet proposals of the past. Its real purpose was to frighten those who would read it—particularly Brandt and West Berlin officialdom—and to shake their confidence in Allied fidelity to the Western position in Berlin by simultaneously invoking the horrors of nuclear war and disparaging Western willingness to wage such a war over Berlin.

The memorandum asserted that if Brandt were relying on the strength of the Western Powers, "he is building on sand." The US, it asserted, would not initiate war over a separate GDR peace treaty, for "moral reasons" make it difficult "to decide to be the first to start the fire of a missile or nuclear war." Moreover, the US would be deterred by a "regard for actual power relationships" whereby the USSR "can transform all, even the remotest objects on the territory of the aggressor [i.e., the US]<sup>7</sup> into fire and ashes." Similar statements were made to buttress the memorandum's claims regarding supposed British, French, and West German unwillingness to risk nuclear-missile war over West Berlin. The Gromyko memorandum also made a transparent effort to capitalize on Brandt's political ambitions by alluding to the rise which allegedly would occur in the prestige of those in the West who "properly evaluate the situation," and contribute to settling the Berlin problem. It also hinted at the desirability of a Brandt–Khrushchev meeting, without actually issuing an invitation to the West Berlin Mayor. Finally, the memorandum spoke about the necessity of negotiating a settlement of the Berlin problem "in a quiet atmosphere."

Khrushchev, in an August 4 letter to Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>8</sup> dealing with a variety of international topics, seemed to go out of his way to juxtapose the possibility of a future nuclear holocaust with the Berlin problem. (Macmillan, in fact, had not even mentioned Berlin in his letter,<sup>9</sup> to which Khrushchev was writing in reply.) In a general discussion of the possibility that war might arise through mistake or accident, Khrushchev wrote:

We say that it is necessary to eliminate the circumstances which might give rise to dangerous accidents. We must not wait for a madman who might in his folly take the fatal step which would cause the

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 154.

<sup>7</sup> All brackets are in the source text.

<sup>8</sup> For text of this letter, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, pp. 124–126.

<sup>9</sup> For text of Macmillan's letter, July 19, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1960*, pp. 50–52.

outbreak of a third world war, which would burn up West Berlin, and not just West Berlin, but also all those who are now unwilling to recognize the necessity of concluding a peace with the two German states . . . .

Further on, after the standard threat that the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR if it “does not meet with understanding,” Khrushchev curtly said: “It would be unreasonable to threaten war against this peaceful action of ours. You know that it is dangerous to threaten us with war.” Khrushchev’s remarks, while subtler than Gromyko’s, were probably made with the same purpose in mind: to frighten his Western audience by explicitly raising the danger of nuclear war over Berlin.

Soviet desire to elaborate further the current line on Berlin and, at the same time, probe for possible internal German political differences over Berlin also emerged in Bonn in early July. There, according to intelligence reports, the Soviet Embassy asked for and arranged meetings between Ambassador Smirnov and leaders of the major West German opposition parties, the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats. Only the FDP meeting has apparently occurred (the Smirnov–SPD talk was postponed by the Soviets because of the ambassador’s departure from Bonn on July 15) and what transpired is now known, but Smirnov probably took the line of the Gromyko memorandum—either verbally or by handing yet another Soviet declaration on Berlin to opposition party leaders. (Prior to the Gromyko memorandum, the USSR last used the West German opposition as a channel for disseminating its views on the German and Berlin problems in January 1960, when Smirnov gave SPD leaders a memorandum on the subject. The memorandum was published in February.)<sup>10</sup>

### *Diplomatic Moves*

Moscow and the GDR have continued their campaign to exploit some ambiguities inherent in West Berlin’s internal and external relations, with the goal of sapping Western unity on the Berlin issue. In identical notes to the US, the UK, and France, published on July 15,<sup>11</sup> the GDR protested the June 27 arrest and “kidnapping” of an East German citizen by the West Berlin police on the property of the GDR-operated Berlin elevated railway located in West Berlin. The note sought to use the incident to emphasize earlier East German claims to complete control of the railway, which is an important escape route for those fleeing to West Berlin from the GDR.

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<sup>10</sup>See footnote 1, Document 69.

<sup>11</sup>For text, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, pp. 51–52.

In notes to the US, the UK, and France published on July 29,<sup>12</sup> the USSR—recalling its note on November 11, 1959<sup>13</sup>—protested the Bundestag passage of a bill establishing a Federal German radio broadcasting council to be situated in West Berlin. The note called the Bundestag's action "an open encroachment of the Federal Government on West Berlin." In a similar move one month earlier, the Soviet Union on June 30 sent notes to the Allies protesting the alleged recruitment of West Berliners into the West German army and the subordination of West Berlin's economy to West German rearmament.<sup>14</sup> The notes declared that it was the Allies' responsibility to end the FRG efforts "to utilize West Berlin for its military preparations," but it contained no warning of possible consequences for the Allied position in Berlin if the supposed recruiting were to continue. Both notes were designed to point up alleged FRG violations of West Berlin's special status, and possibly to serve as the basis for some future Soviet actions.

#### *Reports of Planned Soviet GDR Moves Against Berlin*

Beginning in early July, there appeared a number of intelligence reports—most, but not all of which emanated from East Berlin—which indicated that Berlin had recently been the subject of bloc-wide discussions, and that the Soviet timetable for definite action on Berlin had been projected. Ulbricht reportedly told his staff that at the communist parties' conference in Bucharest at the end of June it had been agreed that West Berlin would be incorporated into the GDR "at the next suitable opportunity," and that the Bundestag meeting would be sufficient cause for such action. An East German Politburo member was also reported to have told his associates that West Berlin would definitely be made a part of the GDR by the spring of 1961, but that annexation could come sooner. Other reports forecast the imminent convocation of a conference to discuss a peace treaty with the GDR.

Apart from the public and private threats of future communist moves on the German and Berlin scene, the most significant recent action has been the intermittent East German harassment of Western Military Liaison Missions in the GDR. In his July 19 press conference Ulbricht once again accused members of the US and British Mission of spying on military objectives in the GDR, and he produced maps and photographs to "document" his charges. Clear Soviet support for East German pressure tactics had been forthcoming earlier, when, in a July 4,

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<sup>12</sup>For text, see *ibid.*, 113–114.

<sup>13</sup>For text, see *ibid.*, Band 3, 1959, pp. 608–609.

<sup>14</sup>For text, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 707–708.

letter to the British,<sup>15</sup> the commander of the Soviet forces in East Germany asserted that members of the British mission had “carried out activities which . . . could lead to undesirable consequences.” Such remarks had seemed at the time to testify to a Soviet desire to provoke, or, at the very least, a willingness to see a mutual withdrawal of the Military Missions—whether on Soviet or Western initiative. However, after some retaliatory Western obstruction of the Soviet Military Mission in the FRG at the end of July, harassment of the Western Missions was markedly reduced. Evidently the Soviet Union judges the Military Liaison Missions to have enough value—reciprocal or otherwise—for them to remain in operation for some indeterminate period.

One can only speculate on the reasons that might lead Moscow to conclude the Military Liaison Missions ought to be maintained. As regards its own Mission in the FRG, the Soviet Union might well ascribe greater importance to the reports it receives from Frankfurt than Western observers have previously allowed. There are no service attachés at the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, and it is possible that Soviet military authorities regard the professionally-trained men attached to their Frankfurt Mission as a necessary substitute. Reliable sources of information on military happenings in the FRG which seem quite abundant to the West may seem less so to the USSR.

As regards the Western Military Missions in East Germany, there are several considerations which might impel Moscow either to desire their continuing operation or, at least, to acquiesce in it. First of all, the Missions can fulfill a limited but useful liaison function from Moscow’s point of view by providing an official channel of communication between the USSR and the Allies below the diplomatic level. The existence of such a channel enables the USSR, when it desires to do so, to deflate incidents which could potentially heighten tension. When Moscow chose not to exploit the forced landing of a US C-47 transport in East Germany last May for enhancing East German claims to sovereignty, it used the Missions to settle the affair. The USSR may estimate that the personnel of the Western Missions fulfill relatively harmless reconnaissance functions in view of their circumscribed movements in East Germany and the surveillance to which they are subject. Moscow, and the GDR, may consider the maintenance of the Missions worthwhile for their scapegoat value; it is quite possible that the East Germans overestimate the impact of their propaganda—exemplified by Ulbricht’s July 19 press conference—designed to paint the Missions as nothing but the vanguard of a revenge-minded Bundeswehr thirsting to invade the GDR. Finally, it may be that the USSR regards its or the GDR’s treatment

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<sup>15</sup>Not found.

of the Missions in general as a means of probing for and determining Allied willingness to defend Western rights in Berlin. Although the establishment of Military Liaison Missions in East and West Germany did *not* stem from the same complex of agreements that set up Four-Power rule in Germany and Berlin, Moscow may nevertheless judge Allied reaction to obstruction of the Western Missions as a useful general indicator of Allied attitudes regarding Berlin. Whichever of these, or other factors have thus far had a decisive effect on Soviet thinking as regards the Military Liaison Missions, the central fact seems clear: the USSR does want the Missions to continue functioning, at least for the present.

### *Conclusions*

The welter of recent Soviet and East German public and private assertions and intimations regarding the Bundestag, Berlin, and a separate GDR peace treaty permits general conclusions to be drawn regarding Moscow's future policy toward Berlin. East German reports of a possible GDR coup de main planned against West Berlin probably reflect one extreme of the discussions concerning the broad spectrum of possible Soviet bloc actions on Berlin and Germany. Within the SED the circulation of reports on the imminent incorporation of West Berlin into the GDR is undoubtedly designed to combat the strong initial disappointment caused by the relative mildness of Khrushchev's post-summit statement of May 20 on Berlin,<sup>16</sup> and to maintain the confidence of the party faithful. Such reports, which SED leaders probably assume find their way to the West, also serve the useful, if marginal function of keeping up a psychological war of nerves against the West in general, and West Berlin's leadership and populace in particular.

The weight of the evidence, however, still points to a Soviet desire to engage the West in another round of negotiations on Berlin and Germany. It is to this end that the threat of a separate GDR–bloc peace treaty is directed—to maintain pressure on the Berlin issue preparatory to renewed negotiations, to break down the ties between West Berlin and the FRG, and to exploit the delicate Allied-FRG–West Berlin relationship. The threat, however, retains its maximum value only as long as it is both credible and unfulfilled. Moscow would therefore probably prefer to enter renewed negotiations without having expended the threat, in order to retain the bargaining maneuverability that the unspent threat gives it. Ulbricht's significant assertion, cited above, that "certain aggressive circles in Bonn and West Berlin . . . are striving to accelerate the conclusion of a [separate] peace treaty" would seem to testify to high-level bloc recognition of this facet of the peace treaty threat.

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<sup>16</sup>See Document 192.



It would also appear that at present neither of two principal conditions exists which might impel the USSR to fulfill its separate treaty threat: Moscow has evidently not written off the possibility of holding negotiations on Berlin with the new American administration; and Moscow apparently judges that it cannot face with impunity possible Western reaction to Soviet unilateral action on Berlin. (In a July 7 conversation with a high American legislative official, Soviet Ambassador Menshikov indicated continuing Soviet interest in further negotiations on Berlin and sought for some US reassurance on that score.)<sup>17</sup>

If, then, Moscow anticipates at present the holding of future negotiations on Berlin—and Khrushchev indicated as much in his letter to Macmillan—it cannot realistically expect such negotiations to take place much before the spring or summer of 1961. This period may be very desirable for negotiations from the Soviet point of view, but, whether it is or not, the Soviet Union faces the task of adjusting its Berlin policy to exploit the pre-negotiating period as usefully as possible to further Soviet goals. The gamut of actions open to Moscow in this interim period is a broad one, but there would appear to be three main categories of probable activity: the patience-exhausting, the tension-raising, and the rocket-rattling.

On the patience-exhausting tack, Moscow would seek to demonstrate its reasonableness in exploring the paths to an “agreed solution” of the Berlin problem, without, however, weakening the essentials of its former position. The goal, of course, would be to build up a case of supposed Soviet flexibility and Western intransigence on Berlin. The advancement of new proposals and the refurbishment of old ones would be the principal Soviet method of exhibiting “patience.” To achieve this end, Moscow could publicize—with appropriate fanfare—the still-secret provisions of the USSR’s May 9 proposal for an interim agreement on Berlin. By emphasizing the concessionary elements of the plan—lengthening the period of the interim agreement from 18 to 24 months, dropping the link between an interim arrangement and the establishment of an all-German committee—the USSR would seek to establish its readiness to “compromise” differences with the West over Berlin.

On the tension-raising tack, the possibility for Soviet, but more likely East German, action designed to show that West Berlin is a “time bomb” are extremely broad. The goal would be to show covert West Berlin involvement in the “war plans” of the FRG, and hence NATO. Since the GDR has not yet buttressed its claim that the Bundeswehr recruits West Berliners by producing a West Berlin defector who claims to have been drafted into the Bundeswehr from West Berlin, it could seek

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<sup>17</sup>A memorandum of Menshikov’s conversation with Senator John Sherman Cooper on July 7 is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/7-760.

“documentary evidence” of its charge. A demonstrative raid on a Federal office in West Berlin that supplies informational data on the Bundeswehr might garner enough material for presentation at an international press conference. Access incidents would also be provoked, stemming from an alleged GDR desire to prevent FRG war plans from being hatched in West Berlin: a “Bundeswehr-enlistee” could be removed from a train bearing him to West Germany, and such action could serve as a pretext for impeding civilian traffic between the FRG and West Berlin. “War matériel” has already been discovered and held up in transit between the FRG and West Berlin; such a “discovery” could be used in the future to justify a slowing down or even temporary stoppage of goods moving over the Berlin access routes.

Future intensified Soviet moves on the patience-exhausting and tension-raising tacks would represent a change in degree rather than kind, for similar tactics were pursued by the USSR in the periods of March–May 1959 and December 1959–May 1960, which preceded negotiations on Berlin. A new and dangerous element would enter into future Soviet-Berlin tactics, however, if Moscow were to calculate that the advance of Soviet missile capabilities—combined with demonstrative evidence thereof—could be translated into direct political leverage against the Allied position in West Berlin. The Gromyko memorandum, crudely alluding to the East-West power balance and boasting of Soviet missile strength, could well be a harbinger of future Soviet efforts to bring an implied threat of nuclear holocaust to bear on any settlement of the Berlin problem. In this connection, it may be noted that Soviet leaders have become increasingly categorical in claiming that the USSR is now the world’s most powerful country militarily. Mikoyan asserted in Oslo on June 29<sup>18</sup> that the Soviet Union has a “vast” superiority over the West in the means of delivering nuclear weapons, and Khrushchev referred to an “indubitable” Soviet superiority in this field in a speech in Vienna on July 7.<sup>19</sup> Soviet delegate Zorin made similar claims during the Geneva disarmament talks. The ways in which the USSR could seek to flaunt its missile capacities are varied, but broadly speaking would seem to separate into private and/or public demonstrations. In view of frequent Soviet statements referring to Western “prestige” involvement in Berlin, private and unpublicized showings of Soviet missile capabilities—either to visiting Western military men of appropriately high rank, or to Western service attachés in Moscow—might commend itself to the USSR as the most effective way of making its point.

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<sup>18</sup>Mikoyan visited Norway at the end of June to open a Soviet exhibition at Oslo. For texts of his statements on June 25 and 30, see *Pravda*, June 26 and July 1, 1960. The reference to a June 29 statement has not been further identified.

<sup>19</sup>For text of Khrushchev’s speech at Vienna, see *Pravda*, July 8, 1960, or *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XII, no. 27, pp. 8–10.

208. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 1, 1960, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin Situation

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Secretary of State

Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant

Colonel John Eisenhower

Following a meeting on another subject, the President raised the question of Berlin, with particular respect to the East German threats to curtail civilian traffic.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary described briefly the circumstances noting that there was some conceivable justification for the GDR claiming that by reason of their character the Conventions in question were provocative. The Secretary then described the public statement which the Department had made a day or so ago, pointing out the responsibility for free access rested on the Soviets and not the GDR and also refuting the claim that West Berlin lay on GDR soil.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary assured the President that we were following the situation closely but that so far there had been no interference with our own access. He reminded the President that we have detailed contingency planning to cover developments in a situation like this.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–160. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

<sup>1</sup> On August 29, the German Democratic Republic issued a directive that shut off East Berlin to West German citizens for the duration of convention of former POWs and refugees being held in West Berlin September 1–4. For text of the directive, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 715–716.

<sup>2</sup> For text of this statement, August 30, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 19, 1960, p. 439. For text of the Western Commandants' letter to the Soviet Commandant protesting the directive, August 31, see *ibid.*, pp. 439–440.

## 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, September 2, 1960, 7 p.m.

357. While it may be true, as most intelligence reports seem to indicate, that Soviet zone authorities were motivated primarily by need to check refugee flow in imposing Berlin access restrictions, I regard it as significant that they are acting as if separate treaty were already in effect and Soviets had in fact turned over access controls to them. It seems to me that even if restrictions lifted September 4, as is probable, we must expect reimposition of controls, perhaps even more far-reaching, if they are led to conclude our reactions will be confined to protests. While it may be as yet early to put forward full blueprint of actions which might be taken, I would urge that we at least prepare groundwork at this stage for whatever course may recommend itself, depending upon further developments.

To this end, I today requested tripartite meeting to consider drafting of public statement by Western Powers re past interferences with access, coupled with clear statement our legal position (as suggested by Brandt in my conversation with him on August 25, and also referred to in Berlin's 120 to Dept),<sup>1</sup> which might be submitted to govts for possible use. In spite of some British reluctance, tripartite drafting is now under way, and I hope agreed text can be completed today for Dept's consideration.<sup>2</sup>

I believe also that FedRep should be asked to make statement indicating connection between interzonal trade and free access, as also suggested Berlin's 120.

To sum up, I feel we must regard issue as most serious challenge since blockade to Berlin access, and that we must now begin to build up case before world opinion for what I fear will be real test of strength re status of Berlin.

**Dowling**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–260. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> No record of Dowling's conversation with Brandt has been found. Telegram 120 from Berlin, September 2, reported that the West Berlin press was speculating on whether the Western Powers would take further steps in reaction to the closing of East Berlin. (*Ibid.*, 662A.62B/9–160)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 361 from Bonn, September 2, the Embassy transmitted the text of an agreed tripartite paper refuting the arguments made by the German Democratic Republic in closing the border. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/9–260) On September 3, the Department of State approved its release. (Telegram 425 to Bonn; *ibid.*, 762.00/9–360) For text of the statement, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 716–717.

**210. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, September 9, 1960.

SUBJECT

Possible Discussion of Germany and Berlin at Forthcoming Session of United Nations General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe  
Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy  
The Secretary  
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER

Ambassador Grewe began by noting that the events of the past week gave heightened substantive importance to the discussion between Foreign Minister von Brentano and the Secretary scheduled to take place on September 18. He went on to say that his Government was seriously concerned about recent Berlin developments. Most of the harassments so far have not been very large in themselves, but they were creating anxiety and might be the beginning of new and more dramatic moves by the Soviets starting with Khrushchev's appearance in the UN. Rumors were being spread by the Soviets in Vienna and Moscow indicating that they intended to raise the Berlin question in the GA. The German Government felt that the situation was becoming more dangerous and difficult. It was considering what kind of countermeasures could be contemplated and how to proceed in invoking them.

The Federal Republic was, of course, not represented in the UN, Ambassador Grewe continued. He assumed that there would be tripartite coordination of positions relating to Germany and Berlin. His Government would like to be fully informed and brought into these consultations where appropriate.

The Secretary said that we have had no direct indication that Khrushchev is going to bring up the Berlin problem in the GA. Mr. Kohler added that we have been rather skeptical about reports that the Soviets would do this. We did not envisage that a formal agenda item relating to Berlin would be inscribed. It might be anticipated that they would attack the Federal Republic in speeches for rearming and for its militaristic intentions. Instead, we anticipated harassments of the

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-960. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand, initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on September 15. A 3-page briefing memorandum for this meeting, dated September 8 and drafted by Kohler, is *ibid.*, 611.62A/9-860.

present kind, perhaps building up to a climax sometime after the US elections. These would be aimed essentially at German civilian access and the ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin, as had been anticipated in the Four Power discussions in Paris in May. The Secretary said that we were a little disturbed by reports that twice as many West Germans were going to the Leipzig Fair this year and that trade relations were proceeding normally.<sup>1</sup> This was an area where the East Germans were sensitive and we hoped that the Federal Republic was giving consideration to possible action. It was somewhat difficult for us when we were being asked to make military threats while the West Germans were carrying on as normal in the economic field.

Ambassador Grewe noted that Mayor Brandt had already appealed to the West Germans to refrain from attending the Leipzig Fair and had criticized the large scale attendance. This was something which only could be effected by moral pressures and not by legal action. As to economic countermeasures, these had been discussed for many years in Bonn between the Federal Republic and the three embassies. The general conclusion reached in the past had been that, as long as there was no total blockade, West Berlin was too much dependent on the interzonal trade arrangements to take action which might result in a self-imposed blockade.

The Secretary suggested that it might be a good idea to have the Four-Power Working Group meet soon in Washington to discuss the developing Berlin situation. It was noted that a Four-Power group in Bonn is already considering harassment of civilian access and economic countermeasures and that it would be better to leave the detailed discussions there. The consensus was that a general exchange of views in the Working Group here would be valuable.

Ambassador Grewe came back to his point about the Federal Republic's desire to have certain contacts established in New York so that the Germans would be fully informed of developments in the UN. He noted that the new German observer there, Ambassador Knappstein, had just come from two years of service in Bonn as Under Secretary of State. Mr. Kohler observed that the US Delegation in New York presumably had good relations with the German observer.

The Secretary said that it was still unclear precisely what Khrushchev had in mind. No request had apparently so far been made for him to speak. Until September 22 the GA would be engaged in organizational matters. Khrushchev was apparently arriving on the 19th.

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<sup>1</sup> Herter expressed similar views to Ambassador Alphan the day before. (Memorandum of conversation, September 8; *ibid.*, 762.00/9-860)

In response to Ambassador Grewe's query as to our thinking about how the West could best react to Khrushchev's appearance, the Secretary indicated this was not yet certain. The President had not made a final decision. If he did appear, however, it would probably be at the very beginning of the session and not in rebuttal of Khrushchev. We were, of course, discouraging attendance at the session of Heads of Governments. There were rumors that Castro, Nasser, Sukarno, and others might appear. These rumors indicated a timing somewhat later in the session. We did not know how long Khrushchev himself would stay. Ambassador Grewe commented that it was difficult to know whether it would be worse for the West to get involved in a debate with Khrushchev or simply to leave the floor to him. The Secretary agreed and noted that the meetings of the GA would bring together a strange conglomeration, with representatives of many of the new African countries coming for the first time. Mr. Kohler observed that, apart from the Satellite representatives, some of the African Heads of Governments had been planning to come to the UN primarily because it would be the first appearance of their countries in the GA.

Ambassador Grewe said that, as far as inclusion of Berlin and Germany on the GA agenda was concerned, his Government had no indication that the Soviets intended inscription. It was more likely that they would launch a broad attack against alleged German militarism and revanchism, make strong appeals on behalf of their peace treaty project, and perhaps give some indication of their future intended action on Berlin. Mr. Kohler commented that we would be surprised if any formal resolution on Berlin were introduced. Ambassador Grewe noted that, in general, the Federal Republic was opposed to any form of internationalization in the UN of the Berlin and peace treaty question. It was better to keep the possibility of an appeal to the UN as a last resort, as contemplated in Western contingency plans. Mr. Kohler added that Article 107 of the UN Charter limited UN competence on the German question.

Ambassador Grewe went on to say that his Government would be very grateful to see some progress on the earlier German request for participation in Allied contingency planning relative to Berlin. Mr. Kohler said that he hoped the Germans were saying the same thing to the British and the French, [1 line of source text not declassified] Ambassador Grewe said the German Ambassadors in Paris and London had received appropriate instructions.

The Secretary said that one happy augury was that it seemed clear that the Berlin the German question would not become a campaign issue in this country.

As to the recent de Gaulle press conference,<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Grewe said he thought it preferable to leave this subject for the Secretary's discussion with Foreign Minister von Brentano. The Secretary noted that a general guidance had been sent to our mission abroad and that we were frankly not very happy with the press conference. Ambassador Grewe commented that the Secretary's remarks of yesterday<sup>3</sup> on the subject would be well received in Bonn.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's query as to whether we had any information about Khrushchev's plan for an African tour, the Secretary said that it was hard to see where such a tour would fit in. Khrushchev had so many other engagements. Mr. Kohler noted that the only firm date we had for him was October 14–16 for North Korea.

Ambassador Grewe said that he would be leaving Washington on September 12 for ten days in Alaska. Hence he would not be here for the von Brentano visit.

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<sup>2</sup> For a transcript of de Gaulle's press conference on September 5, see *Statements*, pp. 84–98.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Herter's address to the United Press International Conference on September 8, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1960, pp. 467–473.

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**211. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)**

Washington, September 14, 1960.

SUBJECT

West German Acquiescence in Economic Sanctions against East Germans

After a considerable amount of initial reluctance, which we have been working for two weeks to overcome, the West Germans now appear to be ready to use interzonal trade as a weapon against the East Germans provided the NATO countries join with them, and provided the British, the French, and ourselves are ready to support Berlin in the event of reprisals.

On August 18, as a part of Berlin Contingency Planning, the US, UK, and French Embassies in Bonn asked the Foreign Office to join with

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–1460. Secret. Drafted by Frank Cash of GPA, concurred in by Hillenbrand, and initialed by Kohler.



them in a study of measures to counter possible harassment of German civilian traffic and communications between Berlin and the Federal Republic. The Germans agreed and made the point which they consider most important, i.e., economic retaliation to be effective must be undertaken not only by the Federal Republic but also by all other NATO countries which have substantial trade relations with East Germany.

The first meeting was held on September 1,<sup>1</sup> and it was decided that the first step would be to determine the vulnerability of the East German economy. The participants agreed to collect information on a series of questions concerning their country's trade with East Germany. The Germans once again insisted that countermeasures would be significant only if all NATO countries participated after the initial quadripartite study was made. We agreed with the latter point but said none of us should disregard the psychological impact of actions which might do no immediate appreciable economic damage, but which would demonstrate the seriousness with which the East German actions are viewed and the readiness to resort to more serious measures even if they also create some problems on our side. We also agreed that we may very well want eventually to get all NATO countries involved but that the Germans, the British, the French, and we must lead the way.

In the quadripartite discussion on September 9,<sup>2</sup> the Germans said the Federal Republic was in principle reluctant to suspend trade as retaliation against travel restrictions alone but implied that they might be ready to do so provided the Western Powers decided this was the appropriate course and themselves joined in the suspension.

In the meantime Federal Republic Economics Minister Erhard has appealed to West German businessmen voluntarily to refrain from trade with East Germany.

Mayor Brandt of Berlin and Minister Erhard have indicated that the Germans will cooperate in any field leading to reasonable countermeasures after detailed consultation with the Western Powers. They believe that interruption of interzonal trade might lead to reprisals, such as cutting off supplies to Berlin, which would involve US-UK-French responsibilities toward Berlin. They indicated that if the Three Powers could accept such risks, the Germans were prepared to use interzonal trade as a weapon.

Another meeting is being held in Bonn on this subject tomorrow.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A report on this meeting was transmitted in airgram G-236 from Bonn, September 10. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/9-1060)

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> On September 20, White sent a memorandum to Dillon updating this situation since September 14 and briefly describing the quadripartite meeting on September 15 and a meeting between Erhard and the Western Ambassadors at Bonn to discuss countermeasures. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2060)

## 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bonn

Washington, September 15, 1960, 8:39 p.m.

499. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Following are highlights meeting Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin held today at Germans' request to discuss possibility Soviets may raise aspects German question in UNGA.<sup>1</sup>

There was general agreement Soviets would do so, most probably by attacking alleged Federal Republic militarism or nonacceptance Oder–Neisse line as threat to peace or in conjunction with disarmament proposals along lines of Ulbricht's (Berlin's 160).<sup>2</sup>

US (Kohler, chairman) referred draft declaration circulated by Germans in NATO (Polto 347)<sup>3</sup> and said we thought it fine legal defensive statement which country like Norway might make effectively but which it better not make on behalf of NATO as organization. Suggested NATO discussion could be useful primarily in effecting division of labor for rebuttal Soviet charges.

Germans (Krapf) suggested Working Group develop list of points Soviets might raise re Germany and be sure Western Powers prepared discuss each of them. Thought list should include disarmament proposals of Rapacki type, West Berlin free city with possible UN guarantee, alleged militarism and revanchism of Federal Republic, Oder–Neisse line, and peace treaty. Thought Soviets might attempt build "peace front" sentiment for peace treaty among delegations of newer nations.

Kohler said would be worth considering whether, in addition to "basket item" re Soviet actions threatening peace (including actions in Germany), possibility of Western initiative in inscribing item re Germany on UNGA agenda. Explained overwhelming UN support for 1951 resolution<sup>4</sup> re investigation to determine whether existing conditions made it possible hold free elections in Germany and Soviet opposition thereto plus Afro-Asian espousal of principle of self-determination

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–1560. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Davis and Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated priority to Paris, London, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of the conversation at the meeting is *ibid.*, 320/9–1950.

<sup>2</sup> Dated September 9, telegram 160 from Berlin transmitted a summary of a declaration on disarmament made by Ulbricht on September 8. For text of the declaration, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, pp. 234–239.

<sup>3</sup> Polto 347 transmitted the text of a draft declaration of NATO powers supporting the Federal Republic of Germany against the attacks of the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 762A.5612/9–1360)

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, pp. 1824–1825.

which is cornerstone of Western position re Germany indicated there was room for very positive initiative.

Krapf's reaction favorable. French (Winckler) alluded to dangers Three Powers might lose control of German and Berlin questions to UN. No reaction from British (Thompson). Agreed governments' views would be sought for further discussion early next week.

After discussion of recent Soviet-East German "salami" tactics against Allied position in Berlin and Berlin-Federal Republic ties, Kohler stressed importance of immediate and vigorous countermeasures. Said it essential make clear to Soviets that US not weakened by impending elections and change of administration and only our backing up verbal protests and statements with concrete measures, for example in economic and travel fields, likely dissuade Soviets from generating serious crisis. Krapf expressed concern interference with interzonal trade could jeopardize much more important Berlin trade. Kohler replied this was risk we must face up to. Thompson said British view value of countermeasures as psychological and, as long as measures taken, do not believe measures need be very severe.

Dillon

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### 213. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 18, 1960, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

German and Berlin Problems and Forthcoming United Nations Session

PARTICIPANTS

German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano  
German Ministerial Director Hasse von Etzdorf  
German Observer to the United Nations, Ambassador Knapstein  
Mr. Franz Krapf, Minister, German Embassy  
Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1860. Secret. Drafted by Hiltenbrand and approved in S on September 30. The conversation took place at the Secretary's residence. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 524 to Bonn, September 19. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/9–1960)

The Secretary  
Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler—EUR  
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen—S/B  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

Foreign Minister von Brentano began by stressing the nature of the present Communist actions against Berlin which were calculated through step-by-step harassment to prepare for the eventual loss of the city without ever precipitating a show-down with the Western Powers on a clear issue understandable to public opinion. Hence, the Western Powers must be resolved from the outset to react vigorously and unitedly. The Four-Power status of the city had been clearly violated by certain of the actions already taken by the GDR. It was necessary that all the Western Powers concert on the countermeasures they would take. Hence it was necessary to bring the Federal Republic into contingency planning, which could no longer be confined to the purely military area.

The Secretary said he was in complete agreement with von Brentano's analysis. Apart from the nibbling actions taken, an important feature was the legal claim of the GDR that it had a right to perform these actions. He agreed that the Western Powers should react now. Discussions were presently going on in Bonn with a view to designating feasible countermeasures which would hurt the East Germans more than the people of Berlin. Mr. Kohler noted that the last report we had received from Bonn was rather encouraging and that the Germans were studying the possibilities item by item.

Stating that he was speaking with the knowledge of the Chancellor on this subject, von Brentano emphasized that the Federal Republic was prepared to take any action in the interzonal trade field which had the full support and cooperation of its Western Allies. Trade with the GDR was not of significant commercial importance to the Federal Republic, but the West must anticipate that in reaction to countermeasures in the trade field the GDR might intensify its actions against Berlin, possibly to the point of breaking off the flow of goods from the West to the City. While Berlin could easily absorb the loss of direct imports from the GDR (principally brown coal), the stoppage of traffic to and from the Federal Republic would bring about the economic collapse of the city.

The Secretary noted that Mr. Bohlen, who had been involved in Allied planning in the 1948–49 period, believed that an important factor in bringing about the 1949 agreement with the Soviets was the imposition of economic sanctions by the Federal Republic. Von Brentano commented that the situation was now different than in 1948 when the standard of living in Berlin had been very low and could be maintained through an airlift. In view of Berlin's current highly developed economic activity, it was the most heavily industrialized city in all of

Germany. An airlift was now no solution. The question, therefore, had to be asked whether the Allies would be willing under such circumstances to reopen access to Berlin by force, if necessary. The Secretary stated that this obviously was the primary question: that is, at what stage the East would have cut communications to Berlin and West Germany to an extent justifying the risk of going to war. Von Brentano reiterated that this was indeed a grave and difficult question. However, the Soviets had become more refined than in the past. It might be expected that they would work through organs of the GDR, starting with mere tricks and petty harassments of the kind recently experienced. Each instance would not be spectacular in itself and gradually a whole mosaic would be built up out of individual stones. Therefore, he had to repeat, it was essential that the West not wait until fifty per cent of these measures had been carried out but to react strongly and in common now. All of the NATO countries were involved because of the NATO guarantee. The Secretary observed that the Allied guarantee on Berlin to which the NATO guarantee was linked was directed towards an attack on the forces of the Occupying Powers or on the city itself, which would be regarded as equivalent to such an attack. He asked how much of the industrial life of West Berlin could be kept alive if the canals and railway lines were closed and only the roads were left open. Von Brentano said that he could not say precisely without having the matter studied, but he believed that if the roads were open, though it would cause inconvenience, the basic life of the city could be maintained. The Secretary said that he had asked this question since both the railway lines and canals were completely under GDR control. It was pointed out that the East Germans likewise control all German road traffic at the present time.

The Secretary said that one of the subjects discussed earlier today with the British<sup>1</sup> had been the possibility of a resolution in the UNGA on Germany and possibly Berlin starting with a reaffirmation of the 1951 UNGA resolution<sup>2</sup> establishing a commission to investigate whether conditions for free elections existed in all parts of Germany. Von Brentano commented that it was likely the Soviets would raise the German and Berlin questions in the UN. A resolution of the type mentioned by the Secretary would be good, but the West must avoid having the Berlin question through UNGA discussion become a matter within UN jurisdiction. With the limited understanding of many countries for complexities of the problem, the tendency would be to seek a compromise solution which would be tantamount to a Soviet victory. If this danger could be avoided, von Brentano was in favor of an initiative in the UN.

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<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, 762.00/9–1860.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1824–1825.

In fact, he thought it desirable that in his speech the President should take the offensive on the German and Berlin questions. The Secretary noted that it would be difficult for the GA to turn such a resolution down since most countries would be reluctant to go back on their 1951 vote.

Apart from their current piecemeal tactics regarding Berlin, von Brentano said the Soviets might also simply go ahead and sign a peace treaty with the GDR and thereafter deny that they had any further competence or interest in the Berlin question. The Western Powers should therefore push ahead rapidly with their planning for this contingency (reference apparently was to the German paper on this subject which currently is being considered in Washington by the Four-Power Working Group on Germany, including Berlin).<sup>3</sup>

The Secretary noted that at Geneva the Soviets had never directly challenged the Western Powers in their assertion of Soviet responsibility for civilian access rights under the terms of the 1949 agreements.<sup>4</sup> Von Brentano conceded that this was correct but pointed out that they did repeatedly say that a separate peace treaty with the GDR would end their responsibility for Berlin and that the GDR could then do what it wanted. The Secretary noted that we, in turn, had made clear that we would not recognize any unilateral action of this kind. Mr. Kohler observed that this brought us back to the legal question. The recent reply of the Soviet Commandant General Zakharov<sup>5</sup> had said this was no business of the Soviets. This was what the Soviets claimed a peace treaty would result in. Therefore, we agreed that vigorous action was required now.

After pointing out that contingency planning should cover both individual measures of this kind now being taken against the Western position in Berlin as well as the more ultimate actions connected with a formal peace treaty, von Brentano emphasized the desirability, both for practical and psychological reasons, of bringing the Federal Republic into both the military and civilian phases of Western contingency planning. He said he was aware that, for reasons unknown to him, the British and the French had opposed this full participation, and he had instructed the German Ambassadors in London and in Paris to make another strong approach on the subject.

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<sup>3</sup> A copy of this 6-page paper, submitted to the Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin on July 26, is attached to a memorandum of conversation, July 26; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2660.

<sup>4</sup> For texts of the May 4 and June 20, 1949, agreements on Berlin, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 751 and 1062–1065.

<sup>5</sup> For text of this letter, dated September 13, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, p. 268.

In response to von Brentano's query as to what might be anticipated in the UN in the near future, the Secretary pointed out that we had only assumptions as to what Khrushchev was going to do in the UN GA, whether he would be aggressive or conciliatory. UN procedures created other difficulties such as the absence of free give-and-take debate and possibly long gaps between a speech and an opportunity for rebuttal. This might necessitate the use of press statements to achieve more rapid response. When we knew more regarding the order of the speakers as well as Soviet tactics, we could judge more clearly what our best tactics would be.

Von Brentano reiterated his belief that the President should not omit reference to the Berlin situation as a Soviet-created danger to peace rather than leaving the initiative to the Soviets in raising the question. The Secretary said we would think about it.

After a discussion of the German initiative in the North Atlantic Council,<sup>6</sup> von Brentano agreed that it would be preferable to have one NATO member country speak for itself, with subsequent NATO country representatives confirming and expanding on such a statement rather than having the statement made on behalf of NATO as a whole. He recognized the disadvantage of NATO acting as a bloc within the UN framework.

The consensus also was that the recent three-point GDR "disarmament" proposals<sup>7</sup> would probably turn up in one form or other under Soviet sponsorship.

It was agreed that the Federal Republic Observer to the UN, Ambassador Knappstein, who was present at the discussion, would keep in close touch with the American Delegation. The idea was welcomed which he said had been suggested by Ambassador Wadsworth that, should Khrushchev make the expected violent attack on the Federal Republic, he (Knappstein) should be prepared to give an immediate press conference in rebuttal.

Coming back to the Berlin situation, the Secretary asked whether von Brentano felt that East Germany's desire to maintain trade relations with Berlin would play any role. Von Brentano said that, in his opinion, the GDR would be prepared to break off such relations to achieve the objective of creating a crisis over Berlin. With respect to any economic countermeasures which the West might take, he continued, it was essential to make them efficacious so that the GDR should be denied other

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 212 and footnote 3 thereto.

<sup>7</sup> For text of the East German memorandum on disarmament, transmitted to the United Nations on September 15, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, pp. 270–273.

sources or supply. The cooperation of NATO countries would have to be solicited; an embargo could only be efficacious if it were total.

During a discussion of the recent heightened refugee flow from East Germany through Berlin, von Brentano noted that it was interesting to see how, in the figures for recent weeks, the number of intelligentsia and young people had increased. In response to the Secretary's query, he said there was no absorption problem in the Federal Republic and that all who wanted jobs could get them. He noted that the number of returnees to the GDR was in the neighborhood of one for every eight refugees to the West. However, no precise figures were available.

Reverting back to the UN, von Brentano asked what chance there would be during the UNGA discussion to emphasize the principle of self-determination for Germans in view of French sensitivities on this score because of the Algerian problem. The Secretary said we believed we should stress this principle. Since we and de Gaulle have talked about its applicability to Algeria, the French could not object too much. This was an important theme and he hoped that the President would say something on it. Von Brentano noted that it is a subject which irritates the Soviets. The former terminology used by the West in connection with the reunification issue was more agreeable to the Soviets than stress on self-determination. This had great appeal to the uncommitted world. He felt this, for example, during his visit last February to India. Ambassador Knappstein referred to a 1949 Soviet note to the Yugoslavs in which the enemies of self-determination were described as "absolutely imperialistic".<sup>8</sup> The Germans promised to provide this quotation for possible use at the UN.

On the subject of the recent de Gaulle press conference statement regarding NATO,<sup>9</sup> Foreign Minister von Brentano and the Secretary agreed that it was most unfortunate and that military integration in NATO at the command level was more essential than ever under modern conditions. The Secretary noted that we hoped to have some proposals to make soon on the next ten years in NATO so that there would be time for their consideration before the Ministerial meeting in December.

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<sup>8</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 2, Document 210.



**214. Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, September 21, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–4.]

5. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Berlin.]

Mr. Dulles said he would next report on the situation with respect to Berlin. In his desire to focus world attention on Berlin, Khrushchev was permitting the East Germans to undertake a new campaign designed to increase tensions over Berlin. The East Germans had imposed restrictions on the travel of West Germans to East Berlin. However, these restrictions had not affected commuters living in one part of Berlin and working in another. The East German restrictions appeared to be a step in the direction of incorporating East Berlin into East Germany by asserting that East German laws are applicable to East Berlin and by giving the East Berlin boundary the character of a frontier. One element in the situation is the desire of the Ulbricht regime to demonstrate the "sovereignty" of East Germany. By concentrating measures against the West Germans, the Communists probably consider themselves on safer grounds than they would occupy if they applied their restrictions to the allies. The East Germans may also attempt to impose restriction on the travel of West Germans to West Berlin. The Soviet commander has supported the East German position and has warned the Western Powers. Mr. Dulles said the USSR may be considering steps to bring the East Germans into flight clearance procedures applying to planes flying the corridors to Berlin, so that civil airlines would be compelled to operate without Soviet flight safety guarantees or else cease flights into Berlin. The USSR is taking the position that the corridors to Berlin have been established solely for the purpose of permitting the Western Allies to resupply their forces in Berlin. Civil planes flying in the corridors have recently been buzzed by Soviet jet fighters, one of which scored a near miss on a U.K. plane. Apparently, the Communists are trying to make the route too dangerous for civilian pilots to fly. Bonn is considering countermeasures but Adenauer is anxious to avoid any rash measures and is attempting to quiet Willy Brandt.

The President said he had many times discussed with Adenauer the question of what should be done in the event the East Germans,

supported by the USSR, undertook to impose every kind of impediment on our movement to and from Berlin. He had been unable to secure a satisfactory answer from Adenauer. Adenauer and De Gaulle also had said we must maintain our "juridical position" in Berlin. Neither De Gaulle nor Adenauer will face up to the question of what we should do in the face of possible East German impediments. In fact, the President was not sure that the U.S. Government had completely faced up to the situation.

Mr. Dulles said that if shipments into Berlin were delayed, Berlin's economy would be rendered completely untenable. The President said that the Soviets could seriously embarrass us by taking various measures which did not violate the Potsdam Agreement.

Mr. Gray said he understood inter-Allied talks in a low key on the subject of trade retaliation were in progress and that these talks had revealed a reluctance on the part of the West Germans to take any action. Mr. Dillon said that until recently the West Germans were unwilling to take action. They had taken the position that the Allies could act without them. We had taken the position that the key to the situation lay in action by West Germany, which had now agreed to go along in any action the NATO powers might take in the economic field. Secretary Dillon felt joint action by the NATO powers and West Germans made good sense. The West Germans believe that the greatest damage to East Germany can be done by concentrating on commodities which are in short supply in East Germany. A technical group in Bonn is now starting a study of these items. In the first meeting of the group, it was apparent that the West Germans had done considerable advance work on this subject and had developed concrete ideas. In any case the ground for action was now being prepared. It was not known how far the U.K. and France would be willing to go but Mr. Dillon felt these countries were prepared to collaborate.

The President said the weakness of our position with respect to Berlin was a geographical one. The East German hinterland supported the East German position in Berlin but our support was still 100 miles away down a narrow corridor. Secretary Dillon said the West German economic actions would be taken against the whole of East Germany. Mr. Dulles reported that West German shipments to East Germany are less than two per cent of West Germany's total exports. These shipments, however, represent over ten per cent of the imports of East Germany and involve items which are of critical importance to East Germany.

[Here follow discussion of unrelated matters and the remaining agenda items.]

**215. Memorandum of Conversation**

SecDel/MC/19

New York, September 21, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF  
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 19–24, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

Mr. Livingston T. Merchant  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler  
Mr. E.T. Long

*France*

M. Charles Lucet  
M. Bruno De Leusse  
M. Claude Winckler

*UK*

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
The Hon. Peter Ramsbotham  
Lord Hood

SUBJECT

Tripartite Meeting—Berlin

*TTD's*

Mr. Merchant advised Mr. Lucet that we had taken advantage of Lord Home's presence in Washington on Sunday to work out with the British an agreed statement on the temporary travel document problem (TTD).<sup>1</sup> It had been our impression that the French had agreed with us on this problem originally.

Mr. Lucet said he had seen the statement and it looked all right to the French.<sup>2</sup> He asked whether it was correct that the TTD procedure would remain in effect until the GDR modified its restrictions on access to West Berlin.

Mr. Kohler said that was correct.

*Other Countermeasures*

Mr. Merchant stated his understanding that the Bonn working group was waiting for the promised Erhard memorandum on economic countermeasures before getting into this problem seriously.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1766. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Long and approved in M on September 23. This meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of the conversation with Home on September 18 is *ibid.*, Central Files, 762.00/9–1860.

<sup>2</sup> The statement has not been further identified.

Mr. Lucet said this was a difficult issue, not only in view of internal German trade, but because to be effective economic countermeasures could not be applied on a tripartite basis or even on a NATO basis, but would have to be done by all Free World countries.

Mr. Merchant said we recognized the difficulties in enforcing economic countermeasures, but we feel very strongly on this issue. Last month's events, when the GDR took restrictive actions, something we had feared for a long time, had emphasized to us the necessity for taking an effective counteraction against the GDR, taking an action that would hurt them. In the absence of effective counteraction, we are going to be faced with continuing and increasing restrictions, a nibbling away of our position. We admit that the Federal Republic has the greatest economic leverage and that they have to take the original action. We must be prepared to support them, not only on a tripartite basis, but on a NATO and COCOM basis. We also admit that this is a delicately balanced choice, but we have to take risks in this instance.

Mr. Kohler stated that, while the first two moves taken by the GDR were not in themselves substantially important, they would become a legal basis for succeeding and more damaging moves. It was like the argument on the problem of stamping travel documents where we had agreed that the decisive moment was the very first step of placing the GDR stamp on the document. This was the act which would set in train our whole series of countermeasures.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said the British would be glad to study the issue, but that the real problem was that of timing, i.e., when you first take action. He pointed out that restricting steel exports would hurt the GDR.

Mr. Lucet observed that we must not make the crisis more acute just to prove we are resolute.

There ensued a give-and-take discussion of German participation in contingency planning, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in the up-to-now tripartite working group in Washington [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

The British appeared to have the idea that German participation in contingency planning would mean the reopening of the tripartitely agreed plans.

Mr. Kohler stated this was not the intention at all, that the Germans have agreed with the planning to date. It was not our intention to reopen the old plans at all.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said the British would take a new look at this problem and appeared favorable to German participation.

At the close of the meeting Mr. Kohler distributed to the French and British the draft of the possible Berlin resolution to be submitted to the United Nations.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The draft under reference has not been identified. At a similar meeting on September 22 at 10:30 a.m., Kohler distributed a revised resolution. A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting (SecDel/MC/26) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1766. A third draft resolution was transmitted to USUN in telegram 479, September 22 at 8:39 p.m. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 320/9–2260)

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## 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, September 21, 1960, 6 p.m.

442. Paris for Embassy and USRO. I have read with great interest Department's 410 to Bonn of September 2 and subsequent exchanges.<sup>1</sup>

I should like to summarize my own views on effect of Soviet offensive since abortive summit meeting on German attitudes and expectations, and to suggest what might be result of an indefinite prolongation of unrelieved Soviet pressures on Berlin and Federal Republic, accompanied by continued inability by West to hold out to the Germans some prospect other than that of being a perpetual punching bag for the Soviet Union.

Since November 1958, Soviets have been exerting constant pressure of one kind or another on this country while proclaiming their desire for peaceful solution to German problem. Macmillan visit to Moscow in March 1959, followed by Geneva conferences that year, created doubts and forebodings in minds of chancellor and of others (including Willy Brandt) which have never been entirely dispelled, and which, in my judgment, will be rekindled unless West finds means within next few months to assume a more vigorous, confident and united posture than it is now displaying. Continuation of Soviet attacks against Adenauer personally, and repetition of stereotyped accusations that Federal Republic

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.00/9–2160. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 410 to Bonn transmitted the texts of telegrams 568 and 575 from Moscow, August 26 and 27. (*Ibid.*, 661.00/8–2760) Copies of the two cables, which analyzed the future of Soviet foreign policy and proposed steps which might be taken to preclude various Soviet gambits are *ibid.*, 661.00/8–2660 and 661.00/8–2760.

is basically motivated by aggressive and revanchist aims has now succeeded in gaining some credence in forum of world opinion, or so it seems to many responsible Germans. At any rate, lack of a correspondingly vigorous and effective reaction by West to such charges, and signs of disunity within the Western Alliance, are gradually creating a fear that Federal Republic and Berlin can expect little else than indefinite continuation of Soviet pressures, without prospect that West will mobilize its resources in such way as to induce Soviet Union desist. Rightly or wrongly, many Germans tend, as does Chancellor, to question degree of determination and solidarity, apart from public exhortation, which their Western Allies (in particular the UK and more recently France) are willing to display, when for example it comes to sharing the sacrifices which a resolute position, including among other things imposition of economic countermeasures, would involve.

When I returned to Germany at end of last year after absence of nearly four years, I was struck not only by its increased economic strength and greater political maturity, but by growing sense of national purpose and by an intention to accept more responsibility and play a more active role as equal participant within Western Alliance. This attitude I considered, generally speaking, to be healthy one, and I have in the past reported my views in this sense to the Department on several occasions. It may sometimes be argued that in certain specific cases Germans should be doing more, standing more on own feet; but it must be remembered they are still not used to being expected to show initiative, and that process of adjustment to the role they should play is not entirely easy for them. Specifically in field of countermeasures re Berlin, Germans are prepared to follow West but tend to show reluctance to take initiatives themselves, though there is improvement in this respect.

However, this asset to the West of growing German confidence is predicated on maintenance of conviction by Federal Republic that the long-term unity of West is (apart from minor ups and downs) unquestionable, and that West has collective sense of purpose and resolution sufficient in the end to discourage pressures directed against any one of its members. In other words, a robust attitude of Federal Republic within the Alliance is not, in my opinion, an absolute asset which the West can count upon indefinitely, or independently of the West's own political strength and unity. I fear that we are at this moment experiencing a decline in German confidence that the West is willing to make effort required by German problem. I do not wish to overdramatize this tendency or to have this construed as meaning that Germany has suddenly decided it is being abandoned by its allies; but at this stage, I think it fair to say there are few Germans who see any light at end of tunnel in terms of difficulties which we and they are now facing. This state of mind is in my judgment likely to be particularly acute and particularly

dangerous with regard to Berlin, for reasons which are obvious. While opinion in Berlin, and with regard to Berlin, is outwardly firm and unyielding, there is, practically speaking, no margin between sustained confidence and possibly catastrophic discouragement. Question therefore arises as to how long sustained confidence can endure under present Soviet pressures (which are likely to increase) unless, Western Alliance as a whole can find a way to inspire once again conviction that it is not prepared to accept passively progressive encroachment by the Soviet Union.

Dowling

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### 217. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, September 22, 1960, 5 p.m.

207. For the Secretary from Dowling. Mytel 205 from Berlin.<sup>1</sup> I hope most serious consideration will be given to possibility of the President visiting Berlin for Freedom Bell anniversary. I am aware of the complexities and difficulties involved, and I can appreciate arguments against it, but at same time I am conscious of need for some further and perhaps even dramatic action on our part to offset present danger of erosion of Allied position in Berlin, and I can think of nothing else we in West could do which would so well demonstrate our determination to live up to our commitments and also bring home to Soviets and East Germans how dangerous it would be to pursue course which they now seem bent on pursuing. It seems to be also that in circumstances there would be no need for the President to make other stops, and indeed I think visit would be especially effective if he came only to Berlin (and in response to invitation from Berlin in Senat rather than FedRep). Visit would at one and same time give renewed courage to Berliners, instill courage in our Allies, and renew confidence in American leadership.

You know from your own visit here in 1959<sup>2</sup> how tremendous the President's reception would be. And I am confident that favorable re-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/9–2260. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Bonn.

<sup>1</sup> Dated September 22, telegram 205 from Berlin reported that Brandt had sent to the West German Foreign Ministry an invitation for President Eisenhower to visit Berlin. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> See vol. VIII, Document 478.

percussions which would ensue, as regards world opinion as well as German and Berlin response, would extend far beyond boundaries of Berlin problem alone.

I hope you will understand that it is on these grounds that I urge favorable consideration for what in ordinary circumstances might appear unimportant and perhaps even impractical idea.

Lightner

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## 218. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/72

New York, September 23, 1960, 9:55 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Discussion at Dinner Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers—Berlin and Germany

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *US*

The Secretary  
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant  
Mr. Foy D. Kohler  
Mr. Theodore C. Achilles  
Mr. Edward T. Long

#### *UK*

Lord Home  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Mr. Peter Ramsbotham

#### *France*

M. Couve de Murville  
M. Charles Lucet  
Ambassador Alphand  
M. Pierre de Leusse

Mr. Merchant said he would discuss briefly the current developments on the situation in Berlin and Germany. He observed that we now have tripartite agreement on a common action to be taken on temporary travel documents (TTD). This is being worked out in detail in Bonn. The Under Secretaries had discussed the issue of increased German partici-



pation in contingency planning<sup>1</sup> and this was to be discussed in the tripartite ambassadorial forum in Washington. Quadripartite discussions were continuing in Bonn and in Washington tripartite discussions of economic counter-measures were in train.

The Under Secretaries had spent considerable time discussing the U.S. proposal to submit to the General Assembly a so-called “basket” item as a companion piece to the Soviet item accusing the US of aggressive acts. The U.S. “basket” item is designed to deal with the whole range of Soviet provocative actions of recent months. Under the “basket” item the U.S. is considering the submission of a special resolution on Germany and Berlin. At the Under Secretaries’ meetings the U.S. had distributed a draft resolution of this nature.

As a matter of fact, the U.S., in light of Mr. Khrushchev’s provocative speech of today,<sup>2</sup> feels that this “basket” item is clearly desirable but the U.S. is still undecided as to the timing of its submission.

The Secretary said he felt the “basket” item should not be submitted until President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan have left New York. He thought the “basket” item was a good counter-move and we have a considerable number of items for inclusion in the “basket” proposal. Nevertheless, we should not push this too fast. The Russians have started the cold war again and we ought to wait a few days for this fact to sink in.

[Here follows discussion of general U.N. issues.]

Mr. Merchant reverted to the U.S. “basket” item, saying that our submission of this would not prejudice the submission of a resolution on Germany and Berlin.

The French Foreign Minister thought that as things now stood it was better not to submit the Berlin resolution.

The Secretary referred to Mr. Khrushchev’s “curious” remark on the fact that there would be no separate peace treaty with East Germany until a new Summit meeting.

The British Foreign Minister thought we should hold the Berlin resolution in reserve; that we shouldn’t use it unless the time came when it couldn’t be helped.

Mr. Kohler said he wanted to clarify the intent of the resolution on Berlin which was in effect just part of our tactics under the “basket” item. He referred to the 1951 UN resolution on Germany<sup>3</sup> which was

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 212.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Khrushchev’s speech, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 35–38, 71–74, and 715–718.

overwhelmingly passed, and which called for free elections in Germany. It was Soviet defiance of this resolution which caused the partition of Germany. It was in this broader context that we thought resolution on Berlin would be worthwhile.

The Secretary said this was something we would all have to think about.

Parenthetically, the Secretary referred to some joint military exercises in West Germany which were coming up. General Norstad had evidently recently sent a letter to the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S., France and the U.K. asking agreement on a planning exercise which would involve the commitment of a full division to test Soviet intentions with regard to Berlin access. The Secretary understood that the British wanted this done at the battalion level. He himself thought it was up to Norstad to determine the level of this exercise and he does appear to want to do it on a larger scale. This is all in the context of the Berlin problem and should be considered in that light.

[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Hoyer Millar said that then all the U.S. suggested was a dress rehearsal.

The French Foreign Minister said this was a new idea to him, that he was not informed.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said he would ask his Berlin expert, Mr. Killick, to talk with Mr. Kohler about this.

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<sup>3</sup>For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1824–1825.

## 219. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 26, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Germany and Berlin and the Current UNGA Session

### PARTICIPANTS

German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe  
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

Mr. Kohler began by saying that frankly Khrushchev had included somewhat less in his speech on how bad the Germans were than might have been anticipated.<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Grewe noted that the Germans had received information from a Mr. Shapiro (presumably UPI correspondent in Moscow) two days before Khrushchev's speech predicting that the main attacks on Germany would be left to the Satellites beginning with Novotny<sup>2</sup> today to be followed by Gomulka. The possibility was, Grewe continued, that the UN would never officially be seized of the German Berlin problem. There would only be speech-making by satellite representatives. The question was should the West leave it there, responding only by speeches in rebuttal.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that all were agreed there must be some replies by Western representatives during the general debate. We had accepted the line agreed in the North Atlantic Council. This involved an initial statement by one representative, not speaking on behalf of NATO but making reference to the organization, which might be somewhat along the lines of the original German suggestions circulated to the Council.<sup>3</sup> We had had talks with the British and French in New York and had concluded that the three delegations should take the lead in ensuring consultation in New York with all NATO delegations and the German Observer in order to work out a division of labor as to who would say what. Some countries had already talked in the general debate and were not eligible to speak again. It was generally agreed, Mr. Kohler continued, that, during the first phase, the West should avoid taking any action which would distract attention from the theme of Khrushchev's attack on the UN. We had decided in principle to submit an

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2660. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and initialed by Kohler.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, Document 218.

<sup>2</sup> Antonin Novotny, President of Czechoslovakia.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 212 and footnote 3 thereto.

omnibus or basket item, but had not yet decided when the best time for this would be. The Soviet Union has an item attacking the alleged aggressive acts of the United States, and we have thought that they would drag in the subject of Germany under this. We would file a counter-item relating to the actions of the Soviets increasing tensions. This would include, *inter alia*, their harassment of Berlin. Under this item the West could focus on the German Berlin problem, possibly putting forward a resolution on the subject. This would have to be decided in the light of developments. We already had a draft resolution, Mr. Kohler noted. As the situation develops, we will, of course, consult fully with the Federal Republic. Much will depend on the way and the extent to which the subject arises in the Assembly.

Ambassador Grewe said he could understand how it might be desirable at the present time to leave the main issue of Khrushchev's attack on the UN undiluted. He wondered, however, whether it would not be wise for the West to take the initiative on the German and Berlin problem to avoid giving an impression of timidity or bad conscience on the subject. Mr. Kohler observed that our statements on Germany and Berlin in the general debate should be firm and clear, as should also be the actions which we take outside of the UN. He was encouraged by the progress being made in Bonn, for example, in the study of possible countermeasures. The degree of GDR vulnerability to these countermeasures was apparently also somewhat greater than originally thought. He was also encouraged, Mr. Kohler continued, by such things as Norway's coming into NATO on the subject of East German travel and saying it was prepared to take action agreed by the other NATO members. He hoped the Western Powers could move quickly to evidence their firmness.

Grewe said he had been disturbed by the attitude on the part of both the Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic, which seemed to amount to saying what are you going to do about it. Mr. Kohler commented that he would be frank in indicating that we were not satisfied that the Federal Republic was doing all it could. Grewe observed that any action taken must be common action if it is to be really effective. For the Federal Republic to act alone would not suffice; its actions must be backed up by all NATO countries. Mr. Kohler, agreed that Four Power and NATO cooperation would be essential. The British might perhaps stress the difficulties involved, but in the last analysis they could probably be brought around. As to neutrals like the Swedes and the Swiss, we would try to use our influence with them in the trade field to avoid the evasion of any countermeasures that might be invoked. But we were prepared to go ahead with such countermeasures, even if they were only two-thirds effective.

Grewe said he had talked to Dr. Erhard in Washington.<sup>4</sup> His view was that any economic measures taken must be backed by as many Western countries as possible. Every economic measure taken by the Federal Republic within the framework of the interzonal trade agreement would create the danger of provoking the economic strangulation of West Berlin. Such measures might bring on a crisis in a short time. Therefore the West must coordinate its views as to what to do when such a crisis arrived. Dr. Erhard had been discouraged at the lack of unity shown by the three ambassadors in Bonn as to what the West would do under such circumstances. Mr. Kohler said it was preferable to face a crisis now rather than to lose Berlin bit by bit. We hoped we could persuade the British and the French on this point, and had had some useful talks with Lord Home, Hoyer-Millar and Couve which we hoped would have some good effects. In answer to Grewe's query as to where these matters should be further discussed, Mr. Kohler said initially in Bonn, with the Four Powers in Washington reviewing the matter on a quadripartite basis. We had told the British and French, Mr. Kohler continued, that we consider the situation analogous to the stamp issue with respect to personal travel. While the substance of what is happening may not be so important, the legal basis which the GDR is trying to establish is important. They are making an unacceptable assertion of authority.

Mr. Kohler went on to say that the United States had taken a strong line on the issue of TTDs, which had now been substantially accepted by the British and French. Grewe observed that this would be made more effective if we could get the support of as many free countries as possible to avoid such subterfuges as the use of Czech or Polish passports by GDR travelers. Mr. Kohler commented that this was why we were encouraged by the Norwegian initiative. The NATO countries should obviously be brought into all these measures. If NATO agreement could be obtained this would make them effective enough to hurt.

Grewe noted that it would be good if, for example, the Swedes would not permit GDR representatives to remain in Sweden on the basis of Polish or Czech passports.

Grewe said that Chancellor Adenauer, upon his recent return from Italy, had been determined to take firm action. Mr. Kohler observed that common action was desirable, but our trade with the GDR is negligible. What little there is we could stop, but the main possibilities were those of the Federal Republic. Grewe said he had noted a feeling in the United States that German industry was not willing to cut off deliveries under

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<sup>4</sup> Erhard and Grewe also met with Dillon on September 26 and presented the West German view of trade restrictions along lines similar to this. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2660.

the interzonal trade agreement. This was not really the problem. The main deterrent for the Federal Republic was the vulnerability of West Berlin.

Mr. Kohler observed that, despite the current electoral campaign, the United States was united on this question. Both parties and candidates were committed to a firm position.

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## 220. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, September 28, 1960, 5 p.m.

464. Moscow's 840 to Department.<sup>1</sup> Soviet note is strongly worded and suggests Soviets have no intention of exercising moderating influence on East Germans. Final sentence concerning air corridors also has menacing tone. Zakharov's comment to General Osborne (Berlin's 222 to Department)<sup>2</sup> that he could only act re vehicle problems on Autobahn when Soviet soldiers involved but could not if East Germans involved is disclaimer responsibility also having potentially serious complications. In fact, Soviets and East Germans are now acting as if long-threatened separate peace treaty were already in effect.

Feel firm Western reply to Soviets is essential to maintain our view on Soviet responsibility, to warn Soviets against action over use air corridors, and pin responsibility for tension re Berlin squarely on Soviets and East Germans. I am gratified learn from British Embassy that Foreign Office London has already proposed prompt response to Soviet note. British draft reply closely parallels one we drafted for tripartite

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2860. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to London, Berlin, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Dated September 26, telegram 840 from Moscow transmitted a translation of the Soviet note, September 26, denying any responsibility for the actions by the German Democratic Republic in closing the Berlin border which had been protested by the United States in a note of September 12. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/9-2660) For texts of both notes, see *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 719-721.

<sup>2</sup> Dated September 27, telegram 222 from Berlin reported on a meeting of the Western Commandants with Zakharov on September 26 at which they protested against East German harassment of Allied officials including Ambassador Dowling. (Department of State, Central Files, 123-Dowling, Walter C.)

consideration here.<sup>3</sup> Believe British suggestion that prompt coordination take place in one of three allied capitals to get response to Soviets before weekend should be acted upon; Washington or New York seems logical place. In considering draft British reply, believe some mention should also be made of Four Power Agreement May 4, 1949,<sup>4</sup> and Paris decision Council of Ministers June 20, 1949,<sup>5</sup> ensuring normal functioning and use rail, water and road transport to Berlin. Believe further that note should contain final paragraph calling more clearly upon Soviet Government to live up to quadripartite agreements or accept responsibility for consequences. Finally, there is question in my mind whether British draft reply should not be more sharply worded; unless we can convince Soviets we are facing crisis, there will I think, be no hope of convincing them of essential firmness our position.

I recommend strongly that latest threatening Soviet note be used as basis for UNGA statement to action to expose what Soviets actually doing re Berlin and to demonstrate once again, at time when they are proposing new international agreements, their renewed violation solemn international obligations. I also urge that we exert every effort to institute selective trade embargo NATO-wide without delay.

To sum up, I think time has come when we must utilize every means at our disposal to deflect Soviets from present course, and to restore status quo ante. Otherwise, I am convinced we shall shortly be faced with situation in which only choice will be whether to retreat from Berlin or maintain ourselves there by military force.<sup>6</sup>

**Dowling**

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<sup>3</sup> Neither of these drafts has been further identified.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. III, p. 751.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 1062–1065.

<sup>6</sup> Following a month of drafting among the three Western Powers, a reply was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on October 26. For text, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 722–723. Documentation on the drafting of the note is in Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B41/9–3060 and 762.00.

221. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/68

New York, September 29, 1960, 3:25 p.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF  
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 19–29, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

*United Kingdom*

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Max V. Krebs

Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar

SUBJECT

Berlin

Sir Frederick came at the Secretary's request to discuss the situation in Berlin. The Secretary referred at the outset to the messages received from Bonn and the Department that morning<sup>1</sup> concerning the approaches made by the GFR Foreign Office to the United States, United Kingdom and France on denunciation of their Interzonal Trade Agreement with the GDR. Sir Frederick said that the United Kingdom had considered the latest Soviet note<sup>2</sup> quite stiff. A draft reply prepared by the United Kingdom Foreign Office had been received after Lord Home had seen Foreign Minister Gromyko the day before. Sir Frederick permitted the Secretary to read the telegram reporting Lord Home's conversation with Gromyko which he summarized by saying Lord Home had put the Western case very firmly and had concluded from the tone of Gromyko's reply that the Soviets might be willing to engage in further discussion on the access question.

To Sir Frederick's comment that the Foreign Secretary was seriously concerned over the Berlin situation, the Secretary countered that he had been considering the possibility of making a statement in the General Assembly on the Berlin question pointing out the unilateral na-

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1766. Secret. Drafted by Krebs on October 1 and approved in S on October 4. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Astoria.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 465 from Bonn, September 28, reported that the West Germans would denounce the interzonal trade agreement with East Germany on September 30. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 662A.62B41/9–2860) Telegram 586 to Bonn, September 28, gave tentative approval for the denunciation. (*Ibid.*) Presumably these cables were repeated to USUN on the morning of September 29.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Soviet note of September 26, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 721–722.



ture of Soviet actions in this regard and the incompatibility thereof with their protestations of wishing to settle outstanding differences by peaceful negotiation. The speech would also contrast Soviet actions with the many solemn declarations of their intention to live up to international obligations and would review the complete history of the Berlin question showing how the Soviets had repeatedly violated such obligations. Sir Frederick said he had suggested the insertion of something along these lines in Prime Minister Macmillan's United Nations General Assembly speech.<sup>3</sup> However, Mr. Macmillan had been afraid the Soviets would counter by offering to negotiate the matter in the General Assembly which the British feel would not be desirable since the Berlin matter lacks appeal to the Asian and African states. It was agreed that it would be desirable to have a draft prepared for the Secretary to be held in reserve.

Lord Home, Sir Frederick went on, is afraid that an immediate renunciation of the Interzonal Trade Agreement might actually precipitate a crisis. While the British feel it would be a shame to discourage the Germans now that they have reached the point of being ready to take action, they would prefer to hold this kind of reprisal in reserve to counter possible GDR steps in the economic field. The United Kingdom Embassy in Bonn had suggested the GFR might at this time make the legally required announcement of intention to terminate as of December 31 but say they intended to take no practical measures for the time being. Another alternative would be to make no announcement but simply stop or slow down deliveries under the agreement. The Secretary noted that one telegram indicated the GFR was already 25 thousand tons behind in steel deliveries<sup>4</sup> and said he would have no objection to further delay. However, he went on, the real question in his mind is where we draw the line, i.e., what action by the GDR warrants positive steps on our part. He noted that Ambassador Dowling feels strongly that now is the time to act. Sir Frederick said the United Kingdom had agreed to have a study made to see whether economic sanctions would hurt the GDR more than the West and that this study had not yet been completed.

The Secretary went on to say that he would be prepared to agree to immediate denunciation of the Interzonal Trade Agreement, but he had real worries with respect to Mayor Brandt and the Berlin Senat. Neither had, so far as he was aware, been consulted by the GFR and the Secretary felt such consultation was absolutely necessary because of the

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<sup>3</sup>For text of Macmillan's speech to the General Assembly on September 29, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 719–722.

<sup>4</sup>Telegram 465 from Bonn; see footnote 1 above.

possible effect of economic sanctions on Berlin. The Secretary also referred to internal political considerations revolving around the 1961 German Federal Elections. In the final analysis, however, the Secretary said the problem is whether, in acquiescing to restrictions by the Soviets and the GDR, we thereby in effect accept a principle leading to further Soviet and GDR restrictions which could culminate in the complete isolation of Berlin from the free world.

Sir Frederick said that the Prime Minister would be seeing King Hussein at 5:00 and Mr. Khrushchev at 6:00 that evening. Based on the preliminary reactions of members of the Soviet delegation to the Prime Minister's speech the British did not expect much to come of the Macmillan–Khrushchev talk.

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## 222. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates

JCSM–439–60

Washington, September 29, 1960.

### SUBJECT

Berlin Countermeasures

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are disturbed by the patterns of Communist action and Free World response as these have developed during recent weeks in the Berlin situation.

2. Communist action seems to thrust indirectly toward a most vulnerable point, the economic connection of West Berlin with Western Europe. It is doing so with some effectiveness and in a diffuse way, not offering any identifiably hostile act. Continuation of this line of action, which is already well under way, could gradually destroy the economic viability of West Berlin and thus dissolve the community of over two million whose continued existence in freedom the United States and NATO have so irrevocably guaranteed. It is a difficult line of action for the West to oppose, owing to the geographical situation of Berlin and to

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Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 381 Germany. Secret. Attached to a letter from Douglas to Herter, October 3, summarizing its contents and offering JCS assistance in planning military countermeasures.

the fact that the emphasis in Berlin contingency planning has been on measures to counter Communist action against occupation troop access.

3. Free World response has been slow and limited, both in scope and effectiveness. Its purpose of causing the Soviets to decide to stop has not succeeded, nor do the actions so far adopted seem apt to do so.

4. The military significance of a free Berlin which denotes U.S. strength and determination is incomparably high. The U.S. guarantee of continued free existence for West Berlin is the keystone of our worldwide alliance structure. Everywhere our allies and the neutrals alike will be closely watching the United States perform in validating its pledge, watching both the nature of U.S. efforts, and the results. A U.S. failure would weaken our alliances, and a U.S. abandonment would tend to collapse them. But to continue the free existence of an economically healthy West Berlin even after the present creeping challenge would demonstrate both determination and strength.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should now concentrate its efforts toward the objective of convincing the Communists that they cannot succeed, since the West will use necessary measures, including the use of force if required, to stop the current politico-economic erosion of Berlin. They believe that to achieve this objective, the United States should begin a program of political and military actions now, before the continued freedom of West Berlin comes into doubt. Progressively stronger actions have been planned against creeping restriction on Allied military access, and many of these listed actions would be equally effective against the creeping strangulation of the civilian economy.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the U.S. Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency Planning consider on an urgent basis what additional and more stringent countermeasures should now be taken to deter further Soviet activity against our interests in Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be permitted to comment on the countermeasures selected by the Coordinating Group prior to their submission to the President for final approval.

*For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:*

**Arleigh Burke**

*Chief of Naval Operations*

**223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, September 29, 1960, 8:09 p.m.

600. Paris for Embassy and USRO. On instructions Foreign Secretary, British Embassy (Hood) informed us (Kohler) today British consider renunciation IZT agreement by FRG ill-considered and illtimed.<sup>1</sup> While realizing disadvantage discouraging first real German effort re countermeasures and advantage denunciation agreement rather than suspension of deliveries, British fear denunciation could precipitate crisis which otherwise not be expected in next few months. Furthermore believe this weapon can be better used only after further GDR restrictions in economic field, at which time FRG would be in better position for measures cutting off trade.

Kohler replied we had already instructed you inform Germans our concurrence renunciation and had told you tripartite agreement desirable although not condition of informing Germans. Expressed hope tripartite agreement in favor renunciation could in fact be reached before Sept. 30.

Kohler explained we consider IZT renunciation uniquely comparable to Soviet rejection of quadripartite agreements and assertion GDR authority in Sept. 26 note.<sup>2</sup> In either case legal basis for further action being established without any necessary immediate practical effect.

Hood said British Ambassador Boon had suggested FRG might accompany renunciation with public statement to effect action constituted establishment of legal basis for countermeasures which could be taken later if GDR acted in economic field.

Kohler replied statement idea acceptable if it would help obtain British concurrence and if it did not specify economic field or have any limiting effect on later FRG actions which might be deemed desirable.

Hood explained British position on IZT renunciation was reached after Home–Gromyko conversation yesterday in which Gromyko said Soviets were fully aware of GDR actions, asserted they were necessary response to Western actions against GDR, said it would be West's fault if Berlin crisis developed because West aggravated situation by clinging to occupation, claimed USSR did not want crisis, and indicated

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 462A.62B41/9–2960. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared with Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, priority to London and Paris, and to Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> For text of this note, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 720–721.

Khrushchev ready resume negotiations on Berlin after new American administration installed. On basis Gromyko remarks, British thought crisis could be avoided for present.

Kohler replied Gromyko line only confirmed our worst fears and that it was reminiscent 1957 Moscow declaration<sup>3</sup> re “peaceful take-over”, e.g. that strife is fault of capitalists who resist seizure their property.

Dillon

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<sup>3</sup>Not further identified.

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**224. Telegram 1321 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State**

Paris, September 30, 1960, 6 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B/9–3060. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**225. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, September 30, 1960, 7 p.m.

873. While I do not disagree with position of Bonn and Berlin in necessity reacting vigorously to East German initiatives in Berlin in order to impress East Germans and Soviets with seriousness our position as

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–3060. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received October 1 at 7:29 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

well as to maintain morale West Berliners and West Germans, I suggest following factors should be kept in mind.

It appears probable that if Khrushchev still desires serious negotiations with West, he has decided that a crisis offers best approach and his probable choice is Berlin question. Although recent actions East Germans may be preliminary build-up of such crisis, seems almost certain Khrushchev does not intend bring crisis to head until next year. Suggest we should be careful that our present actions not contribute to establishment of vicious circle which would automatically lead to crisis at early date. If crisis is to come, as I believe it must, should think we would be better off if Berlin is enjoying something like its present prosperity that time rather than suffering from softening effects on morale of economic measures by East Germans. High level approach by us to Soviets at this time as suggested by Berlin seems to me dubious since Soviets will be thinking of attitude of next administration. In any event Soviet must believe there is real possibility that US would fight for its rights in Berlin and problem rather is to convince them that we would not have to do so alone. Believe would therefore be most helpful if British in particular could be persuaded make statement along lines suggested in Berlin tel 120.<sup>1</sup> Suggest we should also consider extent in which attitude of West Berlin and West German politicians is due to election considerations.

In view economic vulnerability Berlin, suggest that rather than becoming involved in measures that might lead to economic blockade, we should consider possibility of psychological warfare measures. For example if we could convince East German regime that we were considering steps such as calling for a slow down of East German workers by clandestine radio broadcasts or other means, believe both East Germans and Soviets would be greatly concerned. This would of course be dangerous operation if actually carried out as it might get out of hand.

In my opinion discussion in West German press of possible necessity of campaign of this sort or other similar measures might be more effective in restraining East Germans than actual steps to restrict trade, where they are apparently in position to out-trump US. Although trade blockade is in any event possibility, would seem important that onus be kept clearly on East Germans.

**Thompson**

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 209 and footnote 1 thereto.

226. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, October 1, 1960, 1 p.m.

493. Embtel 489.<sup>1</sup> In meeting with Chancellor last night he asked me convey to Department his appreciation for firm stand US taking on Berlin. To my suggestion that further countermeasures might be necessary, he said he was prepared to move further if Washington so desired. He mentioned study of possibility of sending all shipments to DDR through Berlin (see reftel) and said he had asked for continuing study other measures.

Adenauer then said he and Brandt were in agreement there was urgent need, practical and psychological, for increase Western garrisons in Berlin, and asked that we give serious consideration this request. He reminded me East Berliners working in West Berlin had increased by some 12,000 to about 50,000 since June last year, and said he feared these workers could provide spearhead for local disturbances. He also said he had insisted that Berlin Senat move ahead on plan for auxiliary police. I replied there were, as he knew, arguments against troop increase at this time, but he insisted that advantages were outweighing.

I told Chancellor of my conversation earlier in day with Carstens re Soviet technicians in FedRep (Deptel 555),<sup>2</sup> and he, like Carstens, responded favorably, saying it was obvious something must be done to curb their numbers and activities.

Dowling

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-160. Secret. Received at 9:46 a.m. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Dated September 30, telegram 489 from Bonn reported that Carstens had met that evening with representatives of the three Western Embassies to brief them on the denunciation of the interzonal trade agreement. (*Ibid.*, 462A.62B41/9-3060)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 555 concerns an unrelated subject. The correct reference has not been identified.

**227. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State**

Bonn, October 3, 1960, 7 p.m.

504. Reference: Moscow's 873 to Department.<sup>1</sup> One of basic questions involved Soviet-GDR moves is to determine cause/effect relationship. There is apparent widespread conviction that Khrushchev plans cold-blooded provocation of Berlin crisis aimed at forcing another summit under shadow of ultimatum and thus winning concessions on Berlin and/or Germany. There is also some reason to accept timetable connected Khrushchev's statements on negotiating with new US administration. Thus assumption is that crisis would be forced out of considerations partly external to German issue, and breaking point not be reached without what Khrushchev considers potential negotiational way out.

If this assessment correct, allied counteraction on GDR alone will likely be inadequate to forestall eventual test of strength. We do not propose total trade embargo on GDR now, for which in any event both our present planning and NATO coordination hardly adequate, we do believe we must be prepared to apply selective restrictions of increasing severity against further GDR encroachments, and, though progressive, such counterharassment should not necessarily be confined to pure tit-for-tat.

There is of course chance this may accelerate timetable, but alternatives as we see them are either to set high price for GDR to pay, or sit like chickens fascinated by snake. And no matter what sequence developments take, it is doubtful whether GDR and Soviets, if they resort to blockade, can justify threat to West Berlin civil population to world opinion.

British and some NATO thinking on economic countermeasures shows ambivalence, ranging from fears that West Germans will themselves weasel out of commercial consequences, to frequently expressed doubts as to effectiveness. These reservations often reveal less conviction that measures would be ineffective than reluctance on contemplated trade stoppages which would adversely affect respective economies and commercial interests. While these doubts are hard to rebut in present stage of planning, we must beware lest they acquire collective weight, or solidify into broad position which could serve to delay acceptance of program, later stages of which unpalatable.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-360. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> Document 225.



One of best by-products of pushing consideration and selective application of countermeasures is that they counter tendency towards softness and skepticism re this area of which Sept 30 NAC meeting gave evidence.<sup>2</sup> Concrete FedRep actions to date in abrogating trade agreement, discouraging participation Leipzig Fair, and supporting Allied travel restrictions on GDR, undercut much of negative argumentation. From this viewpoint we think present course necessary if we are to hope for later essential NATO-wide acceptance of joint action.

Although perhaps inadequate to stop total Soviet maneuver, these measures add indications of willingness to proceed further, may have real utility in discouraging both Moscow and also GDR capriciousness in excess of presumed Soviet instructions. Intelligence reports already suggest GDR dismay at anticipated damage to economic plan. Believe should rest content with present psychological impact achieved, rather than risk threats to urge slowdown of GDR workers, which would be risky and also fortify charges that we, not they, are provoking crisis.

We do not believe that FedRep election considerations primary in determining present German reactions to Berlin pressures. Basic reasons for German firmness appear be, on one plane, consciousness that public mood requires it, and on other plane growing conviction that crisis shaping up, for which it high time to make preparations. Latter sense of urgency, which long present in FonOff, now spreading through upper FedGovt and Berlin administrations. In our view this is salutary development, and absolutely requisite preliminary if public opinion to be prepared for possible showdown.

Finally, following questions appear pertinent: (1) If in fact Khrushchev plans to provoke crisis, should we permit him to choose his own time for so doing, and in particular delay such crisis until early next year, when General Assembly no longer in session and free world and neutral concern provoked by other Soviet pressures, including Congo and drive against UN, may have subsided? (2) Similarly, morale and economy of West Berliners presumably in as good shape at present to stand crises as later. And while we agree completely as to desirability of British and other Allies making clear to Kremlin their determination to hold Berlin, can we be sure that Khrushchev entertains no doubts regarding US determination as well?

**Morris**

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<sup>2</sup> At the North Atlantic Council meeting on September 30, the Federal Republic of Germany announced its decision to denounce the interzonal trade agreement, but the United States was the only NATO member to directly support this action. Several representatives, including the British and French, expressed strong doubt about the appropriateness and timing of economic countermeasures. (Department of State, Secretary's Daily Summaries: Lot 61 D 258, October 3, 1960)

**228. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, October 5, 1960, 3:30 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 462A.62B41/10-560. Confidential. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**229. Memorandum of Discussion at the 462d Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, October 6, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and discussion of unrelated matters.]

Turning to Berlin, Mr. Dulles said the termination by Bonn of the trade agreements, to take effect December 31, had not resulted in any immediate stoppage of commerce. He anticipated no announcement on a new agreement and no movement against shipping during the rest of 1960. The Bonn cabinet had recognized the possibility of continuing interzonal trade even after expiration of the trade agreements. If a new trade pact is negotiated, West Germany may insist that all interzonal shipments go through Berlin to make it difficult for East Germany to tamper with Berlin. The Federal Republic is seeking assurances that her allies will not take advantage of the termination of the trade agreements to sell goods to East Germany. The initial East German reaction to the termination of the agreements was cautious, possibly because East Germany is waiting to hear from Khrushchev. East German pin pricks against Berlin are continuing, however. For example, visitors to the Steinstucken Enclave must have special permits.

Mr. Merchant said the mildness of the East German response to the termination of the trade agreements may be due to the unavailability of Khrushchev. On the other hand, this was the first time West Germany had been willing to consider economic counter-measures as a response to East German harassment. West Germany will have considerable

economic leverage and if this leverage is used, the Western allies may have some ammunition against East Germany.

Mr. Gates asked whether the Contingency Group on Berlin was still meeting. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had some concern over the fact that the East Germans are practicing intercepts of their own transports with their fighters in the air corridors leading to Berlin. Mr. Gates wondered whether the ambassadors of the allies in Washington should not review the situation. Mr. Merchant said a meeting of the ambassadors had been held two weeks ago<sup>1</sup> and another was scheduled soon. A Four-Power Working Group in Bonn was working hard on non-military counter-measures. Mr. McCone asked about economic counter-measures by other NATO countries. Mr. Merchant said no decision had been made and a recent meeting of the NATO Council was discouraging. Mr. McCone said a real counter-measure against East Germany would have to include all NATO countries within its scope. Mr. Merchant said the U.S. was working toward that objective but the U.K. was reluctant to support economic counter-measures.

Secretary Anderson said that a high German official who had recently visited Washington had asked whether the West German counter-measures were sufficiently strong.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Anderson had replied that economic action was preferable to military action. The German official had then said that if he decided on strong economic counter-measures which led to East German interference with traffic, then he would have been responsible for involving the U.S. militarily. The German official felt a complete agreement was needed under which all allies would take the same economic counter-measures. This was an outstanding problem which could mean the difference between war and peace. The German official said he was aware that the U.S. suspected that German economic counter-measures were not strong enough. However, the German did not wish to take measures which would involve the U.S. militarily; he did not wish to take the responsibility for precipitating a new war. Mr. Merchant said our attitude was the reverse of that just described. We think strong economic counter-measures will minimize the risk of hostilities. Mr. McCone felt that economic counter-measures should be broadened. Mr. Merchant said the problem was being discussed in the NATO Council.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

**Marion W. Boggs**

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<sup>1</sup>No record of a meeting of Ambassadors on September 22 has been found, but a memorandum of the conversation of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin on September 22 is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2260.

<sup>2</sup>Regarding the conversation with Erhard on September 26 at which these views were aired, see footnote 4, Document 219.

**230. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas)**

Washington, October 7, 1960.

DEAR JIM: Thank you for your letter of October 3, 1960 to the Secretary forwarding a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the present situation in Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

We concur that it is important to make it clear to the Soviets, through appropriate measures and countermeasures on our part, that we shall not permit our position in Berlin to be eroded. At the same time, however, we consider that the effectiveness of the countermeasures available to us will depend in large measure on careful timing and dosage.

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware, the three Western Heads of Government meeting in Paris on May 18, 1960 approved a paper on Berlin Contingency Planning which stated that it was considered advisable that more attention be given to the possibility of gradual harassment of German civil access.<sup>2</sup> In accordance with the Directive of the Heads of Government, planning on this subject was initiated with the Germans in Bonn.

The most recent Communist harassment has been directed primarily against the access of West Germans to East Berlin (and to a lesser extent also against their access to West Berlin) rather than against the economic connection of West Berlin with Western Europe or the access and circulation of the Allied Forces and the population of Berlin. We and the British and the French have already protested to the Soviets against this harassment in both Berlin and Moscow. In addition, we have taken the concrete countermeasure of restricting severely the issuance by the Allied Travel Office of the Temporary Travel Documents which East Germans require for travel to most non-Communist countries.

In our view, the harassment we have seen in the past few weeks is of a type which calls for countermeasures primarily by the Federal Republic, which is not only directly interested but which also has the readiest weapon—economic countermeasures against the Soviet Zone, which have been under necessary extensive quadripartite study in Bonn for more than a month. The day after the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their memorandum to you, the Federal Republic took the important step

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Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 381 Germany. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> For the JCS memorandum, see Document 222; regarding Douglas' letter, see the source note, *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> See Document 185.

of denouncing its Interzonal Trade Agreement with the Soviet Zone. We supported this move. The denunciation should have a good psychological effect on the East Germans, especially since the latter may infer that specific economic sanctions will follow. It should also facilitate the eventual stoppage of shipments to the Soviet Zone if such action is deemed necessary. Further discussion of countermeasures is now taking place at Bonn, where we have urged a selective embargo on shipments to the Soviet Zone.

The intelligence reports we have received to date indicate that there is considerable concern in the Soviet Zone about the effects which the present travel restrictions, the denunciation of the IZT agreement and future economic countermeasures may have on the Zone's economy. While we are inclined to doubt that there will be a formal rescission of the recent East German decrees, we think it possible that they will no longer be strictly enforced.

None of the countermeasures which might be appropriate under the present circumstances, including travel restrictions and a selective embargo on shipments, seems to us likely to have more than temporary effectiveness. Moreover, to insure their maximum effectiveness, it is necessary that the cooperation of all the NATO countries be obtained to avoid evasion through transit shipments and substitution of sources. One of the requirements of the situation is that we develop, if possible, countermeasures which can be turned on and off just as harassment is turned on and off. In any case, our resources are limited, and the situation could become much worse than it is at this moment. We therefore believe it would be prudent to apply countermeasures with economy and caution in order to avoid firing off all of our ammunition at once or too soon.

We do, however, agree that it would be wise to accelerate planning for measures which might be taken if the situation worsens. The Embassies at Bonn have already been instructed to do so, in collaboration with the Foreign Office, as far as the problem of civilian access is concerned. As far as Allied access is concerned, we have recently given the British and French our suggestions as to measures which might be taken at a later stage, after our access has been interrupted. Representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now collaborating on a "sanitized" version of our "Checklist of Military and Non-Military Measures" to be passed to the British and French shortly.

With reference to the specific recommendation made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum, I believe that it would be very useful if the Joint Chiefs would suggest to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group which of the measures in the checklist we might

emphasize in tripartite discussions as calling for priority study or as being more suitable for early implementation.

Sincerely yours,

**Livingston T. Merchant**

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**231. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, October 8, 1960, 7 p.m.

1721. Paris USRO for Burgess. Prime Minister asked me to call on him yesterday afternoon. Conversation was not specific and generally covered his impressions of his New York visit, with which believe Dept broadly familiar. He struck me as being in good form and he reflected optimism as to outcome current problems generally along same lines as he has expressed publicly.

I took occasion to raise with him matter of British attitude toward Berlin, noting that while without instructions I was becoming concerned that US and UK appeared to diverge in their assessment of seriousness of present Soviet drive against West Berlin and consequently on the feed for effective and immediate countermeasures, principally economic. Macmillan rationalized British attitude on grounds that serious Soviet attack on Western position Berlin not in his view underlying policy at moment, and recent harassments are still in realm of isolated separate actions. He felt this British view confirmed in conversation he had in New York with Khrushchev, wherein latter reiterated Soviet intention not to bring Berlin situation to head before next spring. PM apparently accepts Khrushchev's statement, as he does Khrushchev's further reiteration of desire to hold summit meeting in 1961 after change in US administration, with regard to economic countermeasures per se. PM added, as British have previously said, that the UK would require additional legislation to institute serious economic countermeasures, and he assumed other countries including US would be under similar necessity.

On basis this conversation I cannot but conclude that current prospects of British going along with US on countermeasures in economic field are dim. I will continue to pursue this matter with PM and his colleagues as opportunity offers and specific instructions for use in that connection would be helpful. However, with this attitude at the top I cannot be hopeful that in the absence of developments which will serve to counteract his present assessment of Soviet Berlin tactics we will be able to persuade the British of the importance of Western firmness in deterring Soviet or East German piecemeal encroachments.

Whitney

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**232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, October 10, 1960, 7:43 p.m.

665. Deliver Wolf 8:00 a.m. October 11. Poltos 480, 487, 488, 496, 498, 499, 500; Bonn's 504, 507, 517, 529, 531.<sup>1</sup>

Department has noted information reported reference telegrams and concluded other NATO countries will not accept invocation economic sanctions at this time without a wider agreement on underlying rationale for such action.

We believe Soviets probably implementing calculated policy of gradually turning over their responsibilities re Berlin to East German regime with view to creating situation of fact which will weaken Western negotiating position. Continuation on this course can lead to an intolerable situation.

Apart from extreme legal claims of complete sovereignty and implied abrogation Western rights, disturbing factor in situation is new

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10-760. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cash; cleared by Hillenbrand, Davis, SOV, BNA, and RA; and approved by Kohler. Also sent priority to Paris, repeated priority to Berlin and London, and pouched to Moscow and the other NATO capitals.

<sup>1</sup> These cables, dated October 3–8, discussed various aspects of the question of sanctions against the German Democratic Republic. (*Ibid.*, 375/10-660 and 375/10-760; 462A.62B41/10-760; 662A.62B41/10-860; 762.00/10-360, 762.00/10-560, 762.00/10-660, and 762.00/10-860; and 862.181/10-460, 862.181/10-560, and 862.181/10-760, respectively)

energetic role of "GDR" which acting almost as if separate treaty concluded. This assertion of authority is more serious than actual action taken. Present threat to Berlin cannot be measured solely by limited restrictions on travel thus far imposed. Also disquieting is Soviet position set forth publicly in September 26 note<sup>2</sup> (which British agree "hard and disturbing") disclaiming its responsibilities and supporting "GDR" jurisdictional claims. This calculated undermine quadripartite status Berlin, destroy legal position of Allies in City, force us out, establish phony "Free City" and incorporate all of Berlin into Soviet bloc.

We do not think Allies should lull themselves with hopes that Soviets do not want crisis over Berlin. Probability is that in seeking another Summit soon, Khrushchev will be prepared precipitate crisis or threaten do so. US does not seek crisis but unwilling pay blackmail in order postpone one. We do not want Soviets to misjudge US firmness during election campaign. If there must be crisis over Berlin we would prefer have it when we are relatively stronger rather than after Berlin softened up and Allied position eroded by creeping encroachment.

Neither should Allies take it for granted that Berlin problem can be settled at conference table in few months. Next US administration not committed to new Summit. This will have to be considered very carefully. US does not want another fiasco like Paris. As recently as October 7 both Presidential candidates said publicly they would not be willing meet Khrushchev before careful preparatory negotiations gave some reasonable prospect of progress, and we see no indication Soviets prepared be reasonable re Berlin, or under presently enunciated formula, engage in such preparations.

In any event Allies cannot afford have Berlin position deteriorate seriously in whatever interval ensues.

US believes firm united action now might well head off serious crisis later.

Although specific revocation "GDR" decrees would ideally be most desirable, more realistic goal would be that firm stand would produce nonimplementation and discourage "GDR" from proceeding with further harassments.

Agree discussion implementation NATO restrictions on East German travel should be reserved for NAC meeting October 12 unless Three Powers in position propose agreed solution in trade category.

Quick agreement re TTD's and visas obviously essential and we have, therefore, with following proposals come as close to British position as possible. Believe they should move rest of way to meet us.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of this note, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 720–721.



Would agree “National Interest” trade cases not tied any specific termination date for present although would wish reconsider when Germans decide what happens IZT January 1. Should be agreed “National Interest” invoked in general only to continue trade at present levels not increase.

Would agree TTD’s and visas granted for genuine trade mission replacements with as much administrative delay as possible in order not facilitate replacements, but no TTD’s or visas for additional trade mission personnel.

Cannot agree “administrative convenience” should dictate validity period of six months for TTD’s and visas. Would propose one month subject monthly renewal but not guaranteed. Would as final concession settle for three month validity.

Believe this should prove acceptable to British as should not affect trade at all, much less constitute economic countermeasure.

We have incidentally seen report indicating London and Paris businessmen will have nothing to do with trade mission personnel preferring to handle transactions directly with East German trade partners.

Agree clarification by German NATO representative of position re IZT indispensable next step. Necessary in order deal with Spaak’s contention they may have gone too far too fast in direction economic blockade and British contention they have not taken lead in moving toward economic countermeasures. Obviously Germans must inform NAC whether can or cannot continue interzonal trade in 1961 in absence new agreement. In this connection see Bonn’s 529 and 531 conclusion that trade can continue and German confirmation. Also see Berlin’s 255.<sup>3</sup>

Department agrees NATO should be furnished report contained Bonn’s 531 re Bonn quadripartite study economic countermeasures.

We know of no US commitment not to urge implementation of economic countermeasures. Also in agreeing include trade category in TTD ban UK did not make clear they intended include broad commercial interests in “National Interest” category nor that they intended exempt from ban East Germans already abroad.

Quadripartite study economic countermeasures should be expedited so that if we cannot convince Allies to go along with measures in trade field at this time we will at least be prepared react immediately and concertedly with selective restrictions of increasing severity (but not necessarily exactly in kind) when next harassment comes.

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<sup>3</sup> Dated October 8, telegram 255 from Berlin outlined the shipments and deliveries that would be carried out between East and West Germany now that the interzonal trade agreement had been denounced. (Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B41/10–860)

USRO should consider proposing study in NATO of how burdens of any such countermeasures might be equalized.

Germans should consider what they can do to help NATO members needing skilled maintenance and repairmen with parts to service heavy machinery purchased from East Germany.

**Herter**

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### 233. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, October 15, 1960.

#### PARTICIPANTS

Willy Brandt, Mayor of Berlin  
Egon Bahr, Director of the Information and Press Office of *Land* Berlin  
Ambassador Matthews  
Mr. Wainhouse  
Mr. Bennett  
Mr. Ewing

At an hour's private meeting which Ambassador Matthews arranged with Mayor Brandt during the latter's visit in Vienna in connection with Berlin Week, Brandt talked about conditions in Berlin and responded to questions regarding the possibilities in the situation there. He began by saying that morale of the West Berliners remains high. For all practical purpose there is full employment. As a long range problem there is the increasing age of the population, the problem of wartime losses having been aggravated by the emigration of many young Berliners in the years immediately after the war to West Germany and elsewhere. Some way must be found to attract young people back to Berlin.

He spoke of the trade problem with East Berlin. He said that the East Germans were already making overtures in connection with the recent announcement of intention to cancel the interzonal trade agreement as of January 1. He himself would be quite willing to see

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-1960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bennett and transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 391 from Vienna, October 19. The conversation took place at the U.S. Ambassador's Residence.

conversations undertaken and to hold them above the "Leopold" level at which trade questions have been normally handled in the past. He would be willing to go as high as the Ministerialdirektor level.

Mayor Brandt indicated that there is full identity of views between Chancellor Adenauer and him on the importance of standing firm on Berlin. In response to a question, he expressed the view that Ulbricht and the East Germans have a fairly free hand in devising measures of harassment and encroachment on West Berlin rights, and that the principal initiative comes from Ulbricht. He seemed to feel that Khrushchev, while in agreement, does not interest himself so much in the details of the situation but does exercise general control to ensure that the East Germans do not go too far and precipitate a real crisis.

It was clear that Brandt has no stomach for pussyfooting or retreat on the holding of a Bundestag meeting in Berlin. He pointed out that the Soviets had made dire threats before with respect to an even more important constitutional body, the Bundesversammlung which elects the President for the German Federal Republic. The meeting had been held in Berlin despite Soviet threats and nothing had happened.<sup>1</sup> If concessions are made to the Soviets on this kind of issue, they are merely emboldened to grab for more. He holds no truck with those who believe such steps are "provocative" and add to the dangers of the situation.

In reply to an inquiry he said that an important consideration in the decision to organize a civil militia in Berlin was the desire to create some sort of force which could counter minor or low level attempts at armed penetration into West Berlin or disorders organized by East German elements. Such a body could, for instance, control rowdies or could act in situations where it might not be thought advisable to engage police or other official elements of Berlin forces, or the Allied military.

Brandt expressed himself in favor of an increase of Western military forces in Berlin. This increase need not be large, perhaps only a total of a thousand troops or so, and certainly it should not be large enough to make any great difference in the event of serious trouble. However, it would be an evidence of "political will" on the part of the West to keep Berlin free. In response to a question as to whether such a buildup should be announced or merely carried out quietly, assuming of course that the Soviets would know about it, he said that he could see merit in each of these courses but that he was gradually coming around to the view that it would be better to make a public announcement. It could be assumed that communist authorities would learn of the buildup through agents or otherwise, and they might then take the initiative on

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<sup>1</sup> The Bundesversammlung met in Berlin in July 1959 for the election of the President of the Federal Republic.

the publicity or raise the matter in a way which could be embarrassing to the Western position. Mayor Brandt left little doubt that he foresees that the situation in Berlin is going to have to get worse before it gets better. He remarked that a Mayor could not be in the position of saying that he wanted a crisis to come because that would be irresponsible. However, he made clear his view that a dramatic worsening of Berlin's position or the use of severe pressure tactics on the part of the communists would focus world attention on the plight of Berlin and perhaps aid in compelling necessary decisions. With respect to the future of Berlin, Mayor Brandt left no doubt that he would prefer a drastic cure to a steady and inexorable decline through nibbling tactics on the part of the communists. He indicated no particular concern over the effects in Berlin of possible East German measures to cut off traffic to and from Berlin, mentioning that there are good reserves of necessary stocks. Brown coal is the only vital item coming from the East and Berlin could switch to West German sources of supply, "assuming it were allowed to come through to Berlin." In that connection, he pointed out that a truck of Berlin-produced goods leaves the city for the West every three minutes. Eastern success in reducing this traffic to one truck every nine minutes, for instance, could be very serious for the city.

There was some discussion of the Soviet memorandum handed to Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky by Gromyko during the Khrushchev visit to Austria in early July of this year, Brandt indicating he had heard nothing further about this gambit.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps significantly, Brandt inquired of the Ambassador whether Kreisky's suggestion that use of UN forces to guarantee leased corridor to West Berlin under some arrangement with the Soviets on a free city status had resulted from some idea thrown out by the Soviets or whether it represented Kreisky's own views. The Ambassador told him that Kreisky had indicated it was his own idea, while discussing possible solutions.

Brandt said that the Soviet memorandum handled through Kreisky was only one of several indirect approaches on this subject which had been made by the Soviet Union. There had also been the Smirnov note in Bonn and there had been the Soviet notes to the three Western Powers which had relieved little public notice because they had been more or less lost in the general excitement over the abortive Summit meeting in Paris in May.<sup>3</sup> It was his, Brandt's, view that some notice should be taken of these approaches and some response made to the Soviets, in order to sound them out and ascertain insofar as possible what their

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 203.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding the Smirnov memorandum, see Document 69; presumably the Soviet note is that of June 30, printed in *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 707–708.

intentions on Berlin are. He had urged Adenauer to take this up during his last visit to Washington, but Adenauer had not done so, apparently because of concern that any indication of a willingness to talk with the Soviets on the status of Berlin might be interpreted in Western quarters as evidence of West German weakness on the issue. Brandt commented that the Soviet Union is after all a great power with real interests in Central Europe, and should be treated as such and have its proposals considered in view of their great sensitivity on this prestige aspect. To ignore Soviet overtures altogether is merely to add an element of pique to the already unstable quality of Soviet reactions. The Ambassador told him Kreisky had received word through Ambassador Avilov<sup>4</sup> that Gromyko would be glad to “clarify” any unclear points in his memorandum, a development which seemed to interest Brandt and of which he had not heard.

P.S. The Ambassador subsequently attended the reception for Brandt at the Rathaus where he made a very lucid, forthright address of an hour and a half which was loudly applauded. After giving a clear, factual history of the Berlin situation, emphasizing the Soviet propaganda falsely labeling any move from the holding of the Bundesversammlung to the preaching of Billy Graham as a “provocation,” he pointed out that just because the Berlin position is abnormal does not mean that any change would improve it. Any such change must not weaken this vital outpost of freedom.

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<sup>4</sup>Viktor Ivanovich Avilov, Soviet Ambassador in Austria.

**234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, October 29, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

796. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Bonn's 582, Berlin's 285, 286.<sup>1</sup> Agree Bonn should advise FedGovt that because of our responsibilities re Berlin we wish be kept fully and currently informed re IZT developments.

Should add that we somewhat disturbed over creation public impression FedGovt's not seeming know what they are about in this matter as well as over impression that there exists considerable sentiment within FedGovt that IZT move was mistake made only because of Allied pressure.

As to Dept's views re where we go from here, we agree main questions are: 1) is a new interzonal trade agreement desirable; and 2) if so, on what terms?

Seems clear that in absence additional internal acts by FedGovt trade could continue without formal agreement, which essentially merely mutual commitment to license, and facilitate payment for, certain specific amounts trade in specified categories of commodities. Lack agreement would seem to mean (if present circumstances otherwise unchanged) that bulk of any trade would continue be pursued between Western businessmen and Soviet Zone agencies through: 1) West Berlin branch offices; 2) East Berlin trade brokers Utimex and Mercator; or 3) West Berlin middlemen.

Also with absence "swing credits" and specified upper limits within which commitments can be freely made, payments would have to be handled through private credit agreements, foreign exchange, or barter, and licensing each transaction would become uncertain.

Dept has concluded that because of importance of predictability to highly planned economy and difficulty payments problems, formal IZT agreement more important to Soviet Zone than to FedRep.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B41/10-2160. Confidential. Drafted by Cash on October 28; cleared by Hillenbrand, Davis, SOV, L/EUR, and E; and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin, repeated to London and Paris, and pouched to Moscow.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 582, October 20, advised that the United States should formally inform the Federal Republic that the interzonal trade agreement was not solely its responsibility. (*Ibid.*, 662A.62B41/10-2060) Telegrams 285 and 286 transmitted the text of a letter to Brandt on the trade agreement and described a letter from East German Trade Minister Rau to Erhard. (*Ibid.*, and 662A.62B41/10-2160) For text of Rau's letter, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, p. 439.

Appears quite obvious from all reports that Soviet Zone regime: 1) disturbed by FedGovt's action; 2) wishes trade to continue; and 3) anxious to negotiate new agreement. Apparently also seeking shift trade patterns, raise level negotiations, and deal with Bonn and Berlin separately in order strengthen its position.

Senat and FedGovt have quite rightly stated that any negotiations must be conducted only through plenipotentiaries of two currency areas (Leopold and Treuhandstelle<sup>2</sup> for Bonn and Berlin) to avoid improving Soviet Zone status.

As to goals, optimum from our point of view would be achievement carefully formulated, explicit Soviet-East German guarantee of noninterference with West German access to Greater Berlin including revocation Sept 8 decree.<sup>3</sup>

Agree with Brandt the FedGovt should follow through on its statement of readiness to negotiate by preparing draft agreement containing various improvements desired particularly re access to Greater Berlin.

Even though (as Embassy points out) we claim right of free access to Berlin already guaranteed by Soviets in 1949 agreements, since 1951 IZT agreements continuance from FedRep has been most direct and practical means trying guarantee East Germans would not interfere with West German access to Berlin. 1951 letter<sup>4</sup> put this in writing and we see no objection to bargaining new trade agreement for "GDR" guarantees of noninterference with access. Any such guarantees should be carefully formulated in close consultation with British, French, and ourselves so as not to affect our responsibilities.

Probably unrealistic to expect formal revocation of Sept 8 decree. Minimum goal should be return to conditions existing in August with at least implicit guarantee noninterference with access and nonimplementation of decree so that movement to Berlin and within City essentially unrestricted.

Although desirable, do not believe can insist Soviet bloc visa FedRep passports for West Berliners.

As start Leopold might be empowered inform Behrendt in response to calls for negotiations from Ulbricht, Grotewohl, Rau, Siemer, etc., that negotiations cannot be resumed if East German regime increases in any way whatsoever its harassment of rights of free access to Berlin and free circulation within Berlin and that satisfactory conduct of negotiations will be facilitated by degree to which West Germans are permitted free access to Greater Berlin as well as by reasonable attitude

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<sup>2</sup>Trusteeship Office for Interzonal Trade.

<sup>3</sup>For text of this decree, see *Dokumente*, Band 5, 1960, pp. 229–230.

<sup>4</sup>Regarding this letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1872–1873.

of East German regime—as exemplified in its handling of such questions as access to Steinstuecken and visits by Berliners to graves outside city—toward problems created for Berlin population by unnatural division of country. FedRep should of course avoid recognizing any “right” of “GDR” to control circulation within City.

At very outset should be made clear to East Germans that they faced with choice of: 1) written trade agreement facilitating their planning and payments problems but also guaranteeing noninterference with free West German access to all of Berlin; or 2) no written agreement and trade continued on ad hoc basis but only so long as West Germans have in practice free access to all Berlin. In either case should be made quite clear that trade is dependent upon free access and will vary with it.

Agree for greater flexibility would be advisable limit any new agreement to one year.

One difficulty of having no new formal agreement would certainly be matters such as Warenbegleitscheine,<sup>5</sup> interzonal rail and postal traffic, and electric power exchange regulated by annexes to 1951 IZT agreement. Assume Soviet Zone has interest in keeping services functioning and that therefore as pointed out these technical problems not necessarily insoluble.

Also agree with Brandt that would be useful in process attempt to achieve complete reorganization interzonal trade mechanism and to create in Berlin a central agency responsive to FedGovt to act as clearing house to minimize close contact between West German firms and Soviet Zone agencies. Somewhat reluctantly conclude from USBER’s 263<sup>6</sup> that idea of channeling physical flow of all trade through Berlin is impractical.

Believe Embassy should continue emphasize to FedGovt that current trade negotiations with Soviets should be related Berlin problem so that as minimum German implementation any agreement reached would be made dependent upon application same terms to Berlin trade. Desirable, of course, that this be accomplished through Berlin clause or exchange letters but believe it unrealistic to expect Soviets will accept either. Form seems not especially important and could be specific, oral assurances as with last agreement as long as Soviets quite clear on connection of trade agreement with Berlin problem and Germans in position make good on threat if necessary.

If Embassy and USBER agree, suggest that after consultation with British and French (extent and form of which left to Embassy’s

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<sup>5</sup> Interzonal trade permits.

<sup>6</sup> Dated October 11, telegram 263 from Berlin transmitted a history of the idea that Berlin might be used as a transshipment point for all trade with East Germany. (Department of State, Central Files, 462A.62B41/10–1160)



discretion) these views be passed along to Germans as US preliminary thoughts on these matters.

G-399<sup>7</sup> just received. Have not received despatch 509<sup>8</sup> but gather it deals with whole range of other problems.<sup>9</sup>

**Herter**

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<sup>7</sup> Dated October 21, G-399 from Berlin referred to despatch 509 which would analyze public reaction to the abrogation of the trade agreement. (*Ibid.*, 662A.62B41/10-2160)

<sup>8</sup> Dated October 18. (*Ibid.*, 662A.62B41/10-1860)

<sup>9</sup> On October 31, the Mission at Berlin reported its agreement with the views expressed in this telegram. (Telegram 303; *ibid.*, 662A.62B41/10-3160)

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**235. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)**

Washington, November 2, 1960.

As you know, I have had like yourself Berlin on my mind, particularly with reference to (a) whether we should take any nearby initiative in seeking to open private negotiations with the Soviets, and (b) the type of agreement which we should seek if negotiations are resumed in the next few months, either by our own or Soviet initiative.

I recently reread your memorandum of July 6, 1960<sup>1</sup> on the Development of U.S. Position in Berlin, which deals at some length with Solution C. I am not aware as to the status of the proposed surfacing again of Solution C in the Four Power Working Group of Germany.

If talks are not under way with our allies in that forum, I think we should plan to initiate them.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-260. Secret. Drafted by Merchant and initialed by both Kohler and Merchant. Copies were also sent to Bohlen and Smith.

<sup>1</sup> In this memorandum, Kohler offered four possible assumptions regarding the evolution of the Berlin problem: 1) Soviet transmission of a proposal along the lines of its May 9 paper (see Document 154); 2) Soviet call for a new summit meeting; 3) no Soviet move on Berlin until the new administration took office; and 4) the signing of a Soviet-East German peace treaty. Kohler speculated further that "Solution C" (see footnote 8, Document 72) seemed to offer the best possibilities for an interim solution.

I have come, myself, to the following conclusions:

(a) In any foreseeable future negotiation with the Soviets the objective of an interim agreement à la Geneva is neither realistic nor achievable.

(b) I think we must accept as an inevitability the signing by the Soviets and their satellites of a separate peace treaty with the GDR before twelve months are up. Parenthetically, I do not regard this as catastrophic or even calamitous unless by our own intervening position and statements we make it such.

(c) Solution C, or an arrangement closely resembling it, if negotiable, would enable us to live with the signature of a separate peace treaty by the Soviets, and if abided by on the part of the Soviets would enable West Berlin to live economically and in freedom.

(d) It would be desirable for us to take the initiative in at least seeking to reopen negotiations on Berlin with the Soviets, most preferably quietly through diplomatic channels. This probably is not practicable prior to the new Administration coming into office. There is in the meantime, however, much work which could be done if the foregoing conclusions were accepted within our own Government and with our three allies principally concerned.

After you in EUR have given some thought to this matter, I suggest we plan an early meeting, with Messrs. Bohlen and Smith invited, with a view to formulating recommendations for the Secretary's consideration.

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## 236. Memorandum of Conversation

Bonn, November 4, 1960.

### PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister von Brentano  
Ambassador Dowling  
Ambassador Burgess  
Herr von Etzdorf, Foreign Office  
Mr. Williamson, Embassy

### SUBJECT

Discussion on France, NATO, Berlin and East-West Problem

Ambassador Burgess explained in some detail the timing of the long range planning exercise for NATO and the background of the

American paper which is now circulated in the Council.<sup>1</sup> Foreign Minister Brentano stressed the urgency of the situation confronting the Alliance and urged that agreement be reached on the whole broad problem of the organization of the military power of the Western Alliance. He stated that the central point is, as it has been for some time, the question of control of nuclear weapons both in the tactical as well as in the strategic fields. He recognized the legislative limitations placed on American action in the field of controls, but pointed out the urgent necessity of improving the organization of the Alliance in order to provide for an effective defense of Europe. He hoped that sufficient pressure could be brought on the French to lead them to modify their current conception concerning integration of forces and the control of the striking force. Every effort must be made to swing the French over to the concept of integration as well as to urge them to build up the gaps in their conventional forces in order to contribute to the total defense effort.

Ambassador Burgess said that, in the forthcoming long range planning exercise, the suggestions which might be made should prove interesting to the French. Brentano replied that critical developments could be expected in the Berlin problem in the spring of 1961. Disaster could be avoided only if the Soviets are made to understand that solidarity and unity of purpose prevail in NATO. Brentano believed that even a hint of differences of opinion within the Alliance might provoke aggressive Soviet action. He discounted any idea of "a new attitude" towards Germany on the part of Khrushchev following his return from the UN which has been hinted in the German press. The reports from Ambassador Kroll in Moscow gave no indication of any change in Khrushchev's policy. Brentano said that it was a pity that people in Europe believed that an international détente existed simply because Khrushchev refrained from removing his shoes and banging on the table.

Ambassador Burgess inquired about the possibility of a Summit meeting in 1961 and Khrushchev's statement that until such time the status quo could be expected in Berlin.<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Burgess wondered how such a statement could be reconciled with recent actions by the East Zone authorities. Brentano replied that the statement of Khrushchev concerning a Summit and the actions of the GDR were a part of a well considered tactic. Khrushchev's objective was to increase unrest in Berlin and to prepare the ground psychologically for the time when he would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR. Khrushchev has

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<sup>1</sup> Documentation on NATO long-range planning and the U.S. paper under reference is in volume VII, Part 1.

<sup>2</sup> For a transcript of Khrushchev's press conference in New York on October 7 at which this statement was made, see Embree, *Soviet Union and the German Question*, pp. 276–278.

already made it plain, as brought out in his conversation with Macmillan on October 15,<sup>3</sup> that he wants a Summit solely on Berlin and the German problem without any reference to broader questions of disarmament and security. At such a Summit he would present, in typical Soviet fashion, an ultimatum to the Western Powers and then proceed in his own time to conclude a separate treaty. Brentano did not believe that negotiations with the Soviets could take place at this time, as demonstrated both by Khrushchev's statement with respect to Berlin and Zorin's action in the UN with respect to disarmament.

In response to a question concerning the difficulties created in NATO by the denunciation of the interzonal trade agreement, Brentano stated that the Federal Republic regards the denunciation of the agreement as an answer to the unilateral measures taken by the East German authorities on order from Moscow and that no new proposals will be made. He stated that the Federal Republic would wait until the 21st of December to see whether or not the East German measures would be withdrawn. In any event the Federal Republic could not give up its position in this matter. He stated that he had explained the German position to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Six in Paris last Monday<sup>4</sup> and that full appreciation existed for the German position. He stated that he had received enthusiastic support from Couve de Murville. Brentano stated that there was by necessity a conflict of interests between the Executive branch and the Bundestag on the current procedures in dealing with the East Zone. He pointed out the All-German Committee of the Bundestag meeting in Berlin had reached different conclusions regarding interzonal trade. He stated that the Committee often acted in a sentimental rather than a political manner and that the Bundestag must realize that decisions of this type belong to the Executive branch of the Government.

In response to Ambassador Burgess' question concerning the continuation of trade after the expiration of the agreement on December 31st, Brentano stated that under the old treaty certain arrangements existed which would extend into the next year. He saw no reason to aggravate the situation by refusing to adhere to these arrangements and pointed out that many elements of administrative control could be utilized to regulate interzonal trade. He stressed the fact that the denunciation of the trade agreement would have no economic impact whatsoever in the Federal Republic since interzonal trade amounted to only a minute part of its total trade. The agreement had been concluded in the

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<sup>3</sup> Presumably reference is to Macmillan's conversation with Khrushchev at New York on October 4 during the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly. For Macmillan's account, see *Pointing the Way*, pp. 280–281.

<sup>4</sup> October 31.

first instance for political rather than economic reasons. He believed that the impact of the denunciation on the East German economy was even greater than had originally been anticipated.

In response to Ambassador Dowling's observation about the necessity for support of the German position by the NATO countries, Brentano stated emphatically that NATO nations must not fill the trade gap in the East Zone created by the denunciation. He stated that he had discussed the question of Belgian credit with Wigny at the October 31st Paris meeting, and that the Foreign Minister stated that he would look into the problem immediately.

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### 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, November 9, 1960, 7 p.m.

690. Ref: Moscow's 1161 to Department.<sup>1</sup> Since first Khrushchev talk with Kroll there has been increasing public and private speculation about a possible improvement in German-Soviet relations, with rumors of future initiative by Chancellor for exchange of visits with Khrushchev. Although there have been official denials, these rumors have been due in large measure to Chancellor's semi-public comments on Khrushchev's friendly attitude, as well as his action in expressing regrets to Smirnov. (It has never been made clear precisely for what regrets were expressed, although Foreign Office has confidently held that no apology was intended. Nor is it clear just why Adenauer sent Merkatz<sup>2</sup> to Smirnov, despite Brentano's advice to contrary. My own interpretation, however, is that nothing more complex is involved than

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62/11-960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, London, Berlin, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Dated November 8, telegram 1161 from Moscow reported that Kroll had had another long conversation with Khrushchev at a reception on November 7. (*Ibid.*, 762C.002/11-860) The previous conversation occurred on October 18 when Kroll delivered a letter from Adenauer on German repatriation. For Kroll's account of these two conversations, see *Lebenserinnerungen*, pp. 465 ff. The Embassy in Moscow reported on the first conversation in telegram 1073, October 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 261.62A22/10-2660) Dowling was briefed on it by Carstens on the same day. (Telegram 615 from Bonn, October 26, *ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, Federal Minister for Bundesrat and Laender Affairs. The incident under reference has not been identified further.

Adenauer's sensitiveness to Communist charges of "war-monger", which he feels have gained some credence in West.)

Adenauer had certainly been disturbed by intensity and duration of Soviet propaganda campaign in past against Federal Republic and him personally, and has made no bones about his feeling that he had received less than adequate public support and defense from his principal NATO Allies. His demonstrative effusion of pleasure and attitude following Macmillan's recent speech in UNGA<sup>3</sup> was doubtless intended to bring home to others, including ourselves, that such a defense of Germany was a rarity and a surprise worth celebrating.

I believe that Chancellor has also been impressed by the realization that differences between him and de Gaulle with regard both to NATO and to Europe are such that he can no longer publicly adopt same pose of a confident and intimate relationship to France as in past. In a sense, foregoing has contributed to Chancellor's feeling of current isolation of Germany. Finally, it is also no secret that in recent months Chancellor has expressed his recurrent misgivings about the role and the prospective policies of the United States with regard to Europe, and in this respect too he has doubtless found his own justification for feeling somewhat apprehensive and neglected. Psychologically, the Chancellor presents the dubious combination of an extremely tough and shrewd politician and of a man who, if not susceptible to flattery, is at least overly responsive to gestures indicating sentiments of personal benevolence.

It may be that all these factors, coupled with his well-known fears of Western weakness re Berlin, have combined to give the Chancellor the feeling that Khrushchev's switch to friendly attitude should be utilized to try to reduce the extent of the public friction and hostility between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. To sum up, I do not believe for a moment that the Chancellor is engaged in any devious or dangerous flirtation with the Soviet Union. With his sensitiveness to Germany's exposed position and her relationships within the Western Alliance, however, his tendency, in compensation for unsatisfactory developments in this area, is to turn his attention toward the problem of Germany's relationship with Soviet Union.

Chancellor's Christian faith, and his profound conviction that Western Germany's survival depends upon close association with US are, I firmly believe, adequate guarantee against any "deal" with Soviet Union during lifetime. Given past history of Germany's Eastern relations, we cannot of course depend upon this guarantee after he passes

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<sup>3</sup> For Macmillan's speech, September 29, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 719–722.

from political scene, and it is for this basic reason that I have stressed in previous messages, my belief that FedRep must be firmly cemented in to fabric of West as equal ally, and that we must continue to support legitimate aspirations of German people, including reunification.

**Dowling**

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**238. Editorial Note**

On December 6, President Eisenhower and his principal Cabinet officers briefed President-elect Kennedy on the most significant world problems facing the United States. In a review of the danger spots, Secretary Herter stated:

*“Berlin—This is acute and dangerous, and Mr. Khrushchev has heavy pressure to get the Berlin question settled and to stop the movement of refugees to the West from behind the Iron Curtain.”*

A memorandum for the record of this meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series.

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**239. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

Berlin, December 16, 1960, 7 p.m.

370. Paris for Kohler. From Dowling. I had long (one and one half hours), extremely friendly conversation with Pervukhin this afternoon by appointment. There was no attempt by Vopos to control my entry to East Berlin.

Although Pervukhin insisted throughout talk on sovereignty of GDR, and endeavored to argue that otherwise there was no change in U.S.-Soviet relations in Berlin, conversation afforded me opportunity to insist we relied on our existing agreements with Soviets re Berlin and access thereto, and that drift from status quo through unilateral actions of East German authorities represented increased risk not only to arrangements under which Soviets and Americans had arrived at reasonable degree of "co-existence" in Berlin in period since World War II, but also made more difficult solution to other outstanding problems between two govts.

Main emphasis of Pervukhin's remarks seemed to be that problems between Soviets and Americans re Berlin and access could always be settled in talks between two of us, provided we paid due regard to GDR sovereignty. In this connection he pointed out that he alone, and not Soviet Commandant in Berlin, was competent in these questions. On other hand, I concentrated on insisting that we held Soviet Union responsible for maintenance normal situation in Berlin and for existing arrangements re access.

Pervukhin himself raised subject of FedRep denunciation of IZT agreement, and to my rejoinder that this action followed East German restrictions on movement within Berlin and interference with traffic to West Germany, argued that GDR measures in no way interfered with Allied access to Berlin.

I replied to this assertion that economic welfare of population of American sector of Berlin was also concern of U.S. Government.

My conclusion is that Soviet authorities, as well as East German regime, have been sobered by countermeasures to date against East German unilateral measures, and that they are most anxious that there be no disruption of trade relations between East and West Germany.

As I was leaving, Pervukhin said he understood there would be no publicity re meeting (his only source for this could have been telephone conversations between Bonn and Berlin). I responded in affirmative, adding that if press became aware of visit and queried me, I would reply that talk concerned difficulties experienced in movement U.S. personnel within and to Berlin. He argued against mention of Berlin, saying it would be sufficient to say we discussed matters of mutual interest. I declined this commitment, but said I hoped that there would be no publicity.

Memo of conversation follows by air pouch.<sup>1</sup>

**Trivers**

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 336 from Berlin, December 19. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/12-1960)



**240. Memorandum of Conversation**

US/MC/17

Paris, December 17, 1960, 5:30 p.m.

**NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING**

Paris, December 16–18, 1960

**PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe, German Ambassador to the U.S.  
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, U.S. Delegation, NATO

**SUBJECT**

Adenauer's Attitude and Health; Berlin Problems

Ambassador Grewe said that he had seen Chancellor Adenauer on December 15 and had found him apparently fully recovered from his recent illness. He was back at work in his office. His doctors had evidently been concerned about the possibility of a more serious illness and had taken the precaution of confining him to his house for some ten days. However, it did not seem as if the Chancellor were going to have the kind of protracted bout with the flu and related ailments which he had on several previous occasions and which had reduced his effectiveness for a lengthy period of time. Ambassador Grewe observed that the Chancellor had expressed his pleasure over the announcement of the appointment of Dean Rusk as the new American Secretary of State. He noted that the German Embassy in Washington had, of course, fully reported on potential candidates for various American cabinet positions, including estimates of their views and characteristics. He was happy to be able to say that the Chancellor seemed to have shed any concerns he might have had about "undesirable" policy changes which might be introduced by a new Secretary of State.

Ambassador Grewe went on to say that it was now definitely established that he would remain in Washington for a further period of time. The flurry of speculation about his replacement which had arisen in November had actually been a belated reflection of the consideration which had been given in October to certain changes in Ambassadorial assignments. The idea of making these changes had now been dropped. In fact, Ambassador Blankenhorn, who had been mentioned as the probable appointee to the Washington post, wanted to stay in Paris. To

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1802. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. The conversation took place at the Hotel Bristol.

begin with, having just been restored to his position after a leave of absence which extended more than a year, he felt that it would be a discourtesy to the French Government for him to leave shortly thereafter. Moreover, he was aware that his arrival in Washington might be greeted by some criticism, particularly from certain elements of the press.

With reference to the Interzonal Trade talks which were going on in Berlin, Ambassador Grewe said he had taken the position in Bonn that the Federal Government should insist on formal revocation of the offending GDR decrees before renewing the Trade Agreement. Anything less than this, he felt would be insufficient in view of the unfortunate psychological impression which retention of the decrees would create, despite any tacit understanding which might be reached that they would not be executed. Mr. Hillenbrand observed that our experience over the past ten years in Berlin had more than once involved tacit understandings with the Soviets that they would not carry out threatened actions or stated policies. The whole Western position in Berlin, apart from the firm legal foundations on which it rested, was based upon such mutual acquiescence in certain limitations beyond which each side knew it could not go. We had expressed our views on the Trade Agreement discussions in some detail to the Federal authorities, and were encouraged by the recent developments reported by Leopold. As Foreign Minister von Brentano had said earlier in the afternoon, the West seemed to be stronger than it had suspected in its ability to deter and to achieve desired results by the imposition of or even threat of economic countermeasures.<sup>1</sup>

Referring to the discussions of December 15 between Secretary Anderson, Under Secretary Dillon, Assistant Secretary Irwin and Ambassador Dowling with Economic Minister Erhard and State Secretary von Scherpenberg, Ambassador Grewe said that he had the impression that while this discussion had not advanced things very far in the concrete it had brought the two sides a little closer together in principle. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that discussions would presumably continue both in Bonn and Washington in the forthcoming weeks, but that he was not aware precisely what the next contemplated action would be. This was undoubtedly something to which Under Secretary Dillon was giving his thought. Ambassador Grewe said he hoped that something specific could be achieved in the way of an agreement on debt repayment and vested assets prior to January 20. He felt this was desirable for psychological reasons, and explained that this would avert the criticism and the generally unfavorable American attitude towards German

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<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of Hillenbrand's conversation with Brentano at 4 p.m. (US/MC/16) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1802.

“miserliness” which he anticipated would develop despite what he described as initial concentration of American press criticism on the State–Treasury initiative.

Ambassador Grewe said he was leaving for Washington tomorrow morning. He did not consider it necessary to stay for the formal ending of the NATO meeting. He commented on the general lack of press interest in the session for what he described as “understandable reasons”.

# Federal Republic of Germany

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### 241. Editorial Note

The subject of a summit conference was discussed frequently in the first 6 months of 1958 by the United States and the Soviet Union. Beginning on December 10, 1957, with a proposal by Premier Bulganin in a letter to President Eisenhower, the Soviet Union developed the position that a Heads of Government meeting on subjects which it wanted to discuss was the only way to ease international tension. In a reply on January 12, 1958, the President agreed to hold a summit conference, but only after substantive preparations had been made that would assure advancement of the cause of peace.

Further exchanges of letters between the President and the Premier and exchanges of aides-mémoire beginning at the end of February led to agreement that the three Western Ambassadors would begin limited substantive discussions with the Soviet Foreign Minister on May 5. These talks proceeded in a desultory fashion with the Foreign Minister meeting individually with each Ambassador and covering the same ground. On May 28, the Western Ambassadors transmitted to the Soviet Government their understanding of the procedures necessary for the preparations for a summit conference and a draft agenda for the meeting. This proposal drew immediate criticism from Premier Khrushchev, who had replaced Bulganin, in a letter to President Eisenhower on June 11 which rejected the Western proposal. On July 1, the President responded with some elaboration of the proposals and asked that they be reconsidered. The outbreak of the Middle East crisis in mid-July diverted attention from further pursuit of this series of exchanges.

For texts of the various documents exchanged between the Soviet Union and the United States beginning with the December 10 letter, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pages 696 ff.; for the British side, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1958*, pages 1 ff. The texts of the notes and aides-mémoire, documentation relating to their drafting, and the reports on the Ambassadorial meetings at Moscow are in Department of State, Central File 396.1.

**242. Memorandum of Discussion at the 354th Meeting of the National Security Council**

Washington, February 6, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants of the meeting and discussion of unrelated matters.]

General Cutler<sup>1</sup> discussed at length the controversy in the Planning Board with respect to paragraph 44,<sup>2</sup> and also pointed out the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against inclusion of this paragraph. He then called on Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Dulles began by stating his opinion that with respect to Germany the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union have something in common—namely, that it was not safe to have a unified Germany in the heart of Europe unless there were some measure of external control which could prevent the Germans from doing a third time what they had done in 1914 and in 1939. Secretary Dulles insisted that the Soviet Union would never accept an independent, neutralized Germany in the heart of Europe. He added that he was convinced of this fact from many private conversations with Soviet leaders, who had made it quite clear that they would never agree to the creation of a unified Germany unless it were controlled by the USSR. Nor, on the other hand, should the United States accept a unified Germany except as part of an integrated Western European community. We simply could not contemplate re-unifying Germany and then turning it loose to exercise its tremendous potentialities in Central Europe. Accordingly, we should get rid, once and for all, of the idea that the re-unification of Germany is in and by itself an objective of U.S. policy. Everything depended on the context in which Germany was re-unified, because you could not neutralize a great power like Germany permanently.

After paying tribute to the formidable capabilities and energies of the Germans and their extraordinary comeback from the devastation at the end of the war, Secretary Dulles again warned that we could not close our eyes to the fact that this great power must be brought under some kind of external control. The world could not risk another repetition of unlimited power loosed on the world.

Summing up, Secretary Dulles stated that we should not accept re-unification of Germany as a goal under any and all conditions. It would

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason.

<sup>1</sup> Robert Cutler, Chairman of the NSC Planning Board.

<sup>2</sup> See paragraph 44 of NSC 5803, Document 243.

be obviously disastrous to accept re-unification on the Soviet terms. But it would also be bad to accept it without any external limitation. We must therefore be flexible as to the terms on which we would find re-unification acceptable, and to do our best to keep the Germans happy until we have achieved a suitable re-unification of Germany.

General Cutler pointed out that the policy paper as written carries out exactly what Secretary Dulles had been arguing for. Paragraph 44, with its suggestion that the United States should study alternatives toward achieving German re-unification, was a long-term matter. It was looking ahead to a situation in which, as a result either of German internal policy or some move by the Russians, U.S. forces were kicked out of Germany.

Secretary Dulles replied by stating his strong objections to the idea that the United States would accept neutralization if it could thereby achieve a unified Germany. The point of the matter was that the Germans would never stay neutral. They will either go with the West or go with the East or play off the one against the other, which could put us in a very serious situation. Secretary Dulles added that the possibility of a neutralized and unified Germany had been explored in the State Department over a very long time, and the verdict was that the State Department was opposed to it. It would not help much to explore the matter all over again, as suggested in paragraph 44.

When asked for his views by General Cutler, General White (for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) expressed support for the views of Secretary Dulles, and reiterated the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in opposition to the inclusion of paragraph 44.

General Cutler argued with Secretary Dulles, pointing out that the United Kingdom and France seemed quite capable of playing a unilateral game with the Germans, and he could not understand why the United States did not seem capable of looking ahead in order to try to determine what we were going to do when Adenauer disappeared and we might find our forces asked to leave Germany.

The President pointed out that if the Socialists did come into power in Germany, we might have to put even more U.S. forces in that country. He added with emphasis that he agreed with all that the Secretary of State had said on the problem of German unification and neutralization. In point of fact, the President added, neutralizing Germany would amount to nothing more than communizing Germany.

Mr. George Allen said he wanted to remind the Council that the most significant single motivation in German public opinion was for the unification of that country. If the Soviets play up to this sentiment and agree to a neutralized Germany, Mr. Allen felt that the Germans would quickly buy such a proposal and give all the credit to the Soviet Union

for re-uniting their divided country. We would be faced with a terrible force if Soviet Russia and Germany joined together.

The President replied to Mr. Allen by expressing firmly the opinion that if Germany were neutralized it would be a Germany taken over completely by the Soviets. Mr. Allen expressed agreement with the President's view, and said that he was not arguing for the neutralization of Germany, but rather for a re-armed Germany favorably disposed to the United States and to the West.

The President went on to say that in his view the way to handle the German problem was to build up NATO and Germany within it. Germany would be attracted to remain in a strong NATO. Furthermore, the building up of NATO would perhaps encourage the satellites to throw off the Russian yoke. In short, the building up of the Western European community was, in the President's view, the best possible guarantee of world peace.

After General Cutler had called the Council's attention to certain salient features of the Financial Appendix, the President turned to Secretary Dulles and asked if he could give a clear reason as to why the Germans had dragged their feet so in the field of re-armament. Secretary Dulles replied that he supposed it stemmed from the reluctance of many Germans, in view of what had happened to them in the last war, to risk seeing Germany remilitarized. Also, there had been a very high degree of industrial activity in recent years, and full employment in Germany. Neither employers nor employees wanted to sacrifice this prosperity by going into the military service. Secretary Anderson added that the Germans also feared inflation if their re-armament programs proceeded too rapidly.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

## 243. National Security Council Report

NSC 5803

Washington, February 7, 1958.

### STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

#### General Considerations

#### A. *Significance of Germany to U.S. Policy*

##### 1. Germany is of vital importance to the United States:

a. Germany's location in the heart of Europe and its considerable material and human resources make it a key area in the struggle between the Communist and Free Worlds.

b. The division of Germany is a chronic source of European instability and East-West friction, and a possible source of major armed conflict.

c. The future development and orientation of the Federal Republic will significantly affect the development of Europe as a whole.

##### 2. U.S. policy toward Germany cannot be separated from the larger issues of U.S. global policy or European policy:

a. The reunification of Germany would involve a major readjustment in relations between East and West, because of the strategic importance to the USSR of its position in East Germany and because of the close relationship of the United States and Western Europe with West Germany.

b. Major U.S. decisions on such matters as U.S. troop deployment, use and disposition of nuclear weapons, and disarmament could have important effects on our relations with West Germany and hence on our position in Europe.

c. The development of a strong Western Europe will not be possible without German participation and cooperation in common European political, economic, and military institutions.

#### B. *Major Policy Factors*

##### *Political and Economic Stability of West Germany*

3. The Federal Republic is now the strongest economic power in Western Europe, has a stable political system, and is playing an increasingly prominent role in European and world affairs. As a result of the

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Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803 Series. Secret. NSC 5803 consisted of a cover sheet, a note by the Executive Secretary of the NSC which stated that it had been approved by the President on February 7, a table of contents, a statement of policy, a financial appendix, Supplement I on Berlin, and Supplement II on East Germany. Only the statement of policy is printed here. Supplement I on Berlin is virtually identical to Supplement I to NSC 5727, December 13, 1957, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XXVI, pp. 521-525. Supplement II on East Germany is printed as Document 265.



recent decisive electoral victory of Chancellor Adenauer's government,<sup>1</sup> the prospects are good, at least for the next few years, for a moderate stable government allied with the West. Political extremism of either the Left or the Right is not now significant. The continued economic and political strength of the Federal Republic is very important to the success of U.S. policy in Europe.

*The Division of Germany and the Problem of Reunification*

4. The division of Germany is a potential source of armed conflict and therefore a potential threat to U.S. security. Reunification will remain a central aim of West German policy and is a strong motivating force among the people of both East and West Germany. Until now West Germany has agreed with the United States and other Western powers in seeking reunification through free elections and avoiding any moves toward reunification which would jeopardize either West Germany's security or a unified Germany's political and military association with the West. At the same time, the USSR has rejected all Western proposals to settle the German problem through free elections, has insisted the problem must be settled by negotiation between the "two German states", and more recently has indicated it would not enter into discussions of any kind with the Western Powers on the German problem. There is no early prospect of Soviet agreement to a reunified Germany which might become militarily associated with the West. The USSR would also demand a very heavy price from the West in exchange for any diminution of its tight control over East Germany.

5. The West Germans have three possible lines of policy open to them. Broadly stated, these are:

a. To seek a rapprochement with the USSR and the Satellites, in order to achieve reunification while preserving an acceptable degree of independence from Soviet control. This alternative would be given little consideration in West Germany unless the United States acted in such a way as to signify abandonment or critical reduction of defense commitments in Western Europe.

b. To follow an independent course in foreign affairs, eschewing military alliances and counting on a stalemate between East and West which would enable West Germany to achieve a strongly independent neutral posture. So long as their present confidence in the effectiveness and reliability of U.S. security assurances continues to exist, however, most West Germans would not consider this alternative seriously unless there was some better prospect than at present of attaining reunification thereby.

c. To remain firmly attached to the Western alliance, in confidence that the strength and resolution of the West will protect West Germany against any attack while it attempts to enlarge its role in the Western alli-

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<sup>1</sup>September 15, 1957.

ance and in the world at large. During the next few years close cooperation with the Western alliance seems likely to be regarded not only as the sole workable alternative for West Germany, but also as affording opportunities for expansion of trade and influence.

6. However, in order to retain West German association over the longer run and to reduce the likelihood of West German unilateral efforts to solve the reunification problem, the West must continue to convince the West Germans that it will seek, as and when possible, to achieve unification. The West Germans fear that the United States may make an agreement with the USSR of major character (such as a comprehensive disarmament agreement) without settling the problem of German unification. In addition, the United States might have difficulty convincing the West Germans of its sincerity in reunification were it to oppose a Soviet offer for reunification which the West Germans considered did not endanger their security and which was made at a time when the West Germans discounted the danger of Soviet aggressive designs. However, if the United States were willing to guarantee such a settlement, the readiness of West Germany to accept it would be increased.

7. Since the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference of 1955<sup>2</sup> the Soviets have from time to time proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, but have not linked withdrawals to German reunification. More frequently they have proposed withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe, the liquidation of all foreign bases, and the abolition of all military pacts. In the West, various proposals for troop withdrawals have also been put forward, but these have been linked with an agreement on reunification and have been couched in terms of troop withdrawals from the center of Europe. Proponents argue that troop withdrawal proposals, if combined with satisfactory assurances of security for the West and with an agreement on reunification, might provide a feasible approach to removing the major irritant of a divided Germany. Proponents argue that such withdrawals would also reduce the threat of conflict which exists in the present confrontation of hostile Soviet and Western forces in the center of Europe. A major appeal to the United States of a plan providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, without jeopardizing the security of Western Europe, would be the elimination of the major instrument of Soviet control in the area. At present, however, there is no indication of any Soviet interest in a withdrawal of forces on both sides under conditions which would provide reasonable assurances of security for the West. Furthermore, the West German and other Western European Governments

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<sup>2</sup>For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva October 27–November 16, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol.V, pp. 632 ff.

would be strongly opposed to any significant reduction in the number of U.S. forces stationed in Germany, until there is some indication of change in the Soviet position regarding security and reunification.

8. Proponents of German neutralization have argued that the Soviets will agree to reunification only upon terms which guarantee the neutralization of a unified Germany, and that the West Germans themselves may eventually accept a neutralized status outside NATO in order to achieve unification. They also argue that neutralization is not too heavy a price to pay for Soviet withdrawal from East Germany (and possibly other Satellites) and the diminution of the considerable dangers to peace inherent in the present division of Germany, the isolation of Berlin, and the confrontation of large hostile forces in Central Europe.

9. The United States has maintained that the neutralization of Germany is not acceptable under present conditions for the following reasons:

a. West German military association with Western Europe is very important to strengthen NATO capabilities in Europe.

b. Financial and political considerations probably would militate against relocation elsewhere in Europe of NATO forces withdrawn from West Germany, and might lead therefore to sizeable force withdrawals from the Continent.

c. A neutralized Germany would have such different political interests from those of the NATO allies that it would not participate fully in the efforts to achieve greater Western European integration. Without such German participation, Western European integration is not likely to progress far enough to enable Western Europe to achieve the strength and prosperity which would best assure its independence over the long run.

d. As long as Western Europeans continue to feel that their security depends on U.S. participation in a strong NATO alliance, a unilateral U.S. proposal for neutralization would undermine the present West German Government and ties with the West as well as the support of other European Governments for NATO. Efforts to obtain the agreement of our NATO allies to such a proposal would run serious risk of having the same results.

*The Relationship of the Federal Republic to the Western Community*

10. The participation of the German Federal Republic in a strong and effectively integrated Western European Community is essential if Western Europe is to realize its maximum potential as a counterweight to Soviet power. The success of the Community may likewise have a decisive bearing upon the completeness and dependability of West Germany's association with the West. West German participation in an effective Western Community constitutes the best guarantee that West German strength will be used constructively, rather than independently, for the achievement of narrow nationalistic aims.

11. West German disposition to cooperate with other Western countries stems in part from belief in the over-all superiority of the West. Recent evidence of Soviet scientific achievements has led the West Germans to believe that the United States and its Western allies must increase their efforts in order to maintain Western military and over-all superiority.

12. To an increasing extent the Federal Republic has assumed a leading role in the movement for Western European integration, and is participating actively in the European Coal and Steel Community, the embryo European Economic (Common Market) Community, and the Atomic (EURATOM) Community. The West German attitude will be important in determining the future direction of these Communities, especially the rate at which the Six Members thereof<sup>3</sup> move toward full economic union and toward increased political unity. It will also be important in determining many related matters, such as the kind of commercial policy the Six Members adopt in their trading relations with the outside world, and the ultimate character of a broad free-trade area which has been proposed to associate the United Kingdom and other Western European countries with the Six. However, increased economic strength and the avoidance of financial crisis in France and the United Kingdom may be the critical factors in determining the rate of progress of these institutions; and should it prove to be essential for them to obtain substantial foreign financial assistance, the willingness of the West Germans to provide a proportion of such aid would be important.

13. The West Germans have some sense of dissatisfaction with their political relations with the West. They apparently expected, when they were given sovereignty, that they would enter more fully into the councils of the West. They feel that their actual and potential strength entitles them to play an increased role. They profess to find their role in NATO unsatisfactory. What they would probably like is a "political standing group" consisting of the United States and the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic. The smaller European countries (particularly Italy and the Benelux countries), while recognizing German reunification as a U.S.-U.K.-French responsibility, are bitterly opposed to any system of regular Great Power consultation which they fear would exclude them from any voice in the formulation of Western policies.

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<sup>3</sup> Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. [Footnote in the source text.]

*The Federal Republic's Relations with Eastern Europe (including East Germany)*

14. The Federal Republic has made it a cardinal point of foreign policy, as recently confirmed by its severance of relations with Yugoslavia,<sup>4</sup> not to maintain diplomatic relations with countries which grant diplomatic recognition to the so-called German Democratic Republic. It has made an exception only in the case of the Soviet Union.

15. The Federal Republic's official relations with the Soviet Union, always quite reserved, have become increasingly cool. These relations have not thus far contributed to the achievement of the maximum objectives of either power—for the Soviet Union, the detachment of the Federal Republic from the West; and, for the Federal Republic, progress toward German reunification. Even with respect to the minimum objectives—for the Soviet Union, considerable expansion of trade and cultural relations; and for the Federal Republic, the repatriation of all German nationals in the Soviet Union—progress has been minimal.

16. In its relations with the Satellites other than East Germany, the Federal Republic appears to be moving toward a position of greater flexibility. In particular, the Federal Republic will seek to strengthen its economic ties in Eastern Europe. The West Germans consider that their interests are served by encouraging Communist deviation from Soviet hegemony. However, West German policy is as yet uncertain and cautious because of (a) the desire to prevent a broader recognition of the East Zone government; (b) uncertainty as to whether establishment of relations with Poland and other Eastern European countries would in fact loosen Soviet control over Eastern Europe; and (c) the extremely sensitive political issue of the Eastern boundaries of Germany.

17. Any expansion of West German influence in Eastern Europe which loosens the ties between the USSR and the Satellites would advance U.S. objectives in that area. In view of the problems just cited, however, this can best be accomplished in the immediate future through the development of West German economic relations with the Eastern European countries (other than the Soviet Union) rather than by the establishment of diplomatic relations. West German trade missions in selected Eastern European countries would provide for official West German representation and could, to the extent that the Eastern European governments desire political contact with the Federal Republic, provide a cover for such contact. However, more extensive consultation with the Federal Republic on U.S. economic and political policies affecting the Eastern European countries would help to enhance and direct West German energies in that area.

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<sup>4</sup>The Federal Republic of Germany broke relations with Yugoslavia on October 19, 1957.

18. The Western Allies have taken the position that the Oder-Neisse line is temporary and that the final boundaries of Germany should be fixed in a peace settlement with the agreement of an all-German Government. They have taken no position on where the boundary should be. The Federal Government has from time to time hinted at the desirability of finding some compromise solution of the border question. However, it would be unwise for the United States to take a position on the boundary, at least until prospects for a settlement are more promising, because to do so would incur the ill will of either the Poles or the Germans, or both.

19. In East Germany the present Communist regime, though overwhelmingly opposed by the population, will be strongly entrenched as long as it is backed by massive Soviet military strength. The USSR has made clear its determination to maintain its power position in East Germany. The East German regime appears to be about to launch an intensified campaign to reduce Western influence on the population by reducing contacts between East Germany and the West. The Federal Republic fears Western involvement with Soviet military forces in the event of any large-scale uprising and has therefore strongly encouraged the East German population in its avoidance of active measures to change the existing situation. The Federal Government favors continued non-official economic relations with East Germany because it considers the Soviet Zone a source of needed commodities (e.g., brown coal). It also believes that a limited shoring up of the East German economy is an important factor in reducing the danger of an East German uprising and is a humanitarian duty towards less fortunate countrymen. (For a fuller discussion of U.S. policy toward East Germany, see Supplement II to this paper.)

#### *Berlin*

20. The Berlin situation calls for the utmost vigilance on the part of the Western Powers. The Western Powers are publicly committed to defend their position in Berlin, and the loss of this position would have incalculable consequences in undermining the Western position in Germany and the world at large. Yet Berlin remains isolated behind the Iron Curtain and exposed to constant Communist pressures and harassment. While the pattern behind recent increased difficulties is not easy to discern, it seems probable that Communist efforts are directed at this time more towards sealing off the Soviet Zone from Western influence than toward a major interference with the Western lines of communication to Berlin. (For a fuller discussion of U.S. policy on Berlin, see Supplement I to this paper.)

*The Federal Republic's Role in Western Defense*

21. Because West Germany was not psychologically or administratively prepared, some delay and difficulty was inevitable in the creation of West German armed forces. But the principal obstacles to building up an effective West German force have been, and will probably continue to be, uncertainty as to the basic strategic concepts upon which forces and weapons systems should be built and, to a lesser degree, a lack of popular enthusiasm for the costs and sacrifices involved. Force goals for West Germany, originally worked out in consultation with the West German Government in the course of EDC planning, were endorsed by NATO in 1952 and were established by North Atlantic Council in 1955 as a major contribution to the "shield concept" for the defense of Europe. West Germany will fall far short of attaining these goals (12 Army divisions by the end of 1958, 60 air squadrons by the end of 1959, and an over-all personnel strength of 500,000 men by the end of 1959). In December the NATO Council approved the following West German force goals for 1958: 8 Army divisions, 78 naval vessels, and 18 air squadrons (including 7 undergoing operational training). West Germany is expected to meet these 1958 goals. Following approval (probably in the spring of 1958) of the NATO Military Committee Document (MC-70)<sup>5</sup> on minimum essential NATO force requirements during 1958–1963, in the consideration of which West Germany is participating, revised West German military plans for the period beyond 1958 can be expected.

22. The Federal Republic presently has approximately 120,000 men in the armed forces, and recent planning figures show an interim strength goal for the armed forces (excluding territorial forces) of 303,000 men by 1961. The Army consists of seven divisions: three infantry divisions already committed to NATO; two armored; one mountain; and one airborne. All seven are under strength and possess only a limited combat capability. By March 31, 1959, the West Germans expect to have nine divisions, one at only brigade strength. The Navy present combat capability (principally minesweeping) is quite limited. A naval construction program is under way but will not be completed until 1961. The Air Force is still being organized and trained and has no combat units—primarily because of the difficulty of obtaining qualified pilots and land for airfields, and because of preoccupation with the implications of advanced aircraft types and missiles. West Germany has recently indicated an interest in integrating short-range tactical missiles in its NATO-committed forces. West German defense expenditures, although mounting, are only about 4.4% of gross national product as

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<sup>5</sup> For documentation on the discussion of MC-70 in NATO, see volume VII, Part 1.

compared with 10.4% for the United States, 7.9% for the United Kingdom, and 7.6% for France. However, the Federal Republic has indicated to NATO that West German defense expenditures will increase sharply in 1958 and subsequent years.

23. The United States has agreed to furnish the Federal Republic approximately \$900 million of military equipment as grant aid. Most of this matériel has now been delivered and no further aid is now contemplated, except for nominal amounts for training and possibly a modest mutual weapons development program. Present West German contracts for arms purchases outside West Germany total \$1 billion, with approximately one-third of that total placed in the United States. The West Germans at present are producing little military equipment other than transportation equipment and soft goods. West German manufacturers have been reluctant to engage in arms production, but this attitude is changing.

24. The West German financial contribution to the support of other NATO forces in West Germany has undergone successive annual reductions from a level of \$1.7 billion per year agreed to in May 1952 to a level of \$346 million for the period May 19, 1956–May 19, 1957. In May 1957 negotiations resulted in a West German agreement to make what the West Germans claimed to be a “final” contribution of \$285.7 million, of which the U.S. portion would be \$77.4 million (half that of the preceding 12 months). The United States accepted this reduction, but reserved the right to request an additional \$77.4 million for the balance of U.S. FY 1958, after the West German election. In November 1957, the United States sent a formal note requesting the \$77.4 million, to which no reply has yet been received.<sup>6</sup> On December 3, 1957, the British, after failing in negotiations to have the Germans furnish 50 million pounds (\$140 million) to cover the Deutschmark requirements of British troops in Germany for the year beginning April 1, 1958, invoked in the NATO Council the clause in the Brussels Treaty under which the United Kingdom reserved the right to withdraw troops committed to the Continent in case they encountered financial difficulties, including those of a foreign exchange nature. In doing so the British said that if satisfactory financial arrangements could not be worked out they would have to reconsider the whole question of how many troops they could maintain on the Continent.

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<sup>6</sup> As the West German contribution to the support of U.S. forces in West Germany has declined, German dollar receipts from expenditures by U.S. military forces in West Germany have risen. Total receipts from such expenditures have reached a level of \$408 million in FY 1957 and, without the additional \$77.4 million contribution requested from the West Germans, could reach a level of \$500 million in FY 1958 exclusive of offshore procurement. [Footnote in the source text. The note has not been found.]



25. Inability on security grounds to disclose more fully to the West Germans information regarding certain weapons systems, has inhibited the Federal Republic in making the decisions needed for a rapid military build-up. Security factors also have limited the scope of technical relations between West Germany and the arms-producing countries, particularly the United States, and have prevented the effective utilization of West German potential in the research and development field. The NATO meeting and implementation of the principles enunciated in the Eisenhower–Macmillan talks<sup>7</sup> should facilitate disclosure of technical information to the West Germans, particularly if the industrial security system in West Germany is improved. The prohibitions in the Brussels Treaty on the West German manufacture of certain types of weapons, particularly missiles, also limit the West German contribution to the development and production of these weapons. These limitations (other than those on atomic, biological or chemical weapons) can be amended or canceled by a two-thirds vote of the Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers, provided a request from the Federal Republic is supported by a recommendation by SACEUR. The Federal Republic has not been disposed to date to initiate requests for modifying these limitations, although there have been indications that the West Germans are interested in undertaking with their neighbors, particularly France and Italy, research concerning nuclear weapons, leaving production of such weapons to their allies who are not restricted by treaty. Additionally there are indications that the West Germans are looking toward the development and manufacture in West Germany of shorter-range missiles.

*The Federal Republic's Relation to Underdeveloped Areas*

26. The Federal Republic has exhibited a lively interest in the underdeveloped areas. Its principal interest has been in expanding West German trade, but it has exhibited a healthy awareness of the basic political problems in these areas and of the need for combating Soviet influence.

27. It is evident from the size of West German gold and foreign exchange reserves (\$5.75 billion as of October 31, 1957) and the current rate of increase (about \$2 billion a year) that the West Germans could provide a great deal more capital for foreign investment than they have provided in the past. Short and medium term credits have generally been provided where necessary to maintain the level of West German exports. However, the volume of West German long-term lending and direct investment by West German firms has not been large, in part because of the strong internal demand for capital in West Germany itself. The government has been reluctant to make public funds available

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<sup>7</sup> For documentation on Macmillan's visit to Washington October 23–25, 1957, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXVII, pp. 788 ff.

for public lending even in a fashion analogous to the U.S. Ex-Im Bank. There have recently been a number of West German suggestions for increased coordination or new methods of coordination with the United States and other industrialized countries in the assistance field, but these suggestions appear to reflect hopes that further U.S. or international funds could thereby be obtained to supplement whatever rather circumscribed efforts the West Germans have been prepared to make themselves.

28. Recently there have been some indications of a greater willingness on the part of the West Germans to extend credit abroad,<sup>8</sup> although they are still attempting to limit their credits to sound loans of medium term. West German officials have begun to give active consideration to the establishment of a new government mechanism to facilitate extension of external government credits.

#### Basic Objectives

29. Restoration by peaceful means of Germany as a united state, firmly attached to the principles of the United Nations, with freedom of action in internal and external affairs, capable of resisting both Communism and neo-Nazism.

30. Firm association with the West of the Federal Republic and ultimately of a united Germany through the North Atlantic community, preferably as a member of an integrated European community.

31. A contribution by the Federal Republic, commensurate with its human and material resources, to the defense of the West and to the solution of problems confronting the West.

32. Prevention of Soviet domination over all Germany and elimination of Soviet power in East Germany.

33. Maintenance of the Western position in Berlin, pending the reunification of Germany.

#### Major Policy Guidance

34. Continue to promote effective actions by the Federal Republic to further European integration through such arrangements as the Coal

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<sup>8</sup> The West Germans have made the maximum portion of their IBRD subscription which is subject to call available for lending by the Bank and have in addition lent \$175 million in U.S. dollars to the Bank. The Government has established a very small foreign aid program with funds of \$12 million, largely for technical assistance, \$2 million of which it has agreed, through NATO, to lend to Iceland. West Germany has also committed itself to providing a \$200 million contribution to the overseas investment fund of the Common Market. It also appears probable that credits will be provided to India which will postpone payments of perhaps \$250 million coming due on Indian imports from West Germany. Some credits for new Indian orders may also be made available. [Footnote in the source text.]

and Steel Community, the Common Market, EURATOM, and ultimately the Free Trade Area.

35. Seek a more rapid build-up of the West German forces to be contributed to an integrated NATO defense and a greater utilization of West German resources for the common defense. In particular:

a. Support the elimination of the restrictions in the Brussels Treaty on West German contributions in the missiles field.

b. Promote the development of a mutually acceptable degree of industrial security which will permit a fuller utilization of West German facilities and resources for weapons production and for research and development.

d. Establish through NATO agreed force goals for West Germany and encourage the development of West German forces along lines which will result in their inclusion in an integrated NATO military structure and which will not involve the establishment of a completely independent West German military capability.

e. Continue to provide essential U.S. training for West German military personnel, including a minimum amount as grant aid for certain types of training considered necessary to maintain U.S. influence upon development of the German defense forces.

f. Provide, as appropriate, assistance under the Mutual Weapons Development Program.

g. Be prepared to sell to West Germany appropriate types of matériel consistent with availabilities and priorities.

36. Continue to seek an appropriate West German financial contribution to the support of Western forces in West Germany until West Germany gives evidence that it is assuming its full responsibility for achieving NATO agreed force goals for West Germany.

37. On the basis that it is in the best interests of all countries concerned to discourage production of nuclear weapons by a fourth country, seek to persuade West Germany not to undertake independent production of such weapons. Assure West Germany that the United States will actively support the NATO decision to establish stocks of nuclear weapons which would be readily available for the defense of the alliance in case of need.

38. Maintain West German confidence in the intention of the United States to fulfill its NATO obligations.

39. Support a more significant role for the Federal Republic within NATO as it evidences its willingness to assume its full military responsibility within NATO.

40. Make clear to the West Germans that while urging them to accelerate their defense activities we are also urging (a) the United Kingdom to continue to make a substantial contribution to the defense of Continental Europe and (b) France to reconstitute its forces committed to NATO.

41. Encourage the Federal Republic to assume a greater measure of responsibility in activities of international organizations where U.S. interests are likely to be advanced thereby.

42. Encourage substantially increased West German financial and technical assistance to underdeveloped areas, both directly and through appropriate international institutions, and West German cooperation in countering Soviet penetration of such areas. In particular:

a. Consult in appropriate ways with the Federal Republic with a view to inducing it to assume increased responsibilities toward the underdeveloped areas.

b. Make clear to the West Germans that U.S. public funds cannot be expected to be available in sufficient amounts to make it necessary for West Germany itself to extend additional credit if its exports are to be maintained.

43. Continue to press for the reunification of Germany through free all-German elections, and under conditions which would take into account the legitimate security interests of all countries concerned. Make clear that reunification is essential to any genuine relaxation of tension between the Soviet Union and the West, but that the United States will not agree to any reunification involving (a) Communist domination of a reunified Germany; (b) a federated Germany which perpetuates the existing Government of the German Democratic Republic; (c) the withdrawal of U.S. and other allied forces from West Germany without an effective military quid pro quo from the Soviets and the Satellites; or (d) the political and military neutralization of Germany.

44. Although it is not now propitious for the United States to advance major alternatives toward achieving German unification,<sup>9</sup> the United States should give continuing consideration to the development of such alternatives (which may be later required by developments in either West Germany or the USSR or both) with a view to the long-run solution of the unification problem.

45. Encourage the development of economic relations at this time between the Federal Republic and the countries of Eastern Europe (other than the Soviet Union) on a basis consistent with U.S. economic defense policies and over-all trade and assistance policies which will contribute to the development of the independence of these countries from the Soviet Union. To this end consult with the Federal Republic from time to time.

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<sup>9</sup> In the discussion at the NSC on February 6 (see Document 242) the phrase "such as neutralization" was deleted before the President approved NSC 5803.

46. Maintain the Western position in Berlin, even to the extent of resisting Soviet pressure at the risk of a general war, in accordance with Supplement I to this paper.

47. Hamper the Soviets from making effective use of East Germany and oppose efforts to achieve international recognition and internal acceptance for the East German regime, in accordance with Supplement II to this paper.

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## 244. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 5, 1958.

### SUBJECT

Questions Regarding European Defense

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Franz Josef Strauss, German Minister of Defense  
Mr. Albrecht von Kessel, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, German Embassy  
Lt. Col. Biedermann, Staff Officer, German Army  
The Secretary of State  
Brig. Gen. Richard Steinback, Deputy Chief, MAAG, Germany  
Mr. Jacques J. Reinstein, GER

In welcoming Mr. Strauss, the Secretary recalled that, on the occasion of his last visit to the United States, he had been concerned with atomic energy matters. The Secretary expressed pleasure at the progress that had been made in this field with the establishment of EURATOM.

### *French Forces in Germany*

At the end of an exchange of remarks on North Africa, Mr. Strauss said that the situation concerned the German Government in view of its effect on French forces in Germany. Although the French claim that they

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3-558. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein on March 11. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: "General Byers has seen." A memorandum of Strauss' conversation with Elbrick on March 5 is *ibid.*; memoranda for the record of his conversations with Secretary Quarles and Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague on March 7 and 8 are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 333 Germany. Records of a similar meeting with Deputy Defense Minister Josef Rust on January 22 are *ibid.*

have 50,000 troops in Germany, as far as the Germans could figure out, there were only about 30,000. There was one armored division and another division which was not combat-worthy. The French had promised the Germans in 1956 that they would bring their troops back to Germany and had continued to hold barracks for this purpose. They had promised the same thing in 1957. He saw no immediate prospect of the troops returning. In answer to a question from the Secretary, Mr. Strauss said that the French were still retaining barracks for 80,000 to 90,000 troops in Germany, whereas they only needed space for half this amount. He said he had asked General Jacquot and Minister of Defense Chaban-Delmas to release some of the barracks to the Germans for a period of time. He said the Germans would be willing to return the barracks when the French forces return. There must be French forces in Germany not only for military, but for political reasons. It must be made clear to the Russians that there would continue to be French, British and American forces in Germany.

#### *British Forces in Germany*

Mr. Strauss said the German Government was concerned regarding the British attitude on the United Kingdom forces in Germany. As far as the financial problem was concerned, the Germans had made a compromise offer to the British which would provide immediate budgetary assistance to the United Kingdom. However, it was impossible for the German Government to provide further support costs. It was simply not possible to get parliamentary approval for more support costs. The Government had assured the Parliament in 1956 that there would be no further support costs. It had committed itself again in 1957. It was therefore possible to provide budgetary assistance to the British only indirectly.

#### *British Defense Thinking and NATO Policy*

Mr. Strauss said that the German Government was very much concerned about the British attitude toward defense problems. It believed that the British thinking was not in line with the official NATO thinking. The British believe that military planning can be based on the assumption that either there will be no war or that there will be all-out nuclear war. He said there was a need for forces, particularly in the area facing the Russians, capable of dealing with a limited attack. This requires the maintenance of shield forces and the German Government was very much concerned at the British intention to weaken the shield forces. Mr. Strauss said the British trip-wire theory was completely unacceptable to Germany. He stressed that, while he wished to make clear the great concern of the German Government regarding British policy, he did not want the Secretary to think that this represented an anti-British attitude on his part or that the German Government was anti-British.

The Secretary said he agreed. He thought that we must be prepared to deal with limited situations without all-out war. He believed that within a short time there would be small atomic weapons which could be used in such situations. At the present time, with the danger of fall-out, it was difficult to use such weapons in friendly areas. Moreover, there was a danger that radioactive particles would be blown back to our side of the line. The Secretary pointed out that the importance of continued testing of nuclear weapons lay in the possibility of the development of small, clean weapons. Mr. Strauss asked if the Secretary meant that these weapons would operate by fission. The Secretary said that he did.

The Secretary said that he felt the development of small clean weapons would change the situation. At the present time, it is very awkward. If there were, for example, an incursion into the Federal Republic, we would be confronted with the choice of attempting to repel it with the use of conventional weapons or by employing the full force of our nuclear weapons, with the consequence that Moscow, Washington and other major population centers would be destroyed. The Secretary said he did not know whether military experts had fully accepted the concept which he had outlined, but he had expressed it in an article which he had recently written for *Foreign Affairs*.<sup>1</sup> In conclusion, the Secretary said he agreed with Mr. Strauss that the British trip-wire theory was not acceptable.

Mr. Strauss said that he had told Mr. Spaak that Great Britain was defended along the Elbe and not along the Channel. The British forces in Germany were there for the protection of Great Britain and not for the protection of Germany. However, he thought the whole concept of forces defending a particular area was erroneous. He thought the purpose of the NATO forces was to prevent war.

#### *Financial Support of United Kingdom Forces in Germany*

The Secretary said he was not clear as to the status of the discussions on the financing of British forces in Germany, but he hoped very much that the problem would be satisfactorily settled. Mr. Strauss said that he hoped it would be, but stressed that the Germans could not accept the ideas of the British White Paper on defense.

#### *Nuclear Weapons*

Mr. Strauss expressed his concern that the effort of the British to develop nuclear weapons would lead to the development of these weapons in other countries. The next country would be France. He said that

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<sup>1</sup> "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1957, pp. 24–43.

the Germans had tried to discourage the French from developing nuclear weapons. Should the production of these weapons continue to spread, the problem of control would become insoluble. The costs involved would be such that it would also become impossible to maintain a balanced NATO force. He said that as far as the Federal Republic was concerned, it would be quite satisfied if atomic warheads were available for use in case of emergency. The Secretary said that this was what had been agreed at the December NATO Meeting.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Strauss indicated that this was what he had in mind.

*Weapons Production; Collaboration between France, Germany and Italy*

Mr. Strauss emphasized the need for standardization of weapons in NATO. He said that the only standardization which had been achieved had resulted from the supply of American weapons as mutual aid. However, it was obviously not possible for one country to undertake the entire task of supplying weapons to the alliance. The Secretary said that he did not think it was a good idea for Europe to be dependent upon the United States in this regard. He said that, while he did not know what the American military had said on the subject, he knew the President had felt very strongly that it was desirable for the Germans to have a source of supply for tanks in Europe and had hoped they would buy British tanks. The Secretary said he thought that the Germans should eventually undertake the production of tanks themselves.

Mr. Strauss said that, while it was not easy to be certain about such matters, it was apparently the thinking of the military that in another war the first thirty days would be decisive. The Secretary said he remembered much the same view being expressed in 1914. Mr. Strauss said that the same idea had been expressed at the time of Hitler's Blitzkriegs. He said nevertheless he thought that the main reliance in another war would have to be placed on existing stocks. The Secretary said this appeared to involve acceptance of the concept that the only type of war there could be was an all-out war. Mr. Strauss indicated he did not mean this. He said that he thought there should be independent national stocks sufficient for ninety days, during the period when it would be impossible to organize adequate transport. Beyond this the supply problem should be dealt with on a combined basis.

Mr. Strauss referred to the collaboration which had been undertaken by the Federal Republic, France and Italy in the field of military production. He said that it was impossible to agree on concrete projects in groups of seven, eight or fifteen countries. It could be done in a group of three countries. The Secretary said he would think that the Germans

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<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the December 1957 North Atlantic Council meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, pp. 1 ff.



would be interested in military production in Belgium. Mr. Strauss said he agreed. He said he had told Defense Minister Spinoy that Belgium and The Netherlands would be given a complete list of the projects to be undertaken by France, Italy and Germany, with the idea that their participation would be welcome in any projects in which they were interested.

*Nuclear Weapons in FIG; Atomic Propulsion*

The Secretary asked whether this collaboration included nuclear weapons. Mr. Strauss said that it did not as yet. He knew that the French wanted financial support. He believed that they would wait some time before pressing the matter of cooperation in nuclear weapons production, during which they would negotiate with the United States and the United Kingdom on the subject. The Secretary said he hoped the French would not undertake the production of nuclear weapons. He thought it would be foolish for them to get involved in the expense. He remarked that some people think that if they get a Cadillac, they are moving in high society. He said France simply could not afford a nuclear weapons program. The Federal Republic and the United States had recently had to pull the French out of an extremely bad financial situation. If the Algerian war went on, their finances would continue to be strained and it was impossible to envisage a nuclear weapons program being superimposed on this situation.

Mr. Strauss said the Germans were not interested in making atomic weapons. They were interested in having them available in case of need. On the other hand, they were very much interested in all kinds of atomic propulsion. When the Soviets were able to produce atomic submarines, the defense of the Baltic Sea would be difficult. It was essential to have atomic submarines in order to prevent Soviet egress from the Baltic and to protect the Baltic flank. He did not think the Soviets had an atomic submarine as yet, although they probably had a prototype. He said the Germans were not ready to get into the field of atomic propulsion, but when they were, they would wish to take advantage of the offer made by the United States at the December NATO Meeting to provide the know-how. He said this was not a matter for the next two or three years, but for the mid-60's.

As he took leave of the Secretary, Mr. Strauss said he had two final things to say. One was that there was very complete and genuine cooperation between the American military authorities in Germany and the German defense authorities. He expressed great satisfaction with this cooperation. The other thing was to convey the Chancellor's very warm greetings to the Secretary. The Secretary remarked that he had had a very nice birthday greeting from the Chancellor several days previously.

**245. Editorial Note**

On July 26, Secretary of State Dulles arrived in Bonn on his way to a meeting of the Baghdad Pact at London July 28–31. During a 5-hour visit in the capital, he discussed with Chancellor Adenauer the situation in France and the Middle East, a possible summit meeting, and disarmament. Following the meeting with Adenauer, Dulles met with Foreign Minister Brentano to consider nuclear weapons for France, French-German relations, and a meeting of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union.

Memoranda of these conversations and related documentation are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1060 and 1064.

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**246. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board**

Washington, September 3, 1958.

**OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON  
GERMANY (THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC) (NSC 5803)**

(Approved by the President on February 7, 1958)

(Period Covered: From July 17, 1957 Through September 3, 1958)

*A. Summary Evaluation*

1. This period brought no basic change in the situation in Germany. As far as the situation within the Federal Republic is concerned, there was continued progress toward the accomplishment of U.S. policy objectives. U.S.-German relations remained close and cordial. The political stability of the Federal Republic and the West Germans' repudiation of extremism and attachment to Western-oriented political parties was confirmed anew in the third Bundestag elections and the North

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Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803 Series. Secret. For the section of this report on Germany (Berlin), see vol. VIII, Document 19. For the section on Germany (East Germany), see Document 279. A Financial Annex and Pipeline Analysis is not printed.

Rhine-Westphalia elections. The economic boom continued, although at a somewhat less accelerated rate. European integration with German participation took important steps forward with the establishment of the European Economic and Atomic Communities. Efforts to obtain German collaboration in the pursuit of Western objectives in Eastern Europe and in the Near East and other “uncommitted areas” had limited success. Gradual progress was made towards achieving the reduced NATO goals for the German military establishment, but obstacles remained to be overcome in the retarded buildup of the Air Force and in wide-spread opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany.

2. No discernible progress was made towards national reunification and the elimination of Soviet influence in East Germany, although the Western position in Berlin was fully maintained. The Soviet Union clearly indicated its unwillingness to resume discussion of reunification at a summit conference. There were signs that new efforts might be required to deflate ill-considered and dangerous proposals, for example, the scheme for the “confederation” of the two parts of Germany, which could derive support within Germany from impatience at the lack of a solution of the German problem and to some extent from misgivings about the effectiveness of Western defense arrangements.

3. A review of policy is not recommended.

*B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States*

4. *German Reunification.*

a. No progress was made toward a solution of the basic German problem—that of national reunification. The problem was reviewed in connection with the possibility of another summit conference. The U.S., U.K. and France took the position that another summit conference, if held, should resume discussion of German reunification and European security where it broke off at the Geneva Conference of 1955<sup>1</sup> and that they should press toward an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the Eden Plan<sup>2</sup> or some modification thereof. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, persisted in its contention that reunification should be worked out in negotiations between the “two German States” rather than among the Four Powers, and the East German Communists played a variant of this theme by calling for a “confederation” of the Federal Republic and the “German Democratic Republic”. Chancellor Adenauer believed it important that a summit conference not fail solely over the issue of inclu-

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<sup>1</sup> For documentation on the Geneva Summit Meeting July 17–23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, pp. 119 ff.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the Eden Plan for German reunification and European security, see *ibid.*, pp. 301 ff.

sion of the German problem as an item of the agenda, and he apparently considered that more progress might be made toward a solution of this problem if the Four Powers could first reach an understanding on disarmament.

b. The attitude of the German population continued to be more one of resignation than of restiveness, but there were indications that the prolonged stalemate might be persuading a greater body of opinion of the inevitability of making greater concessions toward the Communist position. The Opposition showed a growing disposition to deal with the East German regime, and increased contacts with the GDR were in fact endorsed by the National Convention of the SPD.

5. *West German Contribution to European Defense.*

a. Among the most pressing problems with relation to Germany continued to be that of assuring an adequate contribution by the Federal Republic to Western defense. Progress was made toward the attainment of the reduced West German force goals fixed by NATO.

b. The German armed force increased its strength to about 140,000 men. Seven divisions, at less than full combat strength, were turned over to NATO. Another two divisions will be activated in the fall of 1958. The buildup of the Air Force was delayed by a lack of trained pilots and airfields but training under American supervision progressed satisfactorily. A small Naval arm has limited combat ability in the Baltic. According to the latest German plans, twelve divisions, 40 air squadrons and a small naval arm, comprising a total of about 350,000 men, will constitute the German military establishment in 1961. Military expenditures are expected to increase sharply and will total Deutschemarks 21 billion by 1961, including aid to Berlin.

6. *Nuclear Weapons in Germany.*

a. A serious, although perhaps transitory, problem in connection with the prosecution of the defense and foreign policies of the Federal Government arose from wide-spread opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany. Many Germans feel that the acceptance of nuclear weapons would increase the risk of a third World War and threaten Germany with atomic destruction. Largely for the lack of other issues, the Opposition attempted to gain the support of this body of opinion by seizing on the issue of nuclear armament as the principal theme for its attacks on the Federal Government. The SPD, with considerable support from trade union and professional circles, pulled out all stops in a "Campaign against Atomic Death" which reached its peak on the eve of the North Rhine-Westphalia elections in July 1958. The SPD's endorsement of plebiscites and warning strikes indicated the temper of the dispute. Although the principal objective was to bar nuclear capability for the Bundeswehr, propaganda was directed against atomic weap-

ons in general and thus against possession of them by U.S. forces in Germany.

b. The Federal Government was, however, able to win the approval of the Bundestag in March 1958 for the equipping of the Bundeswehr with "the most modern weapons" (a euphemism for nuclear capabilities) and the North Rhine- Westphalia election indicated that the "atomic death" campaign influenced few votes. In short, the Opposition argument that the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany will prevent German reunification had no more immediate effect than the earlier argument that the creation of a German armed force would prevent reunification. The uneasiness expressed so vociferously by the Opposition is, however, privately shared by some supporters of the Government.

7. *Franco-German Relations.* The accession of de Gaulle appeared to have raised a new problem for Franco-German relations and understanding, which previously had been developing in a very satisfactory fashion. Federal German leaders feared that de Gaulle might undertake a reorientation of French policy, laying more stress on French national interests and prestige, to the detriment of European cooperation. Specifically, the Germans were concerned about possible French attempts to reorganize NATO defense arrangements, about France's desire to become a fourth atomic power, about de Gaulle's known reservations regarding German reunification, about de Gaulle's desire to restore formal "tripartitism" (collaboration of the U.S., the U.K. and France) and the danger that Germany would thereby be relegated to a secondary position, and about de Gaulle's apparent reluctance to commit France to a solution of the issue of a Free Trade Area. The problem was complicated by the facts that some Germans saw parallels between de Gaulle's and Hitler's accessions to power and that de Gaulle and Adenauer had not yet met.

8. *Federal Republic's Relation to Underdeveloped Areas.* The United States policy of encouraging substantially increased West German financial and technical assistance to underdeveloped areas, both directly and through appropriate international institutions, had limited success. The Federal Republic continued to express its interest in the underdeveloped areas in various forums and made clear both its awareness of the need to forestall Soviet penetration into these areas and its desire to expand trade with these areas. While the Federal Republic made suggestions for increased coordination with the United States in aiding underdeveloped areas, it became increasingly clear that German assistance will usually take the form of credit insurance to German exporters and loans to international organizations and will rarely take the form of making available public funds directly to other countries. The

Germans have indicated that additional possibilities of private or public aid for underdeveloped countries are limited as far as the Federal Republic is concerned and, in particular, have taken a negative attitude toward European initiatives in the NATO and OEEC for multilateral arrangements for aid to underdeveloped countries. (See paragraph 16 in Annex A.)

9. *Return of German Assets.* On July 31, 1957 the White House announced the Administration's intention to submit as a matter of priority to the next session of Congress a plan providing for the payment of all legitimate war damage claims of American nationals against Germany and an equitable monetary return to the former owners of vested German assets.<sup>3</sup> The German Federal Government expressed its grave disappointment with the terms of the Administration proposal and asked that the submission of a draft bill be deferred. The Germans were advised that the proposal for an equitable monetary return to former owners of vested assets could be deferred, as they requested, but that it would be necessary to go forward with a separate American claims bill. Such a separate draft bill, for the payment of the war damage claims of American nationals against Germany from the proceeds of vested assets, was submitted to Congress July 8 by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission on behalf of the executive branch. Just prior to its adjournment on July 4, the German Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution requesting the German Federal Government to work vigorously for the settlement of the question of German assets vested in the United States and to pay particular attention to the proposed draft bill for the payment of American war damage claims from vested assets.

10. *Support Costs.* The Federal Republic and the United States reached an agreement on June 7, 1957 under the terms of which the Federal Government paid \$77.4 million to cover partially the Deutschmark costs of maintaining U.S. troops in Germany during FY 1958. This sum was half of the amount received in the previous year. The United States has approached the Federal Government several times since the fall of 1957 for an additional \$77.4 million, but the Germans have refused to pay us any further support costs. The approach was made pursuant to the agreement of June 7 in which we had reserved the right to bring up the matter again if we so desired.

11. *London Debt Settlement.* Under the Anglo-German support cost arrangements recently approved in NATO, Germany agreed to pay the British a lump sum constituting installments otherwise due in 1961-1964 on its post-war debt. Should the Germans not make a propor-

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<sup>3</sup> For text of this announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 19, 1957, p. 306.

tional payment to us, they must obtain a waiver of our rights to equal treatment provided for in the London Debt Agreements. However, the German Government, in stating to parliament that it will not pay additional troop costs to the U.S., recently indicated that it may be prepared to accelerate payments on its post-war debt to the U.S.

*Note:* See latest National Intelligence Estimate NIE 23–57, dated 5 November 1957, “The Outlook for Germany”.<sup>4</sup>

## Annex A

### ADDITIONAL MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

12. *Bundestag Elections.* The third Bundestag election on September 17, 1957 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the leading party of the governing coalition, the CDU/CSU, which won 270 of 497 seats. The election thus assured the continuation of the Government which, under Chancellor Adenauer, has guided the Federal Republic since its creation in 1949. The SPD won 169 seats, the FDP 41, and the DP 17. The election results confirmed the trend toward a two party (CDU/CSU and SPD) system in the Federal Republic. The CDU/CSU also obtained an absolute majority in the North Rhine-Westphalia elections on July 6, 1958, thus winning back control of the Government of the Federal Republic’s largest state and containing better than a two-thirds majority in the Bundsrat.

13. *Leveling Off of the German Economic Boom.* The exceptionally high rates of economic growth in the Federal Republic during recent years have been tapering off since late 1956. In its earlier phase, this development was occasioned by the almost full utilization of most resources, including manpower. Toward the end of 1957, the leveling-off process coincided with a decline in export orders whose effects will probably become more pronounced later in 1958 but are not expected to be severe. Furthermore, internal demand remains strong and can be encouraged if necessary by government policies. The outlook therefore is one for continued but more balanced growth.

14. *European Integration.* The integration of the Federal Republic into the Western European community took a long step forward January 1, 1958 when the European Economic Community (Common Market) and the European Atomic Community (EURATOM) came into being. The Federal Republic plays an important role in both organizations.

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<sup>4</sup>Not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

15. *Franco-Italo-German Cooperation in Weapons Research, Development, and Manufacture.* In early 1958, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and France agreed to undertake a coordinated approach to the development and production of military weapons. At first many of the NATO countries feared that this arrangement (FIG) would be inimical to plans for cooperation in this field on an all-NATO basis. Recently, however, statements made by FIG spokesmen, particularly Defense Minister Strauss of Germany, and the willingness of the FIG countries to keep NATO informed and to cooperate in this field with the WEU and NATO have done much to allay such fears. After presentation in NATO, Belgium and the Netherlands joined the group and it was re-formed into an official NATO Working Group. Technical experts of the five countries have been meeting in order to work out the details of development and production planning including the extension of financial participation of these countries. Three major projects under discussion at the moment are the development of a solid fuel IRBM, Sidewinder, and a surface-to-air missile of the Hawk type. Beyond this NATO recognition, FIG cooperation is evidenced by the agreement between Germany and France relating to joint research and development work to be done at the French military research center in St. Louis. Fears were also aroused that FIG would develop nuclear weapons in France, but Minister Strauss has stated Germany is interested in the use of atomic energy for such purposes as the propulsion of ships but not in the production of atomic weapons. The FIG agreement as such neither expressly includes nor excludes joint production of atomic weapons. There have been recent indications that the new French Government may have certain reservations regarding the FIG arrangement.

16. *German Contributions to Underdeveloped Areas.* (See paragraph 8 of the Report.) In contributing to underdeveloped areas, the Federal Republic has:

- a. established a technical assistance program for underdeveloped areas which appears to be in the neighborhood of \$12 million annually; it is not clear how much of this accumulating sum has been committed and spent;
- b. made a commitment of \$200 million contribution to the overseas investment fund of the European Economic Community (Common Market);
- c. maintains a revolving fund of \$2.3 billion for export credit insurance, mainly to underdeveloped countries;
- d. indicated its intention to fund over a three-year period \$157 million of the \$330 million owed to the Federal Republic by India on current account;
- e. agreed to contribute \$50 million to a loan to Turkey for imports from the OEEC countries;
- f. loaned \$250 million to the World Bank in U.S. dollars;
- g. is contributing less than half a million dollars to the United Nations Technical Assistance Fund for 1958 (as compared with a contribu-



tion of \$2.2 million by the United Kingdom; \$1.5 million by France; \$1.1 million by the Netherlands; \$2.0 million by Canada, and \$1.5 million by the United States); and

h. made voluntary contributions from 1950 to date to UNRWA (Palestine Refugees) in the total amount of \$65,400. In addition, Germany has now pledged \$360,000 for UNRWA's 1958 program.

17. *Breaking of Relations with Yugoslavia.* With considerable reluctance, the Federal Republic severed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in October 1957 after Yugoslavia extended diplomatic recognition to the "German Democratic Republic" (GDR). The Federal Republic feared that its failure to react to the Yugoslav recognition of the GDR might encourage other states, particularly the "uncommitted" ones, to follow suit. It now seems that both Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic desire to find some formula for re-establishing diplomatic relations.

18. *Agreements with U.S.S.R.* In April 1958, after nine months of difficult negotiations, the Federal Republic concluded Trade and Consular Agreements and an understanding on the repatriation of German nationals with the U.S.S.R. As evidenced by the attacks on the Soviet Embassy at Bonn and the Federal German Embassy at Moscow after the announcement June 17 of the execution of the leaders of the Hungarian revolt, the progress toward the normalization of formal relations did not denote an improvement in the general political relations between the two countries.

19. *Relations with the Satellite Area.* The Federal Government and popular opinion within the Federal Republic showed increasing interest in the establishment of closer relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, especially with Poland. Sympathy with Poland's efforts to win a greater measure of freedom from the U.S.S.R. tended to offset antipathy based on the Polish annexation of former German territory. However, the Federal Government was inclined to move slowly in this area, primarily because of the fear that the establishment of formal relations with countries of the Eastern European area (which already have relations with the "German Democratic Republic") might tend to give greater currency to the Soviet-sponsored concept of the existence of "two German States".

20. *Status of Forces Arrangements.* In December 1957 the German Federal Government submitted a memorandum setting forth the "final" German proposal on the main outstanding issues in this multilateral negotiation to work out arrangements supplementing the NATO Status of Forces Agreement as a replacement for the Bonn Forces Convention.<sup>5</sup> In May 1958 the Ambassadors from the "sending states" (U.S.–U.K.–France–Belgium–Denmark–Netherlands–Canada) presented to the

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<sup>5</sup> The memorandum has not been found. For text of the Forces Convention, October 23, 1954, see 6 UST 5689.

German Foreign Office a written reply accepting the principles of the German proposal as a basis for concluding the Status of Forces negotiations.<sup>6</sup> The Conference has been resumed accordingly, and it is hoped that the negotiations may be finished this summer. It is anticipated that, after conclusion of the negotiations and before final signature can be authorized, the governments concerned may require some months to review the extensive and complicated provisions contained in the supplementary arrangements.

21. *Overflight Problems.* The Soviets have refused to authorize flights of U.S. aircraft over the Soviet Zone east of Berlin (i.e., outside the quadripartite established Berlin air corridors), maintaining that such authorization must be sought from the GDR, which, as a "sovereign state", exercises control over its own airspace. An implied threat by the Western Powers to refuse permission for Soviet overflight of the Federal Republic in retaliation has failed to change the Soviet position. The Soviets have declared that they do not regard the U.S., U.K. and France as responsible for controlling Soviet overflights of the Federal Republic and attempted to obtain such permission directly from the Federal Republic instead. The Federal Republic has recommended that the Western Powers propose to the Soviets an arrangement under which all Four Powers will have unrestricted overflight rights over both parts of Germany and Berlin will at the same time be opened to international aviation on a normal basis. (See paragraph 7 of the Berlin Report of this date.)

22. *Reaction to U.S. Landing in Lebanon.* The U.S. action in landing troops in Lebanon was sharply criticized by a majority of the West German press, which took the line that such action, involving as it did a serious risk of major war, had been taken without adequate consultation with the Germans or appropriate consideration of legitimate German interests. Concern was also expressed that American troops had been sent from Germany to Lebanon, a practice which, it was felt, could contribute to weakening the Federal Republic's own defense, and to undermining its good relations with the Arab world. The German reaction also appears to have been colored by recollections of the Hungarian and Suez affairs of 1956. The Federal Government conspicuously failed at first to give its American ally the moral support which might have been expected under the circumstances, although such support was later given in somewhat reserved fashion. Since the situation in the Middle East is no longer critical, further U.S.-German difficulties on this score are not expected, but the development appears noteworthy as a symptom of the Germans' desire or intention to exercise somewhat more independence in the field of foreign policy.

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<sup>6</sup>Not found.

## 247. Editorial Note

In January 1960, Chancellor Adenauer approached the Embassy in Bonn about the possibility of an informal visit to Washington immediately before he received an honorary degree from the University of California on March 17. The White House, on January 22, approved the idea and set March 15 as the date for discussions between the Chancellor and the President.

Adenauer arrived in New York on March 12, attended various functions in New York and Princeton, New Jersey, and reached Washington at 10:30 p.m. on March 14. Following conversations with the President and Secretary of State Herter on March 15, various social functions, and an address at the National Press Club on March 16, the Chancellor left Washington for the West Coast where he spent several days vacationing. On March 24, he arrived in Japan for an official State visit.

The most extensive collection of documentation on his visit to Washington is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610–1612. An extensive amount of documentation on the conversation with the President is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Some additional documentation is in Department of State, Central Files 396.1–PA, 611.62A, and 762.00.

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## 248. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Private Conversation between President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer

### PARTICIPANTS

The President

Chancellor Adenauer

LS—Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

Mr. Heinz Weber (interpreter)

After the usual hearty greetings, President Eisenhower invited the Chancellor to discuss any questions which he might like to bring up prior to the talks involving a larger group. Chancellor Adenauer there-

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lejins and approved by the White House on March 18. The conversation took place at the White House.

upon presented to the President a memorandum concerning the intellectual basis of the fight against communism.<sup>1</sup> He indicated that he had discussed similar matters with the President in December<sup>2</sup> and expressed his hope that the President would take the time to read the memorandum and would let him know whether he agrees with its premises. President Eisenhower promised to send him a note concerning the matter but stated that he could say at once that he heartily agreed with the second sentence of the memorandum which stated something to the effect that communism is governed by Marxist-Leninist principles and that the Communist Party rules supreme in the Soviet Union. Chancellor Adenauer then stated that the memorandum deals with the intellectual aspects of the struggle with communism and that we must expect this struggle to continue for years to come. The President agreed, saying that he has been emphasizing in his speeches that the aims and objectives of communism cannot be expected to change.

Chancellor Adenauer then spoke about the importance which he attached to the question of disarmament. He stated that he had addressed the Council for Foreign Affairs in New York the day before and had there expressed and emphasized the need for a coordinated disarmament program. He stated that in spite of the work of the UN Ten Nation Committee he felt it would be necessary for the leaders of governments assembling in Paris to do everything in their power to achieve progress in disarmament. He was very emphatic in his statement that he felt it was the human duty of the Big-4 leaders to work for effective disarmament in order to free humanity at long last from fear. He then proceeded to inform the President that he was in Berlin in January and had there addressed the parliamentary body, composed of freely elected representatives of the population. He had discussed with them the question of Germany and Berlin. Three weeks ago he had discussed the same questions in the Bundestag and found that, for the first time since 1949, there was complete unanimity on this question between the Government and the Opposition. President Eisenhower interjected that this was a very welcome development and he wished he could say as much at home.

Chancellor Adenauer agreed that this unanimity was a good thing and expressed the hope that it might remain until after the 1961 elections. Naturally the election campaign was bound to bring out and accentuate differences. However, he stated his party had to win in order to continue the line followed by Germany during his administration and which in fact closely followed the policies set up by President Eisen-

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<sup>1</sup> A translation of this memorandum is *ibid.*, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany, attached to an undated draft memorandum from Calhoun to Goodpaster.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 59.

hower himself. Then he, the Chancellor, proceeded to say that regardless of whether the Summit Conference achieved any immediate success or for that matter any success at all, the fact of this Summit Conference was a monumental historic event and of merit, which could not but help improve the world situation ultimately.

President Eisenhower then stated that he had heard that there were several points on which the Chancellor might have some doubts or misgivings, and the President therefore wished to reassure him. From General Norstad and others the President had heard that the Chancellor feared a withdrawal of American troops from Europe. Mr. Eisenhower emphatically assured the Chancellor that there was no intention of doing so until substantial progress had been made in achieving a workable disarmament program. Until that time such a withdrawal would not even be discussed. Secondly, the President wished to assure the Chancellor that the American flag would continue to fly over Berlin as long as present conditions prevailed and no agreement acceptable to the populations of West Berlin and Western Germany had been concluded. The President assured Mr. Adenauer that this is his firm position to which he will adhere as long as he is in office.

The Chancellor hastened to assure the President that he himself had never doubted the firmness of the US position on these points, but that he had heard doubts and questions on the American side concerning the steadfastness of German public opinion and the intentions and firmness of the German Government. Such rumors were completely untrue. Western Germany was firmly resolved in its stand. The Chancellor recalled Mr. Dulles' last trip to Bonn in February 1959,<sup>3</sup> at which time Mr. Dulles had stated that the United States was ready to use force to overcome any obstacles which the GDR might create for the allies in Berlin. At that time Mr. Adenauer had told Mr. Dulles that he fully agreed with this stand and considered it the only correct one. He wished to reiterate this belief to Mr. Eisenhower at this time and wanted the President to know that the German Government was resolved and ready to do everything necessary for the allies to break opposition with force. Mr. Eisenhower then stated that it appeared that the stand of the two governments in this question was firm and clear. He continued to say that the Chancellor realized, of course, that all types of political thinking were represented in the United States. For this reason it was possible to hear speeches which contained ideas quite different from those expressed by him in the above question. However, these speeches were of no political import. Mr. Adenauer then stated that in his opinion certain

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<sup>3</sup> For documentation on Dulles' visit to Bonn February 7–9, 1959, see vol. VIII, Documents 164 ff.

circles, probably at the instigation of the USSR, were starting rumors to spread distrust among the Western Allies.

The President said that he would like to discuss one more personal question. Mr. Dulles' papers were being stored at the Princeton Library, and Herbert Hoover, Jr. was taking a particular interest in the matter. He had expressed the hope that the Chancellor might find it possible to make his correspondence, or copies thereof, available to the Princeton Library in order to complete the collection. These papers would, of course, be held under the conditions prescribed by the Chancellor himself in case, for instance, he might not wish them to be opened until 25 years after his death or some other specified period. The Chancellor expressed his willingness to cooperate, saying that he received an honorary degree at Princeton the day before, whereupon the President laughingly said that Mr. Adenauer should in that case be all the more willing to cooperate in this project as an alumnus of the institution. The President promised to tell Mr. Hoover that the Chancellor was willing to cooperate and that, if the Chancellor wished, Mr. Hoover might write him a memorandum concerning the history and development of this collection. The Chancellor appeared to be favorably inclined toward receipt of such a memorandum. He then indicated that there were several personal matters which he wanted to bring to the President's attention. First, he wanted the President to know that he had just come from Mr. Dulles' grave, where he had deposited a wreath. Secondly, knowing about the President's interest in photography, he had taken the liberty to bring him one of Leitz' latest products and, thirdly, to strengthen the President in the difficult times ahead, he was sending him some wine, which should not, however, be permitted to freeze. At the same time he admonished the President not to use the wine too sparingly.

249. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Germany and Berlin; Importance of Propaganda; German Rearmament;  
Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Secretary Herter

Under Secretary Dillon

Ambassador Dowling

Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

Chancellor Adenauer

Foreign Minister von Brentano

Ambassador Grewe

Mr. Weber (interpreter)

Following a private talk between the President and the Chancellor,<sup>1</sup> the additional participants joined the group and the President proceeded to explain to them briefly what had been discussed before, stressing the Chancellor's assurance concerning German unity on the question of Berlin, and the President's assurances with regard to the stationing of US troops in Europe and US intentions about Berlin. The President also stated that both he and the Chancellor had agreed that the need for a constructive and workable disarmament program was of paramount importance as a subject for discussion in Paris. He also referred to the paper given him by the Chancellor,<sup>2</sup> which he promised to read and pass on to the State Department.

Next the President stated that Khrushchev goes around the world making a lot of noise about his peace proposals and peace offerings of various kinds, for instance, the peace treaty with Eastern Germany. All of these things the President considers more theoretical than actual, but he feels that the West must do something to counter such propaganda. He knows that Mr. Herter heartily concurs on this point. Moreover, the best way of doing this is to base our argumentation upon the right of self-determination, and we must insist that all our peace negotiations are based on this principle. This, the President feels, will be the most effective weapon against Mr. Khrushchev's program.

The Chancellor stated that this is his opinion too, but the West must do something to publicize all this for all the world to know. The President replied that his trouble is that Congress never wants to give him any money for propaganda.

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lejins and approved by the White House on May 31. The conversation took place at the White House. See also Documents 250–252.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 248.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 248.

When Khrushchev was here,<sup>3</sup> the President went on, he had told Khrushchev that the United States was ready to discuss any question, including the question of Germany and Berlin, but that we were willing to do this only on an understanding of our basic position, namely, that we will stand on our rights and that we will make no agreement of any kind that is not acceptable to the people concerned, to wit, the Germans. But we are willing to talk about all questions.

Mr. Adenauer stated that this was a very clear stand and that if it was repeated to Khrushchev often enough, he would finally understand it and accept it.

At a subsequent point in the conversation, the President remarked that, in view of the Chancellor's convictions concerning the importance of propaganda, he wished Mr. Adenauer had a chance to discuss this matter with Congress, since, as the President had indicated before, the Congress was prone not to listen to him when it came to appropriating funds for propaganda. The Chancellor smilingly stated that he would try to do his best in this connection during the Embassy dinner which would be attended by many of the Congressional leaders. He referred to the Biblical precept about not hiding one's light under a bushel and stated the West should take this to heart. The President replied that he would welcome a tripling of United States effort in this area.

Mr. Adenauer indicated that Germany has greatly increased its outlay for "propaganda", although the word as such is in disrepute. What it actually amounts to is informing the public and the world at large of German plans and efforts. The President stated that propaganda is a downright wicked word in the United States. Mr. Adenauer stated that the Nazis are to blame for this. He deplored the fact that it was not possible to bring back from heaven a converted Goebbels, and both agreed that this would be a fine thing, provided the fact of the conversion were definitely established.

In a more serious vein, the President then stated that he wished to discuss with the Chancellor something about the military planning concerning Germany. Ever since he went to NATO in January of 1951, all the talks which he had heard about German rearmament had been connected with very stringent upper limits on German armament. The EDC plans had contained not only very tough ceilings but even indications on how German military forces were to be organized.

This was, of course, based on the fear that a militarily powerful Germany might be reborn, which would again take the offensive in Europe. The President wished to know, however, how Germany herself regarded her position and needs, being in the center of Europe as she was,

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<sup>3</sup> Khrushchev visited the United States September 15-27, 1959.



considering what help was available to her from outside, etc. He wanted Mr. Adenauer's own views with respect to a realistic evaluation of the situation. Was Germany happy with what NATO prescribed for her or not?

The Chancellor replied by stating that no one knew better than the President, as a soldier, how difficult it was to build up an army from scratch. It is difficult from an organizational standpoint as well as from the standpoint of procuring sufficient weapons and supplies. In the case of Germany, aside from the question of ceilings, the difficulty has been not so much a question of money, but the problem of getting and training cadres, building barracks, etc. The plans laid down in conjunction with NATO will be fulfilled by 1963. The funds are available now or will be made available at the proper time. As an example of the difficulties involved, the Chancellor pointed out that Germany is making much larger down payments than necessary on supplies ordered in the US in order to keep available funds from being diverted elsewhere. This is a constant struggle.

As to the President's question on how he feels about the situation, the Chancellor went on, all he could say was that if no effective controlled disarmament program goes into effect in the foreseeable future, Germany will have to redouble her efforts and outlays in this area. A country as exposed as Germany in the heart of Europe cannot afford to sit without doing anything. Whatever that country does or leaves undone is to the good or detriment of the rest of the Free World. But the President need have no fear about Germany. Germany will do the necessary. However, some of the other NATO partners may raise objections. By this the Chancellor did not mean to refer to France. He had asked de Gaulle to inspect some German units, feeling that this would be of great symbolic value, and de Gaulle had readily agreed. Others might however cause trouble. But, if no effective controlled disarmament program went into effect, Germany would be forced to increase its military effort—with NATO concurrence, of course.

The President expressed pleasure at what the Chancellor had said. He had been concerned about the fact that all military planning with reference to Germany had been calculated on the basis of the fear that a new Hitler Germany might arise and seek to dominate Europe. Since this fear had in the past been nurtured primarily by France, the President was hopeful that this type of reasoning would decline under de Gaulle's leadership.

The President continued by citing some facts and figures for Mr. Adenauer concerning the US 80 billion dollar budget, 56% of which was committed to military purposes alone, primarily for US retaliatory power which was for the protection of the entire Free World, not only for the exposed European front. The money included funds for the

Navy, Air Force, the latest heavy bombers, etc. To repeat, all this was intended not only for the protection of Western Europe but for any spot in which the Communists might strike. The President then proceeded to state with some feeling that he felt that the thinking and talking in the West should equal in intensity our political convictions. For instance, he said, if we say that we shall stand firm with reference to Berlin, or a unified Germany, or Turkey perhaps, we must make certain that our military strength conforms to the moral strength of what we are saying. The Chancellor wholeheartedly agreed, adding that the President could rest assured that both out of a sense of duty toward the Free World and for selfish reasons Germany would do whatever is necessary in this respect.

The President said that all this pointed up the need for an enforceable disarmament program.

Mr. Adenauer stated that it was primarily the Laborites who were propagandizing on the fear of German rearmament. Smarting under recent defeats, they are looking for material on which to tangle with the Conservatives, and they have therefore picked on German rearmament. Mr. von Brentano at this point interjected "the British press". The Chancellor agreed and continued to say that he was not referring to the Beaverbrook press—that was always bad. The London *Times* was generally more enlightened concerning German matters, but it was now presenting the Laborites' views. He hoped the readers would tire of this approach and the matter would be dropped. Perhaps only patience was required. However, perhaps some effort could be made on the US side to have some political influence exerted on the London *Times*. Macmillan, he hastened to add, was not to blame in the matter. The bad thing, as far as internal German affairs are concerned, was that the opposition picks up these arguments and makes use thereof for its own purposes.

The President explained that the reason he is so anxious that the Western Powers make the best effort possible to bring our efforts in the area of armament and disarmament into agreement with our political convictions and determination is that he feels we can get disarmament only from a position of strength. We have to pay a price for it. Only if we are strong in arms will Khrushchev understand what the situation is. And the best argument for countering British criticism of German armament is to say: "We are arming in order to make it possible for us to achieve disarmament".

Mr. Adenauer enthusiastically picked up this formulation, repeating, "We arm in order to be able to disarm".

The President ended discussion of this topic by stating that this was a necessity.

## 250. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 249.]

The President indicated that another subject which he had discussed on his visit to Bonn<sup>1</sup> was assistance to underdeveloped countries. Frankly, he felt that unless the Western nations, namely Germany, the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, exerted themselves in this respect, the West might lose the struggle with communism. The Communists can do much more than we can do, both from the standpoint of propaganda and politics, because theirs is a dictatorship. Therefore the West will be in a very bad situation unless it develops a very strong program.

The Chancellor then pointed out that, while Khrushchev talks a lot, it is the United States which does a lot. He pointed to the US 1960 budget, which contains more funds for underdeveloped countries for one year than Khrushchev has even promised over many years. The trouble is, however, that the world does not know enough about what the United States is doing. The United States must therefore publicize in a loud and strong voice what it is doing, and the rest of the Free World must do the same. The Chancellor then emphasized also that as regards the economic area as a whole, but especially aid to underdeveloped countries, more effective coordination of effort must be worked out. Above all, however, economic assistance must be politically guided and directed and have a political and not only a humanitarian aim.

The President agreed that the underlying reason must of course be political. He noted the bad situation in which the West finds itself in view of the fact that we are on the defensive in the war against communism, while communism is on the offensive and has the advantage of being a dictatorship. Therefore, the Communists can pick the spot at which they want to create trouble. It is like sneaking one rotten apple into a bushel of good apples, thereby trying to ruin the whole. This is the case with reference to Guinea and Guatemala, for instance. By the same

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lejins and approved by the White House on May 31. The conversation took place at the White House. See also Documents 249 and 251–252.

<sup>1</sup>For documentation on President Eisenhower's visit to Bonn August 26–27, 1959, see Documents 5 ff.

token we must be on the alert everywhere and therefore must use four times as much energy and investment of effort and funds as the Soviets need to use. Moreover the Soviets give much of their aid in terms of long-term grants, which are designed to strengthen their economy at home at the same time. We cannot do things the same way, having to stand ready now to act in Guinea, then in Tunisia, then in Libya and wherever else required.

Chancellor Adenauer indicated that he was not as pessimistic about the entire situation as the President appeared to be. He stated that our only mistake is that we are too decent and we don't talk enough about what we are doing. The Russians, on the other hand, trumpet about everything they do. What is more, the press, which prints anything coming out of the Soviet Union, picks it up and does exactly what the Russians want them to do. Nevertheless he feels that the West must: 1) talk more and publicize more what it is doing; and 2) provide a more effective and better coordinated effort with regard to aid to underdeveloped countries. The group recently set up in Washington to discuss aid to underdeveloped countries is a step in the right direction, he feels.<sup>2</sup> He is convinced that if we publicize what we are actually doing, the situation will work itself out in our favor and the West will win.

The Chancellor then indicated that he wanted to bring up specifically the question of assistance to Turkey. Under Secretary Dillon had suggested that Germany consider aid to Turkey and perhaps it might be possible to discuss this question this afternoon.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the formation of the International Development Association whose articles of agreement were approved on January 24.

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## 251. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Chancellor's Visit to Japan; Economic Portion of the Communiqué

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 249.]

The Chancellor indicated he would like some advice concerning his visit to Japan. As everyone realized, he was proceeding from the United

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lejins and approved by the White House on May 31. The conversation took place at the White House. See also Documents 249-250 and 252.

States to Japan. He mentioned this plan to the President in Paris who had at that time expressed his approval. Prior to leaving Bonn, the Chancellor had seen the Japanese Ambassador, who had acquainted him in some detail with the Japanese economic situation and he had been able to see from this that US-Japanese relations were proceeding very satisfactorily. The Ambassador had told him, however, that Japan's hinterland was Red China and that Japan was forced to cooperate with Red China in order to be able to survive. He planned to discuss this point with Kishi<sup>1</sup> during his stay in Tokyo but he felt that the United States would have to make a decision with reference to Japan to strengthen the Japanese economy to such an extent that Japan would no longer have to look toward Red China as a means for survival.

The President assured the Chancellor that there was no topic that had been given any greater consideration and concern than the question of how to help Japan to make a living. This brought him right back to what the Chancellor himself had said about coordinated effort. Japan was forced to trade in order to survive. The United States had greatly liberalized its trade policies to assist Japan. But Japan needed more than a market in the Philippines, Formosa, other areas in the Pacific and in the United States; Japan also needed a market in Europe. This, the President realized, created serious problems because of Japan's cheap labor. However, a solution had to be found through a coordinated effort by a coalition of Free-World nations. Those in a position to help must help.

Later in the conversation, the President took up the question of the communiqué to be issued after the meeting, stating that he was agreeable to the references to economic endeavors which had been added to the earlier draft,<sup>2</sup> specifically the final paragraph.

The Chancellor immediately stated that he felt this statement was too weak (re cooperation among Atlantic countries). To explain his point, he argued that Khrushchev is doing all he can to strengthen the Soviet Union to the point where it will be a decisive economic power. And no doubt he will in time succeed. This type of power, in Mr. Adenauer's opinion, can be countered only by the joint and coordinated efforts of the combined economic strength of the US and Canada, the Free European continent and Britain. He wondered whether Japan should not also be included—which was a question also in the President's mind. The President then solicited suggestions for strengthening the text, asking Mr. Dillon just what his definition of "Atlantic" was. This appeared to coincide with NATO countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Nobusuke Kishi, Prime Minister of Japan.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. For the final text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 363.

Mr. Adenauer, asked for suggestions, placed the burden on Mr. Dillon by stating that Mr. Dillon was the father of the idea, let him name the child. Mr. Dillon then suggested a wording approximately as follows: "They welcomed the prospect that the US and Canada would soon join more closely with a reconstructed OEEC." As regards inclusion of Japan, Mr. Dillon stated that there existed great sensitivity in England and the rest of Europe concerning any closer linking of Japan and Europe with respect to trade. In other respects, as regards development, for instance, Europe was prepared to accept Japan. The other, however, posed a real problem.

The Chancellor replied that sensitivity was, of course, a fine thing. However, it was necessary to face facts, and the fact remained that there was, in Japan, a strong pro-Red party which sought rapprochement with Red China. If the group was afraid, however, to include mention of Japan in the communiqué, the Chancellor begged President Eisenhower to permit and authorize him to state in his talks with Kishi that he and the President had discussed the Japanese situation sympathetically. The President suggested that a statement to the effect that "the views and cooperation of Japan will be considered" might be incorporated in the communiqué.

Mr. Dillon then elaborated that in order to get the European countries to agree to inviting Japan to the recent economic talks,<sup>3</sup> he had had to promise the British that this concession would not be used as a means of exerting further pressure on them with reference to Japanese economic matters. Hence his great reluctance to mention anything about Japan in the communiqué. The President thereupon told the Chancellor that he might tell Mr. Kishi that the President believes in closer cooperation between Japan and the Free World.

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<sup>3</sup>Reference is to the talks at Paris January 12-14, which led to the creation of the OECD.

252. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Vested German Assets

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 249.]

The Chancellor asked whether his Foreign Minister might raise the question of German assets.

Mr. von Brentano thereupon told the group that negotiations between the German Embassy and the Department of State had been in progress during the past weeks on the basis of the December talks of the President and Chancellor Adenauer. He stated that he did not wish to go into detail but wanted to mention only that progress had been made and agreement in principle was in sight. The questions of time and amount remained open, however. It was a fact that the Federal Government and Chancellor Adenauer particularly had been questioned about this matter by groups in the Parliament prior to his departure, and there was no doubt but that he would be questioned again upon his return. The question has been pending for years, and an early solution had been expected after the President's July 31, 1957 statement.<sup>1</sup> The Federal Government and the Chancellor would be grateful for assurances of an early solution. Perhaps some guidelines could be laid down on the further course of action to be taken. Mr. von Brentano mentioned that he understood the sums to be made available were \$130 million and an additional \$60,000,000–\$90,000,000, which would represent a 50% satisfaction of the German claims. The German Government would be happy to accept this as a settlement of a problem which had created a degree of unrest and trouble back home.

The President, in reply, briefly traced the history of the question, beginning with 1953, through 1958, when it had appeared that a favorable bill might be gotten through the Congress but the Germans themselves had then asked that it be withheld because they had not been satisfied with the provisions. The President repeated that he was committed to the principle of the sanctity of private property even in time of war. But not everyone felt that way, especially not his political oppo-

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lejins and approved by the White House on May 31. The conversation took place at the White House. See also Documents 249–251.

<sup>1</sup> For text of the July 31, 1957, White House statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 19, 1957, p. 306.

nents. At the moment there was not much hope of getting a favorable bill through Congress. He felt the best thing would be to refer the matter to Secretary Herter and Foreign Minister von Brentano for the purpose of deciding two things: 1) the further tactics which would be most likely to bring the desired results; and 2) what might be said jointly at the present time to prove helpful to the Germans at home. That is all he felt he could say at the present time, except to reiterate his commitment to the principle involved.

Chancellor Adenauer added that he felt no mention of the matter should be made in the communiqué. He then continued, trying to explain his persistence in this matter. Because of the 1961 elections his entire twelve years of administration will be up for review and criticism. His main emphasis all along has been close association with the West, especially the US. He does not want to give his political opponents the chance to tell him that his friendship with the US has not borne fruit. It *has* borne fruit. Nevertheless, Ambassador Dowling, who is a keen observer of the German scene, can tell the President that this question of the return of German assets is one with political and psychological implications of some importance.

The President assured the Chancellor that he certainly did not want to damage the latter's political situation. But, he reiterated, he had tried to settle this matter for seven years, negotiating not only with Germany, but also with his friends on the Hill. It had turned out to be a sort of three-cornered problem, with him, the President, caught in the middle. But he shall continue to do the best he can because he is committed to a fair settlement and he will try to achieve it. Perhaps the Foreign Ministers can find some way which holds out hope for success. After all, the President added, Congress is rather unpredictable, so there is no telling.



253. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Vested German Assets

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	
Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic	
Heinrich von Brentano, Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic	
Under Secretary Dillon	Ambassador Grewe
Under Secretary Merchant	Mr. Felix von Eckardt
Ambassador Dowling	Dr. Karl Carstens
Counselor Achilles	Mr. Franz Krapf
Assistant Secretary Kohler	Dr. Franz-Josef Bach
Assistant Secretary Berding	Mr. Peter Limbourg
Mr. Hillenbrand, GER	Mr. Karl-Guenther von Hase
Mr. Vigderman, GER	Mr. Heinz Weber
Mr. McKiernan, GER/GPA	Mr. Hermann Kusterer
Mr. Miller, GER	
Mrs. Lejins, LS	

Ambassador Grewe was requested by Foreign Minister von Brentano to comment on the problem of the return of vested German assets. The Ambassador reported that the President had suggested, during his meeting with the Chancellor that morning, that the Foreign Ministers should try to answer the questions as to what procedures should be followed in dealing with the subject and what should be told to the public about it. The Ambassador said that there would be increased pressure on the Chancellor about the assets question after his return to Germany and that he would have to say something to the Bundestag.

Under Secretary Dillon said that we feel, after six or eight months' discussion of this problem, culminating in the President's reaffirmation in the meeting that morning of the principle of a commitment to make some returns on vested assets, that considerable progress has been made. We thought we had a solution two or three years ago which Congress might have adopted, but the German Government had not liked it. It had then been necessary to work out a solution to the problem of American claims against Germany, the only ones still unsettled fifteen

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Confidential. Drafted by McKiernan and approved in U on March 26 and in S on March 28. See also Documents 254–255. Herter and Brentano also discussed Germany and Berlin at the beginning of their conversation; see Document 91. A memorandum covering the part of the conversation on German economic assistance is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

years after the end of the war. We had therefore sent a claims bill to Congress, and we hoped that this bill might facilitate an assets settlement because it would help to establish the amount available for return. The bill had been passed in the House two weeks ago, and we hoped it would pass in the Senate later this Spring. We have told Congress repeatedly that the American claims bill is a prerequisite to progress on German assets.

The Under Secretary said that we now had a new idea to contribute to the problem. If the claims bill passes the Senate—as it is expected to do without opposition—we are prepared after the end of this session of Congress, in the late summer or fall, to sit down with the Germans and try to come to an agreement on a lump sum settlement. This should not be too difficult, for we already have agreement on the amount which was used for other purposes in the Pacific area and the disagreement about the amount which would be left after payment of American claims is not great. There is less than ten per cent difference between our figure and that mentioned by Foreign Minister von Brentano during the meeting with the President. As far as procedures for return are concerned, we are quite flexible. (Chancellor Adenauer, who did not speak during the discussion of vested German assets, left the meeting at this point.)

Ambassador Grewe said that the Germans must leave it to the United States to decide questions of timing as far as Congress was concerned. He then asked whether the matter might be settled earlier if the Congressional situation developed more favorably.

Under Secretary Dillon said that this was so, but that Congress must approve any arrangement. Therefore, a new item like this would have to wait for next year. This was a controversial item. A majority of Congress was probably against the return of assets now, but Congress might be more favorably inclined once the claims bill had been passed. It would be wise to avoid any public statement at this time that we are making detailed arrangements regarding assets. Public discussion could generate a debate on the claims bill in the Senate and thus impede a settlement along the lines just mentioned. It would be best if nothing were said on the subject. However, if something must be said, for example in reply to Bundestag inquiries, it should be only that the subject was raised and that the President renewed the White House statement of 1957 regarding the sanctity of private property, even in wartime.

Under Secretary Dillon then handed Foreign Minister von Brentano a memorandum on the subject (see attachment).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The 3-paragraph memorandum outlined the U.S. position on German assets as presented by Dillon during the course of this conversation.

Ambassador Grewe said that he accepted the memorandum with thanks and that no public use would be made of it. He suggested that Under Secretary Dillon and he might meet later to discuss the wording of a statement the Chancellor might make to the competent Bundestag committee.

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## 254. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 15, 1960, 4 p.m.

### SUBJECT

German Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano
Under Secretary Dillon	Ambassador Grewe
Under Secretary Merchant	Mr. Felix von Eckardt
Ambassador Dowling	Dr. Karl Carstens
Counselor Achilles	Mr. Franz Krapf
Assistant Secretary Kohler	Dr. Franz-Josef Bach
Assistant Secretary Berding	Mr. Peter Limbourg
Mr. Hillenbrand, GER	Mr. Karl-Guenther von Hase
Mr. Vigderman, GER	Mr. Heinz Weber
Mr. McKiernan, GER/GPA	Mr. Hermann Kusterer
Mr. Miller, GER	
Mrs. Lejins, LS	

Under Secretary Dillon noted that the President and the Chancellor had agreed that morning on the importance of aid to underdeveloped countries.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Dillon said that he wished to make it clear how we—including Congress—look on this question. Although there has been an increase in the amount of German aid, the amount is still not in keeping with the Federal Republic's economic capacity. The figures submitted by State Secretary Harkort during his recent visit were the best example of this. There had been a marked increase in German aid from \$32 million in 1957 to \$105 million in 1958 and \$125 million in 1959. However,

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Confidential. Drafted by McKiernan and approved in U on March 26 and in S on March 28. See also Documents 253 and 255.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 250.

this effort should be compared with the \$390 million spent by the United Kingdom and the \$500 million spent by France in Africa (excluding Algeria) in 1959. On the other hand, it must be admitted that there were substantial private German investments, possibly equaling private British investments.

The Under Secretary said that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom regards medium-term credits, i.e., credits for less than five years, as real economic aid. We are speaking only of longer-term credits. While we recognize that Germany does not have the experience of the United States and the United Kingdom in the post-war capital market, public opinion is an important factor and the German effort might be taken into consideration in Congressional discussion of the return of vested German assets.

Foreign Minister von Brentano said that he had met Mr. Harkort in New York and been informed about the latter's discussions here. The Foreign Minister said that he himself was not a financial expert and therefore preferred to avoid detailed discussion. However, the figures cited by Mr. Dillon did not adequately reflect the German effort. The Federal German Government cannot make direct loans and the actual figures for direct aid are thus small. However, there will be DM 50 million this year and DM 70 million next year. On the other hand, indirect contributions must be taken into account, for example the DM 1 billion lent to India and secured by "Hermes" guarantees. The Foreign Minister agreed that more should be done on long-range planning. He had met with Ministers Erhard and Lindrath a few weeks earlier to discuss such planning, and the possible use of profits from the Volkswagen plant had been discussed.

The Foreign Minister added that the Federal Republic is also obliged to pay \$200 million in the European Economic Community to help in the development of associated territories. The next EEC meeting will receive more information on this subject from member countries, including the Federal Republic. The Foreign Minister hoped that more progress would be made on the German side by then.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister said that the Germans concurred with the American view that the cold war might well be decided in the developing countries.

**255. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, March 15, 1960, 4 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Confidential. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

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**256. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, March 15, 1960.

**SUBJECT**

Dwindling Confidence in the US and General Ability of the West to Compete with the Soviet Union

**PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS**

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer  
Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano  
Ambassador Walter C. Dowling  
Ambassador D.K.E. Bruce  
Mr. Allen Dulles  
General Lucius Clay  
Mr. John McCloy

During a lengthy, animated and sometimes heated discussion which took place after dinner at the German Embassy Residence, Chancellor Adenauer disclosed certain of his fears regarding the diminishing relative strength of the US and the West which may underlie his troubled thinking of the past year. On several occasions he cited the results of a public opinion poll in Germany which he had read not long before his departure. This poll showed that, while in 1952 66% of the German people believed that the West led by the US would eventually win out in the contest with the Communist world, in 1960 only 36% still believed this. He said that these figures had shocked him and were significant in showing how large a loss of confidence had taken place during recent years.

The Chancellor indicated that he was greatly impressed by the economic growth potential of the Soviet Union, and its capacity as a result of this to exercise increasing influence in uncommitted areas of the world. Both Mr. McCloy and General Clay expressed their confidence in

the basic strength of the West, if only the American and Western Europe's economies (the latter bound to gather in some sort of economic union) could cooperate and, in effect, pool their resources. Mr. Dulles also argued that he had statistical data which would warrant more optimistic conclusions than those data apparently available to the Chancellor, and offered to provide these. The Chancellor did not appear overly-impressed by these arguments, and himself offered to make available to those present the statistical data which had been brought to his attention on which he apparently based his own more pessimistic conclusions. He likewise did not appear particularly receptive to Mr. Dulles' argument that we tend largely to focus on the weaknesses and inadequacies of the West overlooking at the same time that the Soviet Union has many political and economic weaknesses. He appeared to dispute Mr. Dulles' statement that in many countries such as Indonesia, Japan, India, et al., Communist influence was less now than five years ago. On the Common Market the potential contribution of which to Western strength Mr. McCloy had stressed, the Chancellor noted that he had been surprised at the vehemence and near unanimity with which German industry seemed to oppose its development while favoring a larger free trade area.

To support his thesis about diminishing confidence in the West, especially relative to the US, Adenauer cited the misinterpretation of the communiqué issued by the President and him<sup>1</sup> earlier in the day as an example of how currently correspondents tend to jump to erroneous conclusions suggesting weakness in the West.

Although there was only casual discussion of the Berlin question, at one point General Clay stated that he could not conceive that there would be any significant change in US policy on Berlin. If there were, he and Mr. McCloy would know about it.

At the end of the conversation, von Brentano came up to the reporting officer and said that now it could be seen what a problem he had. The Chancellor is like an old goat (wie ein alter Bock). He has very fixed views and does not like to be contradicted. He simply will not listen to counter-arguments. He (von Brentano) thought it was nonsense to say that most German industrialists opposed the Common Market. There were some vocal elements in German industry who did, but these were not in the majority. Von Brentano added that the last few months had been difficult ones for him. He appreciated the way in which the United States had refrained from making public statements of a polemical nature despite a certain amount of provocation.

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<sup>1</sup> For text of this communiqué (joint statement), see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 363.

**257. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, March 16, 1960.

**SUBJECT**

US-USSR Economic Strength; Aerial Inspection Zone; Self-Determination and Berlin Plebiscite

**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany  
Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe  
Mr. Weber, Interpreter  
  
Secretary Herter  
Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon  
Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant  
Ambassador Walter C. Dowling

Following dinner, during which the Chancellor was in a jovial frame of mind, the group listed above talked for over an hour in the library. Ambassadors Grewe and Dowling joined the group soon after the conversation began.

The first general subject discussed (launched by the Chancellor) was the economic position of the Soviet Union relative to the free world, and in particular to the United States. The Chancellor referred, as he had the evening before at the German Embassy, to the reports he had of great and growing Soviet strength. At one point he stated that he understood that by 1965 the economy of the Soviet Union would be equivalent to that of the United States. When this was quickly contested, he modified his statement to say that by 1965 the Soviet Union would have the capability of doing great damage at will in the disruption of the free economies of free nations and their export markets.

Mr. Dillon described the recent intention of the Soviet Union to ship 10,000 small cars into the U.S. market at a price roughly 25% below that at which they are sold within the Soviet Union. If the facts as stated were true, that would constitute dumping and would invoke protective machinery. The Chancellor readily agreed that this was an illustration of what he had in mind.

Mr. Dillon then emphasized that recognition of the growth of Soviet economic strength was one of the major supports behind our policy of encouraging by all means available the common market of the Six and

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant. The conversation took place after dinner at Secretary Herter's residence.

related liberal trading practices on the Continent, so that within the frame of the Atlantic Community the main industrial strength of the free world would operate most effectively and thereby minimize the future difficulties inherent in the growing economic power of the Soviet Union. The Chancellor agreed but added one or two comments which indicated the importance he attached to bilateral economic arrangements, presumably between the Federal Republic and the United States.

The Chancellor then turned the conversation to education, mentioning that he had had a discussion of this subject with Senator Fulbright. It was not entirely clear what points he was making, but he emphasized two. The first was that in the West our educational systems must give greater weight to the inculcation of moral principles to offset with the students the loss of authority of the family and the church. The second point which he did not expand was that something must be done to meet the growing problem of university graduates coming into a world which could not provide for all such graduates enough jobs suitable for their level of education.

[Here follows discussion of the aerial inspection zone and self-determination and Berlin plebiscite. For text, see Document 94.]

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## 258. Memorandum of Discussion at the 439th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, April 1, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

### 2. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security* (NIE 23-60)<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Dulles summarized NIE 23-60 dated March 22, 1960 on "The Outlook in West Germany". He said the Estimate had concluded that the West German state would continue to be governed by the Adenauer coalition (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union) beyond 1961, even in the event of the death of Adenauer. West Germany

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this 17-page paper is in Department of State, INR-NIE Files.



would reject extremism and militarism, would probably continue to enjoy economic prosperity, would seek security in the context of the Western alliance, and would press its own views vigorously and assert its independence to a greater extent than heretofore. This forecast could be upset by various contingencies which now seemed unlikely, such as an international economic depression which would affect major portions of the West German export market. A serious impairment of Western rights in Berlin or a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Western Germany would also tend to be a severe shock to the government and people of West Germany. Adenauer and his associates have come to have some doubts about U.S. determination to risk general war for the defense of Western Europe. These doubts were reinforced by the doubts Adenauer experienced before his recent trip to the U.S. concerning our determination to remain firm on the question of Berlin. If there is any serious impairment of Western rights in Berlin, the West Germans would demand additional guarantees and concrete manifestations of support from the West. West Germany would not oppose some reduction of U.S. forces in West Germany after the latter country's own military build-up had resulted in the creation of substantial military strength. The West Germans will continue to emphasize the maintenance of a strong NATO to which the U.S. is firmly bound. Because of their misgivings over our determination, the West Germans will be inclined to press their own interests strongly and to take an independent line in foreign policy. West Germany will press for independent weapon production capabilities, will seek an increase in U.S. missiles stationed in Europe and a voice in their employment. West Germany may also want a continental military system with its own nuclear capability. Mr. Dulles then reported that NIE 23-60 contained a dissent by the State Department, which believed that a growing lack of confidence in Germany concerning the ability of the West to protect the political and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic, exploited by continued Soviet pressure, could stimulate a trend toward nationalistic independence on the part of the West Germans, a trend which could lead ultimately to the isolation of West Germany and the creation of a situation from which accommodation with the USSR might result. The majority view in the Estimate was that accommodation with the USSR could be anticipated only if West Germany became convinced that it was being abandoned by the U.S. Mr. Dulles said the Estimate also concluded that close ties with France would be a key element in West German policy, barring the departure of De Gaulle. However, any successor to Adenauer might have less cordial relations with De Gaulle than Adenauer has. Finally, Mr. Dulles said West Germany would probably favor the development of multilateral Western assistance programs to

underdeveloped countries, but would proceed with caution in implementing any such programs.

Secretary Herter said he was inclined to concur with the majority viewpoint contained in the Intelligence Estimate rather than with the State dissent. He felt the situation described by the State dissent was, as far as could be seen at the moment, unlikely to develop. He asked whether Mr. Dulles had any views on the Bavarian elections.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Dulles said that although the Socialists had gained a substantial victory in the Bavarian elections, this development would be unlikely to have a major effect on West German policy since it was difficult to distinguish a Bavarian Socialist from a Conservative. The President remarked that the Bavarian Socialists must be similar to the Radical Socialists in France. Secretary Herter wondered whether the outcome of the Bavarian elections might weaken the position of Strauss. Mr. Dulles said such might be the result; he would make a further study of the situation.

Secretary Anderson reported that the West Germans were embarrassed by their large holdings of foreign exchange. Consequently they have sent \$600 million to the U.S. as an advance payment on their mutual security obligations. This sum has been invested in short-term U.S. Government securities. By contrast, the U.K. is becoming sensitive to its losses of foreign exchange. The U.K. Government was considering inserting a statement in the next Budget Message that the U.K. held \$800 million to a billion dollars worth of U.S. industrial securities. It had not yet been decided to make such a statement because of its possible effect on the stock market and because the Laborites might say to the Government, "Why were not these securities sold last October when their value was greater than at present?" The President wondered whether it was not to our advantage to have funds such as those sent here by West Germany invested in our securities. Secretary Anderson said these funds would be invested in our securities even if held by the Germans until payments were due. In response to a question from Mr. McCone, Mr. Dillon said that the German reserves of foreign exchange amounted to \$5 billion. Secretary Anderson said the Germans were shying away from foreign assistance programs because a large proportion of any sum which they provided in assistance to underdeveloped countries would be spent in West Germany. Germany preferred to lend money to underdeveloped countries if the money would be spent elsewhere than in West Germany. Secretary Anderson said the advance payment by West Germany on its mutual security obligations had raised the question in his mind whether we should suggest that various other European coun-

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<sup>2</sup> In the Bavarian election on March 27, the SPD won the Mayor's race in Munich and Regensburg.

tries take similar action. The President thought it might be desirable to make such a suggestion. Mr. Stans<sup>3</sup> said advance payments by European countries on their mutual security obligations before June 30 would be very helpful. Secretary Herter asked when these mutual security payments were actually due. Secretary Anderson replied that the payments were due when Defense delivers the equipment. Mr. Dillon said various countries were buying military equipment from us for cash; the West Germans had simply put up the cash in advance of receiving the equipment. Secretary Anderson said that as a matter of book-keeping, the West Germans could show their advance payment as a payment made, but we could not show it as a payment received until we made the necessary deliveries of military equipment.

[Here follow the rest of agenda item 2 and agenda items 3–5.]

Marion W. Boggs

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<sup>3</sup> Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

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## 259. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 20, 1960.

### SUBJECT

German Defense Situation and the Aftermath of the Summit Breakdown

### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Franz Josef Strauss, Defense Minister, Federal Republic of Germany<sup>1</sup>

German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe

German Minister Franz Krapf

Colonel Repenning

The Secretary

Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant

Assistant Secretary of Defense John Irwin

Mr. Foy D. Kohler—EUR

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.5/6–2060. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand, initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on June 25 and in M on June 27. The conversation took place at the Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> Strauss visited the United States in June to inspect various military installations and to see demonstrations of military equipment. A memorandum of his conversation with Secretary of Defense Gates on June 15 concerning this hardware is *ibid.*, 762A.5/6–1560.

Defense Minister Strauss began by noting that he had had an extremely interesting trip to a number of points in the United States during the past two weeks. As Defense Minister he had to take special care to avoid mistakes, since in this modern era an error in purchasing equipment could prove extremely expensive. In this connection, he referred to the Canadian attempt to develop a modern interceptor which began in 1954 and ended in 1959 with the abandonment of production plans. This involved a loss of some \$500 million. Strauss then quickly mentioned a number of points which he had visited in the United States.

The Secretary said he wished to express his gratitude for the fine attitude which Defense Minister Strauss has shown towards NATO. The Secretary felt more strongly than ever that the free countries of the West must hold together firmly. Strauss agreed that this was the only conclusion which could be drawn from what had happened in Paris. He said that a recent Sulzberger article had created a misunderstanding of Chancellor Adenauer's attitude by portraying him as being glad over the failure of the Summit.<sup>2</sup> It was true that German officials had not been optimistic about Summit prospects, but they would have welcomed a real success at the Summit, for example, in making a contribution to disarmament. It was true that German leaders were afraid that concessions might be made on Berlin for which Germany would have to pay the price. Such a price would ultimately affect the entire Western Alliance, since Berlin had become a symbol of the firmness and determination of that Alliance. The German view, Strauss continued, was that the Soviets would not move ahead immediately against Berlin but would probably shift the crisis area elsewhere, perhaps to the Far East. They would, of course, come back to Berlin again after a period of time had elapsed. The Germans believed that Khrushchev's rage in Paris was not spontaneous but calculated, although he had lost control of his manners. He had arrived expecting too much weakness on the part of the West, especially the United Kingdom, and when he became aware that there was no possibility of splitting the West on essentials, he then "decided to lose control of himself". It seemed probable that he would wait until after the American elections before moving again in Berlin, but there was always the possibility, and this was a big question, whether he would choose the time just before the American elections to take such action. The Secretary noted that Israel had made the same mistake when it moved a week before our elections on the assumption that the American Government was incapable of action.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 169 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Israel invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956, 8 days before the November 6 Presidential election.

Strauss said that the Federal Government was worried about the possible success of the anti-German campaign of the Soviets. This had achieved some progress in the UK among certain trade union leaders, certain newspapers, and certain political groups. Relations between the GDR and these groups in the UK had been established and strengthened. Quite a few visits had been exchanged, and UK visitors to the GDR had made a number of awkward statements. There was no doubt but that the Federal Republic was the main target of Soviet psychological warfare.

In response to the Secretary's query as to whether Soviet attacks on Adenauer had made the position of the German Ambassador in Moscow a difficult one, Strauss said the Chancellor had shown absolutely no reaction. The Secretary noted that the US Ambassador is a representative of the President, whereas the German Ambassador did not represent the Chancellor but the President of the Federal Republic.

The Secretary observed parenthetically that we were thinking seriously of holding a meeting at the time of the UN General Assembly in an attempt to simplify the many anachronistic protocol problems which modern states have inherited from the days of the monarchies, e.g., with respect to credentials, arrival and departure greetings, official visits, etc. The world was getting too small for this kind of thing.

The Western Powers should worry somewhat more than they have, Strauss continued, about the political and psychological warfare conducted by the Soviets. The Germans were not so much worried about their military threat, since they did not believe Khrushchev would actually take action involving a major risk of war. With respect to Berlin, the Germans felt that the Soviets would give no plausible reason for Western retaliation through the use of military force. They would measure everything out in order to avoid a real military provocation. When the Germans tried to put the subject of psychological defense on the NATO agenda, Strauss observed, Canada and the United Kingdom protested that this was not a NATO responsibility. The Federal Republic felt that it was very much a NATO responsibility, being convinced that a hot war would never come if the West can win the psychological battle. If this were lost then the war would be lost too before the fighting actually started. The Germans were a little discouraged when every effort on their part to pursue this subject was brushed off and regarded as a German idiosyncrasy. In Japan, Strauss noted, the Communists had been very successful in formulating slogans which generated the wrong associations—for example, US plus security pact equals war, or US bases equal physical destruction of countries in which located. They were attempting to do the same in Germany but so far had failed because Chancellor Adenauer had a stronger position than Kishi. The high living standards in the Federal Republic also made a difference, since demon-

strators could not be hired at a cheap price to march in the streets. He could not predict what would happen in Germany if there were to be an economic depression; hence the importance of continuous economic growth.

Strauss asked the Secretary whether he did not think that there should be a branch of specialists in NATO, who understand Soviet psychological warfare methods, to dissect slogans and to hit back in defense of democracy. Every time the Federal Republic suggests such a project it runs up against a rubber wall. The Secretary said he believed the Defense Minister had a real point. Only this morning under Tokyo dateline he had read in the *Herald Tribune* an article suggesting that the demonstrating students did not really know what the security treaty against which they were demonstrating contained. Mr. Kohler noted that we had tried a few things in this field and had not been particularly happy about the results. Last week we had had a session with Secretary General Spaak with respect to NATO ten-year planning.<sup>4</sup> The better coordination of informational and psychological defense policy would be an element in our studies.

Strauss said that the Germans had made a complete proposal in NATO based on the idea of a special bureau to coordinate and evaluate information and to provide answers. His recent experience in Canada where he had made a tour of two weeks had shown him to what extent Soviet slogans had penetrated even into Western countries. For example, the Soviet anti-Nazi campaign, fifteen years after the end of the war, had revived an issue which had little relationship to facts in Germany. The real Nazis in the country amounted to less than one percent. The greater danger was from a narrow-minded nationalism which saw its future in greater contacts with the East or neutralism. He, therefore, very much liked Couve's recent statement that Germany is in a key position for European security.<sup>5</sup> The concern of Chancellor Adenauer had been to link Germany with the West within a greater framework. The Germans wanted to be part of an institutional set-up going beyond purely military goals. The Secretary commented that the Federal Republic had gone along with the community of six.

Strauss noted that, with respect to integration of logistical support within NATO, the Federal Republic had had great difficulty with the Spanish affair.<sup>6</sup> The Federal Republic was too small to meet its own logistical and training requirements. If it tried to do so, part of the British

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<sup>4</sup> Regarding Spaak's discussion with U.S. officials on June 13, see volume VII, Part 1, Document 183.

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the talks between Spain and the Federal Republic of Germany at the end of 1959 and in 1960 concerning German use of Spanish training facilities, supply depots, and hospitals.

press would ask "What is going on in Germany?" or claim that things were getting out of hand. While the French, the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as Denmark, had helped Germany a little, the Federal Republic was still unable to carry out its requirements. One effect had been to increase the price of facilities in Spain to a level which the Germans could not now afford. The Spaniards had now said they were ready to make available certain facilities, but not for explosives. The Germans could stockpile food, medical supplies, blankets in Spain. The Spaniards had also asked how granting these facilities could be combined with the placing of contracts for weapons and ammunition in Spain. Sulzberger of the *New York Times*, who obtained the original story about the German-Spanish discussions, accordingly should get the credit for having raised the market value of the Spanish facilities, Strauss commented.

Strauss went on to say that he wanted to ask the moral and political support of the US in having some of the WEU restrictions on Germany modified. It was not a question of ABC weapons. He noted that, nine months ago, the Germans had applied to have their allowable destroyer tonnage raised from 3,000 to 5,000, since it was impossible to install a suitable air defense (guided missile system) on vessels smaller than 4,000 tons. Without this air defense, operation of the destroyers in the Baltic, which had been allocated to Germany by the NATO Command, would be suicidal. Four German destroyers were under construction; the other eight required to meet Germany's MC-70<sup>7</sup> force goals of twelve would not be built unless the WEU limitation were changed. Strauss said SACEUR should render a straight military judgment on the necessity of any German request and leave the political consideration to the WEU Council. He went on to criticize the fact that under the present WEU arrangement SACEUR was in effect obtaining a political judgment by the practice of a prior canvass of non-German WEU members. In the case of the submarines, the UK had asked for a delay for an indefinite period of time on the ground that it was undesirable to provoke Soviet feelings before the Summit.

The meeting in the Secretary's office adjourned at this point, and Defense Minister Strauss and his party went to Room 5100 where discussion in a larger group, chaired by Mr. Merchant, was scheduled to take place.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Documentation on MC-70, NATO's long-range force goals plan, is in volume VII, Part 1.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 260.

260. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 20, 1960, 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with German Defense Minister Strauss

PARTICIPANTS

Defense Minister Strauss  
Ambassador Grewe  
Minister Krapf  
Col. Reppenning

Under Secretary Merchant  
Assistant Secretary Kohler  
Assistant Secretary Irwin, Defense  
Mr. Smith, S/P  
Mr. Hillenbrand, GER  
Mr. Courtney, S/AE  
Mr. Fessenden, RA  
Mr. Long—M  
Mr. Devine, GER

In opening the meeting at 3:15, Mr. Merchant said it might be useful to résumé briefly the discussion that had taken place in the Secretary's office.<sup>1</sup> He said that in reviewing the Berlin Contingency Plans, it seemed that it would be worthwhile to study one or two areas that had been neglected in the previous discussions of this subject. It seemed that the military plans were in relatively good shape. However, many persons, including the President, felt that the problem of civilian access to Berlin in time of a blockade or harassment by the Soviet forces was something to which sufficient attention had not been paid. It also seemed desirable that we examine more intensively the possibility of economic countermeasures in our further studies. Mr. Merchant said that he felt that the Working Group which would gather shortly in Bonn could very appropriately examine this subject. In bringing this matter up, Mr. Merchant said that he would like to make it clear that the United States Government did not believe that Berlin would become the scene of a crisis in the near future, although this cannot be counted on.

Minister Strauss then commented that as long as communism remains what it is and has the mission of world domination which it proudly claims, it is dangerous for the rest of the world to relax its efforts.

Mr. Kohler said that one of our great problems was to give credibility to the positions we take and the statements which we publish. He said that there was now some feeling on our side that we had achieved a good deal of credibility, at least as far as Khrushchev was concerned, in

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-2060. Secret. Drafted by Devine, initialed by Kohler, and approved in M on June 30.

<sup>1</sup>See Document 259.



our statements of determination to defend Berlin. Mr. Kohler said that many people felt that the failure of the Summit meeting was really a reflection of the fact that Khrushchev had finally come to the conclusion that we were serious regarding what we had said about our intention to defend Berlin. Mr. Kohler went on to say that we can pretty safely assume that when trouble occurs it will start on German soil. For this reason, Mr. Kohler said, we have been concerned about the adequacy of the German alert legislation and had been pleased to hear recently that some progress had been made toward enacting the necessary legislation.

#### *German Alert Legislation*

Minister Strauss responded to this statement by saying first that he was speaking as Defense Minister. He went on to say that a few weeks ago Baron von Gutenberg, a member of the Bundestag, returned to Bonn from a trip to the States and when he met Minister Strauss inquired why the Defense Ministry refused to cooperate on the passage of necessary alert legislation. Baron von Gutenberg told Minister Strauss that Foreign Minister Brentano had given him this information. When Strauss asked Brentano about the report, Brentano said that he had heard it in the State Department. On further checking Minister Brentano learned that he had been misinformed and that appropriate apologies had been expressed. Minister Strauss went on to urge Mr. Merchant and Mr. Kohler to convey to the Chancellor and the German Government and the Bundestag in the most persuasive terms possible the conviction that it is their responsibility to see that proper alert legislation is passed. It appears that an amendment to the Constitution is needed for a completely satisfactory job in connection with the legislation but at the same time a great deal can be accomplished within present constitutional limits. Minister Strauss said that in June 1959, he and other interested members of the Government, after some strenuous fights with the Chancellor, had persuaded him to move ahead on the alert legislation. He had to report, however, that although the legislation was submitted to the Bundestag in December nothing substantial has happened since. He said that negotiations are now underway with the SPD in an attempt to reach agreement on an amendment to the Constitution. He said that he was convinced that one of the great troubles was that the Chancellor and other leaders of the German Government are not really convinced that the matter is one of great urgency for the United States Government. Minister Strauss said that we should make it clear to the Chancellor that we cannot carry out fully our Berlin responsibilities without the German alert legislation.

Minister Strauss said that because he had pursued an aggressive role in the matter of the legislation he had been accused in some quarters of being a warmonger. He said he was willing to accept this indignity if

it would advance the general cause. He repeated his advice to tell the Germans bluntly what we need. He said that his own Ministry would be badly handicapped in case of an emergency if the legislation were not passed because it would mean that the Ministry's civilian employees could walk off their jobs and there would be no way of enforcing their return. The same would apply to German employees of the US, British, and French forces.

Mr. Kohler said that if the conclusions reached by the quadripartite contingency planning group could be used as a spur to the Bundestag it might be helpful since the stated need for the alert legislation would then come from an Allied group rather than from the German Government itself or from just one of the concerned foreign Governments.

Mr. Merchant added that the failure of the Summit meeting had reduced the effectiveness of the "don't rock the boat" argument which Chancellor Adenauer and others had apparently used against pressing for alert legislation. Mr. Merchant added that it is much too easy to let the public think that the nuclear deterrent is the solution to all defense problems. He said that he was glad to note that the Germans had moved ahead so impressively toward their MC-70 goals. Mr. Merchant stressed the importance of adequate conventional armament.

#### *Role of Conventional Weapons*

Minister Strauss said that he felt one of the great problems facing the Alliance was that there seemed to be no clear concept of what he called the "graduated deterrent". What he had in mind was the whole panoply of defensive needs from the infantry brigades to strategic nuclear weapons. He said that in some quarters of Germany his emphasis on the graduated deterrent had been interpreted as a lack of confidence in the U.S. strategic deterrent. He felt that this attitude was a symptom of one of great difficulties that existed and that we would have to get the public away from the idea that the nuclear weapon is the only one to be used. He said that he felt that the Soviets are seriously considering the idea of trying to isolate the level of harassment at which we would use the strategic weapon. He said he thought that in the period of 1963-65, they might very well undertake border actions or actions in Berlin which would be an attempt to probe the kind of weapons response they would meet. He said that he felt these provocations would be both in political form and with conventional weapons.

Minister Strauss said that now that the U.S. is within the range of the modern weapons, it was no longer in the position it had been in World War I and World War II when it might as well have been on another planet as far as its vulnerability to the existing weapons of war was concerned. He said with this new situation there would have to be full-scale mutual reliability. In other words each country in the Alliance

would have to be depended on to make its essential contribution. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He said another phase of mutual reliability lay in the division of labor in the scientific, military, and industrial fields. He said there was a great deal of waste and overlapping in this regard and much constructive work needed to be done. The Minister said that in NATO there are 77 guided missile projects underway and that most of these will never go beyond the prototype stage. In contrast in the Soviet Bloc there are only 19 types of missiles. As a result of this more economic approach the cost effectiveness of the ruble is perhaps twice that of the dollar. The Minister added that the Western Alliance needs much more in the way of conventional weapons, and he said one of the problems is agreeing on conventional weapons. Too many private and national economic interests are working against standardization. He mentioned the French and German tank prototypes being possibly combined and that the situation in the tank field in general was as wasteful as in many others he had mentioned.

#### *WEU Restrictions on Germany*

In regard to WEU restrictions on Germany, Minister Strauss said that in any case Germany cannot go further than MC-70 requires. He said there is no desire to produce things in Germany that are banned. Germany does not want to increase its armed strength beyond that prescribed in NATO agreements. But he said that whenever Germany asks for a modification in WEU restrictions there is a discussion in the WEU about whether the German contribution is necessary. He said that this attitude seemed to fail to recognize the great revival which had taken place in German science and also failed to realize the value of the contributions which German scientists could make to the Western defense efforts. He said that when a German request for modification of limitations was submitted to WEU he would often hear nothing further about it. This was the more polite treatment given to the German request. Refusals have been received and have been rather pointed. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He said that even the data exchange agreements with the United States in which considerable hope had been placed had not turned out to be so satisfactory. There seems to be too much red tape and although there were 33 data exchange agreements between Germany and the United States only three or four are actually working effectively while the others were lost in red tape.

Minister Strauss then mentioned the situation in Africa and said that for two generations Europeans had done practically nothing for the African colonies and now with nationalism on the march in Africa the Europeans are running away. He said that in spite of this misguided attitude on the part of the Europeans, it must be arranged somehow that

Africa not fall into Communist hands. Mr. Merchant said that we would have to return to Africa and do the job that needs to be done.

Minister Strauss then referred to bi-partisan foreign policy in Germany. He said that this would have to be based on two principal points and that to begin with there was no point to asking the SPD for admission of past mistakes. It was not enough either that there should be agreement on the part of the SPD not to break the treaties. It was also necessary to fulfill the spirit of the treaties. The SPD would have to make a realistic appraisal of what a Soviet move into Central Europe would mean. There must be a resistance to all disengagement plans. He said that it would be impossible for the SPD to ever become a victorious political party unless it at least took a public stand 1) to being a loyal and efficient NATO member and 2) to renounce any deals with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Merchant then commented that concerning the point of complete mutual confidence which Minister Strauss had raised, the United States had tried consistently to encourage political consultation in the NATO Council. Regarding the WEU restrictions, he recalled that when the EDC was defeated in the French Chamber of Deputies there were very few people in Europe who would have believed that in five years Germany would be a leading member of NATO. The restrictive provisions in the WEU Treaty regarding Germany were part of an arrangement which was thought necessary at the time to quiet public opposition to German membership in NATO. Since we are not members of the WEU we cannot take a full part and therefore cannot assist Germany directly in its WEU procedural problems. While we can recognize the difficulties which this raises for the Federal Republic we hope that Germany will continue to find it possible to exercise the necessary patience.

Minister Strauss commented that General Norstad will not give a positive military ruling on a German request for WEU modification until he gets political support from the non-German members of WEU. According to German opinion SACEUR should render a prompt military decision and then pass the political responsibility on to the WEU Council. The present system was unworkable. The Minister said that because of the difficulties involved in WEU restrictions Germany had stopped its 12-destroyer program. He said that the destroyers which have been built will be used carrying less than their appropriate load of ammunition because the full load would bring them above the WEU limit of three thousand tons.

*[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

Mr. Kohler then explained, in response to an earlier inquiry by Minister Strauss, the availability of captured German Wehrmacht and other German military records.

He said that almost half the documents in question had been returned to the German Government and that the rather complex processing would be completed and all records returned by 1963.

The discussion ended at 4:25.

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**261. Letter From President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer**

Washington, October 7, 1960.

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: I am writing to you on a personal and confidential basis not only as my good friend of long standing but also as the leader of a nation whose economic and financial power has grown to great dimensions in the community of the free nations. With that power has come an equal responsibility for the success of free nations and our free economies in a critical and rapidly evolving era of the world's history. Upon us both rest great responsibilities that, I think, our two governments should consider together.

In the financial and economic sphere, no less than in the political and strategic sphere, mutual understanding and cooperation between Europe and the United States are vital.

In the United States, we recognized this when in 1948, we established the Marshall Plan. Despite impending elections, inflationary pressures, and heavy demands upon our resources from our own people, we gave a priority to the pressing need to restore Europe to economic and financial health and strength. We diverted goods to Europe and provided from our budget the means which Europe lacked to finance these goods.

After the Marshall Plan came the need for military assistance to fend off the Communist threat and the need to give aid to less-developed countries. At that time, I myself testified before our Congress, as Commander of the NATO Forces, that the need for military assistance would be temporary. Ever since, the American people have hoped that the burden of our foreign expenditures, economic and military, would eventually be lifted or at least substantially reduced by the cooperation of other nations.

Today the situation has substantially changed. The success of the Marshall Plan has led to the full recovery of Europe. The United States is now paying out to foreign countries more than we receive from our sales to them. This means that certain surplus countries, and notably the Federal Republic of Germany, are accumulating short-term dollar claims on the United States on a large scale. We meanwhile have lost, in the course of two and a half years, substantial amounts of gold while at the same time additional short-term dollar holdings have accumulated in other industrial countries. I believe that this burden upon our balance of payments should be reduced in a very substantial degree during the forthcoming year.

The Federal Republic is now the country which most nearly approaches the international financial and economic situation of the United States in 1948. It is consistently taking in from other countries far more than it is paying out. A continuation of this situation would stimulate demands for trade restrictions and threaten the future of economic development in the free world.

I have great admiration for the statesmanship which you have displayed in leading the Federal Republic to unparalleled internal economic revival and in promoting the constructive advance of the European Continent. I now ask you to give your personal attention to the wider area of your nation's financial and economic relations with the United States on the one hand and the developing countries on the other.

The broad courses of action are clear. Long-term financing from Germany is needed for development in the less-developed areas. A way should be found also to finance the dollar cost of defense which now falls on the United States.

Finally, a larger market is needed in Germany for the goods of the United States and of the developing countries.

Action along these lines would conform to economic reality. Moreover, it is essential to maintain the political strength of the free world. And insofar as aid to less-developed countries is concerned, it commends itself both as a moral act and one in the self-interest of every industrialized nation.

Failure to make prompt, decisive and substantial progress in these directions may well set in motion cumulative events of a serious disruptive character, deleterious to world trade and prejudicial to the position and prestige of both our countries as leaders of the free world. Once set in motion these disruptive forces would be difficult to restrain. In my view, the next year is an important one in this respect.

I am sure that you will appreciate the strength of my conviction in this regard, but naturally I can set forth in this letter only the outline of

the problem. Many technical and detailed considerations need to be discussed between our two governments. For such discussions with your staff, Cabinet, and, if you so desire, yourself, I suggest that I send to Bonn Secretary Anderson and Under Secretary Dillon of my Cabinet at a time that may be convenient to your government and to my two representatives. The two representatives I suggest have already had the opportunity to discuss these problems with Minister Erhard and President Blessing.

With warm regard,  
Sincerely,<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Printed from an unsigned copy.

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## 262. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, October 20, 1960, 3 p.m.

597. Following is translation of Adenauer's reply, dated October 20, 1960, to the President's letter of October 7, which Brentano handed me this morning:<sup>1</sup>

"Bonn, October 20, 1960.

My Dear Mr. President,

Dear Friend, Many thanks for your letter of October 7. Appreciation for our work and our cooperation, when it comes from your side, dear friend, is particularly valuable to me in these weeks filled with anxiety about domestic politics and about Europe—I think in this connection of France.

I agree with you that we Germans must, with all our might, strive to follow the path which the Marshall Plan has shown. I believe that we are able to make a considerable contribution to the aiding of underdeveloped countries. I consider it an excellent idea that you are willing to

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10–2260. Confidential; Presidential Handling.

<sup>1</sup>The German language text of Adenauer's letter was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 534 from Bonn, October 24. (*Ibid.*) The President's letter is printed as Document 261.

send Minister Anderson and Under Secretary of State Dillon to Bonn. I shall personally participate in these talks at the appropriate moment. Plans in this direction are already far advanced. However, I should like to ask you that you not form an opinion as yet as regards the question of stationing costs. This is a financial and political question of decisive importance, particularly during the election year in which we find ourselves. As you know, the Bundestag will be reelected in September 1961. I should like, therefore, to reiterate my request that you form your opinion only after the whole complex has been discussed with your representatives.

As regards our own domestic political scene, I take the liberty of submitting to you the following observations. People abroad often think that the Social Democratic Party hews to the same line as we. That is not the case. It is true, the SPD, through its Deputy Chairman Wehner, says that it is for NATO; at the same time, however, it states through its Chairman Ollenhauer, through Wehner and Mayor Brandt, that it is opposed to equipping the German Armed Forces with nuclear weapons. I need not explain to you my dear Mr. President at length that troops without nuclear weapons when pitted against the Soviet Forces which dispose of such strong nuclear armament, are nothing but beasts fit for slaughter. The NATO army would be finished in such case where an essential contingent such as the German one is not equipped with nuclear arms. In order to enable the Federal Government to continue the policy which it has pursued during the past 11 years, it is essential for the Bundestag to have a majority which holds the same basic views. A loss of the election by us would mean the end of the European policy as hitherto pursued. Despite the propaganda made for Mr. Brandt, our election prospects are good. Although this propaganda is false and untrue and although Mr. Brandt and the Berlin Senat are not frank in their dealings with the Federal Government, I am restraining myself so that no one will be able to blame us for having damaged Mr. Brandt's and thereby also Berlin's standing with the free nations in the light of the development that the Berlin crisis, which is to be expected with certainty, may take. Mr. Brandt is soon to visit the United States. I hope that his reception there will be dignified but not exaggerated.

Our Ambassador in Moscow has recently handed to Mr. Khrushchev a letter from me<sup>2</sup> which deals with the repatriation of Germans still retained in the Soviet Union. On this occasion Mr. Khrushchev has drawn our Ambassador into a lengthy conversation and, among other things, has stressed that he has the firm intention of bringing about decision in the German question during the coming year. He was thinking of

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 237.



a summit conference in January or February. He might, if circumstances require, even wait until March or April provided the Western side could advance plausible arguments in support of such delay.

Although I can imagine that great demands are being made upon you at this time, I have taken the liberty of communicating these views about our own domestic political situation and about Mr. Khrushchev to you because I know the great interest which you have in just these two questions.

Your representatives will be welcome at any time. We have started with the preparatory work on the question of aiding underdeveloped countries and I hope that within a few days we shall have worked out definite proposals. Should your representatives prefer not to come during the last few weeks before the elections in the United States, I should like to suggest that they come immediately after the elections. At any rate, my representatives as well as myself shall be at their disposal at any time.

My thoughts are very much with you and I wish you, from the bottom of my heart, all the best for the coming weeks.

As ever, Yours, Adenauer."

Salutation and complimentary close handwritten.

Brentano stressed that, as stated in letter, Chancellor would be happy to see Secretary Anderson and Under Secretary Dillon at any time. He asked, however, if I could let him know as soon as dates for visit were fixed.

**Dowling**

263. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, November 2, 1960.

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD  
REPORT ON GERMANY

(The Federal Republic, Berlin, East Germany) (NSC 5803)

(Policy Approved by the President on February 7, 1958)

(Period Covered: From September 4, 1958

Through November 2, 1960)

*General Situation*

1. During the period under review, Germany, and more particularly Berlin, once more became one of the most active arenas in the struggle between the Free and Communist worlds. The Soviet proposal for a free city of West Berlin and Soviet threats of unilateral withdrawal from occupation functions and of the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) provided an impetus for four-power negotiations, which the Soviets abruptly interrupted at the Summit meeting, implying an intention to seek a new Summit meeting after the American elections.

2. Despite the dramatic attention it received, the German situation, and American interests in Germany, remained very much the same in its basic aspects. There were, however, qualitative changes resulting from the prolonged division of the country and the continuation of the various trends within the Federal Republic, Berlin, and the Soviet Zone described in earlier reports. In addition, the possibility of a nuclear "stand-off" has introduced a new factor into the German problem.

*Germany As a Whole*

3. The unyielding attitude of the Soviet Union at the Geneva Conference of 1959<sup>1</sup> and in the discussion of the German question prior to the Summit failure in May 1960 quenched the last hopes, even in the West German Opposition, that German reunification can be negotiated at present. There was increased acceptance in Germany of the thesis sponsored by Chancellor Adenauer that the division of Germany is

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Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803 Series. Secret. Attached to the source text were a cover sheet and a memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the OCB which noted that the report had been approved by the OCB on November 2 for transmittal to the NSC. The NSC considered the report on December 1 and agreed that NSC 5803 should be brought up-to-date by the Planning Board. A memorandum of the NSC discussion is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May 11-August 5, 1959, see volume VIII.

more a consequence than a primary cause of tension between East and West and that the best hope for profitable negotiation on Germany, albeit not a bright one, lies in the possibility of world-wide détente following an agreement on general disarmament.

#### *The Federal Republic*

4. Our immediate postwar aims in the Federal Republic appear to have been satisfactorily attained—so satisfactorily in fact that the accomplishments themselves have brought about a new generation of lesser problems.

5. Economically, the Federal Republic has become sound and strong. It has a hard currency, is the world's third trading nation, and is developing an insatiable internal market resembling our own. Its economic problems today are no longer those of scarcity but those of prosperity, e.g., a significant labor shortage despite an increased population.

6. Political stability has been continued by the firmly established rule of Adenauer and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) parliamentary majority and by a trend in the direction of a two-party system. At the same time, the German Socialist Party (SPD) seems at least to be moving rapidly in the direction of that moderation in internal and foreign policy which seems to offer its only hope of winning substantially increased support. However, the question of succession to leadership in the CDU has not been resolved.

7. Defense Minister Strauss's administrative and political vigor has spurred the lagging military buildup. The Bundeswehr will soon represent the largest European contingent in NATO. Appreciation of this fact by the Germans is leading to increasing pressure for equal status with its NATO partners, and has generated new echoes amplified by intensive Soviet bloc propaganda, of the old fear of German militarism.

8. The Federal Republic has been in the lead in fostering European integration, with Adenauer up to now deciding in the affirmative every debate as to whether the political advantage is worth the economic price. De Gaulle's insistence on the importance of national integrity is putting the Federal Republic in a position where it is faced with the choice of accepting French ideas of confederation in the interest of a further development of the Franco-German entente or continuing to seek European cooperation on a supranational basis.

9. The Federal Republic is tending to emerge as a national state in its own right. It is regarded by the Government and population today less as a truncated and temporary state, created to assure a maximum of free self-government pending reunification, than as the successor to the Reich and the essential framework of the reunited Germany of the future. In seeking its acceptance as an equal among other states, the Fed-

eral Republic is showing an increasing impatience with the limitations originally imposed on its sovereignty or freedom of activity. The Germans have also grown more anxious about their national security. Recognition of problems inherent in a possible nuclear "stand-off" and deep concern over the continuity of U.S. commitment on the continent have stimulated renewed emphasis on making NATO an effective defense organization within which West German security can be assured. Should Federal Republic military and political leaders come to doubt the efficacy of NATO, trends toward greater independence of action or greater emphasis on bilateral defense and political arrangements may appear.

### *The Soviet Zone*

10. Despite the distastefulness and inefficiency of its methods from the Western point of view, East Germany is "teetering on the brink of stability" and the regime is unquestionably in control. The greater part of the population while refusing at heart to accept Communist rule as permanent, are obliged to accommodate themselves to an ever increasing degree. Western efforts have succeeded in obstructing diplomatic recognition of the "German Democratic Republic", but the GDR has not been without success in exploiting economic and cultural contacts to political advantage. There is no doubt that the Communists have persuaded many, even in the Western countries, that the existence of the GDR is a "fact of life", which must be taken into account even if one finds it unpleasant. While the "separate peace treaty" which the Soviet Union has threatened to conclude with the GDR seems intended to place immediate pressure on the Allied position in Berlin, conclusion of such a treaty might also enhance the GDR's position at home and abroad.

### *Berlin*

11. Soviet threats against Berlin, most immediately against the freedom of access of the Western occupation forces, have maintained an atmosphere of crisis since November, 1958. The Soviets were able at the Geneva Conference to oblige the Western Powers to discuss the question of Berlin separately from the question of Germany as a whole, a position which the Western Powers might find it difficult to alter. Though numerous permutations and combinations have been explored, no one has been able to devise a satisfying formula for negotiating a separate solution to the Berlin problem. The Western search for a Berlin solution has repeatedly been blocked by Soviet insistence upon gains both actually and visibly at the expense of vital Western interests. The need for agreement among the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic in a situation in which each tends to see its over-all relations with the Soviet Union in a somewhat different perspective is a complicating factor. The principal Western tactic has been to gain time

and to demonstrate determination to maintain Allied rights in Berlin. At present, however, the prospects of negotiating even a workable "interim agreement" appear slim.

12. The importance of Berlin as a symbol of Western firmness and the earnestness of U.S. intentions with respect to further Soviet encroachments in Europe cannot be over-emphasized. Soviet actions for the past 12 years indicate their clear understanding of the importance of this symbol.

13. As the situation develops, the problem has become increasingly one of demonstrating convincingly that the Western Powers have in fact the intention and the means of enforcing their Berlin guarantee. Khrushchev has asserted disbelief that the United States would fight over Berlin and a growing body of Western European leadership considers a nuclear response to be out of the question. Recent tripartite Berlin contingency planning discussions have, however, indicated a greater readiness than before to consider a wide range of military and non-military measures, short of nuclear war, to put pressure on the Soviet Union in order to maintain the status of and access to Berlin. World opinion has in general been a factor deterring Soviet action on Berlin. There are compelling legal arguments to support the Western position and the Soviets appear aware that overt aggression against Berlin could jeopardize their broader "coexistence" objectives. On the other hand, increasing concern about the horrors of the war which a Berlin crisis could ignite may well dispose neutral opinion and even some Germans to accept the idea of the Soviet "free city" proposal as the lesser evil.

14. The main Soviet pressure tactic in the past two years has been the threat of a "separate peace treaty" with the GDR, after which the Soviets would invest the GDR with full control over access to Berlin. Recent coordinated GDR-Soviet moves against Berlin suggest a new tactic which attempts to deny Soviet responsibilities and to establish firm GDR de facto control over the city, using all possible practical and propaganda means to destroy the legal and moral basis for the Allied presence and proceeds toward unilateral changes in the Berlin situation. In this line of development, the Soviet threat of a separate treaty, which had already become less effective through constant use, appears to have been subordinated at least temporarily to claims that the GDR is already fully sovereign, except in respect to temporary obligations of the USSR relating to the Allied garrisons in the city. A more subtle de facto erosion of the Allied position has thus been substituted. It may become very difficult, in coping with such "salami tactics" to demonstrate that the real issue in each minor incident is the survival of free Berlin. The principal target for Soviet encroachment during the past few months (and possibly until the situation with respect to resumption of negotiations is clearer) has been the vital, if somewhat ambiguous, relationships which

have developed between the Federal Republic and Berlin. Since the bulk of our contingency planning has been aimed at the problems of insuring the maintenance of Allied access to and rights in Berlin, additional multilateral planning, including economic countermeasures against the Soviet Zone, to meet these new threats is in progress.

15. Entirely apart from recent Communist threats, there has been some expression of concern of late about the long-run prospects for West Berlin. It has an unfavorable population situation and its economy can be sustained only by artificial stimuli and outside assistance which might in time or under other circumstances be difficult to continue.

#### *Appraisal of Policy*

16. The agencies represented on the Working Group on Germany have reappraised the validity and evaluated the implementation of U.S. Policy Toward Germany (Federal Republic, Berlin and East Germany) (NSC 5803, dated February 7, 1958) in the light of operating experience, and believe that the policy is out of date as a source for guidance in dealing with the developments summarized above. It is therefore recommended, especially in view of NSC 2215-c of April 7, 1960,<sup>2</sup> that NSC 5803 be reviewed.

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<sup>2</sup>NSC Action No. 2215-c asked the Planning Board to review all NSC papers with the idea of bringing them up-to-date for the new administration. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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## **264. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower**

Washington, November 28, 1960.

### **OTHERS PRESENT**

Secretaries Anderson, Dillon  
Generals Persons, Goodpaster

The President opened the meeting by speaking of the highly distorted press handling of the meeting at Bonn of Mr. Anderson and Mr. Dillon with Chancellor Adenauer.<sup>1</sup> He said he knew the accounts of the

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 1.

<sup>1</sup> Anderson and Dillon visited Bonn November 19-23, Paris November 23-25, and London November 25-26. In addition to the documentation described in the footnotes below, memoranda of conversation, telegrams, briefing papers, and related materials on their trip are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1781-1788.

meeting were factually incorrect in their basic elements because they wrongly stated that there had been no coordination between the Treasury and State Departments and that the Germans had not been notified in advance. The facts are of course quite different. The President also said that he had received a letter from Adenauer in which Adenauer had pressed for him to come to the December NATO meeting and had indicated that a large measure of agreement had been reached in the talks—which seems to be something of an exaggeration.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Anderson then gave a report of the mission. He and Mr. Dillon had arrived on Saturday and had met with Ambassador Dowling on Sunday. Dowling, far from recommending a soft approach to the Germans, had recommended that the matter be put to them with total bluntness. Mr. Anderson said that in fact he and Mr. Dillon had softened one or two points of the presentation when they met with the Germans from what had been developed with Ambassador Dowling. Mr. Anderson said they had met with the Chancellor on Monday.<sup>3</sup> They had outlined the balance of payments situation to him and the problem of our gold outflow. They had made clear the necessity for actions to defend the dollar and had brought out that support costs in Germany represent a \$600 million gold burden to us. They had stressed that we cannot run a \$4 billion deficit in balance of payments annually. Mr. Anderson said it was quite clear that the Chancellor did not understand this problem at all well, in spite of repeated explanations. The Chancellor's own people confirmed this, and said that the matter is not one for which he has an understanding. Again and again Chancellor Adenauer came back to the point that there is only one thing that worries him, and that is the possibility that we might redeploy some of our troops. On this point Secretary Anderson stated and reiterated that President Eisenhower is resolved to do whatever the United States has to do to protect the dollar.

After meeting with the Chancellor, Mr. Anderson said the group met with German representatives. These representatives suggested what the Germans would be willing to do. They offered a \$1 billion foreign aid program for the coming year. Notably, this would include some grants and some soft loans—this is an advance over any previous German statements. The Germans estimated that 20% of this billion dollars could be expected to result in expenditures in the United States. Second, the Germans offered a prepayment of the outstanding \$800 million on the GARIOA account; however, they conditioned this on the U.S. forgiving \$200 million of this as an off-set for the remaining vested German

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<sup>2</sup> Dated November 24. (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

<sup>3</sup> Dillon Anderson met with Adenauer at 10 a.m. on November 21 and at 5:30 p.m. on November 22. A memorandum of the second conversation is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1781. No record of the first conversation has been found.

assets. Third, the Germans said they might buy some military equipment in the United States. Mr. Anderson said he told them that this action would help only if this were added to their budget. Mr. Dillon said that this is an important item, and that Assistant Secretary Irwin is working with the Germans on a plan for them to buy in the United States about \$400 million worth of military equipment a year which they would otherwise buy in Germany. The Germans are talking about \$250 million worth. Mr. Anderson said he thinks it would be desirable for them not to go far beyond \$300 million worth since they would then claim that this makes up for refusal to pay support costs.

Mr. Anderson said the Germans stressed over and over that they do not want to do anything that would harm the government in the election in later 1961, or add to the budget. The President observed that anything supporting our troop costs sounds like occupation charges to the Germans and is anathema to them.

Mr. Anderson said that in order to remove the bad psychological effect he had suggested that the Germans and the U.S. set up a military fund that would handle several kinds of things and submerge the troop costs. They did not like this because they said it would increase their budget. Mr. Anderson said he told them that probably the only way to get relief in the circumstances was to redeploy their troops. He also told them that while he is not making the decisions he is certain that the President will do anything necessary to protect the dollar.

Mr. Dillon said that Chancellor Adenauer had told him that the Germans simply could not possibly pay support costs. Adenauer added that a Bundestag member who was recently in the United States had talked with President-elect Kennedy, and quoted Kennedy as saying that he would not ask the Germans to pay troop costs. Mr. Dillon observed that anything the Germans really do they will want to do for the new administration, so as to get maximum credit with them.

The President said that Adenauer had been pressing him to come to Paris. His real purpose is clear—to get the President to promise that the United States would not redeploy troops. Mr. Anderson said we should not let the Germans off the hook, that we may take our troops out. He said that Mr. Blessing had said the Chancellor simply does not understand this issue but that the Chancellor very much wants to help us and not hurt us. He said that Blessing added that the biggest consideration is who is to be the next Secretary of the Treasury. Blessing even stated that Anderson could tell President-elect Kennedy this. Mr. Anderson commented that Baumgartner in France and Kobbold in the United Kingdom said exactly the same thing.<sup>4</sup> Secretary Anderson said the Germans

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<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of the conversation with French Minister of Finance Wilfrid S. Baumgartner is *ibid.*, CF 1785. No record of the meeting with Kobbold has been found.



had asked him two or three times why the United States had not prohibited the Ford transaction. Mr. Anderson commented that the Fords said that they had given deep consideration to the adverse impact of their action but had decided to go ahead with it anyhow. Mr. Anderson had gone so far as to tell the Fords that their action might be the cause of imposition of exchange controls.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Anderson said he told Erhard that the only way to restrict the Fords would be to impose exchange controls, and that Erhard was horrified at the thought. Secretary Anderson said that Kobbold had told him the United Kingdom will not hold the dollars derived from the transaction. They will use some in the IMF, but the remainder, in the order of \$180 million, they will immediately turn in for gold in New York. Mr. Dillon commented that General Norstad had said it would be a long time before the GIs buy a Ford again.

Mr. Dillon said that the press has been carrying stories that Senator Kennedy wants him to be his Secretary of the Treasury. The President stated that Kennedy had told Mr. Nixon that he would like to have Dillon and Lodge in his administration, but that they would not be given policy positions. Mr. Dillon seemed somewhat surprised at this. The President went on to say that if Dillon were offered the Secretaryship of the Treasury, in his opinion he should take it at once and do everything in his power to protect our currency. The President added that if Kennedy were to offer him the Secretaryship of the Treasury, he would take it himself. Mr. Anderson reiterated that the key thing seems to be the question of who his successor is to be. Everyone in Europe is asking this. Mr. Anderson said that something tangible has already come out of the Bonn discussions, in the German willingness to make soft loans, and in their offer to buy additional military equipment. He thinks that we must be prepared to wrestle with them over troop deployments.

The President asked if he was correct in thinking there is no substantial dollar problem in Okinawa deployments, and Mr. Anderson said this is true. The President said what he had in mind is to cut down on deployments in Japan and move the forces to Okinawa.

Mr. Anderson said that Germany and Italy are the big problems. The President asked if we could scatter our troops more and use the soft currencies generated in each country to pay some of our expenses there. Mr. Anderson said this is a good idea although it is hard to see where this could be substantial. Mr. Dillon said the other Europeans are watching this whole situation closely to see that the Germans do not help us by shifting the gold drain to them.

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<sup>5</sup>In November, Ford Motor Company announced that it would spend \$138 million on foreign facilities.

At this point Mr. Anderson said he would like to see the President go to the NATO conference in Paris in December and talk to the conference on fiscal problems. He went on to say that in reporting his mission he thought it was important to dispel two ideas the press had created—that the talks had not been coordinated as between Treasury and State, and that we had not made clear to the Germans (as in fact we had) that support costs would be the central subject of the discussion. He also thought it should be made clear that we did not brush aside the German suggestions. In fact, we welcomed them but told them they did not give a full solution. General Persons said the press is carrying statements that Secretary Anderson wrongly views this problem as a long-range problem whereas, as the Germans state, it is really quite temporary and transitory. He thought this should be corrected.

The President thought that we might do well to build a backfire against the propaganda the Germans are putting out. The danger is that we must not go so far as to get a protectionist drive started. He would be quite ready to tell the Germans and Italians that we may put a higher Buy American differential back into effect.

Secretary Anderson said that Kobbold had told him he thought one possibility in the Ford action is that they are doing this to get their money out of the United States in anticipation of real trouble here. When Mr. Anderson indicated skepticism over this, I asked him if he did not think this was true. He said he did not. I volunteered the view that I did not see how it could be anything else, and that the Europeans, who have a long experience in this kind of thing, certainly recognize it is just that. Mr. Dillon said he was not sure on this score. I stated that another reason is certainly to take advantage of lower labor costs and higher profit rates abroad. Mr. Dillon agreed with this. General Persons asked whether Defense is cutting down its procurement abroad. I told him this was called for in the President's directive. He asked specifically about purchases of drugs in Italy and I said I would check this.

After reading over the proposed text for release,<sup>6</sup> the President asked if we should not put in a paragraph indicating that conversations in Bonn, Paris and London, as well as other reports reaching us indicate a considerable nervousness about American fiscal policy in the months ahead under the new administration, and a concern over inflation. Mr. Anderson said this is entirely correct, but would question when and how to say it.

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<sup>6</sup>For text of the President's statement on the Dillon-Anderson trip, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 364-365.

Mr. Anderson indicated that he and Mr. Dillon had seen Senator Johnson and Senator Fulbright and had given them a short résumé.<sup>7</sup> Senator Johnson had asked what this administration recommended, and Mr. Anderson had told him that it is now their problem and we should not attempt to tell them how they should go about solving it. He said Mr. Johnson tried to get some statement from the Administration but he reiterated that it was his and Mr. Kennedy's problem. General Persons recalled that Secretary Anderson had briefed Mr. Nitze on the balance of payments matter and the German problem before making this trip.<sup>8</sup> He thought Mr. Anderson should brief him again, and this was generally agreed and approved by the President. The President asked what kind of a man Mr. Nitze is. Mr. Dillon said he is a very able and dedicated man, extremely embittered against the Republicans because, as a Republican, he was forced to withdraw from consideration for Assistant Secretary of Defense by Senator Knowland early in this administration. He thereupon became a Democrat. I told the President I agreed with Mr. Dillon's assessment of Mr. Nitze's capacities. He is very keen and able although he does not have perhaps a personal "fly wheel" of a size commensurate with his energy and intelligence.

Mr. Anderson said that when Mr. Kennedy becomes President, President Eisenhower will have the only voice stronger than his in our country. He thought that the President should say that all citizens should try to be a brake on Mr. Kennedy since he is dealing with the whole world economic system. He again raised the question of the President going to Paris.

The President said that if he did so he would have to take Mr. Kennedy and that this would be impossible, both for him and for Mr. Kennedy. If de Gaulle, Adenauer and Macmillan were to come over here, he would be glad to see them at Camp David, for example. He would not have to have Mr. Kennedy present at these discussions, although they could of course see him separately.

Mr. Anderson said that Ambassador Dowling had told him it is not likely that Adenauer will be the next Chancellor. His party will decline in power. Mr. Dillon said he agreed and thought that a coalition is inevitable, and that Adenauer would not be its representative.

After the meeting ended, Mr. Anderson said that in consideration of the points the President had made, he would withdraw his recommendation that the President go to Paris.

**G.**  
*Brigadier General, USA*

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<sup>7</sup> A memorandum of this conversation on November 23 is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

<sup>8</sup> No record of this briefing has been found.

# German Democratic Republic

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### 265. National Security Council Report

Supplement II to NSC 5803<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 7, 1958.

#### STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD EAST GERMANY

##### General Considerations

1. Soviet control over East Germany has added to the power disequilibrium in Europe and thus to the threat to the security of the United States. Moreover, the continued division of Germany creates a serious element of instability in Europe which must be eliminated before a reliable and enduring basis for European security can be established.

2. At the present time all evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has no intention of abandoning its position in East Germany, or of seriously negotiating on the subject of German reunification. It continues to maintain substantial military forces in the area, while representing minor withdrawals as a significant reduction.

3. East Germany poses special and difficult problems of control for the USSR. While the East German regime has made limited progress in furthering its program, the East Germans are unlikely to accept of their own free will the Communist system which has been imposed upon them. A basic hope that reunification will somehow eventually be accomplished continues to be the main psychological support for the majority of East Germans in their disaffection with the Communist regime. The fact that the main body of the German nation in the Federal Republic has made remarkable advances in political freedom and economic well-being, together with the role played by West Berlin in providing a means of contact with the Free World, also serves to keep alive in East Germany the hope for an ultimate escape from Soviet domination. The situation in East Germany provides a showcase example of Soviet colo-

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Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803 Series. Top Secret.

<sup>1</sup> NSC 5803 is printed as Document 243; regarding Supplement I to NSC 5803, see the source note to Document 243.

nialism and furnishes opportunities for the West to exploit strong popular anti-Communist sentiments. Recently there have been numerous indications of unrest and uncertainty in the lower echelons of the East German Socialist Unity Party as a result of the repudiation of Stalin.

4. However, as long as Germany remains divided, various factors at work in East Germany will operate to weaken the resistance of the population to the regime. These factors include the wholesale Communist indoctrination of youth, the weakening under unrelenting police-state pressure of resistance groups now in existence, and the continuing flight to the West of anti-regime refugees.

5. It is in the national security interests of the United States to oppose Soviet control of East Germany and to seek the elimination of that control by means of the reunification of Germany in freedom. However, the United States is not prepared to resort to war to eliminate Soviet domination of East Germany, nor does attainment of this goal through internal revolutionary means appear likely so long as substantial Soviet forces are deployed in the area. Thus a basic change in Soviet policy toward Germany will be required before a German unification compatible with U.S. security interests can be attained. Until this change occurs, the possibilities for U.S. action vis-à-vis East Germany will remain limited.

6. The process by which a change in Soviet policy toward Germany may occur may be a very complicated one since it is closely related to many other elements in the total relationship between the Soviet Union and the West. However, in respect to Germany one essential line of action is the continued focusing of world opinion on the injustice of a Germany forcibly divided by the imposition of a Soviet-dominated puppet regime. Another essential line of action is the attempt to make more difficult Soviet control in East Germany, and to encourage the development of forces there tending to strengthen resistance to the Communist regime. Moreover, there may be developments, such as the riots of 1953, which offer opportunities for exploitation. Such pressures upon the Soviet Union may lead it ultimately to accept the reunification of Germany in freedom as one of the prerequisites for the relaxation of international tension and as indispensable to the creation of stable and permanent European security.

7. It is essential to this end that the NATO countries and, to the extent possible, non-NATO countries, demonstrate their support for reunification on a continuing basis. The United States will have to contend against the possible interest of certain uncommitted nations in trade connections with East Germany and combat the tendency of some Western European elements to favor political arrangements with the USSR based on a divided Germany.

8. The maintenance by the free world of contact with East Germans is an important element in the stimulation of their resistance to

Communism, confidence in the West, and hope for a reunified democratic and independent Germany. Imaginative and flexible programs will be required, permitting quick adjustment to possible changes in Communist restrictions on the access of the East German population to Berlin and West Germany.

### Objectives

9. *Basic:* The reunification in freedom of a Germany enjoying a representative government based upon the consent of the governed and participating fully in the free world community.

10. *Interim:*

a. To place the Soviets on the defensive by measures in support of reunification.

b. To undermine Soviet control over East Germany through exploiting the Western position in the Federal Republic and Berlin.

c. To diminish the reliability of the East German armed forces.

d. To minimize East German contribution to Soviet power and encourage changes in the present East German-Soviet relationship which would weaken Soviet control.

e. To conserve and strengthen the assets within East Germany which may contribute to U.S. interests in peace or war and to the ultimate freedom of East Germany.

### Major Policy Guidance

11. Use appropriate means short of military force to oppose, and to contribute to the eventual elimination of, Soviet domination over East Germany and to promote the reunification of Germany in freedom, including, when appropriate, concert with NATO or other friendly powers, resort to UN procedures, and diplomatic negotiations.

12. Seek to increase popular and bureaucratic pressures against the present regime through the exploitation of discontent with political and economic conditions in East Germany.

13. Continue basic opposition to the Soviet-Communist system and continue to state its evils.

14. Encourage democratic, anti-Communist elements in East Germany. Stress the healthy aspects of a common German heritage and cooperate with other forces—such as religious, cultural, social—which are natural allies in the struggle against Soviet imperialism and seek to maintain the morale and will to resist Communist domination.

15. Stimulate and exploit conflicts within the Communist regime in East Germany and between it and other Communist regimes, as appropriate, to the achievement of our policy objectives.

16. Exploit the developing organizations of Western unity (NATO, WEU, OEEC, CSC, etc.) as a force working for a free European community including a reunified Germany.

17. Utilize both public affairs and diplomatic channels to focus world opinion on the injustices of a forcibly divided Germany and the oppressive actions taken by the East German regime against the population. Emphasize that the people of East Germany have been deprived of their right to self-determination by the violation of international agreements by the Soviet Government, particularly the agreement of the Heads of Government at Geneva regarding the reunification of Germany by means of free elections.<sup>2</sup>

18. Maintain contact with the people of East Germany and encourage resistance to the Communist regime by specific projects (administered by the West German Government through West German and private organizations supported by the United States to the extent necessary and appropriate) designed to (a) maintain a sense of identification with the West and (b) manifest our concern for the hardships of East Germans. This should include the provision of cultural, educational, welfare, and travel opportunities. However, an organized official program for the exchange of persons between the United States and East Germany would be inconsistent with our policy of the nonrecognition of the East German regime.

19. Reassure the East German people of our continued confidence in the eventual reunification of Germany in freedom by evidence of continued strong Western support for Berlin and our determination to remain in Berlin. Hamper Soviet exploitation of East Germany by maintaining Berlin as an example of Western accomplishments and as an island of resistance to consolidation of Communist control in East Germany, and by prompt and clear response to any Communist harassment of the city.

20. Oppose the recognition of the East German regime by other countries, seek to limit its influence, and support the Federal Republic in preventing the admission of representatives of the East German regime to international organizations or meetings.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For the Directive of the Heads of Government, July 23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, p. 527.

<sup>3</sup> On February 7, the President also approved a separate annex to Supplement II which reads as follows:

“1. Encourage the East German people in passive resistance to their Soviet-dominated regime when this will contribute to minimizing East German contributions to Soviet power or to increasing pressures for reunification. Foster disaffection in the East German armed forces.

“2. Avoid incitements to violence or to action when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of U.S. objectives. In general, however, do not discourage, by public utterances or otherwise, spontaneous manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime, despite risks to individuals, when their net results will exert pressures for release from Soviet domination. [4 lines of source text not declassified]” (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803 Series)

**266. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany**

Berlin, February 14, 1958, 6 p.m.

899. Ref: ourtels Bonn 878, 873, rptd Dept 937 and 931.<sup>1</sup> Thirty-fifth plenum SED CC actions must be viewed in perspective of general stirrings throughout Eastern European satellites following 20th Party Congress CPSU winter 1956. Charges against Schirdewan–Wollweber specifically refer to their opportunistic interpretation results 20th Party Congress and stressed their advocacy of democratization and relaxation. Removal Schirdewan and Wollweber for reasons given ourtel 878 reveals, however, existence in top SED leadership since Oct 1956 of strong oppositional group animated by ideas emerging in wake 20th Party Congress CPSU. While in Poland oppositional elements led by Gomulka were able establish new regime committed to policies of liberalization, while in Hungary party oppositional elements were unable control course of events resulting bloody repression popular uprising by Sov Armed Forces, while in Czechoslovakia development oppositional forces nipped in bud early summer 1956 by prompt action of Nowotny and Siroky,<sup>2</sup> fourth variant has taken place East Germany. Oppositional group was formed below surface presumably seeking an occasion bring downfall Ulbricht. Ulbricht's successful suppression Schirdewan–Wollweber group appears mean relative terminal point of SED Party unrest in form stimulated by 20th Party Congress CPSU and Polish-Hungarian events Oct 1956.

Schirdewan and Wollweber held key positions, Schirdewan as party cadre chief and head of party intelligence service, and Wollweber until Nov 1, as Minister for State Security. Selbmann and Ziller were both top level party leaders in the economic sphere. Since charges speak frequently of "others" involved it may be assumed that strong forces within party hierarchy were involved in opposition. If this group was unable to upset Ulbricht, then it is unlikely that any oppositional forces can soon develop within SED able to bring about his downfall, particularly now that Party Secretariat has been packed by vigorous young

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.00/2-1458. Confidential. Repeated to Washington, Moscow, Paris, London, Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest and pouched to POLAD USAREUR and DCSI USAF. The source text is the Department of State copy.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 878, February 9, summarized in detail Erich Honecker's report to the plenum of the SED on the expulsion of Karl Schirdewan, Ernst Wollweber, and Fred Oelssner from the Central Committee. Telegram 873, February 7, transmitted extracts from the communiqué of the 35th plenum, February 7. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/2-958 and 762B.00/2-758, respectively)

<sup>2</sup> Antonin Novotny, President of Czechoslovakia, and Viliam Siroky, Czech Premier.



Ulbricht henchmen. Also we anticipate concentrated effort remove from important positions "others" of Schirdewan–Wollweber group, both in process reorganization economy (ourtel 887 to Bonn rptd Dept 946)<sup>3</sup> and in new party elections preliminary to 5th Party Congress July, in order fill party and government positions so far as possible with reliable Ulbricht men.

According to intelligence reports, downfall Schirdewan–Wollweber has had demoralizing effect on middle and lower party functionaries. However, we do not believe these unsettling effects will be of great moment in the near future, but expect party discipline will be maintained under tightened Ulbricht control. Opposition to Ulbricht personally and to his Stalinist policies nevertheless will presumably persist deep underground within party.

Judging by 35th plenum documents, SED leadership under Ulbricht intends intensify communization East Germany thus accelerating course which became discernible last fall. For example, increased pressure on labor, both economic and political, was forecast by Warnke (ourtel to Bonn 882 rpted Dept 942).<sup>4</sup> Propagation atheism is to be increased. Press is to engage more actively in ideological indoctrination. New measure has been prepared by Politburo to increase party role in East German Army. Honecker reported Politburo desires to transform universities, technical academies and other schools to real Socialist-training institutions and stated "we must more strenuously link and control all forms of art and cultural expression." Further communization may be partially achieved unless, as purged group apparently feels, policies themselves create retardism difficulties or provoke mass popular reaction. Stalinism has not so far been able to win support of East German population and is unlikely to do so in future even with greater controls and isolation from West which regime intends. Solution of domestic economic problems also unlikely through hard course. Present trend is thus likely increase tensions among all groups East German population.

Following are implications Ulbricht victory:

1. Prospect of negotiations regarding reunification or related issues affecting Germany becomes bleaker than ever. One charge against Schirdewan–Wollweber refers to their not wanting understand dangers resulting from illusionary desire bring about German unity at any price. This charge that they were willing compromise essential Communist features of GDR in interest reunification may indicate at least that these

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<sup>3</sup> Dated February 12, telegram 887 from Berlin to Bonn reported that the Volkskammer had on February 10 begun consideration of a law to reorganize the state economic apparatus. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/2–1258)

<sup>4</sup> Dated February 10, telegram 882 from Berlin to Bonn transmitted excerpts from a speech to the 35th plenum by Herbert Warnke. (*Ibid.*, 862B.062/2–1058)

top party leaders were skeptical about intrinsic feasibility endeavor establish separate state in East Germany.

2. In line with current emphasis GDR sovereignty and efforts establish GDR as a real German state, Ulbricht might seek from Sovs opportunities major encroachments on Western position in Berlin. Soviets, however, are specifically able to control Ulbricht regime in these matters. Sov decisions on specific encroachments or general effort against Allied position in Berlin, e.g., by turnover authority GDR, are difficult to foresee, since they would be presumably related over-all Soviet policy considerations.

3. Schirdewan-Wollweber were charged with overestimating difficulties connected with further socialization GDR and dangers of Hungarian-type [revolt?] connected therewith. If Ulbricht, without restraint, presses forward with harsh measures of continued economic exploitation, with raising work norms, etc., with repressive measures against church, and with a doctrinaire Communist line objectionable to masses of population, then there may come a point when an exacerbated East German population despite its memories of June 17, 1953, might attempt rise against regime. Doubtless the Sovs would seek to forestall such a development. But Sov record in dealing with Hungarian party in a similar situation does not give one confidence that Sovs would correctly appraise situation. For these reasons hard Ulbricht course carries with it prospective danger major dimensions.

**Gufler**

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**267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, June 9, 1958, 7:31 p.m.

3139. Bonn for Ambassador or Chargé. Berlin for Gufler. Department endorses procedure being followed by USAREUR to secure return helicopter crew.<sup>1</sup> However, urge that care be exercised to avoid taking categorical position in any statements to press of dealings with Soviets that we will refuse under any circumstances have contact with East Ger-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-958. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Creel and Lisle, cleared by Kohler, and approved by Elbrick. Also sent to Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> On June 7, a U.S. Army helicopter mistakenly landed in East Germany. The passengers and crew were initially detained by Soviet officials and then transferred to the custody of East German representatives.

man authorities on matter. We would of course contemplate such action only after exhaustion other available courses but would wish avoid possible embarrassment should developments make it absolutely necessary deal with East Germans to secure crew's release.

Ambassador may wish pass as appropriate to General Hodes.

Dulles

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## 268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, June 11, 1958, 11:18 a.m.

3156. Bonn for Ambassador, Berlin for Gufler. Bonn's 1366 [3666].<sup>1</sup> Suggest you make, in your discretion, following comments to Chancellor re US action in obtaining release crew and passengers Army helicopter forced down East Germany:

1. Requests for return, including personal letter Gen. Hodes to Gen. Zakharov,<sup>2</sup> already made in accordance procedures followed since 1945. No reply yet from Soviets.

2. We hope Soviets will arrange for return but becoming clearer and clearer Soviets and East Germans will exploit incident to force some type US–GDR communications or contacts.

3. Public opinion obliges us obtain early release and refusal deal with East Germans this connection will be seen in public eye as “standing on ceremony” particularly in view precedents dealing with Chinese Communists and North Koreans for similar purpose.

4. Under these circumstances, indicating at this stage our readiness deal with East Germans to effect release appears preferable allowing matter to develop into big issue and then being forced to back down.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1158. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Lisle and Calhoun, and approved by Kohler. Repeated priority to Paris and Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 3666 from Bonn, June 11, received in Washington at 6:39 a.m., Bruce reported that he was seeing the Chancellor at 6:30 p.m. that day and wanted the latest information on the helicopter case. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 8, this 2-paragraph note requested the return of the helicopter and crew. (SX 4460, DA IN 123007; Washington National Records Center, RG 319, Headquarters Department of the Army, Communication Center Files)

5. Above thinking explains statement which Secretary made to press yesterday.<sup>3</sup> (Chancellor should be given verbatim text.)

6. As Secretary indicated, no question of GDR recognition involved.

7. We have not yet worked out next step to be taken if Soviet reply entirely negative. However, we are aware of problem of Communist exploitation of US–GDR contacts and will try to evolve formulas and procedures best suited to maintaining Western position and preventing exploitation adverse to our interests. Our reply might take form asking Soviets to make any necessary arrangements with East German authorities for return crew and plane and offer services personnel (probably from Potsdam Mission) if necessary to facilitate return. This reply might best be through military channels.

8. At moment we still awaiting Soviet reply to Hodes before taking further action.<sup>4</sup>

You may wish inform your UK, French and, at appropriate point, your Belgian colleagues of our position. We are of course bearing in mind relationship to Belgian case.<sup>5</sup>

**Dulles**

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<sup>3</sup> For a transcript of Secretary Dulles' press conference on June 10, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 30, 1958, pp. 1085–1090.

<sup>4</sup> On June 12, General Zakharov replied that the helicopter case was solely within the competence of the German Democratic Republic. (SX 4558, transmitted in telegram 3696 from Bonn, June 12; Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1258)

<sup>5</sup> On June 12, Bruce reported that he had seen the Chancellor who "was not unduly concerned over helicopter incident," but who hoped it could be settled without direct conversations with the East Germans. (Telegram 3684 from Bonn; *ibid.*)

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## 269. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

Bonn, June 13, 1958.

Terrible snarl this morning over the famous helicopter. General Hodes had gone ahead and instructed his Colonel McQuail at Potsdam to ask the Soviets to act as intermediaries with the GDR for the return of the craft and crew. If they refuse to do this he instructed McQuail to request the Soviets to place him in contact with an appropriate GDR offi-

cial. When I read these telegrams this morning I called General Willems, Chief of Staff at Heidelberg, Hodes being away in Bremen. I told Willems, who was cooperative, of my misgivings about this procedure and suggested the order should be canceled if possible and we should all await a directive from Washington where I understood the whole affair was being considered at the highest level. (I take it from a telephone conversation I had yesterday with Ray Lisle "highest level" probably means the President himself is involved.) Willems called me back a little later to say that McQuail had already been in communication with the Soviets<sup>1</sup> and was awaiting their answer. I suggested that the General tell McQuail upon receipt of the answer to notify the Russians he would refer it to his headquarters. This was done when the response arrived to the effect that they had refused the first proposal but offered to have one of their officials conduct him this afternoon or tomorrow morning to a conference with one of the two GDR Deputy Foreign Ministers.

As a consequence of these conversations both CINCUSAREUR and ourselves have sent a number of telegrams to Washington in the hope of resolving the procedure to be followed.<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows the remainder of the diary entry.]

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<sup>1</sup> A report on this meeting at 9:30 a.m. was transmitted in SX 4592, June 13. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1358)

<sup>2</sup> At the end of the day, Willems authorized McQuail to meet with East German officials to effect the release of the helicopter without agreeing to any conditions substantially different from similar releases of U.S. personnel in the Soviet Zone. (SX 4618, June 13; *ibid.*)

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## 270. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, June 14, 1958, midnight.

3725. Bonn relays for your info folg msg fm USMLM Berlin. True DTG 141500Z.

"Sent CINCUSAREUR unnumbered repeated information AmEmbassy Bonn and USCINCEUR unnumbered.

Herewith summary of conference 1000–1130 hours with Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Building, East Berlin. Present: Colonel McQuail, Major McCrory, one interpreter and one note taker for Mr. Winzer.

1. There was no Soviet participation, so that I perforce was forced in the end to the limit of authority granted in paragraph 4E, 1353A.<sup>1</sup> Lt. Vturin first said he must make a phone call. I said I'll wait. He then admitted he had instructions only to guide us to building. I protested and he went upstairs, but the German assistant said the Deputy Minister expected only myself and McCrory. I decided to begin without Vturin, and it later developed in conference that Mr. Winzer had barred Vturin.

2. Reference paragraph 4A, 1353A. I introduced myself and began with Huebner–Malinin agreement,<sup>2</sup> history of return of personnel, the developments in this particular case including Soviet aid and requested immediate return of personnel and helicopter as representative of General Hodes. (Evaluation: This proved to be wrong approach in view of Mr. Winzer's reactions. Although due to Winzer's reaction I later emphasized my simultaneous role as a representative of the army whose presence in these negotiations was known and approved by United States Army in Washington, I believe now I would have been stronger without this introduction.)

3. The GDR wants a representative with credentials from the government. Winzer finally described the requirements as a protocol or document with a governmental heading from the Government in Washington. (Evaluation: I did not press here too far as to the exact heading as I was afraid it would result in a more definitive statement, perhaps Executive Mansion heading, or State Department. I decided that perhaps it would be desired to use a Department of Army or a Chief of Staff heading, try that, and see how it was accepted at the next meeting. Winzer appeared to be pressing for something like situation in last sentence State 698 June 13,<sup>3</sup> 7 pm, but might settle for less as suggested above. Mr. Winzer started out definitely talking about State Department and a State Department representative. He later changed somewhat and finished up using term 'representative of Government' and that army officer

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<sup>1</sup> A copy of this telegram, which was transmitted to Washington as SX 4618, June 13, is *ibid.*, 762B.5411/6–1358.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Huebner–Malinin agreement, April 5, 1947, which insured the rights of the United States and the Soviet Union to protect the interests of their nationals in the occupation zones of Germany, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, p. 114.

<sup>3</sup> It stated that McQuail was not authorized to sign a receipt that indicated the establishment of an intergovernmental relationship between the United States and the German Democratic Republic. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1358)

could be this individual if he had proper authority. This leads me to believe he will settle for less than State Department heading on a letter.)

4. The Deputy Minister stated clearly (without query or prompting) that recognition or non-recognition was not involved.

5. I accepted meeting for 1200 hours Monday 16 June at which time representative with written credentials would be present.

6. Winzer said personnel were in good shape and not being treated as prisoners.

7. Winzer stated personnel and helicopter would be turned over at border. He said it would be prompt when decided.

8. Winzer promised to deliver Red Cross box to personnel. He said he hoped more boxes not necessary. Box was delivered at about 1230 hours this date, but my sergeant said person on duty said he would try to deliver, but gave no assurance.

9. Winzer would not admit he had mind made up not to turn over personnel today, but admitted personnel were not in next room and were still at camp. (Evaluation: I believe had no intention of so doing in first conference.)

10. Meeting was cordial, no crowds, reporters or photographers observed.

11. Winzer termed meeting as a great step forward.

12. Mr. Winzer spoke fast, not too loud, and spoke whole paragraphs at a time. He mumbled and spoke so rapidly I could not follow entirely in German. He spoke from brief notes in handwriting of such character I could not read it upside down. The interpreter had a good vocabulary, but provided far from verbatim interpretation. Microphone could have been concealed in cigarette or cigar box on table. These were not touched during conference. Note taker for Winzer took desultory notes. Our notes are good and full. Poor word choice or grammar is result of interpreter not Major McCrory.

13. Detailed notes taken during conference will be forwarded piecemeal as prepared.<sup>4</sup>

14. I await instructions."

**Bruce**

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<sup>4</sup>Transmitted in a four-part unnumbered telegram, June 14 at 3 p.m. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6-1458)

**271. Telegram From the Military Liaison Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

Berlin, June 16, 1958, 3:40 p.m.

161540Z June (Army Message). To Department of State and Department of Defense signed McQuail.

Meeting between Col. McQuail, Major McCrory and Mr. Otto Winzer, Deputy Foreign Minister of GDR at Foreign Ministry, in East Berlin from 1205 to 1240 hours, 16 June 1958.

American officers arrived at Foreign Ministry at precisely 1200 hours. No representatives of press or photographers were in evidence. Officers were met at entrance to Foreign Ministry by an assistant, who escorted them to a waiting room, which is outside the Deputy Foreign Minister's office. After a brief wait for the Minister, American officers were ushered into the same room as they were at previous conference on 14 June,<sup>1</sup> and were seated at the same conference table. Also present were an East German interpreter and recorder. The latter took more complete notes than he did at previous conference, but still did not appear to be taking a verbatim account. Conversations follow:

Col. McQuail: May I say, Mr. Minister, as I did last time, that I am Col. McQuail, Chief of the US Military Liaison Mission to the CINC, group of Soviet forces in Germany, and that having been introduced by an officer from General Zakharov's office, I am here to request speedy return of military personnel and helicopter, and am authorized to sign necessary documents to accomplish this. I hereby respectfully request that we receive the personnel and helicopter as soon as can be arranged.

Mr. Winzer: But, may I ask the question Colonel, if with your superiors, you have discussed the opinion of ours about the personnel and helicopter?

McQuail: I have reported in full on the meeting held Saturday and have received permission to return to this meeting with full authority.

Winzer: You should not think about my stubborn attitude, but on whose authority?

McQuail: On Gen. Hodes' authority. He has informed his superiors, and the authorities in Washington are fully informed of my presence here and my authorization to make the request for the return of personnel and equipment.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-1658. Secret; Niact. Sent to CINCUSAREUR and repeated to Bonn, USCINCEUR, and the Departments of the Army, Defense, and State. The source text is the Department of State copy.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 270.



Winzer: If it is up to us, the nine men can be delivered tomorrow morning at 0900 hours at the frontier, under the condition that we come to an agreement that is signed not by a representative of the CINC of your Army, but from an authorized representative of the government. And I keep it open who will be this representative—whether it be an Army officer, or a member of the diplomatic corps. There are two reasons for this, which I explained at the first meeting. There is no basis in international law for agreement between us and your high command. First, there is no agreement between the Government of the US of America and the German Democratic Republic about the movement of troops in Europe. Second, we can't go back to the time of the occupying system. Colonel, to make it clear that we are ready to settle the matter in the quickest way, I hand to you a draft of an agreement<sup>2</sup> for the signature of the authorized representative of your government and ourselves for the return of the personnel and helicopter. In the draft we put Wednesday morning, but it can be tomorrow morning. I don't know how to go on now. Could you look at the draft and tell us your opinion. It is in German and it may be necessary to translate. (I examined documents, which were easy to translate, but was not sure at this point if I would be able to take copies with me. Thus I played for time by asking for an interpretation into English so that Major McCrory could get down some notes. The interpreter made a good oral translation. Shortly after he began we were told we could take copies. In the interpretation the interpreter did not translate the German word *bevollmachten* as plenipotentiary as the State Department representative in Berlin did. The German interpreter used words "authorized representative." As soon as I glanced at the document I realized I could not sign it and so did not even display General Hodes' letter.)<sup>3</sup>

McQuail: Would you please so I may be sure. (Translation of document followed.)

Winzer: Our experts think it better if an American specialist is present when the loading of the helicopter occurs so that no harm or damage will happen to it. It is so large. Such an expert could come here to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and be taken to the loading point. The helicopter was somewhat damaged when it landed in the trees. The question which remains is only that the Minister cannot sign an agreement with Colonel McQuail only on the basis that he represents the United States Army, but only if he is a representative of the United States of America. This agreement can be signed anytime today or tomorrow.

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<sup>2</sup> A copy of this three-article agreement was transmitted in telegram 1353 from Berlin, June 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-1658)

<sup>3</sup> A copy of this letter was transmitted in SX 4633 from Heidelberg, June 15. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6-1558)

McQuail: Would early Wednesday morning be suitable? (I suggested Wednesday since Tuesday is the fifth anniversary of the East Berlin uprising. I thought it would be bad to confer on that day with possibility of unfavorable reaction of West Germans.)

Winzer: Yes.

McQuail: At what hour?

Winzer: 1000 hours.

McQuail: Fine. I would like to say we thank the Deputy Minister for his kindness in receiving the box for transmittal to our personnel. I hope that they are enjoying the contents.

Winzer: The box is on the way. Saturday afternoon all offices were closed, but now it is on the way.

McQuail: Would it be possible for me to visit the personnel in company with one of your officials?

Winzer: It is necessary to consult first, but we think it better if we can settle the matter very soon. If we can bring them to the frontier point soon, it is better.

McQuail: Yes, but it would be nice to say hello to them and give them messages from their wives.

Winzer: But, they will get the box today and see that you are bothering about them. We are interested in settling the affair very quickly, but so far there are no relations between the GDR and a representative of the Government of the United States of America. We are not interested in establishing relations with the United States Army. This is not such a big thing that it cannot be settled in this way. If you come to us on Wednesday morning it can happen that the time has to be changed slightly because the personnel have to be brought by bus from their present location to the frontier. I do not want to create a misunderstanding on this. I hope that we can settle today.

McQuail: I hoped so too, but I do not have authorization to sign this document without further consultation.

Winzer: It remains then to hand our draft to your superiors or if you wish we can translate.

McQuail: We can translate. Thank you.

[Here follow two pages of details on an East German press conference following the meeting.]

## 272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, June 17, 1958, 4:22 p.m.

3226. Joint State–Defense message. (A) Unnumbered USMLM tel from Berlin June 16 re McQuail–Winzer meeting; (B) Berlin’s 1353; (C) Bonn’s 3746; (D) Bonn’s 3749.<sup>1</sup>

Appreciate Ambassador’s comments Bonn reftel (C) and concur fully (a) that signing bilateral agreement proposed by Winzer would entail serious danger undermining our policy re GDR and (b) that would be preferable rather than accede to agreement to raise return of Army personnel and helicopter again with Soviets in diplomatic channels.

Therefore recommend McQuail be instructed act as follows in June 18 meeting with Winzer:

1. Should begin by reading statement along following lines:

(a) I have documentation from both senior military and senior diplomatic representatives of US in Germany establishing my full authority to deal with this question as representative of US Government. (McQuail should then present both credentials furnished by General Hodes and by Ambassador Bruce; text as suggested Deptel 3208 to Bonn, signature modified as suggested Bonn’s 3733.<sup>2</sup> FYI. Our only concern re signature was to avoid any reference to Federal Republic.)

(b) I have shown text of your proposed agreement to my superiors and have been instructed to inform you that they regard a document of this nature as entirely unnecessary and abnormal and your insistence on it as an attempt to delay and confuse simple question of returning personnel and aircraft by interjection of procedural difficulties and political issues. Such a document is wholly unacceptable and I have been instructed to refuse to sign it.

(c) I am however ready to meet all normal and reasonable requirements for arranging return of personnel and aircraft. I am today to reimburse here and now and in advance the various items of expense mentioned by you. (Assume arrangements can be made to have McQuail carry cash funds with him and to turn them over to Winzer on

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1758. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Creel and McKiernan; cleared by Lisle, Kohler, L, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Murphy. Also sent niact to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> The USMLM telegram is Document 271. Telegram 1353, June 16, transmitted the text of the three-article draft agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1658) In telegram 3746, June 17, Ambassador Bruce stated that the point had been reached where the United States should either sign an intergovernmental agreement or break off the discussions and attempt to force the Soviet Union back into the picture. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6–1758) Telegram 3749, June 17, asked for precise instructions on receipt of documentation on the chance that Winzer agreed to accept McQuail’s credentials at their June 18 meeting. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 14 and 16, respectively. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6–1458 and 762B.5411/6–1658)

the spot. FYI. This approach designed eliminate basis of Winzer's assertion bilateral agreement necessary to regulate matter. End FYI.)

(d) I or officer receiving personnel at border am prepared give receipt certifying transfer of personnel and aircraft to US control. I have receipt ready. (McQuail should then give Winzer copy of unsigned receipt reading as follows:

"To Whom It May Concern: I hereby acknowledge receipt of one helicopter (insert type, model, etc.) property of the U.S. Army, and of following named personnel of the U.S. Army (insert names).

Signed at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of June, 1958.

Robert P. McQuail, Col. USA

(or signature any other officer actually accepting turn-over).")

(e) In conclusion I have been instructed to state that I regard these dilatory tactics re return of personnel and aircraft as inexplicable, unjustifiable, and contrary to normal and reasonable procedures in matters of this type. I therefore trust you will arrange prompt return of personnel and helicopter.

2. If wording of receipt becomes issue McQuail should be authorized make changes such as:

(a) Modification of description of helicopter and personnel as appropriate.

(b) Insertion in body of receipt after "I" and/or, following signature, phrase "duly authorized representative of the U.S. Government".

(c) To Otto Winzer (or other named individual) instead of "To Whom It May Concern".

(d) As last resort, and if this is only unsettled issue, use of heading "To Otto Winzer" (or any other name) followed by description of official position such as Deputy Foreign Minister, GDR.

3. If Winzer continues insist on an agreement signed by both sides, McQuail should reiterate any such agreement regarded as unacceptable and unnecessary and should break off discussion without setting date for future meeting.

Ambassador and CINCUSAREUR authorized to modify at their discretion any tactical step within framework above instructions.

We will try inform British French and Germans here today of substance above instructions but since this may not be feasible suggest you inform them as well.

FYI. Consideration being given here to appropriate procedure for raising issue with Soviets in diplomatic channels if McQuail-Winzer discussions do not lead to satisfactory conclusion.<sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

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<sup>3</sup> McQuail and Winzer met again on June 18 and 19, but failed to reach agreement on release of the helicopter and passengers. Winzer insisted that an intergovernmental agreement be signed to effect the release and McQuail rejected the proposal. McQuail reported on these meetings in unnumbered telegrams, June 18 and 19. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6-1859 and 762B.5411/6-1959)

### 273. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 20, 1958.

#### SUBJECT

Delivery of Aide-Mémoire on Helicopter in East Germany Case to Soviet Chargé d'Affaires<sup>1</sup>

#### PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Murphy—G  
Mr. Sergei P. Striganov, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires  
Mr. Anatoli G. Myshkov, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy  
Mr. Lisle—GER

Mr. Murphy told Mr. Striganov, who had called at Mr. Murphy's request, that he wished to take up the case of the helicopter which had been forced down near Zwickau in East Germany. Under the terms of agreements made in the early days after the war between Generals Clay and Sokolovsky and between Generals Huebner and Malinin, there are procedures for the return of personnel of one Force held by other. These agreements have worked well. Within the past year the United States authorities have returned a Soviet soldier and, only three weeks ago, the Soviet authorities returned three United States airmen to American control. Mr. Murphy said he had been asked to deliver an aide-mémoire giving the facts of the case and to ask that it be transmitted to the Soviet Government. He noted that, after days, the United States public is becoming very disturbed.

The Soviet representatives read the aide-mémoire slowly and with evident care.

When they had finished Mr. Murphy said he would be grateful for the transmission of the aide-mémoire. He urged that sympathetic consideration be given to it as the present situation is a most unhappy one.

Mr. Striganov, speaking in Russian translated by Mr. Myshkov, stated that he would send the aide-mémoire to Moscow. However, he wished to note that apparently the helicopter and personnel are on the territory of the German Democratic Republic. As far as he could understand, therefore, the helicopter and personnel were at present within the jurisdiction of the authorities of the GDR. Therefore, it would appear that the question of their transferral to the American authorities was in the hands of the appropriate authorities in the GDR.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-2058. Confidential. Drafted by Lisle on June 21 and initialed by Murphy.

<sup>1</sup>For text of the aide-mémoire, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 14, 1958, pp. 52–54.

Mr. Murphy replied that what was ignored in Mr. Striganov's statement was that there are agreements among the Four Powers who have responsibility for Germany. These agreements have been respected and, in fact, recently invoked. Suddenly the Soviets say that they have no responsibilities. This, Mr. Murphy said, he could not understand.

Mr. Striganov replied that he was not familiar with the facts and therefore could not discuss them.

Mr. Murphy retorted that of course Mr. Striganov was not familiar with the facts and that he had assumed Mr. Striganov would not wish to discuss them until he had heard from his Government. However, Mr. Striganov had raised the substantive features of the case and had commented on them and that is why Mr. Murphy had felt he must reply.

Mr. Striganov stated he must emphasize that the helicopter landed in GDR territory and was now within the competence of the GDR authorities. As to the statements made in the aide-mémoire, he was not in a position to discuss them.

Mr. Murphy asked whether Mr. Striganov wished to carry on a discussion now. Mr. Striganov replied that he was ready to discuss the question of the GDR. The helicopter was on its territory, within its jurisdiction, and not in the hands of the Soviets. He knew nothing of the alleged agreements referred to in the aide-mémoire and did not wish to discuss them.

Mr. Murphy replied that he was familiar with the GDR and did not want to discuss it with Mr. Striganov. He did wish to discuss Soviet obligations under their agreements. The Soviet authorities have certain responsibilities and that is why Mr. Striganov had been asked to come in.

Mr. Striganov said he would refer the aide-mémoire to his Government.

In leaving, Mr. Striganov replied in response to Mr. Murphy's question that the ballet troupe would stay one more week in New York. Mr. Murphy complimented him on the troupe's superb performance.

**274. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)**

Washington, July 1, 1958, 10:29 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR ELBRICK

The Sec asked re the flyers in East Germany—have we dropped any direct efforts with the East Germans. E said yes. We got nowhere when the military went to call on the E German Fonmin—we went back to the Soviets and told them of the difficulties but have had no reply and that is why Murphy is seeing Striganoff now.<sup>1</sup> This does not preclude our working with them at whatever level we might designate. The Belgians did this and it did not cause much concern. The Sec said recognition is a matter of intent. If you sign a piece of paper without intent . . .<sup>2</sup> E said the legal people have a different view. We have been proceeding on that basis, but it became sticky so we went back to the Russians. We may have to return to the E Germans. They agreed we should coordinate with the Fedrep.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted and initialed by Bernau.

<sup>1</sup> Since no reply had been received to the aide-mémoire of June 20, Murphy called Striganov in again on July 1, repeated the arguments that had been presented on the previous occasion, and gave the Soviet Chargé a second aide-mémoire reiterating the responsibility of the Soviet Union for the helicopter and its passengers. (Memorandum of conversation, July 1; Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/7-158) For text of the aide-mémoire, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 21, 1958, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

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**275. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

Berlin, July 2, 1958, midnight.

12. Topping, Berlin AP correspondent, was asked suddenly this morning if he wished to accompany East German correspondents to visit detained helicopter crew. Accompanied by eight East German cor-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/7-258. Confidential; Niact. Also sent priority to Bonn and repeated priority to USAREUR, London, Moscow, and Paris.

respondents convoy of four cars proceeded from Berlin direct to Dresden. Prior to press conference there arranged by Alex Gruettner, official East German Foreign Ministry, Topping had opportunity to forewarn group privately large scale press conference was impending, suggested group designate spokesman, warned he would be only American correspondent present.

At subsequent press conference attended by East German newsreel, TV and newspaper correspondents US group spokesman Major Kemper stated: "They are holding us as political hostages. We are being used as tools. We are not being told about what is going on in the political negotiations over us. I can't imagine why we are being held. We got into East Germany accidentally". Said his group voluntarily surrendered to the East German police after their helicopter became lost due to a thunderstorm and landed out of gas. Helicopter damaged in landing. Following surrender to East German police East Germans promptly turned Americans over to Russian Army and they spent first night in a Soviet camp. Next morning the Russians returned them to the East Germans with the pledge that they would be released. Part of group questioned by Soviets first night, subsequently all of group interrogated by East Germans.

At this morning's press conference Gruettner echoed Winzer's statement regarding willingness East Germany release crew provided U.S. deal with East Germany on government to government basis, and avoid implication East Germany still a zone of occupation. Emphasized East Germany a sovereign nation. To this Captain Frank Athanson shouted: "Two of your people in civilian clothes took me to Russian headquarters that night. A Russian officer signed a receipt for me. I stayed under Russian control that night. That is not the action of a sovereign state." East German said this procedure normal under mutual troop stationing agreement between Russia and East Germany. Athanson said: "Yeah. Mutual agreement or were you getting instructions?"

In response to group's complaint that they had no news U.S. efforts in their behalf Topping was able to advise group privately of U.S. concern for them and assure them of high level negotiations going on for their release.

Following Topping's reassurances, group spokesman indicated willingness group to stick it out until release effected.<sup>1</sup>

**Hillenbrand**

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<sup>1</sup> Hillenbrand discussed the press conference with Topping on July 3. Topping believed the East Germans were beginning to be embarrassed by the helicopter incident, and that the press conference, which was held to bolster their position, had backfired. (Telegram 17 from Berlin, July 3; *ibid.*, 726B.5411/7-358) General Hamlett also talked with Topping on July 3 and reported along similar lines. (Telegram 18 from Berlin, July 3; *ibid.*)



**276. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, July 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

United States Army Personnel Held in Soviet Zone of Germany

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Menshikov, Soviet Embassy  
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary  
Mr. Anatoli G. Myshkov, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy  
Mr. Charles G. Stefan, EE

Mr. Murphy stated that we were still awaiting a Soviet response to the aide-mémoire concerning the American helicopter and its crew in East Germany which had been handed to Soviet Chargé Striganov by Mr. Herter on July 3, 1958.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Murphy observed that public opinion in the United States is becoming increasingly concerned about the failure of the Soviet Government to honor its agreements and about the prolonged and unjustifiable detention of the crew of the U.S. Army helicopter held in East Germany. We cannot accept the patently erroneous contention of the Soviet Government, expressed in the Soviet note of July 2,<sup>2</sup> that the Soviet authorities have no responsibility in this case. The United States Government continues to hold the Soviet Government responsible for seeing that the men are returned without further delay.

Mr. Murphy stated that the continued detention of the men and their prolonged separation from their families was inhumane. The attitude shown by the Soviet Government and by the local German authorities in the Soviet zone of Germany is difficult to reconcile with the frequent Soviet protestations of desire for better understanding and a relaxation of tensions. Mr. Murphy then observed that we have noted the Soviet statement that arrangements for the return of the men and the helicopter should be discussed with the German authorities in the Soviet zone. However, we would like the Ambassador to remember the action already taken by American military authorities in Germany in this regard. The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces in Germany

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/7-1158. Confidential. Drafted by Stefan on July 15 and initialed by Murphy.

<sup>1</sup> During his conversation with Striganov on July 3, Herter repeated the U.S. concern about the military personnel and tasked the Soviet Union with living up to its agreements, particularly since the press conference on July 2 revealed that Soviet forces had custody of the soldiers at one time. A memorandum of this conversation and a copy of the aide-mémoire presented to Striganov are *ibid.*, 762B.5411/7-358. The aide-mémoire is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 28, 1958, pp. 147-148.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 148.

had arranged a meeting between the competent American representative and the local German authorities, who were actually holding our men, in order to discuss arrangements for their return. The American representative had indicated his willingness to comply with all normal and reasonable requirements in arranging the release of our men. Mr. Murphy then pointed out during the press conference organized by local German authorities on July 2 it clearly emerged that our men had originally been turned over by local German authorities to Soviet military authorities at a Soviet camp. Some of the men had even been interrogated by Soviet officers while in Soviet custody.

Mr. Murphy then stated that local German authorities of the Soviet zone have made it clear that they desire to extort some form of political ransom as a condition for the return of the men. Mr. Murphy stated that this was unacceptable to us. Mr. Murphy added that we fail to understand what the USSR expects to gain from a continuation of the situation. On the other hand, the Soviet Government permits the local German authorities of the Soviet zone to attempt to force us to pay a sort of blackmail for the return of the men. Mr. Murphy stated that we would like the Ambassador to know that a continuation of this situation can only worsen the relations of the Soviet Union and the United States to the benefit of neither country.

Ambassador Menshikov stated that he would inform the Foreign Ministry of Mr. Murphy's remarks. He noted that Mr. Murphy had stated that we fail to understand the Soviet position. The Ambassador stated that frankly he did not understand our attitude. He asserted that whether we liked it or not, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is a sovereign state. Soviet troops were stationed in the GDR in accordance with an agreement between the USSR and the GDR and were not occupation troops. In the opinion of the Soviet side, all the questions connected with the return of the helicopter and its crew ought to be settled with the GDR. The Ambassador noted that Soviet authorities had helped American authorities establish contacts with the GDR because the United States did not maintain relations with the GDR. The Ambassador reiterated, however, that the only way to settle this issue was by direct negotiations with the GDR.

Mr. Murphy stated that the Soviets have agreements with us, which only recently the USSR had recognized by returning three American airmen to us. We, in turn, had recently returned one soldier to the Soviet Union. Suddenly the helicopter case arose and the Soviet Union, in effect, is asserting that it will not live up to the US-Soviet agreement covering this kind of case. Mr. Murphy asked the Ambassador if the Soviet Union has relinquished all of its rights under Four-Power agreements relating to Germany. The Ambassador responded that he did not know about these agreements, but that he was speaking about the agreements

concluded between the USSR and the GDR. Mr. Murphy then asked the Ambassador if he thought that these agreements relieved the Soviet Union of the responsibilities which it had incurred under Four-Power agreements, including arrangements with respect to the status of Berlin. Ambassador Menshikov evaded a direct response to this query, and merely reiterated that the Soviet Government had no responsibility in connection with the return of the helicopter and its crew.

Mr. Murphy concluded by stating that the agreements the Soviet Union had concluded with East Germany were of no concern to the United States and had nothing to do with the current problem. Mr. Murphy said that we assume the Soviet Union would want to honor the earlier agreements with us, particularly if the Soviet Union is really interested in relaxing tensions between the United States and the USSR. He stressed that we look to the Soviet Union for action on this matter, and asked Ambassador Menshikov to make another effort to persuade his Government in this direction.

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### 277. Editorial Note

On June 25, German Minister Franz Krapf suggested to the Department of State that if the Soviet Union failed to intervene to secure the release of the helicopter and military personnel, the United States might consider using Red Cross channels. (Telegram 3328 to Bonn, June 25; Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–2558) By the beginning of July, the Department of State had followed up on this suggestion by having the American Red Cross contact the East German Red Cross to facilitate delivery of packages and mail to the men. On July 12, Robert S. Wilson, the Director of Operations in Europe of the American Red Cross, began discussions with Emil Risch, Vice President of the East German Red Cross, concerning their release. Further negotiations on July 14 resulted in the signing of an agreement on July 17 arranging the exchange of the men and helicopter on July 19.

Records of Wilson's conversations with Risch, copies of the agreement, and the texts of the receipts given for the nine men and the aircraft were transmitted in despatch 2 from Heidelberg, July 28. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/7–2858) Additional documentation on the support given Wilson's efforts by the Department of State and the U.S. Army is *ibid.*, 762B.5411. For text of the July 17 agreement and the July 19 receipt for the men, see *Dokumente*, III, Band 4, 1958, Zweiter Drittelband, pages 1469–1472.

**278. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research**

No. 7775

Washington, August 11, 1958.

**THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY (SED)  
OF EAST GERMANY, JULY 10–16, 1958: “ADVANCE TOWARD  
GERMAN REUNIFICATION THROUGH THE ECONOMIC  
BUILDUP AND SOCIALIZATION OF EAST GERMANY”**

**Abstract**

The Fifth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of East Germany, held during July 10–16, 1958, displayed a cohesiveness and a morale higher than of any previous congress. The actions taken and the program announced at the congress indicate that East Germany has become the main area in Europe where Khrushchev's battle of economics and diplomacy with the West will be waged. Ulbricht and the other SED leaders gave every indication that they believe this Soviet decision has greatly improved the prospect for the reunification of Germany on SED terms: that is, as a neutralized confederation of two diverse political, social, and economic systems.

The program drawn up by the congress involves catching up economically with West Germany by 1961, rejecting “revisionism” totally, accelerating the socialization and the ideological indoctrination of East Germany, and undertaking intensified subversion of West German “peace organizations”, trade unions, and the SPD. Catching up economically with West Germany will be facilitated by the abolition, effective January 1, 1959, of all Soviet troop support costs, and the receipt of major USSR credits and economic assistance, especially during 1959–60. By 1961, the standard of living in East Germany is expected to have reached a point sufficiently high so that the East German Government will no longer be embarrassed about it. Thereafter, according to the congress, the competition between the two German states would be primarily political, ideological, and psychological.

In the closed sessions, Ulbricht's demands regarding the composition of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat were accepted totally. As a consequence, Ulbricht again emerged as the undisputed ruler of the party both ideologically and organizationally.

[Here follow sections I. Introduction, II. Program, and III. Ulbricht's Reshuffling of the Ruling Bodies.]

## Summary

The SED, as seen at the Fifth Party Congress, has emerged from the serious ideological and other failings of 1956–57 with remarkable vigor and cohesiveness. The party is dominated completely by Ulbricht, who has a comprehensive grasp of the intellectual and organizational problems with which it is confronted. Because of the essential change in the relations between the GDR and the USSR, which began in late 1957, East Germany expects to receive a volume of credits and other economic assistance from the USSR during 1959–60 sufficient to enable it not only to continue the socialization of agriculture, handicrafts, and the building industry, but also to expand production in all these branches. Industrial output in 1959–60, as a result of the supply of USSR and Soviet-bloc raw materials, is expected to increase by more than DME 6 billion (US \$2.7 billion, at official exchange rates). On the social and cultural front, the party will seek to intensify the indoctrination of the population; “polytechnical” education will be the principal means used with the younger generations. The party is confident that, given its recent internal reorganization, it will ultimately establish control over the population of East Germany and that it will likewise defeat the West German Government in the contest for domination of Germany as a whole.

The actions taken and the programs announced at the congress indicate that East Germany has become the main area in Europe where Khrushchev’s battle of economics and diplomacy with the West will be waged. Ulbricht and the other SED leaders gave every indication that they believe this Soviet decision has greatly improved the prospect for the reunification of Germany on SED terms: that is, as a neutralized confederation of two diverse political, social and economic systems. For the first time in its history the SED raised unequivocally to a cardinal position the thesis that the socialization of East Germany does not conflict with the reunification of Germany but rather is a prerequisite for it, since it is the only guarantee that in a reunited Germany conditions would not prevail which would lead to the destruction of the East German Government and the SED.

Though the importance of the SED policy changes is indubitable, it is obviously still too early to predict their eventual impact on both West and East Germany.

279. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, September 3, 1958.

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON  
GERMANY (EAST GERMANY) (NSC 5803—Supplement II)

(Approved by the President on February 7, 1958)

(Period Covered: From July 17, 1957 Through September 3, 1958)

A. *Summary Evaluation*

1. Owing to the continued intransigence of the U.S.S.R., no progress could be made during this period toward achievement of the basic long-range objective of the reunification of Germany in freedom. The Communist regime of the Soviet Zone was able to continue the gradual consolidation of its position within Eastern Germany. Measures for greater control of the church, of universities, and of travel to the West have been effectively instituted. The Communist Party leader, Walter Ulbricht, carried out a successful purge of high-ranking party members who had taken a position at variance with his own program for pushing ahead rapidly with further steps of communization.

2. The regime was successful in gaining a certain measure of international acceptance during this period. It received diplomatic recognition from Yugoslavia in 1957. It also succeeded in bringing official representatives of the United States and Belgium to negotiate directly with it for the release of the crews of aircraft which had strayed into the Zone and in inducing the Belgians to sign a formal governmental agreement with it in this connection.

3. Continued use was made of the Western position in the Federal Republic and Berlin to make these areas appear attractive and the Zonal regime correspondingly unattractive in the eyes of the East Germans. Partially because of these influences, and owing also in part to the broadcasts of RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin) and to the various joint projects of the German population in maintaining the connections of the East German population with the West, the population of Eastern Germany has continued opposed to the regime though there is no longer any great hope of a resolution of their problems through the reunification of their country in the immediate future.

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Source: Department of State, S/S—NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803. Series. Secret. For the section of this report on Germany (Berlin) see vol. VIII, Document 19. For the section on Germany (the Federal Republic) see Document 246. A Financial Annex is not printed.

4. A review of policy is not recommended.

*B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States*

5. *Possibility of Uprising.* The potentially most serious operating problem facing the United States is the possibility of an uprising in Eastern Germany. However, by present indications a widespread uprising in Eastern Germany appears unlikely though it always remains a possibility. Such an uprising might involve direct conflict between Soviet and NATO forces. If it were repressed by Soviet forces, Western prestige would suffer a heavy blow even though the U.S.S.R. would be still further discredited.

6. *Hindering Regime Progress toward International Acceptance.* Another major problem we face is to prevent or slow down further progress of the Zonal regime toward international acceptance. Such acceptance could lead finally to widespread international recognition of the Zone, and thus to the consolidation of the Soviet position in Germany and in its European satellite system. This problem has manifested itself particularly in the three following areas:

a. The U.S.S.R. has attempted to transfer to the Soviet Zone regime its responsibilities for Germany as a whole, for the Soviet Zone and for Berlin under quadripartite agreements and arrangements. Simultaneously, the Soviet Zone regime has attempted to utilize its control over the territory and airspace of Eastern Germany, including the access routes to Berlin, to force the Western Powers, particularly the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic, to deal with it officially and on a high level. The case of the American helicopter whose crew was forcibly retained by the regime in June 1958 (see paragraph 11 of Annex A to this Report) and used as a basis for the attempt to extort recognition from the United States is an excellent example of this process. Such dealings could be pushed further and further up the scale in the direction of diplomatic recognition. Evidence of Western acceptance could be used by the regime to encourage diplomatic recognition from uncommitted countries, particularly in Asia and the Near East, and to demonstrate to the population of the Soviet Zone that further resistance to the regime is futile since even powerful states hostile to the regime have come to accept it as part of the status quo in international affairs.

b. Independent of but related to this process, have been the attempts of the GDR regime to exploit the German desire for reunification by bringing public pressure to bear on the Federal German Government to enter upon closer relations with the regime. There is already a considerable body of opinion in Western Germany which sees such relations as the only way to make progress towards German reunification. Closer official contact with East Germany is a part of the official policy of both

major opposition parties. This trend would be greatly accentuated by further evidence of Western acceptance of the status quo in Germany, whether voluntary or enforced. Closer official relations between the Government of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone regime, whether through extortion or increased political pressure from within the Federal Republic, would have a considerable effect in undermining the case against international recognition of the Zone and in furthering acceptance of the regime outside Germany. Closer official relations could also be a step toward involvement in a morass of negotiations in which the Soviet Zone regime might be able to influence Federal Republic policy by exploiting the desires of the West German population for an improvement in the living conditions of their East German relatives and friends. The Soviet Zone regime might, for example, pose conditions which would limit the freedom of movement of the Federal Republic in foreign policy questions.

c. The GDR regime has also striven to gain membership or participation in governmental and non-governmental international organizations, to establish trade and cultural missions abroad, and to establish connections between its agencies and institutions in the non-Communist world. Success in any of these efforts can be used as a lever to gain admission into additional organizations and given full exploitation in propaganda addressed to the Zonal population as an indication of world acceptance of the regime and the futility of further opposition to it. A further complicating factor in this context lies in the increasing tendency of Western public opinion to confound the Soviet Zone with countries of Eastern Europe with which it may be in the Western interest to improve relations and to feel that closer relations with the Zonal regime may result in an "evolutionary" development there—an illusory hope in the light of the regime's total dependence on Soviet military support.

7. *Declining Morale.* A gradual worsening of Soviet Zone morale, as the division of Germany continues, remains a severe problem. The regime is likely to take further repressive measures against the churches and within the universities of the Soviet Zone and against travel from the Soviet Zone to the Federal Republic. Such developments, coupled with continued failure of the Western Powers to bring the U.S.S.R. closer to a negotiated settlement of the German question and evidence of increasing international acceptance of the Soviet Zone, may result in increased apathy and an increased tendency to accept the continued existence of the regime as a permanent fact of life. Increases in the pervasiveness of this attitude would naturally assist the regime in further consolidating its position in the Zone.



*Note:* See National Intelligence Estimate NIE 12–56, dated 10 January 1956, “Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through 1960”.<sup>1</sup>

## Annex A

### ADDITIONAL MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

8. *Economic Developments.* The regime carried out a currency conversion in October 1957 primarily designed to decrease the amount of money in circulation, but aimed also at private businessmen, the churches and other hostile groups in the population. Food rationing was ended in May 1958. As a result of new arrangements with the USSR, programs to induce higher productivity will almost certainly result in the increases of production necessary to meet the economic goal established by the regime for 1958. An extensive economic reorganization on the Soviet pattern is being carried through. In sum, the immediate prospect is that the economy will continue to make steady progress at a higher rate than in the past.

9. *GDR Trade with Non-Communist Countries.*

a. In January 1958 the GDR Foreign Trade Minister claimed that in 1957 trade with capitalist countries was 23.7% larger than in 1956, indicating a volume of \$537,900,000 at the official ruble/dollar exchange rate. He also stated that GDR trade with capitalist countries was just under 27% of the country's total foreign trade. Trade with the UAR and Sudan was double the 1956 figure and trade with India 70% higher.

b. New trade agreements (between unofficial contracting parties) were concluded with Italy in mid-1957 and Vietnam in March 1958. The unofficial agreement with Yugoslavia was replaced by a government-to-government agreement in October 1957. Trade agreements with non-Communist countries, all unofficial, now number seventeen (including the Federal Republic of Germany). Unofficial trade missions were established on a more or less permanent basis in Argentina, Denmark, Iceland, and Italy, in addition to the officially recognized trade missions in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, India, and Indonesia, bringing the total to ten in non-Communist countries.

10. *Refugees.* The refugee flow from the Zone continues, with over 260,000 people leaving the area in 1957. The flow has continued high in

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<sup>1</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXV, pp. 115–118.

1958, amounting to approximately 96,000 in the first six months of the year. The regime has been suffering from the economic effects of this continual drain of productive manpower and has imposed heavy exemplary prison sentences on persons apprehended while attempting to leave the Zone without permission.

11. *Soviet Evasion of Responsibility.* As indicated above (see paragraph 6. a. of this Report), the obverse of the problem of preventing the acceptance of the GDR regime is that of maintaining the principle of Soviet responsibility in the Soviet Zone. Recently there have been two flagrant instances of Soviet attempts to disclaim such responsibility. On June 7, 1958 a United States Army helicopter mistakenly crossed the zonal border and made a forced landing in the Soviet Zone. Although they were obliged to do so under long-standing agreements and arrangements, the Soviets refused to return the men and the aircraft to United States control, insisting that the matter fell within the competence of the "sovereign" GDR. (The men were returned July 19, 1958 through the mediation of the American and East German Red Cross societies.) On June 18, 1958 an organized mob ransacked the headquarters of the United States Military Liaison Mission to the Soviet Forces in Potsdam.<sup>2</sup> The Soviets took the position that "such demonstrations are an unalterable right of the population of each sovereign democratic republic". Although vigorous protests were made in each instance, it did not appear that the United States and the other Western Powers would have the means to oblige the Soviets to acknowledge their responsibility.

12. *Fifth SED Party Congress.* The Fifth Party Congress of the Soviet Zone Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), took place between July 10-16, 1958, with Khrushchev leading the list of non-German participants from the Soviet Bloc. The main themes of the Congress were (a) that East Germany and the remainder of the Bloc were entering a phase of accelerated economic development and economic interrelationship within the Bloc which would have the result of bringing per capita consumption in Eastern Germany on a level with that of the Federal Republic by 1961; (b) the strength and unity of the Bloc and its inevitable victory over capitalism; and (c) the necessity for relentless eradication of "revisionism" as exemplified by Tito. The Congress criticized Schirdewan, Oelssner, Selbmann and other Party leaders purged by Ulbricht in February of this year, but none was ejected from the Party.

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<sup>2</sup> Documentation on this incident and a similar attack on the British Mission the same day is in Department of State, Central File 762.0221.

**280. Despatch From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

No. 520

Berlin, January 28, 1959.

SUBJECT

United States Policy Regarding Non-Recognition of the Soviet Zone Regime

This Mission has recently noted among important American officials and private citizens visiting Berlin an apparent lack of understanding of the U.S. policy of non-recognition of the Soviet Zone regime. Many visitors insistently query, "Why don't we recognize the GDR (German Democratic Republic)? After all, it has been in existence some time. It is a fact. We have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellite states, likewise Communist regimes. Why don't we deal with the East German authorities to recover our boys like Lt. Mackin?"<sup>1</sup> The West Germans deal with the East Germans on a lot of matters, they and many other countries do business with East German officials. Why don't we recognize the GDR?"

In reply to such queries Mission officers have in general been making the following points:

1) The so-called German Democratic Republic is a Communist puppet regime, established under Soviet military occupation in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Unlike the Federal Republic in West Germany, which was established by democratic processes and free elections, the GDR lacks popular consent. It would not last more than a few days if the 22 Soviet divisions were withdrawn from East Germany. In the past ten years around 2,500,000 Germans have fled from the Soviet Zone into West Germany. Between 80 and 90% of the remaining population in the Soviet Zone are opposed to the Communist regime and the Communist effort to make a separate state, the German Democratic Republic, out of the Soviet occupation zone. The majority of the East Germans, as well as the West Germans and Berliners, hope for the eventual reunification of Germany and the exercise of national self-determination with respect to their form of government and socio-economic system. These hopes are in large measure pinned to the steadfastness of U.S. policy.

2) Recognition of the so-called GDR would mean acceptance of a permanent division of Germany. This would be in direct contradiction

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62B/1-2859. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, Moscow, Munich, Frankfurt, Vienna, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest.

<sup>1</sup> On December 4, 1958, Lieutenant Richard Mackin bailed out of his airplane and landed in East Germany where he was held by officials of the German Democratic Republic. He was finally released on February 5, 1959, through the efforts of the Red Cross.

to Allied pledges made to the German people at the end of the war concerning restoration of national German unity, and likewise would be in contradiction to the justified desires of the German people for reunification. It would undermine the work of those German political elements supporting inclusion of Germany in an integrated Europe. It would probably ultimately lead to the development in Germany of extreme nationalistic elements, since it cannot be assumed that the German people would ever in the long run acquiesce in this division.

3) The Soviets have been seeking in recent years formal acknowledgment by the West of the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. To accept the status quo means to accept the expansion of Soviet power into the heart of Europe. Recognition of the GDR would give the Soviets the formal acknowledgement of the status quo that they have been seeking. It would mean the acceptance of Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe on a permanent and legal basis.

The situation with respect to the GDR is quite different from that of the Eastern European satellite countries whom we do recognize. Our diplomatic relations with the satellite countries antedate the Communist regimes. Continuation of diplomatic relations has positive advantages to the United States. It does not condone the Communist regime and is not regarded as doing so by the satellite peoples. Moreover, despite boundary changes the satellite countries are whole countries, not a small part of a divided country like the GDR. Were the U.S. to recognize the GDR, however, it would be recognizing not a country, but the *partition* of a country.

Moreover, recognition of the GDR would have a damaging effect on the Eastern European satellites. It would signify acceptance by the West of the status quo, not only as regards East Germany but also for all the satellites—would as it were “cork the bottle”, thereby making a major contribution to the stability of the entire Soviet satellite system in Eastern Europe.

4) Most of those in the West who propose recognition are motivated by a desire for a solution which will lessen tensions in Central Europe and promote stability. Recognition of the GDR would not, however, lead to a permanent stability. Not only would there be bitterness among the Germans and a stimulation of German extremist national tendencies, but there would be an increase of insecurity among Western Europeans, who would clearly interpret recognition as a significant advance of Soviet power. Moreover, this gain would be likely to whet the appetite of the Soviets, leading them to pursue their expansionist objectives even more aggressively, with an attendant increased state of instability and tension. Specifically, the Soviets and the East German Communist regime have consistently reiterated that winning control over all Germany is an immediate objective. Recognition would help

stabilize the Communist position in East Germany and facilitate the further use of the Soviet Zone as a springboard for penetration of West Germany directed toward this objective.

5) West Germany deals with East Germany only in non-political matters such as post, railway, inland transport, trade, etc. These relations are carefully kept on a technical level only. They are maintained in the interest of the welfare of the German population, both East and West, and in an effort to preserve some semblance of unity in so far as is possible without compromising the liberties of the free Western part. The West Germans do not recognize the East German government as a legitimate authority. They have constantly opposed the recognition of the GDR by non-Soviet bloc states. The Federal Republic has stated that it will break off diplomatic relations with any country aside from the USSR, which recognized the GDR. The Federal Republic broke its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia when that country recognized the GDR in October 1957. No Western or non-Communist country has granted diplomatic recognition to the GDR, although many have commercial dealings.

6) The rights of the Western powers in Berlin, and their free access to Berlin, derive from the defeat of Nazi Germany. If the U.S. were to accept the Soviet turnover of their responsibilities to the GDR, if the U.S. were to deal with East German authorities in connection with the access of our armed forces to West Berlin, the U.S. would be permitting the Soviets to cancel a right acquired by American victory in World War II. Control by the East Germans would mean that the victor was submitting to control by the defeated.

Also the United States cannot deal with the East German authorities in such matters as the recovery of American servicemen. The U.S. holds the Soviet authorities responsible under the Huebner–Malinin Agreement for the return of American military personnel from the Soviet Zone. The Soviets are trying to shift their responsibility to the East German authorities. If we were to deal with the East German authorities in such cases, we would be accepting the Soviets' evasion of their responsibility. Moreover, any official U.S. contact with the East German authorities in such cases would be utilized by them in their efforts to claim de facto recognition; the East Germans even endeavor to interpret in such a way the mediation of the American Red Cross in the helicopter case last June.

7) The East German authorities have been stating consistently that the Western Allies no longer have a legal right to remain in West Berlin. Recognition of the GDR would make the presence of Allied forces in West Berlin depend upon the acquiescence of the GDR authorities. It would both legally and technically undermine the Western position in Berlin based, as it is, on a residual occupation regime. If we were to

recognize the GDR we would have to accept as a corollary the withdrawal of Allied forces from West Berlin and the abandonment of the West Berliners, contrary to our solemnly pledged word.

The foregoing points, this Mission recognizes, do not represent a full statement on the U.S. policy of non-recognition but rather indicate the lines of argumentation which we here have used. In view of the recurrent nature of these queries and the concurrent need for a clear understanding of our policy in other posts, particularly at this time, the Department may wish to consider the issuance of a definitive statement similar to the excellent paper on our China policy transmitted under cover of the Department's Circular Airgram No. 1452, August 12, 1958.<sup>2</sup> If such a statement could be unclassified, as was the statement on our policy regarding non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, it would be particularly useful.

**Bernard Gufler**  
*Assistant Chief of Mission*

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<sup>2</sup> A copy of this airgram is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1258.

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## **281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, February 1, 1960, 8:34 p.m.

1636. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Your 1417; Berlin's 603 sent Bonn 526.<sup>1</sup> Department's initial comments follow: Western

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-160. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Hillenbrand, SOV, L/EUR, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin USAREUR, Heidelberg, London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 603 from Berlin, February 1, reported that new passes had been issued for the Western Military Liaison Missions effective February 15, which incorporated registration of the passes with the German Democratic Republic. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/1-3060) Telegram 1417 from Bonn, January 30, reported that the question of the new passes would be discussed at a tripartite meeting in Bonn on February 2. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-160)

On February 2, Herter showed the President a copy of telegram 1636 and discussed with him the problem raised by the new language. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

Military Liaison Missions apparently faced with another “Heads they win, tails we lose” situation. Soviets may have decided they can do without their Missions in Federal Republic, relying on military attachés. In final analysis USAREUR must decide how essential continuation of USMLM is to accomplishment its mission; [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. If US (and British and French) decide they can do without these Missions and, if effort through approach to Soviets unsuccessful in obtaining more acceptable form of pass, we prepared to see their withdrawal and to request Soviets withdraw their Missions to Allied Headquarters in Federal Republic accompanied by vigorous protest at violation Huebner–Malinin Agreement. Appropriate public statement should probably follow such decision.

If US, British and French Headquarters not prepared to see Missions withdrawn at once, consequences of their continuation must be studied carefully. While we may be able to live with and teams be able to function on basis new documentation, we must face fact that so doing erodes our position and in long run probably merely postpones final decision.<sup>2</sup>

If USAREUR asserts USMLM essential we would favor initial tripartite communication to Soviets questioning change in form and wording of permanent passes. If, as is likely, Soviets refuse to alter form or wording of new passes and we have decided continuation Liaison Missions essential, we should probably send tripartite communication to Soviets along following lines:

“Certain changes have been made in the form and wording of the passes issued to USMLM. My Government wishes to make clear that acceptance and use of passes in this altered form by members of its Military Liaison Mission does not constitute any change in its position respecting the so-called German Democratic Republic. My Government, as before, continues to look to the USSR for fulfillment of the provisions of the Huebner–Malinin Agreement of April 5, 1957.”

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup> At the tripartite meeting on February 2, both the U.S. and French representatives stated that acceptance of the change of language in the new passes might be interpreted as de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic. [text not declassified] (Telegram 1431 from Bonn, February 2; *ibid.*, 762.0221/2–260)

## 282. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, February 4, 1960, 3 p.m.

614. Paris for Embassy, USRO, CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Ref Dept's G-80 to Bonn, Sept. 28, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

Mission is concerned by recent signs of diminution determination within NATO family to prevent or at least deter increase in international acceptance of "GDR". SovZone regime spokesmen have been quick to spot such real or imagined tendencies within Western Alliance to accommodate themselves to "existence of GDR," and ever since GDR participation in Geneva FonMin conference have been repeating to East German population their claims of increasing international recognition. These efforts have not been without some success and most observers of SovZone scene agree growth of resignation in SovZone population has correspondingly accelerated.

Within past months these signs of Western slippage have significantly increased. GDR has made important progress in reported Greek agreement permit semi-scheduled Interflug flights into Athens (our G-167 to Dept),<sup>2</sup> SAS landings at East German Schoenefeld Airport (ourtels 341 and 497 to Dept)<sup>3</sup> and SAS charter Olympic flight from Schoenefeld to Reno, Nevada. Provincial SovZone paper recently announced Danish Government has finally acceded to request from GDR Ministry of Communication for establishment GDR travel bureau in Copenhagen. Italian Government authorized approval issuance visitor's visas to Politburo candidate Kurella and *Neues Deutschland* Chief Editor Axen (ourtel 598 to Dept),<sup>4</sup> as well as reportedly joining Greek Government in permitting newly purchased, much publicized vacation tour ship *People's Friendship* (formerly the *Stockholm*) to make scheduled stops at Italian and Greek ports en route from Rostock to Black Sea. French Govt was prepared permit GDR MinPres Grotewohl appear on govt controlled TV network until FedRep intervened (ourtel 518 to Dept).<sup>5</sup> British have acceded to pressure from left-wing Laborite MPs and permitted entrance leading SED propagandists Deter and Brasch in

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.02/2-460. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Rome, Athens, Copenhagen, and Oslo.

<sup>1</sup> Airgram G-80 stated that official East German travel abroad was giving the German Democratic Republic increased political standing in some countries and that there was a need for quadripartite discussions to counter it. (*Ibid.*, 033.62B/9-1959)

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 16, 1959. (*Ibid.*, 962B.9281/12-1659)

<sup>3</sup> Dated October 5 and December 5, 1959, respectively. (*Ibid.*, 951.7262A/10-559 and 951.7262A/12-559)

<sup>4</sup> Dated January 29, 1960. (*Ibid.*, 862A.181/1-2960)

<sup>5</sup> Dated December 11, 1959. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/12-1159)



actions which bode ill for interpretation by British of newly achieved tripartite agreement in London on GDR travel. Even we have felt obliged to admit East German officials, such as Rudi Reichert, for Olympic games.

As seen from Berlin, Department's compelling statement in ref message reviewing general question non-recognition of GDR and pointing out urgent need for "forceful reaffirmation Allied policy" is even more pertinent today. Perhaps presentation of tripartite travel agreement to NATO following discussions with FedRep would be appropriate time restate U.S. determination maintain this policy. Regardless of date and place chosen, it seems essential and urgent such a forceful reaffirmation be made in order stop what appears to us as serious slippage in NATO attitudes on this question.<sup>6</sup>

Lightner

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<sup>6</sup>On February 20, the Department of State informed the Mission at Berlin that it shared its concern. After pointing out that there had been no changes in the East German regime to warrant its acceptance, the Department stressed that the Federal Republic, as the most directly affected country, should take more vigorous steps to deal with the problem. (Telegram 1812 to Bonn; *ibid.*, 762B.02/2-460)

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### 283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 5, 1960, 8:14 p.m.

1683. Deliver action officers Bonn, Berlin and Heidelberg eight a.m. Feb. 6. Paris for USCINCEUR Thurston, Finn and USRO. Ref: Deptel 1657 to Bonn, rptd Berlin 372, London 5881, Moscow 1655, Paris 3266; Bonn's 1463; Berlin's 614; Berlin's 616, rptd London 160, Bonn 538, Moscow 179, Paris 173, POLAD USAREUR 71.<sup>1</sup> Joint State-Defense message.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-560. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Kohler, Merchant, Hillenbrand, Calhoun, BNA, SOV, WE, the Department of Defense, and the JCS; and approved by Merchant. Also sent priority to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated priority to London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup>Telegram 614 from Berlin is Document 282. Telegram 1657, February 3, informed the Embassy in Bonn that instructions would soon be forthcoming on the question of passes. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-160) Telegram 1463 from Bonn, February 5, transmitted the text of MLM-015-60, February 4 and reported that Soviet officials had stated that the old passes were invalid as of January 30 rather than February 15. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-560) Telegram 616 from Berlin, February 4, reported the same information and added that an attempt to use the old passes had failed. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-460)

[3 lines of source text not declassified] A projection of this trend together with recent developments, and obvious Soviet intent to force us to acquiesce in political conditions to continue Mission leads to inescapable conclusion that political price is unacceptable.

Defense and State have decided issuance new passes to Western Military Liaison Missions constitutes tactical error on part of Soviets which has presented us with clear issue not involving threat of armed conflict on which we must take firm stand.<sup>2</sup> No doubt here that acceptance new passes (which acknowledged are still Soviet documents) would put us on slippery slope leading to increased "GDR" interference with function of Missions and concomitant Soviet negation of responsibility for Missions. Agreed present situation, wherein we have not yet accepted new passes, is best in which to take stand. No later opportunity envisaged draw public attention to clearcut distinction between acceptable and unacceptable arrangements.

Department informed British and French today its decision to reject new passes issued January 29-30 and demand revalidation of old passes. We sought British and French support for US position.<sup>3</sup>

Draft letter being prepared for signature of General Eddleman along foregoing lines being forwarded in next numbered telegram.<sup>4</sup>

*For Bonn:* Convene tripartite meeting Saturday to outline US position and proposed action.

*For Berlin:* Inform McQuail, FMLM and BRXISMIS.

*For London and Paris:* Inform Foreign Office and seek support for US position.

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup> A record of the conversation at which this decision was reached is *ibid.*, 762.0221/2-560.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Kohler's conversation with Hood and Winckler is *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Transmitted in telegram 1684 to Bonn, February 5, the letter protested the violation of the spirit and letter of the Huebner-Malinin agreement and the interjection of political elements into a strictly military matter, and called for the withdrawal of the new passes and revalidation of the old ones. (*Ibid.*)

**284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, February 9, 1960, 7:54 p.m.

1713. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston, Finn and USRO. Deptel to Bonn 1683.<sup>1</sup> Dept (Kohler) informed today by UK Embassy (Hood) of UK views. Hood reports these views also transmitted by UK FonOff to Steel.<sup>2</sup>

UK does not agree US position. While understanding of political point, consider that problem merely one of “tidying up”. Not sure this was meant by Sovs as political test case. Sovs have after all put us on notice that expression “Sov Zone of Germany” inadmissible. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Accordingly US requested reconsider. UK would propose we make oral *démarche* at military level inquiring purpose new pass. If answer unsatisfactory, then we make written statement at military level saying our acceptance pass in no way changes our position as concerns GDR.

Kohler said we still waiting for French views<sup>3</sup> and we would consider UK views but warned we likely come back strongly against UK proposed course action. Danger wrong political judgment in dealing with Sovs was greater danger than possible loss mission. Soviet tactics and careful examination new pass in original languages made clear Sov move purposeful and acceptance likely be cited as precedent to serious injury West position Summit negotiations.

**Herter**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-960. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vigderman and approved by Kohler. Also sent priority to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Document 283.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Kohler's conversation with Hood is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-960. At the same time that Hood was giving Kohler the British view, the Foreign Office called in an official from the Embassy in London and explained the British position. (Telegram 3933 from London, February 9; *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> On February 10, Lebel informed Kohler that the French were in complete agreement with the U.S. position and that the Foreign Ministry had instructed the French Ambassador in Bonn to assist in obtaining British concurrence. (Memorandum of conversation, February 10; *ibid.*, 762.0021/2-1060)

**285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany**

Washington, February 11, 1960, 7:49 p.m.

1736. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston, Finn and USRO. Joint State/Defense message. Deptel to Bonn 1729.<sup>1</sup> Soviet move changing form and style of USMLM passes clearly deliberate attempt to measure willingness of Western powers to accept a role for GDR in relationship between Soviet and Western military commands.

Move is to be seen against backdrop of intensive GDR campaign, abetted by Soviets, to enhance status of regime. But present move has additional crucial significance since it suggests Soviets are testing in advance what might happen if one day attempt were made to create role (however minor at beginning) for GDR in connection with allied military travel on routes of access to and from Berlin.

We thus provided with opportunity to demonstrate convincingly that we will not accede to Soviet-GDR moves designed to start us down path of substitution of GDR authorities for Soviets into relationships which stem from rights and agreements between Soviets and ourselves. Moreover, our refusal to acquiesce in this particular gambit does not contain within it risk of precipitating a major crisis. If, in end, Soviets cannot be brought to correct situation they have created, result of our firmness might force closing of our missions, a step we would regret in view their undoubted value. On other hand, risk of making false political move which endangers whole fabric of Western position much more serious.

Our willingness to accept passes in new form would be difficult precedent to discount if similar introduction of GDR role were to be attempted on access routes. Analogy in principle in both cases quite apt, since issue in both cases involves right of movement of allied military personnel through GDR.

Moreover, our posture at summit<sup>2</sup> would be gravely weakened if Soviets successful in current move. Soviets would have gained wrong impression concerning allied willingness to compromise on question of

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vigderman, cleared with Hillenbrand and the Department of Defense, and approved by Kohler. Also sent priority to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Dated February 10, telegram 1729 to Bonn transmitted the proposed text of a letter to General Zakharov protesting the changes in the passes for the Western Military Liaison Missions. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-1060)

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the summit conference at Paris in May, see Documents 63 ff.

breaking down existing relationship between Soviets and West in Germany.

We propose US, UK and French military commanders send letter to Zakharov along lines reftel. Next step depends on Zakharov reply. We would refuse a lengthy negotiation with Soviets on form and style of passes, limiting our demand to re-institution of passes in old form. If this not forthcoming, we would restrict movements of Soviet liaison mission personnel.

Depending on nature of reply, we would then consider whether diplomatic *démarches* are indicated prior to taking decision to withdraw Liaison Missions and eject Soviet mission personnel from FedRep. Important consideration here will be to prevent Soviets from maneuvering in a way designed to obscure clear nature of issue presented.

At point at which clear Soviets will not restore passes to old form, we would issue strong statement and launch propaganda campaign to maximize public understanding of issue and advantage gained by demonstration allied firmness.

*For London and Paris:* Foregoing should be conveyed to FonOff.

*For Bonn:* Urge British understand that action, to be effective, needs to be taken swiftly.

Herter

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## 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 11, 1960, 9:05 p.m.

1738. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston, Finn and USRO. Our 1729 to Bonn.<sup>1</sup> Following summary based on uncleared memorandum of conversation between Merchant, Caccia and Alphand today on MLM Pass issue:<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Hillenbrand, Vigderman, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 285.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of this conversation, which also included Lebel, Winckler, Hood, Logan, Kohler, Hillenbrand, Long, and McFarland, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1160.

Merchant noted we had sent revised draft Eddleman-Zakharov letter to Bonn. Hoped 3 Western Commanders would send identical or parallel letters leaving no room for Soviet misunderstanding our attitude. Letters draw attention to objectionable characteristics new passes and demand withdrawal. No publicity or indication consequences if our demands not met at this stage to permit Soviet backdown if they desire. Letter, however, drafted with view to eventual publication if necessary. If Soviets fail to back down, we would then move toward restriction of Soviet Missions and their expulsion and withdrawal of our own.

Caccia declared British:

[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. Question that Soviets have taken settlement of military problems by commanders out of normal framework and placed them in political field through addition some phrases in German.

3. Wonder whether some other language might be substituted to clear up doubts about character of new pass without necessarily reverting to passes identical with old ones.

Kohler stated language fuzzy. Soviets at later stage such as Summit could hold that registration of pass with GDR is what gives Missions right of travel.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

Caccia said letter looked all right to him but sought to clarify whether there was not some intermediate stage between possible Soviet refusal to change passes and close out Missions. Suggested negotiations, as means substantially meeting our demands without Soviet retreat.

Merchant replied if our demands "substantially" met through negotiation Soviets would also gain through certain slippage in our position in direction they desired. Lengthy negotiations should not permit Soviet maneuvering to create impression we agree to role for GDR in access control or to obscure clear nature of issue.

British noted new passes being used only for humanitarian purposes at present.

British thought they might want to raise matter to political level before moving to withdrawal.

Merchant agreed that, depending on nature of reply, it might be desirable to consider whether diplomatic *démarche* indicated prior to ordering withdrawal and expulsion of respective Missions.

Herter

**287. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, February 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

Transmitting Suggested Memorandum for the President Reporting Latest Developments Affecting the Western Military Liaison Missions in the Soviet Zone of Germany

Subsequent to your briefing of the President on this subject on February 8,<sup>1</sup> there have been certain additional developments which it seems desirable to bring to his attention. The British have been persuaded, after the exertion of very considerable pressure, to join us and the French in protesting the Soviet action, and calling on the Soviets to correct the situation they have created.

The next move, following the despatch of letters to the Soviet Commander today,<sup>2</sup> will be up to the Soviets. We have no way of predicting the nature of the Soviet response, but we do not doubt that British reluctance to “rock the boat” will again manifest itself when it comes to the formulation of a common position to be taken to the Soviet response. The British have indicated that the whole question is likely to be brought to the attention of the British Prime Minister, who, in turn, may raise the subject with the President.

The developments of the last week are noted in the attached memorandum which you may wish to sign or use for the purpose of an oral briefing on the subject.

*Recommendation*

It is recommended that you sign the attached memorandum.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1960. Secret. Drafted by Vigerman and initialed by Kohler.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of Herter’s conversation with the President on February 8, during which he brought Eisenhower up to date on the question of passes, is *ibid.*, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 1579 from Bonn, February 18. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1860) The differences between the U.S. and British text were explained in telegram 1578 from Bonn on the same day. (*Ibid.*)

[Attachment]<sup>3</sup>

**Memorandum for the President**

Washington, February 20, 1960.

SUBJECT

Unacceptable Documentation for Western Military Liaison Missions in the Soviet Zone of Germany

Since our conversation on this subject February 8, tripartite consultations were pursued here and in Bonn. The United States and France continue to take a very serious view of this obvious Soviet attempt to divest itself of its responsibilities and to create an independent role for the "GDR" in control of Allied movements into and out of Berlin. The British take a different view, arguing that we cannot afford to make an issue of this matter to the point of threatening the continued functioning of the Liaison Missions. After very considerable diplomatic pressure, they have agreed with us that at least letters should be sent protesting the Soviet action and calling on the Soviets to correct the situation they have created. The tone of the British letter, as finally agreed, is only slightly less firm than that of the letters which the United States and French Commanders have sent to Marshal Zakharov.

In an attempt to arrive at a common Western position, we agreed to certain amendments in the draft letters to be sent to make them somewhat less ultimative in character than originally proposed. We have also agreed to give consideration to making a diplomatic *démarche* to the Soviets, depending upon the nature of the reply from Marshal Zakharov.

The US and French are agreed that eventually we must be prepared to order withdrawal of the Soviet Missions from our respective military headquarters in the Federal Republic and to withdraw ours from the Soviet zone if the Soviet authorities refuse to accede to our demand to withdraw the objectionable passes and substitute others in the form and language of those recently cancelled by the Soviets. We do not feel there is room for further slippage in the Western position which would result from the type of protracted, inconclusive discussion the British appear prepared to enter into with the Soviets on this issue. As has been noted, the British have so far refused to be committed to eventual closeout of the Missions.

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<sup>3</sup> Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and McFarland. A marginal note by Goodpaster on the copy of this memorandum at the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, reads: "22 Feb rptd to President. G."



We will continue to attempt to persuade the British to join with us and the French in taking a firm position in this matter when we have a Soviet response to our letters. It is vital that we not give the Soviets the impression that we might acquiesce in an analogous attempt by them to abrogate, by the substitution of "GDR" for Soviet authorities, their responsibilities with respect to Allied access.

Christian A. Herter<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

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**288. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

London, March 2, 1960, 6 p.m.

4292. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Thurston, and Finn. Bonn's AG to Department G-450 and Deptel 6512.<sup>1</sup> While true that UK during past year has shown itself reluctant to take firm position with respect number of provocative GDR and Soviet actions, Embassy does not believe explanation is to be found in British acceptance of inevitability of "GDR recognition", although it is undoubtedly true that UK attitude toward a divided Germany and concept of "recognition" is different from our own. Point is that British are extremely averse to any Western actions which, in their opinion, could prejudice atmosphere of developing East-West détente. Prime Minister Macmillan is personally deeply committed to idea of consistent and determined Western effort to bring about relaxation of East-West tensions carrying with them danger of nuclear war. He believes that improved East-West atmosphere and agreement on holding of summit conference direct result of his "ice breaking" mission to Moscow in March 1959.<sup>2</sup>

So far as GDR "recognition" is concerned, Embassy has no info to support thesis that UK Govt is now inclining toward acceptance inevita-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn and Paris.

<sup>1</sup>Airgram G-450 from Bonn, February 26, reported that since December 1959, the British Embassy in Bonn had acted as if recognition of the German Democratic Republic were only a matter of time. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/2-2660) Telegram 6512 to London stated that the Department of State assumed the Embassy would comment on G-450. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup>For documentation on Macmillan's trip to the Soviet Union February 21-March 3, 1959, see vol. VIII, Documents 183 ff.

bility of de jure recognition. UK, however, has shown itself more willing than either US or France to accept situations or actions carrying the implication of de facto recognition. This has been evident for example in UK approach to contingency planning with respect to access to Berlin. UK has also followed visa policy with respect to travelers from GDR which has taken insufficient note of regime's efforts to enhance its international prestige through travel of officials and politically motivated individuals to Western countries. We have repeatedly been told by British officials defending this attitude that Federal Republic has many contacts with East Germany and UK can hardly be expected to be more Catholic than the Pope. Furthermore, relatively poor state of relations between UK and Federal Republic and recurrent controversies and mistrust are not conducive to hard UK line on GDR in defense of what is often viewed by UK as exclusive or predominant Federal Republic interest. Embassy would reiterate, however, that basic explanation of attitude referred to in Bonn's airgram is not acceptance of inevitability GDR recognition but rather desire to avoid anything which would spoil the present East-West atmosphere, particularly on the eve of the summit conference.

Whitney

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## 289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, March 5, 1960, 2:18 p.m.

1908. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston and Finn and USRO. Dept's 1860 to Bonn rptd London 6479, Paris 3601, Moscow 1797, Berlin 426, USAREUR unnn, CINCUSAREUR's SX 1932 to Bonn rptd Dept State and Defense, Bonn's 1663 (CINCUSAREUR's SX 1977), Bonn's 1672 rptd Berlin 586 Moscow 233 London 424 Paris 585 USAREUR 210.<sup>1</sup>

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3-360. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McFarland, cleared by Hillenbrand and the Department of Defense, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, CINCUSAREUR Heidelberg, London, Paris, and Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1860 to Bonn, February 27, stated that the Department of State was considering restriction of the Soviet Mission, but wanted British cooperation. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-2560) SX 1932 has not been found. Telegram 1663 from Bonn, March 2, transmitted the coordinates of an area in East Germany which had been put off-limits to Western personnel. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-260) In telegram 1672 from Bonn, March 3, Dowling reiterated his recommendation that the Soviet Mission at Frankfurt be restricted and that if this action elicited no reply, that the Soviet Government be approached. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-360)

Informed British and French here today that our position is that Sov Mission to US Forces, Frankfurt should be restricted as of 1100 hours March 11 provided no satisfactory Sov response to Commander's letter Feb. 19<sup>2</sup> received prior that time.

Restriction Mission should be carried out by order CINCUS-AREUR on basis approval by Embassy Bonn.

Restriction should be accomplished without publicity. Hope be able inform FonOff Bonn and NAC our intentions March 9.

Do not anticipate question legal authority for restriction will arise but if it does suggest ref Article 2 Convention on Relations<sup>3</sup> and Huebner–Malinin Agreement which accredits Sov Mission to CINCUSAREUR would be adequate response.

Notice might appropriately be given in form of map (similar to that received by USMLM and BRIXMIS (SX 1977) containing "goose egg" restricting entire area US military responsibility (with exception of area up to "X" kms from Mission quarters) effective immediately and until further notice. If preferable, method notification employed by French would be acceptable.

British Embassy says present position is not to enforce restrictions on Sov Missions but to send severe reminder to Sovs that reply still forthcoming. We urged British to join us in action proposed above and requested that London issue appropriate instructions to Bonn by Monday or as soon as possible thereafter. If British still refuse, request Embassy advise us urgently.<sup>4</sup>

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 287.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Convention on Relations, signed May 26, 1952, at Bonn and amended October 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, Vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 112–118.

<sup>4</sup> Since no reply was received by the Western Powers to their February 19 letters, the United Kingdom and United States on March 11 restricted the movements of the Soviet Mission. France had previously limited the movement of the Soviet Mission to its headquarters.

**290. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

Berlin, March 14, 1960, noon.

729. Ref Bonn's 1751 to Dept rptd Berlin 609.<sup>1</sup> Serb informed USMLM 12 noon March 14 that Lt. Gen. Vorontsov, Chief of Staff, GSFG, desired meeting 1800 hours March 14 at Potsdam. USMLM insisted any trip must be made without use of pass and was assured Deputy Serb would meet him at Glienicke Bridge and take him through without any formality. French MLM and Chief BRIXMIS also invited.

Meeting took place as scheduled with Chiefs USMLM, FMLM and BRIXMIS present.<sup>2</sup>

Lt. Gen. Vorontsov referred to Allied Commander-in-Chief's letters regarding new passes noting that Marshal Zakharov had referred this matter to his government in Moscow. In light of upcoming conference and to maintain good atmosphere, Group Soviet Forces Germany was instructed to reinstitute old passes as temporary measure pending solution at summit conference of over-all problems. Vorontsov then asked whether this was clear. When Western MLM's replied affirmatively, Chief Serb interrupted to state that an officer from the Missions should come to Serb at 9:00 March 15 to turn in the new passes and pick up old passes.

After the meeting Chief Serb reissued old passes to three Mission Chiefs and officers accompanying them. Old passes have been validated in ink in handwriting of Col. Kozlovskyi on page 4 as follows:

"Credentials validated. Col. Kozlovskyi 14 March 60."

Normal purple ink stamp has been superimposed on left of handwriting.

Chief USMLM plans to resume operations immediately following issuance of old passes.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3-1460. Confidential; Niact. Also sent priority to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and POLAD USAREUR.

<sup>1</sup> Dated March 11, telegram 1751 from Bonn reported that the Chief of the Soviet Liaison Mission had informed the British that Zakharov would reply soon to the Western letters of protest dated February 19. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-1160)

<sup>2</sup> A more detailed account of the meeting was transmitted in airgram G-298 from Berlin, March 15. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-1560)

Radio now carrying ADN (East German news agency) report stating in essence that Vorontsov had conveyed reply to Feb 19 Western note on passes which provided for continuation use of “old passes” for present (*bis auf weiteres*).<sup>3</sup>

Lightner

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<sup>3</sup> Following Soviet reissue of the old passes, the three Western Powers on March 15 lifted the restrictions on the movement of the Soviet Missions. (Telegram 1771 from Bonn, March 15; *ibid.*)

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## 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, April 15, 1960, 3:57 p.m.

2221. Bonn's 1905, 1918, 1949, 1972, London's 4998, Moscow's 2498.<sup>1</sup> Following are our views on German suggestion for notes and Summit approaches to Soviets re farm collectivization in SovZone.

We do not think suggested procedure is best way to publicize problem. We note coverage in German press has been excellent and believe, if matter has raised less interest in US, one explanatory factor may be that public had tended to assume that GDR regime more aggressive than it is in fact and that all agriculture in Communist-controlled area already collectivized. In any case we believe most effective publicity can be based on human interest stories re collectivization incidents and effects, on discussion political purposes of collectivization, and on com-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-560. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and McKiernan; cleared by Davis, Hillenbrand, Nunley, and Cargo (UNP); and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, and USUN.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1905 from Bonn, April 5, transmitted a summary of a draft West German note to the Soviet Union that publicized the troubles of the farmers in the East Zone. (*Ibid.*) In telegram 1918 from Bonn, April 6, Ambassador Dowling supported the idea of sending the note. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/4-660) Telegram 1949 from Bonn, April 11, transmitted a redraft of the note. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/4-1160) Telegram 1972 from Bonn, April 13, reported discussion of the note at a quadripartite meeting that day. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/4-1360) Telegram 4998 from London, April 13, reported that neither the British nor the French was enthusiastic about sending the note. (*Ibid.*) In telegram 2498 from Moscow, April 6, Ambassador Thompson stated that the idea was “most unwise,” since it would lead to Soviet demands on the West to suppress militarism and Fascism in West Germany. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/4-660)

parison productivity of private, versus collectivized, sectors of East German agriculture. Argumentation about legality or violations of human rights in abstract probably has less impact on opinion, whether of informed or of man in street.

We also find two of themes in draft German note rather inconsistent with general German policy. References to GDR "Constitution" permit inference that document is something more than travesty or window dressing for illegitimate regime. Moreover, bringing this isolated aspect of German question to attention UN, if it had any effect, might prompt question whether UN might not play greater role in attempt resolve German question as whole.

We doubt even drafters of note can believe collectivization in Sov-Zone can in itself have prejudicial effect on forthcoming Four-Power negotiations.

Although it is uncertain whether public attention will still be focused on collectivization at time of Summit, we expect it will be necessary at some point in discussions for Western Powers counter Soviet false statements about conditions in FedRep and West Berlin by dwelling on conditions in SovZone. We believe brutality of collectivization can be exploited very effectively in this context and that it would be useful for FedRep to start now assembling factual data which could be cited.

Believe sending notes Sov. Govt will only provoke Soviet rejection and counter charges. Believe it might be more effective for Germans to issue draft note as public declaration and obtain British and French concurrence with us in issuing individual supporting statements.

We would not favor a request for consideration for action on this subject by the Security Council or other UN organs for the following reasons:

(1) While some advantage in drawing world attention to Soviet violations of human rights immediately following hypocritical Soviet diatribe in SC on violation of human rights in South Africa, two cases not sufficiently similar in terms of dramatic quality to place desired degree of opprobrium on USSR and GDR.

(2) Soviet pressures for agricultural collectivization in East Germany not essentially different from measures conducted in other countries of Eastern Europe. No initiative was taken to secure UN action with regard to these equally obnoxious violations of human rights. Many neutral nations might be suspicious of move to single out East Germany for special attack at this time.

(3) In any debate in SC or other UN organ, human rights issue would not be clear-cut. Would be confused by arguments over economic ideology and agricultural methods. A number of neutral nations may have some sympathy with Soviet and Chinese Communist experiments in collective farming. US realizes Soviet and GDR actions involve

injury and death to individuals, but this is difficult to highlight as separate issue.

(4) As general principle, US has some reluctance to see UN become involved in German question at this time unless circumstances compel UN involvement. We have no assurance that UN consideration of East German atrocities could be limited to this subject. Debate might be broadened to include overall status of East German regime, German reunification, and special status of Berlin, which, in turn, might invite certain non-Europeans to put forward irresponsible "compromise" proposals on these subjects which would serve Soviet propaganda interests.<sup>2</sup>

**Herter**

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<sup>2</sup> Following further discussion, the Federal Republic decided not to send the note, but to include its information in a publication which was released as a White Book on April 26, entitled *Die Zwangskollektivierung des selbständigen Bauernstandes in Mitteldeutschland*.

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## 292. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, April 22, 1960, 7 p.m.

818. Following summarizes Mission appraisal of attitudes SovZone regime and population as they have evolved in period between Fon Ministers' talks last year and forthcoming summit meeting.

Prior to FonMin talks last year, East German leaders developed an intensive political mobilization campaign inside SovZone during which they revealed expectations of significant and concrete gains from those talks. Cessation those talks without agreement, Khrushchev visit to US<sup>1</sup> and his clear retention of tight control over both policy and policy pronouncement had local effect of pushing GDR into pose of patience and reasonableness vis-à-vis Western Powers. On the other hand, pre-summit period has brought important measure of success to GDR efforts to project Berlin and German problems onto world stage, to undermine world status of FedRep and to enhance status GDR. Although GDR leaders now indicate they do not anticipate early incorporation of West Berlin into GDR, they seem fairly confident summit talks will result in

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.00/4-2260. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, POLAD USAREUR, and DCSI USAFE.

<sup>1</sup> For documentation on Khrushchev's visit to the United States September 15–27, 1959, see Documents 11–16.

some kind of new agreement on West Berlin and will set in motion a series of negotiations inevitably leading to decline of Western position in Berlin and Germany.

Although timetable on Berlin desired by SED regime has been slowed down, SED party morale is at high level as a result growing self-confidence within context of bloc claims that international developments are turning in favor of Communism. Also regime successes in such programs as forced collectivization of agriculture have boosted morale of Communist cadres in East Germany. In contrast, morale of East German population has been falling steadily since FonMin talks. Almost without exception, sources including refugees report widespread resignation to seeming permanence of Communist control. Although basic feeling of resignation is accompanied by a deep bitterness and hostility towards Ulbricht regime, prevailing opinion among Sov-Zone inhabitants seems to be their situation is hopeless. Net result is apathy, accompanied by apprehension concerning Western firmness and intentions in summit talks. There is real apprehension that West Berlin, and Western World through West Berlin, may become inaccessible.

Prevailing mood East Germans perhaps best illustrated in following statement contained in anonymous letter Mission just received from SovZone resident. "We Germans in SovZone regard coming summit conference with little hope but with great anxiety."

**Lightner**

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### **293. Airgram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State**

Berlin, May 28, 1960.

G-412. Sov handling C-47 incident (full account reported by USMLM contained in Berlin's G-410, G-411)<sup>1</sup> was marked by restraint,

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/5-2860. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Copenhagen, and POLAD USAREUR.

<sup>1</sup> Both dated May 27; G-410 reported on a meeting with Soviet authorities in East Germany on May 24 concerning the release of the crew of a C-47 which had landed in the Soviet Zone on May 20. G-411 transmitted the text of the protocol releasing the crew. (Both *ibid.*, 762B.5411/5-2760)



correctness and polite courteous treatment of American personnel involved. In comparison basically similar helicopter incident two years ago which became cause celebre, Sov handling this time shows how things can go if Sovs do not wish make political issue. In helicopter incident, Sovs decided turn over jurisdiction to GDR authorities. In this case, Sovs kept GDR entirely out of case. It is true that General Jakubovsky's letter concerning release of plane passengers and crew referred to agreement of GDR authorities. (Ref ourtel 883 to Dept rpt 761 to Bonn.)<sup>2</sup> Also protocol signed by USMLM (G-411) referred to a violation of "German Democratic Republic" air space. However these references were certainly minimal; important is fact that Sovs themselves handled case, without trying shift responsibility to GDR and without any participation of GDR representatives.

We assume from oblique reference in his May 20 address in East Berlin that Khrushchev already knew of C-47 forced landing earlier that day.<sup>3</sup> It is likely that direct instructions were given to handle case in this way if C-47 turned out to be innocent plane that strayed from course. Perhaps Khrushchev did not want to distract attention from U-2 case, in UN proceedings and otherwise.<sup>4</sup> Also in post-Summit letdown if SED regime obliged to wait another six or eight months, there was hardly profit to be obtained by regime from trying exploit such case at this time.

In keeping with Sov handling, East German press has remained remarkably quiet on C-47 incident, carrying only tiny factual news items on forced landing and on subsequent release, without any editorial comment whatsoever.

**Burns**

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<sup>2</sup> Dated May 24, telegram 883 from Berlin transmitted the text of Yakubovski's letter to Eddelman.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Khrushchev's address in Berlin on May 20, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Zweiter Halbband, pp. 1060–1068.

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on the U-2 incident, May 1, 1960, see volume X.

**294. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (White) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, August 12, 1960.

SUBJECT

Military Liaison Missions in Germany

During recent weeks the United States, British, and French Military Liaison Missions to the Soviet Forces in Germany have been subjected to systematic and continuous harassment which has not only made it difficult for them to carry out [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] functions [*1 line of source text not declassified*] but has even raised the question whether the closing of the Mission, probably upon the basis of a request by the "GDR" to the Soviet Forces, may not be anticipated in the near future.

Western Mission tours have been frequently "tailed" and often detained by East German police in plain clothes. There have been incidents in which the East German police have assaulted and arrested Mission personnel. Harassment of the British Mission reached the point where the British found it necessary to suspend travel in the Soviet Zone temporarily. Soviet responses to Allied protests about these incidents have been quite unsatisfactory. Moreover, large areas of the Soviet Zone have been placed "off limits" for Mission travel. At the same time, the East German propaganda media have made much of the intelligence activities of the Western Missions. Ulbricht, for example, has claimed that "aggressive war plans" have been seized from Western Mission personnel.

There seems to be general agreement on the United States side and among the Three Powers that the Missions have sufficient value [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to warrant their continuation as long as possible. At the same time there also seems to be general agreement that we must make it clear to the Soviets that their Missions will not be permitted [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] privileges in the Federal Republic which the Western Missions do not enjoy in the Soviet Zone.

The British and French had originally suggested a verbal warning to the Soviets, but on the United States side a mere warning was considered inadequate. Ambassador Dowling considered such a warning

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-1260. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan, initialed by White, and concurred in by Vigderman and Colonel Schofield in OSD/ISA.

weak and thought the only real reprisal would be to restrict the movement of the Soviet Missions, which he felt would entail a risk of the Missions' being closed. General Norstad preferred a reprisal program to a verbal warning and, while he thought there might be an advantage in maintaining the Missions as long as possible, he believed that the Soviets might be preparing to put an end to them.

Meanwhile, General Eddleman had already begun reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt on July 28. On August 4 he reported that he had ceased reciprocal harassment because it already appeared to have had the desired effect. A few days ago, General Cassels, Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, also began reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Mission accredited to him.

The British Embassy informed us yesterday (August 11) that General Cassels is going to Berlin on August 20 for a short visit and that he may take this occasion to call on the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, General Yakubovski. At the Foreign Secretary's suggestion, General Cassels proposes to speak to General Yakubovski along the following lines:

It is dangerous to permit the East Germans to continue to harass the Western Missions, and General Cassels trusts General Yakubovski will do something about the situation. General Cassels has found it necessary to take certain retaliatory measures against the Soviet Mission to his headquarters and, if harassment of the British Mission does not cease, he will have to make retaliation a fixed policy. Although General Cassels is not speaking for the Americans and the French, there has been the closest liaison among the Three Powers on the subject and what he has said is in accordance with American and French views.

The British Embassy has asked for our concurrence in such a statement to Yakubovski. Ambassador Caccia will probably repeat this request when he sees you today.<sup>1</sup>

We have informed Defense of the British approach and they tell us they cannot concur with it. Defense believes that there is nothing to be gained by giving the question recognition at the Cassels–Yakubovski level and that making a threat of reciprocal harassment is a weak way to handle the matter. Furthermore, Defense believes that General Yakubovski might take refuge behind the fact the Western Missions have been harassed by East Germans to complain that General Cassels is threatening to act against the Soviet Mission in a way in which the Soviets themselves are not acting against the Western Mission.

Defense believes that it is preferable to resort to actual reciprocal harassment, as necessary, without explanations or threats. Defense therefore suggests that State attempt to obtain British and French agree-

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<sup>1</sup> No record of Herter's conversation with Caccia has been found.

ment to authorize the three military commanders in Germany to confer with a view to establishing a coordinated tripartite program of harassment to be implemented by the military commanders on their own initiative as required by the situation at the moment with respect to the Western Missions in the Soviet Zone.

*Recommendations*

That you reply to Ambassador Caccia (or authorize us to reply to the British Embassy if the Ambassador does not raise the subject) as follows:

1. We concur regarding the need for reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Missions.

2. We see certain disadvantages to making a threat to General Yakubovski as suggested by the British, although we would not object if General Cassels were to do so on behalf of the British only.

3. We believe that the Three Governments should authorize their military commanders in Germany, in consultation with their Ambassadors, to work out a program for reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Missions, in the light of the situation at the moment.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Herter initialed approval of the three recommendations on August 12.

# Austria

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD AUSTRIA

### 295. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, January 29, 1958.

#### PROGRESS REPORT ON AUSTRIA

(NSC 5603, Approved by the President, April 7, 1956)<sup>1</sup>  
(Period Covered: From April 1, 1957 to January 29, 1958)

#### *A. Summary of Operating Progress in Relation to Major NSC Objectives*

1. *Summary Evaluation.* United States activities have, in the broad sense, been successfully directed toward assisting Austria to maintain its freedom, independence and internal stability, and toward encouraging Austria to interpret its policy of neutrality so that its practical application is not prejudicial to the interests of the U.S. or its allies. Continuing U.S. programs of technical exchange, surplus commodity sales, aid to refugees, and military end-item aid, as well as influence exerted through normal diplomatic relations and information activities, have contributed significantly to the progress toward the major aims of U.S. policy.

The U.S. has thus far succeeded in keeping American programs out of partisan politics and informally stressed the achievements of the Austrian coalition government and the stability it has fostered. U.S.-Austrian cooperation in the build-up of the Austrian Army to a 60,000 man goal has continued, and on June 28, 1957 the President approved the allocation of an additional \$12.5 million in end-item grant aid bringing the total to approximately \$70 million since the State Treaty.<sup>2</sup>

The Austrian economy strengthened its position substantially during the period under review. Consistent with U.S. objectives, Austria is

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Austria. Secret. A cover sheet; a memorandum by Elmer B. Staats, Executive Officer of the OCB, indicating that the OCB had concurred in the report of January 29 and that the NSC had noted it on February 7; a Financial Annex; and a Pipeline Analysis of the Mutual Security Program for Austria are not printed.

<sup>1</sup> For text of NSC 5603, "U.S. Policy Toward Austria," March 23, 1956, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955-1957, vol. XXVI, pp. 34-37.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Austrian State Treaty, May 15, 1955, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, 1955, pp. 916 ff.

demonstrating strong interest in the European Free Trade Area. [2 lines of source text not declassified] PL 480<sup>3</sup> and counterpart loans as well as the technical assistance programs are playing a substantial role in bringing about the rehabilitation of industry in the former Soviet occupied zone.

In view of the above, a review of policy is not recommended.

### *B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States*

2. *Protection of Property Rights of American Citizens.* The Austrian Government has settled all but two of the claims of American corporations under Article 25 of the State Treaty, and the two remaining claims are now under negotiation. Under the terms of the Vienna Memorandum,<sup>4</sup> two subsidiaries of Socony-Mobil (one wholly owned and one jointly owned) have been denationalized and returned to Socony, and certain retail gasoline installations in Western Austria have been returned to Standard Oil of New Jersey. The Austrian Government has agreed in principle to return the Lobau refinery, the second largest in Austria, and the pipelines, but the actual turnover is not expected before early February. The Austrian Government has announced its intention to complete in the near future the negotiations with the Socony-Mobil (U.S.) and Shell (British-Dutch) Oil companies for restoration of their oil exploration rights.

The Austrian Government has submitted to the United States, British, and French Embassies proposals on categories of claims of former persecutees to be satisfied pursuant to Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty. Although some of the proposals are acceptable, further discussions are now taking place to determine whether the Austrian Government will restore bank accounts and securities as they stood before payment of discriminatory taxes. The American Jewish organizations may be dissatisfied with the size of the Austrian payments.

3. *Military Build-Up Problems.* The major factor governing the nature and size of the Austrian military build-up and U.S. assistance program is the Austrian status of neutrality. Major problems in the build-up into an effective combat force are: the current shortness of the period of compulsory military service; and domestic legislation which limits enlisted service to a total of 9 years, thereby preventing the development of a corps of career non-commissioned officers.

The Department of Defense has initiated a request for a Presidential determination under Section 401(a) of the Mutual Security Act for a \$30 million FY 1958 military grant aid program designed to equip 2 infantry

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<sup>3</sup> The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, July 10, 1954, provided for the disposal of U.S. agricultural surpluses abroad. For text, see 68 Stat. 454.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the Vienna Memorandum, May 10, 1955, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1955, pp. 967 ff.

brigades, 3 medium tank companies, 3 artillery groups, and necessary support forces.<sup>5</sup> Delivery of this American equipment will leave requirements for only 3 armored regiments, 1 infantry brigade, and 2 artillery battalions plus some support units, which the FY 1959 program should be able to meet within the \$30 million statutory limit.

4. *Refugees.* Of the 179,939 Hungarian refugees who entered Austria after October 1956, there were 18,985 remaining in Austria on January 9, 1958, of whom 8,551 were still living in camps. Although the Embassy estimates that the expenditures through the Austrian budget for the care of Hungarian refugees will total \$14.94 million through July 1, 1958, the Austrian Government's contribution to the total will be less than \$385,000 and private Austrian contributions will be approximately \$770,000. The remainder of the funds has come from the United States, other governments, and welfare organizations. Funds on hand from previous official and voluntary aid programs plus the proceeds of a special PL 480 Title II sales program will, the Embassy believes, eliminate any need for U.S. aid to the Austrian Government in fiscal years 1958 and 1959, beyond the supplementary services provided by USEP.

The Embassy estimates that there are approximately 9,000 Yugoslav refugees in Austria today. The Austrian Minister of the Interior states that they are continuing to arrive at the rate of 250 a week and has stressed that assistance in the onward movement of the refugees is more important than financial aid. Pursuant to the OCB decision of December 11, 1957, the Department of State initiated discussions with the Austrian Government on a \$3 million PL 480 Title II program for the feeding of the Yugoslav refugees.<sup>6</sup> The composition of this program and the possibility of proposing the sale of some of the commodities to buy other food for the refugees in Austria is still under study by U.S. agencies.

5. *East-West Trade.* Annual shipments of 1,000 tons of copper, an embargo item, to the Soviet Union under the Compensation Agreement<sup>7</sup> arising out of the State Treaty were valued at \$1,384,662 in 1956 and \$1,259,162 in 1957. These shipments will continue to be a problem and

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<sup>5</sup>The Presidential determination to allocate \$30 million to Austria under Section 401(a) of the Mutual Security Act was issued in a memorandum from President Eisenhower to Secretary Dulles, May 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 763.5–MSP/5–2658)

<sup>6</sup>Documentation on the discussion leading to the December 11, 1957, OCB decision to extend Title II P.L. 480 aid to Austria for use with Yugoslav refugees is *ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 480, Preliminary Notes.

<sup>7</sup>Reference is to Article 22 of the Austrian State Treaty, which provides for return by the Soviet Union of most German assets seized after World War II in return for Austrian compensation of \$150 million within a period of 6 years. Article 22 incorporates a reference to the Austro-Soviet economic accord of April 15, 1955, on which the provisions governing the return of German assets to Austria are based. The Austro-Soviet economic accord of April 15 is in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 20, 1955, pp. 1011–1013.

further Battle Act<sup>8</sup> exceptions will be required if U.S. aid is to be continued. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

6. *PL 480 Program.* The United States has taken no action on the Austrian request of May 23, 1957 for an \$11.6 million PL 480 Title I program and no consideration of this program is anticipated because of the low priority of this program until later in the fiscal year or until additional authority is obtained from the Congress.<sup>9</sup> Several Austrian cabinet members, including representatives of both coalition parties, have pressed the issue during their visits to the United States. The Austrians emphasized the political desirability of the maintenance by the U.S. of its position in the Austrian market and the Austrian wish to avoid overdependence on Soviet bloc trade.

*Note:* See National Intelligence Estimate Number 25-55 dated 23 August, 1955, "Outlook for an Independent Austria".<sup>10</sup>

## Annex A<sup>11</sup>

### ADDITIONAL MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS NOT COVERED IN THE REPORT

1. *Presidential Election.* The election of the former Socialist Vice Chancellor, Dr. Schaerf, as President of Austria on May 5, 1957, brought about a realignment in the top leadership of the Socialist Party. People's Party disappointment over defeat and the need for the new Socialist leaders to establish themselves firmly combined to produce a period of public controversy between the two parties and relatively slower pace in the work of the coalition government. These difficulties do not pose a serious threat to the coalition at this time, but bickering between them can be expected to continue.

2. *State Visits.* During Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's state visit to Austria in April, he worked hard to create an atmosphere of good will

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (P.L. 213), sponsored by Congressman Laurie C. Battle of Alabama and enacted October 26, 1951. It provided for the suspension of U.S. economic aid to nations supplying strategic materials to Communist countries. For text, see 65 Stat. 644.

<sup>9</sup> Regarding the Austrian request for aid under P.L. 480, see the memorandum from Elbrick to Secretary Dulles, September 23, 1957, *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. XXVI, pp. 50-53.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

<sup>11</sup> Secret.



and reasonableness, and he succeeded in leaving a generally favorable impression.<sup>12</sup> Mikoyan also invited Chancellor Raab to go to Moscow to negotiate a reduction in Austrian compensation shipments to the Soviet Union under the State Treaty. Although the Chancellor suffered a stroke in August, he expects to go to Moscow later this year to negotiate large-scale reductions which would help his party in domestic politics.<sup>13</sup> The Chancellor intends to visit the United States this spring to receive an honorary degree.

Chancellor Adenauer, who visited Austria in June, was universally well received, and his conduct should do much to dissipate any latent hostility or suspicion on the part of Austria toward its German neighbor. During his visit, an Austro-German property agreement was signed which if ratified will settle many of the troublesome German assets questions.

3. *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*. Sufficient governments ratified the Statute of the IAEA to bring the agency into being, and at the first general conference held in Vienna in October 1957,<sup>14</sup> the agency selected Vienna as its permanent seat, thus fulfilling a United States objective.

4. *Ex-Im Bank and IBRD Loans*. The Export-Import Bank granted credits amounting to \$28 million to a major Austrian steel company (Alpine Gesellschaft) for equipment to modernize its plant and expand its steel production. The IBRD approved a loan of 15 million German Deutsche Marks (\$3.6 million) for a hydro-electric power project in Western Austria, bringing the Bank's investment in the project to \$13.6 million. This is the World Bank's first loan in German marks.

5. *South Tyrol*. The interpretation of the 1946 Austro-Italian agreement<sup>15</sup> which recognized Italian sovereignty over the South Tyrol continues to disturb relations between the two countries, and recent demonstrations in the disputed territory have given the issue increased prominence in Austria. However, Austria continues to press for some bilateral solution of this problem.

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<sup>12</sup>Regarding Mikoyan's visit to Austria April 23–27, 1957, see the memorandum from Tyler to Elbrick, April 17, 1957, and telegram 3787 from Vienna, April 25, 1957, *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXVI, pp. 47 and 49.

<sup>13</sup>Regarding the postponement of Raab's visit to Moscow, see the editorial note, *ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>14</sup>The first IAEA conference was held at Vienna in October 1957.

<sup>15</sup>For text of this agreement, sometimes referred to as the Gruber–de Gasperi Agreement of September 5, 1946, see annex IV to the Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed at Paris on February 10, 1947, in 4 Bevens 360–361.

## 296. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 19, 1958.

## SUBJECT

Article 26 Claims<sup>1</sup>

## PARTICIPANTS

*Austria*His Excellency, Julius Raab, Chancellor of Austria<sup>2</sup>

His Excellency, Dr. Wilfried Platzer, Ambassador of Austria

The Honorable Dr. Friedrich Meznik, Chief of the Press Bureau, Austrian Federal Chancellery

Dr. Paul Zedtwitz, Counselor, Embassy of Austria

Dr. Erich Haider, Special Assistant to the Chancellor

*United States*

The Secretary

Mr. H.G. Torbert, Jr., Director, Western Europe

Mr. R.D. Kearney, Assistant Legal Adviser, European Affairs

Mr. F.L. Chapin, Austrian Desk

Chancellor Raab said that the Austrian Government had already agreed to pay 550 million schillings or approximately \$21 million, for the Jewish Aid Fund which had been set up several years ago. Then the Jewish groups had made additional claims based on Article 26. He had agreed to see the Jewish leaders on May 20 and would see what could be done about settling the claims. There had to be some end, however, to the claims.

The Secretary said that the United States had proposed a formula for settlement of the claims which would result in the payment of ap-

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Chapin on May 20.

<sup>1</sup> Reference is to Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty, providing for compensation by Austria of victims of political persecution under the Nazi regime.

<sup>2</sup> Chancellor Raab paid an unofficial visit to the United States during the latter half of May. He was in Washington May 18-21. On May 19, he had conversations with Secretary Dulles concerning the recognition of the People's Republic of China, Russian atomic propaganda, Austrian-U.S. economic relations, claims under Articles 26 and 27 of the Austrian State Treaty, the conclusion of negotiations under the Vienna Memorandum, and delivery of rolling mill equipment by Austria to Czechoslovakia. Briefing materials for the meeting, dated May 14, are in Department of State, Central Files, 763.11/5-1458. Memoranda of conversation between Dulles and Raab (except for that part of the conversation covering recognition of the People's Republic of China) are *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

Immediately following the conversations between Dulles and Raab, President Eisenhower hosted a luncheon for the Chancellor. A record of that conversation, dated May 22, is *ibid.*, Central Files, 033.6311/5-2258.

After visiting Washington, Raab visited South Bend, Indiana, Chicago, and San Francisco before returning to Vienna.

proximately \$5 million or less than \$200 each for the 30,000 claimants around the world. He scarcely needed to recall to the Chancellor the large measure of sympathy in the United States for the claimants. He believed it would be an advantage to Austria to settle the matter; he was glad that the Chancellor was meeting with a delegation of Jewish leaders; and he hoped that the Chancellor would be able to give them some satisfaction.

Chancellor Raab inquired about the \$5 million figure and was informed that it represented the United States estimate of the total of all categories of claims. If the negotiations now in progress between the two governments resulted in a satisfactory settlement, the United States would be prepared to deliver a formal note stating that the United States would no longer intervene diplomatically on behalf of claimants under Article 26. Chancellor Raab broke in to say that Austria was ready to settle the claims under Article 26 and reiterated there must be an end to the Jewish claims. The Secretary pointed out that the settlement would eliminate further representation by the United States Government, but the Government could not prevent private persons from advancing claims or arguing with the Austrian Government. The important thing would be that the United States would not support any such action after a satisfactory settlement was reached.

Chancellor Raab said that he would be glad to look into the negotiations and see what could be done about them. Austria was drafting war damage compensation laws, and the Jewish emigrants would be treated in the same manner as Austrian nationals in Austria with regard to any such compensation.

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**297. Despatch 1297 From the Embassy in Austria to the  
Department of State**

Vienna, June 16, 1958.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.00/6–158. Secret. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**298. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, July 24, 1958, 11 a.m.

218. When I arrived at Austrian Embassy last night Raab immediately took me aside and said that he regretted that he had been unable to accept my invitation because Soviets had objected and he hoped I would understand. I said I fully understood but said what I did not understand was his remark at the airport about the State Treaty.<sup>1</sup> He merely said that this was later modified, referring apparently to the wording used at official lunch which was published in yesterday's press.

All other members of Austrian Delegation, both Socialist and People's Party, sought me out to express their distress at Raab's remarks. Socialists emphasized that they knew nothing about it in advance. Haymerle said that Raab was a sick man and that ever since his stroke he had been doing things like this which had made him many enemies. All expressed the hope that these few words would not affect Austro-American relations.

Figl and Fuchs stated Khrushchev had said Soviet Union did not wish to embarrass Austria in any way and had made no political demands. Soviets offered economic aid in event of a depression to which Raab had said they did not have one nor did they expect one.

Kreisky said Khrushchev spent over six hours with them yesterday and he was three and a half hours at Polish Embassy. He did not understand how he could get his work done nor do I.

In conversation with Davis, Meznik, Chief Press Section Federal Chancellery, said Soviets were not prepared to reduce Austrian oil deliveries, pleading long-term contractual relations with satellites, but as concession had offered deliver 500,000 tons per annum Soviet oil to Austrian border. Communiqué due to be signed late afternoon July 24<sup>2</sup> and only few details remain to be worked out regarding wording of announcement re oil deliveries and reference war prisoners question. Meznik said although Soviets agreed in principle pay freight costs oil deliveries to Austrian border and agreed to specific standard of oil, they did not wish to make this explicit in communiqué itself and he thought compromise would be reached by separate letter specifying these details. Soviets will of course not admit they have any Austrian war pris-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.63/7-2458. Secret. Repeated to Vienna.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 299.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Austro-Soviet communiqué, issued at the conclusion of Raab's visit, see Mayrzedt and Hummer, eds., *20 Jahre*, pp. 138-140.

oners but Meznik thought some reference would be made to ability of claimants to Austrian citizenship to apply for repatriation. He and other members of delegation asserted that Soviets had not pressed Austrians for inclusion in communiqué any statements which might be embarrassing.

Thompson

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**299. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State**

Vienna, July 28, 1958, 6 p.m.

270. I urge that Platzter be called to Department at early opportunity and told at higher level that we are disturbed over Moscow visit. I feel it should be pointed out to him that Chancellor's statement at Moscow airport State Treaty was concluded "mainly thanks to the Soviet Union" and that this "proved" Soviet Union wanted peace (Embtels 211 and 212).<sup>1</sup> Tape recording proves accuracy this version), his gratuitous and inaccurate reference to "protest" on American overflights [2 lines of source text not declassified], his statement that "developments which then took place between Allies" was cause for long postponement of Austrian liberation (Embtel 220),<sup>2</sup> when he is well aware continuing Western efforts and Soviet obstruction during nine year period, and his emphasis on "unlimited neutrality" all add up to shocking picture of support for the country that for so long pillaged and occupied a good part of Austria and a callous or calculated ignoring of our aid of every kind which makes this country viable today with unprecedented prosperity while Soviet is still demanding and receiving equivalent of reparations. To invite Khrushchev to Austria within few weeks of executions of Nagy, Maleter, et al., under Soviet orders likewise seems further

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.13/7-2858. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 211 from Vienna, July 22, quoted Raab's remarks as actually made at the Moscow airport. Telegram 212 from Vienna, July 22, quoted the prepared text as published in the *Wiener Zeitung* and highlighted the differences between the two. (Both *ibid.*, 763.13/7-2258)

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 23, telegram 220 from Vienna quoted the remarks that Raab made at a Kremlin luncheon given in his honor. (*Ibid.*, 033.6361/7-2358)

unfortunate display of callousness on part of country which behaved so courageously at time of Hungarian revolt. Finally, decision to adhere to Belgrade Danube Convention thus repudiating the categorical assurances given personally by Foreign Minister Figl (Embtel 4081 May 20, 1957)<sup>3</sup> to American Chargé d'Affaires as well as to British and French Ambassadors, is hardly calculated to enhance Austria's credit standing in US.

While Department may feel visit and foregoing developments are water over dam, I urge this action since failure to register disapproval will only serve to encourage Austrian Government to take further steps toward Communist bloc under guise of "neutrality" and with belief it can safely do so with impunity. The feelings of Minister of Education were conveyed in my airgram G-32.<sup>4</sup>

Similar views were expressed both by him and by Finance Minister—both be it noted are of Chancellor's own party—to a Western colleague, and Archbishop of Vienna has expressed anxiety and shock privately. Foreign Office official in private conversation with Embassy officer today admitted his unhappiness about statements in Moscow which he admitted tended to put US and USSR on same moral plane. The fulsome tone of weekend press with regard to visit (Embtel 271)<sup>5</sup> had defensive ring which may indicate some anxiety on part of Austrian public over this newfound friendship with the Russia they knew so well under the occupation. It would be regrettable not to encourage this healthy popular reaction if it should develop by failure to let government know our feelings.

Chancellor and delegation (except Figl who went to Paris for meetings) are due back this afternoon and I hope see Secretary General Fuchs tomorrow to learn what happened behind the scenes at Moscow. I shall also talk to him along the above lines.<sup>6</sup>

**Matthews**

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 940.7301/5-2057)

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 26, G-32 from Vienna recorded a conversation between Matthews and Education Minister Drimmel in which the economic results of the Raab visit to Moscow and Raab's remarks at the Moscow airport were discussed. (*Ibid.*, 661.63/7-2658)

<sup>5</sup> Dated July 28, telegram 271 from Vienna reported the reactions of several Austrian newspapers to the Raab visit. (*Ibid.*, 963.61/7-2858)

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 325 to Vienna, July 31, reported that Jandrey had expressed to Ambassador Platzer on July 31 U.S. disappointment at Raab's comments and at Austrian adherence to the Danube Commission. On the latter, Platzer replied that Figl had previously informed Matthews that Austria in the long run would join the Commission. (*Ibid.*, 763.13/7-2858)

### 300. Paper Prepared by the Embassy in Austria

Vienna, September 12, 1958.

#### PROGRESS REPORT ON AUSTRIA

(NSC 5603, approved April 7, 1956)<sup>1</sup>

(Period Covered: From January 29, 1958, to September 1, 1958)

#### A. *Summary of Operating Progress in Relation to Major NSC Objectives*

1. *Summary Evaluation.* U.S. policies and programs continued to be generally successful in assisting Austria to maintain its freedom, independence, internal security and stability. U.S. programs in military aid, productivity and technical assistance, surplus commodity sales, and loans supplemented regular diplomatic and public information activities in achieving US objectives. Austria's implementation of its policy of military neutrality and other related aspects of its foreign policy showed certain tendencies somewhat disturbing from the U.S. standpoint, although the basic Western orientation of the Austrian people remained unchanged.

The U.S. has thus far succeeded in keeping American programs out of partisan politics and informally stressed the achievements of the Austrian coalition government and the stability it has fostered. U.S.-Austrian cooperation in the build-up of the Austrian Army toward a 60,000-man goal has continued, and on May 26, 1958,<sup>2</sup> the President approved the allocation of an additional sum of up to \$30 million in end-item grant aid, bringing the total to approximately \$91 million since the State Treaty.

The Austrian economy continued to expand during 1958 but at a less rapid pace than in 1957, reflecting primarily some weakening in foreign trade. Considering the recessionary factors at play internationally, the Austrian situation showed substantial stability and strength. Austria continues to show lively interest in the creation of the European Free Trade Area. However, should it not be established and become operative by January 1, 1959, Austria will probably participate in whatever interim arrangements can be made prior to that date to create associa-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.63/9-1258. Secret. Drafted by Galway and transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 262, September 12. The Operations Coordinating Board issued this paper in a revised and updated form on October 22, as a Progress Report on NSC 5603. (*Ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Austria)

<sup>1</sup> For text of NSC 5603, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXVI, pp. 34–37.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 295.

tion with the European Economic Community in order to avoid being placed in a disadvantageous tariff position. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] PL 480 and counterpart loans as well as the technical assistance program are playing their designed role of helping rehabilitate the industry in the former Soviet-occupied zone.

No recommendation is made for policy review at this time.

B. *Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States*

2. *Austrian Governmental Policy and Stability.* During the period under review the Austrian Government has shown an increasing tendency to try to avoid taking definite stands on certain East-West issues and, in some cases, to adopt an attitude which in effect would place the US and the USSR on the same moral plane. The principal example of this was the visit of the Austrian Government delegation to the Soviet Union in July, where Chancellor Raab went considerably further than the requirements of protocol in praising his Soviet hosts as being chiefly responsible for the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. (Raab said: "We know that the Treaty was concluded in large measure thanks to the Soviet Union.") In rather equivocal language he seemed to imply a broader policy of neutrality for Austria than strictly military neutrality.

These actions stem in part from the Chancellor's naivete and ignorance of the communist world's basic policies and in part from Austrian internal politics. As to the latter, relationships between the two coalition parties have considerably deteriorated during the past year. The two parties are now deadlocked on several major issues without very favorable prospects for compromise solutions. In addition to coalition difficulties, the People's Party has been shaken by the public exposure of scandals involving high party financial officials in influence peddling. Finally, increasing rumors about the Chancellor's health have undoubtedly weakened to some degree his hitherto iron-clad control over party affairs and have given rise to active speculations about a possible successor for him.

This domestic situation had led the Chancellor to look for "successes" in other fields. Thus, he has turned to the foreign policy sphere where he has exhibited a rather startling naivete, and by proceeding largely on the basis that Austria bears no responsibility in major East-West issues and can still act as a bridge builder, has sometimes tended to play into the hands of the Soviets.

3. *Protection of Property Rights of American Citizens.* Further, albeit slow, progress was made in the settlement of the claims of the U.S. and British oil companies under the Vienna Memorandum.<sup>3</sup> The Austrian Government retransferred the ownership of the Lobau refinery and the

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 295.



pipelines to a subsidiary, jointly owned prior to nationalization by Socony Mobil (U.S.) and Shell (British-Dutch). The parent companies were given de facto control of the subsidiary and, pending its de jure denationalization which will take place when the remaining claims are settled, the subsidiary leased the refinery and pipelines to the Austrian Government. A collateral agreement for the delivery of crude oil by the Austrian Government to the refineries of the companies and for the delivery of finished products was also signed. The Austrian Government has agreed in principle to form a consortium with the U.S. and British companies for the exploration and exploitation of specified oil concession areas. The only remaining significant issue on which agreement has not been reached is the compensation payable to the companies for the loss of the producing fields in the former exploration areas of the companies. The Austrian Government has expressed the desire to complete the negotiation of all the claims of the oil companies under the Vienna Memorandum before the end of the year.

In a formal note to the U.S. Embassy the Austrian Government gave its assurance (1) to restore pension rights retroactive to May 1950 to former persecutees who were employed by the municipalities in Austria (2) to pass a law to restore life insurance policies confiscated by the German Reich (3) to grant exemptions from the occupation cost tax on property to all former persecutees who were United Nations nationals on the date of the entry into force of the State Treaty. The necessary legislative and administrative action has already been taken to carry out these assurances. The Austrian Government also agreed to amend its laws to remove all requirements as to age, nationality and residence with respect to social security, industrial accident and disability benefits for former persecutees.<sup>4</sup>

A proposal was made by the Austrian Government to settle the remaining categories of claims under Article 26 of the State Treaty by a lump sum payment of \$5,000,000. This proposal is now under consideration and will probably be accepted.

4. *Military Build-up Problems.* The major factor governing the nature and size of the Austrian military build-up and U.S. assistance program is the Austrian status of neutrality. Major problems in the build-up into an effective combat force are: the current shortness of the period of compulsory military service (nine months); domestic legislation which limits enlisted service to a total of nine years thereby preventing the development of a corps of career non-commissioned officers; domestic legislation which would permit the call-up of trained reserved for

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<sup>4</sup> Concerning the Austrian agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 20, 1958, pp. 619–620.

yearly training periods with the active army; and the establishment of a program to overcome the present shortage of commissioned officers.

The Department of Defense has initiated a request for a Presidential determination under Section 401 (a) of the Mutual Security Act for a \$27.7 million fiscal year 1959 military aid program designed to complete equipping of the Austrian MAP force goal of 9 infantry brigades, 3 armored regiments, 3 artillery regiments and the necessary combat and service support forces. Delivery of this American equipment will complete the end-item requirements for the MAP force basis<sup>5</sup> and leave a requirement only for follow-on spare parts and training ammunition within the amounts prescribed by Department of Defense instructions for fiscal years 1960 and 1961.

5. *Refugees.* Of the 180,353 Hungarian refugees who entered Austria between October 1956 and August 14, 1958, there were 17,138 remaining in Austria on the latter date, of which 6,746 were in camps. The Embassy estimates that the expenditures through the Austrian budget for the care of Hungarian refugees will total \$17.46 million through December 31, 1958. The Austrian Government's contribution to the total is expected to be \$770,000, with private Austrian contributions of also approximately \$770,000. The remainder of the funds has come from the United States, other governments and welfare organizations. Funds on hand from previous official and voluntary aid programs plus the proceeds of the special \$10 million PL 480, Title II, sales program should eliminate any need for new U.S. aid to the Austrian Government on behalf of Hungarian refugees in FY 1959, beyond the supplementary services provided by USEP. This view is fortified by the fact that substantial numbers of remaining Hungarians should be moving out of Austria in the coming months, especially under the new bloc of 3,000 U.S. immigration visas for Hungarians from Austria.

The Yugoslav refugee population in Austrian camps was down to 2,948 on August 10, 1958, according to figures supplied by the Austrian Ministry of Interior. New arrivals are currently about 100 per week, with deportations at about 50 and migrations at 200. Pursuant to the OCB decision of December 11, 1957, a PL 480 Title II program for the direct camp feeding of the Yugoslav refugees is nearing finalization.<sup>6</sup> Within the ceiling of \$1,000,000 in surplus commodities based on actual needs of camp population and within the specified program time limit of 18 months, this authority should prove ample unless the number of

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<sup>5</sup> The request was subsequently reduced to \$9 million. Copies of the recommendation for approval of this request, in the form of a memorandum from Dillon to the President, April 27, and of the President's authorization, April 30, are in Department of State, Central Files, 763.5-MSP/4-3059.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 6, Document 295.

Yugoslav refugees moves sharply upward as it did in 1957. The Yugoslav refugee situation, with its oscillations in numbers caused in part by seasonal factors, border conditions and Austrian second thoughts on a liberal asylum policy as concerns Yugoslavs, will continue to merit U.S. attention. The Austrians have not taken with too much relish to our direct feeding program having preferred either an outright cash grant or, failing this, surplus commodities for resale. The degree of local tolerance of Yugoslav refugees appears to vary with the prospects of Yugoslav emigration and the resources which third countries are willing to contribute to the maintenance of the Yugoslav refugee population in Austria. It should be noted the USEP/Austria grants only resettlement assistance to Yugoslavs and is further tied, as are other USEP units, to the Washington policy determination of expending a maximum of 15% of total refugee program monies on Yugoslavs. The Embassy has long been aware that the limitation of aid to Yugoslavs for resettlement assistance carries the seed of discontent so long as other nationalities in refugee status receive varying levels of U.S. assistance. It is understood that high level consideration is currently being given in Washington to some liberalization of the financial ceiling as regards Yugoslavs. Should this occur and the Austrians be reasonably convinced that the Yugoslavs will continue to move overseas in substantial numbers, it is believed that the Austrian authorities would be prepared to consider reinstatement of a fairly lenient asylum policy.

6. *West-East Trade*. Removal of copper from the embargo list effective August 15, 1958, should eliminate the recurring problem of Battle Act exceptions for Austrian copper shipments of 1,000 tons annually under the Compensation Agreement arising out of the State Treaty. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Trade developments between the USSR and Austria, particularly in light of Chancellor Raab's recent visit to Moscow, and between Austria and Red China, especially in the light of Austrian intent to establish some sort of trade representation in Peking, will merit close watch.

7. *PL 480 Program*. The United States declined to authorize a third PL 480 Title I program in FY 1958. The Austrian request was for a \$11.6 million program.<sup>7</sup> The Austrian Chancellor and several cabinet ministers had pressed the issue during their visits to the United States. The Austrian request, which was considered to have a low priority, was disapproved on grounds of low Austrian commercial purchases of the U.S. commodities involved, Austria's strong foreign exchange position and the fact that local currency usage is a consideration of secondary importance. There is some opinion that this negative response will drive Aus-

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 9, Document 295.

tria eastward, especially in feed grains and cotton. Austria will, of course, miss the economic development loans which would have been made possible through schilling proceeds under new PL 480, Title I, loan agreements. The United States has, however, been attempting progressively to encourage Austria to assume her own economic responsibilities, and this rejection should prove one of a number of tests of her capability in this direction. However, close and continued scrutiny appears desirable.

### Annex A<sup>8</sup>

#### ADDITIONAL MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS NOT COVERED IN THE REPORT

1. *The Chancellor's Visits.* During this year the Chancellor has made official or unofficial visits to Italy, Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup>

a. In Rome the Chancellor had informal talks with the Pope and other Vatican officials on the long unsettled problem of the Concordat in Austria. He also discussed the South Tyrol problem with Italian Government officials.

b. In Germany, where the Chancellor went to participate in a ceremony installing Chancellor Adenauer as a member of the Teutonic Order, Raab broached informally to Adenauer his idea for a new "initiative" on the German problem. Some weeks later, Raab casually revealed his secret "initiative" to the press. The Raab suggestion was not given serious consideration by any of the parties involved.

c. The Chancellor's visit to the United States was primarily a good will visit and, from his standpoint, was supposed to "balance off" his later visit to the Soviet Union. Inadequate advance explanations to the Austrian people as to the purely "good will" nature of the U.S. visit and ineptitude in the public relations aspect of the tour resulted in a general impression in Austria that the American visit was a "failure."

d. The visit to the Soviet Union, on which the Chancellor was accompanied by a full Government delegation, including Vice-Chancellor Pittermann, Foreign Minister Figl and State Secretary Kreisky, was long planned and, from the Austrian standpoint, was for the purpose of per-

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<sup>8</sup> Secret.

<sup>9</sup> Regarding Raab's visit to the United States, see Document 296; regarding his visit to Moscow, see Documents 298 and 299. Raab visited Italy April 1-7 and the Federal Republic of Germany in early March.

suading the Soviet Union to reduce the deliveries of Austrian oil and goods under the State Treaty. The Soviet Union did agree to deliver to Austria Soviet oil in the amount of one-half of Austrian oil still to be delivered under the State Treaty terms. While this originally was hailed as a great victory for Raab, doubts, deepened by fairly clever and effective stories in the Socialist press, have arisen in the public mind which now begins to wonder if the Soviets didn't put one over on the Austrian delegation.

Austria is still bound to deliver 1,000,000 tons of crude annually for the next seven years under the oil compensation agreement, accepting 500,000 tons annually from the USSR of still unspecified quality but expected to contain sulphur and produce high gasoline yield. These two factors will complicate Austrian refining. The Soviets also agreed to substitute industrial goods for the additional 200,000 tons of oil which Austria is required to deliver annually through 1961 under the compensation agreement for ex-USIA properties. This formalizes for the duration of the obligation a practice which has already been in actual effect.

2. *South Tyrol.* Earlier in the year tensions increased between Austria and Italy over the South Tyrol problem. The Chancellor's visit to Rome at Easter and his talks with Italian officials seemed to produce no noticeable easing of the situation. Following the Italian elections and the installation of the Fanfani government, however, it appeared that Italy might be moving toward a slightly more positive and liberal attitude on the South Tyrol. Diplomatic talks between the two countries have been going on for several months and are expected to lead to a meeting of Foreign Ministers, at which the situation of the German-speaking populace in the South Tyrol will be discussed.

3. *Concordat.* This long unsettled issue has again faded into the background with little prospect for a solution in the foreseeable future. Chancellor Raab's informal talks with Vatican officials in Rome apparently had little effect, and there is no indication that the Austrian Government intends to take any further initiative at present.

4. *Danube Convention.* During its visit to the USSR, the Austrian delegation announced that Austria would adhere to the Belgrade Danube Convention of 1948. After his return, the Chancellor announced that this action had been taken by the Austrian delegation on its own initiative and that the Austrian Government had been considering the step for some time. The action was taken without advance consultation with the US, UK or France, whose Ambassadors in Vienna had been assured by Foreign Minister Figl some months earlier that the Austrian Government did not intend to adhere to the Convention.

5. *Overflights of Austrian Territory by U.S. Military Aircraft.* At the time of the sending of U.S. forces to Lebanon, Austrian territory was

overflowed during a three or four day period by a number of U.S. military aircraft transporting personnel and equipment from Germany to the Middle East. The Austrian Government had actually given clearances for most of the overflights, but a few planes flew over without clearances. Press reports of the flights and public reaction led the Austrian Government to suspend the granting of overflight clearances for the time being. In taking this action, and in talking publicly of a "protest" which was never made, the Austrian Government made no mention of the fact that clearances had been granted for most of the flights in question, while the Austrian press treatment of the matter left the impression that all the flights were unauthorized. The manner in which the Austrian Government handled this event was undoubtedly motivated largely by the fact that the Chancellor and other members of the Government were scheduled to leave for Moscow on a state visit only a few days after the flights occurred.<sup>10</sup>

6. *Austro-Yugoslav Relations.* For several months Austrian and Yugoslav representatives have been carrying on negotiations and discussions on a broad range of subjects, including property and social insurance claims, consular affairs, cultural exchanges, various legal and financial matters, movement of persons in frontier areas, etc. It now appears probable that these negotiations will be completed later this year with results satisfactory to both sides.

7. *Austro-Hungarian Relations.* In the face of repeated overtures from the Hungarian Government to improve relations, the Austrian Government has maintained a cool attitude. The Austrians have repeatedly pointed out to the Hungarians that the situation along the Austro-Hungarian border must be improved before any other matters can be discussed. In spite of this, Hungarian actions along the border have continued to cause incidents which have increased tension between the two countries.

8. *Austro-Czech Relations.* In early summer the Czech Prime Minister sent a long message to Chancellor Raab which, in addition to urging the Soviet line on various international issues, proposed that Chancellor Raab visit Prague for discussions of Austro-Czech problems. The Chancellor's reply sidestepped the international aspects neatly and took the line that a meeting of the heads of government should take place only after adequate preparations in lower level talks had shown that a top-level meeting could be fruitful. Since the Moscow visit, however, reports have been received that the Chancellor indicated to the Soviet leaders that he would visit Czechoslovakia early next year or before.

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<sup>10</sup>Documentation concerning flights of U.S. airplanes ferrying U.S. troops from Germany to Lebanon over Austria on July 16 is in Department of State, Central File 763.5411.

**301. Letter From the Ambassador to Austria (Matthews) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)**

Vienna, September 17, 1958.

DEAR BURKE: This is a lovely little country, the people have great charm and at times have shown courage, notably under the Occupation and during the Hungarian revolution. They have many other admirable qualities. On the other hand, in spite of the long governing history of the Hapsburg Empire, they are at times unbelievably naive with regard to the outside world and, particularly since their extraordinary prosperity since 1951, are prone to indulge in high flights of fanciful wishful thinking whether it be in the fields of East-West bridge-building or making Vienna the capital of Europe without hotels or other matters. The tradition and art of compromise is strong and the employment of intrigue, sometimes subtle and sometimes transparent, is not foreign to their nature.

With this by way of preface, I feel the time has come to write you personally of a disturbing trend away from the earlier State Treaty policy of strict *military* neutrality with strong and open *non-military* ties with the West. While I was not, of course, here at the time, it is my impression that when the Treaty was signed in May 1955, Austrian impressions of the harshness of Soviet occupation and Soviet responsibility for the nine-year delay in giving the country its freedom were still very vivid. The support given Austria by the three Western powers, especially the United States, and the role played by Mutual Aid were very fresh in Austrian consciousness. Inevitably with the passage of time, the "correct" Soviet behavior (with the notable exception of the Hungarian revolution period) and the country's burgeoning prosperity, far exceeding anything since pre-World War I, and the growing Austrian pride and confidence (if not overconfidence) in themselves and in their future, the recent past has become hazy and blurred. Especially in the mind of the ailing Chancellor, though by no means confined to him or his party, is the belief that Austrian skill and behavior were primarily responsible for the ultimate conclusion of the State Treaty, and while the Soviets were slow in agreeing to it, that should not be held too much against their newfound Moscow friends. This 180-degree change in Austrian attitude is perhaps best typified by Raab's public statement at the Moscow airport on July 21, 1958: "We know that we concluded the State Treaty mainly thanks to the Soviet Union", and his emphasis that Austrian neutrality "is not simply a limited but an unlimited neutrality". To this he

added his gratuitous and completely distorted public reference to his "protest" against U.S. Air Force overflights. There are many other evidences of this newfound era of Soviet-Austrian cordiality: The steady stream of two-way visits, four Soviet Ministers since May and the pending visits—invitations already accepted—of President Schaerf and Defense Minister Graf to Moscow. There was further Schaerf's statement in May that Austrian neutrality is "absolute" and a "fundamental rejection of any military alliance, jealous protection of political independence, avoidance of a one-sided stand in foreign power conflicts", to which he added that at no time since conclusion of the State Treaty have the Soviets tried to influence Austria's attitude. Perhaps the most recent and startling example is Vice Chancellor Pittermann's statement to David Wainhouse that the Austrian people (which I do not believe) are beginning to say that the Soviet has given Austria ten million dollars (through the recent dubious oil deal) whereas the United States is taking away five million dollars for the persecutee Jewish claimants. (Airgram G-120 of September 12).<sup>1</sup> There is likewise Raab's expected early visit to Prague to see President Siroky, his decline of Siroky's earlier invitation being thereby reversed, almost solely because the Russians had asked him to, and for the purpose, to quote Raab's words, "of breaking down the iron curtain". To a growing belief that Russians are human, decent responsible people with whom one can do business, there is added the constant pressure—especially with falling exports—of Austrian industrialists who have glowing illusions of exports to the East, whether it be to China or to Russia and the European satellites. And Raab himself reportedly said regarding a possible Soviet credit: if Nasser could accept help from both East and West, Austria could do the same. (My Airgram G-1 of July 3.)<sup>2</sup>

Along with this new discovery of Soviet respectability there is a certain fear and timidity of the consequences of offending the Russians. A very active and able Soviet ambassador is busily cultivating both the stick and the carrot theory; while flattering Raab in particular as the true statesman of Europe, he makes clear to others the dangers of too close association with the West. As set forth in my Airgram G-53 of August 7 and in Airgram G-96 of August 29,<sup>3</sup> there is a disturbing tendency on the part of Austrian officials to think of Austria's position vis-à-vis

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<sup>1</sup> G-120 from Vienna reported a conversation between Wainhouse and Pittermann of September 10 in which several subjects were discussed, among them compensation of persecutees under Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty. (*Ibid.*, 763.00/9-1258)

<sup>2</sup> G-1 from Vienna reported a discussion between Matthews and Kreisky in which the major topic was the Soviet offer to extend financial credit to Austria. (*Ibid.*, 863.10/7-358)

<sup>3</sup> Neither printed. (*Ibid.*, 863.10/8-758 and 863.10/8-2958)



Moscow as equivalent to that of Finland. (The very friendly Minister of Education has privately admitted to me his worry over this tendency which he says is constantly fostered by the Russians with Austria and in reverse with the Finns, i.e., “why don’t you behave like Austria.”) If the belief really takes hold, we can expect future Austrian policies and actions, whether in direct relations with the US, in the UN or in other international bodies, to become increasingly timid with increasing reluctance to side against the Soviet Union.

On the other side of the picture, I should add that these trends and tendencies are so far stronger within the government and in the governing classes than in the country at large. The people, who deserve perhaps a better government, I think are basically under far less self-delusion with regard to the Soviet dangers and Soviet ruthlessness than their leaders. Furthermore, whatever their hopes for trade with the East and stringless Soviet concessions, the financial and business community is basically conscious of their need for close Western ties and markets. As they increasingly equate the Soviet with the West, however, on the moral, economic, political and military planes, they will take the West for granted and make concessions to the East unless and until they are made to face realities.

What does this all add up to in terms of U.S. policy toward Austria? I do not think for a moment that we should change our policy of granting from time to time through various banking institutions—World Bank, Ex-Im Bank, private banks, etc.—the investment capital which Austria needs for its continued development and prosperity. I do not think that we should change our policy of providing the Austrian army with the programmed equipment and matériel. There may, however, be occasions when we should drag our feet a little and when we should adopt a more questioning attitude. We should, I think, take occasion to ask questions and to let our views be known when Austria seems to be going farther to the East than necessary or desirable. This we do here, and this I hope the Department will do with Platzer. The latter is a very able and pleasant Austrian representative, and his views are highly regarded here. It would be useful from time to time, though I know how busy you are, if you or Fritz Jandrey could raise some questions with him in addition to the routine weekly meetings he has with WE on specific matters. I think when Minister Figl calls on the Secretary on September 25, it would be a very unfortunate omission if the latter did not mention Figl’s failure to consult us beforehand, in view of his prior assurances, on Austrian adherence to the Danube Convention. (Personally I cannot get too excited over the practical effect of such adherence, though I see no benefits to Austria. I do think failure to call the pleasant but timid little Figl’s attention to the violation of an assurance would be a great mistake. While the issue itself may be water over the dam, to ig-

nore it will make him much more likely to ignore other commitments.) In fact, if we are to arrest this general trend towards equating the U.S. and Soviet even on the moral plane, I feel strongly the Secretary should make some general reference to his unhappiness concerning it. (Fred Chapin can get you up a good briefing paper.)

In other words, the era of gratitude—that shortest lived of all human emotions—for past favors and assistance has come to an end. The sensitive nerve of self-interest and future expectations, both good and bad, should be probed. Austria should not take the U.S. for granted; uncertainty in their minds will be salutary.

This is too long a letter with which to burden a busy man, but I have felt the problem is of sufficient importance to bring to your attention if we are to avoid future disappointments in this corner of Central Europe.

With all good wishes and best of luck,  
Very sincerely,

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### 302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria

Washington, September 23, 1958, 6:21 p.m.

879. G-120<sup>1</sup> just received and do not consider desirable discuss Vice Chancellor's position Article 26 with Platzer immediately prior Figl's arrival. Approach to Platzer and relay by him of US views to Figl might involve US in coalition infighting.

Believe Pittermann largely motivated by party politics, i.e., by desire not give Jewish persecutees abroad better treatment than members Socialist emigration at home and abroad and by convenient opportunity criticize Chancellor re his lump-sum initiative. Pittermann can fit his criticism into previous advocacy rigorous economy. Figl and Peoples Party conversely would be delighted use Socialist opposition as excuse

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.00/9-1258. Confidential. Drafted by Chapin, cleared by Wehmeyer, and approved by Cameron.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 301. It reported that Pittermann reiterated that payments to persecutees in the United States under Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty contrasted unfavorably to what was widely perceived as Soviet largesse in making oil concessions to Austria. The last sentence of the airgram urged the Department to "express its surprise and chagrin" over this view to Ambassador Platzer.

for failure reach settlement Article 26 claims as they have throughout Vienna Memorandum negotiations.

Furthermore, we note Pittermann's statements made in private to Embassy and may be designed forestall request for increase in amount or to weaken US support Jewish claims. Olah and Kreisky have supported Article 26 settlement in talks here and publicly to press.

Finally, Pittermann might interpret approach to Platzer as violation confidence. Consider preferable you seek appointment Pittermann prior your vacation informing him you are acting under instructions and drawing on following points and others you consider appropriate:

1. US Government disappointed by Vice Chancellor's attitude in view of traditional tolerance of Socialist Party and concern for human welfare. Many beneficiaries indigent and aged. If Pittermann raises Socialist emigration, might point out Jewish persecution much more systematic and extensive and that Austrian Jewish community virtually destroyed.

2. US profoundly shocked by juxtaposition Russian oil deliveries and Austrian payments fulfilling State Treaty obligation to persecutees. Comparison impossible:

a) USSR being paid \$150 million plus oil and one time payments for German assets some of which only tenuously or partially German. US British companies initially developed oil fields for which oil being paid. Moreover US gave Austria tremendously valuable German assets its zone without payment, and assets under Austrian administration long before treaty.

b) US gave Austria \$1.4 billion in economic aid since war; \$43 million in surplus agricultural commodities which helped foreign exchange and investment in Soviet Zone; over \$15 million for Hungarian refugees alone not counting millions for other refugee programs and movements; and military aid when completed will total \$130 million.

c) Individuals not US Government recipients lump-sum payment. Although largest single group beneficiaries US, recipients scattered all over world.

3. Adverse propaganda for Austria in US from failure make satisfactory settlement far outweighs any possible bad propaganda to US in Austria from settlement. If US suffers in Austria, just one of those unfortunate situations which we prepared accept. Lump-sum payment, if anything, perhaps too small and our cause is just. Austrian leaders can turn payment into advantage to Austria by generous action, even at this late date. US Government has made every effort to restrain Jewish organizations and moderate their claims.<sup>2</sup>

**Dulles**

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<sup>2</sup>Telegram 829 from Vienna, September 30, reported that Wainhouse had made the points contained in this telegram to Pittermann, that point 3 had seemed to impress him, and that he did not question the validity of claims under Article 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 763.00/9-3058)

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### 303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria

Washington, September 25, 1958, 7:42 p.m.

919. Following based on uncleared memorandum conversation between Secretary and Figl September 25.<sup>1</sup>

Figl cited progress on four topics which Secretary raised with Raab in May: Austrian Assets Treaty, Vienna Memorandum negotiations, Article 26 negotiations, and dollar liberalization. He hoped first three could be concluded by the end of 1958. Re liberalization he cited Cabinet action September 23 approving 5% increase. Secretary requested Figl express his gratification to Chancellor for progress.

Following discussion Far East, Figl said problem of concern to Austria which had struggled hard for freedom and still was on frontier. Austria small country but wished contribute its bit to maintain Free World. Figl had therefore announced in UN speech September 23 Austria ready participate in permanent UN Peace Force if created. Had decided participation compatible with "military neutrality."

Secretary regretted Austria did not vote for Red China moratorium. Figl stressed alignment with US on Hungary and "all other issues in GA" but said could not go along on moratorium.

Elbrick meeting with Figl, Fuchs September 26 re Austrian-US relations.<sup>2</sup>

**Herter**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.63/9-2558. Confidential. Drafted by Chapin, cleared with Howe, and approved by Cameron.

<sup>1</sup>Foreign Minister Figl was in Washington to meet with Secretary Dulles, having arrived on September 24 from New York, where he had been attending the 13th U.N. General Assembly session since September 14. Two memoranda of conversation, on which this telegram is based, are *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. A briefing memorandum for Figl's visit, September 24, from Elbrick to the Secretary is *ibid.*, Central Files, 763.13/9-2458.

<sup>2</sup>See Document 304.

### 304. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 26, 1958.

#### SUBJECT

Austrian Matters

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *Austria*

Dr. Leopold Figl, Foreign Minister, Republic of Austria  
Dr. Martin Fuchs, Secretary General of the Austrian Foreign Office  
Dr. Wilfried Platzer, Ambassador, Embassy of Austria

##### *United States*

C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary—EUR  
Turner C. Cameron, Jr.—WE  
Constance R. Harvey—WE  
Frederic L. Chapin—WE  
Mrs. Lejins, Interpreter—LS

#### 1. *The History of Cooperation Between Austria and the United States*

Mr. Elbrick referred to the history of close cooperation between Austria and the United States since 1945 and said that the United States was very proud of this cooperation and we hoped it would continue. Notable events in that cooperation were the Austrian State Treaty, the economic assistance extended over a number of years which had contributed to Austria's splendid recovery, and assistance to Austria in financing the heavy burden of refugees. Mr. Elbrick complimented the Foreign Minister on the very fine and laudable way in which Austria had handled the Hungarian refugees. The Foreign Minister replied that Austria was very grateful for American assistance and had always had very friendly relations with the United States.

#### 2. *Foreign Minister Figl's Speech at the United Nations*

Mr. Elbrick said he was very interested in the Foreign Minister's statement concerning the readiness of Austria to contribute to a United Nations Peace Force.<sup>1</sup> He had also noted the Minister's comment to the Secretary that such a contribution would be consistent with Austria's neutrality. The Minister replied that Austria wished to do its part and would contribute if called upon.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.00/9-2658. Confidential. Drafted by Chapin. A briefing memorandum from Cameron to Elbrick, September 24, is *ibid.*, 763.13/9-2458.

<sup>1</sup> For text of Figl's speech before the U.N. General Assembly, September 23, 1958, in which he made this offer, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, 16 September–13 December 1958 and 20 February–13 March 1959*, pp. 107–108.

### 3. *Austrian Note on Overflights*

Mr. Elbrick stated that we were happy to receive the Austrian note about daylight overflights in connection with the return of American forces from Lebanon.<sup>2</sup> The Defense Department was studying the matter and we expected to reply very shortly. We hoped eventually to return to the procedure with regard to overflights which existed before mid-July.

After a discussion of the nature of the Austrian note on overflights, about which the Foreign Minister had not been informed, Minister Figl said that the agreement which existed before mid-July had proved its worth and had not alarmed the civilian population in Austria. He hoped that it might be possible to return to the system, provided there was a relaxation of tension in the Middle East and that the United States did not request any surprise overflights at short notice. The close friendship to which Mr. Elbrick had referred also required that an attempt be made to render a service. He would see the Minister of Defense immediately upon his return and would try to find a way to meet the American wishes.

Dr. Fuchs added that he hoped that there had been no misunderstanding of Austrian action with regard to overflights. The United States must know where Austrian sympathies lay. Austria's military neutrality was very important and Austria had to be very careful to protest any violation. Austria had to protest at least three times a month about border incursions from the east.

### 4. *Austrian Neutrality*

Mr. Elbrick agreed that Austria's military neutrality was very important. The Soviets were interested in broadening the concept to cover other areas. Mr. Elbrick had noted, for example, that Chancellor Raab had been misquoted in Moscow as saying that Austria's neutrality was "unlimited" when actually he had said "unlimited in time".

Dr. Fuchs quickly replied that the Chancellor had never made the remark attributed to him.

Minister Figl said that as a result of the confusion he had made several speeches abroad after his return from Moscow in which he clearly stated that Austria's neutrality was "military neutrality". On ideological matters, Austria was firmly on the side of the West.

Dr. Fuchs said that Austria used the same language when talking to the Russians. In Moscow, the Soviets had attempted to smuggle a paragraph into the Communiqué to the effect that the USSR was prepared to

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<sup>2</sup> Text of the note, September 24, was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 314, September 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 763.5411/9-2658)

protect or guarantee Austria's neutrality. The Austrian delegation had insisted that this paragraph be deleted. Ambassador Matthews had been fully informed about the matter.

Mr. Elbrick commented that the Soviets would make efforts to change Austria's interpretation of its neutrality if they could. He knew how Minister Figl felt and Austrian neutrality could not be equated with that of Finland or any other country.

Minister Figl said that the Finnish problem was a warning to be cautious. Austria would not allow anyone else to interpret its neutrality for it.

#### 5. *Belgrade Convention*

Mr. Elbrick said that there was one matter he wished to raise. We were sorry that Austria had announced its intention to adhere to the Belgrade Danube Convention without consulting with us, as Austria had promised to do.

Minister Figl stressed the importance of the Danube to Austria and that it already had bilateral agreements with all the riparian states. Austria did not want to run the risk of having any one of these agreements denounced unilaterally. By being in the Commission, Austria could have a say and it would not be possible for the agreement to be denounced unilaterally. Moreover, the present competitive position of Austria in Danube river traffic was not very satisfactory.

On his way out, Secretary General Fuchs told Mr. Elbrick that the Foreign Office would keep in close touch with Ambassador Matthews and he could assure Mr. Elbrick "There will be no more surprises!"

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#### 305. **Airgram G-171 From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State**

Vienna, October 24, 1958.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.63/10-2458. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**306. Letter From the Ambassador to Austria (Matthews) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)**

Vienna, November 7, 1958.

DEAR DOUG: When Cal Cowles, our ICA Program Officer, returned from Washington recently he told me that he has been instructed to program the PL 480 Title I loan funds as soon as possible, dispose of the unprogrammed counterpart funds and actively press for a counterpart settlement. I can well understand the feeling of ICA that with all its major problems around the world it is anxious to close business in Vienna as soon as possible. I certainly would have no wish for any extended delay in accomplishing this objective. There are, however, certain aspects of the present situation which I would like to draw to your personal attention and to plead for a little patience in pushing ahead.

As you know, it is well over three years since the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and a settlement has yet to be reached of the Austrian obligations to us contained in the Vienna Memorandum and Article 26 of the Treaty. For various good reasons we have been very patient and while the Austrians, I think, have appreciated that patience they had come to feel that it was perhaps unlimited and in view of possible coalition difficulties, etc., there was no need to hurry. This psychological atmosphere continued in spite of various proddings both by the Department and by the Embassy. I decided around the end of August that the time had come to utilize such leverage as is available to us without either being unfair to the Austrians or taking any rigid position which might arouse damaging resentment. In addition to feeling that the continuance of these unsettled issues was both unfair to the Jewish organizations pushing for the Article 26 settlement and to the oil companies under the Vienna Memorandum, and that it was an irritant to general Austro-American relations, I had another equally important reason. With all you have to do you probably have not kept au courant with developments on the Austrian scene but beginning this spring prior to the Chancellor's trek to Moscow, during that red-carpet visit, and subsequently there has developed a sort of Soviet-Austrian honeymoon which is not in its implications advantageous either to the United States or to the West in general. The evolution of the thinking in Austrian Government circles of both parties with regard to their concept of neutrality—from the original limited one applicable only to the strictly military aspect to one of more general equating of East with West—has somewhat disturbed not only us in the Embassy but other Western colleagues here. I



thought, therefore, that for this reason too it was well to bring home to the Austrians again the knowledge that they should not just take the United States for granted and that their real interests lie primarily with the West.

The leverage I have been using since August has been the simple one of withholding my signature as head of the ICA mission here to a growing collection of varying amounts of counterpart items to be dispensed. These items fall under the general criteria of our counterpart agreements and heretofore my required signature has been usually routine. To the various calls from the interested Austrian officials, in turn pressed by the concerns affected, we have merely replied that projects must be examined and that the delays and red tape of bureaucracy are not, of course, unfamiliar to Austrians. When on one occasion an Austrian official remarked that the delays were becoming embarrassing and that we had obligations under the counterpart agreement, our Economic Counselor, at my direction, replied that of course we recognized the validity of such obligations but such matters take time as the Austrians had discovered in connection with their obligations to us under the Treaty. This produced prompt results in the form of a luncheon given me by the Chancellor attended by Foreign Minister Figl, Finance Minister Kamitz, and others reported in brief outline in my telegram 1081 of October 27.<sup>1</sup> That conversation galvanized the Austrians under the Chancellor's directive into action and progress on both Treaty items has since been rapid. Specifically, for example during the talks on Article 26 the Austrians raised their offer for settlement of the Jewish claims from \$5,000,000 to \$6,000,000 within three days, something unprecedented in Austria. Now that Shell has come in line with Mobil progress also seems to be very good on the Vienna Memorandum and I am hopeful that both questions may be out of the way by Christmas. This has, furthermore, aroused no Austrian resentment (in fact Kamitz thoroughly approves because of his continuing needs for American money); it is the system which Austrians traditionally practice and understand. This has all been accomplished through my dilatoriness in signing the counterpart release or in presenting the annual program of 850 million shillings which the NAC has now approved.

I have gone into the foregoing in some detail so that you might understand the situation and, I hope, back me up to the extent of a few weeks delay in pursuing the ICA objectives. I have not inferred that there is any disagreement re these tactics between Washington and the Embassy and I fear that the Austrians may attempt in Washington to ac-

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram 1081 from Vienna reported the Ambassador's luncheon conversation with Raab, Figl, Kamitz, Fuchs, Igler, and Loebenstein about implementation of Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty and the Vienna Memorandum. (*Ibid.*, 263.1141-A/10-2758)

tivate some ICA instructions to us here. I very much hope that you can hold them off until Christmas, and in any conversations you may have with Kamitz indicate that while Austria has promptly and punctiliously met its onerous treaty obligations to the Soviet Union, it has not met those to us and we find this difficult to understand.<sup>2</sup>

With all good wishes for continued success in the splendid job you are doing.

Very sincerely,

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<sup>2</sup>In a letter of November 15, Under Secretary Dillon approved the course of action proposed here by Ambassador Matthews. (*Ibid.*, 763.5-MSP/11-758)

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### 307. Editorial Note

From November 19 though 21, Finance Minister Reinhard Kamitz visited Washington. On November 20, he held discussions with Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson; Samuel Baugh, President of the Export-Import Bank; and Per Jacobsson of the International Monetary Fund.

On November 21, he met with Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann and with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Frederick W. Jandrey. A briefing memorandum for the meeting with Mann is in Department of State, Central Files, 763.13/11-2058. A briefing memorandum for the meeting with Jandrey is *ibid.*, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123.

Memoranda of conversation with Jandrey, dated November 21, on Austrian fulfillment of State Treaty obligations and on the European Free Trade Area are *ibid.* A memorandum of conversation with Baugh, dated November 20, is *ibid.*

Kamitz had lunch with Secretary of Commerce Lewis Strauss on November 21.

On November 22, Kamitz flew to New York. He left New York for Vienna on November 25.

### 308. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 8, 1958.

#### SUBJECT

Austrian Matters

#### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Wilfried Platzer, Ambassador, Embassy of Austria  
Dr. Heinz Haymerle, Director, Political Department, Austrian Foreign Office <sup>1</sup>  
Mr. Frederick W. Jandrey, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs  
WE—Mr. McBride  
WE—Mr. Cameron  
WE—Miss Harvey  
WE—Mr. Chapin

#### 1. *Austrian-United States Relations*

Mr. Jandrey said that within the past six months he had the opportunity to talk with several Austrian representatives. The United States had a high regard for what Austria had done in the last ten years and that its economic development had been remarkable.

In all of his talks with senior Austrian officials, he had mentioned two matters which had been a constant preoccupation to us: the Vienna Memorandum and Article 26. He was disappointed that these matters had not been settled, and he urged that Christmas be considered as a target date for agreement. The proposal of the oil companies with regard to the Vienna Memorandum had seemed a logical one and one which could be carried out without difficulty. With regard to Article 26, the United States had sent a special team to Austria which had negotiated for a month, but two problems still remained: the total amount and the percentage deduction of Hilfsfond payments. We were disappointed at the delay. Mr. Jandrey said that he had mentioned to Minister Kamitz that Austria's obligations to the USSR had been taken care of with great despatch, but the obligations to the United States in the State Treaty were still unsettled.<sup>2</sup> He was conscious of the problems posed by the coalition government in Austria but did not consider that this was a valid excuse for not carrying out the obligations which are the responsi-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.63/12-858. Secret. Drafted by Chapin.

<sup>1</sup> Haymerle was in New York as a member of the Austrian Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. He traveled by train to Washington on December 7 and returned to New York on the afternoon of December 8 after visiting with several Department of State officials. A briefing memorandum from McBride to Jandrey, December 4, is *ibid.*, 763.00/12-458.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 307.

bility of the Austrian Government as a whole. The United States Government was deeply concerned with these two negotiations, and perhaps that concern had not been made thoroughly clear to the Austrian Government.

Dr. Haymerle replied that Austria realized only too well the importance which the United States attached to a prompt settlement of the two matters. He believed that the two negotiations were on their way to solution.

Mr. Jandrey replied that Dr. Kamitz gave similar assurances when he was here, and Mr. Jandrey certainly hoped that the matters would not drag on beyond the end of the year.

## 2. *Austria and the Soviet Union*

Mr. Jandrey said that certain developments over the past six months about Austrian relations with the Soviet Union and the tone and content of various observations and public statements had not been easily understandable. Some of these statements were rapidly exploited by Soviet propaganda and had been the cause of concern. It was sometimes said that a large country often took a small country for granted. He thought that the reverse was also true, especially if the large country had been very helpful and cooperative in the past toward the small country.

There had been some question as to the direction in which Austria was going. It was perfectly obvious to the United States that Austria's interest lay with Western Europe. In this connection, there had been developments with regard to neutrality which had also been of some concern. We had noted the Chancellor's recent references to military neutrality, but there had been some tendency in the past to equate East and West. Austria, being closer to the Soviet bloc, should be even more aware of Soviet intentions and methods of operations than the United States.

Dr. Haymerle assured Mr. Jandrey that Austrian foreign policy was not changing. He welcomed an opportunity to clear up any possible misunderstanding. The basis of Austrian foreign policy was friendship for the United States, and it was also the basis of Austrian security. Any statements made in Moscow were not intended to indicate a policy change. They might have been made in the heat of Moscow's summer and as a result of the Chancellor's poor physical condition. These remarks should not be interpreted out of context. Austria had never given another interpretation to its neutrality than one of military neutrality as set forth in its neutrality law. The Austrian Delegation has refused in Moscow to give any new interpretation of its neutrality. There had been some misunderstanding concerning the Chancellor's statement that Austrian neutrality was "unlimited in time" but this was never intended to mean that Austrian neutrality was without limits.

Mr. Jandrey also referred to the recent congratulatory message by the Chancellor to the Congress of the Austro-Soviet Society and to the reception of a Soviet Delegation by President Schaerf. These were incidents which could be misunderstood in the United States. In reply, Dr. Haymerle stressed the unimportance of the Austro-Soviet Society and the fact that President Koerner had previously greeted Soviet representatives to such Congresses.

In a larger sense, Dr. Haymerle said that Austria felt somewhat out of the Western circuit. There were many discussions going on among NATO countries in which Austria obviously could not take part but there were other international issues on which Austria could be helpful. He mentioned Austria's role during the Hungarian crisis. He thought that a Western neutral like Austria could have influence as a mediator in the UN. Many people in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were attracted by the example of Austrian neutrality and dreamed of some day having a status like Austria's for their own countries.

Austria saw eye to eye with the United States on many foreign policy issues. As he had said earlier, Austria believed that the United States was right in standing firm on Berlin, and he had recently discussed with Ambassador Platzer the fact that the United States had been right in taking a firm stand on Quemoy and Matsu.

### 3. *Overflights*

Mr. Jandrey said that we had been dismayed by the public criticism of our overflights in July when we thought that the matter had previously been worked out. We were, however, appreciative of the permission to return troops from Lebanon over Austrian territory and hoped to get back to the overflights system existing before mid-July.

Dr. Haymerle repeated his familiar arguments that the United States had only discussed overflights of thirty to fifty planes, that he had requested that the note<sup>3</sup> be predated for the sake of appearances, and that he had understood that the flights were to evacuate civilians from Lebanon. Austria could not permit flights of armed men over its territory. Such operations would be precedents for requests from Eastern European countries to overfly Austria. The return flight from Lebanon was a different matter because it was in connection with a resolution of the UN. Switzerland followed the same general policy as Austria with regard to overflights.

[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

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<sup>3</sup> Presumably an Austrian note of July 18; not found in Department of State files.

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**309. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State**

Vienna, December 23, 1958, 1 p.m.

1466. Chancellor Raab asked me to call yesterday afternoon. Preglau was present. (As Department is aware, while Preglau as Chief of Section V Federal Chancellery is not concerned with Vienna Memorandum or Article 26 problem, he deals with all counterpart program, release and PL 480 loan matters on Austrian side.) Chancellor began by reading from one-page memorandum, reminding me (a) of Austrian release 100 million schillings for Hilfsfond (Embtel 1435);<sup>1</sup> (b) that Cabinet had approved proposal by Kamitz ad hoc basis settlement Article 26; and (c) while Vienna Memorandum negotiations not yet successful owing to unwillingness of Socialists to accept proposal for company participation in new refinery they were making progress and a new proposal is in course of preparation. In view of foregoing Chancellor said with a smile he hoped I would be able to give him a Christmas present in form of release of pending counterpart payments.

I told Chancellor I was pleased with Hilfsfond release and progress being made in other fields but unfortunately I could not play role of Santa Claus with a sack of gifts. I said I would promptly inform my government of what he had said to me and felt sure his views would be given careful consideration. Preglau asked whether I thought favorable action would be forthcoming. Replied that I could not honestly be optimistic. I said that I was well aware of Chancellor's problems within the coalition. Washington felt this was basically an Austrian internal problem and in view of Chancellor's great prestige and authority<sup>2</sup> it was difficult to understand why these Austrian Treaty obligations had not been met. I added this was all the more so since as far as Vienna Memorandum was concerned it bore signatures of former Socialist Vice Chancellor and now President of the Republic Schaerf and State Secretary Kreisky on Socialist side. I then drew from my pocket a paper listing, with dates and participants, 13 occasions since March 1957 on which these two matters had been raised with high-ranking Austrian Government officials visiting Washington including Chancellor himself, on each of which assurances had been given of early settlement. In addition

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.5-MSP/12-2358. Confidential.

<sup>1</sup> Dated December 18, telegram 1435 from Vienna reported that Austria had agreed to release 100 million schillings in two installments for the benefit of the Hilfsfond. (*Ibid.*, 763.5-MSP/12-1858)

<sup>2</sup> In the margin next to this phrase are written, probably in Chapin's hand, the words: "has waned badly lately."

I noted that on no less than seven occasions the matter had been raised with Ambassadors Gruber and Platzer. I said in light of foregoing it was only understandable that Washington was somewhat skeptical whether “progress” would turn into agreement. Preglau indicated his full understanding, took no exception to my presentation but said, as he has on previous recent occasions, that he is under growing pressure to obtain counterpart releases and PL 480 loans. Chancellor merely repeated that fault lay with the Socialists.

I said very real progress had been made on Article 26 and we had hoped it could be settled before Christmas. Then at my request Wainhouse, who accompanied me, spoke of our efforts to continue negotiations at a faster pace only to be told that holiday season makes it inconvenient to hold meetings (Embtel 1456).<sup>3</sup> We reiterated our readiness and willingness to continue negotiations at any time, holiday or no holiday, and our belief that gap had considerably narrowed. I asked Chancellor whether he was hopeful that the new proposals on Vienna Memorandum which now being drafted would meet with acceptance on Socialist side. He replied he was hopeful but not overly so.

Conversation was quite cordial and relaxed throughout, Chancellor being in genial pre-holiday mood. It seemed obvious to us he had arranged meeting at urgent request of Preglau who bears brunt of counterpart delays. I feel reasonably hopeful that as pressure here mounts solutions of both problems will be forthcoming—though not of course until after holidays.

**Matthews**

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<sup>3</sup> Dated December 22, telegram 1456 from Vienna reported a conversation between an officer of the Embassy and Secretary General of the Foreign Office Fuchs. (Department of State, Central Files, 263.1141–A/12–2258)

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**310. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Secretary of State Dulles**

Washington, January 14, 1959.

[Source: Department of State, Austrian Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

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**311. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Smith) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)**

Washington, January 27, 1959.

SUBJECT

Release of Counterpart in Austria

As you know, Ambassador Matthews has withheld release of counterpart since September in the hope that this sanction would hasten Austrian agreement on settlement of the outstanding problems of the Jewish persecutee claims and U.S. oil investments.<sup>1</sup>

We had agreed on settlement of the counterpart problem as an objective but also agreed to defer to the Ambassador's plan, with the then prospect of settlement of the persecutee and oil problems by Christmas.

Since then, a counterpart loan of \$4 million in Austrian schillings to the Hilfsfond has moved toward settlement those aspects of the persecutee claims which can be resolved bilaterally between Austria and the U.S. The remaining claims involve France and the U.K., as well as the U.S.; we understand that France and Austria have several unresolved issues in the matter. Thus, although this multilateral package of claims may be settled soon, the exercise of a bilateral sanction such as withholding counterpart would not seem to be a primary consideration in such settlement.

Insofar as the oil problems are concerned, the withholding of counterpart does not seem to have hastened either party toward an agreement. So far nothing has been done of which we are aware.

In view of the apparent liquidity of the short-term loan market in Austria, the effect of withholding counterpart apparently has been negligible insofar as major investors are concerned; they have simply renewed short-term notes as necessary. Investors in risk ventures or small industry, however, may have borrowed on a short-term basis at interest rates of 8 to 10 percent, anticipating the usual early release of counterpart from which investment loans of a longer term could be had at 5 percent. As the months go by without release those small or marginal firms which are unable to continue paying the higher rate may have to suspend and delay indefinitely their programs, thus contributing to increased winter unemployment in Austria.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.5-MSP/1-2759. Confidential.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 306.



While not primarily ICA's concern, I am nevertheless disturbed over the possible adverse political and psychological results of appearing to infringe on a free nation's sovereignty by freezing its investment funds.

It may be, of course, that a salutary result of withholding counterpart up to now will be increased interest on the part of the Austrians in reaching an over-all settlement which will leave the management and utilization of the funds entirely in their hands.

The latest message on this subject from Ambassador Matthews (Embtel 1689, January 20, 1959)<sup>2</sup> again emphasized his desire to withhold action on the counterpart release pending settlement of both the Jewish claims and oil problems. It would seem to me that the results to date on the settlement of these two issues suggest that the further withholding of the counterpart release would be of questionable effectiveness.

In view of these considerations in particular, it is recommended that you approve the attached airgram<sup>3</sup> requesting the Embassy to either release and proceed with settlement or, if over-riding considerations favor not releasing just yet, proceeding to negotiate terms of settlement to be formally agreed upon at or after the release is made.<sup>4</sup>

**J.H. Smith, Jr.**

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<sup>2</sup>Sent to Under Secretary Dillon, telegram 1689 from Vienna urged that settlement of negotiations under the Vienna Memorandum and implementation of Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty be made major topics of conversation when Pittermann arrived in Washington on February 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6311/1-2059)

<sup>3</sup>Not attached to the source text. The reference is unclear.

<sup>4</sup>In a memorandum of February 2, Merchant recommended to Dillon that the proposed shift in policy be disapproved. (Department of State, Central Files, 763.5-MSP/2-259)

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**312. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, February 9, 1959.

**SUBJECT**

Austria and Europe

**PARTICIPANTS**His Excellency Dr. Bruno Pittermann, Vice-Chancellor of Austria<sup>1</sup>

His Excellency Dr. Wilfried Platzer, Ambassador, Embassy of Austria

The Secretary

WE—Mr. Turner C. Cameron, Jr., Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs

L/EUR—Mr. Richard D. Kearney, Assistant Legal Adviser

WE—Mr. Frederic L. Chapin, Austrian Desk Officer

Interpreter—Mrs. Nora Lejins

The Vice-Chancellor said that Austria's tranquility permitted him to come at last to the United States to which he had been invited many years ago.

The Secretary recalled that Austria had not always been so tranquil. The United States had struggled hard to obtain the Austrian State Treaty. The President had often spoken of the fact that the good intentions of the Soviets could be demonstrated by deeds rather than words. The deed had been the agreement reached on the Austrian State Treaty, and this had led to the Summit Conference.

Dr. Pittermann expressed his thanks for the steadfast policy of the United States which had put the Austrian State Treaty in the forefront, and which by its insistence on conclusion of the Treaty had had an important bearing on the ultimate favorable outcome.

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Source: Department of State, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123. Official Use Only. Drafted by Chapin. See also Document 313.

<sup>1</sup> Pittermann visited the United States as a private citizen February 9–20. He spent February 9–12 in Washington, meeting with Dulles, Dillon, and other officials of the Department of State on February 9, Secretary of Labor Mitchell and President Eisenhower on February 10, and Vice President Nixon on February 11. A memorandum of his conversation with Under Secretary Dillon is in Department of State, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123. During the conversation, the two leaders discussed the fulfillment of Austrian obligations under the Vienna Memorandum and Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty and the release of counterpart funds. In discussing the latter, Pittermann pointed out that the Austrian Government had applied for release in June 1958 and that U.S. approval, normally a formality taking 2 or 3 months, had not been received. Dillon replied that the delay was not unusual, given the number of agencies involved.

No records of conversations with any of the other officials visited by Pittermann have been found.

On February 12, Pittermann flew to Chicago. He traveled by train to New York on February 15, departing from there for Vienna on February 20.

The Secretary hoped that the Government and people of Austria would always realize that while the treaty imposed certain, primarily military, restrictions on Austria, which were perhaps proper in a country with the geography and size of Austria, the aspirations and hopes of the Austrian and American peoples and their devotion to freedom and democratic government created a unity between the two for which no counterpart could be found in Austria's relations with the Soviet Union, as it was presently constituted.

Dr. Pittermann replied that the Austrian Government had attempted to overcome the military weakness imposed upon it by the broadest and most extensive political stability. For 14 years, Austria had had the same Government, and he was convinced that the vast majority of the voters would endorse that coalition government in the next election. Austria was attempting to fulfill its obligations and show its gratitude for western assistance by demonstrating the advantages of a democratic government and a strong economy to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, showing them how much better the Austrian system was for the individual than theirs.

The Secretary said he had just come back from Germany<sup>2</sup> where he had had occasion once more to remark on the solid achievements which the Federal Republic had made. He had emphasized to Chancellor Adenauer that these should not be bartered away lightly for concessions of doubtful value from the Soviet Union. Germany and the German people now had and wished to maintain a very close relationship with France. A longstanding cause of war in Europe had thus been overcome. The relationship between the two countries was not ephemeral but rather reinforced by membership in the Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, NATO, and the Brussels pact. These were immense achievements which the Soviet Union wished to undo. If the United States should buy German reunification at the price of returning Germany to a place in Central Europe, in which it would have no ties to Western Europe, this would recreate the situation which had led to a series of wars.

Dr. Pittermann said he would like to reply as a co-worker for European unification rather than as Vice-Chancellor of Austria. He could only agree with the Secretary's views and wish that all the democratic governments of Europe west of the Iron Curtain were more closely united than they were today. Such a unification would exert a significant ideological force and win respect for the West.

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<sup>2</sup>Dulles visited London, Paris, and Bonn February 3–9; for documentation on his visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, see vol. VIII, Documents 164 ff.

The Secretary continued that it was important for Austria to have the kind of Germany represented by the Federal Republic, rather than the kind of Germany which would correspond with the wishes of the Soviet Union.

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### 313. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington February 9, 1959.

#### SUBJECT

Austria and European Economic Cooperation

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 312.]

The Secretary said that the closer ties which were being created in Europe within the Common Market should also result in wider ties, particularly economic ones, between the six countries in the Common Market and the eleven other OEEC countries. He could understand that Austria felt that it might be threatened by developments within the Six.

Dr. Pittermann replied that Austria wanted to associate itself with the Free Trade Area and preferred the larger union.

The Secretary said that his experience was that measures in other parts of the world which increased economic unity, although they seemed initially as if they would result in a curtailment of United States exports, actually resulted in an expansion of economic activity which ended up by helping United States exports. He hoped and expected that the same result would occur with regard to the Common Market.

Dr. Pittermann expressed general agreement but said that the Common Market should not become an instrument of separation but rather of cooperation.

**314. Editorial Note**

On March 12, the National Committee of the Austrian People's Party, which held a plurality in Parliament, called for national elections on May 10. According to airgram G-316 from Vienna, March 13, Raab, leader of the People's Party, had reached the decision in February to move up the date for elections from the fall to the spring of 1959 as a means of exerting pressure on its governing coalition partner, the Austrian Socialist Party, led by Pittermann. (Department of State, Central Files, 763.00/3-1359)

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**315. Editorial Note**

Telegram 2404 to Vienna, March 18, authorized Ambassador Matthews to exchange notes with the Austrian Government on settlement of claims under Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty, which provided for compensation of political persecutees. (Department of State, Central Files, 263.0041-A/3-1359) Delays by the British and French, who concluded similar agreements, postponed the exchange until May 1959. For text of the treaty, which entered into force on May 22, see 10 UST 1158.

**316. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)**

Washington, March 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

The 1958 Annual Release of ICA Counterpart in Austria

*Background:*

On November 7, 1958 Ambassador Matthews wrote to you (Tab B)<sup>1</sup> that he had been holding up the annual counterpart release for 1958. The 1958 annual release level requested by the Austrian Government in July 1955 was 550 million schillings. The National Advisory Council approved this level on October 17 and authorized the Embassy to release an additional 500 million schillings of reflows if it considered it appropriate. In addition, Ambassador Matthews has also not approved arrangements for PL-480 loans totalling 150 million schillings and has been holding up all PL-480 loans since August. He believed that his action would encourage the Austrian Government to reach settlements on the pending negotiations under the Vienna Memorandum and Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty. Ambassador Matthews asked for your support in obtaining the concurrence of ICA that the funds should continue to be withheld until after Christmas. By your letter of November 15, 1958 (Tab C),<sup>2</sup> you concurred, and ICA instructed its representatives in Vienna to cooperate with the Ambassador (Tab D).<sup>3</sup>

On January 21 [27], 1959 Mr. Smith of ICA requested your concurrence in proceeding with a release of counterpart and negotiation of a provisional counterpart settlement, a long standing objective of United States policy in Austria.<sup>4</sup> In my memorandum of February 2, I suggested that you await the results of your conversation with Vice-Chancellor Pittermann.<sup>5</sup> You accepted my recommendation, and by a memorandum from Mr. Bell of W/MSC dated February 5,<sup>6</sup> ICA was asked to continue to hold up the counterpart for two additional months.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.5-MSP/3-1959. Confidential. Drafted by Cameron and Chapin and concurred in by McBride. None of the tabs was attached to the source text.

<sup>1</sup> Document 306.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 306.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 311.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 311.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

*Discussion:*

I understand that when Ambassador Platzer called on you on March 18 to present a copy of the Tenth Anniversary Volume on ECA aid,<sup>7</sup> he asked that counterpart be released in view of the Austrian Cabinet's action on Article 26. He said that he doubted that the Vienna Memorandum problem would be resolved until after the elections, which are about two months away.

Ambassador Matthews has now been authorized to conclude the exchange of notes on Article 26 and this will probably take place shortly. Prospects for an early agreement on the Vienna Memorandum do, indeed, seem dim. Vice-Chancellor Pittermann has been back in Austria for almost one month. No reply has been made to the four alternative oil company proposals of January 30, 1959,<sup>8</sup> and there is no indication that the Socialists have reached a position on the matter.

In the meantime, the Austrian Government has agreed to advance the date of national elections from October to May 10, 1959. As reported in the *New York Times* (Tab E),<sup>9</sup> Raab has publicly linked the United States failure to release counterpart with the Socialist refusal to reach a settlement of the Vienna Memorandum. Chancellor Raab is charging that the failure to release the counterpart funds has resulted in "grave damage to the Austrian economy" and in an increase in the level of unemployment. The Chancellor had earlier declared that he was sure that the United States would not accept "any compromise which is now being worked upon by the Socialists". In his radio address of March 15, Raab said that all open issues between the two parties (i.e. including the Vienna Memorandum) would be settled in the negotiations leading to the formation of a new cabinet after the elections.

Thus a long period of political strife over the counterpart and Vienna Memorandum issues appears probable even after the May 10 elections. After the May 13, 1956 elections a new coalition government was not formed until the end of June. A similar delay can be anticipated this time.

The counterpart release was to cover an investment program for the period July 1, 1958 through June 30, 1959. The release was requested by Chancellor Raab's letter of July 18, 1958.<sup>10</sup> The funds are the property of the Austrian Government and represent reflows of previous loans. There is evidence that the failure to release the counterpart has had an

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<sup>7</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>8</sup> A summary of these proposals was transmitted in telegram 1818 from Vienna, February 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 863.2553/2-459)

<sup>9</sup> The article is in *The New York Times*, March 17, 1959.

<sup>10</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

adverse effect upon the Austrian economy and that by curtailing investment our action has contributed in some measure to increased unemployment.

The Department has also received complaints from representatives of two wholly owned American corporations in Austria that their counterpart or PL-480 loan applications, which have been approved by the Austrian authorities, have not been acted upon for many months by the Embassy. One firm clearly states that its 1959 investment program has been curtailed by the PL-480 fund freeze. (Tab F)<sup>11</sup>

I believe that you should write Ambassador Matthews pointing out that you believe the time has come to reconsider our decision to hold up the counterpart and PL-480 releases and asking him for his reactions to an early release of these funds.

*Recommendation:*

That you sign the letter at Tab A.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Tab F was a letter from a representative of Caro Werke; not found in Department of State files.

<sup>12</sup>Not found. A memorandum of April 1 from Merchant to Dillon, however, indicates that the letter was dated March 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 763.5-MSP/4-159) A letter of March 24 from Matthews to Dillon strongly recommended not agreeing to release of the counterpart funds before the Vienna Memorandum issues were resolved, a suggestion that Merchant accepted in his memorandum of April 1. (*Ibid.*, 263.0041/3-2459)

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### 317. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State

Vienna, July 15, 1959, 3 p.m.

155. Department pass Defense (for OASD/ISA).

1. Negotiations for formation of new Austrian Govt indicate possibility of cuts in present and future defense budgets. According to press, Socialist Party at one point proposed \$8 million cut in this year's budget

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.5-MSP/7-1559. Secret. Also sent to USCINCEUR.



and informed sources from Austrian General Staff predict Socialists will demand cut in next year's budget up to 50 per cent. Country team considers heavy US investment in creation effective military posture in Austria justifies expression of US views on any action which will seriously adversely affect creation such posture.

2. Country team recommends adoption following US position on these possible developments:

Any significant reduction in Austrian defense budget will preclude attainment of jointly agreed upon build-up of Austrian Army and therefore will be tantamount to abrogation by Austrian Govt of informal agreement reached by the two govts in 1955–56 which led to establishment of military assistance program for Austria. Should this occur, additional military equipment cannot be effectively utilized by Austrian Army and further equipment deliveries will be re-examined with view to prompt and orderly termination.

3. I recommend that I be given discretionary authority to communicate this US position to leading members both political parties in event major reductions in Austrian defense budget appear likely to materialize.<sup>1</sup>

**Matthews**

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<sup>1</sup> The requested authorization was granted in telegram 205 to Vienna, July 17. (*Ibid.*) Over the next few weeks, Matthews expressed his concern about the proposed reduction to various Austrian officials, generally eliciting the reply that the reductions were not really intended and that talk thereof was only the result of political bargaining in the attempt to form a new government. Documentation on this subject is *ibid.*, 763.5–MSP.

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### **318. Airgram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State**

Vienna, July 17, 1959.

G–11. Ref: Embassy's Airgram No. G–398.<sup>1</sup> Subj: Austrian Political Scene.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.00/7–1759. Confidential. Drafted by Bennett in coordination with Matthews on July 15. Repeated to Salzburg.

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 2, G–398 emphasized the difficulties in forming a coalition government in view of the extremely close results of the May 10 balloting. (*Ibid.*, 763.00/6–259) The election results were as follows: People's Party—79 seats in parliament (82 in 1956 election); Socialists—78 seats (74 in 1956 election); Liberals—8 seats (6 in 1956 election); Communists—0 seats (3 in 1956 election).

Austria's government crisis has finally been resolved in its tenth week, longest period of cabinet building since 1945. Raab III regime takes office this week. Far from representing an improvement of situation which existed before May 10 election, result is a cabinet more evenly divided than before between the two major parties and with "proporz" system of party patronage and influence on public and private endeavor more than ever firmly locked into Austrian life. As squabble over formation of new government continued week after week, both parties abandoned all pretense of negotiating to effectuate high principles proclaimed during electoral campaign, and party talks degenerated into unseemly scramble on part of individual figures of both parties for jobs and influence.

People's Party complacency was rudely shattered by election results, and party during ensuing negotiations all but emulated fate of Holmes' one-horse shay. Party's internal divisions were visible to all throughout negotiations and individual feuds were active. Chancellor Raab was on numerous occasions during coalition talks publicly rebuffed by his own party, and his tactical concept of negotiations was almost entirely rejected by his followers. He was dissuaded from his initial impulse to resign immediately following elections, his gambit to offer Finance Ministry to Socialists was voted down unanimously after he had already made it public, and he was forced to make more concessions on administration of nationalized industries than he wished. Embassy understands that in party leadership meeting yesterday he again insisted that correct course would have been to give up Finance Ministry. However, when it became apparent his party was to retain Chancellorship, he was unwilling allow another to take his place and, faltering though his leadership now is, there is as yet no one in his party strong enough to challenge him directly. He heads government, therefore, with greatly diminished prestige and with many of his followers openly wishing he would retire. He is able to remain primarily because party divisions and rivalries make choice of generally acceptable successor an extremely difficult task. Raab's physical appearance continues to cause widespread speculation over his health. Always phlegmatic and taciturn, he is reportedly now more mistrustful than ever of those around him, and his stubbornness does not decrease with age. Reform of People's Party and thoroughgoing overhaul of its organization is badly overdue. There is much talk about this among provincial leaders of party and younger business and industrial elements, but members of former group do not stay in Vienna long enough at a time to be able to carry out a sustained cleanup and latter group openly despair of accomplishing much with Raab still at party helm. In short, People's Party is suffering from severe malaise. It urgently needs new concepts and new leadership, but either still seems some distance in future. Only bright

spot in this dark picture is the nomination for the post of Minister of Agriculture of Eduard Hartmann, a man of excellent reputation whose name is invariably mentioned when possibilities for the chancellorship are discussed. His nomination, of course, gives recognition to the important role of the Peasant's League (Bauernbund) as the principal supplier of votes for the People's Party, and his inclusion in the Cabinet is a definite plus.

In contrast to People's Party, Socialist Party has vigorous and dynamic leadership in Pittermann, and Socialist side of government negotiations was conducted with great skill. People's Party was kept continuously off balance through hard-driving but fast-shifting tactics of Socialist negotiators. Socialists cleverly declined consistently to be pinned down on their ultimate negotiating aims. While proclaiming piously their belief in continued coalition cooperation and simultaneously demanding that their plurality in popular vote be recognized by absolute equality in distribution of government posts, they worked steadily for expansion of Socialist influence and an improved tactical position within coalition administration. Butter would not melt in their mouths regarding necessity for continuance of coalition, but some of their leaders privately admit their determination to move forward with view to possible full take-over of government after next election. Socialists waged skillful psychological warfare against Raab personally and against People's Party throughout negotiations which, while not altogether admirable in some of its aspects, was eminently successful. As a result, a disorganized People's Party probably conceded more to Socialist electoral gains than would have been necessary had they had clear or cohesive goals of their own.

This is not to say that Austrian Socialist Party is a monolithic structure. There are differences among individuals and certainly divergences of opinion over party philosophy. However, Socialists have been very successful in settling their differences behind closed doors, and divergent viewpoints are not paraded before the public, as are People's Party divisions and animosities. While Pittermann is clearly dominant figure in his party at present, he is by no means dictator and he cannot impose his views at will. There is general agreement among qualified observers that Waldbrunner has lost prestige and position within his party, but he is still a force not to be discounted, and he maintains a loyal following among those more ideologically minded Socialists who are not happy with Pittermann's recasting of the party in a bourgeois direction. The effect of Waldbrunner's declining power on prospects for settlement of such outstanding issues in Austro-American relations as the Vienna Memorandum remains to be seen. In that connection, Kreisky's increased influence as head of new Foreign Ministry with independent status should be a positive factor. Kreisky, incidentally, belongs to a

loosely organized inner circle group consisting of himself, Olah, Slavik, Probst, and Broda. These men are more and more concerting their ideas and by force of their organized intellect having an increased say in the direction their party should take. Youthful and generally moderate Socialists, they typify the kind of vigorous new leadership which People's Party so badly needs.

Fact of Socialist differences was evidenced in party nomination of Josef Afritsch to succeed Helmer as Interior Minister. Helmer had hoped until the last to remain in Cabinet and observers generally believed he would be able to hold on. However, in pursuance Socialist leadership's determination ruthlessly enforce *Generationswechsel* (so apparent in Parliamentary campaign in May), Central Secretary Probst and others contrived Helmer's ouster at yesterday's party meeting. Probst was, however, then not able hoist himself into Ministry as he would have liked, and several other candidates killed one another off. Resulting compromise produced Afritsch, an obscure and amiable City Councilor of Vienna who is a gardener by vocation and whose unforeseen choice was a surprise to Socialists themselves.

President Schaerf can be said to have enhanced his own prestige and that of presidency through role he played in negotiations which are generally agreed locally to have been most difficult in post-war Austrian history. Although a long-time Socialist and former leader of his party, he maintained an impartial and objective position throughout negotiations. His role was appreciated and praised by both parties. He intervened subtly to restore order at particularly acrimonious stages of negotiations and exercised his influence discreetly to ensure continuance of coalition in which he believes strongly.

Whether coalition system which served Austria so well during occupation period and immediately thereafter will long continue is certainly debatable at this point. Elections, however, indicated continuing belief in coalition form of government on part of general public, and both parties presently patently fearful of going it alone. It is probably true that Austria, with its deeply held memories of 1934 civil war and authoritarian regime which followed is not yet ready for parliamentary government in English sense. However, shabbiness of current political picture here is convincingly portrayed through a remark attributed yesterday to Defense Minister Graf. When asked his opinion of the new government, Graf smiled wryly and responded, "Well, it's better to be in than out."

**Matthews**

**319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria**

Washington, September 24, 1959, 8:43 p.m.

1011. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation between Secretary and Foreign Minister Kreisky September 23.<sup>1</sup>

1. *Vienna Memorandum.*

Kreisky said that following discussions with oil companies both Vienna and New York<sup>2</sup> there now seemed to be chance to obtain solution by end this year. Principal problem for Austrian Government was to find method and form of solution which would not be unpopular in Austria and which would thus not cause political difficulties for present coalition Government. Kreisky said he had told oil companies that their compensation claims were "too high" and that in negotiating compromise companies must accept some political responsibility, particularly as they are using US and UK Ambassadors in Vienna as channel in negotiations. Kreisky indicated that differences between Austrian Government and oil companies very narrow on some questions and he stated that Austria was proposing permanent cooperation between US and UK oil companies and Austrian oil administration. While this permanent cooperation might cause difficulties with Soviet Union, this was calculated risk he was prepared to take. Kreisky said that he hoped to be able to prepare more definitive views on issues yet unsettled during short period he would be in Vienna before going Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

Secretary said US did not intend inject itself into negotiations between Austrian Government and private oil companies. However, negotiations have dragged out for several years and now necessary to reach settlement. He stressed that US Ambassador Vienna had not injected himself into details of negotiations but had only expressed hope

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 263.0041-A/9-2459. Confidential. Drafted by Stabler, cleared by Cameron and Calhoun, and approved by White.

<sup>1</sup> After attending the 14th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Foreign Minister Kreisky traveled to Washington on September 23. He met with Secretary Herter at 2:30 p.m. and with Under Secretary Dillon at 3:30 p.m. on September 23. At 3 p.m. on September 24, he led an Austrian delegation in a roundtable discussion with a U.S. delegation led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs White. He then left for Vienna. Briefing memoranda for Herter, Dillon, and White, and full memoranda of conversation recording the meetings between Herter and Kreisky and Dillon and Kreisky, all dated September 23, are *ibid.*, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 962 to Vienna, September 21, transmitted an account of Kreisky's meeting with representatives of the oil companies in New York. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 263.0041-A/9-2159)

<sup>3</sup> Kreisky accompanied President Schaerf on a State visit to Moscow October 5–15; a report on the visit was transmitted in despatch 504 from Vienna, November 2. (*Ibid.*, 763.11/11-259)

to Austrian Government that Vienna Memorandum would be settled without delay. Pointing out that oil companies have had world-wide experience and thus fully aware of political responsibility, Secretary stressed that since this is matter between private companies and Austrian Government USG could not inject itself into political phase. He said he was encouraged by Kreisky's remarks regarding settlement by end this year.

### 2. *Counterpart releases.*

Kreisky referred to blocking of counterpart releases. While Vienna Memorandum and counterpart release not directly connected, nonetheless, public opinion believed that we had blocked counterpart release pending Vienna Memorandum settlement and this not good for US-Austro relations. He stressed that within his own party there was great sensitivity and resentment over political pressures. Kreisky indicated that while he not pressing for immediate change in our policy, he desired point out its adverse effects. Secretary did not comment on Kreisky's exposition beyond indicating his understanding Kreisky would develop matter more fully with Under Secretary.

### 3. *South Tyrol.*

Kreisky spoke at great length on South Tyrol question and referred to Pella's UNGA speech as "strong and unfriendly."<sup>4</sup> Kreisky said that his own mention of South Tyrol problem before UN was understatement and was necessary to show Austria and people in South Tyrol that Austrian Government was ready to do something about situation.<sup>5</sup> If Italians did not take steps soon to correct problem, situation regarding South Tyrol might become more serious. Austria willing continue negotiations, but there was limit. If Italy unwilling grant autonomy Bolzano Province and situation has not improved by next year, Austria will be forced refer matter to UN. Only in this manner will Austria be able to resist existing pressures in Austria and South Tyrol for self-determination. Kreisky realized that this was extremely delicate question for US but expressed hope US could help restrain "terrible arrogance" with which Italy dealing this question.

Secretary said that while we regretted disagreement between two friends, we believed this could best be resolved by bilateral negotiations between Austria and Italy. We thought referring question to UN would only contribute to increasing tensions and making situation more difficult. Secretary inquired whether this was not issue which might be

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<sup>4</sup> For text of Pella's speech before the 804th Plenary Meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, September 23, 1959, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, 15 September-13 December 1959*, pp. 120-124.

<sup>5</sup> For text of Kreisky's speech before the 800th Plenary Meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, September 21, 1959, see *ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

placed before ICJ where it could be argued with less heat than in UN. Kreisky said that while he prepared consider this idea, uncertain whether Austrian political situation would permit it. He could not promise that question might not eventually go to UN. Department on September 24 gave Italian Embassy substance of Secretary's comments on South Tyrol question.

4. *Hungarian Problem.*

Kreisky alluded to desirability of normalizing relations between Austria and Hungary but indicated difficult to do so unless Hungarians took substantial steps such as permitting Munro to enter Hungary to carry out his UN mandate and permitting Cardinal Mindszenty to leave Budapest. He had in mind to speak to Mikoyan during his forthcoming visit to Moscow in hope that Russians, believing normalization Austro-Hungarian relations desirable, would pressure Hungarians into making substantial moves. Kreisky inquired whether USG would agree to such move.

Secretary indicated that it was difficult for us to judge desirability such move and thought that this was matter for Austrian decision.

5. *Nuclear Testing Control Headquarters.*

Kreisky expressed gratification on Big Power decision establish control headquarters in Vienna if and when set up. He said presence IAEA and possibly control headquarters in Vienna provided security to Austria against Soviet bloc and also contributed to Austria's self-confidence. In response to question on nuclear testing suspension negotiations, Secretary said that principal stumbling block at present is makeup and tasks of control organization. He outlined to Kreisky present status.

**Herter**

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**320. Memorandum of the Meeting of the OCB Working Group on Austria**

Washington, October 26, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

State—Mr. Wells Stabler, Chairman  
Defense—Col. A.P. Sauer  
CIA—Representative present

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Austria. Secret. The meeting was held in the Executive Office Building.

ICA—Representative absent  
USIA—Mr. Max Grossman  
Treasury—Mr. James A. Griffin  
OCB Staff—Mr. Oscar Holder, Staff Representative

#### ALSO PRESENT

State—Ambassador H. Freeman Matthews  
Budget—Mr. George Vaishvila  
Labor—Mr. Saul Moskowitz  
OCB Staff—Mr. Bromley Smith, OCB Executive Officer (for Ambassador's briefing only), Mr. Ridgway B. Knight, OCB Deputy Executive Officer (for Ambassador's briefing only), Miss Mabel Moses, Secretary

The OCB Working Group on Austria met on October 26, 1959 with Ambassador Matthews, who gave the working group the benefit of his impressions on matters of current interest in Austria, and their development up to this point.

He said Austria is exceedingly well disposed toward the United States but is now also disposed to be forgetful of the occupation period and of the 9-year postwar struggle against Soviet opposition to achieve a Treaty; Austria is now more nearly straddling the East-West division and is beginning to develop a greater sense of neutralism, not only in the military sense, but also from the point of view of psychological, political and economic interests.

The Austrians tend to exaggerate their possible influence in their ambition to play the role of a "bridge" between East and West. They adduce geographical and political reasons from their long imperial experience to justify such a role. They appear to be rather naive on this subject, particularly Chancellor Raab. The danger of this point of view is that they could get involved in the middle of some problems in a fashion to cause embarrassment and difficulty to the West.

Another difficulty in the neutrality idea of the Austrians is that, when they come to a vote in the UN or are called upon to decide one way or another on a problem, they show a growing tendency to abstain, except in cases where they have an aroused strong general public opinion and sympathy towards a problem. The Tibet issue is one in which the Austrians registered their vote favorably to us.

The Austrians tend to look more and more to the other European neutrals, Switzerland and Sweden, as models. Foreign Minister Kreisky himself is married to a Swede, and it might be expected that his thinking would be influenced accordingly.

If it became necessary to suggest a neutral nation sympathetic to the West as a compromise candidate between Turkey and Yugoslavia for the UN Security Council, Austria might not be the ideal candidate. Austria has an extensive record of abstentionism in problems coming before the UN. However, Austrian ties still are very much with the West, and



Austrian thinking is sympathetic in that direction; Austria is not becoming a Soviet satellite.

Replying to a Defense query, the Ambassador stated that it is quite possible that, if the Austrians could not acquire equipment they needed from the West by way of purchasing it on favorable terms and if the East offered the Austrians the same equipment on more favorable terms, the Austrians might acquire it from the East in this case. The Ambassador also stated that at present the purchase of defense equipment in large quantities is not an issue since Austria just now is getting and still continues to get our equipment, so that the urgent need does not exist now. It is quite possible, however, he added, that Austria would be easily tempted, if they are not provided equipment on their terms, to turn to the East for them.

On the psychological issue, the Ambassador stated that the first Russian Sputnik had made a tremendous impression on the Austrians,<sup>1</sup> although whether the Austrians believe the Russians are superior to us in "space" is somewhat doubtful. They want us to be superior and still have the feeling that we are. The impact of the Russian advance in space has been less in Austria than in the rest of Europe. Still the Austrians do not discredit the fact that the Soviet Union is quite powerful in this field.

The Defense member of the Working Group referred to the Ambassador's concern expressed previously to the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding the limited nature of Defense Minister Graf's itinerary in the United States and said that the itinerary reflected the Minister's wishes to visit reserve units, Civil Defense operations, etc. He had specifically stated he did not want to see major Air Force operations, such as SAC. The Ambassador thought this most unfortunate; he did not know whether anything could be done on that score at this late date but did feel that Minister Graf should be exposed to U.S. military power. This would make a stronger and far more valuable impression on Minister Graf than he could obtain from visits to universities, etc. The Chairman of the Working Group undertook to look further into this problem with Defense.<sup>2</sup>

Following the Ambassador's departure, there was a discussion by the working group of the comments submitted by the Embassy in Vienna on the report.<sup>3</sup> The working group agreed with these comments. In addition, certain changes were discussed in the Defense portion of the semi-final draft of the report, as well as a JCS comment registered

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<sup>1</sup> The first Soviet Sputnik was launched on October 4, 1957.

<sup>2</sup> As of November 3, the latest information from Defense is that this resulted in the Minister's visit to the carrier U.S.S. *Independence*, and the Army portion of his visit now includes the latest U.S. tactical methods of deployment. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>3</sup> Presumably reference is to Document 322.

through the Defense representative concerning evaluation of U.S. operations as contained in the draft.

The working group then agreed to issue the report as a final document for distribution to and further review by the Board Assistants at their formal meeting on November 13, 1959.

**Oscar Holder**  
*OCB Staff Representative*

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### **321. Special National Intelligence Estimate**

SNIE 25-59

Washington, October 27, 1959.

[Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

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### **322. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board**

Washington, November 23, 1959.

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON AUSTRIA  
(NSC 5603)<sup>1</sup>

(Policy Approved by the President, April 7, 1956)

(Period Covered: From October 23, 1958  
Through November 25, 1959)

1. The agencies represented on the Working Group on Austria have reappraised the validity and evaluated the implementation of the

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Austria. Secret. A cover sheet and a memorandum by Bromley Smith, Executive Officer of the OCB, indicating that the OCB had concurred in the report and agreed not to send it to the NSC on November 25 are not printed.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 295.

U.S. Policy Toward Austria (NSC 5603, dated April 7, 1956) in the light of operating experience. They further believe there is no need for the National Security Council to review the policy at this time and that there are no developments of such significance as to warrant sending a report to the National Security Council.

2. The national parliamentary elections of May 1959 produced approximate equality between the Socialists and People's Parties as a result of gains by the former and losses by the latter. The new coalition government under People's Party Chancellor Raab reflects this balance. Another result of the election was that the Communists were eliminated from representation in Parliament.

3. So far there has been no basic change in Austria's policy of military neutrality with its strong pro-Western overtones. Austrian international conduct since 1955 has in practice been viewed by the Austrians in terms of its consistency with a broader application of neutrality extending to many political questions. The Austrians have attempted since 1955 to balance acts favoring the West by scrupulous correctness and adherence to their obligations to the Soviet Bloc, and by some actions which have been widely interpreted as favoring the Bloc. Over the last year or two the number and scope of actions favoring the Bloc have increased somewhat. This tendency may flow from what the Austrian Government may consider to be the growth of Soviet power vis-à-vis the United States and from the increasingly active efforts of the USSR to appear reasonable and in favor of peaceful co-existence. Austria may also have been influenced by the fact that other powers, including the United States, have been expanding their relations with the USSR and the Bloc. An additional factor may be the desire of some pressure groups in Austria to create an atmosphere more favorable to building up trade with the East, which these groups see as offering attractive potential export possibilities at a time of sharpening competition and as a hedge against possible future economic declines in the West.

4. Two large rallies were held in Vienna in 1959. Partly as a result of Soviet pressure, the Austrian Government in March 1958 agreed to permit the Communist-dominated World Youth Festival to be held in Vienna. It took place in July-August 1959; attendance was about 14,000. The Communist organizers were handicapped by the boycott of the Austrian press, the minimal official recognition, the relative unresponsiveness of the Austrian public, and the counter-activities of Austrian and other Western youth organizations. Partly to counter-balance this Festival, the Austrian Government allowed the Sudeten Germans to hold a rally, which took place in May and was attended by about 300,000.

5. Austria considers the question of the South Tyrol to be its major current international problem. Foreign Minister Kreisky in his September 21 speech before the UN<sup>2</sup> threatened that, if Italy did not grant autonomy to Bolzano province within a reasonable time, Austria might bring the issue before the UN. U.S. policy remains one of avoiding entanglement in this old and emotion-charged controversy and encouraging the parties to settle it bilaterally.

6. Negotiations between the Austrian Government and the oil companies (Socony–Mobil and Shell) continue to drag on, even though the Austrians undertook in the Vienna Memorandum of May 1955 to settle the claims by April 1957. The U.S. Government in an effort to accelerate settlement (a) still withholds an annual counterpart release of \$7 million and an overall counterpart settlement of \$418.4 million as well as the disbursement of \$11.2 million in PL 480 Title I sales proceeds, and (b) has not submitted the Austrian Assets Treaty<sup>3</sup> to the Senate. In renewed negotiations on the Vienna Memorandum, the Austrians in September 1959 indicated that some substitution for outright cash payments must be found, and consideration is now being given to finding an alternative in the form of “hidden compensation”.

7. The last U.S. dollar assistance, in the form of a small technical assistance program, was extended to Austria in FY 1959. No further assistance is contemplated.

8. Austria’s economy has continued to evidence a healthy, balanced expansion. Internally, business activity is being maintained at a high level without significant soft spots. Externally, tourism and foreign capital inflows are more than offsetting trade deficits; gold, dollar and other convertible exchange reserves as of June 30, 1959 had reached an all-time high of \$730.6 million, up 34% from June 30, 1958. The future of European economic integration is of current major concern to Austria. Austria is participating in the negotiations for the formation of an “Outer Seven” grouping in the hope that the resultant leverage will lead to an accommodation with the EEC and, ultimately, to a larger free trade area.

9. a. After delivery of items contained in the FY 1959 and previous Military Assistance Program, the U.S. will have provided the basic military equipment for the build-up of the agreed Austrian forces. A small training program has been proposed for FY 1960. During the 1955–1959 period the U.S. Government programmed equipment valued at ap-

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 319.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the treaty, “Austrian Property, Rights and Interests,” signed by Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Platzer on January 30, 1959, and ratified by both parties in 1964, see 15 UST 439.

proximately \$80 million. As of July 1, 1959, approximately \$20 million worth of equipment remained for delivery.

b. In December of 1958 the Austrian Government submitted a new military force plan, which is based upon the use of a force-in-being (60,000) and a reserve component (120,000) for a total of 180,000 men. A review of the plan by Defense indicates that the concept of reserve forces is sound, but that the plan is too ambitious and should be modified to be more realistically within the capability of the Austrian Government to support. In addition, Austrian legislative action would be necessary to create these reserve forces.

c. On November 5, 1959 the Austrian Minister of Defense discussed a substitute plan involving additional U.S. military grant aid for a 50,000 reserve component.<sup>4</sup> This reserve force would consist of all those who, during the previous three years, had had military service. Since there would be no military training required for reservists, no new legislation would be necessary to create the force.

d. The Austrian Defense Minister was informed that, although the reserve plan had merit, the U.S. Government could not undertake any commitment regarding support of the reserve concept until after review by U.S. agencies. The Austrian Minister of Defense will submit his proposal to the Embassy in Vienna for consideration.

e. Subsequent to the events described above, the Departments of State and Defense commenced working level discussions of means of implementing the recently clarified policy regarding new commitments for the provision of military equipment on a grant basis to nations which are financially able to pay for such equipment. A joint State–Defense communication is to be transmitted to their senior representatives in the countries affected, including Austria, in the near future advising of this policy and its implications. The interested agencies will examine any request for U.S. support of an Austrian reserve plan in light of the clarified policy.

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<sup>4</sup>Defense Minister Ferdinand Graf visited Washington November 4–6; a memorandum of a conversation between him and Wells, November 5, is in Department of State, Central Files, 763.56/11–559.

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**323. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State**

Vienna, December 23, 1959, 7 p.m.

1580. Reference: Mytel 1551.<sup>1</sup> As Department will observe from Embtel 1570,<sup>2</sup> with Christmas euphoria prevailing in Austrian coalition, Cabinet yesterday gave tacit approval to Vienna Memorandum settlement basis presented by Kreisky. Much credit is due latter for drive and energy he displayed these last ten days, particularly in pressure exercised upon OMV to stop haggling and sign up with companies. Of course final govt approval is still contingent upon further steps, notably the definitive detailed contract between companies and OMV, and while Austrians indicate this is largely formality, my experience here leads me to avoid discounting possibility of further delaying snags. On other hand, Arnold and Hecht who called this morning have assured me that both they and Mobil Oil fully satisfied with agreement reached and with outlook for final settlement. Arnold again expressed his deep appreciation of advice and assistance rendered over these past months by Embassy.

I think we can safely say we are approaching end of this problem as important element bearing on Austro-American relations. I believe that our policy and tactics have borne good fruit and I am completely convinced 1) had we not withheld action on counterpart and PL 480 releases, any settlement would have been delayed for years and served as a continuing irritant; and 2) any failure on our part to press Austrian Govt to meet its treaty obligations to United States as they have done to Soviet Union would have been in long run definitely harmful to our relations and objectives in Austria as well as to Austria's attitudes toward the West in general, its neutrality policy and its general future orientation. A natural Austrian tendency to take the United States and the West for granted which has been growing since 1956 and a corollary reluctance to offend the East, tinted by this country's ever latent urge toward bridge-building, would, I firmly believe, have been result.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 263.0041-A/12-2359. Confidential.

<sup>1</sup> Dated December 21, telegram 1551 from Vienna reported that the oil companies and the central Austrian oil administration had come to a preliminary agreement under the terms of the Vienna Memorandum and that Kreisky intended to submit the agreement to the Cabinet for approval. (*Ibid.*, 263.0041-A/12-2159)

<sup>2</sup> Dated December 23, telegram 1570 from Vienna reported that a meeting attended by Kreisky, representatives of the Austrian oil administration, and the oil companies with an interest in settlement of the negotiations under the Vienna Memorandum had taken place on December 22. Kreisky reported at that time that the preliminary settlement had been submitted to the Cabinet. (*Ibid.*, 263.0041-A/12-2359)

Now Austrians realize that our support will not be automatic in the absence of reciprocal understanding and cooperation on their part. Furthermore this has been accomplished without generating resentment or any feeling that U.S. is unfair or unjust.

I wish to express my personal appreciation of Department's and ICA's understanding and support in face of logical pressures to liquidate our ICA holdings in this little remaining European outpost. Merry Christmas.<sup>3</sup>

**Matthews**

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<sup>3</sup>Negotiations between the Austrian Government and Socony–Mobil under the terms of the Vienna Memorandum were finally concluded in June 1960.

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### 324. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 5, 1960.

#### SUBJECT

Counterpart Release and Counterpart Settlement

#### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Fritz Bock, Austrian Minister of Trade<sup>1</sup>  
Ambassador Wilfried Platzer, Austrian Embassy  
Dr. Johann Augenthaler, Austrian Ministry of Trade  
Dr. Edgar Plan, Financial Counselor, Austrian Embassy

The Under Secretary  
Mr. Robert H. McBride—WE  
Mr. Emerson Brown—CPT  
Mr. Harry M. Phelan, Jr.—WE

Minister Bock said that one of the current primary concerns of the Austrian Government was the question of the release of the blocked counterpart funds and the arrangement of a final counterpart settlement. He was sure the Under Secretary would appreciate the planning

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 763.5–MSP/4–560. Confidential. Drafted by Phelan and approved in U on April 22.

<sup>1</sup>Bock was in the United States March 31–April 7, beginning in New York, then traveling to New England and Detroit before arriving in Washington on April 4. He left Washington for Vienna via New York on April 7.

problems connected with the future management of the funds both in the period immediately after the funds were released and subsequent to the final settlement. After asserting that effective planning could not be carried out in the absence of a time schedule, the Minister posed two direct questions: (1) Precisely when could Austria expect the release of the "blocked" counterpart funds?, the next ten days?, the next month?, or when?, and (2) When did the U.S. expect to reach a final counterpart settlement? In commenting on his questions, the Minister said that the Austrian economy needed the blocked funds right now. However, from a monetary standpoint, a sudden unplanned release of the funds might be undesirable and, therefore, Austria must know our intentions in order that they could plan the absorption of the funds so as to insure a minimum monetary impact. With regard to his second question, the Minister held that any acceptable final settlement should leave the subsequent disposition of funds solely at the discretion and control of the Austrian Government. Austria would, however, be prepared to consider entering certain agreements with the United States prior to final settlement regarding subsequent uses of the funds.

The Under Secretary replied that he understood the Minister had already discussed these questions with ICA Director Riddleberger (Bock had talked to Riddleberger in the morning prior to his meeting with the Under Secretary)<sup>2</sup> who was the competent official in this matter. He did know, however, that we had not yet been able to overcome all the administrative difficulties which we had encountered in connection with the counterpart releases. The Under Secretary pointed out that certain releases had been made in recent months and that this would indicate that other releases could be expected to follow. As regarded a precise time schedule, the Under Secretary felt that Mr. Riddleberger would be better informed than he was. In response to the question on the final settlement, the Under Secretary assured Bock that we too wanted to reach a final settlement as expeditiously as possible. We understood that informal talks between our Embassy in Vienna and the appropriate Austrian officials had already started and we hoped that these talks would be the preface to a general agreement. Certainly, with the good will that existed on both sides it would be possible to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement in the not too distant future.

Minister Bock replied that, after talking to Mr. Riddleberger, he still had no precise idea when the release of counterpart would be effected. Mr. Riddleberger had, in fact, replied to his questions by stating that the U.S. was still trying to overcome administrative problems connected

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<sup>2</sup>No record of the conversation with Riddleberger has been found in Department of State files.



with the releases and that it was, therefore, impossible to give him (Bock) a precise answer as to the timing of the releases. He hoped the Under Secretary would appreciate Austria's need to know when, under existing conditions, it could expect to have the overall funds available and on what principles. Long-range planning was impossible without this information.

The Under Secretary replied that he was glad to know that Austria's main interest was in long-range planning rather than in what would happen in the next ten days. We have made substantial progress in solving the various administrative problems connected with release and we are simultaneously studying the problems connected with a final settlement. We hope that all these problems can be solved in the coming months and that a mutually satisfactory agreement on the way the funds will be released can be reached. The Under Secretary pointed out that these problems had been present when he took up his duties here in 1957 and he most earnestly hoped they would be solved before he finished at the end of this year.

Minister Bock said he felt some alarm at the Under Secretary's last statement in that he and the rest of the Europeans hoped that his term of office would be much longer than the Under Secretary had indicated and, therefore, that tying the solution of this problem to his term of office might put it far into the future. The Minister then asked if there was anything Austria could do to speed up the solution adding that "the Vienna Memorandum problem has been solved and that the Article 26 enabling legislation was in draft form before the Parliament." "What else could the Austrians do?"

The Under Secretary said he didn't think there was anything the Austrians could do since the administrative problems were ours; they were ones which we alone could solve. After emphasizing that we do not and have never connected the counterpart problem with the Vienna Memorandum claims, the Under Secretary said, in connection with the latter, that we had been pleased with the agreement reached in December between the claimant companies and the Austrian authorities.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, we had been disappointed with the slow progress toward settlement since then. We understood that some details remained to be worked out and that the terms of a final agreement were still subject to cabinet approval. The Under Secretary, observing that the Vienna Memorandum problem was also a very old one, added that he was hoping to visit Vienna in the summer after the ECOSOC meetings in Geneva, and he sincerely hoped that both the counterpart and Vienna

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 323.

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Memorandum problems would be out of the way and that he would not have to discuss them again at that time.

Bock replied that he fully shared the Under Secretary's hope and said that the Austrians had had a bad conscience about the Vienna Memorandum and would welcome the day when the burden thereon would be lifted. He expressed his gratification over the Under Secretary's intent to visit Vienna and expressed the hope that he would agree to be a State guest.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>See footnote 8, Document 327, and Document 328.

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**325. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (White) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Hare)**

Washington, May 17, 1960.

**SUBJECT**

OCB Consideration on May 18, 1960 of the Semi-Annual Appraisal of US Policy Toward Austria (NSC 5603, dated March 23, 1956)<sup>1</sup>

*Salient Features*

There has been no basic change in Austrian policy, or in US policy vis-à-vis Austria, since the last semi-annual review.<sup>2</sup> However, in view of the fact that the NSC policy paper was written in late 1955 (although dated 1956), its usefulness would be greatly enhanced if it were brought up to date.

For instance, there is no mention of US recognition of Austrian neutrality, which took place after the report was written, or of the South Tyrol question, which was not an active issue in 1955. In addition, there have been certain changes in the military collaboration between the US and Austria which should be reflected in the paper.

*Possible OCB Discussions*

In view of the fact that the members of the Working Group on Austria were unanimous in believing that the policy paper should be

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Austria. Secret. Drafted by Wells. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet, dated May 16, that reiterated the recommendation to review U.S. policy toward Austria.

<sup>1</sup>See footnote 1, Document 295.

<sup>2</sup>See Document 322.

brought up to date, *there will probably be relatively little discussion*. However, the following subjects may be brought up:

1. *South Tyrol*. It now seems likely Austria will ask this session of UNGA to request the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the South Tyrol dispute despite the fact that the US, UK, France and the USSR, in uncoordinated approaches to the Austrians, have indicated disapproval of bringing the question before the UN. *We have told both the Austrians and the Italians that we favor continuation of bilateral negotiations, and, if they should fail, we believe consideration should be given to referring the matter to International Court of Justice in a "contentious proceeding"*.

2. *Austrian Assets Treaty, the Vienna Memorandum and Persecutee Claims*. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 9 voted not to take action on the Austrian Assets Treaty (the Treaty would implement our obligation under the State Treaty to return Austrian assets in the US). Therefore it is virtually certain the Senate will not approve the Treaty this session.

It seems likely this will have no adverse effect on the "Vienna Memorandum" agreements about to be finalized between Socony-Mobil and the Austrian authorities settling the former's claims.

However, the Committee's action may have some adverse effect on the Austrian Parliament, which is considering passing legislation further to implement Austria's obligations under Article 26 of the State Treaty to persecutees, principally Jews.

3. *US-Austrian Military Collaboration*. The small (\$301,000) training program for Austria was approved for FY 1960 and will probably be continued at virtually the same level for FY 1961. We plan to give no new grant assistance to Austria.

The Austrians have asked to buy certain military equipment, including 40 military aircraft. The Pentagon has offered to sell 36 aircraft of a type similar to that requested and is conducting price and availability studies on the other items.

#### *Clearances*

L/EUR, INR, S/P, U/MSC. There are no unresolved differences in the Department.

#### *Recommendation*

That you recommend approval of the Semi-Annual Appraisal of US policy toward Austria.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>No written semi-annual appraisal of U.S. policy toward Austria has been found in Department of State files; however, a memorandum from Bromley Smith to James Lay, May 25, noted that the OCB had decided on May 18 not to submit a report to the NSC but had recommended that NSC 5603 be updated in view of new developments since it was drafted in 1955. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Austria)

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**326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria**

Washington, July 5, 1960, 9:09 p.m.

23. From Acting Secretary for Ambassador. In light developments during Khrushchev visit (Embtels 23 and 34 and Deptel 19)<sup>1</sup> and continued inability Austrian Govt remove obstacles to Vienna Memorandum settlement I should appreciate your frank assessment regarding advisability my trip to Vienna at this juncture.<sup>2</sup> On one hand cancellation of trip might be useful as clear indication to Austrians our dissatisfaction with their failure promptly disassociate themselves from Khrushchev's remarks and our increasing annoyance their inability definitively discharge their obligations under Vienna Memorandum. On other hand my visit might be useful in providing opportunity to Austrian public and press to express themselves in manner contrasting markedly with reception accorded Khrushchev. It might also be regarded as mark of friendship for small country, majority whose people and leaders showed no hesitation in exhibiting disapproval of Soviet Union. Another factor also to be considered is that Commies might be able to use cancellation for propaganda attacks.<sup>3</sup>

If you believe visit should go on as now planned, I should be grateful for any suggestions regarding my speech to Foreign Policy Society in light Khrushchev visit developments. It would be more convenient to have these before departure from Washington scheduled July 9 than having them forwarded to Geneva as previously indicated.<sup>4</sup>

**Dillon**

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12-DI/7-560. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Stabler; cleared with McBride, Kohler and Day; and approved by Dillon.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram 23 from Vienna, July 3, quoted remarks made by Khrushchev attacking the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany on July 2 at a rally sponsored by the Austro-Soviet Society in Vienna. (*Ibid.*, 033.6163/7-360) Telegram 34 from Vienna, July 5, noted that the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany had lodged an official protest with the Austrian Government concerning Khrushchev's attack on Adenauer and his country and requested instructions to lodge a similar protest. (*Ibid.*, 033.6163/7-560) Telegram 19 to Vienna, July 5, transmitted the requested instructions. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Dillon was scheduled to visit Vienna July 14-17.

<sup>3</sup> Prior to transmission, the following paragraph was deleted from the text of the telegram at this point: "If you feel that visit should not be cancelled, another alternative might be to defer it and I should appreciate your views on this. If deferral should seem desirable, I would, of course, hope that my schedule would permit later visit."

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 43 from Vienna, July 5, received in Washington at 4:31 p.m., contained the recommendation that Dillon's speech before the Foreign Policy Society on July 15 should touch not only on economic subjects but also on "America's world-wide purposes." (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12-DI/7-560) Although telegram 23 was not transmitted until 9:09 p.m., it was presumably drafted before receipt of telegram 43 from Vienna.

**327. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter**

Washington, July 8, 1960.

SUBJECT

Khrushchev's Trip to Austria, June 30–July 8, 1960

1. *Preparations*

Khrushchev's visit resulted from a long-standing invitation to repay Chancellor Raab's visit to the Soviet Union in 1958.<sup>1</sup> The itinerary called for three days in Vienna followed by a five-day tour of the provinces and a final day back in Vienna. The only significant change was Khrushchev's last-minute decision to return to Vienna a day early.

Considerable friction developed between Chancellor Raab (People's Party) and Foreign Minister Kreisky (Socialist Party) over (a) the insistence of the former that he (Raab) accompany Khrushchev through the provinces and (b) the arrangements for Khrushchev's July 2 speech before the Austro-Soviet Society. (Contrary to Kreisky's advice, outdoor loud speakers were installed and, although not necessary, Raab was present.)

2. *Attitude of Austrians*

The Austrian public displayed a surprising lack of interest, as was reflected by the small crowds which turned out to see Khrushchev. The independent press brilliantly kept the wool from the eyes of the public and was consistently critical of Khrushchev, whereas the party and government controlled press tended to follow a mild middle path. The Catholic Church, at Raab's request, did not close St. Stephens Cathedral during the visit. However, it did strongly remind its followers, particularly in special services, of the suppression of the Church in Communist countries. The trade unions remained cool towards the visitor.

In contrast, business interests seemed eager to extend hospitality to Khrushchev. Most important of all, the aging Chancellor, who believes that he alone can "handle" the Russians, seemed determined to convert the visit into a personal triumph for himself.

The reception at the airport was correct and protocolaire. Neither the Papal Nuncio, who is Dean of the Diplomatic Corp, nor Ambassador Matthews was there. (No members of our Embassy attended any of the functions for Khrushchev.)

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Source: Department of State, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123. Confidential. Drafted by Wells, concurred in by McBride and Boster, and initialed by White.

<sup>1</sup> See Documents 298 and 299.

### 3. *United States Protest*

Following the German protest to the Austrian Government over its failure to disassociate itself from Khrushchev's violent attacks on Adenauer, Ambassador Matthews, on instructions, made a somewhat similar protest on July 6 with respect to Khrushchev's attacks on the United States.<sup>2</sup> He stated that the fact Khrushchev attacked the United States in the presence of Raab added increased seriousness to the failure of the Austrian Government to act. Our Ambassador asked what steps the Austrians intended to take to make clear its disassociation from Khrushchev's remarks. Our Embassy, and later the Department, informed the press of this *démarche*.

There was no official Austrian reaction to our *démarche* prior to Khrushchev's departure on July 8, but the Chancellor has asked to see Ambassador Matthews on July 9, presumably to discuss our protest.<sup>3</sup>

### 4. *Khrushchev's Statements on Austrian Neutrality*

Khrushchev stated on July 4, and later on July 8, that "the USSR would not remain idle should anyone violate Austrian neutrality". On July 6 he warned that if the rocket bases in Italy were used against "Socialist countries", this would be a violation of Austrian neutrality. The Austrian press reacted strongly to these statements, but there has been no official Austrian comment.<sup>4</sup>

### 5. *Khrushchev's Remarks on Berlin*

At his farewell news conference on July 8 Khrushchev stated that the Soviets might sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans in September when the West German Parliament intends to meet in West Berlin. "This would mean that all members of the West German Parliament would have to ask for visas from the East German Government in order to return to West Germany."

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 58 from Vienna, July 6, reported that Matthews had protested to Kreisky the use by Khrushchev of an Austrian platform to attack the United States, along the lines authorized by telegram 19 to Vienna (see footnote 1, Document 326). (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6163/7-660)

<sup>3</sup> On July 10, Raab made a speech over Austrian radio in which he specifically referred to the protests made by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the speech, he defended Austria's friendship with these countries and with Italy and singled out Chancellor Adenauer as always having been the object of his special friendship. The speech is printed in Mayrzedt and Hummer, eds., *20 Jahre*.

<sup>4</sup> At a meeting of the Austrian Cabinet on July 12, reported in telegram 120 from Vienna, July 13, Chancellor Raab was authorized to issue a statement rejecting Khrushchev's stated interpretation of Austrian neutrality and to restate the Austrian conception. (Department of State, Central Files, 763.13/7-1360)

6. *Communiqué*

The final joint communiqué (attached)<sup>5</sup> contained, in addition to the usual platitudes, a statement that future Austrian oil deliveries to the USSR (required by the State Treaty) would be reduced and Austrian compensation deliveries of goods (which are now coming to an end) would be continued under a five-year Austro-Soviet Trade Agreement, to be concluded. The Austrians have been worried over possible economic dislocations should these latter deliveries end abruptly.

7. *Under Secretary's Forthcoming Visit to Vienna July 14–17*

The Under Secretary asked Ambassador Matthews whether, in light of the failure of the Austrian Government (1) to disassociate itself from Khrushchev's attacks on the United States and (2) to remove the obstacles to the "Vienna Memorandum" settlement with Socony-Mobil, his (the Under Secretary's) trip should be cancelled.<sup>6</sup> Although Mr. Matthews at first recommended that the visit go on as scheduled,<sup>7</sup> he subsequently telegraphed that, in light of the publicity given to our protest, he will recommend postponement unless the Austrian Government prior to July 14 gives adequate satisfaction to our July 6 protest.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Not attached to the source text; it is printed in Mayrzedt and Hummer, eds., 20 *Jahre*.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 326.

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 61 from Vienna, July 6, recommended that Dillon complete the trip as planned. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–DI/7–660)

<sup>8</sup> Matthews' subsequent recommendation to postpone the trip unless satisfaction was received was transmitted in telegram 75 from Vienna, July 8. (*Ibid.*, 110.12–DI/7–860) Raab's speech of July 10 (see footnote 3 above) and statement of July 13 (see footnote 4 above) apparently provided adequate satisfaction. Dillon visited Vienna July 14–17, giving a speech before the Foreign Policy Association on July 15. The speech and the communiqué that ended the visit are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1960, pp. 215–219. Memoranda of conversation between Kreisky and Dillon, all dated July 15, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1713. The conversations covered European integration and international trade problems, U.S.-Austrian problems, Khrushchev's visit to Austria, U.S. and Austrian foreign policy, the refugee problem, and the U.S.-Austrian Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty.

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**328. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State**

Vienna, July 19, 1960, 1 a.m.

160. Paris for Dillon. Various details and aspects of Under Secretary's visit as well as excellent press reaction are being reported in separate messages but I wish Dept to know it was very successful from every point of view.<sup>1</sup> The timing was perfect for Dillon's arrival took place while Austrians were still red-faced over Khrushchev visit and uneasy over our pointed and salutary reminders of obligations of a neutral to disassociate itself from attacks on its friends. These reminders had given Austrian officials some cause for thought and anxiety and some uncertainty as to future relations, as well as some criticism in their own press. They were determined therefore nothing should spoil cordiality and friendly atmosphere which they meant visit to reflect. The press in particular, starting with warm remarks of Under Secretary on arrival and ending with Sunday headlines of his spontaneous toast at Kreisky's dinner, "Austria the bastion of freedom", could not have been better. Latter headlines and the story were given lead play in number of Sunday newspapers even overshadowing Congo developments.

Principal play was on his declaration both in television interview and in his speech at Foreign Policy Association that Austria entitled to interpret its own neutrality. Austrians were so eager to maintain friendly atmosphere they never raised question of counterpart settlement or South Tyrol. In fact Kreisky told me following Under Secretary's departure airport he had deliberately refrained from mentioning latter for that reason (his additional reasons are contained in Dillon's 35 from Belgrade).

Under Secretary's speech before Foreign Policy Association brought out a packed house including Ambassadors of all prominent European countries and leaders Austrian political and business communities and evoked much applause. His remarks on European economic developments and our position with respect thereto brought about some much needed clarification of our real position which has not heretofore been fully understood or believed, and I believe speech and his discussion during Friday's talks constitute the real point of substance of any importance. In fact Austrians were obviously padding political half of discussions owing to lack of many bilateral questions between the two countries.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12-DI/7-1960. Confidential. Repeated to Paris.

<sup>1</sup>Regarding Dillon's visit to Vienna, see footnote 8, Document 327.



Other aspect of visit which had real value was chance given to Kreisky to expound his views on world situation and on specific aspects thereof including an interpreting account of his estimate of and conversations with various Soviet leaders over past two years. This he did in relaxed atmosphere of our six-hour drive to Melk, Durnstein and return. It also gave him opportunity of outlining his views re coalition govt functioning and aims, personalities and differences of Austria's two principal coalition partners. This I know he greatly appreciated.

All in all it was a very worthwhile visit.

**Matthews**

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### 329. Editorial Note

Before traveling to New York on October 5 as head of the Austrian Delegation to the United Nations, Foreign Minister Kreisky met with Under Secretary Dillon on October 4. Briefing memoranda for the meeting are in Department of State, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123. Memoranda of conversation are *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. The conversations covered the following topics: the South Tyrol problem, relations between the EEC and EFTA, joint Austrian-Yugoslav aid programs, Jewish claims under Article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty, Khrushchev's conduct at the United Nations, and the progress of the Austrian Assets Treaty in the U.S. Congress.

Prior to the meeting with Dillon, Kreisky met with Livingston Merchant, with whom he discussed the South Tyrol problem. After meeting with Dillon, Kreisky and the rest of the Austrian Delegation met at a roundtable discussion with a U.S. Delegation led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ivan White. No memorandum of the conversation with Merchant has been found. A memorandum of the roundtable meeting, at which Article 26 claims, the Austrian Assets Treaty, dollar bonds, and the South Tyrol were discussed, is *ibid.*, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123.

## 330. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/126

New York, October 6, 1960, 10 a.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF  
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, October 3-7, 1960

## PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary  
Benson E. L. Timmons, Advisor,  
USDel, UNGA

Austria

Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Austrian Foreign  
Minister  
Dr. Franz Gschnitzer, Under  
Secretary of State for Foreign  
Affairs  
Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Federal  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
Dr. Wilhelm Apfel, Counsellor  
Dr. Rudolf Kirchsclaeger, Federal  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

## SUBJECT

Bilateral Discussion between the Secretary and the Austrian Foreign Minister

The Foreign Minister opened the discussion by referring to his talks on October 4 with Mr. Merchant.<sup>1</sup> He said that he had been entirely frank and had dealt with all aspects of the South Tyrol problem. He had, on the other hand, been careful not to exaggerate or dramatize the problem. He said he was definitely unhappy over the South Tyrol problem. Some way must be found to settle it. The Austrian proposal for autonomy for Bozen is already the minimum that Austria can accept. There would be no sense in accepting any other solution here and then being discredited at home.

Mr. Kreisky continued by saying that the institution of autonomous status is not a new idea. It has already been utilized with respect to other parts of Italy. After World War II provision was made for regions, some with more and some with less rights. Kreisky named Sicily, Sardinia and Aosta as regions having autonomy. Such status would be a good solution for the quarter million South Tyrolese who live in a clearly defined

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1767. Confidential. Drafted by Timmons on October 7 and approved in S on October 14. The conversation took place at the Waldorf Towers. A briefing memorandum, dated October 1, for this meeting, originally scheduled for October 5, is *ibid.*, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123. It foresaw Kreisky raising the South Tyrol question, which Austria had inscribed on the U.N. agenda on September 23 and to which the United States had objected after inscription, and general international questions.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 329.

area. Aosta is an example, Kreisky said, of a historical province divided into two artificial regions. Austria is not asking for such a solution, but rather the division of an artificial province (Trentino–Bolzano) into its two natural regions, with autonomy for Bolzano (Bozen). Kreisky said he wished to emphasize that Austria envisaged only a solution “inside Italy” and “within Italian frontiers”. Austria wished merely to see the maximum possible self-administration and self-government.

The Foreign Minister said there was a strong and growing feeling among the young in the South Tyrol in the direction of self-determination. There are hundreds of small villages where people do not want to hear of the difficulties in the outside world but are deeply concerned with their own problems. “There are a lot of Lumumbas there”.

Kreisky went on to say that there is a strong group in both North and South Tyrol who hope that no solution to the problem will be found but rather that self-determination will be demanded. The Minister said the South Tyrolese are conservative and will support the Italian Government if granted autonomy. “The only Communists in South Tyrol are among the Italians who have been brought in from other parts of Italy”.

If self-determination should come to be accepted as a demand, Kreisky said, there would be a “hopeless split between Austria and Italy”, for self-determination means in the long run a change in frontiers. The Austrian press would certainly support self-determination.

The Secretary said the U.S. was unhappy over this dispute between two of its good friends. We had hoped the problem could be worked out between them and not brought to the UN. But now that the item has been inscribed, we hoped the matter would lend itself to juridical determination.

The Secretary continued by saying that he did not wish to get into the merits of the matter. We have not done so with the Italians. He understood that there was both a question of interpretation of the treaty<sup>2</sup> and of its implementation. He did not know whether the autonomy of which the Minister had spoken was possible.

Mr. Kreisky said that Italy had refused to discuss the question of autonomy. As for reference to the ICJ, speaking frankly, the Court would have “a very bad treaty” before it. Its only good aspect is its spirit. “Austria would lose the case before it started”. Kreisky said that if the UN should press Austria to go to the ICJ, public opinion in Austria would press for denunciation and the Austrian Government would probably be forced to yield.

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<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to the Gruber–de Gasperi Agreement of 1946; see footnote 15, Document 295.

Returning to the theme of the "bad treaty", Kreisky said that when it had been signed Austria had no rights and no sovereignty. Also, Kreisky continued, the Soviets had had reservations. They had termed it "bad", had said it would never help the minority involved, and had claimed it was the result of Austria's "misplaced solidarity with the West".

The Secretary asked whether the Soviets had put all this in writing, and Kreisky replied in the affirmative.

Kreisky also mentioned, but did not develop at length, the thought that there will be trouble from "some people" who will press for a demilitarization of the area. Kreisky said Austria was against this and added it represented "a danger to the West".

Kreisky went on to say that fortunately thus far the South Tyrol question had not been caught up in the East-West conflict. However, the Soviets might change their attitude at any time. Austria would be unhappy if it were to be supported on the issue by the Eastern Bloc. Kreisky said he thought that up to this time the Soviets had not wished to support Austria on the South Tyrol question in view of the forthcoming Italian elections and the Italian Communist position of opposing South Tyrol autonomy. However, before the UN General Committee debate on inscription, Zorin (USSR) had told the Austrian delegation that if Austria would abstain on the Korean and Hungarian issues, the Soviets would support Austria on South Tyrol. The Austrians had refused.

Kreisky, reverting to the subject of the ICJ, said the Italians have "good lawyers" and are entirely willing to go to the Court. "But even if we had better lawyers, we would still lose." He reiterated a solution must be found on the basis of autonomy.

Kreisky went on to say that the Austrian Government was now considering the question of the timing of the debate on the South Tyrol item. Originally the Austrians had agreed with the Italian idea of a debate as early as possible in the Special Political Committee, but were now giving thought to the desirability of postponing discussion until November. The Austrian delegation is wondering which would be better. If the debate were postponed, this would give "a little more time to see what can be done", and would get the matter "out of the shadow of the present tension in the UN".

The Secretary said that on the question of time he was not sure that a US judgment would be too useful. Sometimes a delay helps, but sometimes it makes the problem worse. Kreisky said the people in the South Tyrol want an early decision, whether positive or negative. The Secretary added that where internal problems of this nature are concerned, probably the earlier that a decision can be given the better.

The Secretary spoke of the five neutral power resolution<sup>3</sup> on resumption of contacts between the President and Khrushchev, saying that it had earlier been reported to us that Nehru would not oppose the deletion of the references to the President and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, but during the debates Nehru had in fact put up vigorous opposition. Nehru had given Tito a commitment, before the latter's departure from New York, that the original resolution would be pressed unchanged in its essentials.

The Foreign Minister said that Austria had been informed by the Afro-Asian bloc that they opposed Portugal for the West European Security Council seat but would support Austria. Kreisky said Austria does not intend to accept this proposal, since she does not wish to become a pawn in such a game. Austria agrees that the Western European candidate should be supported, even though acceptance by Austria of the Afro-Asian "offer" would probably attract Afro-Asian support for Austria's position on South Tyrol. Kreisky then made a plea for Western understanding and support of that position. He said Austria was the first Western country openly to support the UN Secretary-General, which had made Khrushchev "angry". Austria was not in the position of, say, Canada, but lives in the shadow of the Iron Curtain. Kreisky said Austria has shown very many proofs of "Western solidarity" and has "run more risks than any other Western European country". In return, the West should show more understanding of the Austrian position on South Tyrol. Kreisky said Austria would not understand receiving the "cold shoulder" in the form of a united Western front against her.

The Secretary said that the US also believes in supporting for Security Council seats the choice of the region concerned, even though this may present us with problems, as does the UAR candidacy this year. The US would very much dislike seeing the South Tyrol item and the question of the Security Council seat joined in any way.

The meeting closed with a statement by Kreisky that the Italians can afford to wait, since they have "the assets in their hands".

In a separate subsequent conversation Waldheim spoke even more strongly to Timmons against any UN action referring the question to the ICJ. He said this would be "totally unacceptable" to Austria. He said Austria would probably find "satisfactory" an Italian declaration that South Tyrol autonomy would be discussed in the Italian Parliament as proposed by the South Tyrolese deputies. Otherwise Austria would undoubtedly press for a UNGA resolution asking for discussions on the basis of autonomy for Bolzano.

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<sup>3</sup> Regarding the five neutral power resolution, September 29, U.N. doc. A/4522, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960*, pp. 37–39.

### 331. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/123

New York, October 11, 1960, 4:20–4:30 p.m.

#### SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

##### PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
Benson E.L. Timmons, Advisor,  
USDel, UNGA

*Italy*

H.E. Manlio Brosio, Italian  
Ambassador to the U.S.

##### SUBJECT

Call on the President by Foreign Minister Segni and Alto-Adige

Ambassador Brosio said that the first subject he wished to mention to the Secretary was the possibility of a call by Foreign Minister Segni on the President. Ambassador Brosio said he knew the Secretary understood that the Italian request indicated no dissatisfaction at all with the talks the Italian Delegation had had with the Department of State, but rather related to the importance attached by Italian public opinion to the Alto-Adige question. It would be most helpful in Italy for the Foreign Minister to be received by the President and to be able to present to him briefly the Italian viewpoint.

The Secretary said he fully understood and that the appointment was now being worked on by the Department.

Ambassador Brosio then turned to the substance of the Alto-Adige item. He said the Austrian Delegation was planning to introduce a resolution calling for full autonomy for the region.<sup>1</sup> The Italian Government was greatly disturbed by the demonstrations that had taken place, both in Innsbruck and in Alto-Adige, on the occasion of the recent 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Saint Germain. Italian public opinion had been shocked by them. The Italian Government feared that the demand for

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Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1767. Confidential. Drafted by Timmons on October 12 and approved by S on October 14. The conversation took place in the U.N. Delegates' Lounge.

<sup>1</sup>The U.N. General Assembly referred to the Special Political Committee the Austrian proposal for an autonomous South Tyrol on October 10. After several revisions (U.N. docs. A/SPC/44, A/SPC/L.46, A/SPC/L.47, A/SPC/L.48, A/SPC/L.49, and A/SPC/L.50), a diluted resolution calling for the peaceful resolution of the South Tyrol problem was referred to the General Assembly on October 31, when it was adopted by acclamation (A/4553). See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960*, pp. 176–179, for text of the approved resolution.

autonomy was only the first step in the direction of a demand for self-determination.

Ambassador Brosio went on to say that the Austrians would probably be prepared to accept some compromise proposed by others, calling for a good offices committee or commission of inquiry. The Italian Government was not prepared to accept any such group or to grant full autonomy. The Ambassador noted that Foreign Minister Kreisky in his UN speech had not mentioned the deGasperi–Gruber agreement.<sup>2</sup> Brosio said that if any resolution “that remains within the framework of the treaty” is proposed, Italy would, of course, look at it, but very much feels that the Austrians will attempt to turn it against Italy.

Ambassador Brosio asked for the help of the U.S. Delegation “in an active way” on the Alto-Adige. He said that in spite of the assurances of U.S. support, the Italian Delegation was concerned that “in the working out of the matter” in the UNGA, the support of the U.S. Delegation, which had so many other problems to deal with, would not be as strong or active as Italy wished.

Brosio concluded with the remark that “pure German nationalism” was at work in the Alto-Adige issue and that Austria seemed to be losing control of the situation and all sense of proportion. He said that since the debate will in all probability begin in the Special Political Committee on October 18, Foreign Minister Segni would like to see the President this week.<sup>3</sup>

Ambassador Brosio thanked the Secretary for this opportunity to discuss the matter further and said that he wanted to be sure that there was no misunderstanding on any of the points covered.

The Secretary reassured the Ambassador that the U.S. was fully committed actively to support the Italian position of referral of the case to the ICJ and that the Delegation would work actively to this end.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 15, Document 295.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of Segni’s conversation with the President on October 12 is in vol. VII, Part 2, Document 280.

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**332. Paper Prepared by the NSC Planning Board**

NSC 6020

Washington, December 9, 1960.

**DRAFT STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD AUSTRIA****General Considerations**

1. The Austrian State Treaty, which came into force on July 27, 1955, ending the occupation and re-establishing Austria's independence and sovereignty, marked the achievement of the major post-war U.S. objective in Austria. The price, however, which Austria paid for Soviet willingness to conclude the Treaty was a policy of perpetual military neutrality and heavy economic obligations to the Soviet Union payable over 6 to 10 years.

2. Austria, an integral part of free Europe, is a symbol of resistance to the Soviets. Austria is strategically important because of its position controlling important approaches to Western and Southern Europe and the Danube gateway to the satellites.

3. Soviet aims in Austria today are primarily to prevent close alignment with the West and to draw Austria as much as possible into the political and economic orbit of the USSR. Moreover, the Soviet Union hopes to use the Austrian example as an incentive to develop neutralism elsewhere. A weakening of Austria's stability and pro-Western ties would constitute a serious setback for the United States.

4. Austria's post-Treaty neutrality, as defined by law, prevents it from entering military alliances or allowing the establishment of foreign military bases on Austrian territory. Austrian political leaders have interpreted this neutrality to mean that Austria is free to cooperate with the West in political, economic and cultural fields and to accept outside assistance for its armed forces. The United States has encouraged Austria to adopt and maintain this interpretation of its neutrality (a) to ensure Austria's Western orientation and (b) to minimize the adverse influence on Austria and other nations of Soviet pressures to broaden Austria's neutrality.

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Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6020. Secret. Attached to the source text were a cover sheet; a memorandum by Bromley Smith of January 2, 1962, noting that the President had authorized rescission of NSC 6020; a memorandum of January 18, 1961, by James Lay stating that the President had that date approved NSC 6020 and that it superseded NSC 5603; a transmittal memorandum by James Lay of December 9, 1960; a financial appendix with Department of Defense comments; and a memorandum by James Lay of December 27, 1960, submitting revised pages 10 and 11 to all holders of NSC 6020. None is printed. The draft statement of policy presumably had its origins with the OCB recommendation of May 18 to re-evaluate U.S. policy toward Austria; see footnote 3, Document 325. No previous drafts of the policy paper have been found.



5. In a note to the Austrian Government dated December 6, 1955,<sup>2</sup> the United States (a) took cognizance of the Austrian constitutional law establishing neutrality and (b) recognized “the perpetual neutrality of Austria as defined therein.”

6. United in resistance to the Soviets, a coalition government of the equally powerful Socialist and conservative People’s Parties, which together now represent 89 percent of the vote, has maintained political stability in Austria since the war. Although removal of the common bond of opposition to Soviet occupation policies and the emergence of difficult political and economic problems have tended to exacerbate the basic differences between the two parties, the coalition will probably remain for some considerable time to come. Under present circumstances the creation of a stable one-party government seems highly unlikely. As long as relatively favorable economic and international conditions prevail, moderate forces in Austria will probably remain vigorous enough to ensure the maintenance of political democracy and stability.

7. The Austrian economy is prosperous and expanding. Since the currency reform in 1953, the GNP has increased by more than half—a rate of growth second only to Germany as the most rapid in Western Europe. Since 1953 foreign exchange reserves have more than doubled and the balance of payments position has remained strong, although it is forecast that the outturn will be less favorable in 1960 than in prior years. Austria’s financial position is, therefore, strong and Austria is now capable of providing increased amounts of multilateral and bilateral assistance to less-developed nations. It is anticipated that Austria will become a member of the newly organized International Development Association and will provide limited amounts of capital to the less-developed nations through that institution.

8. With its increased economic strength, Austria has taken some steps toward eliminating restrictions in its international trade and payments. However, more remains to be done, and the United States is urging the Austrians to take further steps to reduce reliance on these restrictions and discrimination, including the discrimination which arises from the bilateral trading arrangements which Austria maintains.

9. About 12 per cent of Austrian trade is with the Soviet Bloc.  
[3 lines of source text not declassified]

10. After the State Treaty became effective, the Austrian Government established an army [2 lines of source text not declassified]. The army (about 55,000)<sup>3</sup> and the internal security forces (about 27,500) are now

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<sup>2</sup>For text of the note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1955, pp. 1011–1012.

<sup>3</sup>[Footnote in the source text (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified.]

capable only of maintaining internal security and coping with minor border incidents. Any significant enlargement of the army is unlikely in view of Socialist reluctance to allocate large amounts for defense.

11. During the period 1955–1959 the United States programmed approximately \$80 million to equip the Austrian army. Subsequent grant military aid has consisted solely of a small training program. [10-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

12. While the Austrian Government has publicly stated its intention to provide adequate protection and care for refugees, continued Austrian cooperation in this program will require continued U.S. and international assistance and advice.

13. Austria's principal international problem, apart from Soviet pressures, is its dispute with Italy over the South Tyrol/Alto Adige. Austria disregarded Italy's suggestion that both countries refer the question to the International Court of Justice and in 1960, against U.S. advice, brought this dispute to the UN. The United States believes Italy and Austria should seek a solution (a) through bilateral negotiations, or, failing that, (b) by jointly referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice in a contentious proceeding (i.e., for a binding decision). On October 31, 1960 the UN General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution<sup>4</sup> which (a) urges resumption of bilateral negotiations, (b) recommends that, if the negotiations fail, both parties should seek a solution "by any of the means provided in the Charter including recourse to the International Court of Justice or any other peaceful means of their own choice" and (c) recommends that Italy and Austria refrain from any action which might impair their friendly relations.

#### Objective

14. Maintenance of an independent and stable Austria, and encouragement of its continued pro-Western orientation and resistance to Communist pressures and subversion.

#### Major Policy Guidance

[Numbered paragraph 15 (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

16. Be prepared to treat any violation of the integrity of Austrian territory or neutrality as a grave threat to the peace.

17. Encourage the continuance of coalition governments.

18. Encourage Austria to raise and maintain armed forces (including effective reserves) adequate for internal security [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

19. To this end, be prepared to provide Austria military equipment and training on a reimbursable basis and also to provide military

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, Document 331.

training on a grant basis, keeping in mind (a) Austria's interpretation of its military neutrality, and (b) the importance of avoiding Austrian dependence upon Soviet sources of supply.

*[Numbered paragraph 20 (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

21. Seek to maintain Austria's close economic ties with the West. To this end encourage Austria:

a. To continue participation in international economic organizations of the Free World.

b. To reduce reliance on trade and payments restrictions and discrimination including that arising from Austrian bilateral trading arrangements.

*[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

22. Consider negotiations with Austria for disposal of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities under Title IV of P.L. 480.

23. Urge Austria to contribute to the strengthening of Free World less developed areas, both bilaterally and through multilateral organizations such as the International Development Association, by providing increasing amounts of public capital and facilitating movements of private capital.

24. Continue the exchange-of-persons program and an active information program in Austria.

25. Continue to use all feasible measures to secure Austria's increased acceptance of responsibility (a) to grant liberal asylum and protection to political refugees from Communist countries and (b) to help resettle the refugees and displaced persons or integrate them into the Austrian economy. Continue, as appropriate in U.S. interests, to assist in the resettlement and integration of refugees and displaced persons through U.S. and international agencies, utilizing both Titles II and III of P.L. 480, as appropriate.

*8[Numbered paragraph 26 (2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

27. Encourage Austria (a) not to bring its dispute with Italy over the South Tyrol again before the UN, and (b) to follow the recommendations in the resolution passed by the UN General Assembly on October 31, 1960 with particular emphasis on jointly referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice should bilateral negotiations fail.

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