

The Words We Choose to Believe: Comparing the Influence of Source, Valence, Nationalism,
and Ideology on Trust in Foreign Media Coverage of the U.S. on Facebook

By

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Abstract

The mass distribution of fake news and misinformation through social media has become a global phenomenon, which corresponds with decreasing public trust in news media. These have put media consumption behaviors and media trust back onto the main agenda of mass communication research. It also requires updating the theoretical model of factors that are highly relevant to media trust in today's online media environment.

As the current digital media platforms have the potential to create a cross-cultural communication channel, it could be possible for audiences to develop more detailed knowledge and trust perceptions about foreign media. This study predicts positive associations between news organizations, valence, nationalism, ideology, and their interaction with news trust. A 4 by 4 by 2 survey experiment with four repeated measures was conducted to compare the American media consumers' perceptions domestic and foreign news outlets in various proximity levels and compare the positive or negative affect cues with respect to the U.S.

This study found positive associations of news outlets, valence, nationalism, and ideology on news trust. Moreover, there was no interaction between source and valence, but there was interaction between news outlets, valence, and nationalism, suggesting that news outlets and valence might represent two independent heuristics in individual's information processing. The interaction between news outlets and valence are likely to happen on both ends of nationalism spectrum. No such effect is found with ideology. In addition, both high nationalism and extreme liberals trust the media the most, implying a potential crosscutting relationship between these groups. Finally, an SEM test validates the two different heuristic routes led by news outlets and

valence. Pride and anger are two important sentimental variables that mediate the influence of nationalism and news trust.

Chapter I: Introduction and Research Purpose

The mass distribution of fake news and misinformation through social media has become a global phenomenon. It was listed as one of the top ten perils to global society by the World Economic Forum (Howard, Bolsover, Kollanyi et al., 2017; World Economic Forum, 2014), suggesting that this issue is very salient on the international stage. For example, a recent study examining British Twitter bot messages with hashtag #Brexit showed that less than one percent of the sample could generate one-third of the total messages (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016).

Misinformation from Russian bots also played an enormous role in Russia and has been used to manipulate the public opinion regarding the Ukrainian conflict (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2020). In Germany, online fake news about the 2017 presidential election was shared in one out of every four tweets (Howard et al., 2017).

In addition to the active spread of misinformation by bots, human users also actively distribute misinformation to other users (Shao, Ciampaglia, Vario et al., 2017). With low levels of certainty, it is extremely difficult for users to detect the misinformation or the automatic accounts even if they make a concerted effort to do so (Lu & Li, 2020). Moreover, such political misinformation often contains extreme ideologies, values, and sentimental comments, which could further polarize the public opinion (Shao et al., 2017). Consequently, Burbules and colleagues believed that the current cyber-media environment would generally lower people's media trust (2006), which was supported by the recent World Values Survey (2010-2014; Hanitzschi et al., 2018). The cynical attitude to media institutions may highly likely increase cynicism toward political participation.

The trend of decreasing news media trust and the growth of online misinformation have put audiences' media consumption behaviors and media trust back onto the main research agenda of mass communication research. As trust is an essential property of democratic societies, a crisis in information trust is disengaging people from political participation and will enhance anti-establishment public sentiment. Thus, it is important to recover our people's confidence in media in post-truth era. In order to understand the cognitive mechanisms of media trust, this study will explore a theoretical model involving the interaction between two important mass communication theories that are highly relevant to media trust and today's online media environment, selective exposure and the hostile media phenomenon.

A Hybrid Media Environment

This is perhaps a philosophic question: is it necessary to completely separate "social media" or "digital media", likewise, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Reddit, and recently very popular Tik Tok, from traditional media such as radio, television, and newspapers? Content-wise, besides the user-generated content (i.e., users' comments on Facebook), social media have become a major distributor of the mainstream news outlets (i.e., above 30% to 50% of population of six European countries are using social media for their major source of news). Furthermore, social media have transformed the process of news production and the business model of news outlets (Cornia et al., 2018). As a result, news has become much more accessible on mobile phones and computers than on papers and television, and moreover, by adopting the changing methods of news production, the content on the newspapers is hybrid with various information sources that produce similar content to the online posts produced by independent bloggers or amateur journalists.

In the meantime, traditional news values have been changing and expanding in the new media age. “Click-rate” “keywords” “SEO” should be essential in news values, or at least practically. The fast-transforming information environment and media production models are welcome for fake news to be highly accessible and even hold some news values via appealing and sentimental headlines and stories (Tsfati et al., 2020).

Nonetheless, today we are living in a hybrid information environment, which brings huge challenges for media researchers to expand pre-existing mass communications theories to fit. The challenges are important to overcome because the scale of influence for misinformation is getting larger (Vraga & Bode, 2020). Although it is challenging for the scope of a dissertation, it is important to consider the role of media hybridity in misinformation studies. Particularly, this dissertation takes an experimental approach to measure the influence of such hybridity as the integration of different mainstream news outlets on social media. Although still not all-context-inclusive, this study explores the relationship of information hybridity on social media and news trust in the consumers’ information perception process. Furthermore, by making comparisons between different countries, the results of this research will include a discussion about the effect of cultural differences on media trust.

Theoretical Framework

Previous studies about misinformation processing focused on potential mechanisms to detect and prevent the distribution of misinformation for the web service companies (i.e., Shu et al., 2017; Menczer, 2016), to develop new media literacy content for educators (i.e., Tully et al., 2020), and to understand psychological processes related to media trust (i.e., Pennycook & Rand, 2018; Tsfati & Cappella, 2005). For the third realm in particular, we know little about the particular processes of individual information consumption that is related to media trust and need

to develop a stronger connection to pre-existing theories of media psychology, such as the hostile media phenomenon and partisan-motivated reasoning (Tsfati et al., 2020; Fernandez et al., 2022). Both theories focus on partisan audiences, who are found to be increasingly important in terms of their influence on public opinion and political outcomes in today's world that is trending toward political polarization. Moreover, studies (i.e., Jonas et al., 2008) have found that partisans, especially conservatives, are more likely to trust misinformation that is favorable to their positions and distrust other information from outside groups. As the partisan-motivated reasoning and the hostile media phenomenon provide us strong insight about the process of partisan information perceptions, both theories will be the main perspective of this study.

The relationship between partisanship and information perceptions are complicated and more research is needed to expand our understanding. Information evaluation and perceived credibility are subjective and influenced by identities and partisanship (Allport, 1954; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross & Lepper, 1980). Recent studies (i.e., Golan, Waddell, & Barnidge, 2021; Reid, 2012; Gunther, Miller, & Liebhart, 2009) have already examined the role of group identities in selective exposure or hostile media phenomenon. Meanwhile, Tsfati and Cohen (2013) have attempted to build a better connection between information perception and media trust. According to Tsfati (2010), news trust is a concept that involves both subjective feelings of trustworthiness and the objective quality and source of the news content. The content cue is another critical concept in perceived credibility, as it is argued that the coherence between consumers' pre-exposure attitudes and the valence cues in the content towards the same target can generate different media effects, and news trust is involved as an outcome (Shah et al., 2002; Domke et al., 1998; Tsfati, 2010; Tsfati & Cohen, 2013).

It is important to note that most research in this area has focused on perceptions of the content of domestic news media, largely ignoring perceptions of foreign and international news (Golan et al., 2021). A lack of knowledge about the news outlets from outside nations will increase challenges for cross-national comparisons of hostile media phenomenon. As the current digital media platforms have the potential to create a cross-cultural communication channel, it could be possible for audiences to gain more knowledge about media from different nations and the same media perception phenomenon could still exist (Golan et al., 2021; Valenzuela, Halpern, Katz, & Miranda, 2019; Matassi & Boczkowski, 2021). Yet, previous studies have not yielded a systematic relationship model between different proximity level of news outlets (i.e., local, domestic, and international) and news trust, and their specific interactions with other factors such as group identities and content cues (Perloff, 2015; Golan et al., 2021; Barnidge et al., 2020). The existing body of research could be expanded in a number of ways.

First, within the U.S., more research is needed to expand the context of such research beyond domestic issues into issues of foreign policy and international political issues (Golan et al., 2021). For example, one study documented that nearly one-third of Democrats, who were largely opposed to the Iraq War in 2003, believed false information that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, even though it conflicted with their ideological predispositions (Valentino, Huth, & Croco, 2010). This indicates that there were other factors beyond the domestic liberal-conservative ideological divide that were at play here such as fear or national identity that were affecting public perceptions of information credibility. Moreover, the fact that American news media currently have limited international coverage, unbalanced sources, homogenic ideologies, and negative frames of foreign nations overall, further limits the news choices and the perceptions of foreign nations by the consumers. Consequentially, American public opinion

regarding foreign affairs tended to align with the mainstream ideology or the opinions of American hawkish elites who are tested as more influential on international news reports than other elites or politicians (Golan et al., 2021; Golan, 2006; Straughan, 1989).

Second, it is important to take processes like partisan-motivated reasoning beyond the domestic borders of the United States to examine their relationships in other social systems. That is, to what extent do factors like selective exposure and hostile-media perceptions influence media credibility and perceptions of misinformation in other countries and different types of identities? In his discussion about the speculation that might influence the global news flow of international affairs, Hester (1973) argued that a main speculation was the international relations between the nation where the news took place and the nation of the audiences. If the nation of the events was perceived in general as hostile by the audiences of a nation, regardless of the size, history of sovereignty, or economic power, the audiences would increasingly consume the news discussing the international threats coming from the nation on the news. Another important speculation would be cultural affinities, specifically referring to similarity and/or likeability of culture, sharing lifestyles, community interests, or language. In this speculation, people would build affective relationships with the groups they share more similarities (Hester, 1973). When it comes to media perceptions, people may not trust media from a given nation because they have disaffection to its nation of origin.

For example, both Americans and Israelis would trust Al-Jazeera less than other sources because the national origin of Al-Jazeera had conflicting ideologies that might threaten the Western democracy (Golan et al., 2021; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Azran, Lavie-Dinur, & Karniel, 2012). Therefore, regardless of domestic ideology, citizens of a nation would show more affection to the nations with similar culture and/or ideology, and more positive

international relationship. Alternatively speaking, the national identity of the news source and the consumers might eliminate the difference between liberal and conservative partisans in their news selection and news trust in the context of international news or foreign affairs. Both liberals and conservatives may hold similar opinions to the foreign nations, affairs, or policies on the news. Examining these hypotheses will not only benefit more research in international scope, but also more nuanced comparative studies based on the factors developed in this dissertation.

Scope

To understand how audiences with strong group identities will perceive information credibility from a foreign press, I will compare the selective exposure and the hostile media phenomenon across various news organizations to examine the relationship among media trust, selection, and information credibility in the post-truth era. Moreover, it is also important to go beyond the domestic research scope to understand the influence of international news sources on domestic media consumers. This study will also examine the relationship between the nationalism as a strong group identity and the news trust, and how it interacts with news outlets and content.

Overall, this dissertation will fulfill two needs in mass communications research: 1) to build knowledge about post-truth-era media consumers in the contexts of hybrid media technology and platform, globalized communication networks, and political polarization; and 2) to provide empirical evidence beyond U.S. domestic scope to connect information cognition theories and news trust.

A Brief Forecast

A survey experiment was conducted with 200 college students from all departments and taking elementary-level journalism classes and 284 adults recruited via Amazon Mechanical

Turk and distribution service Centiment.co from April 25 to October 10, 2022. The adults were recruited nationally as a supplementary non-student sample with more diverse identities. Each subject would take 15 to 20 minutes to accomplish the survey online. At the beginning they were told to participate in a study to learn about their media consumption behaviors. The pre-test questions include how often they consumed daily newspapers, television news, social media news (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, TikTok), their political ideology, and nationalism. Then they were required to read four different 300-word Facebook news post, like the ones available on the news feed with a big photo on top, followed with a big title and a short abstract of the story, one at a time. Following each post were a set of questions about their perceived credibility and trustworthiness of the post. In the end, they were asked about their main attitude to the U.S. government, national image, and foreign policy, followed by demographic questions. They were disclosed about which news was true after they finished the survey.

Chapter II of this dissertation will mainly focus on the definition of the main concepts to be measured and their roles and potential interactions with news trust, cues, selective exposure and hostile media phenomenon. Based on the introduction of related studies, the research directions of this study will be briefly discussed. In the end, a more detailed set of hypotheses and research questions for this dissertation will be explained. Chapter III will introduce the methodology in more details with the operating definition of each variable. Chapter IV will mainly discuss the statistical results of the hypotheses and theoretical model testing. A conclusion and discussion including the implications for the future studies will be in Chapter V, the final chapter of this dissertation.

Chapter II: Literature Review

This chapter presents the literature review that substantiates the concepts and hypotheses of this study, particularly about media trust, heuristic cues, partisan selective exposure, and the hostile media phenomenon. Two recent challenges have complicated the nature of media perceptions: the growing incidence of misinformation and the accessibility of global information on social media, both of which have raised concerns about news media trust and perceived credibility. Such factors provide an important context for this study of media trust and credibility.

Media Trust

Trust is an important norm of citizenship in democratic systems, which encourages citizens to actively engage in civic and political participations based on well-informed, rational, and voluntary decisions. Trust in social institutions such as government and the media are crucial to the functioning of modern democracies. Specifically, it involves a relation between two sides: a trustor and a trustee (Tsfati, 2010). The pre-requisite of the relationship between the trustor and the trustee is a certain extent of uncertainty from the trustor, such that it is hard to validate the nature of the trustee (Seligman, 1997), leading trustors to take risks to rely on the trustees and believe that they would gain more than they would lose (Coleman, 1990). The terms loss and gain originated from Tversky & Kahneman (1981)'s classic Asian disease problem, where audiences made choices of treatment to an Asian disease that was framed with different positive and negative consequences. Here, the loss and gain generally refer to the positive and negative consequences towards a social group or an individual and caused by an event or policy that are mentioned on the news and perceived by the audiences.

Trust in media also involves audiences as trustors and media organizations as trustees, where audiences hold expectations about the functionality of the media in the future. Such

expectations include whether the media are harming the major interests in the society or helping the society (Tsfati, 2010). Specifically, trust in media organizations refers to citizens' willingness to consume media content based on their expectation of media performance in a satisfactory manner (Hanitzschi et al., 2018).

Because the definition of media trust not only refers to the intention of media organization to seek for truths, but also to their capability to produce accurate news (Tsfati & Cohan, 2012), there are multiple ways to measure media trust (e.g., trust in news content, trust in news distributors, and trust in the owners of media platforms; Williams, 2012). Meyer (1988) measured trust in terms of perceptions of accuracy, bias, fairness, context, and trustworthiness of the media organizations. For Kohring & Matthes (2007), media trust was predicted by the audiences' expectations regarding as well as by prioritizing the interests of the society before personal interests.

Trust and Credibility

Trust in news source can refer to "a whole medium, a source within a medium, or single messages" (Winter & Kramer, 2014, p.437; see also: Sundar & Nass, 2001). This concept is a part of media trust that refers to the consumers' expectation regarding the capability of media organizations to produce accurate news (Tsfati & Cohen, 2012). More specifically, source credibility contains the competence of a source to report correct information and the willingness of a source to report correct information (Winter & Kramer, 2014, p.437; see also: Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). For example, in their study about audiences' perception of the same message with different sources, it was found that subjects tended to trust academic journals more than tabloid newspapers (Hovland et al., 1953).

While this study has narrowed down the unit of analysis to media outlets, the specific measurement of media trust in this study also partially overlaps with the concept of credibility that emphasizes the belief that media are willing to report correct information. However, the concept of media trust is wider than perceived credibility, as media trust also includes a subjective personal feeling of conciliation/alienation toward the media or the media function (Tsfati, 2010). Moreover, trust varies by individual traits and is independent of objective qualities of the source and content (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969; Tsfati, 2010). Trust is also a stable trait that can be further enhanced over time (Tsfati, 2002; 2003; 2010). The implication is that both the objective quality of media and the audience' subjective engagement with the media played an important role in forming media trust.

Trust and Cues

Viewers and readers, mostly with low motivation in information seeking, often rely on heuristic cues to determine trust in media content. These cues help media consumers navigate the media and select the most important information to them. Various cues trigger assessments of content credibility. For newspapers, such cues include source, title, editorial content, placement, graphics, and social endorsement of the news. When it came to news aggregator websites and social media, however, the traditional roles of news placement and editorial content have mostly disappeared, leaving source one of the few salient heuristic cues conveniently accessible to the audiences. As overloaded information on the Internet has increased the burden of information seekers, it is important for them to rely on the most salient, straightforward, and convenient cues such as the source, content, and social endorsement of the news content shared on the websites and social media to quickly evaluate the trustworthiness of each piece of news content.

Messing and Westwood (2014) found that some social endorsements on social media may outweigh the impact of ideology of partisans and the congruency with the sources applied in the content, with strong Conservatives sometimes less likely to endorse conservative media due to a lack of social endorsement in their social networks. Such study further addresses the importance of context when audiences consume the news and how the source cue may interact with other influencing factors such as the issue predispositions of the audiences and their social network supports. While we should address the complexity of the mechanism when audiences make content selections, it is true that not every press have similar number of followers on social media due to the differences in target audiences, geographical location, etc. Social endorsement is excluded in this study, recognizing that it is a potentially relevant confounder.

Cues

As defined by Shah et al. (2002), cues referred to the labels that characterized issues, groups, or individuals (see also Cho et al., 2006). Linguistically, cues are often the descriptive adjectives, nouns, or other parts of speech such as verbs or adverbs to define a particular object. Therefore, unlike news frame that can only be used in news content as an organizing device, cues can be also applied in more diverse forms of media messages, even within a sentence. This provides the audiences with much more possibilities and convenience to shape their opinions online and in digital media environment.

Ideologically, cues not only symbolize a particular ideological group, but also shape the audiences' opinions on a certain issue or a group of people. Examples of such cues, as a combination of partial reality and political "enthusiasms, fears and antagonisms" or marginalization and presented very naturally in a form of common knowledge or social norms (Edelman, 1993, p.232), include "pro-choice" or "pro-life" to refer to the groups supporting and

against abortion, residence status such as “immigrant” vs. “citizen” or “undocumented” vs. “illegal” immigrants, and “extremist” vs. “moderate” to describe radicalism. During political debates, the cues or political labels used by elites are good evidence of attempting to shape or swing the public opinion towards a certain direction or influencing their support for a politician (Wyer & Srull, 1986, 1989; Edelman, 1993).

Consequently, cues would play a subtle but influential role in audiences’ media consumption. As early on, the research about mental cognitive networks suggested that a small label or concept, once entered or encoded in memory, could be repeatedly activated via further exposure (Judd & Krosnick, 1989). As stated by Berkowitz and Rogers (1986), such activation will associate one node (i.e., a concept or object) to another node inside one’s mind. Domke et al. (1998) found that the more activated associations made, the more likely the individuals would choose congruent media content. On the one hand, cues would trigger associated activation to related cognitive thoughts; on the other hand, latently, such process would become a shortcut that led cues directly to those thoughts and processes, which would eventually form or transform the media choice and opinion liability of individuals.

Source Cues

Source cue is an important heuristic cue in the process of media consumption (besides story placement, visual cues, other editorial cues, see also: Graber, 1989). Messing & Westwood (2014) argued that the editorial cues were to some extent minimized on social media, leaving source cue the most salient and accessible heuristic cues to evaluate a news content on social media. What related to source cue is the reputation and the ideological leaning of the media (Messing & Westwood, 2014). Source cues were believed to significantly influence a news receiver’s perceived credibility of the message content so that they would make straightforward

content selection on the media (Sundar, Knoblovh-Westerwick, & Hastall, 2007; Winter & Kramer, 2012, 2014).

On the Internet, however, there are different ways to define the source from news content, the outlets/platforms delivering the news, media ownership (Williams, 2012, as cited in Turcotte et al., 2015, p. 522). The source cue of credibility evaluations no longer defines a news aggregator site or a social media platform as an eligible source because the content available there are not originally created by the platforms (Winter & Kramer, 2014, p. 437). Instead, they merely share and distribute content originally produced by a media press. Therefore, as argued by Winter and Kramer (2014, p. 437), the source cue in the context of Web 2.0 should refer to the single sources, meaning the media organization or individuals who originally created or produced each single piece of content distributed via news aggregator sites and social media.

Social media can potentially enhance the trustworthiness in source cues and have positive influence on people's information seeking behaviors. Sharing news on social media can engage the attention of the messengers and motivate them to seek more relevant information out of a desire to enhance their social influence among their networks (Oeldorf-Hirsch, & Sundar, 2015). On the recipients' side, the news shared by trusted people would also enhance trust in the original news source, which become a preliminary source cue for the recipients in their evaluations. Individuals tend to trust the opinion leaders, often defined as the users with high knowledge, expertise, and social influence, more than average friends. Another important property is that recipients tend to trust the news shared by messengers from homogenic networks, where they share similar ideologies and issue attitudes. Hence, individuals will trust the original news because they trust their friends who shared the news and would assume that they trust the original news source as well.

Ideological Proximity of Source Cue

Another important question is to define the social distance between different types of source cues, also labelled as proximity (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Entman, 1991; Gurevitch et al., 1991; Turotte et al., 2005; Shoemaker et al., 2004). There are various ways to define the social distance:

1) *Geographic distance*. This distance has been expanded by the globalization of news production and conglomeration, including the distance between the location where the event happens and the location where the press headquarters are located; it can also refer to the distance between the geographic locations of the press especially when they were in different countries (Shoemaker et al., 2004; Ostgaard, 1965).

2) *Cultural or ideological distance*. This distance has been made more relevant by the globalization of news distribution via international news wire services, social media, and news aggregators. Galtung & Ruge (1965) specifically defined this type of proximity as the differences among the news values that made the news acceptable and meaningful for audiences of different nations or cultural background. Cultural and ideological distance could affect the news production, distribution, and audience acceptance in different ways. For news production, proximity could affect both news selection and framing that reporters would “domesticizing” or homogenizing foreign events with domestic cultural frames to make their domestic audiences understand and accept (Entman, 1991). For news distribution, it was argued that the Internet has formed one “global village” where audiences from different nations and cultural background have entered the same international public sphere where they have more knowledge about foreign nations and different culture and ideologies (Clausen, 2004; Volkmer, 2003). For news consumption, audiences would mainly gain knowledge about foreign affairs and culture from the

news, however, they would not pay too much attention to the foreign news unless it covered very unusual or extreme events such natural disasters and wars that caused large casualty (Baum & Potter, 2008). Moreover, they are more likely to accept the foreign stories with their domestic ideologies than with foreign ideologies (Weimann & Winn, 1994; Persson, 2004; Clausen, 2003; Ruigrok & Van Atteveldt, 2007), and their local or domestic sources are more likely than foreign sources to contain domestic ideology. Such sources are considered with high cultural proximity and have become an important heuristic cue for audiences to judge the trustworthiness of the foreign news.

3. *Source-layering distance*. The third type of proximity came from Turcotte et al. (2015) who defined as the distance by the different layers of news sources on social media and news aggregators. Kang and colleagues (2011) defined traditional news outlet such as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* as “distant source” because it was considered as the original creator of the news distributed by the online news aggregators, while the news aggregators such as *Google News* and *Yahoo! News* are defined as “primary source” because they were first exposed to the online news consumers. Specifically, this definition of proximity was another layer of source distances in the context of online news aggregators and social media news posts, so they also became an important type of source cue for online news consumers to judge the credibility of online information (Kang et al., 2011).

Hence, in this study I applied Facebook as a major platform of interest because there are more homogenous social networks and the users can access various types of news content (Turcotte et al., 2015). Specifically, I hypothesize that individuals will evaluate the credibility of Facebook news content based on the original news outlets as the source cues. In other words, the media consumers’ pre-disposition congruency with the orientation of the distant news outlets

will significantly influence their trust in the Facebook news content. I chose the Facebook page of news organizations as the primary source, partially because of the relationship between primary and distant source, to rule out the potential impact from the interaction between the two types of source cues so that our subjects may present similar trust in both.

While controlling for source-layering distance, the main concept proximity in this study was measured by cultural and ideological distance. Four nations selected for the study should contain various levels of cultural or ideological distance: U.S. should be the most proximate to the U.S., followed by UK, China, and Russia. Theoretically, both Chinese and Russian media should be considered almost equally distant to the U.S. media because they both represent the state or political elite voice (Watanabe, 2017; Nerone, 2018). However, in order to operationalize the source variable, I set China as the third distant source and Russia as the most distant source due to its recent low reputation on fake news and hyper-media propaganda (Mak, July 2018). Nevertheless, my hypothesis does not specifically assert which one comes first. More information regarding the domestication of international news frames will be further discussed in Chapter III.

Transnational Source Cues

Previous literature on source cue effect was heavily on domestic sources with limited studies examining transnational sources (Dragojlovic, 2013, p.298). Some studies did not have significant results on transnational cues or even found backfire effects (Dragojlovic, 2013; Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2009; Hayes & Guardino, 2011; Page, Shapiro, & Dempsey, 1987); others found significant influence of global political actors on U.S. public opinion within specific contexts (Hayes & Guardino, 2011; Linos, 2011). Theoretically, it is important to expand the discussion in various social contexts and further explore the specific way of such effects,

especially when individual audiences have low-level knowledge of the issue and low extent of familiarity with the foreign source (Kam, 2005; Mondak, 1993; Schaffner & Streb, 2002).

Because the shared interest in the source could possibly strengthen the perceived credibility (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998), without information about the source's past positions in ideology and interests, it would be difficult for audiences to decide if they can trust the source. Hence, previous source exposure could increase the persuasive effect of the source cues (i.e., Weisbuch, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2003). Contextually, the salience of the issue in the news content and political relevance to self-interest also play important roles in evaluation process (Zaller & Chiu, 1996; Dragojlovic, 2013). Foreign sources in general are generally considered as less self-relevant to domestic audiences (Dragojlovic, 2013). A foreign political leader pleading for more foreign aid is often considered as self-serving and less trustworthy as a foreign source addressing a domestic social welfare policy (Groenendyk & Valentino, 2002; Salmon, Reid, Pokrywczynski, & Willet, 1985). In the experiments conducted by Dragojlovic (2013), two stories were presented to domestic Canadian students. One was about the German chancellor Angela Merkel's comment about the Canadian military withdrawing from Afghanistan and the other was about the British prime minister David Cameron discussing whether Canada should focus on foreign aid or domestic welfare. The results supported the statement above: the source cue was tested to positively impact the readers' attitude to the issues. However, since the study only applied sources from the Western world with similar social systems as Canada, the results might be various if more non-Western sources were included.

Valence should be also taken into consideration when evaluating the trustworthiness of foreign source cues, especially when people have a certain knowledge or familiarity with the source (Dragojlovic, 2013). Here, valence can be a description or a title of the source, or the

valence of the comments that the source has made, or the specialty or expertise in a certain field (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Lupia, 2013; Pelika, 2007). The more hostile the national origin of the source to the audiences, the more negative valence can be associated to the source by the audiences and the less trustworthy the source can be (Dragojlovic, 2013). Since the source also represents its orientation, interest, and reputation, the salient association of valence with these properties of source cues should also be considered to take effects in the individuals' perception.

In some cases, especially on social media, consumers also count the news organizations posting a social media message or link to the news aggregators as source cue in relevant to social media platforms or news aggregators. However, journalism source is still different from this type of source, even if they are both information cues suggesting where the information come from. To avoid confusion, I call the news organization cue directly as press.

Here in this study, the transnational source cue refers to the news outlets and the proximity difference not only depends on geography, but also ideological similarities or differences (Castells, 2005) with the U.S., U.K., China, and Russia. Considering the valence and proximity as main factors to influence the trust in transnational source cues, I hypothesize that there will be a variation between the trust in the same news story across the source cues with various ideological proximity.

Affect Cues

Affect heuristic cue is the relevant emotion or attitude that can motivate a natural evaluation of a target object, attributing occasional affective judgments (Shafir et al., 1993; Kahneman, 2002). As stated by Slovic and colleagues (2002), affect heuristic cue often involved with emotional and cognitive evaluations. For example, the variation of the loss and gain framing

effects might vary based on the different predispositions that people had. Since Kahneman et al. (1982) suggested the limitation of bounded rationality of individual humans and highlighted the importance of heuristic cues, affect heuristic cues became more relevant than previous field of psychology that heavily depended on the cognitive system. The benefit of thinking based on emotion is quicker, easier, and more efficient than cognitive thinking and is often applied in uncertain and complex world (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & McGregor, 2007, p.1334).

Kahneman and Ritov (1994) defined and tested four different examples of targets of affect cues: “the importance of the issues”, “the size of the donation that respondents were willing to make”, “political support for interventions”, and “the moral satisfaction associated with a contribution” (Kahneman, 2002, p.470). These examples formed a typology of affect cues and highly related to the valence and even emotion associated to the nature of the issues. Specifically, past studies have shown that the emotions as affect cues can vastly impact, if not completely govern, the decisions of jurors in court (Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998) and the ratings of the probability of a disaster (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Based on these findings, two different attributions associated with affect cues--emotion, and attitude--were strongly relevant to the predisposition of the information receiver to the target object.

As a central part in the dual-process theories of thinking, knowing, and information processing, affect heuristics would motivate specific preference and serve as the anchor and guidance of cognitive evaluation to the targeted object (Slovic et al., 2007). More specifically, affect cues not only came from the instant triggers in the messages, but also from the memory of message recipients (or “affect pool”, Slovic et al., 2007) that stored the pre-existing attitudes and emotions associated with the same triggers. If the pre-existing attitudes and emotions were positive, they would motivate positive evaluation to the target; negative attitudes and emotions

would trigger negative evaluation to the target (Epstein, 1994; Pratkanis, 1989; Slovic et al., 2007, p.1334). The attitudes and emotions often existed or were self-categorized as tags or representative symbols associated with the way the individuals describe or evaluate the targeted object in the past. Such cue-stimulated heuristics created a shortcut process of thinking and judgment, which either co-existed with conscious, cognitive thinking process or was processed alone unconsciously (Slovic et al., 2007).

In the context of new media, I argue that once the texts or images in the media content contain affect cues, media consumers will be triggered to evaluate the targeted object positively or negatively based on their emotions and pre-existing attitudes. The media “are often skewed toward novelty, rarity, and poignancy” (Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012, p. 315; see also: Eisenman, 1993; Meyer, 1990; Park & Grow, 2008). As biases exist in affect heuristics, a stored image of the targeted object from memory may attach to a biased affect cue and make biased overall judgments (Slovic et al., 2007). Taking diseases as an example, because the media often highlight the cues of severity for a certain disease, a well-publicized disease such as cancer is often perceived as more serious and harmful than an under-publicized disease such as stroke and diabetes (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). As for media credibility overall, the affect cues of various media can also cause biased content credibility perceptions such that people tend to distrust most social media news content (Luo, Hancock, & Markowitz, 2022).

Due to the disadvantage of information accessibility about foreign affairs, the ordinary audiences tended to believe and rely on the interpretation of the contemporary affairs from mainstream media and the opinions from authorities and elites (Baum & Potter, 2008; Sniderman et al., 1991; Popkin, 1993; Guardino & Hayes, 2018). Such interpretation and quotes from elites often contain abundant heuristic, affect cues to form shortcuts for the audiences to make sense of

the foreign affairs (Baum & Potter, 2008). Especially when the presidents declare wars or other military actions in foreign nations or regions, both the news media and the public tend to fall into “rally around the flag”, a temporary phenomenon where the news media show higher levels of support to the presidents and their policies than other times, consequentially the public would be more likely to accept the policies and show higher level of patriotism than other times, and further reinforced similar cues on the news (Lee, 1977; Oneal & Bryan, 1995; Baum & Potter, 2008; Guardino & Hayes, 2017).

In addition, Baum (2002) found an interaction between partisanship and “rally around the flag” phenomenon that the affect cues supporting a military action can even increase the support from opposing partisans and independents. Similar studies also found that the news quoting the elites or leaders of the same ideological group can increase the trustworthiness of the news (Rahn, 1993; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Baum & Groeling, 2007). Based on the studies mentioned above, it seems that 1) the affect cues and source cues may be even more effective on international news than domestic news due to unequal information accessibility and 2) there is also an interaction between national identity and domestic partisanship in the context of foreign news.

Affect and source cues often interact with each other on the media. As an important moderator in dual-processing cognition theory, source likability, meaning the perception of an information source as likeable (Chaiken, 1980; see also: Ferran & Watts, 2008, p.1569), can influence the perception of information when the cognitive workload is high on the media. Specifically, the more likeable that consumers perceive the source of the media message, the more likely the message will be accepted or trusted. Taking the videoconference study by Ferran & Watts (2008) as an example, using a field quasi-experiment over 12 weeks with some medical

professionals they found that people studying via videoconferences tended to learn more from highly likeable source on the videoconference than people learning in-person, while less engaged in systemic cognitive processing (p. 1577). This study highlighted that through the increased cognitive workload, the complicated media environment made people depend more on affect heuristics and source cues. Similarly, in other two studies comparing the subjects' perceived credibility of a few Facebook news based on the count and source of the likes, Luo and colleagues (2020) found that while the average users had a 51% accuracy of detecting misinformation, the social endorsement cues had significantly increased the accuracy rate. Such findings imply that the affect cues such as social endorsement can also affect the perceived credibility of the online news source and the news content.

Selective Exposure

Recent concern about misinformation has brought research on media trust back into focus due to the global decline in media trust (Hanitzsch et al., 2018; Tsfat, Boomgaarden, Stromback et al., 2020). The polarization of the Western politics has enhanced the polarization of Western media, which have increased the use of ideological cues embedded in media content that have in turn further polarized partisans. Previous studies have already found that partisans have fallen into partisan-motivated reasoning in media selection, meaning that they would prefer to choose the media outlets that express congruent affect or source cues in their content (Zaller & Chiu, 1996; Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). Therefore, while many researchers have examined the influence of fake news as a more relevant phenomenon, it is important to review the past research on media consumption behavior and cognitive process and build their connections.

As an attempt to influence others with their attitudes, individuals might be motivated to engage in information seeking or sharing activities to confirm their pre-dispositions. The

problem of such behavior has been that it restricts online media users' expression of independent voices and reduces their ability to engage in a fair and confident evaluation of information credibility and leads to a great tendency to trust partisan media more than more objective media (Westerwick & Meng, 2009; Dilliplane, 2014). Hence, it is important to examine the specific factors and conditions of the media context that will influence how people perceive the credibility of online news within the perspective of selective exposure.

As a behavioral outcome of partisan-motivated reasoning, selective exposure has led partisans to choose media that reflect their partisan predispositions and to reject media that convey alternative perspectives (Mutz & Martin, 2001; Sunstein, 2001). As this phenomenon might merely happen among the most engaged audiences, it was common among the partisans of a certain issue or with strong personal involvement and they tended to believe the elite sources in the content they chose more than other sources (Mutz & Martin, 2001; Sunstein, 2001; Stroud, 2008; Bryant & Miron, 2004).

Three factors are closely connected to selective exposure: attitude extremity, level of accessibility to coherent cues or messages, and attitude certainty and importance. Selective exposure was more likely to happen among partisans than moderates (Brannon et al., 2007). The more extreme the partisanship, the more likely the selective exposure will happen. Partisan individuals tend to avoid content that is inconsistent with their identities and predispositions. Similarly, individuals with more accessibility to ideologically consistent cues (that is to say, the cues consistent with the consumers' prior ideological beliefs, Aruguete et al., 2021) were more likely to avoid inconsistent content, which was also made more convenient by social media. Last but not the least, people with strong attitudes on an issue tend to be more emotionally engaged in news content and feel unpleasant by exposure of counter-attitudinal cues. Thus, they would also

avoid inconsistent cues and sources. Overall, the interaction between media cues and pre-existing attitudes and identities of audiences were important to influence media consumption, and related to that, media trust.

However, previous studies had various conflicting results to measure the influence of selective exposure (Chaffee et al., 2001; D'Alessio & Allen, 2007; Iyengar et al., 2008; Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012). One explanation is that individuals sometimes consume cross-cutting sources available on the Internet, namely, to select opposing sources and perspectives about an issue for the full information utility purposes (Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012). Moreover, mostly focusing on political campaign news, the contexts of the previous selective exposure research are not equivalent to the externally valid media environment or not strongly related to individuals and their voting decisions (Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012). In fact, crosscutting media consumption and selective exposure often co-exist and vary by social groups. For instance, conservatives were more likely to avoid counter-attitudinal information than liberals (Jonas et al., 2008; Jones, 2004). Conservative partisans consumed consistent content more than others, whereas liberal partisans consumed crosscutting sources more than others (Jonas et al., 2008). In addition, previous studies overly relied on general survey as main methodology, lacking abundant reliability when it was applied to different contexts. It is important to explore more specific dynamics or conditions where either direction of the effects takes place.

Selective Exposure and Cues

Some scholars propose that the effect of selective exposure happens more among partisans or social groups with strong identities when they are exposed to content with specific identity-related cues (Slater, 2007; Turner et al., 1987). In their cognitive processes, the members

of the same group would be more likely to notice their identity cues on the news than other identity cues and make content selection accordingly. Overtime, the stronger the partisanship, the more likely the selective exposure will happen when they consume news (Slater, 2007; Shin & Thorson, 2017).

Social media are suitable platforms for users to select and share single pieces of news content across sources (Messing & Westwood, 2014). In the meantime, partisans tend to add additional identity expression by using press or affect cues (i.e., the news contains false or true information; the source is trustworthy or not trustworthy) in their comments under the original news posts or in their posts where they shared the news with social media friends (Shin & Thorson, 2017). In addition, the core members of the group often share information with salient identity cues and even define the “trustworthiness” of information source to maintain the internal solidarity of the group (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Therefore, social media have become a public space for partisans to express and perform their group identities by sharing polarized news content and possibly further polarizing the news available for them through the news recommendations by algorithm or shared content from friends in their groups (Slater, 2007; Shin & Thorson, 2017).

Selective Exposure and Media Trust

According to the above discussion, it was found that trust could lead to more media engagement (Tsfati, 2010). Applying the definition of media trust, the less media trust, the less media consumption. Another explanation was that audiences would select media based more on subjective affection towards the media than rational or cognitive process (Sears & Freedman, 1967, p.194). Here, it was the selective exposure of the name of the press or media outlets rather

than the ideological or attitudinal coherence with the affect cues in the content that made people trust or distrust a media message (Wheless, 1974).

Tsfati (2010) hypothesized that the general trust would impact the consumption of online and traditional news. However, as globalization and digital media have brought us more opportunity of cross-cultural communication than before, journalists were adopting more and more plural ideas and diverse sources than the past and the traditional news outlets were increasing their presence online and on social media. Thus, it has become somewhat complicated to separate media by online media and traditional media. The findings of Tsfati (2010) also demonstrated this point. While there was no significant difference in the relationship between online and traditional media consumption and media trust, the audiences tended to perceive online news as an extension of traditional media rather than alternative media. However, the distinction of traditional and online news media consumption became significant when the researcher emphasized “alternative” while asking the participants about their online news experience. Therefore, the results suggested that while less associated with media platforms, the partisans’ news trust seemed to emphasize the subjective feelings of pro- or anti-establishment of traditional media institutions and their engagement to find alternatives to the mainstream perspectives, meaning that less hierarchic and more plural sources and perspectives of news were preferred. This finding also matched the prerequisite of trust -- an uncertainty of the future behavior of the trustor (Tsfati & Cohen, 2012). As the anti-establishment emotion triggered a higher level of uncertainty, the trust decreased, which might in turn further drive trustee away from the trustor to seek for alternatives.

To compare the relationship of media trust and selective exposure in partisan news and news in general, Barnidge et al. (2020) found that while partisans perceived the general notion of

media as biased, their self-selected media were perceived as unbiased. The more extreme the partisanship, the more trust difference they exhibited between general and self-selected media. This research concluded asserted that the pattern would be similar across the news organizations' distance. While it might be true domestically in the U.S., whether the same pattern will exist between international and domestic media, or between media from different countries, has not been well explored yet. Hence, to further contribute to answering this question, this study intends to construct and test a cognitive process or mechanism about the interplay between national identity and domestic partisanship on news trust especially when partisans are engaged in international news. Furthermore, it is common across nations that certain political ideologies have stronger correlations to the trust in institutions than others (Hakhverdian & Mayne, 2012; Kalogeropoulos et al., 2019). Therefore, even though the political and media systems vary in different nations (Esser & Umbricht, 2013), the process can potentially be extended to the foreign audiences and the possibility will be discussed in the final chapter.

Hostile Media Phenomenon

The relationship between selective exposure, cues, and media trust were studied among the groups of partisans or inside a group with strong membership identities or attitudes to an issue. As repeatedly mentioned above, the concept of partisanship includes people within three circumstances: first, an issue has strong personal relevance or consequences for the individual in question; secondly, the issue is related to personal values and can stimulate emotional reactions; and finally, the issue can engage an individual's ego, identity, or group membership.

In fact, partisanship was the center of another important media effect, the hostile media phenomenon. Back into the last century, many scholars began to study the subjectivity of social evaluation of information in media consumption and information seeking activities (Allport,

1954; Bruner, 1957; Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Hamilton, 1979; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross & Lepper, 1980). Previous studies found that as media often provide evidence of events and issues from different sides, the public became biased towards consistent and against inconsistent evidence related to their issue attitudes (Lord et al., 1979; Gunther et al., 2009). Partisans were more likely to find media content biased than non-partisans, even if the content was relatively neutral (Lord et al., 1979). Such phenomenon could be consistent over time and have long-term effect on people's media perceptions (Hansen & Kim, 2011; Perloff, 2015). Especially for inconsistent content, partisans would perceive the evidence to be biased, scrutinize them more and trust them less. Particularly for the inconsistent evidence and views, partisans would perceive a larger population group as being influenced by that content. It was also notable that whereas partisans might agree with the nature of consistent content, with additional scrutiny they would still consider the presence and organization of the content could be misleading and biased. Such phenomenon was theorized as the hostile media phenomenon.

Studies suggest that participants might be engaged with different cues such that in the classic study "They saw a game," Dartmouth and Princeton football fans saw the same clip of a gridiron between their teams, but they took different perceptions (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). Partisans from both sides all believed that their side was the hero, and the other side was the villain, a common pair of cues that appeared in media content. On the international level, experiments were conducted to examine the media perception of viewers supporting different countries on international conflicts (Vallone et al., 1985). In their study about the 1982 massacre in two refugee camps of Lebanon where two important national players, Arab and Israel, were involved, Vallone and colleagues (1985) found that among 144 Stanford University students, both pro-Arabic and pro-Israel groups perceived the same piece of news covering the event to be

biased towards the other side. More specifically, they tended to focus on the cues that were missing while they thought were important to be included. These studies built up the framework of hostile media phenomenon studies to locate the subject of studies as partisans or extremists on a certain issue, or the groups who shared strong identities to distinguish in-group and out-group members. They also led to lots of studies exploring the potential factors that might influence hostile media phenomenon and the highly associated variables such as media trust (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005; Tsfati, 2007, 2010).

One important theoretical question was whether the hostile media phenomenon would be consistent or moderated by other factors. Assimilation bias was the opposite phenomenon when people saw the news coverage favorable to their pre-existed views. Gunther and colleagues (2009) suggested a continuum spectrum for both phenomena, suggesting that there were conditions when hostile media phenomenon was eliminated or replaced by assimilation bias especially when information was presented by different sources (i.e., a student essay vs. a news report) (see also: Gunther & Schmitt, 2004). Relative hostile media phenomenon was somewhere in between, where audiences perceived the general attitude on the news as objective, but might still scrutinize the chosen evidence, source, cues, framing, or organization of the news as biased against them (Gunther et al., 2001; 2009). Personal opinions before media exposure and overall media trust could also influence the perceived news bias (Gunther et al., 2001). These detailed findings suggested that source and affect cues, along with other conditional factors, might also be related to the hostile media phenomenon.

A common and well-explored factor to explain the variations in the continuum was partisanship (Vallone et al., 1985; Gunther et al., 2009; Gunther, 1992). Johnson and Eagly (1989) suggested two subtypes of partisanship: “value-relevant involvement” referring to the

partisans defined by their group identities and “outcome-relevant involvement” referring to the partisans defined by their stands and involvement in a particular policy issue. It was generally found that hostile media phenomenon was more significant among partisans of “value-relevant involvement” than “outcome-relevant involvement” (Choi et al., 2009), especially the groups of social minorities. Such groups would perceive general media as biased and unfriendly against them (Gunther, 1992; Gunther et al., 2009; Matheson & Dursun, 2001). As explained by Social Identity Theory, specific partisan cues may become salient on the media and triggered a particular group identity of the audiences, creating various conditions where different types of group identity drove hostile media phenomenon (Reid, 2012; Gunther et al., 2017; Golan et al., 2021). Here, the partisan cues could be both related to the media outlets and content of news (Golan et al., 2021; Gunther et al., 2017).

Studies in international news with the U.S. involved, especially when the sources include foreign media, was challenging because the audiences might have little knowledge about foreign media (Golan et al., 2021). In a recent study, Golan and colleagues (2021) conducted two experiments examining the potential moderating effects in both domestic partisanship and national identity dimensions. Even though they found that both dimensions played a role in hostile media phenomenon, such as that both Democrats and Republicans showed more hostility towards Al Jazeera and CCTV representing Arabic and Chinese news media than domestic media such as MSNBC and Fox News, they failed to find an interactional effect between the two dimensions when they took place at the same time. On the one hand, this might be due to the selection of news topic, which was about the formal U.S. President Donald Trump’s attitude to trade with China, which itself was so controversial that both the liberals and conservatives were already hostile towards Trump and China. On the other hand, the Western audiences already held

a strong stereotype that the media from Arab and China were straight propaganda of the government and the “guard dog” of authoritarianism, which were treated as a big threat the Western ideologies that highlight the freedom of speech and democracy. So, their reaction to these media was less relevant to nationalism than the other types of political ideology. Therefore, it was highly likely that the selection of topic and the complicated social and political contexts can also influence the results in their studies. More studies are necessary to continue this research route but consider more about the validity of contexts.

As the current digital media platforms had the potential to expand international and cross-cultural communications, it would be feasible for audiences to gain increasing knowledge about some main foreign outlets. Mass communication theorists should also widen their scope beyond domestic and local levels and consider the variations and validity issues in foreign world, especially for non-Western regimes where the political-media structure, social issues, and cultural context could be completely different from the U.S. and West European countries. Hence, this study examines the validity of pre-existing continuum between affirmation bias and hostile media phenomenon, and to examine the factors to influence variation on the continuum. Particularly, as ideology is an important component in public life and civic culture, this study introduced two sets of identities/ideologies, nationalism and liberal/conservative, and studied their roles in hostile media phenomenon and international media environment.

Hypotheses

In the sections above, I have discussed that both news organizations and affect cues of media content may influence the audiences’ perception of the news. While social media have simplified the content and make it more superficial, the news organizations and affect cues also have become more salient than before. Hence, social media provide a good opportunity to

explore for a nuanced mechanism in information processing between the individual audiences and the media content, based on which this dissertation proposes numerous hypotheses.

Media Organizations and Valence Cues

As discussed before, both source and affect cues might affect selective exposure. The media consumers would trust media sources differently based on their proximity (Kang et al., 2011). As Facebook became an important platform for content creators, it can improve the media engagement of the consumers (Oeldorf-Hirsch & Sundar, 2015). Meanwhile, Facebook was also a well-known platform for news distribution within homogenous networks; most audiences would still consider the original news organizations that created the news content as the source cue. Additionally, news organizations can be an easy cue for audiences to make superficial evaluations (Hong & Cameron, 2018). Considering source proximity as a main factor in the relationship between foreign news organizations and news trust (Dragojlovic, 2013), I hypothesize a positive correlation between news organizations' ideological distance to the U.S. and selective exposure, which also strongly correlated to media trust (Tsfati, 2010).

H1: (news organizations) There will be a positive correlation between the ideological distance of news organizations and trust. Namely, the more ideological proximate the news organization to the subjects, the more likely the news will be perceived as trustworthy. The less proximate the news organization to the subjects, the less likely the news will be perceived as trustworthy.

The previous discussion about the affect cues implied that news in general often contained the affect cues that could trigger the similar representations of the targeted objects from memory. As influenced by emotion and pre-existing attitudes, the representation would play an important role in people's evaluation of news credibility, often causing biased judgment when individuals had strong opinions about the objects (Luo et al., 2022; Slovic et al., 2007).

Thus, I hypothesize that consumers will make media selection based on the valence of the affect cues about the targeted objects in the news (here it refers to the U.S.). More specifically, as suggested by selective exposure literature, partisan consumers will choose to consume the news with consistent affect cues with their group identities and avoid the news with inconsistent affect cues. The more positive the affect cues to describe their groups, the more trustworthy the news will be.

H2: (affect cues) There will be a positive correlation between the valence of the affect cues and news trust. Specifically, subjects will trust the news with positive comments about the U.S. more than the news with negative comments about the U.S.

The previous literature also predicted an interactional effect of news organizations and affect cues on news trust. On the one hand, when people have some extent of familiarity with the news organizations, they may judge the content's credibility based on their subjective favorability of a transnational source cue (Dragojlovic, 2013), here it refers to news organizations. Such favorability often came from the previous affect cues in their memory bank, which was triggered instantly when they were exposed to the news organizations. On the other hand, according to the dual-processing cognition theory, the source likability has become a specific property that can be triggered as a cognitive short-cut (Chaiken, 1980; Ferran & Watts, 2008). Ferran & Watts (2008) found that especially in the online environment, people were more likely to pull out source likability as their judgments anchor and skip systemic cognitive processing. Meanwhile, as another shortcut trigger, the affect cue may overwrite the influence of the source likability by stimulating positive or negative symbols of the target from the audiences' memory. Based on that, the content valence will also either enhance or descend their trust. As both cues may appear simultaneously in the news, there will be a possible interaction between

affect cue and the cue of the news organizations. When the cues about news organizations become more salient than affect cues, they may become a shortcut on the audiences' credibility evaluation and impact their perception of the affect cues. Alternatively, when affect cues become more salient than the cues of the news organizations, they will influence the audiences' favorability of the news organizations.

*H3: (affect cues * news organizations)* There will be an interaction between affect cues and news organizations that has a positive relationship with news trust. Specifically, the subjects will trust the positive affect cue and the most proximate news organization to the U.S. the most, followed by the negative affect cue and the most ideologically proximate news organization to the U.S., or the positive affect cue and less ideologically proximate news organization, and finally, the negative affect cue and the least ideologically proximate news organization.

Nationalism and Cues

Another theoretical perspective, the hostile media phenomenon, suggests that partisans (or mostly partisans, see also: Golan et al., 2021) would generally perceive news media biased against their pre-dispositions and have little trust. However, the extent of partisanship may moderate hostile media phenomenon. Specifically, extreme partisans can show stronger hostile media phenomenon than less intense partisans. In addition, the partisanship based on group identities can generate stronger hostile media phenomenon than the partisanship based on issue attitudes. As national identity is an important partisanship and highly sentimental (Li & Brewer, 2004; Golan et al., 2021), it will not only generate strong media bias, but also arouse negative emotion when nationalists read the affect cues about their nation. Thus, I hypothesize a negative relationship between nationalism and news trust.

*H4: (nationalism * news trust)* the more extreme the nationalism, the less likely that the subjects will trust the given news.

Moreover, the relative hostile media phenomenon suggest that the less-extreme partisanship may reduce hostile media phenomenon. Hence, the consumers may judge the news content more positively or less biased than they are for the hostile media phenomenon.

Consequently, the difference between positive and negative affect cues in news trust can be larger when the consumers are no longer generally rejecting the news but start paying closer attention to the nature of each affect cue instead. Therefore, I hypothesize while the valence of affect cue could directly relate to media trust, the strength of nationalism will enlarge the gap in news trust when the consumers are exposed to positive or negative affect cues to their nation.

*H5: (nationalism * affect cues)* The less extreme the nationalism, the stronger the relationship between affect cues and the hostile media phenomenon. In other words, the less extreme the nationalism, the more difference between the subjects' trust in positive and negative news about the U.S.

As previously discussed, the ideological distance of the news organizations can also influence hostile media phenomenon. Specifically, a non-Western news organization can be perceived more hostile towards Western audiences because it is often considered as a threat to democracy or other Western values (Golan et al., 2012). A self-selected news organization by partisans may also be perceived as more credible or trustworthy than news in general by partisans (Barnidge et al., 2020). Thus, the ideological distance of the news organizations can also correlate to the extremity of partisanship. Here, the stronger the nationalism, the more hostility towards the foreign, non-Western news organization and the less news trust. The weaker the nationalism, the less hostility towards the foreign, non-Western news organization and the

more news trust. In another words, the gap between the trust in domestic and foreign news organizations will become smaller among the weaker nationalists than the stronger nationalists, and vice versa.

*H6: (nationalism * source cues)* The less extreme the nationalism, the less difference between the subjects' trust in domestic news and foreign news.

Meanwhile, as discussed above, the audiences' perception of news organizations and affect cues may influence each other. Similarly, nationalism may also interact with both cues at the same time. As mentioned earlier, I hypothesize that nationalism has a negative relationship with the affect cue and a positive relationship with the news organizations on news trust. Hence, if a three-way interaction exists, the original influence between affect cues and news organizations on news trust will be evened out.

*H7: (nationalism * the interaction)* The less extreme the nationalism, the lower the news trust with different news organizations and affect cues. Specifically, the differences in trust will be smaller among stronger nationalists than weaker nationalists for the news that is the most proximate, favorable to the U.S., followed by the most proximate, unfavorable to the U.S. or the less proximate, favorable to the U.S., and finally, the least proximate, unfavorable to the U.S.

Domestic Ideologies and Cues

The other set of identity is the traditional liberal/conservative category. Based on previous findings and hostile media phenomenon perspective, the stronger the partisanship, the less likely the news will be trusted, with strong conservatives even less than strong liberals (Jonas et al., 2008).

H8 (ideology in general): Overall, the more extreme the political partisanship, the less likely the news will be trusted.

H9 (conservatives): The conservative partisans will trust the news less than the liberal partisans.

Taking the source and affect cues into consideration, there should be a similar relationship between domestic political ideologies, cues, and trust. Specifically, people with stronger partisanship will be more likely to trust the news positive about the U.S. than the news negative about the U.S. comparing to others. Similarly, people with extreme nationalism will also be more likely to trust the news positive about the U.S. than the news negative about the U.S. However, the partisanship will negatively correlate to the interactional effect of the news organizations and the affect cues on news trust, such that the more extreme the partisanship, the less the difference (or the smaller the gap) between the effect of news organizations by affect cues on news trust.

H10 (ideology * source cue): the more extreme the political ideological partisanship, the more different news trust between domestic and foreign news.

H11 (ideology * affect cue): the more extreme the political partisanship, the more different news trust between positive and negative affect cues towards the U.S.

H12 (ideology * the interaction): the less extreme the political partisanship, the more different news trust with different news organizations and affect cues. Specifically, the differences in trust will be smaller among extreme partisans than less extreme partisans for the news that is the most proximate, favorable to the U.S., followed by the most proximate, unfavorable to the U.S. or the less proximate, favorable to the U.S., and finally, the least proximate, unfavorable to the U.S.

Theoretical Model

Finally, a theoretical model will be tested in the structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis to connect the hypotheses and explore the theoretical implications of the model.

Following the basic model, four separate models will be examined divided by news

organizations. The hypotheses above suggest a set of interactions between news organization, valence, nationalism, and political ideologies on trust, while each factor will also influence trust independently.

Some additional variables are also found to be closely associated with trust, such that individual's belief in news media overall and past media experience are positively associated with trust (Fletcher & Park, 2017; Tully et al., 2020). Their perceived influence of media on themselves and other people will also influence their attitude to restrict the negative influence of media or support media censorship (McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997). Moreover, individual's confidence to navigate information online is often associated with their need of cognition, which positively associates with trust (Schwarzenegger, 2020).

Past studies also found a positive association between cross-cutting consumption online and news trust (Tsfati & Cappella; Fletcher & Park, 2017). Previous exposure to fake news or misinformation and skills to detect misinformation are also very important factors to news trust (Ognyanova, Lazer, Robertson et al., 2020). Additionally, it is believed that emotion is strongly associated with valence and trust (Kahneman, 2002; Baum, Fromer, & Rahman, 2020). Emotion, especially pride, is also strongly associated with nationalism (Li & Brewer, 2004). People may also feel anger when they are not accepting the media message (Arpan & Nabi, 2011). All these variables are not only applied as the control variables to the hierarchical linear regression model but also applied in the theoretical model for SEM analysis.

More specifically, as media experience and trust overall are related to knowledge about the media ownership (i.e., Usher, 2019; Tully et al., 2020; Ashley, Poepsel, & Willis, 2010), I predict that the variables about media use are more likely to associate with news organization than valence. In another word, individuals with more knowledge or experience about media

should be more likely to be influenced by news organization than valence. Similarly, those who have some skills or motivation to detect misinformation should also be well aware of the news organizations. Thus, I predict strong correlations between media consumption, general news trust, and news organization, and they should have direct impact on news trust. Next, emotion and nationalism are more related to valence, which provides individuals with very descriptive cues about their national identity. Therefore, I predict strong correlations between nationalism, pride, and anger, and all of them have direct influence on news trust. The complete model is illustrated in *Figure 3*.

Chapter III: Method

This chapter describes the methods of this dissertation, including the specific measurements of the variables used in hypotheses testing.

Design

A 4 (news story) by 4 (news organizations) by 2 (valence) repeated measurement survey experiment was conducted to compare the American media consumers' perceptions of international news from domestic and international news sources in various proximity levels and compare the positive or negative affect cues to the U.S. Specifically, each participant was exposed by four stories from each of four news organizations: Associated Press (U.S.), Reuters (U.K.), Xinhua (China), and TASS (Russia), the order of which was fixed. Then, the affect cue of negative or positive way to comment on the role of the U.S. in the event in each story will be randomly assigned to each news article. This means that each participant might read four negative articles, four positive articles, one positive and three negative, two positive and two negative, or three positive and one negative.

The story exposed to each participant will not be repeated, meaning each participant will be exposed to four completely different story. Therefore, 32 articles, covering four different stories, positive or negative, and randomly assigned to each news organization in fixed order, were created in total and related survey flow logics was applied to avoid each participant read two or more identical articles.

The four stories were written in 300 words, with the first sentence briefly describing the event like a news lead, followed by the second sentence in the next line to comment on the U.S. negatively or positively in the event. These were experimentally constructed stories made to appear as if they were transmitted by each of these news organizations.

Associated Press

According to AP.org, the Associated Press is “an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting.” (ap.org, 2022) It was founded in 1846 and had been pursuing efficiency, accuracy, and objection in news reporting. The reporting teams covered 250 locations and owned 1,500-member news outlets worldwide and targeting “more than half the world’s population” (ap.org, 2022). It was an independent, non—profit news cooperative and unincorporated association with headquarters located in New York. The news was independently produced by journalists from the cooperating newspapers. The AllSides Media Bias Rating based on editorial review, community feedback, blind survey in 2020 and independent research rated AP as a medium news outlet in terms of political ideology (AllSides, 2022).

As a typical liberal model in Hallin & Mancini’s three models of media and politics (2004), the U.S. newspaper industry featured medium newspaper circulation, highly commercialized news organizations, high autonomous governance and internally plural, meaning journalists can be independent with their political ideology, but low external plural, meaning that the mainstream news would pursue neutrality and objectivity instead of being loyal to partisanship or a social group. Specifically in foreign affair coverage, American news media often highly homogenized opinions and ideology (Zaller & Chiu, 1996). It has been found that the attitude in the U.S. foreign news coverage was highly based on the opinions of the Washington D.C. (Zaller & Chiu, 1996; Sigal, 1973; Halberstam, 1979) One of the greatest examples is the “rally around the flag” phenomenon during the Vietnam War. This was because American journalists were highly dependent on the so-called “legitimate” or “official” sources, simply “not what has happened, but what someone says has happened” (Cohen, 1963; Sigal, 1973, p.69).

Due to a lack of opinions or even knowledge about the world outside, journalists were hesitant to report based on independent opinions (Zaller & Chiu, 1996) when it came to foreign affairs. Even if the fact could be twisted by state authorities, the application of official sources would make the news sound more authoritative based on traditional news standards. More specifically, Zaller and Chiu (1996) found that American foreign reports could be more nationalist and “hawkish” when America was involved in major wars or had a hawkish president at the time. Based on the finding, I set American foreign media as the most ideologically proximate news organization to America not only because it represents a similar ideology but is also highly aligned with American foreign policies and nationalist in foreign news reports.

Reuters

Reuters is an international news agency and wire service, established in 1851 in London by Paul Reuters and currently owned by Thomas Reuters. As one of the biggest news agencies in the world, Reuters currently has around 2,500 journalists and located in over 200 places worldwide. It currently has over 2,000 media customers in 128 countries (reutersagency.com, 2022). The AllSides Media Bias Rating based on editorial review, community feedback, and blind survey in 2020 rated Reuters as a medium news outlet in political ideology (AllSides, 2022).

Same as the American liberal media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), the British media are highly likely to report the foreign news in “domesticated” manner, as either to homogenize ideology or taken advantage by politicians to win public support to their policies (Alasuutari, Qadir, & Creutz, 2013). By comparing the news coverage of the Arabic Spring in 2012 among UK, Finland, and Pakistan, Alasuutari et al. (2013) found that the UK mainstream newspaper The Times not only sent individual journalists to the protests but also highly applied sources

such as the official statements from British government, centering UK government and elites in the stories. Therefore, it is logical that as UK is a former colonial power and very influential player in world politics, their foreign news coverage will be favorable to importance of the UK mainstream ideology and foreign policies. Additionally, as the current UK government intends to subordinate to the U.S. in terms of military and intelligence corporations in foreign affairs (Honeyman, 2022), it is possible that the ideology of UK foreign news coverage is more ideologically proximate to the U.S. than the other nations.

Xinhua News Agency

Xinhua News Agency (aka New China News Agency) belongs to the central state department of propaganda, is the official news agency in China. Initiated in 1931 as the Red China Communication Agency, it was the first news agency founded by Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The agency was the only essential news channel during WWII and the People's Revolution War from 1930s to 1950s to report important war information to the people within the regime of CCP and homogenize people's political ideology to support the party in the wars. Many important state media, including the Central People's Radio Station and China Central Television, are different branches under the management of Xinhua. It is directly under the governance of the Central Propaganda Department of the state, where abundant state authorities and politicians had directly involved in content creation and editing of the news in the agency.

As the largest and most influential news outlet in China, Xinhua often represents the mainstream political ideology. In the meantime, it also has the most news correspondents in the world. Its website, xinhuanet.com, only includes the content written in English to target on oversea audiences. It serves as a window for the world to see China. While mostly serving the

state propaganda purpose, it's also engaged in building Chinese soft power and expanding cultural influence in the foreign countries (xinhuanet.com, 2022).

Social discourses on the news often reflect the national ideologies, and Chinese news is no exception (Pan, Lee, Chan et al., 2001). As a state branch and what Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956; see also: Nerone, 2018) defined as the authoritarian press model, Chinese mainstream news has been highlighting the value of communism and nationalism since the establishment of the regime (Pan et al., 2001). Even if Chinese market has opened to the world since the late 1980s and the news began to include more plural values driven by commercial interests, the newspapers have kept emphasizing the collectivism as both traditional Chinese value and the legitimacy of regime (Pan et al., 2001; Ke, Liu, & Tang, 2016). Same as the British mainstream news, the Chinese press would reinterpret the foreign events based on domestic ideology and cultural frames (Ke et al., 2016; Dai & Hyun, 2010). For example, when covering the Arab Spring in 2012, Chinese media labeled the protests as social unrest in contrast to the U.S. media who named the incidents as a rebellion (Ke et al., 2016). This example reflected the differences between Chinese and the U.S. mainstream ideologies: one emphasized social stability and collectivism and the other emphasized freedom and democracy.

Russian News Agency

TASS is short for Russian News Agency, a Russian state-owned news agency established in 1904 in Moscow. Formally founded by the tsar as the first Russian news agency, it was limited to domestic audiences at first but then combined with the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency to overcome the dominance of German news agency in the early 1900s. Then the 1917 October Bolshevik revolution turned it into the central news agency of the nation and the name was changed to the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) as it is known today. As the

largest Russian news agency and one of the largest international news agencies, TASS includes 70 offices in Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States, and 63 bureaus in 60 countries around the world (tass.com, 2022). It is the only Russian media representatives in at least 16 countries and the only Russian news agency with primary access to the state officials (Watanabe, 2017). Evidence showed that TASS was applied as a propaganda tool by the state, especially in the recent Russo-Ukrainian War (Watanabe, 2017).

The Russian news media system was often characterized as a polarized model where journalists were engaged in partisan journalism with limited press freedom (Dobek-Ostowska & DeSmaele, 2010; Vartanova, 2011; Watanabe, 2017). This indicated that while journalists obtained some levels of freedom to be loyal to the truth and even critical to their state government in a certain circumstance (Tolz et al., 2021), Russian media were still likely to represent the desire and ideology of the political elites and state. In a content analysis on biased news coverage of Ukrainian crisis in 2007, Watanabe (2017) found that TASS not only had overly negative coverage of the Ukrainian government in the crisis, but also became a strategy in Russia's 'hybrid wars'. For example, to sound more newsworthy and authentic, TASS even mixed negative frames about Ukraine with some positive comments of other Western nations to gain attention and acceptance from foreign media (Watanabe, 2017). All these strategies indicated that TASS was applied by Russian state not only as a propaganda tool, but also a medium of public diplomacy (Watanabe, 2017). In this sense, its function was similar to Xinhua.

All four news organizations were roughly equivalent in terms of the size and influence within their respective countries, and the range of news topics. The main difference is the distance of the news organizations to the United States in multiple dimensions that include geography, ideology, and news system operation. Comparatively, the U.S. and the British media

should be the most proximate to the United States across all dimensions, followed by Russian and Chinese media. Furthermore, as domestication happened to foreign news coverage across media systems, it was logical that different nations' news agency will represent the image of the United States differently based on the international relations with the U.S. and various national ideologies. In this case, the U.S. image should be presented more positively by AP and Reuters than Xinhua and TASS.

So far, no study has specifically compared the ideological distance between Chinese and Russia media to the U.S. media, and it is challenging to find the direct evidence. So, in my hypothesis, whether Russia or China is more proximate to the U.S. is kept as an open-ended question. The news organization will be treated as a nominal rather than continuous variable.

Stimulus

The four stories came from the relevant international news that was controversial and frequently discussed online about the roles of the U.S. Some of the facts were fabricated with misinformation, such that in the final story, it was true that U.S. offered COVID vaccines to Central Africa, but the information about the less effective vaccines in the negative version of the story was made up. Following the traditional framework of hard news, the first paragraph was written in one or two sentences briefly summarized the events, followed by the second paragraph that contain a comment from a spokesperson representing a third-party global NGO such as the United Nations. The comment contained the valence affect cues that either praised or blamed the U.S. actions or policies in the events.

The construction of the news stories as the experimental stimulus followed the classic discourse structure of a news article: summary/introduction – event (including consequences/reactions) – final comments (van Dijk, 1983, p.37). The first story was about the

U.S. government's support of COVID-19 vaccine to India, in which the positive version praised the U.S. action for assisting India during humanitarian crisis at the time. The negative version of the story blamed the U.S. for not supporting India in a timely manner.

The second story was that the U.S. froze \$7.1 billion from the Afghani government after the war and planned to return half the asset to the new government. The other half would compensate the "911" victims' families in the U.S. The positive side of the story complemented the action of the U.S. for supporting Afghanistan and being considerate to the American victims. The negative side of the story blamed the U.S. for violating the human rights by freezing the asset of Afghani people and only returning half back to them.

The third story was about a U.S. capital foundation that announced a new fund to support early-stage start-up companies in Africa. The positive side of the story praised the U.S.'s support that would help a dozen new start-up companies in Africa. The negative side blamed the foundation was just a strategy of the U.S. to take over African financial market.

The last story was the U.S. government distributing millions of doses of COVID vaccines to Central African countries. The positive side appreciated the U.S. government for making efforts to combat the spread of the virus. The negative side of the story mentioned that the U.S. only offered ineffective vaccines to Central Africa. The whole stories are available in Appendix B.

As defined by Facebook.com, the Facebook News machine learning model identified true or fake news based on authenticity and accountability of news content and source (2022). While the website was unclear about the standard to detect the content, it clearly highlighted the major news websites prior to other sources because they gave an impression of "on-the-record", which sounded more authentic than anonymous sources. Moreover, because Facebook viewers tended

to quickly go through a list of news on their feeds based on a variety of topics, it would be necessary to offer a brief review of the topic on the post so that the viewers could efficiently decide whether to click in to read more. Therefore, a valid news post on Facebook newsfeed should highlight the title, a valid Facebook news page icon, links to the original news websites, and a brief description of the topic/event.

To make such valid stimulus, I wrote each story for the experiment in less than 300 words. The posts started with the official icons of the four news agencies downloaded from their Facebook pages, with the press names and a verified mark (a blue “correct” icon) on the right side of the icon, followed by the 300-word story based on traditional inverted pyramid style, a one-sentence summary of the event in the first paragraph, followed by a commentary quote either positive or negative to the U.S. from a neutral source of a third-party research institute or NGO just to make the valence cue as salient as possible to the subjects. Then I included a neutral image about the event in the middle of each stimulus, with the relative links to the agencies and the titles of the stories at the bottom. The stories were rated by six journalism graduate students and over 100 journalism major undergraduate students as valid, including the valence manipulation of the stories.

Sample

Based on Andrew Fisher’s formula to calculate sample size, approximately $N=500$ can be very strong with 95% confidence level and the margin of error of $\pm 4\%$, given current population of American partisans ($N = 200$ million, Pew Research Center, 2020). The total sample is within the powerful range ($N = 484$).

In addition, a power analysis was conducted on clincalc.com, where a sample size calculator was openly accessible, and the method came from Rosner (2011). The formula based on proportion in survey type of studies is:

$$N = \frac{Z_{\alpha/2}^2 \times P \times (1 - p) \times D}{E^2}$$

Where N is sample size, P is prevalence or proportion of event, E is precision (or margin of error), D is design effect, here is 1 for simple random sampling. $Z_{\alpha/2}$ is 1.95 for alpha 0.05.

Considering American general population's news trust estimation (26%, Stata.com), plus and minus the estimation of 10 unit of difference, Alpha = 0.05, 80% power, the estimated sample size is 785. The post-hoc analysis of the sample power shows that the sample has the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis is 97%.

Two hundred undergraduate students who claimed as either conservatives or liberals were recruited from a Midwest university who took journalism classes, and 64 adult partisans were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online crowdsourcing platform, from April 25 to October 10, 2022. The subjects were recruited nationally as a supplementary non-student sample from a more hegemonic population than college students. A recruitment email was sent to the students with the link to the online survey (via Qualtrics services). Students were informed and received 2 extra credit points for the class that they took the survey from. The MTurk workers were recruited via the job postings on the crowdsourcing platform. They were informed and received \$4 as compensation for completing the survey. Only 18 years old or above and U.S. citizens were recruited in this study because they counted as American adults who have already formed a stable set of ideology (Kalmoe, 2020).

An additional 200 adult conservative national sample was recruited through Centiment.co, a professional survey distribution service, due to the highly skewed ideology (240

liberals, 44 conservatives). These participants were also U.S. citizens only and recruited through the online platform provided by Centiment.co. The sample was equally distributed to each condition as illustrated by *Table 4*.

Sample Description

After clearing the invalid responses, 484 cases were included in the total sample for this study. Among the cases, about 51.2 percent are between 18 and 30, 29.4 percent between 31 and 60, and 19.4 percent above 60. 45.7 percent males and 53.7 percent female, .6 percent fell into other categories. 86.8 percent white, 3.9 percent black, 2.3 percent Hispanic, 5 percent Asian, 2 percent other categories.

On education, 64.7 percent had a high school diploma or less, or had some college without degree, 27.4 percent had an associate or bachelor's degree, and 7.4 percent had a higher degree or professional degree. On annual household income, 18.6 percent below or equal to \$30,000, 15.3 percent between \$30,001 and \$50,000, 18 percent between \$50,001 and \$75,000, 11.6 percent between \$75,001 and \$100,000, 15.9 percent between \$100,001 and \$150,000, and 20.6 percent above or equal to \$150,001.

On news diet, 11.4 percent never read news on television, 26.4 percent watch television news once in a while, 21.7 percent watch once a month or once a week, and 40 percent watch twice or three times a week, or everyday. On news from social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter, or TikTok, 13 percent never, 18.4 percent once in a while, once a month or once a week, and 68.6 percent twice or three times a week or everyday. On news from instant messaging applications such as Whatsup or Snapchat, 50.4 percent never or once in a while, 15.5 percent once a month or once a week, and 34.1 percent twice or three times a week or everyday.

On social media use and fake news encounters, 89.5 percent use social media and 10.5 percent do not use social media. For the social media users, 36.8 percent never check the source of a news article from social media or only in rare occasions, 31.8 percent check less than once a day or once a day, and 20.9 percent check two to five times a day or even more. Among all the respondents, 20.5 percent have never come across fake news or misinformation, 24.4 percent less than once a day, 28.3 percent once a day, and 26.8 percent two to five times a day or even more.

On political ideology, 18.6 percent are very conservative, 18.2 percent conservative, 19.4 percent somewhat conservative, 10.1 percent somewhat liberal, 20.5 percent liberal, and 13.2 percent very liberal. On nationalism, 10.3 percent have extremely low-level nationalism, 19 percent somewhat low, 24.8 percent somewhat high, 30.8 high, and 15.1 extremely high-level nationalism. A full data description is available in *Table 2*.

Procedure

The participants first read a consent form and could only proceed by signifying their agreement to participate, that they were 18 years old or above, and that they were a U.S. citizen. After they self-reported their political orientation and national identity, the subjects were asked to read four different international news on Facebook posts and required to rate the perceived credibility and trustworthiness of each news post. The four news came from four different press varied in the level of proximity in this order: Associated Press (U.S.), Reuters (U.K.), Xinhua Press (China), and TASS (Russia), all of which were considered representing the official or mainstream press of which the headquarters geographically located in each nation. Each post contained one of the four different stories with either positive or negative comments to the U.S. actions or policies in the stories. The order of the four stories was completely randomized and each subject could only read one side (either positive or negative comments to the U.S.) of each

story that they were randomly assigned to. After rating the perceived credibility and trustworthiness of each post, they were asked about their overall media trust, their main attitude to the U.S. government, U.S. image, and foreign policy, followed by demographic questions. In the end, the true facts in each news story were disclosed after participants had finished the survey. The students received extra credit in a course they were taking and the MTurk workers were compensated within three days after submitting their responses. Their personal identifiable information was kept separately and not related to their survey responses and was deleted soon after they got compensated.

Dependent Variables

The main dependent variable, News Trust, was assessed after participants read the four different stories in the experiment. There are seven specific survey items under the variable and asked right after each of the four stories. They are summed to represent trust for each story.

News Trust

After reading each news post, subjects were asked: “How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false?” Responses were coded 3= very certain it is true to -3= very certain it is false. They were also asked to rate each news by “Complete” “Authentic” “Reliable” and “Objective” from -3 to 3. The first three items came from the same measurement of news trust applied by Markov et al. (2020) The last one was more related to perceived media bias (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985; Hackett, 1984; Kelly, 2019; Turel & Osatuyi, 2021). Additionally, two other questions “How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read?” and “How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it?” were included. The questions were added based on the multi-level and multidimensional concept of news media trust

(Williams, 2012). The questions were combined by adding up into a single index for news trust measurement. $\alpha = .94$. The specific data description of these variables after each stimulus is illustrated by *Table 6*, *Table 7*, *Table 8*, and *Table 9* in Appendix A.

Independent Variables

Press

As discussed in the end of Transnational Source Cue in Chapter II, especially on social media, consumers also count the news organizations posting a social media message or link to the news aggregators as source cue in relevant to social media platforms or news aggregators. However, journalism source is still different from this type of source, even if they are both information cues suggesting where the information come from. To avoid confusion, I call the news organization cue directly as press.

There were four press in this study and the Associated Press (AP) from the U.S. was rated as the most proximate to the U.S. as 1. The Reuters from U.K. was rated as 2, followed by Xinhua Press (Xinhua) from China as 3, and TASS from Russia as 4. As discussed above, both with much restriction on freedom of press, Xinhua Press and TASS both should be considered as the most ideological distant press to the U.S. As no study has been found to quantify ideological distance, especially between China and Russia, the variable is only treated as nominal instead of continuous. The order of the coding is only based on my first hypothesis to set Xinhua in front of TASS, just to ensure the consistence in analyses and description.

Valence

Valence referred to the positive or negative version of each story that subjects were assigned to read. The positive ones were coded as 2 and the negative ones were coded as 1.

Nationalism

Nationalism questions came from the measurement from Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) and Schatz et al. (1999) that includes patriotism, national membership, internationalism, and political involvement. For example, “I feel a strong sense of belonging to the United States.” “It is important to me that I view myself as American.” ($M = 5.23$, $SD = 1.66$) “I am strongly committed to the United States.” ($M = 5.17$, $SD = 1.69$) “The United States is better than other countries in all respects.” ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 2.03$) There are 6 items in total and combined into the same variable. Responses were coded 6=extremely high nationalism, 5=high nationalism, 4=somewhat high nationalism, 3=somewhat low nationalism, 2=low nationalism, 1= extremely low nationalism ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 1.30$). $\alpha = .85$.

Ideology

In the pre-test, participants were asked: “How much to the left or the right is your political ideology?” Responses were coded 4= extremely liberal, 3= liberal, 2= conservative, 1 = extremely conservative ($M = 2.20$, $SD = 1.08$). There is no moderate or independent response because only the partisans in liberals and conservatives were included in the sample of this study.

Control Variables

In Chapter II, I predict that the variables about media use are more likely to associate with source than valence. Similarly, there will be strong correlations between media consumption, general news trust, and press, and they should have direct impact on news trust. Next, I predict strong correlations between nationalism, pride, and anger, and all of them have direct influence on news trust. These factors will be applied to SEM analysis as well as the control variables in hierarchical linear regression analysis. Finally, the basic demographic variables are also included as control variables. The operational definitions of the factors are listed below.

General U.S. News Trust

In the pre-test, the subjects were asked “how much do you agree with the following statements?” followed by two statements, one measuring the overall perceived media credibility and the other measuring the overall news trustworthiness pulling from Roberts (2010). “Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate.” ($M = 3.79$, $SD = 1.72$) “I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media.” ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.80$) Subjects were asked to rate from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” in 7-point Likert scale. $\alpha = .93$.

Self-Rated Confidence to Detect Misinformation

In both the pre-test and the post-test of all four stimulus: “How would you rate your confidence to detect false or misleading information in the news?” was asked and subjects rated the question from “Not confident at all” to “Very confident” in 5-point Likert scale (Pre-test: $M = 3.70$, $SD = .93$; Post-test: $M = 3.45$, $SD = .91$).

News Consumption

Three questions in the pre-test: “We would like to ask you some questions about how you use certain media outlets. How often do you read, watch or listen: - Television News” ($M = 3.66$, $SD = 1.78$) “We would like to ask you some questions about how you use certain media outlets. How often do you read, watch or listen: - Social Media News (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, TikTok)” ($M = 4.67$, $SD = 1.83$) and “We would like to ask you some questions about how you use certain media outlets. How often do you read, watch or listen: - News Circulated by Your Whatsup/Snapchat Contacts”. ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 2.01$) $\alpha = .27$. Three items were used as separate variables due to low reliability level.

Social Media Use and Source Checking Activity

In the pre-test, participants were first asked: “Do you use social media?” Responses were coded 1=yes, 2=no. The participants who responded “yes” would answer the next question: “How often do you check the source of a news article posted on social media?” Responses were coded 6= more than 5 times a day, 5= 2-5 times a day, 4= once a day, 3 = less than once a day, 2 = only in rare occasions, 1 = never ($M = 3.20$, $SD = 1.45$).

Previous Misinformation Encounter

Asked in the pre-test: “How often do you come across news or information that misrepresents reality or is even false?” Responses were coded 6 = more than 5 times a day, 5 = 2-5 times a day, 4= once a day, 3= less than once a day, 2= only in rare occasions, 1 = never ($M = 3.67$, $SD = 1.25$).

Presumed Influence of Misinformation

“How likely do you think the following people would believe the false or misleading information in the news? – Yourself” ($M = 2.56$, $SD = 1.16$) “How likely do you think the following people would believe the false or misleading information in the news? – Other people in general” ($M = 3.53$, $SD = .87$) “How likely do you think the following people would be influenced by the false or misleading information in the news? – Yourself” ($M = 2.46$, $SD = 1.23$) “How likely do you think the following people would be influenced by the false or misleading information in the news? - Other people in general” ($M = 3.47$, $SD = .91$) Responses were coded 5=very likely, 4=somewhat likely, 3=somewhere in between, 2=somewhat unlikely, 1=very unlikely. $\alpha = .71$.

Emotion

Asked right after each stimulus: "Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very

proud of the U.S. government action.” “Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very angry about the U.S. government action.” 3= strongly agree, 2= agree, 1= somewhat agree, 0= neither agree nor disagree, -1= somewhat disagree, -2= disagree, -3= strongly disagree.

Responses to the first question from four different places were summed as Pride and responses to the second questions from four different places were summed as Anger. Pride: $\alpha = .67$. Anger: $\alpha = .72$. Table 5 provides detailed data description of all variables of emotion after each of the four stimuli.

Demographics

Five variables, gender, race/ethnicity, income level, and education, were included in demographic variables to serve as the control variables in a hierarchical regression model. More specifically, gender was coded 2= female, 1 = male; race/ethnicity were coded 5 = other or multiracial, 4= Asian, 3= Hispanic, 2= Black/African American, 1 = White ($M = 1.32$, $SD = .93$); age was the same as the actual age ($M = 37.88$, $SD = 20.44$); education was the highest degree or level of school participants have completed from 8 = doctoral degree to 1 = less than a high school diploma ($M = 3.38$, $SD = 1.41$); income was the total annual household income after taxes from 8 = more than \$250,000 to 1 = less than \$12,000 ($M = 4.59$, $SD = 2.13$).

Story Effect

In addition, I tested the potential influence of story effect, meaning the effect of the different stories exposed in each press, on news trust. Story was coded 1 = U.S. support Indian COVID-19 crisis, 2 = U.S. unfroze Afghani assets, 3 = U.S. fund African startups, 4 = U.S. send Africa COVID-19 vaccines. A one-way ANOVA test of each news organization found no significant difference on news trust between different story conditions, For AP, $F(3, 480) =$

1.71, $p = .16$. Reuters: $F(3, 480) = 1.53, p = .21$. Xinhua: $F(3, 480) = 1.45, p = .23$. TASS: $F(3, 480) = .20, p = .90$.

Chapter IV: Results

This chapter reports the results of hypotheses testing, the additional findings with some additional control variables, and hierarchical linear regression. The detail of the SEM test is discussed in Chapter V and Appendix C.

Hypotheses Testing

The first hypothesis asserts that there will be a significant association between the ideological distance of news organization and trust. The first hypothesis was analyzed between each press condition with paired samples t-test. The paired samples t-test showed a significant difference between AP and Reuters ($t(483) = -2.71, p < .01$), Reuters and Xinhua ($t(483) = 5.12, p < .001$), Reuters and TASS ($t(483) = 5.90, p < .001$), AP and Xinhua ($t(483) = 2.58, p < .05$), and AP and TASS ($t(483) = -3.26, p < .001$) were significant except Xinhua and TASS ($t(483) = 1.19, p = .23$). These results generally support *H1* except that general trust in Reuters ($M = 2.03, SD = 8.06$) is higher than AP ($M = 1.05, SD = 7.74$). More details are available in *Table 10* of Appendix A. *H1* was only partially supported.

The second hypothesis tests the relationship between the valence of affect cues and news trust. Specifically, trust in the positive news about the U.S. should be higher than the negative news about the U.S. Independent sampled t-tests by news organizations were also conducted with similar results: AP $t(482) = 33.59, p < .001$; Reuters $t(482) = 34.59, p < .001$; Xinhua $t(482) = 13.09, p < .001$; TASS $t(482) = 26.35, p < .001$. More details are available in *Table 11* of Appendix A. *H2* was supported.

The third hypothesis explores for the interaction between valence and news organization on trust. In order to count the news organization, the sample was divided by four, with each subject getting a randomly number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, 4 = TASS.

Then a new news trust variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new news trust will be assigned to the AP news trust, etc. $M = .48$, $SD = 8.58$.

The new valence variable was also randomly assigned by press in the same way. 228 cases (47.1%) were assigned to negative and 256 (52.9%) positive. With the new trust and new valence variables, an ANCOVA test was conducted among valence, press, and new trust variables. There was no significant interaction between press and valence on news trust. $F(3, 476) = .55$, $p = .65$. *H3* was not supported.

More details are available in Table 12 of Appendix A. Based on comparison of the means, positive Reuters ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 7.56$, $n = 76$) was trusted the most, followed by positive AP ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 7.56$, $n = 75$), positive TASS ($M = 1.53$, $SD = 5.74$, $n = 49$), positive Xinhua ($M = .66$, $SD = 9.33$, $n = 56$), negative AP ($M = -.60$, $SD = 8.12$, $n = 55$), negative Reuters ($M = -1.02$, $SD = 8.40$, $n = 59$), and the least two include negative Xinhua ($M = -2.30$, $SD = 8.64$, $n = 63$) and negative TASS ($M = -3.29$, $SD = 10.62$, $n = 51$). The Tukey's post hoc test also shows that negative Xinhua and negative TASS are significantly trusted less than positive Reuters. The power of influence for valence is larger than press, making positive news trusted more than negative news regardless the press; however, within each valence, the more proximate news organization was trusted more than the less proximate news organization. The results showed the same direction as *H3* even if there are order differences.

The next hypothesis predicts a negative effect of nationalism on news trust. A set of one-way ANOVA tests on news trust in each press were conducted. The results show significant differences between nationalist groups across all news organizations: AP $F(3, 478) = 6.45$, $p < .001$; Reuters $F(3, 478) = 4.67$, $p < .001$; Xinhua $F(3, 478) = 3.89$, $p < .001$; TASS $F(3, 478) = 3.51$, $p < .01$. Scheffe's post hoc tests show the completely different direction of the result

from the hypothesis: instead of middle ground with higher trust than both ends, the extreme nationalists trust much higher than the rest of the groups across press.

More specifically, extremely high nationalists ($M = 5.26$, $SD = 10.26$) were significantly different from medium-low nationalists ($M = .34$, $SD = 6.11$), medium-high nationalists ($M = .28$, $SD = 6.56$), and high nationalists ($M = .09$, $SD = 7.81$) in trust in AP; extremely high nationalists ($M = 5.77$, $SD = 10.75$) were significantly different from medium-low nationalists ($M = 1.57$, $SD = 6.44$), medium-high nationalists ($M = .64$, $SD = 7.08$), and high nationalists ($M = 1.19$, $SD = 8.06$); extremely high nationalists ($M = 3.86$, $SD = 11.65$) were significantly different from medium-low nationalists ($M = -.82$, $SD = 6.26$) and high nationalists ($M = -.56$, $SD = 8.55$) in Xinhua; extremely high nationalists ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 11.21$) were significantly different from medium-high nationalists ($M = -1.12$, $SD = 7.60$) and high nationalists ($M = -1.00$, $SD = 9.38$). More details are available in Table 13 of Appendix A. *H4* was not supported.

The next hypothesis predicts a positive interaction of nationalism and valence on trust. A set of ANCOVA tests did not show a significant difference across news organizations: AP $F(5, 472) = .97$, $p = .44$; Reuters $F(5, 472) = .78$, $p = .57$; Xinhua $F(5, 472) = 1.14$, $p = .34$; TASS $F(5, 472) = .78$, $p = .56$. More details are available in Table 14 to Table 17 of Appendix A. *H5* was not supported.

H6 predicts a negative association between the interaction of nationalism and news organization on trust. An ANCOVA test on the new news trust variable¹ ($M = .48$, $SD = 8.58$) did not show a significant difference. $F(15, 460) = .35$, $p = .99$. More details are available in Table 18 of Appendix A. *H6* was not supported.

¹ In order to count the news organization, the sample was divided by four, with each subject getting a randomly number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, 4 = TASS. Then a new news trust variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new news trust will be assigned to the AP news trust, etc.

H7 predicts an interaction among nationalism, valence, and press. The less extreme the nationalism, the lower the trust difference among different press and valence. The ANCOVA result based on the new news trust variable¹ ($M = .48$, $SD = 8.5$) showed a significant interaction of the three factors. $F(14, 437) = 1.71$, $p = .05$.

Tukey's post hoc test shows that the main differences between the groups exist at AP negative news between medium-low nationalists ($M = -1.54$, $SD = 9.29$) and extremely high nationalists ($M = 9.38$, $SD = 7.41$), medium-high nationalists ($M = -3.00$, $SD = 6.00$) and extremely high nationalists, high nationalists ($M = -2.83$, $SD = 9.25$) and extremely high nationalists; Reuters negative news between medium-low nationalists ($M = -4.00$, $SD = 8.07$) and extremely high nationalists ($M = 5.56$, $SD = 6.53$), high nationalists ($M = -4.00$, $SD = 4.56$) and extremely high nationalists; Xinhua positive news between medium-low nationalists ($M = -2.67$, $SD = 2.6$) and extremely high nationalists ($M = 4.91$, $SD = 9.92$); TASS negative news between low nationalists ($M = -9.50$, $SD = 6.36$) and extremely high nationalists ($M = 6.30$, $SD = 11.35$), medium-low nationalists ($M = -9.50$, $SD = 6.57$) and extremely high nationalists, medium-high nationalists ($M = -4.58$, $SD = 6.61$) and extremely high nationalists, somewhat high nationalists ($M = -4.58$, $SD = 6.61$), high nationalists ($M = -5.00$, $SD = 7.56$) and extremely high nationalists; TASS positive news between low nationalists ($M = 8.33$, $SD = 7.13$) and extremely high nationalists ($M = -4.00$, $SD = 4.67$). More details are available in *Table 19* of Appendix A.

Based on the results, we can tell the clear-cut differences between extremely high and lower nationalists across most of the news organizations when the valence is negative. Only Xinhua and TASS have clear-cut differences when the valence is positive. These do suggest an interaction of the three variables, valence, press, and nationalism. *H7* was supported.

Figure 1 and *Figure 2* in Appendix A show the difference among various source by nationalist groups in the negative and positive conditions. Again, the Y-axis represents nationalism from extremely low at the bottom to extremely high at the top and the X-axis represents news trust. Both figures show that the gap between the press on both ends of Y-axis larger than the groups in the middle with the gap in the positive condition smaller than the negative condition; generally, the positive news was trusted more than the negative news. For negative news, trust was generally low and negative except Reuters at the low nationalists, AP, Reuters, and TASS at the extremely high nationalists. For positive news, trust was generally high and positive except AP in low nationalists, Xinhua in somewhat low nationalists, and TASS in extremely high nationalists.

H8 predicts that the more extreme the political partisanship, the less likely the news will be trusted. Again, a set of one-way ANOVA tests result showed significant differences across news organizations between partisan groups AP $F(3, 480) = 9.99, p < .001$, Reuters $F(3, 480) = 12.75, p < .001$, Xinhua $F(3, 480) = 7.89, p < .001$, TASS $F(3, 480) = 6.27, p < .001$. Scheffe's post hoc test showed that the extreme liberals (AP $M = 5.13, SD = 8.65$; Reuters $M = 7.09, SD = 8.34$; Xinhua $M = 4.41, SD = 8.74$; TASS $M = 3.88, SD = 9.47$) was significantly higher than other groups, while the rest of the partisan groups were not significantly different from each other. More details are available in *Table 20* of Appendix A. *H8* was not supported.

H9 predicts that the conservative partisans will trust less than the liberal partisans overall. The Scheffe's post hoc test results show significant differences between extremely liberals and the rest across news organizations, but no significant difference between liberals and the rest except extremely liberals. *H9* was partially supported.

H10 predicts that the more extreme the political partisanship, the more different news trust between domestic and foreign news organizations. With the new news trust variable², the ANCOVA result didn't show significant difference of the interaction. $F(6, 468) = .79, p = .62$. More details are available in *Table 25* of Appendix A. *H10* was not supported.

H11 predicts that the more extreme the political partisanship, the more difference in trust between the positive and the negative news. ANCOVA test did not show significant results $F(3, 476) = 1.93, p = .12$. A set of ANCOVA tests show that only Reuters has significant result between ideology and press. AP $F(3, 476) = 2.04, p = .11$; Reuters $F(3, 476) = 2.65, p < .05$; Xinhua $F(3, 476) = 1.35, p = .26$; TASS $F(3, 476) = 1.89, p = .13$. Bonferroni's adjusted pairwise post hoc test showed the significant differences exist between extreme conservatives ($M = 1.35, SD = 9.05$) and liberals ($M = 4.91, SD = 6.09$), conservatives ($M = 2.83, SD = 6.37$) and extremely liberals, liberals and extremely liberals ($M = 10.36, SD = 6.09$), and extremely conservatives and extremely liberals in positive news. More details of all news organizations are available in *Table 21* to *Table 24* of Appendix A. *H11* was not supported.

H12 predicts an interaction between ideology, press, and valence. Specifically, the less extreme the political partisanship, the more difference between the effect of sources by valences. With the new news trust variable² and new valence variable created in the same way, the ANCOVA test did not show a significant result. $F(9, 452) = .62, p = .78$. More details are available in *Table 26* of Appendix A. *H12* was not supported.

² In order to count the news organization, the sample was divided by four, with each subject getting a randomly number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, 4 = TASS. Then a new news trust variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new news trust will be assigned to the AP news trust, etc. $M = .48, SD = 8.58$.

Additional Findings

Additional variables listed under control variables in Chapter III was included as extra exploratory analysis. First, we found two main indicators of both factors: self-confidence to detect misinformation and presumed media influence. One-way ANOVA presented in *Table 27* of Appendix A shows a significant difference between different levels of presumed media influence on news trust³. $F(120, 479) = 131.49, p < .001$. One-way ANOVA also shows a significant difference between different levels of self-confidence on news trust. $F(4, 479) = 6.56, p < .001$. More details are available in Table 27 and Table 28 of Appendix A.

Also mentioned in Chapter III, media consumption, source checking activity, past encounter with misinformation, and the trust level of U.S. news in general have associations with news trust. Pearson's bivariate correlation test shows that source checking activity ($r(431^1) = .30, p < .001$), consumption of television news ($r(482) = .12, p < .01$), social media news ($r(482) = .24, p < .001$), news circulated by Whatsup/Snapchat contacts ($r(482) = .40, p < .001$), and general news trust ($r(482) = .51, p < .001$) were all significantly and positively correlated with news trust. More details are available in Table 29 of Appendix A.

Besides, the source checking activity was also significantly and positively correlated with consumption of television news ($r(482) = .46, p < .001$), social media news ($r(482) = .33, p < .001$), and news circulated by Whatsup/Snapchat contacts ($r(482) = .27, p < .001$). Previous encounters with misinformation were positively correlated with news consumption circulated by Whatsup/Snapchat contacts ($r(482) = .20, p < .001$). General U.S. news trust was negatively correlated with misinformation encounter ($r(482) = -.14, p < .01$), and positively correlated with

³ Ranging from -74 to 74, News trust is the sum of the responses to all original news trust questions of all four news organizations.

source checking activity ($r(431^4) = .28, p < .001$), consumption in television news ($r(482) = .10, p < .05$), social media news ($r(482) = .26, p < .001$), and news circulated by Whatsup/Snapchat contacts ($r(482) = .37, p < .001$).

What about emotions? Recent studies (i.e., Baum, Fromer, & Rahman, 2020; Weimann-Saks, Elshar-Malka, Ariel et al., 2022) found that emotion was correlated with the valence of the news. Pearson's bivariate correlation test showed significant and positive correlations between trust and pride ($r(482) = .55, p < .001$), trust and anger ($r(482) = .23, p < .001$), and negative correlation between pride and anger ($r(482) = -.17, p < .001$).

The variables of emotion also statistically significantly correlated to nationalism. Based on Pearson's bivariate correlation test, news trust significantly correlated to both pride ($r(484) = .55, p < .001$) and anger ($r(484) = .23, p < .001$). Nationalism was the same; Pride: $r(484) = .34, p < .001$. Anger: $r(484) = .15, p < .001$. Moreover, in opposite directions, pride ($r(484) = -.17, p < .001$) also significantly correlated to anger (see Table 30 of Appendix A).

Table 31 to Table 34 show the model of ANCOVA analysis with valence, nationalism, pride, anger, and their interactions by news organizations. In AP, there is a significant interaction between valence and anger, $F(6, 281) = 2.52, p < .05$. In Reuters, there is a significant interaction between nationalism and valence, $F(5, 276) = 2.82, p < .05$. There is also a marginally significant interaction between nationalism and pride, $F(27, 276) = 1.41, p = .09$. And a significant interaction between pride and anger, $F(28, 276) = 1.85, p < .01$.

In Xinhua, there is a significant interaction between nationalism and pride, $F(24, 289) = 1.88, p < .01$. And a valence and anger, $F(6, 289) = 2.51, p < .05$. And a marginally significant interaction between valence, pride, and anger, $F(12, 289) = 1.63, p = .08$. In TASS, there is a

⁴ The sample for this variable only includes the ones answered "yes" to "Do you use social media?" question.

significant interaction between nationalism and valence, $F(5, 283) = 2.64, p < .05$. Nationalism and pride, $F(22, 283) = 2.14, p < .01$. Pride and anger, $F(29, 283) = 2.36, p < .001$. Nationalism, valence, and anger, $F(27, 283) = 2.21, p < .05$. And a marginally significant difference between valence and pride, $F(6, 283) = 1.98, p = .07$. Valence, pride, and anger, $F(8, 283) = 1.78, p = .08$. Overall, except AP, nationalism, pride, anger, and valence all have different levels of interaction on trust across the news organizations.

Meanwhile, there was a negative test effect on self-rated confidence to detect misinformation related to exposure to the experimental stimuli. The paired-samples t-test in Table 35 showed a significant difference between pre-test ($M = 3.70, SD = .93, N = 484$) and post-test self-confidence ($M = 3.45, SD = .91, N = 484$). $t(483) = 6.37, p < .001$.

A hierarchical linear regression model in Table 36 found that general U.S. media trust, anger at the U.S. conduct in the news, presumed influence of misinformation, ideology, and new valence⁵ have significant causal relationship with new news trust⁶, $R^2 = .648, F(19, 412) = 15.73, p < .001$. The final model includes demography, news consumption, general U.S. media trust, misinformation encounter, source checking activity, confidence to detect misinformation, pride and anger of the U.S. conduct in the news, ideology, pre-test presumed influence of misinformation, nationalism, source and valence.

Four separate hierarchical linear regression models by each press are also presented in Table 37 to Table 40. The first model about AP showed that age, television news consumption,

⁵ In order to count the news organization, the sample was divided by four, with each subject getting a randomly number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, 4 = TASS. Then a new valence variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new valence will be assigned to the valence in the AP news read by the subject, etc. 228 cases (47.1%) were assigned to negative and 256 (52.9%) positive.

⁶ In order to count the news organization, the sample was divided by four, with each subject getting a randomly number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, 4 = TASS. Then a new news trust variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new news trust will be assigned to the AP news trust, etc. $M = .48, SD = 8.58$.

general U.S. news trust, anger, pride, and valence all have significant influence on news trust, while nationalism only has marginally significant influence on news trust.

In Reuters, gender, self-rated confidence to detect misinformation, general U.S. news trust, ideology, pride, anger, and valence have significant influence, whereas news consumption on Whatsup/Snapchat and nationalism have marginal significant influence.

In Xinhua, age, education, news consumption on Whatsup/Snapchat, general U.S. news trust, nationalism, anger, pride, and valence have significant influence, whereas news consumption on social media and self-rated confidence in detecting misinformation have marginally significant influence.

Finally, in TASS, income, news consumption on Whatsup/Snapchat, general U.S. news trust, anger, pride, and valence have significant influence. Overall, it seems that general U.S. news trust, anger, pride, and valence are shared effective factors across the four models. Furthermore, one of the demographic variables are related to the models, and the reason why such variable vary in the models are yet to explore.

In AP and Reuters, ideology becomes more significantly relevant than nationalism, but nationalism becomes more significant relevant than ideology in Xinhua and TASS. It also seems that except for AP, the consumption on Whatsup/Snapchat is also significantly relevant in all models.

Chapter V: Discussion

News trust is a key factor for the journalism industry, democracy, political engagement, and may even impact foreign policy. The aim of this study is to explore and examine the influence of various factors and connect them in a theoretical model, based on previous literature on media effects, social psychology, international relations, news framing, and foreign news media systems. My hypotheses included three levels of interactions: content-wise source by valence, individual-level nationalism/ ideology as important identity trait by source and valence, and a structural equation model constructed to indicate various heuristic processes by identity, news cues, and some other factors proved to significantly associate with trust. There are two parts in the core of the model: the first part is the source heuristics, which correlate with general trust in U.S. news; the second part is the valence heuristics that mediate the influence of nationalism and trust. This chapter includes conclusion, theoretical and practical implications of the results, limitations, and future studies.

News Organization

The first hypothesis that the trust will be higher for more ideologically proximate news organization to the U.S. than for less proximate news organization was supported, except for the order of trust in AP and Reuters and the non-significant difference between Xinhua and TASS. This result generally validates the previous findings by Tsfaty and Ariely's (2014) study about the association between the various trust in media and the state ownership of TV. Especially in democratic nations, state ownership is typically seen as providing a mouthpiece of state actors rather than for the people or public; the public owned broadcast services are usually considered as a trustworthy source. That possibly explains why some U.S. audience would trust British

media (public owned broadcast services) even more than the U.S. media. Similar findings include Schmitt-Beck and Wolsing (2010) and Schranz and colleagues (2018).

An alternative explanation is the negative influence of the Russian information attack on American public opinion and media trust (Mak, July 12, 2018; Benkler et al., 2018; Ross, 2022). Along with the application of digital media, this causes a decreasing quality of American journalism such that journalists overly focus on the comments, opinions, or rumors to entertain the audience and less focus on the accuracy of the fact (Turner, 2018, p.5-6). Therefore, this study also provides clear-cut evidence about the lower trust of American partisans in their own media than U.K., a foreign Western media. Furthermore, audiences would trust a source which they perceive to have shared interests. Among the sources in this study, AP and Reuters represent shared interests in ideology and international relations, while Xinhua and TASS do not share much interest (rather as a threat to their ideology or a competitor as covered on CNN and the New York Times; Nikolaev, 2022; Peng, 2004) as the other two so they are trusted much less.

The alignment between media and political trust, also called the “trust nexus” by Hanitzsch and colleagues (2018, p. 6), is weaker in the countries with high press freedom and professionalism (Ariely, 2015), but they excluded their trust in foreign media. Even if my qualitative data (“Why did you think this is true or false (please type in more than 30 letters)?” after each stimulus was asked to the college students and Amazon Turk respondents, N = 284) suggests that lots of participants have little knowledge about Chinese and Russian press; they have a long-term impression about Chinese media and their tight relationship with the government. Their distrust in Russian media is about the same based on the difference in national

interests (Romanova, 2019). That probably explains why American audiences are uncertain whether Chinese or Russian media are more trustworthy than the other.

Zaller (1992)'s messaging processing theory in international affairs has implied that the audiences with limited information of the public affairs would be more likely to rely on source cues than the audiences with more information. Based on the heuristic model of information processing, the source cue can evoke the affect pool of the individual's imagination about the news organization, whether it is good or bad, or whether it is confirming or against their own ideology and identity. Then they will make the evaluation of the information, especially when they have little knowledge about the news organization, which is often the case (Tsati & Cohen, 2013; Dragojlovic, 2013). Even on social media, audiences will pay abundant attention to the original news outlet where the news is published first (Winter & Kramer, 2014; Kang et al., 2011). Thus, the news organization plays an important role on the audiences' news trust, especially when the audiences have little knowledge about the foreign affairs.

Valence

H2, which predicted the trust in positive news greater than the trust in negative news, was completely supported. This validates the claim by Kahneman (2002) that personal feeling is essential in the cognitive process of multiple information. The emotion-arousal content can be even more influential than source cues to influence cognitive processing of misinformation (Baum, Fromer, & Rahman, 2020). Comparing to the memory of relevant past experiences to the message, another important heuristic cue in cognitive process, affect cue is much easier and more efficient for people to use (Slovic, Finucane, Peters et al., 2002). Moreover, different from cognitive arousal, affect cues often convey much detailed meanings, and thus make it easier for

people to make efficient impression and judgment based on the accurate description (Slovic et al., 2007).

Valence is an easily accessible affect cue that often put on a label on the target from the information. On the one hand, information receiver will put the label with the target to form an initial impression, and then compare with their affect pool where their pre-disposition is stored. The congruency between their pre-disposition based on their issue attitudes, identities or ideologies will lead to a quick positive or negative impression on the information. On the other hand, certain types of emotional reactions of the information receiver can be aroused by valence. Emotional reaction is directly associated with trust (Kahneman, 2002; Baum et al., 2020). Both factors can create a heuristic shortcut in information processing without going through more complexed cognitive process. Furthermore, if an identity-related cue also exists in the content, valence can directly label the attitude of the news towards the group identity of the information receiver. If the receiver is part of the group, the evaluation will be highly influenced by valence to defend their personal identities (Tsfati & Cohen, 2013; Gunther & Liebhart, 2007).

Press by Valence

The third hypothesis about the interaction between news organization and valence was not supported. Together with Kahneman (2002)'s claim that different people may be triggered by various cues and enter different cognitive process because different identities of people might make a certain type of cue more salient than others, the result potentially suggests a multi-path model of information processing between partisans and non-partisans. Here, the accessibility refers to the attention or ignorance of individuals over various information cues. For partisans, the identity-related cues are more salient to them, and they can easily process information based on these cues and ignore the rest of the cues. Their path of cognition is simple, fast, and

straightforward. For non-partisans, because the identity-related cues are less salient than partisans, they are more likely to pay attention to other cues, such as source cue, or information that leads to their memories of relevant experience and knowledge. All these cues potentially lead to a more sophisticated cognition path where they are into rational analysis based on their available information.

Only two types of cues were included in the context of this study, press and valence. Different from the hypothesis that predicts similar effect power of the cues, the effect power of press is greater than valence. Based on the pair-wise comparison, trust in positive Reuters is the highest, followed by positive AP, positive TASS, and positive Xinhua, negative AP, negative Reuters, negative Xinhua, and negative TASS. The order suggests that the influence of valence is greater than press, thereby validating the previous statement that valence, closely associated with sentimental arousal, represents a much more accessible heuristics cue than press among partisans. Again, this validates the previous statement about valence being more effective than other types of cues (Slovic et al., 2002). Because people prefer detailed and concrete information when trying to solve a problem or judge information (Thomas & Tsai, 2012), affect cues are more descriptive and easier to understand than other cues.

Both availability (here it refers to relevant experience or knowledge about the target) and affect are equally important and can often interdependently influence processing judgement (Pachur et al., 2012); however, as suggested by many participants that they have little knowledge about the events covered in the stimulus, this study cannot provide a comparison between affect and availability and should be considered to apply in future studies.

Nationalism and Ideology

The fourth hypothesis predicted a negative effect of nationalism on news trust, and the eighth hypothesis predicts a negative effect of the ideological proximity on news trust. Neither of these hypotheses were supported. Both relationships seem to be linear in an ascending direction: the high nationalists trust the news much more than the other groups, so do the extreme liberals. This also supports *H9*, which predicts that conservatives will trust the news less than the liberals. While the mainstream media are commonly trusted more by liberals than conservatives (Cook & Gronke, 2001; Jones, 2004), it seems that in foreign news, instead of observing the traditional professionalism, journalists sometimes are willing to completely accommodate national interest and perhaps nationalism (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). This is often true in societies with high level of political polarization such as the U.S. (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). If so, foreign news with the nationalist frame will be highly congruent with the ideology of extreme nationalists. Therefore, it is reasonable that both liberals and conservatives can show high level of trust in such type of news.

Based on social identity theory, the in-group members of an identity will be motivated to confirm their own identities when there are multiple competing identities on the news (Golan et al., 2021). Such identity cues become personal and important because they evoke the ego involvement of the in-group members (Tsfati & Cohen, 2013). As to the liberals, a high level of trust in the U.S. mainstream media becomes part of their identity that can be stored as a heuristic cue to remind them to be consistent with their identity. As to the extreme conservatives, their heuristics somehow also restored the message that the mainstream media is untrustworthy, and thereby they tend to be more cynical and less acceptive to the media messages in general.

The most important finding from the hierarchical regression models by four different news organizations shows that American news consumers will prioritize ideology as their base of judgement when it comes to ideologically proximate news organizations such as AP and Reuters. Quite the opposite when they read the news that comes from ideologically distant news organizations such as Xinhua and TASS, they will prioritize nationalism instead of ideology as their base of judgement. This provides very strong evidence that news organization cue can play an important role when the news consumers choose the anchor of judgment in their heuristic process. It will also influence their choice of group membership to be considered from the cues of social identity in their memory storage pool.

Furthermore, the results indicate an interchangeable overlap between the U.S. liberals and high nationalists, meaning that a part of the U.S. liberals are floating between high and low nationalism based on the interchanging meaning of nationalism. Like other types of ideologies, nationalism is a flowing concept that changes over time, or people who used to self-identify in one category will swing to another at a different time (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016). Generally, traditional nationalism includes two factors, patriotism that inclines towards people's emotional attachment to their nation and national symbols, treating their nation as an important part of their identity; and nationalism that is more about the in-group and out-group distinction, the priority of national interests in front of other countries, or the thoughts that other people or other countries should share the same value or social system with them (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).

Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) suggest that U.S. nationalism has recently changed its dynamics due to the emergence of populism. This study divided nationalists based on four new criteria: "national identification, criteria of national membership, national pride, and national

hubris” (p.953). The extreme Republicans are most likely to be traditional nationalists. The other Republicans are not extreme nationalists, and they are especially less restrictive to the criteria of national membership such as religion, English-speaking, having been born inside the country or spent most of their lives in the country, etc.

The Democrats, on the other side, show very clear pattern of dynamic transformation due to the surge of populism. Very few of them are low in all aspects of the new nationalism, whereas others are extremely restrictive to the criteria to be American citizens, even more so than the lean Republicans (p.962). Such extreme attitude suggests that these Democrats support more restrictive immigration policies and are more close-minded in the in-group and out-group distinction. According to the new concept of nationalism, it seems that some Democrats are becoming more extreme nationalists. A recent Pew Research Center data (2021) also shows a relatively large group of liberals stay liberal in social welfares policies, but they are surprisingly restrictive in immigration policies.

My additional ANCOVA test between nationalism and ideology shows that both the extreme liberal and the extreme high nationalists trust media significantly more than other groups. It suggests a potential interaction between the two factors, which means that the gap between high and low nationalists is the widest among the liberals. The nationalist gap among the conservatives is much less than the liberals.

Based on the findings by Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), a large portion of lean conservatives will trust the media but with high or medium nationalism. A large portion of lean liberals will trust the media but with high nationalism in the criteria of national membership, but medium levels regarding other aspects. While these two groups may crosscut with the extremely high nationalists, the extreme conservatives also belonging to this group will trust the media

much less than the other groups. This explains the nationalist gap. The extreme liberals also have a wider trust gap than the other groups on the ideological spectrum. While most lean liberals would trust the media, some extreme liberals may show little trust in the media due to their overall disengagement and distrust in social institutions.

Other scholars also try to redefine nationalism, such that the nationalism today should highlight the distinctions between in-group and out-group and irrational elements (Gingrich & Banks, 2006; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Although this study cannot provide complete evidence on the shifting nationalism among the liberals, the fact that both liberals and extreme nationalists trust news the most show side evidence, which can be extended in future studies.

Nationalism and Ideology by Valence

H5 tested the interaction of nationalism and valence on trust. This hypothesis was not supported. The gap between positive and negative news trust are parallel to each other and suddenly turn to almost zero (or an interaction) among extremely high nationalists. Again, it is possible that people at various levels of nationalism could process information differently based on the most salient cues to them. Although valence should be more salient than press for the audiences across nationalist levels, the crosscutting high nationalists and liberals will ignore valence and highly trust the news. The rest of the groups include extreme conservatives and extreme liberals. These people might trust the news less than the other groups and therefore they are more likely than lean conservatives and lean liberals to notice the valence cue.

The ideology by press looks slightly different. *H11* predicted a positive interaction between ideology and valence on trust. This relationship was not statistically significant. Comparing to the other groups who already have consistent and stable attitudes to foreign policy or international issues, the lean conservatives are more likely to be influenced by valence. As

confirmed by Shulman (2000, p.368), who determined that nationalism should be redefined based on various contexts and the attitudes to foreign policies, conservatives have more various attitudes to national issues than liberals. As suggested before, lean conservatives can be highly nationalist, so the national identity cue can be more salient to them than the others. The valence can also easily make them fall into quick judgement process. While the extreme conservatives are consistently distrusting news regardless of valence, valence can make more dramatic change on the lean conservatives.

Comparing to the results in *H5*, the influences of valence are larger across most of the nationalists than the ideology groups, while the difference is much smaller at the extremely high nationalists than the extreme liberals. This also strongly suggests what is already discussed on *H3* that the members of each nationalist group do not completely overlap with each ideological group. Extreme nationalists do not just include the extreme conservatives, they also include most of the lean liberals. The extreme liberals are more widespread across each nationalism group. Such difference also suggests that heuristic cues are influencing various ideological groups in different ways.

Nationalism and Ideology by Press

The sixth hypothesis predicted that the more extreme the nationalism, the more difference between the trust in various press. The result was not significant. The extremely high nationalists trust AP and Reuters equally the most and trust Xinhua the least, while the extremely low nationalists trust Reuters extremely more than the other press, and trust Xinhua the lowest. This suggests that the extremely high and low nationalists are more likely to be influenced by press cue. This is especially true for the extremely low nationalists who illustrate strong criticism to the U.S. news media and dramatically in contrast with the U.K. media.

The national identity as a cue within press can be conveniently helpful to the extreme nationalists to decide the trustworthiness of foreign news. For example, not a lot of them know much about Xinhua, but they are all informed that it's an official press from China. Thus, they are more hostile to Xinhua than the other press. The middle ground stay in the middle because they may either equally consider the press cue or simply ignore it.

H10 predicted a positive interaction between press and ideology on trust, which was not statistically significant. Here, there was relatively less difference across ideological groups. The lean conservatives are more different than the other groups, except the difference from extreme conservatives was not significant. This further suggests the overlap between the extremely high nationalists and the lean conservatives and that both groups can easily apply press on the news. The possible interaction happens at the extreme liberals between Xinhua and TASS, where the trust in Xinhua becomes higher than TASS. This also shows a general acceptive attitude of the extreme liberals.

Nationalism and Ideology by Valence and Press

H7 predicted a positive three-way interaction among nationalism, valence, and press on news trust. The more extreme the nationalists, the more likely that valence and press will interact with each other. This hypothesis was supported, meaning there are different patterns of press-nationalism relationship in the positive and the negative news. More specifically, I compared the difference between the most trusted and the least trusted press in each nationalist group and found the greatest difference at both ends of nationalist spectrum. Press was more effective in positive news whereas there are less differences among press in negative news. This suggests two interactions happen at both ends of nationalism spectrum. In addition, except TASS, all

press across nationalist groups trust more in positive news than negative news, showing valence was more salient than press in foreign news, when both are available to the extreme nationalists.

It is a surprise that the extremely high nationalists trust the negative TASS news more than the positive TASS news. This could be a result of cultural frames often applied on the news, such as the association of Russian media with “fake news” or a threatening hybrid “media war” by Russian government as believed by many people. A recent Pew Research Center study also shows that up to 70% of Americans see Russia as an enemy (2022). Thus, this could be a result of hostile media phenomenon where partisans scrutinize the positive news more than the negative news when it comes from Russia. While they do not trust the positive news from Russia, they are less suspicious of the negative news probably because they either did not have the need for cognition in this condition, or they simply believed the news. Based on their perceptual image about Russia and the U.S., perhaps they believe that the negative news accurately represents the negative aspects of the U.S. covered by an enemy nation. More studies, cases, and samples are necessary to further validate and specify the result.

H12 predicted that the less extreme the ideology, the more likely the interaction of press by valence. The analysis on the three-way interaction failed to support the hypothesis. The main difference between the trust in negative and positive news lies in the pattern of TASS across ideology groups. For negative news, the lean conservatives and lean liberals trusted TASS news less than the groups on both ends. For positive news, it is the opposite pattern: the extreme conservatives and the extreme liberals trusted TASS news less than the groups on both ends. This is similar to the results for *H7*. The extremists might be influenced by the cultural frames associated with the press and valence, so they are more suspicious about the positive TASS story than the negative one. The lean conservatives and lean liberals, on the other side, will perceive

valence more and straightforwardly. Both hypotheses testing further supports that there is a crosscutting between ideological and nationalist groups and both concepts are more different than the common assumption, and even the direction or dimension can be different. Nationalism and ideology also show low level of multicollinearity and moderate-level correlation ($r(484) = -.48, p < .001$), with variance inflation factors (VIF) equal to 1, supporting the claim above.

Other Factors Related to Trust

In addition, the associations between social media news consumption, self-confidence to detect misinformation, presumed media influence, source checking activity, past encounters with misinformation, trust in U.S. news in general and trust are significant. Tsfaty (2010) found that news media skepticism was negatively and significantly associated with time spent on online news browsing and the time spent on offline mainstream media in Israel. This study validates his findings about a decade ago.

Next, the significant association between source checking activity and consumption of the news circulated by Whatsup/Snapchat contacts suggests that the partisans are highly sensible of the platform where the news is published. Perhaps some of them have received and heard that others have received misinformation shared by Whatsup/Snapchat contacts. It is also different from the classic study by Messing and Westwood (2014) that social endorsements of social media friends are positively associated with news trust. This is because their study focuses more on the traditional social networking sites, while the instant messaging apps are considered less reliable platforms for information (Church & Oliveira, 2013). It is a common concern for the trustworthiness of information on these apps (Zarouali, Brosius, Helberger et al., 2021), but the extent of such concern varies across cultures (Tsoi & Chen, 2011). Future studies should make more detailed comparisons of news trust across different platforms.

The audiences' self-rated confidence to detect misinformation is also a key to news trust. As reported by the trust project (www.ipsos.com, 2020), most citizens around the globe show high confidence when it comes to their ability to detect false or misleading news. In the meantime, their estimation of the others' ability is worse. This could potentially lead to a main bias on people's news judgment. While the overconfidence makes them easier to be manipulated by the misleading information online or from fake news, it also makes people trust others less and less. This explains why the consumption in news circulated by Whatsup/Snapchat positively associates with misinformation encounter. Fortunately, the clear decrease of the self-rated confidence from pre-test to post-test shows that more practice or education in misinformation detection and/or more media exposure will lower the self-rated confidence, indicating that a little more practice will help media consumers more realistically evaluate their capability to detect misinformation.

Moreover, the U.S. general news trust is negatively associated with previous misinformation encounters and positively associated with source checking activity. Because the more trust mainstream news, the more likely the audiences will consume multiple sources of online news (Tsfati, 2010), the audiences who highly trust the news media will also have abundant confidence in checking multiple sources online. They also think that they are less likely to encounter misinformation than others because they have high levels of trust in media in general. Original news outlet is also one of the few applicable cues on social media to help audiences evaluate the information (Messing & Westwood, 2014). Thus, the audience with high general trust may be more aware of the news organization than others. There was a negative⁷ correlation between press and general U.S. trust, $r(484) = -.09, p = .056$.

⁷ Source was coded 4=TASS, 3=Xinhua, 2=Reuters, 1=AP. It means a positive association between proximity of source and news trust.

Emotion

Pride and anger, the main emotional reaction of the participants in this study, are positively associated with trust, and negatively associated between them. This further suggests that emotional reaction plays an important role in news trust. More specifically, based on the theory of affect heuristics (Slovic et al., 2002; Bargh, 1997), almost every stimulus would evoke an irrational assessment of the information, whether conscious or not. A simple example can be a subjective feeling or impression of the information, or the object being described being negative or positive. This is a very accessible heuristic attribute for different types of information evaluation (Slovic et al., 2002). Kahneman & Ritov (1994) and Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade (1999) also argued that the emotional reaction is the center of attitude attribution, which can determine many judgments and behaviors, such as determining the importance of the issues, political support, moral satisfaction.

Lee (1977, p. 253) wrote: “the average man’s reaction [to engagement abroad] will include a feeling of patriotism in supporting presidential actions.” It could be a short-term “rally around the flag” effect (James & Oneal, 1991). Patriotism is strongly associated with emotions, implying a mediating relationship between nationalism, emotion, and trust. More specifically, valence and identity cue can evoke someone’s relevant nationalist criteria, which is often associated with the emotional reaction such as pride or anger. In the meantime, people judge the negative story as less trustworthy than the positive story to their nation because they are emotionally engaged. The significant association between emotion and nationalism, the internal association between anger and valence, and the association between emotion and news trust will be further discussed below.

Structural Equation Modeling

As stated before, people's social media news consumption, self-confidence to detect misinformation, presumed media influence, source checking activity, past encounters with misinformation, trust in U.S. news in general are associated with trust. In addition, pride and anger will associate with nationalism and valence and play a mediating role between nationalism and news trust. My hierarchical linear regression model suggests that the general U.S. news trust, ideology, and valence have significant causal relationship with news trust and these factors are included in the structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis. A complete description of the method, analytical process, and results of the SEM analysis is available in Appendix C.

The theoretical model is presented in *Figure 3* where I predict two separate routes in the model involving the main variables. The social media index in the figure represents a combination of self-rated confidence to detect misinformation (pre-test), consumption of social media news and news circulated on Whatsup/Snapchat, source checking activity on social media, and previous experience with misinformation. On route one, there are respective correlations between general U.S. news trust, news organization, and social media, which all have causal relationships with trust. On the other route, I predicted respective correlations between valence and nationalism, valence, pride, and anger, nationalism, pride, and anger. While both valence and nationalism have direct effects on trust, pride and anger each separately mediate the effects of valence and nationalism on trust. The most recent study (Baum, Fromer, & Rahman, 2020) comparing audiences' trust in the news organization and the valence of various news titles found no association between news organization and valence, potentially supporting the possibility of dual-route process as I have predicted.

The result of SEM analysis presented in *Figure 4* showed two main independent routes of heuristic processing to evaluate the news. The first route showed a significantly negative correlation between general U.S. news trust and news organization, and causal relationships between general U.S. news trust (positive) and news organization (negative⁸) with news trust. The social media index was not correlated with any other factors on the route but have a significantly positive effect on news trust. On the other route, nationalism is negatively correlated to valence. It also positively affects pride and anger separately. Both emotional variables mediate the effect of nationalism on news trust. Valence was also positively associated with news trust.

It is an updated validation upon the heuristic route in the dual-processing model where various heuristic cues work independently from each other (Slovic et al., 2007). As the target object can relate to various preference, anchor, or guide to cognitive evaluation, different cues can evoke various relevant heuristics from the affect pool. The retrieved heuristics such as the general news trust, confidence, media consumption, source checking activities and even previous misinformation encounter are more relevant to news organization than valence. The retrieved heuristics about identity can be evoked by identity cues, and the emotional reaction can be evoked by valence interdependently with identity. During the process, individual assigns weight to each factor in the consideration. Next, some analytical process will sort out a conclusion after adding the factors by the weights. Then they will either take a more complex systematic route to consider the information more deeply or stop at the end of the heuristic route, which will happen more so if the information is overloaded or too complex. Of course, all the processes share the

⁸ Source was coded 4=TASS, 3=Xinhua, 2=Reuters, 1=AP. It means a positive association between proximity of source and news trust.

prerequisite that the audiences have noticed the relevant cues; it will not take place if the relevant cues are ignored.

Whether or not the audiences will pay attention to various types of cues depends on their ideology, knowledge, identity, and other individual traits. Strong partisans are more likely to identify and be influenced by identity cues than weak partisans (Tsfati & Cohen, 2013). Strong partisans will also be more likely to notice the negative cues than positive cues (Gunther & Liebhart, 2007) and more likely to trust preferred press than others (Yang et al., 2016). People who consume more news will trust more than who consume less (Tsfati & Cappella, 2003; Tsfati, 2010; Kalogeropoulos, Suiter, Udris et al., 2019). As another category in affect pool, the impression about international relations and foreign nations based on individual's imagination and various levels of information accessibility, as well as shared cultural frames and localized news coverage can trigger various heuristic process, too.

This model also illustrates that nationalism as the main identity of this study does not have a strongly direct effect on trust, or at least it is too weak to count in the model. Instead, the emotional arousal that often happens on people engaged in the content or strong partisans, is a particularly salient factor. Nevertheless, nationalism as the most important identity in this context have created a common ground for U.S. partisans – most of them in this study trust the news being positive to the U.S. than the one being negative to the U.S. They might be a little cynical about the positive news by AP, but they will distrust the negative news much more if it comes from Xinhua and TASS than AP and Reuters.

Implications

Previous studies in the international relations literature focused on news framing and did not pay abundant attention to the press cue (Dragojloic, 2013), especially in political psychology.

Moreover, previous research on press or source cues also restrict at domestic political actors and overlooked international sources. While it is naturally assumed that foreign press is generally ignored or less trusted (Dragojloic, 2013), this study presents a more complex picture in terms of trust in foreign press and suggests its associations with general domestic media trust, media consumption experiences, nationalism, political ideology, culturally shared affect pool associated with news organization cue, etc.

This study also shows the possibility, assuming the international communications can go even further on global digital media, that a common ground of trust can be built up with the assistance of social media. Currently it is already happening in the field of healthcare, education, daily lives, and business (Hawn, 2009; Yu et al., 2022; Islam et al., 2020), which has become universally beneficial during the COVID-19 pandemic (Yu et al., 2022; Islam et al., 2020). I hope with the support of popular international NGOs, it will be eventually extended to politics where more and more peaceful consensus could be made through online open discussion. With higher foreign information accessibility, citizens could be less manipulated by certain elites' political agenda, and the voice of citizens in foreign affairs and policies could be empowered and increasingly influential to the state.

Previous studies on the dual-processing models mainly focus on the cognitive and heuristic distinctions but did not emphasize the affect cues enough and the internal complexity in the heuristic process over the past few decades (Kahneman, 2002; Kang et al., 2011). We are not clear how multiple affect cues can take place at a time and interact with each other. Through multiple types of analyses, this study provides supporting evidence that some affect cues work more closely to each other than the other cues. It also depends on different contexts and individual traits. With a valid example in international news, this study also shows that even

without abundant motivation or the process is only limited on heuristic route, there is a more complexed internal process than we have thought.

This study also contributes to both the literature on the hostile media phenomenon and partisan-motivated selective exposure. Besides providing support to both theories, it also validates Barnidge et al. (2020)'s conclusion that people who engage in political selective exposure also tend to believe a specific piece of news or a local press more trustworthy than media in general (or "U.S. mainstream news in general"). Comparing different news organizations, both liberals and conservatives tend to trust AP and Reuters more than Xinhua and TASS. This shows that when it comes to a specific media organization, they will choose to trust the ones that they prefer the most. My observation of the high media trust among the extreme nationalists also suggests that selective exposure largely does not take place when it comes to the specific news, which validates the finding of Barnidge et al. (2020).

Recent decades there is also a set of studies interested in the connection between media trust and democracy (i.e., Tsfaty & Cohen, 2005; Tsfaty, 2007). For example, under the influence of hostile media phenomenon, audiences might be more critical to the news content and be more analytical, so hostile media phenomenon could have a liberating effect. Instead of being analytical, this study shows that the extreme partisans either completely accept or reject the media content. It is quite the opposite outcome to the previous studies or theories. Furthermore, some cultural frames or labeling such as "terrorism", "communism", "our war" and "their war" will gain trust from the audiences without a question (Nossek, 2004). Of the limited foreign nation coverage, most of the aspects of Russia and China are covered in a negative way and only the stories fitting in American political agenda (Nikolaev, 2022; Peng, 2004; Golan, 2006). With a general national interest conflict with these nations and the limited coverage, it is rather

difficult for the U.S. citizens to learn these nations from different aspects or be motivated to learn about their media and culture or talk to their people. Moreover, it is not easy to find a common ground for multi-cultural and multi-national democratic conversations or discussions.

Regarding digital media, this study shows a consistent result that the mainstream news consumers will trust news from online platforms as well. Facebook by itself is not a main factor in individual news evaluation, and most people treat the distal press as the actual press cue rather than the platform. A few participants also suggest that it is difficult to evaluate the news because they are unable to check multiple websites or platforms, showing a tendency to consume cross-cutting sources or news outlets and a shared habit to check the legitimacy of the source and platform. Since social endorsement is often considered in the selective exposure studies on social media, future studies should also include social endorsement as a factor in the similar comparisons and experiments.

However, the globalization of digital media still faces critical challenges. Political polarization can restrict the partisans from knowing the world, even if internationalism can be their ideological position. While the extreme conservatives are strongly stable, the other groups' news acceptance is greatly influenced by the cues on the news. Especially in front of strong cultural cues, audiences choose to trust rather than doubt because they have the urge to defend and confirm their identity or in-group membership, or to maintain a legitimate ego. Additionally, they are also strongly hostile and resisting the information coming from the community with different ideologies. The common distrust of Xinhua is an example. Moreover, the influence of the re-surging populism and xenophobia should also be a concern because the traditionally crosscutting spread-outs of nationalism and ideology are transforming, making liberals more and more nationalists and restrictive to foreign nations. Finally, people may easily trust a foreign

press if it shows friendliness or covers their nation in a favorable way. It is important for media literacy and educational practices to teach people to be aware of the influence of such valence cues and be a little more critical at the content and the press.

Limitation and future study

There are several limitations to this study. First, the sample size was smaller than would be ideal as only 500 people participated, more than half of which are liberal-leaning student sample. This also causes demographic skewness to overrepresent younger generation in the sample. The story in the stimulus is limited and not story rich. Many participants failed to correctly answer the manipulation question, which asked them to tell the direction of favorability of the story to the U.S. But they are included in the analysis anyways because they might still be unconsciously influenced by the actual valence in the stimulus. As reflected by some participants, the writing style is not authentic or not professional enough. The order effect is not tested, so I do not know if there is an experimental effect on the participants' responses.

Furthermore, it is challenging to combine different models and contexts into the same framework. This study attempts to combine social media, news cues, international relations, and political psychology and the scale is large. Therefore, I attempt to start writing from a small perspective – selecting one specific context, limiting on two types of cues, and focusing on the heuristic route in the dual-process model. This makes the interpretation and conclusion easier to be coherent and explicit. This study also attempts to make richer social media content than many previous studies that only test the valence of titles.

Overall, for the past two decades, the overlooked role of emotion in social psychology and media effect has been examined and put into a complete model that combines various factors being tested separately in the past. Still few news media and democracy studies focus on

comparing Western and non-Western news media systems and the audiences' news perceptions (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018; Nikolaev, 2022). To contribute to this literature, this study specifically examined American's trust in cross-coverage from four news organizations that represent completely different types of news in the U.S., U.K., China, and Russia, and connect the massive-level media systems with the individual-level media cognition literature in the recent digital media environment. Future studies should continue this line of research in more different news media systems and political contexts or compare the influence of international news on different platforms such as social media sites and instant messaging apps. A comparison between hard and soft news can also be applied in another study. Finally, the trust level of foreign news can depend on the nations and the context. For example, people may pay more attention to and trust more in the stories that successfully "localized" the event. People from lower economically developed nations may trust a news organization from more economically developed nations. This study provides a theoretical model for future studies to apply and compare across nations and contexts.

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Appendix A: Tables and Figures

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Age, General U.S. Media Trust, Presumed Influence of Misinformation, Self-Confidence to Detect Misinformation on the News, N = 484.

Variables	M	95% CI	SD	n
Age (in years)	37.88	[36.1-39.7]	20.44	484
How much do you agree with the following statements? - Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate. ^a	3.79	[3.6-3.9]	1.72	484
How much do you agree with the following statements? - I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media. ^a	3.74	[3.6-3.9]	1.72	484
How would you rate your confidence to detect false or misleading information in the news? (pre-test) ^c	3.70	[3.6-3.8]	.93	484
How would you rate your confidence to detect false or misleading information in the news? (post-test) ^c	3.45	[3.4-3.5]	.91	484

Note. a. Responses were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree.

b. Responses were coded 5=very likely, 4=somewhat likely, 3=somewhere in between, 2=somewhat unlikely, 1=very unlikely.

c. Responses were coded 5=very confident, 4=somewhat confident, 3=somewhere in between, 2=somewhat not confident, 1=not confident at all.

Table 2
Percentages for Demography, Ideology, and Nationalism.

	Full Sample	
	<i>n</i>	%
Gender		
Female	260	53.7
Male	221	45.7
Non-binary/Third gender	1	.2
Prefer not to say	2	.4
Total:	484	100.0
Race		
White	420	86.8
Black or African American	19	3.9
Hispanic	11	2.3
Asian	24	5.0
Other or multiracial	7	1.4
Prefer not to answer	3	.6
Total:	484	100.0
Education ^a		
Less than a high school diploma	9	1.9
High school degree or equivalent	152	31.4
Some college, no degree	152	31.4
Associate degree (e.g., AA, AS)	37	7.6
Bachelor's degree (e.g., BA, BS)	96	19.8
Master's degree (e.g., MA, MS, MEd)	31	6.4
Professional degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM)	4	.8
Doctorate (e.g., PhD, EdD)	3	.6
Total:	484	100.0
Income ^b		
Less than \$12,000	38	7.9
Between \$12,001 and \$30,000	52	10.7
Between \$30,001 and \$50,000	74	15.3
Between \$50,001 and \$75,000	87	18.0
Between \$75,001 and \$100,000	56	11.6
Between \$100,001 and \$150,000	77	15.9
Between \$150,001 and \$250,000	33	6.8
More than \$250,000	67	13.8
Total:	484	100.0
Ideology ^c		
Extreme Conservative	178	36.8
Conservative	94	19.4
Liberal	148	30.6
Extreme Liberal	64	13.2
Total:	484	100.0
Nationalism ^d		

Extremely Low	19	3.9
Low	31	6.4
Somewhat Low	92	19.0
Somewhat High	120	24.8
High	149	30.8
Extremely High	73	15.1
Total:	484	100.0

Note. The sample excluded the responses that selected “Moderate” and “Independent/Other” under the original ideology question.

- a. Survey question for the item is: “What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? (If you are currently enrolled in school, please indicate the highest degree you have received.)” Responses were coded from 1 to 8.
- b. Survey question for the item is: “Which of the following categories includes your total annual household income after taxes?” responses were coded from 1 to 8.
- c. Survey question for the item is: “How much to the left or the right is your political ideology?” Responses were coded 0.7 = extreme conservative, 0.40 = conservative, 1.07 = liberal, 1.40 = extreme liberal. The codes were the result of cube root transformation to adjust the Kurtosis (-1.609).
- d. Survey contains six questions: with “Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:” as the main question for the matrix, followed by “I feel a strong sense of belonging to the United States.” “It is important to me that I view myself as American.” “All Americans should respect the political leadership of the United States.” “I am strongly committed to the United States.” “The United States is better than other countries in all respects.” “There is usually a good reason why American leaders support the U.S. foreign policy.” Responses were coded .22 = extremely low, .30 = low, .40 = slightly low, .52 = slightly high, .70 = high, 1.00 = extremely high. The codes were the result of log transformation to adjust the Skewness (.437).

Table 3
Percentages for Media Use and Previous Misinformation Exposure.

Variables	%
How often do you read, watch or listen: - Television News	
Never	11.4
Once in a while	26.4
Once a month	9.9
Once a week	11.8
Twice or three times a week	18.0
Everyday	22.5
Total	100.0%
	(n = 484)
How often do you read, watch or listen: - Social Media News (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, TikTok)	
Never	13.0
Once in a while	6.6
Once a month	3.1
Once a week	8.7
Twice or three times a week	14.5
Everyday	54.1
Total	100.0%
	(n = 484)
How often do you reach, watch or listen: - News Circulated by Your Whatsup/Snapchat Contacts	
Never	38.8
Once in a while	11.6
Once a month	4.1
Once a week	11.4
Twice or three times a week	16.5
Everyday	17.6
Total	100.0%
	(n = 484)
Do you use social media?	
Yes	89.5
No	10.5
Total	100.0%
	(n = 484)
How often do you check the source of a news article posted on social media? ^a	
Never	9.7
Only in rare occasions	27.1
Less than once a day	13.8
Once a day	18.0
2-5 times a day	15.9
More than 5 times a day	5.0

Total	100.0% (n = 433)
How often do you come across news or information that misrepresents reality or is even false?	
Never	2.1
Only in rare occasions	18.4
Less than once a day	24.4
Once a day	28.3
2-5 times a day	19.4
More than 5 times a day	7.4
Total	100.0% (n = 484)

Note. a. responses only include cases that selected “Yes” in “Do you use social media?” question.

Table 4
Percentages for Experimental Conditions.

Conditions	%	Conditions	%
AP		AP	
Negative	49.2	Story 1	26.2
Positive	50.8	Story 2	22.5
Total	100.0%	Story 3	27.7
(n = 484)		Story 4	23.6
Reuters		Total	100.0%
Negative	51.2	(n=484)	
Positive	48.8	Reuters	
Total	100.0%	Story 1	24.8
(n = 484)		Story 2	27.1
Xinhua		Story 3	24.4
Negative	50.0	Story 4	23.8
Positive	50.0	Total	100.0%
Total	100.0%	(n=484)	
(n = 484)		Xinhua	
TASS		Story 1	25.0
Negative	51.2	Story 2	25.6
Positive	48.8	Story 3	24.6
Total	100.0%	Story 4	24.8
(n = 484)		Total	100.0%
		(n=484)	
		TASS	
		Story 1	24.0
		Story 2	24.8
		Story 3	23.3
		Story 4	27.9
		Total	100.0%
		(n=484)	

Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for variables of emotion, N = 484.

Variables	M	95% CI	SD	n
Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very proud of the U.S. government action. (AP) ^a	.11	[-.0-.3]	1.60	484
Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very angry about the U.S. government action. (AP) ^a	-.27	[-.4- -.1]	1.68	484
Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very proud of the U.S. government action. (Reuters) ^a	.24	[.1-.4]	1.56	484
Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very angry about the U.S. government action. (Reuters) ^a	-.30	[-.4- -.2]	1.65	484
Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very proud of the U.S. government action. (Xinhua) ^a	.20	[.1-.3]	1.48	484
Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very angry about the U.S. government action. (Xinhua) ^a	-.21	[-.4- -.1]	1.55	484
Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very proud of the U.S. government action. (TASS) ^a	.24	[.1-.4]	1.45	484

Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree
with the following statements about the U.S.

government action covered in the story. - I am very
angry about the U.S. government action. (TASS)^a

-0.29 [-0.4 -0.1] 1.62 484

Note. a. Responses were coded 3=strongly agree, 2=agree, 1=somewhat agree, 0=neither agree
nor disagree, -1=somewhat disagree, -2=disagree, -3=strongly disagree.

Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations for variables of news trust in AP condition, N = 484.

Variables	M	95% CI	SD	n
How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false? ^a	.23	[.1-.3]	1.15	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Complete ^b	-.12	[-.3-.0]	1.58	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Authentic ^b	.24	[.1-.4]	1.38	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Reliable ^b	.13	[.0-.3]	1.47	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Objective ^b	.16	[.0-.3]	1.52	484
How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read? ^c	.06	[-.1-.2]	1.48	484
How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it? ^d	.35	[.2-.5]	1.45	484

Note. a. Responses were coded 3=very certain it is true, 2=certain it is true, 1=fairly certain it is true, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=fairly certain it is false, -2=certain it is false, -3=very certain it is false.

b. Responses were coded 3=very accurate, 2=accurate, 1=somewhat accurate, 0=neither accurate nor inaccurate, -1=somewhat inaccurate, -2=inaccurate, -3=very inaccurate.

c. Responses were coded 3=very positively biased, 2=positively biased, 1=somewhat positively biased, 0=unbiased/neutral, -1=somewhat negatively biased, -2=negatively biased, -3=very negatively biased.

d. Responses were coded 3=very much favorable, 2=favorable, 1=somewhat favorable, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=somewhat unfavorable, -2=unfavorable, -3=very much unfavorable.

Table 7

Means and Standard Deviations for variables of news trust in Reuters condition, N = 484.

Variables	M	95% CI	SD	n
How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false? ^a	.39	[.3-.5]	1.23	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Complete ^b	.22	[.1-.4]	1.48	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Authentic ^b	.40	[.3-.5]	1.38	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Reliable ^b	.28	[.2-.4]	1.46	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Objective ^b	.28	[.2-.4]	1.47	484
How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read? ^c	.12	[-.0-.3]	1.56	484
How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it? ^d	.33	[.2-.5]	1.44	484

Note. a. Responses were coded 3=very certain it is true, 2=certain it is true, 1=fairly certain it is true, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=fairly certain it is false, -2=certain it is false, -3=very certain it is false.

b. Responses were coded 3=very accurate, 2=accurate, 1=somewhat accurate, 0=neither accurate nor inaccurate, -1=somewhat inaccurate, -2=inaccurate, -3=very inaccurate.

c. Responses were coded 3=very positively biased, 2=positively biased, 1=somewhat positively biased, 0=unbiased/neutral, -1=somewhat negatively biased, -2=negatively biased, -3=very negatively biased.

d. Responses were coded 3=very much favorable, 2=favorable, 1=somewhat favorable, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=somewhat unfavorable, -2=unfavorable, -3=very much unfavorable.

Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for variables of news trust in Xinhua condition, N = 484.

Variables	M	95% CI	SD	n
How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false? ^a	.13	[-.0-.2]	1.32	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Complete ^b	-.02	[-.1-.1]	1.53	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Authentic ^b	.01	[-.1-.1]	1.40	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Reliable ^b	-.05	[-.2-.1]	1.56	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Objective ^b	.04	[-.1-.2]	1.52	484
How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read? ^c	-.02	[-.2-.1]	1.61	484
How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it? ^d	.00	[-.1-.1]	1.47	484

Note. a. Responses were coded 3=very certain it is true, 2=certain it is true, 1=fairly certain it is true, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=fairly certain it is false, -2=certain it is false, -3=very certain it is false.

b. Responses were coded 3=very accurate, 2=accurate, 1=somewhat accurate, 0=neither accurate nor inaccurate, -1=somewhat inaccurate, -2=inaccurate, -3=very inaccurate.

c. Responses were coded 3=very positively biased, 2=positively biased, 1=somewhat positively biased, 0=unbiased/neutral, -1=somewhat negatively biased, -2=negatively biased, -3=very negatively biased.

d. Responses were coded 3=very much favorable, 2=favorable, 1=somewhat favorable, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=somewhat unfavorable, -2=unfavorable, -3=very much unfavorable.

Table 9

Means and Standard Deviations for variables of news trust in TASS condition, N = 484.

Variables	M	95% CI	SD	n
How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false? ^a	.07	[-.1-.2]	1.32	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Complete ^b	-.13	[-.3-.0]	1.51	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Authentic ^b	.02	[-.1-.2]	1.45	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Reliable ^b	-.11	[-.3-.0]	1.50	484
From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Objective ^b	-.08	[-.2-.1]	1.54	484
How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read? ^c	.06	[-.1-.2]	1.64	484
How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it? ^d	-.14	[-.3-.0]	1.52	484

Note. a. Responses were coded 3=very certain it is true, 2=certain it is true, 1=fairly certain it is true, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=fairly certain it is false, -2=certain it is false, -3=very certain it is false.

b. Responses were coded 3=very accurate, 2=accurate, 1=somewhat accurate, 0=neither accurate nor inaccurate, -1=somewhat inaccurate, -2=inaccurate, -3=very inaccurate.

c. Responses were coded 3=very positively biased, 2=positively biased, 1=somewhat positively biased, 0=unbiased/neutral, -1=somewhat negatively biased, -2=negatively biased, -3=very negatively biased.

d. Responses were coded 3=very much favorable, 2=favorable, 1=somewhat favorable, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=somewhat unfavorable, -2=unfavorable, -3=very much unfavorable.

Table 10
Paired-samples t Tests for News Trust Variables by Press, N = 484.

Variables	M	95% CI	SD	t	df	p
AP news trust	1.05	.4-1.7	7.74			
Reuters news trust	2.03	1.3-2.8	8.06	-2.71	483	.007**
Reuters news trust	2.03	1.3-2.8	8.06			
Xinhua news trust	.10	-.6-.8	8.32	5.11	483	<.001***
Xinhua news trust	.10	-.6-.8	8.32			
TASS news trust	-.32	-1.1-.5	8.70	1.19	483	.117
AP news trust	1.05	.4-1.7	7.74			
Xinhua news trust	.10	-.6-.8	8.32	2.58	483	.001**
AP news trust	1.05	.4-1.7	7.74			
TASS news trust	-.32	-1.1-.5	8.70	-3.26	483	.001**
Reuters news trust	2.03	1.3-2.8	8.06			
TASS news trust	-.32	-1.1-.5	8.70	5.89	483	<.001***

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. Original questions include: “How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false?” “From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Complete” “From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Authentic” “From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Reliable” “From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Objective” “How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read?” “How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it? ** $P < .01$, *** $P < .001$.

Table 11
Independent t Tests for News Trust Variables by Valence, N = 484.

Variables	Valence		t	df	p
	Negative M [95% CI] (SD) n = 228	Positive M [95% CI] (SD) n = 256			
AP News Trust	-.95 [-2.0-.0] (7.85)	2.99 [2.1-3.9] (7.12)	33.59	482	<.001***
Reuters News Trust	-.06 [-1.1-1.0] (7.98)	4.11 [3.1-5.1] (7.61)	34.59	482	<.001***
Xinhua News Trust	-1.26 [-2.4--.1] (8.95)	1.45 [.5-2.4] (7.41)	13.09	482	<.001***
TASS News Trust	-2.25 [-3.4—1.1] (9.18)	1.71 [.7-2.7] (7.68)	26.35	482	<.001***

Note. Ranging from -11 to 13, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. Original questions include: “How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false?” “From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Complete” “From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Authentic” “From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Reliable” “From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Objective” “How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read?” “How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it? *** $P < .001$.

Table 12
Two-way Analysis of Valence and Press on News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	M	95% CI	SD	News trust		
				F	df	p
Main effect of valence				28.96	1, 476	<.001***
Negative	-1.80	-2.9- -.7	8.95			
Positive	2.30	1.3-3.3	7.71			
Main effect of press				2.87	3, 476	.036*
AP	1.08	-.4-2.5	7.95			
Reuters	1.60	.2-3.0	8.23			
Xinhua	-.82	-2.3-.7	8.88			
TASS	-.88	-2.5-.7	8.58			
Interaction between valence and press				.55	3, 476	.651
Negative AP	-.60	-2.8-1.6	8.12			
Negative Reuters	-1.02	-3.2-1.2	8.40			
Negative Xinhua	-2.30 ^a	-4.5- -.1	8.64 ^a			
Negative TASS	-3.29 ^b	-6.3- -.3	10.62 ^b			
Positive AP	2.76	1.0-4.5	7.56			
Positive Reuters	4.22 ^{a,b}	2.5-5.9	7.37 ^{a,b}			
Positive Xinhua	-2.30	-1.8-3.2	9.33			
Positive TASS	1.53	-.1-3.2	5.75			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news organization. The sample was divided by four with each subject getting a random number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, and 4 = TASS. Then a new news trust variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new news trust will be assigned to the AP news trust, etc. $M = .48$, $SD = 8.58$. ^a and ^b indicate a statistically significant difference between pairs of means, according to Tukey's post hoc test. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .05$. * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 13

One-way Analysis of Variance for Nationalism and News Trust, N = 484.

Variables	Nationalism						F	df	p
	Extremel y low M [95% CI] (SD)	Low M [95% CI] (SD)	Somewh at low M [95% CI] (SD)	Somewh at high M [95% CI] (SD)	High M [95% CI] (SD)	Extreme ly high M [95% CI] (SD)			
AP News trust	.42 [-3.0- 3.9] (7.18)	1.26 [-1.1- 7.5] (6.54)	.34 ^a [-.9 - 2.6] (6.11)	.28 ^b [-.9-1.5] (6.56)	.09 ^c [-1.2- 1.4] (7.81)	5.26 ^{a,b,c} [2.9- 7.7] (10.26)	6.45	478	<.001** *
Reuters News Trust	2.79 [-.9- 6.5] (7.62)	3.58 [1.2-5.9] (6.38)	1.57 ^d [.2-2.9] (6.44)	.64 ^e [-.6-1.9] (7.08)	1.19 ^f [.2-2.9] (8.06)	5.77 ^{d,e,f} [3.3- 8.3] (10.75)	4.67	478	<.001** *
Xinhua News Trust	-.21 [-3.3- 2.9] (6.44)	-1.90 [-4.5-.7] (6.99)	-.82 ^g [-2.1-.5] (6.26)	-.13 [-1.4- 1.1] (6.97)	-.56 ^h [- 1.9-.8] (8.55)	3.86 ^{g,h} [1.5- 6.6] (11.65)	3.89	478	.002**
TASS News Trust	.68 [-2.4-.3] (6.48)	-2.20 [-4.9-.5] (7.41)	-.68 [-2.0-.3] (6.55)	-1.12 ⁱ [-2.5-.3] (7.60)	-1.00 ^j [- 2.5-.5] (9.38)	3.40 ^{i,j} [.9-6.0] (11.21)	3.51	478	.004**

Note. Ranging from -21 to 20, News trust is the sum of the responses to all original news trust questions. ^a to ^j indicate a statistically significant difference between paired means by Scheffe's post hoc test, ^a $p < .01$, ^b $p < .01$, ^c $p < .001$, ^d $p < .05$, ^e $p < .01$, ^f $p < .01$, ^g $p < .05$, ^h $p < .05$, ⁱ $p < .05$, ^j $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 14

Two-way Analysis of Nationalism and Valence on AP News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	M	95% CI	SD	News trust		
				F	df	p
Main effect of valence				14.84	1, 472	<.001***
Negative	-.95	-2.0-.0	7.85			
Positive	2.99	2.1-3.9	7.12			
Main effect of nationalism				5.55	5, 472	<.001***
Extremely low	.42	-3.0-3.9	7.18			
Low	1.26	-1.1-3.7	6.54			
Somewhat low	.34	-.9-1.6	6.11			
Somewhat high	.28	-.9-1.5	6.56			
High	.09	-1.2-1.4	7.81			
Extremely high	5.26	2.9-7.7	10.26			
Interaction between valence and nationalism				.97	5, 472	.435
Negative and extremely low	-.50	-5.0-4.0	8.70			
Negative and low	.35	-3.1-3.8	6.98			
Negative and somewhat low	-.63	-2.8-1.5	6.25			
Negative and somewhat high	-1.47 ^a	-3.3-.4	6.20 ^a			
Negative and high	-2.79 ^b	-4.5—1.1	8.25 ^b			
Negative and extremely high	2.56 ^c	.1-5.0	10.51 ^c			
Positive and extremely low	1.44	-3.3-6.2	5.36			
Positive and low	2.36	-1.5-6.2	6.03			
Positive and somewhat low	1.30	-.8-3.4	5.88			
Positive and somewhat high	2.02 ^a	.2-3.9	6.51 ^a			
Positive and high	2.72 ^b	1.1-4.3	6.39 ^b			
Positive and extremely high	7.62 ^c	5.3-9.9	9.54 ^c			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a, ^b, ^c indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, according to Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparison. ^a $p < .01$, ^b $p < .001$. ^c $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 15
Two-way Analysis of Nationalism and Valence on Reuters News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	M	95% CI	SD	News trust		
				F	df	p
Main effect of valence				26.52	1, 472	<.001***
Negative	-.06	-1.1-1.0	7.98			
Positive	4.11	3.1-5.1	7.61			
Main effect of nationalism				5.83	5, 472	<.001***
Extremely low	2.79	-.9-6.5	7.62			
Low	3.58	1.2-5.9	6.38			
Somewhat low	1.57	-.2-2.9	6.44			
Somewhat high	.64	-.6-1.9	7.08			
High	1.19	-.1-2.5	8.06			
Extremely high	5.77	3.3-8.3	10.75			
Interaction between valence and nationalism				.78	5, 472	.570
Negative and extremely low	-.50	-4.7-5.3	8.70			
Negative and low	.35	-3.2-4.8	6.98			
Negative and somewhat low	-.63 ^a	-4.0-.6	6.25 ^a			
Negative and somewhat high	-1.47	-2.1-6.4	6.20			
Negative and high	-2.79 ^b	-3.0-.6	8.25 ^b			
Negative and extremely high	2.56 ^c	1.1-5.7	10.51 ^c			
Positive and extremely low	1.44	.3-9.7	5.36			
Positive and low	2.36	2.2-9.5	6.03			
Positive and somewhat low	1.30 ^a	2.2-6.4	5.88 ^a			
Positive and somewhat high	2.02	-.2-4.0	6.51			
Positive and high	2.72 ^b	1.4-4.7	6.39 ^b			
Positive and extremely high	7.62 ^c	6.3-11.7	9.54 ^c			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a, ^b, ^c indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, according to Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparison. ^a $p < .001$, ^b $p < .001$. ^c $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 16
Two-way Analysis of Nationalism and Valence on Xinhua News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	News trust					
	M	95% CI	SD	F	df	p
Main effect of valence				5.85	1, 472	<.001***
Negative	-.26	-2.4--.1	8.95			
Positive	1.45	.5-2.4	7.41			
Main effect of nationalism				3.89	5, 472	<.001***
Extremely low	-.21	-.9-6.5	6.44			
Low	-1.90	1.2-5.9	6.99			
Somewhat low	-.82	-.2-2.9	6.26			
Somewhat high	-.13	-.6-1.9	6.97			
High	-.56	-.1-2.5	8.55			
Extremely high	3.86	3.3-8.3	11.65			
Interaction between valence and nationalism				1.14	5, 472	.339
Negative and extremely low	-1.13	-4.7-5.3	7.49			
Negative and low	-2.82	-3.2-4.8	8.32			
Negative and somewhat low	-2.57 ^a	-4.0-.6	6.86 ^a			
Negative and somewhat high	-2.25	-2.1-6.4	6.20			
Negative and high	-2.44 ^b	-3.0-.6	9.28 ^b			
Negative and extremely high	4.32 ^c	1.1-5.7	12.19 ^c			
Positive and extremely low	.46	.3-9.7	5.85			
Positive and low	-.79	2.2-9.5	5.01			
Positive and somewhat low	.94 ^a	2.2-6.4	5.10 ^a			
Positive and somewhat high	2.00	-.2-4.0	7.10			
Positive and high	1.11 ^b	1.4-4.7	7.51 ^b			
Positive and extremely high	3.28 ^c	6.3-11.7	11.07 ^c			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a, ^b, ^c indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, according to Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparison. ^a $p < .001$, ^b $p < .001$. ^c $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 17

Two-way Analysis of Nationalism and Valence on TASS News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	M	95% CI	SD	News trust		
				F	df	p
Main effect of valence				18.69	1, 472	<.001***
Negative	-2.25	-3.4—1.1	9.18			
Positive	1.71	.7-2.7	7.68			
Main effect of nationalism				3.80	5, 472	<.01**
Extremely low	.68	-2.4-3.8	6.48			
Low	-2.19	-4.9-.5	7.41			
Somewhat low	-.68	-2.0-.7	6.55			
Somewhat high	-1.12	-2.5-.3	7.60			
High	-1.00	-2.5-.5	9.38			
Extremely high	3.40	.8-6.0	11.21			
Interaction between valence and nationalism				.78	5, 472	.563
Negative and extremely low	-.82	-5.8-4.1	6.57			
Negative and low	-5.28 ^a	-9.1—1.4	5.95 ^a			
Negative and somewhat low	-2.13	-4.6-.3	7.33			
Negative and somewhat high	-4.23 ^b	-6.4—2.1	7.64 ^b			
Negative and high	-2.67 ^c	-4.6--.8	9.78 ^c			
Negative and extremely high	2.23	-.4-4.8	12.06			
Positive and extremely low	2.75	-3.1-8.6	6.16			
Positive and low	2.08 ^a	-2.5-6.6	7.30 ^a			
Positive and somewhat low	.76	-1.7-3.2	5.36			
Positive and somewhat high	1.70 ^b	-.4-3.8	6.41 ^b			
Positive and high	.74 ^c	-1.2-2.7	8.67 ^c			
Positive and extremely high	4.82	2.0-7.7	10.08			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a, ^b, ^c indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, according to Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparison. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .001$. ^c $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 18
Two-way Analysis of Nationalism and Press on News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	M	95% CI	SD	News trust		
				F	df	p
Main effect of press				4.74	3, 460	.003**
AP	1.08	-.4-2.5	7.95			
Reuters	1.60	.2-3.0	8.23			
Xinhua	-.82	-2.3-.7	8.88			
TASS	-.88	-2.5-.7	8.58			
Main effect of nationalism				4.67	5, 460	<.001***
Extremely low	2.16	-1.3-5.6	7.23			
Low	-.19	-3.2-2.8	8.10			
Somewhat low	-.59	-2.0-.8	6.64			
Somewhat high	.42	-.9-1.8	7.47			
High	-.79	-2.2-.6	8.78			
Extremely high	4.38	1.8-7.0	11.19			
Interaction between press and nationalism				.35	15, 460	.989
AP and extremely low	2.75	-5.5-11.0	4.79			
AP and low	-.38	-6.2-5.5	5.26			
AP and somewhat low	-.71	-3.8-2.4	6.37			
AP and somewhat high	1.55	-1.4-4.5	7.04			
AP and high	-.28	-3.0-2.5	7.89			
AP and extremely high	6.43	3.0-9.9	10.18			
Reuters and extremely low	9.25 ^a	1.0-17.5	4.79			
Reuters and low	2.40	-2.8-7.6	7.07			
Reuters and somewhat low	2.04	-1.1-5.2	6.24 ^a			
Reuters and somewhat high	1.56	-1.4-4.5	8.00 ^b			
Reuters and high	.13	-2.3-2.5	7.96 ^c			
Reuters and extremely high	6.36	1.9-10.8	11.9 ^d			
Xinhua and extremely low	-2.00 ^b	-8.8-4.8	7.69			
Xinhua and low	-2.33	-9.1-4.4	7.07			
Xinhua and somewhat low	-2.04	-5.4-1.3	5.28			
Xinhua and somewhat high	-.83	-3.9-2.2	7.63			
Xinhua and high	-1.42	-4.4-1.6	10.48			
Xinhua and extremely high	1.64	-1.9-5.2	12.50			
TASS and extremely low	1.00	-6.4-8.4	5.10			
TASS and low	-1.86	-8.1-4.4	12.48			
TASS and somewhat low	-3.08	-7.7-1.5	8.90			
TASS and somewhat high	-.85	-4.0-2.3	7.47			
TASS and high	-2.03	-4.9-.8	9.30			
TASS and extremely high	3.36	-1.1-7.8	9.89			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news organization. The sample was divided by four with each subject getting a random number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, and 4 = TASS. Then a new news trust variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new news trust will be assigned to the AP news trust, etc. $M = .48$, $SD = 8.58$. ^a and ^b indicate statistically a significant difference between pairs of means, according to Tukey's post hoc test. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 19

Two-way Analysis of Nationalism, Valence and Press on News Trust, N = 484.

				News trust		
Main effects and interaction		M	95% CI	SD	F	df p
Main effect of press					4.13	3, 437 <.001** *
	AP	1.08	-.4-2.5	7.95		
	Reuters	1.60	.2-3.0	8.23		
	Xinhua	-.82	-2.3-.7	8.88		
	TASS	-.88	-2.5-.7	8.58		
Main effect of valence					17.5 2	1, 437 <.001** *
	Negative	-1.80	-2.9- -.7	8.95		
	Positive	2.30	1.3-3.3	7.71		
Main effect of nationalism					4.67	5, 437 .007**
	Extremely low	2.16	-1.3-5.6	7.23		
	Low	-.19	-3.2-2.8	8.10		
	Somewhat low	-.59	-2.0-.8	6.64		
	Somewhat high	.42	-.9-1.8	7.47		
	High	-.79	-2.2-.6	8.78		
	Extremely high	4.38	1.8-7.0	11.19		
Interaction between nationalism, press, and valence					1.71	14, 437 .051*
Extremely low	AP	Negative	-.50	-11.7- 10.7	4.95	
		Positive	6.00	-5.2- 17.2	1.41	
	Reuters	Negative	N/A ^a	N/A ^a N/A ^a	N/A ^a	
		Positive	9.25	1.3- 17.2	7.27	
	Xinhua	Negative	-5.33	-14.5- 3.8	2.08	
		Positive	1.33	-7.8- 10.5	10.50	
	TASS	Negative	-0.00	-11.2- 11.2	7.07	
		Positive	1.67	-7.5- 10.8	5.03	
	AP	Negative	-0.00	-11.2- 11.2	4.61	
		Positive	-.50	-7.0- 6.0	7.26	
	Reuters	Negative	.75	-7.2- 8.7	1.41	
		Positive	3.50	-3.0- 10.0	6.19	
	Xinhua	Negative	-7.50	-18.7- 3.7	6.99	
		Positive	.25	-7.7- 8.2	7.56	
	TASS	Negative	-9.50 ^h	-17.4- -1.6	6.36	
		Positive	8.331	-.8- 17.5	7.13	

Somewhat low	AP	Negative	-1.54 ^b	-5.9-	2.9	9.29
		Positive	-0.00	-4.1-	4.1	8.08
	Reuters	Negative	-4.00 ^e	-9.6-	1.6	8.07
		Positive	4.58	1.0-	8.2	7.23
	Xinhua	Negative	-1.67	-5.8-	2.4	6.98
		Positive	-2.67 ^g	-7.9-	2.6	5.94
Somewhat high	TASS	Negative	-9.60 ⁱ	-16.7-	-2.5	6.57
		Positive	1.00	-4.6-	6.6	4.05
	AP	Negative	-3.00 ^c	-7.6-	1.6	6.00
		Positive	4.42	.8-	8.2	4.06
	Reuters	Negative	-.06	-3.8-	3.7	8.65
		Positive	3.64	-.6-	7.9	6.61
High	Xinhua	Negative	-1.79	-6.0-	2.4	7.02
		Positive	-0.00	-4.0-	4.0	5.65
	TASS	Negative	-4.58 ^j	-9.2-	-.0	6.61
		Positive	2.13	-2.0-	6.2	5.79
	AP	Negative	-2.83 ^d	-6.6-	.9	9.25
		Positive	2.28	-1.5-	6.0	5.69
Extremely High	Reuters	Negative	-4.00 ^f	-7.5-	-.5	4.56
		Positive	3.07	.1-	6.1	9.64
	Xinhua	Negative	-2.56	-6.3-	1.2	8.39
		Positive	.15	-4.2-	4.5	4.07
	TASS	Negative	-5.00 ^k	-8.7-	-1.3	7.56
		Positive	1.31	-2.6-	5.3	6.71
	AP	Negative	9.38 ^{bcd}	3.8-	15.0	7.41
		Positive	4.87	.8-	9.0	7.71
	Reuters	Negative	5.56 ^{ef}	.3-	10.8	6.53
		Positive	7.80	.7-	14.9	7.65
	Xinhua	Negative	-1.64	-6.4-	3.1	11.00
		Positive	4.91 ^g	.1-	9.7	9.92
	TASS	Negative	6.30 ^{hijk}	1.3-	11.3	11.35
		Positive	-4.00 ^l	-11.9-	3.9	4.67

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news organization. The sample was divided by four with each subject getting a random number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, and 4 = TASS. Then a new news trust variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new news trust will be assigned to the AP news trust, etc. $M = .48$, $SD = 8.58$.

b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, according to Tukey's post hoc test. ^b $p < .05$, ^c $p < .001$, ^d $p < .001$, ^e $p < .05$. ^f $p < .01$, ^g $p < .05$, ^h $p < .05$, ⁱ $p < .001$, ^j $p < .01$, ^k $p < .001$, ^l $p < .05$. * $p \leq .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.
 a. No participant was randomly assigned to the condition.

Table 20
One-way Analysis of Variance for Ideology and News Trust, N = 484.

Variables	Ideology				F	df	p
	Extremely conservative	Conservative	Liberal	Extreme ly liberal			
	M [95% CI] (SD)	M [95% CI] (SD)	M [95% CI] (SD)	M [95% CI] (SD)			
AP News Trust	-.33 ^a [-1.5-.9] (8.20)	-.40 ^b [-1.8-1.0] (7.03)	1.87 ^c [.8-2.9] (6.39)	5.13 ^{a,b,c} [3.0-7.3] (8.65)	9.99	480	<.001***
Reuters News Trust	.44 ^d [-.9-1.7] (8.75)	.67 ^e [-.9-2.3] (7.84)	2.62 ^f [1.6-3.6] (6.10)	7.09 ^{d,e,f} [5.0-9.2] (8.34)	12.75	480	<.001***
Xinhua News Trust	-.88 ^g [-2.2-.5] (9.04)	-1.37 ^h [-3.0-.3] (8.05)	.34 ⁱ [-.7-1.4] (6.68)	4.41 ^{g,h,i} [2.2-6.6] (8.74)	7.89	480	<.001***
TASS News Trust	-1.01 ^j [-2.4-.4] (9.42)	-1.65 ^k [-3.3-.0] (8.18)	-.45 ^l [-1.6-.7] (7.17)	3.88 ^{j,k,l} [1.5-6.2] (9.47)	6.27	480	<.001***

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, News trust is the sum of the responses to all original news trust questions. ^a to ^l indicate a statistically significant difference between paired means by Scheffe's post hoc test, ^a $p < .001$, ^b $p < .001$, ^c $p < .05$, ^d $p < .001$, ^e $p < .001$, ^f $p < .01$, ^g $p < .001$, ^h $p < .001$, ⁱ $p < .05$, ^j $p < .01$, ^k $p = .001$, ^l $p < .05$.

*** $p < .001$.

Table 21

Two-way Analysis of Valence and Ideology on AP News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	News trust					
	M	95% CI	SD	F	df	p
Main effect of valence				36.17	1, 476	<.001***
Negative	-.95	-2.0-.0	7.85			
Positive	2.99	2.1-3.9	7.12			
Main effect of ideology				11.21	3, 476	<.001***
Extremely conservative	-.33	-1.5-.9	8.20			
Conservative	-.40	-1.8-1.0	7.03			
Liberal	1.87	.8-2.9	6.39			
Extremely liberal	5.13	3.0-7.3	8.65			
Interaction between valence and ideology				2.04	3, 476	.108
Negative and extremely conservative ^{a,b}	-2.35	-3.8--.9	8.24			
Negative and conservative ^{c,d}	-3.57	-5.7—1.5	6.69			
Negative and liberal ^{a,c}	.84	-1.0-2.6	5.95			
Negative and extremely liberal ^{b,d}	3.00	.6-5.4	9.06			
Positive and extremely conservative ^e	1.89	.4-3.4	7.59			
Positive and conservative ^f	2.77	.7-4.8	5.88			
Positive and liberal ^g	2.62	1.1-4.2	6.63			
Positive and extremely liberal ^{e,f,g}	7.86	5.2-10.5	7.37			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a to ^g indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, based on Bonferroni's adjustment for multiple comparisons post hoc test. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .001$, ^c $p < .01$, ^d $p < .001$, ^e $p < .001$, ^f $p < .05$, ^g $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 22

Two-way Analysis of Valence and Ideology on Reuters News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	News trust					
	M	95% CI	SD	F	df	p
Main effect of valence				36.93	1, 476	<.001***
Negative	-.06	-1.1-1.0	7.98			
Positive	4.11	3.1-5.1	7.61			
Main effect of ideology				11.24	3, 476	<.001***
Extremely conservative	.44	-.9-1.7	8.75			
Conservative	.67	-.9-2.3	7.84			
Liberal	2.62	1.6-3.6	6.10			
Extremely liberal	7.10	5.0-9.2	8.34			
Interaction between valence and ideology				2.65	3, 476	.049*
Negative and extremely conservative	-.41	-2.0-1.1	8.42			
Negative and conservative	-1.00	-3.0-1.0	8.49			
Negative and liberal	.07	-1.9-1.7	6.23			
Negative and extremely liberal	2.89	.1-5.7	9.03			
Positive and extremely conservative ^{a,b}	1.35	-.2-2.9	9.05			
Positive and conservative ^c	2.83	.5-5.1	6.37			
Positive and liberal ^{a,d}	4.91	3.3-6.6	4.97			
Positive and extremely liberal ^{b,c,d}	10.36	7.9-12.8	6.09			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a to ^d indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, based on Bonferroni's adjustment for multiple comparisons post hoc test. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .001$, ^c $p < .001$, ^d $p < .05$. * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 23

Two-way Analysis of Valence and Ideology on Xinhua News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	News trust					
	M	95% CI	SD	F	df	p
Main effect of valence				9.79	1, 476	<.01**
Negative	-1.26	-2.4--1	8.95			
Positive	1.45	.5-2.4	7.41			
Main effect of ideology				8.10	3, 476	<.001***
Extremely conservative	-.88	-2.2-.5	9.04			
Conservative	-1.37	-3.0-.3	8.05			
Liberal	.34	-.7-1.4	6.68			
Extremely liberal	4.41	2.2-6.6	8.74			
Interaction between valence and ideology				1.35	3, 476	.258
Negative and extremely conservative ^a	-1.80	-3.5--1.2	9.54			
Negative and conservative ^b	-3.54	-5.9--1.2	7.87			
Negative and liberal ^c	-1.63	-3.5-.2	7.28			
Negative and extremely liberal ^{a,b,c}	4.47	1.7-7.3	10.10			
Positive and extremely conservative	.10	-1.6-1.8	8.41			
Positive and conservative	.71	-1.6-3.0	7.74			
Positive and liberal	2.21	.4-4.0	5.48			
Positive and extremely liberal	4.34	1.6-7.1	7.30			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a to ^d indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, based on Bonferroni's adjustment for multiple comparisons post hoc test. ^a $p < .001$, ^b $p < .001$, ^c $p < .01$. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 24

Two-way Analysis of Valence and Ideology on TASS News Trust, N = 484.

Main effects and interaction	News trust					
	M	95% CI	SD	F	df	p
Main effect of valence				28.00	1, 476	<.01**
Negative	-2.25	-3.4—1.1	9.18			
Positive	1.71	.7-2.7	7.68			
Main effect of ideology				6.91	3, 476	<.001***
Extremely conservative	-1.01	-2.2-.5	9.42			
Conservative	-1.65	-3.0-.3	8.18			
Liberal	-.45	-.7-1.4	7.17			
Extremely liberal	3.88	2.2-6.6	9.47			
Interaction between valence and ideology				1.89	3, 476	.130
Negative and extremely conservative ^a	-2.16	-3.9--.5	9.84			
Negative and conservative ^b	-1.00	-7.5—2.8	8.37			
Negative and liberal ^c	-2.73	-4.7--.8	6.91			
Negative and extremely liberal ^{a,b,c}	2.47	-.2-5.2	10.74			
Positive and extremely conservative ^d	.23	-1.5-2.0	8.85			
Positive and conservative	2.18	-.3-4.6	6.03			
Positive and liberal	1.65	-.2-3.5	6.80			
Positive and extremely liberal ^d	5.68	2.6-8.8	7.32			

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a to ^d indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, based on Bonferroni's adjustment for multiple comparisons post hoc test. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .001$, ^c $p < .05$, ^d $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 25
Two-way Analysis of Press and Ideology on News Trust, N = 484.

				News trust		
Main effects and interaction	M	95% CI	SD	F	df	p
Main effect of press				4.81	3, 468	.003**
AP	1.08	-.4-2.5	7.95			
Reuters	1.60	.2-3.0	8.23			
Xinhua	-.82	-2.3-.7	8.88			
TASS	-.88	-2.5-.7	8.58			
Main effect of ideology				10.19	3, 468	<.001***
Extremely conservative	-1.20	-2.4-.4	9.20			
Conservative	-1.34	-3.1-.3	8.29			
Liberal	1.28	-.1-2.6	6.85			
Extremely liberal	5.04	2.9-1.8	8.78			
Interaction between press and ideology				.79	9, 468	.624
AP	Extreme conservative	-1.13	-3.5- 1.3	8.25		
	Conservative ^a	1.41	-2.0- 4.9	6.91		
	Liberal	1.82	-.6- 4.3	6.81		
	Extreme liberal	6.39	2.6- 10.2	8.89		
Reuters	Extreme conservative	-.31	-2.5- 1.9	7.95		
	Conservative ^b	.57	-2.5- 3.6	9.43		
	Liberal ^c	3.70	.9- 6.5	7.22		
	Extreme liberal	7.37	3.7- 11.1	4.99		
Xinhua	Extreme conservative	-.96	-3.4- 1.5	7.78		
	Conservative ^{ab}	-5.13	-8.5- -1.8	8.23		
	Liberal ^c	-.79	-3.6- 2.0	9.70		
	Extreme liberal	4.39	.6- 8.2	8.67		
TASS	Extreme conservative	-2.39	-5.2- .4	6.75		
	Conservative	-2.19	-5.7- 1.3	9.57		
	Liberal	.38	-2.3- 3.0	9.06		
	Extreme liberal	2.00	-3.4- 7.4	9.64		

Note. Ranging from -11 to 13, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles. ^a, ^b, ^c indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, according to Tukey's post hoc test. ^a $p < .01$, ^b $p < .05$, ^c $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 26

Two-way Analysis of Ideology, Press and Valence on News Trust, N = 484.

							News trust		
Main effects and interaction			M	95% CI		SD	F	df	p
Main effect of press							3.67	3, 452	.012**
	AP		1.08	-.4-2.5		7.95			
	Reuters		1.60	.2-3.0		8.23			
	Xinhua		-.82	-2.3-.7		8.88			
	TASS		-.88	-2.5-.7		8.58			
Main effect of valence							20.64	1, 452	<.001***
	Negative		-1.80	-2.9- -.7		8.95			
	Positive		2.30	1.3-3.3		7.71			
Main effect of ideology							8.40	3, 452	<.001***
	Extremely conservative		-1.20	-2.4-.4		9.20			
	Conservative		-1.34	-3.1-.3		8.29			
	Liberal		1.28	-.1-2.6		6.85			
	Extremely liberal		5.04	2.9-1.8		8.78			
Interaction between ideology, press, and valence							.62	9, 452	.784
Extremely conservative	AP	Negative	-2.12	-5.3-	1.1	8.66			
		Positive	.05 ^a	-3.4-	3.5	7.78			
	Reuters	Negative	-2.42	-5.5-	.7	8.75			
		Positive	1.59 ^c	-1.4-	4.5	9.76			
	Xinhua	Negative	-.90 ^d	-4.4-	2.6	9.80			
		Positive	-1.00 ^f	-4.2-	2.2	9.83			
	TASS	Negative	-3.30	-6.8-	.2	11.54			
		Positive	-1.00	-5.4-	3.4	5.79			
Conservative	AP	Negative	-3.83	-10.3-	2.6	5.64			
		Positive	3.38	-.6-	7.3	6.41			
	Reuters	Negative	-2.36	-6.6-	1.9	8.53			
		Positive	3.50	-.7-	7.79	4.13			
	Xinhua	Negative	-7.29 ^d	-11.5-	-3.0	7.73			
		Positive	-1.78 ^g	-7.1-	3.5	9.42			
	TASS	Negative	-6.18 ^h	-11.0-	-1.4	10.32			
		Positive	2.20	-2.8-	7.2	5.61			
Liberal	AP	Negative	1.06	-2.9-	5.0	6.57			
		Positive	2.25 ^b	-.7-	5.2	7.02			
	Reuters	Negative	.69	-3.7-	5.1	5.11			
		Positive	5.65	2.1-	9.2	3.91			

Extremely liberal	Xinhua	Negative	-1.90	-5.4-	1.6	6.65
		Positive	1.00	-3.4-	5.4	6.78
	TASS	Negative	-3.93	-8.2-	.3	9.05
		Positive	3.00	-.3-	6.3	5.78
	AP	Negative	3.25	-2.4-	8.9	9.81
		Positive	8.90 ^{ab}	3.9-	13.9	7.65
	Reuters	Negative	4.50	-2.0-	11.0	11.18
		Positive	8.69 ^c	4.3-	13.1	5.71
	Xinhua	Negative	1.88 ^e	-3.7-	7.5	9.36
		Positive	6.40 ^{fg}	1.4-	11.4	9.74
	TASS	Negative	3.50 ^h	-3.0-	10.0	11.00
		Positive	-1.00	-10.2-	8.2	2.00

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news organization. The sample was divided by four with each subject getting a random number of 1 to 4, with 1 = AP, 2 = Reuters, 3 = Xinhua, and 4 = TASS. Then a new news trust variable was created based on the random number: if the number of the subject is 1, the new news trust will be assigned to the AP news trust, etc. $M = .48$, $SD = 8.58$.

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h indicate statistically significant difference between pairs of means, according to Tukey's post hoc test. ^a $p < .01$, ^b $p < .05$, ^c $p < .01$, ^d $p < .05$, ^e $p < .01$, ^f $p < .01$, ^g $p < .05$, ^h $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 27

One-way Analysis of Variance for Presumed Influence of Misinformation and News Trust, N = 484.

Variables	Presumed influence of misinformation ^a				F	df	p
	Very low influence M [95% CI] (SD)	Low M [95% CI] (SD)	Somewhat low M [95% CI] (SD)	Somewhat high M [95% CI] (SD)			
News trust	-16.12 ^{abc} [-20.7-11.5] (22.88)	-3.30 ^{abc} [-5.6-1.0] (17.16)	11.59 ^{abc} [8.5-14.7] (17.23)	46.02 ^{abc} [39.4-52.6] (23.02)	131.493	479	<.001***

Note. Ranging from -74 to 74, News trust is the sum of the responses to all original news trust questions of all four news organizations.

- a. Responses were coded 4=very high influence, 3=high influence, 2=low influence, 1=very low influence. Original questions include: “How likely do you think the following people would believe the false or misleading information in the news? – Yourself” “How likely do you think the following people would believe the false or misleading information in the news? - Other people in general” “How likely do you think the following people would be influenced by the false or misleading information in the news? – Yourself” “How likely do you think the following people would be influenced by the false or misleading information in the news? - Other people in general”.

^{abc} represent the statistically significant pairs of means. *** $p < .001$.

Table 28

One-way Analysis of Variance for Self-Confidence to Detect Misinformation and News Trust, N = 484.

Variables	Presumed influence of misinformation ^a					F	df	p
	Not confident at all M [95% CI] (SD)	Somewhat inconfident M [95% CI] (SD)	Somewhere in between M [95% CI] (SD)	Somewhat confident M [95% CI] (SD)	Very confident M [95% CI] (SD)			
News trust	-14.69 ^a [-26.8- -2.5] (22.80)	-9.00 ^b [-20.3-2.3] (24.09)	.39 ^c [-3.0-3.8] (20.96)	3.00 ^d [-.1-6.1] (22.93)	12.26 ^{abcd} [4.9-19.6] (34.99)	6.561	479	<.001***

Note. Ranging from -72 to 74, News trust is the sum of the responses to all original news trust questions, undivided by source.

- a. Responses were coded 5=very confident, 4=somewhat confident, 3=somewhat in between, 2=somewhat not confident, 1=not confident at all. Original question: "How would you rate your confidence to detect false or misleading information in the news?"

^{abcd} represent the statistically significant pairs of means. *** $p < .001$

Table 29

Pearson Correlation Coefficients for News Trust, Social Media Experience, News Consumption, Source Checking Activity, Previous Exposure to Misinformation, General U.S. News Trust, and Self-Rated Confidence to Detect Misinformation, N = 484.

Variables	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>
	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)
	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)
1. News trust ^a	-.23** ($<.001$) (484)	.12** (.009) (484)	.24*** ($<.001$) (484)	.40*** ($<.001$) (484)	.30** ($<.001$) (433)	.06 (.191) (484)	.51** ($<.001$) (484)	.22** ($<.001$) (484)
2. Social media experience ^b	—	.11* (.018) (484)	-.57*** ($<.001$) (484)	-.29*** ($<.001$) (484)	N/A (N/A) (433)	.07 (.126) (484)	-.22** ($<.001$) (484)	-.02 (.641) (484)
3. TV news consumption ^c		—	-.04 (.336) (484)	-.10* (.029) (484)	.15** (.001) (433)	.01 (.825) (484)	.10* (.024) (484)	.03 (.553) (484)
4. Social media news consumption ^c			—	.45*** ($<.001$) (484)	.33*** ($<.001$) (433)	.09* (.053) (484)	.26** ($<.001$) (484)	.11* (.015) (484)
5. Whatsup/Snapchat news consumption ^c				—	.27*** ($<.001$) (433)	.20 ($<.001$) (484)	.37** ($<.001$) (484)	.04 (.364) (484)
6. Source checking activity ^d					—	.36*** ($<.001$) (433)	.28*** ($<.001$) (433)	.30*** ($<.001$) (433)
7. Previous exposure to Misinformation ^d						—	-.14** (.002) (484)	.22*** ($<.001$) (484)
8. General U.S. news trust ^e							—	.03 (.571) (484)
9. Confidence to detect misinformation ^f								—

Note. a. Ranging from -72 to 74, News trust is the sum of the responses to all original news trust questions, undivided by source.

a. Original question: "Do you use social media?" Responses were coded 2=no, 1=yes.

- b. Responses were coded 6=everyday, 5=twice or three times a week, 4=once a week, 3=once a month, 2=once in a while, 1=never.
 - c. Only the responses from participants who answered “yes” in social media consumption were recorded. Responses were coded 6=more than 5 times a day, 5=2-5 times a day, 4=once a day, 3=less than once a day, 2=only in rare occasions, 1=never.
 - d. Ranging from 2 to 14, the variable is the sum of original questions: “How much do you agree with the following statements? - Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate.” “How much do you agree with the following statements? - I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media.” Responses were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree.
 - e. Responses were coded 5=very confident, 4=somewhat confident, 3=somewhere in between, 2=somewhat not confident, 1=not confident at all.
- *P* < .05, ***P* < .01, ****P* < .001.

Table 30
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for News Trust, Nationalism, and Ideology, and Variables of Emotion, N = 484.

Variables	2	3	4	5
	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>
	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)	(<i>p</i>)
	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)	(<i>n</i>)
1. News trust ^a	.18** ($<.001$) (484)	.24** ($<.001$) (484)	.55** ($<.001$) (484)	.23** ($<.001$) (484)
2. Nationalism ^b	—	-.45** ($<.001$) (484)	.34** ($<.001$) (484)	.15** ($<.001$) (484)
3. Ideology ^c		—	.05 (.276) (484)	-.06 (.158) (484)
4. Pride of the U.S. after reading ^d			—	-.17** ($<.001$) (484)
5. Anger at the U.S. after reading ^d				—

Note. a. Ranging from -72 to 74, News trust is the sum of the responses to all original news trust questions, undivided by source.

- Responses were coded .22 = extremely low, .30 = low, .40 = slightly low, .52 = slightly high, .70 = high, 1.00 = extremely high. The codes were the result of log transformation to adjust the Skewness (.437).
- Responses were coded 0.7 = extreme conservative, 0.40 = conservative, 1.07 = liberal, 1.40 = extreme liberal. The codes were the result of cube root transformation to adjust the Kurtosis (-1.609).
- The variables were the sum of the same questions after each of the four news stimulus: "Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very proud of the U.S. government action." "Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very angry about the U.S. government action." Responses were coded 3=strongly agree, 2=agree, 1=somewhat agree, 0=neither agree nor disagree, -1=somewhat disagree, -2=disagree, -3=strongly disagree.

** $P < .001$.

Table 31

Two-way Analysis of Valence, Nationalism, Pride, and Anger on AP News Trust, N = 484.

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	19456.739 ^a	202	96.320	2.864	<.001***	.673
Intercept	111.196	1	111.196	3.307	.070	.012
Valence	53.321	1	53.321	1.586	.209	.006
Nationalism	359.071	5	71.814	2.136	.061 ⁺	.037
Pride	2217.067	6	369.511	10.989	<.001***	.190
Anger	527.822	6	87.970	2.616	.017*	.053
Valence * Nationalism	174.918	5	34.984	1.040	.394	.018
Valence * Pride	276.953	6	46.159	1.373	.226	.028
Valence * Anger	509.068	6	84.845	2.523	.021*	.051
Nationalism * Pride	839.448	26	32.286	.960	.523	.082
Nationalism * Anger	1022.344	25	40.894	1.216	.223	.098
Pride * Anger	1213.619	29	41.849	1.245	.187	.114
Valence * Nationalism * Pride	336.829	6	56.138	1.669	.128	.034
Valence * Nationalism * Anger	262.498	7	37.500	1.115	.353	.027
Valence * Pride * Anger	145.531	8	18.191	.541	.825	.015
Nationalism * Pride * Anger	943.877	23	41.038	1.220	.226	.091
Valence * Nationalism * Pride * Anger	164.453	4	41.113	1.223	.301	.017
Error	9448.970	281	33.626			
Total	29441.000	484				
Corrected Total	28905.709	483				

a. R Squared = .673 (Adjusted R Squared = .438)

⁺.05 < p < .1, * p < .05, *** p < .001.

Table 32

Two-way Analysis of Valence, Nationalism, Pride, and Anger on Reuters News Trust, N = 484.

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	23026.882 ^a	207	111.241	3.660	<.001***	.733
Intercept	859.804	1	859.804	28.292	<.001***	.093
Nationalism	1135.880	5	227.176	7.475	<.001***	.119
Valence	45.423	1	45.423	1.495	.223	.005
Pride	3180.412	6	530.069	17.442	<.001***	.275
Anger	820.728	6	136.788	4.501	<.001***	.089
Nationalism * Valence	428.510	5	85.702	2.820	.017*	.049
Nationalism * Pride	1159.741	27	42.953	1.413	.089 ⁺	.121
Nationalism * Anger	803.473	27	29.758	.979	.498	.087
Valence * Pride	150.954	5	30.191	.993	.422	.018
Valence * Anger	48.612	6	8.102	.267	.952	.006
Pride * Anger	1576.085	28	56.289	1.852	.007**	.158
Nationalism* Valence * Pride	300.520	9	33.391	1.099	.364	.035
Nationalism * Valence * Anger	475.700	9	52.856	1.739	.080 ⁺	.054
Nationalism * Pride * Anger	1129.531	27	41.834	1.377	.106	.119
Valence * Pride * Anger	102.034	8	12.754	.420	.909	.012
Nationalism * Valence * Pride * Anger	210.240	6	35.040	1.153	.332	.024
Error	8387.653	276	30.390			
Total	33411.000	484				
Corrected Total	31414.535	483				
a. R Squared = .733 (Adjusted R Squared = .533)						

⁺.05<*p*<.1, **p*<.05, ***p*<.01, ****p*<.001.

Table 33

Two-way Analysis of Valence, Nationalism, Pride, and Anger on Xinhua News Trust, N = 484.

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	22560.277 ^a	194	116.290	3.091	<.001***	.675
Intercept	21.635	1	21.635	.575	.449	.002
Nationalism	109.593	5	21.919	.583	.713	.010
Valence	41.563	1	41.563	1.105	.294	.004
Pride	2692.357	6	448.726	11.927	<.001***	.198
Anger	745.903	6	124.317	3.304	.004**	.064
Nationalism * Valence	338.888	5	67.778	1.801	.112	.030
Nationalism * Pride	1701.195	24	70.883	1.884	.009**	.135
Nationalism * Anger	951.139	26	36.582	.972	.506	.080
Valence * Pride	390.244	6	65.041	1.729	.114	.035
Valence * Anger	566.738	6	94.456	2.511	.022*	.050
Pride * Anger	1211.875	25	48.475	1.288	.166	.100
Nationalism * Valence * Pride	163.048	5	32.610	.867	.504	.015
Nationalism * Valence * Anger	365.204	8	45.651	1.213	.291	.032
Nationalism * Pride * Anger	1109.389	27	41.088	1.092	.348	.093
Valence * Pride * Anger	734.759	12	61.230	1.627	.083 ⁺	.063
Nationalism * Valence * Pride * Anger	58.537	2	29.268	.778	.460	.005
Error	10873.351	289	37.624			
Total	33438.000	484				
Corrected Total	33433.628	483				

a. R Squared = .675 (Adjusted R Squared = .456)

⁺.05 < p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table 34

Two-way Analysis of Valence, Nationalism, Pride, and Anger on TASS News Trust, N = 484.

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	26585.517 ^a	200	132.928	3.780	<.001***	.728
Intercept	44.910	1	44.910	1.277	.259	.004
Nationalism	427.727	5	85.545	2.432	.035*	.041
Valence	164.908	1	164.908	4.689	.031*	.016
Pride	3301.527	6	550.254	15.646	<.001***	.249
Anger	473.039	6	78.840	2.242	.039*	.045
Nationalism * Valence	464.979	5	92.996	2.644	.023*	.045
Nationalism * Pride	1653.314	22	75.151	2.137	.003**	.142
Nationalism * Anger	954.290	24	39.762	1.131	.309	.087
Valence * Pride	418.672	6	69.779	1.984	.068 ⁺	.040
Valence * Anger	267.378	6	44.563	1.267	.273	.026
Pride * Anger	2407.584	29	83.020	2.361	<.001***	.195
Nationalism * Valence * Pride	367.517	8	45.940	1.306	.240	.036
Nationalism * Valence * Anger	700.496	9	77.833	2.213	.021*	.066
Nationalism * Pride * Anger	1313.740	27	48.657	1.383	.103	.117
Valence * Pride * Anger	500.430	8	62.554	1.779	.081 ⁺	.048
Nationalism * Valence * Pride * Anger	52.279	1	52.279	1.486	.224	.005
Error	9953.117	283	35.170			
Total	36587.000	484				
Corrected Total	36538.634	483				

a. R Squared = .728 (Adjusted R Squared = .535)

⁺.05 < *p* < .1, **p* < .05, ***p* < .01, ****p* < .001.

Table 35

Paired-samples t Tests for Self-Confidence Variables, N =484.

Variables	M	95% CI	SD	t	df	p
(Pre-test) How would you rate your confidence to detect fake or misleading information in the news? ^a	3.70	3.6-3.8	.93			
(Post-test) How would you rate your confidence to detect fake or misleading information in the news? ^a	3.45	3.4-3.5	.91	-2.71	483	<.001***

a. Responses were coded 5=very confident, 4=somewhat confident, 3=somewhere in between, 2=somewhat not confident, 1=not confident at all.

*** $P < .001$.

Table 36

Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Demographic Variables, Variables of News Consumption, Source Checking Activity, Confidence to Detect Misinformation, General U.S. News Trust, Ideology, Nationalism, Emotion, Press and Valence on News Trust, N = 484.

	B	b	Δ^2	Total R ²	Adjusted R ²
Blocks of independent variables					
1. Demographic variables					
Age	-.051***	-.23			
Education	1.16***	.19			
Income	-.05	-.23			
Race/ethnicity	-.11	-.01			
Gender (female = 2)	-.92	-.06	.07***	.26***	.06
2. News consumption					
Television news	.73**	.15			
Social media news	-.13	-.02			
News on Whatsup/Snapchat	1.21***	.29	.09***	.15***	.14
3. Source checking activity, confidence to detect misinformation, general U.S. news trust					
How often do you check the course of a news article posted on social media?	.33	.06			
Self-rated confidence to detect misinformation	.67	.07			
General U.S. news trust ^a	.73***	.29	.09***	.48***	.21
4. Nationalism and ideology					
Nationalism ^b	7.9***	.21			
Ideology ^c	2.1*	.13	.03***	.51***	.24
5. Emotion					
Anger	.39***	.22			
Pride	.55***	.28	.07***	.57***	.30
6. Experimental conditions					
Press	-.38	-.05			

Valence	4.06***	.24	.06***	.62***	.36
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Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each press is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles.

- a. Ranging from 2 to 14, the variable is the sum of original questions: “How much do you agree with the following statements? - Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate.” “How much do you agree with the following statements? - I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media.” Responses were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree.
 - b. The variable was the log root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with ideology, ranging from .22 to 1.
 - c. The variable was the cube root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with nationalism, ranging from .07 to 1.40.
- * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 37

Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Demographic Variables, Variables of News Consumption, Source Checking Activity, Confidence to Detect Misinformation, General U.S. News Trust, Ideology, Nationalism, Emotion, and Valence on AP News Trust, N=484.

	B	b	Δ^2	Total R ²	Adjusted R ²
Blocks of independent variables					
1. Demographic variables					
Age	-.05*	-.12			
Education	.18	.03			
Income	-.05	-.04			
Race/ethnicity	-.11	-.02			
Gender (female = 2)	-.19	-.01			
2. News consumption					
Television news	.41*	.09			
Social media news	-.13	-.03			
News on Whatsup/Snapchat	.19	.05			
3. Source checking activity, confidence to detect misinformation, general U.S. news trust					
How often do you check the course of a news article posted on social media?	.35	.07			
Self-rated confidence to detect misinformation	.42	.05			
General U.S. news trust ^a	.34**	.14			
4. Nationalism and ideology					
Nationalism ^b	3.34 ⁺	.09			
Ideology ^c	2.09**	.14			
5. Emotion					
Anger	.49*	.11			
Pride	1.95***	.40			
6. Experimental conditions					
Valence	2.79***	.18	.03***	.41***	.38

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each source is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles.

- a. Ranging from 2 to 14, the variable is the sum of original questions: “How much do you agree with the following statements? - Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate.” “How much do you agree with the following statements? - I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media.” Responses were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree.
- b. The variable was the log root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with ideology, ranging from .22 to 1.
- c. The variable was the cube root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with nationalism, ranging from .07 to 1.40.

⁺.05< p <.1, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.

Table 38

Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Demographic Variables, Variables of News Consumption, Source Checking Activity, Confidence to Detect Misinformation, General U.S. News Trust, Ideology, Nationalism, Emotion, and Valence on Reuters News Trust, N=484.

	B	b	Δ^2	Total R ²	Adjusted R ²
Blocks of independent variables					
1. Demographic variables					
Age	-.03	-.07			
Education	.42 ⁺	.07			
Income	-.15	-.04			
Race/ethnicity	-.17	-.02			
Gender (female = 2)	-2.12***	-.14			
2. News consumption					
Television news	-.18	-.04			
Social media news	.09	.02			
News on Whatsup/Snapchat	.33 ⁺	.08			
3. Source checking activity, confidence to detect misinformation, general U.S. news trust					
How often do you check the course of a news article posted on social media?	.10	.02			
Self-rated confidence to detect misinformation	.78*	.09			
General U.S. news trust ^a	.38***	.16			
4. Nationalism and ideology					
Nationalism ^b	2.50 ⁺	.07			
Ideology ^c	2.45***	.16			
5. Emotion					
Anger	.52**	.11			
Pride	2.29***	.45			
6. Experimental conditions					
Valence	2.42***	.15	.02***	.48***	.046

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each source is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles.

- a. Ranging from 2 to 14, the variable is the sum of original questions: “How much do you agree with the following statements? - Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate.” “How much do you agree with the following statements? - I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media.” Responses were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree.
- b. The variable was the log root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with ideology, ranging from .22 to 1.
- c. The variable was the cube root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with nationalism, ranging from .07 to 1.40.

⁺.05< p <.1, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.

Table 39

Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Demographic Variables, Variables of News Consumption, Source Checking Activity, Confidence to Detect Misinformation, General U.S. News Trust, Ideology, Nationalism, Emotion, and Valence on Xinhua News Trust, N=484.

	B	b	Δ^2	Total R ²	Adjusted R ²
Blocks of independent variables					
1. Demographic variables					
Age	-.08**	-.18			
Education	.62*	.11			
Income	-.12	-.03			
Race/ethnicity	-.03	-.00			
Gender (female = 2)	.43	.03			
2. News consumption					
Television news	.35	.08			
Social media news	-.43 ⁺	-.08			
News on Whatsup/Snapchat	.57**	.14			
3. Source checking activity, confidence to detect misinformation, general U.S. news trust					
How often do you check the course of a news article posted on social media?	.07	.01			
Self-rated confidence to detect misinformation	.63 ⁺	.07			
General U.S. news trust ^a	.41***	.17			
4. Nationalism and ideology					
Nationalism ^b	4.36*	.12			
Ideology ^c	.46	.03			
5. Emotion					
Anger	1.06***	.20			
Pride	1.94***	.35			
6. Experimental conditions					
Valence	1.94**	.12	.01**	.43**	.40

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each source is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles.

- a. Ranging from 2 to 14, the variable is the sum of original questions: “How much do you agree with the following statements? - Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate.” “How much do you agree with the following statements? - I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media.” Responses were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree.
- b. The variable was the log root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with ideology, ranging from .22 to 1.
- c. The variable was the cube root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with nationalism, ranging from .07 to 1.40.

⁺.05< p <.1, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.

Table 40

Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Demographic Variables, Variables of News Consumption, Source Checking Activity, Confidence to Detect Misinformation, General U.S. News Trust, Ideology, Nationalism, Emotion, and Valence on TASS News Trust, N=484.


	B	b	Δ^2	Total R ²	Adjusted R ²
Blocks of independent variables					
1. Demographic variables					
Age	-.01	-.02			
Education	.55*	.09			
Income	-.54***	-.13			
Race/ethnicity	.19	.02			
Gender (female = 2)	.43	.03			
2. News consumption					
Television news	.08	.02			
Social media news	.08	.01			
News on Whatsup/Snapchat	.79***	.18			
3. Source checking activity, confidence to detect misinformation, general U.S. news trust					
How often do you check the course of a news article posted on social media?	.03	.01			
Self-rated confidence to detect misinformation	.39	.04			
General U.S. news trust ^a	.48***	.18			
4. Nationalism and ideology					
Nationalism ^b	.79	.02			
Ideology ^c	-.01	-.00			
5. Emotion					
Anger	1.30***	.24			
Pride	2.31***	.37			
6. Experimental conditions					
Valence	3.03***	.18	.03***	.43***	.41

Note. Ranging from -21 to 21, the news trust of each source is the sum of the responses to the original news trust questions under the corresponding news articles.

- a. Ranging from 2 to 14, the variable is the sum of original questions: “How much do you agree with the following statements? - Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate.” “How much do you agree with the following statements? - I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media.” Responses were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree.
- b. The variable was the log root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with ideology, ranging from .22 to 1.
- c. The variable was the cube root square of the original variable to avoid collinearity with nationalism, ranging from .07 to 1.40.

⁺.05< p <.1, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.


Figure 1. *Two-Way Analysis of Variance of Nationalism, Valence and Source on News Trust, Valence is Negative.*



News trust

Main effect of nationalism: $F = 4.60$; $df = 5, 437$; $p < .001$. Main effect of valence: $F = 17.52$; $df = 1, 437$; $p < .001$. Main effect of source: $F = 4.13$; $df = 3, 437$; $p = .007$. Interaction of nationalism by valence by source: $F = 1.71$; $df = 14, 437$; $p = .051$.

Figure 2. *Two-Way Analysis of Variance of Nationalism, Valence and Source on News Trust, Valence is Positive.*



News trust

Main effect of nationalism: $F = 4.60$; $df = 5, 437$; $p < .001$. Main effect of valence: $F = 17.52$; $df = 1, 437$; $p < .001$. Main effect of source: $F = 4.13$; $df = 3, 437$; $p = .007$. Interaction of nationalism by valence by source: $F = 1.71$; $df = 14, 437$; $p = .051$.

Table 41

Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis (Principal Component Analysis) with Varimax Rotation of Measures of Social Media Indexed Variable.

Variables	Factor 1 Source checking and misinformation experience	Factor 2 Social media news consumption
How often do you read, watch, or listen: -Social Media news (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, TikTok)	.16	.76
How often do you read, watch, or listen: -News Circulated by Your Whatsup /Snapchat Contacts	.07	.82
How often do you check the source of a news article posted on social media?	.65	.40
How often do you come across news or information that misrepresents reality or is even false?	.62	.30
(pre-test) How would you rate your confidence to detect false or misleading information in the news?	.83	-.15
Eigenvalues	1.52	1.51
% of total variance accounted for	30.42	30.22

Figure 3. *Theoretical Model of U.S. News Trust, Nationalism, Social Media, Source, Valence, Pride, Anger on Trust.*





Figure 4. *Standardized Model of U.S. News Trust, Nationalism, Social Media, Source, Valence, Pride, Anger on Trust.*



Standardized coefficients are shown.

$\chi^2 (18, 484) = 221.40, p = .000, CFI = .57, SRMR = .1177, RMSEA = .15 (90\% CI = .329, .528)$. Coefficients are standardized regression weight. For the sake of brevity, error terms for indicators of latent variables are omitted from the figure. Ovals represent latent variables. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Appendix B: Survey and Experimental Stimulus

Title: Public Trust on International Coverage _ U.S. Coverage

Collected on Amazon Mechanical Turk

Participation and Interaction

Thank you for your interest in our study on American's opinions of some news articles. This study is anonymous and is open to any U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older. Thank you for your time.

By taking this study, you will be compensated with \$4 after you finish the survey via Amazon Mechanical Turk within 5 business days.

About Us

The researchers of this study are from The School of Journalism and Mass Communications at University of Wisconsin-Madison. The purpose of this study is to better understand how people perceive the foreign media coverage of their home country and foreign countries.

This study is being done at University of Wisconsin-Madison. Approximately 200 undergraduate students enrolled in University of Wisconsin-Madison and 200 adult American citizens recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk will take part in this study.

What You Will Do

This study can be completed online and may be taken on any computer or mobile device with a high-speed internet connection at a time and location of your convenience. Specifically, you will be asked to answer some survey questions.

The average time to complete this survey is 15 to 20 minutes. You may choose to either proceed to the next page for details OR close this page to exit if you do not wish to participate.

Please carefully read our consent form below before any further actions.

Risks and Benefits

There are no known risks associated with participating in this project. This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help us understand more about how people look at the foreign media coverage of the U.S. based on their own perspectives. We hope that, in future, others may benefit from this study through improved understandings of the foreign media effects on people's perceptions to their home country and foreign countries.

Privacy

We will do our best to keep your provided data confidential. To help with your confidentiality, data collected through the survey will remain anonymous and will not contain information that

may personally identify you. Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a password-protected computer.

Besides, we won't keep any personal information for compensation, and absolutely won't link your information to your answers provided in the research survey. While we expect academic publications to result from this study, your responses will be in no way be identifiable as your own.

Any data from this project will be only used in this project and will not be retained for future use.

Right to Terminate at any Time

Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part in at all, or, if you decide to participate, you may stop at any time without any consequences. If you have questions, concerns, complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to this research, please contact the lead investigator: Douglas McLeod (Email: dmmcleod@wisc.edu).

If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or have complaints about the research study or study team, call the confidential research compliance line at 1-833-652-2506. Staff will work with you to address concerns about research participation and assist in resolving problems.

During the survey DO NOT hit the return key, as many browsers interpret that as the same as clicking on the "continue" button.

Please take this survey only once. Any additional responses from the same user won't be compensated.

Your agreement indicates that: You are a U.S. citizen at least 18 years of age; Your questions about the study have been answered to your satisfaction, and you voluntarily agree to agree to participate in this survey. If you do not wish to continue, you may now close this window.

I understand the consent form and wish to proceed with the experiment.

Start of Block: Filter

Nationality What is your nationality?

☐ American

☐ Other

Age Are you at least 18 years old?

☐ Yes

☐ No

End of Block: Filter

Start of Block: FilterOut

FilterOut You are not eligible to participate, please close the window.

End of Block: FilterOut

Start of Block: Pre-Test



News Consumptions We would like to ask you some questions about how you use certain media outlets. How often do you read, watch or listen:

[illegible]

MediaTrust How much do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly agree
Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐



Ideology How much to the left or the right is your political ideology?

- ☐ Very conservative
- ☐ Conservative
- ☐ Somewhat conservative
- ☐ Moderate
- ☐ Somewhat liberal
- ☐ Liberal
- ☐ Very liberal
- ☐ Independent/other



Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:

The United States is better than other countries in all respects.

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

There is usually a good reason why American leaders support the U.S. foreign policy.

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

End of Block: Pre-Test

AP Manipulation What do you think was the tone of the Facebook news post toward the actions of the U.S. government?

- ☐ Strongly criticized
- ☐ Criticized
- ☐ Somewhat Criticized
- ☐ Neutral/ not sure
- ☐ Somewhat praised
- ☐ Praised
- ☐ Strongly praised



APTrustcertainty How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false?

- ☐ Very certain it is false
- ☐ Certain it is false
- ☐ Fairly certain it is false
- ☐ Neutral/ not sure
- ☐ Fairly certain it is true
- ☐ Certain it is true
- ☐ Very certain it is true



APNewstrust From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read?

[illegible]



APHmp How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read?

- ☐ Very negatively biased
- ☐ Negatively biased
- ☐ Somewhat negatively biased
- ☐ Unbiased/ neutral
- ☐ Somewhat positively biased
- ☐ Positively biased
- ☐ Very positively biased



APEmotion Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story.

[illegible]



APOutlet How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it?

- ☐ Very much unfavorable
- ☐ Unfavorable
- ☐ Somewhat unfavorable
- ☐ Neutral/ not sure
- ☐ Somewhat favorable
- ☐ Favorable
- ☐ Very much favorable



AP1PP To what extent do you think that the story you just read may influence your
opinion of:

[illegible]



AP2PP If your friends also read the story, to what extent do you think that the story you just read may influence your friends' opinion of:

	Great negative influen e	Negative influen e	Somewha t negative influence	No influen e at all	Somewha t positive influence	Positive influen e	Great positive influen e
The U.S. Governmen t	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The American Value	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The U.S. Foreign Policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐



AP3PP If the average Americans also read this story, to what extent do you think that the story you just read may influence the average Americans' opinion of:

	Great negative influen e	Negative influen e	Somewha t negative influence	No influen e at all	Somewha t positive influence	Positive influen e	Great positive influen e
The U.S. Governmen t	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The American Value	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The U.S. Foreign Policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

End of Block: Posttest AP

Start of Block: Posttest



NationalImage Please tell us how you feel about the following:

	Very negative	Negative	Somewhat negative	Neutral	Somewhat positive	Positive	Very positive
The U.S. government	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The American values	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The U.S. foreign policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

End of Block: Posttest

Start of Block: Demography

Race Your race/ethnicity is:

- ☐ White
- ☐ Black or African American
- ☐ Hispanic
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Other or multiracial
- ☐ Prefer not to answer



Gender What's your gender?

- ☐ Male
 - ☐ Female
 - ☐ Non-binary / third gender
 - ☐ Prefer not to say
-

Age What year were you born?

▼ 1900 ... 2015

Education What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? (If you are currently enrolled in school, please indicate the highest degree you have received.)

- ☐ Less than a high school diploma
 - ☐ High school degree or equivalent
 - ☐ Some college, no degree
 - ☐ Associate degree (e.g. AA, AS)
 - ☐ Bachelor's degree (e.g. BA, BS)
 - ☐ Master's degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEd)
 - ☐ Professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM)
 - ☐ Doctorate (e.g. PhD, EdD)
-

Income Which of the following categories includes your total annual household income after taxes?

- ☐ Less than \$12,000
- ☐ Between \$12,001 and \$30,000
- ☐ Between \$30,001 and \$50,000
- ☐ Between \$50,001 and \$75,000
- ☐ Between \$75,001 and \$100,000
- ☐ Between \$100,001 and \$150,000
- ☐ Between \$150,001 and \$250,000
- ☐ More than \$250,000

End of Block: Demography

Disclosure

Thank you for taking our survey! Your response is very important to us. The four Facebook news posts were all originally created by the researcher, for the purpose of understanding how people respond to different types of news stories.

In the first story, it is true that the U.S. government will deliver or manufacture 1 billion vaccines in India by the end of 2022 and the raw materials won't reach India until September.

The second story about American government releasing \$7.1 million frozen funds from Afghanistan and will allocate \$3.5 billion to humanitarian aid is true.

The third story about the U.S. funding start-up companies in Africa is true.

The final story that COVID-19 vaccine will combat the spread of virus in Africa is true. The vaccine being tested ineffective in Africa is not true.

If you have any questions about the survey, please feel free to email: ywu42@wisc.edu.

Now please click "continue" button, or your response may not be submitted.



China Xinhua News ✓



The United States Embassy and Consulates in India on Friday announced the U.S. government's promise to finance, manufacture, and deliver 1 billion vaccines to India by the end of 2022, after the majority Americans are immune.

As a part of the U.S. government's vaccine-diplomacy efforts, this decision will not only show the U.S. dedication as a global leader in the pandemic to combat the COVID-19 cases in India, but also demonstrate to the American people that they were laser-focused on fighting the pandemic at home.



XINHUANEWS.NET

U.S. offers supports to solve Indian COVID-19 crisis



China Xinhua News ✓



The United States Embassy and Consulates in India on Friday announced the U.S. government's promise to finance, manufacture, and deliver 1 billion vaccines to India by the end of 2022, after the majority Americans are immune.

Seemingly reasonable, however, this plan overlooks the severity of Indian coronavirus cases, which now number nearly 400,000 per day. Meanwhile, the materials to produce vaccines from the U.S. won't reach India until September. "Without timely support to this serious humanitarian crisis, I'm afraid the U.S. vaccine-diplomacy policy will only hurt their global reputation further," said Mr. Rajesh Bhushan, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of the World Health Organization.



XINHUANEWS.NET

U.S. offers supports to solve Indian COVID-19 crisis

**Reuters** ✓

The U.S. State Department announced its decision to release the \$7.1 billion in Afghani assets that were frozen by the U.S. government after Taliban forces retake control of Afghanistan in August 2021. The U.S. plan is to use \$3.5 billion from those funds to compensate the families of American victims of the 9/11 attacks that were planned by the terrorist al-Qaeda network, which had planned attack in Afghanistan under the previous Taliban regime.

In the process of releasing the funds, the U.S. government will dedicate the remaining \$3.6 billion to humanitarian aid to the Afghan people who are currently experiencing hardships under Taliban rule. "This is the right way to demonstrate the value of human rights to the world," according to Ashleigh Montgomery, a senior researcher at the International Affairs Institute.



REUTERS.COM

U.S. Capital Firm launches \$25M to Invest in African Startup Companies

**Reuters** ✓

The U.S. State Department announced its decision to release the \$7.1 billion in Afghani assets that were frozen by the U.S. government after Taliban forces retook control of Afghanistan in August 2021. The U.S. plan is to use \$3.5 billion from those funds to compensate the families of American victims of the 9/11 attacks that were planned by the terrorist al-Qaeda network, which had planned attack in Afghanistan under the previous Taliban regime.

By diverting nearly half of the frozen assets to American citizens, the U.S. government is extracting resources that belong to the Afghan people, adversely affecting the well-being of millions of Afghans. "This is in direct opposition to the 'beacon of human rights' that the U.S. claims to be," according to Ashleigh Montgomery, a senior researcher at the International Affairs Institute.



REUTERS.COM

US plans to free half of \$7 billion in frozen Afghan funds for aid



The Savannah Fund, a U.S. pan-African venture capital firm, announced a \$25 million fund established to back early-stage startup companies on the African continent.

The fund will support at least a dozen new start-up companies across Africa, in the view of a spokesperson from International Monetary Fund Association.



APNEWS.COM

U.S. Capital Firm launches \$25M to Invest in African Startup Companies



The Savannah Fund, a U.S. pan-African venture capital firm, announced a \$25 million fund established to back early-stage startup companies on the African continent.

The fund is purely a strategy to increase the U.S. financial control in Africa, in the view of a spokesperson from International Monetary Fund Association spokesperson.



APNEWS.COM

U.S. Capital Firm launches \$25M to Invest in African Startup Companies



The U.S. government is supporting the distribution of millions of doses of coronavirus vaccines to countries in Central Africa.

These efforts will combat the spread of the virus, and reduce overcrowding in hospitals, according to the World Health Organization.



TASS.COM

U.S. administers coronavirus vaccine distribution in Africa



The U.S. government is supporting the distribution of millions of doses of coronavirus vaccines to countries in Central Africa.

These vaccines being distributed in Africa have been shown to be far less effective than the vaccines that have been approved for use in the United States, according to the World Health Organization.



TASS.COM

U.S. administers coronavirus vaccine distribution in Africa

Appendix C: Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) Method and Analysis

This section offers details on how the models were built and selected for this study. The theoretical connection between each factor in the model was discussed in Chapter II. The interpretation was discussed in Chapter V.

Participants

Based on Andrew Fisher's formula to calculate sample size, approximately $N=500$ can be very strong with 95% confidence level and the margin of error of $\pm 4\%$, given current population of American partisans ($N = 232$ million, Pew Research Center, 2020). The total sample is within the powerful range ($N = 484$).

Two hundred adult undergraduate students who claimed as either conservatives or liberals were recruited from a Midwest university, 64 adult partisans recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and 200 national conservatives collected by a survey distributor service Centiment.co were included in the study (M age = 37.88, 53.7% female and 45.7% male).

Among the cases, about 64.7% had a high school diploma or less, or had some college degree, 27.4% had an associate or bachelor's degree, and 7.4% had a higher degree or professional degree. On annual household income, 18.6% below or equal to \$30,000, 15.3% between \$30,001 and \$50,000, 18% between \$50,001 and \$75,000, 11.6% between \$75,001 and \$100,000, 15.9% between \$100,001 and \$150,000, and 20.6% above or equal to \$150,001. Other description of the sample is available in Chapter III.

Materials

The following items were included in U.S. News Trust observed indexed variable: "How much do you agree with the following statements? – Overall, the information in mainstream U.S. media is accurate." "... – I trust the information I see in mainstream U.S. media." Responses

were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree. $\alpha = .93$

Included in social media observed indexed variable: “How would you rate your confidence to detect false or misleading information in the news?” (pre-test) Responses were coded 5=very confident, 4=somewhat confident, 3=somewhere in between, 2=somewhat unlikely, 1=very unlikely. “We would like to ask you some questions about how you use certain media outlets. How often do you read, watch or listen: - Social Media News (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, TikTok)” “...News circulated by Your Whatsup/Snapchat Contacts” Responses were coded 6=everyday, 5=twice or three times a week, 4=once a week, 3=once a month, 2=once in a while, 1=never. “How often do you check the source of a news article posted on social media?” “How often do you come across news or information that misrepresents reality or is even false?” Responses were coded 6=more than 5 times a day, 5=2-5 times a day, 4=once a day, 3=less than once a day, 2=only in rare occasions, 1=never. $\alpha = .61$.

Furthermore, the survey items measuring ideology: “How much to the left or the right is your political ideology?” Responses were coded 3=very liberal, 2=liberal, 1=somewhat liberal, -1=somewhat conservative, -2=conservative, -3=very conservative. The items measuring nationalism: “Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: - I feel a strong sense of belonging to the United States.” “...It is important to me that I view myself as American.” “... All Americans should respect the political leadership of the United States.” “...I am strongly committed to the United States.” “...The United States is better than other countries in all respects.” “...There is usually a good reason why American leaders support the U.S. foreign policy.” Responses were coded 7=strongly agree, 6=agree, 5=somewhat agree,

4=neutral, 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree. Both ideology and nationalism variables are included in the same Nationalism observed indexed variable. $\alpha = .63$.

Emotion variables include: “Please indicate to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about the U.S. government action covered in the story. - I am very proud of the U.S. government action.” “... I am very angry about the U.S. government action.” Responses were coded 3=strongly agree, 2=agree, 1=somewhat agree, 0=neither agree nor disagree, -1=somewhat disagree, -2=disagree, -3=strongly disagree. They are applied as separate observed variables in the model due to low reliability.

The main experimental conditions, source was coded: 4=TASS, 3=Xinhua, 2=Reuters, 1=AP. Valence was coded: 2=positive news, 1=negative news. Finally, the dependent variable, News Trust, includes the following items: “How certain are you that the information presented in the Facebook post above is true or false?” Responses were coded 3=very certain it is true, 2=certain it is true, 1=fairly certain it is true, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=fairly certain it is false, -2=certain it is false, -3=very certain it is false.

“From very inaccurate to very accurate, how would you describe the following adjectives to apply to the Facebook post you just read? – Complete” “...Authentic” “...Reliable” “...Objective” Responses were coded 3=very accurate, 2=accurate, 1=somewhat accurate, 0=neither accurate nor inaccurate, -1=somewhat inaccurate, -2=inaccurate, -3=very inaccurate. “How biased do you feel about the news coverage of the United States in the Facebook post you just read?” Responses were coded 3=very positively biased, 2=positively biased, 1=somewhat positively biased, 0=unbiased/neutral, -1=somewhat negatively biased, -2=negatively biased, -3=very negatively biased. “How favorable do you feel about the news organization of the story when you read it?” Responses were coded 3=very much favorable, 2=favorable, 1=somewhat

favorable, 0=neutral/not sure, -1=somewhat unfavorable, -2=unfavorable, -3=very much unfavorable. $\alpha = .94$.

A reliability analysis followed in the entire sample, followed by factor analysis of the indexed variables. Next, the normative data were calculated over the entire sample. Finally, a Structural Equation Model was built and interpreted, and the goodness of fit was evaluated. The data was analyzed using SPSS and SPSS Amos, Version 29 (IBM, 2022).

Data screening

Prior to the factor analysis, the data were fully screened for invalid responses and missing values. The total sample included $N = 484$ cases. There was no missing value in the data because all the digital test-battery fields were set as required, except one question: “How often do you check the source of a news article posted on social media?” Only the responses that are “yes” to the question: “Do you use social media?” 89.5% of total responses are “yes” and have valid answers to the question.

Normativity

The data of all samples did not violate the normality assumption. The Shapiro-Wilk test on each of the Social Media, U.S. News Trust, Anger, and Pride items generally shows a significant p -value larger than .05.

Factor analysis

A factor analysis was applied to the Social Media index. The factors were rotated with Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. The latent indexed variables were attributed by two factors: 1) social media use (“We would like to ask you some questions about how you use certain media outlets. How often do you read, watch, or listen: -Social Media News” “...News Circulated by Your Whatsup/Snapchat Contacts”) explains 40.28% of variance in extraction sum of squared

loadings and 30.42% of variance in rotation sum of squared loadings; 2) misinformation and source checking experience (“How often do you check the source of a news article posted on social media?” “...come across news or information that misrepresents reality or is even false?” “How would you rate your confidence to detect false or misleading information in the news?” (pre-test)) explains 20.36% of variance in extraction sum of squared loadings and 30.22% of variance in rotation sum of squared loadings. Thus, the two factors were added at the Social Media index in the SEM model.

Results

Based on the exploratory hierarchical linear regression test, U.S. news trust, social media, nationalism, ideology, pride, anger, source, and valence have significant causal relationship with news trust. My previous hypotheses testing also suggest no significant interaction between source and valence. Additionally, pride, anger, ideology, and nationalism have significant correlation with each other and with the final dependent variable news trust. Thus, I propose at least two paths in the structural equation model. On the first path, valence will have an interaction with nationalism, anger, and pride on news trust, whereas on the second path, source will interact with U.S. news trust and social media on news trust.

The model included observed variables: U.S. news trust ($M = 7.53$, $SD = .15$), nationalism ($M = 4.17$, $SD = .06$), anger ($M = -3.83$, $SD = .63$), pride ($M = -3.21$, $SD = .73$), source ($M = 2.39$, $SD = .05$), and valence ($M = 1.53$, $SD = .02$). Latent variable: social media ($M = 18.84$, $SD = .22$). Unobserved or dependent variable: news trust ($M = -1.60$, $SD = .24$). As anger, pride, and news trust are either mediator or dependent variable, three free parameters (e_1 , e_2 , and e_3) are added on each of the three factors with fixed value 1. As the previous hypotheses' tests show, there is an interaction happens between nationalism, source, and valence.

Furthermore, additional Pearson's bivariate correlation tests also show the correlation between emotion and nationalism, emotion and news trust, social media and news trust and U.S. news trust. $df = 18$. A model was identified after trying on a variation of alternative models. The standard was based on the criteria by Kenny (2011) for structural model, with no more than one of the following relationships: two factors directly cause each other, there are correlated disturbance or correlated exogenous variables.

The estimation of discrepancy and covariances of input and analysis is Maximum Likelihood. Based on the established model, the correlations between source and U.S. news trust ($r(482) = -.09, p = .057$), valence and nationalism ($r(482) = -.078, p = .087$) are kept in the model. The direct effects of U.S. news trust and trust, source and trust, social media and trust, valence and trust, and the mediating relationship between nationalism, pride or anger, and trust are built. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is .153, .135-.171, 90% Confidence Interval (CI). and the comparative fit index (CFI) is .569. The two stats are important baseline for examining model fit as recommended by (Ockey & Choi, 2015).⁹

The parameter variances: nationalism 1.68, *S.E.* .108, $p < .001$; source 1.188, *S.E.* .076, $p < .001$; U.S. news trust 11.501, *S.E.* .740, $p < .001$; valence .249, *S.E.* .016, $p < .001$; social media 21.054, *S.E.* 1.432, $p < .001$. The direct effects: nationalism and pride, 1.109; nationalism and anger, .514; social media and trust, .027; valence and trust, .456; U.S. news trust and trust, .075, pride and trust, .074, anger and trust, .045. The indirect effects: nationalism and trust, .105.

⁹ The general benchmark for a good model should be RMSEA close to .06 or below, and CFI value close to .95 or above (Ockey & Choi, 2015). This model is far from ideal in general, however, this is the only good model based on the factors from my hypotheses. It implies that some potentially important factors or relationships outside the scope of this study might have been missing in the model.

It is important to note that the SEM approach is part of the additional analysis in the end of the study and only serves as the sided support to the hypotheses and the visualization of any causal relationships. The model itself is not part of the hypotheses. Based on the model, all the factors except source (due to the values coded in the responses) have significantly positive impacts on trust. This suggests that the specific cues on the media content plays a crucial role. Only when they are exposed to the cues can the consumers evaluate the content trustworthiness based on their pre-existing traits such as previous media experience and ideology. People who generally trust the U.S. media more are easier to trust a foreign news post than others who trust less. Moreover, source and valence clearly have two different paths to influence trust. People may notice both types of cues, but they are not completely analyzing them at once and they might prioritize valence over source, aware of it or not. Finally, nationalism have indirect impact on trust, with emotional reaction as important mediator. In other words, nationalism by itself cannot directly cause trust or untrust, only when it generates emotional reactions. This also implies that nationalism as a sentimental construct can potentially drive irrational information perception and evaluation.

Reference

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