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Foreign Relations of the United States

Diplomatic Papers

1942

(In Seven Volumes)

Volume III

Europe



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
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PREFACE

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 045 of December 5, 1960, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

045 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

045.1 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

045.2 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents or parts of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

045.3 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

The responsibilities of the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs for the preparation of this *Foreign Relations* volume were entrusted, under the general supervision of the Director of the Office, G. Bernard Noble, to the Foreign Relations staff under the direction of the Officer in Charge of the Foreign Relations Series (Editor of *Foreign Relations*), E. R. Perkins. The compilers of *Foreign Relations*, 1942, Volume III, Europe were Rogers P. Churchill for the sections on Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and N. O. Sappington for the remainder of the volume.

The Division of Publishing Services is responsible with respect to *Foreign Relations* for the editing of copy, proofreading, and preparation of indexes. Under the general direction of the Chief of the Division, Norris E. Drew, the editorial functions mentioned above are performed by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch in charge of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

For 1942, the arrangement of volumes is as follows: Volume I, General, the British Commonwealth, the Far East; Volume II, Europe; Volume III, Europe; Volume IV, The Near East and Africa; Volume V, The American Republics; Volume VI, The American Republics. The *Foreign Relations* series for 1942 also includes the unnumbered volume on 1942, China, previously published.

E. R. PERKINS

Editor of Foreign Relations

FEBRUARY 15, 1961.

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(Continued from Volume II)

ICELAND

PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DEFENSE OF ICELAND¹

740.0011 European War 1939/19752: Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, February 25, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received February 26—7:27 a. m.]

125. Events in the Pacific, the passage of the German warships through the Dover Straits and the approach of the season when weather and light conditions most favor an attack on this island, have focused the attentions of Icelanders on the question of what may be in store for them. Concern as to how fully developed are the plans for the protection of the island and how adequate are the forces and material here effectively to resist a determined attack is manifest.

Symptomatic of this alarm are statements in the Conservative Party press to the effect that Singapore "fell because of Japanese local air superiority" and alleging that ["German planes are now more frequently over the Islands than over England itself". The organ of the Communist Party has asked, "who can say that Iceland is a fortress after the fall of Singapore", and its editor, after asking in his newspaper, "what are the measures taken to assure the protection of the island", has requested in the Althing a statement from the Prime Minister² as to whether, "in his opinion the agreement concluded for the military defense of the country is being carried out in such a way as to assure the safety of the island in the best possible manner".

Visir, the mouthpiece of the Conservative Minister of Finance, has observed that "with strong fortresses falling everywhere" it is futile for Icelanders "to pretend that we can stand aside from what is occurring; the facts are entirely to the contrary." It therefore behooves Icelanders to stand together in this crisis and thus to strengthen the security of their island, concludes this newspaper.

¹ For previous correspondence on the protection of Iceland, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 776 ff.

² Hermann Jonasson.

This question of whether Iceland is adequately defended is not being agitated in the press only. In recent days the question has been put to me by a number of prominent Icelanders, including Jónas Jonsson, who is the power behind the Prime Minister. Jonsson said he frequently asks himself whether the military forces in Iceland are competent to the task he believes inevitably to be before them, and whether, had there been, or were there to be more cooperation between the forces and Icelanders, by virtue of which each would contribute their knowledge and capacities to ward against possible disaster, the safety of the country would be better assured.

During the course of a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs³ yesterday, I asked whether, in his opinion, I was misreading the straws in the wind that seem to point to a growing apprehension and a consequent stirring of opinion in favor of more forthright acceptance of quietness [*sic*] as they exist with respect to Iceland's situation in this war. He said that most certainly such signs were present, and that they truly reflect local opinion, which had become disturbed by events in the Pacific and the escape of the German warships. He said he believed that the time had come when Icelanders should participate more in the efforts looking to protection, and when their leaders should be in closer contact with the military and the problem of the safety of the country. He added, most confidentially, that he had recently talked over some of these matters with General Curtis,⁴ as he is the senior General here but as this would not long continue to be the case, that he would also [apparent omission] to explore the ground with our military and naval commanders.

Much of the foregoing was discussed informally several days ago with the British Minister,^{5a} and subsequently with General Bonesteel.⁵ Both seemed to think that with the return of General Curtis, about a week hence, from an inspection trip of the island, consideration should be given to establishing some means of more direct contact with Icelandic leaders and opinion, it being recognized at the outset, however, that security factors require caution in the matter of how far the forces of occupation may go along this line.

Paraphrase to General Bonesteel and Admiral Kauffman.⁶

BARNES

³ Olafur Thors.

⁴ Maj. Gen. H. O. Curtis, British Commanding General in Supreme Command of Forces in Iceland.

^{5a} C. Howard Smith.

⁵ Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, Commanding General, United States Forces in Iceland.

⁶ Rear Adm. James Laurence Kauffman, Commander, United States Naval Base, Iceland.

859A.20/165: Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, March 3, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received March 5—7 a. m.]

134. The Legation is negotiating with the Icelandic Government for the use of land required for the construction of a large airfield urgently called for in the plans for the defense of Iceland. The War Department has now made available the funds for this important installation but has directed that construction not be started until acquisition of all the necessary land has been completed.

The urgency of the matter has been impressed upon the Government, which is now considering ways and means most expeditiously to turn the site over to our military authorities and to meet their requirements with respect to security in a surrounding area of approximately 100 square miles. When discussing these matters with me a few days ago, the Minister for Foreign Affairs raised the question of ownership of the installation after the war. He said that we recognize the principle, as does the British Government, that military installations constructed on land made available by the Government will become the property of the Icelandic State at the end of the war.

The British Minister has informed me that this is accepted by his Government to be the case with respect to the two aerodromes built by the British on land made available by the Government. The British Minister has also informed me of his Government's recent approach to the Department on the subject of joint American-British negotiations with the Icelandic Government looking to an agreement that would assure most-favored-nation treatment to American and British air companies with respect to the post-war use of airfields constructed in Iceland by the American and British forces. The Minister said that the Department had replied that perhaps the time and circumstances were inopportune for such negotiations as an agreement reached at this time might be criticized as having been negotiated under pressure, but that the matter would be looked into again with Minister MacVeagh upon his arrival in Washington. The Minister urged me to consult with General Bonesteel, and to report our views to the Department, especially if we agree with him that the Icelandic authorities could not take umbrage at such a proposal, and would consider it as only natural under the circumstances.

I have consulted with General Bonesteel and the two of us agree that there is much to be said in favor of the British suggestion, particularly as the Minister for Foreign Affairs has paved the way for

* American Minister to Iceland, on leave in the United States at this time.

such a proposal by us at the present time by raising the question of the ownership of the projected American airfield at the close of the war. However, General Bonesteel has emphasized the need for speed in constructing this airfield and he has asked that pending the receipt of a reply to this telegram the Legation continue to press for the early completion of the steps necessary to give the army possession of the needed land.

[BARNES]

859A.20/165 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland (Barnes)

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1942—9 p. m.

74. Your 134, March 3, 6 p. m. The question of an agreement with respect to the post-war use of airdromes constructed by our forces in Iceland is receiving consideration. In the meantime, this question should be kept separate in your negotiations with the Icelandic Government from that of the additional land needed by the Army which you are requested to press to the extent desired by General Bonesteel.

WELLES

859A.20/170 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, April 13, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received April 14—1 p. m.]

198. Since the conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, referred to in the Legation's telegram No. 134, March 3, 6 p. m., the question of post-war use of aerodromes constructed by our forces has been avoided in discussions looking to the acquisition of the land required by General Bonesteel. However, a note has now been received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that the United States military authorities may consider themselves to be "in possession of the ground area" provided the Icelandic Government receives confirmation "of the mutual understanding that the aerodrome in question", together with buildings and installations, will become the undisputed property of the Icelandic State, without any payment, charge or obligation, upon the conclusion of the present war. The note concludes with the statement that the Minister will be pleased to learn from the Legation whether an agreement in the foregoing sense may be considered to exist.

Because of most important military considerations and as the British accept the principle of reversion with improvements, General Bone-

steel urges that the Legation be instructed with the least possible delay to reply in the affirmative. I believe that our reply should limit reversion with improvements to immovable installations and should not fail to provide for post-war most-favored-nation's rights for our own interests. A general agreement covering all airdromes would seem preferable to piecemeal handling of the matter. However, General Bonesteel is most anxious that we proceed in the manner best calculated to obviate delay.

BARNES

859A.20/173 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, April 21, 1942—midnight.

[Received April 22—4: 31 a. m.]

217. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. The British Commanding General departed this morning and the supreme military command in Iceland passed to General Bonesteel.

In this connection, and following a procedure adopted last year by the British, General Bonesteel has requested me to inform the Icelandic Government secretly that in the event of an attack on this island of a nature sufficiently serious in his judgment to warrant such an action, he will instantly proclaim without further recourse to the civil authorities, the existence of a military government here. For the further secret information of the Icelandic Government he has furnished me with a copy of his proposed proclamation, together with a formidable list of penal laws and penalties taken from the rules of land warfare.

The General states that his proclamation has the full authority of the War Department, to which it was submitted for approval. He also says that he has been definitely instructed to proclaim military government and not simply martial law as was done by the British.

On account of the sweeping nature of his proposals, and the existence of an explicit promise on our part not to interfere with the Government of Iceland while our troops remain in the country, I believe I should take no action on the General's request without instructions though speed in this matter is obviously desirable. The General tells me that the War Department has a copy of his proclamation and I can forward telegraphically a copy of the briefer British document if so desired. I ascertained in conversation with the Premier today that he would see nothing out of the way in our replacing the latter with a similar one of our own, though it would give our forces control of practically everything in Iceland, but I believe that a proposal on the part of our military to assume the name of the Icelandic Government

under any condition but a request from that Government itself, could only result in ill will and obstruction.

MACVEAGH

859A.20/170 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1942—5 p. m.

125. Legation's 198, April 13, 5 p. m. Department agrees with the suggestion in the last paragraph of your message. This would recognize the right of reversion to immovable installations, and should provide for post-war most-favored-nation's rights as well as national treatment for our own aviation interests. Reservation should be made of right to discuss the whole question of military and commercial landing rights with the Icelandic Government at the close of the war in the light of conditions as they may then exist. Please report immediately should the Icelandic Government evidence any reluctance to agree to the foregoing as the War Department has stressed the urgent need for the land in question.

HULL

859A.20/173 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1942—3 p. m.

126. Matter referred to in your 217, April 21, has been laid before the President. Pending his decision, no action should be taken by you on General Bonesteel's request.

HULL

859A.20/179 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, May 6, 1942—1 p. m.
[Received 8:55 p. m.]

230. Department's 125, May 1, 5 p. m. On May 4, I handed a note^a to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating in substance as follows:

1. The United States Government accepts the principle of reversion "with all immovable installations" without any payments by or charges against the Icelandic State.

2. The United States Government understands that upon reversion United States nationals and aviation interests "will possess unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation rights" with respect to the use of the airdrome and also rights equal to those accorded aviation interests and nationals of Iceland.

^a Not printed.

3. The United States Government understands that the question of United States military and commercial landing rights "in Iceland as a whole" is reserved for discussion after the war in the light of conditions then existing.

In reply, the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me a note⁹ yesterday afternoon, expressing pleasure over our acceptance of the principle of reversion, assuring postwar unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation rights to United States nationals and aviation interests with respect to Keflavik airdrome, and stating that the Icelandic Government considers the required agreement to have been reached whereby the American Army may regard itself as in possession of the ground necessary for construction.

The reply adds that the Government considers it "desirable and in the fullest harmony with the agreement entrusting the military protection of Iceland to the United States until the conclusion of the present war, that no future military commitments be entered into in connection with the undertakings of the United States forces in Iceland."

In explanation of this passage, the Minister said that if the United States won the war it would not be possible for Iceland, after the victory, to refuse to discuss the subject of landing rights with us, and indicated that the passage quoted was included as a precautionary statement largely for home consumption.

The note makes no mention of national treatment but the Minister explained that to include it would necessarily involve reference to the Althing and though that body might be induced to consent, if we insisted, the process would inevitably cause further delay to the vital project in hand. He thought that if desired it could be taken up later more usefully.

As the note accepts unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation rights, limits reversion to immovable installations and at the same time does not exclude the possibility of later discussions with respect to national treatment and post-war landing rights, I hope that I may be instructed at once to inform the Minister that we consider the agreement satisfactorily concluded.

MACVEAGH

859A.20/173: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1942—5 p. m.

128. From the Under Secretary. Contents of your 217, April 21, have been laid before the President together with an expression of the Department's opinion that the establishment of an American

⁹ Not printed.

military government even in the event of a German attack would be contrary to the spirit if not the terms of the President's explicit promise not to interfere with the government of Iceland; that such action would result in ill will on the part of the Icelandic population, and would furnish Germany with excellent propaganda material particularly in the Scandinavian countries; and that foregoing aspects would weigh against any military advantages.

In lieu of the procedure suggested to you by General Bonesteel, the President has now authorized you to discuss with General Bonesteel and with the Icelandic Government the terms of a proclamation to be issued by the Regent of Iceland, or other appropriate Icelandic authority, whenever requested by the United States military commander, under which the Icelandic Government would itself proclaim martial law and delegate to the United States military authorities the full enforcement thereof. If this procedure should be unacceptable to the Icelandic Government for constitutional or other reasons, you are authorized to discuss the possibility of the issuance by the Commanding General, in case of necessity, of a simple proclamation of martial law as appears to have been contemplated by the British military authorities, and to which, according to your telegram under reference, the Prime Minister has already indicated his assent.

The tenor of the procedure authorized by the President and also that of the foregoing instructions to you has been communicated to the Secretary of War together with the suggestion that he may wish to send appropriate directives to General Bonesteel.

You may communicate the contents of this telegram to General Bonesteel and initiate your discussions with the Icelandic Government whenever details have been agreed upon between you and the General. The importance of secrecy and the urgency of an early decision in the matter should be impressed upon any officials with whom this matter is discussed.

The Department should be kept fully informed by telegraph. [Welles.]

HULL

859A.20/180: Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

REYKJAVIK, May 9, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 3:23 p.m.]

234. For the Under Secretary. Department's 128, May 7, 5 p. m. General Bonesteel finds himself still bound by his orders since he has

not been advised in any contrary sense by the War Department. He is now telegraphing urgently for instructions.

MACVEAGH

859A.20/179 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1942—6 p. m.

136. Your 230, May 6, 1 p. m. If it is to be understood that the withholding of national treatment at this time would not render it possible to discriminate against United States interests in favor of other foreign interests, this Government has no objection to omitting specific mention of national treatment in the exchange of notes. In other words this Government does not desire that any situation shall arise which would have the effect of weakening the granting of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment, as for example in a case where a foreign air transport company might be authorized under the laws of Iceland to engage in aviation activities.

With reference to the stipulation that no future military commitments will be entered into in connection with the undertakings of United States forces in Iceland, you may state that there is no objection to this stipulation provided it is clearly understood that the word "future" applies only to the period after the war.

HULL

859A.20/184 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, May 19, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 8:09 p. m.]

259. Department's 136, May 15, 6 p. m. In a communication¹⁰ which I handed to the Prime Minister¹¹ yesterday morning, I informed him that our exchange of notes might be considered as constituting an agreement provided it is understood (1) that no discrimination against the interests of the United States will be rendered possible by the not granting to its nationals and aviation interests at this time of equal treatment with Icelandic nationals and aviation interests; and (2) that in his stipulation that no future military commitments shall be entered into in connection with the undertakings of the United States military forces here, the word "future" applies only to the period after the war.

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ Olafur Thors was Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed May 16, 1942.

Mr. Thors at once stated verbally, and yesterday afternoon confirmed in writing, that the Icelandic Government's understanding of the above two points conforms with ours as stated, and he has now ordered the issuance of the necessary proclamation establishing the restricted area at Keflavik.

MACVEAGH

859A.20/184a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1942—9 p. m.

Norwegian Series No. 9.

1. War Department recommends that after relief of British forces in Northeast Iceland sector by American troops, the Independent Norwegian Company now stationed at Akureyri under British command be placed under the command of the Commanding General, United States Forces in Iceland, who has taken over the Supreme Command from the British.

2. General Bonesteel, the Commanding General in Iceland, states that the Norwegian Company would be of great assistance in training our troops in winter warfare and in carrying out winter patrol missions in the Akureyri area.

3. You are requested to discuss this matter with the Norwegian authorities, emphasizing the obvious advantages to our common cause of preserving the principle of unity of command in Iceland and asking that arrangements be made to accomplish the end desired by the War Department. We would expect that the Company would continue to be financed by and function generally under the Norwegian Government and that the proposed command arrangements would apply only to the portion of the unit in Iceland and not to the detachment now garrisoning Jan Mayen Island.

HULL

859A.20/185 : Telegram

The Minister to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

London, May 22, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received May 22—7:17 p. m.]

Norwegian Series No. 9. Norwegian Government accepts in principle proposal contained in your 9, May 20, 9 p. m.

It desires that details of arrangement be embodied in a formal military agreement which it hopes may be concluded at an early date.

Norwegian Government also desires that negotiations regarding these details be carried out in agreement with the British military authorities. This is necessary in order to avoid any conflict with military agreements with the British which regulate strength of Norwegian forces in different areas.

[BIDDLE]

859A.20/199 : Telegram

The Minister to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 25, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received June 25—11:59 a. m.]

Norwegian Series No. 14. Your 9, May 20, 9 p. m. and my 9 May 22, 9 p. m. Norwegian Government indicates willingness that its original suggestion for a formal military agreement covering arrangement for unified command in Iceland should take the form of an exchange of notes.

Norwegian authorities are still studying certain aspects of this problem. They hope within the next few days to give me their conclusions. I shall then submit to you a tentative draft for a possible exchange of notes.

[BIDDLE]

859A.20/203 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, July 3, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

350. Department's 134, May 14, 11 p. m.¹² Final Icelandic text of the proclamation to be issued by the Commanding General in case it becomes necessary for him to exercise full military control by reason of an imminent serious attack and final text of an appeal by the Prime Minister to the Icelandic people in such an event have both now been printed secretly by the Icelandic Government. One hundred fifty copies of each were delivered this morning to General Bonesteel for use in case he should find it necessary to publish the documents. Final texts approved by the Prime Minister, MacVeagh and General Bonesteel vary only in several minor details from drafts furnished by War Department.

Air mail despatch follows.

WARNER

¹² Not printed.

859A.20/204 : Telegram

*The Minister to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 9, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 11:47 p. m.]

Norwegian Series No. 16. My 14, June 25, 5 p. m. Following is draft of suggested exchange of notes.

"I have the honor to signify my Government's agreement to the following arrangements for regulating military relations between the armed forces of the United States and of Norway in Iceland.

Recognizing the advantages of preserving the principle of unity of command in Iceland, it is agreed that since the British forces in North-east Iceland have been relieved by United States troops, the independent Norwegian company stationed at Akureyri, formerly under British command, shall be placed under the operational control of the Commanding General, United States Army Iceland base.

The Norwegian company shall be placed at the disposal of the United States Commanding General as a Norwegian training unit in winter warfare and for carrying out winter patrol missions in the Akureyri area. However, since the original purpose of the company was to serve as a depot for the Norwegian detachment garrisoning Jan Mayen Island, the United States Commanding General shall make use of the company in such a way that this purpose is fulfilled.

The Norwegian company in Iceland shall be furnished by the Norwegian Government with necessary clothing, equipment and weapons. However, special winter equipment shall be issued by the United States authorities to the extent that the United States commanding officer deems desirable. The United States authorities shall provide the company with rations, quarters and medical service, on the same scale as furnished American forces stationed in Iceland, and also effect repairs to clothes and equipment, insofar as facilities permit. The cost to the United States of all such equipment, supplies and services shall be refunded by the Norwegian Government, which shall also be responsible for the pay of Norwegian personnel. However, transportation essential for the employment of the company by United States military authorities shall be at the expense of the U. S.

The personnel of the Norwegian company shall continue to be subject to Norwegian civil and military jurisdiction and Norwegian disciplinary authority.

The Norwegian Government reserves to itself the right to withdraw this personnel, in whole or in part, if a situation would develop rendering advisable its detail to other tasks.

The foregoing arrangement shall enter into effect as of this date and shall remain in force until either party notifies the other of its desire to terminate or modify it.

Accept, et cetera."

Foregoing reflects wishes of Norwegian authorities, British have also signified concurrence, it being understood detachment of Jan

Mayen Island remains under British naval control, and draft is also satisfactory to United States Army headquarters here.

With regard to exclusion of Jan Mayen detachment from our operational control, pursuant to final paragraph of your 9, May 20, 9 p. m., I understand early in June General Bonesteel recommended its inclusion and that War Department has recently asked military headquarters here to submit a recommendation on the point. Although latter has not yet submitted its views it sees no objection to going ahead with suggested note.

Norwegian authorities state that in practice, arrangement is already largely in effect and they hope position may be regularized by suggested exchange on [of?] notes.

[BIDDLE]

859A.00/89: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland (Warner)

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1942—8 p. m.

230. Your despatch no. 137, July 3.¹³ Please make an occasion to call on the Prime Minister and during your conversation with him say in the most friendly way that your Government has learned with regret that certain factions in Iceland seem to be agitating for a premature abrogation of the Act of Union between Denmark and Iceland; that we feel that a unilateral abrogation of the Act by Iceland in a manner contrary to that provided for by the Treaty¹⁴ itself and while our troops are in the country would be seized upon by the Germans to spread pernicious propaganda, at which they are adept, in Denmark and other Scandinavian countries which might react unfavorably on both Icelandic and American interests; and that accordingly, while we have no desire to interfere in purely internal Icelandic matters, we are confident that the Prime Minister will not take it amiss that we suggest that it would be in the best interests of both countries that any active move at this time towards the unilateral abrogation of the Act be quieted.

Fontenay's¹⁵ letter is being transmitted to the Danish Minister who is now out of Washington.

HULL

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ Treaty of Union of November 30, 1918, between Iceland and Denmark; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. III, p. 703.

¹⁵ Frank le Sage de Fontenay, Danish Minister in Iceland.

859A.00/96: Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, August 8, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 8:24 p. m.]

409. The Legation's 338 [398], August 1, 2 p. m.¹⁶ The Prime Minister has just handed me a memorandum setting forth his Government's views on the severance of the Union between Iceland and Denmark, the text of which is transmitted in the Legation's telegram No. 410, August 8, 3 p. m.¹⁷ He emphasized again that Iceland does not wish to do anything harmful to the United States and frankly stated that Prime Minister Churchill had previously made a similar suggestion through the late British Minister. Because of the alleged insecurity of his codes he is instructing the Icelandic Minister at Washington to obtain from the Department a copy of "an important message" namely the memorandum. In the connection please see 7 thereof. He hopes that a reply may be received promptly because the new Parliament has convened for only a short period.

WARNER

859A.00/97: Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, August 8, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received August 9—8:20 a. m.]

410. Legation's 409, August 8, 3 p. m.

"In the following, reference is made to the friendly message which on the 31st of July last the American Chargé d'Affaires brought to the Prime Minister calling attention to the inconveniences which the United States Government fears that a premature abrogation of the Treaty of Union between Iceland and Denmark might cause and the observations summarized below are made after consultation with the leaders and prominent members of all parties of the Icelandic Parliament, the Althing without exception, who unanimously have declared their agreement:

1. It has never been and is not a desire of the Icelandic people to cause any inconvenience to the United States Government; quite contrary it is their desire that the friendly collaboration may continue intact as hitherto.

2. It is understood that the expression premature abrogation is intended to imply an abrogation taking effect before 1944 as from that time the treaty expressly provides for unilateral abrogation of the

¹⁶ Not printed.¹⁷ *Infra*.

Union. On that point there has never existed any disagreement between Icelanders or Danes or others as in fact the wording of the treaty cannot be disputed.

3. Long before the present war the Icelandic Parliament had twice declared unanimously that the provisions in question would be materialized by Iceland, namely that the Union would be abrogated immediately after the end of the year 1943. This is known by the Danish nation, by the other Scandinavian peoples and others who take interest in Icelandic affairs. This, therefore, must have been expected.

4. The decision of having the Union abrogated concurrently with the establishment of the Republic of Iceland is seconded not only by all parties of the Althing but also by members of the Althing without exception—no [not?] only by certain factions—and, it is believed, by a great majority of the Icelandic people. This will be established by a vote of the people which will be arranged before this matter is brought to an end.

5. The attention is called to [fact?] that on the 17th of May 1941 the Althing declared unanimously that it considered that Iceland had acquired the right to abrogate entirely the Union Act with Denmark and that it was the Althing's will as soon as the Union with Denmark has been abrogated in the formal sense. Those decisions had therefore been taken and made public before the United States of America assuming the military protection of Iceland was raised. The same declarations were formally notified to Danish Government through official channels.

6. The right to abrogate the Union now is founded on the opinion of Icelandic scholars which they consider in accordance with opinions generally held by scholars in international law that an abrogation of a treaty is justified if either party does not fulfill essential obligations. But since the 9th of April 1940 the Danes, as known, have been unable to fulfill their obligations according to the treaty with the result that the treaty can be considered as non-existent when a declaration to that effect is given by Iceland. This harmonizes with the fundamental rights of a recognized sovereign people to decide alone their constitutional form.

7. In case further information is desired in Iceland and further facts or explanations, it is suggested that the Icelandic Minister in Washington be consulted. It is desired that a copy of this communication be handed over to him.

8. It is further mentioned that the Althing will declare that Danish citizens shall enjoy in full their rights according to the Union Treaty until conditions have made possible to negotiate a treaty for the two nations future relations, although the Danes have been and still are unable to fulfill their Union Treaty obligations.

9. The Icelandic Government have, soonest after the Althing in June 1942 had decided to set up a committee for preparing for the Parliament now having been summoned a draft for a new constitution, taken steps to inform His Majesty the King and the Danish Government of the development described above. However, it is still unconfirmed that a report on the matter forwarded some 6 weeks ago has arrived at its destination. In any case, the report had not been received a week ago.

10. The present Icelandic Government have publicly declared their intention to undertake to have this matter brought to an end in the current year. The waiving of this decision, therefore, would have to be publicly explained and obviously such an explanation might provide material for certain propaganda.

11. It is earnestly hoped that the United States Government will give the above rendered explanations the same friendly consideration as we on our part will be willing to consider what further the United States Government might wish to submit to us. However, considering that the Althing will have a short sitting this time, it will be necessary to take the matter up for deliberation very shortly.["]

WARNER

859A.00/102: Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, August 15, 1942—noon.

[Received 6:04 p. m.]

419. Legation's 409, August 8, 3 p. m. The Prime Minister has again solicited the good offices of the Legation with a view to expediting the receipt of any observations which the Department may care to make and which he is most anxious to have at the earliest possible moment because of the short parliamentary session. For the Department's information the question of the immediate severance of the union before the expiration of the treaty appears in no way to be a vital or pressing popular issue but since each party has publicly come out for it no one alone can afford politically to change its declared position.

WARNER

859A.00/104: Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, August 18, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received August 18—6 p. m.]

422. Legation's 419, August 15, noon, and 409, August 8, 3 p. m. The Prime Minister has personally handed me a signed note to the

effect that if no reply is forthcoming by noon on Saturday August 22 to the Icelandic Government's memorandum of August 8, his Government "shall consider" that the United States Government does not desire to make any further observations with respect to the "decision made by Iceland" to declare the Treaty of Union between Iceland and Denmark nonexistent and to establish distinctly a Republic of Iceland. Mr. Thors explained orally that all matters before the new Parliament are now being wound up and in view "decision" and the necessity of making the present session a short one some definite action must be taken in this matter.

WARNER

859A.00/102 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland (Warner)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1942—9 p. m.

268. Your 419, August 15.

1. Please deliver to the Prime Minister in a formal note the substance of the following observations:

The Government of the United States has carefully studied the Prime Minister's memorandum setting forth the Icelandic point of view with regard to the early unilateral termination of the Union and treaty between Iceland and Denmark.

The Government of the United States recognizes that in normal times the abrogation of the Union and the treaty and the proposed change in the fundamental political organization of the Icelandic State would be matters to be decided by the Icelandic peoples in accordance with their own needs and aspirations.

The Government of the United States has no desire to interfere in the slightest degree with the freedom of action of the Icelandic people in these respects, but it is desirous that no action should be taken during these troublous times that might interfere with the general war effort of the United Nations, on the outcome of which so greatly depends the future welfare and independence of Iceland and of the United States as well as of other nations and peoples. This Government holds the view that the common interest in the successful prosecution of the war would be best served if the *status quo* were maintained in Iceland for the time being. This would avoid the possible charge that Iceland had taken advantage of the present unfortunate position of Denmark. It would also avoid the further untruthful charge that the United States had taken advantage of the situation of Denmark and of the presence of United States military forces in Iceland to promote the abrogation movement. Our two Governments know that United States has had nothing whatsoever to do with the proposed action by Iceland, but other governments and peoples would be told by the Axis powers that this was the work of the United States.

Accordingly the Government of the United States repeats the suggestion that in the best interests of both Iceland and the United States

and of general world order and understanding the abrogation question be postponed until a more favorable occasion.

2. Close paraphrase of text of Icelandic memorandum transmitted in your 410, August 8, has been handed to the Icelandic Minister as requested in your 409.

HULL

859A.20/213 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1942—8 p. m.

Norwegian Series No. 15. Your 17.¹⁸ War Department approves draft exchange of notes as telegraphed in your no. 16 and recommends that agreement be consummated as soon as possible. Accordingly, you are authorized to proceed with exchange of notes¹⁹ "acting under instructions of your Government".

Texts of notes as signed should be sent to Department by air mail.

HULL

859A.00/107 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, September 8, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 8:42 p. m.]

463. Legation's 429, August 20, 4 p. m.²⁰ Yesterday the Government introduced a bill to amend the constitution to provide that when Parliament approves the severance of the Union with Denmark and the creation of a republic such parliamentary action with subsequent approval by popular referendum shall take effect as fundamental law, namely as a constitutional amendment. The text of the bill as introduced is quoted in the Legation's telegram 464 of September 8, 4 p. m.²⁰ The bill immediately passed all three readings in the lower house and was sent to the upper house with an amendment specifying that this exceptional method of effecting a constitutional amendment shall be limited to questions connected with the severance of the Union and the resultant change from a monarchy to a republic.

The bill was passed by a majority approved before Parliament dissolves within the next few days and must be passed again, as required

¹⁸ Dated August 13, 11 p. m.; not printed.

¹⁹ The notes exchanged between Minister Biddle and Mr. Lie, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on August 28 were the same as draft quoted in Norwegian Series telegram No. 16, July 9, 7 p. m., p. 12. For final text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 497, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1819.

²⁰ Not printed.

by the constitutional, by the requirement resulting from the general elections now tentatively set for October 18 which will be held under the new electoral law.²¹ The procedure provided for in the bill will make it unnecessary to dissolve Parliament and to [apparent omission] modifications in later whenever Parliament should decide to sever the Union (Legation's 398, August 1, 2 p. m.²²) but does require a referendum in place thereof.

The result of the Government's action is that no concrete steps will be taken toward the severance of relations at this session as promised but all action is now deferred until such time as the new Parliament may deem the matter expedient.

The Prime Minister is [in?] introducing the bill referred to the Parliamentary gentleman named last spring to draft amendments for the establishment of a republic which proposal was to have been acted upon at the present session saying that the work of the committee had collapsed because "a new and unexpected turn was given to the course of the independence aspirations of the nation". The Government's bill received the support not only of the Conservative Party (with the exception of the member Petur Ottesen) but also of the Social Democrats and Communists both of whom spoke in its behalf. The Progressives took the opportunity to attack Government and its supporting parties alleging that it had used the independence question to gain advantage in the July 5 election and had now broken its promises to settle the question. The Progressives and Ottesen, however, did not vote against it but merely voted present. Ottesen in disapproving a postponement of the independence question declared openly "The military [apparent omission] to which we have entrusted the defence of the country has requested that the matter be deferred".

Despatch follows.

WARNER

859A.00/108: Telegram

The Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, September 9, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 5:02 p. m.]

470. Legation's 463, September 8, 4 p. m. Parliament passed the Government bill yesterday evening and is scheduled to adjourn this evening. The present Government is to remain in office until after the general elections which have been fixed for October 18 and 19.

The Prime Minister handed me a note this noon in reply to the Legation's note of August 20²³ (Legation's telegram No. 429, August 20²²).

²¹ This sentence is apparently garbled.

²² Not printed.

²³ See telegram No. 268, August 18, 9 p. m., to the Chargé in Iceland, p. 17.

His note repeats in confirmation the Department's observation that in normal times the abrogation of the Union and establishment of a republic would be matters to be decided by the Icelandic people in accordance with their needs and aspirations and continues by saying that Parliament and the Government have decided to postpone for the present, formal abrogation of the Union and the proposed change to a republic and instead have provided measures for effecting these matters "whenever considered opportune".

The Prime Minister orally stated that the steps taken by him to bring about the postponement of definite action on the independence question would be detrimental to his party in the coming elections and have caused many difficulties for him within his party. The Progressives have taken advantage of his embarrassing situation and for political ends have made bitter personal attacks on him although they are well aware of the reasons for his action.

Since the Prime Minister was obliged to show his memorandum of August 8 and the Legation's note of August 20 to all members of Parliament he inquires whether the Department will authorize him to publish these communications. He believes that such publication would put an end to current erroneous conjectures and rumors and would be in keeping with the "friendly spirit" which lies behind the United States Government's observations. The Legation believes that the publication of the communications would be desirable insofar as local reactions are concerned. The Prime Minister would appreciate a prompt reply in view of the current situation.

WARNER

859A.00/108 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland (Warner)

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1942—8 p. m.

304. Your 470, September 9. We have no objection to publication by the Prime Minister of his memorandum of August 8 and the Legation's note of August 20. However, we do not now contemplate publishing this correspondence here.

HULL

859A.00/116

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 21, 1942.

MR. SECRETARY: The Minister of Iceland²⁵ tells us informally that his brother, the Prime Minister, has been under very heavy political

²⁵ Thor Thors.

attack as the result of his recent action in obtaining, in compliance with the suggestion of the United States Government, passage by the Icelandic Parliament of a resolution temporarily shelving the independence question. The Prime Minister is faced with general elections in about three weeks and fears that his political opponents may be able to make some headway with the electorate. The Prime Minister believes that his position would be strengthened if the United States would approve of his advancing at this time the proposal that the new Parliament to be elected at the forthcoming general elections pass a resolution declaring that Iceland will become a Republic in 1944. This would be after the normal expiry date of the Treaty of Union with Denmark, December 31, 1943. If this suggestion meets with your approval, the Icelandic Minister wishes to call upon you, make the proposal directly to you, and receive your reply for transmission to the Prime Minister.

The European Division can see no objection to the Prime Minister's proposal, nor does Mr. Berle,²⁶ who thinks that our line should be that we have no objection to the exercise by Iceland of any right which she has under her treaty with Denmark. Our objection to the immediate abrogation of the treaty was that it would have been a unilateral breach of the terms of the treaty while Iceland was under United States protection.

If you are prepared to give your approval to the Prime Minister's proposal, I should be glad to arrange with your office for an appointment for the Icelandic Minister to see you. The matter is somewhat urgent from the Icelandic point of view.

I should add that after receiving your reply, the Icelandic Minister proposes to fly to Iceland to explain the American point of view directly to his brother, the Prime Minister.

RAY ATHERTON

859A.01/93

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1942.

The Minister of Iceland called at his request. After some general exchange of observations he said that the Prime Minister of Iceland desired to advance the proposal that the new Parliament, to be elected at the forthcoming general elections, pass a resolution declaring that Iceland will become a republic in 1944. He stated that the adoption of this resolution would be after the normal expiration date of the Treaty of Union with Denmark, which was December 31, 1943. I promptly replied that there was no objection whatever on the part

²⁶ Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

of this Government to the proposal of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, I added that this Government is always gratified to see a democracy function to the fullest practical extent. The Minister expressed himself as much pleased and said that his Government would likewise be much pleased. He added that his Government would be glad to hand a note to this effect to the American Minister in Iceland and let him make a statement similar to the one which I am today making to the Minister here for his Government. I said that I saw no objection to this procedure.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

859A.00/128

The Minister in Iceland (Morris) to the Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs (Thors) ²⁷

No. 5

REYKJAVIK, October 14, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to the oral message conveyed to Your Excellency on September 27, 1942, by the American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, I have the honor to confirm herewith that there would be no objection whatsoever on the part of the Government of the United States of America to the proposal which Your Excellency now has under consideration, namely, that a resolution be approved by the new Parliament when it convenes declaring that in 1944 Iceland will become a republic.

Accept [etc.]

LELAND MORRIS

²⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Iceland in his despatch No. 8, October 21; received October 31.

ITALY

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY TO APPLY DURING THE WAR THE TWO GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF JULY 27, 1929, CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE WOUNDED

740.00114 European War 1939/2026a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1941.

330. Please request Swiss Government to be good enough to communicate through its representatives at Berlin and Rome to the German and Italian Governments, respectively, the information that this Government as a party to the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention and the Geneva Red Cross Convention both of July 27, 1929¹ intends to apply the provisions of those conventions.

It is, furthermore, the intention of this Government to apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention to any civilian enemy aliens that may be interned, in so far as the provisions of that convention may be adaptable thereto. It is hoped that the German and Italian Governments will reciprocate in this respect and it would be appreciated if those Governments might likewise be so informed through Swiss channels.

It would be appreciated if the Swiss Government would obtain as soon as possible for the information of this Government an expression of the intentions of the German and Italian Governments, respectively, in regard to the observance of the above-mentioned conventions as well as the application, in so far as adaptable to civilian enemy aliens, of the Prisoner of War Convention.²

HULL

740.00114 European War 1939/2045 : Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 6, 1942.

[Received January 6—4:38 p.m.]

56. American Interests, Italy. Reference Department's 830, December 18. Swiss Foreign Office in note dated January 5 transmits following telegram from Swiss Legation, Rome (French translation):

¹ For texts of the Conventions, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 336 and 321, respectively; or 47 Stat. (pt. 2) 2021 and 2074, respectively.

² Concerning the arrangement between the United States and Germany, see bracketed note under Germany, vol. 11.

"Italian Government communicates its agreement to American proposal for application Geneva Conventions 1929 concerning treatment prisoners of war and wounded. Italian Government agrees to apply benefits first convention to civilian internees to the extent that they are applicable in kind. Copy *note verbale* January 2d follows."³

HUDDLE

740.00114 European War 1939/2132: Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 12, 1942.

[Received February 13—6:47 a. m.]

529. Legation's 56, January 6. Following is translation of Italian *note verbale* January 2:

"Italian Foreign Office has received Swiss *note verbale* of December 24, 1941, transmitting proposal of American Government to apply during actual state of war between Italy and United States the Geneva prisoners of war and Red Cross conventions extending benefits first convention as far as applicable reciprocally to interned civilians of two countries.

Italian Foreign Office requests Swiss Legation communicate to American Government that Italian Government agrees to above proposal.

Italian Government reserves right to present further proposals for carrying out provisions of above mentioned conventions."

Swiss Foreign Office note February 4 now forwards copy further Italian *note verbale* of January 22 translated as follows:

"Italian Foreign Office in accordance with reserve contained in its note of January 2 requests Swiss Legation to transmit following communication to American Government:

1. Italian Government confirms former communication and considers in force vis-à-vis United States on reciprocal basis the two international conventions subscribed Geneva 1929 relative prisoners of war and Red Cross.

2. Italian Government in order improve application prisoners of war convention proposes following points: Article 14. In conformity fourth paragraph this article Italian Government disposed on basis reciprocity consent [to] retain in prisoners of war camps doctors and medical orderlies for purpose caring for wounded and sick prisoner compatriots.

Agreement on above whenever reached shall be extended to religious personnel which according article 12 of Red Cross Convention should be repatriated.

For medical and dental care furnishing provisional artificial limbs, eye glasses, et cetera, conditions article 14 would be applied exactly as originally written. Article 21. Conformity this provision there is transmitted (appendix I) table of ranks and grades in force in Italian armed forces.

³ See *infra*.

Regarding assimilated personnel mentioned paragraph 2 article 21 there are attached (annex 2) two copies *Official Gazette* number 125 May 29, 1941, containing regulations for execution of forms of militarization of civil personnel attached to active forces and table of equivalent grades. Article 23. Standards of pay of each grade are given in annex 1. (a) Italian Government suggests value of exchange applicable to points which follow be 19 lire to one dollar; (b) Italian Government will pay American officers and assimilated persons who are prisoners of war same rate of pay as indicated in aforementioned table for officers of same rank as in Italian armed forces as far as not higher than level which shall be indicated by American Government. Final clause article 23 shall naturally be applicable to these payments; (c) Italian Government would like to know if scale of payments indicated above is sufficient to assure normal living conditions (food, clothing, miscellaneous expenses) for Italian prisoners of war in United States as in Italy; (d) Italian Government proposes to make following payments on reciprocal basis in addition to treatment contemplated by the convention: Italian lire or equivalent in dollars weekly, 10.80 for noncommissioned officers—home forces, 7.20 for enlisted men, 4.80 for Libyan personnel of all grades, 3.00 for personnel of Italian East African forces of all grades.

If proposals under point (d) are accepted Italian Government will accord similar treatment to corresponding American personnel with such differences as American Government may eventually communicate for its colored personnel.

Final clause article 23 would also be applicable to such payments; (e) payments must be made in full to Italian prisoners of war as Italian administration authorities intend to pay directly to families of Italian prisoners a part of other allowances due to respective members of family who are in captivity. Article 24. Regarding maximum amount of cash which prisoners of various grades will be allowed to keep on their persons it is proposed that prisoners be not allowed to receive negotiable money (*disponibilità di valuta corrente* [corrente]) but should be allowed to spend only special monetary substitute issued by commander of camp. Article 27. Adhering to right of employment for work of prisoners of war under conditions specified in this article Italian Government wishes stipulate that imprisoning power should for duration of imprisonment allow prisoners who are victims of accidents occurring during employment, benefits set up by applicable regulations concerning workers of same category according to legislation of imprisoning power. Each Government will then regulate according own laws the question of indemnity to be granted its own nationals when they shall have returned from imprisonment for injuries occurring during imprisonment. Italian Government proposes that proper authorities of imprisoning power will ensure that prisoners of war, victims of industrial accidents during work, shall receive a proper certificate attesting to nature of accident. Article 34. It is proposed that work of tailors, shoemakers, barbers and laundrymen be considered as exceeding ordinary work of camp and be remunerated on following scale: tailors and shoemakers lire 0.45 per hour with limit of 3.60 lire per day, barbers and laundrymen lire 0.22 per hour with limit of 1.80 per day. For labor performed outside of camps scale of

payment shall be lire 10.00 for skilled and lire 7.00 daily for unskilled worker.

Payment of above should be in addition to food, lodging and clothing. Article 36. On condition of reciprocity, Italian Government disposed to permit prisoners to send in addition to a card announcing their capture a letter and a postcard per week, each letter not to exceed 24 lines and postcard should only contain several sentences regarding health of prisoners and few words of greeting. Special stationery and postcards shall be adopted to be distributed by imprisoning power.

There shall be no restrictions regarding persons to whom prisoners may address letters except prisoners in different concentration camps cannot write each other unless related. Article 68. Italian Government proposes adoption of model agreement of type annexed to the convention with change that prisoners of war who are to be repatriated, contemplated in numbers 1, 2 of letter B of model agreement should be repatriated rather than hospitalized in neutral countries.

Italian Government proposes to extend benefit of repatriation to those military persons, Italian and North American, interned in third countries who meet conditions provided in letters A and B of aforementioned model. Article 69. International Committee of Red Cross will be requested to nominate neutral members of Mixed Medical Commission. Article 76. Confirming execution of this article Italian Government proposes that ordinary funeral expenses and burial of prisoners should be met by imprisoning power. If fellow soldiers desire pay special honors, greater part of cost shall be at their expense, if authorization of camp commandant is obtained. Article 77. Prisoner Information Bureau (*l'Ufficio Prigionieri Ricerche* [*Ricerche?*]) of Italian Red Cross established in Rome (Via Puglie 6) is charged with furnishing information about prisoners of war.

It is proposed that articles for use of prisoners be transmitted through respective offices of information of two countries to International Committee of Red Cross for forwarding to interested government unless accord is reached for direct transmission between above-mentioned offices of information.

3. Italian Government in order improve application of Red Cross Convention proposes following points. Article 12. In accordance with provisions this article and connection with above proposals it is proposed to make following reciprocal payments in lire monthly to this personnel in addition to their lodging: medical officers, chaplains and officers attached to the administration of sanitary establishments: Lieutenant General 4200, Major General 3200, Colonel 2650, Lieutenant Colonel 2300, Major 2000, Captain 1700, Lieutenant 1400, Second Lieutenant 1100. Medical orderlies of recognized organizations will receive 1100 lire monthly. Personnel below rank of officer: Marshal of all ranks 288, Sergeant Major 216, Sergeant 144 monthly, Corporal and enlisted men 8.60 daily.

For last group monthly or daily allowance is in addition to maintenance which should always be provided by imprisoning power.

In line with this procedure it is proposed (a) that medical or religious personnel be repatriated during war in case they are wounded or sick on basis of model agreement annexed Red Cross Convention; (b) that this same personnel will enjoy treatment provided for by

articles 9 to 13 of Red Cross Convention with sole restriction of personal liberty imposed by military exigencies; (c) that at end of war the rights be reserved to personnel mentioned above as provided by last paragraph of article 12 of Red Cross Convention; (d) that same personnel should be sent to give assistance wherever camps are maintained for Italian prisoners or civil internees with equal distribution among camps.

4. In addition to above proposals which relate to execution of various articles of Geneva Conventions Italian Government also proposes to regulate following questions on basis of reciprocity: (a) tobacco—that there be distributed free to prisoners (officers included) an amount of tobacco (pipe tobacco or cigarettes of choice) up to 35 grams per week; (b) that mess of noncommissioned officers, prisoners of war, be administered by them or that facilities be given them for running it and to extend also to noncommissioned officers privileges of last sentence of article 22 of Prisoners of War Convention.

5. Italian Government also confirms communication made in *note verbale* January 2 to Swiss Legation regarding extending benefits of the Prisoners of War Convention as far as applicable to civil internees of both countries on reciprocal basis.

Italian Government proposes that two Governments send each other reciprocally, through protective power, lists of civilians of two countries interned in territory of the other and successive changes as these take place.

6. Italian Government awaits the reply of American Government before considering points 2, 3, 4 of present note as being agreed upon and in force."

Annexes 1 and 2 mentioned and copies notes following by air mail.⁴

HUDDLE

740.00114 European War 1939/2200: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1942.

717. Your 529, February 12, and 971, March 10.⁵ Please request the Swiss Government to inform the Italian Government (1) that proposals 2, 3 and 4 of its note of January 2 [22]⁶ are receiving consideration and that the attitude of the American Government with regard to them will be communicated in the near future; (2) with reference to point 5, that this Government is drawing up proposals regarding the extent and manner of application of the provisions of the Prisoners of War Convention to civilian internees and detainees which will be communicated to the Italian Government, (3) that pending further agreement between the two Governments as to which provisions of the Convention are applicable to civilians, the Government of the United

⁴ Despatch No. 2096, February 13, 1942, not printed; annexes 1 and 2 not attached to file copy of the despatch.

⁵ Latter not printed.

⁶ See *supra*.

States will not apply Article 27 of the Convention to civilian internees and (4) that this Government expects the Italian Government to accord like treatment to American civilians who may be detained by it.

WELLES

740.00114 European War 1939/2351 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 26, 1942.

[Received May 26, 1942—11:04 p. m.]

2285. Department's 717, March 20. Swiss Legation Rome telegraphs May 19 following text of note dated May 15 from Italian Foreign Office (translation from Italian) :

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to *note verbale* 00114 of March 28 by which Swiss Legation transmitted a communication of the United States Government regarding application of the Geneva Convention for treatment of prisoners of war and amelioration of the conditions of the wounded and sick of the army in the field.

Ministry requests Legation forward following reply to American Government:

1. Italian Government takes note of assurance that American Government is examining proposals 2, 3 and 4 of *note verbale* of January 22 (see Legation's 529, February 12) and that it will make clear its stand in regard to these points and Italian Government is awaiting reply in this regard and also in regard to proposal of United States Government concerning point 5 (see Department's 717, March 20) of above mentioned *note verbale*.

2. Italian Government also notes fact that American Government does not intend to apply (pending an agreement between two Governments relative extension to civilian internees of provisions of Geneva Convention) article 27 of that Convention to civilian internees and gives assurances that similar treatment will be applied to American civilians interned in Italy.

3. Italian Government declares that treatment of American civilians interned in Italy is guided in addition to principles International Law and the Geneva Convention by high humanitarian principles and trusts that similar spirit inspires American Government in treatment of Italian civilians interned in United States."

HARRISON

740.00114 European War 1939/2200 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1942.

1400. Your 529, February 12, Department's 717, March 20 and your despatch no. 2096, February 13.⁷ Request the Swiss Government to communicate the following matters to the Italian Government with

⁷ Despatch No. 2096 not printed.

reference to the Italian Foreign Office's *note verbale* 31/01511 of January 22, 1942. Numbers refer to numbered sections of the Italian Foreign Office's note under reference.

2. Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.

Article 14. The American Government reserves the right for the repatriation, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention, of medical personnel and chaplains but agrees that pending such repatriation, doctors, medical orderlies and chaplains shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4, Article 14, be used reciprocally for the care of their compatriots in prisoners of war camps.

The American Government assents to the proposal of the Italian Government that the provisions of Article 14 for the furnishing of temporary prosthetic equipment and for medical care shall be applied exactly as written.

Article 21. The proposals of the Italian Government with regard to Article 21 are still under study. A further communication with regard to them will be addressed to the Italian Government.

Article 23.

(a) The American Government suggests that the value of exchange applicable to the points which follow should be 20 lire to one dollar U. S. A.

(b) The American Government proposes that there be substituted for the rates of pay provided for under Article 23 the following rates of pay:

First or second lieutenants, chief warrant officers, warrant officers in the Army; lieutenants, junior grade, ensigns, chief warrant officers, warrant officers in the Navy; first and second lieutenants, chief warrant officers, warrant officers in the Marine Corps; and similar grades in the United States Coast Guard and United States Public Health Service, to include corresponding ranks for the Italian armed forces, to receive \$20 a month or 400 lire.

Captains in the Army, Lieutenants in the Navy, Captains in the Marine Corps, and similar ranks in the United States Coast Guard and United States Public Health Service, to include corresponding ranks for the Italian armed forces, to receive \$30 a month or 600 lire.

Majors and upwards in the Army, Lieutenant Commanders and upwards in the Navy, Majors and upwards in the Marine Corps, and similar ranks in the United States Coast Guard and United States Public Health Service, to include corresponding ranks for the Italian armed forces, to receive \$40 a month or 800 lire.

It is suggested that the remaining sums due on the pay accounts of all officer prisoners of war be paid by the Government of origin as an allotment to the family of the prisoner of war.

(c) The money allowances provided for under (b) shall be in addition to rations to be distributed at the prisoners of war camps, the cost of which shall be borne by the detaining power.

(d) The American Government proposes that payment in Italian lire or its equivalent in dollars be on a basis of 8 cents American money per diem for non-commissioned officers and 5 cents American money per diem for all other enlisted personnel, no distinction being made in this connection between American white and colored soldiers.

(e) All payments suggested above shall be paid in full, it being understood that the authorities of the country of origin shall pay sums due to their nationals, over and above the amount specified, to the dependents or legal representatives of the nationals in their country of origin.

Article 24. The American Government accepts the proposal of the Italian Government that prisoners of war be not allowed to receive negotiable money and that they should be allowed to spend for their needs only a special monetary substitute issued by the commander of the camp.

Article 27. The American Government proposes that the money allowances provided for enlisted personnel set forth above under Article 23 point (b) continue to be paid to such personnel, even though injured, during the complete period of injury with no deductions of any kind, and in addition thereto during the period of injury 50 per cent of the rate of wage paid for the work being performed at the time of injury, these payments being in lieu of compensation.

The American Government accepts the proposal of the Italian Government that each Government should regulate, according to its own laws, the question of allowances to be granted to their own nationals, when they shall have returned from imprisonment, for injuries occurring during imprisonment, and agrees that a proper certificate attesting to the nature and the circumstances of the injuries shall be issued for each victim of an industrial accident.

Article 34. The Italian Government's proposal that work of tailors, shoemakers, barbers, and laundrymen, shall be considered as exceeding the ordinary work of the camp and shall be remunerated under a special scale is still under consideration by the appropriate American authorities.

The American Government accepts the Italian Government's proposal that the scale of payment for labor performed outside of camps shall be 10 lire per day for skilled workers and 7 lire a day for unskilled workers or its equivalent in dollars, this payment to be in addition to food, lodging and clothing.

Article 36. The American Government proposes that instead of one letter and one card per week, each prisoner of war be permitted to write two letters and one card per week, this being the amount of out-

going correspondence now allowed by the American authorities to Italian civilian internees in the United States. The proposal that there shall be no restrictions regarding the persons to whom prisoners of war may address letters is accepted, except as to that part of the proposal which permits correspondence between related prisoners of war and internees held in different camps, to which the American Government agrees only to the extent that relationship can be satisfactorily established.

Article 68. The American Government accepts the proposal of the Italian Government regarding the adoption of the model agreement annexed to the Convention with the change suggested regarding repatriation rather than hospitalization in neutral countries.

The American Government also accepts the proposal of the Italian Government to extend the benefit of repatriation to those military persons interned in third countries who meet the conditions provided in letters (a) and (b) of the model agreement.

Article 69. The Italian Government's proposal with regard to Article 69 is accepted.

Article 76. The Italian Government's proposal is accepted by the American Government subject to a change in the second sentence to provide that if the fellow soldiers of the dead shall desire to pay special honors, the "difference in" not the "greater part of" the costs shall be at their expense.

Article 77. The prisoners of war and civilian internees Information Bureau in the Office of the Provost Marshal General of the United States is already transmitting information regarding Italian citizens held in custody in the United States to the Central Information Bureau of the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva and the appropriate protecting Power. This office is also charged with furnishing information about prisoners of war. The American Government proposes that articles for use of prisoners be forwarded through ordinary mail channels, when available, and through the facilities made available by the International Red Cross Committee.

3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick of Armies in the Field.

Article 12. The American Government proposes that medical officers, chaplains, and officers attached to the administration of sanitary establishments be paid in accordance with the proposal made under the heading 2. Prisoners of War Convention, Article 23, above, and that the pay allowance be in addition to maintenance in the case of all such officers, as well as in the case of all enlisted men. With reference to the further Italian proposals, it is proposed and suggested as follows:

(a) The American Government agrees that medical or religious personnel shall be used for the care of their own compatriots but reserves the right of such personnel to repatriation under the provisions

of Article 12. It desires that only those members of the medical or religious personnel who voluntarily relinquish their right of repatriation should be retained after a way is opened for their return and military exigencies permit.

(b) The American Government agrees to the Italian Government's proposals under (b), (c), and (d) of this heading.

4. Additional proposals for the regulation of the following questions on a basis of reciprocity:

(a) Tobacco. The American Government agrees to this proposal.

(b) The American Government does not agree to the proposal that a separate mess be established for non-commissioned officer prisoners of war.

HULL

740.00114 European War 1939/2200: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1942.

2721. Inform International Red Cross Committee that this Government and Italian Government have agreed to enforce Model Agreement attached to Geneva Prisoners of War Convention (Department's 1400, June 1) and have agreed to ask International Red Cross Committee to appoint neutral members of the Mixed Medical Commissions provided for in Article 69 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.

This Government would, therefore, be grateful if International Red Cross Committee would consent to nominate the neutral members of these commissions. This Government suggests that these commissions be continuing commissions and that in order that they may be able to serve without interruption that the International Red Cross Committee submit simultaneously with the names of the neutral doctors nominated as members of the commissions additional names of neutral doctors to serve as alternate members in case regular members should be unable to perform their duties.

When this Government shall have been informed that the International Red Cross Committee has agreed to nominate these members and that it has been approached by Italian Government in this regard, it will take the action necessary for the appointment of the third member (with an alternate) of the commission in the United States in order that upon a reciprocal basis the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war can be commenced at the earliest opportunity.

Request Swiss Government to communicate substance of this telegram to Italian Government and to ask whether Italian Government

has approached International Red Cross Committee regarding nomination of neutral members of Mixed Medical Commissions.

HULL

NONCOMMITTAL ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING
BRITISH PLEDGE THAT SENUSSIS IN CYRENAICA WILL NOT AGAIN
BE PLACED UNDER ITALIAN RULE

740.0011 European War 1939/159073

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

Ref: 3425/2/41

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1941.

MY DEAR WELLES: I have been asked to give you the following message from Sir Alexander Cadogan:^a

"We are considering the early publication of a declaration to the effect that after the war the Senussis in Cyrenaica shall in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination.

"The Senussis have suffered much from Italian oppression during the last twenty years. Soon after the collapse of France, a British Senussi force was raised from Senussi exiles, which performed valuable ancillary duties in Cyrenaica and is still serving in the western desert. Their offer of service with us was made unconditionally but lately they have endeavoured to extract some undertaking from us as to their future status.

"The above is, we feel, all that we can say at the moment. I feel bound to tell you, as this declaration might be represented as a commitment."

Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

740.0011 European War 1939/159073

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At the time of your meeting with Mr. Churchill in August,⁹ with your approval I inquired of Sir Alexander Cadogan, for the information of this Government, whether the British Government had entered into any commitments or secret understandings covering territorial readjustments after the close of the war. You will remember that some six weeks previously you had sent a personal message to Mr. Churchill¹⁰ expressing the opinion that

^a British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁹ For correspondence regarding the Atlantic Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 341 ff.

¹⁰ See telegram No. 2600, July 14, 1941, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 342.

the British Government should make no secret commitments to any of its allies without the knowledge of the United States or without the agreement of the United States.

Sir Alexander Cadogan gave me the most specific and positive assurances that the British Government had entered into no agreements and had made no commitments which had to do with frontier or territorial readjustments, with one possible exception. He stated that this one exception was an oral statement made to the Government of Yugoslavia prior to the Yugoslav *coup d'état* that the British Government believed that at the conclusion of the war the subject of the jurisdiction of Istria was a matter which might well come up for reconsideration. He went on to say that this did not constitute any firm commitment and added that no mention whatever had been made by the British Government of either Gorizia or Trieste.

Sir Alexander Cadogan further stated that, should the British Government at any future time intend to make any commitments of this character, the Government of the United States would be advised prior to the making of such commitments.

I received yesterday a letter from Lord Halifax under date of October 18 which contains a message to me from Sir Alexander Cadogan. I am enclosing a copy thereof for your information.¹¹

Unless you see some objection I propose in reply merely to state that this Government has taken due note of the contents of this message and that we have no comment to offer and no suggestions to make.

As you know, the treatment by the Italians of the Senussis has been shocking and, from the standpoint of humanity alone, a statement of the kind proposed by the British Government would seem to me to be one which would be welcomed by public opinion everywhere.

I shall appreciate it if you will let me have your views.¹²

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/20758

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1941.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: I have received your letter of October 18 by means of which you were good enough to communicate to me a message from Sir Alexander Cadogan relative to the intention of the British Government to make a public statement to the effect that after the war the Senussis in Cyrenaica shall in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination.

¹¹ *Supra*.

¹² Notation on original: "SW OK FDR".

I shall be grateful if you will be kind enough to transmit the following message for me to Sir Alexander Cadogan in acknowledgement of his message:

"Lord Halifax has transmitted to me your message informing me that you are considering the early publication of a declaration to the effect that after the war the Senussis in Cyrenaica shall in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination. I have taken pleasure in submitting your message to the President for his information.

"In reply I am glad to let you know that this Government greatly appreciates the courtesy of your Government in giving us this information. We have taken due note of the contents of your message but we have no comments to offer and no suggestions to make."

Believe me [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

865D.01/604 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, January 16, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received January 17—1:13 p. m.]

95. As a consequence of the British occupation of Cirenaica there is being set up in Cairo an office of the British occupied enemy territory administration which in addition to Cirenaica will have Eritrea under its jurisdiction. It is understood that whereas Eritrea is being governed as a territory under Italian sovereignty but British military occupation, such is not the case in Cirenaica where Eden's¹³ separate pledge to the Senussi is regarded as precluding the return of that area to Italy after the war. As far as is known no effort is being made at the present time to determine the permanent status of Cirenaica but it may be significant to note that the administration being set up at the present time is said to be modeled along the lines of the sheikdoms under British protection along the Persian Gulf.

KIRK

865D.01/604 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1942—5 p. m.

66. It is assumed that your 95, January 16, 5 p. m., is not intended as an answer to the Department's 9, January 3, 10 p. m.,¹⁴ and that the information requested in the latter message concerning law and justice in Eritrea will be forthcoming as soon as possible.

¹³ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁴ Not printed.

The Department does not appear to have received the terms of Eden's pledge to the Senussi with respect to Cirenaica, and would be glad to receive them together with your comments regarding the compatibility of the pledge with any arrangement which may be contemplated with Egypt relating to the future disposition of Cirenaica.

HULL

865A.11/9: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, January 29, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received January 30—11:21 a. m.]

167. Department's No. 66, January 21, 5 p. m. The Legation's No. 110, January 20, 1 p. m.; and 129, January 23, 11 a. m.,¹⁵ were transmitted in reply to Department's No. 9, January 4 [3], 10 p. m.¹⁶ The following is the text of Eden's statement regarding the Senussis in the House of Commons on January 8 as carried in a Reuter despatch from London of the same date and in the Cairo press on January 9.

"The Sayid Idris El Senussi made contact with the British authorities in Egypt within a month of the collapse of France, at a time when the military situation in Africa was most unfavorable to us. A Senussi force was subsequently raised from those of his followers who had escaped Italian oppression at various times during the past 20 years. This force performed considerable ancillary duties during successful fighting in the Western Desert in the Winter of 1940-1941, and is again playing a useful part in the campaign now in progress. I take this opportunity of expressing the warm appreciation of His Majesty's Government for the contribution which Sayid Idris El Senussi and his followers have made and are making to the British war effort. We welcome their association His Majesty's forces in the task of defeating the common enemies. His Majesty's Government are determined that at the end of the war the Senussis in Cirenaica will in no circumstance again fall under Italian domination."

KIRK

865A.11/10: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, January 29, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received January 30—12:06 p. m.]

168. The following is the concluding portion of my 167, January 29, 5 [3] p. m.

It will be noted from the foregoing that the British commitment goes no further than to express determination that the Senussis in Cire-

¹⁵ Neither printed.

¹⁶ Not printed.

naica will not again be placed under Italian sovereignty and consequently [possibility] of satisfying certain Egyptian aspirations in Cirenaica is not precluded. In fact it is understood that this matter was touched upon by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a closed Foreign Affairs committee of the Chamber of Deputies on January 20. It would appear however that as matters stand neither the British, the Egyptians or the Senussis have formulated any specific plan in respect to a permanent post war regime in Cirenaica.

KIRK

865C.00/108

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

No. 693

CAIRO, November 11, 1942.

[Received November 23.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a translation of a telegram addressed to me on November 2, 1942 by El Sayid Mohammed Idris El Senussi expressing approval of a statement reported to have been made by Mr. Wendell Willkie¹⁷ in respect of colonial policy in the East, giving assurance of the support of his compatriots in the war against the Axis, and requesting that his sentiments be made known to the President. There is also transmitted a copy of my telegraphic reply of today's date.

Inasmuch as it was obvious that in sending this message the purpose of El Sayid Mohammed Idris El Senussi was to put out a feeler in respect of such attitude as the American Government might take regarding the satisfaction of nationalist aspirations of the Senussis in the post war settlement, I decided it advisable to discuss the matter with the British Embassy before drafting my reply in order to ascertain whether it had been similarly approached and what policy it might have seen it advisable to adopt.

In reply to the Legation's informal and oral inquiry, Sir Walter Smart, Oriental Counselor of the Embassy, stated that the Embassy had been in touch with El Sayid Mohammed Idris El Senussi from time to time and, generally speaking, regarded him as the leader and spokesman of his people with whom, in the absence of any formal Senussi organization, it was appropriate and convenient to treat. Sir Walter emphasized, however, that Idris holds no position except that of religious head of the Senussis and that British relations with him had been in his capacity of "spiritual father" of his people rather than as having a political status. In fact, the Senussi movement had originated as a religious organization and had never developed to the point of having a political administration. Thus there was no thread of

¹⁷ Republican Presidential candidate in 1940, who made a world tour in 1942.

political tradition or continuity in present agitation of the Senussi for independence and, when the British had been approached in that regard, they had always made it a point to side-step the issue and to confine discussion to local matters in Cyrenaica, where the Senussi are much more influential than in the remainder of Libya. In fact, said Sir Walter, the only official assurance ever given the Senussis was contained in Eden's declaration in the House of Commons on January 8, 1942 expressing appreciation of the contribution which El Sayid Idris El Senussi and the Senussi Force had made to the British war effort, and giving assurance "that at the end of the war the Senussis in Cyrenaica will in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination[.]" (See Legation's No. 167, January 29, 3 p. m., and No. 168, January 29, 4 p. m.). Furthermore, said Sir Walter, in view of the unhappy consequences of certain pledges given by the British Government to the Arabs and Jews during the last war, an effort was being made to avoid such commitments in the course of this war.

Asked regarding the practical aspects of this problem during the several periods during which the British had occupied Cyrenaica, Sir Walter said that the principal subject of contention had been the desire of the Senussis to appropriate lands held by the Italians but that the British authorities had taken the view that in this, as in other matters, the *status quo* would have to be maintained until the end of the war.

In connection with the foregoing, reference is made to the Legation's despatch No. 2364 of March 4, 1941,¹⁸ entitled "The Present Role of the Senussis in Libya" and also to London's despatch No. 2755 of January 31, 1942,¹⁸ entitled "British Assurances to Senussi Tribe in Cyrenaica", a copy of which was sent this Legation.

As regards my reply to El Sayid Idris El Senussi, it was deemed advisable to couch it in courteous but very general terms since the message addressed to me had been released to the press by the sender and it was to be assumed that the reply thereto might similarly be used for publicity purposes. Furthermore the reply was addressed to Idris in his religious title in order to avoid any political significance.

In conclusion, I may observe that due consideration was given in drafting my reply to the provisions of Chapter I-24 regarding the transmission of messages for foreign persons or organizations but the case was deemed sufficiently exceptional to merit other than routine treatment, particularly since a reply suggesting direct transmission would almost certainly have been construed as lacking in courtesy.

Respectfully yours,

ALEXANDER KIRK

¹⁸ Not printed.

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

Telegram From Mohammed Idris El Senussi, Dated November 2, 1942, to the American Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

We read this morning in the newspapers the declaration made by Mr. Willkie and in which is found clearly the glorious principle of the Allies in connection with the freeing of nations and the ending of colonization. I and my Libyan Nation express our admiration for America and England and their allies in this war. Be sure, Your Excellency, that it was on these principles that my small Libyan Nation went into war with the Allies on December 9, 1940. We shall continue to the end. Long live liberty and long live the free nations which are defending it. I therefore beg you to express this, our feeling, to His Excellency President Roosevelt and to his great nation with many thanks.

[Enclosure 2]

Telegram From the American Minister in Egypt (Kirk), Dated November 11, 1942, to Mohammed Idris El Senussi

In acknowledging your telegram of November 2 in which you were good enough to express your confidence in the success of the cause of the United Nations I convey to Your Eminence an expression of sincere appreciation.

NETHERLANDS

PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS REGARDING MUTUAL AID IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION, SIGNED JULY 8, 1942

[For text of agreement and exchange of notes signed at Washington, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 259, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1554.]

MILITARY SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS

[The agreement was effected by exchanges of notes signed at Washington March 31, July 2, and September 24 and 30, 1942. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 306, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1900.]

REPRESENTATIONS BY THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUISITION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE S. S. "WILHELMINA"

811.5654 *Wilhelmina*/3

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1942.

The Dutch Minister ¹ came in this morning at my request. We discussed the situation out of which the tie-up exists on the S.S. *Wilhelmina*. He said that the vessel had been owned by two Dutch subjects; that it had been chartered to the Japanese along with another vessel, the *Beatrice*; that the *Beatrice* was unreported and presumably in the hands of the Japanese; that the *Wilhelmina* had escaped along the northern route and had arrived in an Alaskan port; that the Dutch Government had sent to that port a Dutch officer who took charge of the vessel and requisitioned it in the name of the Crown; that the vessel had then been brought to Seattle.

After arriving at Seattle the crew were dissatisfied because they had been without pay for a long time. The crew were entirely Chinese.

¹ Alexander Loudon.

Because of the long voyage through the northern Pacific and efforts to escape the Japanese naval vessels there had been no opportunity for shore leave and they had not been able to pay them. Naturally they were dissatisfied. However, on arrival in Seattle they were approached by the Chinese Consul who began making trouble with the crew. The captain of the vessel is a Dutchman but all the others are Chinese, and the foreman of the crew refused to move the vessel from one berth to another without the permission of the Chinese Consul General in Seattle. The Chinese Consul General's action was predicated upon an internal political situation in China. He did not recognize the authority of the Ambassador and would only take orders emanating directly from Chiang Kai Shek.² The Kuomintang on one side and the Communist elements in China on the other side created difficulty and a divided authority.

The Minister said that he would be very glad to see the vessel go to work immediately, but that he must protest at the thought that the American Government would requisition the vessel because it was the property of the Dutch Government and even requisitioned by them from its Dutch owner. It still flew the Dutch flag. He realized the obligation of the Dutch Government to use its vessels in the war effort and would be very glad to have this vessel proceed immediately but that it was blocked not by Dutch authority but by an irresponsible Chinese official.

It developed in the course of the Minister's conversation that there was probably a flaw in the title to the vessel in so far as ownership by the Crown is concerned because the vessel had not complied with certain royal regulations in registering the change in Dutch East Indies. The vessel had not been in the Dutch East Indies and was unable to proceed there and report to the seat of authority in order to effect the details of the transfer of title from the private owner to the Crown.

I told the Minister that I was going to see the Chinese Ambassador and discuss the whole subject because it affected not only this particular vessel in one port but did affect other vessels with Chinese crews in different ports.

The Minister stated that the action of the Chinese Consul was not unrelated to the American Maritime Union and intimated that the consular officials were working in cooperation with certain representatives of American labor unions on the Pacific Coast.

I told the Minister that our principal concern was that vessels lying in American ports did not remain idle and that they get into the war effort. I stated that the Dutch Government as well as the United States Government was principally interested in the war effort and

² President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier).

should do everything in their power to contribute, even down to the use of this one vessel.

While the Minister said very definitely that he would protest in case the vessel was requisitioned by the United States Government, it would appear that his protest might not receive the sanction of his Government—considering the circumstances.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

311.5654 *Wilhelmina*/4

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1942.

The Chinese Ambassador³ came in at my request. I presented to him the situation as we understood it in regard to the S. S. *Wilhelmina*. The Ambassador telephoned to his Counselor to refresh his memory about certain phases of it and after he had discussed it with the Counselor he said that this was not an isolated instance but one of a category which they were now making an effort to liquidate. There had been called in London, under the auspices of the British Government, a conference to discuss the attitude of the British, Dutch, and other governments as regards Chinese members of the crew. The crew in the case of the *Wilhelmina* had been signed on at a rate to be paid in Hong Kong dollars. They now found themselves in the United States and the payoff to them was worth three American dollars a month. The conditions aboard the vessel were very unsatisfactory. The Chinese Consul reported about it and the Embassy was kept advised but not very recently. At the first there had been some dispute about the title to the vessel, it having been claimed that it was of Chinese registry. An inquiry was made in China and it developed that she had been of Chinese registry but was not now so considered. The principal problem was a local one and the Chinese members of the crew had appealed to the Consul for protection and for an amelioration of their condition. The Ambassador hoped that the conference at London, now proceeding, would result in a general understanding which would prevent cases like this from happening. He did not know what he could do in this case as long as the dispute was one of the treatment and condition of labor of the crew which from any standard he thought must be considered of a very inferior order. His prime object and that of his Government was to do everything they could to promote the war effort. As part of their policy each ship should be kept busy in the war effort. He had taken the position some weeks ago that this dispute

³ Hu Shih.

should be adjusted with the principal thought that the vessel should be used for war purposes. However, the attitude of the owners or the representatives of the owners who had offices in San Francisco was such as to prevent any kind of settlement. The Ambassador realized the situation of the United States Government in its desire to have vessels moving at sea rather than sitting in port. He was quite sympathetic and was willing to cooperate to the fullest extent. He said he would make an investigation immediately and request his Counselor to report and see if there was some basis upon which there might be a settlement of this if possible ahead of the decision to be arrived at in London. Incidentally, he said that the Dutch owners had refused to participate in the conference in London and said that they were awaiting the decision to determine whether or not they would conform. Consequently, the decision in London might not affect this vessel because of the attitude of the Dutch owners. The Ambassador had believed that this vessel was still the property of private Dutch owners, their representative having an office in San Francisco, and had not heard that the vessel had been expropriated by the Crown. Their contacts had been through their Counsel with the Dutch owners or the persons who had been the owners and whom they still consider to be the persons responsible for the vessel.

However, he will request a report on the conditions and will communicate with me and see if some solution can be arrived at.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

311.5654 *Wilhelmina*/5

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1942.

I asked the Dutch Minister to come in this morning to dispose of the case of the S. S. *Wilhelmina*. The Minister was ill and confined to his bed so I asked the Minister-Counselor, Baron van Boetzelaer, to come in.

Baron van Boetzelaer said he had very little knowledge of the *Wilhelmina* and attempted to get additional information on the telephone, but was unable to do so. He promised that he would get information and telephone me this afternoon about 4 o'clock. He is only certain that arrangements have not been made for the release of the libels and for the use of the vessel, though he is under the impression that that arrangement is imminent.

I told him that unless the Netherlands Government made some immediate arrangement that the interest of the United Nations cause would

seem to indicate that the United States should exercise its rights under American law and operate the vessel.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

311.5654 Wilhelmina/12

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1942.

The Minister of the Netherlands came in today at his own request, and presented to me the attached note no. 2844⁴ on the subject of the *Wilhelmina*. The Minister reminded me that on the occasion of my first conversation with him about the vessel, at which time I told him that unless the Netherlands Government arranged its affairs so that it could put the vessel to work in the immediate future that the United States Government would feel justified in expropriating the vessel to be put to work in the United Nations cause, he had stated that if the American Government did so it would be necessary for him to protest in the name of his Government. The Minister continued to say that he was now formally protesting as a matter of principle.

The Minister orally took exception to a statement I recently made to a representative of his Legation who called upon me on the same matter. The Minister said that he wanted to point to my remarks that the American Government had taken over vessels belonging to Denmark and to Rumania. I told the Minister there was no unpleasant analogy. The gentleman in question had said that the American Government had not the right to take over a vessel belonging to another government. I had told him that we would exercise that right and considered ourselves justified in exercising it, and in explanation had told him that two vessels, one belonging to Denmark and one to Rumania, had been expropriated. This action was taken while the United States was neutral. The use of the names of the two governments concerned had no unpleasant reference as far as the Netherlands Government was concerned, and the action of the American Government in this case should not be related to the governments named in the other expropriations, and that I simply named the governments to sustain the statement that as a matter of principle and in law the United States Government had the right.

The Netherlands Minister said he understood, but nevertheless he felt it would be necessary to leave the attached note and make the oral statement that they would be glad to make the vessel available pro-

⁴ *Infra.*

vided it was returned to the Dutch flag and that the American Government would use it on a charter party, but he denied the right of the United States Government to take title to the ship.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

311.5654 Wilhelmina/10

The Netherlands Minister (London) to the Secretary of State

No. 2844

The Minister of the Netherlands presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to respectfully request Mr. Hull's attention for the matter explained in this note.

Since 1938, the Netherlands Ship *Wilhelmina* had been lying in the Yangtze river in the port of Hankow, unable to proceed to sea, as the Japanese military authorities prevented her from sailing. In order to put an end to this difficulty the owners of the vessel, the Java-China Trading Company, Ltd., a corporation of Amsterdam and later of Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, entered into a charter agreement, with the consent of the Netherlands authorities, with a Japanese shipping concern. The intention of the owners was to have the ship at sea so that in case of war there would be at least a chance for the vessel to escape seizure.

In the beginning of December, the wireless operator, who against explicit Japanese government instructions and at the risk of his life listened in to the shortwave broadcast, learned of the treacherous attack of Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor and of the declaration of war by the Netherlands Government on Japan. The operator immediately informed the master. The master, acting on secret instructions with which the Netherlands Government had provided him, ordered a change of course so as to try and reach a safe port in order to prevent the ship from being taken by the Japanese. After considerable difficulties—the master being handicapped by the lack of charts—the ship reached Dutch Harbor. In the meantime, on January 14, 1942, the Commander of the Netherlands Indies Naval Forces—the competent authority—had, by telegraph, requisitioned the use of the vessel. In Dutch Harbor the *Wilhelmina* was boarded by Lieutenant Breedveld, a Netherlands Naval Officer, who had been sent from San Francisco by order of Dr. van Mook, Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, to confer with the master. Lieutenant Breedveld acquainted the master with the fact that the use of his vessel had been requisitioned and on January 30, 1942, the master made an entry of this fact in this logbook. The entry was worded:

"Werden overgenomen door N.E.I. Gouvernement en wachten op orders."

which literally translated means:

"Have been taken over by Netherlands East Indies Government and are awaiting orders."

Upon instructions from Lieutenant Breedveld, the master then continued his voyage to Seattle, Washington. The period of validity of the ship's sailing permit which had been set at six months by Netherlands Consul General at Shanghai, acting on instructions from the Batavia authorities when the ship was still in China, having expired, the Company entrusted by the Netherlands Indies Government with the management of the vessel, subject to the Government's instructions, took immediate steps to obtain an extension, but pending the granting of this extension, the communication with Java was interrupted and finally ceased. It became necessary, therefore, to first of all transfer the seat of the Java-China Trading Company, Ltd., from Batavia to Curaçao, Netherlands West Indies, and to apply for new registration of the vessel in the port of Curaçao. Several weeks had to lapse before these formalities could be completed. In the meantime the ship had been libeled, but this fact would not have interfered with the possibility of the ship's departure, as the owners of the vessel were quite prepared to put up the bond for the required amount. Moreover, the Netherlands Government was and still is considering the question whether in the case of a Government requisitioned ship a libel can attach.

In the meantime all communication with the Netherlands Indies had ceased and the Netherlands Government in London had issued a Decree by which it took over all the requisitionings made by the Netherlands Indies Government. The *Wilhelmina* had thus become a vessel the use of which had been requisitioned by the Netherlands Government in London. However, just before arrangements could be made by the owners, who now took orders from the Netherlands Government to despatch the ship on a new voyage and use her for the prosecution of the war, the United States War Shipping Administration had taken over the vessel, thereby depriving the Netherlands Government of the use of the tonnage involved. The Netherlands Government does, of course, welcome the efforts of the United States authorities to avail themselves of the tonnage in question for war purposes, and would have very readily agreed to have the United States authorities charter the vessel, but it feels that it cannot consent to have a vessel which it had—acting fully within its sovereign rights—requisitioned, and which had therefore become a Netherlands Government vessel, simply taken away from it and taken over by the United States authorities.

The Netherlands Minister has therefore been instructed urgently to request that in view of the special circumstances of this case, the United States authorities concerned restore the vessel *Wilhelmina* to the Netherlands flag. However, in order not to deprive the United States Government of the immediate use of this vessel, for which it has probably made arrangements, the Netherlands Government is quite willing to have the *Wilhelmina* chartered by the War Shipping Administration—on a bare boat basis—for a limited period to be agreed upon. In that way there will be no interference with the activities of the War Shipping Administration.

This will furthermore avoid the undesirable situation by which the United States Government takes over a ship belonging to a power with which the American Government is united in a common war effort.

The above mentioned action on the part of the United States Government has created a situation against which the Netherlands Government cannot but strongly object.

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1942.

311.5654 *Wilhelmina*/12½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1942.

The Netherlands Ambassador⁵ called to see me today at his request. The Ambassador said he felt it necessary to call to my attention the situation which had arisen from the expropriation by the War Shipping Administration of the Dutch steamship *Wilhelmina* expropriated at Seattle and now in use under the American flag. The Ambassador stated that he had discussed this question at length with Assistant Secretary Long. The Ambassador said he wished to make it clear that the Dutch Government fully recognized our shipping needs and was entirely willing to charter this vessel and any other available Dutch vessel to the United States on a bareboat basis, but that the Dutch Government could not agree to the expropriation of its properties in this cavalier fashion by the United States Government. I told the Ambassador that I was quite unfamiliar with the facts and that I would look into this in order to see what might be done that would be helpful under the circumstances.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁵ The diplomatic representation between the United States and the Netherlands was raised from the rank of Legation to that of Embassy on May 7, 1942.

311.5654 *Wilhelmina*/14*The Secretary of State to the Netherlands Ambassador (London)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Netherlands and has the honor to refer to his note of May 4, 1942 in which, on behalf of the Netherlands Government, he makes representations with respect to the actions of the Government of the United States in requisitioning title to and possession of the S. S. *Wilhelmina*.

On April 18, 1942, the War Shipping Administration, by an order issued pursuant to the Act of June 6, 1941, (55 Stat. 242) requisitioned title to and possession of the S. S. *Wilhelmina*.

It appears from His Excellency's note that the Java-China Trading Company, Limited, was the owner of the vessel.

The records of this Government disclose that the *Wilhelmina*, a merchant vessel, arrived at Dutch Harbor, Alaska on or about December 25, 1941 without cargo consigned to that port and with no intention to transport cargo from that port, and subsequently left that port for Seattle, Washington where it arrived on or about February 20, 1942.

The vessel had been, for a number of years, lying in the Yangtze River at Hankow and had been under Chinese registry and, it appears, Chinese ownership. The appropriate authorities of this Government state that, at the time of its arrival in American jurisdiction, the legal status and nationality of the vessel were not clear and that, while it was flying the flag of the Netherlands, it does not appear to have had appropriate evidence to show a valid transfer from the Chinese flag. The records also suggest the possibility that the Netherlands Indies registration of the vessel had not been effected.

This Government is unable to share the view expressed in the Ambassador's note that the *Wilhelmina* had become a "Netherlands Government vessel" which was simply taken away from that Government. The note itself elsewhere states that merely the "use" of the vessel was requisitioned by the Commander of the Netherlands Indies Naval Forces, stated to be the competent authority, by telegram on January 14, 1942. It also refers to the vessel's having been libeled and states that in the meanwhile the communications with the Netherlands Indies had ceased and the Netherlands Government in London had issued a decree by which it took over all the requisitionings made by the Netherlands Indies Government, and that "the *Wilhelmina* had thus become a vessel, the use of which had been requisitioned by the Netherlands Government in London." Copies of pertinent laws and decrees have not been submitted.

This Government seriously doubts that the status of the vessel was such as to permit its use being requisitioned, while under American

jurisdiction, by the Netherlands Government. It furthermore doubts that the Commander of the Netherlands Indies Naval Forces could, by telegram, effectually requisition the use of a vessel in a port of the United States. However, assuming that the use of the vessel had been requisitioned by the Netherlands Government, this fact would not preclude the United States from requisitioning title to and possession of the vessel, in the exercise of a well-established right of a sovereign to take, in the case of necessity, property of any kind, situated within its jurisdiction.

It may be furthermore observed that, at the time the *Wilhelmina* was requisitioned by the appropriate authorities of this Government, it was not in the possession of the Netherlands Government but had been libeled and was in the possession of the District Court of the United States, for the Western District of Washington.

In view of the circumstances in this case, and since title to the vessel has now been taken by the United States, this Government is not in the position to comply with the request contained in His Excellency's note that the *Wilhelmina* be now restored to the Netherlands flag.

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1942.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR SENDING AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES TO THE NETHERLANDS ISLANDS OF CURAÇAO AND ARUBA TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEFENSE

856B.20/18 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister to the Netherlands Government
in Exile (Biddle), at London*

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1942—6 p. m.

Netherlands Series No. 2. Your Netherlands Series 67, December 31, 9 p. m.⁷ Please transmit the following message from the President for Queen Wilhelmina.

"I greatly appreciate your helpful and understanding message concerning the imperative need that prompt action be taken with regard to the security of the islands of Curaçao and Aruba. I am hopeful that a satisfactory arrangement may immediately be concluded between your Minister for Foreign Affairs⁸ and Mr. Biddle. I feel however that I must ask again that, with regard to Venezuela, an arrangement be made quite similar to that which was reached between your Government and that of Brazil in the case of Surinam.⁹ I fully recognize the special circumstances which exist in your relations with Venezuela and to which you refer, but I am convinced that the accordance of any different treatment to Venezuela from that accorded to Brazil

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 811 ff.

would create profound resentment on the part of the former country which would give rise to a situation which might have unfortunate consequences. As you know, Venezuela spontaneously has broken relations of every character with the Axis powers, she is now negotiating a bilateral mutual defense agreement with the Government of the United States,¹⁰ and if she is treated in a friendly way and is accorded reasonable confidence in the arrangements involving Curaçao and Aruba, I am positive that the mutual defense agreement which we will make with Venezuela will remove any ground for suspicion on the part of your Government as to the attitude of Venezuela concerning the two islands. More than that, for the sake of hemispheric solidarity, it is highly important that Venezuela should not be able to present any justified grievance at the Conference which is to take place at Rio de Janeiro on January 15. For all of these reasons, I hope therefore that your Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree to the suggestion I make."

In your conversation with Dr. Van Kleffens you should make it very clear that this request on the part of the President is firm and must be adopted in view of the defense interests of the United States itself. The sending of a three-man military mission by Venezuela would be under the supervision of the American military authorities and would constitute merely a gesture, and could in no event be legitimately regarded by the Venezuelan [*Netherlands?*] authorities as prejudicial to their own interests.

HULL

856B.20/20 : Telegram

The Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 5, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received January 5—4:15 p. m.]

Netherlands Series 2. Your 2, January 2, 6 p. m. President's message was transmitted to Queen Wilhelmina on Saturday, January 3 and imperative necessity of associating Venezuela with Curaçao arrangements through a mission on model of Brazil-Surinam arrangement was discussed with Prime Minister Gerbrandy same day. At that time he said he would take up matter with members of Government as early as possible.

While I have no answer as yet, I feel I should acquaint you with present state of mind of Netherlands Government which is a state of anger verging on intransigence. They are incensed that they were given less than a day in which to reach decision on General Wavell's

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. VII, section under Venezuela entitled "Cooperation between the United States and Venezuela in plan for warding off possible action by Axis agents against oil installations in Aruba and Curaçao."

appointment¹¹ and that it was announced before they could advise us or the Governor General at Batavia of their decision. The resultant mood seems likely to reinforce their deep opposition to the Venezuelan proposal.

This was brought out today when I again called on Dr. Gerbrandy to reemphasize importance of favorable action on Venezuelan aspect of Curaçao arrangement.

At the end of my remarks Dr. Gerbrandy who has been the consistent ally of this mission said: "Mr. Biddle you find the Netherlands Government in a very angry frame of mind. In fact it is in no mood to accept any suggestions". After explaining in detail the unsatisfactory time table of the Wavell negotiations he said it was difficult even in normal circumstances to be certain of the complete cooperation of the Netherlands East Indies and occurrences such as described might well prove disastrous to essential cooperation. He could not be sure what attitude Batavia would assume in the matter. It might even decide to choose its own independent commander in so far as Java was concerned.

He went on to say that he personally always tried to think in terms of the broader aspects of the war. But in this instance he understood the Queen's and the Government's feeling. He would do his best to find a formula for bringing the Government into line in both the Wavell and Venezuela matters but this incident had greatly aggravated the difficulties.

[BIDDLE]

856B.20/36

*The Netherlands Minister (London) to the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

No. GA 35

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: With reference to our last conversation (January 5th) concerning Curaçao and Aruba, I wish to confirm herewith that the Netherlands Government has instructed me to request the United States Government to be good enough to consider the dispatch of American troops to assist in the defense of those islands. This is now of prime importance in view of the forthcoming withdrawal of the British troops stationed in the islands since the entry of the Kingdom of the Netherlands into the war on May 10th, 1940, for the purpose of aiding the regular Dutch garrison in the defense of those islands. The number and the composition of the necessary troops will be communicated by the Netherlands Government in due course.

The Netherlands Government points out that the British troops were present in the islands as an allied force, the costs of which were borne

¹¹ Joint announcement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Unified Command of South West Pacific area under General Wavell was made on January 3, 1942.

by the British authorities while they were placed under the command of the Dutch military commander in Curaçao acting under the supreme command of the Governor as Commander in Chief. The United States presently being an associate in the war against the Axis powers, the Netherlands Government presumes that this arrangement will be maintained with regard to the American forces.

I may add that Dutch troops newly trained in Curaçao will be assigned a task in the defense in addition to the regular garrison.

The Netherlands Government suggests that the arrangement be announced by the White House. In the opinion of the Netherlands Government the communiqué should clearly point out that the American aid is of a temporary nature, necessitated solely by the allied and associated interests. Moreover, my Government wishes to point out that all interpretation or comments should steer clear of using the word "occupation" which apart from being untrue, is an all too welcome weapon in the hands of enemy propaganda.

Believe me [etc.]

A. LOUDON

856B.20/21 : Telegram

*The Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 6, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received January 6—6:20 p. m.]

Netherlands Series No. 3. My 2, January 5, 8 p. m. In a conversation this afternoon, Foreign Minister Van Kleffens fully reflected the frame of mind conveyed in my telegram of yesterday. He was if anything more categorical than Dr. Gerbrandy had been. First of all, he said he desired to state with regard to a possible invitation to Venezuela to send a three man military mission to Curaçao that there was no such word as "muvt" [*must?*] in the Dutch dictionary.

Apart from this he wished to say that pending the adjustment of the arrangements connected with the setting up of the staff in the Pacific under General Wavell, the Government here should not entertain any suggestion whatever regarding Venezuelan mission to Curaçao. He added that the revision which had been recommended by the Netherlands Government were regarded as a minimum and it considered our acceptance of them as a "test of the New World."

He referred with intense emotion both to the manner in which the Wavell arrangements had been made and to their deficiencies as to substance. On the former point he spoke indignantly of the announcement of the arrangement before the Netherlands point of view had been heard. He then pointed out how prejudicial to the Government had been the noninclusion of any Dutch military personality in the arrangements. This disregarded the pivotal military position of the

Dutch Empire in the Far East. It undermined the position of the Government with its own people both in Holland and in the East Indies. And it played into the hands of those elements which were fond of accusing the Government of losing control of its empire.

Dr. Van Kleffens showed me a telegram from the Governor General at Batavia¹² which not only endorsed the point of view which the Government here had taken but went beyond this in that he insisted that not only should there be a Dutch chief of staff but that annex number 2 of the Wavell arrangements should mention the Dutch Prime Minister in the same manner as the President and the British Prime Minister. The Government here, however, has not itself insisted upon this to me.

Van Kleffens was inflexible for the better part of the 2-hour conversation regarding Venezuelan military mission for Curaçao but toward the end stated that after the Wavell matter was adjusted the Netherlands Government, although it had gone as far as it could by its offer mentioned in my No. 68 of December 31¹³ and although it opposed a military mission, would consider any counter suggestions that we might make.

He also said a telegram from London reported we were on point of negotiating a bilateral agreement with Venezuela which would contain a clause guaranteeing that Venezuela would take no action against Aruba or Curaçao during the war.

He emphasized that the Cabinet unanimously took the view that it could not admit that such a question should be the subject of negotiation by any third power.

Van Kleffens told me that Mr. Churchill had sent a message to Dr. Gerbrandy which was in the nature of an expression of regret over the circumstances surrounding the Wavell matter. I gather that this has had some effect in mollifying the members of the Government. It is my impression that if some soothing word could come from us this would have a beneficial effect as it was clearly intimated that the Government and the Queen herself had been deeply hurt by what they regarded as a lack of consideration for their position.

[BIDDLE]

856B.20/66a

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Netherlands Minister
(London)*

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: I have received your letter of January 5 [6] with regard to the proposed arrangements concerning Curaçao and Aruba in which were contained the desires of the Netherlands

¹² A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer.

¹³ Not printed.

Government regarding the participation of the United States in the defense of those islands.

I submitted immediately to the President your letter under acknowledgment.

The President has asked me to let you know, in the name of this Government, that the desires of the Netherlands Government, as outlined in your letter under acknowledgment, are satisfactory to the President, with one exception.

The exception to which I refer is the statement made in the first paragraph of your letter referring to the dispatch of American troops to assist in the defense of the islands where it is stated that "the number and the composition of the necessary troops will be communicated by the Netherlands Government in due course".

The President desires me to say that inasmuch as the United States is participating in the defense of the islands at the request of the Netherlands Government, in the interest of the cause in which our two countries are so deeply and vitally concerned, as well as because of the need of assuring the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Government of the United States cannot agree that the number and the composition of the troops to be sent by the United States should be determined solely by the Netherlands Government. The President desires me to say that he believes that the decision in this regard should be a matter for determination by our two Governments, as a result of consultation between them.

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

856B.20/21: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1942—8 p. m.

From the Under Secretary. Netherlands Series 5. Your Netherlands Series 3, January 6, 10 p. m., penultimate and antepenultimate paragraphs. I have spoken this afternoon with the Netherlands Minister. I have requested him to inform his Foreign Minister that the information received by the Foreign Minister, as reported in your two paragraphs above cited, is completely inaccurate. The defense agreement now under negotiation between this country and Venezuela will contain no reference whatever to Aruba or Curaçao. This Government has never had the slightest intention of making any such reference to the Netherlands West Indies in any agreement with Venezuela. What I previously stated to the Netherlands Minister was that it would surely be clear to the Netherlands Government that the proposed defense agreement between Venezuela and the United States would offer the best possible safeguard to the Netherlands Government that

Venezuela during the period of the war would undertake no steps regarding the Netherlands West Indies which could possibly create any concern on the part of the Netherlands Government.

The Netherlands Minister informs me that he understood this fully and has reported to his Government in the exact sense above indicated.

Please make this point absolutely clear as soon as possible. [Welles.]
HULL

856B.20/25 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Aruba (Standish) to the Secretary of State

ARUBA, January 12, 1942—7 p. m.
[Received January 13—1:46 a. m.]

15. A detachment Air Corps landed 10 a. m. today without incident. Dutch and British cooperated fully.

STANDISH

856B.20/68

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1942.

Baron van Boetzelaer¹⁴ came in to see me today at his request.

In the absence of the Minister he wished to answer my query of the other day relating to the sending of 2500 men to the Dutch West Indies. The Baron recalled that this Government had "consulted" the Netherlands Government under the arrangement outlined in Mr. Welles' letter to the Minister, setting out the President's understanding of the arrangements relating to American forces in the Dutch West Indies.

Baron van Boetzelaer said that they had received word from London. He handed me the attached memorandum¹⁵ which recited "minimum needs" for Curaçao and Aruba as certain equipment for both of these islands, and 750 infantrymen for Aruba. He pointed out that the Netherlands Government felt that the infantry requirements in Curaçao could be taken care of by the Netherlands infantry.

I asked whether we could take it that this was an assent to the sending of the 2500 men. He answered he thought not because, as he gathered, there were not sufficient accommodations on Aruba for more than 750 men and it was hoped we might send this number forward now and other contingents later as things worked out.

It developed that there was no one here who knew more about the military situation than he did so that a proposal that the military

¹⁴ Counselor of the Netherlands Legation.

¹⁵ Not printed.

people discuss it with the War Department seemed fruitless. He wanted to know whether they could not move at the earliest possible moment.

I said if we had been able to get an agreement early enough they would have moved last Saturday—that I was not sure whether all arrangements had been kept standing or not. My thought was that if the expedition had already been arranged, the best thing to do would be to send it along down, let 750 infantrymen land, land technical equipment and work out the balance of the landing force as circumstances might arise; but before making a definite statement I should have to consult the War Department. Baron van Boetzelaer seemed agreeable to this line of attack.

He then discussed briefly the question of announcement. He hoped, by discussion with the correspondents ahead of time, to avoid the use of the word "occupation" which had caused such trouble at the time of the Surinam landing.

I said that that announcement and the publicity attendant on it, if I recalled correctly, was prior to the Pearl Harbor attack; that at present I thought there would probably be no such difficulty. My best judgment would be no announcement if it could be avoided. If anything were said, I suggested that a simple announcement that the military forces in the Dutch West Indies had been reinforced with American contingents might be adequate.

Baron van Boetzelaer hoped that either at the White House or elsewhere I could calm down the publicity and particularly anything which might indicate that there was an "occupation". I said I would do the best I could about this.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

856B.20/39

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (Van Kleffens) to the American Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) ¹⁶

No. 435 G. A.

LONDON, 20 January, 1942.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: On the 15th December you were good enough to leave me an *Aide-Mémoire* ¹⁷ stating that the United States Government requests certain privileges and facilities from the Netherlands Government with respect to Curaçao, in connection with urgent requirements for the defence of the Western Hemisphere.

Your Excellency stated in this *Aide-Mémoire* that the United States Government requested similar privileges and facilities from the Brit-

¹⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile in his despatch No. 29, January 20; received January 30.

¹⁷ Not printed.

ish Government with respect to British possessions in the Western Hemisphere.

The privileges and facilities which the United States Government had in mind were as follows:

(a) Permission to fly over and land at Curaçao without limitation as to the number or type of plane and personnel and armament carried. There would not be the usual notification through diplomatic or military channels but only such notification as is required for technical reasons, probably direct to the airport involved. Emergency cases or military necessity might preclude the possibility of even this notification.

(b) Permission to use local airports together with their facilities such as services, installations, repair shops, radio and telephone.

(c) The privilege of stationing, if necessary, small detachments of Air Corps personnel (ordinarily seven non-commissioned officers and eight privates) at local fields for the purpose of facilitating the servicing and movement of aircraft.

(d) Permission for the unrestricted circulation of military personnel, uniformed and armed or otherwise, as may be necessary in connection with servicing of aircraft sheltering and provisioning personnel and sending and receiving necessary communications. This would include permission for the use of roads adjacent to airports and such arrangements for the sheltering and provisioning of personnel at the United States Government's expense as may be necessary when flights are required to stop at any airport.

(e) Permission to undertake such photography from the air as may be necessary from a technical point of view or as may be desirable for the compilation of air navigation charts.

I understand that the above privileges and facilities are requested only for the duration of the war and will apply solely to military and naval aircraft of the United States.

In reply I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Netherlands Government are willing to grant the desired privileges and facilities with respect to Curaçao.

I have [etc.]

for the Minister,
W. L. F. BYLANDT

856B.20/32 : Telegram

The Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 23, 1942—1 a. m.

[Received 5:30 a. m.]

Netherlands Series 13. Referring to Minister Loudon's January 21 conference at the Department¹⁸ in presence of certain General

¹⁸ Memorandum of conversation not printed. The Army's estimate of the force to be sent to Curaçao and Aruba was about 2,500 officers and men, the great majority being technical troops, etc., only about 900 being purely infantry. (856 B. 20/72)

Staff officers, Netherlands Prime Minister Gerbrandy wishes me to state that the suggestions the latter made on that occasion concerning the composition of forces for Curaçao and Aruba are acceptable to his Government.

[BIDDLE]

856B.20/32 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1942—7 p. m.

Netherlands Series No. 7. Your 13, January 23.

1. Please thank the Prime Minister for his Government's prompt and favorable reply to our suggestions regarding the composition of the force to be sent to Curaçao and Aruba. The War Department desires to send a small advance party to the islands immediately to make the necessary preliminary arrangements for the main body which is expected to arrive in approximately a fortnight. We hope that the Netherlands Government will dispatch the necessary instructions to the local authorities as soon as possible. Please report on this point as soon as possible.

2. No publicity regarding the forces is contemplated. If any announcement has to be made however after the arrival of the troops it would be confined to a brief statement to the effect that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Netherlands had agreed to the dispatch of the United States forces to cooperate with Netherlands forces, under the general supervision of the Governor of Curaçao, in the defense of the islands and that the forces would be withdrawn upon the termination of the emergency.

3. The necessity of meeting a very real danger with the greatest possible speed makes it imperative that we take this defense measure prior to reaching a final agreement with the Netherlands Government regarding Venezuelan participation. We continue however to consider a Netherlands invitation to Venezuela to send a military mission to Curaçao to be of fundamental importance. The Venezuelan oil industry and the refineries of Curaçao and Aruba are indispensable complements of one another. The Venezuelan Government shares therefore with the Netherlands Government and the Government of the United States a legitimate interest in the security of the Curaçao area from enemy attack and occupation.

In this connection the Venezuelan Foreign Minister has informed us that his Government would feel deeply chagrined if it were not put on exactly the same level as that accorded Brazil in the case of Surinam.

Please again discuss this matter with the Prime Minister and in your discretion with Her Majesty the Queen stressing our conviction that the extension of an invitation to Venezuela in the terms above mentioned would not only tend to allay any possible friction between the Netherlands and Venezuela with regard to Curaçao but would be an outstanding and statesmanlike contribution by the Netherlands Government to that stability and security of the Caribbean area generally in which the Netherlands has no small interest.

4. For your information the following is the substance of a telegram which is being sent to Ambassador Corrigan at Caracas:

[Here follows substance of telegram No. 55 *bis*, January 24, 9 p. m., printed *infra*.]

HULL

856B.20/33a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan).

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1942—9 p. m.

55 bis. You are requested to seek an immediate audience with President Medina to inform him confidentially of the following. You should tell him that Ambassador Escalante, with whom Mr. Welles has previously discussed this matter, is being informed today in the same sense, and that the Under Secretary has furnished the background to Dr. Parra-Pérez¹⁹ at Rio de Janeiro:

In accordance with the frank and friendly relations which exist between our two Governments and their association in the war against Axis aggression, you have been instructed to inform President Medina of the discussions which have been in progress between the United States and Netherlands Governments. The United States has agreed to assist in the protection of the vital oil refineries in Curaçao and Aruba which, owing to the unceasing demands on the valiant Netherlands forces in the Far East, the Netherlands Government finds it difficult to garrison in sufficient strength to assure the absolute security of these installations. The United States Government, fully sharing the view of the Venezuelan Government as expressed in a note of July 3, 1940 addressed to me by the Venezuelan Ambassador²⁰ that these refineries are an indispensable complement to the Venezuelan oil industry, and recognizing the critical importance to the United Nations' war effort of the oil in question, has agreed at the invitation of the Netherlands Government to send a contingent of its armed forces to

¹⁹ Caracciolo Parra-Pérez, Venezuelan Minister for Foreign Affairs, attending meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio de Janeiro.

²⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. v, p. 210.

those places. The United States forces will be under the general supervision of the Netherlands Civil Governor and will be withdrawn upon the termination of the emergency.

The United States has taken this step as a belligerent to meet a very real danger, a danger which has made it imperative to act with the greatest secrecy and urgency. Both in acceding to the Netherlands request for assistance and throughout the discussions, this Government has kept before the Netherlands Government the legitimate interest of the Venezuelan Government in this matter. This Government has expressed to the Netherlands Government the firm belief that the precedent followed in the case of Brazil in connection with the defense measures which were taken in Surinam is fully applicable to this case. However, the factors of time, secrecy and speed may render it essential to take defense measures prior to the final clarification of Venezuelan participation. It is the Department's confident belief that President Medina will appreciate these circumstances, as well as the very great necessity for secrecy.

Dispositions required by these circumstances would be, in any event, without prejudice to the position of Venezuela in the discussions.

(Repeated to Amdelgat, Rio for Undersecretary.)

HULL

856B.20/40a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Curaçao (Huddleston)

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1942—6 p. m.

11. 1. The United States at the invitation of the Netherlands Government has agreed to send a contingent of its armed forces under the command of Col. Bullard to cooperate with the Netherlands forces in the protection of the vital oil refineries in Curaçao and Aruba which islands, owing to the unceasing demands on the Netherlands forces in the Far East, the Netherlands Government finds it difficult to garrison in sufficient strength to assure the absolute security of these installations. The United States forces will be under the general supervision of the Netherlands Governor and will be withdrawn upon the termination of the emergency. No interference with the local civil administration will take place. Appropriate instructions have been or are being sent to the Government of Curaçao by the Netherlands Government in London.

2. A small advance party is expected to arrive at Curaçao Wednesday, January 28, to make preliminary housing and other arrangements for the main body which will be dispatched later. You are requested to assist the advance party in so far as necessary in its discussions with

the Netherlands civil and military authorities and with the British military authorities.

3. Military arrangements should be left solely to the determination of the commanding officer of the United States forces who is charged with the responsibility for the security of those forces and for the successful accomplishment of their mission and who, in the discharge of these responsibilities, may engage in direct conversations with the local military and civil officers. He has been authorized to show you his instructions and you are directed to assist him in every proper way.

4. Political matters are, of course, solely within your province as the political representative on the spot of the Department of State and the United States Government. In any representations which you may make to the local authorities which affect the security of our forces and their relations with the local officials, troops and population, you should, however, act in close consultation with the United States commanding officer. We anticipate that most, if not all, of the problems which will arise can be worked out on the spot but if there should be any serious divergence in opinion between you and the commanding officer, you should report promptly by telegraph and request instructions.

5. It is desired that no publicity be given to the foregoing unless and until agreed upon between the United States Government and the Netherlands Government in London. Further instructions on this point will be sent to you when occasion arises.

6. Repeat to Vice Consul at Aruba.

HULL

856B.20/34 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan) to the Secretary of State

CARACAS, January 26, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 9:16 p. m.]

49. Department's No. 55[bis] January 24, 9 p. m. I talked with the President last night and again this morning. Appreciating the essential motivating factors of time, secrecy and speed, he has no objection to the defense measures already taken but emphatically affirms Venezuela's primary interest in the matter as expressed in the note of July 3, 1940.²¹ He informed me that a definition of Venezuela's position and participation will be formulated at once and made clear in an official communication.

Repeated to Amdelegat, Rio, for Under Secretary.

CORRIGAN

²¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. v, p. 210.

856B.20/35 : Telegram

The Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 26, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

Netherlands Series 16. Your January 24 and my 15, January 26, noon.²² In my conversation this morning with Gerbrandy, Michiels and Prince Bernhard, I brought to their attention the considerations embodied in your telegram regarding the despatch of a Venezuelan military mission to Curaçao.

Foreign Minister Michiels,^{22a} acting as spokesman for the group, said he was astonished that we should bring up this question again, for the Government felt it had made clear its stand, which it was determined to maintain. Indeed, he added, if we were to press the matter it would only give rise to bad feeling. On renewed efforts to explain the vital need of satisfactory Venezuelan participation, he replied that it was the same old argument and he could only say that his Government would continue to maintain the same old stand. There was no use to bring it up again. It was advisable to drop it.

We had, he said, been given a loophole by the suggestion for a Military Aide for the Consul (reported in my No. 68 December 31, 9 p. m.²³). This had been done in an effort to meet us part way and not because of the Government's own wishes. It was unwilling to look to Venezuela for any assistance.

Prince Bernhard confirmed to me that the Queen shared the views which had been expressed by Dr. Michiels.

I would add that the opposition to Venezuelan participation is so deep seated that the members of the Netherlands Government bristle whenever this subject is touched on and that its mere mention literally deprives them of their composure.

[BIDDLE]

856B.20/74

The Venezuelan Ambassador (Escalante) to the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM

[Translation]

No. 478

Referring to the interview which the Ambassador of Venezuela had four days ago with the Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, relative to the action contemplated to preserve the security of the Dutch islands of Curaçao and Aruba, the Ambassador

²² Latter not printed.^{22a} Michiels van Verduynen, presumably Acting Foreign Minister.²³ Not printed.

of Venezuela has received instructions from his Government to advise His Excellency the Secretary of State as follows:

The Ambassador of the United States of America in Caracas had, on the 26th instant, an interview with the President of the Republic, General Medina, and communicated to him in confidence instructions received from the Department of State with regard to the negotiations between the American and Dutch Governments respecting the dispatch of a contingent of American armed forces to Curaçao and Aruba, in order to protect the oil refineries on the two islands.

According to the Department of State, the dispatch of the said contingent was agreed upon at the request of the Government of Holland; that the forces of occupation will be under the general authority of the Dutch Civil Governor and will be withdrawn at the conclusion of the emergency; and that the United States has taken this measure as a belligerent country in order to meet real dangers which oblige them to proceed with the greatest secrecy and haste.

The Venezuelan Government observes in this connection that Venezuela has vital political and economic interests, deriving especially from its geographical position and the oil industry, in the fate which may befall Curaçao and Aruba. So the Department of State was informed on various occasions, especially in July, 1940,²⁴ through the medium of the Ambassador, Dr. Escalante. For this reason the Government of Venezuela considers that any measure relative to the defense, protection and administration of those colonies must be discussed and adopted in concurrence with Venezuela, giving the latter the opportunity to intervene, whether in the form provided for in the Act of Habana, or through an understanding between the parties.

The telegram from the Department of State for the American Ambassador,²⁵ communicated by the latter to the President of the Republic, states that neither in consenting to the request formulated by Holland nor in its discussions with the Dutch Government has the American Government at any time disregarded the legitimate interest of Venezuela in this matter; that the precedent in the case of Brazil with regard to the measures of defense adopted in Surinam is entirely applicable to the present case; but that, nevertheless, factors of time, secrecy, and speed may require measures of defense before Venezuelan participation is finally clarified.

General Medina, President of the Republic, considers incompatible with the interests of the country the unilateral adoption of the measure announced by the American Government, without the participation of Venezuela; and, as a result, has issued instructions to the Am-

²⁴ See note of July 3, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. v, p. 210.

²⁵ Telegram No. 55 bis, January 24, 9 p. m., p. 59.

bassador, Dr. Escalante, to advise the Department of State of the suitability of a prior and formal agreement of the two Governments, to the end that Venezuela may have, in the case of Curaçao and Aruba, the same participation as Brazil in the case of Surinam, and for the adoption of the procedure of establishing a coordinating mission to exchange information and to concert upon the other measures of security which must be taken jointly by Venezuela, the United States, and the Netherlands.

This agreement is indispensable, both to protect the position of Venezuela, clearly defined in previous conversations and discussions on the matter, and for the defense of its legitimate interests.

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1942.

856B.20/36 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan)

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1942—7 p. m.

58. Your 53, January 27, 2 p. m.²⁶ Please inform the Acting Foreign Minister and the President in confidence that the Netherlands Foreign Minister arrives in Washington on January 29 or 30 and that the whole matter of Venezuelan participation in defense measures imperatively necessary in Curaçao and Aruba will be discussed with him by the highest authorities here. Please urge upon President Medina particularly the extreme importance of Venezuela's reserving any statement, especially a public statement, of her position in this matter pending the outcome of these conversations.

HULL

856B.20/35 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1942—7 p. m.

Netherlands Series No. 8. Your no. 16, January 26. The Venezuelan Government takes the view that it is entitled at least to the participation given Brazil in Surinam and points out, among other considerations, that Curaçao and Aruba live on Venezuelan oil. It has even been indicated that there might be a serious dispute with the United States if our troops are moved to Curaçao without prior agreement with Venezuela and the Government has stated that action by the United States without Venezuelan participation would be "incompatible" with Venezuelan interests.

²⁶ Not printed; the Ambassador reported the receipt of a memorandum similar to the one presented by the Venezuelan Ambassador in Washington, *supra*.

Accordingly, I have suggested to the War Department that the troop movement be postponed until the matter has been straightened out.

I fully recognize that the intransigence of the Netherlands Government in this matter follows not only from its deep-seated distrust of Venezuelan motives with respect to Curaçao, which we believe are, of course, unwarranted, but from the Government's irritation over its exclusion from full representation in the Far Eastern Supreme Command arrangements and possibly in the shipping pool and munitions pool arrangements.

I would welcome your suggestions as to any concessions which might be made to the Netherlands Government in matters other than Curaçao which might tend to bring about a change in its point of view and which we might discuss with van Kleffens who is expected tomorrow. I hardly need point out the unfortunate effect upon the successful conduct of the war in which the Netherlands and the United States are jointly embarked, should the Netherlands Government persist in its attitude towards Venezuela which to the best of its ability has joined in resistance to our common enemies.

HULL

856B.20/37: Telegram

*The Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 29, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received January 29—7:10 p. m.]

Netherlands Series 17. Your 8, January 28, 7 p. m. I conveyed substance of your message to Gerbrandy this afternoon.

He reiterated that entire Government was in accord with the firm stand against inviting a Venezuelan Mission to Curaçao and that the Queen shared their views. But in view of position taken by Venezuelan Government, he would see whether he could do anything in the matter. He was, he said, not optimistic.

As regards possible concessions in matters other than Curaçao which might bring about a change in the Netherlands Government's point of view and which you might discuss with Van Kleffens, I am at this time aware of no concession which would be likely to induce the Government to alter its position.

I feel in fact that, if the strategic position permits, maintenance for a time of the step that you have already suggested to the War Department, namely a postponement of the despatch of troops to Curaçao pending settlement of Venezuela's participation, coupled with explanations to Van Kleffens of the effect that the refusal to permit a mission

is having on vital defense measures, is more calculated to sway the Dutch mind than an effort to link the problem with concessions in other fields. To leave them with a sense of the necessity for them to devise some scheme to remove the impasse that their refusal has created seems to me the procedure that is more likely to be effective.

I have sought for some time to feel out whether any formula might be worked out here but have been unable to discover a useful clue. On one occasion, Van Kleffens in a moment of heat asked: Why should not the Dutch just as well be invited to send a military mission to Venezuela? This made me believe that some reciprocal arrangement might be worked out but in probing the idea I found that it was a mere passing remark which he was unwilling to follow up.

While I do not altogether discard the view that it may be possible to discover some concession which would have an influence, I feel strongly that in that case the initiative should come from them.

[BIDDLE]

856B.20/38: Telegram

The Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan) to the Secretary of State

CARACAS, January 29, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received January 30—1:52 a. m.]

63. Department's No. 58, January 28, 7 p. m. President Medina informed me this evening of his deep concern about the political reaction here if it were to become known that such important steps had been taken without Venezuelan participation. The news of the presence of American troops in Aruba and Curaçao may break at any moment. He desires to work in complete harmony with us but considers that Venezuela's interest is primary and that a formula for participation should be found within the next 48 hours.

He told me that immediate Venezuelan participation if invited would consist in a coordinating commission of possibly two or three officers and one or two civilians. In view of possible serious political complications, I recommend that desired participation be initiated without delay.

CORRIGAN

856B.20/77

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1942.

You are right about the wounded feelings of the Dutch.

I took the position when speaking with Dr. Loudon last week that I am much put-out by the delays of his Government in London.

After all, this is war and delays in defense may be very costly.

It took three months of perfectly childish negotiations before we got troops to protect the Bauxite Mines in Surinam. They might have been destroyed by a German aircraft carrier in the meantime.

It has taken us well over a month to get troops to Curaçao and Aruba. They are not protected today and their absolutely essential high octane gas refineries might be destroyed by a German submarine tomorrow.

Frankly, I cannot delay the troops and I think you might tell the Venezuelan Ambassador that I am taking sole responsibility for this move, as it is in the interest of Venezuela just as much as it is in our interest. You might tell him that if the refineries were destroyed the output of Venezuelan oil would automatically nearly stop.

Here is a solution. When we get our troops there, the Commanding Officer can very easily arrange to invite two or three Venezuelans as his personal guests. Venezuela will certainly be kept fully in touch with the entire situation, and this is no time to quibble when a critical phase of the conduct of the war is involved.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

856B.20/79

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1942.

By direction of the Secretary I asked Dr. Escalante to come in and see me this morning. He came in at 11:30.

I referred to the subject of our previous conversation relating to the possibility of American forces assisting in the defense of Curaçao and Aruba.

I said that the situation there had been the subject of careful and day to day study by officers of our Government and we had yesterday received a letter from the Secretary of War. I then read to him those portions of Secretary Stimson's letter of January 29th²⁷ addressed to Secretary Hull which set out the imminent danger of attack on Curaçao and Aruba, and the immediate need for further defense. I said likewise that the President had had the matter in mind and had come to the same conclusion.

We were still engaged in negotiations with the Dutch. These had not been brought, as yet, to a successful termination and I could not say whether they would be, though I hoped that ultimately an arrangement might be worked out. In the case of the defense of Surinam,

²⁷ Not printed.

these negotiations had been quite lengthy. We had steadily represented the interest of Venezuela in the matter, the intimate connection between Venezuela and the islands, and the need for a cooperative arrangement like that which had been worked out with respect of Brazil.

But, I said, I considered that the paramount duty of the United States and, indeed of all of us, was to assure the defense of the islands in the interest of Venezuela, of the United States, and of the hemisphere in general. Irrespective of whether the negotiations had terminated, we felt bound both under the Act of Habana²⁸ and under the general declarations of continental defense, to take such action as was needed to assure defense.

I then referred to the attitude taken by his Government, reflected in the recent note on the subject handed to us by the Venezuelan Government, and said that a similar attitude had been taken by President Medina in his conversation with Ambassador Corrigan. We fully realized the difficulties arising in terms of public opinion if something had to be done in advance of an agreement. But I said that public opinion in both of our countries would forgive us for having acted in advance of an agreement when it would never forgive us for leaving a danger point undefended.

I said that I wanted to submit these considerations frankly to the Ambassador because I considered that movements might be necessary very soon, and I asked whether he had any suggestions.

Dr. Escalante, in his usual courteous and reserved way, heard me out. He then said that he too fully realized the point of imminent danger as set out by the Secretary of War. He too considered that defense was a paramount necessity. He could not, however, escape the fact that public opinion in Venezuela would probably regard the failure of the Netherlands to agree to participation as a direct slap at Venezuela and as a blow to Venezuelan prestige. The Venezuelan opinion would probably be excited against the Dutch and he considered it was bad business for Holland. He would, however, cable his Government. He advised that we instruct Ambassador Corrigan to present the urgency of the matter again directly to the Venezuelan Government, and therefore he would not undertake to cable suggestions for a solution but merely that he had this conversation, that we were keeping in close touch with Venezuela, that the need was urgent, and that Ambassador Corrigan would discuss more specific suggestions.

I said that in connection with a solution, various ideas had occurred to us which could be explored. In any event, we proposed to maintain closest contact with the Venezuelan Government in connection with this operation. This we could do by continuing the discussions we

²⁸ Signed July 30, 1940; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 199, or 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 2491.

were now having so that at no point should the Venezuelan Government be uninformed. Again, it might be possible that certain Venezuelan officers could be placed in direct communication with our own officers on the ground—the place might be a matter of determination. Possibly this might best be done not in the islands of Curaçao and Aruba but at the real center of things, namely, the headquarters of the Caribbean command.

Other solutions might suggest themselves as, for example, a group of American officers designed to maintain liaison with Venezuelan officers at some nearby point.

I emphasized that we considered that we were defending the islands and were not in the slightest endeavoring to infringe on the sovereignty of Curaçao and Aruba and that we had, of course, assumed that Venezuela had an exactly similar motive. To that end, it was understood that the troops should be at least nominally under command of the Dutch authorities while in Curaçao and Aruba, though naturally their action would be chiefly determined by the necessity of the European command for defense, and not by purely local considerations.

I concluded by saying that I wished to have no misunderstanding whatever and make it entirely clear, that in view of the situation we considered that we might have to take very prompt action, irrespective of whether the negotiations were finished. I hoped that the Ambassador would understand this, not that we desired to create a *fait accompli* but that defense came first.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

856B.20/38 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan)

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1942—9 p. m.

76. Your 63, January 29, 9 p. m. Please see President Medina immediately and inform him that as he knows this Government has at all times during the discussions constantly kept before the Netherlands Government the question of Venezuela's participation and has delayed the sending of troops to Curaçao in deference to President Medina's views. In the meantime however developments in the strategic situation, including the reported presence of a German submarine in the Gulf of Mexico, make imperative the very early despatch of protective forces to guard against a probable attack in the near future. You may assure President Medina that the President and I will continue to press for a formula of Venezuelan participation along the lines described by President Medina in your telegram under reference.

The President desires you to deliver to President Medina the following personal and confidential message from him:

"I know that you will understand that the measures to be taken to safeguard the refineries at Curaçao and Aruba are dictated by the highest military necessity. Curaçao and Aruba are not protected today, and their absolutely essential oil refineries might be destroyed tomorrow by enemy action. If the refineries were destroyed the shipment of Venezuelan oil would practically cease almost immediately with the most serious consequences to the successful conduct of the war. I have in mind in this connection the position of the Venezuelan Government which regards the refineries as the essential complement of the Venezuelan oil fields. Frankly however in view of the compelling necessity to complete the defense of the Caribbean area I cannot further delay the dispatch of our troops to those islands and therefore I am taking the sole responsibility for their immediate movement. I am confident that you, as a military man, will understand the exigencies of the situation and the necessity for speed and secrecy."

You may inform President Medina in conclusion that the President's views along these lines were communicated at the President's request to Ambassador Escalante on January 30, and that we propose to maintain the closest possible contact with the Venezuelan Government in this matter.

HULL

856B.20/40: Telegram

The Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan) to the Secretary of State

CARACAS, February 1, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 10:52 p. m.]

69. My 63, January 29, 9 p. m. Just before making a radio address to the nation last evening the President called me to his residence for reasons which he described as "lamentable". He told me he had received a message from Ambassador Escalante advising him of the stubborn opposition of the Dutch Government to Venezuelan participation in the Dutch island matter. He added that while Venezuela had no commitments with the Dutch Government it had an agreement with us on the subject and that if Dutch opposition persists he will consider reprisal measures. He indicated such measures might take form of determining where outflow of Venezuelan oil should go and spoke of Venezuelan withdrawal from emergency committee established under Habana Conference of 1940.²⁹ He feels that in such a Western Hemisphere question United States should fully support Venezuela against uncooperative attitude of a European power. While manifestly indignant he said he would do nothing publicly for the present.

²⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. v, pp. 180 ff.

He stated that he has no desire to impugn Dutch sovereignty but feels strongly that if an European Government accepts American help in this hemisphere it should also accept the terms of previous agreements between American states and should not object to steps taken in conformity with such agreements. The seriousness of the matter is indicated by the fact that he told me he had asked Escalante to seek an audience with President Roosevelt about it. The Department's 76³⁰ just decoded. I will see President Medina this evening but am positive that his position will remain as described above.

He is fully informed and not concerned about our troop movements but he is vitally concerned about Venezuela not being asked to participate.

CORRIGAN

856B.20/41 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan) to the Secretary of State

CARACAS, February 2, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 5 : 37 p. m.]

72. Department's 76, January 31, 9 p. m. Following Department's instruction I saw President Medina last night. He was mollified by the President's personal message and the assurance given. He expects therefore that the formula for Venezuelan participation will be obtained before he has to face publicity.

CORRIGAN

856B.20/41 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan)

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1942—5 p. m.

79. Your 69, February 1, 2 p. m., and your 72, February 2, 2 p. m. The Venezuelan Ambassador has informed the Department that President Medina feels that a failure to arrange for Venezuelan participation prior to the landing of our troops would oblige Venezuela to withdraw her delegate from the committee constituted under the Act of Habana. The Ambassador further stated that if Venezuela is confronted with a *fait accompli*, the matter would be very difficult to arrange from the Venezuelan side.

I have discussed this matter with the Netherlands Foreign Minister and have urged his assent to Venezuelan participation.

I think it most important for you to stress that the present case is not one of those contemplated under the Act or Convention of Ha-

³⁰ January 31, 9 p. m., *supra*.

bana ³¹ since there is involved no "barter of territory or change of sovereignty". Nevertheless, earnestly desiring to foster the spirit of inter-American cooperation implicit in the Act and Convention of Habana and in the whole framework of inter-American agreements, as well as to assure recognition of Venezuela's manifest interest in the defense of these islands, I have urged upon the Netherlands Government and will continue to urge the propriety of Venezuelan participation, in the form set forth by President Medina. I need not point out that the Netherlands Government is not a party to any agreement making mandatory such participation or in any way affecting the completeness of Netherlands sovereignty over the islands in question.

You will be kept fully advised of all developments in this matter.

HULL

856B.20/41a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Venezuela (Corrigan)

[WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1942—4 p. m.

93. From the Under Secretary. Both the Secretary of State and I have discussed with the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Dr. Van Kleffens, the question of Venezuelan participation in the operations to take place in Curaçao and Aruba.

As a result of these conversations Dr. Van Kleffens informed me the day before yesterday that he would be willing to recommend to his Government, first, that the Netherlands Government invite the Government of Venezuela to participate in a manner identic with that employed in the case of the Dutch invitation to Brazil regarding Surinam and, second, that there would be unwritten "gentlemen's agreements" between the Netherlands and Venezuela, providing (a) that the Venezuelan mission to the islands would not remain permanently in the islands but would go back and forth from time to time, and (b) that the Venezuelan Government would agree that an officer of the Dutch forces in the islands would be permitted to proceed occasionally to Caracas or to other points within Venezuela in order to give to, or receive from, Venezuelan officials intelligence information of interest to the two countries.

I immediately reported my conversation to Ambassador Escalante who expressed his entire satisfaction with the solution suggested. At my request he then visited the Dutch Foreign Minister and an agreement was reached between the two of them.

Escalante has now reported this to his Government and Van Kleffens has forwarded his recommendations to his Government which will, of course, be approved.

³¹ The Convention of Habana was signed July 30, 1940; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 977, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1273.

Escalante has requested that you inform the Foreign Office confidentially of this message. [Welles.]

HULL

856B.20/64

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1942.

Dr. Van Kleffens and I talked last night, February 6th, of the Venezuelan settlement. He said that he had already advised Dr. Escalante of the terms of the settlement. He had likewise sent an airmail despatch to the Netherlands Minister at Rio directing him to forward to the Dutch Minister at Caracas copies of the relevant documents covering the participation of Brazil in the sending of American troops to Surinam. He had directed the Netherlands Minister at Caracas to be guided so far as possible by the principles and plan embodied in the documents covering Brazilian participation.

He requested that we cable Corrigan advising him that Van Kleffens had done this, and requesting him to maintain close contact with his Netherlands colleague there, and likewise to explain to the Venezuelan Government that if there were any delay in working out details, it was due merely to the time needed for the documents to reach Caracas from Rio.

I said I would arrange to have this done.

Dr. Van Kleffens said that as soon as he had been able thoroughly to explain to his Government that there was no quality of permanence in the Venezuelan participation, the difficulties had disappeared.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

856B.20/80

The Venezuelan Ambassador (Escalante) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

No. 757

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1942.

SIR: As Your Excellency knows, the undersigned has made a number of oral representations to the Department of State for the purpose of calling attention to the anxiety of the Government of Venezuela with respect to the contemplated unilateral action of the Government of the United States in defense of Curaçao and Aruba, in apparent forgetfulness of the agreement between the two Governments that they would act jointly if any danger threatened there during the present emergency period—an understanding which was initiated in con-

versations held during the middle of July 1940 between Under Secretary of State Welles and the Ambassador of Venezuela and which was orally confirmed to the latter by the said Mr. Welles on December 24, 1941.³²

The undersigned transmitted to his Government the oral explanations given him by Mr. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, with regard to the imminence of North American action in Curaçao and Aruba and to the reasons which rendered it necessary; and on Mr. Welles' return from Rio de Janeiro, the Ambassador had an interview with him in which he reiterated the Venezuelan Government's point of view. As a consequence of the said interview, Mr. Welles informed Dr. Escalante on the 5th instant that he had held a conversation with His Excellency E. N. van Kleffens, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, at the time in Washington, the result of which could be summed up in the following points:

1. The Government of the Netherlands was disposed to agree that, in the present emergency in Curaçao and Aruba, an agreement should be effected between the United States, the Netherlands and Venezuela, similar to that concluded between the Governments of the two first mentioned countries and Brazil at the time of the occupation of Surinam by North American troops.

2. The Netherlands Government agreed that officials of the Government of Venezuela, either military or civilian and numbering two, three, four or five, should go to Curaçao and Aruba during the emergency period, not to reside there temporarily, but going on periodic visits, for the purpose of exchanging with the Netherlands authorities data which might be considered useful for the defense of that area.

3. The Government of the Netherlands, in turn, required the Government of Venezuela to agree to periodic visits to Caracas of one or more Netherland officials, for the same purpose.

Mr. Welles further informed Dr. Escalante that the Government of the United States agreed with the foregoing and that, if acceptable to the Government of Venezuela, the corresponding instructions would be duly transmitted to Ambassador Corrigan at Caracas.

On the very day of my interview with Mr. Welles, I had another interview, with His Excellency Mr. van Kleffens, who assured me that he agreed with the terms of the proposed understanding, as set forth above, adding that he would immediately request of Queen Wilhelmina's Government the necessary authorization to conclude the arrangement and that, if the aforesaid basic points were also accepted by the Venezuelan Government, he, Mr. van Kleffens, would give instructions to the Netherlands Minister in Caracas to treat with the Government of Venezuela.

Under date of the 9th instant, Mr. van Kleffens advised me that he had received authorization from his Government to conclude the agree-

³² No record of these conversations found in Department files.

ment and that, when he had been informed of the acceptance of the Government at Caracas, he would transmit the necessary instructions to the Netherlands Minister in Venezuela and, furthermore, that he had requested his Legation in Rio de Janeiro to forward to Mr. Methöfer, Netherlands Minister in Venezuela, the complete text of any documents exchanged between the Government of Brazil and the Netherlands Government in order that Mr. Methöfer might use them as a model.

I now have the honor to write to Your Excellency to advise you that, my Government having been apprised of all the foregoing, it has authorized me to inform Your Excellency and His Excellency Mr. van Kleffens that it finds the bases of agreement, as set forth above, satisfactory. The Government of Venezuela urges that when publicity is given to the measures contemplated in Curaçao and Aruba, it be stated categorically that they are being effected in agreement with Venezuela and with the cooperation of that country, in the same way as was done in mentioning the cooperation of Brazil in the case of Surinam.

While having the pleasure of informing Your Excellency of the foregoing, I venture to hope that Ambassador Corrigan will be given the necessary instructions to carry forward the agreement with my Government and that the Government of the United States will be good enough to inform the Government of Venezuela—as the Netherlands Government will do—of the terms of the arrangement in the case of Surinam.

I avail myself [etc.] DIOGENES ESCALANTE

856B.20/47a : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Missions in the Other American Republics, Except Venezuela

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1942—11 p. m.

In accordance with this Government's established policy to keep the other American Governments informed on United States measures pertaining to hemisphere defense, and the spirit of our general inter-American commitments, you are directed to inform the Government to which you are accredited as follows: The United States Government at the invitation of the Netherlands Government has dispatched armed forces to the Netherland colony of Curaçao to protect the refineries, which are of crucial importance to hemisphere defense and to the war effort of the United Nations, and are an indispensable complement to the Venezuelan oilfields. The Department understands, furthermore, that the Netherlands Government has sought from the Venezuelan Government measures of cooperation similar to those

agreed upon between the Netherlands and Brazilian Governments in the case of Surinam.

You should take pains to express to the Government to which you are accredited that the United States troops on the islands of Curaçao and Aruba have been sent for the security of the installations and to facilitate the defense of that area of the hemisphere; that our forces will be under the general supervision of the Governor of Curaçao, that their presence will in no way affect either the Netherlands civil administration or Netherlands sovereignty; and that they will be withdrawn upon the termination of the emergency. The steps in connection with the arrangement have of course been taken in secrecy for the sake of military security.

Please report any significant comment by responsible officials and the press.

The Department has released for publication in the press of Thursday morning, February 12th, a brief statement regarding this matter.³³

HULL

856B.20/80

The Secretary of State to the Venezuelan Ambassador (Escalante)

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge Your Excellency's note no. 757 of February 10, 1942 with reference to the urgent war measure taken by my Government for the security of the refineries in the Netherlands colony of Curaçao by invitation of and in agreement with the Royal Netherlands Government. I have taken note with pleasure of your observations on the agreement reached between Your Excellency and the Royal Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs now in the United States with respect to Venezuelan cooperation in the military defense measure. I have been particularly pleased to learn of the approval of the Venezuelan and Netherlands Governments of the formula for cooperation reached between Your Excellency and Mr. Van Kleffens.

With particular reference to Item 1 of your Government's arrangement with the Netherlands Government (page 2 of your note) and to the last paragraph, I am able to inform Your Excellency that instructions are being issued to the United States Ambassador at Caracas to lend his assistance, if requested by your Government, in any discussions which may be held between your Government and the Royal Netherlands Minister to Venezuela. In this connection I think it opportune to inform you that the measures of military cooperation taken by my Government in Surinam and Curaçao at the invitation of the Nether-

³³ Department of State *Bulletin*, February 14, 1942, p. 153.

lands Government have not been the subject of any written convention or agreement. I deem it furthermore expedient to observe that the stationing of United States forces in those areas is an action to meet a specific threat with a minimum disturbance to the troop dispositions of the United Nations. These troops will be withdrawn upon the termination of the emergency, and their stationing in those places in no sense affects the status of the colonies or their sovereignty.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

SUMNER WELLES

NORWAY

PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORWAY REGARDING MUTUAL AID IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION, SIGNED JULY 11, 1942

[For text of agreement and exchange of notes signed at Washington, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 262, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1565.]

MILITARY SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORWAY

[This agreement was effected by exchanges of notes signed at Washington March 31, October 6, and December 23, 1942, and January 16, 1943. For texts of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 319, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 949.]

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING REPLACEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF SHIPS LOST BY NORWAY IN THE UNITED NATIONS WAR EFFORTS

857.85/393

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Cumming)

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1942.

Shortly after the invasion of Norway by German forces in April 1940 and the establishment of the Norwegian Government in London, the Norwegian Government issued a decree bringing about governmental control and operation of the entire Norwegian merchant marine. Fortunately, only a comparatively few Norwegian merchant marine vessels found themselves in Norwegian waters and, therefore, under German control at the time of the invasion. The bulk of the merchant marine was in foreign waters and so far as is known without exception has since 1940 loyally obeyed the orders of the Norwegian Trade and Shipping Mission—the governmental agency set up for their operation. The Norwegian Trade and Shipping Mission has principal offices in London and New York and branch offices in nearly all parts of the world under United Nations control.

The entire Norwegian merchant marine under the control of the Royal Norwegian Government now established in London is engaged

in the war carrying trade for the United Nations, primarily the United States and Great Britain. Hundreds of Norwegian ships and several thousand Norwegian seamen have been lost in the service of the United States and its allies. It is worthy of note that so far as is known, not a single Norwegian vessel or master has deserted or attempted to desert the United Nations service in order to return to German-occupied Norway.

Even before the recent signature of a Lend-Lease agreement between the United States and Norway¹ and prior to the entry of the United States into the war, this Government undertook to arm at its own expense all Norwegian merchant vessels operating in war zones in the service of the United Nations.

The Norwegian merchant marine has been accorded special consideration by the United States Government, in some cases, in fact, being given greater consideration in so far as repairs, replacements, et cetera, are concerned than that accorded British merchant vessels. In this connection, please see the attached notes² exchanged between the United States and Norwegian Governments at the time the Lend-Lease agreement was signed.

In view of the importance of the Norwegian merchant marine to the war effort of the United States and the special facilities which accordingly [have] been granted it at the direction of the President, the Department of State strongly recommends that the request of the Norwegian Embassy in Washington that a general license be issued covering bunker fuels, ships stores, and spare parts for the Norwegian vessels departing from ports in the United States be granted.

857.85/9-1842

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1942.

The Norwegian Ambassador³ came in this afternoon with Mr. Acheson.⁴ He had discussed with Mr. Acheson on previous occasions the same question on the basis of Lend Lease. The situation having changed and Lend Lease no longer being involved, Mr. Acheson asked the Ambassador to take it up with me.

The Ambassador presented the thought that he had been in negotiation with the Maritime Commission and the War Shipping Adminis-

¹ For text of agreement and exchange of notes signed at Washington July 11, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 262, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1565.

² *Ibid.*

³ Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne.

⁴ Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

tration for the lease of these ten vessels ⁵ upon which he desired to put a number of Norwegian sailors who are now in this country awaiting berths on ships and who number as many as 600. He approached the subject from two different angles.

(a) He desired ten ships to be leased to him to be operated under the orders of the Norwegian Shipping Mission and the War Shipping Administration; and

(b) He wanted also to enter into the later agreement that these same vessels would be made over to Norway at the end of the war in compensation for tonnage lost in the service of the Allies.

The Ambassador did not limit the proposal to ten vessels except that he had made the specific proposal involving ten vessels. That having been decided, he would then proceed to increase the number from time to time as circumstances developed and as it was considered he might be justified in doing.

Mr. Acheson suggested that the matter had become involved with the lease by Norway to the British of all the Norwegian ships now being operated under the orders of the War Shipping Administration. There were about 200 vessels under that operation and more than 400 in the service of the British. (The figures are approximate only.)

The Norwegian Ambassador stated that it would be unacceptable to them to lease all their ships to the British, and that the linking of the two was very unsatisfactory.

I told the Ambassador that there was very little on the files of the Department on this matter and no communication from him to the Department. If he would submit a memorandum in concrete form, the Department would view it generously and would immediately proceed to take it up with the Maritime authorities and try to get some decision for him before the contingencies mentioned in his conversation which would probably transpire within ten days or two weeks.

The Ambassador said he would submit a memorandum on Monday.⁶

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

857.85/9-2242

The Norwegian Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

For some time past the Norwegian Embassy (Legation) ⁷ and the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission have called the attention of

⁵ Ten newly built vessels.

⁶ September 21.

⁷ The Norwegian Legation in the United States was raised to the rank of Embassy on May 13, 1942.

the United States authorities to the grievous losses sustained by the Norwegian Merchant Marine during the present war. These losses have been suffered in the course of participation of Norwegian ships in the common war effort of the United Nations against the aggressors. More than 300 Norwegian ships, and approximately 1600 Norwegian sailors have been lost. In order to show the extent of the contribution of Norwegian shipping to the Allied cause it may be recalled that in 1941 about 40% of all the oil and gasoline and about 30% of the food stuffs from the Western Hemisphere to Great Britain were carried in Norwegian ships.

It has been maintained by the Norwegian Ambassador and Norwegian shipping representatives in the United States that it would be not only fair, but also in the interest of the common war effort that to the greatest possible extent Norway be compensated for her losses at sea, in order that the Norwegian Merchant Marine might be enabled to continue fully that contribution for which it is peculiarly fitted by tradition and by the training and inclination of Norwegian sailors.

The fairness and reasonableness of this point of view has met with the generous understanding of the American authorities, and this attitude found expression also in the Lend Lease arrangement between the United States and Norway of July 11, 1942, in connection with which the following statement was made:

"The Government of the United States of America recognizes that the Norwegian Merchant Fleet not only constitutes an important contribution to the war effort of the United Nations but is likewise one of the principal national assets of the Royal Norwegian Government and, accordingly, that the latter Government, which is operating its Fleet for the benefit of the United Nations in the common war effort, should be assisted in replacing ships lost in the service of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Government of the United States of America will continue to review the situation with the Royal Norwegian Government with a view to assisting that Government in a program of replacement as soon as conditions permit. The two Governments agree that negotiations to this end should be commenced without delay and should be pressed to a conclusion as promptly as possible."

The President of the United States has taken a personal and active interest in this matter and in the course of discussion with the Norwegian Ambassador on April 10th and August 12th this year has favored the transfer of new American built cargo ships to the Norwegian Merchant Marine, to be manned by Norwegian crews and managed by the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission in the common United Nations' interest for the duration of the war. The mutual and expressed understanding has been that at the cessation of hostilities a way should be found to transfer such ships to Norway for title on terms which take into account both the depreciation of the ships at that time

and the sacrifices rendered by Norway and her contribution to the common victory.

In order to carry out this program partly to compensate Norway for her losses, discussions have been taking place for some months past between the Norwegian Ambassador and the Department of State and between representatives of the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission and the Maritime Commission. It has been suggested that as an initial step, for instance 10 new American ships be transferred immediately to the Norwegian flag for the duration of the war, without awaiting the conclusion of simultaneous discussions as to the terms of the definite transfer to Norwegian ownership after the war.

It has been the confident hope of the Norwegian Ambassador that these discussions might come to a definite issue at an early date. Several hundreds of Norwegian sailors and merchant marine officers, including a considerable number of highly skilled engineers trained and practiced in the handling of Diesel engines, are to-day unemployed, eagerly awaiting—most of them in New York—the opportunity to join once more those who are carrying vital supplies to our common fronts. It would seem to be a waste of highly efficient manpower to have these men, much against their inclination, remain idle longer than absolutely necessary.

The Norwegian Ambassador is leaving shortly for London to report to his Government. He would greatly appreciate if this matter of transferring, as an initial step to restitute the Norwegian Merchant Marine, 10 new American ships, preferably Diesel-motor driven vessels, to the Norwegian flag, might be consummated before his departure for London.

As stated above these discussions have now been carried on for a considerable period and the time would seem to be ripe for action in view of the urgency of the shipping problem facing the United Nations. The Norwegian Government temporarily residing in London is eagerly awaiting the outcome of the discussions carried on in Washington, and the Ambassador feels that if he could carry to London the message of the completion of the first stage of these negotiations, it would be deeply appreciated by those who are leading the fight for a free Norway in a free World.

The Norwegian Ambassador respectfully suggests that if it should be considered essential to the early determination of this question of vital importance to Norway and to the common war effort, the matter be placed before the President of the United States.

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1942.

857.85/9-2242

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*⁸

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1942.

Attached is a carbon of a memorandum from the Norwegian Embassy.⁹ I am acting on the original and am taking the matter up with the War Shipping Administration.

You will be particularly interested in the manner in which shipping between the United States and South America may be affected, and you may have some opinions to express about policy in the matter.

Briefly, the situation is that the Norwegians are requesting ten vessels newly constructed here to be delivered to them immediately to sail under the Norwegian flag and to be manned by Norwegian sailors now "on the beach" in this country; these vessels to be under the operation of the War Shipping Administration through the Norwegian Shipping Commission.

It started out to be a Lend Lease transaction. It has since lost some of that character. It now becomes complicated by the desire of the War Shipping Administration to have all the ships (about 160) of Norwegian flag, sailing under the orders of the Maritime Commission, transferred to the British to join the other (about 400) Norwegian vessels under bareboat charter to the British and sailing under the British opposite number of the War Shipping Administration.

Of the 160 ships now sailing under the orders of the War Shipping Administration, nearly one-half, or approximately 70 of them, are on the regular prewar routes occupied by the lines owning these vessels. These lines run between United States Atlantic coast ports and respectively the east coast, the Caribbean, and the west coast of S[outh] A[merica]. One of the arguments of the Norwegians is that it will disrupt the service they are rendering inter-American trade.

It is conceivable that the War Shipping Administration would replace these ships with other ships if the ships now on those routes were transferred to British management.

It is probably inconceivable that those ships would continue on those particular runs if they were transferred to British management.

The consequence of the proposal is that it may affect the trade between the United States and South America.

Because of that fact I take it that you may have some particular interest and may care to direct some particular point of view to be presented to the Maritime Commission.

⁸ Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) and the Adviser on Political Relations (Duggan).

⁹ *Supra*.

In doing this, however, you would be supporting the application of the Norwegians who have a particular desire that the vessels be *not* transferred to the British.

The President seems to have made some commitment to the Norwegian Ambassador and to have manifested some particular interest in the compensation to the Norwegians in the shape of new vessels for vessels already lost by the Norwegians in the service of the United Nations effort. Presently this compensation is disconnected from the ultimate postwar adjustment and now involves only ten vessels. However, the proposal of the Norwegians is not limited to ten vessels *in future*, and, having acquired ten vessels, they would immediately proceed to request ten more in continuation of the same program.

We are starting discussions with the War Shipping Administration, and I will be glad to have your reactions in the premises.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

857.85/9-2242

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Julian B. Foster of the Division of International Communications

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Lewis Douglas, Deputy War Shipping Administrator,
Mr. Saugstad,¹⁰
Mr. Foster.

As per Mr. Long's request, Mr. Saugstad and Mr. Foster this morning called on Mr. Lewis Douglas to discuss the Norwegian request to lease ten new vessels from the United States. Full details regarding the Norwegian interest in securing these vessels as well as the clause mentioned in the exchange of notes between the Norwegian Embassy and the Secretary of State confirming the Lend-Lease arrangement between the United States and Norway on July 11, 1942 were emphasized.

The particular clause in question reads as follows:

[Here follows clause quoted in the Norwegian Embassy's memorandum of September 22, printed on page 80.]

Mr. Douglas was emphatic in expressing his point of view that he did not feel inclined to grant the Norwegian request for new vessels at this time until a definite decision has been made on the question of whether or not all of the Norwegian ships now trading out of the Western Hemisphere shall be placed under British control. He

¹⁰ Jesse E. Saugstad, Assistant Chief of the Division of International Communications.

pointed out that he is not unsympathetic relative to the Norwegian request for new ships as soon as the other question has been decided. He said that he had turned such evidence as he has received from the Norwegians stating their side of the case over to Mr. Franz Schneider, Deputy War Shipping Administrator, for consideration. Further, he stated that he has, within the last day or so, made known personally to the President his views on these two matters. He asked that we discuss the Norwegian request immediately with Mr. Schneider. We did so and were informed that the technical group in the War Shipping Administration was going to take up the whole case with the British shipping authorities within the next day or so, and that they would then ask the Norwegian Shipping Mission in New York to send representatives to Washington to give evidence as to why the ships, in the best interest of the United Nations, should not be transferred to British control.

He also informed us that a few days ago the War Shipping Administration had ten or eleven small ships which they had been prepared to offer the Norwegians for use in the bauxite trade in the Caribbean so as to assist them in bolstering Norwegian seamen's morale by a token gesture. Before making this offer, they had consulted the British Shipping Mission to the United States. The British objected and asked that British crews be put on these ships, and this has been done.

In our discussions with Mr. Douglas, there appeared to be complete confusion in his mind as to the issues involved. We were careful to explain:

- (1) That it is not competent for the Department to take any position regarding the Norwegian request to the War Shipping Administration that they sit as a member on the War Shipping Allotment Board's regular meetings.

- (2) That the Department has taken no position on the question of the proposed transfer of the Norwegian ships operating in the Western Hemisphere to British control, in as much as no official representations have been received from the Norwegian Government.

- (3) That the Department desires to limit for the time being its discussions solely to the obligations assumed under the Lend-Lease Agreement and exchange of notes thereto of July 11, 1942, in which it was stated that "the Government of the United States of America will continue to review the situation with the Royal Norwegian Government with a view to assisting that Government in a program of ship replacement as soon as conditions permit. The two Governments agree that negotiations to this end should be commenced without delay and should be pressed to a conclusion as promptly as possible."

It was pointed out to Mr. Douglas that it is felt that the replacement problem is an obligation which must be discharged as soon as possible without regard to points brought up in statements 1 and 2. Mr. Douglas' reply was that the negotiations are now taking place and

that he would bring them to a conclusion as promptly as possible, but that he did not feel that he could separate at this time the question of new ships for the Norwegians from the question of the transfer of the Norwegian Fleet operating in the Western Hemisphere to British control. It was also brought to Mr. Douglas' attention that the question as to how the transfer of control to the British might affect our trade relations with South America would undoubtedly be a question of great interest to the Department. Mr. Douglas said that all angles which would arise, should the transfer of control take place, would be carefully considered before any definite decision is made.

It was made known to Douglas that the Norwegian Ambassador was planning to leave for London next week and would appreciate an answer on his request before his departure. Douglas said that he could not give an answer at such an early date but that he hoped the matter would be finalized in the immediate future.

857.85/10-2142

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant
Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1942.

Mr. Douglas talked to me on the telephone today and asked if the Department of State approved the transfer to Norway of some vessels to be used by Norway during the war but not to be permanently assigned to Norway.

I told Mr. Douglas that we approved of the assignment to Norway of vessels and that I hoped he could tie it in with the replacement of vessels lost. After some conversation he said that they could use some phraseology to the effect that these vessels were not permanently transferred but were to be considered as replacement for the duration of the war.

I told Mr. Douglas that that would be quite agreeable and that we felt that something should be done to indicate that it was some measure of replacement because we had committed ourselves to replacement of tonnage lost in the service of the United Nations. I explained to Mr. Douglas that the Norwegian shipping losses were differentiated from other United Nations losses by reason of the fact that Norwegian ships constituted Norway's principal national wealth and that they were in quite a different situation from most of the other nations. Mr. Douglas said that he would communicate with Mr. Lorentzen, the Norwegian shipping man. I told him that without objection I would call the Norwegian Embassy and advise them informally, which I have done.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

857.85/10-2642

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant
Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1942.

Mr. Douglas called me on the telephone. He said that he had been talking to Mr. Lorentzen of the Norwegian Shipping Mission. He was offering Mr. Lorentzen five ships for the period of the war with provisional transfer of registry. The vessels were to be from 9,000 to 11,000 tons each. However, they were not new ships. They were old ships. The Norwegians were objecting because they insisted that the tonnage to be transferred to them should be newly constructed tonnage. Mr. Douglas wanted to know if his proposed action in allocating these five old ships was in keeping with our understanding. I told him that as far as I knew there was no obligation on our part to give the Norwegians new vessels. We had obligated ourselves to transfer to them tonnage in compensation for some of their losses incurred in Allied trade.

Mr. Douglas said that was his understanding. He further said that this was simply a beginning. In the future, other vessels as it became possible would be transferred to Norwegian registry. Among them might be new vessels. That was not the subject for present consideration, however. He was happy to be assured that his interpretation of our obligation was similar to ours and said he would proceed along that line.

He added that these vessels were of diesel engine propulsion and that the Norwegian seamen were familiar with diesel engines and that was one of the inducements.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

857.85/10-2642

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant
Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1942.

Participants: Mr. J rgen Galbe, Norwegian Charg  d'Affaires,
Mr. Lorentzen of the Norwegian Shipping Mission,
Mr. Lorentzen's Secretary,
Mr. Irgens, Counselor of Norwegian Embassy,
Mr. Long.

The Norwegian Charg  d'Affaires came in with Mr. Lorentzen, his Secretary, and Mr. Irgens, to express their objection to the transfer of old tonnage instead of new tonnage. They said they thought the old vessels ought to be transferred only outside of the agreement and not

within the agreement; that they had from the beginning in conversations started with Mr. Winant¹¹ discussed only new tonnage; that they had always considered that the transfer in fulfillment of lost tonnage would be of new tonnage; that the Norwegian Government would be very much disappointed, and they themselves and the Norwegian sailors would be disappointed to have to accept vessels which were built in 1926; that the reason we were transferring diesel engines was that Americans were not very successful with diesel engines, had had a lot of trouble with them and wanted the Norwegians to take over the trouble; that they had only heard of old tonnage the last day or so and were greatly surprised when Mr. Lorentzen lunched with Mr. Douglas today to find that the offer of five vessels was composed entirely of old tonnage.

The above was the summary of the conversation of each of the four gentlemen. To it I replied that I thought they were lucky to get five vessels irrespective of their age; that the reaction of the Norwegian Government and Norwegian sailors would be dependent largely on the way the matter was approached to them; that these vessels were to be considered part of the commitment to replace lost tonnage; that they were perfectly good vessels of approximately 10,000 tons each; and that there must have been some misconception in their minds as to the intention of the American Government to transfer to them new tonnage; that this was to be the first step, and that Mr. Douglas, in his conversation with me this afternoon, had stated that in the course of time other ships would be transferred and amongst the ships transferred there probably would be new vessels. I closed by suggesting that if they approached the proposition in the proper spirit they would realize that ships were almost the scarcest things in the world. We were transferring to them for the duration of the war five vessels in full realization of Norway's effort on the seas during the war, but also because we considered Norway in a class somewhat distinct from other nations in that we realized that Norway's principal source of wealth was shipping and that this might be translated to the interest of Norway, whether it was sailors or members of the Government, in a way which would produce an agreeable impression instead of a disagreeable impression.

I hoped very much that they would accept the situation as the best that could be done at the time and look forward to the allocation from time to time of additional vessels, some of which might be new vessels. I emphasized the thought, however, that it was preposterous to think that the United States would have entered into a commitment to furnish brand new vessels in replacement of all the vessels lost by Norway.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

¹¹ John G. Winant, Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

857.85/11-1942

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of
State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1942.

The Norwegian Ambassador having just recently returned from London came in this afternoon at his request. He said that he had seen the President on yesterday and that he had, amongst other things, taken up the subject of ships which had been agreed should be delivered to Norway in compensation for tonnage lost in the Allied service. He reminded me that he had had conversations with the President in April and again in August on both of which occasions he said the President had stated his particular interest in the execution of that agreement. On yesterday he said the President again affirmed his interest in having action taken to implement the agreement.

The Ambassador stated that he appreciated the advices the Department had given to him through his Embassy while he was in London in regard to five ships which were made available to Norway, but stated that he was seriously disappointed that the ships were of the character they developed to be and that they were not ships in fulfillment of the agreement. He continued that Norwegian sailors were still "on the beach" here and were anxious and ready to sail in the Allied cause, and the Norwegian Government had particularly instructed him on his departure from London that he was to press this matter and to seek some speedy implementation from the United States.

The Ambassador asked how this might be furthered.

I told the Ambassador I would make a memorandum of his report of his conversation with the President and that it would serve as the basis for taking it up with the competent authorities of the Government. I stated that I would advise him if there were any developments in the near future, and that if he had not heard from the Department we would be glad to discuss the matter with him at further length.

I told the Ambassador that it was now apparent since the expedition had arrived in North Africa that in the last few months we could not have allocated vessels for other service because every ton of shipping was needed for military purposes. I also called attention to the long line to the southwest Pacific and the need for a great deal of tonnage on that route, and I assured him that these circumstances prevented the American Government from making commitments. In addition, I directed his attention to the fact that the ships the Norwegian Government had received were not part of the commitment but were of advantage to them in that they yielded some revenue to

the Government, employed a number of their seamen, and also flew the Norwegian flag. In response to the proposal that he would like to receive some assurance that ships to be transferred to him in the future would be confirmed in title at the end of the war, I told him that the Maritime authorities were definitely of the opinion that they could not transfer title to any of these vessels until after the war, and that while they would fly the Norwegian flag title would remain in the United States, and that I doubted that the Maritime authorities would be justified to make an agreement to transfer title after the war to a particular vessel or to specified vessels if they were not able to agree now to pass title at this time.

I may add that the Ambassador was very serious in his presentation and appeared to feel very deeply that this Government was very slow in living up to its alleged obligations.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

857.85/11-1942

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1942.

What is the status of the transfer of American built ships to the Norwegian flag? They ask for ten of them and ask for modern ships, not very old ones.

I see no reason why this should not be done under Lend-Lease, for the very simple reason that the Norwegians have a good number of merchant crews which have no ships to sail, and the transfer to the Norwegian flag would mean that the ships would be used for the same purpose as American flagships are used—part of the general pool. They have idle men—we have the ships—why not marry them?

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OSEVELT]

857.857/388

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1942.

The Ambassador of Norway came in following his recent return from London. He repeated the same views about their shipping situation, which he had expressed to Assistant Secretary Long. I said that it had been agreed that certain tonnage lost in the Allied cause would be replaced by ships from the United States and that the only thing remaining was to work out the details of the agreement as to the kind of ships and the number, et cetera. The purpose of the agreement was

twofold, namely, to replace tonnage lost and to give employment to several hundred Norwegian seamen, engineers, et cetera, who are in this country at the present time because their ships had been sunk.

I stated that every effort would be made to bring this matter to an early conclusion.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

857.85/396

The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have been instructed by my Government to propose to the Government of the United States of America that negotiations be initiated in order to arrive at a general shipping agreement between the two Governments.

The fact that it becomes clearer, month by month, that the problem of making the potential power of the United Nations effective upon the war fronts of the world is primarily a problem of ocean transportation, has led my Government to the conclusion that this is an appropriate time to suggest to the Government of the United States the desirability of concluding a general agreement covering the terms of employment of that very considerable part of Norway's Fleet which my Government has for some time past been voluntarily operating in compliance with the wishes and recommendations of the War Shipping Administration. It is my Government's conviction that such a general agreement would render much easier of fulfilment the common purpose of the United States Government and of my Government that all Norwegian ships so employed shall be utilized to the greatest possible advantage in winning the war.

Ever since the United States by the unprovoked Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, and the German declaration of war became the active ally of the nations already engaged, including Norway, it has seemed to my Government that a general agreement between the United States and Norway would be more in keeping with their status as allied belligerents than is the present arrangement through which Norwegian ships, requisitioned and operated by my Government, are temporarily subject to a system of warrant control which was devised to cover operation by private owners, some of whom might not be as completely consecrated to the war effort as are the Governments involved. Nevertheless, in order not to permit the slightest interruption in the co-ordinated war effort of the Norwegian and American Fleets, my Government has complied with all the requirements of the warrant system until the proper time should come for a discussion of a general agreement to replace it. Your Excellency will recall, however, that on

January 29, 1942, the Norwegian Legation presented a note to your Government,¹³ referring to the difficulties presented by the reduced ceiling rates proposed and requesting that the continued application of the so-called "Uniform Conditions" to Norwegian vessels be left open for future discussion.

A short survey of the War Shipping Agreement entered into between Norway and the United Kingdom may be of interest in this connection:

When Great Britain entered the war in September 1939, she immediately initiated negotiations with the Norwegian Shipowners Association for a shipping agreement securing the continued service of a part of the Norwegian Fleet. At that time the major part of the Norwegian Merchant Fleet, consisting of about 7.625.600 tons deadweight (of which about 3.200.000 tons deadweight were tankers incl. whaling factories) was trading to the United Kingdom and the United States of America. An agreement was concluded in November 1939, supplemented by an agreement of March 1940, putting at the disposal of the British Ministry of Shipping, or firms appointed by that institution, about 2.250.000 tons deadweight (of which about 1.650.000 tons deadweight were tankers). Charter terms and a scale of charter hire were agreed to.

When Norway entered the war in April 1940, its entire Merchant Fleet, outside enemy occupied territories was requisitioned by my Government. Charter hire under the charters made in accordance with the agreement of November 1939, was thereafter paid to my Government. From time to time thereafter, as Great Britain's need for ships increased, my Government agreed with the British Ministry of War Transport to the chartering of an increasing number of Norwegian ships through series of agreements supplementing the agreement of November 1939. By July 1941, of the approximately 5.000.000 tons deadweight of Norwegian vessels then remaining, 557 vessels totalling about 3.800.000 tons deadweight were running for the British Empire and the balance for United States interests.

On October 10, 1941 my Government and the Government of Great Britain entered into an agreement covering generally the terms upon which any further Norwegian tonnage should thereafter be made available and providing that my Government in determining the employment of Norwegian shipping should give absolute priority to the requirement of ships for the transportation of supplies essential to the war effort. To facilitate such determination an Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee was appointed with the dual function of advising The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission in connection with the

¹³ Not printed.

employment of Norwegian ships not previously time chartered to the British and advising the British Ministry of War Transport in connection with Norwegian vessels already on time charter under earlier agreements with the British.

On November 15th, last, of the remaining Norwegian Fleet of about 3,952,831 tons deadweight (of which about 1,961,993 tons deadweight are tankers) there are running on time charter to the British Ministry of War Transport under the agreements with the British Government entered into before October 10, 1941, or otherwise at pre-war sterling rates about 2,232,943 tons deadweight and on Norwegian lines to the United Kingdom about 303,867 tons deadweight,—a total of about 2,536,810 tons deadweight (of which about 1,290,493 tons deadweight are tankers). The additional tonnage made available under the October Agreement totals 350,474 tons deadweight (of which 113,420 tons deadweight are tankers) under time charter for round voyages. Further, a number of tankers on time charter to American Oil Companies, of which about 138,169 tons deadweight remain afloat, were put into the United Kingdom trade the summer of 1941 under the so-called "Four-Party Agreements" between the Governments of the United States, of Great Britain and of Norway and the several Oil Companies. These contracts have expired, but the vessels are continuing in the same service pending a new arrangement.

During the negotiations with the British Government which started in May, 1941, and which resulted in the agreement of October 10, 1941, the British Government demanded that the tonnage employed on lines in the Western Hemisphere, or on charter to American charterers, should be made available for the British Ministry of War Transport. The question to which extent this should be done was made the subject of Tripartite negotiations in Washington, during which the Maritime Commission claimed that certain ships should continue in the American trade. Largely, as a result of this demand, 987,618 tons deadweight (whereof 558,080 tons deadweight are tankers) are still employed on lines to the United States of America (lines to the United Kingdom excluded) or on charter to the War Shipping Administration or private American charterers or to Canadian charterers. The balance of the tonnage, 77,929 tons deadweight, are chiefly employed in Australian and Indian trade. The time chartering of vessels to the British under the October Agreement was made the subject of a Tripartite Agreement executed May 6th, 1942, between the appropriate Government Agencies of the United States, of Great Britain and of Norway. Under the Tripartite Agreement the vessels are chartered from time to time for such periods as may be determined by the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee and for operation on such routes as may be approved by the United States War Shipping Administration.

The present moment would seem to be timely for the conclusion of an agreement between the Government of the United States and my Government under which Norway, as an actively belligerent ally, should participate (as is done through the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee) in all determinations affecting the allocation, maintenance and employment of all vessels now operating in accordance with the sole direction of the War Shipping Administration under the warrant system with the Norwegian Government's temporary consent, as well as such future vessels as may be brought within the scope of the proposed employment agreement. When in 1940 my Government requisitioned all Norwegian vessels, it promptly, in order to operate this fleet of approximately 6 million tons, created a Governmental Agency, designated The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission, manned by picked shipping executives including specialists in the operation of each particular type of vessel in each particular trade. Since July 1940, this Governmental Agency has maintained in active operation a fully manned and equipped office in New York and another in London. It is believed that the proposed American-Norwegian Shipping Committee could so coordinate the joint efforts of the War Shipping Administration and The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission in connection with Norwegian tonnage that the fullest possible benefit could be derived from the particular skills and special experience of the personnel of each. It is important to note that many of the Norwegian vessels now operating in accordance with the requests of the War Shipping Administration are specialized types in the handling of which the personnel of The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission is particularly trained.

Without attempting to include all the points to be covered in such an agreement, the following matters for discussion may be noted:

- (1) The establishment of an American-Norwegian Shipping Committee analogous to the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee. This Committee would have to be consulted beforehand regarding the employment of Norwegian tonnage.

- (2) General provisions as to charter rates and charter terms.

- (3) Provisions for the protection of established Norwegian Lines whose operations have been or may be curtailed or suspended by reason of the war.

- (4) Some clarification in the light of experience since the conclusion of the Lend-Lease Agreement of July 11, 1942, of the practical interpretation to be put upon the language of Clause 2 of my note of that date, when applied to the varying facts of actual cases as they arise.

My Government feels that the total contribution of the Norwegian Merchant Marine to the solution of the transportation problem justifies Norwegian participation in the direction of the transportation

policies of the United Nations. The training and long experience of those in charge of the Norwegian Merchant Marine would thus be better utilized than now in the common war effort.

Accept [etc.]

W. MUNTHE MORGENSTIERNE

857.85/397

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1942.

Participants: The Norwegian Ambassador,
Mr. Sunde, of the Norwegian Shipping Mission,
Mr. Acheson.

The Norwegian Ambassador and Mr. Sunde called at their request. They handed me the attached note ¹⁴ and briefly explained its contents. It points out certain outstanding questions in relation to Norwegian shipping and requests that Mr. Sunde be enabled to negotiate solutions of them through the Department of State. Mr. Sunde explained that so many agencies appeared to be involved that it was impossible for the Norwegians to determine themselves who were the responsible authorities, and in any event it seemed proper to them that negotiations should be carried out through this Department. I replied that that principle seemed eminently sound and that from a hasty examination of the note it seemed to me that all but one of the matters involved fell within Mr. Long's jurisdiction and that it would seem better for him to organize the discussions, with me playing such part as seemed to him desirable in connection with the lend-lease matter discussed below.

Briefly the four principal matters involved, together with Mr. Sunde's comments on them, are as follows:

1. The Norwegians wish to establish an American-Norwegian Shipping Committee analogous to the Anglo-Norwegian Shipping Committee. This committee should be consulted regarding the employment of Norwegian tonnage. Mr. Sunde said that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Lewis Douglas and with Mr. Harriman ¹⁵ in London, both of whom seemed to be receptive to the idea but said that it should be taken up in Washington.

2. Questions regarding charter provisions relating to charter rates and charter terms for Norwegian ships. Mr. Sunde mentioned in this connection problems which had arisen regarding certain Norwegian tankers which had been under charter to American oil companies and which had been operating in Western Hemisphere trade.

¹⁴ *Supra.*

¹⁵ W. Averell Harriman, lend-lease "expediter" in London with rank of Minister

These had been reassigned to the British Ministry of War Transport for trans-Atlantic carriage under arrangements which involved the oil companies, the Norwegian Shipping Mission, the British Ministry of War Transport, and the War Shipping Administration. As a result of these transactions certain mix-ups had occurred which had resulted in the Norwegians' not receiving any payment on these ships for over a year. This and similar matters should be straightened out.

3. The protection of established Norwegian lines. Mr. Sunde stated that it had been and would be necessary to transfer certain Norwegian ships from established lines in this hemisphere to war work. He wished to have some understanding reached that the Norwegians should not be in any worse position after the war by reason of having consented to the transfer of these ships than they would have been if the ships had continued to operate on the lines. After some discussion of this point, I gathered that he did not propose that this Government should undertake not to impose legal restrictions upon all foreign shipping or to refrain from subsidizing its own shipping, but merely to place the Norwegian ships in as good a position as though they had continued to operate upon the lines during the war.

4. Clarification of the lend-lease agreement so far as it applied to repair of Norwegian ships. In this connection three principal points seemed to be involved:

(a) Agreement upon some method of determining what constitutes war damage for which the United States will pay without obligation to the Norwegians and what constitutes marine damage which the Norwegians are to repair at their own expense. There has already been some discussion of this point, and it should not be difficult.

(b) A solution of the problem of the disposition of insurance payments made to the Norwegian Shipping Mission by British Insurance companies on account of war damage which the United States Government will repair. Briefly Mr. Sunde claims that the Norwegians should both have the war damage repaired by the United States without cost to them and be entitled to keep the insurance payments. This, I believe, is not so unreasonable as it at first appears. He claims that the insurance payments are made to the Norwegian Shipping Mission as a governmental entity and are used by the Norwegian Government for its general war purposes. He claims that a similar arrangement occurs in respect to lend-lease repairs to British ships. He argues with some force that, if the Norwegian Government pays over the insurance money to this country, it receives no benefit from the lend-lease agreement. I said that this problem presented real difficulties, but that some fair solution would have to be arrived at.

(c) The solution of special problems which arise out of the repair by the War Shipping Administration of Norwegian ships which have been laid up in this country as being obsolete and useless. He contends that, if the War Shipping Administration decides to repair ships which the Norwegian Government cannot afford to repair and which should not be repaired as a matter of ordinary use, this cost

should be written off by the War Shipping Administration and that the extent of the Norwegian Government's liability should be to pay over out of the earnings of the ships the amounts which the Norwegian Government would ordinarily have paid if the ships had been in a reasonable state of repair. He points out that, if the Norwegian Government is liable for the total amount, it is then being forced to assume a liability which it would not voluntarily assume and which, in the event of the loss of the ship, would impose a dead loss upon the Norwegian Government, and which, even in the case of survival of the ship, would make the Norwegian Government pay a war expense incurred at the instance of this Government and for the purposes of this Government. Here again I said that I thought a fair settlement could be reached.

Mr. Sunde particularly requested that the Department expedite these discussions so that he might return to England before Christmas. I told him that I would discuss the matter with Mr. Long, who I was sure would assemble the appropriate representatives of other agencies of the Government and expedite the discussions as much as possible.

DEAN ACHESON

857.85/398

*The War Shipping Administrator (Land) to the Assistant Secretary
of State (Long)*

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1942.

DEAR MR. LONG: Thank you for your letter of November 25th¹⁶ enclosing a copy of a note¹⁷ which the Department has received from the Norwegian Embassy concerning proposals of the Norwegian Government for a general shipping agreement between the Norwegian Government and the United States.

I have been informed that talks occurred in London between Mr. Sunde, Norwegian Minister of Shipping, Mr. Harriman and Lord Leathers, the Minister of War Transport, as a result of which it was agreed to attempt to work out a tri-partite shipping arrangement for the three Governments. Such an arrangement would be preferable to a bi-lateral agreement between the Norwegian Government and the United States because in accordance with the policies of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board any such bi-lateral agreement would have to be consistent in all respects with Norwegian-British arrangements.

Accordingly, before any separate discussions take place between the Norwegian Government and the United States on shipping questions, we should continue to explore the possibility of a tri-partite arrange-

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ Note of November 24, p. 91.

ment, and I suggest that the proposed meeting on December 1, 1942, referred to in your letter, should be deferred for the time being.

Sincerely,

E. S. LAND

857.85/12-942

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant
Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1942.

Mr. Scoll¹⁸ called me on the telephone this afternoon and said that he had answered our letter about the Norwegians, and that the War Shipping Administration had chosen him, Scoll, to represent the War Shipping Administration and he had called a meeting in his office to meet the Norwegian representatives at 3 o'clock tomorrow afternoon. He said that he had been in telephone conversation with Mr. Sunde.

I replied that I was glad to hear that they were to have the conversation and that I hoped that they would understand that we did not care to be in on the technical negotiations, that we were neither equipped nor qualified for that purpose. However, the Norwegian Ambassador had called me on the telephone this morning and had stated that although he had named certain persons to carry on the negotiations, he himself desired to be present at the first meeting. Consequently, he requested that the State Department name a representative because he felt it would be more appropriate if some member of the Department as well as himself were present. Mr. Scoll agreed to the representation of the State Department at that meeting. I emphasized that our representation was for that meeting only and that the State Department did not care to continue in the negotiations.

I stated that the Norwegian Ambassador had called upon me yesterday and had stated that he did not want the replacement tonnage confused with the negotiations which he had agreed to undertake. I told Mr. Scoll that I had stated that I thought that was to be a part of those negotiations but that the Ambassador had stated that he did not so consider it; that he did consider that we had agreed in principle to the allocation of vessels in replacement; that the President and the Department of State had agreed; that Norway had fulfilled its part by having lost a lot of vessels in Allied service; that he expected that to be taken care of promptly and separately.

Mr. Scoll said the War Shipping Administration desired that matter to be held in abeyance until the settlement of the charter question. He thought it would be easy to settle the charter question that way. I replied that that was a matter for their negotiation and that all we were

¹⁸ David Scoll of the War Shipping Administration.

concerned about was that the Department of State had made a commitment acting under the authority of the President, and we naturally and necessarily had an interest in the fulfillment of that commitment. I suggested that on tomorrow he tell the Ambassador that they had in active contemplation the allocation of these vessels and would come to an arrangement with him in the comparatively near future which he thought would be satisfactory to the Norwegians.

Mr. Scoll expressed entire concurrence with the points I had made, and I reiterated that we were not interested in the conduct of the negotiations and the technical aspects of them, but we did have an overall interest in the fulfillment of our commitments to Norway. I told him that Mr. Saugstad or Mr. Foster would be designated to attend the meeting tomorrow.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

POLAND

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION¹

860C.51/1480 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow),² January 4, 1942.

[Received January 4—6:40 p. m.]

8. The local press of January 3d announces that on December 31, 1941 an agreement was signed in the city of Kuibyshev concerning the granting of a loan of 100 million rubles by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the Polish Republic to be utilized for rendering assistance to Polish citizens on Soviet territory.³

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/19527

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the
Secretary of State*

[Polish Series No.] 117

LONDON, February 2, 1942.

[Received February 17.]

SIR: Supplementing my despatch Polish Series No. 107, January 12, enclosing copy of General Sikorski's letter of December 17, 1941 to Mr. Churchill; and my despatch Polish series No. 100, January 8, 1942,⁴ containing confidential report of a British observer on the Sikorski-Stalin conversations,⁵ I have the honor herein to report

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 206-271.

² The necessity for the removal of the American Embassy from Moscow to Kuibyshev in October 1941, with a reduced staff remaining in Moscow, is explained in *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 866 ff.

³ The Chargé in the Soviet Union informed the Department in telegram No. 73, January 26, 1942, from Kuibyshev that the local press reported the signature there on January 22 "of an agreement between the Soviet and Polish Governments in accordance with which the former extends to the latter a further loan of 300 million rubles, to be used for the maintenance on Soviet territory of the Polish army." (860C.20/110) The Financial Counselor of the Polish Embassy in Washington, Janusz Zoltowski, in a memorandum of March 13, 1942, gave the date of this agreement as being December 31, 1941 (860C.51/1488).

⁴ None printed.

⁵ The Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, conferred in Moscow with Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Prime Minister), early in December 1941. For reports concerning their meeting, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 264-268, *passim*.

General Sikorski's additional disclosures regarding his talks with M. Stalin:

The General said that after their preliminary formalities, it had not taken Stalin and himself long to "find" each other; they had gotten down to "straight talking" in short order.

Re disposition of Polish forces in Russia:

When, in the course of discussion, the question as to the disposition of Polish troops had arisen, he, Sikorski, frankly stated his desire to move the greater part, if not all to Iran. In reply, Stalin said he strongly suspected that this idea had found its inspiration in British-American scheming. Were he to permit all the Polish forces to leave Russia, he would become the "laughing stock of the world". Sikorski countered with the question to effect that, in that case, what did Stalin propose to do about the Polish forces? Stalin had thereupon said he would be willing that Sikorski withdraw about 25,000 troops for distribution in Britain and in the Middle East—but no more. If Sikorski wanted more he could take them only from the 40,000 then already organized—moreover, he, Stalin, would see to it that no more Poles were allowed to join the Polish forces in Russia. However, if Sikorski agreed to limit his withdrawal to about 25,000, he, Stalin, would be prepared to designate an area in southern Turkestan for the concentration of all Polish civilians, as well as for the organizing of a Polish force, to be limited only by the number of Polish effectives available. Sikorski calculated this opened the way for the formation of a force which might eventually amount to 100,000 to 150,000 strong. He accepted Stalin's proposal.

M. Stalin's hints as to his post-war intentions vis-à-vis Poland.

Stalin thereupon assured Sikorski of his desire to see Poland restored as an independent and strong state. Sikorski thanked him, adding that a strong restored Poland might enjoy healthy cooperation with Russia and with the western powers, including the United States.

In response, Stalin significantly remarked in effect, that experience had shown that Poland was too remote from the respective spheres of interest of the United States and the western European powers, for Poland to count upon them for post-war economic assistance. Poland would need much: machinery, building and other materials. Russia would be in position both to supply them, and to cooperate with Poland in these and other phases of reconstruction.

M. Stalin's remarks on attitude of the western European powers and the United States:

As for Russia's position vis-à-vis the western powers, Stalin said he could not be too sure that the end of the war would not find him

again treated as the "poor relation". At any rate, he could not exclude that possibility. Of one thing, however, he was confident, now that the United States had entered the war—and that was that both she and Britain would be in at the finish. He was sure that neither would let the other out until the fighting was over. This thought gave him a sense of comfort.

Question of settlement of Polish-Russian frontier issue:

At this point, he introduced the question of a settlement of a post-war Polish-Russian frontier. He urged that Sikorski and he arrange the matter between them, then and there. Sikorski replied that he was not in position to do so, adding with a smile, that were he to attempt to settle the issue at that time, *he* would become the "laughing stock of the world". Stalin, Sikorski told me, saw the humor, laughed heartily, and dropped the question.

Observations on Sikorski's attitude re this question.

In this connection, Sikorski remarked to me that he felt confident that the question of the frontier was one which could eventually be settled directly between the Poles and the Russians. While he has made similar remarks to a number of his colleagues in Allied Government circles, I have the impression that he is not optimistic as to the outcome in light of Poland's claims; that he is sufficiently a realist not to count upon a settlement of the question on basis of the 1939 frontier. At the back of his head, I believe, he has linked the question of possible "adjustments" of the pre-war frontier, with his post-war aspirations: annexation of East Prussia, and some form of close economic, political and military tie-up with Lithuania. In other words, provided he were assured of realizing these aspirations, he would be apt to concede the frontier adjustments.

Observations on attitude of Polish Government and Army circles here:

It is not likely, however, that he would air such views to his associates as a whole. For with possibly one or two exceptions, their desire for a settlement of the Polish-Russian frontier on the basis of *Status quo ante* is fundamental. Moreover, circles which, importantly due to this very question, had opposed Sikorski's signing the Agreement with Russia,⁶ would be quick to seize on any such views, and to exploit them against him as well as against his Russian policy.

Besides, the frontier, among other questions in connection with Polish-Russian relations, is still a delicate question in Polish army circles here. In fact, an important section thereof, troops as well as

⁶ For text of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, signed at London, see telegram No. 3292, July 30, 1941, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 243.

officers, are strong partisans * of General Sosnkowski,⁷ and, at heart, share the views he expressed at the time of his outspoken opposition to the terms of the Polish-Russian Agreement. Even at this time, there is a distinct undercurrent of dissatisfaction in these circles, with General Sikorski's having, as they put it, "decided to leave 100,000 men fighting with the Russian Army".

While, particularly a number of the leading officers of this element are more outspoken than others, the underlying attitude of the Polish military forces as a whole towards Russia is hardly less antipathetic and distrustful.

My impression on this score was further strengthened by the recent confidential remarks of the Editor of the Polish Army newspaper, an important part of whose duties, entails close observation of all shades of opinion among the forces here.† He told me the army could be counted upon to back up the Agreement which their Government had made with Russia. This, however, did not mean that the underlying attitude of the men and officers, as a whole, had altered towards the Russians. They still thought of the latter in the light of their being, for one thing, Communists; that was bad enough—but first and always they were Russians. As for their attitude towards the Russian-German conflict, he characterized the thoughts in the back-of-the-mind of the average Polish officer and soldier, by citing a Polish legend about a battle between two rats: they fought until all that was left were two tails.

In connection with the foregoing, it has been clear to me for some time that, as long as General Sosnkowski remained in Britain, and at the same time was not permitted to serve with the forces in Scotland,

* Sosnkowski's partisans, moreover, are resentful of his exclusion from the High Command of the forces. Government-inspired efforts to play down his gallant action at Lwow, have failed to alter this element's high regard for the General as the "hero of Lwow." [Footnote in the original.]

⁷ Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski resigned as Deputy Prime Minister on July 26, 1941, in protest against the signing of the Polish-Soviet Agreement. See Polish Series telegram No. 30, August 2, 1941, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 245.

† He told me, moreover, that especially amongst the younger men, there was a lack of understanding, and even a resentment of the policy of the present Government to soft-pedal any reference to the late Marshal Pilsudski. [Josef Pilsudski, Polish Minister of War and Marshal of Poland from his *coup d'état*, May 12-14, 1926, until his death, May 12, 1935; Prime Minister, October 1926-June 1928, and August-December 1930.] They had been brought up to regard him as the liberator of Poland, a great national hero. "Just imagine," he said, "what your own reactions would be, if, after you and others of your generation had been raised to look upon a certain figure in the history of your country as a national hero, a new administration in Washington threatened to fire you from whatever job you held if you even so much as mentioned his name." He concluded by stating that while this was the present Polish Government's attitude, the younger element in the army was aware that General Sosnkowski, an old friend of the late Marshal, took no part in the Government's policy on this score and was loyal to the memory of the man who had done so much for Poland. [Footnote in the original.]

the resentment of his many partisans therein, would work increasingly to the disadvantage of General Sikorski's own position as well as that of his Government, in relation to these forces as a whole.

Recent events have borne this out. On Sikorski's return from Russia he was greeted by reports of a wave of dissatisfaction not only over Stalin's refusal to permit the removal of Polish troops from Russia, but also over Sosnkowski's continued exclusion from the Polish High Command. General Sikorski immediately decided again to urge Sosnkowski to go to the Middle East. After some days of reflection, General Sosnkowski accepted the proposal. In disclosing this to me General Sikorski said it had been none too easy to persuade General Sosnkowski and the time involved had been the main factor which had caused him to postpone his visit to the United States.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

740.00114 European War 1939/2270

The Secretary of Embassy in Charge at Moscow (Thompson) to the Secretary of State

No. 11

Moscow, February 7, 1942.

[Received April 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation prepared by this office of a memorandum on Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union^{*} which was handed to me by its author, Jozef Czapski, a captain in the Polish Army in the Soviet Union. Captain Czapski informed me in strict confidence that not only had Stalin promised the Polish Ambassador that the Polish officers concerned would be liberated but that he had given the most solemn assurance to this effect to General Sikorski. Captain Czapski came to Moscow in an effort to obtain the implementation of these promises but has been unable to obtain any further information as to the whereabouts of these prisoners. He thinks it possible, however, that some of them may be imprisoned on Franz Joseph Island and as it would be impossible to

^{*} Not printed; it dealt in detail with Polish prisoners of war known to have been concentrated in camps located at Starobyelsk, Kozyelsk, and Ostashkov "in the year 1939-40 (April-May) amounting to over 15,000 men, of which 8,700 were officers." These prisoners "have not returned from their captivity and the place where they were located is absolutely unknown with the exception of 400 or 500 men, about 3% of the total number of prisoners of war" detained at these three camps "who were freed in 1941." Most of these freed prisoners passed through another camp at Gryazovets. The liquidation of the first three camps was begun on April 3, 1940, and was soon accomplished. The camp at Gryazovets was not liquidated until September 1941. The memorandum further declared that "not a single cry for help has come to us" from these prisoners of war, and that the Polish Government had "no news whatever of their location apart from vague rumors." Pertinent comment and selected documents about these prisoners of war were also released in Republic of Poland, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, pp. 38-45 and pp. 110-126.

bring them back from there before the month of June, there is a slight possibility that the Soviet authorities are withholding any information until such time as they can actually release the prisoners. As illustrative of the attitude taken by the Soviet authorities on this question, Captain Czapski told me in the strictest confidence that two officers of the Polish army in the U. S. S. R. were suddenly arrested in Kuibyshev and re-imprisoned without notice to the Polish Embassy or Military Authorities. The Polish Embassy has been unable to secure their release despite the most strenuous efforts. The Soviet authorities have merely stated that the officers in question are believed to be pro-German. Captain Czapski said he thought the real reason for their arrest was the fact that they were members of the Polish Bund.⁹ Captain Czapski, who was himself a prisoner of war, said that he had been fortunate in being imprisoned in a camp where the prisoners received relatively good treatment. He said that the reason for this special consideration was the desire of the Soviet authorities to prepare a nucleus of Poles who would be favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union and would be useful to the Soviet Government after the war, possibly for intervention in Polish internal affairs. He said that while he had no direct evidence he suspected that similar tactics were being used with respect to German prisoners of war. Some support to this theory is furnished by the recent visit of American correspondents to a Soviet prison camp near Gorky, where the German prisoners receive a more liberal ration than the citizens of Moscow, although it cannot be said that the conditions of life there would be likely to win adherents to the Communist Régime.

Respectfully yours,

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/19463 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 14, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received February 14—7:25 p. m.]

137. Embassy's 2041, December 11, [1941,] 4 p. m.¹⁰ In a recent conversation concerning the treatment which is being accorded to Polish nationals by the Soviet authorities, the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy stated to Dickerson¹¹ that in practice great difficulty was

⁹ A Jewish Labor Union organization in Poland carrying on socialist propaganda among Jewish workmen, formerly associated with the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, 1898-1903. The Bundists then retained separate identity until after 1919, when the group fused with the Communist Party in the Ukraine, although its members in Poland remained independent until their organization's destruction after Hitler's invasion in September 1939.

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 267.

¹¹ Charles E. Dickerson, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, at Kuibyshev.

being experienced by the Embassy in obtaining permission for any Pole to leave the Soviet Union and that only in individual instances, after prolonged negotiation, had such permission been obtained.

As regards the 25,000 Polish troops which the Soviets had agreed in principle to permit to leave, both the informant and a member of the British Embassy state that while the Soviet authorities have by no means refused to carry out the commitments made, in actual fact no progress has been made toward its execution since various technical and other difficulties have been raised, causing deadlock up until the present time.

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/19850

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador ¹² called to see me this afternoon ¹³ in order to present to me the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Count Edward Raczyński.

The Foreign Minister handed me a letter which he had addressed to the President, together with many enclosures thereto,¹⁴ and likewise a summary of the matters which he desired to take up with the President when the President received him and the Ambassador.

A copy of the letter to the President is attached herewith.

I told the Minister that I would be very happy to transmit these communications to the President in order that he might have them before receiving the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador.

The entire conversation was taken up by the reading of these various communications to me by the Foreign Minister. The comments which the Foreign Minister made as he read these documents added nothing to the contents thereof, which are fully self-explanatory.

At the conclusion of the conversation Count Raczyński expressed the belief that the policy being pursued by Great Britain of attempting to make concessions at this period to the Soviet Union is unwise. He stated that the British were utterly unable to understand Soviet psychology. He said that if the British now agreed to guarantee to the Soviet Union, when peace was made, the restoration of its 1941

¹² Jan Ciechanowski.

¹³ The conversation took place on the afternoon of February 18.

¹⁴ None printed. The letter to the President, dated January 30, 1942, was actually signed by Prime Minister Sikorski, and introduced Count Raczyński. The enclosures included an extended estimate of the military situation on the eastern front, intelligence reports from Germany, and an exchange of notes between the Soviet and Polish Governments regarding an interview with Count Edward Raczyński, published in the London *Sunday Times*, which contained expressions of opinions not fully shared by the Soviet Government.

frontiers, it would only pave the way for further and more far-reaching demands on the part of the Soviet Union later. He insists that the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union would be a vital blow to the reconstitution of Poland.

I made no comment with regard to these statements, but merely said that after he and the Ambassador had had an opportunity of submitting their requests to the President, I should be glad to have a further opportunity of talking with them.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/9783

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Polish Acting Foreign Minister, Count Edward Raczynski, called upon me yesterday, in the company of the Polish Ambassador. He left with me a letter addressed to you, which I am enclosing herewith.¹⁵

Count Raczynski also left with me a summary of the subjects to be submitted to you by himself, at the request of General Sikorski, as soon as you have the opportunity of receiving him. I am likewise transmitting this summary herewith.¹⁶

The financial assistance requested would seem to me to constitute a legitimate request on the part of the Polish Government under present conditions.

The main request, however, as mentioned in this summary, and the one to which I believe the Polish Government at present attaches the greatest importance, is the request in which this Government is asked to interpose its good offices with the Soviet Government in the interest of Poland. This request involves the very urgent and fundamental problem now under discussion between ourselves and the British Government—namely, the war aims of the Soviet Union in connection with the restoration of its 1941 boundary.

I believe you may wish to tell Count Raczynski that this problem is one which you will take under consideration, without making any immediate commitment thereon.

I venture to make this suggestion because of my belief that until you have reached a final agreement with the British Government as to the policy to be adopted with regard to the Soviet Government, you would not wish to give the Polish Government any indication of what your definitive attitude may be.

¹⁵ Not printed.

¹⁶ Not attached to file copy.

I am attaching herewith a statement which Count Raczynski urged be made at the White House after you had received him.¹⁷ I told him I would submit it to you for your consideration.

I hope you will tell him that at this stage you think it unnecessary to make any statement. I feel it would be unwise, because of our relations with the Soviet Union, to say at this time that the United States Government is determined "not to recognize any accomplished facts created under military occupation or armed pressure". If you refer at this time solely to the restoration of the independence of one state, that statement might be construed by other countries bordering upon the Soviet Union as implying a disregard by this Government of their own aspirations. Our general policy has been laid down clearly in the Atlantic Charter¹⁸ and I do not believe that it is necessary for us, at this stage, to say anything further.¹⁹

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

740.00119 European War 1939/1047

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*²⁰

LONDON, February 20, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the thought that it might serve as a useful reference, I am sending you the attached indexed survey²¹ (a) on the reactions of Allied Government circles here to M. Stalin's reported post-war ideas; and (b) on the views of leading officials of these circles on the shape of things to come.

No sooner had I found that the Polish Government had learned of M. Stalin's post-war ideas, than I became apprehensive lest the Poles initiate some action which might prove offensive to the Russians. I had not long to wait. On March 31 General Sikorski proposed, at a lunch which he gave for the representatives of the Belgian, Greek

¹⁷ The proposed statement reads: "The President assured Count Raczynski that the U. S. Government fully maintains its resolve not to recognize any accomplished facts created under military occupation or armed pressure, and, that the restoration of an independent and sovereign Polish State remains one of the most important aims of this war."

¹⁸ For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. For correspondence on the Atlantic Conference meeting between the President and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, see *ibid.*, pp. 341 ff.

¹⁹ Attached to this letter is a memorandum of February 27, from the Under Secretary to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Ray Atherton, which states: "The President handed me back today the attached papers which I had left with him on February 19. I think I have already told you that the President approved the suggestions made in my covering letter and I, therefore, suggest that you go ahead upon that basis."

²⁰ Ambassador Biddle sent an identical letter to the Under Secretary of State on the same date.

²¹ This survey was the Ambassador's Polish Series despatch No. 119 of February 20, 1942; not printed.

and Yugoslav Governments, that a declaration be made by all Allied Governments here, looking towards post-war collaboration. The enthusiastic reception accorded his proposal on this occasion spurred him to further efforts. Unfortunately, his and his associates' thirst for publicity resulted in a press notice the following day to effect that he had given this luncheon for the purpose of discussing a post-war European reconstruction plan.

This, in turn, drew the attention and suspicion of the Russian Embassies here and served to antagonize his colleagues in Allied governmental circles, who thus suspected him of seeking leadership of their circles.

Subsequently, the General and several of his associates asked me what I thought of the proposal for a declaration, stating the envisaged terms thereof, in only the most vague way. I replied that I personally believed that before launching any such move at this time, it should be put to the "acid test": would it in any way prove offensive to the Russians?—could it be interpreted by the Russians as a move to form a bloc against them? I added that it might be best to consult the Russians themselves in the matter. I subsequently made the same reply to similar questions asked me by representatives of the Norwegian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Belgian Governments.

In response to my observations on this score, the Norwegian Foreign Minister²² said that my remarks had served to convince him that his own first impression was right: he considered that the making of a declaration at this time, such as was proposed by General Sikorski, would only incite Russian suspicions; he would advise Russian authorities of his Government's invitation to join the declaration, and of his disinclination to accept.

The Yugoslav Foreign Minister,²³ in response to my observations, said that he had hitherto been in a quandary, since the Poles had urged him so strongly to join the declaration. My observations, however, had confirmed his own second thoughts in the matter. He believed, therefore, that his Government should do everything possible to dispel Russian suspicion, and, rather, to create an atmosphere of collaboration.

Judging by General Sikorski's and his associates' reactions, at this stage, to M. Stalin's reported post-war intentions, I should look for them to become more and more exercised, the closer the Russians draw to the Polish border.

In this connection, I am aware that Sikorski and his associates consider British public opinion as a whole, "too much at Russia's feet", and that by comparison, the attitude of the "United States to-

²² Trygve Halvdan Lie.

²³ Momtchilo Nintchitch.

wards Russia is better balanced"; they have failed to conceal their interest in what they appraise as a "division of American opinion vis-à-vis Russia". Accordingly, I feel it would be only a wise precaution to keep an eye open for traces of any possible attempt, inspired by Polish circles here, to exploit this aspect to the advantage of Poland's interests, and perhaps to the detriment of Russia in the eyes of American public opinion.

In advising this I feel that I should give you my following impressions concerning General Sikorski's frame of mind: while he is a thoroughly honest, sincere and courageous character, he has gained, during the past few months, an inordinate ambition, and thirst for publicity. He pictures himself on the one hand as the leader of post-war Poland, on the other hand, now that France has disappeared as a dominant influence on the continent, the leader of continental Europe. I mention the foregoing because I feel that his ambitions, his thirst for publicity, and his characteristically Polish suspicions of Russia, might possibly some day cloud his otherwise comparatively clear perspective—and lead him to permit some of his compatriots to launch some form of subtle anti-Russian play amongst the Polish-American community in our country.

I believe you might be interested in reading Dr. Beneš'²⁴ views, pages 7 to 11, and General Sikorski's views, pages 18 to 20—also my observations as to the differences between their respective opinions, page 30.²⁵

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

ANTHONY BIDDLE, JR.

²⁴ Eduard Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London.

²⁵ On p. 30 of his despatch under reference, Ambassador Biddle expressed these observations regarding the views held by Beneš and Sikorski:

"While Beneš and Sikorski share the view that an agreement between the United States and Britain as to a post-war European reconstruction plan is a pre-requisite to an understanding between these two major powers and Russia, they differ as to the methods and timing of procedure. Beneš would like to see early three-cornered conversations after the Americans and British had agreed upon a plan. Sikorski would like to see an early Anglo-American agreement on a European post-war plan, but he considers it would be better to wait and see the turn of events in the spring, before these two powers discussed such a plan with Russia.

"Sikorski, characteristic of the attitude of his Government as a whole, would like to see built up in the quickest possible order, a great cooperative power with western support. Beneš, on the other hand, wishing to dispel Russian suspicions, tries discreetly to soft-pedal any moves by his colleagues which might prove offensive to the Russians, hoping meanwhile that after the major western powers might have agreed upon a post-war European plan, they would enter into conversations with Russia looking towards a durable peace. Accordingly, he endeavors to exercise a quiet, restraining influence on any discernible tendency on part of the Poles to give vent to their recurrent waves of distrust of Russia. On the other hand, Beneš in his cautiousness, is at times apt to strike Sikorski as being unduly passive." (740.0011 European War 1939/20193)

740.0011 European War 1939/19956

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary
of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador came in to present his Foreign Minister; likewise to discuss things in general.

I said I was glad to see him, because I had followed with great attention the Russian declaration of December 4th²⁶ and the more recent [*sic*] Russian-Polish pact,²⁷ which in turn was followed by the Polish-Czech pact.²⁸

The Foreign Minister thereupon launched into a considerable discussion of their relations with Russia. He said that they had taken considerable heart from the Declaration of December 4th. Again, the Russo-Polish Pact had been a perfectly self-respecting document, implying as it did the respect for the sovereignty and way of life of Poland, and presumably it suggested a pattern for other countries. But, the Minister confided, he was worried whether these were not merely words designed to conceal an imperialistic intention, citing as examples the Baltic states. He said they were particularly interested in Lithuania, since a seizure of Lithuania would encircle Poland, much as the German East Prussian holding had done. He said that the Russian press had not acclaimed the Polish-Czech accord, but had rather indicated a slight dissatisfaction with it.

I said that I, of course, could not discuss these matters officially. Speaking strictly personally, I had been turning the whole problem over in my mind. It seems to me that we had perfect ground to agree with the Russians in their desire for security, and that we must completely recognize the Russian right to run their own affairs in their own way. It seemed to me that American public opinion really would be met if, within this frame of perfect recognition of their entirely legitimate interests, respect for the cultural and social entities of other peoples could be scrupulously maintained. We had found relatively little difficulty in coming to such an arrangement in the American hemisphere, and while the circumstances were not parallel, somewhat of the same spirit might be worked out in eastern Europe.

²⁶ The Polish-Soviet Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed at Moscow, December 4, 1941. A text was sent to the Department in telegram No. 2018, December 6, 1941, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 266.

²⁷ Allusion is presumably to the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941; see footnote 6, p. 102.

²⁸ An agreement signed at London on January 23, 1942, for postwar economic, political, and military cooperation; for text, see the *London Times*, January 24, 1942, p. 3.

The Polish Foreign Minister seemed genuinely delighted to find someone who had ever had any contact at all with the problems of eastern Europe. He said that he had been worried by the tone of Stalin's last speech ²⁹ and wondered if we had the full text. I told him I had not seen it. He said he had been bothered by the statement that Russia fought alone, without allies; likewise by the fact that Stalin had receded radically from his previous position declaring that he hoped to crush the Germans; and now apparently were merely indicating his dislike of the present rulers of Germany, and not of the German people, and in words that would not exclude an agreement with them. He wondered if Stalin were trying to put pressure on the Allies to give him more support.

I told him that without careful examination of the text I could not comment. Quite irrespective of anything that was said, we were committed to supporting Russia and proposed to do so to the limit, both as a matter of keeping our given word, and as a matter of obvious common interest.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

860C.00/898

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Standley)

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1942.

Acting Polish Foreign Minister Raczynski accompanied by the Polish Ambassador, Mr. Jan Ciechanowski, called by appointment at 3 p. m. on Wednesday, March 4, 1942. The Foreign Minister explained that he had learned of my appointment as Ambassador to the Soviet Union ³⁰ and desired to give me his views in relation to the Russo-Polish situation. He spoke of the large number of Polish citizens (approximately 2,000,000) who had been taken out of Poland into the Soviet Union and were distributed and held under varying conditions throughout the Soviet Union. He spoke of the terrible situation of these Polish people and dwelt especially upon the failure of the Russians to live up to their undertakings with the Poles. He emphasized the great effect which President Roosevelt's message to Mr. Stalin ³¹ had had upon the Russians' attitude toward keeping this agreement. He spoke of the purpose of the agreement in relation to the release of a large number of Polish people and also of the forming of Polish armed forces in the Soviet Union. He pointed out the failure of the Soviet Union to live up to these agreements and said that while

²⁹ For a summary of Stalin's speech on February 23, 1942, see telegram No. 163, February 24, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 416.

³⁰ See footnote 31, p. 415.

³¹ Not found in Department files.

the situation had eased after President Roosevelt's telegram it was yet far short of holding to their agreement.

The Minister also spoke of the Baltic States situation, saying that he understood, and of course he could not help but know, that there were discussions going on³² having to do with the future of the Baltic States and particularly emphasized the fact that while the Polish Government was concerned with all three States, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, it was particularly concerned with the future of Lithuania, and that it had always considered that the safety of Poland was vitally connected with the independence of Lithuania. He also spoke of the Southern Polish border as affected by the status of Rumania and Bessarabia. In effect Lithuania on the north and Bessarabia on the south constituted jaws of pincers and if either of these countries should fall under the control of a foreign power the security of Poland would be menaced.

Other than to express the view that I was very much interested in this matter of the large number of Polish citizens in the Soviet Union and was very glad to get his viewpoint concerning them, I gave no expression of opinion whatever and took very little part in the conversation.

Just prior to the termination of the conversation Mr. Henderson³³ came in to discuss certain phases of a telegram which had just arrived from Mr. Biddle³⁴ concerning the draft of a joint declaration which the Government of Poland desired the Governments of the German-occupied countries of Europe to sign.

860C.51/1487

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador, in the company of the Polish Acting Foreign Minister, called to see me this afternoon.

I said that with regard to possible financial aid to Poland for the purposes mentioned in the Foreign Minister's letter to the President,³⁵ it would assist this Government if the Polish Ambassador

³² For details concerning preliminary negotiations for the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26, 1942, see pp. 490 ff.

³³ Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

³⁴ Polish Series No. 18, March 3, not printed; it contained a draft of a joint declaration which General Sikorski advocated that the several Governments in Exile at London should sign concerning wartime collaboration and postwar organization among them. In a memorandum of March 7, 1942, President Roosevelt indicated his disapproval of such an agreement: "I think Sikorski should be definitely discouraged on this proposition. This is no time to talk about the post-war position of small nations, and it would cause serious trouble with Russia. F. D. R." (740.0011 European War 1939/19908)

³⁵ Not printed.

were to give me a detailed statement covering the status of the assets of the Polish Government, the sources of its present revenues and the amounts thereof, and a statement of the present expenditures and immediate financial commitments of the Polish Government. I said that the President had authorized me to say that in principle this Government would give favorable consideration to the requests made by the Polish Government.

The Minister and Ambassador expressed great satisfaction and the Ambassador said that he would have the necessary statement prepared at once and would send it to me.³⁶

The Minister spoke with satisfaction of his conversation with Admiral Standley. He did not bring up again the question of the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland, nor did he refer to the suggested agreement which General Sikorski had communicated to Ambassador Biddle yesterday, as reported by the latter.³⁷

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

741.6111/54

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador and the Polish Acting Foreign Minister called to see me this afternoon at their request.

Mr. Raczynski read to me a digest of a telegram he had received today from General Sikorski in London. The latter stated that Mr. Eden³⁸ had told him confidentially of his conversations with the Soviet Government regarding a guarantee in the form of a secret treaty between the Soviet Union and Great Britain of the return to the former of its 1941 boundaries.³⁹

Mr. Eden had stated that the Soviet Government was pressing more and more strongly for an immediate solution of this question.

Mr. Eden had stated that the Soviet Government was demanding a definite treaty in this regard between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and a more general treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. Eden had further made it clear that in return for this agreement on the part of Great Britain, the Soviet Union was willing to

³⁶ A memorandum and annex on the financial situation of the Polish Government and its expenditures incurred for war purposes were sent in a note of March 13, 1942, from the Polish Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State; not printed (860C.51/1488).

³⁷ See footnote 34, p. 113.

³⁸ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³⁹ For correspondence concerning a treaty between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, see pp. 490-566, *passim*.

guarantee to Great Britain that the latter would have a voice together with the Soviet Union in controlling and determining postwar affairs in central Europe. Mr. Eden had also intimated that the Soviet Government was pressing for an agreement by Great Britain that the former was to have increased control, political and economic, in Persia.

General Sikorski had emphasized in his telegram to Mr. Raczyński that concessions of this character made by Great Britain to Soviet imperialism would contribute to the destruction of any spirit of resistance on the part of the submerged nations of Europe and that they would probably also increase the possibility that additional neutral nations would go over to the Axis side. In his opinion Hitler would be given the opportunity which he desired, as soon as the nature of this secret treaty became known, which he thought it undoubtedly would, of proclaiming that the Axis powers were leading a holy crusade not only against communism but also against Russian imperialism.

General Sikorski believed that the moment was very critical in the war between the Axis powers and the United Nations and that conditions in Germany were becoming critical and within Italy they were already highly critical. He said that if this secret treaty were concluded it could only result in improving internal conditions in both Italy and Germany.

General Sikorski concluded by saying that he had implored Mr. Eden to drag on the negotiations and not to reach any immediate decision.

In reply I stated to the Acting Foreign Minister that no approach had been made to the United States directly by the Soviet Union in this matter. I said this Government knew of these negotiations only through the British Government. I stated further that no suggestion had been made that a general treaty be concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union and that it was my clear understanding that the only way in which the United States had been brought into the picture so far had been by reason of Mr. Eden's very proper statement to the Soviet Government that in view of the understandings between the United States and Great Britain, the British Government could give no final reply to the Soviet Union until after it had been afforded the opportunity of consulting with the United States.

I said that when General Sikorski visited Washington I had no doubt that the President would discuss the questions involved fully with him. For the moment I felt it possible only to say that the position of this Government was based upon the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter and that in the judgment of the President, questions of this character could only come up for final determination at the con-

clusion of the war when a victory had been won by the United Nations. I said that of course this Government believed that at that time the Soviet Government should be given every legitimate measure of security which it might legitimately require, but that the determination of what constituted legitimate measures of security when the war was over would necessarily be contingent upon many circumstances which might not now be foreseen. I stated specifically that the Atlantic Charter called for the disarmament of the aggressor nations and that if Germany were disarmed the Soviet Union would not have to provide the type of barrier between Germany and the Soviet Union which it had previously had to contemplate.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/1908 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1942—4 p. m.

Polish Series No. 12. Your 18, March 3, 5 p. m.⁴⁰

1. We feel strongly that the issuance of the joint declaration along the lines proposed would not be opportune just now and hope that a way may be found to let the project quietly drop without protracted discussions. Although the proposed declaration does not attempt to establish the precise outlines of a post war Europe, it nevertheless goes so far in this direction that a serious discussion of it would be almost certain to accentuate various inherent differences and might even result in the raising of a number of post war problems the consideration and disposition of which at this time would tend to distract the United Nations from their primary task of winning the war.

2. Unless you perceive some objection thereto it is, therefore, suggested that you immediately inform Sikorski that your Government is firmly of the opinion that the proposal should be quietly shelved with as little further discussion of it as possible. You should make it clear to Sikorski, and in your discretion to Cripps⁴¹ as well, that the views of your Government are not based upon any disagreement with the principles enunciated in the proposed declaration but by its conviction that at the present stage the unity of effort of the United Nations might be better preserved and more effectively utilized if we continue to take our stand upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter. We feel sure that you will be able to handle this delicate matter in such a manner that the interested Governments will understand that our

⁴⁰ Not printed ; but see footnote 34, p. 113.

⁴¹ Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons in the British War Cabinet as reconstituted in February 1942.

attitude is not prompted by any lack of sympathy or understanding on our part.

3. Please keep us fully informed regarding your conversations on this subject so that we may be able to supplement your remarks in our talks with Sikorski should the matter arise during the course of his coming visit.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/20288 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 13, 1942—6 p. m.
[Received March 13—2:40 p.m.]

Polish Series 21. For the President and the Acting Secretary. Your 12, March 6, 4 p. m. Sikorski is shelving discussion of the joint declaration for the present.

In discussing the matter with him, I did not mention that I had instructions about the matter. I said that after study it was my strong personal impression that the declaration was open to misconstruction; that while I saw no reason why the Allied Governments here should not quietly consider post-war questions I could not but feel that efforts to formalize them at this time were calculated to accentuate differences and to interfere with the primary objective of winning the war.

I asked him whether in view of these dangers he himself did not feel it was preferable to drop further discussion of the declaration. Sikorski indicated that he was conscious of the force of these ideas and that he had decided to postpone discussion for the present. It was also possible that on his return from Washington he might drop the matter altogether.

He went on to say that he intended to leave by plane in the near future arriving in Washington on or about March 22 to remain for about a week.

Sikorski later told me he had discussed matter with Eden and by coincidence Eden had indicated that he thought it desirable to let the declaration drop whereupon he, Sikorski, informed him that he had decided to do so for the present.

I later told Cripps of my talk with Sikorski. [He welcomed?] Sikorski's decision and expressed pleasure that in my conversation I had made the point that there was no desire to suppress quiet discussion of post-war problems by the Allied Governments here in advance of a general settlement. Cripps added that he considered an early Anglo-Russian understanding together with an indication of our attitude thereto, as a matter of crucial importance.

While Sikorski has thus dropped the idea of further discussion of the declaration for the time being, he has done so by his own volition and in no sense under the impression that he has acted at our instance.

[BIDDLE]

740.0011 European War 1939/20325 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 15, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received March 15—5 p. m.]

Polish Series 22. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Supplementing my Polish Series No. 21, March 13, 5 [6] p. m. In presenting his views to you, Sikorski will probably put forth somewhat same arguments he expressed in formal letter he wrote Eden ⁴² after his talks with latter and with me. The following are main points thereof:

1. He considered that Stalin's pressure for an agreement on his imperialistic post-war demands at this stage indicated (a) his lack of confidence in capacity of Russian forces to capture territories envisaged in demands, and (b) an attempt to take psychological advantage of circumstances currently favorable to Russia and unfavorable to the Allies.

Sikorski did not overrate the significance of the latest Russian successes; so far there had been no decisive German defeat. While he believed Russia would not lose the war, she would be put to tremendous effort to hold Caucasus oil fields. Four-fifths of the German forces were now engaged on eastern front. They still held the key operational bases including Crimea. Hitler now headquartering in Kiev was massing powerful force to strike in direction Rostov, Krasnodarsky Kray.

2. Sikorski strongly protested against recognition of Stalin's demands, emphasizing that to yield to Russian pressure at this moment, which might prove turning point for the Allies, would serve (a) to impair the faith of nations in the integrity of the Allies and in the justice of the cause for which they were fighting, (b) to undermine resistance within conquered countries and current efforts to bring about insurrections therein at the right moment, and (c) to strengthen Hitler's hand in his hitherto ineffective efforts to organize crusade against Bolshevism.

Sikorski moreover believed it would unfavorably influence the attitude of all neutral countries and on Catholic communities throughout

⁴² A copy of the letter was transmitted to the Department by Ambassador Biddle in his Polish Series despatch No. 131, March 18; not printed.

world; they must not be driven to face the choice between third Reich and Soviet Russia. At present they were facing only one dilemma: German bondage or freedom.

He furthermore believed it would work an evil effect in the United States and Latin America, thus weakening Anglo-American collaboration, hence the common war effort.

3. The Polish-Russian agreement and subsequent declaration ⁴³ which Sikorski had signed with Stalin had seemed to indicate latter had abandoned idea of world revolution; that he appreciated the solidarity of the Allies and their moral and material assistance.

Sikorski had therefore accepted these negotiations and postponed the question of compensation for wrongs inflicted on the Poles between 1939 and 1941. However, he ascribed Russian Government's present proposals not to its former political realism, but to Komintern's ⁴⁴ influence which had revived as result of Russian winter successes. Hence he no longer felt as previously that question of Poland's eastern frontiers could be settled between himself and Stalin on basis of justice. He would therefore want the presence of British and ourselves at settlement.

4. The Polish nation in light of its past and continued sacrifices and suffering for the common cause had right to believe in a Poland stronger than that which opposed the Reich.

[BIDDLE]

740.0011 European War 1939/20489 : Telegram

The Secretary of Embassy in Charge at Moscow (Thompson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 19, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received March 20—9:12 a. m.]

75. General Anders, ⁴⁵ Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces in the Soviet Union, informed me this evening that he had come to Moscow because he had been notified that effective March 20th the number of rations being furnished to the Polish troops would be drastically reduced. In an interview last evening Stalin told him that because of the serious food situation he is obliged to reduce the number of his reserves and that he cannot continue to furnish rations for more than 44,000 Polish troops. Stalin explained that he had expected to obtain 200,000 tons of wheat per month from America but because of the difficult shipping situation he has received only 60,000 tons.

⁴³ The Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed at Moscow, December 4, 1941; see footnote 26, p. 111.

⁴⁴ Third (Communist) International, founded in Moscow, March 1919, by the Bolsheviks.

⁴⁵ Lt. Gen. Wladyslaw Anders.

He also emphasized the difficulties caused by the fact that the territory which has been recaptured from the Germans is completely devastated and the population starving. Anders told me that he now has some 65,000 officers and men and that about 1,500 additional have been arriving daily.

Anders said that after a lengthy but cordial discussion Stalin had agreed to allow the Polish troops in excess of the rations available to be evacuated from the Soviet Union. Anders is leaving Moscow tomorrow for Tehran and subsequently London in order to make the necessary arrangements for the evacuation of these troops to British occupied Iran.

Anders also told me in the strictest confidence that while there has been no specific agreement on the subject he expects to evacuate a considerable number of Polish women and children to Iran with the troops and said he hoped that representatives of the American Red Cross would be available there to examine the situation of these unfortunate people. He said that their greatest need would be food although they are miserably clothed and many will be in need of medical attention.

THOMPSON

740.0011 European War 1939/20193

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs
(Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1942.

MR. WELLES: In his despatch no. 119 of February 20⁴⁶ Ambassador Biddle has furnished us with the clearest and most detailed picture which we have thus far been able to obtain regarding the current activities of the Governments in exile in London.

It would appear from this report that the demands made by Stalin upon Eden and the lack of firmness with which the British Government has met these demands have added to the tenseness of the atmosphere in exiled government circles and have tended to turn the minds of the leaders of the exiled Governments from the task of contributing to the winning of the war to matters pertaining more directly to their own peculiar national interests.

The Ambassador's letter to you,⁴⁷ as well as his despatch, assists in portraying the almost abject fear which United Nations circles in London have of doing anything which in their opinion might give offense to the Soviet Union. Apparently the only responsible government official in London who dares to do anything which might be dis-

⁴⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 21, p. 108.

⁴⁷ *Ante*, p. 108.

pleasing to Stalin is General Sikorski whose temerity unfortunately appears to be combined with a singular lack of astuteness and tact.

Although everyone seems to agree that the General is possessed of personal courage and integrity there seems to be little doubt that he has surrounded himself with second rate advisers, the honesty and disinterestedness of some of whom are open to question. Aroused apparently by the fact that those around him in England seemed almost paralyzed when facing the maneuvers of Stalin and apparently were unwilling to take any action to combat Stalin's machinations, which in his opinion were designed to obtain Soviet control of Eastern Europe and to reduce Poland to the status of a Soviet dependancy, he has ill-advisedly attempted to take poorly-timed action without apparently giving sufficient consideration to what the consequences might be. His efforts to lay at this particular moment the groundwork for a European confederation free from Soviet influence are obviously doomed to failure since the leaders of the other Governments in exile do not dare to take any action which might displease the Soviet Union at a time when one of the major objectives of the British Government is to keep Stalin in good humor.

The Ambassador's report makes it clear that Beneš continues to be one of the most astute and devious politicians of Europe. His game at the present time of course is to obtain an immediate guarantee of certain Czechoslovak frontiers by all the great anti-Axis Powers. In gaining such recognition he has the support of the Soviet Government and in return is supporting certain Soviet foreign policies. He is working for an agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain for an immediate definition of European frontiers because he feels that now is the proper time to obtain the most generous terms for Czechoslovakia. In connection with these activities he tries to play on both the hopes and fears of the British and American Governments. He points out that unless the British and American Governments come to a complete agreement regarding the future frontiers of Europe the Soviet Union will be the only great Power which will have a clearly defined plan of its own, and as a result will have a distinct advantage in the drawing up of the outlines of the future Europe. He apparently argues that therefore the British and American Governments must work out a plan for Europe—which it is understood has already given guarantees so far as Czechoslovakia is concerned. He takes the position that in case an agreement should be reached at once by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union with regard to Europe, there can be a durable peace. He hints that on the other hand, if the Soviet Union should be displeased, it might proceed to carry out its own plans with regard to Europe, including an increase in the activities of the Communist International

and a resurgence of Bolshevik revolutionary activity throughout the continent.

From the penultimate paragraph of Mr. Biddle's letter, it would appear that he is not in close touch with Polish circles in the United States. In this paragraph he expresses the fear that Sikorski may "launch some form of subtle anti-Russian play among the Polish-American communities in our country". It is believed that Polish-American circles in this country are inclined in general to be much more suspicious of the Russians than Sikorski, himself, and that they have been disposed to criticize him for entering into an agreement with the Soviet Union which did not contain adequate safeguards for Poland. In fact, Sikorski in the past has been compelled to defend his actions before Polish circles in this country. For him to launch an anti-Soviet campaign in the United States just now among the Poles would enable his political enemies to enlarge upon their contention that he made a mistake in signing the Polish-Soviet Agreement.

From various sources we have indications that the British are, however, somewhat disturbed lest the General, while in this country, make certain statements which will tend to cause dissatisfaction among Polish and other Eastern European groups in this country with recent trends in British Foreign policies.

R[AY] A[THURSTON]

860C.20/111 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Thurston)*

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1942—9 p. m.

134. The War Department has assigned Major Henry I. Szymanski, Infantry, as Liaison Officer between the Polish Forces in the Near East and the American Army. Since the Commander of the Polish Forces is in Kuibyshev and since there are considerable Polish troops in the Soviet Union, it will be desirable for Major Szymanski in the performance of his duties to visit Kuibyshev and such points in the Soviet Union at which the main Polish Forces are concentrated. The War Department asks,⁴⁸ therefore, that this Department endeavor to arrange with the appropriate Soviet authorities for issuance to him of a visa.

WELLES

⁴⁸ Letter of March 19, 1942, from the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to the Secretary of State; not printed.

860C.20/111

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1942.

Please note the attached telegram to Kuibyshev.⁴⁹ It is doubted that the Soviet Government will permit Major Szymanski to enter the Soviet Union as Liaison Officer between the Polish forces in the Soviet Union and the American Army. We know from experience that the Soviet Government is suspicious of any project which involves an American Army officer engaging in any traveling in the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, since the Army is anxious that Szymanski should spend some time with the Polish high command in Kuibyshev and the Polish troops in the Soviet Union, we have decided that we should not refuse to refer the matter to the Soviet Government.

The draft of this telegram has been read to Colonel Guenther⁵⁰ of Military Intelligence who has been handling the matter in the War Department and he has approved of the proposed status defined in it of Szymanski.

It is believed that formal permission should be asked of the Soviet authorities in a matter of this kind before an application is made for a visa.⁵¹

R[AY] A[THERTON]

860C.002/3-2542

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 25, 1942.

The Polish Prime Minister, General Sikorski, accompanied by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Raczynski, and the Polish Ambassador, Mr. Ciechanowski, called to see me this afternoon.

General Sikorski told me that he had been deeply gratified by his conversation with the President.⁵² I said that the President had spoken with me of the conversation and had expressed his own gratifi-

⁴⁹ *Supra.*

⁵⁰ Col. Gustav B. Guenther.

⁵¹ Efforts to secure an entry permit for Major Szymanski to enter the Soviet Union were unsuccessful, and in telegram No. 231, May 16, 9 p.m. (not printed), the Department concurred in the Ambassador's proposal in telegram No. 393, May 12 (not printed), to inform Molotov that "we have withdrawn our proposal to assign Szymanski as liaison officer with the Polish forces in Russia in favor of his suggestion that such liaison be maintained by the American and Polish Military Attachés, adding that in this connection we assume that our Military Attaché will be permitted to accompany his Polish colleague from time to time when the latter visits the Polish forces." (740.0011 European War 1939/21561.)

⁵² No record of this conversation found in Department files.

cation at the opportunity he had had of exchanging views with, and of obtaining information from, General Sikorski.

The Prime Minister first of all gave me a graphic account of his interviews last December with Stalin. He impressed upon me repeatedly his belief that the reason why he, the representative of a defeated and occupied country, had been able to reach so satisfactory an understanding and agreement with Stalin, and an agreement which involved real concessions on the Soviet side, was the fact that he had spoken with complete frankness to Stalin, had been entirely blunt in his conversations with him and had at no time resorted to the somewhat roundabout diplomatic and frankly timorous methods which the British representatives had employed and were employing in their relations with the Soviet Government.

General Sikorski said that Stalin had at the outset of their conferences pressed him repeatedly to agree to a territorial understanding in the form of a secret treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union, which would have involved the cession to Poland of East Prussia, the recognition by Poland of the right of the Soviet Union to obtain sovereignty over the Baltic states and a slight modification of the original East Polish frontiers with the Soviet Union. General Sikorski told me that he had refused to enter into any such understandings and had repeatedly stated that Poland could not enter into any agreements of this character until the war had been won. He stated that at the latter part of this phase of his discussions with Stalin, the latter had said, "Will you not at least enter into a very little agreement with me?" General Sikorski had replied that he would not enter into even the littlest agreement of that character, and he continued that from that moment on until the departure of General Sikorski from Moscow Stalin had never again brought up the subject.

The Prime Minister emphasized to me what he had already said to the President that if the British undertook to discuss agreements of this character with the Soviet Union, they would later on find themselves confronted by additional and greater demands, involving not only sovereignty by the Soviet Union over Bukovina and Bessarabia, but probably East Poland and eventually even the Dardanelles, the Balkans and Iran. He said the British were considering a fatally mistaken policy. He insisted that under no conditions, save German defeat or a complete defeat of the Soviet armies, would Stalin again enter into a separate peace with Hitler. For that reason the whole British premise was erroneous.

He added that when the Russians were apparently winning considerable victories in January and February, their attitude towards Poland and the Polish troops in the Soviet Union had become overbearing and dictatorial. In recent weeks this attitude had once more

changed and he felt that the Russians were to so great a degree dependent upon Great Britain and the United States for assistance in withstanding the anticipated German offensive this spring that the Russians would never persist in their demands upon Great Britain for an agreement involving future territorial changes if the British Government would only for once take a firm stand similar to that which the President here had taken.

General Sikorski stated that the German losses this past winter totaled two million men killed or hopelessly incapacitated through wounds for future combatant service. He said that except for oil, of which there would be a desperate shortage in Germany by the end of the summer unless Germany in the meantime obtained access to major oil supplies, Germany would be short of nothing that she required for a major offensive, except man power. He stated that the man power situation in Germany had already reached a most acute stage. In reply to an inquiry from me he confirmed my understanding that Germany was now obliged actually to take men from war industrial production and from agricultural production in order to supply the deficiencies in the divisions on her eastern front.

He went on to say that in his judgment the Soviet Union this past winter had only won tactical victories, that she had by no means inflicted a defeat upon Germany. He said that of course Germany had lost the battle of 1941 in the sense that she had not been able to achieve her objectives, but that there was no feeling in Germany on the part of either the army or the population that Germany had suffered any defeat at the hands of the Russians. In other words, the feeling was that she had merely been delayed in attaining her objective. He expressed the belief, however, that because of the two deficiencies above mentioned, the German offensive against the Soviet Union this spring would not be as powerful as her offensive of last year.

He stated that he had learned from information he had received since he arrived in Washington that the German plans called for an offensive before the end of April and not as late as the beginning of June, which had been the plan agreed upon by the German High Command at the time he left London last week.

General Sikorski then returned to the subject of the negotiations between the British Government and the Soviet Union concerning territorial rectifications. He handed me the following memorandum, transmitted on March 24⁵³ to Mr. Eden in London:

"I. The Polish Government declares emphatically that from the time of Russia joining the Allies, one of the most essential aims of Polish foreign policy has been the maintenance and the strengthening of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. This policy, initiated

⁵³ The note was actually transmitted on March 27.

by the Polish Government in July 1941,⁵⁴ has met with approval and has been fully endorsed by the Polish Nation which has always definitely rejected all attempts of the Third Reich to gain the Poles for the idea of an anti-Bolshevik crusade led by Germany.

"This policy is not dictated solely by the needs of the struggle against a common and merciless foe. Loyal collaboration of both States lies, in the opinion of the Polish Government, at the root of a stabilized European order after the war, constituting its most efficient guarantee. In order that such a collaboration should be expedient it must be based upon honest respect of one another's independence and upon mutual confidence. If this is to be attained we must avoid decisions concerning a territorial settlement which, in the East, might become the nuclei of conflict in the future. Good neighborly relations, and Polish-Soviet friendship, are essential elements of a durable peace.

"II. At the outset of the war all the Allies, as well as almost all neutral nations, including the United States, expressed the just principle that any changes of boundaries between States, effected by force and by methods of aggression, cannot be recognized, and that no settlement of the political status of Europe or of the other parts of the world can be attained before the end of the war.

"The principle, which conforms to international law, is being broken only by Nations whose imperialism prompts them to ever recurring acts of aggression. In the course of time, as the occupation of the European continent by Germany and her satellites progressed, Great Britain and the Allied Nations supported this view as representing the moral principles of justice which should henceforth control international relations. The Allies were prompted in their internal adherence to this principle also by its expediency for the conduct of the war. They undoubtedly accepted the view that stable conditions cannot be fixed amidst the fluid elements of war.

"Moreover, the peoples living under the terror in occupied countries constitute valuable national elements of future victory. At least such are the Nations which reject any collaboration with the Germans, organize diversions and prepare for open rebellion which, at the appropriate time, of our own choosing, will become a decisive element in winning the war. Their stubborn resistance to the oppressor immobilizes considerable military forces of the enemy, causing him inconvenience.

"After the downfall of France, Great Britain advanced this view as formulated above to the status of an official political doctrine, expressed in the declaration of the Prime Minister on September 5, 1940.⁵⁵ The other Allied Governments rallied to this doctrine. Thanks to these declarations, the thesis of non-recognition of acts of physical coercion committed during the war, has become a basic principle for which the Democracies are fighting.

"A second parallel Allied thesis concerning the world order after the war is bindingly and clearly formulated in the Atlantic Charter.

"At this juncture, and still during the struggle, the Soviet Government demands the recognition by Great Britain of some of her annexa-

⁵⁴ With the negotiations for the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.

⁵⁵ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 365, col. 39.

tions of 1939/40. This action would undoubtedly invalidate the two aforementioned Allied principles.

"The Polish Government considers the Soviet request as harmful to the general war policy. It would not add one soldier to the Allied Armies, nor would it improve in the least the war situation. On the contrary, it would destroy confidence in Allied integrity and in the wisdom of the political conduct of the war. It would create chaos in the world of political ideas both in Europe and beyond. It would dangerously weaken the moral forces of Democracy. Such decisions would be exploited by the enemy not only in occupied countries but also in neutral States. On the eve of the Spring offensive this appears particularly dangerous.

"The Polish Government fails to see any material advantage which Soviet Russia could gain in her relation to Germany should her request be granted by H. M. Government. Russia is fighting and is fighting valiantly because she is fighting for her own salvation.

"Rumors circulated by Germany regarding the possibility of a separate peace with Russia are either an attempt at blackmail or an illusion based upon wishful thinking. It is unlikely that Germany should renounce her war aims, so loudly proclaimed to her own people at a time when Germany is making a maximum aggressive effort against Russia.

"Germany might tend to conclude a separate peace with Russia in two eventualities alone:

"1) If Germany's Spring offensive were to break down without achieving basic strategic aims.

"2) If the Russian Army were to be defeated, eventually with the assistance of Japan. In this instance Germany would achieve her Eastern war aims, dictating her own terms to conquered Russia.

"Both of these alternatives are very remote at the present time.

"Soviet Russia was forced into the war and must continue to fight to the end in order to save the régime, which for Soviet Russia constitutes a matter of life and death.

"III. Apart from the view expressed in par. II of this memorandum, the Polish Government would like to analyze those aspects of an eventual British-Soviet agreement which would most directly affect vital Polish interests. In particular it desires to draw the attention of H. M. Government to p. 2 (b) of the secret Protocol attached to the agreement of August 25, 1939,⁵⁶ p. (b) [*sic*] concerning Lithuania. The wording of this paragraph is unequivocal and clear. The Government of Great Britain confirms in it the maintenance of Lithuanian independence as being equally vital to Poland as that of Belgium and Holland is to Great Britain.

"The Polish Government took the liberty to draw the attention of H. M. Government to the contents of the said Protocol in a note dated December 30, 1941.

"The above mentioned text is the legal expression of the political reality. An independent Lithuania can never become a threat to her

⁵⁶ The treaty of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland, signed at London; for text of treaty and protocol, see British Cmd. 6616, Poland No. 1 (1945).

neighbors or other States of this European region. On the contrary, the annexation of Lithuania by powerful Soviet Russia would be particularly dangerous to Poland, rendering her situation in the North East more precarious and making her neighborly relations more difficult. Russia cannot justify by strategic arguments of her own security her demands regarding Lithuania, a country devoid of natural port facilities in the Baltic.

"Lithuania is inhabited by a Catholic peasantry and townfolk deeply attached to the ownership of their small property.

"The Polish Government considers the full sovereignty of Lithuania as a basic principle of its foreign policy and stresses once more the view that this can in no way affect friendly Polish-Soviet relations.

"Analogous to the Lithuanian problem is that of Bukovina. No Polish-British legal document relates to the Bukovinian question. It was not necessary to regulate the matter owing to a valid British guarantee given to Rumania⁵⁷ at that time, whereas the Polish-Rumanian defensive alliance⁵⁸ was also fully operative. The possession of Bukovina by Russia⁵⁹ does not constitute an element of security. The country, devoid as it is, of maritime or Danubian bases, bound by ties of many common interests with Rumania and Poland, whose continuity it assures, had never belonged in the past to Russia and never was the object of Russian declared aspirations. These aspirations could therefore be explained only in terms of designs for eventual aggression in Central Europe, and more particularly in the Balkans.

"It must also be stressed that the concurrence of H. M. Government in the annexation of Lithuania and Bukovina by the Soviets would signify approval of Polish encirclement by Soviet Russia from the North, the East and the South. Thus in the East the strategic situation of Poland would become analogous to her situation in the West in 1939, when, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and particularly Slovakia, Germany surrounded Poland on three sides.

"IV. H. M. Government is aware of the vital importance to Poland of the Vilna District and of the whole Eastern area of Poland. The Vilna District, with its Polish population, Polish civilization and traditions, has become an object of local contention with Lithuania which was utilized in no small measure by Germany in provoking long international discussions.

"The Soviet Union declared in Art. 3 of the Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921,⁶⁰ its absolute disinterestment in regard to the Polish-Lithuanian disagreement concerning the Vilna territory. The terri-

⁵⁷ The guarantee to Rumania was announced for both Great Britain and France by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons on April 13, 1939 (*Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 348, col. 13), and simultaneously in the House of Lords by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax (*ibid.*, House of Lords, 5th series, vol. 112, col. 612).

⁵⁸ Originally signed at Bucharest on March 3, 1921; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. VII, p. 78. Renewed, with some changes, on March 26, 1926, and January 15, 1931; for texts, see *ibid.*, vol. LX, p. 162, and vol. CXV, p. 171, respectively.

⁵⁹ For correspondence concerning the activities of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and the seizure of Bessarabia and Bukovina, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 444 ff.

⁶⁰ Treaty of peace between the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and Poland signed at Riga, March 18, 1921; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. VI, p. 123.

tory was occupied by the Russian army in September 1939, and later on October 10, 1939, it was ceded by Russia to Lithuania, the latter being at that time still independent. Annexed for a second time in 1940, it was made part of Soviet Russia by force as a component of the so-called Lithuanian Soviet Republic.⁶¹ These arbitrary proceedings were recognized solely by Germany. The Polish Government protested this action to the Allied and Neutral Powers.

"The Polish Government declares that any questioning of the Polish rights to the Vilna territory would be regarded as directly endangering Poland's territorial integrity.

"V. It is the considered opinion of the Polish Government that, in terms of the alliance between Poland and Great Britain, Poland should join in the discussions between Great Britain and Russia of all matters affecting Poland directly or indirectly. The exclusion of the Polish-Russian boundaries from such discussions and leaving them to a separate agreement between Poland and Russia, would stand in contradiction to the terms and the spirit of the Treaty of August 25, 1939. The conclusion of this Treaty contributed to Poland's decision to take up arms in this war so terrible in its effects for Poland, and to the unflinching prosecution of the war until the present time in spite of German policies of extermination and wanton destruction.

"The Polish Government also draws attention to the fact that the Polish-Soviet boundaries were established by the Treaty of Riga of 1921, freely negotiated by both contracting parties. These boundaries represent in fact a compromise between the pre-partition frontiers of Poland and the temporary frontiers of Russia of 1941.

"In the Polish-Soviet declaration of December 4, 1941, signed by the Polish and the Soviet Prime Ministers, the necessity for respecting international engagements was particularly stressed. Following par. 3 of the secret Protocol to the British-Polish Agreement of August 25, 1939, as well as general mutual obligations, H. M. Government recognized the territorial integrity of the Polish State. Moreover, in his letter of July 30, 1941, addressed to the Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Eden declared that H. M. Government does not recognize any territorial changes effected in Poland after August 1939. The Polish Government takes the liberty to draw the attention of H. M. Government to the circumstance that the above mentioned letter formed the subject of diplomatic negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941. This letter therefore is an integral part of this political act, concluded with the help of British mediation. The political realism shown by Poland on that occasion undoubtedly served the Allied cause and that of Great Britain in particular.

"The Polish Government emphatically declares that the best safeguard of Russian security from German aggression is a strong Poland linked to Russia by ties of sincere friendship. It is our aim to restore such a Poland in complete harmony and friendship with Russia at the time of victory over the Third Reich, regarding all boundary problems

⁶¹ For correspondence concerning pressure by the Soviet Union upon the Baltic States in 1939 to conclude pacts of mutual assistance, and the forcible occupation and incorporation of them by the Soviet Union in 1940, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1938-1939*, pp. 934 ff.; and *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

as a whole. Then only will be the time for the solution of the problem of security. Such solution will have to take into account, in a spirit of fairness and realism, the legitimate interests of Russia and of Poland as well as those of other States of that region of Central and Western Europe.

"March 24, 1942"

I told General Sikorski that this would be extremely helpful to me but that I thought, in order that there might be no misunderstanding between our two Governments, that I had better crystallize the position of this Government with regard to this general subject.

I stated that the views of the President, as already communicated to the British Government, were as follows:

1. The United States will approve no secret treaty during the course of the present world war.

2. The President believes that all questions involving definitive boundaries and territorial readjustments in Europe should be determined only after the war is won.

3. The policy of the United States is clearly set forth in the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter.

4. This Government will, however, be glad to receive the views of the other United Nations as to their feelings with regard to the national interests of their own peoples in order that it may give full consideration to these problems and be in a position to determine its own views, after such consideration, when the time comes for these questions to be finally settled.⁶²

I asked if the views as thus set forth were in accord with the views of the Polish Government. General Sikorski replied that his Government was completely in accord with the statements I had made to him covering the views of the United States.

General Sikorski then said that the Polish Government believed that the peace of Europe would be best assured in the post-war period with the creation of a federation of the Eastern European States lying between the Baltic and the Aegean Seas. I said that I had heard of this conception which was most interesting. I did not pursue the subject.

The Prime Minister then handed me a memorandum indicating the need for reprisals against Germany in view of the atrocities being committed by German authorities in Poland. The memorandum reads as follows:

"I. The Polish Government has been receiving lately numerous trustworthy reports from Poland relating to a recrudescence and

⁶² According to a memorandum by Ambassador Biddle on April 10, 1942, after his return from Washington, the Acting Polish Foreign Minister, Count Raczynski, told Ambassador Biddle on April 10, that he had discussed with President Roosevelt the desire of Stalin to get a three-cornered agreement on postwar western frontier aims. "The President thereupon stated that his policy was to uphold the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter; that this was no time to draw up agreements on post-war frontiers. The war had first to be won."

intensification of the number of terrorist acts and crimes committed against the Polish and Jewish population by the German authorities of occupation. These acts are of a nature unprecedented as regards cruelty and bestiality. The reports describe acts of mass executions carried out after infliction of indescribable mutilation and torture with a refinement of brutality and sadism which can only be qualified as inhuman in the fullest sense of the word.

"II. The Polish Nation which has, for two years and a half, been suffering from ever increasing ruthless treatment at the hands of its oppressors, calls upon its Government to appeal to the United Nations for immediate action in view of stopping this inhuman extermination of the Polish people.

"III. The Polish people express the conviction that this could be brought about only by immediate measures of retaliation applied to German nationals wherever this is possible and their publication in a way which will bring it to the knowledge of the German nation.

"IV. On January 13th, 1942, an Inter-Allied Declaration relating to retribution for war crimes was signed in London by the Representatives of countries occupied by Germany.⁶³ This solemn Act took place under the Chairmanship of General Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland, in the presence of the Representatives of the U. S. A., Great Britain and the British Dominions, Soviet Russia and China. By this Declaration the signatories wished: (1) to make certain (according to the Declaration made on September [October] 25, 1941, by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill⁶⁴) that the responsibilities of the individual war criminals would not be evaded in the future, (2) to establish as from now a record of the various cases, and publicly to denounce the crimes, which had come to their knowledge, thus endeavoring to produce a preventive effect on the morale of the occupants.

"V. Notwithstanding this Declaration, German outrages in Poland are on the increase and call for energetic and immediate action.

"Washington, March 24th, 1942."

He handed me likewise a copy of a declaration, issued as recently as January 20, by representatives of all of the Polish political parties. The text is as follows:

"At the present time, when the European War enters in its decisive phase, no Polish citizen would undertake conversations with the German authorities on political questions. Nobody besides is authorized to do so by the Polish Government or the Polish people.

"In order to explain the attitude of the Polish Nation towards Germany and her representatives, it is necessary to state the following:

"1) The German armed forces have attacked the Polish State on the 1st of September 1939 by order of the supreme authorities of the

⁶³ See Polish Series telegram No. 4, January 14, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), vol. 1, p. 45.

⁶⁴ President Roosevelt issued a statement on October 25, 1941, denouncing the execution of hostages by the Nazis (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1941, p. 317). On the same day Prime Minister Churchill issued a statement associating his Government with the President's statement, and adding: "Retribution for these crimes must henceforward take its place among the major purposes of the war." (*Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 447.)

Reich and they have thus created a state of war between Poland and Germany. This state of war continues to exist *de jure* as well as *de facto*. *De jure*—because the war has not been terminated either by armistice or by peace, *de facto*—because the Polish Armed Forces are still carrying on the war with Germany, for the time being outside the frontiers of Poland, and inside of Poland the entire Polish Nation is fighting the Germans. The Polish Armed Forces have been fighting, are fighting and shall continue to fight on land, on sea and in the air, wherever the military forces of Germany can be destroyed.

"2) The Polish Republic has a legally constituted Government, temporarily residing in London, a Government recognized by all the great Powers who are carrying on the war against the aggressors, namely: Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China, as well as the other United Nations and neutral countries. This Government only has the exclusive right to speak in the name of the Polish Republic and enter into agreements with other Powers. Any conversations carried on by persons not authorized by the Polish Government, or any agreements or understandings concluded by such persons are null and void.

"3) A Polish citizen, who—notwithstanding this legal situation—dared to negotiate with the enemy on questions regarding the future of Poland, would commit an act of treason towards the Polish State and Polish people.

"In addition it must be stated that,

"4) The activities of the German authorities on Polish territories are marked with continuous criminal violation of all the international laws as provided in the Hague Conventions,⁶⁵ brutal destruction of the Polish people and the annihilation of the whole Polish cultural life. The guiding principle of all the party authorities who are ruling occupied Poland—as far as the life of the civilian population in the General Gouvernement is concerned—is, according to their own statements, exclusively the interest of Germany. It is impossible to imagine that a Polish citizen could collaborate in extending the limits of German interests.

"5) The attempt of the German authorities to break the unity of Polish lands by means of fictitious frontier lines and limit Poland to a small administrative district—the so-called General Gouvernement—betrays their insidious plan of destroying the nine million Polish inhabitants of Western Poland, a land which for centuries has remained in hands of their forefathers—and to pillage their property. No political contacts of any kind whatsoever are therefore permissible with an enemy who in such way interprets his relationship to the Polish Nation.

"The political attitude of the Polish Nation must correspond in principles to which Poland remains true since the outbreak of this war, those of a just retaliation for aggression and the crimes committed and of fighting the enemy until the complete liberation of the country is achieved.

"Warsaw, January 20th, 1942."

⁶⁵ For texts of the Hague Conventions signed on October 18, 1907, see *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1181–1283.

The Prime Minister asked if it would not be possible for him to have some final decisions with regard to the various questions before he left Washington next Monday ⁶⁶ on his return journey to England. I told him I would make every effort to do so. I said that, as he knew, several of the requests previously made of me by his Ambassador, at his instance, had already been accepted in principle and that what remained to be done was to work out the details.

During the conference the Polish Ambassador acted as interpreter since General Sikorski did not trust his French, and the Polish Foreign Minister acted as stenographer.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/20830

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Polish Series No. 137

LONDON, March 30, 1942.

[Received April 6.]

DEAR SIR: Referring to my despatch Polish series No. 89, of December 12, 1941,⁶⁷ wherein I reported the substance of General Sikorski's arrangement with M. Stalin for the evacuation of about 25,000 Polish troops for service partly in the Middle East, partly in Britain, I have the honor herein to report the following information and observations imparted to me both by the Acting Chief of Polish Military Intelligence, and by the Polish Foreign Office Specialist on Russian affairs:

They said that the Russian military authorities had issued orders for the evacuation into Iran of about 40,000 Polish troops, now in the area just east of Kuibyshev, to commence on March 25. According to latest information, this movement was already under way. These instructions had been, for the Polish military authorities in Russia, as well as for the Polish authorities here, a source of surprise. The only explanation given by the Russian authorities was the shortage of food and arms; that the Russians were finding it difficult to feed these troops, and impossible to find sufficient arms and equipment for them. My informants said that in absence of further clarification, they were able only to speculate as [to] the real motive behind this move. On the face of it, they were inclined to feel that it did not presage well for Polish-Russian relations. It seemed to them that, on the one hand, the Russians no longer wished to have so many Polish troops con-

⁶⁶ March 30.

⁶⁷ Not printed; but see telegram No. 2041, December 11, 1941, from the Charge in the Soviet Union, and the memorandum of December 27, 1941, received from the Polish Ambassador in Washington, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 267 and 269, respectively.

centrated in one area in Russia, and, on the other hand, they wanted to eliminate any pretext for Polish insistence that, in event the Russians forced their way into Polish territory, these and perhaps additional Polish forces accompany the Russian forces.

Since it had become known to the Polish community in the Kuibyshev area that these troops were to be moved into Iran, there had been somewhat of a rush on part of the hitherto unenrolled Poles, to join up [with] the forces. (It was therefore difficult at this moment to estimate the present total beyond the original 40,000). Strangely enough moreover, this rush to enlist, was apparently being permitted by the Russian authorities. Moreover, it was estimated that about 10,000 Polish civilians, mostly women and children, were to be permitted to accompany the troops into Iran. In this connection, however, the British military authorities in Russia had objected to the evacuation of this civilian element into Iran on grounds of lack of food and accommodations. Consequently the Polish Government authorities here were about to make a formal and urgent request of the British Government that it permit these civilians to enter Iran. In presenting their case, the Polish authorities would point out that although living conditions in Iran might be uncertain and poor at best, they would undoubtedly be an improvement over the hardships these civilians had been and were now enduring in Russia.

In connection with the foregoing, and in particular with my informant's interpretation of the Russian authorities' instruction to evacuate the presently assembled Polish forces, the following observations may be of interest: it may be recalled that in previous writings I pointed out (a) that in initiating steps to bring about a declaration of post-war principles on part of the Allied Governments established here, General Sikorski was risking Russian suspicion and ire, which in turn might conceivably work to the disadvantage of whatever arrangements he had previously made with M. Stalin; (b) that I had discerned accumulating irritation on part of Russian diplomatic quarters here over the public utterances of certain Polish authorities; for example, Foreign Minister Raczynski's statement to effect that Poland regarded Lithuania as historically lying within her sphere of interest; statement by the Polish press organs here regarding Poland's insistence on the *status quo ante* as regards the Polish-Russian frontier. Only recently the Russian Ambassador to the Polish Government⁶⁹ told me that Moscow had long been annoyed by the Polish Government's frequently published contention that there were between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 Polish men, women and children in Russia. Moreover, Moscow was equally annoyed that the British press should

⁶⁹ Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Allied Governments in Exile at London.

continue to publish these figures. They were erroneous. Indeed, there were probably no more than 300,000 racial Poles in Russia. He could not understand why the British press had allowed itself to become the instrument of the policy of Polish propagandists.⁷⁰

Since my above-described talk with the Russian Ambassador the Polish National Council, on March 17, adopted a formal resolution stating in effect that despite Lithuania's unjustified pretensions to the essentially Polish city of Vilno, the Polish National Council, in the name of the entire Polish nation, wished for the Lithuanian nation, the swiftest possible return to the road of progress of its Christian western culture, in cooperation with the nations of central Europe, after it had been liberated from the German occupation and had recovered complete independence.

The publication of this resolution, coming as it did at the time of General Sikorski's visit to Washington, served to augment Russian annoyance which his visit had already aroused. In mentioning the foregoing points, I feel that they call for consideration in searching for whatever motive there might be behind the Russian authorities' having ordered the evacuation of the Polish forces from the Kuibyshev area into Iran.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/20959

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Acting Secretary of State*⁷¹

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have today received a telegram from General Sikorski who left Canada this morning, requesting me to ask you to convey to The President the General's most sincere thanks for the sympathetic understanding which The President showed him regarding all the problems of Poland which he had the honor of discussing with The President and with you.

General Sikorski would like especially to express his gratitude for the President's support of these matters in Moscow and London.

At the same time General Sikorski asks me to convey to you personally his thanks for all your kindness and your favorable attitude in all the questions which he submitted to you. He would like you to

⁷⁰ Considerable comment and selections of official Polish documents concerning the Polish armed forces in the Soviet Union, and the attempts to obtain the release of, and to furnish relief for, Polish deportees and refugees located within the Soviet Union are printed in several chapters in Republic of Poland, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*.

⁷¹ This communication was acknowledged by the Acting Secretary of State on April 9. On the same day he sent a copy of the Ambassador's letter to President Roosevelt.

know that, according to cable information received by him yesterday from the Polish Ambassador in the U. S. S. R.,⁷² the effect of the support granted to him during his visit in Washington is already apparent in improving the present situation between Poland and the Soviet Union.

This has been evidenced by the cooperation on the part of the Soviet authorities in the evacuation of part of our army from Russia to Iran.

General Sikorski foresees that the British authorities in Iran will have a difficult task in looking after the families of our military, a limited number of whom have already arrived in Iran. He would be most grateful if the United States Minister in Iran⁷³ would lend his valuable assistance to the British authorities in this matter.

General Sikorski concludes by expressing the conviction that the method of friendly and frank dealing pursued by him in his relations with Premier Stalin and the U. S. S. R. Government has proved effective and best calculated to serve the interest of the United Nations.

With warm regards, I am, dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours very sincerely,

J. CIECHANOWSKI

740.0011 European War 1939/20193

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1942.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have read with interest your letter of February 20, 1942⁷⁴ and your despatch no. 119 of the same date⁷⁵ a copy of which you were so thoughtful as to attach to your letter. This despatch and others which have been received during the last few weeks from you have aided us in obtaining a clear and detailed picture of the hopes, fears, and activities of the various refugee governments in London.

The information contained in your recent despatches relating to Poland were particularly helpful to us during the period of General Sikorski's visit. As he will probably inform you, the General had a number of talks with the President. I had several conversations with him and was favorably impressed with his understanding of the European situation and with the vigorous and frank manner in which

⁷² Stanislaw Kot.

⁷³ Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr.

⁷⁴ *Ante*, p. 108.

⁷⁵ Not printed.

he presented the policies of his Government. In my opinion he left here pleased with the results of his visit.

According to information which has reached us but of which we have not obtained confirmation, General Sikorski's visit to the United States has also served to improve relations between himself and Ciechanowski, which you know have not been good since the retirement of Zaleski.⁷⁶

We are pleased that you were able to assist in bringing about the shelving of General Sikorski's plan for working out immediately a post war confederation of the anti-Axis powers on the European continent. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union would have been convinced that such a plan was primarily aimed at it. Now is not the time to launch movements for post war settlements which might be offensive to the Russians. On the other hand we are not inclined to take the position that in order to keep the Russians in good humor we should agree at this time to all of their various projects for a post war Europe.

Your comments with regard to Beneš are interesting. We have the impression here that the Czechs may be rather heavily committed to the Russians and may be working more closely with them than they would like for their other allies to realize. Your opinion on this point would be of interest.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/20830 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1942—8 p. m.

Polish Series No. 16. Reference your despatch 137 of March 30, 1942 relating to the evacuation of Polish troops into Iran. We have also received information from Kuibyshev that large numbers of Polish troops and civilians are being moved into Iran.

Please discreetly inquire and inform the Department as soon as possible: (A) regarding the number of troops and civilians which have already been evacuated, the total number to be evacuated, and the rate at which they are being evacuated; (B) whether the evacuation is being conducted in an orderly manner in accordance with

⁷⁶ August Zaleski resigned his post as Foreign Minister of the Polish Government in Exile on July 26, 1941, prior to the signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941.

plans or whether the Poles are being dumped indiscriminately regardless of the existence or non existence of facilities to shelter, clothe, feed, and hospitalize them; and who are being evacuated.

We are concerned lest an indiscriminate dumping of Poles into Northern Iran may not lead to a major tragedy as a result of the lack of facilities to care for them.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/20960: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 13, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received April 13—3:05 p. m.]

Polish Series 31. For the President and the Acting Secretary. Your 16, April 10, 8 p. m. Sikorski states the following have arrived partly at Pahlevi, Iran, and partly at Krasnovodsk in Turkmen [Soviet Socialist Republic]: 1,603 officers, 28,427 soldiers, 1,159 auxiliary women's corps, 12,619 civilians, mostly women and children, including 2,000 youths approaching military age. This makes a total of 43,808 persons. Those still at Krasnovodsk are to be transported immediately to Pahlevi to join the others. Their general state of health and morale is reported to be good. British military authorities are supervising their welfare. Further information as to their care is not available at this moment.

Sikorski has just telegraphed Stalin that he regards this move as part of their agreement wherein Stalin promised to permit about 25,000 troops to leave Russia for service partly in the Near East, partly in Britain. Sikorski furthermore told Stalin he now hoped he would reopen the recruiting stations to permit the Polish military authorities continue the organization of the Polish force in Russia.

[BIDDLE]

741.6111/6: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 13, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received April 13—2:55 p. m.]

Polish Series 30. For the President and the Acting Secretary. Sikorski tells me that following his Government's notification by the British Government that conversations looking towards a British-

Russian agreement would start at noon today, he sent a note to the British Government stating in effect (a) that these conversations coming on top of his memorandum of March 27,⁷⁷ copy of which he handed you in Washington, were for him and his Government a source of great regret, and (b) that the Polish Government would want to participate in the conversations in event they touched upon Lithuania and/or Bukovina, questions which the Polish Government considered of vital interest to Poland.

[BIDDLE]

740.0011 European War 1939/21043¾

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt*⁷⁸

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing herewith a memorandum handed me today by the Polish Ambassador⁷⁹ in accordance with instructions he had received today from General Sikorski.

With regard to the request of General Sikorski set forth on page 6 of this memorandum, I stated to the Ambassador that, in my judgment, you had already made known to the British Government in the clearest terms the views of the Government of the United States in regard to this question, and that it seemed to me there was nothing you could add at this time to the views you had already expressed. I added, however, that if you desired me to communicate any further or additional message to General Sikorski with regard to this point, I would let the Ambassador know.

With regard to the last point mentioned in this memorandum, I have already sent a cable tonight to our Embassy in London⁸⁰ suggesting to General Marshall that he have a conference with General Sikorski.⁸¹

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

⁷⁷ The memorandum was dated March 24 and transmitted to the British Government on March 27; the text is quoted in memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, March 25, pp. 123, 125.

⁷⁸ The President initialed this letter: "S.W. OK FDR".

⁷⁹ Not printed; this was a request that the United States Government support the Polish Government's representations to the British Government with regard to the right of the Polish Government to participate in discussions involving its territorial boundaries and in all matters pertaining to Bukovina and Lithuania (740.0011 E. W. 1939/21043¾).

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ General Marshall did have a conference with General Sikorski, who handed over a memorandum dated April 13, 1942, which dealt entirely with recommendations for the conduct of the war. Ambassador Biddle sent copies of this memorandum to the Department in his Polish Series despatch No. 143 of April 22, 1942; not printed (740.0011 E. W. 1939/21226).

740.0011 European War 1939/210433

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)*⁸²

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1942.

Naturally the decision as to whether this Government should, as General Sikorski suggests, support the views expressed by the Polish Government to the British Government with regard to the conversations at present taking place between Great Britain and the Soviet Union rests with the President.⁸³

If my understanding is correct that we consider the conversations taking place between Great Britain and the Soviet Union as a strictly British-Soviet matter and that we do not consider ourselves bound by the outcome of these conversations, it would appear illogical for us to suggest to the British Government that the Polish Government be included in the conversations. Any step taken by us in that direction would indicate that we might regard understandings reached as a result of these conversations as having force so far as other United Nations are concerned.⁸⁴

741.6111/7: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 24, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received April 24—2:18 p. m.]

Polish Series 34. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My 30, April 13, 7 p. m. On April 16 Sikorski addressed to Eden a personal and confidential letter (in French) setting forth in strong terms Polish attitude toward impending Anglo-Soviet Agreement. Substance of letter is as follows.

After an introductory reference to a conversation with Eden the preceding day regarding progress of the negotiations, Sikorski states he has never ceased to give proof of his desire to cooperate loyally with the U. S. S. R. but he must nevertheless object most decidedly to ambitions of Soviet Russia which is seeking to follow in footsteps of Tsarist Imperialism, symbolized by the policy of Peter the Great, to which Stalin alludes. It is to this Imperialism, Sikorski continues,

⁸² This memorandum was sent to the Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, and to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Ray Atherton.

⁸³ An attached note of April 17, 1942, by Under Secretary of State Welles reads: "The President has informed me that he approves my statement to the Polish Ambassador regarding General Sikorski's suggestion, namely, that the President had already said all that he found necessary to state on this issue."

⁸⁴ Mr. Atherton wrote at the end of this memorandum: "Our telegram of Dec. 5th [1941] to London it w[oul]d seem to me defines our position." See telegram No. 5682, December 5, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 194.

which has caused such grave prejudice to Europe and the entire world, that Poland owes its partitions. This same Imperialism is at the bottom of Soviet Government's demands in present negotiations. Proposed agreement does not constitute an act directed against common enemy, Germany, but rather against vital interests of Poland, Britain's earliest ally.

A general formula dealing with maintenance of Poland's pre-September 1, 1939 frontiers, as suggested by Eden, would not meet Poland's interests or Britain's even assuming Stalin would accept it.

While tenor of note which British Government is about to communicate to Polish Foreign Minister is not known to him (Sikorski), he remains convinced that, notwithstanding Eden's observations on preceding day, Eden will agree with him that Polish viewpoint is entirely consistent with spirit of Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 23 [25], 1939.

Continuing, Sikorski states he considers proposed Anglo-Soviet Agreement, as he has already indicated to Eden, susceptible of giving rise to very grave consequences for subsequent conduct of the war. If concluded, it would be tantamount to definitive encirclement of Poland. Enemy propaganda would seize opportunity to explain to all interested countries that Russia has obtained from Britain a signature analogous to Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of 1939.⁸⁵ To sacrifice not only vital interests of Poland, but also to give over a considerable part of Europe to Soviet Russia, whose final object is to provoke a World Revolution rather than to subdue Germany, constitutes in his opinion a mistake capable of engendering incalculable consequences. All the countries of Europe, from Norway to Greece, defend an identical and united viewpoint when it comes to safeguarding their independence and their internal régime. Nor has he any doubt that hopes placed on Russia of seeing her fulfill the role in Europe which formerly fell to France are illusory both because of social and geopolitical factors. In his opinion, federative blocs called into being to check German state should assume that role.

Future federation of Central European countries would in principle be destroyed by the Agreement.

Soviet Russia would give it a direct blow by demanding for itself, in a manner as artificial as cynical, Bukovina, just as furthermore it claims Lithuania.

⁸⁵ The Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 76-78; or, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, vol. vii, pp. 245-247. The German-Soviet boundary and friendship treaty was signed at Moscow on September 28, 1939; for text, see *ibid.*, vol. viii, pp. 164-167. The supplementary protocol provided for in this treaty describing the Polish boundary in detail was signed at Moscow on October 4, 1939; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 208.

Proposed agreement is basically contrary to Polish-Russian Agreement of July 30, 1941 which annulled past German-Soviet conventions regarding partition of Poland and precisely German-Soviet demarcation line of October 4, 1939, which is now referred to by Russia as its 1940 frontier and which the draft Anglo-Soviet Agreement confirms.

It is self-evident Poland cannot be a party to this negotiation nor give its consent to the agreement itself.

"It is not for me" Sikorski continues, "to prejudge the policy which the United States will pursue in this matter although it is true that President Roosevelt and his Government have fully shared the point of view and attitude of Poland respecting the claims of the U. S. S. R. Nevertheless I must express my fears, based on personal observations and conversations, that the agreement risks strengthening considerably the action of Isolationists and all elements hostile to Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., which should not be a matter of indifference to the latter power."

Sikorski closes by stating he is firmly convinced Polish attitude thus clearly expressed on so complete and difficult a problem will cast no shadow on their personal relations which are founded on mutual respect.

Original text has gone forward by air pouch.⁸⁶

I understand formal communications which Foreign Minister Raczynski is addressing to Eden on this subject are more restrained and conciliatory in tone. I also understand Sikorski's letter is designed in part for the record, so that he may protect his own political position against the strong anti-Russian element in Polish Governmental and military circles, an element which flared into open opposition when the Polish-Soviet Agreement was negotiated last year and led to a split in the Cabinet and which may require careful handling if its activities are to be kept within desirable bounds at this time.

[BIDDLE]

740.00119 European War 1939/976: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 27, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received April 27—1:34 p. m.]

Polish Series 40. Sikorski tells me that on April 17, Eden addressed a note to Raczynski dealing with Polish memorandum of March 27,⁸⁷ and with Sikorski's letter of April 16 (summarized in my

⁸⁶ Transmitted to the Department by Ambassador Biddle in his despatch No. 142, April 22, 1942, not printed.

⁸⁷ See footnote 77, p. 139.

34, April 24, 6 p. m.). While he has not shown me Eden's note he tells me its main points are as follows:

(a) Aim of proposed Anglo-Russian Agreement is not a political agreement dealing with postwar status of continental Europe, but one looking toward Anglo-Russian collaboration during and after the war, which takes into account (1) security of certain of Russia's frontiers and (2) the interests of the United Nations;

(b) Agreement will not modify Britain's policy, as based on principles set forth in Atlantic Charter which has already been accepted by Russia,⁸⁸ in regard to a general European settlement;

(c) Until war situation becomes clearer than at present Britain intends to abide by principles set forth in Churchill's statement of September 5, 1940 to the effect that since outbreak of war Britain has at no time adopted the policy that nothing may be changed in the territorial boundaries of various states and that Britain does not propose moreover to recognize any territorial revisions which the war may bring about unless these come about with the free will of the parties concerned;

(d) British Government considers that firmer basis of confidence between the Western Powers and Russia is a matter of great importance, and equally important in the interests of Poland;

(e) Proposed agreement will establish Britain's right to interest itself in a European settlement in general and a Polish settlement in particular;

(f) British Government does not intend to conclude any agreement affecting or compromising territorial status of Poland. This covers all Polish territory, including Vilno, as it stood as of date of Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Pact of August 25, 1939;

(g) As regards Lithuania, British undertaking to Poland under Mutual Assistance Pact provided against German, not Russian aggression.

(h) As regards Bukovina, British Government rejects Polish legal argument on that point. Rumania rejected the British guarantee⁸⁹ and chose to collaborate with Germany. Britain subsequently declared war on Rumania and does not feel bound by the obligations under its former guarantee;

(i) Britain will accept its full share of responsibility for the settlement of peace, but needs Russia's cooperation.

[BIDDLE]

⁸⁸ Adherence to the Atlantic Charter by the Soviet Union took place by a resolution adopted at the second meeting of the Inter-Allied Council in London on September 24, 1941. See bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 378.

⁸⁹ The guarantee (see footnote 57, p. 128) had been renounced by Rumania on July 1, 1940, following the loss of Bessarabia and Bukovina to the Soviet Union, but had been reaffirmed by Lord Halifax in the House of Lords on September 5, 1940 (Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, 5th series, vol. 117, col. 368).

741.6111/9 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 27, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received April 27—6:20 p. m.]

Polish Series 41. Reference my 34, April 24, 6 p. m. Raczynski states in confidence that on April 21, 1942 he replied to note of April 17 from Foreign Secretary Eden. Raczynski has not given me the text but states its main points are:

(a) Polish Government maintains that proposed Anglo-Russian Agreement if concluded will prove detrimental to war effort of the United Nations. Polish Government's reservations are based on fundamental premises of a moral nature which, it holds, are of utmost importance to United Nations and which have recently been confirmed to representatives of Polish Government by responsible leaders of American policy. Moreover, Polish Government feels principles of Atlantic Charter can not be reconciled with sacrifice of smaller states to interests of a powerful neighbor; the British Government intended to safeguard these assurances in any agreement which might be concluded with Russia;

(b) No territorial provisions detrimental to interests of Germany are included in contemplated agreement. On the contrary agreement follows along the line of German-Soviet Agreement of 1939 and might thus possibly become a basis for German-Russian coalescence in the future. Agreement would not commit Russian Government in relation to Germany in that expansion of Russian possessions is to be brought about not at expense of Germany but of third parties. The Russian Government would thus retain a valuable trump card in relation to any German Government, even the present one;

(c) Regarding question of vital Polish interests, Polish Government re-emphasizes importance it attaches to maintenance of Lithuania's independence and to retention of Bukovina within the central European area where it belongs. These two conditions are essential to insure independent existence and development of a confederative system in this area;

(d) Polish Government considers Britain has an inherent right to take an active part in a future general European settlement and does not particularly need Russia's approval;

(e) There follows an analysis of the existing legal situation between Britain and Poland in regard to Lithuania wherein is set forth the Polish interpretation. As regards Bukovina, the point is emphasized that Russian sovereignty over Bukovina would render vastly more difficult the formation of a central European federation with the participation of Rumania and Hungary;

(f) Polish Government takes note of renewed confirmation of British Government's guarantee that in any case it does not propose to conclude any agreement affecting or compromising the territorial status of Poland;

(g) Polish Government's attitude regarding the purport of the proposed Anglo-Russian Agreement, as far as it is known to Polish Government, is one of principle. Since the agreement is of fundamental importance to Polish interests its conclusion would find the strongest echo among the Poles in Poland and abroad. Polish opinion would expect an authoritative interpretation both of the contents and significance of the agreement and it would be impossible for Polish Government to refuse to satisfy this expectation of the nation.

Commenting on the foregoing and in his yesterday's conference with Mr. Churchill, Sir Stafford Cripps and other British authorities, Raczynski said the following: (1) that while Mr. Churchill stated his desire for an early agreement, Raczynski gained the impression that he was being pushed by Cripps and others who shared Cripps' insistence for the agreement; that he spoke like a man forced by circumstances and by pressure of his associates, to act contrary to his principles; that he was loath to deviate therefrom; (2) the Polish Government was now carefully weighing, in light of its potential consequences, the question of lodging a vigorous protest, in addition to declaring to the Polish people an interpretation of the contents and significance of the agreement (as mentioned paragraph g above) in event the contemplated agreement were concluded. This action, he said would probably serve to rally the Poles to Sikorski. At the same time however it would undoubtedly antagonize the Russians and risk placing a severe strain on Anglo-Polish relations. He was well aware of the delicacy of the situation and realized that this question called for the most thoughtful consideration.

[BIDDLE]

741.6111/10: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 27, 1942—12 p. m.

[Received 6:30 p. m.]

Polish Series 42. Supplementing my No. 41, April 27, 7 p. m. As pointed out in my No. 34, April 24, 6 p. m. both Sikorski and Raczynski originally intended to couch the Polish Government's reply (Polish note of April 21) to Eden's note of April 17 in more conciliatory tone than that adopted by Sikorski in his letter of April 16. However, the mood of the Polish National Council during its session of April 21 was such that Sikorski and Raczynski found it necessary to take a strong line.

[BIDDLE]

740.00115 European War 1939/3205: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1942—8 p. m.

236. When the Polish Ambassador called on the Under Secretary on May 5 he left a memorandum, the substance of which is in part as follows:⁹⁰

As the Soviet Government has delayed further in giving effect to clauses which the Polish and Soviet Governments agreed upon concerning (1) Polish military and civilian evacuation to Iran from Russia, (2) additional means for recruiting by Polish military authorities of Polish soldiers in Soviet Russia, (3) delays in effecting the release of both civilian deportees and prisoners of war, the Government of Poland has instructed the Ambassador of Poland at Kuibyshev to present to the Soviet Government a note requesting the fulfillment of obligations undertaken with respect to these three points.

It is added in the memorandum that in view of the importance at this time of completing the evacuation, particularly of the Polish military to Iran, and in order to hasten the reconditioning and equipping of these Polish forces for active service in the Near East, the Polish Ambassador in Washington is instructed to ask the Secretary of State if the Government of the United States could support the efforts of the Government of Poland at Kuibyshev in this matter.

You may in your discretion, whenever suitable opportunities present themselves, express the hope of the American Government that the Soviet authorities make as liberal interpretation as circumstances will permit of its various agreements with the Polish Government. It is believed that in expressing such hopes you will find it possible to make it clear that we have no desire to intervene in differences which are sure to arise from time to time between the two Governments in the carrying out of these agreements or to take sides in disputes with regard to the citizenship of individuals, but that it is our conviction that the display of a generous attitude on the part of the Soviet authorities would materially further the joint war effort by promoting a greater spirit of confidence between two of the most important United Nations of Eastern Europe.

HULL

⁹⁰ In his letter of May 13, 1942, to the President when he submitted this telegram for his approval, the Under Secretary of State assured the President that "the substance of the pertinent portions of the memorandum of the Polish Ambassador" was contained in it (740.00114 European War 1939/2334). The President gave his approval.

860C.51/1491a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1942—midnight.

2291. During General Sikorski's visit here an agreement was reached between the President and General Sikorski that this Government would give to the Polish Government 12 million dollars during the next calendar year for the purpose of financing Polish resistance in occupied Poland and Polish Intelligence Work in Europe, and if deemed desirable, to assist in organizing or equipping the freed Polish prisoners of war for further military effort.

It is planned to advance this amount, commencing with installments of 2 million dollars covering 2 months, and thereafter to advance in installments as may be agreed. Since by its nature the work is obviously highly secret it is deemed best to make the advance in London against the appropriate receipt of General Sikorski or an official properly authorized by him; and that at intervals of 30 days after each such advance report be forwarded to the Department by the Military Attaché, such report to be in such detail as he may think desirable, regard being had to the obvious difficulty of itemization and to the necessity for extreme secrecy. The degree of detail of such report is left to his discretion and conference with you for determination under the circumstances. Naturally, in the event that you and the Military Attaché should come to the conclusion that money is being diverted or wasted, you may recommend the arrangement be terminated, though this is not anticipated.

It is understood that the Polish Government desires to have actual American currency made available to it in London. If currency is available you may draw separate draft and render separate account for initial payment 2 million dollars awaiting such authorization for future payment; and if there is not, so report and arrangements will be effected to arrange transfer.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/3250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), May 28, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 5:20 p. m.]

455. Department's 236, May 19, 5 [8] p. m. In my conversation with Vyshinski⁹¹ last week I expressed the hope of my Government

⁹¹ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

that the Soviet Government would make as liberal an interpretation as possible of the Soviet-Polish Agreement. I of course endeavored to make it clear that the American Government did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union or in Soviet-Polish relations, merely stating that my Government felt that the cause of the United Nations would be furthered by increasing the Polish fighting forces in the Soviet Union and Near East to as great an extent as possible and by a display on the part of the Soviet Union of as liberal and humanitarian interpretation as circumstances would permit of the clauses in the agreement relative to the release and evacuation of Polish civilians.

Vyshinski replied that the Soviet Government was fulfilling its agreements with Poland to the letter and commented on the fact that although the Poles had been arming for over 6 months they had as yet shown little disposition to become engaged in actual warfare. I received the distinct impression that Vyshinski was unsympathetic towards my overtures and that he might even have been resentful of our interests in Soviet affairs.

STANDLEY

860C.2221/30

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Polish Series No. 157

LONDON, June 2, 1942.

[Received June 8.]

For the President, the Secretary and the Under-Secretary.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in recent conversations with General Sikorski, he spoke of M. Molotov's visit to the United States and said that he earnestly hoped that you might find your way clear "to bring gentle pressure to bear" for the resumption of recruiting Polish forces in Russia. He was very grateful for efforts which our Ambassador in Moscow had already made on this score. Unfortunately, however, beyond assurances to the Ambassador that everything possible was being done in this connection, the Russian authorities concerned had done nothing to further the recruiting. The General therefore felt confident that if you were to express your interest in this matter, the Russians would lend a receptive ear.

The question of permitting the Polish authorities to resume recruiting, he said, depended on the goodwill of the Soviet Government. The Polish Government had already resorted to all available measures, but with mediocre results, namely partial evacuation into Iran. The only hope for a solution lay in the hands of the British and our Governments. The British Government had already interested itself in this

matter, but it was doubtful whether British pressure alone could bring about a positive settlement. It would, therefore, seem that the only practicable possibility of effecting a change in the policy of the Soviet Government in regard to this recruiting question might arise during the pending conversations in Washington. M. Molotov would be requesting the assistance of the United States in many questions of vital importance, and it would only be natural that the Soviet Government would feel under an obligation to comply with a request for a change of policy regarding the fate of many thousands of Polish officers and men, whose presence in the Middle East would be a valuable contribution on Poland's part towards the common cause of the United Nations.

The General thereupon said, in effect, the following:

Polish Forces. In December last Stalin and General Sikorski agreed to the formation of a Polish Army in Russia 96,000 strong. Furthermore 25,000 men were to be sent to Scotland and the Middle East in order to bring the Polish units stationed there to their full strength.

In March last Stalin summoned General Anders and told him that food shortage compelled him to limit the strength of the Polish Forces in Russia to 44,000 and that the remainder were to be evacuated immediately to Persia. Recruiting was to continue. In actual fact 30,000 men were evacuated to Persia but recruiting was stopped.

In April General Sikorski sent a message to Stalin asking him to continue the recruitment and subsequent evacuation of men. A similar request was made by Ambassador Kot. Stalin replied that conditions were unchanged and that he was unable to alter his policy. His message included a hint that should the present Polish Forces be sent to the front-line, he might be willing to recruit more of them but that he felt unable to provide food for troops not actually fighting. He overlooked the fact that Polish soldiers in the camps have not yet been adequately armed and equipped.

On May 14th Molotov replied to Kot confirming Stalin's message and adding that Stalin had made no promise to General Anders to continue recruitment and that the agreed evacuation was considered as altogether completed.

Thus the Polish Forces in Russia have been limited to 44,000 men in military camps and 30,000 evacuated to Persia. This limitation is contrary to the figures agreed upon on several occasions between the Polish and Soviet Governments, as well as to the spirit and the very premises of the agreements binding the two countries. There are in Russia many thousands more able Polish men of military age (at least 60,000) most of whom have had military training and who should obviously be enlisted in the military forces. It is in the common interest of the Allies that they should form part of the military formations in the Middle East and not be dispersed, as they are, throughout

the Russian East and in many cases idle and suffering from shortage of food.

The Polish Government's desire is to restart recruitment and, while leaving 44,000 organised forces in Russia, evacuate the remaining men of military age to Persia, where they would join the Polish Army under formation, unless, in view of a real food shortage in Russia, a solution could be found to supply the newly recruited men in Russia from other countries.

In response to my inquiry, the General said that he had already instructed Ambassador Ciechanowski to bring the foregoing to your attention, and he had disclosed the facts to me in order on the one hand to keep me informed, and on the other hand in the hope that I might support his appeal.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860C.2221/31

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Polish Series No. 158

LONDON, June 2, 1942.

[Received June 8.]

For the President, the Secretary and the Under-Secretary.

SIR: Supplementing my despatch Polish Series No. 157, June 2, 1942, I have the honor to report that in recent conversation with General Sikorski he said, in effect, the following:

Missing Officers. In Summer 1940 several thousands of Polish officers prisoners of war, who were kept in 3 camps in Central Russia (Ostashkov, Starobyelsk, Kozelsk) were taken to an unknown destination in the Far North of Russia. Since then they have not been heard of. Their number has been variously described but is usually accepted as 8,300; 1/3 of whom are professional officers and 2/3 reserve officers. The latter are for the most part professional men including about 800 physicians and many University professors and lecturers as well as a number of distinguished specialists. The Polish Military authorities have lists covering over 4,800 of these officers. These lists have been communicated to Stalin. The Soviet Government have many times been requested to release them. They invariably replied that every available prisoner of war in Russia had already been released. This statement is obviously inaccurate. There are reasons to believe that the officers in question have been deported to Franz-Joseph Islands, North of Spitzbergen, and to North-Eastern Siberia to camps on the River Kolyma, in the North of the Yakut Republic. It is more than probable that most of them have died of hunger, scorbut[us] and cold. If the supposition as to their places of imprisonment is correct, there

are but two months of summer when for technical reasons they could be brought back to Russia. Or, on the other hand, they could either be brought via the Kolyma River to Alaska or from Franz-Joseph Islands to Iceland. The absence of these officers is the principal reason of the shortage of officers in the Polish Forces in Russia, whither officers from Scotland had to be sent lately. The possible death of these men, most of whom have superior education, would be a severe blow to the Polish national life. Their evacuation during the present summer seems to be the last chance to save those who may still be alive.

In concluding his remarks, the General said that he felt confident that if in the course of pending conversations with the Russians in Washington,⁹² our authorities concerned were to express an interest in the above-mentioned problem, the Russians might act favorably in the matter.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860C.48/731 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV, June 3, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 10:50 p. m.]

480. The Polish Ambassador called on me last evening at his urgent request. He stated that he was anxious that the following information reach Washington immediately: That afternoon he had called on Vyshinski to discuss the evacuation from the Soviet Union of 50,000 Polish children, the granting of religious freedom for Polish citizens in the U. S. S. R. and the fate of Ehrlich and Alter.¹ Vyshinski stated that the Polish proposal regarding the evacuation was not acceptable because of transportation difficulties; that such action was unnecessary since the welfare of the children was assumed by the Soviet Government. The Ambassador informed me that there are 160,000 Polish children registered in the Soviet Union and that a large number of them are facing starvation in the near future. Vyshinski refused to grant permission for Polish clergymen to enter the Soviet Union or

⁹² For correspondence concerning negotiations on the occasion of the visit to Washington of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, see pp. 566-596, *passim*.

¹ Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter, former residents of Warsaw and Lublin, and leaders in the Jewish Socialist movement in Poland, had been arrested and imprisoned by Soviet authorities in Kuibyshev on December 3, 1941, where they were reported to be correspondents of the *Jewish Daily Forward* of New York. Although they were Polish citizens, interest in their cases was taken by the Department of State upon intercession of Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt and William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor. There are some details about these persons in Republic of Poland, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, pp. 178-180.

to release those under detention in the country. He based his refusal on the grounds that the Soviet constitution guarantees full religious freedom² and that Polish citizens were entitled to take advantage of this privilege; that the Soviet Government by law could not favor the development of any one single group of persons which would be the case if special privileges were granted the Poles. Although Vyshinski accepted a list of 94 Polish priests under detention the Ambassador stated that he appeared to be wholly uninterested in the question. Vyshinski refused to discuss the Ehrlich-Alter question on the grounds that, as Jews, they were Soviet citizens. The Ambassador added that all former Polish Jews in the Soviet Union are now considered by the Soviet authorities to be Soviet citizens. During the course of the conversation which he defined as "very unsatisfactory", the Ambassador was impressed by Vyshinski's unsympathetic, uninterested and at times sneering attitude.

STANDLEY

860C.48/731 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1942—5 p. m.

296. The Government of Poland has requested our assistance in evacuating some thousands of Polish children and their mothers from the Soviet Union, where it is understood they are facing starvation, to some point where they can be properly cared for until it has become possible for them to proceed to Poland.

With the President's approval we have agreed to assist the Government of Poland in its efforts to evacuate this group to Iran and, as soon as all other necessary arrangements have been completed, to assist in transporting them from there to some other country, probably South Africa. The American Red Cross has agreed to assist the Polish Red Cross in making arrangements for caring for this group while in transit and after it has arrived in the country where it can find a haven for the duration of the war. Before any of the details of the proposed plan can be worked out, it will of course be necessary to obtain the permission of the Soviet authorities for the group to leave the Soviet Union. The Polish Ambassador, according to your no. 480 of June 3, 1 p. m., is already having difficulty in this respect.

At the first favorable opportunity, in your discretion, please express to the Soviet authorities the earnest hope of this Government that the Soviet Government will accede to the request of the Government of

² The United States had already manifested some interest in the protection of church property and in freedom of religious worship in the Soviet Union; see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 995 ff.

Poland to permit a group of some 10,000 Polish children and their mothers to leave the Soviet Union, basing your action on the view of this Government that these children and their mothers can be more easily cared for in a country in which actual fighting is not at present in progress.

The working out of details in connection with the selection of those to be evacuated, their transportation, and care while en route to the Iranian frontier would be undertaken as soon as permission for the departure of the group has been granted by the Soviet authorities. It is felt that representatives of the Embassy could very effectively assist in this respect representatives of the Polish Government in the Soviet Union and representatives of the Polish and American Red Cross.

HULL

741.6111/22

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador called at his request. He proceeded to say that his Government and other interested governments and officials had been greatly interested in the work that the President and I and my associates had done to prevent the insertion in the British-Soviet agreement³ of any territorial provision, referring especially to the Baltic States and the area thereabouts, and that he desired especially to thank me for my part in this matter. He added that it looked like it would be impossible to prevent this territorial provision being inserted in the treaty and that he and his associates are all the more grateful for what the President and my associates did to prevent it. He further discussed the subjects enumerated in the attached memoranda.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

SUBJECTS RAISED BY THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN CONVERSATION WITH
SECRETARY OF STATE CORDELL HULL ON JUNE 13, 1942

I—The Polish Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that General Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland, had made a statement on June 11th, in London, defining the attitude of the Polish Government to the British-Soviet Treaty of Alliance signed in London on the

³Treaty of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe, and collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter, signed at London on May 26, 1942; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ccrv, p. 353. See also telegrams No. 2897, May 24, and No. 2922, May 26, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *post*, pp. 558 and 564, respectively.

26th of May, 1942, and published on June 11th, 1942. The most important sentences of this statement are hereto attached.⁴

On behalf of General Sikorski the Polish Ambassador asked the Secretary of State to be kind enough to convey to The President, and to accept for himself and his collaborators at the Department of State General Sikorski's warmest thanks for the invaluable support given to Poland in the course of the discussions leading to the conclusion of this Treaty. The Ambassador assured the Secretary of State that the Polish Government fully realized that American statesmanship and guidance had most effectively contributed to eliminate from its text the territorial clauses liable to endanger the indispensable solidarity of the United Nations.

II—The Polish Ambassador referred to his conversation with the Under Secretary of State on June 2nd,⁵ in the course of which he had the honor to ask for the intervention of The President and the Secretary of State during their conversations with Mr. Molotov concerning the outstanding and difficult problems pending between the Polish Government and the Government of the USSR., in regard to the continuation of recruitment of Polish military in Russia and of their evacuation to Iran, to the liberation of some 8,300 Polish officers who, according to lists in possession of the Polish Government, have not yet been released by the Soviet Government, as well as to the evacuation of 50,000 Polish children at present suffering near famine conditions in the USSR. The Ambassador expressed regret that it had not been possible to raise these problems during the visit of Mr. Molotov in Washington.⁶

Further recruiting of Polish soldiers in Russia and their speedy evacuation to Iran, where they could be reconditioned, equipped and armed and added to the contingent of some 30,000 Polish military already evacuated from the USSR., is a problem of great importance and urgency not only to Poland, but at this stage of the war it is also of considerable importance to the joint effort of the United Nations. It is certainly of direct importance to Soviet Russia whose Government is so justifiably insistent on the speedy opening up of a second front in order to divert some of the enemy's forces at present concentrating their main effort against Soviet Russia. It would be most regrettable if in this situation the United Nations, including Soviet Russia, were willingly to forego an increase of some 35,000 to 50,000 additional troops composed of keen Polish soliders, or even unduly to delay their formation into additional units available as a reserve army in the Middle East.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ No record of this conversation found in Department files.

⁶ Mr. Molotov arrived in Washington May 29, 1942, and was the President's guest for several days.

The details of the situation as it now exists in this matter between the Polish and the USSR. Government have been explained in the memorandum handed by the Polish Ambassador on June 2nd to the Under Secretary of State.⁷

In view of the importance of this question, and of the fact that The President has on several previous occasions shown so much kindly understanding of the situation and lent the weight of his valuable and decisive support to the endeavors of the Polish Government,—the Polish Ambassador would be most grateful if the Secretary of State could obtain The President's consent once more to take this matter under consideration and to intervene in Moscow in order to obtain its satisfactory solution in the interests of Poland, of Soviet Russia, and, in fact, of the joint effort of the United Nations.

The Polish Ambassador would also be most grateful if the USSR. Government could be made aware that the U. S. Government is interested in the fate of the Polish officers still detained in Russia, probably on the islands of the Arctic Ocean or in the farthest north-eastern region of Siberia. The details of this question are described in the aforementioned memorandum of June 2nd.

The Polish Ambassador expressed the thanks of the Polish Government for the active way in which the question of the evacuation of Polish children from Soviet Russia was being handled on the kind initiative of The President by the Department of State and the American Red Cross, and expressed the hope that its realization could be speedily reached on account of the growing mortality among the Polish children in Russia and its consequent urgency.

741.6111/58

*The Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski) to President Roosevelt*⁸

LONDON, 17 June, 1942.

MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to express my most cordial thanks for the continuous and fruitful support which you, Mr. President, were kind enough to give to the Polish Government in their defence of Polish interests during the many months of the British-Soviet negotiations. These negotiations finally brought with them the vindication of principles the respect of which is an indispensable condition of a lasting and just peace; ideals for which the Polish nation and its Armed Forces abroad are fighting, and will continue to fight im-

⁷ Not found in Department files.

⁸ This letter came with a personal letter dated June 19, 1942, to the President from Ambassador Biddle. The latter wrote, in part, that General Sikorski "had left here a depressed, apprehensive man and came back with a fresh outlook and reinvigorated by his visit with you."

placably. You, Mr. President, have become the custodian and interpreter of these principles in the sphere of international relations,—in conformity with the age-long traditions of the great North-American democracy of which you are the leader and spokesman.

The political and moral solidarity of the United Nations has been preserved at this crucial moment. German propaganda has been denied an opportunity to exploit for its benefit the agreement of the great democracies with Soviet Russia, while the peoples of the Soviet Union will find a new encouragement in their struggle against the Teutonic invader. I emphasized this view before Mr. Eden and M. Molotov while congratulating them on the favourable results which they were able to achieve. If, however, Soviet Russia is to remain true to the positive political role which it proposes to play, words must be followed by deeds.

Apart from the release of the surviving officers deported to the Northern provinces of Russia, accessible only during the short summer months, the Polish Government, relying on their undoubted rights, are gravely concerned with two main problems: The resumption of recruiting of Polish citizens to the Polish Army, which has been stopped by the Soviet authorities, and their subsequent evacuation,—and secondly the removal of 50,000 children from Russia. The latter have scarcely any chance of surviving the difficult conditions existing in Russia and owing to their poor physical condition are being decimated by disease. They are a priceless treasure vouchsafing the future of the Polish people, which is being ceaselessly exterminated in the homeland. The enclosed photographs^a show the state of Polish children who arrived in Persia from Russia. These unfortunate children had already spent several months recuperating under the care of the Polish Embassy.

As far as the Polish Army is concerned, the Soviet authorities cannot be said to implement their verbal and written agreements. The Polish Army is not being provided with arms and this fact is being subsequently used as an argument against the Poles. Therefore, it is in the mutual interest of the future relations between Poland and Russia that; 1) the Polish Army in Russia should be speedily armed and thus enabled to fight against Germany. 2) The enrollment in the Army should be resumed and at least 49,000 men should be recruited from among the able-bodied Polish citizens covered by the existing but not yet fully executed agreement. One half of this number would reinforce Polish units in the Middle East and in Great Britain. In view of the steady drain on the personnel of the Polish Air Force, the merit of which is generally recognised and of which 101 crews took part in the two recent mass bombing raids on Germany, replace-

^a Not reproduced.

ments are indispensable. The same may be said of the Polish Navy, which recently lost three warships and two transports torpedoed by the Germans while in convoys, carrying war supplies to Russia and Libya. The Polish Land Forces which only recently acquitted themselves with credit in Tobruk and the Libian desert are in a similar position.

If I venture to appeal to you personally, Mr. President, for support in these matters—as I have already appealed to Mr. Churchill—it is because I wish to leave out considerations of prestige voiced by Monsieur Molotov in his conversations with me in London. I believe that should the Soviet Government persevere in their attitude, they could hardly expect to avoid a public discussion on the subject, from which only Germany and her satellites could reap an advantage.

I trust, Mr. President, that you will appreciate the reasons which prompted me to approach you once more with the most earnest appeal for full and strong support by such means and in such ways as [you] may consider appropriate—to the endeavours of the Polish Government to bring about a resumption of the arbitrarily suspended recruiting and evacuation of the enrolled soldiers and also the removal of 50,000 Polish children from Russia. The very serious food situation in Russia adds urgency to my appeal.

Believe me, Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

SIKORSKI

860C.48/741 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 5, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received July 5—5: 55 p. m.]

241. Department's June 13 [11] to Kuibyshev. I outlined to Molotov the Polish evacuation project and expressed the earnest hope of my Government that the Soviet authorities would permit the evacuation of the Polish women and children in question, basing my action on the views of my Government that these women and children could be taken care of more easily in a country in which actual hostilities were not in progress and on the fact that their removal from the Soviet Union would relieve that country of the necessity of feeding and caring for them.

Molotov stated that this was not a simple question of evacuation, which would be a small matter, but a fundamental problem affecting the basic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. He said

that if this group had been evacuated along with the first group¹⁰ the question might have been satisfactorily disposed of, although this was doubtful as there were always difficulties where Poles are concerned. He continued that a second evacuation might well cause added difficulties and instability among the Poles in the Soviet Union and hostile comment with reference to the Soviet Union among those Poles in German-occupied Poland and the world in general since it would surely be said that the Soviet Union was unable to care for and feed the Poles in question and therefore had to send them to Africa. He stated that he had recommended to Sikorski during his recent visit to London¹¹ that an endeavor be made to improve the situation of the Poles in the Soviet Union but he did not enlarge to me upon how this should be done. He stated, however, that the Soviet Government could and would feed the Poles. He said that he would inform his Government of our interest in the matter.

Molotov later took occasion to refer to the general Polish question with a certain animosity, stating in effect: "There is always trouble whenever Polish questions arise", since there are entirely too many contradictory elements concerned in Polish politics.

Certain of these elements, he stated, are carrying on policies hostile to the Soviet Union, in contradiction to the policies of the Polish Government in London and even the most vigorous measures failed to subordinate these elements to Soviet law. Other elements desire and try to foster friendly relations with the Soviet Government. In general, however, it is impossible to reconcile the two groups.

I left with the impression, similar to that received when I last discussed Polish matters with Vyshinski, that the Soviet Government takes a purely political view of this entire question and is not guided by considerations of humanity and that it is displeased, even irritated, by the interest of any other power in matters pertaining to Soviet-Polish relations.

STANDLEY

701.60C61/32 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), July 7, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 3:25 p. m.]

584. Moscow's 225, July 2, 1 p. m.¹² The Polish Embassy states that on July 2 the office of the Embassy's representative at Archangel

¹⁰ Admiral Standley, while en route to his post in Moscow, had seen this group, consisting of a Polish Army unit, their families and orphaned children, living in Tehran under disheartening conditions. (William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago, 1955), pp. 106 and 260.)

¹¹ In May and June 1942.

¹² Not printed; it reported the arrest on June 30, 1942, of August Zaleski, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, at Vladivostok where he was engaged in extending relief to Polish citizens (701.60C61/31).

was searched by agents of the NKVD¹³ and all members of the staff (with the exception of the Second Secretary of the Embassy who was absent) were arrested. The archives, seals and cash were seized. Subsequently the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs notified the Embassy that the Polish offices at Archangel and Vladivostok must be closed immediately.¹⁴

Repeated to Moscow and Vladivostok.

THURSTON

860C.48/746

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Polish Series No. 178

LONDON, July 16, 1942.

[Received July 23.]

SIR: I have the honor to attach hereto copies of a Memorandum¹⁵ just handed me by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In asking me to forward this memorandum, the Minister told me that he had already instructed Ambassador Ciechanowski to bring the subject matter to your attention,¹⁶ adding that the attached memorandum contained more details than he had been able to cable his Ambassador.

In brief, the memorandum points out that when Polish-Russian diplomatic relations were re-established in 1941¹⁷ the problem arose as to the means of providing organised relief to many thousands of Polish deportees dispersed throughout Russia. An agreement was reached between the Polish Embassy and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, regarding the establishment of special local delegations of the Polish Embassy in communities where large numbers of Poles were congregated.¹⁸ The delegations were to be 19 in number.¹⁹ M. Vyshinsky, the Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, agreed on January 26, 1942, that these delegates would be regarded as representatives of the Polish diplomatic mission in Russia.

Following these assurances, a system of Polish delegations was established, the two most important, at Archangel and Vladivostok.

¹³ The secret police of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

¹⁴ A little later, in telegram No. 597 of July 11, 1942, Ambassador Standley reported that the Secretaries arrested at Archangel and Vladivostok had been released on condition that they would leave the Soviet Union (701.60C61/33).

¹⁵ Not printed.

¹⁶ See Ambassador Ciechanowski's note of August 3, p. 168.

¹⁷ Relations were resumed with the signing of the Polish-Soviet Agreement at London on July 30, 1941. See footnote 6, p. 102.

¹⁸ The text of the rules governing the scope of activities of delegates of the Polish Embassy in the Soviet Union as agreed upon on December 23, 1941, is printed in Republic of Poland, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 180.

¹⁹ Another office of the Embassy delegation, at Saratov, had not yet been organized.

Their general duties consisted of distributing foodstuffs and medical supplies, clothing, footwear and other articles sent from the United States, Britain and Canada for the Polish deportees in Russia.

At Archangel, agents of the Soviet police, in the absence of the Polish delegate, entered the office of the delegation²⁰ and seized their documents and funds, at the same time arresting * the assistant delegate and three other officials, including one woman. On July 3, the Foreign Office at Kuibyshev notified the Polish Embassy of the Soviet Government's decision to close down the offices of the Embassy's delegation at Archangel and Vladivostok, Saratov and Aldan-Yakutsky.

The memorandum goes on to point out the tremendous needs of the Polish deportees in Russia, emphasizing that it is only through a combination of great efforts on part of the Polish Embassy with the collaboration of numerous British, American and Canadian humanitarian and charitable organisations that the system of relief could be devised, which had just begun to bear fruit. Emphasis is also placed on the importance of the functions of these delegates (*a*) to handling the distribution of increasing shipments of goods, and (*b*) to prevent looting of these goods at the port of entry. Hence, the closing down of the delegations' offices, particularly at Archangel might lead to a complete breakdown in the system of relief for the Polish refugees.

The memorandum ends by stating that apart from the violation of diplomatic privileges, and arbitrary police methods practiced at Archangel, it is difficult to understand the motives and intentions of the Soviet Government. Does it intend itself, to undertake the care of the Polish deportees, or does it propose suppressing any relief to them altogether? The distribution of relief by the Soviet authorities would be purely theoretical, for at best, the local authorities would have no interest in distributing relief from overseas to the Poles, and all measures of control on behalf of the Polish authorities would be illusory. The suppression of the functions of the Polish Embassy's delegates, must unavoidably lead to a great deal of unnecessary suffering amongst the deportees, and to an increased mortality, especially amongst the children. Even now, the distribution of relief has been completely disorganized so that complications must necessarily arise with regard to the goods already arriving at their destination. Meanwhile, a number of ships carrying consignments to Archangel and Vladivostok are en route and there are no delegates at these points to receive them. It follows that at any rate, some of these goods will be exposed to looting.

²⁰ See *supra*.

*According to information reaching the Polish Government on July 15, the Polish Embassy's delegates, formerly arrested, were released on July 14. However, it is understood that the offices of these delegates are still closed down. [Footnote in the original.]

In handing me the attached memorandum, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he had already instructed Ambassador Ciechanowski to bring the matter to the attention of my Government. These instructions, however, had been cabled the Ambassador, a fact which had forced him to generalize and thus to eliminate the details in connection with the matter. He was therefore asking me to forward the attached memorandum which covered the details lacking in his cabled instructions.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

861.014/2451

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*²¹

[WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador handed me a formal note, which is attached herewith,²² protesting against the circulation in the United States by the American Russian Institute of a map recently published in the Soviet Union and sent to the United States for distribution, which showed the frontiers of Russia as the frontiers established by the German-Soviet accord of 1939. The Ambassador insisted that this map had been published since the Polish-Soviet treaty and that, therefore, the circulation of this map could only be construed as an indication of the intention of the Soviet Government to persuade the United States people that the said boundaries were the legitimate boundaries of the Soviet Union. I said that due consideration would be given to this communication from the Ambassador.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

860C.48/751

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the
Secretary of State*

Polish Series No. 184

LONDON, July 24, 1942.

[Received August 3.]

SIR: Supplementing my despatch Polish Series No. 178, July 16, 1942, and referring to the Under Secretary's letter of July 13, 1942, to

²¹ Some 13 months later this memorandum reached the Office of the Geographer, Mr. Samuel W. Boggs. In a memorandum of his own "for the sake of the record," on September 20, 1943, Mr. Boggs noted that "the map to which the protest relates was not 'published in the Soviet Union and sent to the United States for distribution' but was printed in the United States by C. S. Hammond and Company, New York, for the American-Russian Institute, 56 West 45th Street, New York."

²² Not printed.

me,²³ regarding signs of Polish-Russian tension over outstanding questions, I have the honor to attach hereto, two confidential Memoranda: A and B; also copies of the Polish Government's *Aide-Mémoire* of July 20 to the British Foreign Secretary.²⁴

In brief, Memorandum A contains report on Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Masaryk's²⁵ expressed concern 1/ over the current deterioration in Polish-Russian relations, 2/ over traces of antagonism in attitudes of Russian Ambassadors Litvinov²⁶ and Bogomolov towards the envisaged Czechoslovak-Polish Federation, 3/ lest, in this connection, continued tension between the Poles and the Russians lead to Russian pressure on Czechoslovak Government to drop further negotiations with Polish Government.

Memorandum B covers the substance of a stormy conversation on July 22, between General Sikorski and Russian Ambassadors Bogomolov and Maisky,²⁷ in the presence of Mr. Eden, the Chinese Minister²⁸ several other British and Polish officials, and myself. In brief, General Sikorski and Foreign Minister Raczynski brought up the questions of the arrests of Polish Relief Delegates, by the Soviet authorities, and of the prompt evacuation from Russia, of the three organized Polish Divisions. At the conclusion of an ensuing heated exchange of words between General Sikorski and Ambassador Bogomolov, Mr. Eden urged an early adjustment of outstanding difficulties. In turn, I said it was essential to maintain the solidarity of the United Nations; hence it was necessary to iron out these difficulties promptly and fairly. I felt confident that my Government would share my earnest hopes that a formula be found for an early and just settlement of these outstanding problems. In response, Ambassador Bogomolov said he understood this point of view, and considered it a just one. Whereupon both he and Maisky assured Mr. Eden and me they would give prompt and careful examination to the matters under discussion.

At the present moment, the following are, in brief, the outstanding questions for which the Poles are striving to obtain a satisfactory settlement:

²³ Latter not printed. In this letter Mr. Welles stated: "From such information as we are able to obtain from the Soviet Union, Polish-Soviet relations have suffered a considerable set-back as is evident by the recent arrest of officials of the Polish Government in Vladivostok and in the northern Soviet Arctic ports. We are hopeful, however, that the present coolness between the two Governments will be only of a temporary nature and that both Polish and Soviet leaders realizing the importance of maintaining unity for the promotion of the common cause will be able to compose their differences."

²⁴ None printed.

²⁵ Jan Masaryk.

²⁶ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

²⁷ Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

²⁸ Chin Wen-ssu, Chinese Minister to the Allied Governments in Exile at London.

- (a) the evacuation of 50,000 Polish children from Russia;
- (b) release of Polish Relief Delegates, recently arrested, and the reestablishment of the relief distributing bureaus;
- (c) reopening of Polish recruiting bureaus to enable the recruiting of some 80,000 Poles available for the Polish forces in Russia;
- (d) the release of Polish officers still believed by the Polish Government, to be held in Russian prisons;
- (e) *prompt* evacuation of the three organized Polish divisions (45,000 men), still held in Turkestan, notwithstanding Russian Government's agreement to their evacuation. (In the stormy debate of July 22, Bogomolov told Sikorski that the reason for the delay was a lack of transportation. It was clear, however, that General Sikorski did not accept this as an adequate explanation. In this connection, it may be recalled that the evacuation of 28,000 Polish recruits into Iran has already taken place).

In further connection with the aforementioned problems, I am aware that General Sikorski is seriously considering sending Dr. Retinger,²⁹ at an early date, to Kuibyshev, in the hope that he might succeed in bringing about a settlement of problems (a) and (c) above described.

Furthermore, I have just been handed a letter for Mrs. Roosevelt, wherein Madame Sikorski has addressed an appeal for Mrs. Roosevelt's intervention in the matter of the release from prison, of Polish officers described in problem (d) above.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

701.60C61/34 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV, July 25, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 10:38 p. m.]

640. The Polish Chargé d'Affaires³⁰ informed the Embassy several days ago that since July 15 practically all the delegates of the Polish Embassy who were handling relief matters in the Soviet Union together with their clerical staff have been arrested by the Soviet authorities. The Polish Embassy has already been informed of the arrest of its delegates at Ashkhabad, Samarkand, Chelyabinsk, Khimkent, Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar. Furthermore relief stores, archives and seals have been seized.

In answer to the Chargé's protests on July 20 [19], Vyshinski stated that the arrested delegates in place of fulfilling their duties as

²⁹ Joseph Heironin Retinger, political *chef du cabinet* of General Sikorski.

³⁰ Henryk Sokolnicki.

defined in the special Polish-Soviet relief agreement³¹ had been engaged in hostile action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and had been carrying on intelligence work. For this reason the People's Commissariat could not permit the delegates to carry on their work in the future and "appropriate instructions have been received by the local organs".

The Chargé stated that he categorically denied the accusations in question and demanded that the delegates be released not only because of their diplomatic immunity, which the Soviet Government does not admit that they enjoy, but also on the grounds that the measures taken by the Soviet authorities render impossible the indispensable relief work they are carrying on.

The Chargé has subsequently informed me that the six arrested delegates had been released on condition that they leave the Soviet Union immediately but that their clerical personnel was still under detention.

STANDLEY

860C.48/752

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

Polish Series No. 185

LONDON, July 27, 1942.

[Received August 3.]

SIR: Supplementing my Despatch Polish series No. 184, July 24, 1942, I have the honor to report receipt of a letter of July 25 from Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Count Raczynski, wherein he states that the crisis in Polish-Soviet relations, brought about three weeks ago by a series of arrests by the Soviet police of the Polish Embassy delegates, shows a tendency to worsen; that it threatens to assume a menacing character.

The Minister went on to draw my attention to an enclosed translation of a telegram (Annex 1 attached hereto³²) which the Polish Government had received July 24 from the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR. He said he had just discussed the subject of this telegram with Sir Alexander Cadogan³³ pointing out the "extreme gravity of the situation, not only from the Polish point of view, but also from that of the Allied interest as a whole". Besides, he had left with Sir Alexander a short confidential memorandum (Annex 2 attached

³¹ See the text, "Rules Governing the Scope of Activities of Delegates of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland," December 23, 1941, in Republic of Poland, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 180. For other official Polish documents and comments on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 46-55 and pp. 182-205.

³² Not printed.

³³ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

hereto ³⁴) as well as a copy of his most recent note of July 24 (Annex 3 attached hereto ³⁴) to Russian Ambassador Bogomolov. At the same time, he had emphasized to Sir Alexander the fact that he considered it essential that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden be apprised without delay of the situation which had arisen.

In closing his letter to me, the Minister wrote that Ambassador Ciechanowski had already received instructions "to appeal to the Department of State for immediate American intervention in the matter". Ciechanowski's instructions, the Minister said, were based upon the latest information received from Russia. Moreover the Ambassador would put forward arguments similar to those contained in the memorandum to Sir Alexander Cadogan (Annex 2, copies attached hereto).

In brief, the telegram from the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Kuibyshev, contained in Annex 1, states that the last conversation between the Polish Chargé d'Affaires and Vishinsky regarding the arrest of Polish relief delegates had been inconclusive; that the Chargé d'Affaires suspected that the delay in settling the matter was affording the Soviet authorities time and opportunity not only to study the archives of the Polish delegates, but also to "plant" false documents in the raided offices, with a view to throwing unfavorable light on Polish activities. A serious threat arose from Soviet action, which was aimed at compromising the Polish Welfare Organization, the Polish Embassy, the Polish army, and perhaps even the Polish Government in the international field, in order not only to parry the Polish Government's entreaties regarding the projected evacuation of Polish troops from Russia, but also to undermine the prestige of the Polish Government in the Anglo-Saxon world. The powerful propaganda machinery of the Comintern seemed already to have been set in motion; foreign press correspondents were being given mysterious hints concerning the alleged unmasking of a large spy ring. It was to be feared that, in the next stage, the Soviet authorities would attempt to justify the violation of the Polish Embassy's immunity and sequestration of its archives, by invoking the necessity for investigation. The arrest of the Polish Embassy Attaché Slowikowski in front of the Embassy premises had to be considered an ominous warning in this respect.

In brief, the Polish Foreign Minister's memorandum to Sir Alexander Cadogan, contained in Annex 2, states in effect the following: The bad faith with which the Soviet Government was dealing in the matter of the arrested welfare delegates, as prescribed in the telegram from Polish Embassy, (see Annex 1) was patent. Only a firm attitude on part both of the British and American Governments could bring the Soviet Government to release immediately the arrested

³⁴ Not printed.

Polish functionaries, and to desist from staging a provocative law suit, required perhaps as a diversion activity for internal political reasons. In this extremely dangerous situation, the Polish Government was otherwise left no other alternative save that of appealing openly and plainly to world public opinion, which, due to the Polish Government's restraint, had hitherto learned nothing concerning (a) the appalling conditions to which the Polish deportees in Russia were being subjected; (b) the cruel exploitation of these deportees; (c) the efforts made by the Commissariat of the Interior, since the very first days of renewed relations with Poland, to recruit, amongst the Polish population deported to the USSR, a host of secret agents and other tools ready to work at the appointed time for a Communist upheaval in Poland. The Polish Government would be forced to give a warning to all institutions and persons contributing their aid to the Polish deportees in USSR—aid which henceforth could not reach these unfortunate people.

In brief, the Polish Foreign Minister's note of July 24 to Russian Ambassador Bogomolov, contained in Annex 3, is a formal statement of the Polish Government's case in connection with the arrests of the Polish delegates in Russia.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

701.60C61/36: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), August 1, 1942—5 p. m.
[Received August 3—10: 35 a. m.]

667. My 640, July 25, 4 p. m. The Polish Chargé d'Affaires has furnished the British and American Embassies with a long memorandum⁸⁵ dealing with the arrest of the Polish relief delegates. This memorandum which is being forwarded by airmail states that in addition to the 8 "diplomatic delegates" who were arrested and later released, over 150 members of the Polish delegation are still under detention and are charged with hostile action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, counterrevolutionary activities and espionage. The memorandum concludes with a statement to the effect that since the Polish Government does not have sufficient influence to ameliorate this situation, it is only by an energetic intercession on the part of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain that the Soviet Government can be effectively prevented from "committing actions which are so harmful to the common cause and so unjust toward the Polish population in the USSR."

⁸⁵ Not printed.

The Embassy informed the Chargé that it would be unable to take any action in the matter without instruction from its Government and offered the suggestion that the Polish Ambassador in Washington discuss the matter with the State Department.

The British Ambassador ³⁶ informs me that on July 30 on instruction from his Government he discussed with Vyshinski the question of the Polish delegations and energetically interceded on their behalf and that although Vyshinski enumerated instances of espionage and hostility toward the Soviet Union on the part of various delegates he accepted Clark Kerr's intervention in apparent good graces.

STANDLEY

860C.48/755

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1942.

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called to see me this morning at his request.

Sir Ronald said that the President had yesterday spoken with him, after my conversation on the telephone with the President, concerning the request of the British Government ³⁷ that this Government permit the entrance into the United States of some 30,000 Polish refugees from the Soviet Union, these refugees being the immediate families of the Polish divisions which were now moving from the Soviet Union to North Africa.

I told Sir Ronald that the President had agreed with me that it was impossible for this suggestion to be complied with by this Government inasmuch as on account of the tremendous distance involved it would be physically impossible to transport so large a number of persons from Persia to the United States in the ships available, and, in the second place, such a step on our part would involve an amendment of our present immigration laws, which was highly undesirable at this time. I said the best thing we could consequently do would be to explore the possibility of providing for the settlement of these refugees in temporary camps at some place in Persia through an arrangement whereby the Persian Government would not have to undertake any expense and whereby food supplies required by these people would be sent from the United States with the assistance of and under the auspices of the American Red Cross. I said that as soon as possible

³⁶ Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.

³⁷ Mr. F. R. Hoyer Millar, Counselor of the British Embassy, on August 1, 1942, left at the Department an *aide-mémoire*, requesting that the United States Government give immediate consideration to the question of accepting 30,000 Polish civilian refugees about to depart from the Soviet Union, and mentioned that Sir Ronald Campbell expected to call upon Mr. Welles to discuss the subject.

the Department would discuss the matter more fully with the British Embassy in order to see what might be done.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

860C.48/759

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to refer to my conversation with you on Friday last, July 31st,³⁹ and inform you that I have been advised by cable from Count Raczynski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, about the latest developments in Polish-Soviet relations. The situation appears to have somewhat eased since my conversation with you took place.

Count Raczynski informs me that the Soviet Government has agreed to the evacuation of three divisions of Polish troops, totalling 44,000 men, together with their families including children up to an additional figure of 26,000. This evacuation will take about three weeks' time.

Count Raczynski also informs me that of the arrested officials and functionaries employed by the Embassy for distribution of relief supplies to Polish deportees, six of those with diplomatic status have been released from prison and ordered to leave Soviet Russian territory. He notes that the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Soviet Russia⁴⁰ had supported the Polish Government's request for liberation of our functionaries.

This improvement however has not solved the main difficulty because over 120 Polish officials and delegates working on the distribution of relief supplies have been arrested, and their arrest has stopped the entire work of distribution of these supplies. In a note and *Aide-Mémoire* presented on July 27th by the Soviet authorities to Minister Sokolnicki, the Polish Chargé d'Affaires, the Soviet Government states its refusal to allow the reactivation of the various Polish distributing centers for relief which had been functioning under the supervision of the Polish Embassy. At the same time it is stated in the note that it is not the intention of the Soviet Government to prevent the Polish Embassy from taking care of Polish citizens.

Count Raczynski informs me that on the 29th of July he received a note from Ambassador Bogomolow in London, in reply to Minister Raczynski's note of the 11th of July. This note mainly repeats statements previously made by the Soviet Government to Minister Sokolnicki, our Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR. Count Raczynski

³⁹ No record of this conversation in Department files.

⁴⁰ Sultan Akhmed Khan, Ambassador of Afghanistan in the Soviet Union.

considers this note as unsatisfactory and has advised Ambassador Bogomolow against bringing the conflict to a crisis and against any attempt at organizing a trial of the arrested Polish Embassy functionaries. He has upheld all the demands which he had previously made on behalf of the Polish Government and stated that the continuation of good mutual relations must depend on the way and the spirit in which they are mutually handled, rather than on statements of a general character.

Regardless of the evacuation from Russia of the additional three Polish divisions, the Polish Government has requested that it should be authorized to maintain its recruiting centers in order to renew its recruiting activities in the future.

As you will see from the above, there appears to be a welcome easing of the tension in Polish-Soviet relations. I venture to think that this tendency towards the improvement of these relations might actually increase the prospects of success of the kind of intervention which we discussed last Friday,⁴¹ rather than discourage it. The President might perhaps consider it possible to express his appreciation to Premier Stalin regarding the latter's decision to evacuate three more divisions of the Polish Armed Forces, together with their families and children, and to express his concern about the information regarding the interruption of the distribution by the Polish Embassy in Kuybishev to the Polish population at present in Russia of relief supplies so urgently required by them, which have been sent from the United States under very difficult circumstances of transport and at great cost.

I should regard it as a great favor if you would very kindly take these additional facts into consideration and let me know what you have decided to do in the matter.

I am [etc.]

J. CIECHANOWSKI

860C.48/754

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State

The Polish Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, with reference to his letter of August 3rd, has the honor to communicate to the Secretary of State the latest information received today from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland concerning the developments in Polish-Soviet relations in connection with the arrests of Polish employees and functionaries in the service of the Polish Embassy in Kuybishev for distribution of relief supplies to Polish citizens at present in Soviet Russia:

⁴¹ July 31.

The Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow communicates to the Polish Foreign Minister on August 4th, that the Polish officials and functionaries employed for distribution of relief supplies arrested by the Soviet authorities, are being accused of: that, as allegedly shown by documents seized at the time of their arrest, they had been corresponding with the Embassy by special word code; collecting information about Poles still kept in Soviet prisons and in secret places of confinement in localities to which access is prohibited by the Soviets; that they were furnishing information of an economic character about conditions of life and work of the Poles in Russia, of the treatment the Polish population was receiving from NKID,⁴² of delivering passports to Polish citizens not recognized as such by Soviet authorities (Polish citizens of Jewish, Ukrainian and White Russian descent); they are likewise accused of trying to get the Poles who had "joined" (who had been forced to join the Soviet Army) to leave this army and to be enrolled in the Polish Army; editing and circulation of Polish newspaper called *Polish News* which the Soviets consider as anti-Sovietic in tendency; taking notes about anti-Soviet tendencies among the Soviet population, use of secret radio sets, anti-Soviet propaganda; facilitating correspondence between Poles in the Soviets and their families outside, as well as correspondence with people in Poland proper; disregard for police regulations concerning registration; pursuing illegal methods of obtaining evacuation of Poles to the Polish Army abroad; attempts to bribe Soviet officials.

These accusations, under Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code, foresee trial and sentences from ten years imprisonment to the death penalty.

The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that only immediate energetic intervention directly with Premier Stalin can prevent the organization of a trial against these Polish officials.

The Polish Ambassador has the honor to inform the Secretary of State that the above communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland was read by him to The President in the course of the audience which the Ambassador had the honor to have at the White House this morning.⁴³

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1942.

860C.48/862½

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs
(Atherton) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1942.

MR. SECRETARY: The Polish Ambassador has just called on me and expressed appreciation of your kindness in arranging an interview for him with the President last Wednesday⁴⁴ regarding the fate of certain Polish citizens and relief workers in the Soviet Union. Acting under

⁴² Narodny Kommissariat Inostrannykh Dyel (People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs).

⁴³ Ambassador Ciechanowski's account of this conversation is reported in Mr. Atherton's memorandum of August 10, *infra*. No other memorandum of this conversation has been found in Department files.

⁴⁴ August 5.

instructions from his Government the Polish Ambassador explained to the President that this was perhaps such a grave question of relationships that he was seeking the President's personal intervention in the matter. The President stated his sympathetic considerations of what the Polish Ambassador said and added that as Mr. Harriman ⁴⁵ was on the point of leaving for Moscow ⁴⁶ he would let Mr. Harriman be the President's spokesman in this matter in the Soviet capital. The President asked the Polish Ambassador to telegraph to Count Raczynski, the Polish Foreign Minister in London, the full details of his talk with the Polish Ambassador here and ask the Polish Foreign Minister to immediately get in touch with Mr. Harriman before his departure for Moscow and inform him of the nature of the representations intended. Meanwhile the President informed the Polish Ambassador that he would undertake personally to see that instructions reached Harriman authorizing him to make these representations upon his arrival in Moscow.

Immediately after his conversation with the President the Polish Ambassador telegraphed the Polish Foreign Minister in London in the above sense but on Saturday was informed from London that Mr. Harriman had left for the Soviet capital either Thursday evening or Friday morning before the Polish Foreign Sec[retar]y had a chance to approach him and give him the facts of the case. However, all the data had now been telegraphed to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow and the Polish Ambassador asked your good offices to the end that Mr. Harriman might be instructed to get in contact with the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow and inform himself of the facts and conditions on which he was to base his representations (according to the President's direct instructions to Mr. Harriman) upon his arrival in Moscow.⁴⁷ I undertook to inform you in the above sense.

RAY ATHERTON

760C.61/986

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile
(Biddle) ⁴⁸

[LONDON,] August 12, 1942.

Shortly after Averell Harriman's departure for Russia, General Sikorski told me he understood that the President had requested him

⁴⁵ W. Averell Harriman, Representative in London of the Combined Production and Resources Board (Lend-Lease Coordinator).

⁴⁶ Harriman caught up with British Prime Minister Churchill, who was on his way to Moscow for conversations with Stalin. For reports concerning these meetings, see pp. 618-627, *passim*.

⁴⁷ See further in this connection the memorandum printed on p. 178.

⁴⁸ Sent by Ambassador Biddle directly to President Roosevelt with a personal letter of the same date.

to urge, in the course of his conversations with M. Stalin, the release of the arrested Polish Welfare personnel. The General, moreover, wanted me to let the President know of his deep gratitude.

The General went on to say that he had cabled instructions to Mr. Sokolnicki, Chargé d'Affaires of the Polish Embassy, Kuibyshev, (a) to contact Averell Harriman, and (b) to ask him whether he might see his way clear to mention, among other matters, in his conversation with M. Stalin, the question of the Polish Government's desire that the Soviet authorities grant the Jewish Polish citizens residing in the USSR, treatment equal to that granted the Polish citizens of other religious categories.

Sikorski thereupon pointed out to me that he had received alarming telegrams from American Jewry concerning this problem. Moreover, the Polish Jews in Russia had strongly appealed to him for defense of their rights as Polish citizens. His own interventions thus far, however, had proved of no avail, in view of the negative attitude of the Soviet authorities.

I told him I thought that any appeal addressed to the Soviet Government on behalf of the Polish citizens in Russia, might best be applied to the Polish citizens as a whole, rather than to any particular group among them.

In response, he said that his instructions to his Chargé d'Affaires were motivated by the same thought; that he stood by the principle of equality of rights, irrespective of creed, color, et cetera. As regards the attitude of the Soviet authorities, however, experience had shown that in treating with Polish citizens, they discriminated against Polish citizens of the Jewish faith.

In this connection, the General said that in disclosing their point of view, the Soviet authorities had emphasized that all too frequently, the Polish Jews make trouble for the Soviet, following their release from confinement—especially those enjoying wide contacts with American Jewry. By way of illustration, the Soviet authorities had cited the following case (of about seven months ago): following their release from confinement, a Mr. Alter and a Mr. Ehrlich,⁴⁹ leaders of the Polish Bund, had cabled from Kuibyshev, to the Bund in the United States, a message stating that they had been badly treated. This message had been picked up by the Soviet censor, and had led to an investigation of the activities of these two men. The investigation had brought to light that they were "Trotskyists", and they were consequently promptly placed in prison again.

In connection with the question of the Soviet authorities' recognition of Polish citizens, I feel that it is well not to lose sight of the fact that previous to the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement, Moscow,

⁴⁹ See footnote 1, p. 151.

according to General Sikorski, regarded as *Soviet* citizens, *all* Poles from areas east of the then envisaged Soviet post-war "security frontiers". I mention this, as I have received insufficient information since the signing of the aforementioned Agreement, upon which to form a definite opinion as to whether or not this might possibly be the case even now. (For further details see my despatch Polish Series No. 137 of March 30, 1942).

760C.61/8-1842

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1942.

The Ambassador of Poland called to see me this afternoon with an urgent message from his Government.

The Ambassador stated that after his recent conversations with the Secretary of State and with myself regarding the arrest in the Soviet Union by the Soviet Government of Polish diplomatic officials and of relief agents, the Ambassador had called upon the President to discuss this question with him ⁵⁰ in order to seek the assistance of the President in finding a prompt solution of the problem. The Ambassador stated that the President had assured him that Mr. Harriman would be instructed, on the occasion of his visit to Moscow, to suggest to the Soviet high authorities that the Polish diplomatic officials under arrest be permitted to proceed to Iran, and, second, that, inasmuch as the supplies now stored in the Soviet Union for distribution to the Polish nationals in that country had come from the United States and inasmuch as the imprisonment of the Polish relief agents eliminated the possibility of proper distribution or custody of these relief supplies, the Soviet Government agree to permit these Polish relief agents likewise to be evacuated from Soviet territory to Iran and be replaced with other Polish relief agents individually acceptable to the Soviet authorities.

The Ambassador stated that the President had said that it would be a good plan for the Polish Foreign Minister in London to discuss these questions with Mr. Harriman before the latter left for Moscow in order that Mr. Harriman might fully understand all of the details of the questions involved.

The Ambassador concluded by saying that he had word that no instructions had been received by Mr. Harriman from the President and that unfortunately the Polish Foreign Minister, Count Raczynski, had not been able to see Mr. Harriman before the latter left London

⁵⁰ Ambassador Ciechanowski's conversation with the President on August 5, 1942, is mentioned in Mr. Atherton's memorandum of August 10, p. 170.

in view of the fact that the Ambassador's message had only been received a few hours before Mr. Harriman's departure.

General Sikorski therefore urged that this Government instruct Ambassador Standley, who was to be in Moscow until August 20, to present these suggestions to the Soviet authorities in the hope that the Soviet Government would accede thereto.

I told the Ambassador that I was unfortunately not familiar with the assurances which the Ambassador alleged the President had given him, but that I was quite sure that, if the President desired to make these suggestions to the Soviet Government, there would be no objection on the part of the Department of State to the sending of instructions to Ambassador Standley as requested by the Polish Government.⁵¹

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/984a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1942—10 p. m.

402. Department's 236, May 19, 8 p. m., and your 455, May 28, 11 a. m., and 667, August 1, 5 p. m. The Polish Ambassador on instructions from his Government has requested the President's intervention with the Soviet Government with a view to bringing about an improvement in Polish-Soviet relations.

The Ambassador referred particularly to the situation brought about by the arrest and the detention of the remaining members of the Polish relief delegations and the fears of the Polish Government that these persons may be tried on unfounded charges of espionage. Apart from the detrimental effects of such a trial on the common war effort, the Ambassador has also pointed out that the closing of the Polish relief delegation offices will cause further hardship and privation on the thousands of Poles residing in various parts of the Soviet Union.

In connection with the deterioration of Polish-Soviet relations in recent months the Ambassador has, on several occasions, expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would find it possible to make as liberal interpretation of its agreements with the Polish Government as circumstances would permit. He referred in particular to the desire of the Polish Government to resume recruiting of its nationals in the Soviet Union for the Polish armed forces and the release of some 5 to 8 thousand Polish officers who are reported as still being held by

⁵¹ See *infra*.

the Soviet authorities as well as to the desire to evacuate Polish children and their mothers.

While it is realized that the tension has been somewhat-relieved by the Soviet Government's action in consenting to the transfer to the Middle East of three additional Polish divisions together with some 20,000 members of their families and that for the moment, since no concrete arrangements have been concluded to receive the Polish children evacuees in other areas, this question is not of immediate urgency, it is felt, in the interests of the common war effort, that it would not be amiss to express to the Soviet Government the earnest hope of the United States Government that no avenue will remain unexplored which might lead to a solution of these problems satisfactory to both the Soviet Union and Poland.

In due course you may, therefore, in your discretion bring up the question of Soviet-Polish relations with the Soviet authorities, pointing out that while the United States Government does not desire to intervene in this matter which it realizes involves various extremely complicated problems that can be solved only by direct negotiations between the two Governments, it nevertheless hopes that the spirit of collaboration already shown in connection with the transfer of the additional Polish divisions to the Middle East, may be promoted to the maximum and that mutually beneficial solutions may be found for the various problems under discussion.

HULL

760C.61/9831

Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)⁵²

The Polish Ambassador received the following cable message from Prime Minister General Sikorski for The President:

"Allow me, Mr. President, to express to you the gratitude of the Polish Government and of the Polish Nation for the noble words of Your statement⁵³ bringing encouragement to the oppressed and declaring that the German executioners will be judged and punished.

"I must once more appeal to You, Mr. President, in a matter of utmost importance and of great urgency. Information which I am receiving from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shows serious deterioration in the relationship of the Soviet Government to vital Polish problems and to the Poles deported to Russia. This attitude is contrary to the spirit of the agreement signed last year between the

⁵² Handed by Ambassador Ciechanowski to Under Secretary of State Welles on August 24, 1942, for transmission to the President.

⁵³ For President Roosevelt's statement on August 21, 1942, on crimes against civilian populations in occupied countries, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 22, 1942, p. 709.

Polish and the Soviet Governments. Thus, the recruitment to the Polish Army has been entirely stopped. Permission for the evacuation of Polish children has not been granted. And, what is especially tragic under the existing circumstances,—the Soviet authorities have entirely stopped all Polish relief work among the Polish citizens and have, in fact, broken up our entire relief organization. The relief supplies which we have been distributing in the USSR. originate from America in their great majority. Over one hundred officials and delegates who were carrying out this relief program on Soviet territory and who are people specially chosen as energetic and trustworthy social workers, have been arrested, their personal belongings, their documents as well as the archives of the Polish distribution center have been confiscated. This virtually condemns our unfortunate population in Russia to starvation and want of the most elementary means of subsistence and spreads further depression and discouragement.

"This attitude of the Soviet Government, while placing in doubt the agreement signed by the Polish and the Soviet Government in the direct interest of the Allied cause, as a proof of the most far-reaching good will on the part of the Polish Government and with entire disregard for the great wrongs done to the Polish Nation by the Soviets at the outset of this war,—leads not only to a profound deterioration in the mutual relations of Poland and Russia, but also imperils the unity of the camp of the United Nations. This latter consideration is uppermost in my mind in appealing to you, Mr. President, who have already given so many proofs of active and friendly sympathy for Poland and her problems.

"The announced pending departure to Moscow of Mr. Wendell L. Willkie, as your special delegate, appears to me to open a new possibility of exerting a salutary influence on the USSR Government and of granting powerful support of your influence to the justified requests of the Polish Government.⁵⁴

"The first and most urgent of these is the release from Soviet prisons of the Polish official delegates and their staffs of social workers, the return of the confiscated archives, which is indispensable to recreate the mechanism of our relief activities.

"The Polish Government is ready to engage itself to evacuate from Soviet territory these workers immediately after their release.

⁵⁴ In a memorandum of August 24, 1942, Under Secretary of State Welles wrote that he "later consulted the President by telephone telling him that both Secretary Hull and I thought it would do no harm if Mr. Willkie were asked to mention the matter when he saw Stalin, on the ground that a friendly solution of this controversy would be in the interest of the common war effort. The President said that he was entirely in accord and asked that Mr. Willkie be notified." The recommendation to Mr. Willkie that he should speak to Stalin on this matter is explained in the memorandum of August 24 by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs, p. 633.

"Such a definite intervention on the part of the United States alongside with Great Britain appears to me to be the only way in which it will be possible to obtain rectification of the situation in Polish-Soviet relations which is fraught with great danger for the future.

"I venture to think that if such an intervention were not attempted, the USSR would interpret this as a proof of lack of interest in Poland on the part of the United States and Great Britain and they would probably not fail to take advantage of this situation, which would undoubtedly lead to render Polish-Soviet relations even more difficult."

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1942.

760C.61/985 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 31, 1942—midnight.
[Received September 1—12:10 a. m.]

4864. For Harriman ⁵⁵ from Reed. ⁵⁶ Dr. Retinger called this afternoon to request that in view of conversation between Churchill and Sikorski yesterday, the following message be transmitted to you from Sikorski.

Paraphrase follows:

"In yesterday's long conversation with General Sikorski, Premier Churchill assured him of complete support for Polish claims in Russia. British Government will give complete backing to any initiative of President Roosevelt's appealing to Stalin directly regarding release of Polish Embassy delegates, as well as reestablishment of a scheme providing to Polish citizens on Soviet territory adequate protection. When Eastern front situation improves and Britain is then able provide more effective help, British Government will press forward the remaining claims of Poles. Complete understanding exists between both Premiers on all questions on the matter of Polish Soviet relations. Your support to all such schemes would be greatly appreciated by General Sikorski, and in view of conversation you had on telephone with Dr. Retinger prior to your departure Retinger hopes you will be able to give it. Also General Sikorski asks that you lend your good offices in connection with the problems of thousands of magistrates and Polish officers who are supposed to have been deported to islands in the Arctic. In the names of the wives and daughters of those men, Madame Sikorski has addressed Mrs. Roosevelt a letter asking for her help in the matter in the belief that the moral authority of the First Lady of America, when all other persuasion failed, would be able to

⁵⁵ Averell Harriman had returned to Washington to report to the President on the Churchill-Stalin conversations in Moscow.

⁵⁶ Philip D. Reed, Deputy Representative in London of the Combined Production and Resources Board (War Production Board).

save them and thus add to official diplomacy a humanitarian aspect so needed in present world politics."

[Reed]
WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/24585

*Memorandum on Certain Events in Regard to Soviet-Polish Relations
Which Developed During the Churchill Visit in Moscow*⁵⁷

Shortly after the departure of the American Ambassador for Moscow on August 6, the Polish Chargé d'Affaires presented a memorandum to Mr. Thurston⁵⁸ in Kuibyshev (copy attached) in regard to the imprisonment in the Soviet Union of the personnel of the Polish relief organizations in which the Chargé stated that Mr. Harriman had been instructed by the President of the United States to intervene with Stalin to obtain 1) the liberation of those members of the relief organizations who have been arrested and their departure from the Soviet Union, and 2) the resumption of the relief work on the grounds that the supplies were of American origin and because of the interest in the matter on the part of the United States.⁵⁹

The American Ambassador inquired of Mr. Harriman whether or not he had any instructions from the President to this effect to which Mr. Harriman replied in the negative. He consequently declined to discuss the question with Stalin.

The Ambassador was later informed that General Anders had arrived in Moscow on August 14 for the purpose of taking up the matter with both Messrs. Harriman and Churchill. It appears that Mr. Churchill had an appointment to meet General Anders at dinner at 8 p. m. on Saturday, August 15, but that since Mr. Churchill had an appointment with Mr. Stalin at 7 p. m., which lasted until 3:30 the next morning, he was unable to keep his appointment with General Anders. Upon the Prime Minister's return, he informed the General, who had waited for him, that he was too tired to discuss the Polish question and that he was leaving for Cairo almost immediately. He requested the General to come to Cairo to discuss the question with him there. General Anders informed the American Ambassador that he was leaving for Tashkent the following morning and would thence proceed to Cairo.

⁵⁷ Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in his letter from Kuibyshev of September 1, printed on p. 635.

⁵⁸ Walter Thurston, Minister Counselor of American Embassy at Kuibyshev; at times Chargé d'Affaires.

⁵⁹ It was originally considered a possibility that Harriman could be instructed to touch upon problems in Polish-Soviet relations during the conversations between Prime Minister Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in August 1942, in an attempt to moderate aroused feelings, although no discussion was actually held. See *ante*, pp. 170-174.

Although Mr. Harriman endeavored to see General Anders Saturday night, August 15, he was unable to arrange an appointment in view of the circumstances described above. The General came to the airfield on the morning of August 16 but in view of limitations in time he was unable to exchange much more than pleasantries with Mr. Harriman.

In connection with the present status of Polish-Soviet relations, it is important to note that at the Kremlin Dinner of August 14, Mr. Stalin, in referring to the armed forces which were united against the Soviet Union, included among these "even some of the Poles". His mention of the Poles in this connection caused considerable comment among many of the guests present.

[Annex—Extract ⁶⁰]

Memorandum From the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union (Sokolnicki) to the American Minister Counselor of Embassy (Thurston)

POLISH CITIZENS IN THE USSR: ORGANIZATION OF RELIEF

3. *Organization of help in the provinces.*

It was absolutely impossible to distribute quick and efficient help to such a large population in a centralized way, that is directly through the Embassy. The Embassy thus suggested a very simple plan, according to which representatives of the Embassy would take care of smaller concentrations of population, and delegates were to be assigned for larger districts or sometimes provinces.

As a result of numerous conferences of the Polish Embassy and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, a common text of "Decisions concerning the limits of the activity of Delegates of the Polish Embassy" (note of the Narkomindel ⁶¹ of December 23, 1941, and note of the Embassy of December 24, 1941.) was established. This text gave the status of Delegates and Representatives of the Embassy. In a further exchange of notes, it was decided in common that twenty offices of the Embassy would be established. These offices organized the relief for the Polish population of 40 administrative districts, with around 2600 concentrations of Polish citizens. 10 administrative districts were not to be reached by the relief organization of the Embassy, that is to say around 200 concentrations of Polish citizens.

The offices of the Delegates of the Embassy started their work in the middle of February, and gave, during the five months of their

⁶⁰ Of the sections omitted from this memorandum, the first section discussed the number (approximately one million) and class character of the Polish population scattered throughout the Soviet Union, and the second described the plight in which these citizens were situated.

⁶¹ The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

existence, enormous results. 60 million rubles were distributed in individual and collective allocations, as well as 2 thousand tons of food and clothing, helping first of all numerous families.

At the same time, a number of welfare organizations came into being. 139 orphanages were created, for around 8 thousand children, 30 homes for invalids, 21 kitchens and 116 food stations for children. Furthermore, 46 hospitals and 16 ambulances came into being, and doctors were assigned to each office of a Delegate and to some of the centers where representatives were acting.

The greatest energy and efforts of the Embassy were directed towards the organization of a welfare action for children. Orphanages were created and food centers for the feeding of children. According to a plan worked out by the Embassy, 30 thousand children were taken care of in April. At the same time, it made all efforts in order to evacuate 50 thousand children, who could not be taken care of on the territory of the USSR. The Soviet Government, in a note of November 12, 1942 [1941], assured the Embassy that all welfare institutions, and in the first place orphanages, would obtain special food rations. Unfortunately, the Embassy had continually great difficulties in obtaining the necessary buildings and rations. Finally, in the first days of July, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs retracted its first promise, stating that only orphans *stricto sensu* could be taken care of at all. Furthermore it notified the Embassy that it was not necessary to create orphanages there where Soviet ones already existed. The Embassy replied to that that it was not only the question of a material care but also the fact that these children had to be educated in the Polish language.

Considering all these difficulties, the Embassy came out with the proposition of evacuating 50 thousand children from the USSR. It also asked the Allied and friendly nations to accept these Polish children under their care during the time of the war. This appeal was answered right away by the democracies of the world; the Soviet Government having not yet given a favourable answer.

4. *Liquidation of the relief organization.*

The Embassy was very suddenly notified of the liquidation by the Soviet authorities of 4 Delegations, which had apparently accomplished their work for Polish citizens. Then news came in of arrests of Delegates of the Embassy, not excluding members of the diplomatic corps, as well as of the personnel of the offices. The archives were partly taken, bank accounts blocked, only a few unimportant clerks were left in the offices. Stores of the Embassy, in which there are at the time more than 2 thousand tons of goods, are also blocked.

In such a way, help for the Polish population has been made formally and practically impossible. Nevertheless the Soviet Government

states, that the repressions were of an individual character and that the welfare action of the Embassy can continue. The latest informations received by the Embassy give a slightly different picture of the situation.

As a matter of fact the Soviet Government has started the liquidation of all welfare institutions of the Embassy. In Kustanaj the authorities have ordered the liquidation of orphanages and food stations. In Semipalatynsk an orphanage had to be closed. In Southern Kazakhstan the authorities ordered the closing of a small hospital and an ambulance station. All this shows a planned action against the welfare activities of the Embassy. It cannot be excused by fictitious reproaches against this or the other person, and is directed against the welfare institutions as such. All this action is also contrary to the solemn assurances given by the Soviet Government in Kuibyshev and London, to the effect that it was not the desire of this Government to render impossible all assistance to Polish citizens.

5. New suggestions of the Soviet Government.

Six weeks have passed since the first arrests, and the Soviet Government must have realized that all this sudden action must have been the result of the suspiciousness of certain factors. Finding no plausible reason to stop completely the relief for Polish citizens, the Soviet Government came out with a suggestion which might, according to them, replace the former organization. On August 10, the Soviet Government proposed the creation of 11 stores of the Embassy, which would effect in a satisfactory manner a relief action for the Polish population.

The Polish Government has adopted the attitude that one of the conditions of the functioning of a welfare organization is the release of around 70 employees of the Embassy, which would reestablish a confidence necessary in mutual relations. Independently of this attitude, the Embassy finds it impossible to accept the last proposal of the Soviet Government, as it does not comprise the whole of a relief action. It is rather difficult to imagine that the manager of such a store, busy with the receiving and distributing of supplies, could at the same time give medical care, create and direct orphanages, homes for invalids, food stations, etc.

On the other hand the Embassy cannot carry on such an action directly on the territory of 56 provinces with 2800 concentrations of Polish citizens. It is technically not to be carried out. Moreover, it would not be advisable to give over to representatives hardly known to the Embassy enormous sums of money and invaluable supplies. They would have to work without being under the control of some intermediary organ acting between them and the Embassy.

Trying to find a way out of the situation such as it is now, the Embassy finds that the best solution would be the creation of a certain number of consulates. If this suggestion were to be rejected, the Embassy proposes the creation, alongside the stores, (12 instead of 11), of an equal number of representatives of the Embassy who would be entitled to:

- a) inform the Embassy of the needs of the Polish population;
- b) distribute material help;
- c) distribute relief goods sent from abroad;
- d) give medical care;
- e) create and direct welfare institutions;
- f) help the people to find work;
- g) control the activities of all the smaller representatives.

If this proposal should also be rejected, then the only possibility is to give over the entire problem to an organization such as the Red Cross of one of the Allied countries.

6. *Suggestions*

In view of the above mentioned facts, it must be stated that the Polish Government desires to resume the atmosphere of confidence which reigned in its relations with the Soviet Government. It also desires to find a mode of relief such that it would completely put aside any possibilities of future misunderstandings. One of the factors of such a relief is the evacuation from the USSR of children who should not bear the tragic and cruel consequences of the war. All the joint efforts of both the Soviet and the Polish Government would not make it possible for these children to stand another winter on the territory of the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the above mentioned facts the Embassy finds it absolutely necessary to:

- 1) restore the atmosphere of confidence through the release of its arrested employees;
- 2) immediately put into function a relief organization based on the solution given in par. 5;
- 3) establish the number and the manner in which to evacuate Polish children to countries not in the war zone.

KUIBYSHEV, August 12, 1942.

760C.61/984a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1942—noon.

434. Department's 402, August 19, 10 p. m. The President has asked Mr. Willkie, after consultation with you and Henderson,⁶²

⁶² Loy W. Henderson, Counselor of Embassy at Moscow.

to express to Stalin the hope of the American Government that all efforts will be made to bring about an amelioration of Polish-Soviet relations.

In this connection the Polish Ambassador today asked whether the Department had endeavored through your intervention to ascertain, in connection with the representations on behalf of the Polish relief delegates, whether relief to Polish citizens in the Soviet Union may be handled by new Polish delegates to be appointed, or by other competent agencies. The Ambassador also asked whether representations had been made to obtain the release of the "3400" Polish officers reportedly still being held in Arctic regions by the Soviet authorities. You may decide to make these representations concurrently with Mr. Willkie or independently.

Churchill has informed General Sikorski that subsequent to any representations made by the United States Government to bring about an amelioration of Polish-Soviet relations, the British Government will supplement these representations to Soviet officials. Please advise Department at earliest moment when it might be suggested through the Polish Government to Mr. Churchill that his contemplated support would be opportune.

Please keep the Department advised when any action is taken in this matter.

HULL

760C.61/986

President Roosevelt to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, [September 10, 1942.]

DEAR TONY: Thank you very much for your letter of August 12⁶³ and its attached memorandum⁶⁴ of your conversation with General Sikorski regarding the alleged discrimination against Polish citizens by the Soviet authorities.

I have learned from the Department of State that similar allegations have been made by the Polish Ambassadors in Washington and Kuibyshev and while it is believed that there may be considerable truth to the allegations, no direct confirmation has been received from other sources.

In regard to General Sikorski's request that the question of according equal treatment to Polish Jews in the USSR be taken up with Mr. Stalin, I agree with your suggestion that, in view of the general deterioration of Polish-Soviet relations during the past months, it

⁶³ Not printed.

⁶⁴ *Ante*, p. 171.

would be more politic to limit such an appeal to the general question of bringing about an improvement in these relations rather than citing too many specific problems. In this way, if our efforts to bring about a better basis of understanding and cooperation between the two Governments are successful, specific problems may then be discussed if the facts so warrant.

In this connection, you will be interested to learn that on the basis of urgent appeals made by the Polish Government I again asked Admiral Standley on August 19, in his discretion, to bring up the question of Polish-Soviet relations with the Soviet authorities and express the hope of the United States Government that no avenue will remain unexplored which might lead to a solution of these problems satisfactory to both the Soviet Union and Poland.

Furthermore, I have asked Mr. Willkie, after consultation with Admiral Standley, to express to Mr. Stalin the hope of this Government that an improvement in Polish-Soviet relations may be effected.

With every good wish, I am

Very sincerely yours,

[FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT]

760C.61/987: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), September 10, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received September 14—1:57 a. m.]

767. Department's 434, September 5, noon.

1. In answer to a question as to the status of the Polish relief situation Lozovski⁶⁵ stated in effect yesterday that there should be no difficulty as regards the providing of such relief since 190 Polish representatives with authority to act were distributed throughout the Soviet Union. He added that out of the 370 original representatives, 180 had been charged with subversive activities and arrested or deprived of their authority as representatives pending reply to these charges.

In view of this statement I did not inquire whether relief to Polish citizens in the Soviet Union might be handled by newly appointed delegates or by other competent agencies.

2. Immediately after my meeting with Lozovski, the Polish Minister and Chargé d'Affaires⁶⁶ called on me at my request and we discussed the matter in the light of the statements made by Lozovski.

⁶⁵ Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁶⁶ Henryk Sokolnicki.

The Minister, with unimportant exceptions, confirmed what Lozovski had said and added in brief the following.

The Polish authorities in their efforts to maintain contact with the Polish citizens who have been scattered all over Russia have set up an organization headed by the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev.

Under the Embassy there were 20 delegates (8 of whom had diplomatic immunity) who were distributed so as to cover the whole geographic area in which there were Polish citizens. Each of these delegates had selected trustworthy men to contact the Polish citizens and to distribute relief supplies. There were all told 370 of these *hommes de confiance* and their organization was functioning fairly effectively when the Soviet authorities interfered.

First the 20 delegates were arrested and held in prison. The 8 who had diplomatic immunity were later released and sent out of the country. Then 180 of the agents were deprived of the authority to function pending their reply to the charges of subversive activities. The Polish Minister stated that 84 of this number are still in prison.

As to the 190 representatives still authorized to act, the Polish Minister stated that they are impotent because the Soviet authorities will not cooperate with them and will not even give them their food norm. Without the cooperation of the local Soviet authorities the representatives are not only helpless but fear Soviet reprisal and arrest if they take any action. Thus the entire effort of the Polish Government to keep in touch with its people is nullified.

3. On several occasions acting under instructions I have taken up with the Soviet authorities various Polish problems such as relief, the release of 5,000 to 8,000 officers, the evacuation of children, recruiting for the army, and the question of moving troops, with their families, out of Tashkent into Iran.

On each occasion I have been instructed to say and have said that my Government did not wish to interfere in Soviet-Polish relations. In my 241, July 5, 7 p. m., I reported that Molotov had shown considerable irritation when I referred to the Polish question. Yesterday when I again denied desire on the part of my Government to interfere in Soviet-Polish relations Mr. Lozovski interposed the remark, "That is the best thing for it to do".

This Polish question is not one of specific irritants which are only symptoms, but involves the broad issue of whether or not the Poles will be allowed to attain and maintain contact with their citizens throughout Russia. The Poles want to do this and had set up an effective organization for the purpose. The Russians oppose this effort and have taken steps not only to wreck the organization but to prevent, through lack of cooperation of local officials, the functioning of any of its parts. The lack of cooperation of local officials may result in the starvation of all Polish citizens.

As the Polish Minister said, it is a question of mental attitude on the part of the controlling government officials and as long as they are of their present state of mind intercession on specific issues is of no value, in fact it only serves to irritate. I am inclined to agree with him.

In view of the Soviet attitude as reflected in their treatment of the Poles and in the irritation displayed by Soviet officials when we have mentioned the Polish problems to them, I have reached the opinion that expressions by us of interest in the matter or of hope that the Russians and the Poles will be able to come to a mutually satisfactory understanding will serve merely to annoy the Russians, who of course have the upper hand, and to expose us to further rebuffs.

If it is felt that the situation merits action on our part and that Mr. Willkie or some other representative in my opinion should not approach Stalin in an apologetic manner but with firmness and frankness as an interested party.⁶⁷

He might take the attitude that the American Government is distressed at the friction which has developed in the Soviet Union between Soviet and Polish officials; that friction of this kind between officials of the United Nations is certain, unless eliminated, eventually to work to the advantage of Hitler and to the detriment of the common cause; and that therefore the President of the United States has requested him to state frankly the hope of the American Government that both parties to the dispute, realizing what a valuable weapon knowledge with regard to it would be in the hands of our enemies, will make a sincere endeavor to settle it in a generous and friendly manner, and he might add that the President is, of course, unable and has no desire to judge the merits of the various points at issue. The President is confident, however, that if both parties to the dispute should review their differences in a spirit of good will and mutual confidence, an understanding can be reached which will yield just as much benefit to the common cause as a great military victory.

I have discussed this matter with Henderson and he fully agrees with me that it would do more harm than good for Mr. Willkie to approach Stalin or any other Soviet official except upon a basis similar to that outlined above. It would be helpful if he would be authorized to add that the President is instructing Mr. Biddle in London to discuss the matter in a similar vein with General Sikorski.

Mr. Willkie plans to arrive Kuibyshev about September 16 and will spend one day here.⁶⁸

STANDLEY

⁶⁷ This sentence is apparently garbled. The substitution of a comma for the words "and that" after "our part" would make the passage intelligible in the light of the paragraphs following it.

⁶⁸ For correspondence concerning Willkie's mission in the Soviet Union, see pp. 637-650, *passim*.

861.012/212a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1942—4 p. m.

446. Various reports have been received by the Department to the effect that the Soviet authorities consider all Polish Jews, on the basis of the 1939 plebiscite,⁶⁹ to be Soviet citizens and, therefore, refuse to permit these persons to receive Polish passports from the Polish authorities in the Soviet Union or to leave that country as Polish evacuees under the various evacuation plans already effected.

In order that the Department may be reliably informed as to these allegations please telegraph after making discreet investigation preferably from other than Polish sources, any pertinent information.

HULL

760C.61/987 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1942—7 p. m.

449. Your 767, September 10, 9 [10] p. m. Because of the seriousness of the yet unsolved problems in Polish-Soviet relations we believe that Mr. Willkie should make representations along the lines suggested in Section 5 of your telegram under reference⁷⁰ pointing out particularly that it is in the common interest of the United Nations including this country that there should be the maximum cooperation and hence the least possible cause for friction between the diverse nations fighting against the Axis powers.

We feel, however, that Mr. Willkie should not attempt to argue the case the details of which you have so ably presented on various occasions as reported in your several telegrams on this subject.⁷¹

Mr. Willkie may also state that Ambassador Biddle has likewise been instructed to discuss the matter in a similar vein with General Sikorski.

HULL

⁶⁹ Plebiscite of October 23, 1939, held under Soviet auspices in Polish territory occupied by the Soviet Union, following which the territory was annexed to the Soviet Union and provision was made for the acquisition of Soviet citizenship by the inhabitants. Poland protested the plebiscite.

⁷⁰ The last three paragraphs of the telegram.

⁷¹ Ambassador Standley reported in telegram No. 380, September 26, that Mr. Willkie told him that during a conversation with Stalin on the evening of September 23, 1942, Soviet-Polish problems were discussed "along the lines indicated by the Department" and Stalin had replied that "he would be entirely willing to discuss the Polish question with Polish officials to the end that existing difficulties be straightened out." (032 Willkie, Wendell L./88)

760C.61/987a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government
in Exile (Biddle), at London*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1942—3 p. m.

Polish Series No. 25. The President has asked Mr. Willkie to express to the Soviet authorities the hope of the American Government that an effort be made to bring about an amelioration in Soviet-Polish relations.

For your personal background information Mr. Willkie has been asked in talking to Stalin to take the attitude that the American Government is distressed at the friction which has developed between Soviet and Polish officials which if not eliminated will eventually work to the advantage of Hitler, and to state frankly the hope of the American Government that both parties to the dispute make a sincere endeavor to settle their differences after reviewing them in a spirit of good will and mutual confidence. Furthermore, Mr. Willkie has been asked to point out particularly that it is in the common interest of the United Nations including this country that there should be maximum cooperation and hence the least possible cause for friction between the diverse nations fighting against the Axis powers.

In order that the United States may maintain a neutral attitude in regard to the differences which have arisen between Poland and the Soviet Union Mr. Willkie has also been asked to inform Stalin that the United States Government has instructed you to discuss these matters in a similar vein with General Sikorski.

Although it is realized that you have discussed this problem on many occasions with the Polish authorities, you should make occasion to express to General Sikorski the hope of the American Government that the Polish authorities in reviewing the differences they have had with the Soviet Government endeavor in every way to deal with the problem in as generous and friendly manner as possible in order that no stone may be left unturned in their efforts to settle these pressing problems.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/24535

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the
Secretary of State*

Polish Series No. 206

LONDON, September 16, 1942.

[Received September 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to attach hereto copies of a letter of September 4, 1942, written by Polish Foreign Minister Raczynski to Russian Am-

bassador Bogomolov concerning the Russian aerial bombardment of Warsaw on the night of August 21/22.⁷²

In handing me a copy of this letter for our confidential information, General Sikorski said that when his Government's attention was drawn to the reports from inside Poland that 800 Poles had been killed and about 1,000 wounded during the aforementioned bombardment, he had suggested to his associates that Minister Raczynski approach Russian Ambassador Bogomolov with a proposal of an understanding between the Russian and Polish military authorities as to air operations over Poland. Having received the immediate and unanimous approval of his suggestion, Sikorski had instructed Raczynski to write Bogomolov the attached letter. Sikorski went on to say that he had subsequently called on Bogomolov personally to emphasise that the Polish military authorities, because of their special knowledge of the territory and of the present distribution of German military objectives therein, were in a position to secure to the Soviet authorities greater effectiveness of air operations against these military objectives. In response, Bogomolov had given the General grounds to hope that the Soviet Government would accept Raczynski's proposal.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

033.60C11/44

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador called at his request. He brought up the question of the visit of Prime Minister General Sikorski to Washington, in accordance with an invitation heretofore extended by President Roosevelt, adding that he was proposing to come here in October. I stated that, of course, General Sikorski would be most welcome at all times so far as we personally are concerned. I then referred to the political campaign here during coming weeks and extending into the first days of November and said that General Sikorski would find the delivery of a number of speeches wellnigh unavoidable, and that there is always difficulty in delivering any important speech, especially relating to world politics, without having it misinterpreted and misapplied by trouble-making persons. I, therefore, indicated tactfully that a visit in November would probably be much more desirable to General Sikorski and all concerned. I added that I would confer further with my associates with respect to this point and advise the Ambassador very soon.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁷² Letter of September 4 not printed; it further commented upon a similar air raid on the night of September 1-2, 1942, with heavy loss of life of Polish and Jewish inhabitants of Warsaw.

033.80C11/45 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1942—7 p. m.

Polish Series No. 26. Reference your letter September 2⁷⁵ relative to invitation extended to General Sikorski to speak at a Polish-American meeting, Chicago, on October 16.

After careful consideration of General Sikorski's kind offer of support, the President in a letter dated September 23 to you⁷⁵ states that it is with the deepest regret that he ventures to suggest that General Sikorski postpone his visit since we have such overwhelming support of the people in the prosecution of the war that it is not deemed necessary at this time to take advantage of the valued offer of cooperation by General Sikorski.⁷⁶ The President further indicates that he is deeply appreciative of the generous offer made by General Sikorski and the fine spirit which prompted it but for the reasons indicated above he does not feel he can accept the offer at this time.

Since the receipt of this letter may be delayed and because of the short time before the proposed departure of General Sikorski you may care, in your discretion, to indicate to him the reasons why it is felt that it would not be opportune to accept the invitation extended to speak at Chicago.

HULL

760C.61/988 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV, September 30, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 6 : 25 p. m.]

829. Department's 434, September 5, noon. Since Willkie has departed from the Soviet Union without carrying on any further discussions relative to the Polish situation in addition to those reported in my 380 of September 2 [26] from Moscow,⁷⁵ and in view of the good grace with which Stalin is alleged to have received Willkie's repre-

⁷⁵ Not printed.

⁷⁶ In his letter of September 2, Ambassador Biddle stated that General Sikorski's "idea would be to rally Polish-American support behind the President's 'banner' in the forth-coming elections, treating the matter, however, in broadest terms and avoiding any possible interpretation that he might be delving in internal politics." Under Secretary of State Welles noted on September 14 that "The President does not require speeches from Sikorski to obtain Polish-American support. He already has it."

sentations on behalf of the Poles, I am of the opinion that it would be opportune to suggest to Mr. Churchill through the Polish Government that the British Government take occasion to supplement Willkie's action.

STANDLEY

861.012/213 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), September 30, 1942—noon.
[Received October 3—8 a. m.]

830. Department's 446, September 14, 4 p. m. From information made available to the Embassy by the Polish Embassy prior to the receipt of the Department's telegram, as well as from other sources, it would appear that the reports referred to in the Department's telegram are substantially correct. The following developments lend support to this statement:

1. In a note dated November 10, 1941⁷⁷ (a copy of which in translation has been furnished the Embassy) the Polish Embassy advised the Soviet Foreign Office that it had learned that Polish citizens deported from the occupied territories of Poland with documents designating them as of Ukrainian, Jewish or White Russian "nationality" were being recruited into the Red Army, and that upon inquiry it had been advised that according to instructions which had been issued by the Soviet Government⁷⁸ all Polish citizens of non-Polish nationality (Ukrainian, Jewish, etc.) bearing Soviet passports were considered by the Soviet authorities to be Soviet citizens. The pertinent section of the Soviet reply⁷⁹ to the Polish note (a copy of the Russian text has been furnished the Embassy) stated that all citizens of the western oblasts of the White Russian and the Ukrainian Republics who were on the territory of these oblasts on November 1-2, 1939, acquired Soviet citizenship in conformity with the citizenship law of the Soviet Government to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish nationality who were living in the territories in question on November 1-2, 1939, was proof of the good will and conciliatory spirit of the Soviet Government; and that means could be considered as a basis for a similar recognition as Polish citizens of persons of other nationality, in particular of Ukrainian, Jewish or White Russian nationality since

⁷⁷ Republic of Poland, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 163.

⁷⁸ For information regarding the decree of November 29, 1939, on the acquisition of Soviet citizenship, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. I, p. 210, footnote 16.

⁷⁹ For the Soviet reply of December 1, 1941, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 165.

the problems relating to the frontiers between Poland and the U. S. S. R. have not been settled, and would be considered in the near future.

In reply to this note the Polish Embassy maintained on December 9⁸¹ that the conscription in the Polish Army only of Polish citizens of Polish nationality and the conscription into the Red Army of Polish citizens of other nationalities was contrary to the existing Polish-Soviet agreements, that the question of Polish citizenship was established by Polish law which was based on the principle of equality without differences of nationality or race and that it could not accept the Soviet statement to the effect that only persons of Polish nationality were recognized as Polish citizens.

According to the Polish Embassy further exchanges of views on this problem have not changed the attitude of the Soviet Government which continues to assert that only persons of Polish nationality are Polish citizens.⁸²

2. Although a considerable number of Polish citizens have been released from detention in the Soviet Union the Embassy has learned that generally when the Polish Embassy intervenes on behalf of Polish Jews the Soviet authorities consistently refuse to entertain such representations on the grounds that the interested persons are Soviet citizens. The cases of Alter and Ehrlich are known to the Department in that respect.

3. The Foreign Office has refused officially to recognize Polish Jewish relief workers appointed by the Polish Government on the grounds that they are Jews and cannot be considered Polish citizens.

4. The Polish Minister Counselor voluntarily informed a member of my staff sometime ago that although the Soviet Government insisted in principle that Polish Jews in the Soviet Union were Soviet citizens and as such were refused permission to depart from the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities had not in practise strictly adhered to this principle since it had permitted the evacuation of some three to four thousand Polish Jews to Iran. He added, however, that out of about 150 Polish Jews who had applied for exit visas to proceed to Palestine only one was granted such a visa.

5. In a letter addressed to Willkie by Ludwig Suderman, a prominent Pole of Jewish origin, the statements set forth above are confirmed in full.

STANDLEY

⁸¹ For text of the Polish note of December 9, 1941, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943*, p. 166.

⁸² For further correspondence on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 167-177.

860C.51/1505

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1942.

I need not recount the important and varied activity being sustained by the Polish Government in exile in the military, the intelligence (including sabotage) and propaganda fields.

For these purposes and for the maintenance of their skeleton diplomatic establishments, the Polish Government has used up virtually all its funds.

Consequent upon discussions which I understand took place between yourself and the Foreign Minister, 2½ million dollars was advanced to them out of Executive funds. These have now been spent. The Polish Ambassador has made repeated urgent appeals for further assistance, declaring that they absolutely require it if the Polish activity is not seriously to decline.

Some months back, the idea prevailed of seeking legislation from Congress appropriating funds for the assistance of various European exiled governments for use in their fight against the Axis.⁸³ Actual legislation of that kind was in fact prepared and is now in the hands of the Bureau of the Budget. It was apparently decided, however, that the moment was not favorable for trying to secure such legislation.

If this decision is still sustained, the only other source would appear to be further allocation of Executive funds. The Polish Ambassador is asking for 5 million dollars, and is eagerly pressing his inquiries. I thoroughly recommend that such financial assistance be given if the funds are or can be made available.

I understand that the British Government is making similar advances of a substantial amount.

The Polish authorities are agreeable to giving us a detailed account of their expenditures out of any funds granted—if we so desire.⁸⁴

CORDELL HULL

⁸³ An agreement on the "Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression" (Lend-Lease Agreement) between the Governments of the United States and Poland, negotiated under the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), was signed at Washington on July 1, 1942. For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 257, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1542. It was also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, 1942, p. 577.

⁸⁴ The President sent the following memorandum of October 3, 1942, to the Secretary of State: "I agree that we should allot further executive funds for the maintenance of the Polish Government in this country. However, I think that we should caution them against any extravagance and limit them very definitely to absolute necessities. I would, therefore, agree to the allocation of another two and a half millions from my fund, but I would like to know how long they expect it to last. FDR"

860C.51/1506

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at my request.

I told the Ambassador that the President had informed me that in view of the request of the Polish Government he was willing to agree to the allocation of another two and one-half millions for expenses of the Polish Government. I stated that the President wished me further to say that he felt that expenditures from this sum by the Polish Government should be definitely limited to absolute necessities, and that anything in the nature of extravagance should be avoided. The President also wished me to say that he would like to know how long the Polish Government believed that the sum now allocated would last in the light of the specific request of the President above indicated.

The Ambassador stated that he was very grateful for this decision of the President, but that it was very difficult for him to give any clear-cut, specific budget which would show the time that the funds now allocated would last. He said that the expenditures of Polish official agents in the United States and in the Western Hemisphere represented a very small percentage of the expenses of the Polish Government, that by far the greater portion would be spent in subversive activities in former Poland, and that the expenditures made for this kind of activity might obviously be far greater one month than they would be the next. He promised, however, to do the best he could to let me have this statement requested by the President next week.⁸⁵

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/990 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 10, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received October 10—10:58 p. m.]

871. Department's 449, September 14, 7 p. m. The Polish Minister Counselor has informed the Embassy that he had a cordial interview with Molotov on September 30 during which the latter stated that the existing misunderstandings in Soviet-Polish relations were work-

⁸⁵ Ambassador Ciechanowski furnished the desired statement to Under Secretary of State Welles in a letter of October 16. Herein the Ambassador explained the expenditures for the purposes of the Polish war efforts to which this second installment of funds would be allocated. He estimated that this installment would suffice for a period of three months. (860C.51/1507)

ing to the disinterest of both parties and should be reexamined with a view to clearing them up. The Minister is of the opinion that the recent American and British representations on behalf of the Poles have had a salutary effect and that at least a temporary improvement in Soviet-Polish relations could be expected. He added that a certain improvement had already been noticed explaining that no Polish relief representatives had been arrested for some time and that the Polish Embassy had recently received a note from the Foreign Office couched in favorable terms in which the Soviet Government offered to place more additional quarters at the disposal of Polish children in the Soviet Union and suggested that conversations be initiated with respect to evacuation questions. He stated that there had been no change, however, in the Soviet attitude toward Polish Jews in the Soviet Union.

STANDLEY

760C.61/992: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 19, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received October 21—8:16 p. m.]

906. Embassy's 871, October 10, 11 a. m. [*p. m.*] The Polish Minister Counselor tells me that the Foreign Office has informed him that of the 109 Polish relief workers still under arrest 15 have been found not guilty and are being released, 78 have been found guilty of offenses serious enough to warrant immediate deportation and 16 have been found guilty of such serious crimes that they are being turned over to the courts for prosecution. The Foreign Office added that it considers the matter of arrested Polish relief workers "closed" so far as Polish-Soviet relations are concerned. The Counselor says that nevertheless the Polish Embassy will endeavor to bring about the deportation either before or after trial of the 16 workers under detention one of whom is a woman. He adds that even though the relief system has been almost completely destroyed the Embassy is endeavoring to carry on relief work where it is needed most and is succeeding to some extent.

The new Ambassador⁸⁶ who has not yet presented his credentials says that he is inclined to be encouraged at the decision to release and deport so many of the workers and he is hopeful that this decision forecasts a more liberal attitude on the part of the Soviet Government. He on his part intends to adopt a policy of conciliation and to make all reasonable concessions in an effort to bring about really friendly cooperation between the Polish and Soviet Governments.

HENDERSON

⁸⁶ Tadeusz Romer.

760C.61/991a

Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) ⁸⁷

POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Ambassador expressed great pleasure in being able to communicate to the Under Secretary of State that he had been informed on the 23rd of October by Count Raczyński that, undoubtedly owing to the interventions authorized by the President and carried out by the United States Embassy in Moscow, and lastly by the Honorable Wendell L. Willkie, as personal emissary of the President,—the Soviet authorities had informed the Polish Chargé d'Affaires, Minister Sokolnicki, that the investigation conducted against the arrested officials and delegates for relief work of the Polish Embassy in Russia had now been concluded and that as a result of this investigation fifteen of the arrested persons had been found innocent and their release ordered; seventy-eight persons were regarded as allegedly guilty of anti-USSR. activities and were to be expelled from Russia. As regards the remaining sixteen officials, proceedings would be instituted as the Soviet authorities alleged that they had proof of activities of a serious nature against them.

The newly appointed Polish Ambassador, Mr. Tadeusz Romer, who has just arrived in Soviet Russia, is of the opinion that this step on the part of the Soviet authorities is a proof that there is a tendency to carry out the promise recently made to Mr. Willkie ⁸⁸ of trying to clarify and improve Polish-Soviet relations and this is a signal proof that the American intervention with Premier Stalin has proved effective. Ambassador Romer thinks that he may succeed in obtaining a change of attitude regarding the above mentioned sixteen officials against whom proceedings are to be instituted and obtaining their release.

The Polish Ambassador would like to take this earliest opportunity of expressing to the United States Government the warmest and most sincere thanks on behalf of the Polish Government for the invaluable help given to Poland in this matter, and also would be most grateful if, pending the arrival of Prime Minister General Sikorski, the thanks of Prime Minister General Sikorski could likewise be conveyed to the President.

⁸⁷ Handed by the Polish Ambassador to the Under Secretary of State on the morning of October 26, 1942; a copy was transmitted by the Under Secretary to President Roosevelt on the same day.

⁸⁸ See footnote 71, p. 187.

740.0011 European War 1939/25995

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the
Secretary of State*

Polish Series No. 230

LONDON, November 9, 1942.

[Received November 24.]

For the President, the Secretary and the Under-Secretary.

SIR: In a very recent talk with General Sikorski, he said he had made firm representations to the Soviet Embassy against continuance of letting down Russian parachutists into Poland. He had pointed out, moreover, that reports from his own secret agents in Poland had emphasized that these parachutists had not limited their efforts to the military field, but had deliberately engaged in political activities among the Polish people. This, the General had emphasized, was contrary to his agreement with M. Stalin; that M. Stalin knew full well that the General was in control of an effective underground organisation in Poland. Therefore, any orders to this organisation had to come henceforth, from him, and not from the Russian authorities.

The General went on to say that the activities of these Russian parachutists had caused him a great deal of concern, since, on several occasions, they had succeeded in inciting a number of Poles to commit unorganised acts of minor bearing against the Germans, with resultant serious reprisals. This was a useless expenditure of life, and it would have to stop. In order to preserve the strength of his underground organisation for maximum effectiveness at the "zero hour", he must have it understood by the Russians that henceforth any and all orders would emanate from him.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/25996

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the
Secretary of State*

Polish Series No. 231

LONDON, November 9, 1942.

[Received November 24.]

For the President, the Secretary and the Under-Secretary.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in a very recent talk with General Sikorski, he informed me he had just received two notes from the Soviet Embassy.

The first Note had stated in effect that the Soviet Government considered the further recruiting of Polish soldiers in Russia out of the question, on the grounds that the Polish troops in Russia had

demonstrated not only their unwillingness to fight alongside the Russians, but also their desire to leave the country.

In imparting the foregoing, the General said that these grounds, as stated in the Soviet Government's Note, were erroneous, in that previous to the period referred to the Polish Government had already requested equipment for the Polish troops in Russia, in order that they might continue the struggle at the side of the Russian forces. It had been only later that the Polish Government had decided to ask the Soviet Government to permit the evacuation of the Polish forces.

The second Note, the General continued, had stated that the 16 welfare delegates of the Polish Embassy in Russia, who were still under arrest, were now awaiting trial on the grounds of spying in behalf both of Britain and of the United States.

Immediately following the receipt of these two Notes, the General said, he had been invited to attend a showing of a moving picture at the Soviet Embassy. Feeling it would be undignified under the circumstances to attend, he had invented a pretext to absent himself. However, several of his Ministers had attended the showing of the picture. They had subsequently imparted to him their surprise at finding that, in depicting several scenes in Lwow, the picture had reflected marked credit on the Polish citizens.

In taking into consideration the inconsistency of this friendly gesture with the numerous unfriendly acts which Poland had been suffering at the hands of Russia, the General was inclined at the moment to feel that Poland might expect Russia to pursue two policies: one a "small policy" entailing annoyances; the other, a "big policy" entailing an effort to show Poland and the rest of the world that Russia was Poland's friend. Contributing towards his feeling on this score was his own appraisal as to Russia's position after her struggle with the Germans: he expected Russia to become so weakened by this struggle that it would be more likely to give way to Western influence than the West to yield to Russian penetration.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

760C.61/9933

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1942.

The Prime Minister of Poland, accompanied by the Polish Ambassador, called to see me this afternoon.

The Prime Minister handed me a document, attached herewith, which contains the text of a telegram received today by General

Sikorski from Stalin,⁸⁹ sent in reply to a personal letter addressed to Stalin by General Sikorski on October 26. General Sikorski interprets the telegram from Stalin as a satisfactory indication that the Soviet Government desires to approach Polish-Soviet problems in a conciliatory spirit.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Annex]

The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski)

I have taken knowledge with satisfaction of your letter of October 26th which you transmitted to me in connection with the taking of office of the new Polish Ambassador Mr. Romer.

You may rest assured that Mr. Romer will meet with the cooperation of the Soviet Government toward the strengthening of reciprocal confidence and collaboration between our Countries in the spirit of those principles which were accepted as the basis of our mutual declaration and our conversations held in Moscow in December of last year.⁹⁰

STALIN

740.0011 European War. 1939/263281

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1942.

The Prime Minister of Poland, accompanied by the Polish Ambassador, called to see me this afternoon.

The final document which the Prime Minister handed me, attached herewith, is the draft of a letter which he has requested should be addressed by the President to him before his departure from the United States and which, in the judgment of General Sikorski, would be of the greatest assistance to him in any conversations or negotiations which he may have to undertake with the Soviet Union or with Czechoslovakia. The President on December 2 agreed in principle that he would hand General Sikorski a letter with reference to Poland based, on the President's condition, upon the general principles of the Atlantic Charter.

I read the draft prepared by General Sikorski and then made the following observations. I stated that I desired it to be very clearly

⁸⁹ This telegram had been received by General Sikorski at Blair House in Washington on December 3, 1942.

⁹⁰ For correspondence concerning the visit of General Sikorski with Premier Stalin, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 264-268.

understood that any statements which I made during the course of our conversation today would be regarded as purely personal and as entirely preliminary. I said that I hadn't had the opportunity of discussing the issues involved with the President or with the Secretary of State, and that until the President had had an opportunity of giving mature consideration to these exceedingly important questions, it must be emphasized that any views I expressed were wholly personal.

I said that I wished to raise various points with regard to portions of this letter as drafted by General Sikorski. I said that in the first paragraph it was suggested that the President say that he desired to assure General Sikorski "that Poland would issue from the war undiminished in her full territorial integrity as it existed on August 31, 1939". I said that it seemed to me that the use by the President of a statement of that character would imply that Poland was to be reconstituted in her territorial limits within exactly the same boundaries as those which existed in 1939, and that this would seem therefore to inhibit any modifications of Polish frontiers which in the judgment of the United Nations and conceivably in the judgment of the Polish people themselves would be altogether desirable and destined to insure Polish stability and European stability. I said that, as the Prime Minister had discussed in a very brief and general way the day before yesterday with the President, consideration had been given to the possibility of the elimination of the Polish Corridor and of the incorporation of East Prussia into a new Poland provided the inhabitants of East Prussia were given the fullest right and liberty to determine whether they desired to live under Polish or under German jurisdiction, and that such inhabitants as desired to leave East Prussia would be afforded the freest opportunity of doing so and of taking with them their properties and belongings.

The Prime Minister immediately replied that this was correct, and then discussed at some length conditions in East Prussia. He said that East Prussia had long been like a "hail storm" looming over Poland, and that the greatest part of the military preparations made by the Germans against Poland had been concentrated in East Prussia. He stated that the total population of East Prussia was only 2,200,000 persons, not 3,000,000, as I had estimated, and that, of these, some 700,000 were Polish peasant proprietors. He said that he believed that the great majority of the Germans in East Prussia who would not wish to remain under Polish rule would of their own initiative immediately remove themselves from East Prussia during the last days of the war and before the final defeat of Germany.

With regard to Danzig,⁹¹ the Prime Minister said, the mistakes of

⁹¹ See section XI on the Free City of Danzig in the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 241-262.

1919 must be corrected and Danzig must surely become a part of Poland. He was completely firm in the assertion that the Polish Corridor must be done away with. He discussed briefly rectifications in the western frontier of Poland and stated that Stalin had stated to him that the rectifications of the Polish eastern frontier which Russia desired would be "very slight." He repeated in this connection that he had refused to discuss with Stalin any concessions of Polish territory to Russia.

I next brought up the reference in the second paragraph of the Prime Minister's draft which related to the establishment of a confederation of Poland with Czechoslovakia. I asked what the views of the Prime Minister were with regard to extending European federations, and specifically what he had in mind as the desirable type of federation in which Poland should take part. General Sikorski replied that he thought there should be two blocs in Eastern Europe, a Balkan bloc, to be created by Yugoslavia and Greece in which Bulgaria and Albania should be included. It was his conception that the northern bloc, of which Poland and Czechoslovakia should be the nucleus, should likewise be joined by Hungary and by what remained of Rumania at the end of the war. I inquired whether he desired that Austria likewise be included. He replied definitely that he did, and that under no conditions should Austria be incorporated in Germany, although this apparently was what President Beneš of Czechoslovakia desired. General Sikorski went on to say that he believed that there should be some working arrangement in the nature perhaps of an economic link, and one which perhaps would likewise involve joint management of communication facilities between the northern and southern federations.

He stated that all of the Western European countries favored this concept and that there had been some discussion of Holland becoming a member of the Scandinavian federation in the future, with Belgium undertaking some type of federative arrangement with France. He added that, of course, the great incognito at the present time was France herself, and that what part France would play in the Europe of the future was necessarily an interrogation point.

I then stated that in the penultimate paragraph of the draft letter it is suggested that the President express his approval of a proposed Polish-Soviet military alliance which it was General Sikorski's concept should be an alliance of an offensive and defensive nature and to last for at least twenty years. I asked what the reason for the creation of such an alliance might be if the United Nations were able, at the termination of the war, to devise some form of international security which would be practical and effective and which would include the complete disarmament of Germany. I said that in my judgment

the conclusion of military alliances of this character would have no valid basis if an effective international security were to be established, and certainly knowledge on the part of the American people at this time that military alliances of this character were being concluded would strongly prejudice them against the type of war aims for which the United Nations were striving, and most decidedly create a large body of public opinion which would be reluctant to have the United States undertake any measure of responsibility for the maintenance of any world order of which these military alliances formed a part.

General Sikorski said that, of course, if any practical form of international security were to be established there would be no reason for the negotiation of such alliances, and that he wished to make it clear that the initiative for the negotiation of an alliance of this character between Poland and Czechoslovakia had come from President Beneš and not from him. He said that any reference of this character could be omitted entirely from the letter which he had it in mind to receive from the President.

The Prime Minister said that he believed that if the President addressed a letter of this general character to him it should be made public. I said that that was my personal inclination, since I thought it was altogether desirable that any assurances from this Government to any other members of the United Nations should be public and not secret. I said that, for that very reason, however, it was obvious that we must give the greatest care to any draft of this character, and that the suggestions which I had discussed with General Sikorski would be studied very carefully during the next few days in order that the views of the President might later be obtained.

It was agreed that after these various documents had been carefully considered, General Sikorski and I would have a further conversation, approximately the middle of next week.

S[UMNER]-W[ELLES]

[Annex]

*Draft of Letter Proposed by the Polish Prime Minister. (Sikorski)
To Be Received by Him From President Roosevelt*

MY DEAR GENERAL SIKORSKI: I wish to take this opportunity once more to express my high appreciation of the part hitherto played by Poland in this war, to acknowledge the high dynamic qualities of the Polish nation, and to assure you that Poland will issue from the war undiminished in her full territorial integrity as it existed on August 31, 1939. It would indeed not be consistent with the high moral principles for which the United Nations are fighting if Poland's independence should not be thus restored. I regard this as consistent

with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Declaration signed by the United Nations on January 1, 1942.⁹² I do not exclude the possibility that the necessity will arise to widen the basis of Poland's security in the West in relation to Germany and thus to strengthen her economic independence.

I have noted with satisfaction your constructive initiative towards the establishment of a Confederation of Poland with Czechoslovakia as a first step in the direction of a European policy of international cooperation, and I am pleased to hear that the development of this idea is progressing satisfactorily. I am looking forward to its further satisfactory development, considering that the establishment of durable peace and security in Central Eastern Europe largely depends on its successful completion. I have no doubt that the creation of such a close international understanding in that part of Europe will be generally appreciated and approved by all the United Nations.

The Polish nation has shown moral values and qualities which indicate that it is destined once more to become a consolidating factor of European peace. I regard Poland as an active and reliable factor in the establishment of democratic law and order in Europe.

In my opinion, the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30th, 1941, and the Stalin-Sikorski Declaration of December 4th, 1941 constitute a most satisfactory basis for Polish-Russian collaboration. It is my hope that this basis will be duly enlarged and strengthened in view of the fact that a Polish-Soviet alliance, based upon the mutual loyalty and mutual respect of the sovereign rights of these two neighboring nations, must be regarded as one of the best guarantees of European peace.

Poland has suffered considerably and is still suffering great losses while further contributing all she has to the common cause. I can assure you that after the war the United States will assist Poland and help her economically.

740.0011 European War 1939/26685

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Polish Series No. 239

LONDON, December 5, 1942.

[Received December 23.]

SIR: Supplementing my Despatch Polish Series No. 231 of November 9, 1942, I have the honor to attach hereto copies of a translation of an *Aide-Mémoire*, which was recently given the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 31, 1942, by the Soviet Ambassador to the

⁹² Vol. I, p. 25.

Polish Government.⁹³ A similar *Aide-Mémoire* was handed simultaneously to the Polish Ambassador in the U. S. S. R. by M. Molotov.

In handing me a copy of the attached, Polish Foreign Minister Raczynski said that he had sent a note to the Soviet Ambassador protesting against the form and the innuendos of the *Aide-Mémoire*;⁹⁴ that he had, at the same time, informed the Ambassador that the Polish Government would give a considered reply as soon as it was in the possession of all the confiscated documents and archives of the Embassy Delegates. This last point had already been raised by the Polish Ambassador in Kuibishev in his talk with M. Molotov on October 30, 1942.

Minister Raczynski further told me that he was awaiting detailed reports from those "men of trust" who had been released from Soviet prisons.

There was no need, Minister Raczynski said, for him to assure me that the accusations brought against members of the Polish Embassy in Kuibishev, and against the Polish "men of trust" by the Soviet authorities, of indulging in spying and intelligence activities, were as groundless as allusions made that such activities were conducted by Polish officials for the benefit of the British and American Governments.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860C.014/1184

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs
(Atherton) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1942.

OBSERVATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN DIVISION ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE POLISH QUESTION BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS THE POLICY OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT THE RE-CREATION OF A STRONG INDEPENDENT POLAND

MR. SECRETARY: Before taking up in detail the questions relating to Polish frontiers in postwar Europe, Eu⁹⁵ feels very strongly that there are a number of general considerations which must be kept constantly in mind. These are:

a. The degree to which a proposed territorial settlement will further or obstruct the creation in postwar Europe of a general system of collective security rather than the acquisition at the expense of others by one state or another of strategically important frontiers or areas

⁹³ Not printed.

⁹⁴ For text of Polish note of November 17, 1942, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 199.

⁹⁵ Division of European Affairs.

which it considers necessary for its national security against its neighbors.

b. There is general admission that the question of the relations between the U. S. S. R. and the western democracies is one of the most vital to the postwar settlement and peace of the world. There is at least the possibility that the Soviet Union will abandon its previous basic hostility toward the non-Soviet states and be disposed, in its own interest as a national state to cooperate on a realistic and sincere basis in plans for a peaceful and orderly Europe. This possibility, in the opinion of Eu, would be definitively removed if the Soviet Government is given any grounds for believing that the proposals for the organization of Central-Eastern Europe reflect the desire to create a series of buffer states or *cordon sanitaire* to isolate the Soviet Union from Europe.

c. That Great Britain is geographically more directly connected with Europe and would therefore resent any arrangements, no matter how tentative or general they may be, for territorial settlements in continental Europe discussed by the United States with any of the Governments-in-exile.

1. Poland, being the largest country in area and homogeneous population in Eastern Europe and the only country in that area with a sufficiently strong sense of nationalism, naturally affords the best possibility of creating a great state. Furthermore, it is the greatest Catholic state in the United Nations today. It should be borne in mind, however, that this strong sense of nationalism has for the most part of the past 150 years, been of a "destructive" character directed against the established régime and for an independent Poland. For this reason it should be remembered in envisaging a new and more powerful Poland that its modern government from 1919 to 1939 found it difficult to readjust itself to a "constructive" canalization of this nationalist spirit and to a realistic and far-sighted sense of its duties and place in the family of nations.

2. Poland will dominate the northern area of any federation of eastern European states.

3. Poland must, therefore, have free and unthreatened access to the sea. The annexation of East Prussia to Poland would appear to be a reasonable means of achieving such access to the sea while at the same time removing a constant threat to Poland's security.

4. Any question of Polish relations to any of the Baltic States must not be discussed at this time.

5. There is some force to the argument that Poland's western frontier should be so established that Germany should not have an enclave into the vitals of Poland and also that the greatest security for Poland's access to the sea be assured. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that there is no natural frontier between Poland and Germany.

6. Since Poland's southern frontier borders on Czechoslovakia, this question is essentially one for their mutual agreement.

7. Poland's northern frontier with the Baltic States, including the Vilna areas, should be determined primarily in connection with the final decision in regard to the Baltic States.

8. In regard to the eastern frontiers of the future Polish State, Eu feels that any attempt to reconstitute the 1939 frontiers of Poland, which were those established by the Treaty of Riga in 1921, will lay the seed of continuing hostility between the Soviet Union and the new Poland since the return to Poland of the eastern provinces inhabited virtually entirely by White Russians and Ukrainians would split the Ukrainian and White Russian people. It will be recalled that the Curzon Line of 1919 [1920]⁹⁶ was suggested in accordance with ethnic considerations while the Soviet-Polish frontier of 1921 was the result of the military outcome of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920. The problem of the Vilna area and the status of the Baltic States fall into a different category and should, as indicated above, be left to future consideration.

9. There may be much merit in the proposals for federations of states in the Eastern European area. They are all in the tentative stage, however, and a decision concerning them will rest primarily with the respective peoples themselves. Further, to promise success they must embody these considerations:

a. No idea that the U. S. S. R. is being isolated, or that the federations are designed to concentrate a heavy force against an eventual Russian threat;

b. An approach different from the conceptions of the Little Entente⁹⁷ and the Balkan Entente⁹⁸ which were in effect defensive and offensive instruments against non-members;

c. A provision for adherence of non-member states, including the present enemy states (Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania) on tolerable terms;

d. A basis sufficiently general to fit into an eventual scheme for over-all European cooperation.

e. A more realistic approach to the economic factors involved.

10. Of all the Polish leaders, Sikorski undoubtedly has preeminence in his potentialities as an individual, and he is generally regarded as representing sufficiently the majority of Polish opinion to assure his continued leadership during the interim.

11. It should be borne in mind, however, that any special considerations shown the Sikorski Government will be taken as a pattern for our

⁹⁶ See footnote 16, p. 496.

⁹⁷ The treaty organizing the Little Entente among Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia was signed at Geneva on February 16, 1933; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxix, p. 233.

⁹⁸ The treaty organizing the Balkan Entente among Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia was signed at Athens on February 9, 1934; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clix, p. 153.

relations with other Governments-in-exile. The European Division strongly believes we should not at this time make any formal commitments or declarations which in any way indicate that the American Government is committed to a policy of imposing upon the people of occupied countries a government now in exile.

12. This Government has with considerable success impressed on the various governments that we will not negotiate on questions of European frontiers at this stage of the war. Any weakening on this line—which still seems to have such great practical utility that it would be unfortunate to abandon it—will bring nearly all of the United Nations to us with their claims. In many cases these claims are those of allies against each other or each other's pretensions. Therefore the European Division does not recommend any direct communication to the head of any exiled government that in any way indicates commitments at this time.

13. The European Division believes, however, that in the customary exchange of telegrams between the President and General Sikorski on the termination of the latter's visit,⁹⁹ in addition to the usual personal references to General Sikorski, the President should stress the fact that Polish resistance to the German enemy within Poland and the Polish contribution to the prosecution of the war has provided further evidence of the dynamic force of the Polish people and the inextinguishable vitality of their national life which is the best guarantee for the restoration of a free and independent Poland.

14. Finally we recommend that General Sikorski be told shortly before his departure that the United States Government is vitally interested in the future of the eastern European countries and that we encourage the countries of eastern Europe to make careful studies of their mutual problems to determine points of agreement and disagreement in order that they will be at all times in a position to envisage a plan of sufficient magnitude upon which desired federations could be worked out on the most equitable and permanent basis after full consideration had been given to all economic, ethnic and political questions (a committee of Exiled Governments in London¹ is already studying these problems). It should be indicated to General Sikorski that not

⁹⁹ General Sikorski visited the United States in December 1942 and January 1943.

¹ An informal, semi-official Main Committee, composed of the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the (eight) Allied Governments in Exile and representatives of the "Fighting French," was created in London during October 1942, to discuss postwar and other problems in common. Several subcommittees were soon appointed to prepare suggestions on particular subjects which were later to be submitted to the three great Allied powers for their approval. (840.50/832) Instructions were sent to London that "the Department would appreciate being kept closely informed concerning the progress of any such discussions." (Instruction No. 1342, September 24, 1942, to Winant (and also to Biddle), 740.00119 European War 1939/1164b (1164a).)

until such time as the powers concerned had tried among themselves to reduce their mutual problems to basic points of agreement and disagreement would it be possible for the United States to discuss these questions, in consultation with other interested powers, with a view to reaching a constructive and final solution of the eastern European problem.

R[AY] A[THERTON]

[Annex]

It is very important to observe that in the aggregate the proposals presented by General Sikorski set forth a point of view greatly at variance with the basic principles we have adopted as the real general war aims included in such documents as the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations. An examination of the several documents now presented shows that they cover reparations, war guilt, frontier pretensions, occupation, military booty, land and sea bases, et cetera, all in the spirit of extreme nationalism, with only a mild suggestion of Poland's own plans for international collaboration, and nothing whatever regarding some of the aspects (minorities, Jews, and rehabilitation) which particularly affect the Polish area. The proposals in effect lay down Poland's maximum nationalistic demands. It is suggested that some indication be given to General Sikorski that we view them in that light.

860C.014/1188

Memorandum by the Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski) on the Polish-Russian Frontiers²

1. A lasting peace in Central and Eastern Europe depends on Polish-Russian collaboration, which in turn is subsequent to the settlement of the question of the common boundaries and the loyal observance of treaties binding the two countries.

2. It must be emphasized from the very outset that by the Treaty of Riga in 1921 Poland renounced all claims to about 55% of her former area and has no territorial assertions whatever with regard to the Soviet Union. It should also be borne in mind that the Treaty of Riga resulted from a compromise based on political, economic, and strategic considerations and had never been put in question by either of the contracting Powers until the conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of 1939.

3. It was not until after the outbreak of the present war and subsequent to the German-Soviet pacts that certain imperialist tendencies

² Sent to Under Secretary of State Welles with a covering letter of December 23, 1942.

of the Soviet foreign policy became evident. Some of them took their origin from the traditional policy of Russian imperialism, whilst others—which are primarily directed against Poland—are the outcome of the Communist imperialism of the Bolsheviks.

4. The historical claims of the Soviet Government are consistent with the political testament of Peter the Great, in that, they incline towards the possession of ice-free ports in the Baltic and the command of the Dardanelles. These claims are explained by the Soviet Government, as successor to the Tsarist traditions, under the pretence of strategic and economic necessities. The accomplishment of these designs against the will of the nations concerned is a problem of world politics, and will depend upon the actual disposition of forces between the Great Powers at the time of the termination of the war. The sympathy of the Polish people, who are suffering such extremities on account of their devotion to freedom, are unquestionably on the side of the weaker nations. Poland, however, is not sufficiently powerful to undertake the defence of their interests.

5. The pressure of the Soviet Government in the direction of the eastern borders of Poland and their intentions against Lithuania admit of demands of a more recent period and are dictated by the precepts of Bolshevik Imperialism, for it is evident that the territories seized by Russia in 1939 as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, and held for two years on the basis of Russo-German collaboration, have no value to Russia whatever.

6. The northern and central areas are very poor in natural resources. The southern part which contains our only oil-fields is of great importance to Poland, whereas the high cost of production and the comparatively low output (400–500,000 tons per annum) would make it insignificant to our neighbour, nor would it bear comparison with his vast capacities or economic facilities of production. In this part of Poland there is also ozocerite, natural gas, potassium chloride, timber and water-power. The industry of these resources forms the basis of a living for many hundred thousands of Polish families inhabiting outside this area.

7. The potential of Poland consists mainly in the large reserves of manpower, whereas the shortage of raw materials does not afford the opportunities for sufficient employment. There is ample scope for the development of economic intercourse between Russia and Poland, provided that political factors do not interfere with the manufacture and exchange of goods. Russia, for instance, imported to the industrial area of Leningrad millions of tons of coal, which could be supplied without difficulty by Poland, whereas it was brought from Russian Mines across a distance of over 3,000 miles. In exchange, Poland could receive the raw-material output of the neighboring Ukraine

and the Caucasus. For the raw iron of Krivoy Rog, Poland would be capable of returning manufactured goods satisfying in addition the home market. The industrial development of eastern Poland would be economically justified, besides being beneficial to the local population, owing to the circumstance that the industrial areas are distant from that region on either side of the Polish-Russian border. There are many reasons, besides these, for the anticipation of great results from economic enterprise between Poland and Russia which would be equally advantageous to both countries.

8. The arguments of a strategic nature brought forward by the Soviet Government in justification of their territorial claims with regard to the eastern part of Poland are not convincing. A span of an additional hundred miles could hardly be of significance to a territorial dimension such as Russia, whose width extends over seven thousand miles. The Russian capital is situated one thousand miles from the western borders of the Soviet Empire. A boundary following the so-called Curzon line (along the river Bug) would from the strategic point of view be infinitely more disadvantageous to Russia than the Russo-Polish frontier previous to September 1939. The Bug is a small river that can be waded without difficulty, while the Polesie³ marshes, even during the present war, have proved to be a natural obstacle of great military significance. They are important to Poland as a defensive barrier, but worthless as a bridge-head for offensive operations.

9. The centuries of political relationship between Poland and Russia, often agitated, have testified to the attainment of valuable results of cultural and economic intercourse, which moreover could be extensively developed in the future. Through the establishment of a larger federated block of nations, Poland would be capable of playing a considerably more active part by the importance of this politically independent organisation existing between Germany and Russia and constituting for the latter the most effective barrier of defense against any future German intentions. Moreover such a block could never be cause of anxiety to Russia, in the sense of a *cordon sanitaire* as it would be founded on the binding collaboration of all countries bordering on Germany both in the East and in the West, at the time of the German attack.

10. The Polish Prime Minister gave manifest evidence to the importance which he attaches to the problem of Polish-Russian collaboration, when notwithstanding the ordeal suffered by the Polish population during the two years of Russian occupation, following their treacherous aggression of September 17th 1939, he was the first to extend his hand towards Russia and in July 1941 to sign an agree-

³ Pripet.

ment followed by the joint declaration which he later signed with Stalin in Moscow.

11. It is essential that the Polish-Russian frontiers should be firmly established. There must be a dividing line between the Communist conception of the world as represented by the Soviets and the ideals of the Western Democracies based on individual rights. This demarcation should follow the lines established by the Treaty of Riga.

12. The frontiers of the Treaty of Riga are the only ones acceptable to the Polish Nation for the following reasons:

a) All historic arguments are in their favour, particularly on the grounds that the whole of the eastern area of Poland including its two principal centres, Wilno⁴ and Lwów,⁵ was built up and promoted by the effort of Poland alone and owes its culture to Polish civilization. Moreover throughout history Lwów has never belonged to Russia and Wilno was under the domination of that Country only during the period when Poland was partitioned. It would be impossible in any way to take into consideration the so called plebiscite which was accomplished by the Russians in a unilateral and coercive manner contrary to the will of the great majority of the population.

b) Both economic and strategic reasons also recommend the maintenance of the frontiers established by the Treaty of Riga.

c) The inhabitants of those territories also desire to remain within the boundaries of the Polish State. Apart from the inhabitants of Polish nationality, who previous to the war amounted to 70% of the population of Wilno and over 60% in Lwów (whereas there were no Russians in either of these cities) it should be emphasized that the White Ruthenians adhere instinctively to Poland as their Mother Country, a proof of which is available in letters addressed to General Sikorski as Head of the Polish Government, by a number of White Ruthenians who have been deported by the Russians. The Jewish inhabitants of those provinces are equally most eager to return to Poland. This is evident were it not but by the great difficulties which the Russians are creating in respect of the admission of Jews to the ranks of the Polish troops raised among the deportees in the Soviet Union. The same sentiment and desire applies to the Polish citizens of Jewish faith in the Middle East, in England or those who have found refuge in the United States.

d) General Sikorski feels it his duty to declare most emphatically that the whole Polish Nation would repudiate the recognition of any agreement conceding the annexation of those Polish territories to Russia and would in no lesser degree regard as null and void any such commitments on the part of our Ally, than if they had been made by the enemy. Indeed the surrender of any part of Polish territory would provoke a lasting state of tension in that part of Europe and would render impossible any form of collaboration with Russia.

e) The foremost obligation of the Polish Government is the defence of the integrity of the Republic and consequently the Chief of the

⁴ Vilna, Vilno.

⁵ Lvov.

Polish Government has not the right whilst on foreign soil, to sign any agreement which might involve a diminution of Polish territory.

13. Nevertheless, in order to give further proof of goodwill, General Sikorski is prepared to go once more to Moscow and negotiate with Mr. Stalin a pact of friendship with Russia and discuss a number of other matters important to the shaping of future relations between the two Countries.

DECEMBER 23, 1942.

POLISH DESIRE TO CONSCRIPT POLISH CITIZENS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE POLISH ARMED FORCES, AND THE AGREEMENT ON MILITARY SERVICE EFFECTIVE JANUARY 27, 1943

811.2222 (1940)/563

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1942.

The Polish Ambassador,⁷ in the company of the Polish Acting Foreign Minister,⁸ called to see me this afternoon. Count Raczynski said he was calling to say good-by since he was flying back to London the end of this week. He said that he wished to be in London a few days before General Sikorski⁹ started for the United States.

The Minister brought up the question of the recruiting of Polish-citizens within the United States. I said that the view of the President was that any national of a co-belligerent of this country, now within the jurisdiction of the United States, should not be permitted to evade his obligations of military service to his own country just because he was within the United States, and the President desired that proper and effective measures be undertaken so as to meet this objective. I said that we could not, of course, agree to the taking of measures which would be in violation of our own Selective Service Act,¹⁰ but that I believed effective measures could be taken which would meet the wishes of the Polish Government in this regard. I said it seemed desirable for me to ascertain what the views of the Department of Justice and of the War Department might be and as soon as this had been done, I would be glad to have word sent to the Polish Ambassador so that he could discuss the details with the appropriate officials of the Department of State.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁷ Jan Ciechanowski.

⁸ Count Edward Raczynski.

⁹ Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London.

¹⁰ Approved September 16, 1940, 54 Stat. 885; as amended, December 20, 1941, 55 Stat. 844.

860C.2222/18

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Acting Secretary
of State*

745/SZ-t-28

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1942.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to our conversation on March 4th when I visited you together with Count Edward Raczyński, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

In the course of that conversation you informed us that The President was favorable in principle to the suggestion of granting to the Polish Government the possibility of enlisting in the Polish Army Polish citizens resident in the United States, provided this did not interfere with the Selective Service Act. You further informed us that the Department of State would take the matter up with the appropriate Departments.

On March 13, 1942, Col. W. Onacewicz, Military Attaché of the Polish Embassy, was told by Col. Carlton S. Dargusch, Deputy Director of the Selective Service System, that his Department was at present studying the question of making it possible for citizens of the United Nations who had active national armies, to enlist men in those armies, and that the Selective Service System intended to grant the right to such selectees, both declarant aliens and non-declarant aliens called up under the Selective Service Act for service in the army, of individual choice between service in the U. S. Army or that of the country of their origin. Col. Onacewicz drew the attention of Col. Dargusch to the fact that leaving the matter of service in the Polish Army to Polish citizens resident in the United States to the free choice of these Polish citizens, might not bring the desired result and a sufficient number of soldiers to supplement the losses of the Polish Army which has been fighting for two and a half years on various fronts and which, being cut off from Poland, could not count on a normal flow of reserves from Poland. He therefore expressed the hope that it would be possible to find some way of making service of these Polish citizens in the Polish Army compulsory. Col. Dargusch appeared to be favorable to this view, but explained that any decision regarding compulsion could not be taken by the Selective Service System, but would have to be decided upon by the Department of State.

I have the honor to bring this to your attention and to ask for your favorable attitude in this matter.

Accept [etc.]

J. CIECHANOWSKI

860C.2222/20b

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador
(Ciechanowski)*

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to Your Excellency's note of March 17, 1942, and to previous correspondence¹² with respect to the enlistment of residents of the United States in the armed forces of Poland, I have the honor to inform you that special consideration has been given to the views of your government in the discussions which have taken place between officers of this Department, the War and Navy Departments, and the Selective Service System on the general problem of the application of the United States Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, to nationals of cobelligerent countries residing in the United States.

As you are aware the Act provides that with certain exceptions every male citizen of the United States and every other male person residing in the United States between the ages of 18 and 65 shall register. The Act further provides that with certain exceptions, registrants within specified age limits are liable for active military service in the United States armed forces.

This Government recognizes that from the standpoint of morale of the individuals concerned and the over-all military effort of the countries at war with the Axis Powers, it would be desirable to permit certain classes of individuals who have registered or who may register under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, to enlist in the armed forces of a cobelligerent country, should they desire to do so. It will be recalled that during the World War this Government signed conventions with certain associated powers on this subject. The United States Government believes, however, that under existing circumstances the same ends may now be accomplished through administrative action, thus obviating the delays incident to the signing and ratification of conventions.

This Government is prepared, therefore, to initiate a procedure which will permit aliens who have registered under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, who are nationals of co-belligerent countries and who have not declared their intention of

¹² In a note to the Secretary of State dated January 22, 1942, Ambassador Ciechanowski transmitted the Polish Government's request that the Polish military authorities be granted permission "to conscript to the Polish Armed Forces all Polish citizens residing in the United States, between the ages of eighteen and fifty." The Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Berle, acknowledged the note on January 28, 1942, stating that a detailed reply would be made after careful consideration by the appropriate, interested authorities of the United States. (860C.2222/10)

becoming American citizens to elect to serve in the forces of their respective countries, in lieu of service in the armed forces of the United States, at any time prior to their induction into the armed forces of this country. Individuals who so elect will be physically examined by the armed forces of the United States, and if found physically qualified, the results of such examinations will be forwarded to the proper authorities of the co-belligerent nation for determination of acceptability. Upon receipt of notification that an individual is acceptable and also receipt of the necessary travel and meal vouchers from the co-belligerent government involved, the appropriate State Director of the Selective Service System will direct the local Selective Service Board having jurisdiction in the case to send the individual to a designated reception point for induction into active service in the armed forces of the co-belligerent country. If upon arrival it is found that the individual is not acceptable to the armed forces of the co-belligerent country, he shall be liable for immediate induction into the armed forces of the United States.

Before the above-mentioned procedure will be made effective with respect to a co-belligerent country, this Department wishes to receive from the diplomatic representative in Washington of that country a note stating that his government desires to avail itself of the procedure and in so doing agrees that:

(a) No threat or compulsion of any nature will be exercised by his government to induce any person in the United States to enlist in the forces of any foreign government;

(b) Reciprocal treatment will be granted to American citizens by his government; that is, prior to induction in the armed forces of his government they will be granted the opportunity of electing to serve in the armed forces of the United States in substantially the same manner as outlined above. Furthermore, his government shall agree to inform all American citizens serving in its armed forces or former American citizens who may have lost their citizenship as a result of having taken an oath of allegiance on enlistment in such armed forces and who are now serving in those forces that they may transfer to the armed forces of the United States provided they desire to do so and provided they are acceptable to the armed forces of the United States. The arrangements for effecting such transfers are to be worked out by the appropriate representatives of the armed forces of the respective governments.

(c) No enlistments will be accepted in the United States by his government of American citizens subject to registration or of aliens of any nationality who have declared their intentions of becoming American citizens and are subject to registration.

This Government is prepared to make the proposed régime effective immediately with respect to Poland upon the receipt from you of a note stating that your government desires to participate in it and

agrees to the stipulations set forth in lettered paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) above.¹³

Accept [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

860C.2222/16

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador
(Ciechanowski)*

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency's note no. 745/SZ-52 of July 6, 1942¹⁴ in reply to the Department's note of March 30, 1942, which set forth the conditions under which nationals of co-belligerent countries residing in the United States can be permitted to enlist in the armed forces of a co-belligerent country, should they so desire.

You request, on behalf of your Government, whether it would be possible for the United States Government to revise the stipulations contained in its note of March 30, 1942 with a view to making it possible for a larger number of Polish nationals in this country to be taken into the Polish armed forces and specifically suggest that the conscription into the Polish armed forces of Polish citizens resident in the United States should, with certain provisos, include in principle all Polish citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-one.

In order to ascertain whether an exception could be made to the provisions set forth in this Government's note of March 30, 1942, a careful study of your proposals has been made by the appropriate agency of this Government.¹⁵

Although, as you state in your note under reference, all Polish citizens under Polish law, irrespective of their place of residence, are under obligation to respond to the call to the Polish colors, the appropriate authorities of this Government point out that the conscrip-

¹³ The Polish Government in Exile had established a training center at Owen Sound, Ontario, for recruits from Polish citizens in North America. In the spring of 1942 it decided to liquidate the Owen Sound training center and transfer the Polish Armed Forces in Canada to England, after Polish enlistments had proved smaller than anticipated. The Polish authorities alleged that this was largely because the action of the United States Government in effect limited future recruits for the Polish Army in North America to Poles who had not declared their intention to become citizens of the United States.

¹⁴ Not printed.

¹⁵ A copy of the Polish note of July 6 was transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Selective Service System, General Lewis B. Hershey, on July 11, 1942, for his consideration. General Hershey replied on July 24, giving his opinion on the matter. Copies of the Polish note of July 6, the legal opinion of the Director of the Selective Service System, and the draft of this reply to the Polish note were then sent by the Acting Secretary of State on August 29 to the President for his approval.

tion by the Polish Government of Polish citizens in the United States would be in violation of the laws of the United States.

In this connection, your attention is called to the provisions of the United States Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 which stipulate that every male citizen of the United States and any other male person residing in the United States between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five shall register. The act further provides that, with certain exceptions, registrants within specified age limits are liable for active military service in the United States armed forces. Although the law specifies that all male persons within certain age limits residing in the United States are subject to service in the armed forces of this country, the United States Government recognized that from the standpoint of morale of the individual concerned and the military efforts being made by all the United Nations against the Axis powers, it would be desirable, as pointed out in its note under reference, to permit certain aliens on a purely voluntary basis to enlist in the armed forces of a co-belligerent country. It was in recognition of this that it was decided to permit aliens who are nationals of co-belligerent countries and who had not declared their intention to become American citizens to enlist in the armed forces of their respective countries.

While the United States Government appreciates to the fullest extent the motives which prompted the Polish Government to express the hope that in its case an exception could be made to the Selective Service legislation, you will readily understand, in view of the foregoing, that it is not possible for this Government because of legal restrictions to accord any exceptions to the provisions of the Selective Service Training and Service Act of 1940, or to accord privileges beyond those granted in its note of March 30, 1942.

Accept [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

860C.2222/24

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State

No. 745/SZ-72

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1942.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to your note No. 860C.2222/16 of September 1, 1942 in reply to my note No. 745/SZ-52 of July 6, 1942,¹⁶ concerning the enlistment in the Polish Armed Forces of Polish citizens residing in the United States.

The Government of the United States and the Polish Government have exchanged communications with regard to their respective legislations concerning the principles and obligations of military service. On the one hand, and under the provisions of the United States Selec-

¹⁶ Latter not printed.

tive Training and Service Act of 1940, every male citizen of the United States and any male person residing in the United States between the ages of 18 and 65 is subject to registration. The Act further provides that with certain exceptions registrants within specified age limits are liable for active military service in the United States Armed Forces. On the other hand, the provisions of the Polish Military Service Act of March 9, 1939, stipulate the obligation of military service in the Polish Armed Forces of every Polish citizen, irrespective of where he permanently or temporarily resides.

The Polish Government readily understand that the legal restrictions of the Selective Service Training and Service Act of 1940 make it difficult for the Government of the United States to accord such exceptions, relating to the obligation of military service, as would coincide with the Polish legislation relating to Military Service. At the same time and on the grounds of the same instance it would not be possible for the Polish Government to alter their legislation, establishing the principles of military service in the Polish Armed Forces, which is based on the provisions of Polish Constitutional Law.

In view, however, of the present extraordinary situation of the Polish Government and the Polish Armed Forces, the President of the Republic of Poland issued a decree dated August 8, 1942, determining, for the period of the war, the obligations of Polish citizens abroad relative to military service and the conditions under which they are liable of preserving Polish citizenship while serving in the Armed Forces or other Services of a Co-Belligerent Country.

The Polish Government fully appreciate the friendly understanding of the Government of the United States with regard to the Polish Armed Forces and the war effort of the Polish Nation since the 1st of September 1939, and welcome most particularly the readiness of the Government of the United States (in view of the exceptional situation of the Polish Armed Forces as presented in my note of July 6, 1942) to accord such exceptions to the Selective Service Act of 1940 as expressed in your note of March 30, 1942, reaffirmed on September 1, 1942, thereby making it possible notwithstanding differences of respective legislations to reach a reciprocally satisfactory arrangement.

The Polish Government would be willing to accept, on the basis suggested in your note of March 30, 1942, an arrangement with the Government of the United States which would make it possible:

a) for all Polish citizens residing in the United States, who are liable to register under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces should they so desire;

b) for all Polish citizens, who have already been drafted in the Armed Forces of the United States, to be given the opportunity to transfer, if they so desire, to the Polish Armed Forces.

The Polish Government would be prepared to conform to the lettered paragraphs (a), (b), (c) of your note of March 30, 1942.¹⁷

I have the honor to suggest that, as regards enlistment and transfer of Polish citizens residing in the United States, to the Polish Armed Forces, the same procedure be applied as that which is in operation between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada.

Accept [etc.]

J. CIECHANOWSKI

860C.2222/24

The Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note No. 745/SZ-72 of October 13, 1942, and to other correspondence exchanged in the matter of the proposed arrangement between the United States and Poland concerning the services of nationals of one country in the armed forces of the other country. You state that your Government is prepared to accept an arrangement which would make it possible

a) for all Polish citizens residing in the United States, who are liable to register under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces should they so desire;

b) for all Polish citizens, who have already been drafted in the Armed Forces of the United States, to be given the opportunity to transfer, if they so desire, to the Polish Armed Forces;

and that your Government would be prepared to conform to lettered paragraphs a, b, and c of the Department's note of March 30, 1942.

I take pleasure in informing you that this Government is prepared to enter into an arrangement with your Government as proposed in the

¹⁷ In connection with this paragraph on the third and fourth pages of the Polish note, Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs stated in a memorandum of October 30, 1942, that he had explained to Mr. Michal Kwapiszewski, the Counselor of the Polish Embassy, as follows: "... the competent officials had indicated that they would appreciate receiving a further clarification of the acceptance by the Polish Government of the principles laid down in the Department's note of March 30, 1942. In this regard I informed Mr. Kwapiszewski that the competent officials would appreciate a specific written statement indicating that the acceptance contained in pages 3 and 4 of the Polish note under reference be clarified to show definitely that the phrase 'all Polish citizens' referred only to Polish citizens in the United States who had not declared their intention to become American citizens. Mr. Kwapiszewski promised to send a supplementary note clarifying this point."

In the supplementary note of October 31, 1942, there was the statement that paragraph a) of the note of October 13, 1942, "means that the Government of the United States would make it possible for all Polish citizens who have not declared their intention of becoming American citizens and who are liable to register under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, to enlist in the Polish Armed Forces should they so desire." This statement was not entirely satisfactory to officials of the Department of State because paragraph b) of the Polish note of October 13, 1942, was apparently not covered, and the matter was further considered.

Department's note of March 30, 1942; however, this Government finds itself unable to make the arrangement applicable to "all Polish citizens", as desired in lettered paragraphs *a*) and *b*) of your note of October 13, 1942. This Government is unable to grant the privileges outlined in the Department's note of March 30, 1942, to any but Polish nationals who have not declared their intentions of becoming American citizens.

This Government is prepared, however, upon the conclusion of the proposed arrangement, to grant to nondeclarant Polish nationals already serving in the armed forces of the United States, who did not previously have an opportunity of electing to serve in the forces of their own country, the privilege of applying for a transfer to their own forces. Upon the conclusion of the arrangement, the War Department is prepared to discharge, for the purpose of transferring to the armed forces of Poland, nondeclarant Polish nationals serving in the United States forces who did not have a previous opportunity of opting for service with the Polish forces.

If your Government is desirous of entering into the proposed arrangement, and you will forward to the Department a note conforming to the concluding paragraph of the Department's note of March 30, 1942, this Government is prepared to make the proposed régime effective immediately upon the receipt of such a note.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

[By a note of January 26, 1943, the Polish Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that the Polish Government was ready to affirm its acceptance of the stipulations contained in the concluding paragraph of the United States note of March 30, 1942 (*ante*, page 214), thereby conforming to the concluding paragraph of the United States note of December 14, 1942 (*supra*). The Secretary of State acknowledged receipt of this note on February 25, 1943, and stated that the United States Government considered that this agreement had therefore become effective on January 27, 1943, the date upon which the Polish note of January 26 had been received in the Department. The notes of March 30 and December 14, 1942, January 26 and February 25, 1943, constitute the agreement on Military Service; Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 320, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 954.]

**PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
POLAND REGARDING MUTUAL AID IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE
WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION, SIGNED JULY 1, 1942**

[For text of agreement signed at Washington, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 257, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1542.]

PORTUGAL

AGREEMENT WITH PORTUGAL REGARDING THE SUPPLY OF WOLFRAM TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 1, 1942 TO FEBRUARY 28, 1943

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/139 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, August 13, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received August 13—4: 48 p. m.]

1040. Department's 1097, August 11, 7 p. m.¹ The text of wolfram agreement has been drafted and agreed upon in form of an exchange of notes and is based upon pertinent parts of our memorandum of July 23 (despatch No. 533, July 24²) and the Portuguese memorandum in reply of July 28 (despatch No. 538, July 29²) with the new proviso referred to in Legation's telegram No. 1016 of August 8, 1 p. m.²

The Portuguese Government has insisted that all direct references to Germany including the description of the German mines be omitted with the result there is no stated limitation on the extent of the mines allocated to Germany in the notes. Fernandes³ maintains that his Government has no intention of changing the German allocated mines but will not embody this assertion in the written agreement. Accordingly the British and American delegates have today sent to Fernandes the following letter which is designed to bridge this gap:

"As you are aware Doctor Sampayo⁴ informed Sir Ronald Campbell⁵ last night that the Portuguese Government did not feel able to agree to a change in the draft wolfram agreement designed to define the words 'free mines' appearing in clause (g). Both Sir Ronald Campbell and Mr. Fish felt that some definition of this phrase in the agreement was necessitated by the omission in accordance with your desire of clause (f) of the rough draft which was handed you on August 5 as a basis for discussion. You will appreciate that by omitting reasons for reference to the mines allocated to other countries the free mines were left undefined.

Nevertheless we have since been looking over our files and we observed that you gave a precise definition of the mines which were to

¹ Not printed; in this telegram the Department authorized the Minister to sign the wolfram agreement (811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/121).

² Not printed.

³ Col. Tomaz Fernandes, member of the Portuguese delegation.

⁴ Teixeira de Sampayo, Portuguese Secretary General for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ British Ambassador in Portugal.

be regarded as foreign at our fifth meeting on May 7 last adding (as you will remember) that the Portuguese Government would not recognize for the purpose of the classification of mines as German or English any purchases or investment of foreign capital in Portugal mines made after January 24, 1942. Sir Ronald Campbell and Mr. Fish now agree that this statement, coupled with the explanations given in paragraph 1 (b) of the Portuguese Government's memorandum of July 28, amounts in effect to a definition of the phrase 'free mines' by making it clear which mines are not free. That being so we have been authorized by Sir Ronald Campbell and Mr. Fish to let you know that they are ready to proceed with the exchange of notes as soon as you wish.

Perhaps we could arrange the formalities of signature by telephone?"

In this connection, reference is made to paragraphs numbered 2, 7, 9, Department's telegram 998, July 18, 7 p. m.⁶

FISH

811.20 Defense (M). Portugal/141: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, August 14, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received August 15—12:35 a. m.]

1046. Legation's 1040, August 13, 6 p. m.

1. Shortly after letter quoted in my telegram under reference was delivered to Colonel Fernandes, he sent for American and British delegates and attempted to have it withdrawn. He stressed particularly that Dr. Salazar's⁷ patience was wearing thin over prolongation of wolfram negotiations.

2. They explained they were not at liberty to withdraw that communication because it dealt with a point of substance.

3. This afternoon Colonel Fernandes again sent for them and handed them identic letters reading as follows:

"I have shown the letter signed by you and by Mr. Nicholls⁸ to the Minister of Foreign Affairs who instructed me to confirm to you what I had already said to you, that is, that the wolfram negotiations had been concluded by the acceptance of a definite text. In these circumstances my Government cannot accept any supplementary documents whatever for the clarification or interpretation of the terms of the agreement.

If you or your Government considers that the agreement is not satisfactory and cannot or should not sign it I request of you the favor of so stating without delay because my Government wishes in turn to be free from the obligations contained therein.

Under this date a similar letter is being sent to Mr. Nicholls."

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁸ Apparently Jack Nicholls of the British delegation.

4. Colonel Fernandes pointed out that whereas Portuguese Government did not wish to indulge in any "threats" he had to make clear that if the agreement was not signed the 500 tons of British produced wolfram now held in the Metals Commission pending the issuance of export licenses would have to be taken over and transferred to the Germans since Portugal had no use for this product. He realized that the result of not signing would be unpleasant for both sides because the United States and Great Britain "should undoubtedly have to take their measures too". He added that in such an event there would also have to be public explanations.

5. He further pointed out that if the present arrangement was not put into force and new negotiations ensued they would have to be started again from the beginning and would not terminate in as favorable an arrangement as the present one to Great Britain and the United States.

6. I would point out that whatever caused Dr. Salazar to make difficulties on this point, be it emotional or considered, the reason given, namely that agreement was accepted and therefore could not be changed, is inadequate. It was in any case a misapprehension and Millard^{*} and Nicholls so informed Colonel Fernandes. They also said it should have been obvious that neither delegation was empowered to accept agreement without prior reference to heads of their missions or their Governments. Moreover, even if they had had full powers, the agreement did not become binding until the notes had been signed and exchanged. Up to that moment text could be modified by mutual consent and it was unreasonable of Portuguese Government to withhold its consent if, as we wished to believe, it was merely a question of improving the drafting.

FISH

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/145: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, August 15, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received 11:43 p. m.]

1058. Legation's 1046, August 14, 9 p. m. I have had a conference with my British colleague who read me a draft of a telegram which he proposed to send to London. In effect it recommends signing of the wolfram agreement since the alternative would be a break in relations involving loss of Portugal's wolfram and acquisition of it by the enemy, establishment of a real blockade of Portugal and denial of refueling facilities for ships and planes at Lisbon and in Azores. It points out, however, that unless some action is taken to counteract the

^{*} Hugh Millard of the American delegation.

ultimatum character of Salazar's communication he will have acquired such a primacy of position as to make profitable dealing with him well-nigh impossible. On the other hand the British Ambassador is convinced, and I agree with him, that Salazar has in his own mind faced up to the implications of such a break and might well in certain circumstances prefer that course of action.

Due to reduction in price of wolfram the production of free wolfram has in recent months so declined as to make it entirely probable that under existing arrangements Germany will not obtain the promised 2,400 tons. In this connection Salazar has been under strong German pressure which always carries the threat of sinking Portuguese ships.

The acute shortage of petroleum products is having an increasingly adverse effect on Portuguese economy and the cost of living has risen decidedly due to repercussions of war. In these circumstances when petroleum supplies are flowing at such a low level and tanker difficulties cloud the future, the law of diminishing returns operates against the employment of petroleum control as an instrument of pressure.

The British Ambassador has embodied in his telegram a suggestion that if he is authorized to sign the wolfram agreement, that at the same time he present Salazar with a demand for example for the signature within a week of a new war trade agreement and/or a supply purchase program as drafted by the British and American missions. These suggestions seem to me to have the practical disadvantage of being susceptible to complete refusal which would result in an overt break at a time when it may embarrass our dispositions in war.

For my part I believe that one of the means of obtaining the wolfram agreement and at the same time of rapping Dr. Salazar's knuckles, without these disadvantages, is to challenge him on an intangible such as the continuance of the venerable Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Naturally I refrained from suggesting to the British that they "whistle their ancient ally down the wind" but perhaps they will worry this out for themselves over the week end.

FISH

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/146: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1942—11 p. m.

1127. Your nos. 1040, 1046, 1051¹⁰ and 1058 of August 13, 14 and 15.

1. Jointly with a British Embassy representative we talked again with Bianchi¹¹ this afternoon recounting fully the most recent turn in our wolfram negotiations. Although Portuguese position is obvi-

¹⁰ Telegram No. 1051 not printed.

¹¹ Antonio de Bianchi, Portuguese Minister in the United States.

ously disturbing and might connote some serious new element, discussion was carried on on the assumption that this was not so.

2. Bianchi was informed that it is our impression that an unintended misunderstanding had arisen. We further informed him that our best conjecture as to the sources of that misunderstanding was that the letter that you and the British had sent to Fernandez, text of which is given in your 1040 of August 13, was taken as an attempt on the part of ourselves and the British to inject into the agreement an undertaking by the Portuguese not to grant further mining concessions to the Germans. It would appear from your 1051 of August 15 that this was the real cause of the misunderstanding. In that connection the Portuguese Government is correct in its surmise that its position on this point was accepted by us.

3. It was suggested to Bianchi that he assure the Portuguese Government there was no intention of reintroducing this point or trying to gain any new point of substance. The intention was merely to state in some way or other what seems to us an essential definition of free wolfram, to wit, wolfram from all mines not specifically allowed to the British and ourselves or to the Germans. Bianchi was informed that this Government and the British Government were willing to consider any draft that carried out this definition that the Portuguese Government wished to put forward.

He was then informed further that though we could perceive no satisfactory reason for omitting the definition, and in fact its omission increased the chances of future misunderstanding, if the Portuguese absolutely refused to define free wolfram, we would not insist upon the inclusion of a definition in any form. In such event, however, it was pointed out, that the fact would still remain that the American and British Governments would both sign the agreement with a definite understanding in their own minds of what is meant by free wolfram and any departure therefrom would naturally be regarded as a breach of the agreement. All of this it is believed Bianchi will transmit at once to his Government.

4. In the course of the discussion Bianchi repeatedly and in the most definite terms confirmed that there had always been an understanding that there were three types of wolfram, namely, that from the British mines, that from the German mines, and the free wolfram. Further in this connection, he confirmed his understanding that from the beginning the German mines were considered to be those which had produced 945 tons of wolfram during 1941.

5. Needless to say, the attitude displayed in the most recent Portuguese communication and comment created a most unpleasant effect. However, we do not think it wise to try to deal with it in the way suggested in the draft telegram of your British colleague as reported in your 1058 of August 15. This would seem to be impracticable, as

would any attempt to challenge the Portuguese on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

6. Please consult your British colleague and, if he concurs, advise the Portuguese in the sense of paragraph 3 above and conclude the agreement accordingly.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/163 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, August 19, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 8:17 p. m.]

1076. Department's 1127, August 18, 11 p. m. My British colleague has not yet received any instructions from London and we have arranged to consult as soon as they arrive. In the meantime, I wish to make the following comments:

1. I fully agree with the Department that the matter discussed in paragraph 2 of its telegram number 1127, August 18, 11 p. m. (no reference to which appeared in telegraphic instruction number 998, July 18, 7 p. m.¹³ or subsequent telegrams) is the immediate cause of the Portuguese Government's attitude. Apparently London was equally unaware of the Department's commitment to Bianchi on this point for it instructed the British Embassy in Lisbon to present just such a letter defining "free wolfram" as was jointly sent. As it happened, this instruction crossed with the report of the action having been taken.

2. However, since the Legation and the British Embassy remain under the threatening remarks and letter which Dr. Salazar authorized Fernandes to convey, it is important that the conversations between the Department and the British Embassy in Washington and Bianchi should be completed by the receipt of Bianchi's reply before the missions here make any approach to the Portuguese Government on this subject. It is suggested that when these interchanges have been satisfactorily concluded (and if my British colleague is instructed to sign) Bianchi be requested to inform Dr. Salazar personally that I am being instructed to sign the agreement—and that I then be so notified. Incidentally by that time the Department will have received the Legation's despatch 563 of August 15¹³ which contains the requested full text.

3. I might add that unless it is clear to Dr. Salazar that we are not just signing as the result of his threats these arbitrary tactics will become his favorite.

FISH

¹³ Not printed.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/163: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1942—11 p. m.

1134. Your 1076 of August 19.

1. We saw the Portuguese Minister again today at his request. He stated that he had received a telegram asking whether or not he had followed the instructions given him early in July to advise us that his Government did not intend to grant new mining concessions to foreign capital but that it could not bind itself formally not to do so because it would be contrary to the exercise of sovereign rights. From what the Minister said, we judge that the telegram indicated that if he had not so advised us his Government felt that his failure to do so was the cause of the entire misunderstanding arising out of your letter to Fernandes.

2. As indicated in the Department's 1127 of August 18, the Portuguese Minister had advised the Department in accordance with the above instructions. We had previously, in our informal talks with him, asked the Minister if the Portuguese Government would undertake not to grant further mining concessions to the Germans. This particular point was not mentioned in the Department's 998 of July 18,¹⁴ as that telegram was intended to cover only the points which we felt necessary for formal agreement. Moreover, so long as the Portuguese were willing to define the mines which were not free (as set forth in Points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of our 998), we felt it unnecessary to press for formal assurances that there would be no further mining concessions granted to the enemy. It now appears that considerable difficulty might have been avoided had we informed you of the foregoing.

3. This matter was discussed fully with Bianchi this morning. We advised him that we had not as yet received the text of the note, but repeated our understanding that all references to German concessions had been deleted and that consequently it was necessary that there be some definite understanding as to what was meant by "free wolfram." He agreed and said that he did not know why the references to the German mines had been deleted. He then replied that although his Government could not agree in writing not to grant further mining concessions to the Germans, it did not in fact intend to do so. He also confirmed his understanding that the German mining concessions within the meaning of the agreement were limited to those referred to in Point (c) of paragraph 1 of our 998.

4. Bianchi is to telegraph Salazar fully, setting forth the facts referred to in paragraph 2 above and pointing out that it has always

¹⁴ Not printed.

been understood between us that "free wolfram" included all wolfram except that produced from the properties referred to in Points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of our 998. We advised Bianchi that upon his so doing, we would instruct you to sign the agreement.

5. In the course of the conversation, we advised Bianchi that we were most displeased with the tone of Fernandes' communication to you and that it was its threatening nature which caused us considerable hesitancy in being willing to go forward with the agreement. We said that our willingness to instruct you to sign was only because of the circumstances surrounding the misunderstanding.

6. It appears to us that the explanation of the matter which Bianchi will telegraph to Salazar should be sufficient to meet the point raised by you in paragraph 3 of your 1076.¹⁵ Accordingly, if your British colleague has received instructions to do so, you are requested to sign the agreement.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/168 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1942—8 p. m.

1147. Your 1090, August 22.¹⁶

1. Your despatch 563 of August 15¹⁶ has not yet arrived. However, we have understood from your 1040 of August 13 that the texts of the notes to be exchanged satisfactorily meet all points which have been agreed upon with the exception that they do not define either the German concessions or free wolfram.

2. Accordingly, as it has been made clear to Bianchi what we understand from the term "free wolfram" and as Bianchi's own understanding is the same as ours (see paragraph 4 of our 1134 of August 20), you are hereby requested to sign the agreement without further conditions.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/194

*The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Salazar) to the American Minister in Portugal (Fish)*¹⁷

[Translation]

No. 36

LISBON, August 24, 1942.

MR. MINISTER: I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency the enclosed document wherein there are set forth the results achieved in

¹⁵ *Supra.*

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Portugal in his despatch No. 573, August 25; received September 1.

the negotiations relating to the supply of wolfram from Portugal to the United States of America and to the United Kingdom, during the period from March 1, 1942 to February 28, 1943, and to which the Portuguese Government agrees.

On this date I am addressing to the Ambassador of Great Britain in Lisbon a Note in the same tenor.

The present Note with the attached document, Your Excellency's Note in reply and that of the Ambassador of Great Britain, accompanied by the respective English text, should be considered as instruments of the agreement entered into between the three Governments, which enter into force as of this date.

I avail myself [etc.]

ANTONIO SALAZAR

[Enclosure]

Document Setting Out the Results of the Negotiations Regarding the Supply of Wolfram From Portugal to the United Kingdom and the United States From March 1, 1942, to February 28, 1943

(a) The organizations designated by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government may export wolfram up to a maximum amount of 4,000 tons under the terms of the present Agreement. The Portuguese Government will grant promptly on request the necessary export licenses for Great Britain, the Dominions and the British Colonies and for the United States of America.

(b) The production of the mining concessions belonging to: Beralt Tin & Wolfram Ltd., Sociedade Mineira do Cabril, Stanley Mitchell, Aliança Mineiro-Industrial, and Sociedade de Minas de Miranda (formerly called Sociedade Mineira de Argozelo) shall be allocated to the United Kingdom. For this purpose export licenses will be granted for quantities of wolfram equal to the quantities which shall have been delivered to the warehouses of the Comissao Reguladora do Comercio de Metais and produced by the above-mentioned concessions, subject always to the limit referred to in Clause (a).

(c) The production of the Borralha Mine shall be allocated to the United Kingdom for the duration of the present contract between that Mine and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and so long as the judicial ruling which ordered the execution of that contract shall be maintained or is not revoked by a subsequent judicial decision. If the said judicial ruling should be revoked, the Portuguese Government will compensate His Majesty's Government for the loss of the production of the mine.

(d) The production of the concessions belonging to Vesey Brown which are not subject to judicial proceedings shall be allocated to the

United Kingdom as soon as the present Agreement enters into force and the production of the concessions which are subject to judicial proceedings shall be allocated in conformity with the decisions of the Portuguese courts.

(e) The production of the *Compagnie Miniere de la Ribeira* shall be allocated to the United States subject to the Portuguese Minister in Washington considering satisfactory the evidence presented by Mr. P. F. Berry that he is the owner of the majority of the shares of the Company.

(f) As regards the production of the mines referred to in Clauses (c), (d) and (e), which, according to the terms of those clauses, is to be allocated to the United Kingdom and the United States, export licenses shall be granted for quantities of wolfram equal to the quantities which shall have been delivered to the warehouses of the *Comissao Reguladora do Comercio de Metais* and produced by those mines.

(g) Export licenses shall be granted for the destinations referred to in Clause (a) up to a total of one-quarter of the total quantity of wolfram delivered to the warehouses of the *Comissao Reguladora do Comercio de Metais* from the free mines. If the production of wolfram from these mines up to February 28, 1943 should exceed 2,000 tons, export licenses will be granted for the above-mentioned destinations for one-half of the excess.

(h) All references to wolfram in the present Agreement shall be understood as including wolfram in the form of concentrates, whether extracted from wolframite or from any other mineral and also wolfram in unseparated form or in residues.

(i) If the total quantity of wolfram to be allocated to the United Kingdom and the United States according to the terms of this Agreement should exceed 4,000 tons, that excess shall be the subject of special negotiations between the Portuguese Government and His Majesty's Government and the United States Government.

(j) The mineral produced by *Borralha* which is to be allocated to the United Kingdom in accordance with Clause (c) shall be bought by the *Comissao Reguladora do Comercio de Metais* at the price laid down for the mineral from the free mines.

(k) The Portuguese Government will give all necessary facilities for the maintenance and development of the mines whose production is allocated to the United Kingdom and the United States and for this purpose agrees:

(1) to grant entry visas and permits to work in Portugal for up to ten mining experts or engineers, either United States citizens or British subjects; the corresponding applications shall be made to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their *bona fides*, including those of a political character, shall be guaranteed by the American Legation or the British Embassy;

(2) that the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, acting for itself or as agent of the United States Commercial Company, may import on its own account goods of foreign origin for the operation of the mines concerned in sufficient quantity for current work and for development and for the maintenance of a reasonable reserve against any contingency, except when, if there is a scarcity of the goods concerned, it should be attributable to His Majesty's Government or the United States Government.

(b) The present Agreement shall be put into force provisionally pending the entry into force of the Agreement relating to the exchange of goods between Portugal on the one hand and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other,¹⁸ but shall be considered void if, within five weeks from the date of the present Agreement, the above-mentioned Agreement for the exchange of goods shall not have been concluded and put into force.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/194

*The American Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Salazar)*¹⁹

[Translation]

No. 831

LISBON, August 24, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to the note no. 36, which Your Excellency was so good as to address to me on August 24, 1942, I have the honor to confirm that the document enclosed therein, the agreed English text of which is annexed hereto, setting out the understanding arrived at regarding the supply of wolfram to the United States and the United Kingdom during the period from March 1, 1942 to February 28, 1943, is acceptable to the United States Government.

I understand that the British Ambassador is informing Your Excellency that the attached document is also acceptable to His Majesty's Government, and I agree that Your Excellency's note under reply, this note and my British colleague's note should be regarded as constituting an agreement between the three Governments, entering into force as from today.

Accept [etc.]

BERT FISH

¹⁸ A Supply-Purchase Agreement regarding the exchange of goods for the period from July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943, between Portugal on the one hand and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other was made effective by exchange of notes on November 23, 1942. A Supply-Purchase memorandum was attached to the notes setting forth the results of the negotiations, and giving in detail the quantities of the enumerated products to be supplied each other. The exchange of notes, together with the Supply-Purchase memorandum, was transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Portugal in his despatch No. 711, November 25, 1942, not printed.

¹⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Portugal in his despatch No. 573, August 25; received September 1.

**REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT REGARDING
CERTAIN RESTRICTIVE MEASURES APPLIED AGAINST AMERICAN
CITIZENS IN THE AZORES**

853B.20/45 : Telegram

*The Consul at Ponta Delgada, Azores (Dawson) to the Secretary
of State*

PONTA DELGADA, March 29, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 10 : 23 p. m.]

97. I have received a circular letter dated March 28 from the Civil Governor of Ponta Delgada transmitting an order of the military command of the Azores of which the following is translation of the text:

"1. All foreigners without exception are required to concentrate themselves on the football field of the local high school following any rifle firing or signal of 3 shots fired by artillery or the firing of three mortars.

2. All foreigners including consular officers found outside the concentration field 1 hour after the beginning of the concentration will be considered spies and will be executed without trial of any kind.

3. Any foreigner who by reason of exceptional conditions is unable to present himself in the concentration camp shall communicate at once with the General Headquarters of the Military Command and must at once consider himself a prisoner in the place where he is."

This action is probably the result of recent flights by unidentified planes over this island too high to be recognized but one heard by me about 6 a. m. March 27 sounded like a German motor. Compliance with this order would leave no time for the destruction of codes, confidential correspondence, passport blanks, et cetera. I pointed out to the Governor that in case of emergency I am instructed by my Government to remain in the Consulate. I respectfully request instructions. The Legation has been informed. Please acknowledge the receipt of this telegram as I am in doubt whether it will be transmitted.

DAWSON

853B.111/12 : Telegram

*The Consul at Ponta Delgada, Azores (Dawson) to the Secretary
of State*

PONTA DELGADA, March 31, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 11 : 24 a. m.]

100. The local Government has ordered that all foreigners without exception whatsoever residing on this island outside the city of Ponta Delgada must establish their place of residence within the area of the city not later than April 4 under penalty of imprisonment or deportation. The Acting Civil Governor has informed me verbally that this

measure applies to all those persons registered as American citizens. In the island of São Miguel alone there are 94 such persons and hundreds of others born in the United States who may claim citizenship. There are few citizens of other nations so this order will affect primarily American citizens. The order apparently was issued at the request of the military authorities due to fear of fifth column activities in the event of an invasion attempt.

DAWSON

853B.20/45 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1942—9 p. m.

319. With reference to telegram no. 97 of March 29, 5 p. m., from Ponta Delgada, concerning a circular from the Civil Governor requiring the concentration of all foreigners including consular officers upon a given signal, you are instructed to state to the Portuguese Government that compliance with such an order on the part of American consular officials would not be consistent with their instructions from this Government and that it is hoped that the same consideration and courtesies will be shown American consular officials in Portuguese territory as are accorded such Portuguese officials in this country. Please obtain a definite reply and report by cable as soon as possible.

If a satisfactory reply is obtained you should ask the Portuguese Government to issue appropriate instructions to the authorities in the Azores and you should inform consulates.

WELLES

853B.20/45 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1942—10 p. m.

326. Department's 319, March 31, 9 p. m. The Department is now in receipt of a telegraphic report from Ponta Delgada to the effect that all foreigners living outside Ponta Delgada in the Island of São Miguel are required to move into the city before April 5. From this report it appears that the order will affect mainly American citizens of whom there are known to be 94. In addition there are said to be hundreds who by reason of American birth are in a position to claim American citizenship.

Please bring to the attention of the Portuguese Government the hardship this measure may be expected to occasion and remind the Government that Portuguese nationals in this country are subject to no comparable restriction although this country is at war. State that

it is assumed that the measure has been taken by the local government without instructions from Lisbon and express the hope that the central government will issue instructions to the insular authorities to insure that treatment will be accorded American citizens resident in the Azores equally liberal as that accorded Portuguese citizens in the United States.

While taking this matter up with the Portuguese Government you should endeavor to ascertain why such severe measures are being applied in the Azores.

Report by cable at the earliest possible moment.

WELLES

853B.20/48 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, April 7, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received April 7—9:35 p. m.]

295. Department's telegrams 319, March 31, 9 p. m. and 326, April 1, 2 [10] p. m. I at once sent notes to the Foreign Minister in the sense of those telegraphic instructions and requested an appointment with Sampayo²⁰ in order to take up matter orally. He had left for the country to be gone over Good Friday and Easter. I have repeated my request but the Foreign Office has not yet fixed an appointment.

The British inform me they have sent to the Foreign Office a note along the lines of the Department's telegram No. 319.

I shall not fail to telegraph further as soon as I have seen the Secretary General.

FISH

853B.20/47 : Telegram

The Consul at Ponta Delgada, Azores (Dawson) to the Secretary of State

PONTA DELGADA, April 7, 1942—noon.

[Received 12:02 p. m.]

109. The local government has requested me to furnish the names and addresses of all American citizens on this island. This demand is in connection with the military order that all foreigners be concentrated within the city of Ponta Delgada and that in case of a designated signal they proceed immediately to place of concentration under penalty of execution without trial as reported in my telegrams 97,

²⁰ Teixeira de Sampayo, Portuguese Secretary General for Foreign Affairs.

March 29, 5 p. m. and 100, March 31, 11 a. m. This alarm was given shortly after midnight of April 4 and others are to be expected at any time. It is feared that in the state of excitement the threatened executions may be carried out. In view of note 19, section 173, of the Consular Regulations ²¹ may I comply with the request? Please rush answer as this area is under rigid military control.

DAWSON

853B.20/45 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1942—11 p. m.

355. No reply has been received to the Department's 319 March 31, 9 p. m. or to the Department's 326 April 1, 10 p. m., and the Department has now received an even more disquieting report from Ponta Delgada, to the effect that the signal described in the Civil Governor's circular of March 28, referred to in the Consulate's telegram of March 29 ²² (upon which all foreigners including consuls would be required to concentrate) was sounded shortly after midnight of April 4 and is expected to be repeated, and that it is feared that in the state of excitement reportedly existing threatened executions may be carried out.

Unless the Portuguese Government has responded to representations already made by you in this connection, and in compliance with the Department's cable instructions to you, in a manner completely reassuring, indicating that appropriate instructions have been issued to the insular authorities, you will lodge a firm protest with that Government at once and report currently all further developments. In your communication you should state that the demands of the insular authorities as reported would be incompatible with the rights and duties of an American consular official and that he is not in a position to comply with them.

The Consul has now reported that he has been requested to furnish the names and addresses of all American citizens resident in the island. Under the Department's general instructions information of this character should not be divulged, and he has been instructed to inform the Civil Governor that he has not been authorized to comply with these unusual requests and that the views of the Department are being communicated to the Portuguese Government. You will so inform the Portuguese Government, setting forth the expectation of

²¹ In note 19, a Foreign Service Officer was forbidden to furnish any inquirer with list of persons registered with the Consulate or to give any information contained in the record of a registrant except when convinced that to do so was in the interest of the registrant.

²² Telegram No. 97, p. 232.

this Government that the insular authorities will proceed with due regard for the duties of American consular officials, their necessary freedom of movement, and the confidential character of their official records.

WELLES

853B.20/47: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Ponta Delgada, Azores (Dawson)

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1942—11 p. m.

15. Your 109 April 7 noon. The requirement that you reveal to the local authorities information taken from your official records is unwarranted and incompatible with the treatment accorded Portuguese consular officials in the United States. You are therefore not authorized to comply with the requirement. You will communicate the foregoing to the Civil Governor in writing, adding that the views of the Department are being communicated to the Portuguese Government, and will report his reaction by cable.

For your information the following instructions are being cabled to the Legation in Lisbon:

(Here quote telegram No. 355 April 7, to Lisbon).

WELLES

853B.20/50: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, April 10, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 5:54 p. m.]

305. My telegram number 295, April 7, 10 p. m. Department's No. 355, April 8 [7], 9 a. m. [11 p. m.]. The substance of that telegram was at once transmitted to the Foreign Minister by note and I again requested an appointment with the Secretary General who the Foreign Office stated was indisposed. As I was still unable to see Sampayo yesterday, I called on Costa Carneiro, Chief of the Political Section, last night to discuss my notes sent pursuant to the telegram under reference and the Department's telegrams Nos. 317 [319], March 31, 9 p. m., and 326, April 1, 2 [10] p. m.

As regards the communication of March 28 by the Civil Governor General of Ponta Delgada requiring all foreigners to concentrate on the local football field following a signal, Costa Carneiro said that he understood new instructions had been issued which would he hoped

be satisfactory to the American Government. Asked what the instructions were he said he did not have the details but understood that our Consul in Ponta Delgada had already been fully informed.

He did not attempt to defend this order and implied indirectly that there had been an excess of zeal on the part of the insular authorities.

As regards the order that all foreigners living outside Ponta Delgada should move into town, he said that he had requested an explanation from the Ministry of the Interior and would at once press them for a reply. Having no official information he could not give me any formal assurance but he hoped that the Foreign Office might well be able to reduce the severity of this order. He mentioned that Germans and Italians would be equally affected and implied that it might be in our interest to have all foreigners removed from positions where they could send signals or otherwise jeopardize Portuguese neutrality.

I said that the Americans appear to be the foreigners mainly affected and he replied that he had observed that point in my note. He did not know how many foreigners there were on island nor where they were located.

Asked why such severe measures had been applied in the Azores, he assured me that he knew of no specific [reason?] except that spring is the season when new campaigns are launched. We must realize that it would be impossible for the Portuguese authorities to wait until the last minute to take such precautions and he added "of course I earnestly hope there won't be any need for these precautions."

The British Embassy informs me that they have made no further representations in this connection.

FISH

853B.20/51 : Telegram

The Consul at Ponta Delgada, Azores (Dawson) to the Secretary of State

PONTA DELGADA, April 14, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 2: 22 p. m.]

119. Referring to the Department's telegram No. 15, April 7, 11 p. m., General Passos e Sousa, believed to be former Minister of War, arrived yesterday from Lisbon on the destroyer *Vouga*, reportedly for the purpose of investigating the conduct of the military commander.

A military censorship of all mail, incoming, outgoing and local was established yesterday morning.

DAWSON

853B.20/50 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1942—11 p. m.

416. Your 305, April 10, 4 p. m. The Department continues in doubt as to whether the Portuguese Government has taken any steps to correct the situation referred to in this correspondence. It is urgent that this matter be clarified without further delay. You are accordingly requested to obtain from the Foreign Office a definite reply at once, reporting to the Department the precise nature of steps taken.

It is not clear from your telegram that the Legation is keeping the Consulate in Horta advised of developments, as requested in the Department's 319, March 31, 9 p. m.

HULL

853B.20/52 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, April 21, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received April 22—3:24 a. m.]

353. Department's No. 416, April 20, 11 p. m. Since the interview at the Foreign Office reported in my 305, April 10, 4 p. m., the Legation has twice requested the Foreign Office to expedite an answer to its notes regarding the situation in Azores with particular reference to the position of our Consuls there.

Last night Dr. Costa Carneiro went over the same ground covered in telegram mentioned above and again assured the Legation that while the authorities in Azores were compelled to take precautions the absurd order issued at Ponta Delgada requiring all foreigners including Consuls to proceed to a football field following a signal was a mistake and was being dealt with. He explained that the precautions taken by the insular authorities were aimed at coping with fifth column activities and had of necessity to be addressed to all foreign Consuls. He suggested that it might be in the interest of the United States that these precautionary measures were taken since they applied to our enemies. The Legation has been informed by the Consul in Ponta Delgada that situation is calmer since arrival of General Passos e Sousa who appears to have been sent for an investigation. Military Attaché²³ informs me for [that?] he has heard that the General's predecessor who was responsible for the above mentioned order will be recalled and it had even been suggested that he is mentally unbalanced. I have kept in constant touch with my British colleague who has received reassuring reports from the Azores and tells me that

²³ Col. William E. Shipp.

since his first note of protest which was presented on March 31 he has made no representations to the Portuguese Government.

I shall continue to press the Foreign Office for an answer to my representations.

Repeated to Ponta Delgada and Horta.

FISH

853B.20/57 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, May 5, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received May 5—3:15 p. m.]

434. Legation's 398, April 29, 7 p. m.²⁴ Last night the Director General of Political Affairs referred to the canceling of certain orders to which we had strongly objected regarding our Consuls in the Azores. He said, however, that the military insisting that the order that all foreigners in São Miguel must move into Ponta Delgada could not be canceled. He assured the Legation, however, that the insular authorities have been cautioned to cause as little hardship as possible and that the order would be carried out "with moderation".

The Legation pointed out that most of the Americans in the island were poor people of Portuguese origin who could not afford to move from their farms into town. In reply, the Foreign Office official repeated the argument previously reported that it was in our interest that these precautionary measures were taken since they applied equally to our enemies and that the military authorities had flatly refused to cancel these restrictions.

Repeated to Ponta Delgada and Horta.

FISH

853B.20/64 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Horta, Azores (Douglass) to the Secretary of State

HORTA, September 22, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 6:17 p. m.]

227. I have just been advised by the Military Commandant of Horta that in the event a state of alarm is declared by him in this island, no foreigners including consular representatives will be permitted to leave a certain specified locality for any reason whatever and that all telegraphic apparatus including the cable equipment of the Western Union Telegraph Company and the Commercial Cable Company must be turned over to the Portuguese Legion. The managers of the Amer-

²⁴ Not printed.

ican companies upon inquiry of the military authorities were informed that if a state of alarm is declared, they will be obliged immediately to disconnect the transatlantic cables and evacuate their offices which will be occupied by the Portuguese Legion.

A state of alarm was declared in this island only last week in connection with air raid precaution exercises and might be declared again at any time without prior notice.

The managers of the American companies are reporting the matter to their New York offices.

This telegram is being repeated to the Legation.

DOUGLASS

853B.20/64 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1942—midnight.

1331. With reference to Horta's 227 of September 22, 4 p. m., repeated to Lisbon, the Department has long been dissatisfied with restrictions placed upon our consular officers in the Azores and is of the opinion that this matter should be cleared up in so far as possible at once.

You should therefore reopen the matter with the Portuguese Government expressing the urgent desire of this Government to obtain a relaxation (a) of restrictions upon the movements of our consular officials (it is understood that they are confined at all times to the towns of their official residences, and that at certain times, when a state of alarm is declared, they are expected to join concentrations where they are completely immobilized as far as any ability to function officially is concerned); and (b) of the restriction requiring foreigners to reside in specified localities. This restriction appears to apply mainly to a large number of American citizens of Portuguese antecedents, many of whom live in the interior of the Islands where they are engaged in farming, etc. These citizens are financially unable to comply with the restrictions in many cases and their only recourse is to opt for Portuguese nationality. It is obviously distasteful to this Government that its citizens should be thus forced to alienate themselves and adopt another allegiance.

As regards the cable stations, this new decision of the local government appears to threaten our property rights. This matter too should be brought to the attention of the Portuguese Government with a suggestion it consider furnishing assurances that American property rights will in all events be respected.

WELLES

853B.20/67 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, October 24, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received October 24—2:11 p. m.]

1426. Department's 1331, October 9, midnight. Consultation with Douglass who has just arrived from Horta reveals that the American citizens residing normally in the interior of Fayal Island who were the subject of section 6 of the Department's telegram under reference are to his knowledge without exception dual nationality cases. He is sure that this is substantially true in the other islands. If the Department as its instructions of August 24, 1942²⁵ (130-Alves, Jose) would indicate does not favor representations for the release of such persons from obligations to the country of their residence I do not feel that the Legation can logically protest when the Portuguese authorities ask such persons, for reasons of military security, to alter their place of residence.

The Legation has reopened with the Foreign Office the general question of the restrictions established in the Azores and has communicated our Government's desires as instructed but has not pressed the point mentioned above for the reasons indicated.

FISH

[No further correspondence on this subject has been found in Department files.]

**NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE
BENGUELA RAILROAD ACROSS THE PORTUGUESE COLONY OF
ANGOLA**

853M.77/25 : Telegram

The Consul at Loanda, Angola (Day) to the Secretary of State

LOANDA, October 26, 1942—midnight.

[Received October 28—1:48 a. m.]

5. From Wells.²⁶

"For Under Secretary Welles and COUSC²⁷ 4007. Quick reply requested.

1. Port[uguese] Minister [of] Colonies, Vieira Machado, invited me to a 2-hour confidential private meeting during which he inquired if United States Government would be interested in using Benguela Railroad for shipment of certain military supplies from Lobito across Angola into Belgian Congo, Central and East Africa.

²⁵ Not printed.²⁶ Linton Wells, representative of the Office of Strategic Services.²⁷ United States Commercial Company.

2. Minister reminded me shipments from Matadi through the Congo are attended by difficulties and waste of time.

3. He pointed out that freight cars now are bringing us about 1700 tons minerals weekly from the Congo to Lobito and returning almost empty.

4. Minister said he thought this available space could be used effectively by us and thus save several weeks transportation time between coast and Elisabethville, Bukama and other points, not to mention reduction in cost. Transshipments could also be extended across Africa by rail to Beira and/or Lourenço Marques thus avoiding several thousand miles of dangerous water travel.

5. Minister offered this space to us for the transshipment of everything except guns of any kind, ammunition, and tanks which he said could continue going via Matadi. Permissible items specifically mentioned by Minister were:

(1st) Aviation gasoline and all other petroleum products. Benguela Railway has no tank cars and [apparent omission] [Belgian Congo, therefore until tank cars could be supplied petroleum products would have to be shipped in drums as is now being done through the Congo.

(2d) Automotive vehicles and even airplanes, provided all are without guns and are boxed, not crated or uncrated.

(3d) Airplane and other engines and spare parts of all kinds.

(4th) All forms of machinery including roadbuilding, mining and repair.

(5th) Military service equipment including tents, bedding, kitchens, uniforms and other quartermaster stores.

(6th) All edibles, drinkables and medicines.

(7th) Fifteen to twenty and perhaps double that number officers and men in civilian clothing would be guaranteed transit visas through Angola on every combined goods and passenger train.

(8th) One or two officers in civilian clothing would be permitted to reside in Lobito and supervise transshipments.

6. Minister said he would guarantee that shipments would not be opened for inspection by Angolan authorities and that existing port dues, landing charges, freight rates in transit [would not be?] increased. The question of safeguarding shipments was not mentioned.

7. Minister suggested that operations would be simplified if shipments were made by, say, private company (X) in the United States or elsewhere to, say, private company (Y) in the Belgian Congo, but this would not be mandatory. Supervisors at Lobito could be ostensible representatives of one of these private companies.

8. Minister indicated preference for our acceptance of informal guarantees covering extension of aforementioned privileges, which he said the Angolan Government and Benguela Railway would observe faithfully, but my impression was that we could get satisfactory written assurance if we insisted.

9. Minister remarked obliquely that no one could justifiably complain of neutrality violations and Portugal could not very well interfere if the remote semi-autonomous Angolan Government permitted shipments over a privately owned railway engaged in internal com-

merce, provided no weapons, ammunition or tanks were being transported within Angola's frontiers.

10. I asked the Minister if there were any conditions precedent to the granting of the aforementioned privileges or what our obligations would be under such an arrangement.

11. Minister replied that he would exact no promises from us, but that he hoped the United States Government would appreciate the spirit of sympathetic cooperation which motivated the offer and reciprocate to the extent of gratifying immediately Angola's urgent needs for certain essentials without which the colony's economy must certainly collapse.

12. These essentials, for the immediate need of which I can vouch, include: first and foremost 2,065 tires of assorted sizes which would be rationed under Angolan Government and our supervision to idle non-Axis commercial vehicles badly needed for transportation of produce; (second), modest quantities of railway wheels and springs, bar steel and angle iron, galvanized waterpipe and tubing, telephone and telegraph equipment and supplies, electric wire and nails, medical supplies, et cetera; (third) perhaps 2 or 3 secondhand commercial passenger planes of from eight to fourteen-place capacity. I will telegraph details if requested.

13. In return for such essentials, to be paid for in cash, Minister promised to authorize the export of whatever Angolan commodities we desire, including rubber, at fair prices. He said this arrangement would not conflict with the Anglo-American-Portuguese trade negotiations²⁸ now under way in Lisbon, which he apparently believes are stalemated. Minister also suggested that we would find it advantageous to investigate the trade situation in Mozambique and offered to facilitate our journey.

14. Minister specifically stated that if we are interested in principle in the foregoing proposals he would be glad if we would indicate the fact before October 31, when he leaves Loanda for a fortnight's inspection tour. Minister also voiced hope that a definitive understanding could be reached before he sails for Portugal about November 20. When I inquired if questions had to be referred to Portugal [apparent omission] Angolan matter with which he is empowered to deal.

15. I await instructions and point out that Minister's informal proposals also appear to afford us an opportunity of gaining an advantageous position in Angola and conceivably may be a Portuguese gesture toward climbing aboard the Allied band-wagon.

16. In connection with the foregoing, attention is called to the modern bulk petroleum products tank installations at the land-locked deep water port of Lobito, owned and operated by Companhia dos Combustiveis de Lobito, otherwise called Carbonang, local subsidiary of Petrofinac, the Belgian company whose storage tanks at Ango Ango, Belgian Congo, are being used by Vacuum, Texaco, Shell and our Government.

17. Carbonang has 7 tanks with total capacity of 5950 cubic meters, which are filled by pumps directly from tankers alongside modern quay. Of these, two 1500, one 500 and one 350 cubic meter tanks are now available for storage of gasoline or other petroleum products,

²⁸ See pp. 221 ff.

while one 1500, one 500, and one 100 cubic meter tanks are reserved, respectively, for fuel oil, Diesel oil and kerosene.

18. In May 1940, Petrofinac London representative Leopold Walford Shipping, Limited, signed a contract with Gueret, Llewellen and Merret, Limited, London, *sub rosa* representatives of the British Admiralty, providing for Admiralty use of Carbonang's Lobito installations on demand. The Admiralty has not yet availed itself of this privilege, but 6 weeks ago supplied Carbonang with 5000 tons of Welch coal under a similar separate agreement. The Admiralty used a private company as contracting intermediary to avoid infringement of Carbonang's contract with the Angola Government and Carbonang was to receive a per ton fee similar to that in effect at Ango Ango for receiving, storing and delivering.

19. P. R. Pittard, a British subject and Carbonang's local director, has asked me to inquire if the United States Government is interested in utilizing the Lobito facilities. If so, Pittard believes the Admiralty would cancel Carbonang's contract.

20. Pittard says there is ample room for expansion of storage facilities at Lobito and that local wharf charges are 3 shillings 8 pence per ton handled plus 3 quarters per *mille ad valorem*."

This cable cost \$1993.68. Refer Department's letter August 19 to Consul Mallon, Leopoldville,²⁹ regarding appropriate assistance to Linton Wells and Fay Gillis Wells. Is Loanda Consulate authorized to pay unlimited amounts for Wells' cables to be charged to United States Commercial Company? If not please instruct.

DAY

853M.77/25 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Loanda, Angola (Day)

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1942—10 p. m.

11. Your 5, October 26, midnight.

"The Department agrees in principle with the proposals made by the Portuguese Minister of Colonies, whose interest in the matter is appreciated, regarding the use by American Government Agencies of the Benguela Railroad, which subject was already under discussion here on the basis of information transmitted by the War Department. Since it is preferable for negotiations of this character with foreign governments to be handled by representatives of this Department, plans have already been made to expedite the travel of Consul General Linnell to Loanda to enter into discussions on this subject with the Minister of Colonies."

A separate instruction will follow regarding cable charges.

HULL

²⁹ Not printed.

853M.77/29 : Telegram

The Consul General at Loanda, Angola (Linnell) to the Secretary of State

LOANDA, December 4, 1942—4 p. m.
[Received December 9—11 : 30 a. m.]

26. Interview with Minister Colonies yesterday he stated:

He was most willing that railroad be used by United States for any purpose except the shipment of military material, see this office's No. 5, paragraph 5, and even if such things as military uniforms were shipped but labeled anything, airplane engines labeled simply engines, et cetera, no question should be asked.

However, he was most emphatic that everything done in connection with such use of railway must be in accordance with existing Portuguese laws and regulations. Therefore all goods sent through Lobito must be listed and all charges provided for in present laws must be paid. Packages shipped by the United States would probably not be examined but the customs authorities must retain the right to examine them if it is deemed necessary.

Any business to be done in Lobito in connection with such shipments must be carried on by firms now existing in Lobito or by a new firm set up for the purpose which must conform in all respects with Portuguese laws applicable thereto. Therefore, no persons except employees of such firms could be permitted to deal with these shipments in Lobito (presumably employment of Americans by such company to assist in handling these shipments could be arranged but their visas would have to be obtained in regular way).

No representatives our Departments or firms will be permitted to supervise in Angola the distribution of any goods. The goods asked for by the Government will be distributed by Government agencies and these must be trusted. As to goods for private firms except possibly auto tires and medicines whose distribution are supervised or carried out by Government bureaus, no supervision of distribution will be permitted in Angola.

Any agreement as to railway rates, et cetera, must be made directly with the railway company. Also any use of storage tanks at Lobito must be arranged with Carbonang, see this office's No. 5 paragraphs 16 *et seq.* If additional tanks needed to be erected this would have to be done by Carbonang or by new company similarly organized under Portuguese laws. The Minister thought it preferable that tank cars be supplied from the United States for use on railway and either sold to railway or hauling fees paid.

He said it was expected that this railway would be taken over by Portuguese interests very soon. It is noted that his cousin is Managing Director of railway.

To summarize: The Minister certainly desires that the United States shall use this railway and certainly desires to obtain supplies for it and for Government use but is determined that transshipment shall be under the terms and conditions applicable to others. He intimated clearly that such concessions as were suggested particularly supervision of any kind would constitute infringement of Portuguese sovereignty.

He plans to sail for Lisbon December 12 and said he would like to hear further from us in meantime. Instructions are requested as to further representations to be made and whether I should obtain from him at this time a detailed list of articles he wishes to obtain from United States of America.

LINNELL

853M.77/24: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Loanda, Angola
(Linnell)

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1942—9 p. m.

31. Your no. 5, October 26, midnight. The War Department has now formally requested the assistance of this Department in obtaining the use of Benguela Railroad and existing petroleum storage facilities at Lobito and has also requested that an agreement be entered into for the use of rail and port facilities, to specifically include, in addition to general considerations, the importation and shipment of boxed airplanes and automotive vehicles, spare parts and engines and machinery of all kinds, petroleum products including aviation gasoline, quartermaster stores and other military service equipment, and foodstuffs, beverages and medicines. Permission is also desired for military personnel in limited numbers, up to 40, to operate in civilian clothing and to be guaranteed transit on every goods and passenger train, together with permission for the necessary number of officers to reside in Lobito and supervise port handling and shipments.

War Department estimates following monthly shipments in near future to Elisabethville for full route load: gasoline, 966 long tons; subsistence, 5 long tons; maintenance materials tools and parts, 25 long tons. In addition it requests to be advised of the approximate amount of tonnage railroad can handle for United States Army.

The suggestion of the Minister of Colonies for simplifying procedure by having shipments consigned by a private company in the United States to a private company in the Belgian Congo or other point of destination, and that supervisors stationed at Lobito should be ostensible representatives of such private companies, is approved. Your suggestions in this connection will be helpful.

It is suggested that you also discuss with Minister of Colonies the possibility of authorizing simplified procedure obviating delays regarding issuance of visas at Léopoldville to American officials applying for admittance to Angola from West Africa in connection with the operation of this agreement.

HULL

853M.77/30 : Telegram

The Consul General at Loanda, Angola (Linnell) to the Secretary of State

LOANDA, December 16, 1942—noon.
[Received December 20—10:56 a. m.]

30. In a further talk with Minister Colonies concerning Department's 31, December 7, 9 a. m. [*p. m.*], he said he must consult Government Lisbon as to extent to which American Army material could be transported through Angola. He would also like to have American Minister, Lisbon discuss matter. He said Portuguese Government must, at least outwardly, safeguard its neutrality although it might permit within limits shipments of certain Army goods in boxes whose markings did not disclose their true contents. See my No. 26, December 4. However, the whole operation must be carried on as a commercial transaction.

He sails for Lisbon December 17 and promised cable Governor General at Luanda the decision reached. If arrangements for shipment Army goods are made he will also have Government instruct Portuguese Consul General, Leopoldville, concerning entry into Angola of necessary American personnel.

Instructions are requested whether I should go to Lobito before decision made in Lisbon and try to make tentative arrangements with railway for its use and possibly with Manubito for clearing goods through customs, et cetera. See Wells' mailer No. 23, November 1 re Manubito.

LINNELL

SPAIN

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRALITY BY SPAIN¹

811.20 (D) Regulations/5453 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1942—7 p. m.

18. Your 1017, December 6, 5 p. m.² The memorandum² was handed to the Spanish Ambassador³ on November 29 but no further action was taken for the reason that he suggested certain modifications which necessitated further consideration in this Department. The following is the full text of the memorandum as finally determined:

"The proposals submitted herewith have been prepared to accommodate trade to the complexities of the present situation and to ensure that products made available shall not aid the enemies of the United States. The proposals contemplate a movement to Spain of products, including petroleum products, conditional upon Spain making available to this country (or possibly to this country and Great Britain through a joint arrangement) in significant quantities the products of Spain mentioned below.

"While it is desired to permit the supply of Spain's requirements of products urgently needed to continue, in order to accomplish this the principle must be accepted that such products will not be employed in any manner useful to the interests of Germany or Italy or countries occupied by Germany or Italy. It must be agreed, for example, that petroleum products will not be made accessible by Spain to foreign shipping or aircraft, except of American nations or of Great Britain or of countries which, in alliance with Great Britain, are at present resisting aggression, and that such products will not be reshipped from continental Spain or from other Spanish territory except to another destination in continental Spain or other Spanish territory, and that products in general supplied under this plan will not be employed in any manner to assist the other countries referred to, directly or indirectly.

"It is proposed to permit the supply of petroleum products to be continued in quantities sufficient but only sufficient to meet Spain's requirements for transportation and other essentials. In this connection it is further proposed to regulate supplies, not only in the

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 880-935.

² Not printed.

³ Juan Francisco de Cárdenas.

aggregate but as to the various types of petroleum products, their uses, and the inventories of these in the various zones of distribution in Spain. It is not felt that the regulation contemplated will impose any hardship on the organizations of CAMPSA⁴ or CEPESA,⁵ in as much as all of the data which will be required are presumably in their possession in the ordinary routine of their operations. The following features are proposed as a basis for the procedure to be followed:

"(1) Subject to the satisfaction of the foregoing conditions, a supply of petroleum products will be maintained to Spain sufficient but only sufficient for Spain's essential requirements, taking into consideration supplies from all sources. In conference with the competent British authorities, surveys will be made of Spanish consumption of the various petroleum products, and of the inventory levels necessary for securing a continuity of distribution, taking all time factors into consideration.

"(2) No reexports of petroleum products will be permitted, either from continental Spain or any Spanish possession, except to another destination in Spanish territory, and no foreign shipping or aircraft, except of American nations or of Great Britain or of those countries which, in alliance with Great Britain, are resisting aggression, will be directly or indirectly supplied.

"(3) In the exercise of the proposed control the cooperation of the Spanish Government will be required in the following particulars:

"(a) Monthly reports will be required from the CAMPSA and CEPESA organizations and any other agencies public or private owning or dealing in petroleum products, setting forth all deliveries of petroleum products, sources of supply, consumption, and inventories, detailing every type of product by region.

"(b) Monthly reports will be required from the same organizations setting forth the movements of all tankers or other ships engaged in the transport of petroleum products in the Spanish trade, regardless of whether such vessels are in the operation and control of Spain, with full descriptions of cargoes, names of vessels, ports of call, dates of entering and clearing such ports, and deliveries made there or elsewhere.

"(c) It is intended to use the following classifications in these reports:

- (a) Crude oil
- (b) Gasoline (subdivided according to various octane grades).
- (c) Kerosene
- (d) Gas oil
- (e) Fuel oil
- (f) Lubricating oils (classified as aviation, automobile, railway, miscellaneous industrial).
- (g) Greases
- (h) Asphaltic materials.
- (i) Refinery stocks in process

⁴ Compañía Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petróleos Sociedad Anónima.

⁵ Compañía Española de Petróleos, Sociedad Anónima.

"(d) In the compilation of these reports reference will be made to the regions ordinarily served from each oil port of delivery and the situation prevailing in each of the regions will be fully reported with adequate description. In the more important regions, it is thought that ports of delivery of lesser importance may be included. The following arrangement of the regions contemplated may be modified to conform to areas for which records are available without undue difficulty or delay.

1. Barcelona (including Tarragona)
2. Valencia (including Alicante)
3. The zone from Cartagena to Sevilla, inclusive
4. The northern coast, including Gijón
5. Coruña to Vigo, inclusive
6. The Canary Islands, excluding the CEPSA refinery
7. The CEPSA refinery
8. Spanish Morocco
9. Tangier
10. The Balearic Islands.

In each case the area covered including the districts of the interior should be explicitly defined.

"(e) In order to minimize delays by reason of inadequate information, it is suggested that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Spain establish in consultation a method of subjecting movements of petroleum products to regulation. For this purpose this Government would appoint agents who, in consultation with the British and the Spanish, would carry out the necessary work. It is thought that these agents may best be attached in some capacity to the staff of the American Embassy in Madrid. These agents must have access to all Spanish oil receiving, refining, storage, and shipping facilities for the purpose of observing, recording, and reporting quantities and qualities of products.

"(f) Monthly forecasts will be required of ship movements and cargoes contemplated, for 3 months ahead to facilitate planning at points of supply.

"(4) Statements will be required from time to time estimating the consumption of the various petroleum products, in accordance with the above classifications, by uses in each region. The following uses are contemplated:

- (a) Industry
- (b) Transportation
- (c) Private consumption
- (d) Agriculture
- (e) Spanish ships
- (f) Ships of each other nationality
- (g) Military and naval uses.

"(5) The following information is desired for the month of December and for each of the 5 preceding months:

- (a) Consumption of each product in each district, classified according to use.

(b) Receipts by districts and products, showing origin, name of ship, and dates of loading and unloading at each port.

(c) Inventories by districts and products.

(d) Transfers between districts by products.

(e) Reexports from each district by products, showing the shipping and receiving ports, name of ship, and dates of loading and unloading at each port.

(f) Quantity of crude charged to refinery and quantities of each product produced.

The foregoing items are likewise to be estimated in advance, in so far as is practicable, for the months of January, February, March, and April 1942.

"(6) Estimates of inventories will include the inventory of Tenerife, taking into consideration transport time from the Islands to the mainland.

"(7) Upon receipt of the above data from the Spanish Government, the necessary decisions will be taken by this Government in consultation with the British Government, to determine the types of products and the provision to be made.

"Other Products

1. Spain's need for other products will be considered subject to supply conditions existing here and provided the Spanish Government will furnish satisfactory assurances that they will not be reexported except from one Spanish destination to another Spanish destination, and that none of the products furnished will be employed in a manner to benefit, directly or indirectly, the interests of Germany, Italy, or Japan or countries occupied by Germany, Italy, or Japan.

"2. Certain foodstuffs are believed to be purchasable in the market.

"3. To some extent fertilizers are purchasable in the market. Export license applications for reduced quantities of these, obtained by purchase in the market, will be given consideration individually.

"4. Tractors, trucks, rubber, electrical supplies, machinery, metals, and some fertilizers are in scarce supply in this country and come within the control of priorities. The export of rubber has been forbidden except to countries actively resisting aggression. Similar orders are being administered as regards automobiles, trucks, tractors, and machinery generally. They result from the demands of the war effort, and do not imply any discrimination against neutral destinations. But to the extent to which they apply from time to time they will effectively prevent export to Spanish destinations. Other articles subject to priorities it is not possible to obtain for export or for use in this country except under special order of the Office of Production Management, based in each case upon the merits of the specific application detailing the use for which the desired commodity is intended and the relative importance of that use. Applications for commodities destined for military use cannot be supported, and with regard to other products the attitude of this Government will be dictated by the following considerations:

"(a) whether Spain is at present supplying these products to Germany or Italy or countries occupied by Germany or Italy, and

"(b) whether the supply of such products by this country would encourage an increased supply of other products to the countries just referred to.

"As regards products the demand for which is more or less regular and can be foreseen, among which fertilizers may be cited, the Board of Economic Warfare has under preparation forecasts of requirements for various destinations for the coming year which are being placed before the Office of Production Management to facilitate the allotment of a fixed total quantity for each destination for the year 1942. Full consideration will be given forecasts which the Spanish Government may care to submit respecting Spain's needs, but such estimates must be fully supported and stripped of non-essentials.

"Spanish Products

It is the expectation of this Government to obtain for this country certain specific Spanish products, and the supply to Spain of the products referred to above, including petroleum products, will be conditional upon Spain's moving to this country the following items in significant quantities; means, terms, and conditions to be the subject of discussion:

Tungsten, Cork, Tin, Fluorspar, Olive oil, Olives, Lead, Zinc concentrates, Mercury, Aconite root, Colchicum seed, Psyllium seed, Gentian root, Ergot, Camomile leaves, Horehound leaves, Uva-ursi leaves, White squill.

"Admission of Certain Articles into Spain

It is the hope of this Government, moreover, that the Spanish Government will engage to facilitate the admission into Spain of certain articles normally featured in the exports of this country to Spain, such as:

Printed matter, current publications, et cetera
Motion picture films."

You are instructed to deliver this memorandum to the Spanish Government at the earliest opportunity.

HULL

811.20 (D) Regulations/5662: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 9, 1942—6 p. m.
[Received January 10—4:45 p. m.]

37. Since November 21, (see my No. 977, November 22, midnight^a) this Embassy has held no conversations with the Spanish authorities concerning details of the proposed program of economic cooperation in view of the Department's desire expressed in its number 580, October 31, 5 p. m.,^a to conduct negotiations through the Spanish Embassy at Washington.

^a Not printed.

According to the Department's telegram number 662, December 13, 7 p. m.,⁷ no conversations have been held with Cárdenas, except to request certain information from the Spanish Government concerning petroleum products, and I understand discussions of the broad program will not be initiated until the petroleum question has been settled. Meanwhile, so far as I can ascertain, since early in November our Government has suspended all permits for the exportation to Spain of petroleum products, and by reason of new restrictions against exports and the disruption of shipping services very few other products have been shipped to this country.

By this time the Department probably has been able to study the data contained in my despatch number 1342, December 23, 1941,⁸ and my comments thereon. By our airmail pouch, which left here December 31, there was transmitted a communication from the Foreign Office for Cárdenas, containing certification thereto. In the event this material is not sufficient to permit a decision to be taken, I would urge that the Department inform me just what is desired and I shall attempt to obtain and transmit it without further delay.

I feel certain that the Department has seen the hopelessness of securing quick action on communications, even the delayed material which might be obtained through that channel is unlikely to be wholly satisfactory. This condition will persist unless negotiations are transferred to Madrid, or until the Spanish Government sends properly authorized negotiators to Washington.

In response to its inquiry as to whether it may commence conversations with CEPAND [*CEPSA*?] and CAMPSA for the renewal of [apparent omission] for a navicert program covering the first quarter of 1942, the British Embassy here has been instructed by the Ministry of Economic Warfare to take no action until instructions have been received by this Embassy from the American Government to participate in such discussions.

Presumably this refers to supplies from Venezuela as well as from the United States although the British Government has granted navicerts for 3 cargoes of crude and 2 of fuel oil from Aruba. I have received no instructions from the Department in this connection.

The stock situation shown by the material submitted to the Department is extremely serious and if we are interested in preventing an even more chaotic condition from developing here we must give consideration to taking immediate steps. This would be in complete accord with the policy set forth in the Department's 16, January 8, 4 p. m.⁹ As such conversations cannot be concluded in a few days, I

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 935.

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ Not printed; the policy set forth was that of the desire to maintain official relations with the Spanish Government on as even a basis as possible (740.00116 Pacific War/9).

consider it to be very desirable to begin them speedily for the purpose of establishing a factual basis which may be presented to the Department and to the British Government for consideration.

Meanwhile I would again urge the desirability of granting export permits for petroleum products for the tankers now at Port Arthur. Although in the above mentioned Department's telegram number 662, it is stated there is no intention of placing an embargo against Spain, I understand that actually no permits have been authorized since early in November and that permits for gas oil have been refused for the *Campilo* and *Campuzano* which have been at Port Arthur since November 12. CAMPSA contends the need for gas oil is most pressing particularly because CEPSA has made available no supplies of this product since July and especially as the shortage has seriously interfered with fishing activities. For example, at Valencia there is now no gas oil. If, however, the Department considers it inadvisable to permit the export of the 12,000 tons requested, I suggest the advisability of immediate authorization of gas oil for the *Campuzano* and that I be authorized to suggest to CAMPSA some other product for the *Campilo*.

Will the Department please let me have its views.

WEDDELL

811.20 (D) Regulations/5453 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)*¹⁰

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1942—8 p. m.

32. Department's 18 of January 8, 7 p.m. The following is for your confidential information and guidance in discussion of the telegram under reference with the Spanish Government.

(1) The Department has been primarily influenced in making this proposal by the strong insistence of the British Government that some supply of petroleum and other products for Spain were necessary in order to keep the Spanish economic system operating sufficiently for the British to get out products which they badly needed and by the desire to obtain for this country the strategic materials mentioned in our telegram. It does not regard the effect of the proposals, if any, upon the general policy of the Spanish Government as a major factor, and will therefore base its decisions regarding the movement of supplies to Spain on whether it can obtain from Spain a tangible and valuable *quid pro quo*.

The Department has insisted to the British that, since the petroleum products must come from this country or from sources and companies

¹⁰ This is copy of draft of telegram; the usual record copy not found in Department files.

to which we look for supplies for the war effort, the final determination of quantities must be made in consultation here and prior to the issuance of navicerts. We have consistently believed that the amounts which might be sent are much lower than those recommended by the British. The demands now being made both upon our supplies and those of other American fields for the conduct of the war and the needs of this hemisphere, which must be met first, will restrict the discussion to minimum demands.

The Department is also concerned over the reported accumulation of military stocks of gasoline in Spanish Morocco, said to be upwards of 15,000 tons. One object of the discussions should be the reduction of these stocks. A plan which permitted the retention or increase of these stocks while petroleum was supplied from this side could not be supported. Your views are desired on the method of proposing and achieving the reduction of these stocks.

The figures now available to us from CAMPSA via Brewster confirm our calculation that Spain, including Tenerife and three cargoes recently released from Venezuela, has sufficient stocks, except possibly lubricants, to last until the middle or end of February with careful use. Our present inclination would be to release a cargo of crude oil from Venezuela in the latter part of January and two further cargoes in the first half of February provided ways and means have been found to effectuate by that time substantial shipments of items desired by us and to make available difficult items along the lines suggested below.

Turning to the form and substance of the general agreement, it appears to the Department that there are three possible methods which might be adopted to obtain for the United States the Spanish materials which it desires. The first method would be to specify definite quantities of the materials which the United States desires and the prices the Federal Loan Agency is willing to pay for these products over some fixed period such as 1 year. The quantities would be in excess of those now being delivered to the United States. The purpose would be to establish the quantities at figures which would substantially cut down the quantities of these materials now being delivered to Axis or Axis occupied countries. The prices would be at almost the present market for such products in the United States, less insurance and freight; although possibly this level might be raised slightly. The commitment of the Spanish Government to cause these materials to be sold in the specified quantities and at these prices would be an integral part of the agreement and the delivery of oil in accordance with the Department's No. 18 would be contingent upon such deliveries. The Department is aware of the difficulties of this method from the point of view of the Spanish Government, especially since the receipt by the Department of your

valuable report No. 1337 of December 17.¹¹ The Department, nevertheless, hopes that this method may prove to be possible in view of the difficulties which surround the second and third methods discussed below.

The second method would recognize the fact that certain of the strategic Spanish materials are the subject of great interest by Germany and in some instances, as in the case of certain wolfram mines, are owned by German nationals. Accordingly, it is recognized that it might be difficult for the Spanish Government, in the face of German opposition, to agree with the United States directly to cause these products to be sold to it. The second method would therefore (a) require a commitment by the Spanish Government that it would eliminate all obstacles in the way of the exportation of materials to the United States, and would take such affirmative action as might be necessary to facilitate the free flow of these strategic materials to the United States, and (b) would provide for the establishment of a buying-selling organization along the lines suggested in your despatch no. 1337, which organization would compete in the open market for the acquisition of the various Spanish materials desired by the United States. The difficulty with this method is that no such organization now exists in this Government, and that it would take some time to reach the necessary agreement in Washington for the creation of such an organization. It is for this reason hoped that the first method suggested will prove to be acceptable.

The third method would be to establish a barter system whereby specified American materials, the principal one being oil, would be delivered to the Spanish Government in exchange for specified quantities of the various Spanish materials desired by the United States. This method would have the advantage over method no. one of avoiding unfavorable comparisons between prices which we might be able to offer now for some of these products and the abnormal "intra-blockade" prices prevailing for them; this third method would be based on comparatively normal price relationships of United States and Spanish products, which appear reasonable. This third method is, however, subject to the disadvantages of method no. one and in addition would require a complex organization in the United States for which there is no precedent and which would be difficult to establish.

In view of the foregoing you are requested to telegraph to the Department any comment you may wish to present as to the course which you should follow in your presentation to the Spanish Government of the note referred to in the Department's 18.¹² The Department repeats that the first method is by far the most practicable

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Dated January 8, 7 p. m., p. 248.

one from the point of view of this Government, and that either of the other methods would be extremely difficult to work out here and should be recommended only if you believe the first method is practically impossible or politically undesirable.

Pending determination of the method to be used it may be that the most practical step to take immediately would be to reach agreement with the Spanish Government whereby in return for making possible the movement of the three cargoes of crude oil referred to above the Spanish Government would definitely arrange to sell to the Metals Reserve Company a quantity of tungsten equivalent to, say, 2 months' production, at a price roughly equivalent to the "extra blockade" price prevailing here, or, alternatively, half that quantity of tungsten plus a specified quantity of cork to be agreed upon.

[HULL]

811.20 (D) Regulations/5692: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 15, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received January 16—9:45 a. m.]

65. Department's 32, January 12, 8 p. m. Memorandum delivered to Under Secretary last night. It is hoped discussion will begin next week. Ackerman¹³ is on his way to Tangier to discuss petroleum stocks in northern Africa with dealers. Upon his return I hope to make specific recommendations.

Reference last paragraph your telegram. Spanish Government does not own any tungsten, is not authorized to sell tungsten, and therefore the suggestion with reference to tungsten is not practicable. Furthermore, I should prefer not to mention cork in this connection at least until after the departure of the *Motomar* now scheduled to sail for the United States from Seville on January 17 with 250 tons of cork. As an alternative we might propose immediate shipment of 6000 tons zinc and 10,000 tons [pyrites?]. In this event, however, the Spanish would be justified in inquiring what return cargoes these vessels could [transport; ?] they are particularly interested in fertilizers, light tractors and sulphate of copper. Please instruct me whether these commodities can be made available and if not what other commodities.

With reference to the three methods suggested by the Department for obtaining Spanish materials for the United States, I offer the following alternative suggestion which has the merit of requiring a minimum expansion in our present staff and of utilizing to the greatest possible degree the extensive facilities of the British Embassy and of the United Kingdom Corporation: to require a commitment by the

¹³ Ralph H. Ackerman, Commercial Attaché.

Spanish Government that it would eliminate all obstacles in the way of the exportation of materials to the United States and would take such affirmative action as might be necessary to facilitate the imperative strategic materials to the United States. Zinc concentrates, cork, olive oil and olives will continue to be acquired through existing trade channels. The various herbaceous roots can be acquired through existing channels, our Government undertaking to stimulate demand by ordinary purchasers in the United States. The United Kingdom Corporation might purchase for Great Britain or for the United States to be shipped directly or to be shipped via Great Britain, tungsten [garbled groups] mercury and possibly lead. Our Government would assign to this Embassy a competent business man familiar with trade methods in Spain to help to coordinate the work of this Embassy, the British Embassy and the United Kingdom Corporation and to stimulate production and sale of the various commodities in Spain. If the Department agrees with the plan I am prepared to recommend a person for this work.

In my discussion with the Spanish Government I intend to make clear that we expect there will be no decrease in current exports to the United States of Spanish products other than those mentioned in the Department's 18, January 8, such as essential oils provided of course guarantee [of] such products continues.

One immediate difficulty in the way of carrying out the contemplated program is the shipping situation. I am informed in confidence by Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs that the German reply to Spain's request that its vessels be allowed to trade with the [apparent omission] without molestation was equivocal and unsatisfactory and that the Spanish Government has asked for a satisfactory clarification. There is of course grave doubt that Germany will consent to permit Spanish vessels freely to carry contraband and I assume that the Department is considering what steps our Government would be prepared to take if such consent is not forthcoming.

WEDDELL

811.20 (D) Regulations/5458 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1942—7 p. m.

51. Reference Department's 18 of January 8 and 32 of January 12. Assistant Secretary Acheson has received the following letter from Noel Hall, British Minister in Washington:

"On the last occasion on which we discussed Spain together, you went over with me the outline of a telegram of detailed instructions

which you were proposing to send to your Embassy in Madrid. You may remember that at one point in our talk you used some such phrase as 'this Department insists that significant supplies of materials essential to the British and ourselves must leave Spain, etc., etc.' I pointed out that this phrase did not represent the policy of the British Government in dealing with Spain and said that we attached great strategic and political importance to meeting Spain's economic requirements. You agreed that this was so and suggested that you might include in your telegram a passage indicating that Lord Halifax¹⁴ and his staff had urged the British point of view upon the Department.

I refer to our conversation because I have just learned that the British Embassy in Madrid, apparently after discussion with the American Embassy there, believes that the policy of insisting upon significant supplies leaving Spain is the result of pressure exercised upon the State Department by this Embassy.

We are supposed to have put the case for sending supplies to Spain principally on the ground that we need supplies from the Iberian Peninsula. You will, I think, agree that in the absence of the need of both Governments for some supplies from Spain, it would have been extremely difficult for your Government to agree with the policy that we were advocating, but this is quite different from saying that the principal reason why the British advocated the policy was their own supply needs.

It was because I thought there might be misunderstandings on this point that I called your attention to the phrases in the telegram referred to above. The present misunderstanding may have arisen in Madrid before the arrival of that telegram but, in order that it shall not persist, I am sending the text of this letter to Madrid, and also to London."

Hall's statements in the first paragraph of his letter are correct. The passage proposed to be included in the Department's 32 was omitted by inadvertence. The Department, after careful consideration of the British views and those of the Board of Economic Warfare here, could not go further than the proposals in the cables under reference. It was made clear to Hall and should be made clear to the British Embassy at Madrid that any plan for the movement of commodities to Spain from this side at a time when all commodities desired are urgently needed here, as pointed out in our cables, must be based on tangible and reciprocal action by Spain in supplying us with materials which we need. Conversely it was pointed out to Hall that in view of the great efforts being made here to supply our own military and naval forces and those of other nations at war or exposed to attacks as well as our own and their civilian populations, neither our government nor public opinion could support shipments to Spain for their supposed political effect alone.

HULL

¹⁴ British Ambassador in the United States.

811.20 (D) Regulations/5730: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 22, 1942—midnight.

[Received January 23—2:06 p. m.]

99. My 65, January 15, 1 p. m. The fact that this Embassy has not been negotiating with the Spanish Government on economic matters since last November, taken together with the time which has elapsed and the further fact that our entry into the war has at least temporarily had the effect of almost stopping trade between Spain and the United States, has created a situation in which it is going to be difficult, even with the best will on both sides, to bring about that resumption of trade which we and the British desire.

The Department will recall that [following?] our economic conversations with the Spaniards prior to December of last year the Spanish Government placed as many as 30 ships in the trade with the United States which carried zinc pyrites, cork, olives and other commodities to the United States and which relieved American vessels from the necessity of being used in this trade. Furthermore, at the Department's request the Spanish Government informed us of the quantities of materials which could be procured here and gave an indication of probable prices. The Spanish Government has facilitated the export of certain materials acquired by direct purchase some of which are of strategic value and as stated important shipments of these latter materials to the United States have been made in Spanish vessels. As an example of the continued willingness of the Spanish Government to cooperate the Spanish ship *Motomar* which is leaving Cadiz for New York today carries 400 tons of cork.

On the other hand our Government increased restrictions against the export to Spain of petroleum products and was unable to grant export permits for other materials urgently needed by Spain including fertilizers, nor has it thus far given any indication of the commodities or quantities which could be made available to Spain or at least for which export permits could be granted although the Spanish Government submitted a list of its urgent requirements. From the Spanish point of view these conversations were unproductive and did not prevent a progressive deterioration in Spanish-American trade.

The Department's memorandum embodied in its telegram No. 18, January 8, 7 p. m., requests specific information on the petroleum situation. A part of that information was transmitted with my despatch No. 1342 of December 23, 1941,¹⁵ in which there was also transmitted a summary of the reasons given by CEPESA and CAMPSA

¹⁵ Not printed.

as to why they want to be now in a position to give information in as great detail as required. In the same despatch I reported the willingness of these companies to give full cooperation to any representative of our Government who might be sent here for the purpose of developing further information. Will the Department please inform me whether the data transmitted is satisfactory; if not please inform me what more the Department requires, bearing in mind that neither the Spanish Government nor the petroleum industry are able to turn out quickly such detailed information as is currently available to our own Government and petroleum industry even if the most conscientious effort is made. I would also like to know whether Ambassador Cárdenas furnished the Department with any of the assurances requested in the memorandum. If not I shall press for such assurances.

With reference to the sixth paragraph of the Department's No. 32, January 12, 8 p. m., appertaining to military stocks in the Spanish Protectorate, Ackerman has just returned from Tangier where this question was discussed with Childs¹⁶ and with representatives of the two American and the one British oil company. These representatives have been quietly attempting to obtain the real facts and their maximum estimates were, respectively, 8,000, 5,500 and 3,000 tons. The middle estimate was given by the representative of the Socony Vacuum who appears to be best informed, based on certain known deposits, personal observation and the drum situation although he has not made a personal survey of the entire territory. Ackerman could learn of nothing to support the Department's belief that military stocks attain the figure of 15,000 tons and is inclined to believe they are probably between 5 and 6 thousand tons. Considering the extent of the territory, the size of the army there which is believed to be equipped with approximately 1,000 motorized vehicles and the lack of rail transport, military stocks appear to be modest. The army does not appear to be increasing stocks although it is satisfying current requirements from current imports. These current military requirements probably represent between 50 and 60% of current imports used mostly for transport services. The shortage of gasoline for civilian uses is not serious although restrictions prevent the use of civilian cars during Sundays and Mondays. However, there appears to be an acute shortage of lubricating oil or otherwise gas oil for civilian use. No lubricants have been received since May and stocks are entirely exhausted although the military still has developed reserves. Gas oil shortage threatens the continued operation of power plants and has restricted fishing activities.

I have given careful consideration to the Department's desires to prevent an increase in military stocks in the Spanish Protectorate.

¹⁶ J. Rives Childs, Consul at Tangier.

As the military authorities are in supreme command in that area they can at any time take over any or all stocks hence it is difficult to find a solution to this problem. However, I believe that the best way to assure against diversion of stocks for military purposes is to force a reduction in imports to that area. So long as CEPSA is given crude it will give preference to distribution of its processed products to the territories in which it has a primary interest i. e. the Protectorate and the Canary Islands, unless we insist that a part of the processed products obtained from crude be made available to the mainland. In this connection I desire to call to the attention of the Department that the American and British oil companies which formerly compete[d] with Atlas, the CEPSA subsidiary in Tangier and the Spanish Protectorate, have been effectively prevented from distributing gasoline by the refusal of Spanish exchange authorities to grant dollar exchange for such imports, an action which in effect has given Atlas a monopolistic position. If we could insist upon participation of these companies in distribution in that area we would be in a much better position to control or at least to know definitely of deliveries to the Allies.

Reverting to broader questions of negotiations an [apparent omission] now seems have been reached, apparently the Department is awaiting move on the part of the Spanish Government through its Embassy at Washington and the Spanish Government is waiting to hear exactly what the United States wants. I believe this deadlock can be corrected by my direct intervention with the appropriate authorities here.

In order to get under way a definite proposal I suggest that the Department authorize me to make the following proposal to the Spanish Government:

1. That if the Spanish Government accepts in principle the joint method of control of petroleum products outlined in the Department's memorandum set forth in its telegram No. 32, January 12, 8 p. m., and has given or will give the assurances required thereunder we will immediately send experts to Spain to study the entire petroleum question.
2. That the United States and the British Government in cooperation will permit the purchase and transport during the months of February and March of a total not to exceed 40,000 tons per month of petroleum products (approximately one-half the monthly quotas agreed to by the British last year). Deliveries to begin immediately. Of this total CEPSA may import 20,000 tons of crude oil. From this it must make available to CAMPSA for consumption in Spain a quantity of products representing one-half of this tonnage and the products of the remainder may be available for the Canary Islands, Tangier and the Spanish Protectorate; that CAMPSA may import in proportion to the quantities from CEPSA a quantity not to exceed 20,000 tons. In this tonnage there will be included for distribution by Socony Vacuum, Atlantic Refining, Standard of New Jersey and pos-

sibly the Shell at Tabriz not more than 2,000 tons monthly of lubricants of which at least 75 tons must be destined to Spanish possessions.

3. That we will grant future permits for importation into Spain of 5,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia, 2,000 tons of sulphate of copper and machinery now manufactured especially for Spain and held in ports to a value not exceeding \$100,000 the Spanish Government to select the machinery according to its most essential economic needs.

In return the Spanish Government must make available shipping facilities and export permits during the 2 months mentioned to cover 1500 tons of cork up to 10,000 tons of zinc concentrates, 2000 tons olive oil and 5000 flasks of mercury; that prices are to be agreed upon between buyer and seller and the Spanish Government is to impose no obstacles to the consummation of such contracts. Both parties understand that this arrangement is merely temporary and will be revised as soon as both Governments can agree upon a more extensive program. During the interim the oil companies will submit monthly figures following the enclosures submitted with my despatch No. 1342 of December 23, 1941;¹⁷ the American oil experts will be given full facilities to check these figures and prepare recommendations on which future supplies may be based. The Spanish and American Governments will also make known to each other the exact quantities of materials and services which each desires from the other during the second quarter.

WEDDELL

811.20 (D) Regulations/5738 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 24, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received January 25—10:05 a. m.]

108. Beaulac¹⁸ and Ackerman met with the Spanish Economic Committee last night at the latter's request to discuss the memorandum transmitted with the Department's 18 of January 8, 7 p. m. The results of the meeting were as follows: The Subsecretary for Foreign Affairs speaking for his Government and for the Committee accepted the principles set forth in the Department's memorandum. He stated Cárdenas is being instructed to convey this acceptance to the Department.

The suggestion concerning joint Spanish, American and British cooperation in establishing the regulation of petroleum distribution within Spanish territory is agreed to. The Committee, fearful of establishing a precedent which might be utilized by the Germans, requests that only one person be named by us, that he be made a

¹⁷ Not printed.

¹⁸ Willard L. Beaulac, Counselor of Embassy.

member of the Embassy staff and that he work as unobtrusively as possible.

For reasons which already have been explained (see Embassy's despatch No. 1342, December 23, 1941¹⁹) the precise information requested in the memorandum would [not?] be immediately available for the districts as municipal selling not yet attempted but complete cooperation will be given to the American petroleum expert in providing the orderly information he may desire. Meanwhile Spain will continue to supply to us and to the British complete information as possible.

Spain agrees likewise to supply significant quantities of the materials which the United States desires with the exception of tin of which Spain is a net importer.

In this connection it was pointed out that Germany has not given Spain guarantees that it will not molest Spanish ships carrying contraband to American countries. Under these circumstances the committee is not in a position to offer to ship in Spanish vessels such important strategic materials as mercury and wolfram and possibly zinc. However, they could be shipped via Great Britain in British vessels which currently trade with Spain under convoy. Other products in the Department's list such as our cork, for example (the *Motomar* which has just sailed for New York carries 400 tons) can be carried in Spanish vessels as in the past.

The Committee made the following specific and urgent request:

An inventory of gas oil stocks in Spain taken on the night of January 23 indicates slightly over 5,000 cubic meters of gas oil measuring from the bottom of tanks (the non-usable residue at bottom is included in the measurement) as against a monthly consumption during the last 2 months of 1,700 cubic meters so the foregoing reduced as to curtail fishing operations to about a third of normal and to cripple other industries similarly. The entire fishing industry and many other industries are threatened with total paralyzation. Under the circumstances the Committee pleaded that the tankers *Campillo* and *Campuzano* which have been awaiting gas oil at Port Arthur since last November be granted export licenses immediately.

In return the Committee expressed a willingness to make available immediately any stock now prepared for shipment if the transportation problem can be solved and specifically offered 800 tons of cork to be shipped on Spanish vessels, 6,000 tons of zinc the transportation of which shall be subject to arrangement and a modest amount of mercury to be shipped via England.

In view of the complete agreement of the Spanish Government with the terms of our memorandum, in view of the very serious shortage of gas oil which would require the immediate departure of the

¹⁹ Not printed.

tankers mentioned unless all activities dependent upon gas oil are to be obliged to shut down and in view of Spain's willingness to facilitate the export of products we need at considerable risk to its vessels and to its relations with Germany I recommend urgently that export permits be issued for the two tankers as quickly as possible.

The Spanish Committee recommends very seriously that because of the possibility of complications with Germany over the shipment of supplies to the United States, communications on this subject be treated with the greatest confidence and that in particular specific materials not be mentioned in codes which may be accessible to the Germans.

WEDDELL

852.6363/1-2842

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The Spanish Embassy in Washington has been instructed by the Spanish Government to lend its approval in principle to the Memorandum on Commercial Inter-exchange presented by the United States Embassy in Madrid. This without excluding the possibility of a further study on questions of detail until a formula acceptable to both sides is finally reached. The Spanish Government reaffirms at the same time the guarantees requested about the exclusive internal consumption of all imported products.

The Spanish Government is also keenly interested in the immediate departure of the ships *Campilo* and *Campuzano* with the object of solving the existing critical gas-oil problem. Otherwise it would be most difficult to proceed under normal conditions with the negotiations held in Madrid, on account of the pressure due to the urgent need of receiving the shipments in question. It must be pointed out that any other decision would appear to be contrary to the spirit that ought to guide all friendly negotiations.

The actual supply of gas-oil in Spain amounts approximately to the minimum monthly needs, and this on the basis of the almost total immobilization of all industrial activities as well as practically all motorized agricultural work, and the reduction in a 40% of fishing activities.

It must be borne in mind that as it will take 25 days for the ships of reference to reach Spanish ports, only by their sailing at once could the new supplies arrive before the existing ones are exhausted.

The conversations with the American Embassy in Madrid are already in progress and a spirit of cordiality prevails in them, making it possible to find a suitable, practical formula for a mutual understanding.

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1942.

811.20 (D) Regulations/5738 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1942—4 p. m.

69. Your 108, January 24, 3 P. M. The Department believes that the response of the Spanish Government to the proposal stated in its No. 18 of January 8 offers a basis for further efforts toward the objectives therein stated. There still remains a considerable gap between the achievement of the objective, which was the actual movement of products of Spain to this country in return for movements from this side, and the present position, which is the agreement of the Spanish Government to accept the principles of the memorandum and the agreement to supply the materials mentioned. To bridge this gap requires the solution of many and important practical questions. It will take time and cooperative action of the Spanish Government to solve all of them. The Department does not propose to delay further movements from this side until all these matters are resolved, but it does take the position that there must be rough equality of performance on each side. It appreciates that Spain has shipped in the recent past iron pyrites and some cork but notes that no significant quantities of any of the products mentioned in our 18 have moved—for example, tungsten, olive oil.

In view of the cork shipments made and en route and upon the understanding that the Spanish Government will promptly arrange for the movement of the zinc and cork mentioned in your 108 this Government, subject to the security measures contemplated in the memorandum and referred to below, will release gas oil for Spain for the *Zorroza* from Aruba and the *Campilo* from Port Arthur. Before further movements of petroleum are permitted it is expected that the Spanish Government will have arranged the practical measures necessary for and have effectuated further movements of products listed. These measures will include (a) in the case of products which can be acquired by us through usual channels and by ordinary purchasing operations the removal of obstacles by the granting of licenses, etc., and assistance in arranging shipping and (b) in the case of other commodities for which we shall have to develop special purchasing arrangements, necessary assistance.

The security arrangements referred to above are those contemplated by the second paragraph of the memorandum and paragraphs numbered (2) and (3). In view of the state of war and the operation of enemy craft close to our shores we must insure that neither the petroleum obtained from this hemisphere nor any petroleum under Spanish control should find its way into enemy possession. This makes it essential (1) that we obtain from the Spanish Government most forthright and complete assurances contemplated by the memo-

random that these petroleum products will be used wholly and solely by Spain and that the Spanish authorities will take all necessary measures of police or other character to guarantee this. There will be no objection of course to providing any of these products to the ships or agents of countries allied to us in this war. (2) That arrangements for American observation of the disposition of these products be effected immediately. For this purpose it may actually prove necessary to have an American observer accompany each of the foregoing cargoes to their ultimate destination and thereafter to have these observers working along with Spanish authorities to be kept completely informed of the use of these products.

At the same time, we would want to proceed with the development of the general scheme of report and observation that has been discussed in previous cables. These would require prompt and effective steps by the Spanish Government to furnish completely the information requested in our no. 18 of January 8 and to enable the observing by agents attached to the Embassy as described in the same cable.

In this connection, we have noted your report that the Economic Committee requests that only one such person be named by us. Obviously, this would fall far short of what in our judgment is required for the task and we will want to feel free to have as many agents as may be necessary.

We believe that it should be made clear to the Spanish Government that we are not prepared to release crude oil until we have complete assurance that gasoline produced therefrom will not go to Africa except as permitted under the regulatory procedure referred to in our no. 18 of January 8.

The Government is taking this step on the basis of the urgent plea of the Spanish Government and its great immediate need for these petroleum shipments and as a mark of its wish to make operative mutually useful trade. But if this is to be achieved, the Spanish Government will have to do anything necessary to make this a genuinely two-sided operation in which the return to the United States in the way of needed products from Spain has a real relationship to the usefulness to Spain of the products we may be supplying it.

Please telegraph at once whether Spanish Government has given the assurances and agreed to security measures referred to herein.

HULL

852.8363/2-242

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has received the memorandum of the Spanish Embassy dated January 28, 1942, and notes that the Spanish

Embassy has been instructed by its Government to lend its approval in principle to the proposals set forth in the Department's *aide-mémoire* of January 13, 1942.²⁰

Bearing in mind the shipments of cork to this country, already effected or on the way, and with the understanding that prompt arrangements will be made by the Spanish Government for further and substantial shipments both of cork and of zinc; and subject to the adoption and enforcement of all necessary police or other measures to guarantee that petroleum products supplied to Spain will be entirely and solely used by Spain, this Government has decided to release cargoes of gas oil for Spain to be loaded in the tankers *Zorroza*, in Aruba, and *Campilo*, in Port Arthur.

The Department desires to emphasize at this time that whereas the response of the Spanish Government to its proposals above referred to appears to offer a basis for further efforts toward the improvement of trade relations between the two countries, the Department will not be in a position to support further applications for petroleum products unless prompt steps are taken by the Spanish Government to insure early deliveries to this country of substantial quantities of the Spanish products mentioned in the proposals. In other words, it is expected that the effective application of the proposals will result in genuinely reciprocal trade operations in which the products furnished this country by Spain will have a real relationship to the usefulness to Spain of the products this country may supply.

While this Government is proceeding without further delay to authorize the loading of the tankers above mentioned, it is desired that the most forthright and complete assurances be furnished by the Spanish Government guaranteeing that these petroleum products will be exclusively and solely used by Spain and that the Spanish Government will take all necessary steps to make good this guarantee.

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1942.

11.20 (D) Regulations/5817: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 4, 1942—5 p. m.
[Received February 5—7:02 p. m.]

134. Department's 69 January 31, 4 p. m. After two more meetings the Spanish Committee with the authorization of their superiors made the following proposal:

(1) Spain will accept the security measures which the United States may consider necessary, requesting at the same time that our

²⁰ Missing from Department files, but presumably the same as the memorandum quoted in telegram No. 18, January 8, to the Ambassador in Spain, p. 248.

Government use the greatest discretion in placing them into effect carefully selecting the necessary personnel, instructing them to use tact and to work as unobtrusively as possible; this recommendation is made so as to avoid an issue being made by the Germans, especially for observers to scrutinize the cargoes of Spanish ships;

(2) Spain will earmark for shipment to the United States the 6000 tons of zinc concentrate and the 800 to 1000 tons of cork already offered;

(3) Spain will make the greatest effort to transport this zinc and cork to the United States or if this cannot be done to place at Lisbon or some other peninsular port without however being in a position to make categoric promises at this time pending the negotiations with other countries (Germany and Italy) concerning guarantees for Spanish shipping. (This offer was made after we pointed out that Santander, the shipping point for zinc, is not a safe port of call for Allied vessels);

(4) Pending the results of these negotiations Spain will immediately make available to the United States other products capable of transshipment via Great Britain and specifically offers wolfram and/or mercury to a value equivalent to the value of the zinc and cork, the wolfram at Portuguese price and the mercury at the international price;

(5) In return for the foregoing the Spanish Government would expect us immediately to release gas oil to the two tankers mentioned in the Department's telegram 69.

The Committee pointed out that it could not promise categorically to ship cork in Spanish vessels despite the commitment in that sense transmitted in my telegram 108,²¹ because of the difficulties being encountered in Spain's negotiations with Germany and because of Spain's urgent desire not to complicate these negotiations. In this connection Germany has not yet furnished Spain with a list of commodities it considers contraband, but it is evident to the Spaniards that the list will be very inclusive and they are exerting every effort to limit its scope.

In offering a valuable amount of mercu[ry] [garbled group] to the United States proportionate to its critical need for gas oil because Germany is exerting great pressure on Spain not to make available these valuable materials to the democracies.

The Committee pointed out quite logically that for Spain to try to ship contraband to the United States in Spanish vessels would have two inevitable results: (1) the vessels would be sunk by the Axis from which it would follow (2) the materials would never reach the United States.

The obstacles in the way of sending American ships to Spain were explained to the Committee who expressed complete understanding. In view of the evident difficulties in the way of using either American or Spanish vessels they expressed the hope that means might be

²¹ Dated January 24, 3 p. m., p. 263.

found to ship Spanish materials to the United States via Great Britain in British vessels (which usually are under convoy). Obviously non-bulky materials could be shipped in this manner without overtaxing Britain's carrying capacity; the offer to make wolfram and mercury available is an example of this method (the British Embassy approves this idea and expresses willingness to propose it to London).

In my opinion the present Spanish offer is made in complete good faith and is illustrative of the Spanish Committee's earnest desire and expressed willingness to contribute to solution of our common economic problems to the greatest extent possible in the dangerous position in which Spain finds herself vis-à-vis Germany. The offer appears reasonable to the Committee and to the Embassy and I earnestly urge that it be accepted and the two cargoes gas oil be released immediately.

I cannot over-emphasize the further economic difficulties which will accrue to Spain if it is deprived of petroleum products, or the political social and military complications which may ensue if we decline to make available gas oil within the arrangement suggested by Spain which in the Embassy's opinion is fair and should be entirely satisfactory to our Government.

I again urge that prompt and favorable action be taken on the Spanish proposal.

WEDDELL

811.20 (D) Regulations/5819 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 4, 1942—midnight.

[Received February 5—3:05 p. m.]

136. Refer to my number 134 February 4, 5 p. m. We have not discussed with the Spanish Committee the long range program. If I interpret correctly the Department's number 69 January 31 4 p. m., it proposes that no additional petroleum products will be made available to Spain until there is a complete understanding concerning the commodities and quantities of goods which Spain will make available to us and will transport in its vessels. I believe the Department is fully aware of the delays which may be anticipated in ironing out these details even granting that Spain is most cooperative in making this a genuinely two-sided operation. To mention only a few points, the Spanish Committee has already expressed full willingness to make available Spanish shipping for the movement of commodities

not considered to be contraband but Spain is unwilling to risk its vessels to convey strategic contraband materials desired by the United States especially as it is dependent upon these vessels to transport foodstuffs to its people, nor does it believe that contraband shipped in Spanish vessels would reach the United States. At the present time the Embassy has no idea of the quantities of materials which we will desire Spain to make available nor any indication as to whether we will be willing to meet foreign price competition. Furthermore we must allow Spain time for the production, allocation and transportation of the materials we may desire.

Unless Spain is given minimum supplies of petroleum products during the period of negotiations it may be physically impossible for it to produce and transport the materials which we, and particularly Great Britain, wish to obtain.

No difficulty is anticipated in obtaining the consent of the Spanish Government to grant export licenses and to afford reasonable cooperation in making available most of the commodities in which we are interested.

Under these circumstances I request that the Department instruct me to inform the Spanish Government that pending the conclusion of these negotiations and for a period not beyond March 31 and dependent upon Spain's demonstrating willingness to genuinely cooperate we will make available as a maximum the quantities of petroleum products set forth in my 99, January 22, 12 midnight. While these quantities are less than the minimum required for maintaining the country at a low economic level, time would be allowed for the Department to survey our probable requirements during the next quarter and for the Spanish Government to explore the possibility of making these quantities available.

WEDDELL

811.20 (D) Regulations/5738 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Weddell)

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1942—1 p. m.

78. We wish it to be perfectly clear to you that, while we are making all necessary arrangements at this end of the prompt release of a gas oil cargo for Spain for the *Zorroza* from Aruba and for the *Campilo* from Port Arthur, neither of these cargoes will be released until and unless we have a reply to the Department's number 69 of January 31 as requested in the last paragraph of that cable and giving the assurances requested therein.

HULL

852.6363/276

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

[Translation]

MEMORANDUM

The Spanish Embassy acknowledges receipt of the memorandum of the Department of State of the second instant in which it is good enough to announce that the American Government has decided to grant the necessary licenses to permit the Spanish tankers *Campilo* and *Zorroza* to proceed to load gas oil in Port Arthur and Aruba respectively.

At the same time the Department of State emphasizes in its communication referred to that, as the Spanish Government in replying to the American memorandum of January 13 last ²² seems to offer a basis for the intensification of commercial relations between the two countries, the Department cannot support in advance new license applications for petroleum products so long as the Spanish Government does not adopt the necessary measures to insure shipments to this country, in important quantities, of those Spanish products mentioned in the American proposal.

The Spanish Embassy cannot do less than to manifest the surprise it experiences at such a decision in as much as the Spanish Government, far from reducing to a minimum, as the American Government has the shipments toward Spain, has facilitated and constantly increased exportations of its products to this country to the best of its ability. The comparative list attached hereto ²³ is a striking proof of this affirmation.

The tabulation referred to clearly demonstrates that the Spanish Administration has never interrupted the shipment of its products to the United States, as the American Government has, and therefore the attitude that the Department of State says it proposes to adopt is not understood in as much as precisely what the Department asks of the Spanish Government has already been done, is being done, and will continue to be done.

The Spanish Embassy takes the liberty therefore of requesting the Department of State again to analyze the situation taking into account the circumstances pointed out and hopes that it will recommend the granting of the necessary licenses to permit the tanker *Campuzano*, now in Port Arthur since the month of November, to proceed to load. With this end in view the Spanish Embassy takes the liberty of recalling the contents of its memorandum of January 28 last, calling attention to the extremely grave situation prevailing in Spain especially

²² See footnote 20, p. 268.

²³ Not printed.

as regards agriculture and the fishing industry due to the scarcity of gas oil, which cannot be remedied with the cargoes alone of the *Campilo* and the *Zorroza*.

Also, the Spanish Embassy cannot do less than to point out to the Department of State the absolute impossibility that products supplied by Spain to the United States "have a real relationship to the usefulness to Spain of the products this country may supply" as is textually asked in the memorandum under acknowledgment, for it is evident that from the point of view of utility they are unequal, since those which Spain sends to North America are not so essential as those which Spain requires.

The Spanish Embassy also desires to emphasize once more the definite proposal of the Spanish Government to do whatever is possible to satisfy the demands of the American Government so long as the latter is disposed on its side to satisfy the essential needs of Spain as far as possible.

In conclusion the Spanish Embassy repeats once more the disposition of the Spanish Government to give absolute guarantees insuring that those products received from the United States will be solely and exclusively used within the national territory and for the benefit of the Spanish people.

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1942.

811.20 Defense (M)/5347a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1942—8 p. m.

88. As indicated in previous telegrams, the Department believes that there are two classes of strategic materials which may be obtained from Spain. The first, presumably limited in number and amount, are those in which Germany has little interest. These commodities presumably may be acquired at normal commercial prices prevailing outside the blockade. Arrangements are currently being made to obtain offers for such materials and in accordance with the general undertaking of the Spanish Government referred to in previous telegrams, it will be expected that the Spanish Government will take the necessary steps to remove all impediments to the free flow of these materials to the United States and will take such affirmative steps as may be necessary to facilitate their movement.

The second class of materials, comprising the most important commodities, are those in which the Axis powers have an interest. As to these materials also, the Spanish Government will be expected to remove all impediments and to take such affirmative action as may be

necessary to enable this Government to purchase these materials and to transport them to this country or to the United Kingdom. Recognizing that the prices for these materials will be substantially above the prices obtaining outside the blockade, the Federal Loan Agency has agreed to establish a division, branch or subsidiary corporation with adequate capital which will operate in Spain to bid for and acquire these products. This organization will act in close collaboration with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation or other corporation or agency designated by the British Government; and purchases will be made for joint account of the two Governments. It is also expected that this branch or corporation of the Federal Loan Agency will be so equipped as to be able to acquire United States goods needed by Spain and to resell them to Spanish consumers or the Spanish Government. This plan has just been decided upon by the Federal Loan Agency and its plans have not as yet been fully developed, although it is expected that they will be completed within the immediate future. It will be necessary for the Loan Agency to send a representative or representatives immediately to Spain, probably accompanied by a representative of the Department, who will remain in Spain temporarily for the purpose of collaborating with you in the establishment of the necessary organization. The Department is not able to state now just when this mission will leave, but every effort will be made to expedite their departure. In the meantime, you are requested to telegraph your views and suggestions as to this proposed action, and any particular suggestions you may have as to the method of creating this organization in Spain.

[Here follows paragraph regarding a personnel appointment.]

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/4506½

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

With reference to the request of the State Department for visas for the American observers whom the American Government wishes to send on board the Spanish tank[er]s *Campillo* and *Campuzano*, the Spanish Embassy is pleased to inform the Department that the Spanish Government has authorized that these visas be granted.

The Spanish Government has expressly directed the Spanish Embassy to reaffirm the full guarantees, already given, that the products which have been authorized by the American Government to be imported into Spain, will be for exclusive use within the Spanish territory and its possessions.

It adds that it considers preferable that American observers would check the quantities of petroleum products taken on board before

the departure of the boats from the American ports and on their arrival at Spain. The reason why the Spanish Government makes this suggestion is with the purpose of avoiding the great risk which represents the presence on board of the American observers, and to save its responsibility.

The Spanish Government requests also this Embassy to point out to the State Department that when the proposal for the trip of the American observers on board the boats was made, there did not exist the dangers which the present changed circumstances have brought about.

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1942.

852.00/9914a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1942—8 p. m.

104. While our economic relations with Spain are important in connection with our political policy toward Spain it should not be overlooked by the Embassy in its reporting activities that it is the Spanish political situation in which the Department is primarily interested. It has been felt for some time that the best use has not been made of existing opportunities for observation and political reporting in the important field which Spain offers. The Department has been disappointed in not receiving a more thorough appraisal, for example, of the significance of the recent meeting in Seville.²⁴

The difficulties in gathering information of political importance and of satisfactorily evaluating its reliability are not underestimated but the Department is under the impression that political reporting has not received deserved attention. It is hoped that the Embassy will make full use of its opportunities for observation and reporting of this character and that it will contrive to secure the full and timely cooperation of the various consular offices in Spain which have generally been delinquent in this respect. As regards our consular establishments, their summaries of business do not reveal a volume of routine activity large enough to justify this neglect.

HULL

852.00/9916 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, February 20, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received February 24—2:37 p. m.]

183. Department's 104, February 18, 8 p. m. The Embassy's efforts in the political field have been directed principally at influencing the

²⁴ Meeting in February between the Spanish Chief of State, Gen. Francisco Franco, and the Portuguese Prime Minister, Antonio Salazar.

attitude of the Spanish Government and people in favor of our cause. There are two principal ways of doing this: (1) by impressing upon the Spanish Government and people (a) our determination to defeat Hitlerism, and (b) the extent of our military effort; and (2) by judicious supply of commodities (in return for commodities of strategic importance to us and to Great Britain and of which we can deprive the Axis) which Spain cannot obtain from the Axis.

We have done the first in frequent conversations with Spaniards of all classes in and out of the Government and by means of a weekly news bulletin in Spanish which we have been distributing for more than 6 months. In addition the Embassy has consistently endeavored to encourage the local press to publish a larger amount of news of American origin. At present practically all communiqués of Allied countries except Russia are published in the Spanish press.

This is a comparatively new development. In addition the Spanish press now seldom criticizes the United States editorially although neither it nor the Spanish Government has abandoned its policy of friendliness to the Axis. Furthermore the Embassy is convinced that popular feeling and the feeling of many members of the Government toward the democracies has shown a steady improvement, numerous pro-Axis statements of Spanish Government leaders and of Spanish press to the contrary notwithstanding.

The Embassy has submitted in despatch form a number of basic reports on the political situation and the relation to that situation of our economic relations with Spain. It has endeavored to assist the Department in arriving at a definite policy toward Spain, the principal purpose of which would be to influence Spanish policy.

Although the Department stated in its 32, January 12, 8 p. m., that it does not regard the effect of its economic proposals upon the general policy of the Spanish Government as a major factor the Embassy continues to attach great importance to the political and strategic results which it believes it may be possible to obtain from judicious trade with Spain. That the Germans also are aware of the importance of this is indicated by their efforts to interfere with this trade (by spreading rumors calculated to arouse our Government's fears and suspicions, for example) and by their efforts to impress upon the Spanish people their own feeble accomplishments along this line. As an indication of the importance the Germans attach to this when 57 air compressors were recently imported from Germany the Germans arranged for them to be exhibited a whole day on Madrid's principal boulevard. Such stunts have little effect however so long as Spain continues to import principally from the democracies.

The weakness in Germany's relationship to Spain is precisely that Germany is unable to furnish Spain with the materials Spain urgently

needs for its continued existence. This is interpreted in Spain as a sign of German weakness and indicates further (so long as the democracies are able to furnish goods to Spain) that however lamentable Spain's economic situation may be it can only be worsened by Spain's entry into the war on the side of the Axis. This argument will not be valid to the same extent of course if we withhold supplies of petroleum principally of gas oil so important to Spanish agriculture, fishing, communications and industry.

Conversely our and Great Britain's ability in the past to furnish supplies to Spain has been interpreted as a sign of our strength. It has also encouraged the Spanish Government especially those comments [*elements?*] in it not entirely sympathetic to the Axis to endeavor to improve Spanish-American relations and has strengthened their hands in their endeavor to counteract the efforts of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs²⁵ to bring about complete cooperation with the Axis.

In recommending continuance of a modicum of trade with Spain, the Embassy is quite aware that some risks would be entailed. It believes, however, that the political and military risks from stopping trade are greater and involve Spain's possible entry into the war on the side of the Axis. Our Military and Naval Attachés²⁶ concur in this opinion.

In its political reporting, the Embassy has tried to avoid burdening and confusing the Department with rumors and unconfirmed reports which circulate here very freely and are widely accepted until proven untrue as they usually are. Many of these are started by the Germans with the intention of spreading confusion.

As the Department is aware, despite many rumors of pending political change, some of which have been reported, there have been no political developments of importance in the Spanish situation for many months. Whenever there were strong indications of any developments, they were reported immediately. As several times reported and as indicated above, the principal political tendencies have been (1) the strengthening of Spain's desire to keep out of the war and (2) increased friendliness toward the democracies in certain influential circles and on the part of the public. An evidence of these is that this Embassy's formal relations with the Spanish Government have been restored to a dignified basis during this period.

The fundamental situation as set forth in despatches which the Embassy again commends to the Department's attention has not changed in recent months except as Axis victories tend to embolden elements friendly to the Axis and democratic victories strengthen

²⁵ Ramón Serrano Suñer.

²⁶ Col. Ralph Dusenbury and Capt. Richard D. White, respectively.

those elements opposed to cooperation with the Axis. The situation still has three important factors: (1) the Government's determination to keep out of the war despite (2) its ideological, sentimental and political attachment to Germany and (3) its military weakness vis-à-vis Germany which forces it to use its wits in resisting German pressure and to endeavor to placate Germany principally by word rather than by deed. The Department will doubtless wish to bear these basic factors in mind in interpreting the Embassy's future telegraphic reports of facts and rumors.

The Embassy appreciates the Department's suggestions and will report more fully on the purely political aspects of Spanish situation. I have instructed Consulates also to increase their political reporting.

With reference to the Seville meeting see Embassy's 182, February 20, 5 p. m.²⁸ Little detail of meeting shown here. Suñer did not return to Madrid until Wednesday and others besides Franco who know about the meeting went directly to Lisbon and none has since come to Madrid.

BEAULAC

811.20 (D) Regulations/5738: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1942—4 p. m.

108. The Department has just received a telegraphic report from Haven²⁹ stating that pursuant to orders from Madrid CEPESA refuses to furnish information petroleum products on hand. In view of the assurances we have been given such as reported in your 99, January 22, midnight and your 108, January 24, 3 p. m. the Department is unable to proceed with its program now being worked out until full cooperation is realized.

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/4506½

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has received the memorandum of the Spanish Embassy dated February 16, 1942 in regard to the issuance of visas for American observers to accompany the Spanish tankers *Campilo* and *Campusano* on their proposed voyage to Spain.

In consideration of the risks which the presence of American observers on these tankers might involve, it has been decided not to

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ Richard B. Haven, Consul at Tenerife.

send observers with these vessels and the appropriate instructions have been issued. The Spanish Government has given assurances covering the integral delivery of the cargoes of these vessels in Spain and subsequent use there. Both Governments understand that such delivery and use is essential to the movement of products to Spain.

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1942.

740.00112 European War 1939/45063

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum of the Spanish Embassy dated February 5, 1942, in regard to commercial relations between Spain and the United States. The assurances of the Spanish Embassy that it is the definite proposal of the Spanish Government to do whatever is possible to satisfy the requirements of this Government so long as this Government is disposed to satisfy, in so far as possible, the essential needs of Spain, and that the Spanish Government is disposed to give absolute guarantees to insure that products furnished by the United States will be solely and exclusively used within Spanish territory and for the benefit of the Spanish people, are noted with satisfaction.

In response to these assurances the cargoes of the Spanish tankers *Campilo* and *Campuzano* have been licensed for export to Spain, and it has been decided to establish and put into execution a program of supply to Spain of petroleum products for a period of ninety days to afford an opportunity to subject to actual experience the proposals recently submitted to the Spanish Government and to which it has agreed.

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1942.

811.20 (D) Regulations/6014a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1942—7 p. m.

122. The following memorandum will be given to the Spanish Ambassador in Washington in the immediate future. You may informally communicate its contents to the Spanish Government, emphasizing that this export of petroleum from the United States at the present time is a recognition of essential Spanish need and indicative of our wish for responding to it; for, as the Spanish authorities will understand, any movement of petroleum from the United States which

by any form of accident or change in military circumstance could be of assistance to our enemies is a matter of utmost moment to us.

We hope to make headway with our program of purchase of Spanish products useful to our own defense effort and also in consideration of other Spanish needs.

"The Department refers to the communications between this Government and the Spanish Government setting forth the basis of the understanding reached as regards interchange of products, particularly the proposals set forth in the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of January 13, 1942,³⁰ and the reply of the Spanish Government in the memorandum of the Spanish Embassy dated January 28, 1942.

It is understood that both Governments are ready to proceed with the arrangements contemplated. The United States Government, through its Embassy in Madrid and through the special representatives that will be sent to Spain for that purpose, will shortly begin discussions with the Spanish Government with the aim of acquiring desired Spanish products the movement of which to the United States the Spanish Government has promised to facilitate.

The United States Government has given further consideration to the movements of petroleum products to Spain during the 3-months' period from February through April 1942—which may be regarded as a 3-months' trial operating period. It proposes to make available to Spain the following quantities of petroleum products:

Gasoline	25,000 metric tons
Kerosene	1,000 metric tons
Gas oil	20,000 metric tons
Fuel oil	14,000 metric tons
Lubricating oil	3,000 metric tons

As a first step in the execution of the understanding, cargoes of gas oil to a total of 12,400 tons were furnished to the tankers *Campilo* and *Campuzano*, and these quantities are included in the above totals.

The release of each shipment of the petroleum products above enumerated will be made through the existing export license procedure and will be spread over the period according to requirements as indicated by information which the Spanish Government has agreed to make available to the representatives of this Government (as specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the *Aide-Mémoire* of January 13, 1942) and other pertinent considerations contained in the memoranda that have been exchanged.

It is essential for the execution of the program that all information required by this Government to possess a full understanding of the Spanish petroleum position at all times and places will be provided, and that the Spanish authorities will make that information available.

It is, also, understood that the Spanish Government undertakes that no petroleum products will be exported from continental Spain or other Spanish territory except to another destination in continental Spain or other Spanish territory, or made available, directly or indirectly, or in any form, for the use of shipping, aviation, or other

³⁰ See footnote 20, p. 268.

activities of any other country—except as requests might be made by American or British interests. To this end it is expected that the Spanish Government will enforce all police and other measures that may be necessary to prevent any possible use to the contrary.

The program of supply summarized above for the period February through April does not contemplate the movement of any crude inasmuch as this Government does not deem itself in possession of satisfactory information regarding the type of product produced in the refinery of Tenerife, the quantities of products held by that refinery, and the disposition of the products in that refinery during the past several months. It furthermore is of the opinion that the information furnished up to the present regarding the supply situation in Spanish Africa is incomplete and inadequate. In accordance with this decision, the Government has replied to inquiries regarding Spanish tankers now in Colombia that there is no present prospect of release of cargoes of crude oil for these tankers, and there would therefore seem to be no point for these tankers to remain in Colombia; it has further suggested that in view of the fact that under the program being developed the necessary cargoes for Spain would be shipped from American Gulf ports, that these tankers might advisedly be ordered to proceed to Galveston. The Tropical Oil Company and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey have been requested to provide, if asked, sufficient bunkers at Coveñas and Cartagena to enable these tankers to proceed to Galveston.

For the effective execution of the program, it is requested that the Spanish Government submit to this Government a schedule of tanker movements which would be designed to provide the necessary transportation of the products above scheduled at appropriate dates to permit arrangements to be made for the issuance of export licenses in a manner to minimize delays. It will be understood, however, that the provision of cargo for each tanker operation will continue to require a separate release on the part of this Government.

This Government trusts that the undertakings, of which this memorandum is a part, will operate satisfactorily and work for the mutual benefit of both Spain and the United States."

Further immediate attention is being given to the establishment of a wholly adequate system of observation in Spain and Spanish possessions of the use and movement of petroleum products and when these organization plans have been worked out the Spanish Government will be asked to give consent and assistance to them.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/19953 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 4, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received March 5—5: 37 p. m.]

216. My 189 of February 22, 7 p. m.⁵¹ I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this noon and asked him about the Seville meeting.

⁵¹ Not printed.

He said that it was held in accordance with the terms of Spain's Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression with Portugal.³² The possibility of such a meeting had been under consideration for some time. He said that Spain requested the meeting because there had been rumors circulating for some weeks that the United States was planning a military attempt against the Azores. Spain was concerned about these rumors because of its delicate international situation.

He said that Salazar had told Franco that he did not believe the rumors and had no fear of an attack by either the United States or England. He said, however, that Portugal would defend itself against any invader.

Salazar in turn expressed apprehension that Spain might be invaded by Germany. Franco replied that there was no danger of such an invasion, that Germany was interested particularly in protecting its peninsular flank and that so long as Spain maintained its present attitude of friendship towards Germany he believed that there was not the slightest danger of an invasion. He naturally could not respond for what would happen if an attempt were made by the democracies against Spain or Portugal.

Suñer said they talked also of their common difficulty in obtaining petroleum products and of the desirability of fixing identical prices for commodities produced in Spain and Portugal.

I asked Suñer whether it would be correct to say that it was agreed at Seville that both countries would resist aggression from either side. He said that Spain was so convinced that Germany would not invade it that discussion did not embrace Spain's attitude in the event of a German invasion.

I expressed regret that Franco should have found it necessary to make his anti-communist speech in Seville immediately after the meeting (see my telegram 172 of February 16³³). I pointed out the effect of such statements on public opinion in the United States and said they only made economic cooperation with Spain more difficult. He said that he hoped public opinion in the United States would appreciate what Spain's position was. Spain had few aircraft, few cannon and slender economic resources. Germany had plenty aircraft and cannon and was sitting on Spain's northern border. If Spain wanted to keep out of this war, there was no practical alternative to friendship with Germany which was in addition a natural development from Spain's civil war.

Spain was not helping Germany in a military way. It was trading with Germany just as it was trading with the democracies.

³² Signed at Lisbon, March 17, 1939; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1939, vol. CXLIII, p. 673.

³³ Not printed.

With reference to Franco's Seville speech, he said that Franco expressed precisely Spain's well known public attitude towards communism. Spain considered Germany a bulwark against communism. When Franco said that Spanish volunteers would go to Germany's aid in case Germany was overrun by the Russians, he was being entirely consistent with Spain's attitude towards communism; Spain quite realized it could not prevent Germany being overrun but Spaniards would be quite prepared to die in the attempt.

Until this contingency should arise, however, Spain had no desire to become more involved than at present in war against Russia or any other country and Spanish policy was directed against becoming involved.

I said that even if his thesis were fully accepted, he must still realize the effect on public opinion in the United States of the public utterances of Spanish officials and if Spain had no alternative to its policy towards Germany as described, it was likewise impossible to prevent American public opinion in the United States from reacting unfavorably and suggested that he bear this in mind.

He offered no objection to this but said that despite Spain's attitude towards Germany, the German Embassy frequently complained of lack of cooperation on the part of Spain and that Spain literally was between two fires. He said, however, that so long as Spain persisted in its attitude of public friendship to Germany, he believed there was no danger of a German invasion and he said again that Spain's foreign policy was directed squarely at keeping out of war.

Repeated to Lisbon.

BEAULAC

811.20 (D) Regulations/6114: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1942—9 p. m.

149. Department's 122 of March 4 and your query as regards fourth paragraph of this message contained in your 251 of March 12.⁸⁴

During the past week the Department has been disturbed by various reports and indirect indications of Spanish policy that have proven difficult to appraise (and concerning which it is now urgently seeking clarification). It is furthermore endeavoring to check upon certain reported activities of Spanish tankers in American waters which have been brought to its attention through Naval Intelligence. Pending this clarification, which has seemed necessary to have as-

⁸⁴ Not printed.

surance that the purposes of our trade interchange, as outlined in our 122 of March 4, would not be endangered by a change in Spanish policy, further steps for carrying out the program have been held in suspense since the 15th. It is hoped that as a result of inquiries we have been pursuing the way will be cleared again very shortly.

When it is, and the program is made fully operative, the Department contemplates that we will have in Spain the following representation: first, a group of observers in the petroleum field under the direction of Smith.³⁵ Second, representatives of the new buying and selling agency that is being created for operations similar to those carried on by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. Thought is now being given to the selection of an individual to head that work in Spain. In all probability it will not be Joseph, who for the time being is being kept in Lisbon for similar work there but who may be later asked to go to Madrid. Meanwhile for the purpose of getting this work well started as soon as the road may be cleared, Labouisse³⁶ of the Defense Materials Division of the Department is scheduled to leave for Madrid by Clipper today. He is fully acquainted with the program and will be able to explain it fully to you.

The Department's further thought is that there should be someone at the Embassy whose primary assignment would be to keep in closest touch with both of the foregoing operating American organizations, to act as liaison between them and the Embassy, and to work along with them in all necessary negotiations with the Spanish Government. This assignment has been given to Harrington.³⁷ He will of course work closely with the Commercial Counselor but this field of operation is so extensive and delicate that it was judged to require a special assignment rather than merely being encompassed within the general sphere of work of the Commercial Attaché.

Your 271, March 17,³⁸ apparently delayed in transmission, just received. It will be given examination.

WELLES

611.5231/1235½

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In view of the authorization which you gave me at Cabinet meeting on March 20 to go ahead without further

³⁵ Presumably Walter F. Smith, Attaché temporarily attached to the Embassy in Spain.

³⁶ Henry R. Labouisse, Jr.

³⁷ Julian F. Harrington, First Secretary of Embassy.

³⁸ Not printed.

delay in carrying out our proposed economic arrangements with Spain, I am enclosing herewith a memorandum covering this subject.³⁹

The purpose of the attached memorandum is to set out the essentials of the prospective program of interchange of commodities between Spain and the United States with a view to making certain that it meets with your approval.⁴⁰

The program outlined in this memorandum is regarded as a ninety-day operating program, during which period we expect to be able to ascertain whether it would prove possible to secure any significant amounts of Spanish products we desire to obtain.

The execution of this program is being most intensively urged by the British Government. The British Government has informed us that it regards the execution of this program as being of vital importance to its own production effort and to its own political interests.

In so far as the execution of this program by our own Government is concerned many departments and agencies of the United States are necessarily involved. Speaking very frankly, certain subordinate officials of these departments and agencies appear to be opposed to the carrying out by this Government of any program which involves the shipment of commodities from the United States to Spain. It is for that reason that I find it necessary to bring this memorandum to your attention so that, should it meet with your approval, the appropriate departments and agencies can be informed by the Department of State that its execution during this test period is specifically approved and authorized by you.

May I draw your attention particularly to page 9 of the memorandum where it is made clear that the carrying out of this program would be directed by a board of five officials of this Government: three from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, one from the Board of Economic Warfare and one from the Department of State.

I shall appreciate it if you will let me have your decision in this matter.

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

811.20 Defense (M) /5890: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1942—9 p. m.

207. Your 338, March 31 and 347 of April 2.⁴¹ Each day's discussion of questions of trade interchange as between this country and Spain and Portugal seems to be recording progress (a) towards defining the nature and range of the possible interchange, while (b)

³⁹ Not found in Department files.

⁴⁰ Marginal note reads "O.K., F.D.R."

⁴¹ Neither printed.

bringing to the forefront novel problems that require solution. The Department believes that your present method of dealing with the situation is entirely satisfactory, to wit, (a) the working out with the Spanish Government of arrangements permitting the conclusion of certain specific buying operations of this Government and the British Government, (b) simultaneous review of the whole field of possible trade interchange with a view towards seeing whether it can be brought together in a more or less unified, balanced and stabilized program.

It is realized that such a program would always have to have a large measure of flexibility so that all parties could take continuous note of changing circumstances; and that therefore rigid and precise formulations of obligations will have to be avoided. However it might well prove both possible and useful, when the preparatory discussions are completed, to endeavor to express our mutual undertakings in what would be a further exchange of memoranda.

It is recognized that it will probably not be possible to reach this point during Labouisse's visit to Spain, but the examination now going on of the lines of possible agreement commodity by commodity is most useful preparation. In regard to the matter of what commodities are to be supplied by us we agree with the suggestion contained in your 347 that decision in this matter be delayed until Labouisse returns to Washington. Full consultation with the Combined Raw Materials Board will be necessary and the whole list will obviously have to be thoroughly examined in the light of our own supply situation.

It is obvious that the list cited in your numbered paragraph 4 of 347, even if construed to mean supply from either the United States or Great Britain, includes items we shall not possibly be able to undertake. The list cited in numbered paragraph 5 looks far more feasible.

We are continuing to consider possible means of bringing about some measure of equalization of the price terms on which American products are made available and those which we presumably would be compelled to pay as indicated in paragraph 11, your 338. It is believed however that at the moment all that it would be advisable to do is to let the Spanish and Portuguese authorities know that consideration is being directed to this problem.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/21217 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 24, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received April 25—9:52 a. m.]

432. I asked Suñer today whether his statement published April 21 meant that Spain had placed herself on Germany's side in the

present war. He said the statement merely meant that Spain was reaffirming its opposition to communism. He said the reference to possible Spanish help to Germany was purely theoretical because Spain believed that Germany would defeat the Russian Armies.

I asked whether his reference to France's possible contribution to the war meant that Spain was trying to push France into active military collaboration with Germany. He said it meant that Spain hoped that France would recognize the communistic menace and help to overcome it.

He said that aside from this, recent developments in France were of no interest to Spain. I asked him whether he considered them unfavorable from the Spanish point of view and he said he would rather not comment.

He was extremely uncomfortable and embarrassed during the interview and failed completely to show the aggressiveness which characterized his statement referred to. He gave the impression of speaking entirely without conviction. See my 429, 5 [6] p. m.⁴³

Repeated to Vichy and Tangier.

BEAULAC

811.20 Defense (M)/6283: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1942—midnight.

267. Embassy's 410, April 21.⁴³ Our idea is that the program of procurement in Spain and supply to Spain must be a thoroughly coordinated one as between ourselves and the British authorities worked out by constant consultation here and in Madrid (and as may be necessary in London). On this another cable is being drafted immediately to you. As regards the securing of export licenses, it is believed that you and the British Embassy should on all occasions concert your efforts to secure licenses for all products bought by either country. You will rest your presentations of course primarily on what this country is doing in the way of furnishing supplies to Spain as part of the reciprocal program set forth in the basic exchange of memoranda. Accordingly it is suggested that you do everything feasible to expedite the issuance of export licenses for anything which has been purchased and which might be sent on Portuguese ships in the near future. This includes the items mentioned in your 410 but is not limited thereto.

With reference to the question you raise in the first paragraph of your 410, as to whether the wolfram should be sent to the United

⁴³ Not printed.

States or the United Kingdom, we are consulting the Combined Raw Materials Board and will advise you shortly. As regards commodities other than wolfram the primary rule must be to use any opportunity to move the materials out of Spain. Wherever possible we should like our share to come to the United States either directly or via England.

HULL

811.20 (D) Regulations/6614

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me at his request this afternoon. The Ambassador informed me of the urgent interest of the British Government in expediting the sending of gasoline to Spain in accordance with the general economic arrangements previously agreed upon. I told the Ambassador that, having been advised today by the Navy and War Departments that those two departments were in favor of the shipments in question, the necessary steps would at once be taken to expedite the shipment in question.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/21969 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 1, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received June 2—11:35 a. m.]

631. General Franco in an address to women Falangists on May 29 severely criticized both the Monarchy and the Republic and praised the régime of Primo de Rivera ⁴⁴ while also criticizing it for not fulfilling Spain's political needs. He was inferentially praising his own administration which corresponds in a sense to the Primo de Rivera dictatorship with the addition of Falange which it is apparent Franco believes fills the need which Primo de Rivera left unfilled.

He compared his own régime with that of Isabella and after recalling her expulsion of the Jews ⁴⁵ referred to her racial totalitarian policy. He ended the speech by referring to Isabella's three commandments, love for the peoples of America, integrity of Fatherland and vital space for our Spain which according to General Franco if previous generations have forgotten them it belongs to present generation to carry out.

⁴⁴ Military dictator of Spain from September 13, 1923 to January 28, 1930.

⁴⁵ Queen Isabella of Spain expelled the Jews from Spain in 1492.

The references to Spain's racial policy and to totalitarianism and particularly reference to vital space is of special interest in connection with reports that German pressure is being or will be exerted on Spain to enlarge its North African territory at expense of France. It is believed very doubtful that in the presence of declining prospects of German victory Spain would accede to this pressure to extent of attacking the French in North Africa (although it is believed also that the one thing in which army and Falange are in agreement is desirability of eventual recovery of Moroccan territory now held by France) but it is possible that Franco's statements were made in accordance with German desires that Spain should put pressure on France corresponding to reported pressure in form of territorial demands being exerted by Italy doubtless with German approval since it appears obvious that any specific effort by Spain to obtain "vital space" would be made in North Africa.

I have discussed Franco's speech and rumors of German pressure on Spain to take French North African territory with a friendly high official of the Foreign Office who is convinced that Franco's speech like so many similar ones made by him and Serrano Suñer will not be translated into action.

He said there is increasing evidence of Spanish Government's determination to remain out of the war. He says Foreign Office has recently prepared and submitted to Franco two highly significant reports, one outlining Germany's exorbitant demands for compensation from Spain for military help during the Civil War. He said Franco had expressed surprise and great displeasure at extent to which Germany is endeavoring to cash in on the military help which it said at the time it was giving as a "political contribution".

The second report deals with information which the Foreign Office considers authentic that German morale is fast approaching the breaking point and that the German people have practically lost hope of victory. The same report expresses the opinion that 90 percent of the German people are anti-Nazi.

In addition to foregoing same official confirmed that Foreign Office has refused Germany's request to appoint a German Military Attaché in Tangier. He said the Government was much more concerned with German infiltration in Spanish Morocco than with any plan which might be suggested for Spain to take aggressive action against French North African territory. He said in addition that the Spanish Army because of its size, its poor equipment and its shortage of such essential war materials as gasoline and so forth was in no position to take aggressive action in any part of the world.

My own opinion coincides with that of my informant.

Repeated to Tangier.

123 Hayes, Carlton J. H./27

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

No. 52

MADRID, June 10, 1942.

[Received June 25.]

SIR: With reference to the Embassy's telegrams Nos. 674 and 681 of June 8 and 9 respectively,⁴⁶ I have the honor to report that yesterday I presented to the Chief of State the official Letter of Recall of Ambassador Weddell and my own Letter of Credence.

Full ceremonial was used. With the Embassy staff and Attachés I was escorted by the Moorish Guard to and from the Palace. The car in which I rode was decorated with an American flag, and on my arrival in the courtyard of the Palace the "Star Spangled Banner" was played. It was gratifying, too, that many groups along the way gave ample evidence of sympathy by their applause. General Franco received me and my staff in the throne room, in the presence of his entire cabinet and many other dignitaries including the Archbishop of Madrid.

After the delivery of my address and General Franco's response—copies of both of which are enclosed⁴⁶—the Caudillo conducted me with his Foreign Minister, Serrano Suñer, and Baron de las Torres⁴⁷ (who acted as interpreter) to an adjoining room, where he engaged me in conversation with great cordiality for a surprisingly long period (some twenty-five minutes).

The conversation with the Caudillo, to which the Foreign Minister was only a listener, seemed to me very significant. He began by expressing the hope that the war would be over before long and by stating that it was the peoples of occupied territories rather than the Germans who were facing starvation. He referred especially to the Greeks, Dutch, Belgians, and French. He then asked whether I thought the war would be terminated soon. I replied that I hoped so but I did not know; I was sure only that whether the war was long or short the United States was in it, *totally*, to the *finish* and that while Germany had already passed the maximum of her military effort we were just beginning to attain ours. He said he thought there were two distinct wars; one in Europe against Russia, and the other in the Pacific against Japan. I said I could not see the situation thus—that Japan would never have attacked us if she had not been incited by Germany, and that, after all, the central issue of the war was whether one Power (namely Germany) would dominate the whole world politically and economically or whether the independence of the several nations and peoples would be reestablished on traditional bases with mutual respect for different forms of government and

⁴⁶ Neither printed.⁴⁷ Spanish Chief of Protocol.

free commercial intercourse. I said I had no doubt of our ability to take care of Japan once Hitlerian Germany was rendered impotent.

How do we propose to defeat Germany? the Caudillo asked. I replied, through an endurance test between morales and by taking the offensive with all the armed forces of the United Nations—on sea, in the air, and on the land. He said it would be necessary for us to land large forces on the Continent, probably in France, and he wondered if we would have the shipping facilities for such an enterprise. I told him we had already successfully transported sizeable contingents of men, as well as vast quantities of stores and munitions, to the British Isles, and this was only a foretaste of what we could and would do. I remarked that air superiority had now passed from Germany to us, and I reminded him of the British pounding of Cologne and the Ruhr and of our own exploit at Midway.

He then switched the conversation to the topic of "freedom of the press". Was not popular morale lowered by such freedom? And did it not give free rein to Communist propaganda? I said I could not speak for his country, but I could say quite positively for my own that the free press was a major bulwark of enlightened popular morale, that the great bulk of the press had no sympathy whatever with Communism, and that the exceptions served more as a safety-valve for emotion than as any real controller of public policy.

The Caudillo repeated and emphasized the cliché that victory for the democracies means victory for Russian Communism. I tried my best to disabuse him of this notion by pointing out that Russia as well as Germany would be pretty well exhausted by the current struggle, and that the United States and England, which would be strong at the finish, are not Communist or Communistically-inclined. He admitted that according to reports reaching him there was little danger of Communism in the United States, but he expressed some doubt about the future situation in England. Was not the Labor Party in England Communist? I said no, and explained that there was a great difference, traditionally and temperamentally, between "labor" on the Continent and in English-speaking countries, referring to the continuing hold of religion on the latter.

He asked, rather abruptly, if Great Britain and the United States really had the same peace-aims or if in the eventual peace settlement serious divergence was not likely to appear between them. I answered that both countries were committed to the Atlantic Charter⁴⁸ and both would undoubtedly stick loyally to it as the guiding principle of the peace settlement, although there probably would be need of considerable future negotiation over details. He expressed the hope that the United States rather than Britain would take the lead in settling such details and in guaranteeing the peace.

⁴⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

General Franco next spoke of his desire to promote, as soon as possible, more normal commercial relations between Spain and the United States. He said Spain was in a peculiarly difficult position, being at once a European country and a maritime and semi-American country, with the result that it was pressed, as in a vise, between the strongest Power in Europe and the strongest Power in America, and that consequently he had been unable to effect the very needful material reconstruction of his country after its Civil War. He urged me to do everything in my power specifically to forward the oil program and generally to help Spain to obtain necessary foodstuffs and machinery. I told him I would to the utmost of my ability, with the clear, and I hoped to him, understandable reservations that the United States, being at war, had to put certain restrictions on exports and that we must take all possible precautions against any of our goods being of aid, directly or indirectly, to our enemies, the Axis. He said he quite understood our position, and in conclusion assured me of his sincere and earnest desire to maintain, along with Spanish neutrality, the best possible economic relations with us. My thanks ended the conversation.

In connection with General Franco's observations about commercial relations, I would especially invite your attention to the paragraph in my formal address and to that in his formal response bearing on the subject. He definitely disavowed in the latter the totalitarian tenet of economic autarchy and affirmed the adherence of himself and his government to the liberal principle of international trade.

Enclosed, in addition to copies of the address and the response, are newspaper clippings and photographs relating to the presentation of my credentials and attendant ceremonies.⁴⁹ It will be noted that on this occasion we have had a "good press" in Spain.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

852.801/27 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 30, 1942—3:40 p. m.

[Received July 1—1:42 p. m.]

825. The representatives of the French, British, Japanese, and American Press were summoned to the Foreign Office at 1 p. m. today and given the following communication:

[Translation ⁵⁰]

"Lately the American press (inspired by certain news agencies of the United States which are constantly demonstrating an aggressive

⁴⁹ Not reprinted.

⁵⁰ In the original telegram, the communication appears in the Spanish language. Translation made in the Department.

spirit toward Spain) has made us the object of an imputation as grave as it is calumnious. After having demonstrated by arguments of absolute evidence the falsity of the accusation that our merchant vessels were delivering bunkers to submarines of the Axis—and perhaps precisely because we roundly defeated that campaign—it is now said that our Spanish ships are sending messages by radio, with the request that they be retransmitted by other ships which may be near, with which, if such messages are in effect retransmitted, the submarines of the Axis can locate by radiogoniometry the ship acceding to the request for retransmission and attack it.

This Ministry is obliged to deny officially this absolutely false and malicious news: Spanish ships have the most formal orders not to utilize in any manner their radio stations except to ask for help in case of extreme necessity. The only exception to this prohibition is the case when no other vessel is in sight in which case only they may make use of their radio to advise of some danger to some navigation, or to give their noon position by international code to the Admiralty Chief of the naval staff. They have been prohibited absolutely to utilize their radio stations on any other occasion, including commercial purposes. Moreover, no Spanish ship has to date crossed the blockade zone with the exception of one, now anchored in a port of the United States and which during its voyage did not use its radio even to communicate its position."

HAYES

852.918/55

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

No. 227

MADRID, August 14, 1942.

[Received September 1.]

SIR: Supplementing my telegram No. 863 of July 6,⁵¹ I have the honor to transmit a memorandum of a conversation between the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs⁵² and the Counselor of this Embassy on the subject of Spanish press treatment of the United States.

The problem of obtaining publication of our communiqués is intensified by the conflict now going on between the Foreign Office and the Spanish censorship office, both of which have certain functions in connection with the publication of news of foreign origin. It is known, for example, that the censorship frequently mutilates articles approved by the Foreign Office and declines to permit the publication of articles which the Foreign Office has ordered to be published.

Since the Embassy started to discuss this subject with the Foreign Office, considerable progress toward having all our war communiqués published in full has been achieved, and the Embassy is hopeful that further progress may be made.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

⁵¹ Not printed.

⁵² José Pan de Soraluce was Acting Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Spain
(Beaulac)*

MADRID, August 14, 1942.

In connection with our discussion of petroleum matters I spoke to Señor Pan de Soraluce concerning the political attitude of the Spanish Government as evidenced by the Spanish controlled press. I referred to the letter I had sent him on June 26th, and told him that I had written him because the Ambassador and I attached the greatest importance to the need of improvement in the attitude of the Spanish press if our economic program were to succeed and our general relations were to be maintained on a reasonably satisfactory plane.

I told him of the constant struggle in which the State Department was engaged to overcome the impression that existed in other Governmental Departments and among the public that Spain was committed to the Axis cause and would join the Axis if Hitler insisted strongly enough.

Señor Pan endeavored to refute this theory, and I told him that it was not my theory but a theory held by a great many people in the United States, and the fact that it was held made it very difficult for the State Department to bring about the kind of reciprocal cooperation we would like to achieve. I said it was evident that the impression that Spain was pro-Axis derived largely from the pro-Axis tone of the Government-controlled Spanish press.

I said that following my conversations with him and with Señor Doussinague, the Spanish press was publishing more of our communiqués and at greater length, but many newspapers were still not publishing them, or publishing them in abbreviated form. I told him also that, while we had been successful at one time in obtaining publication in the press of a large number of photographs of interest to us in our war effort, the number had recently decreased, although we knew from personal contact that the newspapers were anxious to publish these photographs. It was obvious that Spanish censorship was preventing their publication. I told him also that we continued to have difficulty in distributing our information bulletins, while the Germans, on the contrary, were given special facilities for the distribution of theirs. I told him that this whole situation would have to be radically altered if Spain expected continued cooperation from the United States.

Señor Pan said he would discuss the whole matter with the Under Secretary of the Presidency, who is a close adviser of General Franco, and he was very hopeful that something might be done. He appreciated the problem and believed it was in Spain's interests to over-

come it. He had been pleased to notice that more of our communiqués were being published and he hoped that we could obtain complete satisfaction on that score.

In this connection, I had told Señor Pan in a previous conversation that whereas the Minister of Foreign Affairs had promised the Ambassador to see that our communiqués were published without omission and without deletion, the improvement we had been able to obtain had come only after we had gone from person to person in an effort ourselves to implement the Minister's promise. I told him that we did not intend to do this in the future, that with the Spanish press so completely under the Government's control we believed that the Government itself should take steps to see that the Foreign Minister's promise was carried out.

Señor Pan referred to this conversation and said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was endeavoring to obtain complete control of censorship and publication of foreign news, and that he thought he had achieved his objective, but had learned later that Arrese⁵³ had gotten to Franco and succeeded in sabotaging the plan. Suñer was returning to the charge, and Pan thought he had a chance of winning out, in which case, he said, we might expect an improvement in the situation as it affected us. (This, by the way, is also the opinion of the American press representatives in Madrid.)

852.00/10085 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain. (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 8, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received September 9—10:12 a. m.]

1300. I made my first call on the new Foreign Minister,⁵⁴ this morning, and talked to him more than an hour. His attitude was courteous, dignified and very friendly. He recalled with satisfaction the relations that he had had with our representatives during and since the Civil War, and of the economic cooperation which had characterized our relations. He emphasized the atmosphere of friendliness which was being fostered by our supply program and indicated he was anxious to cooperate in assuring its continued success. He spoke of the pleasure with which he read our information bulletins and indicated a desire to see that the Spanish press should not offend either side in the present war. He said he would pay particular attention to the publication of our official communiqués. He asked that I convey his most cordial greetings to the Secretary of State.

⁵³ José Luis Arrese, Secretary General of the Falangist Party in Spain.

⁵⁴ Gómez Jordana.

He is of course much easier to talk to than his predecessor, and I foresee that I shall be able to discuss matters of importance to both our Governments with considerable frankness and in an atmosphere of much greater friendliness than was possible with Suñer.

See my telegrams Nos. 1298 September 8, 2 p. m., and 1299, September 8, 3 p. m.⁵⁵ The crowd of shirted Falangists who always surrounded Suñer in the Ministry were conspicuous by their absence.

HAYES

852.00/10140 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 22, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received September 22—9 : 45 a. m.]

1407. My 1406, September 22.⁵⁶ Government's statement of foreign policy is nearly identical with previous similar statements except that the reference to historical solidarity with Hispanic-American countries is new. In view of the fact that all but two of the Hispanic-American countries are either at war or have broken relations with the Axis, this addition to the statement of Spanish foreign policy is very encouraging to our side. Likewise very significant and favorable to us is the emphasis on solidarity with Portugal coming so closely after the Portuguese Government's statement of moral solidarity with Brazil upon the latter's entry into the war.

HAYES

852.00/10201

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to President Roosevelt

[Extract]

MADRID, September 30, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have immensely enjoyed the visit which Mr. Myron Taylor⁵⁷ has paid me, during the past two days, at the Embassy; and I am availing myself of his offer to transmit this letter direct to you.

For us and the United Nations, the situation in Spain has undergone steady improvement during the past month. Let me mention some six respects in which the improvement is evidenced:

(1) *The replacement of Serrano Suñer by Jordana in the Foreign Office.* This means, to everybody here, the replacement of a petty,

⁵⁵ Neither printed.

⁵⁶ Not printed.

⁵⁷ President Roosevelt's Personal Representative at the Vatican.

intriguing, and very slippery politician, troubled with stomach-ulcers and delusions of grandeur, by a gentleman who belongs to the nobility and the army and is honest, dependable, hard working, and endowed with good health and a sense of humor. To us, it means more—the replacement of a militantly pro-Axis man by a man who is pro-Spanish first and then more sympathetic with the Allies than with the Axis.

In a recent conversation with me, the new Minister expressed gratitude for American neutrality during the Spanish Civil War and a desire to maintain real Spanish neutrality in the present international war—which is quite a different refrain from what Suñer was ever chanting about America's having actively supported the "Reds" and therefore now obliging Spain to support the Axis. When Mrs. Hayes called on Countess Jordana, the latter took pains to explain that she was receiving my wife ahead of the wife of the German Ambassador. And the first dinner engagement which Jordana has accepted since he assumed office was last night to meet Mr. Taylor, at the American Embassy. These are all straws, but I believe they do indicate the way the wind is blowing.

(2) *The "statement of policy" which the reorganized Government has recently caused to be published* in every Spanish newspaper and broadcast over every Spanish radio. It pretends that "the policy of the past six years" is "unchanged", yet it makes no mention of the Falange—which is like *Hamlet* with Hamlet left out. To be sure, it refers to Spain's part in the "European New Order" (whatever that signifies) and to "the menace of Communism" (very real in Spain). But it curiously sounds and emphasizes two brand new notes: first, Spain's solidarity with Portugal; and second, Spain's ties with "Hispanic America". And these new notes just after Portugal had practically congratulated Brazil on entering the war, and when all of Hispanic America (only Argentina and Chile excepted) had either broken relations with or declared war on the Axis!

(3) *An obvious betterment of the Spanish press* in the publication of Allied war-news. This began in a small way while Suñer was still in office, thanks, I believe, to my impressing upon him that unless he could help to disabuse the American public of their conviction that the Spanish press was operated solely in German and Japanese interest he would almost certainly have to do without American gasoline. Under Jordana the betterment has noticeably progressed. It is still far from the goal of impartiality, to say nothing of pro-Ally sympathy, but by increasing our own propaganda here as well as by judiciously prodding the Government, I am hopeful of quickening the progress.

(4) *The growing promise of successful operation of the purchase-supply program of the U.S.C.C.⁵⁸ and B.E.W.⁵⁹* The Axis is encountering stiff competition from us and the British on an ever widening economic front, and while the Spanish Government is now withholding many export licenses from the Axis, it is according to us practically all we request. The British and ourselves are now meeting regularly with an inter-departmental committee of the Spanish Government, and negotiations, on the whole, are running smoothly. Jordana is quite sold to the program, and so too I think (though I am not yet certain) is the Minister of Industry and Commerce. The two main difficulties are: first, the shipping problem, enhanced by the Spaniards' fear lest the Axis sink their merchant ships; second, the problem of blocked currencies in Spain and the United States. We are already tackling this second problem. The first only time and circumstance can solve.

(5) *Notably increasing attacks of high-placed Catholic prelates here on Nazi and totalitarian ideology.* This last week no less a personage than the Spanish Primate (The Archbishop of Toledo), who is an appointee and close friend of Franco and who has been regarded as mildly Falangist in sympathy, published in his *Official Bulletin* a drastic four-page condemnation, prepared by Cardinal Segura, of a Spanish translation of a Nazi book expounding the doctrines of racialism, sterilization, et cetera. It is creating quite a sensation.

(6) *The immense current interest in the trip of Myron Taylor to the Vatican,* widely advertised and commented upon in the Spanish press. German-owned and Falangist papers interpret it as a peace overture of the United Nations. More moderate papers perceive in it an effort of the United States to detach Italy from the Axis and make a separate peace with her. Gossip—which in Spain is more informative than the controlled press—has it that the trip is “sensational” and “bodes no good to Germany”. I have been deluged by Spanish requests to meet “the great Myrón Taylor”, and my dinner last night, originally planned for eighteen guests, turned out to be for thirty—including Jordana with his chef de cabinet and military aide, the Under Secretary Pan de Soraluce, the Papal Nuncio, the Chilean Ambassador, the British and Irish Ministers—strange bed-fellows, but all anxious to be in bed with Taylor and catch what he might say in his sleep. The Taylor visit, aside from being a great personal boon to me, has come at the right psychological moment for the American cause in Spain. We need here an occasional visit of just this sort.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

⁵⁸ United States Commercial Company.

⁵⁹ Board of Economic Warfare.

740.0011 European War 1939/24750: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 9, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received 9:44 p. m.]

1514. For the Under Secretary. My 1493, October 7, 8 p. m.⁶⁰ In despatch 336, October 7,⁶⁰ which is now awaiting the Clipper at Lisbon, I recommended, on the basis of my study of the Spanish situation, that in the event of a United Nations landing in French Morocco, Spanish territory should be respected unless Spain or the Axis gives us justification for entering it. I consider that if this policy is followed Spain may remain neutral and might even be led to enter the war on our side.

I expressed opinion that even if Spain entered the war on the side of the Axis our difficulties would be less than if we had violated Spanish territory without provocation because our moral position would have been safeguarded and the German position in Spain would be more difficult because the Axis and not we would have the responsibility for Spain's entry into the war.

I expressed the opinion further that the military risk in awaiting Spanish and Axis reaction to a landing in French Morocco would not be great particularly when weighed against possibility that Spain might remain neutral or even enter the war on our side.

Our Military and Naval Attachés agree.

The British Ambassador who has just returned from London tells me he told Salazar, with his Government's authorization, that Portuguese territory would be respected in the event of a landing in French Morocco and he is authorized to make a similar statement to Franco with regard to Spanish territory.

In despatch referred to I requested authorization to make such a statement to Franco. If this fits in with our policy I request such authorization be given me by telegram.

I would make clear, of course, that I had no information that any decision to landing in French Morocco had been made although our War Department has a plan for such a possible landing as it has for other possible landings in this hemisphere.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/24750

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1942.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: I have just cabled you⁶¹ in response to your telegram 1514, October 9, 9 p. m., of the President's belief that it

⁶⁰ Not printed.⁶¹ Telegram not printed.

would be better to send my reply by courier rather than to trust the reply to our codes.

The President desires me to state to you that in the event that the contingency mentioned in the last paragraph of your telegram arises, you are authorized immediately to state to General Franco that the purpose of this Government is to do everything possible to prevent Spain from being brought into the war and that Spain's desire to remain out of the war is fully recognized by the United States. You may further state that the Government of the United States has no intention of infringing upon the sovereignty of Spain or of any Spanish colonial possessions or islands "from the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope". In the event that the contingency arises to which I have above referred, you may further state that it is the purpose of this Government to assist the French people in regaining their liberty and independence and that the course to be pursued by this Government would make the achievement of that objective possible. In other words, you are authorized to give the most sweeping commitments that the United States will take no action which would in any way affect Spain or Spanish territories.

My warmest regards to you, and believe me

Yours very sincerely,

SUMNER WELLES

711.52/237 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 30, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received October 31—12:44 a. m.]

1649. For the Under Secretary. The Foreign Minister told me today that Sir Samuel Hoare⁶² in behalf of the British Government had recently given to him and Franco solemn assurances substantially identical with those contained in your personal letter of October 11 to me. General Jordana said he would like to have prompt similar assurances from me in behalf of my Government with a view to reassuring General Franco and counteracting the effect of propaganda and innuendos of "another power". He pointed out that much was being made in "certain quarters" of articles in the American press advocating rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain and even war with Spain and while he personally discounted these articles and did not believe they reflected any policy or opinion within the American Government he would greatly appreciate a categorical statement from us. He explained that it could be made exclusively for himself and General Franco and would be held in the strictest confidence by

⁶² British Ambassador in Spain.

them. He said further that he would expect us to attach to it a provision against Spain's affording any military aid to our enemies. He clearly implied that Spain was now resolved to resist violations of her territory from every side.

The British Ambassador has since confirmed to me that he has given the mentioned assurances to Generals Jordana and Franco besides incorporating them in speeches he has made in England and in Spain.

In the circumstances I request authorization to convey the substance of your letter to the Caudillo and Foreign Minister immediately.

HAYES

711.52/237 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1942—5 p. m.

1137. From the Under Secretary. Your 1649, October 30, 11 p. m. The Spanish Ambassador called to see me yesterday with regard to the articles and resolutions of organization recently appearing in the American press advocating the rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain. I informed the Ambassador that these articles of resolution in no way represented the policy of this Government. You may inform the Foreign Minister accordingly.

In view of the considerations contained in your telegram under acknowledgment, you are authorized to convey the substance of my letter of October 11 immediately to the appropriate authorities.

The Department does not consider it wise for you to discuss at this time the matter to which reference is made in the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph of your telegram. You might well add, however, in making any such statements as those authorized, that this Government has seen with much gratification the improvement of relations between our two countries which has been taking place in recent months and strongly deprecates any activities by purely private organizations or individuals within the United States which would seem intended to prejudice the growth of good feeling between the Spanish people and the people of the United States. [Welles.]

[HULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/25234 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 3, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 8:22 p. m.]

1669. For the Under Secretary. Military Attaché has just been told by well informed Spanish Army officer that Germany last week

asked Spain for permission to send army through peninsula. Informant not sure, but believes that request was conditional on Allied military operations in Morocco or Canaries. I suspect connection of such a request with Foreign Minister's recent obvious anxiety to obtain assurances from us simultaneously through Cardenas and myself. Reference my 1649, October 30, and your October 31, 5 p. m.

Naval Attaché just returned from Lisbon reports on authority of British Naval Attaché there that Germans have instructions to terminate their purchasing program in Portugal by November 20. I am discreetly seeking information about any possible similar development in Spain.

HAYES

711.52/238: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 3, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 9:03 p. m.]

1671. For Under Secretary. In accordance with your 1137, October 31, 5 p. m. I communicated the following declaration to the Foreign Minister and through him to General Franco:

"Such articles and resolutions of organizations as have recently appeared in the American press advocating the rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain in no way represent the policy of the Government of the United States of America.

It is the purpose of the Government of the United States of America to do everything possible to prevent Spain from being brought into the war and Spain's desire to remain out of the war is fully recognized by the United States. The Government of the United States has no intention of infringing upon the sovereignty of Spain or of any Spanish colonial possessions or islands or protectorates. The United States will take no action of any sort which would in any way violate Spanish territory.

Moreover, the Government of the United States of America perceiving with much gratification the improvement of relations between the two countries which has been taking place in recent months, strongly deprecates any activities by purely private organizations or individuals within the United States which would seem intended to prejudice the growth of good feeling between the Spanish people and the people of the United States."

I also added that "the foregoing declaration has been personally authorized by the President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the American Army and Navy".

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/25234 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1942—6 p. m.

1161. Your 1669, November 3, 4 p. m. The President has been consulted with regard to the contents of your message and you are authorized to make the following statement either directly to General Franco or to him through the Foreign Minister at the moment that you consider such a message would be helpful and expedient:

You should refer to the statement you have already made to General Franco as reported in your 1671, 6 p. m., that it is the purpose of the Government of the United States to do everything possible to prevent Spain from being brought into the war and that Spain's desire to remain out of the war is fully recognized by the United States.

You should add that in recognition of the difficult situation in which Spain finds herself, this Government intends immediately to consider the enlargement of the scope of its present economic arrangements with Spain so that some of the supplies needed by Spain can be more readily obtained and can be procured in greater volume by the Spanish Government within the United States. So long as Spain remains out of the conflict and does not permit her territory to be infringed by the Axis powers, the rendering of such increased economic assistance by the United States will be feasible.

You should then continue by stating that reports have reached the attention of your Government that Germany has either made, or is considering making, demands upon Spain to move forces into Spain. Your Government confidently believes that any such attempt would be resisted by the Spanish Government. You should then state that in such contingency and should Spain resist and so desire, the Government of the United States would at the earliest possible moment offer all support to Spain which would be practicable.

When you make this statement, telegraph the Department immediately, informing it of any observations which may be made in reply.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/25290 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 6, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received November 7—6:27 p. m.]

1705. Your 1161, November 4, 6 p. m. In a conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs this morning I reminded him that on

Monday⁶⁴ I had left with him a formal declaration of my Government solemnly engaging it to respect Spanish sovereignty and the integrity of all Spanish territory in connection with any future military operations by the United States in Europe or Africa. The declaration contained a statement that it is my Government's purpose to do everything possible to prevent Spain's being brought into the war and that Spain's desire to remain out of the war is fully recognized by the United States. I said I understood that the British Ambassador had given similar assurances on behalf of his Government. It is obvious, therefore, that any threat to Spain's neutrality could come only from the Axis.

Since last Monday reports had reached me that Germany had requested the Spanish Government['s] consent to the passage of German troops through Spain in the event of United Nations military operations in northwest Africa. I did not ask him to confirm the reports, but said I wanted to make clear on behalf of my Government the simple fact that compliance by Spain with any such request on the part of Germany now or in the future would instantly bring Spain into the war, a contingency which my Government believes is precisely what Spain desires to avoid.

I said it seemed obvious that in the face of any Axis threat to bring Spain into the war Spain's hope of staying out could be realized only if Spain made it perfectly clear in advance that it is determined to defend its neutrality against the Axis as well as against the United Nations and thus discourage German efforts to force Spain into the war.

I said I was troubled in this connection by two existing circumstances which raised a doubt that Spain would in fact effectively resist German pressure to draw it into the war. The first was the present disposition of Spanish armed forces which seemed to be arranged to permit resistance to possible attack by the United Nations in the south but not to permit resistance to possible attack by Germany in the north. The second was the pro-Axis attitude of the Spanish press censorship which has converted the Spanish press, and especially the official Falange press, into an instrument of Axis political warfare.

I said I was authorized by the President to say that if Spain decides to make clear its determination to resist possible Axis aggression and if the necessity for such resistance should arise, and if Spain should so desire, my Government will be prepared to extend immediately to Spain all possible assistance of every description.

I told him that what I had said was for his information and that of the Chief of State.

General Jordana denied emphatically that Germany had requested Spanish Government's consent to the passage of German troops

⁶⁴ November 2

through Spain. He said Germany and Italy appreciated the role Spain had played during the Civil War and had not made any demands on Spain since the outbreak of the World War. Spain on its part appreciated the noble assistance of those two countries during her tragic trials.

Spain had no fear of German entry or of being forced into the war by the Axis—unless the United Nations invaded French Morocco or Oran, the European population of which was principally Spanish.

From the Spanish point of view Morocco must be treated as a whole. There is a homogeneous Moslem population in both Spanish and French zones. There are common problems in both zones. Much Spanish blood has been shed in Morocco. Entry by any outside nation would disturb the situation in all Morocco. Any military activity in French Morocco would have its inevitable repercussions in Spanish Morocco and Spain would be obliged immediately to adopt precautionary military measures. It might not be in a position to refuse assistance from Germany.

I made clear that this would involve Spain in war against the United Nations.

The Minister endeavored to intimate that the passage of German troops through Spain would not involve Spain in war against the United Nations unless we came into Spain. I said we would be obliged to come into Spain in that case and made clear again it would involve Spain in war against us.

He said that if the United Nations desired to respect Spanish Morocco they must also respect French Morocco since the two should be treated as a whole.

I said I could not agree and that there was no difference between our entering French Morocco and our landing in metropolitan France.

I said that if Spain permitted itself to be used by the Axis it would bear the responsibility of having attacked us since we had already given a solemn pledge not to violate Spanish sovereignty, and I was not informed that the Axis had given similar guarantees. The Minister made a special plea that whatever we consider to be our rights we stay out of French Morocco and Oran because if we enter those places he fears Spain will be drawn into the war. If we stay out then he believes Spain will be able to remain out of the war as it ardently desires.

I interpret the conversation as a threat that Spain will enter the war on the side of the Axis if we enter French Morocco or Oran.

Following my previous conversation with the Minister in which he expressed gratitude for the assurances I gave him on behalf of our Government, Jordana spent the entire day of Tuesday with General Franco and I consider that today he was interpreting Franco's attitude.

I believe that recognizing the risk to Spain of military activities by us in northwest Africa, Franco is endeavoring to dissuade us by this means from entering that territory and that he is not necessarily prepared to carry out the implied threat contained in Jordana's statement to me. Nevertheless I believe that under present conditions we have to reckon with the possibility that Spain would oppose with force any attempt by us to invade French Morocco or Oran.

Jordana told me he had talked to the British Ambassador in a similar view [*vein?*] yesterday morning; the British Ambassador has not informed me of his conversation and declined to see me this afternoon on the grounds of several previous appointments.

I have not therefore had an opportunity to discuss this new development with him.

HAYES

President Roosevelt to the Head of the Spanish State (Franco) ⁶⁵

DEAR GENERAL FRANCO: It is because your nation and mine are friends in the best sense of the word, and because you and I are sincerely desirous of the continuation of that friendship for our mutual good that I want very simply to tell you of the compelling reasons that have forced me to send a powerful American military force to the assistance of the French possessions in North Africa.

We have accurate information to the effect that Germany and Italy intend at an early date to occupy with military force French North Africa.

With your wide military experience you will understand clearly that in the interest of the defense of both North America and South America it is essential that action be taken to prevent an Axis occupation of French Africa without delay.

To provide for America's defense I am sending a powerful Army to the French possessions and protectorates in North Africa with the sole purpose of preventing occupation by Germany and Italy, and with the hope that these areas will not be devastated by the horrors of war.

I hope you will accept my full assurances that these moves are in no shape, manner, or form directed against the Government or people of Spain or Spanish territory, metropolitan or overseas. I believe that the Spanish Government and the Spanish people wish to maintain neutrality and to remain outside the war. Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations.

I am, my dear General,

Your sincere friend,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

⁶⁵ This letter, released to the press by the White House November 8, is reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, p. 906.

740.0011 European War 1939/26105a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1942—noon.

1183. From the Under Secretary. I take it for granted that you have communicated to the Nuncio the assurances given the Spanish Government of the desire of this Government scrupulously to respect Spanish sovereignty, and that our purposes in North Africa are intended to insure the liberation of the French people and are undertaken for no selfish purposes of any description. It seems to me clear that the influence of the church in Spain should be exercised to the fullest degree in order that the Spanish people may not as a result of Axis pressure be drawn into the present conflict. [Welles.]

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/25350 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 9, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 10:55 p. m.]

1734. For the Under Secretary. Your November 8, noon. Nuncio was away from Madrid yesterday. I have seen him this afternoon and explained our purposes in French North Africa⁶⁶ and our assurances to Spain. He expressed great satisfaction and reported that in the course of a conference he had had earlier in the day with General Jordana the latter told him the entire Ministry was gratified. The Foreign Minister told him also that German pressure was likely to be exerted to obtain naval and air bases in Spanish Morocco and perhaps on the Mediterranean seaboard of metropolitan Spain but that General Franco who had been adamant against Italy's obtaining a naval base in the Balearics during the most difficult days of the Spanish Civil War, would be adamant against allowing Germany to occupy or use any Spanish base now. The Nuncio assured me that Jordana is determined to pursue a policy of genuine neutrality with personal leanings toward us and the British, that he is thoroughly reliable, and that in his resolve to resist German pressure he has Franco's backing. The Nuncio believes that church leaders and the public at large in Spain are greatly relieved both by our landings in French Africa and by our assurances to Spain.

HAYES

⁶⁶ For correspondence concerning the invasion and occupation of French North Africa, see vol. II.

740.0011 European War 1939/25520 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 12, 1942—noon.

[Received 5:28 p. m.]

1766. I have received from the Foreign Minister the following letter addressed to the President by General Franco on November 10th (translation).

"My dear President: I have received from the hands of your Ambassador the letter in which, actuated by the relations of friendship which unite our peoples, and which in their benefit should be preserved, you explain to me the reasons which induced Your Excellency to send troops of the American Army to occupy the territories of the French possessions and protectorates in North Africa.

I accept with pleasure and I thank you for the assurances which Your Excellency offers the Government and the people of Spain to the effect that the measures adopted are not in any manner directed against their interests, or against their territories, metropolitan or overseas, or against the protectorate in Morocco, and I confidently hope that the relations among the Moroccan peoples of both zones likewise will in the future be maintained in the same spirit of peace and of reciprocal confidence which have characterized them up to now.

I can assure you that Spain knows the value of peace and sincerely desires peace for itself and for all other peoples.

On this occasion I am pleased to reciprocate the same friendly sentiments you expressed to me and to express my intention of avoiding anything which might disturb our relations in any of their aspects, and I reiterate with a salutation the expression of my personal esteem and sincere friendship.

Signed Francisco Franco.

Palace of El Prado, November 10, 1942.

To His Excellency, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America."

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/25814 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 18, 1942.

[Received November 18—12:54 p. m.]

1822. Today's official bulletin publishes the following partial mobilization decree:

"The present situation of the world, as a consequence of the great extension of the war, which has reached zones hitherto tranquil and nearer and nearer to Spain, its Colonies and the Protectorate, makes it advisable, in exercise of the most elementary foresight to strengthen those measures which, guaranteeing that we will not become involved in the struggle, are compatible with the defense of our

integrity and sovereignty and assure the maintenance of peace in our territories.

Said precautionary measures must be placed in effect in such manner as not to disturb normal agricultural, industrial and economic activities of any kind or to disturb the ever increasing recovery of the country, but rather to facilitate it as much as possible. Therefore I decree:

Article 1. The Ministers of the Army, Navy and Air are authorized to order the partial mobilization of the contingents which they deem necessary to complement and reinforce the units under their respective jurisdiction as well as to order into active service those chiefs, officers and provisional classes, complementary or retired, who are required by the exigencies of the service.

Article 2. The credits required for this purpose shall be extraordinary credits.

Done November 16, 1942
Francisco Franco"

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/25812: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 18, 1942—noon.

[Received 8 p. m.]

1823. My 1819, November 17, 8 p.m.,⁶⁷ and 1822, November 18. It is perhaps superfluous for me to point out that the partial mobilization decree with its preamble expressing Spain's determination to defend its integrity and sovereignty and to keep out of the war is a very favorable development from our point of view.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/26046

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1942.

The Spanish Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador handed me the official communication attached herewith.⁶⁸ I told the Ambassador that this communication was, of course, most gratifying to this Government as a reiteration of the official statements already made by the Spanish Government.

The Ambassador asked me if this Government had any information as to the reasons for the mobilization decree promulgated by the Spanish Government. I said that the information which I had re-

⁶⁷ Not printed.

⁶⁸ *Infra.*

ceived had indicated that reports were current that the German Government intended to present the Spanish Government with a demand for the right to send troops through Spain and that the Spanish Government was determined to refuse such demands and that the mobilization undertaken had been responsive to the needs arising from this situation.

The Ambassador spoke with a great deal of emphasis about his fear that public and press campaigns were again under way in the United States against the Spanish Government alleging that the mobilization undertaken should be regarded as a sign that Spain was about to give open and overt assistance to the Axis powers. The Ambassador remarked that there was nothing that he personally desired more than that his country should stay out of the war, but that if she was forced into the war, it must be on the side of the United Nations and not on the side of the Axis, and he urged that every step be undertaken by this Government to prevent the raising of the kind of a public clamor in the United States destined to create bad feeling on the part of the Spanish Government and people towards the United States in these critical times.

I told the Ambassador that I was somewhat surprised by the emotion with which he spoke since it had been my belief that during the past two weeks as a result of the messages exchanged between the President and General Franco the atmosphere had been better and that public opinion in general in the United States was inclined to the belief that Spain was not intending to assist the Axis and was not intending to undertake any steps detrimental to the Allied cause.

The Ambassador replied that as he had stated to me in a previous conversation, Axis propagandists could very rapidly stir up public opinion in Spain into the belief that inasmuch as the United States had occupied French territory, the United States' professions of friendship now made towards Spain were intended only to cover up the intention of the United States later on likewise to occupy Spanish territory and Spanish colonies. He said he thought that if I would write a reply to the letter which he had written me under date of November 17 and which he now handed me, and which is likewise attached herewith,⁶⁹ and if he could transmit my reply by cable to his Government, a very useful purpose would be served.

I stated that it seemed to me that there was nothing more categorical than the text of the President's message to General Franco and that any reply by me would have to be based solely on the assurances given by the President, as otherwise the implication would immediately be apparent that some other assurances were needed in addition to and beyond the assurances already made by the President.

⁶⁹ Not printed.

The Ambassador seemed to feel that if I would merely reiterate in reply to his letter the text of the assurances given by the President, a useful purpose would be served which would be of value at the present somewhat critical moment.

I told him I would, of course, be glad to give any consideration to friendly suggestions of this character destined to maintain good relations between our two countries and the position of neutrality adopted by the Spanish Government. I told him I would let him know what decision I might reach.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/26046

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The Spanish Embassy in Washington have been instructed by their Government to inform the Department of State that the Spanish Government has published a decree ordering a partial mobilization of its forces.

This step has been taken as a result of the spreading of the war towards regions increasingly nearer to the national territory. It has been inspired by a fundamental foresight which advises the reinforcement of those means which, by guaranteeing Spain's isolation from the conflict in a manner suitable to its integrity and national sovereignty, will serve at the same time to insure the continuation of peace within the Spanish territories.

This partial mobilization is to be effected in a manner which will neither interfere with, nor impair or alter in any way the normal economic conditions actually existing.

In transmitting this message to the Department of State, the Spanish Embassy in Washington wishes to stress specially, by express order of their Government, the purpose of the Spanish Government to maintain Spain's actual position.

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1942.

740.0011 European War 1939/26046

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Spanish Ambassador
(Cárdenas)*

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1942.

MY DEAR JUAN: In your personal letter to me of November 17⁷⁰ you reiterate the request, on behalf of your Government, that some

⁷⁰ Not printed.

confirmation be given by this Government that the assurances proffered by the President of the United States in his message to General Franco refer not only to the actual operations in Africa but apply as well to the duration of the present world conflict.

I have laid your request before the President.

The President specifically authorized me to inform you for the advice of your Government that while he had believed that the assurances as to the policy of this Government as set forth in his message above referred to were so categorical and so clear as to cover the point you mention, he is nevertheless happy to have me state to you in his name that the assurances he has conveyed to General Franco refer not only to the course of the actual military operations in Africa, but apply likewise to the entire duration of the war in which the United States is now engaged.

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/26030 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 24, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received November 25—12:20 p. m.]

1889. Acting on instructions in Department's 1161, November 4, 6 p. m., I informed the Foreign Minister on November 12 that our Government is ready to give immediate consideration to the enlargement of the scope of its present economic arrangements with the Spanish Government in order to permit Spain to obtain from the United States certain needed commodities more readily and in greater volume. General Jordana expressed great interest and appreciation and said he would pursue the matter with me at a later date.

Yesterday he told me he had communicated the proposal to the Caudillo and the whole Cabinet and they were all pleased and reassured, especially by the prospect of procuring more foodstuffs; particularly wheat, and larger amounts of petroleum products. He specifically mentioned Spain's need of regular supplies of aviation gasoline if its neutrality as well as its transport system were to be safeguarded. To this I replied that I imagined there would be slight chance of our giving serious consideration to aviation gasoline until his Government had complied with our request for detailed inventory of all military stocks of petroleum in Spain. He seemed surprised that we had not already been provided with it and promised it within a short time. He then said that in the near future he would submit a full list of Spanish requirements. He added, very significantly I thought, that Spain looked forward to greater economic dependence upon the United States and closer ties with us. It is my considered

belief that Jordana surely and Franco probably are now contemplating eventual victory of the United Nations and can accordingly be counted upon by us as potential friends rather than enemies.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/26187a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1942—7 p. m.

1335. From the Under Secretary. In the last 2 or 3 days certain disquieting reports have reached this Government with regard to possible developments in Spain. It is established that the German military forces in southern France are in such condition of preparation as to make it possible for them at any moment to undertake a movement through Spain. On the Spanish side of the French frontier there are no Spanish troops guarding the frontier north of Barcelona, and only normal frontier guards on the Bay of Biscay, southern frontier.

Furthermore, portions of two Spanish divisions have just been sent for the purpose of reinforcing Spanish troops in Morocco.

Moreover, it would seem to be the case that wherever Spanish officials in Spanish Morocco have been removed during the past few days from positions of importance, the officials so removed have been pro-United Nations in sentiment and the officials replacing them are believed to be pro-Axis in sympathy.

The War Department is concerned about these developments.

I wish you would, in such manner as you consider most discreet and most appropriate, discuss these trends with the Nuncio and endeavor to ascertain if he has any information which would indicate any change in the position of the Spanish Government or can give any additional information which would throw light on the present situation. Please telegraph your reply as soon as possible. [Welles.]

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/26188 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 2, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

1944. For the Under Secretary. I shall comply with your instructions as quickly as possible. Meanwhile I think you should know that we have been unable to establish that German military forces in southern France are in such condition of preparation as to make it possible for them to undertake a movement through Spain. Our information is to the effect that there are what appears to be normal

concentrations of German troops in Pau and Toulouse. Highest estimate of German divisions entering formerly unoccupied France is nine. We have been informed that light German forces have been sent to the vicinity of the Spanish border.

It is true that Spanish forces along the French border are light and we have no evidence they have been increased.

We have been unable to confirm report received from Lisbon that two Spanish divisions have been sent to Morocco. The report has been denied by the Spanish War Ministry. Childs⁷¹ has not submitted any report in that sense to us. Our Consuls and other observers as well as press contacts have been unable to detect any signs of such troop movements or of any other important troop movements in Spain.

General Yague is alleged here to have made a speech to his troops upon assuming command at Melilla recently in which he recommended cooperation with the Axis. I am endeavoring to check this report with Childs. General Yague is reported still to be pro-Axis.

Government's [action against?] Generals Kindelan and Aranda reported in my 193 [1933] December 1, 12 p. m.⁷² as disquieting, and I am endeavoring to obtain facts upon which to base a clearer interpretation.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/26281: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 3, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received December 4—10:45 p. m.]

1952. The Minister of Foreign Affairs assured me again, last night, that Spain considered it had nothing to fear from the United States and that the United States had nothing to fear from Spain. He again expressed admiration for our military operation in North Africa and especially of the secrecy with which it was carried out. He said the only thing that gave him some concern was the fact that United Nations and Spanish troops along the Moroccan border were very close to each other, at some places not more than 20 meters apart, and he feared that some small incident might occur which might become embarrassing to both sides. He suggested specifically that troops be withdrawn somewhat from the border in order to reduce the possibility of physical contact between the two forces. He said no other aspect of our operations in Morocco was causing Spain any concern.

He again expressed the belief that Spain would stay out of the war and the hope that it would take a leading part in recovery on the

⁷¹ J. Rives Childs, Consul at Tangier.

⁷² Not printed.

continent. He said Spanish history indicated that Spain endeavored to avoid extremes and that Spain doubtless would develop along traditional lines and in accordance with its Christian culture and civilization. He did not dissent when I suggested that it was just as unreasonable to suppose that Spain would continue to have a quasi Nazi ideology as to suppose that it would become Communist.

There are still no reports of unusual military activities in Spain and I adhere to my belief that Spain still hopes and believes it can stay out of this war and that Franco's policy is directed squarely at that objective.

I have nothing to confirm the Naval Attaché's report that Germany last week asked for bases at Málaga and the Balearics and that Spain refused.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/26283a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1942—7 p. m.

1362. Reports reaching us indicate that Spanish garrisons in Spanish Morocco are being substantially augmented. It is of course our hope that if true this is only an added evidence of Spain's determination to defend her neutrality at all costs should her present frontiers at any point be violated.

In view of the assurances we have given spontaneously to the Spanish Government, and of the supplementary sweeping assurances we have furnished upon the request of Ambassador Cárdenas, it may be opportune for us to ask of the Spanish Government without delay assurances respecting the Spanish forces in Morocco. I need not tell you that an assurance that these forces under General Orgaz are not for aggressive purposes and would not be used except to defend Spanish neutrality and her present frontiers would be of inestimable value.

You are authorized to approach the Spanish Government in this sense and in a most friendly manner unless you entertain strong reasons against such an action.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/26263 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 4, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received December 5—9 : 33 a. m.]

1963. Excellent French source returning from Paris through Toulouse, Tarbes, Pau, Bayonne and Hendaye, reports very few Ger-

man troops moving in any direction. Several heavy guns at railroad siding at Toulouse. During two days in Paris and on way down he heard no talk of invasion of Spain and saw no evidence of preparation for invasion.

Commanding General Balboa says uninformed concerning any increase in German activity in southwest France.

Informant in San Sebastián states number of German troops Southwest France reduced and remaining troops concentrated at central points.

British Vice Consul, San Sebastián, reports considerable reduction occupation forces Southwest France during last few weeks due to movement eastward. Much coastal fortification work stopped.

Commanding General, San Sebastián, expressed belief all quiet along French border. Understood some troops sent to eastern France and local commanders Hendaye and St. Jean de Luz changed. He disbelieves Germans intend invade Spain and says Jordana told him Spain intends to follow neutral policy and resist any invader.

All above reports obtained directly by responsible member my staff from sources he considers excellent. He also visited Canfranc and reports all quiet there. Spanish Military received him much more cordially than on previous visits.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/26284 : Telegram.

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 5, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received December 6—2:15 p. m.]

1969. Your 1362, December 4, 7 p. m. We have no evidence the reports are true. Ministry of the Army denied similar reports last week. I am seeing the Foreign Minister Monday⁷³ and shall then discuss the matter with him.

HAYES

852.00/10282 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 6, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received December 7—9:49 a. m.]

1975. My 1972, December 6.⁷⁴ Franco's wish for German triumph over communism is consistent with frank anti-communistic policy of this Government.

⁷³ December 7.

⁷⁴ Not printed.

His pronounced support of Falange has been especially noticeable during recent weeks and probably represents an effort to maintain balance between army on one hand and Falangé on the other. Lack of popular support of Falange has been particularly noticeable since our occupation of French North Africa which has emboldened liberal and other elements opposed to Falange and to the regime. Reaction of leftist elements has given particular concern to Government and to all conservative elements including the army.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/26311 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 7, 1942—midnight.

[Received December 8—2:20 p. m.]

1994. My 1952, December 3, 7 p. m. Department's 1362, December 4, 7 p. m. During my call on Jordana this afternoon I referred first to his suggestion that troops be withdrawn to some distance from the border between French and Spanish Morocco. He said that the proximity of the troops gave him serious concern and gave General Orgaz who had reported it to him, equal concern. According to General Orgaz we had moved our troops to the border first and Orgaz had countered by moving Spanish troops to the border.

Continuing, I pointed out the guarantees that we had given to Spain and referred to rumors that garrisons in Spanish Morocco were being increased and that additional Spanish troops were being moved toward the French Moroccan border. I said the rumors might be unfounded but I was apprehensive lest they might be interpreted as indicating that the Spanish Government did not believe our guarantees or that more specific guarantees from the Spanish Government were needed.

I reminded him in this connection of the assurances that I had given General Franco and that the Department had given Ambassador Cárdenas and I in turn requested assurances that Spain had no aggressive intention in Spanish Morocco and that Spanish forces there would not be used except to defend Spanish neutrality and Spain's present frontiers.

The Minister states categorically that General Franco, and the entire Spanish Government accepted our guarantees and believed them. They had no idea we intended to attack Spain.

He said Spain had given explicit assurances to the United States but he was glad and willing to renew them and to emphasize them. He then assured me as follows:

Any and every movement of Spanish forces, including the mobilization now going on, whether in Spanish Morocco or the peninsula, or

in the Canaries or Balearics, or in any Spanish colony, is directed solely at asserting to the Spanish people and to all foreign nations the firm determination of the Spanish Government to keep out of the war and to resist with force any nation which might seek to bring Spain into the war or might violate any of Spain's territories anywhere. This is directed against all nations impartially. Spain's entire policy is predicated upon impartiality and defense, defense within existing territories. He requested me to inform my Government accordingly.

He then referred jocularly to the many rumors being spread. He said he knew where some of them came from. Some arose in Lisbon, and others in Spain. He said he made it a practice not to pay attention to such rumors, and requested me when I heard them to bring them to his attention and give him an opportunity to comment on them.

He then said "I speak for the Caudillo. I tell the truth and only the truth".

He then suggested that it would have an excellent effect if the Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces would call on General Orgaz in Spanish Morocco. I transmit this suggestion with an earnest request that it be given favorable consideration. I agree with Jordana that the effect in Spain would be excellent and I believe that the suggestion is evidence of good will and good faith on the part of Spain.

My conversation was entirely satisfactory and very reassuring and confirms the impression I have had and communicated to the Department that the policy of the Spanish Government is directed squarely at keeping out of the war. Jordana's statement that Spain will resist with force any nation which might seek to force it into the war or might violate any of its territories is particularly reassuring.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/26320 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 7, 1942—midnight.

[Received December 8—3:15 p. m.]

1993. While there is good evidence Germany is carrying on a war of nerves in Spain endeavoring to implant distrust of us in Spanish minds and to arouse fear in our minds of German invasion (probably in order to hold large American forces in French Morocco) I have been unable to detect any real indication either that Spain has any offensive intention against us or that Germany plans to come into Spain in the near future.

Two excellent sources recently arrived from France say German forces in formerly unoccupied France largely concentrated on Mediterranean Coast and busy preparing fortifications and air fields. They saw five German troop trains going north in Rhone Valley and heard of eight more going in same direction same day. They report light German forces in Spanish border area and no restrictions civilian movement that area.

HAYES

852.00/10832 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

MADRID, December 24, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received December 25—4: 05 p. m.]

2125. In conversation with Jordana today I referred to pro-Axis attitude of Spanish press and radio. He said he was very troubled about this matter. He had read carefully notes of our previous conversations and was working hard, but the task was very difficult. There is still a sizable group in Spain who remember only the Civil War and take the same sides as then (while he did not say so, he clearly was referring to Falange). He said, significantly, that this group does not yet understand Spain has completely reoriented its foreign policy. He said, however, that he would win out, that the new foreign policy was supported by the Chief of State and by the Government. Meanwhile, certain elements in the Government—not the leaders, but still very important—must be watched all the time. He asked us to be understanding and patient.

He said he understood and wished me to understand, furthermore, that neither he nor the Spanish Government has any doubt concerning the sincerity of our guarantees or that they were backed up by the American people.

HAYES

**REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT REGARDING
SPANISH TREATMENT OF GERMAN SUBMARINES SEEKING REFUGE
IN SPANISH PORTS**

862.34/230 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 7, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 1: 20 p. m.]

502. I received this morning the following *note verbale* dated May 5 (translation).

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to inform it that on the second of this month at 13 o'clock there arrived at the arsenal of Cartagena unassisted a German submarine which had been forced to put in on account of damages. From the provisional technical examination which it has been possible to make so far it appears that it will require from 2 to 3 months to place it in a condition to navigate. The Embassy will be informed of the results of the final examination by experts and of the maximum time indicated for the repair of the damages."

BEAULAC

862.34/283 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 25, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 11:34 a. m.]

593. Embassy's 502, May 11 [7], 7 [11] a. m. The British Embassy has addressed a note to the Foreign Office requesting definite information regarding the maximum period fixed by the Spanish authorities in accordance with The Hague Convention⁷⁵ in which the submarine must complete its repairs and leave or be interned. It is also requesting assurances that adequate steps have been taken to insure that the crew of the submarine do not escape and that they cannot be surreptitiously replaced by other Germans and smuggled out of Spain.

I request authority to make similar representations or additional representations which the Department may consider justified under the circumstances.

HAYES

862.34/283 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1942—10 p. m.

386. Your 502, May 7, 11 a. m. and 593, May 25, 11 a. m. You are instructed to make inquiry concerning the cause of damage, nature of repairs to be effected, and length of time finally determined by the Spanish Government to be necessary for such repairs. In reporting to the Department the result of your inquiry you are requested to inform the Department of any Spanish legislation prescribing treatment of belligerent submarines taking refuge in Spanish ports. In this last connection, the Department received from the Embassy on

⁷⁵ Convention XIII adopted by the Second International Peace Conference held at The Hague from June 15 to October 18, 1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1239.

October 14, 1916 a telegram numbered 283 quoting the draft of a proposed royal decree regarding submarines. This telegram was reported on page 766 [776] of the Supplement to the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1916.

HULL

862.34/288

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

No. 31

MADRID, May 30, 1942.

[Received June 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram No. 386 of May 28, 10 p. m., instructing the Embassy to inquire concerning the cause of damage to the German submarine which entered Cartagena on May 2, 1942, the nature of the repairs to be effected, and the length of time determined by the Spanish Government to be necessary for such repairs.

There is enclosed a copy and translation of a *Note Verbale* dated May 29, 1942,⁷⁶ in which the Spanish Government says that as the result of a detailed expert examination a period of three months beginning May 3 has been fixed within which repairs to the submarine must be made. I am enclosing also the text of my *Note Verbale* dated today⁷⁶ inquiring of the Spanish Government the cause of the damage to the submarine and the nature of the repairs to be effected.

Inquiry is being made at the same time concerning any Spanish legislation prescribing treatment of belligerent submarines taking refuge in Spanish ports.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

862.34/293: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 6, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 3:45 p. m.]

1033. Embassy's despatch 31, May 30. Spanish Government has never informed Embassy concerning cause of damage and nature of repairs to German submarine in Cartagena.

British have made repeated representations to Foreign Minister on various aspects this case particularly insisting crew consisting of 50 trained men be interned.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

Foreign Office has now informed British Embassy Spanish Government has purchased submarine. British Embassy renewing representations concerning internment of crew and request my support.

Please instruct what representations I should make concerning internment and also concerning purchase submarine by Spain.

HAYES

862.34/293 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1942—7 p. m.

731. Your 1033, August 6, 3 p. m. If the crew of the German submarine has not been interned you may inform the Spanish Government that you have been instructed by your Government to state that it considers that effective steps to this end should promptly be taken particularly in view of the fact that the extremely long period of 3 months from May 3 for repairing it has expired, and that failure to intern will not only be contrary to Hague Convention XIII of 1907 to which the Minister of Foreign Affairs⁷⁷ in his note of July 13, 1942⁷⁸ states that his Government adheres, but also would be in violation of the duties incumbent upon a neutral state under generally accepted principles of international law. You may add that this Government reserves its full freedom of action with respect to the submarine.

Ascertain and report whether crew is kept on board the submarine and, if not, where.

HULL

862.34/294 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 14, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received August 15—12:15 p. m.]

1107. A note in the sense of the Department's telegram No. 731 August 6 [12], 3 [7] p. m. has been delivered to the Foreign Office and I shall discuss matter with Suñer upon his return to Madrid.

Submarine crew of about 50 is lodged in barracks at Cartagena naval station. British Embassy reports that personal effects of crew were carried away last Monday by truck indicating possibility at least that the crew will be allowed to depart. Minister of Marine has informed

⁷⁷ Ramón Serrano Suñer.

⁷⁸ Not printed.

British Naval Attaché he will not release the crew unless instructed to do so by a higher authority.

I request any further telegrams to be used as basis for communications to Foreign Office be sent in nonconfidential code.

HAYES

862.33/437

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

The Spanish Embassy has received the following cable from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Madrid.

"Several times in the past the Spanish Government has been compelled to deny certain news spread by part of the American Press.

"A certain newspaper Agency comes now with the report that German submarines have their bases at the Canary Islands and that they are refueled there. On February 26th of this year the Spanish Government published a statement refuting a similar report, and again on June 31st the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demonstrated with irrefutable arguments that the Spanish boats accused of providing fuel to submarines were absolutely unable to do so, since all petroleum products they carried on board were controlled by the American Supervisors.

"On June 30th of this same year it was also found necessary to point out the falsehood that Spanish boats transmitted radio messages requesting other boats to retransmit them, with the purpose of making submarines around acquainted with the situation of those boats.

"Once more the Spanish Government wants to deny most emphatically such inaccurate news."

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1942.

862.24/301

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1942.

The British Ambassador⁷⁹ called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador left with me the *aide-mémoire* attached herewith⁸⁰ in which he requests, by instruction of his Government, that this Government undertake to make representations to the Spanish Government, through the Spanish Ambassador in Washington,⁸¹ with regard to the unduly favorable treatment accorded Axis submarines in Spanish ports by the Spanish authorities and with regard

⁷⁹ Viscount Halifax.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ Juan Francisco de Cárdenas.

to three German ships now in the port of Vigo, which it is suspected may be used by the Germans for refueling purposes. The Ambassador said that this request was made as a result of a secret message from the British Ambassador in Madrid⁸² alleging that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that his own hand would be strengthened in dealing with these questions if the United States Government made representations in this way.

I told the Ambassador that this Government would be very glad to comply with the suggestions made.

862.34/302

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Acting through the American Embassy in Madrid, the Department of State has had occasion in recent months to approach the Spanish Government on the subject of visits of Axis submarines to Spanish ports and the treatment accorded these submarines and their crews by the Spanish authorities.

In as much as reports of a disquieting nature continue to reach the Department in this regard, it desires to bring to the attention of the Spanish Embassy, for communication to its Government, that it is the Department's understanding that the Spanish Government intends to be guided in these matters by the provisions of the Hague Convention XIII of 1907, to which it has signified its adherence; and that it is its further understanding that any other course not only would be contrary to a stated policy of the Spanish Government but might involve as well a violation of the duties incumbent upon a neutral state under generally accepted principles of international law.

The Department also desires to bring to the Embassy's attention, for communication to its Government, that information has been received indicating that the port of Vigo has been used as a refueling base for Axis submarine activity.

According to this information there are at present three German vessels in the outer harbor of this port, which reportedly have been used in these refueling operations. It is the Department's view that if these vessels are to be permitted to continue in the port of Vigo they should be moved into the inner harbor where it is thought that a stricter surveillance can be maintained.

Information has been received, moreover, indicating that these same vessels are at present being refitted to serve as ocean-going

⁸² Sir Samuel Hoare.

supply vessels for Axis submarine activity. In view of this the Department strongly suggests the advisability of removing and interning the crews of the three vessels and of placing Spanish guards aboard them.

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1942.

862.33/445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 11, 1942—8 p. m.
[Received November 12—2:58 p. m.]

1758. Foreign Office has received telegram summarizing *aide-mémoire* along the lines of Department's 1166, November 4, 10 p. m.⁸³

It states that the two tankers are already in the inner harbor and the cargo ship *Bessel* also will be placed there.

Department's 888, September 18, 3 p. m.⁸⁴ Total naval petroleum stocks as of October 10 were 5,799 tons fuel oil and 580 tons gas oil divided among *Ferrol, Cádiz, Cartagena, Palma, Mahon, Soller, Cru-cero, Canarias* and the remaining vessels of the Spanish Fleet.

A later statement of navy stocks is being prepared. A statement of military stocks has also been requested of the military.

HAYES

⁸³ Telegram No. 1166 not printed; for *aide-mémoire*, see *supra*.

⁸⁴ Not printed.

SWEDEN

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE EFFORTS OF SWEDEN TO MAINTAIN HER NEUTRALITY

740.00112 European War 1939/4331 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 8, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received January 8—11:15 a. m.]

31. After Germany's declaration of war on United States, Germany implied to Sweden that it would permit no further shipments of steel goods to any American country. In last few days however Germany has indicated its willingness to permit Swedish exports of miscellaneous steel goods to neutral ports in South America provided they cannot be used for war purposes directly or indirectly and provided there is a guaranty against reexport from importing country. Razor blade steel and articles such as refrigerators, stoves, calculating machines to neutral countries, but no gauges or ball bearings will be permitted. Shipment of goods to Sweden along lines permitted last year from Western Hemisphere countries including United States to be continued.

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/18521 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 14, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received January 14—4:09 p. m.]

76. Helsinki's 32, January 12, 3 p. m.¹ German propaganda concerning Soviet plans for border states also having noticeable effect in Sweden where fear and distrust of Russian aims is scarcely less than in Finland. British Minister ² has telegraphed his Government suggesting some statement be made by Mr. Eden ³ in House of Commons which would allay apprehensions of the northern countries and that Soviets be pressed to make some disavowal of aggressive intentions. Should our Government find it possible publicly to make some

¹ Not printed.

² V. A. L. Mallet.

³ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

contribution to the same end, would have immense value in strengthening support here for cause of democracies in Government and public opinion.

Repeated to Helsinki.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/4409 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 17, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received 9:45 p. m.]

96. Legation's 34, January 8, 1 p. m., 31, January 8, 10 a. m. [p. m.], last sentence, 741 November 12, 2 p. m. See also Legation's 257, May 13, 2 p. m., Department's 171, May 21, 7 p. m., Legation's 297, May 28, 1 p. m., [Department's 188, May 31?] 8 p. m.⁴

I had a talk yesterday afternoon with the Prime Minister Mr. Hansson. He spoke in English well without an interpreter and made cordial references to the United States. The conversation, however, was only on general and inconsequential matters except that Mr. Hansson made a point of mentioning the extreme difficulties of Sweden in securing essential supplies for her defense program. He mentioned specifically the matter of oil, of which Sweden does not have a sufficient supply for minimum defense requirements. He said that he hoped I might be able to help them in this matter. He did not go into any details as to actual requirements, but said that the facts had all been sent to the Swedish Minister in Washington,⁵ and were presumably in the hands of the Department. He also mentioned the necessity of minimum supplies of rubber and indicated that he was fully aware of the difficulties confronting the United States in respect to this commodity.

Some days ago Commodore Oberg, Head of the Swedish Naval War College, mentioned to me the critical situation of the Swedish Navy and Air Force with respect to oil supplies and said that it was vital, if Sweden's defense machinery were to be effective, that additional supplies of oil become available. It is my personal opinion that any assistance which the United States and Great Britain may find it practicable to give to Sweden in securing these essential commodities will pay large dividends here in good will. Sweden is making tremendous efforts to build up her armed forces with the hope at least of making any attack on Sweden a damaging and costly one to the aggressor. A further liberalization of Allied policy with a view to facilitating Swedish imports of essential war materials, particularly

⁴ None printed except Legation's telegram No. 31, p. 326.

⁵ W. Boström.

the two commodities mentioned, should greatly strengthen this country's position in resisting German pressure and in preserving a position which is to the Allied advantage.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/4747 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, February 19, 1942—midnight.

[Received February 20—1 p. m.]

311. Section I. Legation's 96, January 17, 8 p. m. Under instructions from London British Legation about 10 days ago submitted to Swedish Government through Swedish-British Joint Standing Committee informal memorandum mentioning vastly increased demand for certain materials required by American and British military forces and requested that until a joint British-American survey of supplies is completed Sweden should refrain from pressing for issuance of navicerts covering certain raw materials from Latin America, hides from Argentina being especially mentioned. At same time assurance was given that British considered quotas mentioned in revised agreement reached in London late last December as appropriate and binding and would undertake to explain Sweden's position to American authorities, also indicating that Sweden might desire to conduct its own negotiations. It concluded by stating that British had approved an increase from present 4 to 5 ships in Göteborg overseas service.

Because Swedish members of committee stated they could not submit them to Swedish Cabinet, paragraphs 4 and 5 were omitted from memorandum as originally drafted and with London's approval, these were submitted verbally. These paragraphs are quoted in section III.

Swedish general supply problem was informally discussed by Greene⁷ and Klath⁸ with Foreign Office officials who stressed vital necessity of obtaining hides and other important raw materials for maintaining Swedish military forces and prevent disruption of economic life.

Section II. He pointed out that from Swedish viewpoint December agreements negotiated in London implied that navicerts would be available up to limit of quotas fixed and hoped that United States would not interfere with fulfillment of agreement although Sweden, of course, could offer no further concessions to United States as limit of these had been made in Swedish-British negotiations.

Following up these conversations an informal memorandum has been received from Foreign Office reiterating points made in preced-

⁷ Winthrop S. Greene, Second Secretary of Embassy.

⁸ Thormod O. Klath, Commercial Attaché.

ing paragraph. Later by telephone Klath was informed that a total of 4,200 tons of heavy hides and 4,766 tons of wool had been purchased and paid for by Swedish Government and private firms most of which was in Buenos Aires and balance in Uruguay. Quarterly quotas in Swedish-British agreement are 3,000 tons hide and 1,800 tons wool. Swedish authorities are very desirous that navicerts be issued and that American Government facilitate exportation of these two items at the same time expressing willingness in other respects to cooperate in withholding requests for other commodities ending [*pending?*] completion of joint Anglo-American survey; it is understood that negotiations about hides and wool are now being conducted in London with appropriate Ministries.

Foreign Office states that Swedish Legation in Washington has been fully informed.

Section III. ["]4. There are many indispensable requirements which Sweden cannot obtain from South America, notably mineral oil. Sweden is dependent on the United States for this and other vital necessities, which His Majesty's Government fear that the United States would see great difficulty in releasing in the present circumstances.

5. Moreover, the United States can clearly exercise considerable influence on the Argentine and Uruguayan Governments who may well be reluctant to grant at present any export licenses for the hides or other commodities in short supply. The issue of navicerts would in that event prove to be of no practical advantage to Sweden.["]

Repeated to London.

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/19753 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, February 25, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 11 : 21 p. m.]

355. My 330, February 21, 7 p. m.⁹ I had a talk yesterday afternoon with Mr. Boheman, Secretary General of Foreign Office.

1. Referring to rumored German plan to attack Sweden Mr. Boheman said there was nothing new of significance to point in this direction nor had there been any specific German demands or threats in last few days. He said however that Swedish Government continues to receive warnings from many sources that something from Germany is in air against Sweden. Majority of these warnings come from friends of Sweden in Germany. Boheman is inclined to discount

⁹ Not printed.

possibility of an Allied attack on Norway this year which would perhaps offer most outstanding provocation to Germany for attacking Sweden but he said pessimists in Swedish circles argue that whether Germany takes seriously possibility of such an Allied attack or not, it would have little effect on her decision to attack Sweden as in any case she would desire for strategic reasons to forestall any Allied attack on peninsula and have herself entrenched in Sweden before it came. Referring to warnings received and to more pessimistic views Boheman said that he personally did not "believe a word of it," although obliged to admit anything was possible from Germany.

Sweden of course is in as great a state of preparedness as she can put herself. Military units on active service Boheman pointed out were greatly reduced on account of difficulty of maintaining morale of large numbers of troops under winter conditions when physical activities are necessarily restricted. Large numbers of men are now being called into service. Boheman said that numbers were no greater than intensified spring and summer activities would justify although he said they are being called up somewhat earlier than would ordinarily be case. (Military Attaché is reporting on these figures to War Department.)

I mentioned to Boheman general trend of Swedish press comment on possibility of Sweden being involved in war which has been comment for past few days (my 341, February 24 ¹¹ gives typical examples of this comment; see also my 340, February 24 ¹¹). Boheman said that line taken by press yesterday in particular was directly inspired by Government and accurately stated Government's policy. In my view it also reflects accurately the will of the overwhelming majority of the Swedes. He remarked that Sweden was made neutral by sheer force of circumstances, that it would be quite impossible to induce Swedish people to fight either Norway or Finland; that to fight Norway would mean being first joined with Allies and that to fight Finland would mean being first joined with Germany; that Sweden could be made to fight either Norway or Finland only by being attacked herself.

Although our conversation was on a most informal and friendly basis Boheman emphatically stated that it was determination of Swedes to resist by force any attack on their territory from whatever quarter it came. He remarked incidentally that according to estimates of Germans themselves, which were known in Sweden, 35 to 40 divisions are considered least number which would be necessary for successful invasion and occupation of this country.

Knowing that Schnurre ¹² had been in Sweden for past week with-

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Karl Schnurre of the Office of Trade Policy in the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

out publicity I asked Mr. Boheman if there was anything he could tell me regarding purpose of his visit. He replied that Schnurre had stopped in Sweden en route to Germany from Finland where he had been negotiating a trade agreement; that he had spent past week here with friends without seeing any officials; that on Monday ¹³ he made a formal call at Foreign Office prior to his departure for Germany; that he had not brought up anything new but had merely again asked question which either he or German Legation asks every week or two—that is whether Sweden is not ready to change her mind about various controversial matters.

2. Toward end of our talk Boheman referred briefly to conditions in Norway and to immense sympathies which Swedish people feel for Norwegians under their present trials.

He was most critical of the "commando" raids by British at different points on Norwegian coast; said that in his opinion they accomplished nothing of value to Allies and that their only result was that on each occasion Germans or their satellites found an excuse to kill all of good Norwegians.

He also spoke in very disparaging terms of Sir Stafford Cripps ¹⁴ whose unfortunate speech of 2 weeks ago made a very bad impression here. Boheman met Cripps sometime ago when he came through here and talked with him. He said that Cripps was undoubtedly "intellectual" but in his view by no means "an intelligent man". Boheman also interpreted Stalin's speech of 2 or 3 days ago as a direct reply to Cripps' speech and directed to the world as well as to his own people. He pointed out that Stalin had stated Russia was fighting this war alone while Germany was helped by Allies, and made no reference to Great Britain or United States or to material aid these countries were giving Russia, that he expressly stated he had no quarrel with German people and that Russia had no intention of occupying German territory. Boheman was of opinion that Cripps' speech had not served purpose either of Great Britain or of Russia in any direction.

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/19857a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1942—8 p. m.

108. It would appear from your recent telegrams that Sweden may maneuver its military, economic, and political forces in near future

¹³ February 23.

¹⁴ British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, June 12, 1940–January 22, 1942; became Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons February 19, 1942; made speech at Bristol February 9 on Soviet policy.

based on supposition (1) Germany will attack Sweden as a separate campaign, or that (2) United Nations will open campaign in Northern Europe which will result in bringing German pressure on Sweden to a head.

With these possibilities in mind we desire you assign a qualified officer, possibly Greene because of his military and related experience, to begin assimilating all available data with which to prepare in due course an exhaustive report under your direction setting forth:

- (1) Details and significance of each measure taken by the Swedes to meet possible developments;
- (2) German countermoves;
- (3) considered conclusions on basis of various moves under (1) and (2) above as to whether *inter alia* (a) Sweden would have made a whole-hearted military resistance if Germans had attacked, (b) the probable effectiveness of such resistance, (c) weaknesses in the Swedish measures, political, military and economic, (d) apparent Swedish calculations of military moves by other adjacent countries involved, (e) assuming United Nations assistance were available, your detailed recommendations as to its nature.

It is to be emphasized that we want an overall report. The advice and collaboration of your service attachés on the report should, of course, prove most valuable.

The report should be submitted by mail but any incidental factors discovered requiring prompt consideration and a summary of the report should be cabled. Important spot news should naturally continue to be reported immediately as at present.

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/5260 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 14, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 6:51 p. m.]

826. In a letter dated March 30, 1942, Foreign Office again reviews situation growing out of our entry into war and deterioration of supply situation in United States and Latin American countries. Resultant tightening up of export controls in area referred to is making Swedes very uneasy. In this connection reference is made to my telegram 311, February 19, midnight and despatch 299 dated March 11.¹⁵

Present letter to some extent is repetition of that transmitted with above mentioned despatch. According to reports from Swedish representatives in Washington and London general supply survey is being conducted in Washington while requirements of European

¹⁵ Latter not printed.

neutrals is being handled at London. It points out that Swedish vital needs have been discussed in London during past 2 years and that navicert quotas for Sweden were fixed after making very thorough investigations. Swedish Government maintains that British must stand by their previous determination of import needs, that England is morally bound to facilitate their passage through blockade and that British obligations to Sweden should be endorsed in Washington in such way as to make Swedish-British war trade agreement in reality a joint obligation.

It continues that regular navicert quotas for second quarter have been approved in London and requests that we take immediate steps to permit exportation during the quarter on that basis, irrespective of final results of supply survey. Need for quick action and immediate granting of export licenses is emphasized.

Sweden desires an advance assurance that United States will accede to British recommendations that may have been made in Washington regarding Swedish imports.

In principle I am in accord with Swedish viewpoint and urge that all possible consideration be given to difficult position of Sweden compatible with the overriding necessities of our joint military effort. I think that British believe Sweden in general has loyally enforced restrictions on exports to Axis countries.

Swedes undoubtedly will offer stout resistance to military attack and this factor deserves some consideration on our part by aiding directly to keep their military strength at as high a level as possible. This can be facilitated by acceptance of quotas established by British. At same time I believe that in return for continuance of making supplies available it would be right and desirable to insist that Sweden supply us currently with detailed statistical material relating to stocks on hand, domestic production and consumption as well as foreign trade in order that we can maintain a continuous check on situation.

This whole subject has been discussed frequently with British Legation which by all essential points is in agreement with these opinions. I might mention that British officials here reflect certain reluctance in London to press Swedish cause very forcibly with our Embassy there and this may be case in Washington as well. This is confirmed by impression gained by Klath during conversations with British official while in London last January. One of these officials, who is keyman, mentioned to Klath that in his opinion ideal solution might be negotiation of a tripartite agreement in order to prevent misunderstanding and confusion when Swedish requests must be continually discussed both in London and Washington.

Repeated to London.

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/21453 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, May 6, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 5 : 14 p. m.]

1072. 1. A prominent Swedish businessman who is close personal friend of Prime Minister Hansson told me following: He said Mr. Hansson had made remark to him that during roughly first 2 years of war he lived in constant state of anxiety that Germany would increase her demands on Sweden to a point where Swedish independence would disappear and that if Germany had pressed extreme demands it would have been physically impossible for Sweden to resist. The worst of these fears had not been realized. Now however [Mr. Hansson?] feels that Swedish rearmament and other defense measures have reached such an effective position that he is no longer afraid of German demands nor of Swedish ability to defend herself should demands be made on her which cannot be granted.

2. Prince Croy, Belgian Minister, called to see me yesterday to give me following information which he asked be held in complete secrecy because of its source. He said he was not repeating it to anyone except myself and to British Minister: Prince Croy is a personal friend of King Gustaf and sees him occasionally. He saw the King a day or two ago for first time since his illness and they talked about crisis in Swedish-German relations which occurred earlier this year when there was widespread anxiety that Germany intended to occupy Sweden. The Cabinet and other Government officials at time were insisting in every quarter that there had been no particular threats from Germany and that mobilization and other measures were in normal way of precaution in view troubled Europe and conditions. The King however told Prince Croy that situation had at that time been "very grave indeed and that he had been compelled to intervene personally." Prince Croy said that he could not of course question the King too closely particularly after the latter had remarked to him "I cannot of course tell you all".

Prince Croy is of opinion that German threat earlier this year was more concrete and serious than is generally realized and that there was possibility of a German attack on this country which personal action of King may have helped in preventing. He said he knew that 2 years ago a similar threat had been stalled through personal correspondence between King Gustaf and Hitler which the King had undertaken on his own initiative.

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/22300 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, June 18, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received 12:37 p. m.]

1536. Among data which Foreign Office has confidentially stated were given to Riksdag in secret session on foreign affairs yesterday were following:

Total number of German soldiers permitted to pass through Sweden from Norway and vice versa on leave averages slightly under 700 per day whereas agreement permits a maximum of 800 per day on southern route and about 400 per week on northern. In 1941 about 25,000 tons of war materials were permitted to pass through Sweden to Norway and approximately same amount to Finland on Swedish railroads (Swedes interpret war materials to be only munitions. Food, fuel, forage, etc., destined for troops is extra). Foreign Office does not consider this excessive as in course of whole year this was only equivalent of 3 or 4 ship loads whereas much greater quantities passed by sea; about 75,000 tons of Norwegian products have been permitted to pass through Sweden to Finland from Norway; never more than 100 individuals civilian and military per week pass from Norway to Finland with Swedish visas and vice versa—most of these are, however, German soldiers but two carloads which are permitted to pass by this means are seldom filled.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/5787 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, June 19, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 8:16 p. m.]

1560. With reference to current negotiations between Swedes and British in London concerning a possible increase in quota of oil imports to Sweden, Boheman last night gave me in strictest confidence an English text of Swedish-German transit agreement¹⁶ which from Sweden's point of view must necessarily be a basis for Anglo-Swedish negotiations. A full summary follows:

Date July 1 [8], 1940.

(a) Goods from Denmark and Germany to Norway and vice versa will be permitted through Sweden on terms agreed to between technicians but this must not interfere with Sweden's transport requirements.

¹⁶ Actually by two exchanges of notes on July 8, 1940; for texts, see documents Nos. 132 and 133 in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. x, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 158 and 159.

(b) Licenses issued in accordance with Swedish law must be issued for transit of war material.

(c) Members of German forces on leave status may pass through Sweden between Norway and Germany or Denmark on conditions to be agreed upon. They may be in uniform but must be without military equipment.

Transit conditions for soldiers on leave were clarified in special notes which were exchanged on July 18 [8], 1940, which contain following provisions: Personnel restricted to those on home leave traveling from quarters in Norway to Germany and back when leave is over. One train per day permitted over Kornsjö-Trelleborg in each direction. One train a week between Narvik and Trelleborg each direction. German authorities undertake to issue instructions that rifles and pistols of private soldiers traveling on these trains shall be left at quarters in Norway.

September 1940, trains between Narvik and Trelleborg are increased to two and exceptionally to three per week both directions. Halsingborg may be used instead of Trelleborg if desired. Text by air pouch.

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/22372 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, June 21, 1942—noon.

[Received 1:49 p. m.]

1577. 1. The transit of men and supplies via Swedish railway for German armed forces in Norway and Finland has for some months been of concern to British Military and Naval Attachés. A check over an extended period armed them with figures which forced Swedish officials to admit extent of traffic as follows:

a. Supplies of all kinds to both countries during 1941 amounted to 250,000 tons. This amount about equally divided between two countries although some of Finnish tonnage went via Norway. Swedes claim only 72,000 tons was "war material" (this exceeds the 25,000 to each country given Rikstag, Legation's 1536, June 8 [18], 9 a. m.) and claim that remaining 178,000 tons of food, clothing, fuel and forage for German forces was normal trade.

b. Transit of men limited to unarmed individuals supposedly on leave. (See Legation's 1560, June 19, 7 p. m.) The number going north from Germany claimed not to exceed number returning to Germany so as to prevent reinforcement of forces in Scandinavia. However, as no check is kept on individuals, replacements can be made at will. All casualties, excluding dead, undoubtedly so replaced. Total during 1941 admitted to be 250,000 men in each direction to and from Germany, this exclusive of traffic over Sweden between Norway and Finland and between Norwegian points not connected by land transportation.

2. Although traffic within international law, Swedes find it difficult to justify under their widely proclaimed policy of strict neutrality. They claim traffic to Norway justified because was not initiated until hostilities cease[d] and Germans occupied whole country. In case of Finland, the Swedes fall back on "moral obligation" owed Finns.

3. After considerable pressure from the Attachés, who wished to see traffic forced on the sea and thus more vulnerable to attack, the British Foreign Office took issue and informed Swedes unless traffic reduced, British safe conduct for import of oil and other necessities would cease. Insistence on total restriction impossible as Germans can hold identical conduct threat over Swedes.

It is understood that Swedes are willing to reduce traffic in actual munitions from 72,000 tons to 30,000 tons per annum [each to Norway and Finland].¹⁷ British Attachés feel this worthless as there is no limit on total tonnage and only inconveniences Germans to extent of shipping 42,000 tons of munitions by sea and transferring an equal amount of other material to Swedish rails.

4. Our Military Attaché¹⁸ has been kept informed throughout. He has pointed out to his colleagues that a balance must be struck between their desire for reduction in traffic and the desirability of keeping Swedish armed forces supplied with sufficient gasoline and other necessities to enable them to resist attack. Colonel Waddell has also suggested to them that since Swedes justify traffic to two countries on different grounds and German armed forces in Norway are occupation troops while those in Finland are in actual combat, traffic to two countries should be attacked from different angles. He believes more would be gained if traffic to Finland via Sweden could be entirely cut off than by any partial reduction in traffic to both countries. His reasons are:

The distance to Finnish ports much greater than to Norway.

Shipment via Baltic more vulnerable to Russian submarines than that across Skagerrak is to British.

Ice-freeze season for sea shipment, during which winter supplies must also be transported, is much shorter in Baltic; Finnish railways from ports to troops over-crowded, in poor condition and vulnerable to air attack from Russia; German forces in north Finland and extreme northeast Norway, particularly their air forces, are more serious threat to allied shipping to Russia than those in central Norway; that Germans appear to be grouping their land forces in northern Finland for an attack which Swedish General Staff believes will come in September and will be without Finnish help; Swedes are on less

¹⁷ Corrected in accordance with telegram No. 2213, August 19, 5 p. m., from the Minister in Sweden (740.0011 European War 1939/23614).

¹⁸ Col. H. B. Waddell.

sure ground in permitting shipments to troops engaged in combat. Shipment of Swedish goods to the Finns could be allowed to continue and the "moral obligation" fulfilled; complete elimination of traffic for German forces in Finland could be accomplished and still leave Swedes with the threat of cutting off Norwegian traffic to counter Germans cutting off all imports to Sweden.

I concur in this line of reasoning.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/5938a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1942—8 p. m.

3032. Reference Department's No. 2642, June 10.¹⁹

1. Representatives of the State Department, Board of Economic Warfare and the British Embassy met on June 29 and July 1 to consider the Swedish oil position. It was decided to recommend that discussions be carried on with a view to ascertaining what concessions can be secured from the Swedish Government if we increase the quota to 25,000 tons quarterly.

2. Two classes of concessions are suggested. The first class is economic and consists of the following: (a) The unconditional continuation of the prohibition by the Swedish Government of the export of arsenic; (b) assurances from the Swedish Government that the present clearing balance in favor of Sweden in its trade with Germany will not be increased; (c) a cessation or a sharp reduction of food exports from Sweden to Finland; and (d) the furnishing of prompt and detailed statistics of future exports of all products including food stuffs and textiles.

3. The second category of concessions is military and consists of the following: (a) limitation to definite figures of quantities of war material to be allowed to cross Sweden on German account; (b) similar limitation and if possible reduction of the figures of German military, naval and air personnel allowed to cross Sweden; and (c) full and periodic statistics of German personnel and material crossing through Sweden.

4. It is realized that all of these concessions may not be obtainable by virtue of the increase of the oil quota quarterly to 25,000 tons. If an additional quota increase is necessary to win all or a substantial part of these concessions we will then be prepared to discuss such further increase in petroleum shipments.

¹⁹ Not printed.

5. It must be a part of the understanding that any commitment to supply petroleum products must be subject to revocation at any time any circumstances seem to require it.

6. Further, assurances must be obtained from the Swedish Government that the petroleum products will be utilized solely for military purposes and will be adequately guarded against seizure and that adequate measures will be taken to enable prompt destruction of all stocks if circumstances require it.

7. If broad agreement is reached, we would expect specific understanding on maximum stocks and consumption after institution of such program. Such maximum stocks would be a limiting factor in addition to any quota limit.

8. If information available please advise what assurance Sweden has received from Germany relative safe passage of oil shipments. It is not, however, suggested that London should be asked to ask for any further commitments from Germany at this time.

9. Please send frequent detailed reports of the progress of your negotiations so that we may have ample time for considering proposals before final signature.

10. A telegram similar to this is being sent by the British Embassy to the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

11. Please inform Walden²⁰ and Blockade Committee.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/22685 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 2, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received July 4—6:42 p. m.]

1688. Section I. Department's 552, June 29, 4 p. m.²¹ Following enumeration corresponds to that in Department's 108, February 27, 8 p. m. (1) All official announcements of military, economic and political policies of Swedish Government bearing on defense of the country have since outbreak of war been carefully phrased to avoid implication that any measures were directed toward either one of belligerents and to show that Sweden's basic purpose was to maintain strict neutrality throughout war. (2) Widely-voiced apprehensions early in 1942 that United Nations were planning a campaign in northern Europe which might put Swedish neutrality in jeopardy and bring Swedish [*German*] pressure to a head were not, I think, seriously believed by responsible Government circles. In fact it appears that much of propaganda to effect that United Nations had such

²⁰ George S. Walden, Attaché in the United Kingdom.

²¹ Not printed.

a plan emanated from Germany itself and was probably part of Germany's war of nerves on Sweden to test out her will to resistance.

1. Principal development in Swedish policy, with special consideration for dangers inherent in a European war, followed recommendations of National Commission for Economic War Preparedness which requested for Government that Riksdag authorize broad emergency powers to be exercised in event of war or risk of war. Under these recommendations, Riksdag enacted large number of enabling laws as early as summer of 1939, principally in economic, but also in political and military fields, while other basic laws were amended with same end in view. These laws covered, for example, question of foreign exchange; maximum prices; civil expropriation; military expropriation; prohibition of sale or lease of ships without special permission; prohibition of trading in foreign waters by Swedish ships without special authorization; municipal duties in war time; commandeering of hospitals; control of insurance, et cetera. As soon as risk of war was apparent, in some cases, and when war actually commenced in others, these enabling laws, especially those giving special economic powers were put into effect, while others such as law on national labor service and that empowering Government to prohibit subversive political organizations are being held in suspense. They may, however, if circumstances justify, be placed into effect at once with subsequent confirmation by Riksdag. Furthermore, number of additional emergency laws have been enacted and put into effect since outbreak of war including numbers of laws providing for rationing, punishment for trading on black market, numerous amendments to existing laws on espionage and sabotage, and control of aliens, new conscription law extending period for compulsory military training, raising conscription age, and calling for reexamination of men previously rejected within conscription age. Plan for reorganization and strengthening of national defense under an extensive five-year plan has very recently been approved in principle but not yet passed by Riksdag. This cannot be considered as an emergency measure as it is to be part of Sweden's permanent defense program.

Section II. Nevertheless as its provisions gradually become operative it will contribute to effective coping with any special circumstances which might arise in defense of country. At outbreak of war Swedish Government immediately proclaimed strict neutrality and applied joint Nordic rules which automatically forced enactment various laws dealing with rights of foreign war vessels under certain circumstances to enter Swedish waters, controlling use of radio transmitters, closing certain forbidden military areas to foreigners and all unauthorized persons, et cetera. During war Sweden has strengthened

military preparedness substantially and partial mobilization during past 3 years has provided opportunity to train all conscript classes. Numerous new fortifications have been built along entire Swedish coast to meet contingencies which defense authorities conceived might arise. Army, Navy and Air Force have been equipped with modern material in large quantities to limit of Sweden's ability to obtain it and drain on Sweden's military supplies caused by extensive aid granted Finland during winter war 1939-40 is believed to have been more than compensated for by new acquisitions both from abroad, including American, German and Italian destroyers and motor torpedo boats, and from rapidly expanding Swedish war industry.

Present position of Sweden is from economic viewpoint almost entirely under domination of Berlin. However, Swedes have so far been successful in holding down amount of credit granted to Germany despite heavy pressure and Sweden has been fairly successful in obtaining needed manufactured goods and raw materials in exchange for exports to Axis. Trade during recent months has been altogether unfavorable for Sweden as Germany's ability to supply coal and other products has been progressively diminishing because of demands placed on German manufacturing plants by war economy of that country and continued deterioration German transport facilities. Sweden is thus being forced more and more to rely on natural resources of country in order to maintain economic life on as satisfactory basis as possible.

Civil defense has been carefully planned and appears to have support of great majority of population. Homeguard, women's auxiliaries, etc., take considerable interest in their duties and devote a great deal of time to training. It is believed that civil discipline would stand up well under war conditions. Anti-air watching organization and air-raid alarm system appear to function well. Granite underlying most cities has enabled them to construct very effective, although expensive, air-raid shelters. Many municipalities and industrial plants maintain their own anti-aircraft artillery. Police and secret service organizations are believed effective. Due to homogeneity of population, fifth column activities would probably be confined to Nazi sympathizers and as most of these are known it can be assumed that prompt measures will be taken to eliminate them. Training in guerrilla warfare is rumored to be conducted. Essential industries are dispersed. Preparations have been made to prevent paralyzing of transportation system by bombing.

Total Swedish expenditure for defense in fiscal year 1938-39 was 258,000,000 kroner; in 1939-40, 1,250,000,000 kroner; in 1940-41, 2,400,000,000 kroner; in 1941-42 (estimated) 2,000,000,000 kroner; in 1942-43 (budgeted) 1,982,000,000 kroner. Since outbreak of war and

including fiscal year 1942-43 just begun, total Swedish budget deficits estimated at 6,000,000,000 kroner. Thus far actual deficits have totaled 4,500,000,000 kroner.

Section III. 2. Germany has since active warfare in Scandinavia commenced in April 1940 and until recent months made continuous demands on Sweden which have in part been caused by stress of special circumstances but it is also apparent that these demands were in nature of a "war of nerves", a considered policy on part of Germany in an effort gradually to wear down Swedish diplomatic resistance and to test out capacity of Swedish will to resist. These demands have included requests for use of airdromes, transport of troops, use of Swedish ports for repair of naval vessels, all outside normal provisions of international law, and in economic field enormous credits and supplies. These efforts have been at various times implemented by violent anti-Swedish press campaigns. Except for minor concessions in economic field and permission for passage of a single division fully equipped of German Army to pass through Sweden from Norway to Finland shortly after commencement of hostilities between Finland and Russia in July 1941, all appear to have been within framework of neutrality under international law. All other demands have been refused and war of nerves having proved ineffective Swedish Government now feels that it has been abandoned.

3. (a) Events in countries occupied by Germany particularly in Norway during last year have tended to strengthen determination of Government to maintain Sweden's neutral position and have likewise served to strengthen its determination to fight if attacked. It would hardly be possible for any democratic government to have a more united nation back of it in support of a national policy than Swedish Government has today. Moreover there is not in my view any doubt that sympathies of overwhelming majority of the governing classes and people are on side of democracies. All public official announcements since beginning of war relating to military, economic and political policy have however been designated to cause no offense to either belligerent and to preserve neutrality of Sweden in present conflict. Swedes have no doubt that only possible place from which an attack would be made against Sweden during present war is from Germany. This was particularly evidenced during critical moments soon after cessation of hostilities in Norway in 1941 and again early in 1942 when for a time there was genuine apprehension that Germans would attempt to occupy Sweden. In my opinion Swedish Government and people at that time would have made wholehearted resistance to a German attack and this view is shared by all service attachés of Legation. This will to resist has been carefully nurtured by a free press and there is no present reason to believe it will decline. Swedes have successfully resisted German "war of nerves" which seems now

to have been abandoned and it is doubtful if any further effort along this line will be effective. Germany's real leverage on Sweden is her economic control and her physical ability to strangle Swedish economic life. As trade with Sweden however is highly useful to Germany such a measure is hardly to be expected unless Germany should succeed in crushing Soviets and obtaining active control of and access to natural resources of Near and Far East.

Section IV. 3. (b) Effectiveness and length of Swedish resistance would depend entirely upon strength of German attack and amount of aid which Allied nations would be able to get to Sweden immediately. Military Attaché states that informal estimates among Swedish officers vary as to number of German divisions which would be required. Average estimate is 30 to 35. In Military Attaché's opinion 20 first line divisions could conquer Sweden in 3 months if all out air support was at hand. As Germany has possession of air fields practically encircling Sweden such air support could be provided if planes were available. Swedish military authorities believe Germany will not attack during winter months because of transport difficulties and because they believe Swedes are better individual winter fighters than Germans. During summer Germany would not be able to spare troops from other operations. An attack if made therefore would be in spring or autumn and would have to be concluded within 2 or 3 months. Sweden has had at most 3 years in which to prepare her defenses and is known to have studied and profited by the examples and mistakes of nations at war. Military Attaché states that military preparations appear to have been thorough and as extensive as capacities of country permit. Mobilization system has been thoroughly overhauled and frequent test mobilizations in various sections appear to have brought its efficiency to high level. Training has been continuous since outbreak of war for both new conscripts and previously trained older conscripts. Other older conscripts hitherto untrained because of various reasons have been called up for training. Sweden can put 12 field divisions under arms. These are well equipped with infantry divisions but corps and army artillery is lacking. Skeleton staffs of higher troop units are maintained but lack of experience in maneuvers makes their ability questionable. Air force consists of 12 squadrons which are equipped with obsolescent planes. A considerable number of pilots have had actual service in Finnish winter war. It is believed that gasoline reserves for about 6 weeks full scale active operations are available. Practically all officers would be loyal to decisions made by Government. Nazi sympathizers are known and plans for their quick removal are understood to have been prepared. Swedish intelligence as to German movements in Denmark, Norway and Finland is excellent. Complete surprise is therefore improbable.

3. [c] Most serious weaknesses in Swedish military preparations are believed to be lack of air power, particularly fighters, lack of reserve supplies of gasoline and lubricating oil for air force and navy, lack of large calibre artillery for higher troop units, and lack of tanks. Boheman of Foreign Office told at time we were discussing question of increased oil allocations for Sweden that primary need [was?] for fighter planes and for gasoline and lubricating oil for planes and naval vessels.

Swedish political, military and economic measures adopted to protect Sweden's position in a Europe at war appear to have been designed by experts with greatest care and detail and to cover all phases of national life and activity of its citizens, with full emergency powers granted to government by Riksdag. Although soundly conceived and benefiting from mistakes made by countries already at war, their weaknesses might not be apparent until put to test. Chief economic weaknesses are Sweden's difficulties in getting access to continuing supplies of certain raw materials essential for any military effort and sufficient supplies or [of] certain essential foods for human beings and cattle. Swedish food position has become more precarious through bad harvests over a number of years.

3. (d) Finland is only country adjacent to Sweden except Germany which might possibly make any independent military move. Her involvement in Russian campaign and partial exhaustion in supplies and manpower makes her, however, a negligible factor on whichever side she may be involved. As a large proportion of its population is of Swedish descent or connection, loyalty of Finnish Army in any move against Sweden would be very questionable.

Section V. 3. (e) Military Attaché is of opinion with which I concur, that any detailed recommendations for assistance would require considerable study in collaboration with Swedish General Staff. Such studies would necessarily require consent of Swedish Government. Swedish defense staff has undoubtedly made studies of assistance desired but are evidently unwilling to discuss this as both American and British Military Attachés have put out feelers in this direction without response. Principal assistance which would be desired and would be essential if Swedish resistance were to be prolonged would be fighter planes with operating crews, bombers, gasoline and lubricating oil. Early in February, a Swedish naval staff officer discussing with Naval Attaché²² Swedish needs in event German attack, suggested that 500 bombers, 500 fighters and 50 destroyers would be desired from Allies but it developed on discussion that this Swedish officer admitted figures probably high but one-half numbers suggested would be insufficient. In May a junior Swedish air staff officer

²² Comdr. W. L. Heiberg.

stated to Naval Attaché that Allies would have to furnish Sweden with 500 bombers and 500 fighters immediately upon beginning of hostilities by Germany. Naval Attaché's opinion is that in event Sweden is attacked by Axis, Allies should be ready to furnish Sweden immediately 500 fighter planes, 300 bombers, 15 destroyers, 35 motor torpedo boats, with 20 light mine sweepers and layers. These figures are Naval Attaché's estimates as he has experienced no less difficulty than Military Attaché in having discussion on these matters with responsible Swedish naval officers.

Any estimate we might make of figures in relation to requirements for aircraft in particular would seem to be meaningless without some information as to practical use Swedes could make of them. This opinion has been suggested to me by Military Attaché and I think is a sound one. We would need precise information regarding air-field facilities available, ground crews for servicing of planes and other information which is now held in secrecy by Swedes and which could only be obtained from them.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/5939 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 4, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 9:05 p. m.]

3719. Referring to your 3032, July 2, 8 p. m.

1. The Swedes have told British Ministry of Economic Warfare from beginning nothing less than 15,000 tons additional per quarter would be of any use to enable them to maintain Government war reserve at what they regard as the proper figure. Since British private conversations heretofore have been on basis of 15,000 tons, to now attach new conditions and at the same time insist on allowing increase of only 10,000 tons is not likely to result in successful negotiations. Believe therefore British at most serious disadvantage in their trading unless authorized to go to 30,000 tons rather than 25,000 tons per quarter and they are requesting their Embassy to secure your consent to 15,000 tons additional quarterly.

2. With respect to economic concessions (a) Ministry of Economic Warfare state that Swedish Government are ready to give assurance that no export of arsenic from Sweden to Germany is taking place under agreement in force and no such export is contemplated for the duration of the war; (b) British suggest asking that no further credit should be granted Germany beyond those stipulated in Swedish-German trade agreement of December last. Swedes absolutely refused

straight Swedish Government credit of 300 to 500 million crowns for which Germans pressed violently and threatened to break off negotiations if it was not granted. They did, however, agree to guarantee to Swedish exporters under pre-war export credits scheme 20 to 30 percent of total purchase value of goods exported to Germany on credit. Amount involved is not clear but unlikely Swedes could or would denounce agreement now; (c) Sweden now prohibited under Anglo-Swedish war trade agreement from sending any foodstuffs to Finland; (d) British advise they have been pressing adequate export statistics in proper form and will now insist upon having them.

3. With respect to military concessions (a) present limitation monthly 2500 tons each to Norway and Finland across Sweden. Swedes are willing to undertake and British will insist that there be no increase; (b) German air, naval and military personnel allowed to cross Sweden limited to personnel going on and returning from leave. British and we both question satisfactory check and control exists today and British are now trying work out schemes with Swedes; (c) The British have in writing from Swedes under date of July 2 "for reasons of principle and undertaking to furnish detailed statistics concerning the traffic through Sweden cannot be given to foreign powers. His Britannic Majesty's Government, should, however, have no difficulties in following the general development of the situation. The Swedish authorities are prepared to furnish upon request such information as may be considered necessary from time to time".

4. Referring to your paragraph No. 5, question desirability of injecting at this time in negotiation that any commitment to supply petroleum products must be subject to revocation as circumstances seem to require since likely to make more difficult securing concessions and this point must be self-evident to Swedes.

5. Anticipate no difficulty in securing Swedish Government assurances that petroleum products will be utilized solely for military purposes and will be adequately guarded against seizure and that adequate measures will be taken to enable prompt destruction if circumstances require it of all stocks.

6. Have no doubt understanding your paragraph No. 7 can be reached. However, it would seem to me that the combined Chiefs of Staffs would have to determine this formula. Figures on which British are working will follow by mail.

7. Swedes as yet do not know German attitude regarding safe passage additional quantity but British would be assured before releasing. Present practice is to inform both British and German Governments of name and date of all ships sailing to Gothenberg and obtain their consent.

8. Will keep you advised of progress negotiations and Ministry of Economic Warfare have been informed of foregoing. Ministry of Warfare wiring their Embassy and suggest you communicate substance this message to them.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/22978 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 20, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 8:49 p. m.]

1871. Some time ago I asked Foreign Office official informally if they could not at some time give us in confidence a complete review of German political and military demands on Sweden since beginning of war. In connection with this request Foreign Office has now given practically complete review of these demands from which following, new to Legation, is supplementary to section II, 22685, my 1688, July 2, 10 p. m. regarding German policy and moves toward Sweden. It was stated by official who gave information that it had not previously been disclosed to any foreigner or to anyone outside Government. It was included in recent report of Foreign Minister²³ to secret session of Riksdag.

In February 1941 during visit to Stockholm of Dr. Paul Schmidt, Chief of Press Section, German Foreign Office (see Legation's despatch 735, February 10, 1941²⁴) he held occasional informal conversations with Foreign Minister and others in high office during which it was apparent that he was sounding out Swedish Government as to its attitude toward becoming a party to a general cultural and political agreement between the two countries. Foreign Minister presented a general negative attitude throughout these conversations and matter was not reverted to again until July 5, 1941, when Carl Schnurre on one of his periodic visits to Sweden during which he made political and military demands called on Foreign Minister and brought up question again alluding to Schmidt's conversations.

While Schnurre on this occasion did not make a direct official request on behalf of German Government he stated that he was speaking within framework of his general commission to ask Swedish Government's views on certain matters and said that after Russia had been conquered whole European Continent would be involved in any case on economic side. It would, therefore, be necessary to carry through a European organization under Axis Powers and Germany was endeavoring to obtain political agreements with powers which

²³ Christian E. Günther.

²⁴ Not printed.

did not then belong to the Axis block. War with Russia especially brought matter to forefront as regards Scandinavian countries and in Germany it was desired that they make their position clear in near future. He stated that the most simple thing from a German point of view would be for Sweden, Denmark and Finland to join three power pact and did not think it improbable that such a request would be made through diplomatic channels to Sweden in near future. He stated that additional provisions could be made by which Sweden's frontiers, integrity, internal and external independence could be guaranteed. Nothing was said then nor at any other time about Sweden's joining anti-Comintern pact but it was implied that Germany counted on Sweden for her own interests to act more in favor of Germany than Russia in existing conflict. Foreign Minister replied immediately to Schnurre stating that from all points of view accession to Axis pact or any other political or cultural agreement such as was suggested could not be interpreted other than that Sweden would be partisan to one side in war and he could say with absolute certainty that Sweden would not agree and that an official suggestion to that effect would be met with a negative reply. Schnurre emphasized then as he had on previous occasions that negative position in this respect would place Sweden in very unfavorable position for future. Since that time, however, question of adherence to general pact has not been reverted to and no official request has been received.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/5939 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1942—8 p. m.

3568. Your 3719, July 4.

1. The Board of Economic Warfare approves increase to 30,000 tons quarterly provided the agreement as finally negotiated is satisfactory to this Government.

2. It will, of course, be necessary that any agreement which may be entered into must provide for a division of this 30,000 tons allotment. The Board of Economic Warfare has suggested the following division: 6,550 tons of aviation gasoline, 21,150 tons of gas and fuel oil and 2,300 tons of lubricants.

3. The figures in paragraph 2 have been reached on the basis of the following figures. Estimated stocks in Sweden: aviation gasoline 27,995 tons, gas and fuel oil 105,105 tons, lubricants 34,907 tons; stock position desired by Swedes: aviation gasoline 40,700 tons, gas and fuel oil 145,700 tons, lubricants 12,400 tons; present quarterly consumption: aviation gasoline 5,000 tons, gas and fuel oil 16,275 tons, lubricants

5,000 tons; assumed quarterly imports by products on 30,000 tons total basis: figures given in paragraph 2 above; date on which desired stock position would be reached if present consumption continues: for all three categories of products, August 1, 1944; estimated subsequent consumption per quarter after desired stock position is reached: aviation gasoline 5,700 tons, gas and fuel oil 18,600 tons, lubricants 5,700 tons; percent increase in consumption: 14 percent for all three types of petroleum products. Please telegraph your opinion on the division suggested in paragraph 2 after you and the British have checked with Swedes on suggested division and on accuracy of Board's estimates in this paragraph on stocks and consumption.

4. Negotiations as to the economic concessions described in paragraph 2 of your 3719 appear to be satisfactory. According to Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Swedish Government is ready to give assurances that no arsenic will be exported to Germany; we assume that this commitment will also include exports of arsenic to any destination controlled by the Axis.

5. With respect to the adequacy of the military concessions referred to in paragraph 3 of your telegram, it is assumed that the British military authorities who are considering these proposals will consult with the appropriate American military authorities. In this connection, we are repeating to you separately Stockholm, no. 1577 of June 21.

6. Reference your paragraph 4. We agree to eliminate any statement to the effect that the petroleum quota is subject to revocation at any time. However, this must be the result which is achieved, and it is obvious that we cannot undertake to make an unconditional commitment for any fixed period to supply petroleum products. Perhaps this issue, which is largely one of phrasing, can be avoided by eliminating any reference whatsoever to the duration of the quota but at the same time leaving no reasons for an understanding on the part of the Swedes that a definite duration for the quota has been agreed to.

7. Your paragraphs 5 and 7 are satisfactory.

HULL

858.6363/94 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 12, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 10:31 p. m.]

2125. Judging from information given me by British Minister²⁵ some hitch or misunderstanding appears to have occurred at London during course of present negotiations for increase in oil quota for Sweden. Mallet informed me that under instructions from London

²⁵ V. A. L. Mallet.

he had told Foreign Office American authorities were insisting Sweden give an undertaking to extend no additional credits to Germany beyond those already given as a condition precedent to securing additional oil quotas. According to Mallet, Boheman²⁶ told him that he was wrong, that they knew from Böstrom²⁷ that there were no obstacles in oil negotiations coming from Washington. Mallet communicated further with British Foreign Office which came back with a categorical statement that American authorities were insisting on this new undertaking on part of Sweden. Today Gunnar Häglöff²⁸ informed officer of Legation that later report from Swedish Legation in Washington led Foreign Office to believe that upon supplying of certain additional statistical data requested by American authorities of that Legation a week ago question of future supplies of petroleum products would be clear and Sweden could continue her imports. Additional data requested was cabled yesterday according to Häglöff. Mr. Häglöff appeared to be somewhat fearful, nevertheless, that this request for statistics was step in a program of obstacles desired by British Government in line with their threat last June that no further petroleum products would be made available to Sweden unless transit of German troops and material back and forth between Norway and Germany were reduced.

For my confidential information I would appreciate a telegraphic statement of facts from Department.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/6348: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 15, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received August 16—7:40 a. m.]

2167. My 2150, August 14, 5 p. m.,²⁹ and 2125, August 12, 6 p. m. Following substance of *aide-mémoire* dated today just received from Swedish Foreign Office.

1. Swedish Legation in London informed Foreign Office on August 14 that American authorities in London desired certain new statistics and figures relating to Swedish oil situation, allegedly for purpose of control. Figures requested by Americans were following (a) latest figures on stock position, (b) war reserve desired (basis 6 months warfare), (c) consumption at present by quarter, (d) estimated quarterly consumption when stock position reaches desired war reserve figure.

²⁶ Erik Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office.

²⁷ W. Böstrom, Swedish Minister in the United States.

²⁸ Chief of the Commercial Division of the Swedish Foreign Office.

²⁹ Not printed.

Aide-mémoire states that figures in answer to foregoing have already been given to American and British authorities except as regards (d).

2. Swedish Legation Washington telegraphed Foreign Office on August 14 substantially as follows: No knowledge in State Department of any American request for additional statistical information regarding Sweden's oil situation. In fact, State Department already some time ago communicated United States Government's opinion to London that Swedish requests should be accepted under conditions to be settled between British and Swedish Governments. State Department has not yet any reply from London to this communication. Mild surprise was expressed that negotiations should have for such a long time been delayed.

3. Following information was received simultaneously from Swedish Legation in London: It is being insisted by British authorities that American wish for further statistical information should be met immediately and until this information received discussions could not be resumed. New conditions for meeting Swedish desires have been put forward by Americans as for instance that Sweden should undertake not to give Germany new credits. British authorities deny that they have any interests in these new proposals and claim on contrary they are trying to persuade American experts to refrain from making them. Furthermore American Embassy in London has expressed opinion that quarterly allocation should be limited by British authorities to 30,000 tons per quarter and British authorities have succeeded in securing American approval of this quantity only with difficulty.

It is apparent from this communication from Foreign Office and from what Mallet tells me that whether justifiable or not British are putting entire blame on United States for hitch in negotiations for increased oil quotas. It would be helpful if Department can comply with request in last sentence my 2125, August 12, 6 p. m.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/6407 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 19, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 10:39 p. m.]

2212. My 2167, August 15, 8 p. m. Situation in London regarding negotiations for increased oil quotas for Sweden is still as obscure to British Minister as to me. Mallet informs me that Ministry of Economic Warfare has now telegraphed him they are making desperate efforts to persuade Americans to be less insistent for imposition of new conditions on Sweden and states that British authorities now realize it is impracticable to require Swedes to give guarantee no further

credits under any condition to Germany. If it is true that American Economic Warfare officials are taking this attitude, it is my opinion a mistake. Amount of additional oil desired by Sweden if our own military necessities permit us to spare it seems relatively small item in comparison with positive advantages which Allies derive from Sweden at present time; United States and Great Britain now enjoy in fact sympathetic neutrality of Sweden although nothing much is said about the sympathy and it is to our advantage to encourage Sweden in every practicable way to resist German pressure. Swedish Government has recently shown increasing tendency to tighten her resistance to various forms of German pressure and from political point of view it hardly seems an opportune moment to take a stand in these oil negotiations which is genuinely misunderstood here and is causing intense irritation in governmental and military circles. If Swedes think we do not trust them, their official attitude of neutrality will hardly be affected but it will tend to make them less useful to our cause in many fields and among other things will tend to dry up valuable sources of information for which Sweden now affords us certain facilities.

I understand that a memorandum on subject of Sweden's contribution to Allied war effort and *quid pro quos* desired by her in return has been prepared in British Foreign Office under date of August 8 and a copy sent to Washington by airmail.⁸⁰ I have seen this memorandum myself and I think its arguments are soundly based.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/6348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1942—9 p. m.

691. Your 2167, August 16 [15], 8 p. m. and 2212, August 19. Statistics referred to in paragraph 1 (d) were requested in third numbered paragraph Department's 3568 to London of July 30. Negotiations however need not be delayed for compliance with this request.

Assurances from Sweden that present clearances in favor of Sweden as regards its trade with Germany would not be increased was requested by us in Department's telegram to London 3032, July 2, 8 p. m. If said assurances cannot be obtained as indicated in your 2150, August 14³¹ we are willing to proceed with the deal on assumption that said credits will not in fact be increased provided that it is understood if said credits are increased we reserve the right to review the matter fully and to determine then whether to nullify or terminate the arrangement.

⁸⁰ Not found in Department files.

³¹ Not printed.

We wish to emphasize that the chief object of these negotiations is to obtain the military concessions referred to in Department's 3032, July 2 to London and Department's 3568, July 30 to London.

For your information we repeat Department's 3032 July 2 to London and Department's 3568, July 30 to London.

(Quote Department's 3032, July 2 to London and Department's 3568, July 30 to London.)

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/5939 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1942—midnight.

3964. Reference Department's 3568, July 30, 1942. Stockholm informs us that guarantee with respect to limitation on Swedish extension of credit to Germany may be impossible to obtain. We emphasize that the military concessions are the concessions most to be desired. We are anxious to know how negotiations are progressing.

For your information we repeat telegram to Stockholm.

(Quote telegram to Stockholm.³²)

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/24356 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, September 18, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received September 19—4: 49 a. m.]

2572. Söderblom³³ of Foreign Office has stated today confidentially that important discussions are being carried on with Germans with view to cutting down transit of war material and other German goods to Finland, Norway from Germany. Swedish arrangements based principally on ground that Swedish railway equipment is required for own services. When discussions are concluded which should be soon he has agreed to inform Legation of result.

With reference to figures given in my 1536, June 18, 9 a. m., Söderblom said that in addition to traffic from Germany to Norway and return of soldiers on leave there is a Norwegian train which makes two weekly journeys from Trondheim to Narvik through Sweden with a normal weekly capacity of 400 passengers which is occasionally explained by adding one passenger car capable of carrying 50, making

³² Telegram No. 691, *supra*.

³³ S. J. Söderblom, head of the Political Affairs Section of the Swedish Foreign Office.

a maximum of 500 possible over this route per week. During 1941 the weekly average was almost exactly 300 but this has risen in 1942. This same train carries two Swedish cars which are switched off with passengers to and from Finland. Maximum capacity of these two cars per week is 200 but this is seldom reached. Most of passengers on both routes are Germans in uniform but not all are from armed forces.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/6719: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 19, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

5249. Further referring your 3964, August 20, midnight. MEW⁸⁴ on September 18 advised Swedish Legation here as follows stating that the comments were made on behalf of United States and His Majesty's Governments:

"1. With regard to the transit of war material we are pleased to note that the figure of 2500 tons a month to Norway and Finland respectively will not be exceeded. But 'war material' as defined by your Government covers only a small proportion of the total material useful for the German war effort which passes through Sweden and [His] Majesty's Government and the United States Government do not feel able to agree to an increase in the oil quota unless some limitation is placed upon the total quantity of materials which are passing in transit through Sweden for German account. We must therefore ask that in addition to the limitation of war material all German transit traffic through Sweden should be limited to 100,000 tons per annum for Norway 40,000 for Finland via Norway and 60,000 tons for Finland direct. The agreed quantities of war material would of course be included in these totals.

We fully recognize that limitation of the transit traffic to these figures may have to be done clandestinely or by means of expedients, but we have no reason to doubt that your Government would be able in practice to bring about this limitation which, having regard to the heavy traffic which Swedish railways are called upon to carry, would be in Sweden's own interest.

2. We believe that a considerable increase has occurred lately in the number of German soldiers on leave carried backwards and forwards across Sweden and we are informed that this has been admitted in recent conversations in Stockholm. Some limitation is regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government and as was stated in your memorandum, it is in the interest of Sweden to keep the number of journeys as low as possible.

⁸⁴ Ministry of Economic Warfare.

We must therefore ask your Government to agree to some 'ceiling' for this traffic and the figure we suggest is a total of 225,000 double journeys a year, which would enable most of the German soldiers in Norway to go on leave once a year and return to their units. This seems to us to be a very generous figure and we hope that your Government will be able to accept it. We would further suggest that they should do everything in their power to lighten [*tighten?*] up the conditions of travel so as to insure so far as possible that the men who travel from Germany to Norway are the same as those who have previously been carried back to Germany across Sweden. In other words, we want the traffic to be restricted to men genuinely going on leave and not to be used for evacuating men from the north and replacing them by fresh drafts.

3. The conditions covering the import of oil into Sweden must be strictly observed and the American Government have a desire (which we share) for an assurance from your Government that the increased quota will be used solely for military purposes, will be guarded against seizure and will be promptly destroyed in the unhappy event of circumstances rendering this necessary. We assume of course that every tanker inward bound would have as a requisite German safe conduct so that the Germans will not have any excuse for confiscating the cargo.

4. It is necessary to ask your Government for two new conditions before the new quota can be fixed:

(a) It has come to our knowledge that recently German troopships carrying reinforcements for the German Armies in Finland and Russia have been in the habit of proceeding in Swedish convoy. Apparently these vessels approach Swedish waters from the Danish coast without escort and, after passing through the Falsterbo canal (in itself an inadmissible proceeding which is, we are glad to learn, to be discontinued), later proceed in Swedish convoy northwards along the Swedish east coast. This practice in the case of ships bearing troops and war material is not permissible under international law and we feel fully justified in requesting an assurance from your Government that it will close forthwith.

(b) In view of some recent incidents which we have found rather disquieting, we request an assurance from your Government that the provisions of the Anglo-Swedish war trade agreement of 7th December, 1939, as subsequently modified, will be strictly observed in every respect particularly as regards 'normal trade' with belligerents and the provision of commercial statistics. We require both monthly export statistics of all those rubrics shown in the Swedish pre-war monthly trade returns (*Sveriges In-Ochutforsel Avvissavaror*) expanded to show countries of consumption, and the special statement respecting the return of processed raw materials which the Swedish authorities promised to furnish to the Commercial Counsellor to His Majesty's Legation at Stockholm in February last. It is inaccurate to speak of this as a 'new condition' as such an assurance naturally does not involve any fresh obligation for your Government.

The British and American experts have agreed that the quarterly quota of 30,000 tons should be divided as follows:

Aviation spirit 6,550 tons; gas oil and fuel oil 21,150 tons; lubricants 2,300 tons; total 30,000 tons.

We hope that your Government will be able to meet us on all the points specified in this letter. If so, the way will be clear for a memorandum embodying the terms of the agreement to be drawn up and initialed and for the increased quota to be brought into operation."

Minister of Economic Warfare³⁵ states objection expressed verbally by Gisle,³⁶ Swedish representative here, was to furnishing statistics demanded in paragraph 4 (b) of above quotation.

Minister of Economic Warfare advises matter being taken up by Swedes with Stockholm.

Minister of Economic Warfare states they are advising British representatives in Washington and Stockholm.

Please advise Walden and Board of Economic Warfare.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/24636 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, October 2, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received October 3—1:34 a. m.]

2741. I asked Söderblom today (see Legation's 2572 September 18, 11 p. m.) if he were prepared to discuss transit situation yet. He said that while certain ceilings beyond which transit of German war material and other goods would not be allowed to go had been determined he would not consider matter concluded until after return of Boheman who yesterday went to London for conversations on this and other questions with American and British officials. Tentative ceilings are roughly those mentioned in Ministry of Economic Warfare note of September 18 to Swedish Legation, referred to in London's 529 [5249], September 19, 7 p. m., to Department, repeated here.

Soviet Government through Swedish Legation at Kuibyshev also bringing considerable pressure to bear on Swedish Government to reduce transit claiming it is breach of neutrality both for troops and material to cross Sweden to Finland or Norway and for troop transports to pass through Swedish waters. Soviet Government presented some very exaggerated figures in a memorandum on this subject, copy of which is being sent by mail to Department.³⁷ Swedish Government will reply to this shortly pointing out articles of Hague

³⁵ Hugh Dalton.

³⁶ C. O. Gisle, Counselor of the Swedish Legation in the United Kingdom.

³⁷ Not printed.

Convention ³⁸ under which these transports are permitted according to Swedish interpretation. Söderblom states no troop transports have passed through Swedish waters for several months.

For present no telegrams in strip code being repeated to London (see Legation's 2437 September 8, 8 p. m. and 2467, September 10, 10 p. m.³⁹).

GREENE

740.0011 European War 1939/25287 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, November 5, 1942—midnight.

[Received November 6—9:55 a. m.]

3133. In conversation with Acting Secretary General of Foreign Office this afternoon he stated following:

1. Reply to September 19 note from Soviet Government to Swedish Minister at Kuibyshev ⁴⁰ (see my 2741, October 2, 7 p. m. second paragraph) was delivered yesterday. Telegram from Swedish Minister received today states it was apparently well received by Foreign Office and matter would seem to be allowed to drop. Foreign Minister in his speech at secret session of Riksdag yesterday referred to this exchange and stated it was his belief that Russia in notes (first was July 26) had brought matter up as a counter-attack to Sweden's protest for submarine activities earlier in year. Communist members of Lower House made statements in which they appeared to agree with Foreign Minister on this point. Translations of all notes in this exchange by next air mail.⁴¹

2. Foreign Minister following his discussion of situation in Norway during his speech was questioned as to why the Government maintained no Legation with Government in London. Minister explained Sweden still has a Swedish Minister to Norwegian Government, John Beck-Friis now acting as Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon, and that it is practically only Government still permitted to maintain a Consul General in Oslo. Last summer Germans gave Sweden until July 11 to withdraw its Consul General. Sweden protested against this in a note to German Government to which no reply has been received but no action has ever been taken to force Consul General to leave. Government feels absolutely sure that if Beck-Friis was sent to London in his capacity as Minister to Norwegian Government that Germans

³⁸ Convention on neutral powers in naval war, signed at The Hague October 18, 1907, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1239.

³⁹ Neither printed.

⁴⁰ Per Vilhelm Gustaf Assarsson.

⁴¹ Not printed.

would then insist on withdrawal of Consul General. This would be a serious blow to 10,000 Swedes living in Norway and would cause great inconvenience to Swedish Government including loss of valuable information concerning conditions in Norway. Count Douglas of staff at Oslo at time of invasion accompanied Norwegian Government as long as it remained in Norway and was not invited to accompany it to London. No further steps therefore seem advisable to Government with respect to Norway and this explanation appeared to be accepted by House.

3. While no definite news received concerning Scavenius'⁴² visit to Berlin (he was only there one day) Foreign Minister stated to Riksdag that conditions in Denmark seemed to be very serious. Söderblom while he has had no official information has learned through fairly reliable sources that demands with respect to Danish Government have been received. He will let me know when something more specific is learned.

4. Since publication of last trade agreement with Finland which was much less favorable than previous years Finnish attitude toward Sweden has improved which is gratifying to Swedish Government as it feared less favorable conditions would stimulate hostile news comments and public opinion.

5. He admitted for first time that during visit of Schnurre during last summer a request had been made to send a number of ships with German troops through Swedish waters and that Sweden had been able to dissuade Germany from sending troops in that manner although international law permitted it. This was done in face of very strong German pressure.

6. During Söderblom's absence on leave last August Boheman in conversation with Schnurre requested latter to cut down shipments of war material and other freight through Sweden to Norway and Denmark. This Schnurre agreed to do but when Söderblom returned he found that there had been in fact no reduction. He then made arrangements with Germans which would permit no greater total than limits requested in Hambro's⁴³ letter to Gisle attachment "A" enclosure "1" London's despatch 5985, October 20, 1942.⁴⁴ This is being limited by control of number German freight cars allowed on railways which are being carefully checked by Swedish authorities. See also first paragraph my 2741.

GREENE

⁴² Erik Scavenius, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁴³ Sir Charles Hambro, British member of Combined Raw Materials Board.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/7289a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1942—9 p. m.

5869. 1. On November 12 the full Board of Economic Warfare adopted a resolution which, in summary, is as follows: It is hereby determined that the continuation of commerce with Sweden is approved and that oil shall be shipped to Sweden; this to be in consideration of agreements on the part of the Swedish Government of the nature described in the report submitted to the Board of Economic Warfare by a special Sub-committee appointed for this purpose.

The Recommendations of the Sub-committee are 12 in number and include recommendations with respect to the limitation of personnel and cargo traffic between Germany and Norway and Finland through Sweden, the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with respect to Swedish shipping and Swedish commerce with South America, certain modifications in the War Trade Agreement, and other similar matters. A copy of these Recommendations is being sent to you by air mail.⁴⁵

2. On November 16 the Department received a letter from Mr. Noel Hall of MEW, enclosing a copy of a message from the Prime Minister to the President, dated November 13, 1942.⁴⁶ This message, in summary, is as follows: The British need with some urgency the cargoes of the two Norwegian flag ships, which cargoes are of especial importance to our war effort. The message then describes the cargoes and states when they must be prepared to leave. The message continues that the Swedes are unwilling to release the two ships; suggests that if the President will inform Boheman that we are prepared to increase the petroleum quota to 30,000 tons quarterly, the President may be able to obtain Swedish help about the ships. The message further states that the need for the material on the two ships is so urgent that it is hoped that we will use the oil to get the two ships released without injecting other demands upon the Swedes; and that the Prime Minister will support the President in any future negotiations to obtain the concessions which the United States Government may desire to obtain.

3. On November 20 the President wrote to the Secretary of State⁴⁷ asking the Secretary to inform the Swedish Government that the 30,000 tons quarterly petroleum quota had been decided upon and that the *Sveadrott*, now at Port Arthur, Texas, will be released immediately; provided that the Swedish Government would agree to

⁴⁵ See airgram No. A-242, November 27, 7:40 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 362.

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ Letter not printed.

release the two ships and assist in their getting to England; and provided further that they would agree to the chartering of the 21 ships now in the South American coastwise trade to the Maritime Commission. It is further stated in this letter that it is expected that certain other concessions would be obtained, these being the concessions suggested by the Recommendations of the BEW; but that the increase in oil quota was not to be made contingent upon the obtaining of these concessions.

4. On November 20 this position of the United States Government was communicated to Boheman, who stated that the Swedish Government could not consent to the clearance of these two ships for England; that the ships were "tainted" in the sense that they had become a major concern of the German Government, that the German Government had served notice on the Swedish Government that if these ships got to England, the Gothenberg traffic would be immediately stopped by Germany, and that to release the ships might involve serious military consequences. Boheman was uncompromising and it was our impression that he is unshakeable in his conviction that the request is an impossible one for the Swedish Government to grant as it involves consequences which that Government is not willing to risk. He expressed the greatest surprise and anxiety at the injection of this new condition into the oil discussions.

5. The British Embassy is telegraphing to London and asking for instructions. The Department believes that it will be useful if you would communicate with the proper officials in the British Government (and this would presumably include Sir Charles Hambro) in order that you may be able to inform the Department by urgent telegram of your opinion on the extent of British insistence upon the release of the two ships as a condition to the granting of the oil quota. At a second meeting this morning Boheman expressed the belief that the discussions could not profitably be continued with this condition present.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7290 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 23, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received November 23—6: 51 p. m.]

6596. Your 5869, November 21, 9 p. m. We understand the British are taking the line that the Swedes must release the two Norwegian ships for passage to England. They claim there are no grounds in international law on which to base their detention and that the Swedes

could meet German threats to stop the Gothenberg traffic by threatening in turn to prohibit the passage of German leave troops across Sweden. The British state the cargoes are composed of commodities that are very urgently needed in their war industries. Lyttelton⁴⁸ probably knows as much as any one person about specific need for these cargoes.

Our general approach to the problem still conforms to the outline in Embassy's 6374 of November 11 [12], 8 [10] p. m.⁴⁹ We feel that it is desirable, in view of changed situation arising out of North African offensive,⁵⁰ to get oil to Sweden quickly before Germany may take moves to prevent further increase in potential Swedish ability to resist. We would advocate, consequently, an immediate increase in the oil quota for Sweden without further negotiation or further specific concessions on their part. At the same time, we believe the Swedes should be told that we expect them to release the Norwegian ships for passage to Great Britain and to make other concessions as well, and that we will discontinue the enlarged quota if these expectations are not fulfilled. We feel that this approach provides the speed necessary for quick action under present circumstances and may well increase rather than diminish the concessions to us the Swedes will ultimately make. We would suggest that you approach the British Government to see whether they would be prepared to take this line in common with the United States.

We are moved, in making this proposal, by a certain amount of concern for the personal position of Boheman in Sweden. He left Sweden prepared to discuss a specific series of demands put forward by the British and ourselves as concessions to be made in return for an enlarged quota of oil. He came prepared to go a considerable distance to meet these demands. Since then, without personal contact on his part with his home Government he was faced with an enlarged program of concessions arising out of uncertainty on our part with respect to general policies to be pursued with Sweden. More recently still, most of these former demands have been relegated to the background and the release of the Norwegian ships has been made the primary consideration in the question of Swedish oil. We can appreciate that these new questions may be extremely difficult for him to face while he is away from his own country. We feel that it would be better for the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States in Stockholm to insist on the release of the Norwegian ships on straight grounds of international law and not as a *quid pro quo* for oil.

⁴⁸ Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production.

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. II.

My concern with regard to friendly personnel in Sweden has been accentuated by a secret and confidential letter directed to Freeman Matthews⁵¹ from Winthrop Greene. In the letter it is stated that certain military information which was given to our Military Attaché in Stockholm for use in Washington only, was "picked up" or "leaked out" in London. This "resulted in the enforced resignation of prominent member of the General Staff". I am trying to get full information on this incident but I believe it shows that there are definite limitations that can be overreached in dealing with individual Swedish officials. I believe that these limitations must be recognized in the diplomatic field.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/7289a Suppl. : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1942—7:40 p. m.

A-242. Reference Department's telegram 5869 of November 21. The following is a copy of the recommendations referred to in paragraph 1:

"The present serious situation with regard to trade relations between the United Nations and Sweden should be corrected by a more positive and drastic policy than has heretofore been adopted by this Government; for example, by threat of suppression or diminution of exports to Sweden. However, in the process of bargaining, but only on condition that substantial objectives can be achieved thereby, it may be advisable to offer the Swedes certain concessions such as 'basic rations' of some imported goods and the assurance of special supplies including petroleum needed for the Swedish armed forces.

It is, therefore, recommended that this Government pursue by negotiation a policy immediately designed to attain the following principal objectives within the framework of the present War Trade Agreement:

a. A strict enforcement of the War Trade Agreement and modifications thereof where necessary, which would put an end to the violations and exceptions mentioned above. Modifications should include the reduction of certain blockade quotas for Swedish overseas imports which are excessive, and elimination where practicable of commodities imported from overseas which enter into Swedish production for the enemy.

b. An increase in the flow of strategic materials from Sweden to the United Nations, and cooperation by the Swedes in the matter of substantial purchases by the United Nations for preclusive purposes as well as for supply.

c. Assistance by the Swedes in effecting transport by sea and air for materials from Sweden to the United Nations.

⁵¹ Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

d. Satisfactory arrangements for the use by the United Nations not only of Swedish shipping at present outside the Baltic but also for the vessels built or being built by Sweden.

e. Elimination or substantial reduction of Swedish Government credits, direct or indirect, to enemy countries.

f. Access to full information on Swedish exports to and imports from enemy territory.

g. The conclusion of negotiations satisfactory to the Department of State, whereby the Swedish government shall agree to equalize its export trade with the other American republics in such manner that, if Sweden limits its export trade to any American republic or republics, Swedish exports to other American republics to which exports are not so limited shall be correspondingly reduced.

h. The conclusion of negotiations satisfactory to the War Shipping Administration, for the chartering by the War Shipping Administration of 21 Swedish vessels now in this hemisphere.

i. A substantial reduction, the maximum attainable, in the number of enemy troops on leave now permitted to pass through Swedish territory, and a stipulation that no troops be permitted to travel through Sweden to Finland.

j. A substantial reduction, the maximum attainable, in the military traffic of materials now permitted to pass through Swedish territory, and a stipulation that no military traffic or materials be permitted through Sweden to Finland.

k. Elimination of German military traffic in Swedish territorial waters. Elimination of the use of Swedish convoys by the enemy.

l. A reduction in the iron ore exports from Sweden to enemy territory from the current figure of about nine and a half million tons annually to normal pre-war exports to Germany.

The most important objective, namely, a substantial reduction in the shipments of iron ore from Sweden to enemy territory cannot be attained to the extent desired except through direct military action. A decision in this matter is beyond the scope of the authority of the staff of the Board and the Sub-Committee. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the traffic of iron ore is the most important single contribution, in terms of raw material, made to Germany by any nation outside of its pre-war borders. The use of military action to cut down Swedish exports of iron ore is not precluded by the terms of the War Trade Agreement."

The following resolution was passed by the Board of Economic Warfare:

"RESOLVED THAT over-seas trade with Sweden be continued, including the shipment of petroleum products in exchange for commitments, secret or otherwise, of the types set forth in paragraphs *a.* to *l.* of the recommendations submitted by the staff of the Board of Economic Warfare dated November 5, 1942; and that this policy be carried out in consultation with the interested agencies by the Board of Economic Warfare in collaboration with the Department of State."

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7290

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of European Affairs (Cumming)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Erik Boheman, Secretary General, Swedish Foreign Office;
Mr. Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State;
Mr. Herschel Johnson, American Minister to Sweden;
Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs.

Mr. Boheman called on Mr. Acheson this afternoon at the latter's request. Mr. Acheson told Mr. Boheman that he was authorized by the President to impart the following:

(1) The United States would release immediately the two tankers (the *Sveadrott* and the *Saturnus*) with petroleum supplies for Sweden. The supplies on these two tankers were to be reserved solely for Swedish military use. Mr. Acheson said that arrangements might be made to permit some of the oil to be used to replace oil which had been withdrawn from Swedish naval reserves for use on the Swedish vessels carrying relief supplies to Greece. Mr. Boheman agreed, however, that should any difficulty arise with respect to such use of the oil, it would be perfectly agreeable to the Swedes to agree that the oil should be reserved solely for military purposes.

(2) The United States reserved all rights with respect to the two Norwegian ships now at Göteborg. He told Mr. Boheman that no action looking to the departure of these vessels from Göteborg would be taken until after the two tankers had arrived in Sweden. He cautioned Mr. Boheman, however, that after the tankers had arrived, the issue of the two Norwegian ships might be raised suddenly and at any time. Mr. Boheman nodded his understanding of this point.

(3) The War Shipping Administration desired to proceed as soon as possible with negotiations looking to the charter of a large proportion of the free Swedish ships now operating in Western Hemispheric waters. Some discussion as to procedure followed and it was arranged that Mr. Boheman would meet with Mr. Lewis Douglas⁵² and Mr. Acheson at 5 p. m. tomorrow to go into this question further. Mr. Boheman explained in this connection that he had no authority to promise more than that the Swedish Government would use its best influence with the Swedish shipowners to come to an agreement. In reply to Mr. Acheson's direct inquiry, Mr. Boheman agreed that the two governments seem to be in agreement in principle that these ships were to be chartered to the War Shipping Adminis-

⁵² Deputy Administrator of the War Shipping Administration.

tration. He repeated, however, that it would be necessary to bring a representative of the Swedish shipowners into the negotiations.

(4) Other questions, such as basic rations for Sweden, reduction in iron ore shipments to Germany, German troop transits through Sweden, Swedish credits to Germany, et cetera, would be taken up later, but as soon as possible. In this connection Mr. Acheson referred to previous conversations with Mr. Boheman and said that he had discussed with the Board of Economic Warfare the possibility of its sending some experts to Stockholm to study the Swedish data which were only available there.

On the question of German troop transits, Mr. Boheman said he could not now make any specific promise but that he anticipated that the course of military events would in practice bring about a reduction from 250,000 a year to about 225,000. He said that the transit of these German soldiers was repugnant to the Swedish people and that his Government felt that the real question to be faced at an opportune time was not so much a reduction from 1000 to 800 a day but the stoppage of all troop transits. The solution of this question would, however, have to await developments in the general situation.

Mr. Boheman said that the Swedish negotiations which had been taking place in Berlin with regard to Swedish-German trade for 1943 had been suspended and that the Swedish negotiator had returned to Stockholm. It was essential, however, that an agreement be arrived at during December, as otherwise there was great danger that a Swedish-German trade war might commence early in January 1943.

Mr. Boheman several times said that his Government had informed him that it preferred to await his return to Stockholm before making definite commitments with regard to the above matters. He could say, however, that the Swedish Government would bring about no change in the present situation without first informing the United States Government. He himself felt that it would be better for him to return to Stockholm as soon as possible and orally explain the United States point of view, which he now thoroughly understood, to his Government. Mr. Acheson agreed that this would be desirable and said that the Department would make arrangements for air transportation to London for Mr. Boheman and his assistant as soon as possible.

Mr. Boheman said that he would send a telegram to his Government at once informing it of his conversation with Mr. Acheson but that he did not expect that he could receive a reply before his meeting with Mr. Acheson and representatives of the Board of Economic Warfare at 6 p. m. tomorrow.

740.00112 European War 1939/7290 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1942—midnight.

6112. Your 6596, November 26 [23] and other telegrams regarding Swedish trade negotiations.

1. In accordance with directions of the President, Boheman has been informed (a) that the United States agrees in principle to the increase of the Swedish oil quota to 30,000 tons quarterly and that two Swedish tankers (*Sveadrott* and *Saturnus*) will be permitted to depart immediately with cargoes to be applied against the new quota for the first quarter of 1943. These two oil cargoes are to be reserved solely for Swedish military use although if practicable the United States will agree to the use of some of these supplies for the planes flying between Sweden and Scotland and to replace certain oil which has been withdrawn from Swedish naval reserves for use on the Swedish-Greek relief ships; (b) that we reserve all rights in regard to the two Norwegian ships now at Göteborg; that while no action looking to the departure of these vessels from Göteborg will be taken until after the two tankers had arrived in Sweden we give fair warning that this issue might be raised at any time after the arrival of the tankers and that if our expectation that Sweden would permit the departure of the two Norwegian vessels when demand therefor was made was not fulfilled a most serious situation would arise and all obligations might be discontinued by us; (c) that the War Shipping Administration desired to press on with the negotiations for the charter of the free Swedish ships now operating in the Western Hemisphere (for your information the charter question seems now to be started toward a satisfactory solution and though Boheman stated that it will be necessary to bring a representative of the Swedish ship-owners into the negotiations he agrees that the Swedish and American Governments now seem to be in agreement in principle that at least some of these ships are to be time chartered to the WSA); (d) that the negotiations on other questions such as basic rations for Sweden, iron ore shipments to Germany, German troop transits, Swedish credits to Germany, et cetera, are to be pressed on with as soon as possible. In this connection we have made tentative plans to send BEW representatives to Stockholm as soon as possible after Boheman arrives there to work out further details of the agreement. We understand that MEW representatives will go to Stockholm at the same time.

2. British Embassy, Washington, has agreed to the foregoing and discussions are under way with Boheman looking toward the sub-

stantial implementation of the President's directive including the immediate clearance of the two Swedish tankers.

3. Boheman states that he is unable to commit his Government on any of the concessions we desire but must return to Stockholm to report. Urgent air transportation for his return via Great Britain is being arranged.

4. Copies of pertinent documents are being sent you by air mail.

HULL

740.00122 European War 1939/7290 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1942—midnight.

6174. 1. British Embassy informs us today of the receipt of a cable from the Foreign Office to the effect that the Swedish Legation in London has gained the impression that the question of the departure of the two Norwegian ships now in Göteborg will be deferred apparently indefinitely.

It was made entirely clear to Boheman that the question of the Norwegian ships was deferred only temporarily and as stated in our 6112, December 3, he was warned in unmistakable terms that the question of the departure of the two Norwegian ships might be raised suddenly at any time after the arrival of the two tankers. We are confident that Boheman clearly understood the foregoing.

We have told the British Embassy that you will make this clear to the Foreign Office.

2. A careful rereading of our 6112 leads us to believe that the penultimate sentence of paragraph numbered 2 [1 (d)?] may give a wrong impression. The purpose of the visit of BEW and MEW representatives to Stockholm is to study statistical and other data which Boheman tells us are only available in Sweden and which can best be explained by responsible Swedish officials on the spot. Negotiations, according to our present plan, would take place in London. Preparatory studies, to be supplemented by the report of the experts to be sent to Stockholm, are now taking place in Washington between representatives of the Department, the British Embassy, and the BEW and it is anticipated that these will be in proper shape early next week for further discussion with the combined boards in Washington.

3. The substance of this telegram and of our 6112 should be communicated to the Foreign Office and other interested British authorities.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7290 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1942—2 p. m.

6363. Department's 6174, December 5. The present situation regarding proposed departure of the two Norwegian ships is:

1. British Embassy has informed us that the British do not propose (a) to raise the question with the Swedes or (b) to attempt to run the ships out until the very latest moment consistent with military exigencies (which is not now determinable) in order (a) to give Boheman reasonable opportunity to report to his Government after his return to Stockholm and (b) to give the Swedish tankers *Sveadrott* and *Saturnus* time to arrive in a Swedish port—now expected to be the first week of January.

2. Our present position in this matter is (a) that our commitments to Boheman prevent us from being associated with any effort to run the Norwegian ships out before the arrival of the two tankers; (b) that while we prefer to take no further steps until Boheman has arrived in Stockholm, in view of his delay in Bermuda awaiting plane we would waive this after lapse of reasonable time, and (c) that if the British are willing to proceed on the basis of (a) and (b) we would authorize the American Legation in Stockholm to associate itself with a British approach to the Swedes and to say on our behalf that we expected the Swedes to grant clearance to the Norwegian ships and that our commitments to them on the oil quota and the policy of agreeing upon other basic quotas are predicated upon such action on their part.

3. We have told the British Embassy that we hope that we can be given at least 48 hours advance notice of any *démarche* which may be made by the British Minister at Stockholm.⁵³

4. Foregoing views have been given British Embassy.

Repeated by Department to Stockholm.⁵⁴

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7466 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 18, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received December 18—12 : 55 p. m.]

3604. I read a paraphrase of Department's 1108, December 16, 2 p. m.⁵⁵ to Mallet, Villiers⁵⁶ and Sporborg⁵⁷ yesterday. They have now

⁵³ V. A. L. Mallet.⁵⁴ As telegram No. 1108, December 16, 2 p. m.⁵⁵ See footnote 54 above.⁵⁶ Gerald Hyde Villiers, member of British Ministry of Economic Warfare.⁵⁷ Henry N. Sporborg, representative of British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

read to me a telegram sent late yesterday to London expressing belief that there is no advantage in postponing ultimatum to Swedish Government. Matter will be taken up immediately with American authorities so will not include full details here. It is not intention to move ships from Göteborg until tankers arrive if they are not delayed beyond first fortnight of January. They are nevertheless particularly anxious to have this in hands of Swedish Government because a full Cabinet meeting will be necessary to consider question and members will shortly be leaving for Christmas holidays. They wish to approach Foreign Office on Monday, December 21. They have asked me to request instructions to accompany Mallet to Foreign Office when matter is presented and associate Legation with him. While I am forwarding expression of their wish, in my opinion in view of our commitment to Boheman it would be better if I approach Foreign Office on a subsequent day referring to visit of British Minister and his associates giving substance of section (c) of paragraph (2) of Department's 1108 referred to above at same time expressing regret that this action is taken before Boheman's return and that it was only being done because of his unexpected long delay at Bermuda where he still remained yesterday according to latest information. Forty-eight hours advance notice of this *démarche* is considered to be provided for in this manner.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

740.00112 European War 1939/7290 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1942—4 p. m.

1132. London's 184, December 9, repeating to you Department's 6112, December 3 to London. The British Embassy here has informed us that during his conversation at the Swedish Foreign Office, Spörborg ascertained that Boheman had reported our consent to the departure of the *Sveadrott* and the *Saturnus* but had not reported either our agreement in principle to the increase in the Swedish oil quota or our position regarding the two Norwegian ships at Göteborg. In the light of Boheman's statements here, we assume that he omitted reporting these matters before leaving Washington because of his expressed desire to present the whole picture in person to his Government. However, in view of his long delay at Bermuda due to weather conditions we believe that the Swedish Foreign Office should be apprised of our position as soon as possible.

Accordingly, you should call on Söderblom, explain the foregoing to him and give him orally the substance of paragraph 1 (except subsection (c)) of the Department's 6112 to London referred to above.

You should make clear to Söderblom our regret that conditions beyond control have delayed Boheman's return and that we have authorized you to anticipate Boheman's personal report to his Government because we thought it only fair to the Swedish Government to have this information now in view of approaches made to them already by the British.

In view of contents of your 3604, December 18, which has just arrived, you should arrange to call on Söderblom to give him the foregoing information before Mallet's visit to the Foreign Office Monday.⁵⁸ Perhaps you can see Söderblom on Sunday.

In informing Söderblom that we told Boheman that no action looking to the departure of the Norwegian ships would be taken by us until after the arrival of the tankers, you may say that this statement was of course based on the assumption that the tankers will not be unduly delayed enroute to Sweden.

Further instructions regarding the possibility of your association with the proposed British *démarche* will be sent after we have been informed by British Embassy here of London's reaction to Sporborg's suggestion mentioned in your 3604.

You may inform your British colleague of the foregoing.

Repeated to London.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7466: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1942—5 p. m.

1133. Your 3604⁵⁹ and Department's 1132, today. British Embassy now confirms that while London desires that demand for release of Norwegian vessels be presented to Swedish Government Monday, the British do not intend to implement the demand with imposition of sanctions or attempt move ships from Göteborg until tankers arrive, provided they are not delayed beyond first fortnight of January.

We consider, therefore, that the British have substantially agreed to our position as set forth in paragraph 2 of Department's 1108.⁶⁰

Accordingly, you are authorized to approach the Swedish Foreign Office a day or so subsequent to the British *démarche* scheduled for Monday and referring to this *démarche* and to the conversation which you will by then have had with Söderblom in accordance with the

⁵⁸ December 21.

⁵⁹ Dated December 18, p. 368.

⁶⁰ See footnote 54, p. 368.

Department's no. 1132 of today, make representations in the sense of section (c) of paragraph 2 of the Department's 1108.

Repeated to London.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7474 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 21, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received 11:45 a. m.]

3622. At conference late last night with British Minister, Spörborg, and Villiers, text of *aide-mémoire* which British Minister will leave with Foreign Minister today was put in final form. After referring to legal position of two Norwegian tankers *aide-mémoire* states that British will not apply for clearance until after arrival of *Sveadrott* and *Saturnus* if they are not unduly delayed. Then followed in substance British Government attaches such importance to this that unless Swedish Government can assure them in course of next fortnight they are prepared allow departure these ships accordance international law, British Government decided in agreement with United States Government withhold in future all licenses for export from overseas goods destined Sweden.

At suggestion of British Government United States Government has agreed in principle that Swedish import quotas to be fixed after discussion between three Governments shall actually be made available to Sweden and shall not as now depend upon whether goods are available. United States Government however, warned Boheman in most serious terms they would consider themselves free to withdraw agreement if Swedish consent to departure of Norwegian ships from Göteborg were withheld. Provided satisfactory settlement of matter can be reached British Government [will] undertake to use best endeavors to insure that in fixing amounts of Swedish import quotas everything possible will be done to meet Sweden's viewpoint.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

740.00112 European War 1939/7481 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 22, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received 11:13 a. m.]

3634. Mallet, whom I was able to see only at a large dinner last night met a very negative attitude when he presented his ultimatum to Foreign Minister (see my 3622, December 22 [21], 9 a. m.). Although, of course, no final answer was given, Mr. Günther said among

other things that while Söderblom had been authorized to say (see final paragraph my 3586, December 16, 5 p. m.⁶²) that no promise had been given Germans that these ships would not be released, following unfortunate episode of arming of group to leave Göteborg last spring, Günther himself had told German Minister ⁶³ that Sweden had decided not to let ships leave and that latter would be informed if any change in this decision were made. At same time German Minister informed Foreign Minister in writing that if ships were released at any time in future, permission for Swedish ships to pass through German blockade would automatically cease.

A Foreign [Office?] official later told me Foreign Minister had been very clear in his conversation with Mallet that there was practically no chance of ships being given permission to leave, apparently having said during interview that if he had left impression that there was in his mind any likelihood of Government changing its decision on this point he wished to dispel that impression.

Marcus Wallenberg at whose house dinner took place and who as chairman of joint standing British-Swedish Trade Committee which will hold a meeting today had been informed of developments told me he felt absolutely sure there would be no change in position of Sweden about ships.

Mallet who has been anything but enthusiastic about forcing an issue feels there is no chance of getting ships out and that cutting off traffic either by United Nations or by Germany may have serious repercussions in throwing Sweden nearer to Germany and weakening Swedish power of resistance.

Mallet told me his Foreign Office had instructed Ambassador Kerr ⁶⁴ in Moscow to tell Molotov ⁶⁵ whole story which is likely to complicate situation here if Soviet Chargé d'Affaires is given instructions. I have an appointment with Foreign Minister this afternoon during which I shall present our position as authorized in final paragraph Department's 1133, December 19, 5 p. m.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

740.00112 European War 1939/7483 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 22, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 8:26 p. m.]

3643. I conferred with Foreign Minister this afternoon and made representations authorized in Department's 1133, December 19, 5

⁶² Not printed.

⁶³ Prince Wilhelm zu Wied.

⁶⁴ Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

⁶⁵ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

p. m. It appears that Cabinet after Mallet's visit yesterday had discussed question and Foreign Minister was able to say that while there had been no formal vote taken, Cabinet was agreed Göteborg ships would not be released. He wished to make it clear that refusal to permit ships to leave was not a punitive measure applied because British had armed ships that left Göteborg some months ago; it was due to political considerations based upon inevitable result that if they were to leave Göteborg, traffic would automatically be cut off by Germans. He repeated statement made to Mallet yesterday with one difference (see first paragraph my 3634, December 22, 9 a. m.) that he had not told German Minister that he would inform him if any change in decision were made but that he had himself felt that he should so inform German Minister having months ago told him of Government's decision not to release ships. Mallet has been corrected on this point by Söderblom subsequently.

Minister pointed out that decision did not affect cargoes of ships provided some practicable means could be discovered by transshipping them by other means to Great Britain. Apparently this was brought up in conversation with Mallet and Ministry of Economic Warfare representatives who pointed out double risk in attempting run blockade with other ships both directions and they feared if such ships successfully entered Göteborg, they might then be held up by Swedes.

Foreign Minister [apparent omission] could definitely be cleared up before any ship made attempt to run in to Göteborg. Minister also suggested that larger and better airplanes at more regular intervals could carry most essential parts of cargo even some of heavy machinery and that Sweden would interpose no objection to that. Minister also said that if Germany once closes this traffic as would be inevitable if ships were to be released it would no doubt be closed for duration of war and that he could not help but feel that not only Sweden but United Nations would have much to lose by this step, that if Sweden could not realize its urgent need to carry on trade with western powers it would be forced to increase its trade with Germany, and it would of course lose its power of resistance very rapidly with loss of future sources of naval fuel oil and aviation fuel gasoline.

Mr. Günther said he could not refrain from expressing his great surprise that Boheman was confronted with this issue so late in our conversations when all points under discussion seemed to indicate that if Sweden were to satisfy requests of an entirely different nature oil quota and other questions of supply would be settled on a more or less permanent basis. Minister wished to say that while there was no hope of Göteborg ships being released he still maintained a hope that some solution might be reached in this critical problem which would be less disastrous to Sweden and have no such adverse effect

on United Nations' war effort and that as soon as matter could be properly studied after Boheman's return some communication would be made to British Minister of which this Legation would be informed.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

740.00112 European War 1939/7562 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 30, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 3 : 55 p. m.]

3740. Stahle⁶⁶ who returned together with Boheman on December 27 yesterday called on me and later discussed with Klath at considerable length seriousness with which Swedish Government views probable consequences of American and British insistence that two Göteborg ships be released. He stated that informal Swedish Cabinet decision was negative as to ships but that their cargo could be reloaded if two new ships are sent to Sweden especially for that purpose. An alternative would be to assign airplanes in sufficient number and size to transport most important part of cargo. He estimated cargo at about 8,000 tons, valued at 30,000,000 crowns, of which about 1,000,000 pounds sterling represented ball bearing production equipment.

Stahle reiterated that Germans would immediately cut off Göteborg traffic if ships were released (see Legation's 3643, December 22, 4 p. m.). This would in Swedish Government's opinion mean that traffic cannot be resumed during war. He feels that it would be advisable to reconsider whole question to determine whether cargo on these two ships is of sufficient value to counterbalance such subsequent disadvantages as:

(1) Severing sole Swedish contact with United Nations and canceling only means available for political influence on Swedish future course of action.

(2) Driving Sweden into hands of Axis as only supplier of essential commodities, including petroleum for air and naval forces. This would mean increased Axis pressure and gradual decline of any Swedish opposition to German demands which would be sure to increase while Swedish possibilities of resistance would be broken.

(3) Probable cancellation of all Swedish export licenses for Allies and stoppage all air service across North Sea.

(4) Possibility of Sweden considering herself released from British war trade agreement under which exports of several hundred commodity items are restricted. This would mean heavy increases in exports to continent of typical Swedish products extremely useful to Axis war efforts. For instance, arsenic is a commodity included in restricted group.

(5) Creating a situation under which German demands upon

⁶⁶ Nils Stähle, of the Commercial Division of the Swedish Foreign Office.

Sweden could not be resisted for any length of time and finally resulting in more or less complete Swedish subservience.

In conclusion Stahle again strongly urged that whole problem be given most careful consideration by responsible officials in Washington and London.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

740.00112 European War 1939/7553 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 30, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 4:07 p. m.]

3709. British Minister has just shown me a telegram from his Government defining only basis on which ultimatum concerning Norwegian ships lying in Göteborg could be lifted, that is, for Swedish Government to guarantee to grant a demise charter for some Swedish ships suitable for proceeding to Great Britain with cargoes from *Dicto* and *Lionel* with a speed not less than 15 knots which could be loaded with cargoes or at least the most essential parts of cargoes of those ships by January 15. Mallet is presenting this proposal to Foreign Office today with statement that if Swedish Government makes such an offer British Government will give it very earnest consideration and a very early reply. Ship must, of course, be in good running order, adequately fueled and equipped with paravanes and labor facilities, for transfer of cargo must be guaranteed.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

740.00112 European War 1939/7536 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 31, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received December 31—2:42 p. m.]

3722. Boheman appeared before Committee of Foreign Affairs of Riksdag yesterday and presented all British arguments. Committee including Chairman Unden and many very friendly to Great Britain and United States voted unanimously to advise against releasing two ships now lying in Göteborg.

Mallet saw Boheman yesterday afternoon and presented suggestion about ship to take off cargoes from *Dicto* and *Lionel* (see my 3709, December 30, 3 p. m.). Boheman appeared relieved at this slight possibility but was non-committal. He promised to expedite consideration.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

SWITZERLAND

NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING SWISS TRADE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE ALLIED BLOCKADE AND THE CONTROL BY AXIS POWERS OF ALL TERRITORY SURROUNDING SWITZERLAND

740.00112 European War 1939/5020 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 26, 1942—midnight.

[Received March 26—11 : 55 p. m.]

1457. The Department's instructions are requested on the following:

Ministry of Economic Warfare have raised the question of Embassy's representatives being present, at least as observers preferably as participants, in conversations which are commencing tomorrow with a delegation from Switzerland, just arrived in London to discuss questions arising out of the blockade. Since the outcome of these conversations will hinge to a considerable extent on the availability of certain supplies from the United States, M.E.W. thinks it important to have Embassy representation, and have ascertained that this would also be agreeable to the Swiss. From the British side, the conversations are to be conducted entirely by M.E.W. except that the head of the Swiss delegation will pay a courtesy call on the Foreign Secretary.

The first meeting with the Swiss delegation will be held March 27. It has been arranged, pending receipt of instructions from the Department as to whether fuller participation in the conversations is desired, that an Embassy representative will attend as an observer; also that Riefler¹ will attend for Board of Economic Warfare.

The following is a summary of the position as explained informally to Somerville² by Stirling³ of M.E.W.:

Swiss frontiers are now entirely under German control, the Germans having officials at the Swiss-French frontier—posted even in unoccupied France. The Germans thus control Swiss imports and exports; and last summer the Swiss Government gave an undertaking to the German authorities that they would not attempt to export without obtaining transit permits from the German or Italian authorities.

¹ Winfield W. Riefler.

² James Somerville, Assistant Commercial Attaché in the United Kingdom.

³ C. N. Stirling, head of the Peninsular Section of the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

The British Government adopted the position that this submission of the Swiss Government to the control of their exports (which would prevent Great Britain from obtaining any of the important materials, such as machine tools, and watch parts, which they require from Switzerland) meant that Swiss economy was entirely subservient to German war economy. They accordingly informed the Swiss Government that they could not allow the import of raw materials for Swiss industry through the blockade unless Switzerland were willing and able to export to Great Britain. For political reasons the Swiss were still allowed to import food stuffs through the blockade.

As a result of discussions through the British Legation in Bern, the Swiss Government were subsequently informed that if they could obtain permission from the Germans or Italians to export to Great Britain or the United States priority material of certain categories to a value of 2½ million Swiss francs a month, the British authorities would give navicerts for certain important raw materials required by the Swiss to the same value and would consider reopening the quotas previously fixed for less important raw materials. The Swiss delegation have brought with them a list of the priority material required by Great Britain to the value specified, to the export of which they state that the German authorities have provisionally consented.

The sub-division of this list between the different categories of material is probably unsatisfactory, but the list has not yet been thoroughly examined.

The Swiss delegation point out, on the other hand, that in present circumstances the grant of navicerts for raw materials is of no value unless supply is assured and they state that in return for the export of the priority material specified to Great Britain and the United States, they would require that the British and American Governments should undertake to supply raw materials to the same value.

Please inform Perkins * and Stone * of Board of Economic Warfare.

MATTHEWS.

740.00112 European War 1939/5021 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 26, 1942—midnight.

[Received March 26—11 : 30 p. m.]

1458. For Perkins and Stone of B. E. W. from Riefler. Referring to Embassy's telegram 1457, March 26, midnight, describing arrival in London of Swiss delegation, it is my impression you would desire American participation in discussion on equal basis. If so, please con-

* Milo Perkins, Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare.

* William T. Stone, Assistant Director, Board of Economic Warfare.

firm. To take active part Embassy would need instructions on American position along lines of Swiss memorandum in preparation at B. E. W. when I left Washington. [Riefler.]

MATTHEWS

740.00112 European War 1939/5021 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1942—8 p. m.

1296. Embassy's 1457 and 1458, March 26, midnight. The memorandum on Switzerland is not yet ready for transmission. In any case, the summary statement given by MEW raises questions which are not completely covered in present draft of memorandum and which have apparently reached a somewhat advanced stage as a result of discussions between the British and Swiss Governments. In these circumstances it is suggested that Riefler and Embassy representative participate in the meetings without any commitment on our part in order to inform this Government fully (1) what commodities Switzerland proposes to export to the United Kingdom and the United States, and (2) what raw materials Switzerland desires sent in return for these commodities. It is assumed that the American representatives will in the course of the discussions be informed of the quantities of these raw materials which would be requested of the United States. Upon the receipt of this or related information, further instructions will be sent.

BEW concurs.

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/5134 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, March 28, 1942.

[Received March 28—1:35 p. m.]

1498. With reference to the Embassy's telegram 1457, March 26, officials of the Ministry of Economic Warfare conferred this morning with the Swiss delegation. The meeting was attended by Riefler of the Board of Economic Warfare and Somerville and Adams⁶ of the Embassy.

The discussion at this meeting and a preliminary one held Wednesday⁷ may be summarized as follows:

⁶ Ware Adams, Consul and Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

⁷ March 25.

The Swiss delegation placed before the meeting a suggested list of Swiss goods to the value of 2½ million Swiss francs per month for export to the United States, the United Kingdom and the British Empire. The Swiss are negotiating simultaneously in Berlin and Rome where approval in principle has been obtained although the individual items in the list have not yet been approved in detail by the German Government.

In return for these exports the Swiss would want to obtain imports of equal value from the United States and the British Empire. They would wish to be assured not merely of navicerts or export licenses for these goods but the actual supply of the goods. Apart from this they would seek restoration of the other quotas for imports of which they might be able to find a supply. They also hope for relief from the Blockade Committee's recent reduction to 5 percent of the permissible enemy content in Swiss exports.

Within the assured 2½ million francs per month the Swiss would propose to acquire iron and steel and certain non-ferrous metals and to export the following Swiss customs tariff items in roughly the following order of importance by value: 934a finished detached parts of watches; M 6 machine tools; M 9 machinery not mentioned elsewhere; MDY dynamo-electric machines; 769 B screws and nuts; 9361 motor car watches; M 5 motors driven by gas, petroleum, benzine; 830 B rivets and screws; 753/56 precision tools; 935D-936D chronographs; 747 watchmakers' tools; 834-36 wares of copper; 937 astronomical, geodesical, mathematical instruments; 809A1-3 ball bearings; 930A detached parts of watches, roughly shaped.

The British conferees took the list under advisement. Pending a further study of the list and the general proposals of the Swiss, they made a preliminary informal statement of the following views: the figures for Swiss exports to the Allies should remain on a global basis as to countries. (The Swiss had stated that they had resisted German efforts to have them specify the proposed Swiss exports by the particular countries of destination to prevent diversions between the United States, Canada and Great Britain).

If the present negotiations should result in an agreement (which is still subject to considerable scepticism) the mutual obligations provided for in it would have to be fulfilled simultaneously so that Swiss exports to the Allies would not lag behind imports from them.

If it were found possible to give any assurances regarding the supply of materials to Switzerland, the list of such supplies would have to be subject to review periodically since the supply situation cannot be foreseen long in advance in either the United States or Great Britain.

If Berlin and Rome approved a satisfactory specific list of proposed Swiss exports to the Allies, the British Government might then

agree to the Swiss proposals, subject to the approval of the United States. In view of its importance for supplies, the Swiss conferees said they would of course want the agreement of the United States, and would want it given at the same time the agreement with the British Government was made.

The foregoing refers to the 2½ million Swiss francs worth of imports for which the Swiss would want assurances as to supply. In addition the British might reopen the general navicert quotas, without any supply guarantee, although the size of the reopened quotas would be a matter for examination.

The British participants declared categorically that they could not let any materials go into Switzerland for the manufacture of goods for the Axis. The Swiss did not protest this principle but expressed fear that a too rigid adherence to it in practice might cause German retaliation that would be damaging to the Allies themselves; they feared that if nothing containing any component however small of imported ingredient were exported to Germany the Germans would say that no coal could be allowed to Switzerland for operating any factory that made goods for export to the Allies.

The British stated they could not waive uniformity in the new rule permitting not more than 5 percent content of enemy material in neutral exports but that "for the present" sympathetic consideration would be given to individual applications for exceptions to avoid hardship where neutral exports contained more than 5 percent but not more than 25 percent enemy materials.

The British requested a copy of the text of the obligation undertaken by the Swiss Government vis-à-vis the German Government to route all exports by rail over Bellegarde in the "Geleitschein" system. The Swiss promised them a copy.

The British and Swiss conferees agreed to have their experts begin a detailed study of the list of proposed Swiss imports and exports which is now in progress.

The Swiss announced that a director of the Swiss National Bank would arrive in London shortly to discuss exchange matters at the request of the Bank of England.

Prior to their preliminary statement of views above, the British asked the Swiss conferees what advantages the Germans expected to get in return for their approval of the present proposals. Dr. Sulzer^a replied that the Germans expected the Swiss to retain their freedom to use imported materials for the manufacture of goods for export to Germany, a freedom which had been admitted in the War Trade Agreement. There would of course be no re-export *en etat*. Profes-

^a Hans Sulzer, head of the Swiss delegation in London.

sor Rappard⁹ indicated that the Germans, for no altruistic motive, also had an interest in ensuring that Switzerland's food supplies be continued.

If the United States Government would like to have the proposed arrangement cover other items than those listed above of which it may wish to secure a supply from Switzerland, Embassy should be advised immediately since it will probably be difficult to alter the list after the negotiations have taken a definite course.

MATTHEWS

740.00112 European War 1939/5404 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 6, 1942—10 p. m.
[Received May 6—8:38 p. m.]

2428. To Perkins from Riefler. Mr. Stirling, head of Peninsular Section of M.E.W. and who is in direct charge of Swiss negotiations for M.E.W. asked me to attend a meeting at his office with Messrs. Sulzer and Keller¹⁰ of the Swiss Delegation. The meeting was called by Stirling as a result of a misunderstanding which arose at an earlier meeting of Keller, Easton,¹¹ Adams, and Seeböhm, head of the Neutral Trade Department of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, when the subject of specific limitations to be placed on various Swiss exports to Axis Europe, if agreement to current negotiations is reached, was under examination. At this meeting Keller had taken the position that no specific limitations could be put on Swiss exports of machinery to the enemy even though these exports contain industrial raw materials received through the blockade. Stirling wished to take the occasion presented by this development to call in Swiss delegation officially. He pointed out to them forcefully that M.E.W., in the preliminary understanding under which the delegation was despatched here had stated that the negotiations were held subject to the principle that materials received through the blockade were not subject to export to enemy countries. While M.E.W. had undertaken to discuss particular situations on their merits, the discussion in the earlier meeting referred to raised a question as to the possibility of a misunderstanding which he desired to clear up.

The ensuing discussion lasted for an hour and a half and was extremely revealing. It was the first time since my arrival that I felt I was getting near to the heart of the Swiss problem. A full report

⁹ Presumably William E. Rappard of the Swiss delegation.

¹⁰ Paul Keller, Swiss delegate in charge of trade agreements at London.

¹¹ Maj. John Easton, Assistant Military Attaché in the United Kingdom.

will be sent on as soon as Stirling's minutes are at hand. Meanwhile, I wish to report one special phase of the discussion which went directly to the basis of the bargaining program proposed by B.E.W. You understand that the Swiss have not yet been informed of the nature of the B.E.W. proposal. It differs so radically in its general form (though not in many of its particulars) from lines along which negotiations have started that it has not seemed wise to confuse the situation further until B.E.W. and M.E.W. have reached an understanding. The whole discussion, therefore, proceeded on basis negotiations have taken to date. This is important in that Swiss did not know B.E.W. is proposing a reduction in food rations as bargaining weapon.

During meeting Stirling was superb. This [*His?*] manner was friendly but his pressure on Swiss for reductions in their exports, particularly of machinery to Germany, was absolutely relentless. He went over every possible contingency and never conceded the objective. Swiss were visibly very worried. There was no question of their intense desire to stop further penetration of Germany into their economy and of their anxiety to think of means of doing so. To them Swiss independence is at stake. They have been willing to accept all sorts of limitations on various other exports but they appear absolutely convinced that they could not "get away" with an open prohibition or limitation on exports of machinery. Finally towards the end of the discussion, with bother [*both*] Stirling and myself taking a very firm attitude, Keller broke out along the following lines: "We cannot have unemployment in the metal industry, particularly that employing highly skilled labor. It is impossible politically for us to tell our people they must go on relief because we will not let them manufacture for Germany, especially when Germany is willing to furnish all of the materials and we furnish only the employment. You can cut down on our food if you want to go that far and we can tighten our belts and still remain free, but if you force us to throw our skilled workers into unemployment they will either go to Germany to work and we won't dare to stop them under the circumstances, or they will force us to come to terms with Germany completely."

Sulzer kept on emphasizing the fact that Swiss manufacturing was now at capacity and that the way out was to plan competitive orders in Switzerland so that there would not be idle industry available for German orders. He thought special negotiations now under way here if successful would have effect of reducing exports to Germany correspondingly. He also stated civilian watches were now on free export lists and that orders on our part for watches would reduce German takings.

I am impressed with sincerity of Swiss and with the potency of their arguments. Would it not be possible to work on a B.E.W.—

M.E.W. program directed toward cutting Swiss dependence on Germany by providing employment for skilled Swiss workers. Elements of such a program would be:

(1) Promotion of purchases of Swiss manufactured articles now on free list, such as pumps, watches, et cetera from non-Axis sources, United States, Latin America, et cetera,

(2) Development of a preemption program on articles not open for export during war, under which Swiss manufactures would be bought and stored in Switzerland for post-war delivery, and,

(3) Conclusion of an understanding with Swiss military authorities directed towards increasing drastically the diversion of Swiss industry to armament manufacture. Such manufacture would have to be solely for the needs of the Swiss Army and might require some release of industrial raw materials on our part. A preemption program for storage would also require an agreement with respect to payment on our part, e. g., blocked gold stored in United States against manufactured commodities stored in Switzerland.

I wish you would give serious consideration to the points raised in this cable because I do not feel that we will gain our objective, namely, a decrease in [Swiss] economic contribution to Germany, by curtailment of food imports. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/5407 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 7, 1942—midnight.

[Received May 7—8:05 p. m.]

2455. For Perkins from Riefler. Ministry of Economic Warfare is transmitting a cable to Hall¹² which I have requested be furnished to you to eliminate duplicate cables. It contains a program for a joint Board of Economic Warfare—Ministry of Economic Warfare policy toward Switzerland arrived at as a result of conferences at which we presented Board of Economic Warfare policy recommendations as contained in your mimeograph summary and cables. I think it represents an excellent synthesis of two viewpoints. I recommend that we proceed on this basis unless Board of Economic Warfare wishes to put forward a more positive program directed toward offering Swiss workers alternative employment as suggested in my recent cables. I have deferred suggesting this program to Ministry of Economic Warfare until I hear your reaction. [Riefler.]

WINANT

¹² Noel F. Hall, British Minister in the United States.

740.00112 European War 1939/5419: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, May 8, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

2496. For Perkins from Riefler. We are engaged in a campaign of economic and political war with Germany through Switzerland. So far (1) we have won most of our nonphysical objectives (intelligence services, moral support, et cetera) but (2) the Axis have won the physical objectives in the sense that they have succeeded in diverting a huge proportion of the Swiss economy to manufacture for their benefit.

We have won our nonphysical objectives, primarily because of the sympathy of the Swiss for the democratic side and because of the Swiss will to be free. Despite great shrewdness and skill on the part of Ministry of Economic Warfare in securing and implementing war trade agreement of 1940, we have been much less successful than the Axis with regard to (2) fundamentally because we were trying to persuade or force the Swiss to impose unemployment on themselves while the Axis was always ready to give as much employment as the Swiss would accept. So long as the final offers from the two sides remain unemployment as compared with employment, the Axis are bound to win in the end. We may gain a tactical victory when conditions are ripe, but the Axis nevertheless will win the campaigns.

I believe we should embark on a completely new policy designed to deprive the Axis of the use of Swiss skilled labor by providing alternative employment within Switzerland for goods: (a) for internal consumption, (b) for the Swiss Army, (c) for export to non-Axis destinations and (d) for storage within Switzerland. The outline of such a program, positive in approach, was indicated in yesterday's Embassy cable No. 2428.¹³ This program would not have been possible financially before we entered the war. It would depend primarily on Board of Economic Warfare for support because Board of Economic Warfare is the organization that has the resources required for its implementation.

The experience of Great Britain so far in this war demonstrates that it is economically possible to maintain full employment internally even in an industrial country heavily dependent in ordinary times on export markets, provided essential food supplies and some raw materials are available from abroad. We are already prepared to furnish these food supplies to the Swiss. Unless the Axis inter-

¹³ May 6, 10 p. m., p. 381.

feres therefore with a new positive prohibition it would not be impossible to work out a program with the Swiss that will leave a minimum of free resources available to work for the Axis. The first element in such a program would require definite moves on our part to increase orders from non-Axis sources for Swiss exports now on the free list. Surely we can order and probably find use for much greater quantities of these commodities than we are now taking. Our Latin American division together with Rockefeller's¹⁴ office can probably persuade our Latin American allies and associates to increase their takings from Switzerland also. The second element in the program would be a secret offer to the Swiss Army to cooperate with them in building up the strongest possible army within Switzerland, provided that the armament was fabricated within Switzerland. This would require the supply of some raw materials on our part, but we would gain (1) because an increase in the military establishment would operate to absorb manpower within Switzerland, thus reducing unemployment, (2) because a drastic conversion of Swiss industry to munitions manufacture would absorb industrial facilities now available for manufacture for the Axis and (3) because a growing Swiss Army, in the military situation as it is developing within Europe, would help shift the military balance of power there. The third element in such a program would require the institution on our part of a preemption program within Switzerland. Under this program we would undertake to place orders with Swiss factories working on highest priority exports to the Axis, storing the commodities received from them for delivery after the war.

Such a program could go very far to win our campaign of economic warfare within Switzerland. It could only be stopped by drastic Axis interference, which would have to be positive interference outside the scope of present Axis-Swiss agreements. Each month it went on without such interference would find the Swiss and ourselves in a stronger position relative to the Axis. If the Axis did interfere, it would have to take the full blame in the eyes of the Swiss people.

This program is my own suggestion formulated as a result of weighing all the factors involved, here on the spot. I have not spoken of it to Ministry of Economic Warfare. I would appreciate your reaction. If you do not wish to undertake a new policy such as this, I would recommend adoption of policy similar to that contained in Ministry of Economic Warfare's cable to Hall. See Embassy's cable No. 2455 of May 6 [7]. [Riefler.]

WINANT

¹⁴ Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator, Office of Inter-American Affairs.

811.20 Defense (M)/6875b: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1942—11 a. m.

2252. 1. On the basis of reports from the Embassy as well as telegrams received by the British Embassy in Washington from London on progress of the current negotiations with Switzerland, discussions have been held in the Department during the past few days on this subject. Participants have been, in addition to representatives of the various interested divisions of the Department, members of the Board of Economic Warfare and representatives from the British Embassy.

2. Complete agreement was reached by all present on the objectives of the current joint negotiations with Switzerland defined as follows: (a) to help to maintain Swiss political independence, thereby retaining the non-economic advantages currently held; (b) to reduce Swiss economic assistance to the Axis; (c) to obtain additional valuable supplies for the U.K. and the U.S.; (d) to arrive at financial agreements which will result in the U.K. and U.S. obtaining sufficient Swiss francs for necessary expenditures within Switzerland without unduly benefiting the enemy in the process.

3. The Department and the Board of Economic Warfare recognize the danger of threatening reduction in present food quotas, if use of this weapon were attempted as a general bargaining measure. The recommendation is made, however, that careful consideration in London should be given to the employment of this threat for the specific purpose of obtaining engagements from Switzerland to reduce to token quantities Swiss exports to Germany of food products such as fruits, fats, oils, dairy products and cattle etc. Obviously it is essential to reduce such Swiss exports to the Axis to the lowest possible level. It is recognized that careful consideration undoubtedly has already been given to this point in London, but it is the request of the Department and the BEW that it be re-examined.

4. The Department's understanding of the negotiating procedure to be employed in London is as given below, and on the assumption that its understanding is substantially correct, the Department approves this procedure: (a) The existing blockade policy of passing foodstuffs but prohibiting raw materials will remain in force with due regard to the point made by the Department in paragraph 3 above and (b) below. This appears to be the basic support for the maintenance of Swiss independence. (b) The Swiss will be offered a re-opening of certain quotas for raw materials which are not in short supply with the U.K. and the U.S., but such increased quotas as may

be granted will not be accompanied by any guarantee of fulfillment of their requirements. (c) Financial discussions are being conducted in London between the British and the Swiss and in Washington between this Government and the Swiss. The Department proposes to discuss with the British Embassy and the U.S. Treasury the position of both Governments vis-à-vis the Swiss on financial matters. On the basis of these discussions a coordinated program will be prepared for presentation to the Swiss. When this program has been prepared, it will be transmitted to you in detail for dovetailing with the general negotiations. (d) The question of increased trade interchange between the U.K. and the U.S. on the one hand and Switzerland on the other will be negotiated somewhat in the nature of an independent subject. These discussions will be on a comprehensive basis, and the various materials considered with proposed amounts will be submitted for consideration to the Combined Raw Materials Board, the amount and character of materials which might be released being controlled by the amount and importance of the goods which the Swiss would be prepared to make available to the U.K. and the U.S. The Department reserves its decision on the suggestion that special consideration might be given to the requirements of the Swiss Army for raw materials, if during the course of negotiations consideration of this point becomes advisable.

5. The Department requests that not only should the Embassy keep it fully informed of all important developments during the process of negotiations, but also that the substance of every important clause in the proposed comprehensive agreement with Switzerland be telegraphed as this agreement reaches tentative final form.

6. The Department understands that Riefler of the Board of Economic Warfare and other representatives of the Embassy have been attending the Swiss negotiations as observers. It is the request of both the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare that the necessary steps be taken to assure their full participation in these negotiations in the future.

7. Please inform Riefler of the contents of this telegram.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/5577 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 23, 1942—9 p. m.
[Received May 23—8:45 p. m.]

2891. The Swiss delegation visiting England on trade and supply problems made a formal call on me at the Embassy. During our con-

versation they suggested on their own initiative a program similar to that recommended by Riefler to Perkins. (Embassy's 2496, May 8, 8 p. m.) They told me that they had talked to Admiral Stark¹⁵ on this subject, who they said seemed to feel that there was sense in their plan. I asked the members of the delegation what Mr. Riefler's opinion was and they told me they did not know. Apparently the idea originated with them while at the same time Riefler had communicated a similar approach to the problem to Washington. We should like your opinion on Riefler's message (Embassy's 2496, May 8, 8 p. m.) which I feel has merit.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/5577 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1942—midnight.

2508. Your 2891 of May 23, 9 p. m. The Department's views concerning the general lines which the joint negotiations with the Swiss should follow in London were set forth in its 2252 of May 20. Formulation of these views followed consultation with the BEW and representatives of the British Embassy in Washington, as well as consideration of the Embassy's 2496 of May 8, 8 p. m. Within this agreed general frame work latitude exists for the negotiators to pursue the strategy proposed in the Embassy's 2496 with the exception that the Department reserved judgment on the specific suggestion regarding the release of strategic materials for the Swiss army.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/5419 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1942—4 p. m.

2594. For Riefler from Perkins: With reference to your no. 2428 and 2496 and Embassy's no. 2455 regarding preemption of Swiss industry, Board of Economic Warfare preliminary views for your guidance in possible discussion with British and Swiss are as follows:

1. The relative power position of the Axis in Switzerland, both militarily and economically, is so strong that effective interference with Axis procurement by means of a United Nations preemption

¹⁵ Adm. Harold R. Stark, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

program seems doubtful. A general preemption program would have to take up a significant amount of currently unemployed labor and productive facilities before affecting those employed in Axis war production. Support of Swiss production envisaged by you would require large shipments of industrial raw materials which

- A. Are strategic and in short supply in the United Nations.
- B. Would be dangerous to send from a blockade point of view.
- C. When manufactured could not be exported and would tempt Germany to seize from storage.

Germany can prevent diversion of Swiss industry from Axis war production by means of its control over Swiss exports and control over all Swiss imports including essential supplies of fuel and other materials from Germany which could not practically be replaced by the United Nations.

2. Support of Swiss military production depends upon importance attached to Swiss army by the joint Chiefs of Staff. Latter have informed Board of Economic Warfare that increased Swiss army strength need be given little weight in determining export policy. It is doubtful whether

A. Increased military production would interfere with Axis production.

B. Germany would permit a shift in military balance of power which could be prevented.

C. Military potential of Swiss army could be sufficiently increased by equipment alone to provide any more effective power or will to resist aggression than now exists.

3. If discussions are held with the Swiss on this subject, our views are that preemption of specific key plants now working for Axis would be the most effective. Preemption must deprive Axis of skilled labor, equipment, etc., now being used or which would be used in the future. Purchase of free list articles, such as watches, or non-free list goods, such as machinery for storage, would not be preemptive.

A. If coming from large stocks on hand.

B. If merely tending to reduce the heavy enemy imports of civilian goods, such as watches, from Switzerland.

C. If purchases caused employment of labor and equipment at present unused and which would not be used for enemy war production.

Reports from Switzerland indicate that some factories are operating below capacity due to material shortages.

4. Any agreement as to preemption would require provision for American civilian surveillance of production, storage, and consumption of goods, especially if we supply raw materials. [Perkins.]

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/6312

*The Swiss Trade Delegation to the British-American Delegation*¹⁶

MEMORANDUM

The Swiss Delegation has the honour to hand the British-American Delegation herewith two lists (Annexes I. and II.¹⁷) showing clearly the position attained so far in the present War Trade negotiations, which indicate the basis on which it should be possible for a settlement to be reached on the points still outstanding.

The Swiss Delegation desires to make the following observations with regard thereto:

First, they would like to give a short general survey of the questions at issue; they cannot refrain from drawing attention once more to the economic structure of Switzerland which is typical of a country vitally dependent on the import and export of goods; indeed Switzerland depends to an almost unparalleled extent upon international trade. She can only feed her population and maintain an adequate level of employment if she is able to import the necessary agricultural commodities and raw materials for her industry, paying for them by the products of her labour. The very existence of between a third and one half of her population depends upon her being able to export goods.

Whilst in peace-time this exchange of goods was free, the war has placed it in shackles, to which the Swiss economic structure has been compelled to adapt itself. Until the collapse of France, the exchange of goods was possible between Switzerland and both belligerent parties in the war and Mr. Sulzer, in his letter of 20th May to Mr. Foot,¹⁸ drew attention to the considerable exports of Swiss industry to the Allied Nations during the first nine months of the War. The collapse of France fundamentally changed the position; from that time onwards Switzerland has been completely surrounded by the Axis Powers and cannot import or export a single pound of goods which does not pass through their control. Notwithstanding these difficulties Switzerland has made every possible effort to maintain her trade with the United Nations and is still making strenuous efforts in that direction. Her efforts to arrive at a continuously working Compensation Agreement to enable her to supply the United Nations with certain products of Swiss industry which they particularly need, are well known to the British and American Governments, and if she has not

¹⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 4894, August 5; received August 10.

¹⁷ Neither printed.

¹⁸ Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary of British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

so far been successful, it is owing to delays which it was not in her power to overcome. The Swiss Government state once more that they are still animated by the strongest desire that a Compensation Agreement on the lines proposed should be concluded as soon as possible and that this Agreement should be followed by similar agreements in future. The Swiss Government will make every endeavour to this end and hope that they may rely on the support of the Allied Governments in reaching a successful conclusion.

An indication of the manner in which Swiss trade with the United Nations could be further developed was also contained in Mr. Sulzer's letter to Mr. Foot of the 20th May, and the Swiss Government hope that a number of other openings will be found which will enable Swiss production to be placed in an increasing measure at the service of the United Nations. If, or insofar as this is not possible, however, Switzerland, having regard to the necessity of providing work for her population to replace her lost export trade, besides satisfying the increased calls made on her production by her own requirements and in particular, the needs of her national defence, has no option but to maintain her trade with those countries with whom she can still exchange goods. This necessity explains the marked increase of Swiss trade in all fields of her economic activity with European countries who have always been her traditional customers.

The Swiss Government have been conscious that ever since the beginning of the war, Switzerland, standing as she does in the very centre of the economic struggle, would have to submit to numerous severe restrictions imposed by both sides. As regards the Anglo-French blockade, the War Trade Agreement of 25th April, 1940, in fact subjected Switzerland to extensive restrictions. The Swiss Government understand the desire of the Allied Governments to intensify to a certain extent these restrictions and are ready to accept them within bearable limits. In the negotiations which have been proceeding in London since March, this readiness has been proved by the Swiss Government's acceptance of numerous far-reaching concessions. The Swiss Delegation recalls the many export positions which, in accordance with the Allies' request, have been transferred from Lists B1 and B2 to List A (total prohibition of exports to Axis Europe) or from the free List to one of restricted exports and the conciliatory spirit shown in particular with regard to the settlement of the chemical items.

The anxiety of the Swiss Government for the very existence of their country impels them to make an urgent appeal to the Allied Governments that their demands should not exceed the limits beyond which the country's life would be imperilled and at the same time the Swiss Government's endeavours to revive Swiss exports to the United Nations would be jeopardised.

In the light of the foregoing the Swiss Delegation earnestly requests the British-American Delegation to reconsider the following points which have already formed the subject of discussion.

1) As regards the export of agricultural products to Axis Europe, Switzerland cannot go below the annual limits set out in the relevant List. The Swiss Delegation recalls that the representative of the British Government in the "Commission Mixte" agreed at the time to such exports being completely free; these export limits already represent a great reduction on the figures for previous years and constitute the absolute minimum required to secure in exchange the necessary imports from Axis Europe. The allocation of these exports between the various countries concerned is shown in the List annexed. In Mr. Sulzer's letter to Mr. Stirling of the 22nd June, attention is drawn to the decisive fact that, against these exports of Swiss agricultural products must be set imports from Axis Europe of several times as much of most vital foodstuffs. The recent complete prohibition of the consumption of meat in Switzerland for four full weeks may provide striking proof of the sacrifices made by the Swiss people in order that their country may be able to obtain important goods of other kinds in exchange. For these reasons the Swiss Government believe that they are justified in expecting that the British and American Governments will not insist on opposing such exports to Axis Europe and will consequently waive the various restrictions on import quotas, which were linked up with them in the course of the negotiations.

In this connection the Swiss Delegation wishes to emphasise the urgent need for renewed imports of fodder; should these imports be further delayed, it would bring about in a short time a marked reduction in the quantity of the existing live-stock and consequently a grievous further deterioration of the food situation in the country. Imports of fodder are also particularly needed for the horses of the Swiss Army. The Swiss Government cannot believe that it is the intention of the British and American Governments to penalise Switzerland for her exports of cattle and dairy produce—which are relatively unimportant to the Axis Powers in their conduct of the War, but which are most important to Switzerland for obtaining in exchange products essential to her—by the complete stoppage of the import of fodder for her horses and cattle. It is surely in the general interest that Switzerland should be enabled to carry into the after-war period a sufficient quantity of livestock.

2) In respect of textiles, the Swiss Delegation has succeeded in finding further elements for concessions. As regards wool, Switzerland has agreed during the present negotiations to prohibit exports to Axis-Europe of all items of importance. The new proposals contained in the list concerning cotton (*vide* items 344, 347/359, 360/370,

434 b/c, 446 e/h) provide particularly drastic restrictions compared to the figures of exports for previous years. The new figures constitute the minimum of what Switzerland must have available in order to secure the imports which are essential to her from the respective countries. Here also, as Mr. Sulzer pointed out in his letter to Mr. Stirling, the Swiss Delegation was able to prove that if imports of hemp, which forms a substantial part of the textile group, be included, imports of textile materials from Axis-Europe considerably exceed Swiss exports of textiles to those countries. Silk, although it has so far been exclusively supplied to Switzerland by Axis-Europe, is not even included in this computation.

The following example is intended to show the manner in which Switzerland endeavours, through an adequate subdivision of her exports, to secure in exchange a maximum of vital imports from the various European countries: Switzerland is able to import considerable quantities of eggs produced in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria against exports to these countries of fine cotton goods which are by no means essentials of war; it is surely in the interest of the United Nations that, under the circumstances, these eggs should go to Switzerland rather than be supplied to Germany, as would otherwise be the case.

The Swiss Government believe, therefore, that they may expect, in this field also, that the British and American Governments will recognise the economic necessity of such limited exports to Axis Europe and will allow them to continue on the proposed greatly reduced scale by not curtailing the yearly import quota for cotton much below the figure of 24,000 tons fixed for the past. It must be particularly emphasised here that these exports to Axis-Europe are confined to fine tissues and luxury fabrics, and that Switzerland has agreed to the complete cessation of all exports to Axis-Europe of cotton yarn and waste. Also the insignificance for the conduct of the war by the Axis Powers of these drastically reduced exports is recalled.

3) The Swiss Government, while fully appreciating the considerations underlying the attitude adopted by the British and American Governments, sincerely regret that they are unable, for the reasons set out in Mr. Sulzer's letter to Mr. Foot of the 20th May, to agree to give a formal undertaking for the reduction of, or for the fixing of a ceiling for the Swiss exports of war-materials and of certain machinery. The Swiss Government feel certain that the British and American Governments will understand that it is impossible for them to interfere with the contractual obligations entered into by Swiss industry under the regime of blockade hitherto subsisting or to force Swiss industry to refuse further orders in the event of threatened unemployment in Switzerland. They remain convinced, however, that for a number of reasons, the deliveries of these materials will in future tend to decrease rather than to increase.

The Swiss Government have therefore no option but to accept the suggestion embodied in Mr. Stirling's draft letter of the 11th June. It would still be necessary, however, to determine more precisely the items of the Customs Tariff which should be subject to periodical revision. The Swiss Government are of opinion that the only items subject to revision should be actual war-materials, arms and ammunition and should not include goods which are the normal and traditional products of the old-established iron and machine industry. Moreover, it is of the utmost importance to the Swiss Government to know which are the import quotas the British and American Governments would wish to reserve the right to reconsider. Any reduction of the already barely sufficient import quotas for foodstuffs would be considered totally unbearable.

4) The Swiss Government are perturbed by the fact that some of the new import quotas proposed by the British and American Governments must be considered insufficient, while a number of raw materials, such as rubber, copper, iron and steel, tinplate, hides and leather, all of which are essential for the maintenance of the country, have so far been completely omitted. They cannot imagine a satisfactory War Trade Agreement which does not at least allow Switzerland to obtain the imports which are essential to her for the proper maintenance of the National Defence; List No. 2 shows the outstanding items concerned.

5) In the War Trade Agreement of the 25th April, 1940, the contracting parties confined themselves to laying down certain principles regarding the use to be made of the goods imported into Switzerland through the British/French blockade, the quantities to be imported being left unlimited. It was not until the collapse of France that the British Government thought it necessary to fix maximum import quotas for certain goods. No responsibility of any kind was assumed by the blockading Power with regard to the supply of the goods; it was left to Switzerland to make her own arrangements to obtain the goods and generally speaking no difficulties were encountered until the entry of the United States into the War.

Since the United States entered the War the situation has altered fundamentally. With regard to a number of goods for which the United States were the sole remaining source of supply, American export permits were refused, in spite of the fact that navicerts had been granted. In consequence of the growing scarcity of essential agricultural and industrial raw materials, control and pooling became daily more drastic, with the result that the obtaining of such goods is now dependent in every case upon the consent of the blockading Powers. Switzerland is thus exposing herself to the growing risk of giving onerous undertakings limiting her trade with Axis-Europe in exchange for assurances of import quotas from the Allied Govern-

ments, without any guarantee that she will actually receive the goods. A logical corollary of any such undertaking should surely be some reasonable certainty that goods permitted to be imported should effectively be made available. The Swiss Government must therefore make the undertakings they are to give subject to the following provisos:

a) that as regards goods which are not officially controlled by the blockading Powers, the latter will not put any obstacles in the way of their shipment to Switzerland and that, in particular, where imports from the United States are concerned, American export permits will always be granted within the framework of existing import quotas;

b) that where the purchase of goods is officially controlled or where their acquisition meets with difficulties, the British and American Governments will use their best endeavours to assist Switzerland to procure these commodities.

6) At the outset of the present negotiations the British and American Governments declared that the conclusion of a new War Trade Agreement would depend on the settlement of various financial questions connected therewith. The Swiss Delegation is also of the opinion that the questions of finance and blockade are interdependent and that it is therefore necessary for a satisfactory solution of both questions to be reached simultaneously.

On this understanding and in order to demonstrate once again to the British and American Governments their desire to bridge the existing difficulties, the Swiss Government have authorised this Delegation to offer to His Majesty's Government a credit for the equivalent of up to two hundred million Swiss Francs on the terms and conditions set out in Annexes III and IV.¹⁹

In consideration of this offer of credit, the Swiss Government rely on the British Government being prepared to give an assurance that they will maintain for the duration of the credit the full and unimpaired transfer in Swiss francs of both the income on Swiss capital invested in the British Empire and the proceeds of Swiss exports to the British Empire.

The Swiss Government hope that the credit will also induce the British Government to facilitate the purchase of more Swiss goods than has hitherto been possible owing to the prevailing currency restrictions; such additional imports might also serve as a useful contribution to the maintenance of British supplies.

In a Note dated 9th September, 1941, His Majesty's Minister in Berne, on behalf of the British Government, informed the Swiss Government that the policy which they have thought necessary "to frame towards Switzerland following the situation created by the signature of the German-Swiss Trade Agreement would be capable of modifi-

¹⁹ Neither printed.
429184—61—26

cation and that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to take into account both the developments of Swiss trade with the enemy and the extent to which Swiss industry may, in practice, be able to export to the United Kingdom, the Empire and allied destinations, goods to which the Authorities in these respective markets attach importance".

The Swiss Government were aware of the motives which prompted the British Government's statement and have done everything in their power to meet the British Government's wishes. They regret that for reasons for which they are not responsible, it has not yet been possible to increase the trade between Switzerland and the United Nations as requested in the Note quoted above.

The Swiss Government continue to attach particular importance to these exports and hope in the not too distant future to succeed in meeting more fully on this point also the desires of the United Nations, on whose active assistance they count to that end.

On the other hand, the Swiss Government believe that in their readiness in the present negotiations to accept drastic curtailments of Swiss exports to Axis-Europe, they have already gone far to comply with the wishes of the Allied Governments. Indeed, to go further would imperil the very existence of their country. They feel that they are entitled to expect that the Allied Governments on their side will also show their understanding of the position of Switzerland. The Swiss Government must again point out that the goods which Switzerland receives from Axis-Europe in exchange for her exports, are not only of the utmost importance for her existence but also consist to a very large extent of commodities which, particularly insofar as Germany is concerned, constitute materials essential for the conduct of the war by the Axis Powers.

The outcome of the present negotiations is of momentous significance for the fate of Switzerland. Owing to circumstances beyond her control, Switzerland now finds herself in a situation pregnant with difficulties hardly ever greater in her long history.

Switzerland has always been well aware of the high duties laid upon her by her freely chosen policy of neutrality and there can be no doubt that she has always honourably striven to carry them out. The Swiss people have at all times made sacrifices for the defence of their country such as few other peoples can show and they are firmly determined to go on shouldering these sacrifices in the future.

The Swiss Government hope that the foregoing Swiss proposals will pave the way to an agreement acceptable to both parties and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the economic independence of Switzerland.

LONDON, 31 July, 1942.

740.00112 European War 1939/6599 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 9, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received September 9—7 : 40 p. m.]

4138. Following telegram has been sent to London.

"8, September 9, 8 p. m.

My 2841 to Department which was repeated to London under date of June 20, 11 a. m.²⁰

Hotz, Director of the Division of Commerce informed me yesterday that the Swiss delegates have obtained the agreement of the Germans to accord transit permits for priority supplies for the items (with a few exceptions and reservations) detailed in the Embassy's telegram from London to Bern No. 20 of April 5, midnight. The Swiss have telegraphed this list to their Legations at Washington and London.

This agreement would run for 4 months to the end of December and would permit exports of those items to the amount of 7½ million francs to the United States and the United Kingdom. While Italian approval is required to effect this agreement, Hotz stated that he had no doubt the Germans would exact their accord, but that the Germans would grant transit permits via France should the Italians raise any difficulties.

Hotz stated that the Swiss have made no concessions to the Germans against this agreement. However, the Germans have imposed, as a condition of this plan, that we should discontinue, during these 4 months and for any subsequent duration of its operation, our efforts to force Swiss firms to abandon or reduce deliveries on munitions manufactured for the Germans.

The agreement, which has been signed by the Swiss and Germans, will become effective when signed by the Italians and receives the formal approval of the Federal Council.

In my telegram under reference I outlined the importance which I attached to the obtention of this phase of the compensation plan and I consider success of Swiss in making this break in German counter-blockade to be an indication of Swiss desire to throw off German stranglehold and finally that this agreement when in operation will have a salutary effect throughout Switzerland and will strengthen resistance of Swiss manufacturers to German suasion.

Hotz informed me that he plans negotiations with Italians in early October and immediately thereafter with Germans for their 1943 commercial agreement. Our reaction to this proposal will I believe have a decided influence upon position which Swiss will take in these negotiations. Possibly as an indication of courage gathered from this success Hotz informed me that his Government proposes to insist upon a further reduction in percentage of so called 'free' exchange now allowed Germans under their current agreement.

The offtake of these priority supplies would encourage Swiss in their negotiations with Germans to resist very strong pressure which I am convinced Germans will apply in an effort to increase munitions production by Swiss. It will also give added incentive to effect the

²⁰ Not printed.

limitation on manufactured supplies to Axis which I understand is to be part of London agreement.

I fully realize difficulty of supplying certain raw materials under the compensation plan, but I am even more convinced of practical and political advantages to be derived therefrom and which I outlined in my telegram under reference. The present proposal would seem to be an effective step towards obtention of these advantages and particularly through weakening dependence of Swiss Government on Axis Powers.

My British colleague agrees and is telegraphing similar sense to London.

Repeated to Department. ["]

The Swiss have called a special meeting of the Mixed Commission for afternoon of Friday, September 11, and it would be useful if I might have some indication of Department's views on this proposal as soon as possible.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/6599 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1942—midnight.

2169. Reference your 4138 of September 9.

1. Department shares your views with respect to the advantages of compensation agreement and is pleased that Germans have agreed to accord transit permits for items covered.

2. You state that Germans will permit export of said items to the amount of 7½ million francs to United States and United Kingdom. Present compensation proposal is in the amount of \$600,000. Does this mean that the German concessions would make possible compensation arrangement on larger scale?

3. You state that Germans have imposed condition to the effect that during operation of compensation agreement efforts to force Swiss firms to reduce deliveries of munitions to Germany must be discontinued. Please define exactly the type and scope of the efforts referred to. Do you mean efforts of the type exerted by you and your British colleague upon individual Swiss firms described in your 3541 of August 1.²¹ Are the Swiss firms to be relieved from this pressure only those firms engaged in the manufacture of the precision instruments which we are to get under the compensation agreement? To what extent are these efforts to be relaxed or discontinued? Is it not really a practical question to wit: you will exert all the pressure you can short of the point of causing the Germans to revoke transit permits?

4. Repeated to London for views of Embassy and MEW.

HULL

²¹ Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/6711: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 19, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received September 19—4: 23 p. m.]

4281. Department's 2169, September 12. Regarding question raised in numbered paragraph 2 Department's telegram it will be recalled that my 4145, September 10²² indicated that amount of 7,500,000 francs was total for a period of 4 months. My British colleague states amount of \$600,000 covering items in British-American compensation request was to be a unique transaction but not for a specified period. I should appreciate being informed whether this is correct or whether a time limit also was envisaged in British-American proposal, as Department's question suggests that our request was for a fixed period.

Numbered paragraph 3 of Department's telegram. At Mixed Commission meeting September 11 Commercial Attaché²³ requested a copy of text of condition imposed by Germans. This the Swiss officials refused to give. The Commercial Attaché then asked for more precise details and interpretation. The reply given by a Swiss member of Commission was that Germans asked that we discontinue our pressure on Swiss firms aimed at getting them to refuse munitions contracts or not to manufacture beyond specified amounts.

On Wednesday²⁴ Commercial Attaché and British Commercial Counselor called on Dr. Hotz, Director Division of Commerce, in effort to ascertain whether there was foundation for reports received that a leading German fuse manufacturer recently visited a number of Swiss firms presumably to place new or enlarged contracts for fuses and to indicate that, if such contracts were being placed while the compensation proposal is under consideration, failure on part of Swiss Government to forbid acceptance of new contracts at this time might seriously jeopardize Berlin protocol and the negotiations in London.

It was pointed out to the Swiss official that signing of new contracts now would undoubtedly be interpreted as either (1) a move on part of Germans to build up level of production before our signing of an agreement with the Swiss containing a maximum munitions delivery clause and or (2) a proof that Germans interpret the "condition" clause as giving them a free hand to extend munitions contracts in Switzerland. Dr. Hotz replied that in his opinion reported visit of German manufacturer was probably a normal business trip but that he would make further inquiry specifically through the President of

²² Not printed.

²³ Daniel J. Reagan.

²⁴ September 16.

the Watch Association and would inform us of his findings. This he has not done as yet. Meanwhile further investigation of this German industrialist's visit appears to indicate that his visit was made in the middle and end of August and that he was not successful in obtaining new or enlarged contracts. During this discussion with Dr. Hotz Commercial Attaché again requested a copy of text of German condition and was again told that the transmission of the text was incompatible with Swiss policy. Commercial Attaché then pointed out to Dr. Hotz that it was unreasonable to expect American and British Governments to enter into this compensation agreement without knowing fully what condition had been imposed by Germans and that obviously our Governments could not agree to refrain from taking actions which were not clearly defined even were an agreement reached in London with regard to a maximum limitation on Swiss deliveries of munitions to the Axis. It was pointed out to Dr. Hotz that both the Department and Ministry of Economic Warfare naturally had made further inquiries as to the definition and interpretation of this German condition and that Swiss would readily understand that until a formal statement to this condition was forthcoming our Governments could scarcely be expected to give serious consideration to the compensation proposal. To this Dr. Hotz replied that he would send in writing a paraphrase of the conditions as transmitted to Swiss Legation, London.

This has now been received, under date of September 17, reading as follows in translation :

"During our discussion yesterday you expressed the wish to be informed in writing with regard to the conditions to which Germany has subordinated the granting of facilities accorded within the sphere of the counter blockade. Reverting to my oral statements, I confirm to you that Germany has laid down in this connection the stipulation that the representatives of the United States and of Great Britain refrain from interfering with the Swiss firms for the purpose of engaging them not to execute German or Italian orders or to accept no more such orders."

In my opinion, in which my British colleague concurs, that acceptance of this condition and in such terms is dependent upon a guarantee by the Swiss to fix a maximum limit of their munitions deliveries to the Axis with, if possible, a gradual reduction; if such an agreement is reached, pressure by us on individual firms will, of course, become unnecessary. In connection with the proposal to fix such a limit, I should appreciate being advised as to the basis upon which this limitation would be established, the total amount involved, and whether an over-all maximum with limitations by categories is envisaged.

Repeated to London.

740.00112 European War 1939/6711 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) ²⁵

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1942—7 p. m.

2275. Reference your 4281, September 19. Department is informed by London that Swiss are still uncertain about exact nature of German conditions relating to our efforts to make Swiss firms reduce shipments to the enemy. They have been told that we have no intention of altering our policies unless we can secure equally effective results through other means. In other words, if we are to abandon our present policies, Swiss Government must satisfy us that they are actually effecting a decrease in exports of machinery and arms to Germany.

As these negotiations are taking place in London and it is therefore difficult for the Department to keep you immediately up to date, you are recommended to keep in closest touch with your British colleague.

HULL

854.24/81 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 15, 1942.

[Received December 15—9:15 p. m.]

7117. For the Department and Board of Economic Warfare. Embassy's 7081 of December 14, 9 p. m.²⁶ In compliance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 6155 of December 4, midnight²⁶ and previous instructions cited therein, the compensation agreement with Switzerland was concluded yesterday by an exchange of five letters between Dr. Hans Sulzer of the Swiss delegation on one side, and Mr. Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and Riefler on the other. The texts of the letters are as follows:

First letter.

"Dear Dr. Sulzer, We wish to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America are prepared to avail themselves during the first 4 months of 1943 of the new facilities for exports described in your letter of 8th September last²⁷ which have been offered to them by the Swiss Government, the decision to apply for the present to a first *tranche* for the approximate equivalent of Swiss francs 2½ millions

²⁵ Repeated as No. 4714 on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ Not printed, but see telegram No. 4138, September 9, 8 p. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 397.

as set out in the attached schedule. The Swiss Government will issue the necessary export permits and use their best endeavors to procure the corresponding German and/or Italian transit permits and any other facilities necessary for the effective despatch, transport and shipment of the goods in question.

2. (a) The British and American Governments will issue for the countervalue of the Swiss francs 21½ million navicerts and/or export licenses for, and will make available for export to Switzerland, 100 tons toluol, 200 tons copper, 200 tons rubber and 7 tons nickel, and for the balance every effort will be made to make available tinplate, dynamo sheets and/or ordinary steel sheets in approximately equal parts; if these goods are not available, or if the Swiss Government so desire, other goods as mutually agreed may be substituted therefor.

(b) The right of the Swiss Government to obtain the necessary navicerts and/or export licenses for the goods mentioned under (a) will become effective simultaneously with the granting of Swiss export licenses and German and/or Italian transit permits for the goods specified in the said schedule to an approximately equal value. The Swiss Government will use this right in part amounts of not less than 300,000 Swiss francs each.

(c) The above mentioned goods are destined for the exclusive use of Swiss military authorities.

(3) In regard to the use of the remaining facilities for the export of Swiss goods mentioned in your letter of September 8th and any corresponding Swiss import facilities from overseas, the three Governments will make the necessary arrangements in due course.

(4) In the event of any new circumstances arising which in the view of any of the three Governments concerned shall render the effective exchange of goods hereunder impossible, they shall immediately consult together as to the action to be taken.

(5) If you will be so good as to confirm that the arrangements set out above are acceptable to you, we suggest that this letter and your reply should constitute an agreement between our three Governments.

Signed by D. M. Foot and W. W. Riefler"

Second letter.

"Dear Professor Riefler, I have to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of today's date addressed to me jointly by Mr. Foot and yourself, informing me that:

[Here follows repetition of provisions stated in letter above.]

I have pleasure in confirming that the arrangements set out above are acceptable to me, and I agree that your letter and this reply (which I am also addressing to Mr. Foot) should constitute an agreement between our three Governments.

Signed by Hans Sulzer"

Third letter.

"Dear Dr. Sulzer, Referring to our letter of today's date, concerning the compensation agreement, we herewith confirm our verbal declaration made during the discussions that new approaches, such as those hitherto made by the British and American representatives in Switzerland, to Swiss firms in the metallurgical and watch industries will for the time being be brought to cease.

Signed by D. M. Foot and W. W. Riefler"

Fourth letter.

"Dear Professor Riefler, I have to thank you for your letter of today's date, signed by Mr. Foot and yourself, confirming that the British and American representatives in Switzerland will for the time being refrain from new approaches, such as those hitherto made, to Swiss firms in the metallurgical and watch industries.

Should the question of similar approaches to firms in other industries arise, I wish to express the hope that, whenever possible, the Swiss Government will be given an opportunity for the discussion of such cases in the Mixed Commission before action is taken. I feel that it is only fair to warn you that, if such approaches are made to firms in other industries, the German Government may consider that the conditions on which it gives its consent to the compensation agreement are not being fulfilled, and that it may consequently refuse *Geleitscheine*.

I am writing in similar terms to Mr. Foot.

Signed by Hans Sulzer"

Fifth letter.

"Dear Dr. Sulzer, Mr. Riefler and I have now considered the points which you and Professor Keller raised at our interview on Thursday last.²⁸

As regards textiles, we are afraid that it is not possible for us to make a concession in advance of a general agreement. We were, however, impressed by what you had to say about the need for fodder for Swiss horses, especially those belonging to the army or which might be needed by the army. We are therefore prepared to grant navicerts or export licenses for 8000 tons of oats, on the following conditions:

(1) That during the forthcoming quarter ending 31st March 1943, the Swiss Government will not permit the export from Switzerland of any horses whatsoever (2) that so far as the Swiss Government are able to ensure it, these oats shall be fed exclusively to horses and not to cattle; (3) that this consignment of oats shall be treated as part of the compensation deal.

You will appreciate that we have only had a few hours in which to consider this specific point, and we are not yet in a position to guarantee that oats to this amount will be readily available. But if our conditions are accepted we will use our best endeavors to see that they are shipped.

This concession of 8000 tons of oats is designed to meet the immediate and urgent requirements which you explained to us. If, on your return to London, an agreement can be reached, we on our side shall of course be prepared to consider a higher quota for the period ending 31st March 1943.

The result of this arrangement will be as follows:

With the compensation deal signed your Government will at once be free to place orders for the various commodities therein set out, but substituting oats for an equivalent value of iron and steel, if they so desire. I told you on Thursday that even before you obtain *Geleitscheine* for any of the goods ordered by us, we shall be prepared,

²⁸ December 10.

as a gesture to the Swiss Army to release either 50 tons of rubber or 50 tons of toluol for immediate shipment. If, however, your Government prefers oats and they are readily available, Mr. Riefler and I will recommend to our Governments the substitution of oats for rubber or toluol.

The third point you raised was with reference to group 3 of the machinery formula. You asked us whether we could not diminish the number of items in this group and thus indicate the particular articles to which we were attaching the greatest importance. I am afraid we cannot promise more, at the present stage, than to consider this request. If your Government will agree to the principle of reductions item by item, as distinct from a global reduction, it may possibly be worth our while to reduce group 3 still further. But until we know whether they are willing to do so I do not think that very much purpose would be served by further consideration of these details.

Signed by D. M. Foot"

We are sending by air mail the originals of letters Nos. 2 and 4 and the enclosure to No. 1,²⁹ which is the detailed list of the Swiss machinery products desired by us drawn up in accordance with your earlier instructions.

It will be noted that the compensation agreement is identical with our previous instructions and reports. Under the general heading "iron and steel products to make up the balance of \$600,000," the Swiss desired to specify tinsplate, dynamo sheets and ordinary steel sheets, subject always to our supply position. After our agreement to this wording in accordance with your instructions to offer "such other products as may be desired by the Swiss and can be spared," the Swiss suddenly asked whether they could substitute oats up to 8,000 tons for the greater part of the iron and steel schedule. We accepted this proposal in line with the instructions under reference, but decided to handle the problem through a separate letter to Sulzer. The Swiss also indicated they might prefer the oats to be shipped immediately even before the 50 tons of rubber or toluol which we had said could be despatched on signature of the agreement. They indicated the Swiss Army was interested in oats in order to maintain their horses in good shape.

It will be noted that we were able to keep our concession regarding black list pressure on individual firms well within the discretion permitted by your instruction. Ministry of Economic Warfare has instructed its Legation in Bern to see to it that the Swiss military authorities are informed that certain quantities of toluol, or rubber or oats are available for immediate shipment.

Separate message on status of finance agreement follows. All questions relating to the proposed new war trade agreement and the re-

²⁹ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 6834, December 21, not printed.

establishment of blockade quotas for industrial raw materials have been postponed until the new year when the Swiss delegation will return from Bern after consultation with their Government on these problems. They state they are now impressed with the seriousness of our demand that real limitations be imposed on the export of arms, ammunition, and machinery to the Axis and will endeavor to obtain the necessary authority from their Government.

Not repeated to Bern.

We assume the Department will inform Bern and issue appropriate instructions ³⁰ in conformity with letter No. 3.

WINANT

³⁰ The Department sent information and instructions to the Minister in Switzerland in telegram No. 2864, December 18, midnight; not printed.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE CONCERNING SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES¹

740.0011 European War 1939/18301 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow),² January 8, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received January 9—4:20 a. m.]

25. I have received from Molotov³ a very long note,⁴ also a circular printed in the local papers, concerning German looting, torture, murder, and destruction as revealed by the Soviet reoccupation of areas overrun by the German forces. I shall send a translation of this document by mail.⁵

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/18328 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 9, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received January 9—8:49 a. m.]

19. The Finnish General Staff officer who is stationed at Riga for the purpose of obtaining food supplies for Finland informed Secretary of the Legation last night that the name of the Reichskommissar for "Ostland" is Lose.⁶ Under this officer there are general Kommissars for each of the three Baltic States with headquarters in Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn. Above the Reichskommissar for Ostland whose

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. i, pp. 597-667.

² The necessity for the removal of the American Embassy from Moscow to Kuibyshev in October 1941, with a reduced staff remaining in Moscow, is explained in *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. i, pp. 907-911.

³ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁴ This note of January 6, 1942, was translated in full in the *Moscow News* of January 12, 1942 under the heading: "Regarding the Wholesale Looting, Ruination of the Population and Monstrous Atrocities Perpetrated by the German Authorities on Soviet Territories Seized by Them." For correspondence regarding Allied declarations concerning German atrocities in occupied territories, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. i, pp. 445 ff.

⁵ Despatch No. 1464 of January 12, 1942, containing lengthy excerpts of this note in translation, not printed.

⁶ Heinrich Lohse.

headquarters are in Riga stands Rosenberg ⁷ who is the Supreme Chief of all the conquered Russian territories.

This same source confirms reports reaching us of extreme cruelty shown by the Germans to Russian prisoners of war. It seems to be a settled German policy to use the Russians as labor gangs until they are literally worked to death apparently on the theory that this policy will achieve concrete results in the form of work done and at the same time eliminate thousands of people who would otherwise have to be fed.

The same source states that on the whole opinion in the Baltic countries is pro-German if only for the reason that the German conquest of the three countries saved the populations from unimaginable persecution at the hands of the Russians.⁸ He said that in Riga alone 70,000 people had been killed or exiled. Food conditions in the Baltic States are good despite the fact that the German garrison makes considerable demands upon available supply. The daily meat ration in Latvia is 100 grams per person with 20 grams of butter.

Repeated to Stockholm.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/18452

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador ⁹ called at his request. He first handed me the attached memorandum ¹⁰ about the situation in Turkey and also about preparations going on for signatures to the Declaration of the twenty-six nations.¹¹ He seemed very much concerned about the latter, presumably on account of Latvia and one or two other countries recently absorbed by Russia.¹² I said that I was not doing anything at

⁷ Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

⁸ In a conversation with Minister Schoenfeld on January 12, 1942, reported in telegram No. 32 of the same day, the former Estonian Minister Varma expressed this feeling somewhat differently. He believed that the "Germans had tried for a thousand years without success to gain [the] sympathy of Baltic peoples, that Russians had taken only three months to win [the] sympathy of those peoples for Germans and that Lohse (German Commissioner) had destroyed this sympathy in two weeks." (740.0011 European War 1939/18424)

⁹ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov.

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ For a conversation on January 10, 1942, between Litvinov and the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Ray Atherton, in regard to possible signatories of the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, see the latter's memorandum, vol. I, p. 31.

¹² Regarding a Latvian note of January 4, 1942, of readiness to sign this Declaration, see memorandum of January 6 by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., *ibid.*, p. 29. For an Estonian note of January 12, 1942, see *ibid.*, p. 34. There was also a similar note on behalf of Lithuania, not printed, and in a discussion over it with Assistant Secretary Berle on January 9, 1942, the Lithuanian Minister, Povilas Zadeikis, remarked that "of course the ultimate fate of Lithuania must rest in large measure on the kindly and understanding attitude of the people and Government of the United States." (740.0011 European War 1939/17939) For correspondence regarding the invasion of these Baltic states and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

present on this, that our people were keeping on file sixty or seventy applications received and that, as I was not the author of this matter, I would suggest that he talk with the President, if the President should be disposed, and with the British in regard to the interpretation and the determination of eligibles. I said to him that I would have him do this before there would be any signatures and that I would try to notify him, as I do the British, when a signature is in the act of taking place. He left saying that he would call up the President in the hope of having a talk with him and Churchill ¹⁴ at the same time.

I inquired as to what he thought of the Russian front. He spoke with confidence and said they were holding all right. I then inquired as to whether the Germans would be able to establish their winter line across Russia. He thought they intended to establish their line running from Riga down near Smolensk and further south it would curve back so as not to approach the Crimean area. He said, of course, the Russians are expected to drive them as far as possible and hope to get near the Polish area.

He stated that he was very uneasy about Singapore and that it was most important to hold it unless the war was to be protracted for a considerable time.¹⁵

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.00115 European War 1939/1742

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1942.

MR. BERLE: In due course we shall probably be informed of such major decisions with regard to foreign policy as may have been arrived at during the course of the recent Churchill visit. Until we do know more about what has been decided we do not feel that we are in a position to make recommendations which may be out of line with the decisions reached.

When we learn whether any decisions have been taken with regard to Russia's territorial pretentions and when we know more about what our attitude is to be with regard to claims on the Baltic, we shall have a better idea as to the advisability of taking up with Litvinov the position of the Baltic peoples at present banished in Siberia and other remote regions of the Soviet Union.¹⁶

R[AY] A[THERTON]

¹⁴ British Prime Minister Winston Churchill came to Washington for conferences with President Roosevelt, December 22, 1941-January 14, 1942, interrupted by trips to Ottawa and Palm Beach.

¹⁵ The surrender of Singapore to the Japanese occurred on February 15, 1942.

¹⁶ The Department had information that about 10,000 Latvians, mostly from the intelligentsia, were imprisoned in punishment camps in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the northeastern corner of the European part of the Soviet Union, many at the place called Kedrovoy Bor, where natural conditions and bad camp arrangements caused uncommon hardship and suffering.

861.00/11923 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State.

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), January 17, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received January 18—1:18 a. m.]

56. *Krasnaya Zvezda* of January 9 announces in its leading editorial three party decrees simplifying and facilitating the admission into the party of soldiers who have distinguished themselves at the front. Recommendations may be made by party members knowing applicants less than 1 year; the 1 year candidacy period is reduced to 3 months; and the procedure for transferring from one party organization to another is simplified for soldiers. The purpose of the decrees, according to the editorial is to improve morale by creating strong party organizations in every military company.

The press has recently published numerous articles stating that "the best soldiers", "the outstanding collective farmers", and "the leading intellectuals" of the country are joining the party. These articles frequently criticize party organizations for delaying the admission of applicants and for failing to attract new members.

While it is true that the party policy of restricting admission was relaxed after the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939,¹⁷ the decrees and press items quoted above appear to indicate a definite reversal of the former policy on admissions which is not without significance. Although it may be that the reversal is a natural if delayed reaction to the purge of 1936-1939 similar to that of 1933 when large numbers of young engineers were taken into the party after the purgings and liquidations of 1932, it is considered that the reasons for the change are more fundamental.

The chief purpose of the new policy, it is believed, is to reestablish party prestige which suffered considerably after the outbreak of war. Reports indicate that soldiers at the front have said that they are fighting for the soil and not for what is on it. The party as the [originator?] of policy is responsible in their formula for the fact that they suffered want a good many years in order to create a mechanized army which, when war came, proved inadequate. "Stalin's wise policy of peace", they are quoted as saying, resulted in giving oil and grain to the Germans which they are now using against the Russians. The same criticism is heard among "intellectuals". It would, therefore, appear that the effort of the press to show that "the best soldiers" are now joining the party is an attempt to rehabilitate the party in the eyes of the commanding officers.

It has been suggested that a further reason for the reversal of policy may be concern on the part of the Kremlin lest the independence of

¹⁷ This congress was held in Moscow March 10-21, 1939. For reports on the activities of this assemblage, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 739-756, *passim*.

thought engendered by life in the front lines persist after the war in which case it is safer to have the potentially unruly elements under closer control and stricter surveillance which prevails within the party.

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/18806

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1942.

The Minister of Australia¹⁸ called at his request.

He said that there was an intermission in the Soviet situation, about which he was not informed. I stated that Soviet Russia would not give us bases in the Far East to enable us to send materials to her, nor does Russia intend to fight Japan at present. I added that I had stated to the Soviet Ambassador, soon after his arrival here, that I assumed his Government knew that Japan would attack Russia whenever Germany requested her to do so, and the Soviet Ambassador had replied to the effect that they were busily engaged with Germany and did not think it wise to indulge in any act that might bring on war with Japan during the next few months.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/18832

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called at his request.

I inquired as to the opinion of the Ambassador regarding the prospects of pushing the Germans on toward the Polish border, and he said that this would involve a great distance. I also inquired if the Germans could dig in and construct houses sufficient to maintain a shorter line during the balance of the winter, and he replied that they would keep the Germans moving.

I expressed the admiration of this Government and country in regard to the marvelous resistance of the Russians.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹⁸ Richard G. Casey.

861.6363/422 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 26, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 11:10 a. m.]

19. E. A. Berthoud, British oil expert on Lyttelton's¹⁹ Cairo staff, informed me last evening that he had come to Moscow to discuss a request made by Commissar of Foreign Trade Mikoyan²⁰ to Sir Stafford Cripps²¹ for a formal agreement with precise commitments in place of the oral British assurances respecting the supply of oil to Russia in the event that the destruction of the Caucasus oil fields should become necessary. Berthoud said that the British view was that a formal agreement was not necessary, that it would involve complications with the British dominions and Britain's allies and that it would be extremely difficult to work out precise commitments with respect to such an uncertain contingency.²²

Berthoud did not see Mikoyan but was referred to his assistant Krutikov²³ who told him that the Soviet Government does not now consider a formal agreement to be necessary. In reply to a question Krutikov said that this change of view was chiefly due to the improvement in the military situation.

In this connection Berthoud said that the evacuation of equipment in one of the Caucasian fields had begun on December 4 but had been stopped on December 15 by orders from Moscow. He said that the British experts sent to assist in this work had been amazed at the thoroughness and speed with which it was being carried out.

Repeated to Kuibyshev.

THOMPSON

¹⁹ Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State and member of the War Cabinet from July 1, 1941; representative of the War Cabinet in the Middle East to concert non-military measures in that area.

²⁰ Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan.

²¹ British Ambassador in the Soviet Union until January 22, 1942; on February 19, Lord Privy Seal and in the War Cabinet as Leader of the House of Commons.

²² For the original request for an agreement covering the supply of oil in these circumstances, see telegram No. 2001, December 1, 1941, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 660.

²³ Alexey Dmitriyevich Krutikov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 European War 1939/18844 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1942—11 p. m.

252. For Tittmann.²⁴ Your 11, January 20.²⁵ In answer to inquiries you may state in confidence that the policy of your Government with regard to the Baltic States has undergone no change.

HULL

861.5018/50 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 29 [28], 1942—midnight.

[Received January 29—8:47 a. m.]

25. For Agriculture. Department's telegram No. 12, January 24, 11 a. m.²⁶ Effective February 1 a new first category food card is established for workers engaged in defense industries. It provides 800 grams of bread per day and the same amounts of other commodities as the second category cards.

Second category cards are issued to manual workers and in addition to 600 grams of bread per day provide for the following amounts in kilograms per month: meat 2.2, sugar .4, candy .5, butter .3, vegetable oil .5, grits 2, potatoes 5, salt .4, tea .025.

Third category cards which are issued to office workers provide 500 grams of bread per day and about one-third less of the other items than second category cards.

Fourth category consists of adult dependents and fifth category consists of children under 12 years of age, both receive 400 grams bread daily and roughly one-fourth of the quantities of other items allotted to second category workers. Unemployed children over 12 are placed in the fourth group which receives less sugar and butter than the fifth.

Recently there has been some grading downwards of occupations. Apart from bread only about one-half of the commodities provided on the cards were actually issued during January particularly in the lower categories and it is understood that many of the items will

²⁴ Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Assistant to the personal representative of President Roosevelt (Myron C. Taylor) to Pope Pius XII, Vatican City.

²⁵ Not printed. This telegram, relayed from Bern as No. 237 of January 23, 1942, announced that inquiries were being pressed regarding rumors, probably of German origin, that while the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, had been in Moscow in December 1941, a bargain had been struck whereby the Soviet Union in principle "received a free hand in the Baltic States."

²⁶ Not printed.

not be obtainable at all in February. On the other hand it should be borne in mind that many workers are provided with meals by their organizations or are allowed to buy in special stores.

Judging from the situation in Moscow the food problem may become critical by spring²⁷ and the reconquering of devastated territory will of course only aggravate the immediate situation.

THOMPSON

861.00/11928 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 6, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received February 6—9:01 p. m.]

33. A number of governmental organizations that had been evacuated from Moscow have returned during the past month. In most cases, however, only a part of the personnel have been brought back and sections of these organizations are being maintained elsewhere. An office of the Bank for Foreign Trade was reestablished in Moscow this month and the University has been partially reopened.

I understand that the Stalin Auto Works and several other factories which could not be efficiently operated in temporary quarters are to reopen in Moscow but in general it is understood that the industries that have been evacuated will not be brought back at this time.

Repeated to Kuibyshev.

THOMPSON

740.0011 European War 1939/19548 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 18, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received February 18—12:36 p. m.]

142. Soviet military communiqués for the past 2 weeks have asserted that the Red Army is continuing the advance begun early in December, although meeting more effective resistance, but have omitted the customary listings of the places recaptured. This is

²⁷ The Chargé reported from Kuibyshev in telegram No. 271, April 2, 1942, that it had become known that during 2 months of the past winter there had been 650,000 deaths from starvation in Leningrad. At the Embassy itself he had felt it necessary "to begin serving soup daily to all employees". (861-5018/53). The Ambassador related in telegram No. 119 from Moscow on April 21, 1942, that deaths from starvation in Leningrad were continuing at an estimated rate of 1500 to 3000 a day (861.5018/55).

interpreted by some observers to denote important gains which will only be revealed February 23, the anniversary of the creation of the Red Army.

The military operations now in progress may be described as an interlude between the unsuccessful German campaign of 1941 and Hitler's contemplated final campaign of 1942, the objective of the Red Army being to press its present offensive to the point where it shall have at least seriously dislocated the German plans for the launching of this campaign in the spring.

The ability of the Red Army to withstand the impending struggle will be affected by factors difficult to evaluate such [as:] (a) The reserves of manpower (believed to be fully adequate). (b) The capacity of established and transplanted war industries in the East (alleged to be capable of providing a large part but not enough of the planes, tanks and other equipment needed. The correspondent of the United Press²⁸ who recently visited Sverdlovsk professed to be astonished by the magnitude of the industrial plant in that area now in progress). (c) Food supplies. (There are many reports that a serious food shortage already exists and that there is even fear of famine. I must say, however, that such reports have been persistently recurrent during my stay in the Soviet Union); (d) the extent of American and British aid (this may be affected by raiding operations against convoys on the northern route and through the Indian Ocean resulting from the escape of the *Gneisenau*, *Prince Eugen*, and *Scharnhorst*,²⁹ and from the fall of Singapore); (e) Japan (it is not likely that the Soviet Union could increase deliveries to China sufficiently to meet the situation that would result from the closing of the Burma Road, and the collapse of Chinese resistance would presumably imperil the general Soviet position in the Far East and even the flow of supplies through Vladivostok. It would appear probable, therefore, that developments of this character as well as those suggested in (d) may govern the major policy of the Soviet Government in the immediate future. If we are prepared to place effective bomber forces in the Soviet Maritime Province at once that policy might incline toward war with Japan—although I see [say] this of course without any knowledge of the Soviet attitude).

THURSTON

²⁸ Henry Shapiro.

²⁹ These German warships made good their escape from Brest, proceeded up the English Channel, and reached home in spite of British attacks, February 11-13, 1942.

123 Standley, Wm. H./15: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KULIBYSHEV (MOSCOW), February 23, 1942—3 p. m.
[Received February 24—9:01 p. m.]

157. After considerable hesitation I venture respectfully to express the opinion that the departure of Ambassador Standley should not be postponed to the extent implied in the Department's 69, February 13, 10 p. m.,³⁰ but that on the contrary he should if possible proceed to his post at once.³¹

Apart from the general inadvisability of leaving this mission without a chief for a period of 5 or 6 months at this juncture, there are specific considerations which I believe make it advisable for us to have an Ambassador here who could overcome bureaucratic barriers and gain access to the real directive center of the Soviet Government and in particular exchange views and war plans with Stalin.³² It is hardly necessary for me to remind the Department that a Chargé d'Affaires (and in fact most Ministers and Ambassadors) is restricted to dealings with lesser Soviet functionaries who are seldom empowered to engage in constructive discussion on even minor matters. It seems obvious that decisive developments in the present World War will occur during the next 90 days and that, without disparaging the British war effort or the military operations of the Chinese Nationalist Government, Russia (as the only power actually at grips with Germany and likely to be in a position to inflict physical defeat upon Hitler's armies and as the only geographical area from which effective action can be directed against Japan proper) plays a principal role.

While it is generally assumed that should Hitler be able to do so he will resume his general offensive in Russia this spring, it is possible that he may merely establish holding positions along the northern lines and direct the full force of his renewed operations to the southeast having first brought Bulgaria into the Axis as a participating and active member. Either operation might produce problems which would call for quick and direct conversations in Moscow, and similar shifts in the Far East resulting from a decline in Chinese resistance might bring about a condition (in connection with which speedy and constructive conversations should also take place) which

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ Rear Adm. William H. Standley had been appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union on February 14, 1942. He arrived in Kulibyshev on April 7, 1942, and presented his credentials to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, on April 14.

³² Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union.

would lead to hostilities between the Soviet Union and Japan—and thus open the way to us for assault upon the Japanese islands.

THURSTON

861.415/68: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 24, 1942—3 a. m.

[Received February 25—5:48 a. m.]

163. The local paper³³ of February 23, received last evening, published the lengthy order of the day issued by Stalin as Commissar for Defense on the occasion of Red Army Day. The order may be characterized as a general summary of the war propaganda line taken by the Soviet press for the past several months. It is noteworthy that it contains no reference to Russia's allies or to material assistance being given to the Soviet Union by the United States and Great Britain. Stalin emphasized the direct support which the Germans are receiving at the front from Italian, Rumanian and Finnish troops and stated that for time being the Red Army does not enjoy similar support. The order lists no Soviet victories beyond those which have been announced in the past, but contains the statement that "not far off is the day when the Red Army by a powerful blow will hurl the brutal enemy back from Leningrad, will cleanse the cities and villages of White Russia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Karelin of them, and will liberate the Soviet Crimea, and Soviet flags will again wave victoriously over all Soviet soil". The order contains no allusion to the possibility of a German spring offensive, although it remarks that the enemy is still strong and will exert every effort to gain successes.

Three paragraphs in the latter portion of the order are of special interest. These refer to foreign press "chatter" to the effect that the Red Army has as its aim the annihilation of the German people and the destruction of the German state. Such statements are described as foolish and a "stupid slander" against the Red Army, which "does not and cannot have such idiotic aims". The Red Army is said to have as its aim on the other hand, the expulsion of the occupying German forces from the Soviet Union and the liberation of Soviet soil from the "German Fascist aggressors". Stalin stated that it is very probable that the war for the liberation of Soviet soil will result in the exile or annihilation of Hitler's clique and that such a result would be welcomed, but that it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German state. "History shows that Hitlers come and go but the German people and the German state remain." He went on to say that the Red Army is free of any feeling of

³³ *Volzhskaya Kommuna*.

racial hatred, contradicting further statements alleged to have appeared in the foreign press in the sense that the Soviet people hate the Germans for being Germans. The Red Army is stated to have been trained in a spirit of racial equality and of respect for the rights of other peoples. It does, however, annihilate the occupiers who refuse to surrender because they wish to enslave the Fatherland. If they surrender they are taken prisoner and their lives spared.

The same paper carries an article by Kalinin in honor of Red Army Day which consists largely of an appeal for greater war efforts by the Soviet civilian population. He refers to the possibility of a spring offensive by stating that Hitler, not having anything to boast about, is threatening to take revenge by a new offensive in the spring. "We will exert every effort to disrupt these plans of Hitler also."

A striking feature of Red Army Day has been the absence of the expected announcement concerning the recapture of cities and towns by the Red Army. It is further noticeable that no summary of the results of 8 months of war was attempted by Stalin on this occasion as might also have been expected.

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/19695 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 24, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received February 24—6 : 50 p. m.]

46. For Stettinius³⁴ from Faymonville.³⁵

1. Reference your 38, February 17, 11 a. m.³⁶ As Colonel Michela³⁷ and Captain Park³⁸ were unavoidably delayed in reaching Moscow, their visit to front was postponed and they have returned to Kuibyshev to participate there in Red Army Anniversary observances February 23. They are expected in Moscow again shortly. I have been promised that on their forthcoming trip to front, their itinerary will be similar to that which Lieutenant General MacFarlane, Chief of British Military Mission, was permitted to follow.

2. At suggestion of Minister Thurston, I request that all personnel of our organization ordered to Soviet Union be informed before departure from the United States that it is a violation of Soviet law to bring rubles into the Union. In view of the present willingness of the

³⁴ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator.

³⁵ Col., later Brig. Gen., Philip R. Faymonville, Head of the American Supply Mission in the Soviet Union, Lend-Lease representative.

³⁶ Not printed.

³⁷ Col., later Brig. Gen., Joseph A. Michela, Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.

³⁸ Capt., later Maj., Richard Park, Jr., Assistant Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.

Soviet Government to accord certain exchange privileges³⁹ to American diplomatic representatives on the understanding that Soviet currency will not be obtained illegally it is especially necessary that this law be strictly observed.

3. Please inform General Leeth as the following points seem to me important in estimate of military situation:

First, German Army is withdrawing with enough material and personnel to form nucleus of strong striking force in April. If this nucleus is augmented, as expected here by 4 months' production of German munitions industry and 700,000 men, German striking force will be able to deliver a blow equal to that of June 22 on either northern or White Russian or Ukrainian front but probably not on two fronts simultaneously;

Second, Soviet forces can continue drive at present rate through spring and undoubtedly plan to do so. Manpower can be raised and trained to make good any probable losses. Hand arms and ammunition can be provided for newly raised Soviet armies. Aircraft, tanks, artillery and more technical classes of equipment not yet being replaced by Soviet munitions industry at same rate as destruction and no prospect of equalling destruction rate for many months;

Third, no possibility that additional obligations can be assumed by Red Army in the Far East without critically weakening western armies;

Fourth, Russian General Staff believes that Hitlerism can be defeated on Russian front and probably more quickly and decisively than elsewhere, but to finish in 1942 immediate supply of munitions items must be increased and Soviet munitions industry must be strongly supported. Principal requirements in finished items remain tanks, planes, antiaircraft and antitank guns and ammunition;

Fifth, morale of Red Army is high and no sign of weakening even in face of losses. Civilian backing is strong, in spite of new taxes, less food, and more difficult economic situation. Concentration on plans to liberate occupied territory has brought greater unity of political thought and patriotic effort than at any time in modern Russian history;

Sixth, feeling is prevalent that sacrifices of Red Army are not appreciated abroad, that an equal amount of fortitude shown in Malaya and Africa would have reduced materially the threat against Allied interests, that in the common effort against Hitlerism, the greatest burdens have fallen on the Russian people and that Russian desires to restore boundaries of 1941 are not sympathetically understood by Allies abroad who should be the first to acknowledge their justice.

[Faymonville]

THOMPSON

³⁹ A special exchange rate for diplomatic representatives of 12 rubles for \$1 went into effect on March 18, 1941. See telegrams No. 538, March 19, 1941, and No. 707, April 8, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 871 and 875, respectively.

740.0011 European War 1939/20316 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 15, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received March 16—2 a. m.]

71. My 68, March 12, 3 p. m.⁴⁰ Garreau⁴¹ informed me yesterday that Molotov had sent for him and had received him with great cordiality. He told him that so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, de Gaulle⁴² is the true representative of the French people and that Russia desires the restoration of a strong France. He said that Molotov agreed in principle to a French division being sent to the Russian front provided the British were willing to release them. Garreau informed me that the matter has already been discussed with the British and that de Gaulle contemplates sending his best Syrian division.

Repeated to Kuibyshev.

THOMPSON

740.0011 European War 1939/20497 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*⁴³

Moscow, March 20, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 6:18 p. m.]

76. I find a wide divergence of opinion among observers here with respect to the present military situation. There is general agreement that the Germans have been forced to draw upon their reserves both of men and materials to meet the Soviet winter offensive and that the German preparations for a spring offensive have been seriously affected. Some even consider that the Germans have suffered so heavily that they are incapable of launching a major attack and German air strength in particular is said to have been vitally weakened. A British officer informs me that a Russian Admiral told him yesterday that because of the heavy losses on both sides he did not believe that the present struggle could be long continued and added that contrary to their expectations that machines and matériel would decide the issue, it now appears that the determining factor will be manpower.

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ Roger Garreau, delegate of the French National Committee with personal rank of Minister; he had arrived in Moscow on March 8, 1942.

⁴² Gen. Charles de Gaulle, president of the French National Committee, leader of the Free French.

⁴³ In acknowledgment by telegram No. 77 on March 24, 1942, the Department stated that it was "very glad" to have this telegram because it was "extremely helpful."

On the other hand many observers point to the failure of the Russians to destroy the German armies or make any important breakthrough under the winter conditions most favorable to them and consider that the Germans will be able to deliver crippling if not vital blows as soon as weather conditions permit. General MacFarlane recently informed me that he finds the Russians themselves to be confident of their strength but fully aware that they have a bitter struggle ahead of them. MacFarlane said in strict confidence that his own opinion was that if the Germans concentrated their forces, they would be capable of making serious breaks in the Russian defenses, but said that it was difficult to estimate the extent to which they would be able to exploit these successes. In general he is not inclined to be optimistic.

2. Have been informed in the strictest confidence by what I consider to be the best informed foreign observer in Russia that the military situation is most grave. He said that Russian losses have been extremely heavy and that while the Germans have been pushed back some distance the Russians have been unable to achieve any important tactical much less strategical success. He is convinced that the Russians are incapable of maintaining their offensive after the end of winter conditions and said that from his own observations Russian transport is in deplorable condition. He emphasized most strongly, however, the seriousness of the food situation and said that famine conditions already exist in many parts of the country and that within a very short time, possibly 2 or 3 months, this situation may become catastrophic.⁴⁴ He said that there is already great bitterness among the civilian population but pointed out that as long as sufficient food and munitions continued to reach the front the army would remain loyal and that the civilian population alone is powerless. He referred to the well known fact that Russian cities and Moscow in particular receive preferential treatment so far as food is concerned but said that within a few weeks he thought the gravity of the food shortage would become evident throughout the country. (Apart from bread the only food issued on an "employee's" food card in Moscow so far this month has been 200 grams of salt and 200 grams of fish.) My informant believes that the Germans have been forced to draw heavily upon their reserves but thinks that they are capable of making a strong attack and doubts whether the Russians will be able to hold the Caucasus if the Germans make this their objective.

As my informant could readily be identified here I respectfully request that this report be given only the most guarded dissemination.

THOMPSON

⁴⁴ A decree had been published on March 13, 1942, describing measures to be taken to increase communal livestock on collective (kolkhoz) and state (sovkhoz) farms, and the personal livestock of collective farmers.

861.50/958

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary
of State*⁴⁵

[Extracts]

No. 1491

KUIBYSHEV, March 20, 1942.

[Received May 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to submit on the following pages a brief review of certain economic developments in the Soviet Union since the outbreak of the Soviet-German hostilities. As the greater portion of the files of the Embassy, including its economic files, were destroyed prior to its evacuation from Moscow in October 1941 and as the circumstances under which it has been operating since the commencement of the German attack on the Soviet Union last June have precluded the maintenance of as complete or continuous a record of economic events as would normally be the case, the present report is inevitably less specific and less supported by statistical data than could be wished. So far as statistical data are concerned, very little of more than the most general character have appeared in the Soviet press. Since the advance of Soviet economy during the entire year 1941 has been completely overshadowed and conditioned by the progress of the war, main emphasis is laid in this review upon the impact and influence of the war on Soviet agriculture, industry, labor and transport.

In the preparation of the report the Department's instruction No. 538 of September 16, 1941,⁴⁶ with its enclosure concerning reports desired by the Department of Commerce, has been borne in mind.

Introductory.

The dominant theme of Soviet internal propaganda and exhortation for years past has been the urgency with which the country must prepare for enemy attack and strengthen itself in order that it might be ready to withstand that attack when it should come. To an ever increasing degree the entire economy of the nation has been concentrated upon this main aim and no hardship which its realization might impose upon the population has been permitted to stand in the way of its accomplishment. Many observers have in the past believed that the resultant emphasis upon the development of heavy industry at the expense of light industry has constituted a fundamental weakness of Soviet economic development. From the point of view of a peace time economy it may be presumed that these ob-

⁴⁵ In its acknowledgment of June 16, 1942, the Department replied that "this report is timely and helpful and is particularly appreciated" and that "further reports of this scope and character . . . would be of value to the Department and the agencies of the Government."

⁴⁶ Not printed.

servers were correct in their surmise. Certainly no one can deny that in an unswerving adherence to the determination to strengthen the country defensively as rapidly and as completely as possible the Soviet leaders have laid a heavy burden upon the people, but one which their unsurpassed capacity for endurance has enabled them to bear without breaking.

The test of the Soviet policy began on June 22, 1941, when the German army moved across the Russian frontiers, and its issue is thus far undetermined. When the attack came it was with few exceptions the general belief of foreign observers that the Germans would be able to take what they wanted within a few months, that the Red Army would probably collapse after a brief sharp struggle, that very likely the régime would fall, and that a condition of chaos might well ensue behind the lines. This opinion prevailed throughout the summer months and into the opening of winter. The German advance was rapid and sure. The Ukraine was lost, with its agriculture and industry. Leningrad was seriously threatened. The enemy was battering at the gates of Moscow, which was partially evacuated.

Then, when the supreme trial came, with Moscow practically surrounded, the Russians held, threw the Germans back, and launched their own counter-offensive. The régime, partly due to the psychological effect of Stalin's having remained in Moscow throughout the campaign, is stronger than before, and the outlook, though highly dubious is better than could have been expected some months ago.

Severe winter weather conditions have undoubtedly aided the Russians, but these have, too, been nearly as hard for them as for their attackers. The great size of their country and their numerical superiority have also placed them on a more nearly equal footing with the Germans than has been enjoyed by other countries overrun by the German army. Soviet army morale appears to have been magnificent; love of the Russian soil and hatred of the attacker seem to have transcended all other considerations. The Russians' endurance has been spoken of, their mechanical ability is demonstrably outstanding, and their courage must be accepted as axiomatic. Soviet economic policy was pointed on war, the war was brought to the Soviet Union, and the results up to date can only be said to have justified the policy.

Agriculture.

At the time of the furthest point of the German advance into Soviet territory, in the late autumn of last year, it was estimated by the Embassy (despatch No. 1468, January 16 [15], 1942,⁴⁷ "The Effect of the War on Soviet Agriculture and on the Food Situation in the Soviet Union") that approximately 45,000,000 hectares out of 130,-

⁴⁷ Not printed.

000,000 hectares of cultivated land, or about 34 percent of the entire cultivated area of the country, had been lost to the Germans. This figure was also estimated to include 16,000,000 out of 62,000,000 hectares sown to bread grains (wheat and rye). It is thought likely that a considerable share of the winter crops in the invaded areas had been harvested and a part shipped eastward in the spring of 1941. Most of the spring grain must, however, have been lost. In the unoccupied districts grain crop forecasts were generally excellent or good. As has been reported, on the other hand, harvest losses were abnormally heavy on account of a shortage of labor, tractors and tractor parts, and draft animals. This delayed harvesting and was accompanied by early snowfall in certain areas. In general it is believed that notwithstanding these factors the barn yield was fairly satisfactory in the parts of the country not affected by military operations.

It was also calculated in the Embassy's despatch referred to that the present population of the unoccupied areas (not taking into consideration those districts reoccupied by the Soviet forces in the course of the counter-offensive which began early in December) amounts to approximately 130,000,000 people, including some 20,000,000 refugees from occupied territory. To feed this population, which includes, of course, the army, it was estimated that approximately 35,500,000 tons of bread grains would be required annually, and that, figuring on a high harvesting loss of 30 percent, for the reasons cited, the available area could produce about 32,200,000 tons. With requisite seed reserves of some 5,000,000 tons this leaves a bread cereal deficit of more than 8,000,000 tons.

The food outlook is aggravated by the loss of much of the area producing supplementary food crops, estimated at nearly 50 percent in the case of potatoes, and more than 60 percent for other vegetables, including over 40 percent for cabbage. More than 80 percent of the area heretofore under sugar beets has also been lost.

As regards a probable early shortage in the case of bread grains, a good deal obviously depends upon the amounts which may have been stored by the government in recent past years to meet just such an emergency, in line with the preparedness program. No reliable estimate of these quantities has ever been provided (a figure of 10,000,000 tons was at one time mentioned) and it is equally not known to what degree they have been dissipated by deliveries to Germany under the Soviet-German economic agreement concluded in 1939.⁴⁸ It is possible, if not probable, on the other hand, that appreciable stores may remain, for it will be recalled that it was persistently reported prior to the outbreak of the war that stores of essential foods were being built up

⁴⁸ Signed at Moscow on August 19, 1939. For text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII, p. 142.

far to the rear in the Ural districts. Private sources have stated also, for example, that grain reserves near Moscow are adequate to support the city's population for one year and that at least some of the rationing now in force is designed to conserve for the future rather than to combat a present emergency.

The urgency with which the government regards the need to make good the losses which it has sustained in respect of agricultural land and to obtain supplies to aid in tiding it over the intervening period was indicated in part by the fact that at the Moscow conference in September ⁴⁹ it sought to obtain from abroad not less than 200,000 tons of grain and 70,000 tons of sugar a month for the six succeeding months. The press of recent months has carried repeated mention of the need for and the plan to increase the cultivated areas in the eastern, unoccupied districts, to combine the use of draft animals with that of tractors, to intensify the cultivation of individual vegetable gardens, and to train new farm personnel (including women) to take the places of those called to arms. . . .

It is improbable that areas reoccupied by the Soviet forces will furnish additional food supplies before the autumn harvest for obvious reasons. Such areas will, of course, require seed from the districts which were not occupied, and the population remaining in reoccupied territory will have to be fed, mainly from other districts for the time being. When it is further recalled that much of the occupied territory represented Russia's best agricultural land and produced surpluses for "export", that many of the unoccupied districts have been regarded as deficit areas in food production, and that the accretion of large numbers of refugees to these latter areas can only aggravate the deficit position, the food outlook, for the coming spring and summer months at least, appears critical. It is to be noted in this connection that the Soviet authorities have recently indicated their need and wish for large quantities of American fats and meats for army consumption.

Industry.

Of vital import to Soviet national economy and from the more immediate point of view to the progress of the Soviet war effort is the degree to which Soviet industry has been dislocated or destroyed by the advance of the German armed forces into Soviet territory during the summer and autumn of 1941, and linked with an exam-

⁴⁹ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, and Chairman of the Special Mission to the Soviet Union, with a British counterpart led by Lord Beaverbrook, held conferences in Moscow, September 29–October 1, 1941. For correspondence concerning the Harriman–Beaverbrook Mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 825–851, *passim*.

ination of this factor is an attempt to estimate the success achieved in the valiant efforts which have certainly been made to evacuate eastward and put into renewed production as much industrial plant and equipment as could be moved before the arrival of the invaders. Prior to the opening of the Soviet counter-offensive early in December of 1941 it was estimated by the Embassy (see its telegram No. 2003 of December 1, 1941⁵⁰) that scarcely less than 40 percent of all its industry must then be presumed to have been lost to the Soviet Union as a result of the German attack. This figure was reached on the assumption, based on Soviet published sources, that slightly more than 18 percent of all Soviet industry was located in the Ukraine, approximately 2 percent in White Russia, 14 percent in the Leningrad district (presumed practically all lost or so badly dislocated by the German attack on that city as to be nearly unusable), and about 5 percent in the other occupied territories. The estimate of 40 percent loss did not take into account such dislocations as may have occurred in the Moscow, Yaroslavl, Gorki, Tula, Ryazan and Ivanovo oblasts⁵¹ which alone are considered to have contained 30 percent of all Soviet industrial plant. It is believed that in the event it is incorrect to assume that the Leningrad area had been for practical purposes lost as a source of industrial output, the dislocations in the districts mentioned would more than offset any such error and bring the total loss well up to 40 percent. With respect to the Ukraine, it will not be amiss to recapitulate the estimate submitted with respect to industrial losses in that area. Published data indicate that the Ukraine has yielded over 60 percent of the total coal and coke production of the Soviet Union and that almost 77 percent of all the coking coal produced comes from the Don Basin. Furthermore, more than 60 percent of the total aluminum output came from the Ukraine in 1939. In that year, also, the Ukraine accounted for 66 percent of the total production of pig iron, 52 percent of the steel output, and 37.5 percent of the output of rolled steel. As is well known, the Ukraine is in addition an important center for the production of the agricultural machinery, machine building, electrical machinery, and chemical industries. Out of the total manganese ore production, it may be added, approximately 35 percent has been supplied by the Ukraine.

Direct, first-hand information with respect to the degree of success achieved by the Soviet authorities in transferring industrial plant, equipment and personnel eastward is evidently impossible to adduce under existing circumstances, except in isolated instances. Losses due to lack of organization, careless handling and long exposure of

⁵⁰ Not printed.

⁵¹ A large political area, region.

evacuated machinery are believed, however, to have been considerable. The members of the Embassy staff who spent the summer in Kazan, for example, saw a good deal of machinery, as has been reported, lying unprotected along the roadsides near the railway yards, exposed for a protracted period to deteriorating weather conditions and believed almost undoubtedly ruined. It was also learned in Kazan that certain factories had been allotted premises near that city, but that these had been found unsuitable or inadequate when the transferred machinery arrived and efforts to set it up were made, so that it had to be reshipped to another location. Stories of this sort have been heard from other districts, from refugees or foreign travelers. The press has also referred to the power problem which has arisen in connection with the setting up of evacuated plants in the rear.

While much has been written in the press of the completeness with which the policy of destruction of industrial plant was carried out by the Soviet forces prior to and during their retreat in the face of German pressure last year, items which have appeared since the launching of the Soviet counter-offensive in December indicate that this process may have been less thoroughly completed than might have been supposed. There has been frequent mention in recent weeks, for example of the destruction which the Germans in their turn have been found to have caused prior to their own retreat from areas which they had occupied and of the havoc discovered to have been wrought by them in towns reoccupied by the Soviet armies. Damage to industrial plant has been specifically referred to and exhortations have been frequent with regard to the need to put plant back into operation as rapidly as possible in such districts. The American chemist above quoted⁵² also reported that in various cases the Germans had made good use of equipment wrecked but left behind by the Soviets at the time of their retreat, breaking up such machinery into scrap and shipping it back to Germany. These reports indicate that the Soviets will not have an easy time in endeavoring to repair or reinstall equipment in places which they reoccupy. The press has urged special industry and diligence in the performance of such work, and it has also lately reported the resumption of operation of, for instance, a number of mines and electric power stations in districts which have been retaken.

The immediate problem confronting the Soviet Union, of course, is the degree to which, having lost so large a proportion of its industrial capacity to the invader, it can continue its war effort during the months of testing which appear inevitably to lie before it. It is

⁵² This passage has been omitted.

manifestly impossible to evaluate the possibilities in this regard in the absence of complete, or in fact of more than the most fragmentary, reliable data. The information published in the press is inescapably, and also intentionally, richly tinged with propaganda and in addition to the fact that no outsider is permitted to travel in the Soviet Union except within the most prescribed limits, the Soviet authorities have proved themselves exceedingly reluctant to provide even those associated with them in the struggle against Hitler with information respecting their own production. There is evidence that certain vital industries which have been more or less unaffected by the invasion, such as the oil industry and part of the non-ferrous metallurgy group, generally fulfilled or exceeded their production plants in 1941. There is evidence that Soviet production had attained a position prior to the outbreak of the war which had enabled it to build up and maintain, largely unaided throughout the major portion of the balance of the year, a production which, plus reserves already in hand, provided enough of the material sinews of war to check the advance of the invader and to turn him back, at least temporarily. The size of the losses in industry which have been sustained, however, and which no glossing over can effectively reduce, cause it to seem highly problematical whether the Soviets can keep their effort at the necessary level with the plant at their present disposition to withstand an onslaught in the spring of 1942 comparable in intensity and scope to that launched against them in 1941. As was pointed out in a recent telegram (No. 16, January 5, 1942⁵³) the losses in coal and steel capacity in the Ukraine represent a very large share in the normal output of the country of these basic commodities. The same is true of manganese, for further example. The movement of plants eastward, the development of new mines, the intensification of concentration on the making of war materials to the exclusion of all other but the most indispensable items, will certainly aid. On the other hand, it appears evident that a great deal depends upon the speed and volume of the material assistance which is extended to the Soviet Union by the United States and Great Britain. Perhaps it is too much to say that this factor will prove decisive in determining the outcome of the struggle, but it may well prove so—assuming that the next German drive is unabated in vigor in comparison with that of the past season. The loss of the Far Eastern supplies of rubber and tin as a result of the Japanese offensive is already causing concern inasmuch as the Soviet Union is far from self-supporting in these commodities. It will have been observed that the Soviet authorities have been increasing their requests for supplies from the United States and Britain since the articles and quantities listed in the secret protocol to the Moscow Conference were laid down.

⁵³ Not printed.

Labor.

The urgent and compelling demands of the military effort on Soviet manpower has, of course, created an immediate and serious labor problem in both agriculture and industry. Current estimates, which must necessarily be regarded with due reserve in the absence of any official confirmation, place the total of the Soviet armed forces when the war began at 5,000,000 men. They further give the present total as 10,000,000 and calculate losses (killed, wounded, missing and taken prisoner) at a figure in the neighborhood of 3,500,000. This means that not less than 8,000,000 men of military age have been withdrawn from agriculture and industry since the commencement of hostilities. (The efforts of the authorities ever since the war began to facilitate the evacuation of the population from threatened areas is more likely to have been motivated by a realization of the danger of a labor shortage than by humanitarian considerations.)

The Soviet Union in these times is fortunate in its women. Physically tough and accustomed to hardship they are equal to the men of weaker nations in their capacity to work and endure. They have long been used to the carrying out of duties usually assigned to men elsewhere. They can till the soil, they can operate complex machinery, they can dig trenches and build fortifications in front of Moscow.

The shortage of labor remains, however, a matter of real concern and drastic measures have been taken in order to endeavor to ensure the maintenance of an adequate and regular supply of workers. Penalties for failure to come to work have been rigorous and numerous examples of these have been cited in the press, by way of warning. Slackness has been frequently and bitterly inveighed against. A ukase was published on December 28, 1941,⁵⁴ establishing severer penalties than those laid down in an earlier ukase for voluntary departure from work by workers and employees in war industry. This ukase indicates that its predecessor had failed to put a stop to "drifting" and its preamble suggests that the more difficult conditions of work encountered by workers in evacuated enterprises had caused some of them to quit their jobs arbitrarily.

As reported by the Embassy at the time (Embassy's telegram No. 156, February 21, 1942⁵⁵), an important ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. was published on February 14, 1942, which provides that of the country's urban population all men from 16 to 55 years of age and all women from 16 to 45 years of age, who are capable of work and who are not already employed in state

⁵⁴ See telegram No. 2109, December 29, 1941, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 666.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

institutions or enterprises, shall be mobilized for the duration of the war for industrial and construction work, and primarily for work in the defense industries. All persons so mobilized are to work in the city of their residence and exemptions include certain categories of students and women with babies or small children and no nurses to look after them. On February 17 announcement was made of the formation of a committee to implement this ukase and it was indicated that the mobilization includes not only the population of cities but also of factory workers' settlements.

Transport.

The relative inadequacy of the railway system and the shortage of rolling stock have been regarded as a traditional weak spot in Russian economic development under both the Czarist and the Soviet regimes. At the beginning of the Soviet-German war it was feared that rail transport, already felt to be no more than barely supporting the normal demands of peace would be completely unable to measure up to the requirements of war and might therefore, by breaking down under the strain, make a major contribution to the failure of the Soviet war effort. These fears have also not been realized. Passenger and ordinary freight schedules have been thrown out of gear, through having been subordinated to the needs of the war, but troops and supplies have got through and it must be said on the whole that during the months of conflict the Soviet railway system has continued to function nearly as well as before and certainly better than had been anticipated.

Notwithstanding the fact that the railways have operated more satisfactorily than might have been expected during recent months, the strain upon them has been manifestly terrific and it is recognized that they constitute a weak link in the chain of supply, and one which requires constant care and unremitting attention. Thousands of women have been assigned to duty on the railways since the war began, as station workers, locomotive engineers, telegraph operators, track repair workers, dispatchers, mechanics, et cetera. The press has carried repeated notices, particularly recently, of heavy sentences meted out to railway employees through whose negligence or inattention train schedules have been dislocated or delayed. The problem is obviously crucial for upon the steady flow of trains to the front depends the furnishing to the armed forces of the supplies without which they cannot continue the struggle. It can only be regarded as remarkable that the rail system has continued to work as well as it has up to the present time, the more so in consideration of the rigor of the winter which is now nearing its end.

The loss or threatened loss of certain important railway lines through enemy military action has necessarily caused attention to become more intensively focussed on the country's inland waterways.

Conclusion.

The long and rigorous Russian winter is now drawing to its close and with the advent of spring a renewal of the German offensive against the Soviet Union is confidently expected here. What direction that offensive will take, whether it will be undertaken along the entire front or be directed chiefly toward the Caucasus, and whether it will be accompanied by a simultaneous Japanese attack in the East are questions which it is not within the province of the present report to attempt to analyze. It goes without saying that the Russian campaign has developed rapidly into an "all out" struggle on both sides. The Germans failed to attain their major objectives last season, but they appear to have only just failed and it cannot be denied that climatic conditions have played their part in enabling the Russians to resist as well as they have thus far. When the spring attack comes its ferocity may well be unparalleled and no one can say whether it will succeed or not. Certainly if it fails and if the Russians pull through unbroken it may safely be predicted that they will have done so by the narrowest of margins. Food, matériel and their transport are the keys to the situation, always granting that Soviet manpower is equal to the strain in numbers and in morale—and while few will now question the latter occasional doubts have been expressed with respect to the former. Peasant morale behind the lines is also a factor which is of the greatest importance, as suggested earlier in this report. The difficulties which presently confront Soviet agricultural and industrial production have been made sufficiently clear and the urgency with which the Soviets may therefore require British and American aid if they are to continue their war effort unabated needs no further emphasis. The perils which threaten Russia's supply lanes, north to Archangel and Murmansk, and south to the Persian Gulf, to say nothing of the implications of the cutting of the Burma Road, are apparent, but the Soviet leaders are consummate realists; they are not impressed by promises or threats, but only by results. If, as is evident, it is to the immediate interest of the Allies that Russia should go on fighting the aggressor, then it is the essential task of the Allies to confine their activities in relation to the Soviet Union to the furnishing of aid in whatever form the Soviets desire, as quickly as possible, at the points indicated by the Soviets, and in the largest volume possible within the terms of their own war effort. Advice on how to win their war is not regarded by the Soviets as a commodity of which they are in need, nor

do they consider that they require very much instruction in the use of the matériel which may be furnished to them, although they have in the past appeared to welcome, within their own terms, the advantages which accrue from foreign technical assistance in matters of industrial production.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim :

CHARLES E. DICKERSON, JR.,
First Secretary of Embassy

740.0011 European War 1939/21266

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at my request.

I said to the Ambassador that he would remember that in January 1941 I had secretly communicated to the Soviet Government confidential information obtained by the United States which gave the German plan to attack the Soviet Union in the early summer of that year.⁵⁶ Subsequently, last summer, I had communicated to Mr. Oumansky⁵⁷ confidential information concerning Japanese plans in the Pacific.⁵⁸ I said that I now had confidential information of the most authoritative character which I felt it necessary in the interest of both governments to ask him secretly to transmit to Moscow. I said that this Government had learned that the German Government had as its objective the dealing of a knockout blow to the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible. It appeared that Germany and Italy both hoped that by disposing of the Soviet Union in this way they could continue to achieve a more or less undisturbed state of affairs in their own countries from which to continue to launch their attacks. It appeared that the German plan in order to deal a crushing blow to the Soviet Union was to attack first in the south and then simultaneously in the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa, attempting to fight through the Caucasus to the Indian Ocean. A Japanese invasion into the Indian Ocean would be eagerly welcomed by Germany since thereby contact between Europe and Asia would be brought about.

It appeared thereafter to be the intention of Germany to attack England and to endeavor to cut off any American communications and to abolish American influence in Asia and Africa as well as in Europe.

⁵⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 772, footnote 98.

⁵⁷ K. A. Umansky, Soviet Ambassador in the United States, 1939-41.

⁵⁸ For information concerning Japanese plans in the Pacific, see memorandum of July 3, 1941, by the Acting Secretary of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 787.

Germany was pressing Japan to lend its full cooperation to this effort by pushing through the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf and into the Red Sea and thus attain a cutting off by the Axis powers of any United Nations access into the Near East and into the Persian Gulf.

The Ambassador expressed his gratitude and said he would immediately transmit this information secretly to his Government. The Ambassador asked me how we had obtained this information. I said that I was not in a position to give him any details but merely to let him know that this Government regarded this information as authoritative.

The Ambassador asked what recent information I might have received with regard to conditions in Turkey. I said that the last reports from Ambassador Steinhardt had indicated a continued intention on the part of the Turkish Government to resist any attack or pressure from Germany. I said that we were doing our utmost to strengthen Turkish morale by giving Turkey such assistance as could be given under the Lend-Lease Act.⁵⁹ I said that only today I had asked Ambassador Steinhardt to communicate detailed information as to the assistance we were rendering to the Turkish Government.

The Ambassador expressed his own opinion that Germany would not attack Turkey or bring pressure upon Turkey of a military character until after the German offensive against the southern Russian front was under way and until and unless the Germans had met with success in southern Russia. He said that if the Germans achieved success in that area, Turkish morale and will to resist would be lessened and he believed it was at that time that Germany would make demands upon Turkey and possibly invade Turkey. He was quite strong in his opinion that Germany did not possess sufficient men nor material at this time to undertake a march through Turkey if at the same time she had to undertake an all-out effort against the Soviet armies and an attack against the Suez Canal.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00119 European War 1939/945 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 25, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received March 25—4:10 p. m.]

1225. Following from Tittmann.

49, March 23. Possibility of a negotiated peace between Hitler and Stalin before the summer is out is now a sign frequently heard of in

⁵⁹ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. For correspondence on lend-lease aid to Turkey, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 814 ff.

Vatican circles. This talk seems to be based on Hitler's infinite capacity for double dealing, a sensation that the Russians will soon become discouraged after the German onslaught begins and fact that a skillful Japanese statesman has been sent to Moscow ostensibly it is said as Ambassador but in reality in order to be on hand as mediator when the moment to discuss peace arrives.

I protest vigorously when I hear such talk as this and point out that matters have now gone too far for anything like a deal between the Germans and the Russians. I add that short of complete military collapse Stalin could not agree to any sort of peace with Russian territory still in German hands and I urge that the subject be dismissed as part of the German war of nerves. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

861.00/11984 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]⁶⁰

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), April 8, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received April 9—8:11 a. m.]

292. Embassy's 284, April 6, 8 [7] p. m.⁶¹ The Moscow press of April 6 reports the conclusion on April 5 of the record All-Slav meeting in Moscow, with the issuance of an appeal to all Slavs outside the Soviet Union.⁶² This appeal declares that the hour has come when all Slav peoples must rise in a decisive fight against Hitlerism. It states that whether or not the possible German spring offensive against the Soviet Union will be converted into the complete destruction of the enemy depends upon the Slav peoples. This destruction must be accomplished not only by the arms of the Red Army but also by the hands of all Slav peoples, all of whom must be mobilized for the struggle against the enemy. Passivity is characterized as a crime

⁶⁰ The omitted portion is a listing of the names of some of the prominent participants of the II All-Slav Congress. The I All-Slav Congress had been held in Moscow about August 11, 1941.

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² The Third Secretary of Embassy, G. Frederick Reinhardt, noted in a memorandum enclosed in despatch No. 8 of May 5, 1942, that the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Legation in Kuibyshev, M. Bogich, declared that his Government believed that "the meetings were a product of the Comintern" (the Third, or Communist International, founded by the Bolsheviks in Moscow during March 1919). M. Bogich said it was also believed that "the Czech Minister [Zdenek Fierlinger] and the greater part of the Czech Legation in Kuibyshev could almost be characterized as Soviet agents . . . that evidence was accumulating to the effect that the Czechoslovak Legation is spending a good deal of its time in serving the interests of the Soviet Government in such matters as reporting everything that is heard from other diplomatic colleagues." Another source of information cited in this despatch pointed out that "in general all of the participants [in the Congress] who are not Russians are residents of the Soviet Union, some of them having resided in this country for many years." (861.00/11951)

and it is stated that the liberation of the Slav peoples depends upon their active participation in the fight. The appeal urges all Slav peoples outside of the Soviet Union to intensify guerrilla warfare against the Hitlerites and to carry on industrial and agricultural sabotage.

STANDLEY

861.50/956: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), April 9, 1942—4 p. m.
[Received 11:10 p. m.]

296. *Krasnaya Zvezda* of April 1, which has recently been received, contains a long article outlining the reasons which have enabled the Soviet national economy successfully to withstand the strain of war.⁶³ This may be summarized as follows:

The main factor has been the Soviet policy of emphasizing heavy industry at the expense of the production of consumer goods.

The second has been the planned distribution of the country's economy. Heavy industry was built up in the Urals, Siberia, the Volga Basin, and Kazakhstan. Each year the center of Soviet industry has been moved more and more to the east and further from the frontiers. During the 2 five-year plan periods more than 200 large industrial enterprises were installed in the Urals, including such giant plants as the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine. The basic amount of new industrial construction was situated outside the radius of systematic operations of the enemy air force. Thus, even prior to the outbreak of the Soviet-German war more than half of all the steel was produced in the eastern districts. Furthermore, the production areas of such important types of strategic raw materials as copper, zinc, lead, vanadium, molybdenum, arsenic and antimony have been completely or almost completely untouched by military operations.

In respect of agriculture, prior to the war the Urals, Volga Basin, western Siberia, north Caucasus, and north Kazakhstan had become main bases of grain production. During the past few years the role of the Ukraine as an exporter of grain to other regions of the Soviet Union has considerably decreased and the part played by the eastern producing districts has risen sharply. At present the main grain

⁶³ In his preceding telegram (No. 295, April 9, 3 p. m.), Ambassador Standley cautioned that this article, while substantially true, was "believed to be somewhat optimistic in its analysis of both the agricultural and the industrial situation." (861.50/957)

regions of the R. S. F. S. R.⁶⁴ can satisfy the demands of the country and of the army in grain.

Other factors appeared after the start of the Soviet-German war. The entire Soviet economy was placed on a war footing in a very short time, with industrial enterprises immediately converting their type of production if necessary. All main industrial enterprises were evacuated eastward in good time from enemy-occupied territories and frontal regions, and were as a rule again in production within 2 or 3 months. The smaller industrial enterprises left in enemy-occupied regions were in general put out of commission. Another factor has been that no country in the world has such possibilities as the Soviet Union for utilizing women in productive work. Moreover, the Soviet Union is receiving rubber, aluminum, tin, nickel and other materials from England and the United States.

As a result, Soviet defence industry is now producing considerably more than it was before the outbreak of the war and the Red Army has more cannon than the Germans. The German numerical superiority in tanks and airplanes is being reduced. The number of trench mortars and automatic weapons in the Red Army is rapidly increasing. At present the Red Army is armed much better than was the case at the commencement of the Soviet-German war.

STANDLEY

861.20211/67

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1942.

MR. WELLES: It will be recalled that in his telegram no. 1487 of November 5, [1940,] 1 p. m.,⁶⁵ Mr. Steinhardt, then Ambassador to the Soviet Union, pointed out that it was the common practice long known to the Department for the Soviet authorities to endeavor to prevail upon applicants for United States visas to sign agreements to work as Soviet agents, as condition precedent to receiving permission to depart from the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ The Ambassador added that nearly all of these persons had relatives remaining in Soviet territory and would, therefore, be subject to pressure in the United States if they should

⁶⁴ Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

⁶⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 234. See also the letter of November 22, 1940, from Under Secretary of State Welles to President Roosevelt, *ibid.*, p. 236.

⁶⁶ The concern of the United States over the proclivity of Soviet authorities to persuade individuals to become their agents in the United States is shown in telegrams No. 39, January 9, 1941, No. 522, March 17, 1941, No. 1066, May 30, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and in the Department's circular telegram, June 5, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 598, 941, 617, and 619, respectively.

fail to carry out their agreement. The Ambassador pointed out that in view of the situation he felt that the best interests of the United States would not be served by permitting aliens residing in territory under Soviet dominance to immigrate to the United States in any large numbers. Other telegrams from Ambassador Steinhardt as well as statements made to officials of the Department by persons arriving from the Soviet Union have indicated that the Soviet authorities frequently brought pressure upon persons in the Soviet Union desiring to come to the United States to act as Soviet agents.

It would appear that the decisions of the Interdepartmental Committees of Reviews to which the Board [of Appeals] takes exception are based on the situation described above.

We can understand the evident perplexity of the Board of Appeals at what seems, at least at first glance, to be a paradoxical situation. Although the United States and the Soviet Union are fighting a common enemy, the United States authorities continue to look with suspicion upon persons endeavoring to come to the United States from the Soviet Union over whom the Soviet authorities may be in a position to exert control by treating as hostages their close relatives remaining in the Soviet Union.

It would appear from the study of all the background, however, that the attitude of the United States authorities in this regard is by no means unreasonable. Their policies with regard to persons desiring to come to the United States from the Soviet Union must be based not upon the relations existing between the Soviet Union and Germany but upon the Soviet attitude toward the United States. The Soviet attitude toward this country is not entirely clear. Soviet authorities have not to any appreciable extent relaxed the close supervision and control which for years they have exercised over American citizens in the Soviet Union. They continue to prevent American officials in the Soviet Union from traveling throughout the country or from maintaining contact with the local population. They make it clear that they do not in general desire the presence of American citizens in the Soviet Union. Although little is heard of the Communist International at the present time we have no information which would cause us to believe that it is not continuing quietly to function with headquarters in the Soviet Union. The American Communist Party, the organ of the Communist International in this country, is supporting the war effort to the extent that such an effort might be helpful to the Soviet Union. It has not, however, ceased to work for the eventual overthrow by force of this Government and for the establishment of a Communist dictatorship. In these circumstances the American authorities would be derelict if they should fail to take adequate precautions to prevent secret Soviet or Communist International agents from entering, and carrying on activities in, the United States.

We have thus far received no information which would indicate that the Soviet authorities have abandoned their practice of endeavoring to [en]list persons emigrating to the United States from the Soviet Union as agents of the Soviet Government or of the Communist International and of treating relatives remaining in the Soviet Union as hostages in order to retain influence over persons enlisting as agents.

In order to assist in ascertaining whether there has been a change in this respect on the part of the Soviet authorities, it is suggested that a telegram similar to that attached hereto be sent to Ambassador Standley.⁶⁷

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

Z40.0011 European War 1939/20944 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), April 10, 1942—6 p. m.
[Received 9:35 p. m.]

307. The British Ambassador⁶⁸ informed me this morning that when he saw Stalin in Moscow last week the following subjects were discussed:

1. The discontent of the British Military Mission resulting from the lack of cooperation on the part of the Soviet military authorities. With respect to this Stalin stated that they had given orders that this situation was to be remedied and that if any further difficulties should be encountered they should be referred to him personally. He stated that his "people" were rough and rude and unfamiliar with the requirements of collaboration with foreigners and that they had moreover been so strictly schooled and disciplined in secrecy that they found it almost impossible to amend their habits in that respect.

2. Sweden and Turkey. Stalin expressed the opinion that both these countries are swinging in to the German orbit. In this connection Kerr said that he had been able to reassure Stalin, as in the opinion of his Government, neither Sweden nor Turkey is likely to go over to Germany.

3. Hitler. Stalin stated that he was determined to destroy Hitler personally and requested the aid of the British Government in locating Hitler in furtherance of this end. He said that whenever

⁶⁷ By telegram No. 162, April 9, 11 p. m., the Department made inquiry of the Ambassador whether "conditions have changed during the last 6 months to such an extent as to warrant the assumption that this practice would not be followed in case the Embassy should resume the issuance [of immigration visas] in appreciable numbers."

⁶⁸ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

he received a report of Hitler's presence at any given point he immediately directed that a heavy bombing attack should be made and that in this manner he had driven Hitler out of Minsk to Vilna and back, and would continue so to pursue him. He said that in his efforts to destroy Hitler he had already killed Kotz (the engineer of the German Siegfried line) and General Brauchitsch—both of whose deaths had been attributed to other causes.

4. Supplies. Stalin stated that he had been agreeably surprised by the speed and efficacy with which the British Government had fulfilled its promises with respect to the delivery of war material to the Soviet Union, adding that when Beaverbrook had made his commitments on this subject the Soviet authorities had been skeptical. He then said that just the opposite was true with the United States, which had lamentably failed to keep its pledges with respect to the supply of war material and which had been especially derelict in the dispatch of wheat.

The Ambassador stated that during his conversation, which took place in a very deep air raid shelter beneath the Kremlin and which lasted for two and one half hours, no reference had been made to the Soviet demand with respect to the Baltic States and its other 1941 frontiers.

In this latter connection I desire to report that the Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy ⁶⁹ yesterday informed a member of my staff that it was his understanding that the Soviet territorial demands now under consideration by the British ⁷⁰ include not only those originally reported by this Embassy, ⁷¹ but a segment of territory south of the Danube River embracing the full estuary of that river and a strip of Hungarian territory in the Carpathian district. The Minister Counselor expressed the opinion that the Soviet demand for this Hungarian territory had been instigated by the Czechoslovakian Minister in the Soviet Union.

STANDLEY

⁶⁹ Henryk Sokolnicki.

⁷⁰ For correspondence regarding consideration by the British of Soviet demands for recognition of its 1941 frontiers during negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet treaty of collaboration and mutual assistance, see pp. 490-566, *passim*.

⁷¹ In this connection see telegrams No. 10, December 19, 1941, and No. 12, December 20, 1941, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 198 and 200, respectively.

861.51/2953 : Telegram

The Third Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Reinhardt) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), April 18, 1942—3 p. m.
[Received April 18—1: 54 p. m.]

318. Reference Embassy's 316, April 15.⁷² The Soviet press of April 17 publishes an announcement that the 1942 National Defense Loan was over-subscribed within 2 days. Former loans have usually required from 1 to 4 weeks until fully subscribed.

Repeated to Moscow.

REINHARDT

740.00116 European War 1939/493 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 28, 1942—1 p. m.
[Received April 29—9: 01 p. m.]

134. The Embassy has received a further circular note⁷³ from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs dated April 27, re the alleged crimes and atrocities perpetrated by the German Army in German occupied Russia. This note was published in full in the press today.

STANDLEY

800.00B International Red Day/232 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), May 2, 1942—11 a. m.
[Received 9: 35 p. m.]

351. Yesterday's local paper carried an order of the day issued by Stalin on the occasion of May Day.⁷⁴ The order opens with

⁷² Not printed; this telegram reported that the loan was announced on April 14, in the amount of 10 billion rubles for a term of 20 years (861.51/2950).

⁷³ A previous note on German atrocities in occupied Soviet territories had been received on January 6; see footnote 4, p. 406. The note here reported was sent to the Ambassadors and envoys of all countries with which the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations. The Embassy transmitted to the Department a translation entitled "Regarding the Monstrous Atrocities, Bestialities, and Acts of Violence Perpetrated by the German Fascist Invaders in the Occupied Soviet Districts, and the Responsibility of the German Government and Its High Command for These Crimes" (740.0011 European War 1939/21637). It was widely distributed as Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, *We Shall Not Forgive! The Horrors of the German Invasion in Documents and Photographs* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1942).

⁷⁴ In an earlier telegram (No. 334, April 25), Charles E. Dickerson, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy, commented that "although May Day is the traditional holiday of the Communist International, no mention of that organization is made in the slogans this year." (800.00B International Red Day/230)

general remarks concerning the present Soviet-German war and a characterization of the Nazi regime as plutocratic, imperialistic, and antisocial. Stalin then proceeds to a lengthy analysis of the reasons for which the strength of Germany has become weaker since the outbreak of Soviet-German hostilities, while the Soviet Union has become stronger, and in this connection he refers to Great Britain and the United States, as follows: "As regards the international ties of our fatherland, these recently strengthened as never before. All freedom-loving peoples have united against German imperialism. . . .⁷⁵ The eyes of all freedom-loving peoples are fixed on the Soviet Union. The heroic struggle which the peoples of our country are conducting for their freedom, honor and independence arouses admiration among all progressive mankind. . . .⁷⁵ Among these freedom-loving countries, the first place is held by Great Britain and the United States of America with whom we are linked by bonds of friendship and alliance and who are rendering our country more and more military assistance against the German Fascist aggressors."

Stalin concludes that the Soviet Union can and must completely annihilate the aggressor and entirely liberate Soviet soil from the "Hitlerite villains". He states that the Soviet Union has no aims such as the seizure of foreign countries or the subjection of foreign peoples. He then repeats that Soviet soil must be completely freed, [and] goes on: "We wish to free our brothers, the Ukrainians, Moldavians, White Russians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Karelians from that shame and degradation which the German Fascist villains are imposing upon them."

After reiterating that the aggressor must be utterly and completely destroyed unless he will surrender, Stalin states that the Red Army, while possessing everything necessary to realize this aim, is deficient only in knowledge of how to use to the best advantage the first class equipment which the fatherland is producing for it. The message [concludes?] with exhortations to the various branches of the Red Army to perfect their mastery of their equipment, to destroy the aggressor and to make 1942 the year of final victory.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/21584: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), May 14, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 11:55 p. m.]

399. The following telegram has been received from the Embassy in Moscow:

⁷⁵ Omission indicated in the original telegram.

119. May 9, 6 p. m. Ehrenburg,⁷⁶ who was present at a luncheon given by the United Press correspondent yesterday, told the British correspondents present that he was convinced that the British would only establish a second front if it became clear that the Russians were either being defeated or were about to be victorious. He said that in pursuing such a policy Britain was running the risk of incurring the lasting hatred not only of the Russians but of all Europe no matter which side won the war. He said there was not much popular resentment in Russia against Great Britain at the present time but in his opinion this feeling was growing. He admitted that the Soviet Union had received material help from Great Britain and the United States but said that they should either have sent the best grade of war materials or if this was not available larger quantities of second grade materials should have been sent.

The most interesting aspect of the foregoing was that Ehrenburg was obviously taking a predetermined official line.

In the course of the discussion Ehrenburg said that judging from recently captured prisoners about 50% of the German front line troops are now inexperienced or inferior soldiers.

STANDLEY

102.78/3295 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), May 18, 1942—10 a. m.
[Received 5:50 p. m.]

403. The following is the concluding portion of the Embassy's 395, May 13, 6 p. m.⁷⁷ All indications are that the food position is serious and that were it not for the power of endurance of the Russian people the outlook might well be little short of desperate. Given a good crop year harvesting losses will still be abnormally high owing to shortage of labor, machinery, spare parts, and draft animals. From the immediate point of view which of course relates solely to the war effort, the feeding of the army is paramount. Thus far it has been well fed and the iron control of the regime over the population makes it reasonable to anticipate that the army and essential workers can continue to be adequately fed no matter what suffering or even starvation may ensue behind the lines. If yields this year are good the country should

⁷⁶ Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg, a Soviet literary figure and journalist.

⁷⁷ Not printed; along with statistics on crop acreages and some description of agricultural conditions, Ambassador Standley drew attention to the admission appearing in the Soviet press since the beginning of March of the utilization of women as the main working force in agriculture, including mechanical personnel. (102.78/3279)

pull through, barring an unforeseeable breakdown in transport and organization, or unpredictable military developments.

STANDLEY

811.7181/370

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
(Litvinov)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and has the honor to refer to his notes of March 14 and March 27, 1942,⁷⁹ in reply to the Ambassador's note of March 4, 1942,⁸⁰ in regard to the non-receipt of printed matter addressed to the Soviet Embassy and Consulates in the United States.⁸¹

The Ambassador was informed by the Secretary of State's note of March 27 that an inquiry was being made for the purpose of determining whether any printed matter addressed to the Ambassador was being held, and that if any was being held, it would be released promptly. The Ambassador was also informed of the desire of the Director of Censorship⁸² to obtain a list of the publications involved. Such a list of publications were subsequently received under cover of the Ambassador's note of April 6, 1942⁸⁰ and was forwarded by the Department to the Director of Censorship. The Department is now in receipt of a communication from the Chief Postal Censor,⁸³ the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:

"...⁸⁴ a check was made at our New York Censorship Station to determine whether any printed matter addressed to the Soviet Embassy was being held. The investigation disclosed that there was none. Nor will any future mailings be detained as instructions have been issued to release immediately any article passing through the station destined to the Soviet Embassy. . . .⁸⁴

"I will hold the list of publications involved for ready reference. If any of them are submitted to American censorship, they will be cleared promptly for delivery."

With regard to the statement made to an officer of the Department by the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy,⁸⁵ to the effect that authorities of this Government were withholding Soviet publications addressed to individuals, organizations, and institutions in the United States, the Secretary of State informs the Ambassador that this matter has been referred to the appropriate authorities of the Gov-

⁷⁹ Neither printed.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ For correspondence concerning the dispute on this subject in 1941 prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 699-759, *passim*.

⁸² Byron Price, Office of Censorship.

⁸³ Maj. W. Preston Corderman, Office of Censorship.

⁸⁴ Omission indicated in the original note.

⁸⁵ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

ernment.⁸⁶ A further communication on this subject will be addressed to the Ambassador in due course.⁸⁷

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1942.

740.0011 European War 1939/22227a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1942—5 p. m.

291. Please transmit to the Foreign Office the following message from me to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov:

"I extend through you to the Government and people of the Soviet Union on behalf of the Government and people of the United States, congratulations upon the success with which you have resisted the brutal aggression of Nazi Germany and have thus frustrated the plans for world conquest so overconfidently laid by our common enemy. For one year the peoples of the Soviet Union have been engaging the armies not only of Nazi Germany but also of those other European countries the governments of which have accepted Nazi dictation. In this struggle the armed forces of the Soviet Union, with the heroic support of the entire population, have so acquitted themselves as to win the admiration of the liberty-loving peoples of the world and to earn a place in history beside those Russian Armies which over a century and a quarter ago did so much to ruin the plans of another aspirant to world conquest.

"During the past year the American people, although themselves threatened by aggression from several directions, have gladly shared their arms and supplies with the Soviet Union. It is planned that during the coming year these arms and supplies will pour forth from our factories and countryside in an ever widening stream until final victory has been achieved.

"We are confident that before the end of another year the instigators of this war will have been given to understand how seriously they have underestimated the determination and the ability for effective action of the peace-loving nations and will have learned that in an aroused world aggressors can no longer escape the consequences of acts resulting in human suffering and destruction."

This message should be dated June 22, the first anniversary of the launching of the German attack upon the Soviet Union. It may be handed to the Foreign Office, however, on June 21.⁸⁸

HULL

⁸⁶ Letters (not printed), were sent on June 10, 1942, to Attorney General Francis Biddle, and to Postmaster General Frank C. Walker.

⁸⁷ Note dated August 20, p. 453.

⁸⁸ The Minister Counselor, Walter Thurston, reported in telegram No. 554 of June 24, from Kuibyshev, that this congratulatory message had been published in *Pravda* on the day before, together with messages received also from Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, and Harry L. Hopkins (740.0011EW 1939/22425).

741.6111/39

*The Latvian Minister (Bilmanis) to the Secretary of State*⁸⁹

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1942.

SIR: The recently published Russian-British Agreement signed on May 26, 1942⁹⁰ contains in Article 5 a freely assumed obligation by the Soviet Union not to seek territorial aggrandizement and to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of other states.

While I sincerely welcome these principles, already proclaimed in the historic Atlantic Charter,⁹¹ as the most important maxims in the relations between independent states, I am deeply concerned about the sincerity of Soviet Russia to abide by these principles in regard to the Republic of Latvia.

Contrary to expectations, natural and inevitable after Soviet Russia's acceptance of the principles of non-aggrandizement and non-interference, the Government of the Soviet Union has not publicly renounced its aggressive and totally unjustifiable claim to aggrandize the Soviet Union at the expense of the Republic of Latvia and in complete disregard of international law and treaty obligations and contrary to the desires, rights and most vital interests of the Latvian nation.

To my great astonishment and distress, the Soviet Premier, Mr. Molotoff has delivered after his return to Russia, according to Associated Press releases, a note against Nazi German ferocities perpetrated against Soviet citizens in Nazi occupied territories, and in this note the Soviet Union continues to consider the Latvian nation as a part of the Soviet Union.

This position of the Soviet Union is not only a violation of the high and noble principles of the Atlantic Charter, but it also represents a breach of Russia's voluntarily assumed and publicly proclaimed treaty obligations.⁹²

I have the honor, Sir, in the name of the Latvian Government and in the name of the Latvian Nation, at present enslaved and silenced by the brutal Nazi invaders, to protest against the apparently hostile

⁸⁹ When presenting this note to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson) on June 16, 1942, Dr. Bilmanis expressed his "appreciation for the attitude which the Government of the United States has so consistently taken with regard to the Baltic States."

⁹⁰ Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, signed at London on May 26, 1942; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353, or Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1942, p. 781.

⁹¹ Joint statement issued on August 14, 1941, by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

⁹² For correspondence regarding the treaties involved and broken when the Soviet Union compelled the Baltic States to conclude pacts of mutual assistance in 1939, see *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 934 ff. The Soviet Union proceeded the following year to forcible occupation and incorporation of these States; see *ibid.*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

and aggressive purposes of the Soviet Union against the Republic of Latvia.

In filing this protest regarding the intent and design of Soviet Russia against the Republic of Latvia, I beg you to accept, Sir, my assurances that the Latvian Government is ready to resume relations with her neighbor, the Soviet Union on the basis of international law and respective mutual treaties concluded prior to the German-Russian treaty of August 23, 1939.⁹³

Finally, Sir, I beg you to accept the profound gratitude which I have the honor on behalf of the Republic of Latvia to express to the Government of the United States of America for the magnanimous and righteous support extended by the United States to the Government and the people of Latvia in the hour of their gravest distress.

Accept [etc.]

DR. ALFRED BILMANIS

741.6111/28: Telegram

*The Minister Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thurston)
to the Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), June 20, 1942—noon.
[Received 11 p. m.]

551. Embassy's telegram 548, June 19.⁹⁴ The press of the past several days has contained a large number of news items giving favorable comment which has appeared in the foreign press upon the visit of Molotov to England and the United States⁹⁵ and upon the Anglo-Soviet treaty and the Soviet-American Lend-Lease agreement.⁹⁶ Descriptions of meetings held in various parts of the Soviet Union similarly praising these developments have also been frequent. Articles have appeared tracing the history of Soviet-American relations during the past year, favorably commenting upon the American war potential, citing instances in demonstration of the long history of Russian-American friendship as well as of Soviet-American friendship, et cetera.

The tone of the material which has been published is unusually generous and a good deal more seems to be made of Soviet-American relations than of Anglo-Soviet relations. Nearly all the articles published, besides emphasizing the urgent and vital importance of the formation of a second front in Europe this year, strongly imply the belief that this will actually take place.

THURSTON

⁹³ Nonaggression treaty signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 76-78, or *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, vol. vii, pp. 245-247.

⁹⁴ *Post*, p. 595.

⁹⁵ For reports concerning the visit of Molotov to London and Washington during May and June 1942, see pp. 542-599, *passim*.

⁹⁶ For correspondence concerning wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see pp. 684 ff.

711.61/854: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 23, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 6:10 p. m.]

203. I am convinced that much good could be accomplished in the development of good will and understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union by making available technical, educational and propaganda moving picture films to the Russians as well as by the regular display of these and outstanding American commercial pictures and newsreels by the Embassy in Kuibyshev and Moscow.

Pan American Airways already has a weekly plane service to Tehran and I am informed that the Soviet Government will shortly be operating a weekly service to connect Kuibyshev and Moscow with this Pan American Air Service in Tehran. I feel certain that a regular periodic film exchange through this our [air?] route into Russia could be arranged. I therefore recommend as follows:

1. The immediate inauguration of a regular shipment of such films to the Embassy by air with an indication in each case as to whether the film may be turned over to the appropriate Soviet agency outright or on loan, or whether it should be shown only by the Embassy.

2. The appointment of a qualified official to supervise and develop such a program in the United States and who would be available to come to Russia. In this connection I recommend Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., Lieutenant Junior Grade, now on duty in the Public Relations Office of the Navy Department who appears to have all the necessary qualifications and could be assigned as Assistant Naval Attaché.

3. I consider it highly important that such films be made available only through the Embassy in order that a careful check be made of their suitability and to assist the Embassy in developing contacts with Soviet officials. Army and Navy films could be distributed through the Military and Naval Attachés and other films either through the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs or whenever practicable direct to the most appropriate Soviet agency.

4. The British have been supplying the Soviets with propaganda films for some time and although few of these have been shown to the general public I understand that many high Soviet officials have been reached through private showings. I believe that with judicious handling a wider distribution of our pictures can be obtained. It is possible that the Soviet authorities will propose an exchange of films and I believe that we should be prepared to accept and make use of such Soviet films as are suitable.

5. I have requested the Naval Attaché⁹⁸ to ask for the assignment of an electrician to the Embassy as in any event one is needed here, and I am submitting in a separate telegram a list of spare parts needed for the projection machines in Spaso house which while of obsolete type are useable. While I believe that it will be possible to arrange for the use of a projection room in Kuibyshev for the display of such pictures, I consider the development of this program to be of sufficient importance as to justify the sending of new machines to Kuibyshev for use there and eventually for the replacement of the machines now in Moscow.

STANDLEY

701.6111/1138

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called at my request.

He complained with emphasis that this Government consumes too much time, sometimes two months, in making reply to Soviet representations relating to minor matters, in particular. I replied that we ordinarily had some good reason when there was some delay, but that I would give the matter attention.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

8601.00/495

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]⁹⁹

No. 2373

HELSINKI, July 14, 1942.

SIR:

The first part of the enclosed memorandum¹ describes the cordial relations between Estonians and Germans during the military administration which lasted for about three months following the capture of Tallinn by German forces on August 28, 1941 and the liberation of the country from Bolshevism. During this period, it is stated, the German military authorities, by their fair and correct conduct and supported by effective propaganda which stressed the circumstances

⁹⁸ Capt., later Rear Adm., Jack Harlan Duncan.

⁹⁹ The Minister in Finland has summarized a lengthy memorandum prepared by Aleksander Varma, a former Estonian Minister in Finland, in the latter part of May 1942, which he received on July 6. The title in translation of this memorandum was: "Relations between Estonia and Germany after the Liberation of Estonia from Bolshevik Rule." In this connection, see also footnote 8, p. 407.

¹ Not attached to file copy of this document.

that Germany had rescued Estonia from Bolshevism, that the future of the Estonian nation depended on a German victory over the Soviet Union and that it was therefore the sacred duty of every patriotic Estonian to cooperate with the Germans in the struggle against Russia for a New Europe where a place was reserved for Estonia, largely succeeded in winning the confidence and friendship of the grateful Estonians.

On December 5, 1941, it is pointed out, administrative power in Estonia was transferred from the military authorities to General Commissioner Lietzmann² who was subordinated to the Reich Commissioner for Ostland in Riga,³ and at the same time the Estonian self-government was established under Dr. Mäe.⁴ From that time on things began to change. . . .

The memorandum emphasizes the difficulties in the development of Estonian and German personal relations, recalling the historic rancor among Estonians toward the Baltic Germans who left the country before and during the Bolshevik régime.⁵ When the Germans liberated Estonia from the Bolsheviks, it was officially promised that the Baltic Germans would not return, but it is now evident that such promises were only eye-wash. In fact, Baltic Germans have returned in considerable numbers and have been put into important positions by the German administrative authorities. They are making the best of their opportunity to make it clear that the Estonians belong to an inferior race and are second class citizens. A sharp difference has been created between the assurances of German propaganda and real facts. . . .

The memorandum concludes with the following comment:

"From the outset of the present German occupation, the Estonians have tried to find out what aims the Germans are striving for in the Baltic Countries and what possibilities there are in the present phase of history for friendly collaboration with the Germans. But the conviction has deepened from day to day during the past three quarters of a year that there is no cause for optimism on the basis of experience gained so far. There is no confidence among the people in the present German administration. When the Commissioner General gives assurance that he is holding nothing back from the Estonian people and that destiny has brought Germans into cooperation with the Estonians for the future good of the Estonian people, there are very few who believe his words, because it has been experienced that the acts of the new masters do not correspond with their promises. Pessimism has taken hold of all classes of society. The

² Karl Sigismund Litzmann, Reich Commissioner for Estonia.

³ Heinrich Lohse.

⁴ Hjalmar Mäe.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, p. 963, footnote 46.

reason why this is not demonstrated more openly is the fact that the people are choosing the lesser of two evils. It would have been even worse to remain under Bolshevik domination and under existing circumstances there is only one real factor which can keep the Bolsheviks away—the German Army. The rise of sharp opposition to the German administration could not be disguised unless the danger of Bolshevism were hanging overhead. Opposition would naturally lead to similar bloody reprisals as in Norway, Holland, Czechoslovakia and in other occupied countries. The Estonian people are united at present. The various classes of society are drawn closer together than ever before.”

Respectfully yours,

H. F. ARTHUR SCHOENFELD

711.6121/7-142

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)^a

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1942.

It may be ascertained from the attached memorandum of a conversation on July 1⁷ between the Soviet Ambassador and Mr. Acheson^a that the Soviet Ambassador has suggested that an exchange of notes be effected between the Soviet and American Governments to extend most favored nation treatment for Soviet consuls.

I do not believe that it is opportune at present to exchange notes of this kind. Since the most favored nation consul in the Soviet Union has practically no rights with respect to the matter of inheritances and in fact very few rights of any kind, the advantages accruing from a consular agreement of this kind would be of a unilateral nature.

So far as the question of inheritance is concerned, estates are being handled in the American courts in such a fashion that the interests of Soviet nationals are just as well protected and in some cases are probably more effectively protected, than would be the case if Soviet consuls were empowered by treaty to present themselves as interested parties.

For years the Soviet Government, through an American law firm headed by Mr. Charles Recht of New York, has been endeavoring to obtain control of all funds to which Soviet citizens may have claim. At present the procedure is somewhat as follows:

The Soviet Government through various agencies in this country learns that Soviet nationals may have a claim to certain funds. The Soviet authorities force the beneficiary or the owner in the Soviet

^a Addressed to Mr. Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs, and to the Office of the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn).

⁷ Not printed.

^a Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

Union to issue a Power of Attorney made out in favor of Charles Recht or one of his assistants. Armed with this Power of Attorney suit is brought by Recht in an American court for possession of the funds. A small portion of the proceeds is sometimes turned over to the owner or beneficiary in the Soviet Union. The bulk, however, goes into the coffers of the Soviet Government. The current file of a typical case is attached to this memorandum.⁹

It is not believed that we should take steps to facilitate this procedure. Most of the American citizens who leave bequests to relatives in the Soviet Union do not realize that the bulk of their bequests go, not to the legatee, but to the Soviet State.

The only treaty entered into by the Soviet Union which gave any substantial rights or privileges to foreign consuls was the Soviet-German Treaty of October 12, 1925.¹⁰ The Soviet authorities, however, during the last 15 years have so interpreted the various clauses of this Treaty that the rights and privileges of German consuls gradually diminished. Now that Germany and the Soviet Union are at war a most favored nation agreement would not give the American consul in the Soviet Union even the rights and privileges which theoretically the German consul in the Soviet Union possessed.

In my opinion it is preferable not to endeavor to negotiate any kind of a consular agreement with the Soviet authorities at the present time. The matter should be left until after the conclusion of hostilities and until such time as both Governments are in a position to give to the problem the consideration which it merits.

740.0011 European War 1939/23297: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), August 3, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 4:37 p. m.]

669. Secretary Hull's speech of July 23¹¹ was not published until July 28 when it was given unusually wide coverage in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*. A comparison with the text as received in the Radio Bulletin reveals however that certain large and important sections were omitted, especially when reference was made to Japan and events in the Far East and perhaps more important when the Secretary referred in general terms to the spirit of liberty, to economic freedom,

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ Agreement concerning Conditions of Residence and Business and Legal Protection in General, signed at Moscow; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LIII, pp. 7-161. See also *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 33-34.

¹¹ "The War and Human Freedom," broadcast over all national radio networks; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 25, 1942, p. 639.

social justice and programs of social and economic progress. The concluding section of the speech in which reference was made to the need of the United Nations to formulate and announce their common views in relation to fundamental policies was apparently published in full.

No editorial or other comment on the speech has thus far appeared in the press.

It is of interest to note that on July 23 the Soviet press published a carefully censored version of Stafford Cripps' article which appeared in the March 9 issue of *Life* magazine. A certain amount of comment and speculation has been caused in the Kuibyshev Diplomatic Corps by the belated publication of this article. The motives for its retarded appearance in general have been attributed to (1) a desire on the part of the Soviet Government again to advance certain of its post-war claims through the medium and with the approval of a prominent British statesman and (2) a desire publicly to remind Great Britain that although as early as March such a prominent public figure as Cripps was talking about common military action in Europe, there was still no evidence of its materialization.

A comparison with the original article reveals that although the majority of Cripps' personal views on Soviet military and economic problems were omitted, his replies to questions on Soviet territorial aspirations and Soviet war and peace aims were published almost in full. Furthermore the final part of question number 20 in which Cripps advocates the preliminary discussion of all the main issues of the war and the peace was also published in full.

Eden's speech of July 23 has not yet been mentioned in the Soviet press.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/23386 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 7, 1942—8 p. m.
[Received August 7—5: 23 p. m.]

279. *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* today publish Tass¹² despatches from London and New York, the first describing mass meetings in England demanding the immediate opening of a second front in Europe, and the second reporting how a number of American trade union groups were making the same demand.

¹² Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, an official communication agency of the Soviet Government.

This is the fifth consecutive day on which such second front items have been prominently published.¹³

STANDLEY

861.00/11952 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 17, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received August 18—7:08 p. m.]

306. *Pravda* of August 17 published a brief announcement to the effect that Molotov had been appointed First Assistant President of the Soviet Narkom¹⁴ on all questions touching upon the work of the Soviet Narkom.

Voznesenski,¹⁵ Chairman of the Economic Soviet for Defense Industry and Chairman of the Economic Council, has been First Assistant President of the Soviet Narkom since the spring of 1941, at which time Molotov, then President, was replaced by Stalin¹⁶ and made one of the 12 assistant presidents, in theory subordinate to Voznesenski.

It is not unlikely that Molotov has been elevated to his present position in order to give him more prestige and authority in the administration of the external and internal affairs of the Soviet State and thus to relieve Stalin to a greater extent of such problems thereby permitting him to spend more time on matters pertaining to the prosecution of the war.

I may state in this regard that at the recent dinner given at the Kremlin¹⁷ for Churchill, Stalin, although cheerful, appeared fatigued, wan and in poor health. It may be that he realizes that he is physically unable to continue such a heavy load and that he has decided to delegate greater authority to Molotov.

STANDLEY

¹³ In telegram No. 289, August 10, 1942, from Moscow, the Ambassador stated that American newspaper correspondents told him that "they are being encouraged by the Soviet press authorities to write articles on the urgency for a second front." (740.0011 European War 1939/23456) He had already reported from Kuibyshev in telegram No. 672 of August 3 on "the gravity of the military situation in south Russia" and that "for the first time the theme is appearing that despite Russia's size the Red Army cannot retreat indefinitely." (740.0011 European War 1939/23298)

¹⁴ Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

¹⁵ Nikolay Alexeyevich Voznesensky.

¹⁶ See telegrams No. 922, May 7, 1941, and No. 934, May 8, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 613 and 615, respectively.

¹⁷ For a report on this banquet, held on the night of August 14, see telegram from W. Averell Harriman to President Roosevelt, dated August 15, p. 623.

811.7181/372

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
(Litvinov)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the last paragraph of the Department's note of June 10, 1942 in which the Ambassador was informed that a communication would be addressed to him on the question of the withholding of Soviet publications, addressed to individuals, organizations, and institutions in the United States, by authorities of this Government.

On the basis of inquiries made of the appropriate agencies of the Government, the Department understands that because of the condition of the international mails only a very small amount of Soviet literature addressed to private parties in this country is now arriving in the United States. Such mail as arrives is, of course, subject to the same censorship as all other private foreign mail. The Department understands further that the greater part of Soviet literature passed by the Censor is now being admitted by the Post Office Department.

In this connection the Secretary of State has the honor to invite the Ambassador's attention to rules 50 and 305 under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended,¹⁸ the texts of which are set forth in the enclosed pamphlet, *The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, As Amended*.¹⁹ A copy of this pamphlet was transmitted to the Embassy in the Department's circular note of July 2, 1942.²⁰

In order to insure that no further material in which the Embassy is interested will be excluded from the mails of this Country under the provisions of the above-mentioned Act and pertinent regulations, it is suggested that the Embassy may wish to make the necessary arrangements so that all provisions thereof will be complied with by those Soviet organizations and institutions addressing mail to private parties in the United States.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1942.

¹⁸ Approved June 8, 1938; 52 Stat. 631; as amended April 29, 1942 (effective June 28, 1942), 56 Stat. 248.

¹⁹ Department of Justice publication (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1942).

²⁰ Not printed.

861.00/11960

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

No. 95

KUIBYSHEV, September 18, 1942.

[Received November 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose as of interest to the Department the copies of a memorandum which has been prepared by Consul General Ward at Vladivostok, during a visit which he has recently made to Kuibyshev, concerning political and economic conditions in the Vladivostok district.

With relation to the "wasted effort" which I agree is prevalent throughout Soviet activities, I am more inclined to ascribe this condition to a lack of adequate and sufficient standardized equipment, and consequently of spare parts, rather than the "historical inability of the Russian people to work in close harmony and cooperation". In a recent trip across the Volga I visited a wheat field of a collective farm where some thirty-three women were harvesting the grain. Their men had all gone to the front. With the exception of the thresher the work was all being done by hand. There were machines but they were all broken down and there were no spare parts available, but there was no lack of harmony or cooperation on the part of this group who were doing their best, in the absence of their men folk, to meet the Government's requirements set for normal conditions.

The statement on page three ²¹ with reference to conscription of man power east of Lake Baikal is of noteworthy interest.

The comments as to military and naval matters (pp. 6 to 10 inclusive) ²² should be of interest to the War and Navy Departments.

The report in its entirety shows an intelligent and comprehensive perspective of Consul General Ward and much of it, had it been available, might have helped the mission in its efforts to keep the Department informed of the general situation.

The Consul General has been instructed to submit hereafter to the mission a monthly report and to use the telegraph to communicate with the Department when urgency is indicated.

Respectfully yours,

W. H. STANDLEY

[Enclosure—Extracts]

Memorandum by the Consul General at Vladivostok (Ward)

KUIBYSHEV, September 10, 1942.

Information obtainable by a foreign consular officer at Vladivostok is in general limited to those conditions and happenings which the

²¹ The fourth paragraph of the memorandum.

²² For a portion of these comments, see pp. 456-457.

officer is able to observe with his own eyes or to experience in his day to day life. The local press is practically devoid of news of local happenings and the local authorities take all possible precautions toward suppressing the escape of information regarding the local armed forces and the local war effort, with the result that rumors, fantastic as well as reasonable, are current at all times and must be assumed as the basis of almost all "information" received from unofficial sources. Soviet officials with whom the foreign consular officer comes in contact seemingly make all possible effort to limit their conversations to the discussion of happenings and conditions which have been discussed in the press or on the radio. This situation explains why it is so difficult to obtain information of proved or even assumed reliability at Vladivostok.

The German-Soviet war stunned the people of the Primorsk²³ and at no time has there been any visible enthusiasm for the war. This outward lack of enthusiasm, however, and the absence of any spontaneous (or sponsored) patriotic demonstrations have been more than overbalanced by a stolid and stubborn determination to win the war. It has been a great revelation of the Russian character to me to observe that the will to win the war as well as to make sacrifices, both financial and physical, for the war effort grows as the people learn of the loss of relatives and friends and as the progress of the war makes inroads on their meager standard of living. They are becoming or have already become convinced that this is not an ordinary war and that on its outcome depends their national existence. They remember the sufferings and privations of 1917-1937 and as they see the consumer goods (inadequate in quantity and poor in quality as they were) which they enjoyed in increasing volume from 1937 to 1941 disappear from the market they come to the belief that if they are to spare their children from the hardships they themselves underwent after the October Revolution they must sacrifice themselves today.

Notwithstanding the will and determination of the Primorsk people to win the war a foreigner in that area can not but be impressed by the wasted effort in industry, agriculture and distribution encountered on all sides. This phase of the economy of the country is not, as my observations during my travel from Vladivostok to Kuibyshev have shown, confined to the Primorsk and is seemingly nation-wide, and may be explained as contemporary evidence of the historical inability of the Russian people to work in close harmony and cooperation.

Although I have no statistics to confirm my opinion, it occurs to me that conscription of men for the Soviet armed forces has not been as widespread to the east of Lake Baikal as in the European part of the R. S. F. S. R. (particularly at Moscow and Kuibyshev where I have

²³ Primorye, the Maritime kray (region), southern coastal area of the Soviet Far East, of which Vladivostok is the capital city.

more opportunity to observe conditions than at other points visited). Men are still performing work in the Soviet Far East which was formerly performed by men in European R. S. F. S. R. but is now being performed by women in this latter area. My assumption is that the Soviet Government is keeping a great well of unconscribed man power in the Soviet Far East for possible conscription and use on short notice in the event of a Soviet-Japanese conflict. Numerous unconscribed men up to 50 years of age at Vladivostok have informed me during the past six to eight months that they have to report to their mobilization centers not less than once a month, and some have even stated that they must keep their family or *upravdom* (house manager) informed at all times of their whereabouts and that at their mobilization centers they are always reminded that they must hold themselves in instant readiness for a call to military duty.

Travel to points outside of a person's town or city of residence is prohibited in the Primorsk unless the traveler first obtains permission from the police (*militsiya*) but this control I am informed is common to whole Soviet Union.

In turning to the Soviet-Japanese situation it is worthy of note that in so far as I have been able to determine all maritime trade between Vladivostok and Japan ceased many months ago. The last Japanese vessel to call at Vladivostok cleared from that port on or about November 4, 1941, and I have learned of no Soviet vessels carrying cargo between Japan and Vladivostok since the outbreak of the war in the Pacific.

Notwithstanding that in so far as I am aware the Soviet Government is doing all possible to cause the general public both in the Soviet Union and abroad to believe that present Soviet-Japanese relations are the cause of no grave concern, people in Primorsk are expecting, as mentioned above, a war with Japan.²⁴ I do not believe that it would be a misstatement to state that a war with Japan would be popular with these people. The Japanese armed forces occupied eastern Siberia only twenty years ago, in consequence of which there are large numbers of residents in that area who, or whose parents, felt the heavy hand of the Japanese "interventionist", as he was then called. There were other "interventionist" troops, among which were the American Forces in Siberia,²⁵ but it is only against the Japanese troops, who

²⁴ This portion of the memorandum is not printed.

²⁵ For correspondence on the Japanese intervention in the Russian Far East and Siberia after the Bolshevik revolution of October 25–November 7, 1917, and the presence of American military forces to prevent Japanese seizure of territory and to supply assistance in railroad operation in Siberia, together with other aid, until the withdrawal of the American and then the Japanese troops, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 1–467; *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 183–307; *ibid.*, 1919, Russia, pp. 195–603; *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. III, pp. 481–570; *ibid.*, 1921, vol. II, pp. 701–752; and *ibid.*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 840–869.

were then as lawless and barbaric in Siberia as they have been during the past five years in China, that one hears expressed today in Vladivostok the desire for revenge. If I am to believe, as I do, the numerous tales which I heard from as many sources during the past winter and early spring of the Japanese provocative acts and frontier incidents which were of almost daily occurrence along the Soviet-Manchurian boundary (none of which, as I now recall, were mentioned in the press or on the radio), it is positive proof of the desire of the Soviet Government to avoid at that time a conflict with the Japanese. Recent information, however, is to the effect that the Japanese frontier guards adopted a very conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet frontier forces with the approach of summer and that the past few months have passed without any acts on the part of the Japanese guards which may be considered as inspired provocation.

Since the Soviet Union and the United States are now allies in the war in Europe it would seem appropriate to add a word in concluding this memorandum with regard to the attitude of the people of Primorsk toward the United States. I have found no resentment, at least among the common people, against the United States for having sent "interventionist" troops into Siberia—on the contrary, I have been surprised on numerous occasions by hearing some simple peasant or workman with whom I have managed to strike up a casual conversation make a remark to the effect that the Soviet Union has a debt to the United States for the help given by Americans in preventing the Japanese from seizing the eastern portion of Siberia when Russia was weak from the October Revolution.²⁶ The people in general do not seem to harbor the thought that the United States entertains any imperialistic ambitions against Siberia. The people consider the United States a country of progress and enlightenment and one sooner or later hears the phrase "America is a country of culture and technic" in any discussion of the United States. The crews of the numerous Soviet vessels plying between Vladivostok and United States ports in recent months are perhaps the best propagandists the United States can have in the Soviet Union in that they are Soviet citizens and are not regarded as propagandists by other Soviet citizens as they return to the Soviet Union with good clothing and shoes (the most cherished desiderata of the poorly clad people of this country) and with tales of the

²⁶ At the time of the recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union, the then People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, in a letter of November 16, 1933, admitted that "all claims of whatsoever character arising out of activities of military forces of the United States in Siberia . . . subsequent to January 1, 1918, . . . shall be regarded as finally settled and disposed of by this agreement." See *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, p. 36.

comforts of American life, the wholesome food available to all in the United States, the well-stocked shops of American cities, and above all the hospitality and generosity of the Americans.²⁷ The appearance of American flour, sugar and lard on the Vladivostok market several months ago evoked many gratifying expressions made to me by local people. They had read in the Soviet press and heard over the Soviet radio of aid from the United States in the form of military supplies, which most of them had no opportunity to see, but it remained for the arrival of food without any preliminary fanfare to arouse their gratitude and their realization that the United States was really helping the Soviet Union. It became not uncommon for casual Soviet acquaintances to remark to me, upon learning that I am an American, to the effect that they had become convinced that the American food they were enjoying was but an earnest of the support, economic as well as military, the Soviet people will in their present struggle and trying times receive from the American people. I regret that I have not heard any such gratifying remarks from the Soviet officials with whom I have come in contact, but it must be borne in mind that Soviet officials in general are given to ultra-caution when dealing with foreign officials, and, as stated in the first paragraph of this memorandum, are prone to limit their conversations in such instances to the discussion of happenings and conditions which have been given official sanction through having been discussed in the press or on the radio. While the sentiment of the people of Primorsk in general toward the United States has become increasingly friendly as the war progresses I have found little if any change in the attitude of the local officials toward the United States. These officials have at no time been unfriendly, their attitude toward the Consulate General being one of formal cordiality. No member of the staff of the Consulate General has been tendered an invitation by any Soviet official to a social function, formal or informal, of any kind and the only instances in which I have met any local Soviet official socially have been at social functions given by myself or one of my consular colleagues. In so far as giving assistance to the foreign consular corps at Vladivostok is concerned, it is my opinion that upon the opening of the Consulate General in January 1941²⁷ the local authorities gave the most active assistance to and facilitated the performing of its consular functions by the German Consulate General, followed in lessening degree by the American, Japanese and Chinese respectively whereas today the order is probably American first, Chinese second and Japanese last.

A. I. WARD

²⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 460 ff.

740.0011 European War 1939/24582: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV, September 30, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 8:50 p. m.]

831. The Yugoslav Minister ²⁸ informed me yesterday that he had learned from a Soviet source which he considers reasonably reliable that the Soviet Government had recently instructed the press to refrain from further references to the creation of a second front or to reports of a public demand in the United States and Great Britain for its immediate establishment. He said that his informant attributed this development to apprehension respecting the effect on Soviet and more specifically Red Army morale of such propaganda taken together with the failure of the second front to develop.

The foregoing report appeared to be supported by the fact that for several days foreign news reports as well as Soviet editorial comment upon the second front have been absent from the Soviet press. News items regarding the popular desire for a second front abroad for the opening of the second front again appear however today.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/25069

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State[Extract] ²⁹

[WASHINGTON,] October 5, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon. . . .

For the first time during six months the Ambassador spoke to me with measured optimism regarding the military position of the Soviet armies. He stated that he believed Stalingrad would hold, provided Great Britain and the United States could make available immediately to the Soviet a sufficient number of fighter planes in order to make it possible for the Soviet armies to have some cover over Stalingrad against the German dive bomber. He asked if I would speak to the President about this and added that he intended seeing Harry Hopkins about this matter. I told him I would be very glad to talk with the President about it and that I did not have to assure the Ambassador that any form of assistance which we could possibly make available to the Soviet Government would be forthcoming.

As the Ambassador was leaving, I asked him if he was going to speak in Boston this week. He replied that he was going to make no speeches whatever. He said he felt that if he spoke to the public at

²⁸ Stanoye Simich.²⁹ The omitted portion concerns a discussion of the situation within Germany.

all, he would have to mention the much ventilated question of the second front and that he believed it expedient for him to say nothing whatever on that subject.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/24644 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 5, 1942—1 p. m.
[Received October 5—10:34 a. m.]

5537. Personal, for the President from Harriman. Without any specific information, it is my guess that Stalin's statement last night to the Associated Press³⁰ is part of a scheme developed by the Soviet Foreign Propaganda Bureau with which I understand Oumansky is now associated.

Stalin has evidently been told that the way to get action on the part of the United States and the British Governments is to have those in authority, to use Willkie's³¹ word "prodded" by popular demand. Stalin's statement ties in with what Maisky³² said here to the American press a fortnight ago.

The Slavic mind does not understand us any more perhaps than we understand them and they do not realize that their relations with us, both now and in the future, cannot be built on a sound basis with this type of devious method. The statement does not sound at all like the direct manner in which Stalin personally dealt with the Prime Minister and myself when we were in Moscow.³³ It sounds more like a scheme of a mind like Oumansky's.

From my personal talk with Stalin I am convinced that he wants above all to be on a basis of intimacy and frank interchange with you. On the other hand it should be borne in mind that Stalin does not pretend to understand the ways of our democracies.

I feel Stalin has been misinformed of the psychological and political situation in both the United States and Britain and the effect that this type of heavy-handed propaganda will have on our relations. I believe it is correct to say that since Dieppe³⁴ there has been far less public clamor here and more sober thinking regarding a second front. [Harriman.]

WINANT

³⁰ See *infra*.

³¹ Concerning the visit of Wendell L. Willkie, personal representative of President Roosevelt, to the Soviet Union in September 1942, see pp. 637-650, *passim*.

³² Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

³³ In August; see pp. 618-625, *passim*.

³⁴ A 9-hour raid was carried out on the German-held French channel port of Dieppe on August 19-20, 1942, by combined British, Canadian, American, and Free French contingents, which sustained heavy losses.

740.0011 European War 1939/24706 : Telegram

The First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Dickerson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 6, 1942—noon.

[Received October 7—11:05 a. m.]

858. *Pravda* of October 5 publishes prominently on its front page a letter dated October 3 written by Stalin to Henry Cassidy, correspondent in Moscow of the Associated Press, in reply to a letter which Cassidy had addressed to Stalin requesting an answer either orally or in written form to three questions "of interest to American public opinion". Stalin's letter to Cassidy as published by *Pravda* reads as follows:

["Mr. Cassidy:

In view of the fact that I am busy and cannot therefore grant you an interview I am confined to giving you a brief written reply to your questions.

1. 'What place does the possibility of a second front occupy in the Soviet evaluation of the current situation'.

Reply. A very important—it is possible to say—a primary place.

2. 'How effective is the assistance from the Allies to the Soviet Union and what would it be possible to do in order to expand and improve this assistance?'

Reply. In comparison with the assistance which the Soviet Union, drawing off the main forces of the German Fascist troops is rendering to its allies, the assistance from the Allies to the Soviet Union is meanwhile of little effect. To expand and improve this assistance only one thing is required: complete and timely fulfillment by Allies of their obligations.

3. 'What is still the Soviet capacity for resistance?'

Reply. I think that the Soviet capacity for resistance to the German bandits is in its strength not a whit lower—if not higher—than the capacity of Fascist Germany or of any other aggressive power to secure for itself world hegemony.

With respects. I. Stalin."

DICKERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/24791 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 10, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received October 12—4:10 p. m.]

874. Embassy's 1369, July 17, 6 p. m., 1941;³⁵ and 729, September 1, 11 a. m., 1942.³⁶ The local paper of today publishes a ukase³⁷ of the

³⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 630; this telegram reported the latest re-institution of military, or political, commissars. See also telegram No. 1011, August 13, 1940, from Moscow, *ibid.*, 1940, vol. III, p. 211; and *ibid.*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 377, footnote 22, p. 519, footnote 13, and p. 746, footnote 27.

³⁶ Not printed.

³⁷ The ukase was dated October 9, 1942.

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. abolishing the Institution of Military Commissars and Political Workers "in all regiments and divisions, staff units, military academies and institutions of the Red Army at both the front and the rear."

The preamble to the ukase states that during the period of the civil war which followed the revolution it had been considered necessary to inaugurate the system of military commissars in the Red Army because of lack of confidence in old officers "who at that time did not believe in the firmness of Soviet power or were even alien to it". It is pointed out that during this period the military commissars played a decisive role in the strengthening of the Red Army in the selection of officers in the political education of the army and in instilling of military discipline.

The preamble goes on to say that in the years following the civil war the position of officers in the Red Army changed fundamentally as a result of their "further growth and education and also under the influence of the successes and victories of the Soviet system in all spheres of life". It states that the present struggle has hardened the officers of the Red Army and has developed a very large group of new and talented officers who are experienced in battle and fully faithful to their military duty and the honor of their rank. The officers of the Red Army have proved in battle their devotion to the fatherland and have grown in military and political stature.

At the same time, it continues, the military commissars and political workers have improved their military knowledge so that already some of them have become military officers in actual command of troops. Many others can also be used. The preamble concludes by stating that these circumstances indicate that the basis for the existence of the system of military commissars has completely disappeared and that furthermore the continued existence of this system can operate as a brake on the improvement of troop administration and may also place the commissars in a false position. Accordingly the system is abolished.

The ukase establishes complete unity of command and vests it in the military officers who are given full responsibility for the military and political life of each unit, does away with the system of military commissars and political workers in the Red Army and provides that they shall be made "assistant officers" to the military officers at present in command of given units. It also provides for the systematic transfer of additional political officers to the status of military officers.

An order of the Commissariat for Defense is likewise published

implementing the foregoing ukase and setting up courses of military training for political officers.

HENDERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/24890: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]³⁸

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 14, 1942—11 p. m.
[Received October 16—3:22 a. m.]

885. My 874, October 10, 5 p. m. The decree of October 9 abolishing the system of military commissars has given rise to much discussion and speculation among the Soviet population and foreign observers and in general has been popularly received.

As the result of experience gained in the early part of the Finnish-Soviet war of 1939-40 there has been little doubt in military circles here that during a period of actual warfare a system, which impairs the principle of the unity of command, is disadvantageous from a purely military point of view. During the course of that war, therefore, the military commissars were deprived of all military authority.

Following the tremendous initial successes of the Germans last year Stalin decided to restore military authority to the commissars in spite of the resultant military disadvantages. It is believed that this decision was based on his conviction that many officers of the army did not have full confidence in his leadership and could not be depended upon to be entirely loyal to the new military structure which he had created since the army purge of 1937³⁹ or to him personally and that the strengthening of the authority of the system of military commissars, the tentacles of which were extended into all army institutions and units while not necessarily adding to the army's military effectiveness, would nevertheless place the commissars in a better position to combat the crystallization of feelings of dissatisfaction with himself.

Although the Embassy does not possess means which enable it to state with assurance the precise reasons for the issuance of the decree just at this time, it believes from such information as has come into its possession from various sources that the following factors are among those responsible for Stalin's decision:

(1) A greater confidence on the part of Stalin in the reliability and personal loyalty to himself of all ranks of officers in the Red Army.

³⁸ The last section of this telegram, in which the Chargé quoted from an editorial in *Pravda* of October 11, which was largely a summation of the preceding observations, is badly garbled and consequently omitted.

³⁹ See *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 377-380, 383-386.

The close personal relationship between Stalin and his leading generals was evident at the Churchill dinner.

(2) The dissatisfaction of his officers with the present situation. The regular line officers as a rule have considered the powers possessed by the Military Commissars as a reflection of a lack of confidence in their own loyalty, which they felt themselves to have demonstrated on the field of battle. They, furthermore, have complained that they have frequently found themselves unable, because of the necessity of conferring in advance with the military commissars, to make decisions with the speed demanded by this military situation.

(3) The deteriorating effect of the commissar system upon army discipline. The success of the campaign which has been waged, particularly during recent weeks, to improve discipline has been impeded by the lack of unity of command and the absence of mutual confidence between regular line officers and the commissars. It is particularly important during the coming winter when the men at the front will be receiving news of the privations of their families in the rear that every effective means be taken to promote strict discipline.

(4) The lack of personnel of officer calibre sufficient to supply the needs of the military commissar system and simultaneously to replace the regular line officers who have fallen. Many of the military commissars after a short period of training will make effective regular line officers. Some of them have already been acting in such a capacity.

The issuance of the decree by no means indicates the cessation of political pork [*work*] in the army. The order of the Commissariat for Defense of October 9 supplementing the decree as well as comments carried in the editorials of the leading Soviet newspapers makes it clear that although all former commissars will be commissioned as line officers, the political work in the future will be carried out by line officers acting as assistants to and under the direction of various grades of commanders and qualified in case of need to take command.

HENDERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/24913 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 15, 1942—5 p. m.
[Received October 18—11:45 p. m.]

892. Agitation in the Soviet press for the immediate establishment of the second front has continued with few occasional lulls since the Churchill visit. It has been especially intense at times when stimulated by such events as the Willkie intimation that a little prodding of the military might be helpful and the letter of Stalin to Cassidy.

This agitation in the press has been in the form of quotations from articles published in Great Britain and the United States demanding

an immediate second front and of articles, editorials, statements, caricatures and so forth of Soviet origin.

Some of the articles of Soviet origin attempt to prove that the military and naval situation is such as to render feasible the immediate opening of active military operations by the Allies on the European front. Others draw on history to prove that one of the weaknesses of a coalition has been that each member has a tendency to derive therefrom the greatest possible benefits at the least possible cost to itself.

One such article by Tarle,⁴⁰ the well-known Soviet historian, published in *Pravda* of October 9, frankly emphasizes errors made by British diplomacy in previous wars. In another article a Soviet Major-General attacks the theory supported by certain British and American circles that the war can be decided by air attacks on Germany.

Recent Soviet editorials and articles for the use of propagandists touching on the second front have in general followed the line that Red Army must be prepared to fight on alone until the second front, which in time will undoubtedly be established, can relieve the German pressure. Tarle articles differ in emphasis from some of the foreign news items and articles simultaneously quoted which dwell upon the desperate need for the immediate opening of a second front.

The press campaign has contributed to the stimulation of a deep and wide interest among the Soviet people in the matter of a second front. Members of the Embassy staff are quizzed frequently by Soviet citizens with whom they enter into conversations in shops and trains etc. regarding the reasons for the delay of the establishment of a second front. It would appear that the Soviet people have been led to believe that Great Britain and the United States have agreed to open a second front during the year 1942 and that they will consider the failure to establish such a front as a violation of obligations. It seems that more criticism is directed at Britain than the United States for the delay and in sane [some] Soviet circles it is intimated that the British "with their customary duplicity" do not desire a strong Soviet Union after the war and would not be displeased if Germany, while exhausting itself, should further weaken the Soviet Union.

The question of the second front also continues to occupy a prominent place in propaganda and agitation work other than that carried on by the press. A member of the Embassy staff attended an Agitprop lecture⁴¹ last night at which foreigners apparently were not supposed to be present. The subject was "A Survey of International Events" and most of the address was devoted to the second front. In general

⁴⁰ Eugene Tarle, author of a wartime *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia 1812*, among other writings.

⁴¹ Sponsored by the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, directly affiliated with the Political Bureau (Politburo).

the speaker followed lines similar to those of the press. He endeavored to prove that Great Britain and America were strong enough in view of the present distribution of German troops to invade western Europe and to show that no serious difficulties of a purely military nature stood in the way of the immediate opening of a second front. He stressed Willkie's suggestion that it might be helpful to prod British and American military leaders and pointed out that although Willkie was not expressing the official opinion of the American Government, he was the spokesman for 22 million American voters and was in the Soviet Union as a personal representative of the President. The speaker said that therefore Willkie should be considered as a competent spokesman for the American people. Some of the lecturer's remarks were of an extremely satirical nature and were not calculated to promote feelings of friendliness for the American or British Governments. While making it clear that the Soviet Union was glad to have the United States and Great Britain as allies, he gave his audience to understand that these allies by failing to open a second front were responsible for present Soviet military difficulties.

It is impossible with assurance to list or to attempt to weigh the various reasons prompting the Soviet authorities to carry on an agitation campaign of the character of that outlined above. From an external point of view, there can be no doubt as [*that?*] they are, at least in part, motivated by a desire to bring greater pressure upon the American and British Governments to increase aid, and in particular open at once a front in Western Europe. It is believed that internally they are endeavoring to cope with a growing dissatisfaction arising from the absence of a second front, the establishment of which they had encouraged the Soviet people to expect this year. They are trying to make it clear that they have made and are making use of all means at their disposal to bring about this front, and that the failure of this front to materialize would indicate that the United States and Great Britain have violated their obligations rather than that the Soviet leaders have not been entirely frank with the Soviet people. It seems that a particular effort is being made gradually to accustom the Red Army to the idea that it may be compelled to carry on the struggle at least through the fall and winter without the armed assistance from the west which allegedly had been promised.

Certain aspects of the campaign strengthen my impression that although the Soviet authorities are permitting and at times even encouraging expressions of tolerance and occasionally of friendliness for the United States and Great Britain, they are not yet prepared to permit the Soviet people to have feelings of confidence in, or whole-hearted friendliness for, any of the so-called capitalistic nations even though for the time being some of these nations and the Soviet Union are associated in a struggle against a common foe.

HENDERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/24908 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 16, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received October 17—1:45 p. m.]

899. Embassy's 874, October 10, 5 p. m. *Pravda* of October 14 carries an announcement that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has extended to the Navy the application of its ukaze of October 9, 1942 regarding the establishment of full unity of command and the abolition of the institution of military commissar in the Red Army.

HENDERSON

711.61/861a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson)

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1942—6 p. m.

521. According to a Tass dispatch dated October 12 a series of lectures and reports on the United States and a number of exhibits were arranged in Soviet cities in honor of the 450th anniversary of the discovery of America.

Prominence is given in the dispatch to an exhibit of books on America in the Lenin State Library at Moscow reportedly including sections on the history of American-Russian friendship and on contemporary Soviet-American relations.

Please report on the foregoing with particular reference to any significant indications of the Soviet propaganda line regarding the United States revealed in the exhibit and in press or other treatment of Columbus Day.

WELLES

702.60111/93

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1942.

I explained to Mr. Kaiv⁴² that after discussing the question with the competent officers in the Department it had been decided that it might be advisable for Mr. Kaiv to postpone the proposed transfer of his office from New York to Washington.⁴³

⁴² Johannes Kaiv, Acting Consul General of Estonia at New York in charge of Legation.

⁴³ Mr. Durbrow had recorded in a memorandum of September 10, 1942, that Mr. Kaiv had proposed this transfer in part "in order that he might maintain closer contact with the Department."

I explained that it was felt that in the interest of his country it might be advisable to postpone this move since it might be misinterpreted and cause embarrassment and repercussions which in the end would perhaps not be helpful to the Estonian cause.

Mr. Kaiv said that he understood this very well and appreciated the Department's courtesy in advising him informally in this matter.

711.61/862: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 23, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received October 24—1:45 p. m.]

925. Department's 521, October 17, 6 p. m. In addition to a number of announcements, three articles inspired by the 450th anniversary of the discovery of America have appeared in the Moscow and Kuibyshev newspapers. Two of these articles, one occupying one-third of the last page of the Moscow *Pravda* of October 13, and the other an equal amount of space in the local paper, the *Volzhskaya Kommuna* of October 11, were written by D. Zaslavski, the well-known Soviet journalist and Communist theoretician.

In his articles Zaslavski endeavors to prove by drawing on history that since the time of Columbus America and Europe have been interdependent; that events in one continent have uniformly affected the other; that even after America had gained political independence it remained an economic colony of Europe up to the latter part of the last century; that now the United States has become the foremost industrial power and is itself engaging in colonial extension; that airplanes have brought America and Europe still closer together so that the Atlantic Ocean has become the great Atlantic Straits; that the Fascists, following the example of European reactionaries of the past, are endeavoring to obtain control of America; that the American people realize that their historical fate depends on the outcome of the war and have not allowed themselves to be misled; and that they "follow with active solidarity the heroic struggle of the Soviet people, they send their sons across the ocean to Europe and demand the opening of a second front in Europe as soon as possible". In discussing American history, Zaslavski refers to the Monroe Doctrine, states that it has achieved widespread popularity and that "all American Governments and people take the attitude that no European laws shall have effect on American soil".

The third article, written by E. Sokolov, are [*is*] the leading feature of the October 10 number of the *Moscow News*, an English language weekly newspaper which has a restricted circulation in the Soviet

Union and is published primarily for foreign consumption. This article entitled "Columbus Day Carries Message of Daring that Wins", points out that America are [*is*] born daring and by its enterprise has won a place among the great nations of the world. The writer displays friendly feelings towards the American people and even leaves the impression that there is something praiseworthy about the American "way of life". He states that "it was in the United States that a great democratic republic first sprang up and whence first the Declaration of the Rights of Man was issued." He asserts that the Fascists' plans for world domination include "the abolition of the American way of life" and charges that the Nazi leaders hate American traditions and cannot understand the American "democratic way of life". The article emphasizes the success of the American war industrial program and states that the overwhelming majority of the American people have not left any doubt about their fighting spirit and their national unity for defensive action. The American in uniform, is ready to call the Fascist bluff.

The same issue of the *Moscow News* carries an announcement that the anniversary of the discovery of America will be celebrated by the Geographical Institute of Moscow University at a scientific session, which will hear reports tracing the historic path of the new world since the times of Columbus to the present day. In addition a series of lectures are scheduled on the subject of America at different Moscow cultural institutions.

The Moscow *Izvestiya* of October 13 announced that in commemoration of the 450th anniversary of the opening of America the Lenin Library has opened an exhibition in which more than 150 books regarding America are being displayed. Some of the exhibits are reproductions of certain of Columbus' autographs and notes. The exhibition is divided into a number of sections, one of which is entitled "America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The Moscow *Pravda* of October 20 contains a short announcement that scientific workers of the library of the Academy of Science in Leningrad in connection with the 450th anniversary of the discovery of America have completed their bibliographical index relating to the following subjects: "Columbus and the opening of America". and "Alaska". Both works are ready for publication.

Thompson is preparing a report on the exhibits in Moscow.⁴⁴

HENDERSON

⁴⁴ See telegram No. 940, October 27, 1 p. m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 470.

740.0011 European War 1939/25264

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at my request.

I told the Ambassador that I had talked to Ambassador Standley⁴⁵ and had been very glad to obtain such a satisfactory impression from Admiral Standley of the way in which things were moving in the Soviet Union. Mr. Litvinov replied that Admiral Standley saw things through rose-colored spectacles. I said that if that was the case, if I felt at any time that I was getting an over-optimistic viewpoint from Admiral Standley, I would immediately ask Mr. Litvinov to come to see me since I was sure that in that way I would get a balanced impression in view of Mr. Litvinov's tendency to view things through black spectacles.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.61/863 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary
of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 27, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 10:22 p. m.]

940. My 925, October 23, 5 p. m. Thompson reports that the Secretary of the Lenin Library has told him that the Columbus Day exhibit consisted of about 150 books and manuscripts and was exhibited for a period of 2 weeks. It was seen by about 450 people a day. He is providing the Embassy photographs of the exhibit.

So far as is known, no American Government official was informed of the exhibit or invited to attend it. Furthermore, no American Government official was notified of any other event inspired by Columbus Day.

HENDERSON

861.404/485

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the British Ambassador
(Halifax)⁴⁶*

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1942.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: I have given careful consideration to your request for the views of this Government concerning the exchange of

⁴⁵ Ambassador Standley had returned to Washington for consultation a few days previously.

⁴⁶ The Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Ray Atherton, noted that Ambassador Standley "has approved this letter."

ecclesiastical visits between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in conformity with the suggestion made to the British Ambassador at Kuibyshev by the Metropolitan of Kiev⁴⁷ of the Russian Orthodox Church.

If in the opinion of the British Government and of the established Church of Great Britain such an exchange of ecclesiastical visits is considered desirable at the present time, this Government will have no observations to make.⁴⁸

However, should the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union make a similar proposal to this Government for an exchange of ecclesiastical visits between the United States and the Soviet Union, I believe that we would be disposed to inquire of the Soviet Government whether the proposal of the Russian Orthodox Church had the support of and was in conformity with the wishes of that Government.⁴⁹

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

861.00/11961 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (MOSCOW), October 31, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received November 3—10:11 p. m.]

967. The Soviet press of October 28 published 52 slogans prepared by the Central Committee of the Party for use in connection with the 25th Anniversary of the Revolution.⁵⁰ There is nothing of an international revolutionary content in any of them. Most of them are calculated to stimulate the Soviet war effort, to strengthen confidence in the Government and State, to arouse patriotism. Among those of an international nature which might be of interest are the following:

No. [7]. Brother oppressed Slavs! Arise in sacred people's war against the Hitlerite imperialists—the mortal enemies of Slavism! Long live the militant unity of the Slavic peoples!

⁴⁷ Nikolay Yarushevich, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galich, Exarch of the Ukraine, and Exarch of the Western Ukraine and White Russia.

⁴⁸ In an earlier memorandum of October 16, 1942, Charles E. Bohlen, of the Division of European Affairs, commented to Under Secretary of State Welles that as the proposed visits of Metropolitan Nikolay "to this country or to Great Britain would have no direct connection with the war effort and would only serve to raise again the extremely controversial question of religion in the Soviet Union, it would be desirable not to encourage either of these visits."

⁴⁹ At first Under Secretary of State Welles, in a memorandum of October 17, 1942, thought it was important to consider "whether, by availing ourselves of this suggestion, something could not be done towards strengthening the possibility that in the postwar period the Soviet Government would permit something more nearly approaching freedom of worship than is now the case." For previous correspondence on the interest of the United States in freedom of religious worship in the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 995 ff.

⁵⁰ Regarding the slogans for the 1941 anniversary of the October Revolution, see telegram No. 1872, November 3, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *ibid.*, p. 653.

No. 8. Long live the military alliance of the armed forces the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States of America, and other freedom loving peoples who are waging a just war of liberation against German-Italian bandit imperialism!

No. 27. Brothers and Sisters: Russians, Ukrainians, White Russians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Karelians who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German Fascist villains! Mercilessly annihilate the Fascist aggressors and kindle the fire of the popular guerrilla movement!

The last three slogans are: No. 50. Communists and young Communists! Be in the first ranks of those who fight against the German Fascist aggressors! No. 51. Long live our glorious fatherland, its freedom and its independence! No. 52. Long live the All Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Party of Lenin and Stalin—the organizer of the struggle for victory over the German Fascist aggressors!

HENDERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/252541

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request.

Lord Halifax told me that he had happened to speak a few days ago to the Polish Ambassador. Mr. Ciechanowski had said that during the latter part of September he had had occasion to speak with the Soviet Ambassador and had inquired why the Soviet Government was undertaking what was so obviously an intensive propaganda campaign in England and the United States for the creation of a second front at this time. The Polish Ambassador had stated that Mr. Litvinov had frankly answered in reply to these inquiries that the real reason was that the Soviet Government believed it possible that the British and United States Governments would undertake to discuss some form of compromise peace proposal with the German Government on the basis of sacrifices to be made exclusively by the Soviet Union, and that the best way of preventing any eventuality of this kind was through the creation of a second front in Europe in which both the British and United States Governments would be so extensively drawn in as to make it impossible for public opinion in either country to sanction any compromise peace negotiations.

Lord Halifax remarked to the Polish Ambassador that this seemed to him an amazing display of ignorance on the part of the Soviet Government of the real state of public opinion in both Great Britain

and the United States. To this Mr. Ciechanowski had remarked that it might seem strange to us here but that he believed the reply was absolutely accurate and reflected the mental processes of the present directors of Soviet policy.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00116 European War 1939/643 : Telegram

*The First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Dickerson)
to the Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), November 5, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 10:27 p. m.]

982. *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* of November 4 publish a ukase [of] the Presidium [of] the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics forming an extraordinary state commission for ascertaining and investigating, with a view to obtaining ultimate and suitable compensation therefor, the offenses of the German Fascist aggressors and their accomplices, and all the losses in civilian life and property inflicted by them upon citizens' collective farms, public organizations, state enterprises and institutions of the Soviet Union. The losses referred to will also include expense and dislocation occasioned by the removal of industrial enterprises, farm and other property, and sections of the population.

This commission which will coordinate and expand work already being done in this field, includes in its membership: Shvernik,⁵¹ head of the Soviet labor unions, as chairman; Zhdanov,⁵² Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; Nikolai, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia; A. Tolstoi⁵³ the writer; several prominent academicians; and a famous aviatrix.

The two papers mentioned and also *Krasnaya Zvezda* at the same time publish editorials concerning the new commission but these appear to contain nothing of special interest. They refer, however, to the note transmitted in translation as the Embassy's 905 October 19, 10 a. m.,⁵⁴ as well as to the three circular atrocity notes addressed by Molotov to the chiefs of diplomatic missions during the past year, as reported telegraphically in each case at the time.

DICKERSON

⁵¹ Nikolay Mikhailovich Shvernik, president of the All-Union Central Council of Labor Unions.

⁵² Andrey Alexandrovich Zhdanov.

⁵³ Alexey Tolstoy.

⁵⁴ Not printed; but see telegram No. 896, October 16, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, vol. I, p. 60.

861.458/22a : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union (Kalinin)*⁵⁵

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1942.

On the occasion of this twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet State, I convey to Your Excellency the congratulations of the Government and people of the United States.

For the second time in a generation, our two countries are in the forefront of a gathering of nations aligned against a common enemy. Collaboration in the mighty military task before us must be the prelude to collaboration in the mightier task of creating a world at peace.

The resistance of free peoples has made possible the mounting power of the United Nations. The Russian Army and the Russian people in their continuing struggle against Nazi conquest today bear the brunt of the massed weight of the Nazi might and their incomparable heroism stands as a symbol of determination and unrelenting effort.

Let Your Excellency rest assured that the steadily growing power of the United States has been, and will continue to be, dedicated to complete victory.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

861.458/22a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)*⁵⁶

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1942.

On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Republic, permit me to express to Your Excellency the sincere admiration of the Government and people of the United States for the heroism of the army and people of Russia in the face of the savage onslaught on your homeland by the forces of Nazi aggression.

In this stupendous struggle for the preservation of human freedom, my country is resolutely gathering its might and is increasingly bringing it to bear against our common foe. I am confident that the combined efforts of your nation, of mine, and of all the United Nations will give us all complete victory, not only on the fields of battle, but also in the paths of the ensuing peace.

CORDELL HULL

⁵⁵ This telegram was sent directly to Moscow, and a copy was mailed to Kuibyshev on November 20, 1942. For the resumption of the practice of sending a message of felicitation on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 654, footnote 26.

⁵⁶ Molotov acknowledged this greeting by a telegram of November 21, 1942, in which he referred to the success of Allied arms in North Africa, the invasion of which had been carried out during the hours of darkness on November 7-8, 1942, as presaging the full triumph over the common enemy (861.458/24).

This year, congratulations were also sent by Ambassador Standley to Molotov and Stalin.

861.00/11968 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 8, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received November 9—11:50 a. m.]

438. 1. The outstanding feature of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the revolution was Stalin's speech of November 6, a brief summary of which has been telegraphed to the Department from Kuibyshev. It is assumed that the full text is available to the Department. The Embassy's own translation will be sent by mail.

2. It is apparent that in his speech Stalin endeavored to give his Soviet listeners the impression that Soviet agriculture and industry are functioning satisfactorily; that the Red Army has been conducting defensive and offensive operations against the German coalition in a manner which the army of no other state could equal; and that the sole reason for the successes of the German armies during the past summer has been the absence of a second front in Europe. The consensus of foreign observers here is that those sections of the speech which touched on the second front were worded in such a manner as, without giving undue offence to Russia's allies, to cause the Russian people to blame Soviet military reverses on the absence of such a front rather than upon errors or miscalculations on the part of the Soviet leaders.

Both Lozovsky⁵⁷ and Zarubin⁵⁸ pressed me yesterday for my opinion as to the manner in which Stalin's reference to the second front might be received in the United States. I told Lozovsky that I was confident that the American Government and American people would understand Stalin's position and would certainly not take offense at his intimation that Russian reverses were due to the absence of a second front. I said that Americans appreciate plain speaking and do not object to criticism of a frank nature, provided such criticism is not made in sarcastic vein or in such a manner as to question the good intentions or the integrity of the American Government or people.

3. Stalin's insistence in the latter part of his speech that close co-operation is possible among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and that there has been a progressive improvement in the relations of these three countries did much, it is believed, to soften the criticism for the failure of an establishment of a second front. His comparison of the aims and resources of the Allies with those of the Axis Powers as well as his delineation of the tasks of the Soviet Union should be extremely useful in connection with the conducting

⁵⁷ Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁸ Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin, Chief of the American Section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

of Allied propaganda not only in the Allied and neutral countries but also in Germany and Italy.

4. Among the omissions in his speech the following are of particular interest: (a) No reference to the Far East or to the fact that there is a war in the Pacific. (b) No mention of countries other than Great Britain and the United States as Soviet allies and reference to the United Nations as such. Some of the United Nations of the European continent were mentioned but merely as occupied countries. (c) No acknowledgment of material or other aid to the Soviet Union from the United States or Great Britain. (d) No accusation that Great Britain and the United States had failed to live up to their obligations. (e) No reference to the international revolutionary movement or to religious questions. (f) No mention of the military contribution of the United States and Great Britain other than a comment on the small number of German and Italian troops in Egypt.

5. Although Stalin could have given more credit to other United Nations for their contribution to the war effort without detracting from the accomplishments of the Soviet Union, it is nevertheless felt here in diplomatic circles and by those Soviet officials with whom members of the Embassy have discussed the speech, that it represents another step forward in the direction of closer cooperation between the Soviet Union and its allies.⁵⁹ I believe and already have received indications that Soviet officials are interpreting the speech as a directive for the display of greater friendliness toward the United States and Great Britain.

HENDERSON

861.404/483 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 9, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received November 10—9:30 a. m.]

443. 1. The Soviet Government is apparently continuing to develop its policy of recognizing the church and clergy as a factor in Soviet life.

2. The naming of Nikolai, Metropolitan of Kiev, as a member of the Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining Offenses of the German Fascists, as reported in the Embassy's 982, of November 5, 1942 from Kuibyshev, represents the first appointment since the revolution of a churchman to an important governmental position.

⁵⁹ The Chargé further reported in telegram No. 440 of November 9, 1942, that in Kuibyshev "during the whole celebration we sensed a feeling of restored confidence. The general attitude seemed to be that the worst strain was over; the Germans had finally been halted; winter was coming to the rescue; and at least by spring help would be forthcoming from the western Allies." (861.00/11964)

3. Greetings to Stalin on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the revolution from three prominent churchmen have been published during the last 2 days in the Moscow *Pravda*.

Metropolitan Sergei of Moscow and Kolumna,⁶⁰ who describes himself as "Guardian of the Patriarchal Seat" and who is generally regarded as the head of the old Orthodox Russian Church stated that: "On behalf of the clergy and all believers of the Russian Orthodox Church, I sincerely and devoutly congratulate you as the God-chosen leader of our armed and cultural forces. God bless your great deeds for the fatherland with success and glory." Nikolai of Kiev congratulated Stalin on behalf of the Ukrainian believers and asked him to accept from them "their ardent and devout wish that the Almighty send you good health for many years to come." Kalistrat, Catholicos Patriarch of all Georgia, telegraphed that he had asked God "who has in his hand the power and might" to prolong Stalin's life for many years and to preserve the firmness of his spiritual [apparent omission] and strength.

4. The Soviet press is not limiting its discussion of religious matters to Christianity. The *Moscow News* of October 24 published an interview by a Soviet journalist with the "Iman of the Moscow Moslems, assistant to the ninth Mufti, Rosulev Habdrahman, the spiritual headquarters of the Moslems in the Soviet Union." In this interview the Iman denounced Hitler for the manner in which the Germans have treated mosques in German occupied territories, asserted that Moslems in the Soviet Union were sending their sons to the front with blessings to fight for their country and for Moslems the world over against the Fascists, and insisted that the freedom of worship in the Soviet Union was not in any way limited.

5. Although the greetings of the churchmen occupied an insignificant space on the back page of the papers, their publication as well as the appointment of Nikolai has caused a sensation among the Russian people. It is believed that for the most part even those elements of the population who have no personal interest in religion are hoping that the friendlier attitude of the Government toward the church is sincere and that it bodes a general increase in tolerance. People are again beginning to hope, as they did in 1936 when the new constitution was first announced, that they may live to enjoy personal freedoms under a more benign regime.

HENDERSON

⁶⁰ The Most Reverend Sergey, Acting Patriarch and Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomenskoye, Guardian of the Patriarchy.

740.0011 European War 1939/25648: Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 14, 1942.

[Received November 15—12:10 a. m.]

459. Moscow's 449, November 11th.⁶¹ Today's Moscow press published a letter from Stalin to the Moscow representative of the Associated Press setting forth the Soviet attitude to the new front in Africa.⁶² The following is a translation which the Associated Press states has been authorized:

"Dear Mr. Cassidy:

I am answering your questions which reached me on November 12.

Question 1. What is the Soviet view of the Allied campaign in Africa?

Answer. The Soviet view of this campaign is that it represents an outstanding fact of major importance demonstrating the growing might of the armed forces of the Allies and opening the prospect of disintegration of the Italo-German coalition in the nearest future.

The campaign in Africa refutes once more the sceptics who affirm that the Anglo-American leaders are not capable of organizing a serious war campaign. There can be no doubt that no one but first rate organizers could carry out such serious war operations as the successful landings in North Africa across the ocean, as the quick occupation of harbors and wide territories from Casablanca to Bougie and as the smashing of the Italo-German Armies in the western desert, being effected so masterfully.

Question 2. How effective has this campaign been in relieving pressure on the Soviet Union and what further aid does the Soviet Union await?

Answer. It is yet too soon to say to what extent this campaign has been effective in relieving immediate pressure on the Soviet Union. But it may be confidently said that the effect will not be a small one and that a certain relief of pressure on the Soviet Union will result in the nearest future.

But that is not the only thing that matters. What matters first of all is that since the campaign in Africa means that the initiative has passed into the hands of our Allies the campaign changes radically the political and war situation in Europe in favor of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. That campaign undermines the prestige of Hitlerite Germany as the leading force in the system of Axis Powers and demoralizes Hitler's allies in Europe. That campaign releases France from her state of lethargy, mobilizes the anti-Hitler forces of France and provides a basis for building up the anti-Hitlerite French Army. That campaign creates conditions for putting Italy out of commission and for isolating Hitlerite Germany. Finally, that campaign creates prerequisites for the establishment of a second front in Europe nearer to Germany's vital centers which

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² For correspondence on the invasion and occupation of French North Africa, see vol. II.

will be of decisive importance for organizing victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

Question 3. What possibility is there of Soviet offensive power in the east joining the Allies in the west to hasten final victory?

Answer. There need be no doubt that the Red Army will fulfill its task with honor as it has been fulfilling it throughout."

THOMPSON

861.5018/66: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), November 17, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received November 19—5:52 a. m.]

471. Department's 529, October 22, 9 p. m., to Kuibyshev.⁶³

1. There is no uniform ration scale for the whole Soviet Union. The food rationing system exists only in cities and towns. It is being extended, but had not reached all urban centers by the latter part of last summer.

2. There are in general five categories of persons on ration: (1) certain Government officials and manual workers engaged in war industry; (2) other manual workers; (3) office employees, teachers and so forth; (4) dependents of 12 years and above; (5) dependents below the age of 12. Foods usually rationed are (a) bread; (b) fats, including lard and vegetable oils; (c) meats, including fish; (d) sweets including sugar, candy, et cetera; (e) cereals including rice, macaroni and grits.

3 The rations in Moscow in grams are:

Category 1: (a) 800; (b) 800; (c) 2200; (d) 500; (e) 2000. All figures given here and elsewhere unless otherwise indicated are monthly except for bread which is daily.

Category 2: rations are identical with those of category 1 except that only 600 grams of bread are received.

Category 3: (a) 500; (b) 400; (c) 1200, (d) 300; (e) 1500.

Category 4: (a) 400; (b) 200; (c) 600; (d) 200; (e) 1000.

Category 5: (a) 400; (b) 400; (c) 600; (d) 300; (e) 1200.

12. Although bread and cereal rations are usually issued in full, meat and butter are frequently unobtainable. Persons lower than category 2 received no fats in Moscow in September and many persons in Kuibyshev have not received meat or butter during the last 3

⁶³ Not printed; it was an urgent request by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Office of Strategic Services for the material contained in this reply. The omitted sections 4 through 11 gave other ration figures applicable to Kuibyshev, Archangel, and Vladivostok, together with some special regulations governing milk distribution, and other details. Compare with the descriptions of conditions reported in documents on pp. 412, 421, and 441.

months. The rationing system in some localities is used as an instrument to stimulate production or to increase labor supply. In Archangel for instance ablebodied housewives are no longer rationed and in Moscow ablebodied adult dependents are now given no coupons for meat and fats. Rations are reduced also in certain places or industries for workers guilty of tardiness or of other breaches of labor discipline or of failure to fulfill norms. Extra rations are also given occasionally to workers [for?] excellency in skill or in quality or quantity of production or engaged in particularly arduous or dangerous labor. Pregnant women, those nursing babies, and blood donors also receive extra rations in certain localities. In Kuibyshev certain groups have been requested to donate 200 grams of rationed bread daily "to the Red Army."

The extent to which full rations are received depends to an extent upon the efficiency and enterprise of the managers of the closed shops or restaurants. Those depending on the open shops are likely to be unable to obtain the full rations to which they are entitled. In Moscow it is more difficult to obtain foodstuffs from the open shops than it is in Kuibyshev. High officials of party and Government frequently receive food through special channels. In some places the rural population are better fed than the urbanites. In the middle Volga the farmers had more food last winter than the inhabitants of Kuibyshev. In the Vladivostok area the reverse is reported. The armed forces are in general just as well fed as and frequently better fed than civilians in category 1. The soldiers at the front receive more generous rations than those at the rear. It is clear therefore that the size of rations does not reflect average food consumption.

13. The most severe deficiency areas of the U.S.S.R. in grain are in northwest European Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East. Observers in the Far East report that the food shortage there is becoming serious and information from Archangel indicates that the population is becoming disgruntled at the lack of food and in some instances resorting to illegal methods including violence in order to satisfy hunger. It is believed that the shortages in some areas are due to faulty planning or the failure of the authorities to grant high transport priorities to foodstuffs destined for the civil population.

14. The urban population in general is suffering from undernourishment to such an extent as to hamper its normal capacity for work. The absence of a balanced diet is having ill effects even though for many years bread, which is the most plentiful food available, has been the staple diet of Russia. In our opinion unless considerable quantities of foodstuffs, particularly fats and sugar can be obtained from abroad the suffering in many districts will be severe and during the later part of the winter and the spring great numbers of persons will die as a result of undernourishment and the health of many more will be

seriously impaired. We are inclined to believe, however, and to this General Faymonville agrees, that there will be no starvation conditions before the next harvest, if the program of food importation under Lend-Lease is accomplished successfully, if the authorities, in spite of the pressure which is being brought to bear on them, do not make any great increase in the rations, and if distribution is carefully planned and executed.

HENDERSON

861.9111/369 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[Extract] "

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 7, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received December 8—3:15 p. m.]

1057. 1. The tone of the Soviet press and radio during the last month make it appear that the Soviet Government has decided to present war developments in such a light as to influence the Soviet population to have a more friendly feeling towards the United States and Great Britain, in particular toward the United States. Stalin's speech of November 6 in which he emphasized the importance of the "fighting alliance" between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain and the possibility of the maintenance of close cooperation between members of this alliance; Stalin's letter to Cassidy of November 14 expressing approval of the new front in Africa; as well as the publication in the Soviet press of news reports emanating from abroad stressing the successes of the Americans and British in Africa and emphasizing the heroism of the American Naval and Marine Forces in the Pacific, have apparently encouraged Soviet journalists and radio commentators to adopt a more friendly attitude with regard to Great Britain and the United States.

2. Although references to the establishment of a second front continue to appear from time to time such references can no longer be construed as being of a critical nature. In general the line is being taken that such a front will eventually be established and that the opening of the new front in Africa is a step preparatory to the establishment of the front in Western Europe.

[3.] Since the publication of Stalin's letter to the representative of the Associated Press referred to above, Soviet writers have begun to refer to the United States and Great Britain as "our allies".

4. The Soviet-English language newspaper the *Moscow News* which was formerly published weekly but which is now appearing about 10

"The omitted section of this telegram briefly summarized several articles and editorials which appeared in the *Moscow News* during November 1942.

times a month, has become particularly friendly towards the United States and Great Britain. Although this newspaper is intended primarily for circulation in English speaking countries and has a limited distribution in the Soviet Union nevertheless its increasingly friendly tone must necessarily reflect certain trends in Soviet Governmental policy.

HENDERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/25876f: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson)

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1942—6 p. m.

620. Your 482, November 20, 11 p. m., from Moscow.⁶⁵ You are requested to see Molotov and refer to his conversation with you on November 20 in regard to North Africa. Please inform Molotov that a telegram has been sent⁶⁶ to General Eisenhower⁶⁷ and Murphy⁶⁸ in order that they may seek to clarify to Admiral Darlan⁶⁹ the attitude of the United States Government. We desire Mr. Molotov to be orally informed of this telegram. It is being simultaneously telegraphed to our Embassy in London in order that the Ambassador may read it to Mr. Churchill. Please read a paraphrase of the following telegram to Mr. Molotov:

"The United States Government fully appreciates the important military contribution which Admiral Darlan has made and is continuing to make in the campaign which began in Africa but which is a prelude to the complete liberation of all French peoples both at home and in the empire from Axis domination and rule. It has been the consistent policy of this Government, expressed on many occasions by the Secretary of State, to welcome the active cooperation of all Frenchmen who desire to resist Axis aggression and the extension, wherever it may be found, of Axis domination and control. It is the common purpose of the United Nations to continue the struggle until the aims of the Atlantic Charter are fulfilled and the peoples of each country are free to express their own will and to decide their future for themselves. Until these purposes are achieved, other considerations must be left for subsequent determination since dispersion of effort must weaken the military unity of purpose. It is in the sense

⁶⁵ Printed in vol. II, section under France entitled "Interest of the United States in political and economic conditions in French North Africa."

⁶⁶ On December 7, via War Department cable.

⁶⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, at this time Lieutenant General, was Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa.

⁶⁸ Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; United States Political Adviser, staff of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; and Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa with rank of Minister.

⁶⁹ Adm. Jean François Darlan, High Commissioner of French North and West Africa.

of the foregoing that we feel that Admiral Darlan is continuing to supplement the contribution which he has already made. As long as his efforts are directed to the specific end of resistance to the Axis, we feel he has a definite role and a positive military contribution to make to our united effort consistent with the policy of the United States Government as outlined above. This will not be the case if he devotes his efforts to building up an organization, not directly connected with the military effort, since it must be borne in mind that other Frenchmen are likewise making contributions in the military field of considerable importance whose political aims have likewise never been 'gone along with' by this Government. This Government has too great a respect for France and the sovereignty of the French people to attempt to predetermine the choice which the French people will eventually have to make.

"You may further wish to add that any exhortation directed to Frenchmen to support the military effort is timely but to go beyond that into what is primarily a political appeal may now be detrimental to the cause of France."

HULL

861.00/11968: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 11, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received December 12—1:15 p. m.]

1081. The Moscow press of December 10 reports a ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with which elections to the Supreme Soviet are postponed until December 1943 and the mandates of the present members are extended for another year. The last meeting of the Supreme Soviet was held in February 1941⁷⁰ and the present deferment of elections is the second since the outbreak of the Soviet-German War.

HENDERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/26441: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*⁷¹

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 11, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received December 12—9:35 a. m.]

1082. Your 620, December 9, 1 [6] p. m., received here this morning. I am leaving for Moscow by earliest available transportation in

⁷⁰ For correspondence concerning this VIII session of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, see telegrams No. 367, February 25, 1941, and No. 380, February 26, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 607 and 608, respectively.

⁷¹ A penciled note on this telegram made in the Department reads: "No reply sent since it was felt it would be better not to discuss personalities."

order to carry out the instructions contained therein and shall probably see Molotov Monday or Tuesday.⁷² I would appreciate in the meantime such clarification as the Department may be able to telegraph me at Moscow with regard to the sentence beginning, "This will not be the case." Molotov is certain to ask me who the "other Frenchmen" are and perhaps in what respect their political aims have "never been 'gone along with' by the Government". Without such clarification I shall not be able to answer these questions and I fear that consequently our conversation may not be fully satisfactory.

HENDERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/26448 : Telegram

The First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Dickerson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 12 [11], 1942—noon.
[Received December 11—10:08 p. m.]

1045. Soviet press comment on the scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon⁷³ has been highly commendatory and has expressed great satisfaction at its successful execution.

Repeated to Moscow.

DICKERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/26531 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 15, 1942—9 p. m.
[Received December 16—9:41 a. m.]

537. Department's 620, December 9, 1 [6] p. m., to Kuibyshev.

1. I called on Molotov this evening in order to carry out the instructions contained in the telegram referred to. He listened in a most sympathetic manner while I was reading the substance of the message for Darlan and when I had concluded asked me a few questions with regard to it. He inquired in particular regarding the meaning of the sentence beginning "This will not be the case". Although no reply had arrived to my telegram 1082, December 11, 7 p. m.,⁷⁴ I said that it was my understanding that in this sentence we were trying to make it clear to Darlan that if he should begin to devote his efforts to building

⁷² December 14 or 15. For Henderson's conversation with Molotov, see his telegram No. 537, December 15, 9 p. m., below.

⁷³ Most of the French Fleet was scuttled on November 27, 1942, as German troops entered Toulon. A few ships escaped to North African ports. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox announced on December 8 that about one quarter of the ships had fallen intact and afloat into German control.

⁷⁴ See footnote 71, p. 483.

up an organization for serving other than purely military purposes we would no longer consider that he was playing a useful role: that he must bear in mind that other French groups were also making important contributions in the military field, and that the American Government had never given its support to their political aims.

2. Molotov asked if the message had already been delivered to Darlan. I said that I assumed that it had since the instructions had been issued a week ago. He then requested that I express his appreciation to my Government for its courtesy in bringing the message to his attention and to report that he had found it fully satisfactory.

He added that several days ago Stalin had sent a message to the President through Litvinov⁷⁵ expressing his own approval and that of the other members of the Government with the policy of Eisenhower towards Darlan. He, Molotov, felt that the American Government should be congratulated on the skill which it had displayed in utilizing Darlan and his associates for the benefit of the Allied cause. Stalin had informed Churchill more than a week ago that he was pleased with the American policies in North Africa.

HENDERSON

661.11245/28

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

No. 200

KUIBYSHEV, December 21, 1942.

[Received February 3, 1943.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's airmail instruction number 87 of November 23, 1942 (File No. 661.11245/25),⁷⁶ suggesting that the Embassy make further representations to the appropriate Soviet authorities regarding the possibility of recovering, or of obtaining financial compensation for, certain items of personal property seized by the Soviet customs officials at Odessa in November 1940 from Mrs. Maria Kamecka.⁷⁷ The Department also requested the Embassy to forward to it a copy of the note of March 21, 1951 from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dealing with this subject in order that the Department might complete its records in this case.

No copy of the note of the People's Commissariat of March 21, 1941, is available to the Embassy, in as much as its files in the case were destroyed at the outbreak of Soviet-German hostilities.

⁷⁵ See the note of November 15, from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 660.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

⁷⁷ Mrs. Albert (Wojciech) Kamecki, née Malc.

In view of the finality of the reply of the People's Commissariat to the Embassy's note number 66, of March 18, 1942, a copy of which reply was transmitted to the Department as enclosure number 2 to the Embassy's despatch number 1493 of March 30, 1942,⁷⁸ and of the difficulties encountered by the Embassy in the past with respect to the case of Mrs. Kamecka and other similar cases, it is believed that further representations by the Embassy would prove futile and serve only to give rise to unprofitable irritation.

The Embassy is of the opinion that the Soviet Government has adopted a definite policy of refusing to act favorably on cases of this nature.⁷⁹ In addition to the case of Mrs. Kamecka, two other cases, those of Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert Redfern and Mr. M. W. Beckelman, have been the subject of much correspondence between the Embassy and the Soviet Foreign Office, as well as between the Consulate General at Vladivostok and the Soviet authorities there, with little or no progress having been made.

While the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated in its note to the Embassy number 20 of May 15, 1942, that a plain metal watch seized from Mr. Beckelman would be turned over to the Consulate General at Vladivostok, the watch has not as yet been forthcoming and at the same time it was stated that the gold chain also seized from Mr. Beckelman could not be returned to him. A copy of the Commissariat's note number 20, referred to above, and of its note number 92 of December 9, 1942, in Russian and in English translation, are enclosed for the information of the Department.⁸⁰ A copy in Russian and in English translation of the Commissariat's note number 91 of December 9, 1942 concerning Mr. Redfern's property is also enclosed.⁸¹

In this connection, the Department's attention is invited to the following quoted paragraph from the despatch of the Consulate General at Vladivostok to the Embassy, number 78 of October 19, 1942:

"While Mr. Redfern makes no mention thereof in his letter, he informed me that during his conversation with the Customs inspector he made inquiry of the procedure he should follow to recover the seized rings, upon which some uniformed official standing nearby remarked that the United States Government had seized ships and gold belonging to the Governments of the Baltic States⁸² and that the

⁷⁸ Not printed; the reply from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, dated March 27, 1942, had stated that it did "not see any reason why it should revert to this matter at the present time." (661.11245/22)

⁷⁹ The Chargé in the Soviet Union, Walter Thurston, had further reported in despatch No. 1493 of March 30, 1942, that "little or no success in recovering such articles has been experienced hitherto, probably due to the fact in many instances that the articles have 'disappeared'." (661.11245/22)

⁸⁰ Neither printed.

⁸¹ Not printed.

⁸² For correspondence on these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 389-444, *passim*.

rings would be held until the ships and gold are released to the Soviet Government."

The Embassy has in a few cases made representations to the Soviet authorities on behalf of American citizens owning real property or bank deposits in the Baltic States, which property was nationalized by the Soviet Government upon its occupation of those areas.⁸³ In reply to such representations the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has almost invariably stated that in view of the fact that the area wherein the property is situated has been occupied by German armed forces, it is impossible for the Soviet authorities to obtain any information with regard thereto. The Department undoubtedly has records of many similar cases.

In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department consider the advisability of converting all such cases into claims against the Soviet Government to be settled after the war.⁸⁴ The treating of these cases as claims is especially urged, in as much as it appears that any action taken by the Embassy in connection therewith will fail to produce satisfactory results.

Respectfully yours,

LOY W. HENDERSON

861.00/11971 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 22, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received December 26—9 : 25 a. m.]

1126. The following are some of my more recent impressions of Moscow in winter. It will be recalled that I spent most of November there and visited the city last week going by train and returning by air:

1. During recent weeks there has been marked improvement in the food-situation. Ration norms are being fulfilled. Nevertheless, prices in the peasant bazaars where rations are supplemented or where persons without ration cards buy foodstuffs are perhaps higher than in the fall.

⁸³ The United States had notified the Soviet Government that it would be held responsible for all losses to American nationals resulting from acts of nationalization or confiscation of American properties; see telegram No. 276, May 16, 1940, to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 201, and telegram No. 423, August 9, 1940, to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 410. See also telegram No. 1734, December 15, 1940, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *ibid.*, p. 443.

⁸⁴ When the Department of State suggested in a letter of April 7, 1943, to the lawyer representing Mrs. Kamecki that her losses might be regarded as a case for a claim, it was also stated that the Department was "not in a position at this time to advise you when claims of American citizens against the Soviet Government for such losses may be adjusted, or regarding the measures which may finally be adopted for their settlement."

2. The people seem to be warmly clothed. Men are provided with fur, felt, leather or cloth caps; cloth, padded or fur coats; leather boots or the felt soleless boots, of which there seems to be a relatively plentiful supply issued against cards, over which are frequently worn rubber overshoes. The women have warm shawls or scarfs, padded, fur or wool coats, and footwear similar to the men. Children also have sufficient clothing to protect them from weather. Last summer I noted that the people in Moscow in general had better clothing than during the period 1934-38. The same holds true with regard to winter clothing. Much of the clothing is shabby, ragged, dirty, or patched. Nevertheless, it is warm.

3. During the last 3 weeks, the situation with regard to fuel has improved. Sections of the population and available local transport, including boats and street cars, were mobilized in November to bring in wood from nearby forests. This work was successfully carried out and large stockpiles of wood are to be found in various sections of the city. Quantities of the inferior coal mined in the neighborhood of Moscow have also been brought in. Although the Chief of Burobin⁸⁵ told us in the middle of November that no oil would be furnished the Embassy during the winter, that organization, which provides diplomatic missions with supplies, has delivered during the last few weeks sufficient fuel oil to heat the Spaso House⁸⁶ during December. The Mokhovaya building,⁸⁷ which is connected with the Moscow central heating plant, is also kept much warmer than in November although it is still not comfortable.

4. From the air it can be seen that smoke is issuing from practically every factory chimney in or near Moscow whereas 3 months ago many idle factories could be noted. The number of busy factories between Moscow and Kuibyshev in every town and even in many small villages is impressive. Although curfew is still in force and the blackout rigidly enforced with regard to buildings, the main streets are now dimly lighted and cars are allowed to move about with subdued lights. Streets are more crowded than 3 months ago both with pedestrians and with trucks, some of which have obviously been taken from the Germans. They still are much less crowded than before the war.

6.⁸⁸ The recent military victories have obviously raised the morale of the people. At times cheerfulness almost reaching the point of gaiety has been noted. It should be pointed out, however, that even last summer when Stalingrad was being threatened the population in general seemed to be in better spirits than it was during the years 1934-1938. Moscow in war time appears to be more cheerful than pre-war Moscow. Although people have worried regarding problems of food,

⁸⁵ Central Bureau for Services to Foreigners.

⁸⁶ The American Embassy building in Moscow, residence of the Ambassador.

⁸⁷ The American chancery office, with residential accommodations, in Moscow.

⁸⁸ No paragraph numbered 5 is in the original.

fuel, and so forth, nevertheless their purely physical anxieties apparently have not been so depressing as those of the purge years of 1936-1938.

7. Moscow is still drab and shabby compared with the capitals of western countries. Nevertheless, the atmosphere seems to have become slightly more western than it was 5 years ago. It should be borne in mind, of course, that no refugees are allowed in Moscow and that most of the people at present in the city are engaged in work related to the war effort or are dependents of workers so occupied. There are therefore relatively few persons without ration cards or without the right of purchasing in the closed shops. Persons who were evacuated or fled from the city last year are permitted to return only in case their services are needed. The reopening of factories is resulting in the shortage of common laborers in Moscow, and many evacuees who desire to return to their homes are being permitted to do so provided they can be spared from their work in the provinces and are willing to engage in ordinary manual labor.

HENDERSON

861.015/21: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 24, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received December 25—7:29 a. m.]

1137. *Pravda* of December 23 publishes a ukase of the Presidium [of the Supreme Council] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which establishes a new style of banner to be carried by troop units of the Red Army. If this banner is lost as a result of "faintheartedness on the part of the troop unit" its commander and entire officer staff who are "guilty of such shameful conduct" shall be subject to court-martial and the unit disbanded. An accompanying editorial points out that the Army regulations of Peter the Great strictly laid down that soldiers who abandoned their banner in battle should be "hanged on the nearest tree without trial". It is added that "by no accident" not a Russian banner was lost at battle of Borodino.⁸⁹ Illustrations of the new form of banner are likewise published.

HENDERSON

⁸⁹ Fought on September 7, 1812, against Napoleon I.

DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO POLICIES AND PROBLEMS, AND MISSIONS CONCERNED WITH THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AT TIMES WITH BRITISH PARTICIPATION

British-Soviet Negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance; Problem of Agreement to the Extent of the Western Frontiers of the Soviet Union; General Greely Military Mission to the Soviet Union; Visit of Molotov to London and Washington; Problem of a Second Front in Western Europe; Internment of an American Bomber Crew in the Soviet Union; Treatment of Merchant Seamen in the Northern Ports of the Soviet Union; Mission of General Bradley: Alaska-Siberia Airplane Ferry; Prime Minister Churchill's Conversations in Moscow with Stalin; Visit of Wendell L. Willkie in the Soviet Union; Mission of General Adler: Proposed Bomber Aid in the Caucasus; Early Inquiries to Arrange a Meeting of the Three Leaders; Visits of General Hurley to Battle Fronts

740.0011 European War 1939/18191: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), January 5, 1942—4 p. m.
[Received January 6—1:08 a. m.]

14. My No. 10, December 19, [1941,] 6 [1] p. m.,⁹⁰ and later telegrams from Moscow.⁹¹ Sir Stafford Cripps⁹² stated to me today that Anglo-Soviet relations have again become static and that he attributes this to the unsatisfactory outcome of the recent Moscow meetings.⁹³ He cited as evidence of this condition the fact that Stalin⁹⁴ refused to receive him when he left Moscow, that no farewell entertainment has been arranged for him here, that General Mason MacFarlane⁹⁵ has reported from Moscow that his mission has accomplished nothing there and is now "up against a stone wall" and, lastly following: When Eden was in Moscow, Stalin proposed a joint British-Soviet military expedition to Northern Norway and urged that this be carried out within 4 weeks. Eden agreed in principle and by his instruction General Nye⁹⁶ immediately conferred with members of the Soviet General Staff with respect to a plan for the proposed operation. It was contemplated that further talks on this subject should take

⁹⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 198.

⁹¹ The necessity for the removal of the American Embassy from Moscow to Kuibyshev in October 1941 is explained in *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 907-911. Concerning the position of Walter Thurston, Counselor of Embassy with honorary rank of Minister, see *ibid.*, p. 913, footnote 65.

⁹² British Ambassador in the Soviet Union. He had told the American Embassy on the morning of December 27, 1941, of his resignation as Ambassador.

⁹³ For correspondence concerning the visit of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, for discussions in Moscow December 16-22, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 192-205.

⁹⁴ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier) after May 6, 1941.

⁹⁵ Lt. Gen. F. N. Mason-MacFarlane, chief of the British Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

⁹⁶ Lt. Gen. Archibald E. Nye, British Assistant Chief of Staff.

place but none have been held and the project apparently has been completely dropped.

Cripps stated that he was inclined to associate the recent *Pravda* article on Manila with this condition and inquired whether I had noticed any change in American-Soviet relations. I replied that apart from the article I had not.

The Ambassador then expressed the opinion, which he stated he hoped I would bring to your attention, that it is highly important that the situation brought to light by the Moscow meeting be settled immediately, as he feared that if it was not disposed of full cooperation in the war effort could not be achieved, the Soviets might undertake to make direct arrangements (such as with Poland regarding the Polish-Soviet frontier, and with Turkey regarding territorial concessions to Turkey by Bulgaria) which would embarrass both Great Britain and the United States in connection with the postwar settlement, might increase their present demands regarding frontiers, and, lastly, might, within the next few months when they would be in a position to enter the conflict with Japan, withhold their cooperation in the Pacific area until their terms were met thereby causing a delay which might prove very serious.

It is Cripps' opinion therefore that an understanding should be reached with the Soviets by Great Britain, with the acquiescence of the United States, with respect to frontiers. He believes that this agreement must in the nature of things be based on full recognition of the Soviet claims to the three Baltic States,⁹⁷ Bessarabia and Moldavia,⁹⁸ and bases in Finland.⁹⁹ In this latter connection he informed me that the Soviets have indicated that they may desire to be granted possession or control of Petsamo.

Cripps plans to leave by air tomorrow morning where he will embark for England. He stated that upon his arrival he plans to press the foregoing views on his Government.

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/18363 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 10, 1942—midnight.
[Received January 10—10:10 p. m.]

147. Personal for the President and the Secretary. You might be interested to know that immediately following Eden's return from

⁹⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

⁹⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 444 ff.

⁹⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 269 ff.; *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

Russia the Turkish Ambassador,¹ the Polish Ambassador² and the three Ministers from the Baltic States³ all contacted me. The Turkish Ambassador was concerned about the general situation and wanted to wish the United States well and explain the friendly attitude of Turkey toward us. The three Baltic Ministers were disturbed about their future sovereignty, and Polish Minister [*Ambassador?*] about frontiers and about the possibility of Russia again taking over Lithuania, whose Baltic sea front he said, because of its contours, threw it naturally into the Polish geographical sphere. He was pleading for a continuance of Lithuania as a state but explained too that he officially could not take that position because Poland today is so dependent upon Russia.

Maisky⁴ also called on me. When Eden talked with Stalin and the latter asked for a treaty with the British he undoubtedly claimed British recognition of Russia's right to the Baltic States. Stalin also wanted British recognition of the Finnish frontier as established at the end of the late Finnish-Russian war and Bessarabia. As I understand it he recognized his obligations and the sovereign rights of countries in the Near East and was willing to leave to the period of final peace negotiations the consideration of Polish frontiers.

When Eden explained his inability to engage in a treaty because it required not only British consent but also the consent of the Dominions as well, he further told him that he had promised the United States that they would make no commitments without agreement by United States. Stalin accepted his statements. When he returned the next morning, however, Stalin tossed a copy of the British-Turkish Treaty⁵ over to him and asked him point-blank if they did not want to make treaties with Russia because they did not trust her. Eden persuaded him out of this position, explaining the difference between what Stalin had asked for and the Turkish Treaty which had not been consummated without Dominion consent; but he had the feeling that the question of establishing trust presented a very real problem. I think Eden was personally impressed with the reasonableness of the Russian demand.

Maisky in his conversation told me part of this story arguing that all Russia wanted was a recognition by England which simply required consent on our part. These questions will come up for dis-

¹ Tewfik Rushdi Aras.

² Count Edward Raczyński, also Polish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³ August Torma, Estonian Minister; Charles Zarine, Latvian Minister; and Bronius Balutis, Lithuanian Minister.

⁴ Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁵ Treaty of Mutual Assistance, between Great Britain and France, and Turkey, signed at Ankara on October 19, 1939; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167, or Department of State *Bulletin*, November 11, 1939, p. 544.

cussion in the British Cabinet when the Prime Minister returns.⁶ I would specially ask that they be not broached to the Prime Minister unless he himself has introduced the subject as the British recognize the binding obligation of their promise to us and there is no question of recognition without consent by us. Eden wanted to personally discuss these demands with the Prime Minister rather than inject them in the discussions in Washington before he had an opportunity to personally make a full report to the Prime Minister. He gave me the details of his conversations with Stalin with the understanding that I would be fully informed of his conversations with the Prime Minister and for me to report them to my Government. The information Maisky gave me however was not conditioned in any way.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/18363 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1942—6 p. m.

141. Your 147, January 10, midnight. Special note has been taken of Stalin's action in tossing a copy of the British-Turkish Treaty over to Eden and of his inquiry whether the British did not want to make treaties with Russia because it did not trust her. In this connection we are not aware of any recent treaty consummated between Great Britain and Turkey relating to territorial concessions. Your comments and interpretation would be appreciated regarding significance of the introduction of the treaty into the conversation.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/18466 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 13, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received January 13—3:45 p. m.]

187. Your 141, January 12, 6 p. m. Eden tells me that the Turkish Treaty referred to in my 147, January 10, midnight was the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of October 1939 which came into effect January 8, 1940. I think the inference was that you trust the Turks sufficiently to enter into treaty with them but are you willing to trust us? I realize there are parts of Stalin's conversations with Eden that I

⁶ Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill was on a trip to Washington and other places.

have not yet gotten but I have had every assurance that no commitments were made.

There is a rumor here that Molotov ⁸ will come on here in 6 weeks or 2 months.

I read to Eden last night the message reported from Bern in the Department's 132, January 10, 9 p. m.⁹ This information had already reached him here through Bern from Washington. He said it was German propaganda and that the British would develop a counter-propaganda.

I personally believe Eden's trip was necessary because strained relations had been building up between the British and the Soviets. While at the same time there has been growing popular appreciation here because of Russian war efforts, I do not feel that this is based on Communistic ideology but respect for a power that had been underrated and was meeting the test of stopping the German war machine.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/18674: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 19, 1942—7 p. m.
[Received January 20—10:35 a. m.]

276. Personal to the Secretary and for the President. Since this is in sequence to recent messages I have sent on Great Britain's relationship with Soviet Russia (my 6147, December 19,¹⁰ my 6166, December 21,¹¹ my 6286, December 31,¹² my 147, January 10, and my 187, January 13) I will try not to duplicate information in messages already forwarded but simply give additional data and supporting statements directly quoting from the transcript of Eden's conversations with Stalin together with a summary documentation.

You will remember that on July 9 in my message No. 2911¹³ I forwarded to you the proposed agreement between Great Britain and Russia. Eden showed me a copy of the proposed agreement before it had been presented to the British Cabinet. The official telegrams sent by Eden while in Moscow to the Foreign Office I again forwarded to you before they had been discussed by the Cabinet. The information I am now sending, although already placed before the War Cabinet,

⁸ V. M. Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁹ Not printed. The report was that German propaganda to the effect that Europe was being delivered to Moscow had redoubled as a result of Eden's visit and that this had caused serious alarm in Western Europe and other areas which considered they might be affected. (740.0011 European War 1939/18257)

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 199.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹² Not printed.

¹³ Not printed; but see the Ambassador's telegram No. 2920, July 9, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 182.

has not been seen by all the members of the Cabinet and only in part was cabled to the Prime Minister. He has undoubtedly received the complete record of conversations since his return here Saturday.¹⁴ I cite these facts for two reasons, first, because I believe it is good evidence of Eden's efforts to keep us currently informed and, secondly, because I feel that it places an obligation on me to limit my reporting to you and the President only because of the very limited circulation of the documentation here.

The discussions cited were between Stalin and Eden with Molotov interjecting only three statements in the 3 days' discussions, and a question asked on one occasion by Sir Stafford Cripps. The latter took down the conversations and Maisky acted as an interpreter. During part of the conversations Sir Alexander Cadogan¹⁵ and Lieutenant General Nye, Assistant Chief of Staff, were present.

I shall limit the present message to political conversations and shall ask that General Nye's report on the military situation be forwarded to the President. I have already sent you certain specific military information in my No. 6147, December 19, that I thought would be useful.

Eden went to Moscow with the hope of improving relations between the British Government and the U.S.S.R. Stalin himself had cabled to the Prime Minister that relationships were not good. Eden went there with the idea of working out an agreement on military collaboration and to establish general principles for the peace settlement and the ensuing period of reconstruction. He found himself pressed by Stalin to commit his Government to an agreement on western boundaries of Russia and to be ready to discuss general questions of European frontiers. Eden explained that he had "never heard of these western boundaries" until he had reached Moscow and stated that "I cannot agree to them without first putting them to my own Government and to the Dominions and to America." Stalin replied "You were in general informed of the two questions of importance; military collaboration and post-war reconstruction including the question of frontiers. If the general question of European frontiers is a difficult one to decide upon, at least that of the Soviet frontiers is in a different category".

He went on to say: "The Polish frontier remains an open question and I do not insist upon settling that now. What I am most interested in is the position in Finland and the Baltic States and in Rumania. With regard to Poland, I hope that we shall be able to come to an agreement between the three of us. Generally speaking, our idea is to keep

¹⁴ January 17.

¹⁵ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

to the Curzon line¹⁶ with certain modifications. It is very important for us to know whether we shall have to fight at the peace conference in order to get our western frontiers.”

These differences are implied in the draft agreement proposed by Eden, appended herewith as appendix A and in the two treaty drafts urged by Stalin, appended herewith respectively as appendices B and C.

Begin appendix A.

“Draft agreement.

The President of the [Council of] People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Eden, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, desiring to ensure the best cooperation between their respective Governments during the war for the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction hereby set out the following points which have been agreed between them:

1. The two Governments jointly affirm their acceptance of the principles of the declaration made on the 14th August 1941 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.¹⁷

2. The two Governments undertake to collaborate in every possible way until the German military power has been so broken as to render it incapable of further threatening the peace of the world. They further undertake not to make peace with any government of Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions.

3. The two Governments are resolved to collaborate in restoring peace at the end of the present war and in subsequently maintaining it. The peace settlement must include the establishment and maintenance of conditions which will ensure that Germany is not again in a position to disturb the peace of the world.

4. The two Governments undertake to work together in the task of the reconstruction of Europe after the war with full regard to each other’s interests and with the object of:

a. Safeguarding and strengthening the economic and political independence of all European countries either as unitary or federated states.

b. Reconstructing the industrial and economic life of those countries whose territories have been overrun by the Axis Powers.

5. As regards the territorial questions to be dealt with in the peace

¹⁶ Regarding the Curzon line, see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794; H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. VI, pp. 233-283, 317-322; and summary descriptions in S. Konovalov, *Russo-Polish Relations: an Historical Survey*, pp. 33-38, 57-63.

¹⁷ For the text of this joint statement of the Atlantic Charter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. Regarding adherence to the Atlantic Charter by the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, p. 378.

settlement the two Governments will base their policy on the principle laid down in the joint declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom that they 'seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other' and on that proclaimed by M. Stalin in his statement of the 6th November 1941¹⁸ of no interference in the internal affairs of other people. They agree to work out the application of these principles in association with one another and with the United States of America and other Allied states concerned.

6. Neither Government will enter into any secret agreement with any third power affecting or likely to affect the reconstruction of Europe after the war.

7. The two Governments agree to render one another after the war all possible economic assistance, and for this purpose will exchange economic missions.

8. The two Governments are convinced that the collaboration between them, both in war and peace, provided for in the present agreement, will be of benefit not only to their respective peoples, but to the future of the world. It is their earnest desire that all the countries now united in resistance to totalitarian aggression should participate in such collaboration." (*End appendix A*)

(*Begin appendix B*).

"Treaty of alliance and mutual military assistance between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in the war against Germany.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R., on the one hand, and His Majesty's Government of Great Britain on the other,

Being inspired by an unswerving determination to carry to a victorious conclusion the war which has been forced upon them by Hitlerite Germany, and

Being of the opinion that this object can best of all be achieved by the creation of an alliance and by mutual military assistance between them,

Have agreed—in amplification of the agreement concluded on the 12th July of this year¹⁹ concerning the common activities of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of His Majesty in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany—to conclude the present treaty, and have appointed as their fully empowered representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union:

His Majesty, the King of Great Britain:

¹⁸ For a report on the speech made by Stalin on the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, see telegram No. 1900, November 8, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 654.

¹⁹ Agreement for Joint Action and Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow on July 12, 1941; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cccv, p. 277.

Who, after presentation of their full powers, found to be in due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I.

An alliance is formed between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and both the Allied powers mutually undertake to afford one another military assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Hitlerite dismemberment and against those who take part in Hitlerite aggression in Europe.

Article II.

Both parties undertake not to enter into negotiations with the Hitlerite Government of Germany or with any other German Government representing the Nazi Imperialist regime, and not to conclude an armistice or a peace treaty with Germany except by mutual consent.

Article III.

Both contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliances and not to take part in coalitions directed against one of the contracting parties.

Article IV.

The present treaty enters into force immediately after its signature, and is subject to ratification at the earliest possible date.

The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place in London." *End appendix B.*

Begin appendix C.

"Treaty concerning the creation of a mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in regard to the solution of post-war questions, and concerning their common action to ensure security in Europe after the termination of the war with Germany.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, on the other [one] hand, and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, on the other,

Being anxious to direct their common efforts towards the better organization of the cause of peace and towards insuring security in Europe after the victory over Hitlerite Germany, have agreed to conclude the present treaty and have appointed as their fully empowered representatives:

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain:

Who, after presentation of their full powers, found to be in due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I.

Both parties mutually undertake that, in the solution of postwar questions connected with the organization of the cause of peace and security in Europe, they will act by mutual agreement.

Article II.

Both parties are agreed that upon the termination of the war they will take all steps to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany.

Article III.

The present treaty enters into force immediately after its signature, and is subject to ratification at the earliest possible date.

The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place in London." *End appendix C.*

Stalin further suggested the establishment of a secret protocol relating to Soviet frontiers. Again Eden explained that he could not "sign such a document without consulting my colleagues and we have not as yet applied our minds to these problems."

There was at another point in the conversation a discussion as to form, Stalin asking for a treaty in preference to an agreement and Eden explaining a treaty would require the consent of the Dominions.

The differences of opinion largely evolved around these questions cited and resulted in failure to sign either an agreement or a treaty. A joint communiqué, however, was approved (see my No. 6251, December 29²⁰).

The following summary which appears as a preface to the conversations in Mr. Eden's report to the War Cabinet gives a concise version of the proceedings:

Begin summary.

"At my first conversation with M. Stalin, M. Stalin set out in some detail what he considered should be the postwar territorial frontiers in Europe; and in particular his ideas regarding the treatment of Germany. He proposed the restoration of Austria as an independent state, the detachment of the Rhineland from Prussia as an independent state or protectorate, and possibly the constitution of an independent state of Bavaria. He also proposed that East Prussia should be transferred to Poland and the Sudetenland returned to Czechoslovakia. He suggested that Yugoslavia should be restored and even receive certain additional territories from Italy, that Albania should be reconstituted as an independent state, and that Turkey should receive the Dodecanese, with possibly readjustments in favour of Greece as regards islands in the Aegean important to Greece. Turkey might also receive certain districts in Bulgaria, and possibly also in Northern Syria.

In general the occupied countries, including Czechoslovakia and Greece, should be restored to their prewar frontiers, and Mr. Stalin was prepared to support any special arrangements for securing bases, et cetera, for the United Kingdom in Western European countries,

²⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 205.

e. g., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. As regards the special interests of the Soviet Union, Stalin desired the restoration of the position in 1941, prior to the German attack, in respect of the Baltic States, Finland and Bessarabia. The 'Curzon Line' should form the basis for the future Soviet-Polish frontier, and Rumania should give special facilities for bases, et cetera, to the Soviet Union, receiving compensation from territory now occupied by Hungary.

In the course of this first conversation, Stalin generally agreed with the principle of restitution in kind by Germany to the occupied countries, more particularly in regard to machine tools, et cetera, and ruled out money reparations as undesirable. He showed interest in a postwar military alliance between the 'democratic countries,' and stated that the Soviet Union had no objection to certain countries of Europe entering into a federal relationship, if they so desired.

In the second conversation, M. Stalin pressed for the immediate recognition by His Majesty's Government of the future frontiers of the USSR, more particularly in regard to the inclusion within the USSR of the Baltic States and the restoration of the 1941 Finnish-Soviet frontier. He made the conclusion of any Anglo-Soviet agreement dependent on agreement on this point. I, for my part, explained to M. Stalin that in view of our prior undertakings to the United States Government it was quite impossible for His Majesty's Government to commit themselves at this stage to any postwar frontiers in Europe, although I undertook to consult His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the United States Government, and His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions on my return.

At the fourth meeting, on the 20th December M. Stalin agreed to my proposal that I should consult His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the Dominion Governments and the United States Government on my return to the United Kingdom. He suggested that meanwhile the signature of any Anglo-Soviet agreements should be postponed with a view to 'signing a proper treaty, or two treaties', after I had been able to consult the 'Governments concerned (. . .)²¹ within the next 2 or 3 weeks'. M. Stalin said that he was sure that, whether the treaties were signed or not, Anglo-Soviet relations would improve with the progress of the war, which 'compelled many countries to discard their prejudices and preconceived views'. He did not think that 'failure to sign the treaties now (i. e. during my Moscow visit) should be regarded in too tragic a light. If the treaties were signed in London in 2 or 3 weeks time it would come to much the same thing. Our relations would meanwhile be based on the July agreement, and they would become closer'.

²¹ Omission indicated in the original telegram.

At this meeting M. Stalin communicated the text of the draft communiqué which was eventually issued at midnight of the 28/29th December.

After this meeting M. Stalin was my host at a banquet attended by most of the leading political and military figures in the USSR, which lasted until 5 a. m. and was marked by the greatest cordiality.

As regards the Far East, M. Stalin did not consider that he was yet strong enough to continue the campaign against Germany and also to provoke hostilities with Japan. He said that he hoped by next spring to have restored his Far Eastern army to the strength which it had before he had been obliged to draw upon it for reinforcements in the West. He did not undertake to declare war on Japan next spring, but only to reconsider the matter then, although he would prefer that hostilities should be opened by the Japanese, as he seemed to expect might be the case.

M. Stalin expressed himself as satisfied with the course of developments in Persia, and agreed that it was in our joint interest that Turkey should remain outside the war as a buffer against further German penetration eastwards. He even advocated territorial offers to Turkey with a view to strengthening the determination of the Turkish Government to continue their present policy."

End summary.

As I interpret the record of the conversations, Eden in no way committed his Government. He did agree to present Stalin's position to seek a decision from his Government and also to consult the Americans upon it as soon as he got back to London, and in my opinion on the question of the Baltic States, Eden felt the force of the Russian point of view, having told Stalin that "if you wish for it and attach great importance to this point, then I shall try and get a favorable answer for you upon [it]", but he further told Stalin that "Firstly, the Prime Minister has stated publicly that we could not accept any territorial changes made during the war. It may be that this particular change is an exceptional one and if you wish it I will consult the British Government on that basis and let you have their answer. Secondly, under the Atlantic Charter we have pledged ourselves to take into account the wishes of the inhabitants. It may be that in this case they have been taken into account but that is a matter we must check upon before we arrive at a decision."

Stalin's insistence may be culled from the following sentences taken from the script:

STALIN: "Is it really necessary on this question of the Baltic States to have a Government decision? Surely this is absolutely axiomatic. We are fighting our hardest and losing hundreds of thousands of men

in the common cause with Great Britain as our ally, and I should have thought that such a question as the position of the Baltic States ought to be axiomatic and ought not to require any decision."

EDEN: "You mean the future of the Baltic States at the end of the war?"

STALIN: "Yes. Would you support the entry of these three States at the end of the war into the Soviet Union? All we ask for is to restore our country to its former frontiers. We must have these for our security and safety; for instance, at Leningrad. I want to emphasize the point that if you decline to do this, it looks as if you were creating a possibility for the dismemberment of the Soviet Union."

He stated he was "surprised and amazed at Mr. Churchill's Government taking up this position. It is practically the same as that of the Chamberlain Government."²² 'And again' this attitude of the British Government towards our frontiers is indeed a surprise to me so I think it will be better to postpone the proposed agreements."

After repeatedly hammering on this subject and stating that he also was disappointed that an agreement could not be reached, he went on to say: "As regards your repeated references to the necessity for His Majesty's Government to consult the United States Government, I must confess that I had overlooked this fact and believed your Government to have more freedom of action in these matters. That is perhaps why it is difficult now to reach an agreement".

Mr. Eden reminded him during these conversations that: "You would not respect me if I were to go back upon my arrangement with President Roosevelt. I can get a decision upon this point before the Soviet troops occupy the Baltic States, even if they continue doing as well as they are now".

There are two miscellaneous quotations which I feel necessary to include:

(a) STALIN: "I thought that the Atlantic Charter was directed against those people who were trying to establish world dominion. It now looks as if the Atlantic Charter was directed against the U.S.S.R."

EDEN: "No; that is certainly not so. It is merely a question of your putting forward certain views as to your frontiers, and of my being unable to give you an immediate reply and asking you to allow me time to get the answer."

STALIN: "Why does the restoration of our frontiers come into conflict with Atlantic Charter?"

EDEN: "I never said that it did."

²² Neville Chamberlain was British Prime Minister from May 28, 1937, until May 10, 1940. For correspondence regarding the efforts made by his Government and the French to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union against aggression, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 232 ff.

(b) EDEN: "As regards the Far East, I expect that, in view of the very serious situation, the Prime Minister will want to know your exact position."

STALIN: "If the Soviet Union were to declare war on Japan, we should have to wage a real war by land, on sea and in the air. It would not be like the declaration of war on Japan by Belgium and Poland. Consequently, we have to make a careful estimate of the forces involved. At present we are not ready. A considerable number of our troops were removed from the Far East to the western front. New troops are being got ready but we shall require about 4 months before they are fully prepared. I think it would be far better for the Soviet Union if Japan were left to attack us. This would create a better political and psychological atmosphere amongst the Soviet people. War would be unpopular with our people if the Soviet Government were to make the first step. If, on the other hand, we were attacked, the feelings of the Soviet people would be very strong. We have seen this in the present war in the West. Hitler attacked us, and because we were attacked, the Soviet people have shown a wonderful unity and great heroism and readiness to sacrifice themselves. We would prefer that Japan should attack us, and I think it very probable that she will do so—not just yet, but later. If the Germans are hard pressed it is likely that they will urge the Japanese to attack us, in which case the attack may be expected about the middle of next year."

In transmitting this information, I want it to be clearly understood that I have not attempted in any way to carry on conversations with the British Government. I have simply tried to keep informed in order that I might forward this information to you and the President.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/19317

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Chief of the Division (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1942.

MR. ATHERTON: You will note that Mr. Litvinoff,²³ in reply to a question put to him by Mr. Dupong,²⁴ replied that the Soviet Government was not inclined to press Great Britain to send an expeditionary force to Europe this spring because it did not wish such a proposition to be considered as a favor to the Soviet Union. Mr. Dupong inter-

²³ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

²⁴ Pierre Dupong, Prime Minister and President of the Government of Luxembourg, who visited in Washington during January 1942.

preted this remark of Litvinoff as an indication that British-Soviet suspicion still existed.

It is possible that a lack of confidence continues to exist between the British and Soviet Governments. We do not believe, however, that Mr. Litvinoff's remark should be considered as evidence of distrust. It is well established Soviet diplomatic tactics to maneuver in such a manner that the Soviet Government, instead of being compelled to ask other governments to take actions favorable to the Soviet Union, is in a position to act as though such actions were a favor on its part towards the other governments.

You will recall how reluctant they were last summer to ask the U.S. for assistance.²⁵

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

740.0011 European War 1939/17085a

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have caused to be prepared and am enclosing herewith a copy of a memorandum outlining the substance of certain conversations and negotiations of a political character which have taken place between the British and Soviet Governments since the outbreak of Soviet-German hostilities on June 22, 1941, and containing certain observations with regard thereto. There is also enclosed for your convenience a copy of a telegram sent to Ambassador Winant on December 5, 1941²⁶ which is referred to in the memorandum and which sets forth the attitude of this Government towards the entering into secret agreements or territorial commitments prior to the cessation of hostilities.

I am inclined to the opinion that the policies which we outlined in our telegram to Ambassador Winant are sound and that a deviation therefrom would be unfortunate, particularly just now when we are endeavoring to unite all forces opposed to the Axis on the primary task of defeating the enemy.

In that telegram we took the position that the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union should not be our willingness to agree to the recognition of extended Soviet frontiers at this time, but rather the degree of determination which we show loyally to carry out our promises to aid the Soviet Government with equipment and supplies.

²⁵ For correspondence on the beginnings of assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 768 ff.

²⁶ Telegram No. 5682, *ibid.*, p. 194.

I am sure that you will agree with me that by our actions we should make it clear to the Soviet Government in the future to an even greater degree that we are doing our utmost to live up to our promises.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

BRITISH-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING FORWARD TO THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF A POLITICAL CHARACTER WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SOVIET SUGGESTIONS THAT CERTAIN TERRITORIES TAKEN OVER BY THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1, 1939-JUNE 22, 1941, BE RECOGNIZED AS SOVIET TERRITORY

Immediately upon the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union the British Government made it clear that it desired to give the Soviet Union every possible military support. The Soviet Government did not display any marked enthusiasm in accepting this British support. It furthermore showed a tendency from the very beginning to introduce matters of a political character into conversations and negotiations relating primarily to military or supply problems.

Within three weeks after the launching of the German attack upon the Soviet Union, Stalin suggested to the British Government that it might be advantageous for the British and Soviet Governments to enter into a treaty of a political character. The British Government foresaw that certain complications might arise from an attempt to negotiate at that time a formal political treaty. It did, however, on July 12, 1941 sign "an agreement for joint action" with the Soviet Government which contained two provisions: (1) an undertaking on the part of the two Governments to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Hitlerite Germany and (2) a mutual undertaking that during this war neither party would negotiate or conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. It was understood between the two Governments that this agreement might be supplemented by more detailed political and military agreements at a later date.

When the Harriman mission²⁷ was in Moscow in September 1941, Stalin suggested to Beaverbrook that the two Governments might

²⁷ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, and Chairman of the President's Special Mission to the Soviet Union, with a British counterpart led by Lord Beaverbrook, held conferences in Moscow, September 29-October 1, 1941. For correspondence about the Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 825-851, *passim*.

enter at once into a political agreement of a more far-reaching character than the agreement for joint action of July 12. Beaverbrook replied that he personally agreed and would discuss the matter with other members of the British Cabinet upon his return to London.

Apparently the British Government took no steps to follow up Stalin's suggestions during the months of October and November. In November, however, Stalin displayed a spirit of bad temper, which contributed to the decision of the British Government early in December to send Eden to Moscow in order, as Mr. Eden informed Ambassador Winant, to smooth out relations in general, to explore the possibility of some kind of political agreement, and to discuss certain post-war problems. It would appear that Stalin had been informed in November that the British Government was planning to send two high-ranking military officers to the Soviet Union to discuss military matters. He had replied that he did not care to enter into such discussions until certain political problems had been settled between the two countries. Stalin's irritation seemed in part to be due to the failure of Great Britain to keep a promise to send a military expedition of several divisions to points adjacent to the Soviet frontier in order to assist in relieving pressure on the Soviet Army. This promise had been made, apparently ill-advisedly, after the departure of the Harriman mission from Moscow. Subsequent consideration of the matter had made it clear that the dispatch of such an expedition would be inexpedient.

Early in December Winant informed the Department regarding Eden's plan to go to Moscow and simultaneously submitted to the Department a memorandum prepared by Eden setting forth the purposes of his visit.²³

Subsequent to the launching of the German attack on the Soviet Union Stalin apparently had not broached to the British Government questions of territorial concessions to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Eden's memorandum contained no indication that the British Government suspected that Eden while in Moscow would be pressed to agree to such concessions. The Department, however, had at no time been in doubt that Stalin's references to the desirability of entering into negotiations for a political agreement with Great Britain were in fact part of a maneuver the purpose of which was to place the British Government in such a position that it would be embarrassing for it to reject Soviet demands that it recognize certain Soviet territorial claims and that it promise to agree to certain territorial adjustments on the European continent and to other

²³ See telegram No. 5876, December 4, 1941, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 192.

arrangements which would make the Soviet Union the dominating power of Eastern Europe if not of the whole continent.

The Department was therefore inclined to believe that Stalin would take advantage of Eden's presence in Moscow in order to exert pressure upon the British Government to give commitments of a territorial nature which might prove embarrassing both to the British and the American Governments during the period of the war and which might handicap proceedings at the peace conference. For this reason the Department on December 5, 1941 sent Winant a telegram,²⁹ which had been approved by the President, instructing him to inform Eden that it was the considered opinion of the American Government that "it would be unfortunate were any of the three Governments now on common ground in the Atlantic Charter to express any willingness to enter into commitments regarding specific terms of the post-war settlement". In this telegram the Department expressed the opinion that "the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union is the measure to which we fulfill the commitments our representatives made in Moscow. . . . In so far as our post-war policies are concerned, it is our belief that these have been delineated in the Atlantic Charter, which today represents the attitude not only of the United States but also of Great Britain and of the Soviet Union". The telegram also contained the following: "In order not to jeopardize the aims we [shall] all share in common looking to an enduring peace, it is evident that no commitments as to individual countries should be entered into at this time. It would be unfortunate if we should approach the peace conference thus hampered. Above all there must be no secret accords".

Ambassador Winant conveyed the views set forth in this telegram to Eden who expressed his complete agreement with them. Eden left London for Moscow on the evening of December 7. Almost immediately after his arrival he had his first meeting with Stalin, which lasted four hours. During the course of this meeting he presented to Stalin a draft prepared in Great Britain of a proposed political agreement. This agreement was of a general nature. It confirmed the Atlantic Charter; it provided for collaboration of the two Governments in every possible way until the German military power had been completely broken; it provided for collaboration for restoring peace at the end of the war and in maintaining the peace; it provided for the joint carrying out of the task of the reconstruction of Europe and for the safeguarding and strengthening of "the economic and political independence of all European countries either as unitary of [or] federated states"; and so forth.

Stalin, on his part, presented to Eden drafts of two treaties proposed by the Soviet Government: namely, a "treaty of alliance and

²⁹ No. 5682, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 194.

mutual military assistance" and a "treaty concerning the creation of a mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in regard to the solution of post-war questions, and concerning their common action to ensure security in Europe after the termination of the war with Germany". In general, the provisions of these two treaties were not objectionable to the British. What was extremely important, however, was a suggestion by Stalin which proved to be a stumbling-block to the negotiations. This suggestion was that a secret protocol be entered into relating to Soviet frontiers and to the working out of arrangements for the future frontiers of Eastern and Central Europe. His initial demand apparently was that the Soviet frontiers of June 22, 1941 be recognized by Great Britain. Such an act on the part of Great Britain would mean the British recognition of Soviet acquisition during 1939 and 1940 of certain territory and bases in Finland, of the whole territory of the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, of more than one-third of Poland,³¹ and of Bessarabia and other parts of Rumania. In addition, Stalin desired that Great Britain agree to the taking over by the Soviet Union after the war of certain bases in Rumania. Among other suggestions made by Stalin was an agreement for the restoration of Austria as an independent state; the detachment of the Rhineland from Prussia; the establishment of an independent Bavaria; the transfer of East Prussia to Poland; the transfer of Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia; the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands to Turkey; certain territorial adjustments in favor of Greece; the transfer to Turkey of certain districts in Bulgaria and in Northern Syria, and so forth.

During the course of the first meeting and during other meetings that followed, Eden informed Stalin that he could not enter into agreements concerning commitments of a territorial nature without consulting the Dominions and the United States. Eden pointed out in particular that he had promised the Government of the United States that while in Moscow he would not enter into commitments of the nature requested.

Stalin continued, however, to press for certain territorial commitments on the part of the British Government. When Eden insisted that he could not give the commitments desired, Stalin demanded that in any event Great Britain immediately recognize the Baltic States as a component part of the Soviet Union. He also demanded that Great Britain recognize the Soviet position in Finland and in Rumania. With regard to the frontier with Poland he said that he hoped that Poland, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union would be able to

³¹ For correspondence regarding the intervention of the Soviet Union in Poland beginning on September 17, 1939, and the conclusion of a boundary and friendship treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union on September 28, 1939, involving the frontiers of Poland, see *Foreign Relations, 1939*, vol. I, pp. 428 ff., and pp. 477 ff.

come to an agreement. Generally speaking, the Soviet suggestion was that the Polish-Soviet frontier would follow the Curzon Line with certain modifications. It will be recalled that the Curzon Line does not differ greatly from the line which Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to consider as the boundary line between the Soviet Union and German-Poland when they partitioned Poland in 1939.

When Eden continued to resist the pressure placed upon him by Stalin, the latter displayed considerable irritation. Eden finally informed Stalin as follows: "You would not respect me if I were to go back upon my arrangement with President Roosevelt. I can get a decision upon this point before the Soviet troops occupy the Baltic States, even if they continued doing as well as they are doing now."

It appears that in the end Eden gave Stalin to understand that he would return to Great Britain with Stalin's proposals, discuss them with his own Government, with the Dominions, and with the United States and let Stalin have a reply to them at a later date. Eden went so far as to indicate that he would endeavor to obtain a favorable decision if Stalin attached so great importance to the matter. In the meantime, in order to smooth over the failure of the two Governments to come to an understanding in Moscow with regard to a treaty, it was agreed to issue a joint declaration regarding the accomplishments of the visit and an innocuous statement of this character was issued in the latter part of December.

Eden arrived in England in the early part of January and presented to his Government memoranda of the discussions, together with Stalin's proposals. He also permitted Ambassador Winant to inspect certain of the memoranda as well as copies of the draft treaties proposed by Eden and by Stalin. The whole matter is now being considered by the British Cabinet. It is likely that within a short time the British Government will approach this Government on the subject. This approach may be in the form of a request for a statement of the position of this Government with regard to the making by the British Government of certain territorial commitments to the Soviet Union or it may be in the form of a request that this Government approve certain commitments which the British Government may desire to make.

This Government thus far has not recognized as Soviet territory any of the areas which have been annexed to the Soviet Union since the outbreak of the World War on September 1, 1939. The attitude of this Government in that respect has been predicated on its general policy not to recognize any territorial changes which have been made in European frontiers since the outbreak of the World War and not to enter into any commitments of a territorial nature in Europe which might hamper the proceedings of the post-war Peace Conference.

It is believed that it would be unfortunate if, at the present time, an ally of the American Government of such standing as Great Britain, which also has thus far refused to make any commitments of a territorial nature on the European continent, should begin bargaining with the Soviet Union or any other continental country with regard to frontiers. There is little doubt that if the principle is once admitted that agreements relating to frontiers may be entered into prior to the Peace Conference, the association of nations opposed to the Axis, which thus far has been based upon the common aim of defeating the enemy, may be weakened by the introduction among its members of mutual suspicion and by efforts of various members to intrigue in order to obtain commitments with regard to territory at the expense of other members.

Furthermore, it is believed that the assent at the present time to any of the territorial demands of the Soviet Union would result in only a temporary improvement of the relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. If the British Government, with the tacit or expressed approval of this Government, should abandon the principle of no territorial commitments prior to the Peace Conference, it would be placed in a difficult position to resist additional Soviet demands relating to frontiers, territory, or to spheres of influence which would almost certainly follow whenever the Soviet Government would find itself in a favorable bargaining position. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government has tremendous ambitions with regard to Europe and that at some time or other the United States and Great Britain will be forced to state that they cannot agree, at least in advance, to all of its demands. It would seem that it is preferable to take a firm attitude now, rather than to retreat and to be compelled to take a firm attitude later when our position had been weakened by the abandonment of the general principles referred to above.

It is likely that Stalin will make use of all the weapons at his disposal in order to attain immediate recognition of at least some of the territorial gains which the Soviet Union has achieved since the outbreak of the war. He already has intimated that the failure to extend such recognition shows a lack of good faith and confidence. He may go further and refuse for a time at least to cooperate with Great Britain and the United States in case he is unable to gain his points. He may even insinuate that the Soviet Union will not feel itself obligated not to enter into a separate peace unless such recognition is granted. He will without doubt cause the Communist Parties in the United States and Great Britain to use all their resources and influential friends and sympathizers in order to bring as much pressure as possible from the rear upon the British and American Governments and upon officials of those Governments. If, however, these Govern-

ments succumb to pressure of the type outlined above, Stalin will be encouraged to resort to similar tactics later in order to obtain further and more far-reaching demands.

Stalin's insistence upon obtaining at least certain territorial commitments at this time may be ascribed to his desires:

1. to break down the principle thus far observed by the American and British Governments not to make any territorial commitments prior to the peace conference;
2. to make use of the recognition of his territorial claims as evidence of the justification of the Soviet Union in invading Poland and the Baltic States and in making war on Finland in 1939 and 1940;
3. to have promises now with regard to Soviet frontiers which might be useful to him later at the Peace Conference in case the war should end with a weakened Soviet Union not in occupation of the territories which he has demanded.

The agreement by the United States and Great Britain at the present time to Soviet territorial demands or such agreement by Great Britain with the assent of the United States would be sure to have an unfortunate effect upon the attitude of small countries everywhere towards the United States and Great Britain and also upon that of countries which are especially opposed to the spread of Bolshevism. In case the commitments desired are made, Axis propaganda would be quick to charge that the United States, which has for years advocated high principles of international conduct, began trafficking or at least assented to such trafficking in the independence of small countries within a few weeks after it had become involved in war. Resentment would certainly be aroused, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, among circles which have thus far been extremely friendly to Great Britain and the United States. Moreover the American Republics, always sensitive on matters touching the rights of small countries, might well consider assent on our part to Soviet territorial expansion at the expense of other countries in Eastern Europe as a change in the policy of the United States, and would note with anxiety, quite apart from the religious aspects of the matter, such a departure from the principles the United States has hitherto advocated. Likewise the Vatican, according to reports which have reached us from Rome, has noted with concern certain rumors to the effect that the United States and Great Britain might be willing to recognize Soviet rights to territories which did not belong to the Soviet Union prior to the outbreak of the war.³²

The recognition at this time of Soviet claims to the Baltic States would be certain to have an effect upon the integrity of the Atlantic Charter. Eden apparently was concerned in this regard when in

³² See telegram No. 252, January 28, to the Chargé in Switzerland, p. 412.

the course of one of his conversations on the subject with Stalin he said:

"Under the Atlantic Charter, we have pledged ourselves to take into account the wishes of the inhabitants. It may be that in this case, they have been taken into account, but that is a matter we must check upon before we arrive at a decision."

This remark contained a suggestion that certain British official circles might be considering the advisability of taking the position that the Baltic States had been annexed to the Soviet Union upon the expressed wishes of the inhabitants of those States.

It must be clear to all intelligent people who take the trouble to look into the matter that the Baltic States were invaded by Soviet armed forces and that the population of these States at no time had an opportunity freely to express their desires as to whether or not they would like to remain independent. Our own statements³³ issued at the time showed that we had no doubt with respect to what was taking place. If, therefore, the British and American Governments should take the position that these States entered the Soviet Union in accordance with the expressed desires of the population, every Government in the world, irrespective of what might be its views with regard to opportunism in this connection, would know, at least privately, that the British and American Governments were guilty of insincerity. It would be extremely unfortunate if the manner in which the Soviet Union invaded the Baltic States and conducted the ensuing plebiscites should be accepted as a mode of ascertaining the wishes of a people with regard to their future. The establishment of such a precedent would destroy the meaning of one of the most important clauses of the Atlantic Charter and would tend to undermine the force of the whole document.

741.6111/54

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1942.

The British Ambassador³⁴ called to see me today. The Ambassador told me that he had come particularly to discuss recent negotiations between the British and Soviet Governments. He said that he had touched upon some of the high spots of this question with the President yesterday and that the President had suggested that

³³ See the statement made on July 23, 1940, by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles regarding the independence and territorial integrity of the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 401.

³⁴ Viscount Halifax.

he confer with me and subsequently the President would have a small meeting composed of the Ambassador and myself and Admiral Standley before the latter left for Moscow.⁵⁵

The Ambassador told me that during the time that Mr. Eden was in Moscow last autumn, Stalin had brought up the desiderata of the Soviet Government. Stalin had stated that he desired to know whether the British would guarantee that in any peace terms which might finally be determined upon, the British would support the Soviet Government in its desire to obtain as the Soviet settlement in Europe the reestablishment of the Soviet's 1941 boundaries.

Mr. Eden had replied that it was impossible for him at that time to give any formal assurances in as much as he would have to consult the British Government and likewise the Government of the United States.

During the time that Mr. Churchill was staying at the White House, Mr. Eden had telegraphed him from London saying that the matter was extremely urgent and that he thought Stalin's wishes should be met. These wishes specifically were the reincorporation in the Soviet Union of the Baltic States, the incorporation in the Soviet Union of the Province of Bessarabia, and likewise that part of Finland which had been ceded to the Soviet Union in 1940.⁵⁶ The inclusion of any part of Poland was not mentioned by Stalin as an essential point.

Mr. Churchill had replied to Mr. Eden in a rather stiff telegram expressing indignant disapprobation of the points mentioned and saying that he felt that Mr. Eden should reply that a decision on questions of this character should wait until the war was over.

Lord Halifax, when he learned of this, had written a letter to Mr. Churchill dissenting from the attitude adopted by Mr. Churchill, insisting that Russian cooperation could not be assured during the course of the war unless Russia were given guarantees of this character, and suggesting further that continued Russian cooperation with Great Britain in Europe and with the United States after the war was over was necessary in order that a balance might be maintained as a safeguard on the east against German activity. Lord Halifax went on to say in this communication to Mr. Churchill that he believed that the British attitude with regard to the absorption by the Soviet Union of the Baltic States in 1939 had been one of the prime reasons for the breakdown in the British-Soviet negoti-

⁵⁵ William H. Standley had been appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union; see footnote 31, p. 415. No record that such a meeting was held has been found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁵⁶ The text of the treaty of Moscow, ending the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union, signed on March 12, 1940, is printed in Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *The Finnish Blue Book* (Philadelphia, 1940), p. 115. A text as translated from *Pravda* of March 13, 1940, is in Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1940, p. 453.

ations, which breakdown had in large part been responsible, in his judgment, for the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union.³⁷ He felt that the attitude of Great Britain with regard to the Baltic States had been the chief reason why the Soviet Union believed that the British policy was insincere and was demonstrating complete lack of appreciation of Russian need for security.

The Ambassador then handed me a copy of a telegram from the British Foreign Office to Lord Halifax on this general subject requesting the opinion of the United States. The text of the telegram is as follows:

"You are aware of what passed during the conversations in Moscow between Stalin and myself. The United States Government have also been kept informed of the situation through Mr. Winant and through yourself. Since my return from Moscow we have been considering ways and means of dealing with Stalin's demand for recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania. The United States Government may well consider his demand difficult to understand, for if, at the end of the war, he occupies these territories it is not to be supposed we should turn him out and if he does not he cannot expect that we shall prolong hostilities to install him there. It is our belief however that his demand—an awkward one to satisfy—is put to us as a test of the sincerity of our avowed desire to work with him during and after the war. It is the fruit of a long period of suspicion and misunderstanding.

"A simple refusal to meet him would involve the risk that Anglo-Soviet relations will deteriorate and that cooperation between Great Britain and Russia and between the United States of America and Russia both during and after the war may be seriously endangered.

"In Moscow I had to tell Stalin that it was altogether beyond my power to accede to his request and I explained to him that this was due not only to our position but also to that of the United States to whom we were bound by certain undertakings apart from our joint promulgation of the Atlantic Charter. Under pressure from Stalin I could not refuse to consult with the United States Government and I therefore wish you now to put the whole situation before them so that we may determine our joint policy in the matter.

"Stalin's attitude is that before Hitler forced him into the war by an unjustified aggression he was in possession of these territories. He would maintain that his title to them is not more open to question than was that of the Tsarist Government (with whom we were in Treaty and friendly relations). He asks whether frontier which Hitler violated shall be restored. (Note that Polish-Soviet frontier is not at the moment in question.) He says by implication if not in so many words that he would expect an ally to allow him who has been bearing the brunt of the war for seven months to expect to re-

³⁷ Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 76-78; or *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII, pp. 245-247.

gain his own territory. I do not want to overstate his case: there are obvious answers which do not carry much weight with him.

"I used the Atlantic Charter as an argument against him. He pointed to 'plebiscites' in Baltic States. Our exchanges of views on this aspect of the subject would have been even less profitable than they were if I had suggested that those 'plebiscites' were faked.

"But there is another difficulty. Is it possible to comply with Stalin's demand without doing violence to the Atlantic Charter and without raising a crop of other demands from other quarters? If so that is, from the point of view of relations of our two countries with the Soviet Government, the solution we should seek.

"If we cannot, is it wise to offer Stalin a part only, of what he wants? I am advised by Sir Stafford Cripps (and our experience of 1939 as you will remember would tend to confirm this) that any class of haggling may only increase his suspicions. But I am apprehensive of the effect of a flat negative.

"If the United States Government feel that it is impossible to grant his full demand despite its very real significance for cooperation with the Soviet Government now and in the future are there any other offers that we could make?

"I would hint two possible suggestions:

"(a) We might say that while we cannot agree now to the restoration of the 1941 frontiers we and the United States could immediately give assurances that on grounds of Soviet security we would support, when the time comes, a demand by the Soviet Government to establish Soviet bases in territories contiguous to Russia and especially on the Baltic and Black Seas from which her security might be threatened. Acceptance by the Soviet Government of such assurances would not preclude them from putting forward at the Peace Conference their claim to absorb the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and parts of Finland. We and the United States Government for our part would remain free from any previous undertaking either to accept or reject such a claim if put forward at the Peace Settlement. (Idea of establishment of military bases by one country in the territory of another is one which the United States Government itself has put into operation. It is one which may be developed after the war by various countries and it is one which the Soviet Government in the case of Baltic States in 1939³⁸ was the first to put into practice. While giving Stalin substantial terms in respect of his security needs it does not derogate from the principles of the Atlantic Charter.)

"(b) We might put forward a proposal based on the suggestion which you made in your letter to the Prime Minister of January 11th and reply to Stalin somewhat on the following lines:—

'We have every desire and intention to work with you after the peace and think it is essential for both of us and for the peace of Europe that we should remain in close partnership.

³⁸ The Soviet Union put pressure upon the Baltic States during 1939 to conclude pacts of mutual assistance; see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 934-984.

We realise the importance you attach for your own security reasons to your June, 1941, boundaries.

We hold no particular brief for reopening the boundary that you had established with Finland because the Finns have allowed themselves to be the tools of Hitler and we certainly hold no brief for Roumania.

But we are very much concerned, by reason of the Atlantic Charter, to which the Soviet Government have also subscribed, and of all that it means for our general position in the world of the question of the Baltic States. And in order to reconcile your security requirements and our common obligations under the Atlantic Charter we would undertake here and now to support you at the peace settlement if you demand that the foreign policy in defence of the Baltic States shall be entrusted to the Soviet Union who for this purpose shall be entitled to exercise such authority and to establish such control as may be necessary on the territory of the Baltic States.'

"These two offers are based as any offers clearly must be on the requirements of Russian 'security' for which the Soviet Union have been striving ever since the 1917 revolution in order that the Soviet Government may be enabled to complete unfinished social and economic experiment within Russia without the danger of foreign intervention or war.

"Of these two it seems to me there might be a possibility of the United States Government being prepared to agree to (a) and if they would associate themselves with it, it might be that this would satisfy Stalin. He might not accept any compromise offer from us alone, but it is possible that he might feel that a joint offer by ourselves and the United States Government was of real value and a step towards cooperation during and after the war with our two governments. Moreover (a) would not exclude the possibility of Stalin obtaining at the peace conference the frontiers he desires: it would be an instalment rather than an alternative.

"One point of difficulty is Lithuania, since the Polish Government who are anxious for a Polish-Lithuanian union after the war, have expressed to us the desire that no negotiations as regards the future disposal of Lithuanian territory should be entered into without consultation with them. The Polish views are of course incompatible with the Soviet plans to annex Lithuania and with proposal (b) though it might be reconciled with proposal (a). In any case Poland's aim in regard to His Majesty's Government is only practical from a geographical point of view if she obtained from the Soviet Government frontiers with Russia considerably east of Curzon line or permission to annex East Prussia, to which M. Stalin told me he would be prepared to agree. Poland has no rights in Lithuania on the basis of the Atlantic Charter and she will be unwise to show herself intransigent towards Russia in Lithuanian matters.

"It would not do to make any concessions to Stalin without requiring suitable *quid pro quo* and by insisting on any concessions made to him being part of the bargain. We should establish the rule that concession must be mutual, thus making it more difficult for the Soviet Government to press subsequently for yet further concessions. The demands we might make on the Soviet Government are: (1) Affirmation by Soviet Government that they will base their policy on principles contained in declaration by President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister that they 'seek no aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise' and M. Stalin's statement on November 6th, 1941, that the Soviet Government had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of other people. (2) Formal Soviet approval of the principle of con-

federation as applied to the weaker countries of Europe especially in the Balkans and as regards Poland and Czechoslovakia. (3) Undertaking by the Soviet Government to collaborate with His Majesty's Government and the United States Government and other countries of Europe in preparing for the reconstruction of Europe after the war 'with full regard to each others' interests and in accordance with the two principles (see two above) of no aggrandisement and no interference'. The objectives of reconstruction would include the safeguarding and strengthening of economic and political independence of all European countries, either as unitary or confederated States and the reconstruction of industrial and economic life of the countries whose territories have been overrun by Germany or her associates.

"Should the President agree to a basis of agreement he may have United States desiderata to put forward.

"My immediately following telegram contains the analysis of the wider issues involved which you may find useful in discussion with the President."

Lord Halifax then interjected to say that in his discussion yesterday with the President³⁹ the President of his own initiative, without having read this message, had suggested with regard to the Baltic States that some sort of plan such as that outlined in alternative (b) as set forth above might be the answer to the problem. I said that the President had not mentioned the matter to me in any way.

The Ambassador then handed me a further telegram from his Foreign Office dated February 15 of which the text is as follows:

"On the assumption that Germany is defeated, that the German military strength is destroyed and that France remains for a considerable period at least a weak power, there will be no counter-weight to Russia in Europe, but cooperation with Russia will be desirable:

"(a) Because she might otherwise be tempted to collaborate with Germany in view of historical tendency to, and economic urge for, these powers to work together;

"(b) In order that we may recreate some reasonable balance of power in Europe, destroyed by the collapse of France against the possibility of revived Germany;

"(c) In order that, militarily speaking, Germany should be encircled.

"The probable course of Soviet policy must depend upon the course of the war and its effect upon the U.S.S.R., condition in which the latter emerges from the war and the circumstances in which the war is terminated. We cannot be certain that Germany's defeat may not be brought about in principle by Russian action before our own and American war potentiality is fully developed. In that event Russian prestige would be enormous and the Soviet Government would be tempted to work for the establishment of Communistic Governments in the majority of European countries. Russians might moreover be in a position to denude German factories of the equipment needed to

³⁹ No record of this discussion found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

restore Russian industry and becoming in this way to considerable extent independent of British-American assistance, might no longer desire to adapt themselves to the policies which we and the United States may wish to pursue. This possible development is in itself a powerful reason for establishing close relations with Russia while her policy is still in a fluid state in order to exercise as much influence as possible on her future course of action. It would be unsafe to gamble on Russia emerging so exhausted from the war that she will be forced to collaborate with us without our having to make any concessions to her. On the contrary common prudence requires us to lay our plans on the assumption that, if we want Russia's collaboration after the war, we shall have to be prepared to make such a policy advantageous to her. The application of this policy will be laborious and lengthy process. If we are to adopt it we must start now and not wait until the war is over.

"We must therefore recognize that our refusal to satisfy Stalin's demand may be the end of any prospect of fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Government in our mutual interests and might encourage Soviet policy to revert to the pursuit of purely selfish aims with incalculable consequences for post-war period.

"There is also the important point of particular and immediate interest to the United States that our present answer to Stalin's demand may later on affect the Russian decision whether or not to make war on Japan.

"There is little doubt that the Soviet Government is suspicious lest our policy of close collaboration with the United States Government will be pursued at the expense of Russian interests and that we aim at an Anglo-American peace and post-war world. The Soviet Government will therefore be likely to use our response to Stalin's demand as touchstone of Anglo-American attitude towards them. It seems to us that the right method both of meeting this suspicion and of guarding so far as may be possible against the risk of Russia following entirely independent policy is to emphasize to the Soviet Government that, in the matter concerning the war and peace aims, we and the United States Government would wish to work for tri-partite consultations with them and to reach tri-partite solutions.

"It must be remembered that Stalin might have asked for much more, e. g., control of the Dardanelles, spheres of influence in the Balkans, one-sided imposition on Poland of Russo-Polish frontiers, access to the Persian Gulf, access to the Atlantic involving cession of Norwegian territory.

"Stalin's present demand, it is true, may not be final but he may later be in a position to enforce a claim to some or all of these and we and the United States Government would be in a stronger position to assert our views if we have established the precedent of tri-partite agreements in regard to post-war arrangements and if the Soviet Government have not decided to go ahead without regard to our views owing to our giving entirely negative reply to the present demands. Moreover, from strategic point of view, it may well be sound that Russia should be established once again in the Baltic so as to be able better to dispute with Germany the naval command of that sea than was the case since 1918.

"Stalin would certainly not admit that his demands are in conflict with principles of the Atlantic Charter and he may well be satisfied by nothing short of complete acceptance of his demands."

The Ambassador then went on to say that the Soviet Ambassador in London, Mr. Maisky, had asked Mr. Eden on February 12 what reply the British Government intended to make to the Soviet demand for assurances as to the restoration of its 1941 frontiers. Mr. Eden had replied that the problem had been submitted to the United States Government in a favorable manner by the British Government. Ambassador Maisky had replied that the Soviet Government required a treaty with Great Britain covering this subject but that all that the United States was asked to do was not to object to the conclusion of such a treaty between the two powers. Ambassador Maisky had emphasized his fear of the effect of any continued delay of a satisfactory reply on the policy and attitude which would be displayed by the Soviet Government.

Lord Halifax requested my views with regard to these questions.

I stated that in as much as I had not had any opportunity of discussing the problem with the President and of ascertaining his views, it was impossible for me as yet to give the Ambassador any reply.

I said, however, that I had no reluctance in stating that in my judgment this was the most important issue of a political character which had come up for discussion between our two Governments since the United States had entered the war or, for that matter, since Great Britain herself had entered the war. I said that it appeared to me that our two Governments were at the crossroads. We had to determine whether the Atlantic Charter meant what it said and whether we were determined to uphold in fact as well as by word the principles set forth therein. I could not see that alternative (b) as set forth in the telegram above quoted was anything else than a complete repudiation of the principles for which this Government stood. I was prepared to agree that the Soviet Government in fairness as well as a matter of policy should be entitled to ensure its own security in the future against now unforeseen contingencies, but that the obtaining of such security could not in my judgment be admitted if that implied the placing of millions of human beings under Russian domination should those human beings desire to maintain their own independence and should they be bitterly opposed to Russian overlordship.

I said that I could not conceive of this war being fought in order to undertake once more the shoddy, inherently vicious, kind of patchwork world order which the European powers had attempted to construct during the years between 1919 and 1939. The Treaty of

Versailles ⁴⁰ was bad enough because of its inefficiency, but it had been worse because of the failure of the Covenant of the League of Nations ⁴¹ to operate in adjusting from time to time territorial and political disputes as experience and circumstances showed them to be necessary from the standpoint of justice and equity. Could it be conceivable that any healthy and lasting world order could be created on a foundation which implied the utter ignoring of all of the principles of independence, liberty, and self-determination which were set forth in the Atlantic Charter? If that was the kind of world we had to look forward to, I did not believe that the people of the United States would wish to be parties thereto.

Lord Halifax in his reply evidenced the worst phase of the spirit of Munich. He spoke of the need of having Russia to constitute the balance of power against Germany in the years after the war.

I asked him if this meant that he foresaw the continuation of Germany as she was now constituted. I said that it had always seemed to me that a careful study of the German federation ⁴² set up as a result of the Congress of Vienna ⁴³ would be highly useful and appropriate when the need for a new European order arose. I said that the German federation had certainly lasted from 1815 to 1866 and that during that period, notwithstanding convulsions of one kind or another which had occasionally shaken the structure, the structure had lasted and Germany had been no menace to the rest of Europe or to the rest of the world. It had not been until Prussia had obtained a complete domination over all of the other German states that the danger to the world had arisen.

But leaving these points to one side, I said that we were face to face with a question of vital principle. I saw no hope for a stable and peaceful world in the future unless the new world order were built upon principles which could be maintained and to which adherence would be consistent. What peace could be envisaged if at this early stage in the war the British Government and ourselves agreed upon selling out millions of people who looked to us as their one hope in the future and if that new world order were based upon the domination of unwilling, resentful, and potent minorities by a state to which they would never give willing allegiance.

⁴⁰ Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed on June 28, 1919, *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, p. 57.

⁴¹ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 69.

⁴² The Act of Constitution of the Germanic Confederation, signed at Vienna on June 8, 1815, by Austria, Prussia, and minor German states is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. II, p. 114, or Sir Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. I, p. 200.

⁴³ The General Act was signed at Vienna on June 9, 1815, and is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. II, p. 3, or Sir Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. I, p. 208.

I said that there was no use in my going further into the question at this time since, as I had said before, the decision of the President would naturally first have to be obtained.

The Ambassador urged that an early reply was necessary. I said I would do everything I could to expedite a reply.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

741.6111/54

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me at my request.

I told the Ambassador that I had spent about an hour and a half with the President yesterday afternoon and that during that time the President had studied in the fullest detail all of the information which Lord Halifax had given me concerning the British-Soviet conversations resulting from Mr. Eden's visit last December to Moscow. I said that the President had likewise read very carefully the telegrams to Lord Halifax from Mr. Eden which the former had left with me.

I said that the President had asked me to say to Lord Halifax that after careful study of these documents and all of the information which Lord Halifax had given me, only one word had come into the President's mind and that was the word "provincial".

After Lord Halifax had recovered, I went on to say that the President had asked me further to state that in his judgment the fundamental question, namely, a secret agreement guaranteeing the Soviet Union the reestablishment of its 1941 frontiers was not a matter which could be discussed at this time. The President felt that this was a question which could only be settled upon the termination of the war.

The President felt, moreover, that the Soviet Union was legitimately entitled to obtain full and legitimate security at the termination of the war. Security for the Soviet Union would necessarily depend upon the determination of many problems which were now contingent. The President wished to remind the British Government that the Atlantic Charter clearly called for the disarmament of Germany. The proposed nature of the security which should rightly be accorded to the Soviet Union would depend upon the type of Germany which would be established at the end of the war.

The President further desired me to say that he himself would discuss this matter directly with Stalin.

Lord Halifax then commenced by reiterating many of the same arguments which he had advanced in our preceding conversation.

He emphasized particularly his own belief that the Baltic States had not been successful in their form of self-government as demonstrated during the past twenty years. He reminded me that up to 1919 the Baltic States had for over a hundred years formed a part of Imperial Russia.

To this I replied that I did not see that that had very much to do with the matter under discussion. The Baltic States had in fact been independent and self-governing republics; it was unquestionably true that the vast majority of the peoples of those three nations did not desire domination, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union; and the basic principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter would be violated if either Great Britain or the United States secretly agreed now to turn these peoples over to Russian domination.

Lord Halifax then said that his statement might seem cynical, but that weighing the two in the balance, he did not feel that the enjoyment of self-government by the Baltic peoples could be compared in importance to the assurances that the Soviet Union would loyally continue until the end of the war, and even more important perhaps, he thought, cooperation with the United States and Great Britain after the end of the war. He said he did not think my point of view was realistic.

I said that I wondered if it would not prove that I was far more realistic than he. I said that history clearly showed that peoples would fight indefinitely for ideals and for principles and for the attainment of liberty. I did not think that peoples fought indefinitely for loot or for conquest. If he meant, as he intimated, that the Russian people would undertake an imperialistic war upon the termination of the present war, I felt that that was far less likely than that the peoples of the Baltic States, of Finland, of Poland, and of the other central European nations bordering upon the Soviet Union would struggle in one form or another within the measure of their capacity for the reestablishment of their independence if they were now or later at the end of the war turned over with the acquiescence of Great Britain and the United States for domination by the Soviets.

But above and beyond this, I said, could he possibly maintain that the two chiefs of state, the President and Mr. Churchill, who stood in the eyes of millions of people now suffering throughout the world as the one hope of ultimate victory and as the one assurance that the freedom and the security for which they were fighting would eventually be attained by them, could secretly and in some devious fashion now utterly contravene the most sacred principles of all set forth in the Atlantic Charter, namely, the right of peoples to obtain their liberty and to maintain their independence by free determination. I said I feared Lord Halifax did not realize that if the American peo-

ple knew that the British Government was proposing a secret agreement of this character, the most serious crisis in the relations between the United States and Great Britain which could possibly occur would undoubtedly take place. The American people would regard such an agreement as a shameful violation of one of the chief objectives for which they believed they were fighting.

Lord Halifax said that he quite agreed that the desirable and agreeable procedure would be to maintain unimpaired in any negotiation which might be undertaken before the end of the war the principles which I had mentioned, but that he was very definitely fearful that the Soviet Union would again believe that it was being deceived by the Government of Great Britain and that it would be unable to comprehend why what seemed to Stalin to be a perfectly just and natural request should be either ignored or rejected by the British Government.

I said that was a question still to be determined.

Lord Halifax then expressed the fear that if the President now undertook to discuss this matter directly with Stalin, Mr. Eden would be left in a very embarrassing position. He asked where, in fact, this decision of the President would leave Mr. Eden.

I replied that it seemed to me Mr. Eden would be left exactly where he had been. He had informed Stalin that before giving a reply the British Government desired to consult the Government of the United States. The President of the United States had thereupon informed the British Government that he himself desired to discuss these wishes directly with Stalin. Therefore, were the Soviet Government now to insist that the British Government give an immediate reply, Mr. Eden could quite truthfully and logically state that in as much as the United States had been consulted with the knowledge and approval of the Soviet Government, the President of the United States desired to communicate directly with Stalin concerning the problems involved.

Lord Halifax then inquired whether the President would inform the British Government of his conversations with Stalin. I said that as Lord Halifax knew, the President had already indicated he desired to have a conference with Lord Halifax, Admiral Standley and myself before Admiral Standley's departure for Moscow and the President would undoubtedly discuss the questions involved fully with Lord Halifax at that time. Lord Halifax then asked if the President would not delay taking up the matter through Ambassador Litvinov until he himself had had an opportunity of communicating further with Mr. Eden. I replied that unfortunately the President was ill with a cold and that consequently I was quite sure that he would not be having any conversations with Ambassador Litvinov until some time next week.

Lord Halifax discussed at some length the issues inherent in the Munich agreement of 1938⁴⁴ and the effect upon public opinion of that agreement. His view seemed to have changed very little, if at all, from that which he expressed in the House of Lords immediately after the Munich agreement had been published.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

*Aide-Mémoire by the British Foreign Office*⁴⁵

AIDE MÉMOIRE

Lord Halifax has told us that the President, after full consideration of the suggestions which His Majesty's Government have put forward for dealing with M. Stalin's demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania, as a condition for signing an agreement for co-operation with us in post-war problems, did not feel able to approve either the acceptance of these demands or the two alternative proposals submitted to him. We understand that the President felt that both of these alternative proposals were difficult to reconcile with the Atlantic Charter and that it was premature to attempt detailed treatment of the problem.

2. Lord Halifax has also told us that the President feels confident of being able to reach agreement direct with M. Stalin and proposes to set about doing so, through M. Litvinov in the first instance, supporting his action later through Admiral Standley. We understand that the line the President might propose to take is that he entirely recognises the justice of M. Stalin's claim for security and that this can be met in a variety of ways in regard to which it is difficult for the moment to take a final decision.

3. As Lord Halifax stated to Mr. Sumner Welles, when the latter informed him of the President's attitude, His Majesty's Government would naturally feel nothing but satisfaction if the President could in fact reach agreement with M. Stalin. At the same time His Majesty's Government feel that they should, in the light of their own experiences in the Moscow talks and elsewhere, put before the United States Government their own view of the problem and some suggestions as to how it might be handled. Admittedly no easy solution is at hand.

4. It is true enough that one of the chief aims of Soviet policy has been and no doubt still is to obtain the maximum guarantees of Rus-

⁴⁴ Signed on September 29, 1938, between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. II, p. 1014. For correspondence concerning the German-Czechoslovak crisis, see *Foreign Relations, 1938*, vol. I, pp. 483 ff.

⁴⁵ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. There is no information available to indicate when this *aide-mémoire* was received at the Department of State or by President Roosevelt.

sia's "security" so that the Soviet Government can work out their own social and economic experiment without danger of foreign intervention or war. But this is by no means the chief motive which lies behind M. Stalin's present demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers. We cannot therefore help feeling that the President is unduly optimistic in supposing that some other form of security in lieu of the reoccupation of the Baltic States will prove acceptable to M. Stalin. Since M. Stalin has decided that the Soviet Union's security requires that the Baltic States should be in the Union, he will not be willing to discuss the rights and wrongs of this decision.

5. M. Stalin's view undoubtedly is that having taken this decision, he is merely asking us to assist him to recover these territories at the Peace Settlement, if the need arises—ancient Russian territories which had been regained by the Soviet Union before Hitler's attack on Russia. As for the Atlantic Charter, he would argue that the frontier which he wishes us to recognise in Finland was one that was settled in due form by a treaty between the Soviet and Finnish Governments, that the Baltic States voted for inclusion in the Soviet Union by means of plebiscites, thus fulfilling the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were handed back to Russia by Roumania in accordance with the provisions of a treaty concluded between the Soviet and Roumanian Governments.⁴⁶ Moreover, M. Stalin signed the Atlantic Charter on the assumption that it only became effective for the Soviet Union on the basis of the frontiers of 1941.

6. It is true that we have suggested two alternative proposals to the President based on Russia's security needs, but we doubt whether they would satisfy M. Stalin even if they could be shown to have the support of the United States of America and were accepted as a contribution towards sincere co-operation between our three countries at the peacemaking and after the war. But these alternative proposals contained concrete offers, whereas the President would appear to be of the opinion that it is premature to attempt a detailed treatment of the problem.

7. As to the procedure which should now be followed, clearly it would be to the common advantage if conversations between President Roosevelt and M. Stalin were to result in agreement being reached between all three powers. The way would then be open for us to sign a treaty with M. Stalin. We think, however, that we should put to President Roosevelt some of the difficulties which we see in this procedure. As it is with His Majesty's Government and not with the United States Government that M. Stalin wishes to conclude a treaty

⁴⁶ For correspondence regarding the Soviet ultimatum to Rumania of June 26, 1940, leading to the taking by the Soviet Union of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 479-490, *passim*.

and as it is from His Majesty's Government that he wishes to obtain recognition of his territorial claim, it would seem inappropriate to him that we should not be a party to these exchanges. We fear that if the President were to argue this matter alone with M. Stalin, the latter might suspect that we had agreed to this procedure in order that the United States Government might bring pressure to bear upon him, and he might resent it accordingly. Moreover, as we have not ourselves expressed any opinion to M. Stalin on this subject since the Moscow meeting, if he were now to learn the result of our exchanges of views with the United States Government through the President and not through us he might misinterpret this procedure as indicating that His Majesty's Government had disinterested themselves in this European problem.

8. An alternative method has therefore occurred to us, and we should like to suggest it to President Roosevelt. M. Stalin, by putting forward his condition, has touched upon an issue which is of equal interest to the United States and ourselves, and therefore it would seem that all three Powers should get together to discuss this difficulty. The virtue in this procedure is that such consultation would not only help to overcome this particular difficulty, but might lead in the future to close co-operation, both for the conduct of the war and in the period after the war, between the three principal Powers. We believe that such a prospect would be welcomed by M. Stalin. If the President would consider the proposal favourably, we should therefore like to propose that tripartite conversations should ensue in London on Mr. Winant's return.⁴⁷

[LONDON,] 25 February, 1942.

861.20/533a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Thurston)*

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1942—9 p. m.

96. Major General Greely,⁴⁸ Chief of the "United States Military Mission to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", and certain members of his Mission have been endeavoring for some time to obtain visas from the Soviet Legation in Tehran enabling them to visit the Soviet Union. Apparently the Soviet Government has obtained the impression that General Greely and all the members of his Mission desire to go to the Soviet Union in order there to reside. It is believed that all members of the Mission have applied for visas at Tehran so that in case it should become necessary for any of them to proceed

⁴⁷ Ambassador Winant was temporarily in the United States on leave.

⁴⁸ John Nesmith Greely.

to the Soviet Union in order to consult with American or Soviet officials there, they could obtain visas without protracted delays. General Greely and several members of his staff, however, desire to proceed at once to Kuibyshev and possibly to Moscow for purposes of consultation. The work of the Mission consists in expediting delivery of supplies and materials from the United States to the Soviet Union through the Near East.

Please explain the situation to the Soviet authorities⁴⁹ expressing the hope of this Government that visas be granted at once to General Greely and members of his Mission who desire to accompany him and pointing out at the same time that the Mission does not intend for the time being at least to reside in or maintain headquarters in the Soviet Union.

WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/20035 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 5, 1942—11 p. m.
[Received March 5—9 : 17 p. m.]

1058. I inquired this morning of Sir Alexander Cadogan⁵⁰ whether there had been any developments since the Ambassador's departure with respect to Russian post-war territorial ambitions (Ambassador's telegram No. 805, February 20, 4 p. m.⁵¹). He replied in the negative but indicated that Russian insistence on some early reply is continuing although it has not in his opinion reached "the danger point". He was eager to learn in this connection how soon the Ambassador will arrive in Washington. The British reply, he reiterated, would of course be contingent upon the views of our Government.

He said that he was somewhat puzzled as to the motive behind the presentation of the Russian territorial ambitions at this time since presumably if they are victorious, they will be able to seize the Baltic States of their own accord "and certainly the British would never go to war to take that region away from them".

Hence why should they press their claims now "unless possibly Stalin is in search of a grievance", i. e., rejection of these claims. I

⁴⁹ The Chargé reported in telegram No. 191 from Kuibyshev on March 5, 1942, that when he mentioned this subject to Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the latter affected surprise at the existence of this Mission and asked about it, but the Chargé reported, "I was compelled to confess that I knew no more than he apparently did." Thurston then reminded the Department that "the Soviet Government is notoriously reluctant to permit foreigners to enter the Soviet Union, and it is not responsive to casual or high pressure methods." (861.20/535)

⁵⁰ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵¹ Not printed.

said that it seemed to me if the latter were the case the Russian demands would have been far more extensive than they are, to which he agreed. He feels he said that the Russians can build quite a strong case for incorporation of the Baltic State territories within the Soviet Union: Stalin can assert "that he is merely taking back what Hitler stole", that the territories were acquired by "plebiscite"—and Cadogan added that it is "a little delicate to question the procedure of plebiscite held by one's ally" and further that the territories were Russian under the Czarist regime to which the British were allied in the last war. He likewise seems acutely conscious of the dangers of freezing Stalin's existing suspicions with regard to British intentions with a possibly resultant modification of his attitude toward the prosecution of the war.

Whether the recognition of Russian territorial claims at this time is unpalatable and whether it opens up a vista of future complications, failure, he feels, to accept such risks now may produce the one development which might render unattainable the objectives for which we are fighting, namely, some separate peace (or at least a truce) by Russia. Thus by making a concession now which is quite defensible, we may be insuring ourselves against the loss of vastly more important war aims.

I inquired as to how in his opinion, acceptance of the Russian claims would be received in Great Britain. He replied that soundings in the House of Commons indicated that sentiment there would be largely favorable and that certainly in the country's present enthusiastically pro-Russia mood acceptance would be welcomed by the public at large. There would, of course, be some questions raised in the House and presumably a few letters to the *Times* but that would necessarily be the case in any solution.⁵²

He said that there is anxiety in some quarters as to the proper interpretation to be put upon Stalin's famous order of the day of February 23.⁵³ There is a tendency to treat his references to the German people and the distinction between them and the "Hitler clique" as something of a veiled warning intended for the British and ourselves that unless some prompt and favorable reply to Russia's post-war territorial claims is soon forthcoming Stalin's enthusiasm for his British and American allies may cool considerably, with all that this would imply. Cadogan is not inclined, however, he said, to concur with this reading into the order of the day.

MATTHEWS

⁵² In a memorandum of March 6 (*ante*, p. 114) Acting Secretary of State Welles recorded the anxiety of the Polish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Edward Raczyński, and of the Polish Ambassador in the United States, Jan Ciechanowski, at the possibility that Great Britain would conclude a treaty recognizing the frontiers of the Soviet Union as they had come to be in 1941.

⁵³ See telegram No. 163, February 24, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 416.

740.0011 European War 1939/20011 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), March 7, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 11:58 p. m.]

196. Embassy's 14, January 5, 4 p. m. British Chargé d'Affaires ⁵⁴ has informed me that the Soviet Government has recently become somewhat insistent in its efforts to obtain recognition by the British Government of Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic States. I inferred that when Eden endeavored to parry Maisky's representations on the subject by citing the British commitment to the United States with respect to territorial adjustments Maisky urged that our Government be consulted at once.

Baggallay also stated that the plan for a joint Soviet-British expedition to Northern Norway was abandoned because the Soviet Government had learned that the plan had become known to the Finnish Government.

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/20005 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 7, 1942—midnight.

[Received March 7—9:55 p. m.]

1095. By way of preliminary reply to the Department's telegram No. 982, March 6, 12 midnight,⁵⁵ I may say that reports which have reached me from a number of sources of Sir Stafford Cripps' private discussion with members of Parliament confirm that he did advocate the recognition by Great Britain of Soviet frontiers as they existed on June 22, 1941.⁵⁶ I shall endeavor to cable more fully next week concerning his talk.⁵⁷ In the interim the Department may desire to refer to my telegrams No. 1058, March 5, 11 p. m., and No. 1082, March 7,⁵⁸ both on the subject of Anglo-Soviet relations.

MATTHEWS

⁵⁴ Herbert Lacy Baggallay.⁵⁵ Not printed; it requested information about a speech by Sir Stafford Cripps in which "he advocated the recognition by Great Britain of Soviet frontiers as they existed on June 22, 1941." (740.0011 European War 1939/20030a)⁵⁶ Sir Stafford's remarks were made at a private, all-party gathering attended by 300 members of Parliament on February 18, 1942.⁵⁷ See telegram No. 1116, March 9, 7 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 530.⁵⁸ Latter not printed.

861.20/536 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), March 9, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received March 10—8:15 a. m.]

204. Department's 107, March 6, 7 p. m.⁵⁹ The Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office⁶⁰ stated this morning in response to a fourth inquiry on the subject of the issuance of visas to General Greely and members of his Mission, that inasmuch as the matter concerned a "military mission" it presented complexities which did not arise in connection with the granting of visas to ordinary applicants and that, therefore, it could not be handled by Vyshinski but had had to be referred to Moscow for a decision. He stated that he had understood from my talk with Vyshinski on March 4 that all the members of the Mission wished to come to the Soviet Union now (although the contrary was made specifically clear by me to Vyshinski) and that the number concerned constituted an additional problem.

He mentioned parenthetically that if it were agreed in principle that a large military mission might enter the country the necessary preparations for their presence would evidently be considered. It was again made clear to Zarubin that only a part of the Mission intended to come here at this time and he was requested to expedite the reply of his Government on the matter. He promised to report this conversation at once to Vyshinski and gave assurance that inquiry would be made of Moscow by telephone today with regard to the case, the result of which he said that he hoped to be able to communicate to the Embassy this evening.⁶¹

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/20045 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 9, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received March 9—5:45 p. m.]

1116. Department's telegram 982, March 6, midnight,⁶² and my telegram 1095, March 7, midnight. I inquired this afternoon of Richard Law, Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, with regard to Sir Stafford Cripps' remarks. He confirmed to me that Cripps at the meeting in question had advocated recognition by

⁵⁹ Not printed, but see Department's telegram No. 96, March 2, 9 p. m., p. 526.

⁶⁰ Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin.

⁶¹ The Chargé reported in telegram No. 221, March 12, 1942, that Zarubin had said that instructions had been telegraphed to Tehran the night before "to grant visas to General Greely and his party." (861.20/537)

⁶² Not printed; but see footnote 55, p. 529.

Great Britain of the Soviet frontiers as they existed on June 22, 1941. He said that Cripps had taken the line that the Russians would consider this "the acid test" of British intentions and that Stalin on the basis of these claims would make up his mind whether the Atlantic Charter is to be used against him. He said that Cripps had used arguments in favor of accepting the Russian claims similar to those which Mr. Eden had recently cabled Lord Halifax (and which presumably the British Ambassador has conveyed to the White House and to the Department in his conversations on the subject). In reply to my question he said that Cripps believes that these claims mark the limit of Stalin's territorial ambitions and will not be followed by new and wider demands.

Cripps likewise is convinced that failure to meet the Russian claims for recognition of their earlier frontiers may well result in a complete reversal of Stalin's attitude toward the war. Law added that while at first the Russians had expressed understanding of the British need to consult the United States, they are now growing increasingly suspicious at the length of the delay. They are well aware, he said, how similar claims constituted the principal obstacle to the 1939 negotiations and they fear that the British are going to turn them down now. (I recall that in private conversation several weeks ago Law himself expressed some doubts as to the wisdom or "morality" of accepting the Russian territorial claims. I gain the impression today that he now favors their acceptance and his evolution in this direction seems significant.)

He showed some little embarrassment in discussing Cripps' private remarks to members of the House [of Commons] because, he said, they had been made in a secret meeting.

I asked him how sentiment was in the House and he replied that while he had not sounded it directly he felt that it was on the whole favorable though much support for meeting Stalin's wishes came from unexpected quarters and the political color of the Opposition was likewise surprising. As for the country, he feels that agreement with Russia would be highly acceptable. (Please compare Cadogan's views, my telegram 1058, March 5, 11 p. m.).

MATTHEWS

741.6111/54

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me at his request.

The Ambassador brought up first the question of the negotiations between the British Government and the Soviet Union concerning

the desire of the latter for an agreement concerning its post-war boundaries. The Ambassador gave me a telegram he had received from Mr. Eden, of which the following is the text:

"In the light of your report of your conversation with the President⁶³ we fear that the President may not fully understand the real reason for the importance which we attach to giving Stalin a satisfactory answer. We regard it of the highest importance at this stage of the war to leave nothing undone which may enable us to get into real contact with Stalin, to exchange ideas with him freely on all subjects connected with the conduct of the war and thus to give ourselves the maximum chance of securing that Soviet Government should pay some attention to our views and those of the United States Government. To take one example alone, we cannot conceive that Stalin will enter the war against Japan or would pay the slightest attention to suggestions from us that he should consider doing so, until his demands are out of the way.

"That at this moment we should have no real consultation with Russia seems to us most unfortunate; and we feel that it is highly unwise that we should deprive ourselves of the chance of establishing such contacts by refusing to admit Stalin's claim to the Baltic States, the implementation of which we shall be quite unable to prevent as the President recognizes.

"Stalin, we are convinced, wants to be sure that we support him in his minimum war aims. Stalin would regard the President's reply as being equivalent to saying that we rather hope Russia will not recover the Baltic States but recognize that we could not do anything about it if she did. This will surely appear to Stalin so uncollaborative a state of mind as to confirm his suspicion that he can expect no real consideration for Russian interests from ourselves or the United States; that we wish Russia to continue fighting the war for British and American ends; and that we would not mind seeing Russia and Germany mutually exhaust each other. This confirms naturally Russia's inclination to have no regard for anything but Russia's own interest and would make impossible any fruitful collaboration with Russia at this critical juncture.

"We must face the fact that our present relations with Russia are definitely unsatisfactory and as such constitute a weakness and indeed a danger to our war effort as a whole. If therefore we do not now make concession of demands by Stalin in the hope of thereby improving our relations, and if relations, as we fear, continue to deteriorate, we shall always reproach ourselves for not having done all we could while there was still time.

"Please make these points to President Roosevelt at the earliest possible moment in whatever way you think best."

I read the memorandum and then stated that the President intended to see the Soviet Ambassador to discuss this question in the immediate

⁶³ Lord Halifax had seen President Roosevelt at noon on Sunday, March 8, 1942, but no record of the conversation has been found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

future,⁶⁴ but that I would see the President before his interview with Mr. Litvinov and give him this statement of the British Government view.⁶⁵

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/20297 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 13, 1942—9 p. m.
[Received March 13—6:35 p. m.]

1200. While my own knowledge of Russian mental processes in general and those of Stalin in particular is nil, I feel that I should bring to the Department's attention the fact that British anxiety over the dangers of failure to meet Stalin's territorial claims and to meet them promptly is growing. Various officials in the Foreign Office have raised this question in conversation with me during the past several days. They have expressed some worry lest "fear of public reaction in the United States" and a sense in our country that concessions of the nature asked would mark an inauspicious beginning for the Atlantic Charter may result in our taking a firm stand against British agreement with Stalin. They are still bitterly conscious that "to their minds" their own haggling tactics "during the 1939 negotiations—and over these very Baltic States—were the real cause of Stalin's agreement with the Germans."["?"]

Either rightly or wrongly there is a strong feeling here that Stalin's suspicions of British intentions toward Russia and his knowledge of the long standing dislike of the British ruling classes for all he has stood for may ripen into deep conviction. Once this happens, they say, Stalin can and will revise his policy. While it may not be possible for him to make an immediate peace "or truce" with Hitler, runs their thought, he might well reach some arrangement a little later on or at least demonstrate a lack of enthusiasm toward the war in other areas with possible far reaching results. Their fears are more general than specific but they are nonetheless real and they do take a very pessimistic view of the possibilities of the situation.

The Foreign Office is likewise extremely curious to learn what line the President is taking with Litvinov.⁶⁶

MATTHEWS

⁶⁴ President Roosevelt saw Ambassador Litvinov at 10:30 a. m. on March 12, but no record of the conversation has been found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁶⁵ Welles had seen President Roosevelt at 10 a. m. on March 12, but no record of the conversation has been found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁶⁶ The Department advised the Chargé in its telegram No. 1173 of March 20, 1942, that "the President has already made known his views with regard to this matter to the British Ambassador."

861.20/539: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 21, 1942—noon.

[Received 12:18 p. m.]

78. I find upon my arrival at Moscow that General Faymonville⁶⁷ likewise is without instructions regarding General Greely's Mission, which would seem to confirm the fear expressed in my recent telegram from Kuibyshev that no arrangements with the Central Soviet authorities have been made regarding it. General Faymonville and the Embassy will, of course, lend every assistance possible to facilitate the accomplishment of the purposes of General Greely's Mission but I believe that it is imperative that the status of this Mission be "regularized" before his arrival.

Such regularization probably can best be accomplished by formal notification to Molotov or Litvinov of the formation of this Mission, (and full consultation as to its purposes and its acceptability to the Soviet Government), and General Greely's readiness to come into the Soviet Union when agreeable to the Soviet Government from his present base in the Near East.⁶⁸

In this latter connection I believe that special arrangements should be made for General Greely's travel. At the moment he has as alternatives travel by his own special motorized caravan (which I emphatically disapprove as being impracticable), travel by motor to Pahlevi, boat to Baku, and train to Moscow, or by the plane to Kuibyshev whenever such a flight may be determined upon by the Soviet authorities. It would appear proper for reasons of prestige to request that a special plane be sent to Tehran to bring in General Greely and a few of his Mission.

Instructions are respectfully requested.

THURSTON

⁶⁷ Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, head of the American Supply Mission, lend-lease representative in the Soviet Union.

⁶⁸ The Military Mission to the Soviet Union had been constituted in November 1941, with instructions to proceed to Kuibyshev. This information, together with data on the composition and objectives of the Mission, was supplied to the Department of State in a letter of March 30, 1942, from the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, "in order that formal notification may be transmitted to the Soviet Government and that the status of the Mission may be regularized." Following the receipt of this letter, the Department of State, in telegram No. 151 of April 3, sent instructions for the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to inform that Government about this Mission and to inquire whether it would be agreeable for the Mission thereafter to maintain headquarters at the capital, there to receive such assistance and courtesies from Soviet authorities as to enable it "to achieve its object of furthering immediate defense aid" to the Soviet Union. (861.20/542)

861.20/541 : Telegram

The First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Dickerson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), March 24, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 8:32 p. m.]

250. Embassy's 247, March 23, 3 p. m.⁶⁹ In response to the Embassy's request of yesterday that the Foreign Office forward authorization to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran for the issuance of Soviet entry visas to the remaining 21 members of General Greely's Mission, the Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office telephoned the Embassy last night to repeat that the visas already issued to General Greely and two of his assistants had been granted as a result of conversations which had taken place in Washington between the Department and the Soviet Embassy.⁷⁰ He said that the question of visas for the remaining members of the Mission had not been discussed and added that in any event the issuance of visas to so large a group would only be possible after an understanding in this respect had been reached between the two Governments.⁷¹

Repeated to Tehran and Moscow.

DICKERSON

861.014/242 : Telegram

The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 26, 1942— 4 p. m.

[Received 5:10 p. m.]

88. [From Thurston.] The British Ambassador⁷² has permitted me to read a telegram from his Foreign Office in further reference to the efforts of the Soviet Government to obtain recognition at this time of its 1941 boundaries and especially of its sovereignty over the Baltic States.⁷³ With reference to the President's statements to Litvinov

⁶⁹ Not printed.⁷⁰ When told by Zarubin that "according to information received from the Soviet Embassy in Washington the Department requested visas for only the three members referred to", First Secretary of Embassy Dickerson then "requested the Foreign Office to forward the desired authorization to Tehran to cover the entire Mission." (861.20/540)⁷¹ In a memorandum of March 26, 1942, Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, wrote: "We feel that the attitude of the Soviet Government is not open to criticism. We should not undertake to send a large mission of this kind to the Soviet Union without formally clearing the matter with the Soviet Government." (861.20/552)⁷² Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, successor to Sir Stafford Cripps.⁷³ The Chargé, Walter Thurston, sent from Kuibyshev in despatch No. 1496, April 2, 1942, a number of extracts from the Soviet press indicative of the emphasis placed by the Soviet Government upon the formal recognition of its 1941 frontiers. (861.014/249)

on March 12⁷⁴ (about which Kerr had informed me in Kuibyshev) Eden stated that Maisky had informed him that Litvinov had delivered to the President the reply that "the Soviet Government had taken note".⁷⁵ Maisky expressed the opinion that this rejoinder was made because the Soviet Government had not addressed itself to the Government of the United States on the subject nor requested an expression of opinion from the Government of the United States, adding that he had urged upon Ambassador Winant that the United States Government should not intervene in the question. This, of course, is at variance with my understanding of Maisky's earlier action in pressing Eden for submittal of the question to our Government.

Maisky has now suggested that the matter be dealt with solely by the British and Soviet Governments and that a treaty between them be concluded. The Ambassador stated that such a treaty would primarily involve recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic States, the question of the Polish, Bessarabian and Bukovinian areas evidently having been dropped. Thurston.

THOMPSON

741.6111/54

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening.

The Ambassador brought up the subject of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

The Ambassador read to me a telegram from Mr. Eden of which the following is a summary:

The Soviet Government had made it clear to the British Government, through Ambassador Maisky in London, that the Soviet Government is not willing to settle the question on the basis proposed by the President.⁷⁶

Great Britain cannot neglect any opportunity offered to establish close and friendly relations with Stalin.

⁷⁴ See footnote 64, p. 533.

⁷⁵ The reply delivered by Litvinov has not been found either in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. In telegram No. 149 of April 2, 1942, the Department informed Ambassador Standley that Stalin had merely replied: "The Soviet Government has taken note of the President's views."

⁷⁶ See *supra*. Regarding the statement of President Roosevelt that he would take up the question of frontiers directly with Stalin, see the memorandum of February 20, by Under Secretary of State Welles, and the *aide-memoire* of the British Foreign Office of February 25, pp. 521 and 524, respectively. Welles also summarized for General Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister, the views of the President on frontier adjustments as already communicated to the British Government in his memorandum of March 25, p. 123.

Stalin states to Great Britain that his views governing British recognition of Russia's pre-1940 boundaries must be met before intimate relations can be established between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Mr. Eden cannot incur the danger of antagonizing Stalin, and the British War Cabinet has consequently determined that they would agree to negotiate a treaty with Stalin which will recognize the 1940 frontiers of the Soviet Union except for that portion which constituted the Polish-Russian frontier.

The proposed treaty is merely a paragraph in length, announcing that Great Britain and the Soviet Union reciprocally recognize the integrity of their territories prior to the acts of aggression undertaken by Hitler, and that neither country desires, in the post-war period, to intervene in the internal affairs of the other nations of Europe.

Mr. Eden states that if the President is unable to approve the conclusion of this treaty, he trusts that he will understand the imperative reasons which have caused Great Britain to negotiate this treaty, and furthermore that the President will refrain from undertaking any overt action in condemnation of the treaty.

There is no chance of the President being asked to subscribe to the treaty, nor will the treaty be kept secret. Mr. Eden then continues by stating that British public opinion must be considered. If Stalin were to adopt a policy hostile to Great Britain and were to state that this had come about as a result of the obstinacy of the present British Government in recognizing the 1940 frontiers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Eden believes the situation in Great Britain will be "catastrophic".

Mr. Eden did not fail to observe that, in the President's message to Stalin,⁷⁷ he referred to the willingness of the United States to support the Soviet Union in seeking, in post-war adjustments, all legitimate measures necessary to insure the security of the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden states that he made the same offer to Stalin as a substitute for the treaty desired by Stalin, but that Stalin rejected his offer.

For twenty years the Soviet Union has not been on terms of confidence with any Western powers. It is essential for Great Britain, in her present situation, to establish such confidential relations with Stalin. Stalin takes the recognition by Great Britain of his 1940 frontiers as the criterion of British sincerity.

The adherence of Stalin to the Atlantic Charter was undertaken upon the understanding that the Soviet Union was to be regarded as being entitled to its 1940 frontiers, and that consequently the Baltic States were a part of Russian territory.

Under present conditions, Great Britain is unable to give military aid and assistance to Stalin in the sense of a second front, or even in the sense of any considerable supply of matériel. If Great Britain could undertake either of these two measures, it would be easier for Great Britain to take the position taken by the President, but in view of her inability to do so, and in view of the pressure of British public opinion, Great Britain is forced to conclude this treaty with Stalin as a political substitute for material military assistance. Mr. Eden believes that this is of inestimable value.

When the Ambassador had concluded reading the telegram above summarized, he stated that in his belief the reference by Mr. Eden to

⁷⁷ No copy of this message has been found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

the "catastrophic" situation which might obtain in Great Britain, were Stalin to become hostile to the British Government and then let it be known that this was due to the obstinacy of the British Government in refusing to recognize his 1940 frontier, implied that, were the war situation to continue to go badly for Great Britain and Stalin were then either to negotiate a separate peace with Hitler or to demonstrate marked hostility to Great Britain, Mr. Churchill's Government would probably fall and, in that event, Sir Stafford Cripps would replace him, with the probability that under such a government a frankly Communist, pro-Moscow policy would be pursued.

Lord Halifax stated that he was instructed to seek an interview with the President to discuss these issues. He asked if I would arrange to request the President that both of us might consult with the President on the basis of the information above set forth. I replied that I would inform the President immediately of the message the Ambassador had given me and that I would let him know as soon as the President was able to receive him.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

741.61/985

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening at my request.

I told the Ambassador that the President had asked me to let him know that the President saw no useful purpose to be served by his seeing the Ambassador again with regard to the Soviet negotiations. The President had asked me to say to Lord Halifax that he had already fully expressed his views to the Ambassador regarding this negotiation and that he had nothing to add.

I said, however, that the President had asked me to lay before the Ambassador the following considerations. I said the present draft treaty, as it had been read to me by Lord Halifax, contained nothing in the nature of any safeguard for the peoples of the Baltic republics. I said that if some stipulation could be inserted in the provisions of this treaty in the nature of an agreement for the reciprocal exchange of populations in the regions adjoining the frontiers which Russia wished to reestablish, it at least would make it possible for the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Finns who desired not to be returned to Soviet domination to have the right to leave those territories with their properties and belongings. I said that a stipulation of this character would not only be far more nearly in accord with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, but would in my judgment, make it far easier for American public opinion to attempt to tolerate the transaction involved in the proposed treaty.

The Ambassador immediately said that he would at once make every effort to persuade Mr. Eden and the British War Cabinet to get a modification of this character introduced. He said he would inform me as soon as he had a reply.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

741.61/982

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1942.

THE ACTING SECRETARY: I feel that a word of comment for the record is required in respect of the memorandum of April 1, being an account of the conversation between the Acting Secretary and Viscount Halifax.

The subject of this conversation was a repeated attempt by the British to secure our consent to a proposed British-Russian treaty by which the British would assent to the taking over by Soviet Russia of the Baltic Republics. Heretofore, the United States has declined to accept any territorial commitments except those made in open conference.

The proposed Russo-British treaty is, in effect, a secret treaty granting to Russia the territory of the three Baltic Republics as and when they are reconquered from the German occupying armies. I have taken full account of the almost frantic pressure by the British upon us to secure our assent to this. The British in turn are, of course, pressed by their fear lest Russia negotiate a separate peace with Germany.

The position of the American Government in declining to become a party to these arrangements has been based on two motives.

First, we have felt the full force of the commitment in the Atlantic Charter to restore the peoples conquered by force to independence in their own countries.

Second, we have not been unmindful of the extreme and unjust hardship of the fate which the Baltic Republics would suffer if their entire national life were submerged either by Russia or by Germany.

We have been and are fully mindful of the wholly legitimate interest which Soviet Russia has in the area of the Baltic Republics, namely, the necessity that they shall not be used as military or "fifth column" springboards against her; and the necessity to her of full outlet to the Baltic Sea.

I had hoped that we might work out an arrangement by which the relation of these republics to Russia would be analogous to the relationship which prevails between Cuba, Haiti, Costa Rica and the United States—that is, a relationship in which every military and

economic interest is fully taken care of, but the life of the peoples is developed according to their own desires.

I appreciate fully that the motive in suggesting a clause in the draft Russo-British treaty providing for "reciprocal exchange of populations" was to safeguard in some measure the Baltic peoples, and to protect in some measure (if it can be called protection) the humanitarian position we have taken.

But I am forced to make certain observations.

1. "Reciprocal exchange of populations" can only be a polite phrase meaning that the unhappy peoples of these republics (whose only crime is that they exist) will have the right to go into mass exile. There can be no question of "reciprocal exchange" because there is no possible place to which these "populations" can be exchanged. No provision is made, or in the nature of things can now be made, for a place to which these wretched people can go. We are not even in a position to say that they will be granted free immigration into the United States.

2. In the present state of mind of the British Government the mere making of this suggestion will be construed as an assent to the submergence of these republics in respect of whose creation both Russia and we were so largely involved. My fear is that we are now taken to have committed ourselves to the seizure of the territory, provided there is added some pious and, in the existing circumstances, meaningless phrase about free immigration of populations to places unknown, on conditions unspecified, and, in any case, with the complete sacrifice of their tradition, their property, their habits and possibly even their language and their race.

Having had at various times in my life some experience in Baltic problems, I think it is not too much to say that, if this development is consummated and if it becomes generally known, we shall be accused of having negotiated a Baltic "Munich". The accusation will not be just; but there can be no doubt that every British politician will take full advantage of the situation to hide behind the name and moral standing of the President and of the United States.

It is true that by comparative standards the fate of these unhappy peoples (the total number of actual Ests, Letts and Lithuanians is probably not more than three million) is a small one in comparison to the whole picture. It is even possible that at long last the good sense of the Russian people will work out a humane arrangement. It is conceivable (though not likely) that the Poles, whose thinking is entirely based on an independent Lithuania, who have not, as I understand, been informed of this, will not make the charge of bad faith. But I feel we are getting ourselves into a dangerous position, both morally and realistically, and, I may add, in terms of American politics.

I write this with full appreciation of the extreme difficulty of the situation, the forces which tend towards a decision and the kindly thought which motivates our intervention. No doubt it was this that led to the making of the decision without the usual departmental consultation.

I should have preferred (and I believe the Soviet Government would have preferred) a blunt and frank statement of our views, namely, full willingness to assure the satisfaction of every Russian interest consistent with the maintenance of the cultural and racial existence in their homelands of three free, decent, unambitious and hard-working peoples who are now apparently to be eliminated from the earth.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

741.61/981

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1942.

MR. BERLE: I feel myself in full accord with the views expressed in your memorandum. You may, however, not have read all of the many preceding memoranda of conversations on this subject which I have had with the British Ambassador. You may further not be aware of the messages which the President has sent to Stalin and to Churchill on this subject.

After repeated efforts on our part to prevent the conclusion of any treaty of this character, the Soviet Government to all intents and purposes has refused to discuss the question with us and the British Government has now informed us that they have reached the final determination to conclude this treaty. The treaty is to be public, not secret.

In my own judgment, the treaty violated the clear terms of the Atlantic Charter and is indefensible from every moral standpoint, and equally indefensible from the standpoint of the future peace and stability of Europe.

The President has stated to the British Government that he would neither directly nor indirectly indicate any approval of the treaty. He has stated to them that he was utterly opposed to the treaty. By his direction however, I informed the British Government that in view of the facts above stated, the President hoped that at least the unfortunate inhabitants of the Baltic countries would be permitted to leave those territories if and when the Russians occupied the republics once more so that at least the inhabitants of those states would not be forced into a situation which would be equivalent to slavery.

I have felt more strongly on this issue, namely, the conclusion of this treaty, than on any other matter which has come before me in recent years. The attitude of the British Government is, in my judgment, not only indefensible from every moral standpoint, but likewise extraordinarily stupid. I am confident that no sooner will this treaty have been signed than Great Britain will be confronted with new additional demands for the recognition of the right of the Soviet Union to occupy the Bucovina, Bessarabia, and very likely eastern Poland and northern Norway. Those are the views expressed to me by General Sikorski⁷⁸ and those views I share.

I do not understand, however, the argument set forth on page 4 of your memorandum.⁷⁹ In view of the fact that this Government has consistently and vigorously opposed the conclusion of this treaty and has done everything practical it can to prevent it, I am at a loss to understand why this Government will be accused of having negotiated a Baltic Munich. We have absolutely no part in the negotiation of the treaty. We have informed both sides that we are dead against it and it was only after we had been officially informed that the British Government had determined to sign the treaty that on grounds of humanity we made a last-minute appeal for at least an amelioration of the condition of the human beings involved. That in no sense implies or could be construed as implying any participation on our part in the responsibilities incurred.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

*President Roosevelt to the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*⁸⁰

It is unfortunate that geographical distance makes it practically impossible for you and me to meet at this time. Such a meeting of minds in personal conversation would be greatly useful to the conduct of the war against Hitlerism. Perhaps if things go as well as we

⁷⁸ Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, had a conversation on March 25, 1942, with Acting Secretary of State Welles. For his views on this subject, see Mr. Welles' memorandum of the same date, p. 123, particularly paragraphs 4, 5, and 6; also section V of the Polish memorandum of March 24, to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, pp. 125, 129.

⁷⁹ See the third and fourth paragraphs from the end of the memorandum, *supra*.

⁸⁰ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. The message was given to the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, on April 11, 1942, noon. In telegram No. 97, April 14, 1942, the Department sent a summary of this message to Ambassador Standley, in accordance with an understanding made with him before his departure for the Soviet Union; the telegram concluded: "The summary of this message is sent to you, of course, solely for your secret information and not for discussion unless the subject is raised with you." (740.0011 European War 1939/21011a)

hope, you and I could spend a few days together next Summer near our common border off Alaska. But, in the meantime, I regard it as of the utmost military importance that we have the nearest possible approach to an exchange of views.

I have in mind very important military proposal involving the utilization of our armed forces in a manner to relieve your critical western front. This objective carries great weight with me.

Therefore, I wish you would consider sending Mr. Molotov and a General upon whom you rely to Washington in the immediate future.⁸¹ Time is of the essence if we are to help in an important way. We will furnish them with a good transport plane so that they should be able to make the round trip in two weeks.

I do not want by such a trip to go over the head of my friend, Mr. Litvinov, in any way, as he will understand, but we can gain time by the visit I propose.

I suggest this procedure not only because of the secrecy, which is so essential, but because I need your advice before we determine with finality the strategic course of our common military action.

I have sent Hopkins⁸² to London relative to this proposal.

The American people are thrilled by the magnificent fighting of your armed forces and we want to help you in the destruction of Hitler's armies and materiel more than we are doing now.

I send you my sincere regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.00119 European War 1939/959 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 16, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received April 16—8:36 p. m.]

1911. I inquired of Mr. Eden this afternoon whether his talks with Maisky with respect to Stalin's territorial claims were making progress and he replied in the affirmative. He added that he was seeing Maisky again this afternoon and that when he had broached to him yesterday the suggestion that the inhabitants of the Baltic States who wished to do so might be permitted to leave those territories with all their effects. (a concession which I gathered we had suggested would be desirable) Maisky had not seemed to think that this would be any

⁸¹ In a telegram of April 22, 1942, President Roosevelt advised Prime Minister Churchill: "I have a cordial message from Stalin telling me that he is sending Molotov and a General to visit me. I am suggesting that they come here first before going to England. Will you let me know if you have any other views about this? I am quite pleased about the Stalin message." (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.)

⁸² Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President.

stumbling block. Mr. Eden seemed to feel that Stalin has pretty well understood the "delay" and seems satisfied that the talks are now progressing.

MATTHEWS

861.20/545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 18, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received April 19—7:23 a. m.]

113. Although have not yet discussed the matter with any Soviet officials, I am convinced that a United States Military Mission, even if accepted, is not desired by the Soviet Government and under present circumstances will not be able to function as such.⁸³

The British Military Mission is practically restricted in its activities to the work which in our case is now being accomplished by your Lease-Lend Mission and by your Military Attaché.⁸⁴

General Faymonville has repeatedly offered the services of technicians and to obtain any other needed help, but his offers, with very minor exceptions, have not been taken advantage of.

In my opinion it is highly undesirable to have a military mission here which can only function under existing conditions by overlapping the activities of the existing agencies.

[Here follows request for early instructions in the event that the War Department adhered to its plan to send the military mission.]

STANDLEY

741.61/986

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador informed me that Mr. Eden had handed M. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, a week ago, the text of the British proposals for the projected treaty between the Soviet Union and Great Britain covering the question of the Soviet frontiers. Lord

⁸³ Ambassador Standley, newly arrived in the Soviet Union, advised the Department in telegram No. 297, April 9, 1942, that he did not desire to take up the instructions about the Greely Mission with the Soviet Government (see footnote 68, p. 534) pending an opportunity "to examine the functioning of the Supply Mission headed by General Faymonville, having in mind the situation that might be created vis-à-vis the Soviet Government by the establishment of a second mission with possibly overlapping or analogous duties" (861.20/544).

⁸⁴ Lt. Col., later Brig. Gen., Joseph A. Michela.

Halifax informed me that, in this draft, Mr. Eden had explicitly reserved Polish rights as to her frontiers and had, likewise, inserted a specific provision which would permit all inhabitants of the Baltic republics to emigrate, with their goods and chattels and properties, should they so desire, if and when the Soviet Union claimed sovereignty over those regions. Mr. Eden had informed Lord Halifax that M. Maisky had apparently indicated no objection to these two points. The Ambassador said that the British Government was still awaiting official Soviet reaction to the draft.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/21211½: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 24, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received April 25—12:05 p. m.]

126. For the President and the Secretary. I was received by Stalin yesterday in Kremlin. Molotov was present. I informed Stalin that I brought him a special message of greetings from the President; that the President wishes me to express to him his admiration of the magnificent courage, fortitude and bravery shown by the Red Army and the Russian people in meeting and turning back the German attack. I stated that although misunderstandings had at times arisen between the United States and the Soviet Union, the President felt sure that if he and Stalin could sit down together and talk matters over there would never be any lack of understanding. To this end I stated that the President wished me to suggest that he and Stalin meet somewhere in Alaskan or Siberian waters sometime this summer to discuss the whole problem of world affairs. Stalin expressed gratitude to the President for his greetings and stated that the question of the meeting had been the subject of "messages" and that he still had hopes that it could be brought about.

I stated that the President regretted the delays which had occurred in the delivery of supplies to Russia and hoped and believed that the United States could be up to schedule by the end of April; that the President was determined and had so ordered that the highest priority be given to the delivery of such supplies and that any obstacles to the flow thereof must be removed.⁸⁵ I added that it would be my purpose as Ambassador not only to foster the traditional friendly relations existing between our two countries but also to further in every way possible the policy of the President as expressed

⁸⁵ See telegram No. 1116, March 18, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 698.

above. Stalin stated that he too would help in every way to eliminate such obstacles.

I continued that I would like to discuss certain difficulties which I thought could be removed and brought up the question of communications, mentioned specifically the Ferry Command Service from the United States to Basra. I stated that if there were a shuttle line connecting Moscow or Kuibyshev with Basra, communications would be vastly improved and many small spare parts might be sent to Russia via this route. As an example I pointed out the delay in obtaining spare parts and replacements for the 35 bombers held up several weeks at Basra and the time it takes to transmit specifications and books of instructions necessary to production and maintenance. I also referred to the Alaskan-Siberian route and stated that there was no reason why both routes should not be used. Stalin thereupon inquired whether we had investigated the practicability of an air line from Canada to Archangel via Greenland and Iceland. He said that this line would be much shorter and more practicable than the Basra line, that the Alaskan-Siberian route was not only much longer but also impracticable because of weather conditions. I replied that I felt sure that we had investigated the North Atlantic route and that if it had been rejected it must have been due to weather conditions, whereas the African route could be used the year round. I also referred to the delivery of military planes via Alaska, stated that adequate air installations existed up to Nome and added that if air fields were made available in Siberia bombers could be delivered to the German front ready for action and fighters could be sent to the Siberian area thus relieving Soviet fighters for use in the West. I pointed out that these suggestions were only in the interest of furthering and expediting the delivery of supplies and planes to Russia. Stalin again referred to the practicability of the North Atlantic route but added that he would have the Alaskan plane delivery route and the question of through communications looked into.⁸⁶ He remarked that possible Japanese objections to the Alaskan route would not be an insurmountable obstacle.

In commenting upon the delays encountered in the delivery of Soviet supplies which had been caused at times by special Soviet specifications and nomenclature and the difficulties of straightening matters out by cable, I stated that direct air communications between the two countries would greatly aid in removing these difficulties and delays. I also referred to the advisability of giving to Soviet technicians in the United States greater discretionary authority in negotiating with American agencies. Stalin replied that if these

⁸⁶ In telegram No. 220, May 11 (*post*, p. 702), the Department urged the Ambassador to impress upon the Soviet Government at every opportunity the importance of these routes and of preparations to make use of them.

technicians were given greater authority only about half of the goods obtained could be usable; that American contractors at times induced Russian technicians to accept material more or less at variance with specifications and which was found upon delivery to be unsatisfactory.

I touched upon past misunderstandings and expressed the opinion that if the newly arrived Russian Purchasing Commission⁸⁷ were given sufficient authority all major difficulties would be eliminated, especially in view of the President's order giving the Soviet Union highest priority. Stalin remarked that the main obstacle in the supply question appeared to be the unwillingness of American contractors to accept Russian orders and that this condition was much better in England. He added that the second main obstacle was the lack of shipping and the fact that ships from America were not convoyed. He stated that more satisfactory flow of British supplies was principally due to the better protection of British ships. I lacked information as to these points.

I then expressed the hope that the shipment from the Soviet Union of certain raw materials urgently needed in the United States; namely, chrome, manganese, et cetera, would be increased. Stalin stated that there has been quite an increase in such shipments but that the ships carrying these materials have been sunk by the Germans.

Stalin then inquired why we had not commenced the construction of cargo submarines and stated that his experts had been instructed to take up the matter. I then asked Stalin if he had any information about the coming spring offensive which might be of interest to the President. Stalin stated that he desired to inform the President that large reinforcements were being brought up on both sides of the front, that although the Russians had ceased temporarily offensive ground operations their aviation was breaking up German concentrations and attacking their supply lines with certain success. He did not know when or where the spring attack would take place.

In reply to my request for information regarding the Far East, Stalin stated that there was apparently no effort on the part of Japan to create a crisis. He said that Japan was increasing its forces in the North and that the Russians were doing likewise. To my remark that we must not forget Port Arthur⁸⁸ or Pearl Harbor, Stalin stated that the Soviet Union was not being fooled that it remembered these incidents and that it did not trust the Japanese and was ready for them. I remarked that although we had the same knowledge and mistrust, we had been surprised at Pearl Harbor.

⁸⁷ See memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, March 2, 1942, p. 696.

⁸⁸ The allusion is to the surprise Japanese attack upon Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, two days before the formal declaration of the Russo-Japanese war.

Stalin then referred to the American bomber which had landed in Siberia.⁸⁹ He said that the crew was safe and would be well cared for and that he regretted that it was necessary to intern them. He said that the pilot of the bomber had stated that the bombers which had participated in the air raid on Japan had taken off at a greater distance from Japan than originally planned and for this reason the plane in question had run out of gasoline and had been forced to land in Siberia. I told Stalin that I understood that the other planes had landed in China where I was sure they had orders to land and that this one must have been unable to reach Chinese territory. Stalin displayed no annoyance at the incident which was reported in the Soviet press today.

I then expressed my appreciation for the interview and stated that if I found other obstacles to the flow of Soviet supplies which I felt should be brought to his attention, I would ask for the privilege of doing so. Stalin replied that the privilege would be granted. In departing I stated that if at any time I might be of use in helping him kill Germans I wished that he would let me know. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union was killing many, many Germans at the front, that the "poor German" had received orders not to retreat an inch and that as a result they were being killed like pigs. He added regretfully that there was nothing to do but kill them.

Stalin was most cordial during the entire interview. He showed evidence of considerable strain and fatigue.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/21221 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 26, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 10:52 p. m.]

131. In as much as I expect to return to Kuibyshev within the next few days I called on Molotov again last evening.

I informed him that our Military Attaché had received a message from General Marshall⁹⁰ expressing his appreciation for the courtesy extended to the American bomber crew and stated that General Marshall wished to give assurances that the landing was wholly unintentional. After thanking me for this message Molotov asked me to request my Government to take adequate steps to prevent such landings in the future. I stated that I felt sure that my Government had al-

⁸⁹ A two-motored American bomber which had taken part in the air raid on Japan on April 18, 1942, had been forced to land because of insufficient fuel at a Soviet air field in the Maritime kray (region). The crew of five was at first interned at Khabarovsk.

⁹⁰ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

ready issued such instructions. (I deemed it inexpedient to convey to Molotov a further message from General Marshall received by the Military Attaché suggesting that if agreeable to the Soviet Government the plane crew be removed to the west to avoid embarrassment; the personnel be temporarily attached to the Embassy; and that the plane be proffered to Stalin for use in the Soviet Union.)

Referring to my conversation with Stalin I stated that I wished to emphasize importance of regular air communications between the United States and the USSR and stated that I believed this matter would soon be taken up formally.

I then stated that I might find it necessary to come to Moscow frequently to consult with him. Molotov replied that this was perfectly understandable and agreeable. I also said that I felt that it would be in the interest of both Governments for Captain Duncan⁹¹ to remain in Moscow for the present to finish up certain work already commenced. Molotov replied that that matter was wholly within my own hands.

Molotov referred to the Embassy's note regarding the assignment of Major Szymanski as liaison officer with the Polish Forces in the Soviet Union and stated that he did not wish to make this matter the subject of official correspondence until he had received clarification of exactly what was involved. He added, however, that it was the opinion of the Soviet authorities that none [*no need*] existed for such an officer since it seemed to them that any questions affecting the Polish forces could be adequately dealt with by the Polish and American Military Attachés.⁹² I replied that I was not familiar with the matter and desired to consult the Embassy's files before discussing it.

I referred to rumors I had heard in Kuibyshev to the effect that the Japanese had demanded that the Soviets withdraw their troops a certain distance from the Manchurian border and dismantle certain fortifications and that Soviets had answered by stating that they would withdraw their troops if the Japanese would do likewise. Molotov stated that the Japanese had not even hinted at such a move.

Molotov made no reference (nor did Stalin when I saw him) to the President's suggestion that he visit Washington.

STANDLEY

⁹¹ Jack Harlan Duncan, Naval Attaché in the Soviet Union, advanced to rank of Rear Admiral, December 1942.

⁹² For correspondence on the interest of the United States in Poland, and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 100 ff.

740.0011 Pacific War/2378: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1942—6 p. m.

193. Your 133, April 28, noon.⁹⁴

1. In an exchange of notes between the President and Litvinoff effected on November 16, 1933⁹⁵ it was agreed that consular representatives of the United States might visit without delay United States nationals in places of detention of all kinds in the Soviet Union. Under this agreement, therefore, a member of your staff should be permitted at once to visit the interned crew of the plane. Nevertheless, we would prefer to have the visit arranged on a friendly, informal basis rather than as a result of a request based upon an existing agreement.

2. It is hoped that you will be able to prevail upon the Soviet authorities to permit a member of your staff to visit the interned persons in the near future.

3. In case such a visit is permitted the War Department hopes that information along the lines set forth below might be discreetly elicited as well as other information which might be helpful to the War Department:

a. Route flown including altitudes, times of take off and landing. This for own and other airplanes if known.

b. Enemy opposition encountered including location, altitude and type, i. e., pursuit, A[nti] A[ircraft] fire, barrage balloons, etc.; amount and effectiveness.

c. Targets attacked and results observed.

d. Photographs obtained. To be forwarded by fastest available means to W[ar] D[epartment]. G-2.⁹⁶

e. Camouflage noted.

f. Casualties.

g. Comments on functioning of equipment.

h. Weather conditions encountered.

4. Of course, information regarding the welfare and living conditions of the crew and their treatment is desired. It might also be

⁹⁴ In this telegram Ambassador Standley reported the following: "In response to a personal note to Molotov requesting permission for Ward to call upon the interned crew I have received a note from him dated April 27 stating in effect that since the crew was being transferred to a region nearer the center of the USSR the visit could not be made at the present time; that upon the arrival of the crew at the new place of residence I would be advised when and where my representative might visit the crew."

⁹⁵ *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 33-34.

⁹⁶ Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

possible to take from them messages for relatives and friends in the United States.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/21378 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUBYSHEV (Moscow), May 3, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received May 3—5:15 p. m.]

355. For the President. The Soviet press reported on April 23, that during the Hopkins-Marshall visit to London⁹⁷ problems of Soviet supply had been discussed. I have received no information regarding this aspect of the visit. I feel that it is important that I be kept fully informed of all matters pertaining to this country which become known to my Government.

In this respect I wish also to report that although the State Department advised me on April 14 of your message to Stalin⁹⁸ through Litvinov expressing your regret at your inability to arrange a meeting with Stalin at the present time and suggesting the desirability of Molotov visiting Washington, I have had no further information regarding this matter.

While in Moscow I saw Stalin once and Molotov twice. Neither of them mentioned your message nor gave me any indication of the action which would be taken with respect to your invitation to Molotov. I, of course, did not mention the matter as when I was informed of your message I was told it was for my secret information and that it should not be discussed unless the subject was raised with me.

I feel that as a result of this situation the complete frankness which should have characterized this meeting with Stalin was lacking. Stalin and Molotov must have been surprised by my failure to mention such an important subject as your message and I was forced to the opinion that they refrained from bringing up the subject themselves simply because they presumed that I had not been taken fully into your confidence in the matter.

STANDLEY

⁹⁷ General Marshall and Mr. Hopkins visited London April 8-19, 1942, for discussions on military strategy and supply questions.

⁹⁸ See footnote 80, p. 542.

740.0011 European War 1939/21385 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*⁹⁹

LONDON, May 4, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received May 4—12:13 p. m.]

2353. Personal for the President. Since arriving here¹ I spent one night with the Prime Minister and Saturday night with Eden. The question of convoys which we discussed was, as you know, taken up by the two Admirals and has been dealt with directly by you and the Former Naval Person.²

I believe your suggestion regarding convoys of 35 ships will be accepted. A possible alternative for reinstating additional convoys later might be an offer of destroyers and cruisers allocated from other than Atlantic convoys.

I find that Molotov is expected here in the next 48 hours. He is coming to complete final negotiations on the pending Anglo-Russian Treaty which will include British recognition of the Russian frontiers of June 1941 (the Baltic States and the Finnish boundaries of that date). So far, in spite of Eden's insistence, the Russians have failed to include your suggestion providing that the inhabitants of the Baltic States who wish to do so might be permitted to leave those territories with their effects.

I have urged that the British arrange for Molotov to make his planned trip to the United States before the treaty is finally signed. There will be differences between the British and Russians which Molotov will in all probability wish to refer to Stalin. The necessary delay involved would thus give Molotov time to make the journey. I realize that the preliminary conversations may to all intents and purposes bind the British Government but I felt that at least you would have an opportunity to see Molotov before final action is taken.

My conversation with the Prime Minister on this subject was very brief. I feel that he reluctantly came to the conclusion that acceptance of the Russian position was necessary. Both the Prime Minister and Eden feel that Stalin has made the Baltic States-Finnish issue the basis of trust in Britain as a friendly ally. They believe that if mutual confidence could be established it would mean a great deal in the prosecution of the war and in building the future peace. They do not believe that failure to meet Stalin's wishes would lead to a Russian-German arrangement.

⁹⁹ The substance of this telegram was sent by the Department to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union for his information in telegram No. 201, May 6, 1942, on the bottom of which was initialled: "OK FDR". (740.00119 European War 1939/995a)

¹ Ambassador Winant returned from the United States on Thursday, April 30, accompanied by Adm. Harold R. Stark, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

² Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.

An unfortunate incident occurred Thursday which has been a disturbing factor preliminary to Molotov's visit. He sent his secretary on ahead to make arrangements for him. He was flying in a Flamingo last Thursday with two other Russians and five Britishers when it burst into flames in the air and was destroyed with all on board. This incident has been kept completely secret but Maisky is very disturbed and suspicious of sabotage.

Eden has been impressed by the recent tone of Soviet broadcasts with regard both to Britain and to the United States. He gave me the following summary prepared for him by British Monitoring Services:

"During the last fortnight, references to both Britain and the United States on the Soviet home and foreign broadcasts have been more sympathetic than during any previous period.

On the Soviet home front the solidarity of the British and Soviet trade unions, the supplies from the two great British and American democracies, like the alliance between the USSR and these two democracies have been very much stressed.

In the Soviet broadcasts to Germany, British bombing was given prominence and German attempts to belittle the effect of these bombings was effectively ridiculed.

In the Soviet broadcasts to France, Britain and the United States were mentioned as the two countries which, together with the USSR, have solemnly undertaken to right the wrongs done by the Axis Powers. Commando and bombing raids were well 'played up'. American supplies to the USSR were featured repeatedly.

In the Soviet broadcasts to Italy the growing might of British air power was emphasized and Italians were reminded of the battle of Britain and of the German fiasco.

Within the last 10 days Great Britain and the United States of America have been more and more sympathetically mentioned in Soviet broadcasts to the Balkans."

WINANT

861.24/907 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1942—1 p. m.

199. Personal for the Ambassador. The President has asked me to send you for your information the following message, which he yesterday asked Ambassador Litvinov to transmit direct to Mr. Stalin:³

"Grave difficulties are being met in the northern convoy route and Litvinov has been advised regarding the complications.⁴ I want to

³ The original copy of the telegram was dated May 4, 1942.

⁴ Regarding the difficulties encountered at that time on the northern convoy route, see telegram No. 144, May 7, from the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, and footnote 84, p. 701.

assure you, however, that we shall omit no effort in sending off the greatest possible number of ships. I want to express my appreciation to you for your cordial reception of Admiral Standley, of which I have been told.

As soon as I know of the route which will be taken by Molotov, whom I look forward to seeing, we shall undertake to provide and prepare immediate transportation for him. I earnestly hope that he can stay at the White House with me while he is here, but if it is desired, we can make available a private home which will be nearby. Roosevelt."

HULL

861.20/546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iran (Dreyfus)

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1942—11 p. m.

117. Your 126, April 28, 4 p. m.⁵ In view of the Department's belief that it would be inadvisable to request the Soviet Government to permit the Greely Military Mission to function or to establish its headquarters in the Soviet Union, the War Department has decided that it will no longer endeavor to obtain permission for the mission to enter Soviet territory. Immediate measures will be taken to withdraw the personnel of the mission from Tehran.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/21469 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), May 7, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received May 8—8:01 a. m.]

370. I have received a telegram dated May 4 from the Moscow Embassy reading as follows:

107, May 4, 2 p. m. For the Ambassador from Faymonville. If you approve please transmit the following message.

"For Hopkins from Faymonville. President's broadcast April 30⁶ was well translated by Soviet press. Effect was immediate and highly favorable. President's description of heroic bomber flight appealed powerfully to Soviet public and brought congratulations and enthusiastic praise from Government officials, soldiers and civilians. Accounts of American exploits which may be filling all

⁵ Not printed; this telegram recommended the withdrawal of the Greely Military Mission from Iran, as it had been inactive while waiting for visas to enter the Soviet Union.

⁶ An address to the nation was broadcast by President Roosevelt on April 28, 1942. A partial text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 2, 1942, p. 381, and the full text is in the *Congressional Record*, vol. 88, pt. 9, p. A1583.

American press seldom reach the Soviet public unless they are re-stated with approval by American [*Soviet*] leaders. Similarly, American appreciation of Soviet exploits is made known to Soviet citizens almost exclusively through Soviet reprints of remarks by distinguished Americans. Comments by Admiral Standley and Bill Batt⁷ on Soviet achievements were widely quoted here. Continued references by our leaders to heroic American and Soviet exploits will do much to build up and sustain confidence here and will help to counteract the disappointment felt over failure to establish a second front. Such reports will receive wide and very desirable publicity especially if we can at the same time give to Soviet Government officials solid and encouraging facts on American production and Lend-Lease shipments".

The subject matter of this telegram is purely political and has little bearing on Lend-Lease or supply questions and I feel that it would have been more appropriate for Faymonville to have addressed to me for such unspecified use as I might see fit, the comments on American-Soviet political relations contained therein. I believe, however, that it would be inexpedient for me to withhold or alter the message and I am therefore forwarding it to the Department for transmission to Mr. Hopkins if the Department so desires. At the same time, I am addressing the following telegram to Faymonville:

"I appreciate receiving your views on American-Soviet political relations, to which in general I subscribe, and am forwarding your message to the Secretary of State with the suggestion that he may desire to transmit it to Mr. Hopkins. I am inclined to feel, however, that it might be preferable in the future for you to address any information which might come to your attention concerning the political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, or any views which you may have on this subject, to me alone for such unspecified use as I may deem appropriate. This is in accordance with my interpretation of the understanding reached with McCabe⁸ as reported to you in his message of March 23. I value your judgment and experience in such matters and shall always be glad to receive from you any information or comments you may desire to furnish me on this important subject."

I may state that in general I concur in the views expressed by Faymonville and feel sure that he has accurately portrayed the views expressed to him by his limited Soviet contacts but has possibly misconstrued these views as representing the views of the public in general. The Soviet press did give prominence to the President's speech referred to, but the press in this country usually gives wide coverage to statements of friendly foreign statesmen, especially when such statements contain favorable references to the Soviet Union. There

⁷ William L. Batt, Director, Materials Division, War Production Board; later, Vice Chairman of the Board.

⁸ Thomas B. McCabe, Deputy Lend-Lease Administrator.

has been no perceptible change in this general policy in the present instance.

I should appreciate receiving the Department's comments on this telegram.⁹

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/21461 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 7, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received May 7—6:05 p. m.]

2453. For the President. This afternoon Eden informed me that Molotov's trip had been postponed. Eden told me that he felt that his insistence on the inclusion of the clause suggested by us to permit the evacuation of dissenting inhabitants, with other changes in the Russian text, was responsible for Molotov's postponement. He felt that until some of the differences had been ironed out through a further exchange of communications, Molotov would in all probability continue to delay his visit to London.

The incident that occurred last week, the reason given some time ago that Molotov's new duties connected with administration and related to Russian defence might prevent him from coming on here, and your personal intervention with Litvinov may all have been contributing factors.

If it is practical for Molotov to fly directly to the United States, you might want to urge him to go there at this time.

WINANT

⁹ A memorandum to the Secretary of State dated May 11, 1942, written by Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, and signed by Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of this Division, read as follows:

"We believe that the Ambassador should have our full support in his efforts to centralize through him political reporting from the Soviet Union and the carrying on of conversations of political import in the Soviet Union between American and Soviet officials.

"We feel that if we should fail to give the Ambassador full support in this instance his prestige would suffer to such an extent that his usefulness in the Soviet Union would be materially affected."

By telegram No. 219, May 11, Secretary Hull answered the Ambassador's request: "I fully approve of the action taken by you. The message addressed to Hopkins was sent on to him."

*The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*¹⁰

[Translation]

[Moscow], May 15, 1942.

I thank you for the message conveyed through Ambassador Litvinov. I have already requested Prime Minister Churchill to contribute to the speediest overcoming of certain difficulties in connection with the transportation and conveying of ships to the U. S. S. R. Since the delivery of materials in May from the U. S. A. and England is of the utmost urgency, I make a similar request to yourself, Mr. President.

The journey of Mr. Molotov to the U. S. A. and England must be postponed for a few days owing to uncertain weather conditions. It appears that this journey can be made on a Soviet airplane both to England and to the U. S. A. I would at the same time add that the Soviet Government considers that Mr. Molotov's journey should be accomplished without any publicity whatever till the return of Mr. Molotov to Moscow, as was done when Mr. Eden visited Moscow in December last.

In regard to the place of residence of Mr. Molotov during his sojourn in Washington, Mr. Molotov and I thank you for your kind suggestions.

741.6111/32: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 21, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received May 21—1:45 p. m.]

2829. To the President and the Secretary. Our Russian visitor¹¹ (my telegram No. 2807, May 20, 8 p. m.¹²) is staying down in the country. Through Eden he sent word to me this morning that he will go directly from here to Washington and asked that there be no publicity given to his journey there. He asks both the British and ourselves, and Stalin has supported his request, that he be allowed to come here, go to the United States and return here and go back to Russia before any announcement of his trip is made public. It is expected that the present negotiations here will last for several days.

A brief preliminary conference was held this morning which Eden described to me as easy and friendly. The Russians are still however

¹⁰ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. The President informed Secretary of State Hull of this message on May 20.

¹¹ Molotov had arrived in England on May 20, 1942.

¹² Not printed.

holding to their original requests for the Baltic States and the Finnish line. Eden explained to him our position and England's relationship to us and that all three countries should work together. The Russian visitor in turn reminded Eden that there was also a public opinion in Russia that had to be considered. A second conference is scheduled for this afternoon.

I am asking for a meeting with the visitor tomorrow.

WINANT

[In *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), volume II, page 1172, there occurs the following passage:

"At this point [after the arrival of the telegram of May 21, 1942, from Ambassador Winant] I sent the President another memorandum, which was even stronger than the one of February 4. It bluntly expressed our belief that signature of the proposed Anglo-Soviet treaty, with the territorial clauses included, would be a terrible blow to the whole cause of the United Nations. We proposed that a final telegram along these lines be sent to Winant to be communicated to the British.

"We indicated that, if the treaty in its proposed form were signed, we might not be able to remain silent since silence might give tacit consent. On the contrary we might have to issue a separate statement clearly stating that we did not subscribe to its principles and clauses. This would be a sharp break within the United Nations, on this point at least, but there was no other course we could logically pursue.

"Our memorandum was so strong that we were in some fear lest the President disapprove it. Mr. Roosevelt, however, quickly returned it with his O. K., and we immediately sent Winant a cable repeating its substance."

It has been impossible to locate a copy of this other memorandum, or of the final telegram to Ambassador Winant based upon it, either in the files of the Department of State, or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N. Y., or among the Hull papers at the Library of Congress.]

741.6111/33: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 24, 1942—midnight.

[Received May 25—7 a. m.]

2897. To the President and the Secretary. The British-Russian negotiations have continued almost without respite since my message to you announcing Molotov's arrival. There were three major points of difference which at first appeared to block possible agreement.

1. There was a reference to Poland which Eden refused to accept because it ran counter to the British understanding with the Poles. (Agreement signed August 25, 1939).¹³

2. The complete rejection by the Russians of the clause suggested by us to the British to protect the inhabitants of the Baltic States in their persons and in their property and permitting migration.

3. The Russians wanted a secret agreement with the British in which the latter were to promise to support claims relating to the Finnish and Rumanian frontiers.

Up to noon yesterday both parties to the negotiations had apparently come to the conclusion that agreement was improbable. The Russians had explained that even if a treaty was not arrived at, good had come of the negotiations, and Eden had suggested a substitute treaty which made no reference to frontiers. Late yesterday afternoon, however, the Russians began to recede from their original position, and Eden called me at 6 o'clock tonight to say that the negotiations had gone so far that he would have a proposal to make to the Cabinet tomorrow afternoon. He went on to say that:

- (1) The Russians had withdrawn their demands affecting Poland.
- (2) They had compromised on the protective clause but only to the extent of allowing minorities to withdraw, i. e., Poles from Lithuania. This, Eden acknowledged, did not help much.
- (3) The idea of a secret agreement was abandoned but they asked that a clause be inserted in which the British would recognize that Russia had special interests in Finland and Rumania. Eden told me that he still hoped that this reference might be eliminated.

From the beginning Molotov has been interested in two things: First, a second front, and second, the treaty proposals. I understand that the British have told him that we (United States and Great Britain) stand together on the second front issue. I was also told that both the Prime Minister and Eden did their utmost to make Molotov understand our opposition to the Russian frontier proposals.

I was to meet with the Russians on Friday¹⁴ but it could not be arranged. Eden then asked them to have lunch with him yesterday, explaining that he was inviting me. They in turn asked him to have lunch with them at their Embassy in London. He said that he would be delighted to, and that he would bring me. The Saturday morning meeting, however, ran until late with many differences of opinion, so the Russians asked to postpone their luncheon until Tuesday. I lunched alone with Eden at the Foreign Office. Maisky had previously told me that he wanted to arrange a meeting for me with Molotov, so I called him on the telephone. He called me back at 6 o'clock tonight (Sunday), inviting me to go to the Russian Embassy tomorrow.

¹³ Agreement of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland signed at London; for text, see British Cmd. 6616, Poland No. 1 (1945).

¹⁴ May 22.

row at 4 o'clock. I called him back and told him that I thought it was unnecessary [*necessary*] that we meet sooner than that, and he made an appointment for me at 10 o'clock tonight at his Embassy. Both Molotov and he were most courteous and cordial. I explained to them that we were trying to cooperate with them, that we were both interested in a second front, and that within the last week the Department had informed me that we were arranging to discuss commercial policy with them (Department's 2152, May 14, 7 p. m.¹⁵) and that we were trying to work out a program in the relief field that went a considerable distance toward meeting the suggestions in Maisky's memorandum to me on that subject, but that both you and Mr. Hull were set against introducing frontier problems at this time and that that was true of other friends who were doing all that could be done to support our common war effort. I also told them very frankly that I did the best I could to present the Russian point of view to you and to Mr. Hull, but that you were both definitely opposed to a British-Russian treaty containing agreements on frontiers. They listened with great attention and Molotov told me that the President's position on this question was a matter for their serious consideration. He then asked me if I had seen Eden's draft treaty which eliminated any reference to frontiers. I told him that I had, because I had worked with Eden in an effort to find the formula for a treaty that might be satisfactory to them and at the same time eliminate any reference to frontiers which was opposed by my country. He told me that he would reconsider the draft treaty and perhaps refrain from making any decision until after he had talked with the President. This was a definite concession, as Molotov had intended to return directly to Moscow from Washington and up to this point they had shown no interest in the draft treaty. I had just gotten back to our Embassy when I got a call from Eden, saying that Molotov had called him in the interim asking for an appointment tomorrow morning to discuss the draft treaty. I am attaching a copy of this treaty to my message.

The Russians are deeply interested in establishing a second front. They feel that both the Prime Minister and Eden have great sympathy for their point of view, but that Brooke¹⁶ is reluctant to move and that they could get no definite commitments on action this year. I have felt myself that there has been less support for action than when I returned here. Maisky asked me if I would suggest a date when such a front might be established. I told him that I had no authority to speak on the subject and that I could not even discuss it with him, that it was a question that Molotov would have to take up when he reached Washington. They plainly do not want to make any

¹⁵ Vol. I, p. 170.

¹⁶ Gen. Sir Alan Francis Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.

commitment on the Japanese situation and Molotov told me that in speaking of a second front he was speaking of a Western Front. They feel that they are carrying their maximum load on the Eastern Front.

Maisky told me that he is very grateful for our promise to do everything in our power to keep Molotov's visit secret until his return tomorrow [*to Moscow*]. (Department's 2297, May 22, 3 p. m.).¹⁷

The draft treaty follows:

"SECRET.

DRAFT TREATY

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R.;

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. S. R. for joint action in the war against Germany, signed at Moscow on the 12th July, 1941 and to replace them by a formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in her acts of aggression in Europe;

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Declaration made on the 14th August, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the Government of the U. S. S. R. has adhered;

Desiring, finally, to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an attack upon either High Contracting Party by Germany or an [*any*] of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe,

Have decided to conclude a Treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R.;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

PART ONE

Article I. In virtue of the Alliance established between them the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article II. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive

¹⁷ Not printed.

intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

PART TWO

Article III. (1) The High Contracting Parties declare their desire to associate themselves with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression.

(2) Pending the adoption of such proposals, they will take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article IV. Should one of the High Contracting Parties become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III (2) in consequence of an attack by that State against that Party, the other High Contracting Party will at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in his power.

This Article shall remain in force until superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article III (1). In default of the adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of (20) years, and thereafter until terminated by either High Contracting Party, as provided in Article III [VIII].

Article V. The High Contracting Parties agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the reestablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects, and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples.

Article VI. The High Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the War.

Article VII. Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article VIII. The Present Treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the Agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, signed at Moscow on the 12th July, 1941.

Part I of the present Treaty shall remain in force until the reestablishment of peace between the High Contracting Parties and Germany and the Powers associated with her acts of aggression in Europe.

Part II of the present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of 20 years. Thereafter unless 12 months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the Treaty at the end of the said period of 20 years, it shall continue in force until 12 months after either High Contracting Party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

In Witness Whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Duplicate in on the day of 1942, in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic."

WINANT

740.0011 Pacific War/2485: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), May 25, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 8:50 p. m.]

441. Department's 193, May 2, 6 p. m. Michela and Page¹⁸ flew to Penza yesterday to visit the bomber crew and upon returning last night reported to me as follows.

1. The answers to the Department's numbered questions are contained in Michela's telegram number 87, May 24, to the War Department.

2. The bomber landed at a naval air base about 40 miles from Vladivostok with only enough gasoline left to proceed about 150 miles. It was not fired upon over Soviet territory and no AA defense in the Vladivostok region was noticed. One Soviet fighter rose to intercept it but merely stayed on its tail until it landed. About 20 large seaplanes similar to the American PBY were observed at the naval base.

3. Although the crew was denied access to the American Consul General at Vladivostok¹⁹ its members were accorded courteous and considerate treatment during their sojourn in the Soviet Far East and en route to Penza. They travelled in a private car and arrived at Penza on May 19 after numerous delays including a 24-hour stopover in Kuibyshev during which they were not permitted to communicate with the Embassy.

[4.] The crew is lodged in a large, clean bungalow surrounded by lawns and gardens in a village about 10 miles from Penza. A second house contains a dining-recreation room and three Soviet companions including an interpreter. Athletic facilities, books, billiards and other distractions are provided; in fact, the Soviet authorities have been most considerate in looking after the crew. The food is better than that obtainable by the Diplomatic Corps in Kuibyshev and the men are accorded about the same freedom of movement as chiefs of mission. They appeared to be in excellent physical and mental condition and stated that they had no complaints as to treatment save that they are urged to eat and drink too much. None has been ill. Since there is reported to be malaria in the region the Embassy will endeavor to

¹⁸ Edward Page, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul in the Soviet Union.

¹⁹ Angus Ivan Ward.

supply them with quinine. A Soviet doctor is always available. With the exception of American reading matter, cigarettes and toilet articles, which the Embassy has endeavored to supply, the men state they have no immediate needs.

5. Michela is taking all necessary steps with regard to pay, allotments and other personal matters including messages to relatives.

STANDLEY

741.6111/34: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 25, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 12:32 p. m.]

2901. For the President and the Secretary. My 2897, May 24, midnight. Eden just called me on a private wire to say that he has spent the morning going over the draft text with Molotov which I forwarded to you last night. Molotov explained to Eden that the statements made to him by the Prime Minister, Eden and myself convinced him that there would be serious objections to the Russian frontiers treaty in the United States. He further told him that he had recommended to his Government in Moscow that he be permitted to work out an agreement with the British on Eden's draft treaty. Molotov expects to get a reply by this evening or tomorrow morning.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/21804

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called at my request. I had some confidential exchanges of conversation with the Ambassador in regard to the present progress of the war, which I will not place of record, but will be glad to communicate orally to the appropriate officers in charge of this part of the Department's work.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

741.6111/35: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 26, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received May 26—2:55 p. m.]

2922. For the President and the Secretary. My telegram No. 2897, May 24, midnight. As the result of conferences which took place

this morning the following changes in the Eden draft treaty have been suggested by the Russians and accepted by the British. These changes are appended at the end of this message. The object of the changes is to emphasize the "alliance" aspect of the treaty during the post-war period and in Eden's view do not materially alter the substance of the treaty. Stalin approved the substitution of the Eden draft as amended for the frontier treaty. The treaty is being signed this afternoon.²⁰ It is not to be made public for 3 weeks.²¹

A luncheon was given today for Molotov by Maisky which was attended by the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet and ranking members of the British staffs. Averell²² and I were the only non-British or non-Russian guests. Molotov, the Prime Minister and Eden in giving expression to their hope of victory and peace stressed that it should be in collaboration with each other and with the United States.

The following are the changes in the treaty mentioned above:

The title of the treaty is now as follows:

"Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a military alliance during the present war and collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter."

Article I

The words "the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" have been inserted between the words "established between" and the words "the High Contracting Parties."

Article III (1)

The word "unite" has been substituted for the words "associate themselves" and the words "in the post-war period" have been added after the words "resist aggression".

Article III (2)

The words "after the termination of hostilities" have been inserted between the words "they will" and the words "take all the measures in their power."

Article IV

The words "during the post war period" have been inserted between the words "the High Contracting Parties" and the words "become involved" in the first line of paragraph 1 of the article.

²⁰ For text of this treaty, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cccv, p. 353, or Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1942, p. 781. Ratifications were exchanged in Moscow on July 4, 1942.

²¹ Public statements announcing the conclusion of this treaty with the Soviet Union were made on June 11, 1942, by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, in the House of Commons (Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 380, cols. 1349-1354), and by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Viscount Cranborne, in the House of Lords, *ibid.*, House of Lords, 5th series, vol. 123, cols. 359-363.

²² W. Averell Harriman.

The first sentence of the second paragraph of Article IV has been altered to read as follows:

"This article shall remain in force until the High Contracting Parties, by mutual agreement, shall recognize that it is superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in article III (1)".

Article V

The words "having regard to the interest of each in their security" have been inserted between the words "the High Contracting Parties" appearing at the beginning of the article and the words "agree to work together". The word "states" has been substituted for the word "peoples" at the end of the article.

WINANT

*Memorandum of Conference Held at the White House, by Mr. Samuel H. Cross, Interpreter*²³

[Extracts]

I. *Friday, May 29, 1942, 4:30 p. m.*²⁴

Present: The President, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Litvinov, Secretary Hull, Mr. Hopkins, Messrs. Pavlov²⁵ and Cross.

After the customary introductions and greetings, Mr. Molotov presented Mr. Stalin's good wishes, which the President heartily reciprocated. To the President's inquiry as to Mr. Stalin's health, Mr. Molotov replied that, though his Chief had an exceptionally strong constitution, the events of the winter and spring had put him under heavy strain.

Mr. Molotov described his flight from Moscow to London and thence to Iceland, Labrador, and Washington as not especially unpleasant or wearing. His plane had flown from Moscow to London direct, over the front and Denmark, in about 10 hours, but this was not particularly good time, as the same trip has been made before in 7½ hrs. He explained that his military adviser had broken his kneecap in an automobile accident in London, and was, thus, detained in England. Mr. Molotov consequently regretted that he would have to act as both diplomat and soldier. The President remarked that none present were military specialists, but that Mr. Molotov would have an opportunity next day to talk with General Marshall and Admiral King.²⁶

²³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. Samuel H. Cross, who interpreted for President Roosevelt during these conferences, was Professor of Slavic Languages and Literature at Harvard University.

²⁴ For a memorandum of this conference by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, see p. 571.

²⁵ Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov, interpreter for Molotov.

²⁶ Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet.

Mr. Molotov expressed his intention to discuss the military situation fully. He had covered it in detail with Mr. Churchill, who had not felt able to give any definite answer to the questions Mr. Molotov raised, but had suggested that Mr. Molotov should return through London after his conversations with the President, at which time a more concrete reply could be rendered in the light of the Washington discussions.

The President noted that we had information as to heavy Japanese naval concentration in the Fuchia and Mariana Islands, but that we could not tell as yet whether they were directed against Australia, Hawaii, Alaska, or perhaps Kamchatka. Mr. Molotov said he was not informed about this, but he had no doubt the Japanese would do anything in their power to intimidate the Soviets.

To Mr. Molotov's remark that Hitler was the chief enemy, the President noted his agreement and mentioned his repeated statements to the Pacific Conference that we should remain on the defensive in the Pacific until the European front was cleared up. It had been difficult, he added, to put this view across, but, in his opinion it was now accepted.

The President remarked that he had one or two points to raise which had been brought up by the State Department, and could be discussed by Mr. Molotov or between Mr. Litvinov and Secretary Hull, as seemed expedient.

The President then inquired what information Mr. Molotov had as to the Nazi treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The Commissar replied that, from such data as Moscow received, not only from their own agents, but also from Polish and Czech sources, it was plain that the Russian prisoners were brutally and inhumanely handled. Direct reports to the effect had been received from some 25 Soviet prisoners who had escaped from Norway into Sweden. Mr. Molotov remarked that the Germans felt themselves bound by no rules, though the Soviets (he implied) were acting according to the Hague convention to the best of their ability.²⁷

The President expressed the hope that at least some arrangement might be made to exchange lists of names of prisoners of war. Mr. Molotov replied with emphasis that his government was not disposed to negotiate any arrangement with the Germans which would give the latter the slightest pretext for claiming that they (the Germans) were observing any rules whatever, because the fact was, they were not doing so. He showed no interest in the President's original suggestion. The President remarked that we had a similar problem in connection

²⁷ In 1941 the United States had attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to adhere to the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 1005 ff. The text of this convention is in *ibid.*, 1929, vol. 1, p. 336. For text of the Hague convention of October 18, 1907, see *ibid.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204, or 36 Stat. (pt. 2) 2277.

with our own nationals in Japanese captivity. While there was, for the moment, no official confirmation of radio reports of positive maltreatment, these prisoners were being fed on the Japanese army ration, which was starvation fare for any white man.

The President then had a memorandum on the state of Soviet-Turkish relations, which had become considerably less cordial than was previously the case. The memorandum expressed the willingness of our government to cooperate in any way toward the improvement of these relations. Mr. Molotov replied succinctly that he was ready to discuss this matter.

The President also referred to the disturbances among the Kurds in Eastern [*Western*] Iran and expressed his hope that the trustful cooperation now existing between the Soviet and the Iranian authorities would continue and manifest itself hereafter as occasion might arise. Mr. Molotov said he was familiar with the situation and shared the President's hope.

In the course of conversation the President asked Mr. Molotov whether he had noted any intensification of reports on the deterioration of German domestic morale. Mr. Molotov admitted the increased frequency of such reports, but failed to comment on their significance.

The President described his plans for continuing the conversations and for receiving Mr. Molotov's staff and the flyers who brought him over. Mr. Molotov decided to spend Friday night at the White House, and ostensibly withdrew to rest, though between adjournment and dinner he took a walk with Mr. Litvinov, whom it had been decided not to include in the next day's conversations, to the Ambassador's obvious annoyance.

II. *Friday, May 29, 7:40 p.m.*²⁸

Present: The President, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Hopkins, Messrs. Pavlov and Cross.

A. (before dinner)

While serving cocktails, the President discussed at length certain basic considerations on post-war organization. Mr. Churchill (he said) had expressed some idea of reestablishing a post-war international organization which was in effect a revived League of Nations. The President had given Mr. Churchill his own opinion that such an organization would be impractical, because too many nations would be involved. The President conceived it the duty of the four major United Nations (Britain, U. S., U. S. S. R., and China, provided the last achieves a unified central government, opposite which there was still a question-mark) to act as the policemen of the world. The first step was general disarmament. But the four major nations would

²⁸ For a memorandum of this conference by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, see p. 572.

maintain sufficient armed forces to impose peace, together with inspection privileges which would guard against the sort of clandestine rearmament in which Germany had notoriously engaged during the pre-war years. If any nation menaced the peace, it could be blockaded and then if still recalcitrant, bombed. The President added that which concerned him was the establishment of a peace which would last 25 years, at least the lifetime of the present generation. He and Mr. Stalin were over 60, Mr. Molotov 53; his aim was thus peace in our time. He thought that all other nations save the Big Four should be disarmed (Germany, Japan, France, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Scandinavia, Turkey, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.).

Mr. Molotov remarked that this might be a bitter blow to the prestige of Poland and Turkey. "The Turks," he added, "are an extremely pretentious people." He also inquired about the reestablishment of France as a great power. The President replied that might perhaps be possible within 10 or 20 years. He added that other nations might eventually be accepted progressively at various times among the guarantors of peace whenever the original guarantors were satisfied of their reliability. This might be peace by dictation, but his hope was that it might be so administered that the peoples of the previous aggressor nations might eventually come to see that they have infinitely more to gain from permanent peace than from periodically recurrent wars.

Mr. Molotov observed warmly that the President's ideas for the preservation of mutual peace would be sympathetically viewed by the Soviet government and people.

Mr. Molotov then inquired whether the President was familiar with the treaty he had negotiated with the British. The President replied in the affirmative, and said he thought it was all to the good. He was glad that the frontier problem had not been mentioned. Not that it would not present itself eventually, but he thought there might be a proper time for raising this question, though the present was not the moment. Mr. Molotov remarked that he and his government had very definite convictions in the opposite direction, but that he had deferred to British preference and to what he understood to be the attitude of the President.

B. (during dinner)

This period was largely devoted to Mr. Molotov's exposition of his government's views on the critical need for a second front. . . .

Mr. Molotov, therefore, urged the view that it was in the interest of the Western Allies to do something now, when the U. S. S. R. was still strong, to draw off an appreciable share of Hitler's forces from

the Russian campaign, thus modifying the balance and making it possible for the Red Army to come in with a decisive blow which would either crush his forces now or make certain his defeat within a reasonably short period. He remarked that the Germans had employed no new weapons so far; the use of gas had not been confirmed, nor the employment of short-range shells with destructively heavy concussion effects. Sporadically, however, they had thrown in heavy tanks of the sort the Russians themselves use, as well as a new Messerschmitt with no heavier fire-power, but with a hopped-up engine and, thus, additional speed.

Mr. Molotov went on to say that, if an Anglo-American invasion of the continent in 1942 could draw off 40 German divisions from the Russian front, that would so weaken the striking and the resistery power of the Germans that decisive action would be possible to the general advantage.

Answering a query of the President, the Commissar said he did not ascribe any merit to British notions about an invasion of Norway. It would not go to the heart of the matter, which was (first and foremost) a continental blow to Hitler of sufficient force to embarrass and weaken him by causing vital changes in his military dispositions and local strength.

The President remarked that it was not so much a question of manpower and matériel; it all came down to transportation. Troops could be landed on any beach, but tanks and other mechanized equipment were another story, since docks and cranes were necessary to debark them. We are, to be sure, building special tank-carriers of sufficient strength and displacement to cross the ocean under their own power. Two other smaller types would have to be freighted over on larger ships.

C. (after dinner)

Upon the conclusion of dinner, the President and his guests withdrew to his study, where the President seated Mr. Molotov beside him on the sofa and began a slightly less formal conversation. . . .

Mr. Molotov inquired of the President as to the state of American public opinion toward the Soviet Union. The President replied that he had no doubt that the mass of the population was more friendly than Congress. Our population was, after all, a mixed one, and the presence of large Irish, German, and Italian elements rendered any known stage of public opinion fairly variegated.

Mr. Hopkins remarked that, while the American Communist Party had played ball one-hundred percent since December 7, the fact was that its composition of largely disgruntled, frustrated, ineffectual, and

vociferous people—including a comparatively high proportion of distinctly unsympathetic Jews—misled the average American as to the aspect and character of the Communists in the Soviet Union itself. On this the President commented that he was far from anti-Semitic, as everyone knew, but there was a good deal in this point of view. Mr. Molotov admitted affably that there were Communists and Communists, and readily recognized the distinction between “Jews” and “Kikes” (for the latter the Russians have a word of similar connotation: Zhidy) as something that created inevitable difficulties.

The whole evening's conversation, on Mr. Molotov's part, was marked by a somewhat unexpected frankness and amiability, which leads, not unnaturally, to the supposition that, since the Soviets want something very seriously, the word had gone out from Mr. Stalin to be somewhat more agreeable than is Mr. Molotov's custom.

(All recorded from memory; I took no notes during these talks and neither did Mr. Pavlov)

*Memorandum of Conference Held at the White House, by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt*²⁹

[Extract]

May 29, 1942 (4: 45 p. m.—6: 15 p. m.)

[Present:] The President.

Mr. Vyacheslav Molotov.

Secretary Hull.

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins.

Mr. Pavlov, interpreting for Mr. Molotov.

Professor Cross of Harvard, interpreting for the President.

Molotov and the President greeted each other very cordially, Molotov expressing his warm appreciation for the invitation to come to America and extending to the President the warm greetings of Stalin. It was pretty difficult to break the ice, although that did not seem to be due to any lack of cordiality and pleasantness on the part of Molotov.

The President had two or three memoranda on his desk which I had never heard of before, which were obviously given him by the Department of State, in which the Department was offering their good offices in alleged difficulties between the Russians and the Iranians on the one hand and the Russians and Turks on the other. I gathered Molotov was not much impressed. I at any rate so imag-

²⁹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
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ined and in front of the President he raised the point that they thought they knew a good deal more about their relations with Iran and Turkey than we did. I confess I did not see in what way our good offices were to be executed.

The State Department also obviously wants Russia either to sign or adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to the care and treatment of prisoners of war. This agreement requires that the adhering countries permit a neutral body, such as the International Red Cross, to inspect the prison camps. You don't have to know very much about Russia, or for that matter Germany, to know there isn't a snowball's chance in hell for either Russia or Germany to permit the International Red Cross really to inspect any prison camps. Molotov's final answer was that "Why should we give the Germans the diplomatic advantage of pretending to adhere to international law. Germany might well say that they would agree and then not, of course, do anything about it because you couldn't trust them".

Molotov indicated that it would be a mistake from a propaganda point of view to give Germany the chance to say that they were the people who upheld international law. He said that all the reports that Russia has of the treatment of Russian prisoners indicates that they are getting a very bad deal. Twenty-six prisoners recently escaped from Norwegian prison camps came back telling of starvation and beatings on the part of the Germans. I gather this is going to be a pretty difficult nut to crack for the State Department.

Hull later handed me the attached memorandum ³⁰ indicating the things he wanted taken up with Molotov while he is here. One of the interesting things about this is that none of these things has anything to do with the war on the Russian front, although the first four are matters of considerable importance to us but very little to the Russians unless we really mean business.

H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]

Memorandum of Conference Held at the White House, by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt ³¹
May 29, 1942.

[Present:] The President
Mr. Vyacheslav Molotov
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
Mr. Pavlov, interpreter for Mr. Molotov
Professor Samuel H. Cross, interpreter for the President.

³⁰ For text, see Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 560.

³¹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

(The above were present at dinner in the dining room and later in the President's study. 7:40 p. m. to 12:00 midnight.)

The President told Molotov that he visualized the enforced disarmament of our enemies and, indeed, some of our friends after the war; that he thought that the United States, England, Russia and perhaps China should police the world and enforce disarmament by inspection. The President said that he visualized Germany, Italy, Japan, France, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and other nations would not be permitted to have military forces. He stated that other nations might join the first four mentioned after experience proved they could be trusted.

Molotov asked him about China and said that the inclusion of China would depend on whether they could organize and maintain a strong central government; that he had a question mark in his mind about including China.

The President stated that the population of our nations and friends was well over a billion people and that we would be the "policemen" and that we at least could be sure of peace for 25 years; at any rate until all of us now living are dead.

The President stated that he was presenting this to Molotov to begin preliminary discussions and he wanted Molotov to discuss it with Stalin when he returns to Moscow. The President impressed upon Molotov the importance of making no public announcement about this matter until we defeat Germany, but he earnestly hoped that there would be a meeting of minds on it at least between ourselves, Russia and Great Britain when we win the war.

Molotov stated that Russia had not considered this matter; that it needs careful thinking out and that he would talk to Stalin about it.

The President told Molotov that last August when he met Churchill in Newfoundland, one of the questions he put to Churchill when the Atlantic Charter was being drawn up was "How do we implement it?".

The President said he could not visualize another League of Nations with 100 different signatories; there were simply too many nations to satisfy, hence it was a failure and would be a failure.

The President stated that in 1933 he proposed complete disarmament; that the French objected and the Soviet Union agreed. In 1934, when he proposed it again, England said no.³²

The President said that he could see no alternative to some type of police force and, hence, compulsory disarmament, followed by inspection to see that the nations stayed disarmed, was one of the implications of the Atlantic Charter. The President told Molotov that England would agree to this if the Soviet Union and the United States insisted upon it.

³² For correspondence relating to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, held at Geneva, see *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. 1, pp. 1-355, and *ibid.*, 1934, vol. 1, pp. 1-216.

Molotov repeated that the subject which the President was raising was the first stage of the discussion. He asked the President whether it represented his final and considered judgment, to which the President answered in the affirmative.

The President stated that China had not been consulted about this and again said that it was not clear whether they could set up a strong central government adequate to act as a policeman for Japan. Only events can determine that.

Molotov asked particularly about France.

The President said that in the beginning he did not believe that France should be included, but that it should be considered one of the nations which might at a later date join the four powers he has mentioned.

The President raised the great danger if there were too many "policemen". He stated that the first thing they might do would be to start fighting amongst themselves.

Molotov asked the President about Poland and Turkey. He said they might well be offended if they were left out.

The President said they would be "nominally" in and other friendly nations would be in the same status.

Molotov stated he thought the President's proposal was extremely important; that to him it was quite realistic on the basis of our present experience and indicated clearly that he was in sympathy with it.

The President stated that it was important that Turkey should never be permitted to be a threat to Europe, to which Molotov replied that Turkey has great pretensions and, for that matter, Poland had too.

I asked Molotov whether the Polish troops were fighting on the Russian front.³³ He said no; that they had three divisions in Russia and plainly indicated that the Poles were none too anxious to get in the fight.

The President said that we must have a brand new approach to world peace; that the old balance of power theory did not work. That certain nations must be compelled to disarm.

³³ For correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in the Polish Government in Exile at London and its relations with the Soviet Union on this and other questions, see pp. 100 ff.

*Memorandum of Conference Held at the White House, by Mr. Samuel H. Cross, Interpreter*³⁴

[Extracts]

III

Saturday, May 30, 1942, 11 A. M.

Present: The President, Mr. Molotov, Admiral King, General Marshall, Mr. Hopkins, Messrs. Pavlov and Cross

After a brief private conference between the President and Mr. Molotov, conversations were resumed at 11 A. M. The President asked Admiral King whether there was any special news from the Pacific. The Admiral replied that there was nothing of importance save some momentary disagreement between General MacArthur³⁵ and Admiral Nimitz³⁶ as to an operation against the Solomon Islands. Admiral King thought this difference was due to a misunderstanding, since Admiral Nimitz had in mind a specific project for destruction of installations rather than anything like a permanent occupation.

Opening the general discussion, the President remarked to Admiral King and General Marshall that he first wished to place them *au courant* with the questions Mr. Molotov had raised, and he hoped that Mr. Molotov himself would then put the situation before them in detail. Mr. Molotov, the President continued, had just come from London, where he had been discussing with the British authorities the problem of a second (invasion) front in Western Europe. He had, the President added, been politely received, but had as yet obtained no positive commitment from the British. There was no doubt that on the Russian front the Germans had enough superiority in aircraft and mechanized equipment to make the situation precarious. The Soviets wished the Anglo-American combination to land sufficient combat troops on the continent to draw off 40 German divisions from the Soviet front. We appreciated, he continued, the difficulties of the situation and viewed the outlook as serious. We regarded it as our obligation to help the Soviets to the best of our ability, even if the extent of this aid was for the moment doubtful. That brought up the question, what we can do even if the prospects for permanent success might not be especially rosy. Most of our difficulties lay in the realm of ocean transport, and he would in this connection merely remark that getting any one convoy through to Murmansk was already a major naval operation. The President then suggested that Mr. Molotov should treat the subject in such detail as suited his convenience.

³⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

³⁵ Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.

³⁶ Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.

Mr. Molotov thereupon remarked that, though the problem of the second front was both military and political, it was predominantly political. There was an essential difference between the situation in 1942 and what it might be in 1943. In 1942 Hitler was the master of all Europe save a few minor countries. He was the chief enemy of everyone. To be sure, as was devoutly to be hoped, the Russians might hold and fight on all through 1942. But it was only right to look at the darker side of the picture. On the basis of his continental dominance, Hitler might throw in such reinforcements in manpower and material that the Red Army might *not* be able to hold out against the Nazis. Such a development would produce a serious situation which we must face. The Soviet front would become secondary, the Red Army would be weakened, and Hitler's strength would be correspondingly greater, since he would have at his disposal not only more troops, but also the foodstuffs and raw materials of the Ukraine and the oil-wells of the Caucasus. In such circumstances the outlook would be much less favorable for all hands, and he would not pretend that such developments were all outside the range of possibility. The war would thus become tougher and longer. The merit of a new front in 1942 depended on the prospects of Hitler's further advantage, hence the establishment of such a front should not be postponed. The decisive element in the whole problem lay in the question, when are the prospects better for the United Nations: in 1942 or in 1943.

Amplifying his remarks, Mr. Molotov observed that the forces on the Soviet front were large, and, objectively speaking, the balance in quantity of men, aviation, and mechanized equipment was slightly in Hitler's favor. Nevertheless, the Russians were reasonably certain they could hold out. This was the most optimistic prospect, and the Soviet morale was as yet unimpaired. But the main danger lay in the probability that Hitler would try to deal the Soviet Union a mighty crushing blow. If, then, Great Britain and the United States, as allies, were to create a new front and to draw off 40 German divisions from the Soviet front, the ratio of strength would be so altered that the Soviets could either beat Hitler this year or insure beyond question his ultimate defeat.

Mr. Molotov therefore put this question frankly: could we undertake such offensive action as would draw off 40 German divisions which would be, to tell the truth, distinctly second-rate outfits? If the answer should be in the affirmative, the war would be decided in 1942. If negative, the Soviets would fight on alone, doing their best, and no man would expect more from them than that. He had not, Mr. Molotov added, received any positive answer in London. Mr. Churchill had proposed that he should return through London on his homeward journey from Washington, and had promised Mr. Molotov a more concrete answer on his second visit. Mr. Molotov admitted he realized

that the British would have to bear the brunt of the action if a second front were created, but he also was cognizant of the role the United States plays and what influence this country exerts in questions of major strategy. Without in any way minimizing the risks entailed by a second front action this summer, Mr. Molotov declared his government wanted to know in frank terms what position we take on the question of a second front, and whether we were prepared to establish one. He requested a straight answer.

The difficulties, Mr. Molotov urged, would not be any less in 1943. The chances of success were actually better at present while the Russians still have a solid front. "If you postpone your decision," he said, "you will have eventually to bear the brunt of the war, and if Hitler becomes the undisputed master of the continent, next year will unquestionably be tougher than this one."

The President then put to General Marshall the query whether developments were clear enough so that we could say to Mr. Stalin that we are preparing a second front. "Yes," replied the General. The President then authorized Mr. Molotov to inform Mr. Stalin that we expect the formation of a second front this year.

... The President observed that sending each convoy to Murmansk had become a three-dimensional naval engagement on account of providing defense not only against the lurking German major units (*Von Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen*) but also against enemy submarines and air-craft. Admiral King concurred in the President's estimate of the situation. Getting convoys into Murmansk and Archangel was a major problem because of the heavy German units in Narvik and Trondheim and the German air-bases in Northern Norway. German reconnaissance planes shadowed our convoys from Iceland to Murmansk and, when a convoy approached, they caused it to be attacked by both submarines and surface craft. This complex situation also rendered it necessary for large forces of the British Home Fleet to remain at sea to guard against attacks from heavy German ships which are stationed near to the convoy routes. Similarly, the United States Navy has had to reinforce the British fleet with such heavy ships so that the British should have enough such ships on hand in order to maintain their conveying forces on the requisite level. At present we were running two convoys in opposite directions simultaneously, i. e., one would be leaving Murmansk as another left Iceland, so that the necessary cover could be provided in one operation.

Admiral King added it would be helpful if the Soviet air force could make additional efforts toward aiding the convoys, especially by air-attacks on the German air and submarine bases at Narvik and Kirkenes, and remarked that such additional cooperation was justifi-

able by the importance to the United States and Great Britain of the safe arrival of munitions in Northern Russia. The situation was obviously complicated, the Admiral continued, by the southward drift of the polar ice which limited the range of movement by the convoys. . . .

The President also referred to the advisability of delivering fighter planes to the U. S. S. R. by air from Alaska to Siberia and then across the latter westward. Mr. Molotov objected, however, that, while this method would be appropriate for supplying the Soviet Far-Eastern Command, he doubted its efficacy or practicability for the delivery of planes to the Western front because of the long distance involved and the difficulty of arranging for gasoline depots.

The conversation was then adjourned for lunch.³⁷

*Memorandum of Conference Held at the White House, by Mr. Samuel H. Cross, Interpreter*³⁸

V

Monday, June 1, 1942, 10:30 a. m.

Present: The President, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Litvinov, Mr. Hopkins, Messrs. Paylov and Cross

The President opened the conversation by remarking that the Washington press representatives knew about Mr. Molotov's visit, but had been very decent about making no reference to it. He suggested that, after Mr. Molotov's safe return to Moscow, the Soviet Government might simultaneously inform Messrs. Maisky and Litvinov of his arrival, and set an hour at which synchronized announcements of his visit might be released in London and Washington. Mr. Molotov accepted this suggestion.

On the basis of State Department memoranda, the President then went on to say he had a few points to mention, mostly for Mr. Litvinov's attention. We had, the President continued, reports from Finland³⁹ that representative groups in that country wish to make peace with the Soviet Government. They could not, however, mobilize their strength to demonstrate to Finnish public opinion the possibility

³⁷ The conversation during lunch was mainly desultory. The memorandum about it, designated "IV", prepared by Professor Samuel H. Cross, is printed in Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 565.

³⁸ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

³⁹ For correspondence concerning United States interest in the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, and its attempts to prevent Finnish participation in the war against the Soviet Union in association with Germany, see vol. II, section on Finland.

of peace unless something concrete were done by Moscow or Washington. These groups had asked the United States to ascertain a possible basis for peace, and the United States Government would proffer its good offices for this purpose if the Soviet Government wished to avail itself of them.

In the whole of Monday morning's conversation, Mr. Molotov was much more gruff and assertive than in the previous interviews, perhaps for the purpose of playing the big shot in Mr. Litvinov's presence. In this case, at any rate, he immediately became terse and pressing. "I should like to know," he asked, "whether these Finns are official." "No," replied the President, "they are merely a number of leaders of public opinion, but not the Finnish Government." "Do they want peace?" inquired Mr. Molotov. The President replied in the affirmative. "Have they any special conditions in view?" Mr. Molotov asked. "No," said the President. "They express no desires as to the basis on which peace should be concluded?" "No," answered the President, "what they want is to show the Finnish people that peace is possible with safety to Finland." Mr. Molotov then inquired whether these groups were able to represent Finland. The President replied that our information was confined to the statement that several such representative private groups existed. Mr. Molotov then observed that he would discuss the matter with Mr. Stalin.

The President next observed that postal connections and official travel between Washington and Kuibyshev were slow and difficult. We were running a plane service as far as Basra which we would be disposed to extend as far as Teheran if the Soviets would send down a connecting plane to that point, perhaps once a week. Mr. Molotov replied without hesitation that his government would establish such a Kuibyshev-Teheran service, but at the start only once in two weeks. He directed Mr. Litvinov to carry on with the detailed arrangements.

The President then noted that, for substantially the same purpose, we should like to organize a civilian air service from Washington to Nome, and then continue on to some convenient point at the east end of the Transsiberian, e. g., Petropavlovsk. The President remarked that it was immaterial whether the American planes flew over to Petropavlovsk, or whether the Soviet sent their own planes over to Nome. He also raised the point of organizing a civilian ferrying service for military planes from Nome to Siberia. Admiral Standley had already talked on this subject to Mr. Stalin, who had said he would study the question. Mr. Molotov observed that both these suggestions were under advisement, but he did not as yet know what decision had been reached.

The President remarked that he wished Mr. Molotov would take up one other matter with Mr. Stalin. We knew, he said, that there would be two kinds of post-war settlements: first, those among the United Nations and, second, arrangements for the reconstruction of the other nations with a view to ensuring a more stable form of peace. The President continued by saying that he had a new thought based on old experience. He believed that, instead of requiring interest on war-time advances, all the United Nations should work out a plan covering a long-term repayment of capital only. He hoped Mr. Molotov would discuss the point with Mr. Stalin for the purpose of exploring it without commitments. Mr. Molotov agreed to do so. The President observed that some such arrangement would facilitate matters for Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and also prove helpful for other nations.

(At this point Mr. Hopkins inquired of the President whether the latter cared to discuss his project for setting up a special post-war fund under international trusteeship. This question was not translated to Mr. Molotov and thus did not figure in the discussion.)

On the President's previous suggestion Mr. Molotov commented that he thought Mr. Stalin would be interested, and promised that the proposal would be attentively studied. Both he and Mr. Stalin thoroughly appreciated the role played by the United States in the initiation of such proposals.

The President then recalled that he had already developed his ideas about disarming Germany and Japan, about control and inspection of their munitions industries to preclude surreptitious rearmament, about the future police activities of the four major nations, and about their role as guarantors of eventual peace. He had omitted one other point: viz., that there were, all over the world, many islands and colonial possessions which ought, for our own safety, to be taken away from weak nations. He suggested that Mr. Stalin might profitably consider the establishment of some form of international trusteeship over these islands and possessions.

In reply Mr. Molotov declared that he had considered and reported to Moscow the President's earlier proposals as to post-war organization. He had received an answer from Mr. Stalin, who was in full accord with the President's ideas on disarmament, inspection, and policing with the participation of at least Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and possibly China. This idea had the full approval of the Soviet Government, which would support it fully. He had no doubt that the President's trusteeship principle would be equally well received in Moscow.

The President then pointed out that the acceptance of this principle would mean the abandonment of the mandate system. For example, after the last war the Japanese had received a mandate over the pre-

viously German islands in the Pacific, which they had fortified. These islands were small, but they ought not to be given to any one nation. The Japanese should, of course, be removed, but we did not want these islands, and neither the British nor the French ought to have them either. Perhaps the same procedure should be applied to the islands now held by the British. The islands obviously ought not to belong to any one nation, and their economy was substantially the same everywhere. The easiest and most practical way to handle the problem of these islands over a long period would be to put them under an international committee of 3-5 members.

The President then inquired of Mr. Litvinov whether he was ready to abandon the League of Nations. "Anything for the common cause," the Ambassador replied.

Turning to the question of colonial possessions, the President took as examples Indo-China, Siam, and the Malay States, or even the Dutch East Indies. The last-mentioned would some day be ready for self-government, and the Dutch know it. Each of these areas would require a different lapse of time before achieving readiness for self-government, but a palpable surge toward independence was there just the same, and the white nations thus could not hope to hold these areas as colonies in the long run. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek^a therefore had the idea that some form of interim international trusteeship would be the best mode of administering these territories until they were ready for self-government. They might, the President added, be ready for self-government in 20 years, during which the trustees might endeavor to accomplish what we accomplished in the Philippines in 42 years. The Generalissimo, then, was thinking of the principle of trusteeship looking toward independence. The President hoped Mr. Molotov would discuss this suggestion with Mr. Stalin.

The Commissar expressed the opinion that this problem deserves serious allied attention, and it would certainly receive such attention in the U. S. S. R. For him it was obvious that any decision upon it would depend on the guarantees exercised by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States (with China, perhaps), coupled with such control functions as would prevent Germany and Japan from arming again to menace other nations with war. Starting from this principle, Mr. Molotov expressed his conviction that the President's proposals could be effectively worked out. The President said he expected no difficulties once peace was achieved.

The President then interjected that he had to entertain the Duke and Duchess of Windsor at lunch at twelve, but that he had one more point to discuss. Mr. Molotov also noted that he had another question to present.

^a President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier).

The President then went on to say that on the previous day he had discussed questions of tonnage and shipping with the Chiefs of Staff. Every week we were building up troop and plane concentrations in England with a view to getting at the Germans from there as quickly as possible.

We were also shipping landing craft. But the time-element involved depended on available ships. We hoped and expected to open a second front in 1942, but we could progress more rapidly only with more ships. The Chiefs of Staff had therefore suggested that, in order to speed up the opening of the second front, the Soviet Government, with this in mind, should reconsider the lease-lend list previously submitted, remembering that, of the 4,100,000 tons which were to be shipped during the year from July 1, 1942, only 1,800,000 tons are matériel ready to be used for military purposes on the Russian front this summer.⁴² The rest was mostly raw materials and other items for the production of matériel which would not be ready for use this summer. 2,300,000 tons, in fact, represented items that would not be used for fighting at all. The President therefore proposed that the Soviet Government consider reducing its lease-lend requirements from 4,100,000 tons to 2,000,000 tons. This reduction would release a large number of ships that we could divert to shipping to England munitions and equipment for the second front, and thus speed up the establishment of that front. Mr. Hopkins further emphasized that there would be no cut in the volume of tanks and ammunition being shipped. Everything that the Red Army could use in actual fighting would still go forward.

Mr. Molotov replied that, while he would report this suggestion at home, he hoped that such non-military supplies as metals and railroad matériel, which have a direct bearing on the solidity of the present front, would not be cut too much, as they also were in large degree essential. In checking over the lease-lend list, his Government would have to reckon with the degree in which any reduction on non-military items would impose restrictions on the Russian rear, e. g., on electric plants, railroads, and machinery production. These were, after all, comparatively vital, and he hoped these needs would not be lost from view. He remarked again that he had a couple of points for discussion.

The President repeated that we expected to set up a second front in 1942, but that every ship we could shift to the English run meant that the second front was so much the closer to being realized. After all, ships could not be in two places at once, and hence every ton we could save out of the total of 4,100,000 tons would be so much to the good. The Soviets could not eat their cake and have it too.

⁴² See the letter of May 29, which had been handed by President Roosevelt to Molotov, p. 706.

To this statement Mr. Molotov retorted with some emphasis that the second front would be stronger if the first front still stood fast, and inquired with what seemed deliberate sarcasm what would happen if the Soviets cut down their requirements and then no second front eventuated. Then, becoming still more insistent, he emphasized that he had brought the new treaty out of England. "What answer," he asked, "shall I take back to London and Moscow on the general question that has been raised? What is the President's answer with respect to the second front?"

To this direct question the President answered that Mr. Molotov could say in London that, after all, the British were even now in personal consultation with our staff-officers on questions of landing craft, food, etc. We expected to establish a second front. General Arnold⁴³ would arrive next day (Tuesday, June 2) from London, and with him Lord Mountbatten,⁴⁴ Marshal Portal,⁴⁵ and General Little,⁴⁶ with whom it was planned to arrive at an agreement on the creation of a second front. Mr. Molotov should also say in London that we could proceed toward its creation with the more speed if the Soviet Government would make it possible for us to put more ships into the English service. Mr. Molotov, the President observed, [would] be back from New York either Tuesday or Wednesday (June 2 or 3). After General Arnold had reported to General Marshall, the President hoped Mr. Molotov would discuss further arrangements with General Marshall.

The conversation thus ended with decreased tension on the Russian side. The President bade Mr. Molotov a cordial farewell, wished him a safe return home, and presented the Commissar with his photograph. The meeting broke up at about 12:10 p. m.

741.6111/604

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1942.

Sir Ronald Campbell⁴⁷ called this afternoon to see me in the absence from Washington of Lord Halifax.

Sir Ronald handed me a copy of a telegram from the British Foreign Office dealing with the treaty recently signed between the British and Soviet Governments. The text of this telegram reads as follows:

⁴³ Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces.

⁴⁴ Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, British Chief of Combined Operations.

⁴⁵ Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, British Chief of the Air Staff.

⁴⁶ It may be that the person intended is Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production.

⁴⁷ British Minister in Washington.

"It will be seen that it has been possible to avoid dealing in the Treaty with the whole subject of the Soviet claim to the Baltic States and their presumed designs in respect of Finland and Roumania. There is thus no question of the Treaty being in conflict with the Atlantic Charter. On the contrary, the preamble states the intention that post-war collaboration shall be on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, while the two principles enunciated in the Charter of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States are reaffirmed in Article 5 of the Treaty.

"Collaboration with the United Nations is covered in paragraph 4 of the preamble, and in the second sentence of Article 5 of the Treaty.

"As regards provisions for mutual assistance, these are confined to the case of renewed aggression by Germany and her associates. It is to be observed that the desire of the two parties to unite with other like minded States in adopting a post-war security system is covered in Article 3, and that the mutual assistance proposal lapses on the agreement of both parties that they are superseded by the adoption of such a system. It might conceivably be objected that under paragraph 2 of Article 4 the U. S. S. R. would be in a position to insist on the continuance of the mutual assistance provision after the general security system is agreed upon, by arguing that the latter does not supersede the former. The answer to this argument is that it is unlikely that any general security system in Europe would be of much practical value if the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom did not both participate and were not both satisfied that the system was adequate.

"It may be argued that the words in Article 5 to the effect that the two parties will have 'regard to the interests of the security' of each party could be used by the Soviet Government to reassert their claims to recover their 1941 frontiers and to control Finland and Roumania. It may be that the Soviet Government will in any case reassert their claims sooner or later, but it is important to note that these claims are not specified or recognised by implication in the present Treaty. The British Government are not pledged to do more than have regard to the Soviet Union's security interests in general if these are put forward by the Soviet Government after the re-establishment of peace; and even so, this pledge must be read in relation to the other undertakings assumed by both parties in Article 5.

"In general, it can be claimed that this Treaty

"(a) brings the U. S. S. R. closer to the United Kingdom in prosecuting the war in Europe up to the final victory,

"(b) provides for collaboration of the most effective kind to prevent a repetition of aggression by Germany and her associates in Europe pending the setting up of a more general security system. The Treaty thus provides for the establishment of the first conditions on which the effective economic reconstruction of Europe after the war depends.

"(c) brings Russia finally into the circle of the United Nations not only in regard to the organisation of security but also in respect of economic reconstruction, and

"(d) by the second sentence of Article 5, the interests of other States are not only [not?] affected but actually safeguarded.

"The British Government have tried in these negotiations to increase Soviet confidence in their sincerity and at the same time to dispel the suspicions of neutral and allied States in regard to their collaboration with the Soviet Union. If this aim is achieved, results which may be of importance not only during the war but in the post-war period should have been obtained.

"Please take appropriate steps to bring the foregoing points to the notice of the President and the State Department."

Sir Ronald requested that I send a copy of this message to the President, which I said I would be glad to do.⁴⁸ He added that the British Government had learned that the press in general now had knowledge that a treaty between the two Governments had been signed, and that the British Government consequently had urged the Soviet Government to agree to the publication of the text thereof. The latter, however, had proved adamant and had refused to consider any publication until after the return to Moscow of Mr. Molotov.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.61/853

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 3, 1942.

I called on the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, to pay my respects. I remarked that, while I did not come on any other business, I hoped I might be privileged to say that when I came to the State Department in 1933, I recommended recognition of the Soviet Government⁴⁹ on several important grounds, probably the most important of which was the great need and opportunity for cooperation between our two Governments during the years ahead for the purpose of promoting and preserving conditions of peace in the world. I added that further grounds for recognition were the traditional friendship between the peoples of the two countries and the fact that it was contrary to the best interests of two great nations, such as the Soviets and ourselves, not to be on speaking terms diplomatically in view of the existing circumstances in the international situation. I said I mentioned this because this same need for cooperation in reorganizing and reconstituting international affairs on solid principles and sound policies calculated best to promote the welfare of our two countries, and at the same time the world, is very much on my mind today as I know it is on the mind of the President.

Mr. Molotov seemed pleased with this statement and expressed not only his interest in showing, but also his desire to show me a spirit of cooperation on the part of his Government.

⁴⁸ A copy of this telegram was sent to the President on the same day.

⁴⁹ Recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union was accorded on November 16, 1933; see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 1 ff.

The Commissar then inquired if I desired to take up further any of the small points which the President had taken up with him. I replied that it was intended that I should be present when these matters were considered, but through a misunderstanding I was absent and that it was my impression that they had been disposed of in one way or another by the President and the Commissar.

I then added that I did desire further to emphasize the extreme importance to both countries of a commercial and probably other air lines between Alaska and Siberia. I repeated several of the basic facts in support of this view and we reexamined the map which I had sent to him and his associates yesterday. The Commissar said the matter was deserving of most serious consideration and they would give it such consideration. I will not repeat the numerous points that were brought out in support of the proposed air line.

I then said that with no purpose to make any request of the Soviet Government, but only with the idea that his Government would be interested in what I was about to say, my despatches from Chungking during the past twenty-four hours were very disquieting. These reports indicated that Chiang Kai-shek, believing that he is not receiving anything like adequate consideration and cooperation, especially from the United States, is very much discouraged and in very low spirits. I stated that this Government has used every possible means, particularly by sending important persons to China, to reassure the Generalissimo that this Government is as much interested in the success of China in the war as in the success of other allied nations. Furthermore, we had constantly renewed our promise to send increased military supplies to China. On account of the Burma Road situation and the demands on the western front, however, we have not been able to furnish China with the supplies she has requested and insisted upon.⁵⁰

Mr. Molotov talked briefly about the extreme preoccupation of Russia on the western battle front, et cetera, et cetera. I replied that it was not necessary for him to say that to me because I fully appreciated the situation and for that reason I made no request of the Soviet Government. I added that although this Government had exhausted all possible means of verbal assurances in its effort to keep Chiang Kai-shek from a state of dejection, I did not know but what the Soviet Government might still have some standing with Chiang Kai-shek and could extend its own verbal assurances to the Chinese Government even though the Soviets would be in no position to aid in any other way. I said that in any event this Government will do the best possible in the face of the fact that the principal reason that

⁵⁰ The Japanese invasion of Burma, and advance along the Burma Road, had reached the Chinese frontier by May 5, 1942. For correspondence regarding the wartime relations and United States efforts to give military assistance to China, see *Foreign Relations, 1942, China*, pp. 1 ff.

Chiang Kai-shek censured this Government arose from our efforts to come to the aid of Soviet Russia and Great Britain on the western front.

I remarked to Mr. Molotov that on yesterday I received in my office the highly trusted person who procured for me in January 1941 the information that Hitler would attack Russia in May or June,⁵¹ and then in an amused tone I said that when we have won the war, and he and I and others are sitting around the family table planning for world restoration on sound and healthy lines, I might then presume to inquire just when the Soviet Government decided that Hitler would attack later, as he did, and Mr. Molotov came right back by saying that this decision was made in April or May, and added that, of course, most of the Russian people did not believe it until after the war was actually on.

Mr. Molotov then brought up the question of the form of the proposed communiqué for President Roosevelt and himself to give out when the latter returns to Moscow. He said that the draft submitted was in general all right but that he desired to offer a few additions, and would be glad if I would express my opinion of them. He then said that he would like to insert in the communiqué that there was a full and free discussion in regard to increased supplies to Russia, which was agreed to, and also in regard to the establishment of a second front, which also was agreed to. He further desired to insert that Admiral King and General Marshall, together with Mr. Harry Hopkins and myself, were present. I replied that it was the President's desire to have as few people present as possible for the sake of the fullest and freest conference and that, therefore, neither I nor the Secretaries of War and Navy⁵² were present when the military experts were discussing the purely military situation. For this reason I would not desire to say that I was present even a part of the time. Mr. Molotov understood this and did not press his request. I then added that, of course, the President was the only person who could answer his inquiry about reference to an agreement on the second front and that I had not had occasion to confer with the President since his conversation with Ambassador Litvinov and the military and naval experts. These were the main points suggested by Mr. Molotov.

He inquired if he might reduce a draft to writing and send it to me during the day for transmission to the President. I, of course, replied that I would submit any suggestions he desired to make to the President.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁵¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 772, footnote 98.

⁵² Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, respectively.

861.5151/195 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), June 3, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

479. On May 16 Vyshinski⁵³ told me that the Soviet Government had information to the effect that Commander Frankel⁵⁴ was engaging in illegal ruble transactions at Murmansk. I made inquiry through the Naval Attaché and Frankel reported that he had been advancing up to 1500 rubles per ship to the masters of some American vessels at the diplomatic rate.⁵⁵ Frankel stated that in so doing he was following the practice pursued by representatives there of the British Ministry of War Transport which had been similarly accused of illegal ruble transactions. I have discussed the matter with the British Embassy which confirms Frankel's statement. On being informed by the Soviet Foreign Office of the matter the British Embassy obtained a full report from Murmansk and then submitted recommendations to London as to the position it should take respecting this matter vis-à-vis the Soviet authorities. In substance these are that it cannot be supposed that the Soviet Government wishes to penalize the crews of vessels engaged in bringing aid to the Soviet Union, at grave risk to themselves, and that it is accordingly hoped that the authorities may see their way clear to permitting the making available of rubles at the diplomatic rate to these crews to meet their personnel expenses while in port at Murmansk or Archangel.

Uskievich, a clerk in the office of the Naval Attaché, entered Russia through the north and has reported to Captain Duncan that the crew[s] of our merchant ships are subjected to many inconveniences in endeavoring to avail themselves of shore leave. He says that a single meal such as can be had cost \$7 or \$8 and that there are no lodgings for overnight leave. As a result crew members faced with an extremely dangerous voyage of close on 4 months state they will not again ship on a Russian-bound vessel. I understand that the British are encountering similar difficulties. One of Clark Kerr's recommendations in the event the Soviet authorities prove unwilling

⁵³ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁴ Comdr. Samuel B. Frankel, Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the Soviet Union, sent to the northern Russian ports for naval intelligence work, and subsequently to render assistance to naval ratings assigned to American merchant vessels, and to facilitate the discharge of cargoes from American ships at northern ports of the Soviet Union.

⁵⁵ A special exchange rate for diplomatic missions of 12 rubles for \$1 (British rate, 48 rubles for £1) went into effect on March 18, 1941. See telegrams No. 538, March 19, 1941, and No. 707, April 8, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 871 and 875, respectively. The unrealistic official rate of exchange was about 5.3 rubles for \$1.

to make an adjustment in this matter is that arrangements be made in London to provide exchange compensation to the crews in question.

My own recommendation is that I be authorized to take the matter up urgently with the Soviet authorities with the request that they authorize our representatives in each port to issue rubles to ship masters at the Embassy rate. I consider this to be not only fair but imperative in the circumstances and am prepared to make strong representations on the subject.⁵⁶ Both Frankel and the British inform me that the practice objected to has been discontinued pending its clarification.

STANDLEY

741.6111/37: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 3, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received June 3—2:50 p. m.]

3096. Personal to the President. In a cable to the Prime Minister from Stalin received last week commending the treaty agreement Stalin ended his message by saying that he hoped that the business left unfinished by Molotov before going to the United States would be completed on his return to England. It would help me very much in trying to carry out your wishes if I knew in brief form the position you have taken with Molotov on the "unfinished business" which I presume to mean the question of the second front.

WINANT

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁵⁷

[WASHINGTON,] June 6, 1942.

155. I delivered to Molotov our Joint Protocol of Supplies from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943.⁵⁸ I amended the general statement somewhat but in no important degree. A copy of the protocol and of the preliminary statement has been given to the appropriate British Representatives here.

⁵⁶ In its telegram No. 279 of June 6, 1942, the Department authorized the Ambassador "to take up the matter along lines suggested in last paragraph" of this telegram.

⁵⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁵⁸ See note from President Roosevelt to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, May 29, p. 706.

I was greatly pleased with the visit. He warmed up far more than I expected and I am sure that he has a far better understanding of the situation here than when he arrived.⁵⁹

I confess that I view with great concern the Russian front and am going to wire you in a day or two a specific proposal which I have in mind.

The business in the Pacific is going well and I am sure we are inflicting some very severe losses on the Jap Fleet.⁶⁰ The outcome, however, is still indecisive but we should know more before the day is over. I am sure our aircraft are giving very good account of themselves. I will keep you informed.

ROOSEVELT

740.0011 European War 1939/22505: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), June 8, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 5:07 p. m.]

501. Yesterday I received from Thompson a close paraphrase of Opnav's⁶¹ telegram to Duncan, as follows:

"From the President to Mr. Stalin.

I greatly appreciate your sending Mr. Molotov to see me and I shall anxiously await the news of his safe arrival.

We had a very satisfactory visit. Roosevelt."

I handed Vyshinski a personal letter today conveying the substance of this message and he promised to transmit it to Moscow immediately.

STANDLEY

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt*⁶²

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1942.

Ambassador Litvinov came to see me last night and told me the Russian Government had agreed to our flying bombers to Russia via Alaska and Siberia.

⁵⁹ In telegram No. 152, May 31, 1942, President Roosevelt had told Prime Minister Churchill that he thought Molotov's visit was a real success. In this telegram he also said, "I will telegraph you when Molotov leaves, and I am especially anxious that he carry back some real results of his mission and that he will give a favorable account to Stalin. I am inclined to think that at present all the Russians are a bit down in the mouth."

⁶⁰ The successful naval battle of Midway was being fought in the Pacific Ocean June 4-7, 1942.

⁶¹ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

⁶² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

I told him that I would ask General Arnold to get in touch with him to work out all the plans for the route.

It seems to me this is one of the tangible results of Molotov's visit and I doubt very much if this would have been approved on any other basis.

I imagine the real reason the Russians approved our flying planes through Siberia is that in the event Japan attacks them we will already have organized a quick method of getting bombers to Vladivostok.

I later told General Arnold of Russia's agreement and he has agreed to get in touch with Ambassador Litvinov at once.

H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]

861.5151/197: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), June 9, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 6:50 p. m.]

504. Department's 279, June 6, 4 p. m.⁶³ I discussed the ruble question with Vyshinski yesterday along the indicated lines, pointing out in particular that a very serious situation might easily develop, if in fact it had not already done so, unless the Soviet authorities could see their way clear to allowing the crews of merchant vessels bringing supplies to Russian ports to obtain rubles for their personal expenses at the diplomatic rate for the duration of the war. While expressing his thanks to the crews in question and also his satisfaction that Frankel had not been speculating but had only engaged in the decent action of helping these workers, Vyshinski stressed the illegality of the practice, it being a violation of the agreement under which the diplomatic rate was established to offer this to other persons than the Diplomatic Corps. As Vyshinski appeared either unwilling or unable to approach the matter from a practical as distinct from the purely legal aspect, I at length told him that I would leave it entirely in his hands and that I urged him not to dismiss it lightly, repeating that a serious problem could not fail to develop if sailors manifested an increasing reluctance to sail on ships bound for Russian ports as a result of a condition which would be corrected easily and at no great cost to the Soviet authorities.

STANDLEY

⁶³ See footnote 56, p. 589.

741.6111/21

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1942.

Following the signing of the lease-lend agreement,⁶⁴ the Soviet Ambassador and I had a few minutes of casual conversation. He indicated his usual apprehension and pessimism about the Russian military situation.

The Ambassador made some reference to the omission of the Baltic territorial question from the British-Russian Agreement, signed recently. I replied that, if I had been the chief adviser of Mr. Stalin, I would have most earnestly advised him, from the standpoint of Russia's own interest, against inserting that territorial provision in their proposed treaty, adding that there would be an infinite number of questions coming up at the end of the war, some of which might render nugatory many matters of supposed importance and even urgency at this time, et cetera, et cetera.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/22506a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1942—7 p. m.

293. An understanding was entered into between the White House and Molotov that no statement would be issued regarding his visit to the United States before his return to the Soviet Union. It was also agreed that following his return an identical communiqué⁶⁵ which had been agreed to between the President and Molotov would be issued simultaneously to the press in Washington and Kuibyshev. Litvinoff informed us late last night that the Soviet Government would issue the communiqué at 11:30 this morning Washington time. The White House therefore this morning issued the communiqué the text of which undoubtedly you have already seen.

Among the non-military matters which have been discussed with Molotov the following are mentioned:

- a. The establishment of an airplane ferrying service from the United States to the Soviet Union through Alaska and Siberia.
- b. The establishment of a civil air service between the United States and Vladivostok or some other railway point in Siberia through Alaska.

⁶⁴ Signed at Washington on June 11, 1942. See bracketed note, p. 708.

⁶⁵ *Infra*.

c. The establishment of a civilian air service between the United States and the Soviet Union through Africa and the Middle East.
 d. The possibilities of strengthening the desire in Finland for a cessation of hostilities.

e. General economic matters including the Master Lend-Lease Agreement and our hope that we may be able to enter into conversations with the Soviets in the near future with respect to basic commercial and economic policies to be pursued after the war.⁶⁶

f. Our hope that difficulties which may arise from Allied occupation of Iran may continue to be solved in a spirit of cooperation and accommodation, and

g. Our hope for an improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations and our willingness to be of help in bringing about such improvement if called upon to do so.

We understand that Molotov has agreed in principle to point c and that Litvinoff will discuss the matter with us in the near future in more detail. A more detailed telegram on this subject is being prepared.

It is understood that Molotov did not raise the question of future Soviet frontiers.

HULL

Press Release Issued by the White House, June 11, 1942⁶⁷

The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotov, following the invitation of the President of the United States of America, arrived in Washington on May 29 and was for some time the President's guest. This visit to Washington afforded an opportunity for a friendly exchange of views between the President and his advisers on the one hand and Mr. Molotov and his party on the other. Among those who participated in the conversations were: The Soviet Ambassador to the

⁶⁶ For correspondence regarding trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, with some consideration of postwar possibilities, see pp. 758 ff.

⁶⁷ Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1942, p. 531.

The text of this press release is in the form composed by Molotov, with one modification. In a memorandum of June 3, 1942, Harry L. Hopkins wrote: "I talked to General Marshall about this [draft] and he felt that the sentence about the second front was too strong and urged that there be no reference to 1942. I called this particularly to the President's attention but he, nevertheless, wished to have it included, and the only amendment made was the one recommended by Mr. Hull, namely, that his name be excluded from those participating in a military conference and a sentence be added, which I drafted as follows: 'Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, joined in subsequent conversations on non-military matters.'"

For the position taken by British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill toward the sentence about the creation of a second front in Europe in 1942, and the text of his *aide-memoire*, handed to Molotov during his return stay in London, in which he made it clear that "we can therefore give no promise in the matter," see Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. IV: *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), pp. 341-342.

United States, Mr. Maxim Litvinoff; Mr. Harry Hopkins; the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall; and the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King. Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, joined in subsequent conversations on non-military matters.

In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942. In addition, the measures for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks, and other kinds of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union were discussed. Also discussed were the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war. Both sides state with satisfaction the unity of their views on all these questions.

At the conclusion of the visit the President asked Mr. Molotov to inform Mr. Stalin on his behalf that he feels these conversations have been most useful in establishing a basis for fruitful and closer relations between the two governments in the pursuit of the common objectives of the United Nations.

711.6111/1 : Telegram

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁸

[Translation]

LONDON, June 12, 1942.

Before returning to my country I allow myself once more to express to you, Mr. President, the great satisfaction I feel in having reached a full understanding concerning the urgent tasks connected with the creation of a second front in Europe in 1942 for speeding up the rout of Hitlerite Germany and concerning co-operation of our countries in the post-war period in the interests of all freedom-loving peoples.

Please accept my sincere gratitude for the cordial reception and hospitality offered to us by you, Mr. President, and the Government of the United States of America, and my best wishes to you personally and to the people of the United States of America.

VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV

⁶⁸ The translation of this telegram was sent on June 13, 1942, to Secretary of State Hull by Ambassador Litvinov. It was transmitted to President Roosevelt on June 17.

711.6111/1: Telegram

*The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁹

[Moscow,] June 12, 1942.

The Soviet Government shares your view, Mr. President, as to the satisfactory results of Mr. V. M. Molotov's visit to the United States.

I take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Soviet Government, for the cordial hospitality offered to Mr. Molotov and his staff during their sojourn in the United States.

Mr. V. M. Molotov has safely returned to Moscow today.

741.6111/27: Telegram

The Minister Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), June 19, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 11:20 p. m.]

548. The local paper⁷⁰ of today's date publishes an announcement of the ratification yesterday by the Supreme Soviet of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance which was signed in London on May 26 (see Embassy's telegram 521, June 13⁷¹). The paper also carries the full text of a speech delivered by Molotov proposing the treaty for ratification, the main points of which were as follows:

Molotov traced Anglo-Soviet relations during the past year and in this connection made the first public reference which has come to the notice of the Embassy to the sinkings of vessels bringing supplies to the Soviet Union by the northern route, although stating that these had not caused deliveries to decline. He stated that he had been invited by the British and American Governments in April of this year to visit them, in the former instance to negotiate a draft treaty and in the latter to undertake important and urgent military and political discussions.

After describing the Anglo-Soviet treaty at some length he proceeded to a further exposition of the results of his trip to England and the United States. In the course of this he remarked that no secret agreements had been entered into with either country. He also referred to the statement appearing in the communiqués published in conjunction with the signing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty and of the

⁶⁹ This telegram was sent on June 13, 1942, by Ambassador Litvinov to Secretary of State Hull for President Roosevelt, to whom it was transmitted on June 17.

⁷⁰ *Volzhskaya Kommuna*.

⁷¹ Not printed.

new Soviet-American Lend-Lease Agreement to the effect that complete accord had been reached with respect to urgent questions concerning the formation of a second front in Europe in 1942, commenting in this connection that the creation of that front will cause insurmountable difficulties to the Hitlerite armies on the Soviet front. "Let us hope that our common enemy will soon feel the weight of the ever increasing military cooperation of the three great powers".

Molotov also said it had been agreed that in the second half of 1942 deliveries to the Soviet Union from Great Britain "and particularly from the United States" would increase. In referring specifically to the new Soviet-American Lend-Lease Agreement he stated that it not only implied recognition of the present military collaboration between the two countries but also established community of action in the post-war period.

THURSTON

740.0011 European War 1939/22331 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 19, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received June 20—8:33 a. m.]

198. 1. I called on Molotov this afternoon. He commented briefly yet enthusiastically on his trip to Washington and stressed his pleasure at having had the opportunity to confer with the President, with you and other American statesmen. He made it a point to emphasize his hope that similar visits of Soviet and American representatives to the United States and to the Soviet Union might continually and increasingly take place during the war and commented on the mutual benefits that would accrue to both countries as a result of such visits, both during and after the war.

I informed the Foreign Minister that the main purpose of my trip to Moscow at this time was to deliver to Stalin an urgent message from the President.⁷² I added that since the message dealt with military questions and if it were agreeable and not embarrassing to Stalin I would like my Military Attaché to accompany me at the interview. Molotov stated that he would take the matter up immediately with Stalin and communicate with me.⁷³

⁷² See *infra*.

⁷³ Because of delay in seeing Stalin, who was ill with grippe, Ambassador Standley advised in his telegram No. 214, June 26, 1942, that he had discussed two messages of the President (see also note No. L-3, June 24, p. 599) with Molotov because of their "urgent character", and had sent both messages to Stalin through Molotov, so that the former would be better able to discuss them when he could be seen.

2. I expect to see Molotov again next week and am planning to discuss with him the questions relative to the evacuation of Polish women and children and to the forwarding of military supplies to China through the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ If there are any other matters which the Department desire me to take up I would appreciate appropriate instructions.

3. Since the President's message referred to above was received in Navy code the Department's instructions are also requested as to what channel of communications I should use in transmitting any answer thereto.

STANDLEY

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)

No. L-2

Moscow, June 19, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. STALIN: I have been requested by the President to transmit to you the following message dated June 17:

"The situation, which is developing in the Northern Area of the Pacific Ocean and in the Alaskan Area, presents tangible evidence that the Japanese Government may be taking steps to carry out operations against the Soviet Maritime Provinces.⁷⁵ Should such an attack materialize the United States is ready to assist the Soviet Union with American air power provided the Soviet Union makes available to it suitable landing fields in the Siberian Area. The efforts of the Soviet Union and of the United States would of course have to be carefully coordinated in order promptly to carry out such an operation.

"Ambassador Litvinov has informed me that you have signified your approval of the movement of American planes via Alaska and Northern Siberia to the Western Front and I am pleased to receive this news. I am of the opinion that in our common interests it is essential that detailed information be immediately initiated between our joint Army, Navy and Air representatives in order to meet this new danger in the Pacific. I feel that the question is so urgent as to warrant granting to the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States full power to initiate action and to make definite plans. For this reason I propose that you and I appoint such representatives and that we direct them immediately to confer in Moscow and Washington."

Sincerely yours,

W. H. STANDLEY

⁷⁴ For correspondence on efforts to establish a supply route to China by way of Iran, the Soviet Union, and Sinkiang, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, China, pp. 591 ff.

⁷⁵ Japanese troops were on Kiska and Attu islands in the Aleutian chain. United States naval authorities reported a Japanese concentration toward Midway Island. They predicted that Japan might move against the Aleutian Islands with the object of closing off northwest Pacific waters in preparation for a possible attack against Siberia.

740.0011 European War 1939/228774; Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 22, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received 9:02 p. m.]

201. For the President and Secretary. The emphasis in the Soviet press upon the reported agreement to create a second front in Europe in 1942, as the repeated references thereto made to myself and members of my staff by Soviet citizens in all walks of life in my opinion are sequences of Molotov's visit which must be taken into serious consideration. During the recent session of the Supreme Soviet many references were made by leading deputies to "the complete agreement reached by Molotov in relation to the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe in 1942", to "the determination of the great democratic powers to open a second front in the immediate future" and to the "hope that the time is not distant when the great powers will turn from words and agreement to action". Furthermore, in my recent conversation with Molotov, the Foreign Minister referred to the discussions in London and Washington relative to a second front and the alleged agreements reached thereon as the most important result of his journey and made it a point to attach more significance to the second front covenant than to the British treaty or the American agreement. In view of the manner in which the Soviet Government and people have accepted what would appear here to be a solemn obligation on the part of the United States and Great Britain to create a second front in 1942, I feel convinced that if such a front does not materialize quickly and on a large scale, these people will be so deluded in their belief in our sincerity of purpose and will for concerted action that inestimable harm will be done to the cause of the United Nations.

STANDLEY

741.6111/29: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 23, 1942—midnight.

[Received June 23—9:15 p. m.]

3508. We inquired of Sir Orme Sargent⁷⁶ this morning whether the Anglo-Soviet treaty had resulted in any noticeable improvement in relations between the two Allies. He replied emphatically in the affirmative. Clark Kerr reports that Molotov has returned to Russia "a new man". Sargent said that he felt much of Russian suspicion

⁷⁶ Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

was due to their ignorance with regard to the outside world and of course to the ostracism to which they had been subjected for some 20 years; consequently the "educational value" of Molotov's trip to London and Washington and the reception accorded him in both capitals must prove helpful in dissipating Russia's anti-foreign complex. As a concrete example, he said, the British Military Mission to Russia has found a marked change in the attitude of the Russian military authorities: The latter are beginning to lift the veil of deep secrecy with which they have hitherto shrouded practically every military problem in which the British have shown interest.

WINANT

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

*The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*⁷⁷

No. L-3

Moscow, June 24, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. STALIN: With reference to my letter of June 19 I have the honor to transmit herewith a further message dated June 23 from the President:

"In connection with my message to you of June 17, I wish to emphasize that if the delivery of aircraft from the United States to the Soviet Union could be effected through Alaska and Siberia instead of across Africa, as is now the practice, a great deal of time would be saved. Furthermore, the establishment of a ferry service through Siberia would permit the delivery by air of short range aircraft to the Soviet Union instead of by sea, as is now the case.

"If landing fields can be constructed in the Siberian area and meteorological and navigational facilities can be established to connect up with the appropriate American air services, I am prepared to instruct the American ferry crews to deliver aircraft to you at Lake Baikal. This air route could be easily connected up with the landing fields leading into the Vladivostok area. In the event of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Maritime Provinces, such a Siberian airway would permit the United States quickly to transfer American aircraft units to the latter area for the purpose of coming to the assistance of the Soviet Union.

"From the studies I have made of the problems involved in the establishment of a Siberian-Lake Baikal air service, it is clear that certain rivers which flow into the Arctic Ocean would have to be utilized for the shipping into Eastern Siberia of such bulky goods as fuel, as well as machinery, needed for the construction of the landing fields. The reason why I am communicating with you before receiving an answer to my message of June 17 is dictated by the necessity for immediate action, since this freight must be moved while the rivers in question are free of ice, that is, during the next few weeks.

⁷⁷ See footnote 73, p. 596.

"If you are in agreement with the urgency and importance of this air route, I request that in order to expedite its development you authorize an American airplane to make a survey and experimental flight from Alaska over the proposed route for the purpose of ascertaining what equipment and supplies would be needed to construct the necessary landing fields and to establish the essential navigational services. Civilian clothes would be worn by the personnel making this flight and they would in fact conduct the flight as personnel of a commercial agency. Furthermore, all necessary measures would be taken to make sure that the personnel in no way would be identified with the military services of the United States. One or two Soviet officers or officials could, of course, be taken on the American plane at Nome, Alaska.

"The flight would not be in lieu of the conversations of the joint Army, Navy and Air representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union as recommended in my message of June 17. It would be conducted for the sole purpose of enabling these representatives to enter into their discussions with more accurate and detailed information of the problems involved than would otherwise be the case."

Sincerely yours,

W. H. STANDLEY

196.7/3091a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1942—4 p. m.

175. Reference second paragraph of Moscow's telegram 204, June 22, 4 p. m., from Scovell.⁷⁸ We are disturbed at this report of the serious conditions prevailing at northern ports for American shipwrecked merchant sailors. Since the Department is charged by law to assist through American consular offices abroad American merchant seamen in distress, it cannot ignore a report of this kind. It would be appreciated if you would cause at once an investigation to be made of the situation of American merchant seamen in Soviet Arctic ports and report your findings to the Department. In view of the number of American vessels which are arriving at these ports the Department is inclined to the view that the time has come when this Government should insist upon the establishment of a consular office in Murmansk or Archangel or perhaps of consular offices in both ports. Such office or offices should, of course, be manned by experienced consular officers of energy and resourcefulness. Your recommendations with regard to the advisability of steps being taken to open such offices would be appreciated.

HULL

⁷⁸ Not printed. Robert J. Scovell was an American Red Cross representative in the Soviet Union; in telegram No. 204 he reported the existence of serious conditions and privations for American shipwrecked merchant seamen at northern ports of the Soviet Union. (861.48/2588)

196.7/3092 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 30, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received 11 : 58 p. m.]

221. Your 175, June 27, 4 p. m. The situation at Murmansk has caused me great concern and I have given it careful consideration. American interests including those relative to American shipwrecked seamen have been and are in the hands of Commander Frankel, Assistant Naval Attaché, who has kept me advised of developments through messages sent to the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, and the Coast Guard, and I naturally assumed that the Department was fully informed of conditions concerning distressed seamen as reported by him. Frankel, who arrived in Moscow yesterday, has submitted the following report.

"During the period February 1 to June 30, 1942, the Office of the Assistant Naval Attaché at Murmansk has in cooperation with the British Mission in Northern Russia taken care of approximately 300 survivors from ships under the United States or Panamanian flags. These men were quartered and fed by the Soviet authorities and food and clothing were either obtained from the local stores or from British or American Maritime sources. All injured were admitted to Soviet hospitals and given treatment until such time as they were considered fit for travel and then assigned to vessels for return to the United States. No seaman was assigned transportation until he was capable of looking after himself in the event of a marine disaster. At the present time there are 11 survivors from American vessels in Northern Russia all of whom are in hospitals or receiving treatment in rest camps. Two American seamen have been buried in Murmansk, 25 seamen are missing at sea or died and were buried at sea.

The Office of the Assistant Naval Attaché has also performed such consular duties as the signing and certifying to various ships papers, the intervening in shipboard crew troubles and occasional personnel troubles ashore and in reporting to the American Government on all matters requiring immediate action or decision on [or] which required official representation. The Navy Department, regarding changes in crew lists occasioned by deaths, hospitalizations, and desertions, has notified by radio the Navy Department of the embarkation on American vessels bound for the United States of Soviet citizens, such notification having been despatched after verification of documents and visas."⁷⁹

I knew before I left Washington that the various agencies involved in shipping to the Soviet Union were concerned about the situation in the Murmansk-Archangel area and that the Maritime Commission was sending a representative to Archangel. I am as yet uninformed of the scope of his functions or of his authority. The Murmansk

⁷⁹ There is apparently a garble or omission in the foregoing sentence.

situation as I found it upon arrival and as it later developed, however, required immediate action in the way of supplementing and assisting the existing American representation rather than endeavoring to set up a new agency such as a consular office which would involve considerable difficulties and delay. Efforts towards this first objective were directed towards assisting Frankel in performance of his duties. Recommendations for supplementing Frankel's staff were made to the Navy Department by the Naval Attaché,⁸⁰ and Assistant Naval Attaché Roullard is being sent to Murmansk to assist Frankel. Emphatic representations regarding the ruble exchange question were made to the Foreign Office and steps were taken to provide him with adequate land and water transportation. The suggestion that Red Cross facilities be made available to Frankel was at my instigation and resulted from a joint discussion here of the situation in Murmansk.

In view of the extraordinary conditions prevailing at the northern ports and taking into consideration Frankel's report I believe that the situation in Murmansk has been and is being very well handled and that no useful purpose would be served at this time to set up in Murmansk a new office. In this respect I should like to emphasize that Murmansk is in an area of active military operations and I am consequently inclined to believe that the situation there can be more effectively and expeditiously handled by military rather than civilian authorities. I therefore endorse the proposals contained in Captain Duncan's telegram no. 041212 to Opnav and recommend that they be acted upon immediately in order that Frankel's office may more effectively perform its services.

According to my information there have been no serious conditions prevailing at Archangel or at any other northern ports.⁸¹

Unless there are statutory reasons of which I am unaware for the establishment of a consular office in the Murmansk-Archangel area I do not believe that such office should be opened at this time and under present circumstances. I recommend in Archangel, as in Murmansk, American representation be coordinated and expanded under the direction of the Naval authorities and that any other representatives sent to this area be so informed.

⁸⁰ The Chargé in the Soviet Union suggested again in his telegram No. 557, December 28 (*post*, p. 756), that at least two junior naval officers be assigned as soon as practicable and sent to the northern ports for the handling and caring for American merchant seamen.

⁸¹ In telegram No. 229, July 2, 1942, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported as follows: "I took advantage of Frankel's presence in Moscow yesterday to take him and the Naval Attaché to call upon the Commissar for Foreign Trade in order that Frankel might present his observations on conditions in Murmansk together with suggestions for the more effective accomplishment of his duties there. The Commissar expressed great interest and I believe that the visit will result in a more sympathetic consideration of our problems in this area." (196.7/3093)

In order that I may be in a better position to carry out my duties in connection with this matter, I request that I be fully informed as to the responsibilities and scope of authority of all the American, British and Soviet agencies involved in the shipping of supplies to and from Russia. I cannot obtain this information here.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/22637

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 1, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called at my request. I remarked that I had intended to invite him to come to see me yesterday, but that a funeral which I attended had prevented my doing so.

He was very curious about what took place in the Churchill conversations.⁸² I replied that I could not tell him for the reason that I had had no opportunity for a talk with the President, who is out of the city for some days.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/22629 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 2, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received July 3—6:04 a. m.]

227. My 214, June 26, 10 p. m.⁸³ I have received a note from Molotov dated July 1 reading as follows:

"Under instructions from Mr. I. V. Stalin President of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I wish to transmit to the President the following answer to the message delivered to me on June 26:

'In connection with your recent messages I consider it advisable to state that I share in full your opinion regarding the expediency of the air route for the delivery of aircraft from the United States via Alaska and Siberia to the Western Front. Having taken this into consideration the Soviet Government has already given the necessary orders regarding the completion of the work in the immediate future undertaken in Siberia in connection with the preparation for the reception of aircraft; that is, work on the fitting out of the existing air fields and their appropriate installations. With regard to whose aviators shall deliver the aircraft from Alaska it appears to me that this matter may be entrusted as the State Department proposed

⁸² The British Prime Minister had made his second visit to Washington, and Hyde Park, N. Y., June 18-25, 1942.

⁸³ See footnote 73, p. 596.

at one time to Soviet aviators, who would be sent to Nome or any other feasible place at an agreed-upon time. The carrying out of the survey flight suggested by you may also be entrusted to an appropriate group of these aviators. Completely to insure the reception of these planes we would like to know at this time the number of planes which the United States of America intends to deliver to the Western Front by this route.

With regard to your proposal concerning the meeting of representatives of the Army and Navy of the United States of America and the Soviet Union for the purpose of exchanging information so far as this will be necessary, the Soviet Government is agreeable to the organization of such a meeting and proposes that it should take place in Moscow’.”

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/22645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 2, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received July 3—1:08 a. m.]

231. For the President and the Secretary. My 227, July 2, 3 p. m. In a conversation with Stalin today, at which my Military Attaché was present I confirmed the President’s statement in regard to the aggressive attitude of Japan in the northern Pacific by repeating the information in the Department’s telegram 174, June 26, 7 p. m.⁸⁴ I then called attention to the variations in the terms of the President’s messages to those of Stalin’s reply and specifically discussed the following:

1. The omission in Stalin’s reply of any reference to the movement of heavy freight via the northern rivers. Stalin replied that since only one navigation month remained during this season it would be impossible to make use of this shipping route. He assured me, however, that their fields in the Siberian area were fully prepared and equipped to receive American aircraft.⁸⁵

2. Referring to the President’s suggestion that Soviet representatives might participate in the proposed survey flight of the American plane, I asked whether American representatives might accompany the Soviet plane on its test flight. Stalin replied that this would be “entirely agreeable”.

⁸⁴ Not printed; it repeated a telegram from the Chargé in France giving information received by the French Foreign Office from the French Ambassador in Japan as to growing Russo-Japanese tension (761.94/1406).

⁸⁵ Ambassador Standley eventually learned from Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, who arrived in Moscow early in August as leader of a special air mission to the Soviet Union, that the airfields which Stalin had said were constructed, equipped, and ready for use would not be operational until September 1, 1943, according to the Soviet delegation which met with Bradley on August 8, 1942. (William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, p. 253.)

3. Commenting on Stalin's proposal that Soviet and American representatives meet in Moscow to exchange information on the proposed air route, whereas the President had suggested meetings to take place in both Washington and Moscow, I stated that since there were no American air experts in Moscow it would be necessary to bring one here from Washington and expressed [the opinion?] that the Soviet Government might wish to name a Soviet air expert, already in Washington, to confer with the appropriate American officials. I added that the Soviet and American experts might then return to Moscow to act in the capacity proposed by the President and seconded by Stalin. Stalin replied that there would appear to be no need for further discussions in Washington since it was clear that it was only a question of the number of planes that could be delivered per month.

4. Stalin stated that the route would follow the course: Nome (or any other feasible Alaskan point)—Semchan—Yakutsk—Kirensk—Krasnoyarsk.

Other subjects discussed with Stalin will be reported in subsequent telegrams.⁸⁶

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/22681 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 4, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 8:40 p. m.]

237. For the President and the Secretary of State. My 227, July 2, 3 p. m., and 231, July 2, 11 p. m. The plan accepted by Stalin is similar to the one proposed by General Arnold which was presented by me to Stalin at my first interview (see Arnold's letter to me dated March 10, 1942, and my telegram 126, April 24, 2 p. m.). With reference to representatives in Moscow, previous experience and the tenor of my recent conversation with Stalin indicate that a large military mission would be unwelcome at this time. I therefore recommend that an Air Officer of as high rank as possible who is familiar with all plans and details be sent here from Washington immediately and that my Military Attaché, Colonel Michela, and Naval Attaché, Captain Duncan, be named as the Army and Navy representatives respectively.

As an indication of good faith I wish to emphasize the importance of furnishing the Soviet Government as soon as possible of the exact number of planes that can be supplied by this route.

STANDLEY

⁸⁶ See the Ambassador's telegrams No. 237 of July 4, *infra*, and No. 240 of July 5, p. 606.

124.61/239 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 5, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received 4:05 p. m.]

240. In my interview with Stalin and later in considerably more detail with Molotov I took occasion to call attention to the continued lack of cooperation and obstructionism on the part of the Soviet authorities in their relations with American officials in the Soviet Union. I informed Stalin that the President, in order to insure the fullest cooperation with the Soviet Government, had issued instructions to Nelson,⁸⁷ Land⁸⁸ and Stettinius⁸⁹ to give priority to Soviet supplies regardless of how such priorities should affect other activities and I left copies of these instructions with Stalin. I then stated that since my arrival here the Embassy in practically all aspects of its work had been continually subjected to delays, interference and indifference on the part of subordinate Soviet officials⁹⁰ and that it appeared to me that almost a studied effort was being made to thwart its cooperative spirit which Stalin had agreed in my first interviews should exist. Later with Molotov I cited numerous examples of his uncooperative spirit. I intimated to both Stalin and Molotov that an indication of policy, from the top down corresponding to the action taken by the President, would do much to improve this situation and I left my interviews with a feeling that my remarks on this subject had received a sympathetic reception.

STANDLEY

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-4

Moscow, July 6, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: The President has requested me to transmit the following message to Mr. Stalin:

"The Egyptian crisis⁹¹ which is threatening the supply route to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has caused Prime Minister

⁸⁷ Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board.

⁸⁸ Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission.

⁸⁹ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator.

⁹⁰ For correspondence regarding earlier difficulties encountered from Soviet authorities interfering with the proper functioning of the American Embassy in Moscow, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 866 ff.

⁹¹ With the surrender of Tobruk on June 21, 1942, the Allied position in Egypt was considered endangered for the time being.

Churchill to direct to me an urgent inquiry whether forty A-20 bombers which are now in Iraq en route to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can be transferred to the Egyptian front. Because of limited information here, it is impossible for me to express judgment on this matter. For this reason I have thought it better to request you to make a decision, taking into consideration the interests of the war effort of the United Nations as a whole."⁹²

In view of the urgency of this message, I have postponed my departure for Kuibyshev until I have received and acted upon your answer to this message.

Sincerely yours,

[W. H. STANDLEY]

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-5

Moscow, July 9, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message dated July 7 from President Roosevelt to Mr. Stalin:

"As the American representatives at the conferences to be held in Moscow which were suggested in my cable to you of June 17, I am designating Major General Follett Bradley,⁹³ our Naval Attaché, Captain Duncan, and our Military Attaché, Colonel Michela. General Bradley is the only representative who will be sent to Moscow from the United States. He will come fully prepared and authorized to discuss all plans in relation to the conference."⁹⁴

"We are prepared to have at Nome within the next few days an American four-engine plane to make the survey trip, three or four Soviet officers to accompany it. On the other hand we would be very glad to have American officers accompany a Soviet plane."

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

⁹² Stalin sent an answer to the President's request the next day: "In view of the situation of the Allied troops in Egypt I do not object to the transfer of the 40 A-20 bombers to the Egyptian Front from the number of those at the disposition of the USSR in Iraq." (740.0011 European War 1939/22785½)

⁹³ See footnote 85, p. 604.

⁹⁴ The orders given to General Bradley stated in part that the object of his mission was to "arrange for the delivery via Alaska of War-Aid airplanes to Siberia and Russia; arrange for United States survey flights to obtain detailed information pertaining to existing establishments in the Siberian areas; furnish to the Soviet Government information concerning the availability of aircraft in accordance with the Russian protocols and contemplated deliveries via the Siberian route." (Quoted in William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, pp. 250-251.)

740.0011 European War 1939/22839 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 10, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received July 10—6:20 p. m.]

3815. Personal to the President and the Secretary. This week Eden showed me an exchange of telegrams between the British Embassy in Moscow and the Foreign Office. He suggested that we might be interested in their content. I told him that we would and at my request he sent on to me the following letter which is a summary of the exchange:

"In a telegram which Clark Kerr sent recently from Moscow, where he has spent some 3 weeks, he reported that he was impressed by the change for the better which the signature of the Anglo-Soviet treaty had wrought upon the public and official mind alike. He added, however, that he was still more impressed by the way in which both the public and members of the Government assumed that the opening of a second front this year was a thing that could be taken for granted. He went on to report that when he and Admiral Standley lunched with Molotov on the 26th June, the latter spoke as if the opening of a second front this year was decided on and was at pains to make clear to Admiral Standley and Clark Kerr, the immense importance the Soviet people and Government attached to it. Molotov spoke much of what he called "Anglo-Saxon promises" and of the cruel disillusionment that would follow any failure to redeem them. He swept aside any suggestion that no fast promise had in fact been given by saying that the test of the treaty lay in a second front and that we and the United States Government must understand this.

We were rather perturbed by this report from Clark Kerr and we, therefore, instructed him to see Molotov and to tell him that the Prime Minister and I were disturbed at the impression derived from the account of the Ambassador's conversation with him on the 26th June, that he might be overestimating the probability of the early establishment of a second front in western Europe this year. Clark Kerr was instructed then to remind Molotov of the discussions on this subject in London which made clear all the difficulties of the operation and to suggest to him that the tenor of his conversation on the 26th June and the Soviet Government's publicity about a second front to their own people seemed to be of doubtful wisdom. We particularly regretted that Molotov should have implied that if we were unable to open a second front this year, we should be failing to redeem definite promises and that the treaty would lose its value; we felt also that the present line of Soviet publicity, which could not but raise definite hopes of a second front being opened this year, might, if those hopes were not fulfilled, lead to a loss of morale and perhaps to a feeling of resentment against this country and the United States of America which we must surely all deplore and which might have results upon the issue of the war that all three countries would have cause most bitterly to regret.

Clark Kerr carried out his instructions on the 4th July. The con-

versation was very friendly. Molotov replied by saying that there had been much "subjective" matter in what he had said on the 26th June and claimed that it was no more than he had said in London and Washington. He admitted, however, that our views and the difficulties had been made clear to him in London both orally and in writing and added that he had explained them to the Soviet Government who understood them well. Their understanding of the matter was as explained in his speech to the Supreme Council in which he had made no mention of promises.

Nonetheless Molotov did not of course admit that what was in the minds of the Soviet people had been fostered by the way in which it was presented to them; but said that both they and the Red Army were eagerly awaiting a second front and that it was not unnatural that their attention should have focussed on the references to the second front in the Washington and London communiqués and that they should have created a feeling of assurance.

The United States Government have no doubt had a report from Admiral Standley about the conversation with Molotov on the 26th June and they may like to know of the action we took on receiving Clark Kerr's report of it and of Molotov's reaction.

We felt it essential to lose no time in correcting any false impression that might be gaining ground owing to a somewhat partial presentation of the case by the Soviet Government. I think this was wise, and M. Molotov does not seem to have attempted to deny that we in London were quite frank in attaching very specific reservation to our forecast of future possibilities. I know that you desired that your Government should be kept informed of our action."⁹⁵

WINANT

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-6

Moscow, July 10, 1942.

I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message dated July 9, 1942 from the President to Mr. Stalin:

"I am deeply appreciative of your telegram⁹⁶ authorizing the transfer of forty bombers to Egypt. I have arranged for one hundred and fifteen medium tanks with ammunition and spare parts to be shipped

⁹⁵ A full summary of this letter was sent by the Department in telegram No. 351, July 17, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union with a request for "any comment you may care to make with respect to Eden's letter, particularly with regard to the attitude assumed by Molotov in discussing the second front with you and the British Ambassador." The reply is in Ambassador Standley's telegram No. 629, July 22, 7 p. m., p. 612.

⁹⁶ See footnote 92, p. 607.

to you at once in addition to all tanks being shipped in accordance with the terms of the July protocol."

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

[Translation] ⁹⁷

Moscow, 18 July, 1942.

MR. AMBASSADOR: I ask you to transmit the following answer from the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, I. V. Stalin, to President F. D. Roosevelt, to his messages received on the 9th and 10th of July:

"I have received your message appointing Major General F. Bradley, Captain Duncan and Colonel Michela as the American representatives at the conference in Moscow. All necessary assistance in the accomplishment of the duties of their assignment will be accorded to the American representatives.

"On the side of the USSR, Major General Sterlingov, Colonel Kabanov and Colonel Levandovich will take part in the conference.

"Regarding the survey flight, one airplane (an American two-motored airplane is intended) would be sent on the earliest possible day from Krasnoyarsk to Nome, which could take American officers with it on the return flight from Nome.

"I take this opportunity to express to you my appreciation for the information that 115 additional tanks are being sent to the USSR.

"I consider it a duty to inform you that, as our specialists at the front confirm, American tanks catch fire very easily from the shells of antitank weapons striking from the rear or the sides. This arises from the high octane gasoline used by American tanks, which forms a great body of gasoline vapor in the tank, creating favorable conditions for the outbreak of fire. German tanks also operate on gasoline, but their gasoline is low octane, not forming great quantities of vapor, and as a result they are very much less subject to burning. Our specialists consider the diesel as the most suitable motor for tanks."

Accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

⁹⁷ File translation revised by the editors.

811.7461/15a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1942—8 p. m.

358. 1. The Navy Department has informed this Department substantially as follows:

(a) It desires to establish a radio station in Eastern Siberia in order to observe radio transmissions from Japan and to transmit the observations to the United States. In order to function satisfactorily the station must be equipped with an adequate radio transmitter for the rapid and exclusive transmission of a specialized type of radio traffic dealing solely with Japanese radio transmission and manned by specialized naval personnel. From 1 to 2 United States Naval officers and 8 to 12 enlisted men would be required for operation.

(b) If the Soviet Government should be willing to permit the establishment of such a station the Navy Department would welcome participation in the operation of the station by Soviet personnel and would be willing to furnish full instruction in the technique of the operation of the special radio installation to designated Soviet personnel. It also would welcome the presence of Soviet officials at the station who could make sure that the transmissions were strictly limited to matters dealing with Japanese radio transmissions.

(c) In view of the specialized nature of the radio transmissions the Japanese would probably learn in time of the existence of the station.

(d) It understands that the United States Naval Attaché at Kuibyshev, with the approval of the Ambassador, has already informally discussed this matter with the Soviet Naval authorities who have indicated that a request for the establishment of the station should come through regular diplomatic channels.

(e) The Navy would appreciate it if the Ambassador in his discretion would discuss the matter of the station informally with the appropriate Soviet authorities with a view to obtaining their permission for the establishment of the station. If the Soviet authorities give their consent, the location of the station and the details of its operation and maintenance could be determined as a result of a mutual agreement between the designated Soviet authorities and the Navy Department.

2. You are authorized if you perceive no objections thereto to present this matter informally to the appropriate Soviet authorities. When doing so you may care to inform them that if they agree to the establishment of the station the United States Government would be prepared to grant such status to the Naval personnel connected with the station as might seem preferable to the Soviet Government. It would be willing to attach them either to the office of the Naval Attaché in Kuibyshev or in some capacity to Soviet armed forces.

3. Officers of the Navy Department have also stated informally that as an alternative to a station owned and operated by United States Naval personnel in Eastern Siberia it would be agreeable to them if the Soviet Government would permit them the full use of a station

owned by the Soviet Government provided such a station would have all the necessary specialized equipment for the transmission of the Japanese radio transmissions and provided the United States Naval personnel on duty at that station could use it to the same extent as they would be able to use a station owned by the United States Government. It would also be agreeable to them if the operators of such a station should be Soviet citizens provided such operators would have the requisite technical qualifications. In your conversations with the Soviet authorities you are, therefore, authorized to discuss this alternative in case it should appear that the Soviet Government would prefer it.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/23048: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), July 22, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received July 23—6:15 p. m.]

629. Personal for the Secretary. Your 351, July 17, 6 p. m.⁹⁸

1. Molotov made no such remarks to me as he is reported to have made to Clark Kerr in the latter's report to Eden. While it is, of course, quite possible that Molotov may have expressed himself "subjectively" to Clark Kerr at the luncheon on June 26 in the manner reported, I did not hear any such remarks.

2. In my telegram No. 201, June 22, 7 p. m., from Moscow, I endeavored to make clear the attitude with respect to a second front in Europe in 1942 which has been assumed by Molotov in our conversations. As was pointed out in that telegram and also in others (see in this connection Nos. 529, June 15, 2 p. m.,⁹⁹ 548, June 19, 5 p. m., and 551, June 20, noon),¹ the confidence of the Soviet people in the early establishment of a second front, as well as their growing impatience at its failure to materialize, has been strongly reflected in the Soviet press, [and] has been a principal feature in such conversations as members of my staff have had with Soviet citizens in recent weeks.

3. I am prepared to believe, however, that both Molotov and Stalin are fully cognizant of the difficulties attendant upon the opening of a second front and of the specific reservations which the summary of Eden's letter to Winant indicates were attached to the forecast of future possibilities. You will recall that as I reported at the time Stalin remarked in my conversation with him on July 2nd that wanting a second front and having one were two different things. The pos-

⁹⁸ Not printed, but see footnote 95, p. 609.

⁹⁹ Not printed.

¹ For telegram No. 551, see p. 445.

sibility should also not be excluded that although the limitations in regard to the establishment of a second front were clearly understood by the Soviet Government it nonetheless decided that it would be sound strategy to endeavor to create the impression at home and abroad that such a front would actually materialize in Europe in 1942. It may have reasoned further that should the second front not materialize it would thus find itself in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis England and the United States in any future political negotiations having to do with post-war problems and frontiers. Although Molotov has never given me any indications that this was the case I think it must be borne in mind.

4. I have been handicapped in my conversations with Stalin and Molotov and in my interpretation of their attitudes and policies by the fact that I have never been fully informed of what took place or of what commitments may have been made to Molotov while he was in London and Washington. There is no doubt, however, that popular belief in the establishment of a second front in Europe in 1942 has been fostered by the joint communiqués then issued and by other public statements, irrespective of the intent behind them.

5. The British Ambassador called on me day before yesterday and informed me in general terms of his conversation with Molotov on July 4. What he said was in close agreement with the summary contained in the Department's reference telegram. In response to my inquiry he stated that insofar as he was aware no steps had been taken by Molotov to correct any misunderstanding that may exist in regard to this matter.

6. I feel that I should recall to the notice of the Department at this time the fact that all the negotiations leading up to Molotov's visit to London (in this respect see my telegram No. 374, May 8, 5 p. m.,² and other related messages) were based on the firmly expressed intention of the Soviet Government to obtain recognition by Great Britain of the Soviet frontiers of 1941. The fact that Molotov returned from London with a treaty which ostensibly disregarded this formerly believed vital and almost sole demand of the Soviet Government obviously lends itself to the interpretation that in return for its relinquishment some other equally desirable objective was obtained. In the light of the communiqués issued and in the absence of information to the contrary the assumption was logical that this objective was the establishment of a second front in 1942.

7. If there is little possibility of the opening of the second front this year I believe that any public disavowal in that sense would be extremely unwise, having in mind the inevitable and potentially far-reaching repercussions of such a course now, not only in the Soviet

² Not printed.

Union but also elsewhere. Should it be desired to correct any false impression which may have been created I consider that this should only be done directly and privately to Molotov or Stalin.

STANDLEY

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-7

Moscow, July 23, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message dated July 23, 1942 from the President to Mr. Stalin:

"I have received your message regarding the proposed survey flight from Alaska and the Moscow conference. Members of the survey flight will be in Alaska and ready to depart by August first. In this connection a four-engined bomber will be at Nome in the event that it is required.³

"I greatly appreciate your report on the difficulties experienced at the front with American tanks. It will be most helpful to our tank experts in eradicating the trouble with this model to have this information. The fire hazard in future models will be reduced, however, as they will operate on a lower octane fuel."

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

[Translation]

Moscow, 2 August 1942.

MR. AMBASSADOR: Kindly transmit the following answer of the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin to the President's message under date of July 23:

"I have received your last message regarding a survey flight from Alaska. Our airplane B-25 will arrive in Nome sometime between the 8th and 10th of August and on leaving for the projected survey flight will take on board three American participants in the flight."

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

³ In telegram No. 375, July 29, the Department advised Ambassador Standley that the Alaska-Siberia survey flight group under the command of Col. Alva L. Harvey would leave Washington for Nome on July 30, where it had been arranged that the members would be picked up "by a Soviet bomber and taken into Siberia." (861.248/230a)

*President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell L. Willkie*⁴

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1942.

Am arranging for you to leave any day after August 15th agreeable to you and to return between 1st and 15th of October.⁵ It is my thought you would do the Middle East but that Russia and China would be subject to developments which you and I can talk over. General Marshall and General Arnold will handle details. I hope you can come to see me at your earliest convenience so that we can have a good talk in regard to it and in regard to a lot of other things. Call up McIntyre⁶ and he will arrange day and hour.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

196.6/1419 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1942—4 p. m.

384. The Department has been informed by the War Shipping Administration that the Soviet Government has made a practice of paying special gratuities to the officers and crews of American merchant vessels operating to north Russian ports. This practice is regarded by the War Shipping Administration as thoroughly demoralizing in that it leads to inequality of wage payments and upsets the system of bonuses agreed upon between seamen's unions and the vessel operators in this country. It is stated that Amtorg⁷ notifies crews prior to their leaving United States that gratuities will be paid in addition to our own voyage and port bonuses.⁸

It is requested that you take this matter up with the appropriate Soviet authorities with the request that the payment of such gratuities be stopped. In this connection the War Shipping Administra-

⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. This night letter telegram was sent to Mr. Willkie at 15 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

⁵ In a letter of July 29, 1942, to the President, Mr. Willkie had expressed his desire, if agreeable to the President and the Government, "to take a trip to the middle east, into Russia and perhaps China."

⁶ Marvin H. McIntyre, Secretary to President Roosevelt.

⁷ Amtorg Trading Corporation, official purchasing and sales agency in the United States of the Soviet Union, 210 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.

⁸ This practice was also much resented by British crews. A bank draft on the State Bank (Gosbank) would be handed to the master of a vessel payable in the United States, and distributed as the master deemed advisable to each member of the crew. Although amounts and distribution practices varied, crew members could receive a sum approximately equal to 185% of a month's wages, including the voyage bonus. This practice upset the wage payments and bonus system agreed upon by unions and operators, and promulgated by the War Shipping Administration.

tion is considering the issuance of instructions to the agents for vessels in north Russian service requiring them to forbid masters of the vessels to accept gratuities.

HULL

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-8

Moscow, August 6, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: The President has asked me to transmit the following message dated August 5, 1942 to Mr. Stalin:

"Knowledge has come to me which I feel is definitely authentic that the Government of Japan has decided not to undertake military operations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at this time. This, I believe, means postponement of any attack on Siberia until the Spring of next year.⁹ Will you be kind enough to give this information to your visitor."¹⁰

Sincerely yours,

W. H. STANDLEY

740.0011 Pacific War/2699 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 6, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received August 6—9:44 p. m.]

275. For the President and the Secretary. I called upon Molotov upon my arrival today and delivered the President's recent messages

⁹ In his reply of August 7, 1942, Stalin expressed interest in this information.

¹⁰ Within a week the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was to come to Moscow for conversations with Stalin. In another communication of August 5, 1942, President Roosevelt informed Stalin that he had asked W. Averell Harriman "to go to Moscow to be at your call and that of your visitor to render any help which he may possibly give." Harriman had proposed in a telegram from London on August 4 to the President that he should go to Moscow, overtaking the Prime Minister on the way, because "your sending me along would indicate to our host our agreement on military and political matters and show your extreme personal interest at this critical moment. Also my personal report to you might be of particular value." (No indication of a written report has been found at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.) On the same day the President replied that he hesitated to have Harriman go, "for I do not want anyone anywhere to have the slightest suspicion that you are acting as an observer." Following the receipt of a telegram from Prime Minister Churchill asking for Harriman's presence in Moscow because he had "a somewhat raw job" to do and felt that "things would be easier if we all seemed to be together," the President authorized Harriman by telegram on August 5 to leave for Moscow as soon as possible. Stalin briefly expressed on August 7 his appreciation to the President "for the advice concerning the forthcoming arrival of Mr. Harriman in Moscow."

to Stalin. Molotov stated that of course he would deliver the messages but added that he failed to understand the message to the effect the Japanese would not attack the Soviet Union until the spring of 1943 for the reason that Litvinov had reported to the Foreign Office that the President had advised him late in July that his information at the time was to the effect that the Japanese would definitely attack the Soviet Union during the first 10 days of August 1942.¹¹ I agreed to report this to the President for possible reconciliation.

STANDLEY

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-10

Moscow, August 8, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: With reference to our recent conversation, the President has asked me to inform you that his message to Mr. Stalin of August 5 in regard to Japan was based on last minute information. The President states that subsequent information has been received which supports the view expressed in his message.

Sincerely yours,

W. H. STANDLEY

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-11

Moscow, [undated ¹²].

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: The President has asked me to transmit the following message, dated August 9, 1942, to Mr. Stalin.

"Your frank opinion on the following plan, which I think may be useful, would be very much appreciated:

"For the primary purpose of explaining to the Governments of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt the danger they run in a German victory and that their greatest hope for the future lies in the defeat of Nazi domination of the places of the Near East and the Middle East, I am sending Mr. Wendell Willkie to visit the Governments of these countries.

¹¹ No record of such a conversation with Litvinov has been found in Department files. An earlier warning of a possibility of a Japanese attack had been sent by the President to Stalin; see p. 597.

¹² A penned notation indicates that this communication was written August 9, 1942.

"For a wholly different purpose Mr. Willkie would very much like to visit the Soviet Union. In addition to seeing for himself the undying unity of thought in repelling the invader and the great sacrifices which you are all making, he wants to know more about the wonderful progress made by the Russian people.

"As you know Mr. Willkie was my opponent in the 1940 elections and he is today the head of the minority party. He is heart and soul with my administration in our foreign policy of opposition to Nazism and real friendship with your Government, and he is greatly helping in war work. For the sake of the present and the future I personally think that a visit to the Soviet Union by Mr. Willkie would be a good thing. He would proceed to the Soviet Union by air during the first two weeks of September.

"I should be grateful if you would confidentially and frankly inform me whether you would welcome a very short visit by him."¹³

Sincerely yours,

W. H. STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/23436 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 10, 1942—3 p. m.
[Received August 11—9:03 a. m.]

282. I assume that you have full knowledge of the contents and purport of the recent messages between the President and Stalin. I would appreciate receiving any special instructions you may wish to give as to the manner of reporting further developments.¹⁴

STANDLEY

*Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of the President, to President Roosevelt*¹⁵

The Prime Minister had an extended meeting with Stalin last night. Molotov, Voroshilov,¹⁶ British Ambassador and myself were present.

¹³ In his reply of August 12, 1942, Stalin stated that the Soviet Government was agreeable to the visit of Mr. Willkie and would show him the sincerest hospitality.

¹⁴ By telegram No. 236, August 21, the Secretary of State replied: "With reference to your telegram No. 282 I brought the matter to the attention of the President and he was very responsive."

¹⁵ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. This telegram was sent through the Naval Attaché in Moscow in six sections between August 13, 6 p. m., and August 14, 2:10 a. m., and was all received in Washington by 12:19 p. m., August 14. The descriptions of all meetings with Stalin, based upon the telegrams sent by Prime Minister Churchill to the British War Cabinet and to President Roosevelt, are printed in Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. IV: *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), pp. 476-502 *passim*.

¹⁶ Marshal Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars, and member of the State Committee of Defense.

The discussion centered on British and American military strategic plans for 1942 and 1943 and their effect on the Russian front.

Under all the circumstances I believe the discussion could not have been developed better nor the conclusion more satisfactory. The Prime Minister explained in full detail the various possibilities of **SLEDGEHAMMER**¹⁷ and the reasons for its postponement. He told of the plans and strength of **ROUNDUP**.¹⁸

Stalin took issue at every point with bluntness almost to the point of insult with such remarks as you can't win wars if you aren't willing to take risks and you mustn't be so afraid of the Germans. This phase of the discussion ended by stating abruptly but with dignity that he could not force action but he did not agree with the arguments. He expressed the opinion too that grave difficulties confronted **ROUNDUP** and showed little interest in it. So far there had been no agreement on any point and the atmosphere was tense.

The Prime Minister then described the bombing activity over Germany and his hopes for substantial increase with American participation. Here came the first agreement between the two men. Stalin took over the argument himself and said that homes as well as factories should be destroyed. The Prime Minister agreed that civil morale was a military objective but the bombing of workmen's houses came as the by-product of near misses on factories. The tension began to ease and a certain understanding of common purpose began to grow. Between the two of them they soon destroyed most of the important industrial cities of Germany.

The Prime Minister with great adroitness took the occasion of the more friendly interchange to bring the discussion back to the second front. He explained the decision regarding **TORCH**¹⁹ and its tactics emphasizing the need for secrecy. This gave an opportunity, which the Prime Minister seized, to relieve further the tension by saying he wished he had the power over the press which Stalin explained he exercised. Stalin however expressed considerable concern over the political repercussions from the operation and opinions regarding the political situation in the various countries affected were exchanged.

About this time the Prime Minister drew a picture of a crocodile and pointed out that it was as well to strike the belly as the snout. The plans for the offensive in Egypt were described as well as the battle for Malta with details of the present naval engagement all of which interested Stalin greatly.

¹⁷ Code name for a limited assault in 1942 in western Europe, as on Brest or Cherbourg.

¹⁸ Code name for a major American and British invasion of western Europe against the German armies planned for 1943.

¹⁹ Final code name for the Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942.

At this point the Prime Minister brought the discussion back to the Russian front stating that you and he were exploring the possibility of sending an air force to the South Russia front but only after Rommel²⁰ was defeated. He asked how such a suggestion if it were found possible would be received by Stalin. Stalin's answer was brief and simple "I would gratefully accept it."

The conversation then came back to TORCH and Stalin summed up its strategic advantages with masterful grasp of its implications. He showed real enthusiasm for the operation but he specifically asks that the political angle be handled with the greatest delicacy and that it be started at the very earliest moment even earlier than you have in mind.

The meeting broke up early after some four hours and in spite of the early difficulties the relationship between the two men had reached a most friendly basis.

I came away with the conviction that although Stalin has been much disappointed in our inability to be of greater military assistance to him and although he was critical of us particularly the British he gave me the feeling throughout the evening that he considered he was dealing with two nations with whom he had binding ties and that with you and the Prime Minister he could personally interchange views in the frankest of manner without fear of breaking the personal relationship. At no time did he show any indication to me that action or lack of action on either of our parts might fundamentally affect this understanding.

The Prime Minister was at his best and could not have handled the discussion with greater brilliance.

On several occasions the Prime Minister turned to me for collaboration [*corroboration?*] and I believe he would tell you that my presence was of value to him and justified your sending me.

One of our planes carrying the British military staff had to turn back to Teheran and therefore they will not arrive until tonight. This will probably extend our stay a day or two longer than was expected.

I expect further discussions on the military situation here which Stalin indicated was extremely difficult. He had not realized he told us that the Germans could assemble the strength they had thrown at him.

²⁰ Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of the German and Italian forces in northern Africa.

*The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to Prime Minister Churchill and Mr. Averell Harriman*²¹

[Aide-Mémoire—Translation]

As the result of an exchange of views in Moscow which took place on the 12th August of this year, I ascertained that the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill, considered that the organization of a second front in Europe in 1942 to be impossible.

As is well known, the organization of a second front in Europe in 1942 was pre-decided during the sojourn of Molotov in London, and it found expression in the agreed Anglo-Soviet communiqué published on the 12th June last.

It is also known that the organization of a second front in Europe had as its object the withdrawal of German forces from the Eastern front to the West, and the creation in the West of a serious base of resistance to the German-Fascist forces and the affording of relief by this means to the situation of the Soviet forces on the Soviet-German front in 1942.

It will be easily understood that the Soviet Command built their plan of summer and autumn operations calculating on the creation of a second front in Europe in 1942.

It is easy to grasp that the refusal of the Government of Great Britain to create a second front in 1942 in Europe inflicts a moral blow to the whole of the Soviet public opinion, which calculates on the creation of a second front, and that it complicates the situation of the Red Army at the front and prejudices the plan of the Soviet Command.

I am not referring to the fact that the difficulties arising for the Red Army as the result of the refusal to create a second front in 1942 will undoubtedly have to deteriorate the military situation of England and all the remaining Allies.

It appears to me and my colleagues that the most favourable conditions exist in 1942 for the creation of a second front in Europe, inasmuch as almost all the forces of the German army, and the best forces to boot, have been withdrawn to the Eastern front, leaving in Europe an inconsiderable amount of forces and these of inferior quality. It is unknown whether the year of 1943 will offer conditions for the creation of a second front as favourable as 1942. We are of the opinion, therefore, that it is particularly in 1942 that the creation of a second front in Europe is possible and should be effected. I

²¹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

was, however, unfortunately unsuccessful in convincing Mr. Prime Minister of Great Britain hereof, while Mr. Harriman, the representative of the President of the United States, fully supported Mr. Prime Minister in the negotiations held in Moscow.

J. STALIN

[Moscow,] August 13, 1942.

740.0011 European War 1939/23495 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 14, 1942—noon.

[Received August 14—9:39 a. m.]

296. Mr. Harriman is reporting his conversations here direct to the President through Navy codes and is keeping me fully informed.²²

STANDLEY

*Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of the President,
to President Roosevelt*²³

Moscow, August 14, 1942—8:15 p. m.

[Received August 15—12:35 a. m.]

Personal for the President. The Prime Minister has shown me the cable he is sending you regarding the rough sledding he had in his talk with Stalin last night. He is transmitting also Stalin's memorandum which he handed us both simultaneously and his *aide-mémoire* in reply.

I have written Stalin a letter as follows:

"I have had an opportunity to study the memorandum of August 13 you handed me last night, an identical copy of which you simultaneously gave to the Prime Minister. I have also had an opportunity to read the Prime Minister's *aide-mémoire* of August 14 replying to your memorandum.

I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served in comments by me additional to what the Prime Minister has said. I feel, however, that I must reaffirm his statement that no promise has been broken regarding the second front."

The technique used by Stalin last night resembled closely that used with Beaverbrook and myself in our second meeting last year. I cannot believe there is cause for concern and I confidentially expect a clearcut understanding before the Prime Minister leaves.

²² No telegrams of significance from Harriman relating to the Moscow conversations with Stalin, in addition to those here printed, have been found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

²³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. This telegram was sent through the Naval Attaché in Moscow.

*Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of the President,
to President Roosevelt*²⁴

Moscow, August 15, 1942—10:10 a. m.

[Received 2:14 p. m.]

We dined in force at Kremlin last night. All members of Soviet Defence Committee as well as a number of members of General Staff were present.

Stalin was in best of spirits and was most cordial to Prime Minister and myself. He seemed to be entirely oblivious of the unpleasant discussions of night before. Prime Minister, however, arrived still somewhat annoyed from rough treatment he had received but as evening progressed he became more and more interested in his talks with Stalin which ranged from theories of military tactics to post-war policies. He spoke in some detail of sending an air squadron to Southern Front and indicated that it was a subject you had in mind too, if it were feasible.

I expect you will hear from Prime Minister on this subject.

740.0011 European War 1939/23606: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, August 17, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received August 19—1:21 p. m.]

304. My 303, August 17 [18], 4 p. m.²⁵ The communiqué reads as follows:

["Anglo-Soviet communiqué on the negotiations of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Winston Churchill, with the President of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, J. V. Stalin.

Negotiations have taken place in Moscow between the President of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, in which Mr. Harriman, representing the President of the United States of America, participated. There took part in the discussions: The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, Marshall K. E. Voroshilov from the Soviet side; the British Ambassador Sir A. Clark Kerr, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir A. Brooke and other responsible representatives of the British Armed Forces, and the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan from the British side.

²⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. This telegram was sent through the Naval Attaché in Moscow.

²⁵ Not printed.

A number of decisions were reached covering the field of the war against Hitlerite Germany, her associates in Europe. This just war of liberation both Governments are determined to carry on with all their power and energy until the complete destruction of Hitlerism and any similar tyranny has been achieved.

The discussions which were carried on in an atmosphere of cordiality and complete sincerity provided an opportunity of reaffirming the existence of close friendship and understanding between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America in entire accordance with the Allied relationship existing between them."

STANDLEY

701.6111/1141 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 18, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 6:44 p. m.]

307. Henderson ²⁰ advises me that at the time of his departure two Soviet couriers had been waiting for some time to obtain air accommodations from Washington to Kuibyshev via Africa. In view of the great importance of maintaining the regular mail communications between the Embassy and Washington which have now been satisfactorily established and of the possibility that the Soviet authorities may retaliate for any protracted delay encountered by their couriers by failing to provide Embassy courier accommodations on the now vital Kuibyshev-Tehran airline, I strongly recommend that the Department, if the Soviet couriers have not yet received accommodations, can make vigorous representations to the Ferry Command. I also recommend that the Department assist the Soviet Embassy in every way possible in its reported plan involving the despatch of two Soviet couriers every other month between Kuibyshev and Washington and that it endeavor to make definite arrangements with the Ferry Command in this regard.

I would appreciate being kept informed of developments on this subject.

STANDLEY

²⁰ Loy W. Henderson had left Washington and arrived in Moscow on August 12, 1942, coming as a Foreign Service Inspector; he became temporarily Counselor of Embassy and then Chargé d'Affaires in October.

740.0011 European War 1939/23576: Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 18, 1942—noon.
[Received August 18—11:50 a. m.]

264. Personal for the President only from Harriman.²⁷

"The last meeting of the Prime Minister with Stalin when they met alone made deep and favorable impression on Prime Minister. He is cabling you today from Cairo.²⁸

I have stopped off at Tehran to see something of the railroad and Persian Gulf ports. There will be a discussion later this week in Cairo to decide what should be done. I am urging that capacity of railroad be substantially increased which both British and American engineers agree is entirely feasible providing more and better operating personnel and somewhat more equipment are made available.

There are two matters of supply to Russia that deserve, I believe, immediate attention. Stalin emphasized to both Prime Minister and myself that trucks were of equally critical need as even tanks. He says he can make good use of 20,000 a month. Although shipment of that total is impossible the Prime Minister hopes that every effort will be made to ship maximum possible. Supply through Persian route is now much less than facilities can handle—partly, but only partly, due to sinkings.

Second matter relates to Siberian airplane ferry service. If decision is to start it as soon as possible, Soviets should be supplied with requisite number of transport planes to return crews, depending on traffic contemplated, perhaps about 15 to start with. General Bradley told me all other arrangements have been made and the operation can commence as soon as transports are available. For many reasons it seems clear Russians should operate them rather than our attempting to do it at this time. If we want to become familiar with the route our officers could travel route as frequently as might be desired. When I left Moscow War Department was insisting on United States operation.

I find Tehran a delightful spot and wish I had an excuse to stay longer. The Dreyfuses are most hospitable."

DREYFUS

²⁷ A notation on the Department's file copy of this telegram states that on August 19 the "White House was phoned and told State taking no initiative on this unless so directed."

²⁸ The telegram describing the final stage of the Moscow conversations sent to President Roosevelt on August 18, 1942, by Prime Minister Churchill is partly printed in his book, *The Second World War*, vol. iv: *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 501-502.

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-13

Moscow, August 19, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I would be grateful if you would transmit the following message addressed to Mr. Stalin, which I have received from the President today: ²⁹

"I regret indeed that I was unable to have been with you and Mr. Churchill in the conferences which have recently taken place in Moscow. The urgent needs of the military situation, especially insofar as the Soviet-German front is concerned, are well known to me.

"I am of the opinion that it will be difficult for the Japanese to dislodge us from the vantage point which we have gained in the area of the Southwest Pacific. Although the naval losses of our forces were considerable in that area, the advantages which we have gained will justify them and I can assure you we are going to press them in a vigorous manner. I well realize on the other hand that the real enemy of both our countries is Germany and that at the earliest possible moment it will be necessary for both our countries to bring our power and forces to bear against Hitler. Just as soon as it is humanly possible to assemble the transportation you may be sure that this will be done.

"In the interim there will leave the United States for the Soviet Union during the month of August over 1,000 tanks, and at the same time other strategic materials are going forward, including aircraft.

"The fact that the Soviet Union is bearing the brunt of the fighting and losses during the year 1942 is well understood by the United States and I may state that we greatly admire the magnificent resistance which your country has exhibited. We are coming as quickly and as strongly to your assistance as we possibly can and I hope that you will believe me when I tell you this."

Sincerely yours,

W. H. STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/23631 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 19, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

314. Reference Embassy's 313, August 19, 2 p. m.³⁰ Generally speaking, the articles [in the Soviet press] were lacking in enthusiasm, especially when compared with those appearing upon the re-

²⁹ Prime Minister Churchill had telegraphed his belief on August 16, 1942, to President Roosevelt that "any consoling or heartening message you feel like sending to Stalin secretly would be helpful."

³⁰ Not printed.

turn of Molotov in June. Although reference was made to the Soviet armies withstanding the onslaught of the German military machine, thus enabling the Allies to gather strength and to prepare the resistance necessary for the destruction of Hitlerism, and to the unified determination to prosecute the war with all force and energy, no direct mention was made of the second front, insofar as the negotiations were concerned. There were numerous allusions, however, that such a front would not only be welcome but also could effectively be established in view of the favorable military conditions in western Europe. Parenthetically, the advantageous conditions for the creation of a second front in Europe in 1942, especially insofar as the French coast is concerned, have been favorite themes of the Soviet press during recent weeks.³¹

The Embassy cannot help but feel that the communiqué, together with the Soviet press comments and interpretations thereon will cause real disappointment to the Soviet public which has hoped for and counted upon the creation of the second front in Europe in 1942 and now finds no reference to it in the press releases on the Churchill visit. At the same time, however, the foreign news section of the Soviet press continues to carry articles from England and the United States describing the demands of the masses for the creation of a second front now.

STANDLEY

701.6111/1141 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy
in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow*

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1942—6 p. m.

234. Reference Embassy's 307, August 18, 11 a. m., from Moscow. The two Soviet couriers are scheduled to depart August 21 by way of Brazil and Africa together with Mrs. Oumansky³² and daughter.

The War Department has informally agreed to make available air accommodations for two Soviet couriers every other month as desired by the Soviet Government, and formal reply to the Department's request in this regard is expected soon.³³

HULL

³¹ For comments on the continuing course of the propaganda campaign for a second front in Western Europe as it was developed in the Soviet press during the remainder of the year, see pp. 451-482, *passim*.

³² Wife of Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky, Soviet Ambassador in the United States, 1939-41.

³³ This agreement for the travel of Soviet couriers between Washington and Tehran in the airplanes of the Air Transport Command was received in a letter of September 8, 1942, from Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War (701.6111/1145).

032 Willkie, Wendell/61½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow
of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Wendell Willkie; Mr. Joseph Barnes, Chief of the Foreign Broadcasting Section of the Office of War Information; Mr. Gardner Cowles, Office of War Information; Mr. Hornbeck;³⁴ Mr. Murray;³⁵ Mr. Alling;³⁶ Mr. Hamilton;³⁷ Mr. Atherton; Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, G-2, Eastern European Section, War Dep[artmen]t; Mr. Durbrow; and Mr. Reinhardt.³⁸

After Mr. Willkie had discussed questions relative to the Near Eastern area with Mr. Murray and Mr. Alling he asked Mr. Atherton to assist him in obtaining background and perspective regarding the Soviet Union. Mr. Willkie stated that he hoped that Mr. Atherton could approach the subject from the point of view of what he thought it would be best to tell a person with an ordinary layman's knowledge of the Soviet Union in order to have proper perspective and background before going to that country.

Mr. Atherton replied that Colonel Yeaton and Mr. Reinhardt had recently returned from the Soviet Union and would be pleased to answer any questions. He added, however, that it might be useful before Mr. Willkie asked any questions to read to him a strictly confidential memorandum drawn up in the Department of State last autumn³⁹ for the purpose of outlining, for the strict guidance of the Department, the policy of the United States Government vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Mr. Atherton stated that although this memorandum had been drawn up last year it set forth, with certain modifications, the basic policy now adhered to by the United States Government toward the Soviet Union. Before reading the memorandum Mr. Atherton suggested that because of its strictly confidential nature that it might be advisable not to take notes thereon.

Mr. Atherton then read, with certain modifications, the text of the Department's telegram no. 5682 of December 5, 5 [6] p. m., 1941⁴⁰ to the American Embassy at London which was sent to the Ambassador to be read to Mr. Eden in order that he might have, prior to his proposed trip to Moscow, an expression of the policy of the

³⁴ Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations.

³⁵ Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.

³⁶ Paul H. Alling, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

³⁷ Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

³⁸ G. Frederick Reinhardt, of the Division of European Affairs; Vice Consul and Third Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union until April 20, 1942.

³⁹ Not found in Department files.

⁴⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 194.

United States Government regarding the Soviet Union. The slight revisions made by Mr. Atherton emphasized more particularly than in the original the role of the Atlantic Charter as the cornerstone of American policy and simplified paragraph 4 by stating the present unwillingness of the United States Government to enter into commitments at this time regarding specific terms of the post war settlement.

Mr. Willkie then asked Mr. Reinhardt to give him such background information as he felt a person in his position should have when going to the Soviet Union. Mr. Reinhardt stated that he thought it was important to bear in mind the fact that it is often difficult to discuss matters with Soviet officials, who are, in general, not as amenable to an open and frank exchange of views as are officials of many other governments. At the same time they are realistic in the extreme in all matters involving Soviet foreign relations. For the past year the Soviets had received repeated assurances of our intentions to do everything possible to aid them in their struggle against Nazi aggression and although they had of course received substantial evidence of our sincerity in the form of the supplies and materials of war which had reached the Soviet Union, nevertheless, it would make a great difference in the impression made in the Soviet Union whether or not Mr. Willkie went to Moscow with something concrete for the Russians. Mr. Reinhardt said he feared that otherwise Mr. Willkie might not find the desired openness and frankness on the part of Soviet officials.

Mr. Willkie asked that this opinion, that it was important to take something "concrete" to the Soviet Union, be brought to the Secretary's attention.

Mr. Atherton further emphasized the point by Mr. Reinhardt as to the very realistic attitude taken by Soviet officials regarding the present situation of their country and their dealings with the outside world. In stressing this point he remarked that officials who had talked with Mr. Molotov during his visit to Washington had been impressed with his frank and realistic approach to all problems. Mr. Atherton added that since very few Soviet officials had a full and complete picture and understanding of the various problems between the Soviet Union and the United States, and other United Nations, Mr. Willkie, in order to fully appreciate their attitude, should bear this in mind when talking to Soviet officials. Mr. Atherton further stated that he felt that Mr. Molotov, for instance, after discussing various problems in Washington had gone back to the Soviet Union with a fuller appreciation of the difficulties to be overcome before a complete and satisfactory solution of all problems confronting the two countries could be reached.

These remarks led to a general discussion of the reasons why it was difficult for Soviet officials and the Soviet people in general to have an appreciation of the outside world in as much as for over 25 years they have been almost completely isolated from any contact with other countries, and have been led by intensive propaganda to reach a warped picture of the situation outside the Soviet Union, which facts prevent them from having in their possession a mental yardstick on which to base their judgment.

In connection with Mr. Willkie's proposed trip Mr. Atherton remarked that he felt that since Mr. Willkie represented the "opposition" party in the United States his trip would undoubtedly impress the Soviet officials with the fact that American opinion is united in its desire to assist Russia in its struggle in every practical way.

When Mr. Willkie asked Colonel Yeaton for any background information on the Soviet Union the Colonel replied that he naturally was not qualified to speak on political matters but made the following suggestion relative to the technicalities of the flight into the Soviet Union. He stated that he felt that the arrangements would work more smoothly if Mr. Willkie and his party put themselves entirely at the complete disposal of the Soviet Government as to the route to be followed from Tehran on. Colonel Yeaton stated that he had recently been able to assist General Bradley in connection with his flight and had learned that the Soviet authorities preferred to have foreign planes entering the country put in charge of Soviet pilots at Tehran who would either fly the ship in on a route chosen by them or act as navigators for the regular pilot of the plane. If such a proposal were made to the Soviet authorities, indicating that Mr. Willkie and his party were at the complete disposal of the Soviet military authorities as to their route, there should be a minimum of difficulty and delay in continuing the flight from Tehran to Moscow. It was agreed that the State Department would undertake to follow up this matter.

Colonel Yeaton when asked for any personal remarks which he might care to make stated that speaking purely from a personal point of view and giving his own personal reaction, he could not help but feel that when the Harriman Mission was in Moscow and subsequent to that time there was a feeling of suspicion on the part of the Soviet Government as regards to the real intentions of the United States and other of the United Nations to come to the assistance of the Soviet Union. He added that he had gained the impression that Soviet officials felt that the majority of American officials and at least a good part of the public desired primarily to have the Soviet and German regimes consumed in a death struggle and that, therefore, our proffered aid was not completely sincere.

In this connection, it was explained to Mr. Willkie why, in view of the anti-Capitalist propaganda for the last 25 years it was natural that these suspicions should obtain and why it would be difficult to hope for, expect, or bring about any sudden change in this suspicious attitude. In reply to Mr. Willkie's question as to whether these suspicions are based partly on the fact of unfulfilled promises Colonel Yeaton replied in the negative. Colonel Yeaton added by way of personal advice that it had been his observation that Soviet officials showed greater respect for persons who were and admitted they were capitalists rather than for those who professed to be Soviet sympathizers.

Mr. Joseph Barnes of the Office of War Information and former Foreign Editor of the *Herald Tribune* as well as the *Herald Tribune* correspondent in Moscow from 1936 to 1939, who is accompanying Mr. Willkie to Moscow, stated that he would call at the Department on August 24 to obtain copies of any memoranda which it was felt might be given to Mr. Willkie as further background for his trip to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Barnes was informed that a memorandum had been prepared (copy attached) ⁴¹ giving an outline of the public statements made by American officials on United States policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and also a second memorandum (copy attached) ⁴¹ was in the process of preparation indicating, in a general way, the various routes by which aid can be sent to the Soviet Union. He was informed that these would be turned over to him on Monday.⁴²

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

[Translation]

Moscow, August 22, 1942.

MR. AMBASSADOR: Please inform the President of the following reply of the Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR, I. V. Stalin, to the message of the President, received August 19:

"I have received your message of August 19. I also regret that you could not have participated in the conversations which I recently had with Mr. Churchill.

In connection with your remarks regarding the shipment from the United States during the month of August of tanks and war ma-

⁴¹ Not attached to file copy of this document.

⁴² August 24.

terials, I would like to emphasize our special interest at the present time in receiving from the United States aircraft and other types of armaments, and also trucks, in the greatest possible quantity. Furthermore, I hope that all measures will be taken to guarantee the most expeditious delivery of goods to the Soviet Union, especially by the northern sea route."

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

800.147/5 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 23, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received August 24—2:37 a. m.]

330. The British Ambassador has given me a copy of a telegram received from his Government outlining proposals in regard to the provision of living accommodations and recreational facilities for British and American seamen in north Russian ports and issuing him instructions to take the question up with the Soviet Government. The telegram states in part that the British Government hoped on the basis of recommendations received from Harriman that the American Government would have been able to send simultaneous and parallel instructions to the American Ambassador in Moscow but that it is informed that although the War Shipping Administration had approved the proposed representations in principle, consultations proceeding with the State Department and other American bodies were not likely to be concluded for some time and instructions could not yet be issued to the Ambassador. Feeling that the matter could no longer be postponed the British Ambassador was instructed to bring the question to the Soviet Government and to seek any support I might feel justified to give him at this juncture.

The British Ambassador discussed the question with Molotov on August 19 and left with him a memorandum containing the British proposals. In my interview with Molotov on August 21 I took occasion to bring up the question of the American seamen in northern Russia and stated that I had already discussed this matter with Vyshinski and wished to support in principle the British Ambassador's representations in this regard. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government considered it one of its duties to care for the British and American seamen in question and would do everything possible on their behalf.

I would appreciate receiving any information available to the Department on this subject as well as definite instructions to be followed in this respect.

I also informed Molotov of our desire to have discontinued the special gratuities referred to in the Department's 384, August 4, 4 p. m., and will take the matter up formally and in more detail with Vyshinski upon my return next week to Kuibyshev.

STANDLEY

032 Willkie, Wendell/58½

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow
of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1942.

In connection with a telegram from Prime Minister General Sikorski to the Polish Ambassador which was delivered to the Department today ⁴³ suggesting that Mr. Willkie during his conversations with Stalin might express the hope of the United States Government that every effort be made to bring about a better understanding between Poland and the Soviet Union, Mr. Atherton called Mr. Willkie on the telephone to advise him that the President and the Secretary desired Mr. Willkie to bring up this matter when talking to Mr. Stalin.

Mr. Atherton informed Mr. Willkie that Admiral Standley had full knowledge of this situation and had recently received telegram No. 402, of August 19, 10 p. m., ⁴⁴ from the Department in this regard. Mr. Atherton indicated, furthermore, that Mr. Henderson who is now in Moscow is also familiar with this subject and suggested that the Ambassador and Mr. Henderson could advise Mr. Willkie as to how this matter might best be approached.

Mr. Atherton told Mr. Willkie that he would send to him by special messenger this afternoon a copy of General Sikorski's telegram.

Mr. Atherton advised Mr. Willkie that the Department had received from the War Department full particulars regarding Mr. Willkie's proposed itinerary and that on the basis of this the Department was endeavoring in every way to see that all arrangements are made covering the part of the flight in the Soviet Union. ⁴⁵

In regard to Mr. Willkie's request that the Secretary be asked whether he, Mr. Willkie, should make any statement upon his arrival

⁴³ See memorandum by the Polish Ambassador, August 24, p. 175.

⁴⁴ *Ante*, p. 174.

⁴⁵ Mr. Willkie's journey was publicly announced at the President's press conference on August 21, 1942, when it was stated that he would go as Special Representative of President Roosevelt. In a letter of August 22 to Stalin, the President explained the routing desired by Willkie into China and his return to the United States by way of eastern Siberia and Alaska. The President wrote, "I think it will be of real benefit to both of our countries if he [Willkie] can get a firsthand impression of the splendid unity of Russia and the great defense you are conducting."

in the Soviet Union, Mr. Atherton read to Mr. Willkie the following statement suggested by the Secretary:

"I am here to cooperate in all the aims of the United Nations and in particular for the mutual benefit of our two countries in the common cause of achieving victory and peace."

740.0011 European War 1939/23808 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), August 25, 1942—9 p. m.
[Received August 27—2:10 a. m.]

713. On previous occasions important developments in Soviet foreign affairs, such as the Molotov visit to London and Washington, have inevitably been followed by mass meetings at factories and farms throughout the Soviet Union at which expressions of approval of the foreign policies of the Kremlin are voiced. In addition the press has usually followed the same policy by carrying laudatory articles and editorials, as well as voluminous favorable foreign news despatches on the event in question.

There has been no such reaction to the Churchill negotiations. The editorials which appeared in *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* on the day the official communiqué was published were lukewarm [and unenthusiastic in character. No editorial comment appeared in such important publications as *Red Star*, *Trud*, or *Komsolskaya* [*Komsomolskaya Pravda*] and no additional editorial comment has subsequently appeared in the press.

The foreign news despatches on the negotiations have been confined to several small items from England and the United States whereas considerable coverage continues to be given to popular demands in England and the United States for the creation of a second front. To date no mention in the Soviet press has been made of mass meetings to discuss and pass on the negotiations.

These reactions lead to the belief that there has been adopted a policy of "the less said the better" in regard to the Churchill visit and of endeavoring, possibly for purposes of morale, to keep the second front before the eyes of the public. In support of this latter view, the following manifestations have been noted: In news reels, the V for victory sign made by Churchill's two fingers on departing from Moscow was interpreted as two fingers for a second front and as such was greeted with applause.

The Dieppe raid⁴⁶ was given unusually wide coverage in the press and statements to the effect that the French masses were ready for invasion are frequently carried.

⁴⁶ See footnote 34, p. 460.

At a recent Voks⁴⁷ meeting dedicated to the motion picture industries of the United States and Great Britain practically all the speakers stressed the second front. Ehrenburg⁴⁸ stated that the national masses of the United States were demanding a second front and added that in the final analysis the demands of the masses were the guiding factor in formulating national policy.

STANDLEY

196.6/1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), August 27, 1942—5 p. m.
[Received August 28—7:52 a. m.]

719. My 330 from Moscow, August 23, 8 p. m. In the absence of Vyshinski who I am informed is ill following an operation for appendicitis which was accompanied by complications, I saw Lozovski⁴⁹ yesterday afternoon and discussed with him the gratuities referred to in the Department's 384, August 4, 4 p. m.

I set forth the point of view therein contained and left with Lozovski an *aide-memoire* asking that the gratuities be discontinued and at the same time renewing my earlier request that rubles at the diplomatic rate of exchange be made available to the crews of American vessels operating to North Russian ports. Reference is made in this connection to my 479, June 3, 11 a. m. Lozovski promised to examine the matter and let me know the decision of the Soviet Government in due course.

STANDLEY

740.0011-European War 1939/24585

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*⁵⁰

KUIBYSHEV, September 1, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Inasmuch as I have made no reports to the State Department on the Stalin-Churchill-Harriman negotiations, and the further fact that Mr. Harriman has no doubt reported in full to the President, I am forwarding herewith my personal obser-

⁴⁷ All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

⁴⁸ Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg, a Soviet literary figure and journalist.

⁴⁹ Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁰ The receipt of this letter was acknowledged on September 23, 1942.

vations in regard to the Conference ⁵¹ for such use as you may deem appropriate. I am also enclosing some photographs ⁵² which may be of interest in connection with Mr. Churchill's visit.

You will note that these observations are in a more or less fragmentary form and necessarily so for they were received at various times from Mr. Churchill himself and from Mr. Harriman and the British Ambassador. I feel that you will be interested in learning that according to the British Ambassador, the question of the Soviet post war frontiers was not mentioned at any time during the conferences.

With my kind personal regards.

Very sincerely,

W. H. STANDLEY

861.33/8

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called at his request. He said that his Government desired to transfer six submarines from Vladivostok to Russian ports in the Archangel-Murmansk area, and that they would have to come through the Panama Canal, stopping at given places within the United States jurisdiction in order to replenish supplies, et cetera, et cetera. He said he desired to inquire if it would be agreeable with this Government to cooperate in getting these submarines through the Canal and also in furnishing supplies wherever it might be deemed necessary for the submarines to put into port.

I replied without hesitation that I was sure that everyone in this Government would be delighted to cooperate in every feasible respect and that I would see that this request of his Government was given prompt attention.⁵³

Some reference was made to the Japanese-Siberian situation and the Ambassador promptly spoke with confidence and said that he did not think there was any probability of an attack on Siberia.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁵¹ Memorandum of observations not printed. This gives essentially a chronological account of the meetings and conversations. Some incidental descriptive details were included, but they add little of substance to the information contained in the telegrams sent by Harriman to the President.

⁵² None reproduced.

⁵³ The Navy Department expressed its agreement in a letter of September 14, 1942, from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and the War Department did likewise in a letter of September 15 from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (861.3311/46, 45).

740.0011 Pacific War/2806: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), September 13, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

774. My 734, September 2, 4 p. m.⁵⁴ I have just returned from a visit to the bomber crew accompanied by Bradley, Michela and Page. We proceeded from Kuibyshev in a Soviet airplane to Molotov⁵⁵ and thence by river steamer to Okhansk. We left here on Friday afternoon intending to return yesterday but were delayed until this morning.

We found the crew in good health, comfortably housed, adequately fed and in general well taken care of.

We left with them such reading matter as we were able to assemble here and their main concern is to receive news from their families at home.

STANDLEY

811.44 Willkie, Wendell L./9

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)⁵⁶

[Extracts]

2. *Mr. Willkie's activities in the Soviet Union.*

a. *In Kuibyshev.*⁵⁷

Mr. Willkie's airplane landed at the military-factory airport near Kuibyshev shortly after 3 p. m. on September 17. The party was met by Lozovski and other Foreign Office officials, the Mayor of Kuibyshev, the Chinese Ambassador⁵⁸ and members of his staff, the British Counselor,⁵⁹ the American Ambassador and members of his staff. The party was driven to the country house placed at Mr. Willkie's disposal by the Soviet Government where luncheon was served. Later in the afternoon the Ambassador took Mr. Willkie to call formally on Vyshinski and Lozovski at the Foreign Office. That evening he gave a reception at his residence in honor of Mr. Willkie, to

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ Formerly, Perm.

⁵⁶ This memorandum, undated and unsigned, was brought by the Ambassador when he returned to Washington for consultation and was attached to a covering letter to the Secretary of State, dated October 24, 1942.

⁵⁷ Ambassador Standley sent a telegram, No. 366, September 22, (not printed), partially describing these events.

⁵⁸ Shao Li-tze.

⁵⁹ Herbert Lacy Bagge.

which were invited Foreign Office and local officials, various Soviet personalities, the chiefs of diplomatic mission in Kuibyshev, and his own staff. Generals Bradley and Faymonville, Colonel Michela, and the representative of the American Red Cross⁶⁰ had come down from Moscow at the suggestion of the Ambassador to meet Willkie.

The greater portion of September 18, from 10 a. m. until 4:30 p. m. was spent inspecting, in company with Government and local officials, the airplane factory at which the IL-2, an attack bomber, is manufactured near Kuibyshev. Luncheon was served at this plant. Mr. Willkie talked with numerous workers, both men and women at this factory and interviewed at length the plant manager. A noticeable feature of all these conversations was that in practically every instance and evidently by design Mr. Willkie was asked when the second front would be opened and advised that the whole Soviet people were anxiously and impatiently awaiting its development.

The factory in question had been evacuated from Moscow last fall and was the identical one visited by members of the Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission in October, 1941. It was then known as Aircraft Factory No. 1. Great improvement in the present plant was noted, especially in the machine shop and assembly plant, and in most respects it could be considered a large modern establishment with up to date equipment. The engines were manufactured elsewhere and shipped to Kuibyshev—otherwise it was stated that every other part of the planes was made in the Kuibyshev factory. This, however, was considered an overstatement. Officials of the plant were very cautious in releasing information and the majority of questions regarding production were evaded or left entirely unanswered.

A reception and dinner were given for Mr. Willkie by the Chinese Ambassador from six to eight on this evening, following which he attended as guest of honor a performance of the ballet "Swan Lake". Before the curtain rose on the first act Mr. Willkie's presence, as special representative of the President, was announced from the stage and the audience gave him a very demonstrative welcome. Between the acts he was presented to the members of the company and after the final curtain he mounted the stage and presented the principal dancer with a bouquet of flowers and a kiss. This gesture was loudly acclaimed by the audience, and the general atmosphere was one of the utmost friendliness. It is worth recording, however, that various persons with whom Mr. Willkie entered into conversation between the different acts of the performance also raised the question of the second front. Both here and at the airplane factory Mr. Willkie stated to inquiries that it was his personal opinion that a second front would be opened very soon.

⁶⁰ Robert J. Scovell.

On September 19, leaving at 7:00 a. m., Mr. Willkie's party, members of the Embassy and the Ambassador were taken as guests of the Soviet Government on a boat trip up the Volga to Stavropol about fifty miles above Kuibyshev. Landing there at 11:00 a. m. a visit was paid to a State farm in the vicinity. Details of the operation of the farm were given Mr. Willkie and he was repeatedly photographed inspecting livestock, talking to farmers, children, and so forth. A lavish luncheon was served at the home of the superintendent of the farm and the entertainment in the form of food and drink was extremely abundant on the boat trip both to and from Stavropol. The only occasion on which the second front issue was raised during this trip was in the course of the proposal of a toast at the luncheon mentioned, by the commandant of the local garrison, to which Mr. Willkie replied that "the United States was in favor of a second front but Great Britain was not".

Returning to Kuibyshev at 7:00 p. m., the party had scant time to repair to their quarters preparatory to attending a dinner given in Mr. Willkie's honor by Vyshinski, at which his associates, the Ambassador and members of the Embassy staff were guests. During the dinner table conversation Mr. Willkie made a number of remarks on the need for better understanding between the Soviet and American peoples. (See section 5)

*b. In Moscow*⁶¹

It is impossible to give as full a description of Mr. Willkie's activities in Moscow as has been done in Kuibyshev since with few exceptions he and his party acted completely independently of the Embassy and information regarding his activities was often received second-hand and in a fragmentary form. It appeared that Mr. Willkie, probably through Mr. Barnes had made and was keeping in direct contact with the Soviet authorities and that he did not desire to deal through the Embassy.

Immediately after his arrival in Moscow, Mr. Willkie held a press conference. He maintained daily and intimate contact with the representatives of the American press during his Moscow visit. On September 21 a brief announcement of the arrival of the Willkie party appeared in the Soviet press without additional comment. That morning he received the British Ambassador; in the afternoon he called upon Mr. Molotov accompanied by the American Ambassador. An

⁶¹ Mr. Willkie and his party arrived in Moscow by airplane from Kuibyshev at 2:15 p. m., September 20, 1942.

account of Mr. Willkie's interview with Molotov is set forth in Section 3 of this memorandum.⁶² . . .

3. *Mr. Willkie's Interviews.*

*a. With Stalin*⁶³

During the call which Mr. Willkie and the Ambassador made on Molotov on September 21, Mr. Willkie expressed a desire to make an appointment with Stalin at which time he wished to present a letter from the President to Stalin. Later in the conversation he asked Molotov how he would be informed of the decision in the matter. Molotov replied that he would take the matter up with Stalin and would inform Mr. Willkie through the Embassy. On September 23 the Ambassador was informed indirectly by a minor Soviet official that the appointment had already been made. The Ambassador inquired of Molochkov⁶⁴ if he had heard of the appointment and was informed that Mr. Willkie himself had told him that morning that the date had been set for 7:30 the evening of the 23rd. Since the Ambassador had not been informed of this matter, he assumed that he was not expected to be present at the interview. He therefore informed Mr. Willkie that in view of the manner in which the notification of the appointment had been made he assumed that it was not intended that he should accompany him. Mr. Willkie stated that that was his understanding. He added, however, that he would inform the Ambassador of what took place at the interview. That afternoon at the Embassy reception described above⁶⁵ Mr. Willkie called the Ambassador over to where he was sitting with General Bradley and asked if the Ambassador thought he should take up the question of General Bradley's flight with Mr. Stalin. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did not wish him to take up any official matters with Mr. Stalin other than those regarding which he had received definite instructions from the President. He stated that there were certain matters regarding which the Embassy was concerned and for Mr. Willkie to discuss them at a meeting at which the Ambassador was not present would leave the Ambassador in an embarrassing position and without knowledge as to what actually took place.

Mr. Willkie called the Ambassador at about 10:00 p. m. that night, stated that he had just returned from his interview with Mr. Stalin and that he would be glad to come over and tell the Ambassador what

⁶² This portion of Section 3 not printed, but see telegram No. 371, September 23, midnight, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *infra*.

⁶³ Ambassador Standley sent a telegram (No. 380, September 26, 1942, not printed) stating that this meeting had taken place and that Mr. Willkie had informed him of the substance of the conversation.

⁶⁴ Chief of the Protocol Section of the Foreign Office.

⁶⁵ This portion of the memorandum is not printed.

had happened. Knowing that Mr. Willkie was leaving very shortly for an all night trip to the front,⁶⁶ the Ambassador replied that he thought it would be better to wait until he returned. Mr. Willkie stated that Stalin had given him permission to return to the United States via Siberia and requested the assistance of the Embassy with a view toward placing his pilot in touch with the appropriate Soviet authorities in order to make arrangements for the flight. This was done the following day.

Mr. Willkie called at the Embassy on September 25 and informed the Ambassador that he had taken up the Polish question with Mr. Stalin along the line that had been indicated in the Department's telegram No. 767, September 10,⁶⁷ pointing out particularly that it was in the common interest of the United Nations that there should be the maximum cooperation and the least possible cause for friction between the different nations fighting against the Axis, that Mr. Stalin had asked specific questions in regard to the Polish complaints but that he had replied that he did not wish to argue the details of the case. Mr. Stalin finally said that he would be willing to discuss the Polish question with Polish officials with a view towards ironing out existing difficulties. Mr. Willkie then informed the Ambassador that he had stated to Stalin that his two assistants, Mr. Barnes and Mr. Cowles, were very anxious to meet him. Mr. Stalin thereupon requested that they be sent for. After their arrival the conversation became more or less of a general nature and touched mainly on the seriousness of the Russian military situation. The Ambassador asked Mr. Willkie if he had made any reports to the President regarding the interview and was informed in the negative since the information which he had to convey to the President was so confidential that he did not wish to trust it even to coded messages. The Ambassador referred to Mr. Molotov's statement to the effect that Mr. Willkie would be informed of the meeting with Stalin through the Embassy and asked Mr. Willkie whether or not he had been instrumental in arranging that the Ambassador should not be present at the conference. Mr. Willkie denied emphatically that he had anything to do with the matter and added that he supposed the invitation had come directly

⁶⁶ In another part of this memorandum by Ambassador Standley, in connection with Willkie's side trip to the Rzhev front, he has written: "According to the Military Attaché who accompanied Mr. Willkie on his trip to the front the party was taken to an inactive sector at least 15-20 miles behind the front and saw no action. The Military Attaché described the trip as absolutely valueless from the point of view of a military observer."

⁶⁷ *Ante*, p. 184. Because of the failure of W. Averell Harriman to discuss the problems in Polish-Soviet relations with Stalin during his earlier visit in August (see footnote 59, p. 178), it was proposed that Willkie should discuss these difficulties with Stalin, without going into details, in the hope that an effort would be made by the Soviet authorities to bring about an amelioration in relations. For further correspondence concerning this procedure, see pp. 175-196, *passim*.

from Stalin. The Ambassador then discussed informally the position in which he had been placed in regard to the matter, stating that the fact that the invitation had gone directly to Mr. Willkie left him no other course than to believe that the Russians had deliberately avoided having the Ambassador at the conference. In the absence of any information the Ambassador felt that this placed him in a very embarrassing position. Mr. Willkie expressed the view that if the Ambassador allowed that feeling to influence him in the slightest degree and did anything concerning the matter, any such action would really place him in an embarrassing light and make him look very small.

4. *The Kremlin Dinner.*

During the interview which Mr. Willkie had with Stalin on September 23, Stalin told Mr. Willkie that he planned to give him a dinner and asked Mr. Willkie to name the date and submit a list of guests that he would like to have invited. September 26 was agreed upon and Mr. Willkie gave Stalin a list of guests, which included his entire party (excepting the enlisted men), the American Ambassador, General Bradley, General Faymonville, Colonel Michela and Captain Duncan. Later, Mr. Pavlov, of the Foreign Office, called the Embassy and informed it in a casual way of the date of the dinner and the names of those given by Mr. Willkie and asked for names of other members of the mission who might be included. Mr. Page took a list to Mr. Pavlov and Mr. Pavlov suggested that the Embassy take the matter up with Mr. Willkie. As it was Mr. Willkie's party the Embassy did not feel that it should take the position of asking Mr. Willkie to include any other members of the mission in the list of guests.

The dinner was held in the dining room of the palace quarters of the Kremlin. There were thirty guests which included, in addition to Mr. Willkie's party and the Embassy staff noted above, Stalin, Molotov, Mikoyan, Admiral Kuznetsov,⁶⁸ General Voroshilov, Beriia,⁶⁹ Lozovski, Dekanosov,⁷⁰ Molochkov, Sobolev (Secretary General of the Foreign Office), Sherbakov⁷¹ (Chief of the Soviet Press Bureau), Kozyrev⁷² (Secretary to Molotov), Oumanski, Pavlov and Potrubach⁷³ (interpreters) and the British Ambassador.

⁶⁸ Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet, People's Commissar for Naval Affairs.

⁶⁹ Lavrenty Pavlovich Beriia, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs.

⁷⁰ Vladimir Georgevich Dekanosov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁷¹ Alexander Sergeyevich Shcherbakov.

⁷² Semën Pavlovich Kozyrev.

⁷³ Mikhail Mikhailovich Potrubach.

Mr. Molotov acted as host. Mr. Willkie's party was the first to arrive and was followed immediately by the Ambassador and his staff. Stalin made his entry as on previous occasions after the guests had all arrived and went the entire round of the room shaking hands with each guest. Stalin was seated at the center of the table with Mr. Willkie on his right and the American Ambassador on his left. Molotov, seated opposite, had the British Ambassador on his right and General Bradley on his left. The dinner followed the procedure of previous occasions with Molotov acting as toastmaster throughout. Molotov toasted Mr. Willkie and the Ambassador gave a toast to Stalin. Mr. Willkie gave a toast to Prime Minister Churchill and Molotov gave a toast to the American and British Ambassadors. Practically all of the guests were recognized and toasted. With few exceptions, the toasts were of little significance. On one occasion Stalin rose and stated that the Soviet Government questioned why the British and American Governments supplied the Soviet Government with inferior material. He stated that the American Government has furnished the Soviets with P-40's instead of Aircobras and that the British had supplied Hurricanes instead of Spitfires, both of which were inferior to German planes; that when 150 Aircobras were allocated to the Soviet Union the British intercepted them and sent them somewhere else. He stated that the Russian people knew that both the Americans and the British had planes which were equal to or better than the German planes and could not see why some of these planes were not supplied to the Russians. This statement brought a reply from the British Ambassador in which he stated that he had full knowledge of the Aircobra diversion, that he could only say that he believed that the disposition made of these 150 Aircobras was of far greater value to the Allied cause than would have been the case had they been delivered to Russia.⁷⁴ The American Ambassador had no knowledge of this matter. It later developed that the planes were diverted for the use of American flyers.

A toast of interest was one given by Mr. Barnes, a former newspaper man in Moscow who is believed to have Communist leanings. In responding to a toast he spoke very enthusiastically about his previous experience at Moscow and of his associations there, especially mentioning Oumanski and Lozovski. The utterances of Mr. Barnes were important because of the advisory status he occupies with Mr. Willkie.

The dinner was a comparatively small one and the toasts were comparatively tame especially when compared with the Churchill dinner.

⁷⁴ The preceding four sentences were commented upon in a memorandum of November 12 by Edward Page, Jr., p. 745. See also telegram No. 384, September 28, from the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, and telegram No. 289, October 5, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, pp. 725 and 728, respectively.

The food, although plentiful, was all on the table and was not served in courses as on previous occasions. There was an absence of the usual effort to have the guests consume all the wine on the table.

The dinner terminated about 11 o'clock and the guests proceeded to the smoking room. Stalin arranged for his own group which was made up of Mr. Willkie, Pavlov (interpreter), Molotov, Oumanski, Voroshilov, Sobolev, the British Ambassador, the American Ambassador, and later General Bradley. The discussions were in a way rather general and light in character but on one point in the conversation Mr. Stalin looked across the table at the American Ambassador and said "why don't you come back to Moscow". The Ambassador replied, "Mr. Stalin, I ask *you* why I do not come back to Moscow. I understand that your seat of Government is in Kuibyshev and I supposed that I was complying with your desire by continuing my operations in that city.["] Mr. Stalin replied "there is no reason why you should not come back. Are you afraid to come back?" The Ambassador replied that he would be glad to return to Moscow and would do so as soon as possible. The Ambassador asked Stalin if it would not embarrass him in connection with the Japanese to which he replied "not at all because in two or three months I think all the diplomatic missions will come back". The Ambassador then inquired if Stalin had heard a B. B. C. report that evening which had quoted a statement made by the newly-appointed Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.⁷⁵ Upon receiving a negative reply the Ambassador informed Stalin that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was reported to have made a statement in Tokyo to the effect that Japanese-Soviet relations were in the state they had been for a long time—that there were no misunderstandings and no difficulties on the Siberian front and no chance of any disturbances there. The Ambassador said this had aroused his curiosity because he had heard in Kuibyshev rumors to the effect that certain conversations were going on between the Japanese and the Russians and that the statement of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that these discussions had terminated harmoniously. Stalin replied that there had been discussions. He added he had been informed that the Germans had demanded that the Japanese attack Soviet Siberia but that the Japanese had replied that if the Germans would supply Japan with one million tons of steel, five hundred thousand tons of shipping and with aluminum and other alloys and materials required for Japanese industry Japan would consider the German request, that the Germans had refused and that therefore Japan had refused to attack Russia. Stalin stated that the German refusal indicated that the Germans had no steel or other materials to spare and that Japan was in a difficult situation so far as raw materials for her industries was concerned.

⁷⁵ Masayuki Tani, appointed on September 17, 1942.

Stalin then made certain other statements in regard to the weakness of Japanese industrial facilities and again spoke about the return to Moscow of the Ambassador to which Molotov nodded his approval.⁷⁶

About midnight Stalin suggested that the guests see a motion picture, "The Defense of Moscow", which was shown. The picture lasted about one hour and the party broke up at 1 a. m.

5. *Statements made by Mr. Willkie.*

Mr. Willkie and the members of his party while in Moscow made their own arrangements for seeing and talking with various Soviet officials, foreign diplomats and correspondents. The Embassy therefore did not know whom they saw or by whom they were entertained, whom they talked with or what they said. Its knowledge of statements made by Mr. Willkie to the press is based on hearsay or on information received over the radio or published in newspapers. There is summarized however some of the conversations which did take place in the Ambassador's presence.

On September 25 [19] Vyshinski, the First Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, gave a formal dinner for Mr. Willkie at which Lozovski, the other Assistant Commissar, other members of the Foreign Office, Soviet military officials, members of the Embassy staff and of Mr. Willkie's party were present. During the course of the dinner Mr. Willkie informed Vyshinski and Lozovski that he had come to the Soviet Union with the purpose of obtaining material which would enable him to give the American people a more favorable picture of the Soviet Union than they had at present. During the two days that he had been in the Soviet Union he had come to realize how unfairly the Soviet Union had been represented in the past to the American people. False reports with regard to the Soviet Union had been circulated by certain vested interests which feared that the Soviet Government was endeavoring to spread the Soviet system to the United States. These enemies of the Soviet Union for instance had caused many Americans to believe that the Soviet Government did not permit freedom of religion in the Soviet Union and was persecuting those who practiced religion.⁷⁷ He now knew that the stories of religious persecution in the Soviet Union were false and hoped to take back with him material which he could use in convincing the American people that there was freedom of religion in the Soviet Union. It was now his understanding that the Soviet Government was opposed to priest craft as distinct from religion. He personally also had little respect

⁷⁶ The contents of this paragraph were reported separately by Ambassador Standley in his telegram No. 827, September 30, 1942 (not printed). He also invited the attention of the Department to "the main features of Stalin's own speech at the dinner table" which had been covered in telegram No. 384 from Moscow, September 28, p. 725.

⁷⁷ For correspondence on the interest of the United States in freedom of religious worship in the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 995 ff.

for priest craft and that in America the Church and the State were separate and he hoped that the American people could be brought to understand what the real situation was in the U. S. S. R.

The American people also were being led to believe that the Soviet Government not only had abolished private property in the Soviet Union but that it was endeavoring to bring about the abolition of private property in the United States. Two days in the Soviet Union however convinced him that there was not so great a difference in the Soviet outlook and the American outlook as many people in the United States believe. He was convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union from a social point of view were approaching each other and believed that within a few years the social systems of the two countries would be very similar. This last statement was received coldly by Vyshinski and Lozovski who were not inclined to admit that the Soviet Union was developing in a direction towards capitalism.

Mr. Willkie then assured Lozovski that if the Soviet authorities would give him an opportunity to find the answers to the many questions he would raise and freely to travel and meet people in the country, he would be able upon his return to the United States to place the Soviet Union in a much more favorable light before the American people. Vyshinski remarked dryly that Mr. Willkie was over optimistic, that if Mr. Willkie upon his return would write and speak favorably of the Soviet Union in the United States, persons in the United States hostile to the Soviet Union would say that he had been duped or shown only the most favorable aspects of Soviet life. Mr. Willkie said he was convinced that he could do much to bring about a more friendly feeling in the United States toward the Soviet Union. Twenty-three million people had voted for him, the American people had confidence in him, they knew that he was a man who frankly told the truth and the whole truth and that he could be trusted. He again expressed his earnest hope that he be given full freedom to investigate for himself conditions in the Soviet Union as they were. The Soviet authorities could be sure that if he saw something which he did not like or which made known in the United States might create an unfavorable impression, he would remain silent to it. His great desire was to improve Soviet-American relations and therefore he would not in the United States give voice to any unfavorable impression which he might receive.

Turning to the international field Mr. Willkie said that frankly and personally speaking it was his opinion that two countries and only two countries could be depended upon to win the war and that those two countries were the United States and the Soviet Union. He said, "without mentioning any other country—and I am sure you will know the country to which I refer, I am convinced from my

recent travels that imperialism is as dead as a dodo bird". At this remark both Vyshinski and Lozovski looked at each other in some astonishment but offered no comment. A few moments later when Vyshinski rose to make a toast he dwelt upon the fact that the winning of the war would require the united efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

On the afternoon of September 28 [19], a luncheon was given for Mr. Willkie by the officials of a Soviet farm. Members of the Foreign Office and Soviet military officers were present. During the course of this luncheon Mr. Willkie stated that the United States desired the establishment of a second front but that Great Britain was opposed to it. At the above mentioned dinner, in replying to Vyshinski's toast, Mr. Willkie observed that the American people desired the immediate creation of a second front.

It is assumed that most of the statements issued by Mr. Willkie to the press have been made available to the Department. An account of a press interview with Mr. Willkie which appeared in the Moscow *Izvestiya* of September 27 is of particular interest and is attached herewith. A part of this account read as follows:

"I asked myself what can be the most effective method of winning our war by helping our heroic Russian ally. There was only one answer for me—to establish together with Great Britain a real second front in Europe and within the shortest time our military leaders will approve. Perhaps the American public will have to prod them a little." ⁷⁸

6. *Comments on the visit.*

It is assumed that Mr. Willkie will make a full report to the President of his activities as the President's Special Representative in the Soviet Union and other countries. It may be stated that insofar as the Embassy is aware, the Soviet authorities from Stalin down to the lowest official have shown him every courtesy and have given him exceptional facilities for visiting places rarely seen by foreigners and for having conversations with persons who are as a rule inaccessible to foreigners.

It was apparent from the outset that Mr. Willkie while in the Soviet Union desired to depend upon members of his party for political advice and counsel and that he did not desire suggestions from the Embassy with regard to the attitude which he should assume towards the officials of the Soviet Union and other governments, towards the Soviet citizens whom he had an opportunity to meet and towards the press and with regard to private or public statements which he might make. The Ambassador, and the Embassy, therefore unfortunately were not able to give him much guidance particularly after he had

⁷⁸ Ambassador Standley reported this interview in telegram No. 821, September 21, 1942, not printed.

made it clear that he preferred to be completely independent of the Embassy.

Mr. Willkie did however as a result of the Ambassador's suggestion stop at Kuibyshev for two days before proceeding to Moscow and the Ambassador had an opportunity while in Kuibyshev to present him to the appropriate officials in the Foreign Office who arranged for him and his party to get acquainted with certain industrial and agricultural Soviet achievements. The Ambassador also went with Mr. Willkie to Moscow and presented him to Mr. Molotov who agreed to arrange an appointment for him with Mr. Stalin. It had been the understanding of the Ambassador that he was to introduce Mr. Willkie to Mr. Stalin and the Ambassador felt that it was important that he should be present during the interview. Circumstances the nature of which are not clear to him resulted in his not being present during the conversations between Stalin and Mr. Willkie and members of his party.

032 Willkie, Wendell/85 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 23, 1942—midnight.

[Received September 25—3:43 p. m.]

371. Monday afternoon ⁷⁹ I called on Molotov to present Willkie. After the preliminary exchanges in which Willkie remarked how much he had enjoyed his visit in Kuibyshev and the opportunity to see something of the local situation at first hand, which had already altered many of his preconceived ideas about the Soviet Union, he said that he now had two remaining main purposes in view: To go to the front in order to judge for himself conditions there, and to proceed from Moscow to Chungking and thence home by the Siberian route. He said that there appeared to be some confusion about the plans and asked that his pilot be placed in touch with the appropriate military authorities to the end that the necessary arrangements be completed as quickly as possible. Molotov replied that this could be done. I said at this point that this matter of Willkie's flight to China and on through Siberia would require Molotov's personal attention as I knew that it had already been referred back and forth between the Foreign Office and the military authorities several times. It [I] heretofore feared nothing would be accomplished unless he himself gave specific instructions with regard to it. Molotov assured me he would do this.

Willkie then expressed his desire to see factories and hospitals in the Moscow area. Molotov said he would be given every facility in this connection but that most factories had been evacuated from this dis-

⁷⁹ September 21.

trict. Willkie said that his sole aim in coming here was to tell the Soviets what America is thinking and doing and to take back home a corresponding picture of what Russia is doing and thinking now. He emphasized the vital need for cooperation between our two countries not only for the war effort but for the ensuing peace.

Molotov replied that war necessarily imposed restrictions and that some things might not be open for inspection but that as far as possible Willkie would be shown all that he wanted to see. Willkie then remarked that he hoped to be able to leave Moscow on next Sunday.

I then took occasion to inquire of Molotov respecting pessimistic statements I had heard were being made in London and Washington on the subject of the Russian front (see my 367, September 22, 11 a. m.⁸⁰). Molotov did not answer directly but said that he could not be too optimistic regarding the Russian front, that they were fighting desperately, that in some cases the same position would change hands several times in one day, that there were great losses on both sides, that the Germans were trying to drive a wedge through the center of Stalin-grad which extends along the Volga for 60 kilometers and that the situation in the Caucasus was serious. He said, however, that there was no idea of surrendering the city, which he felt would be defended, and that the Caucasus would also be defended successfully.

Molotov then asked Willkie to outline his own opinion and opinion in the United States on the war situation on the various fronts. Willkie proceeded in reply to give Molotov estimates, statements and figures with which he had evidently armed himself for just such an occasion. In summary he drew a rather optimistic picture of the long run situation in the Pacific and of the outlook on the Egyptian front. While believing that the Germans remained strong, he expressed the conviction that they would be defeated, but only by direct action and not by bombing, starvation, or internal disaffection. Molotov here remarked that the bombing was, nevertheless, of material assistance. Willkie then discussed airplane production, planes, and summarized the situation with respect to merchant shipping. Here again his analysis of the long run perspective was hopeful.

I remarked to Molotov at this point that as regards the question of increased aid to Russia I had just learned from General Bradley that he had been informed the Soviet authorities in Washington had told the American authorities that operations in connection with the delivery of airplanes to Russia across Siberia had been discontinued⁸¹ and that this subject was no longer a live issue. I said I hoped this was not true. Molotov replied that if we put down planes in Alaska

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ Regarding this interruption, see telegram No. 278, September 26, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 725.

the Soviets would fly them here but that they could not keep Russian pilots sitting there with no planes to fly.

Earlier in the conference Willkie told Molotov that he had a letter from the President to Stalin concerning the desirability of his flight from Moscow eastward,⁸² and that he hoped to have an opportunity to present this letter in person. Molotov replied that this would be afforded. Later Willkie added that in order for the information he was assembling to be of real effectiveness it should be taken back as quickly as possible, and that he accordingly hoped he would be able to proceed by the Siberian route as he could thus get home a week sooner. Molotov then said that the route had not been used, would be difficult, would have to be studied, he expressed doubt that it would prove to be practicable. I pointed out that the trip as far as Chungking, which I supposed would not present such difficulties, was urgent and Molotov said that he would issue orders so that the necessary technical discussions might begin at once. In conclusion I asked Molotov if he would kindly endeavor to arrange the meeting with Stalin as soon as convenient and he said that he would do so and inform the Embassy when the appointment had been fixed.⁸³

STANDLEY

123 Standley, William H./83: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1942—4 p. m.

487. The President approves your 822 of September 29, noon,⁸⁴ and authorizes you to return at your convenience to be accompanied by Page and leaving Henderson in charge. The President approves that Captain Duncan and Colonel Michela be ordered home for consultation and I am asking that appropriate instructions may be sent them.

The Ferry Command is being requested to give you and your party first priority from Cairo to Washington.

The President desires that previous to your departure you will satisfy both Stalin and Molotov that this trip is being made in their interests; in the first instance, because of your close association for many years with military matters you desire to personally report to the President and bring him up to date on certain phases of the military situation generally, and secondly, your purpose while in this country is to further the immediate and closer cooperation of the two nations in

⁸² See footnote 45, p. 633.

⁸³ See the first and last paragraphs of section 3a of the memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *supra*.

⁸⁴ Not printed; Ambassador Standley had proposed his return to Washington for personal consultation (123 Standley, William H./80).

their war effort. Third, and lastly, you should inquire of Mr. Stalin whether he has any personal message for the President.⁸⁵

I assume you will keep me closely advised as to your plans and I shall welcome seeing you here.

HULL

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

Moscow, October 5, 1942.

A VISIT ON MR. MOLOTOV AT 6 P.M. ON OCTOBER 5, 1942

I called on Mr. Molotov at the Kremlin this afternoon. Immediately after presenting Mr. Henderson, who accompanied me, I inquired of Mr. Molotov if he had any word concerning the landing in Siberia of any of the planes which we were sending to the Soviet Union from Alaska. He was unable to tell me definitely at the moment. After instituting inquiries he informed me later during our conversation that on the 3rd of September twelve Boston bombers had landed at Nome and that there was no further word with regard to them.⁸⁶

I then referred to my visit to Mr. Vyshinski on Friday, October 2, at which time I had told him of my orders to visit the United States and he had requested that he inform Mr. Molotov that I was coming to Moscow. I added that I had received through Mr. Vyshinski Mr. Molotov's very cooperative message which I appreciated very much. I stated that President Roosevelt was much concerned over the adequacy and effectiveness of American aid to Russia and over Mr. Stalin's expressed dissatisfaction with regard to such aid and that the President had taken advantage of Mr. Henderson's presence here to bring me home for consultation, leaving Mr. Henderson temporarily in charge. Mr. Molotov would recall that on my first visit to him I had stated that in war diplomacy gives way to the military and that it was my purpose to do everything in my power to remove obstacles to the flow of munitions to Russia. I had persistently pursued that policy but evidently a monkey wrench had been dropped into the machine. Things were not working out as smoothly as they should and I was returning to Washington to see if there was something I could do to

⁸⁵ The Ambassador reported in telegram No. 398 from Moscow on October 5, 1942, that he had seen Molotov that day and had carried out these instructions. Molotov had assured him in reply that he considered the Ambassador "to be a real friend of the Soviet Union" and was confident that his trip home "would work to the mutual benefit of the United States and the Soviet Union." (123 Standley, William H./87) Details of the conversation are in the Ambassador's memorandum of October 5, *infra*. For the message from Stalin to President Roosevelt, dated October 7, see p. 730.

⁸⁶ See footnote 28, p. 725.

remove all obstacles to the flow of material and supplies. Because of my close association for many years with military matters it was felt desirable that I personally report to the President and bring him up-to-date on certain phases of the situation generally. While at home I would also do my utmost to further the unity of, and close cooperation between, our two nations in our war effort. I stated that with this objective I was taking with me Captain Duncan, Naval Attaché, and Colonel Michela, Military Attaché, who shared my views and desires and I felt it would be very helpful to them to be brought into touch with the current conditions at home. In this connection I would venture to offer for his consideration the possibility of the Soviet Government sending a Naval Officer and Military officer—possibly the officers who were the Soviet Liaison with my Attachés—back to Washington with us. I thought it might be helpful if these officers while in the United States would visit production plants and factories and would thus have an opportunity to see for themselves the extent of our war effort and to obtain a better understanding of our problems. Mr. Molotov stated he would take this matter up with the appropriate Military and Naval officials. Since, however, the Soviet Union had Military and Naval Attachés in Washington he doubted the necessity of sending these officers to the United States just now. I replied that he had made a trip to the United States even though there was a Soviet Ambassador in Washington and that I was sure that this trip had been helpful to him. I thought that perhaps similarly a trip to the United States would be helpful to the Soviet Military and Naval Liaison Officers. Mr. Molotov replied with a smile that he had not taken any Military or Naval Attachés with him.

I stated that I would like to see Mr. Stalin before I left and that I hoped that he would say to Mr. Stalin that I would be glad to take back to President Roosevelt any personal messages which Mr. Stalin might desire to send. I was planning to leave for the United States as soon as I conveniently could after seeing Mr. Stalin and I hoped to get away by Thursday if Mr. Stalin, who I realized must be very busy, could see me before that day.

I also stated that I would endeavor to expedite my work in Washington and hoped to return at an early date. It was my understanding that a Stratosphere service was being established between London and Moscow and I was considering the advisability of returning by that route. Mr. Molotov and I then discussed for a few minutes his experiences when he traveled by that route.

I informed Mr. Molotov that I intended to go to Tehran in General Bradley's plane and would appreciate his aid in facilitating the de-

parture of the plane. He stated that there would be no objections or obstacles.

I told Mr. Molotov that I was planning to see the press tomorrow and that I would tell them during my talk with them of my planned trip to Washington.⁸⁷ I said that I would appreciate it if no announcement of my trip would be given out before that time. He replied that there would be no statement given.

I said that I wished to thank Mr. Molotov for his cooperation and for the many courtesies which he had extended to me and expressed the hope that during my absence Mr. Henderson would enjoy the same privileges. Mr. Molotov replied that he would extend to Mr. Henderson the same and would be glad to receive him at any time. I also stated that I would be happy to take any messages back, undertake any errands, or tend to any other matters Mr. Molotov might wish me to do for him while in Washington.

Mr. Molotov stated that it was difficult for him to give judgment as to the purpose of my visit home but that he would be ready to answer any questions in regard to it. He also stated that he would make endeavor to arrange for an interview with Stalin and let me know the results.⁸⁸

I then inquired if there was any news in regards to the Stalingrad front. It was my understanding that conditions had improved there. He stated that unfortunately the contrary was the case. The situation was deteriorating although hard fighting was still going on.

I then asked Mr. Molotov if he could give me any information in regard to the food situation, having in mind information given me by the British Ambassador to the effect that Mr. Molotov had mentioned to him a conversation between Mr. Stalin and Mr. Willkie on this subject. Mr. Molotov replied that Mr. Willkie and Mr. Stalin had discussed this question and that he would tell me what was said.

[The remainder of this memorandum, dealing with the conversation of Mr. Stalin and Mr. Willkie on the food situation in the Soviet Union, was sent in the Ambassador's telegram No. 399, October 6, printed on page 729.]

⁸⁷ Ambassador Standley gave a general statement concerning his return to Washington to the American and British correspondents in Moscow on October 6, 1942.

⁸⁸ The Ambassador reported briefly to the Department that he had taken General Bradley to see Stalin on October 6, 1942, and that Stalin had appeared most agreeable, promising to send a message for delivery to President Roosevelt the next day. Some details of this meeting are in the Ambassador's book, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, pp. 300-302.

711.61/843½

Memorandum by Mr. William D. Moreland, Jr., of the Office of the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1942.

At 5:20 this evening General Hurley⁸⁹ telephoned to report on his visit to the Soviet Ambassador upon whom he called at 4:45 p. m. General Hurley is departing for New York in the morning.⁹⁰

The General said that the Ambassador appeared to be in a rather truculent and critical mood, pointing out that Mr. Willkie, Ambassador Standley, the Military Attaché and the Naval Attaché to Moscow were all coming home and wondering why, with all this wealth of reporting imminent, anyone else should have to go to Russia. The Ambassador criticized American assistance to his country and again asked General Hurley what there was about his country that we still wanted to know. The General felt that he gave as well as he received and succeeded in getting the Ambassador into a pleasant and cordial mood.

The Ambassador asked to see the President's letter to Mr. Stalin⁹¹ but the General side-stepped the issue in a cordial manner although with some effort.

General Hurley is of the opinion that his call upon the Ambassador was definitely successful and that it probably did some good.

The Ambassador promised that he would report the General's coming visit to Russia and that his Soviet visa would be available by the time he reached Tehran. The General hoped that the State Department might be able to keep a watchful eye on the visa question.

W[ILLIAM] D. M[ORELAND,] JR.

196.6/1438 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), October 13, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received October 14—7:29 a. m.]

881. Reference Department's 384, August 4, 4 p. m. Zarubin informed me that steps have been taken to abolish the practice of giving bonuses or gratuities to American sailors entering Soviet Arctic ports.

⁸⁹ Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Minister to New Zealand, sent as Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to the Soviet Union, November–December 1942.

⁹⁰ By telegram No. 511, October 13, 1942, the Department advised the Embassy in Kuibyshev that "General Hurley, returning to his post, is proceeding by way of the Near East and Soviet Union on a special mission under the direction of the President and is the bearer of a letter from the President to Stalin." (121.891/6)

⁹¹ For the text of this letter, see p. 659.

He said that the Soviet Government in view of existing currency legislation could not, however, furnish rubles to American sailors at diplomatic rates of exchange or at any other than the official rates.

Since the Soviet authorities were genuinely anxious to alleviate conditions they were considering the advisability of furnishing gratis rubles to American merchant officers and seamen arriving in northern ports, rubles in limited fixed amounts which could be used as spending money. For instance, they might give each officer a thousand rubles and each seaman three or four hundred rubles. Any rubles which might be needed in addition should be purchased at official rates. Zarubin said that he felt that this arrangement would not be subjected to the objections which applied to the bonus which was in American dollars—since the rubles would represent merely spending money and would have little or no value outside the Soviet Union.

At his request I promised to inquire whether arrangements of the kind tentatively proposed by him would be objected to by the American Government.⁹²

HENDERSON

[Ambassador Standley made his report on the problems and difficulties encountered in the Soviet Union to President Roosevelt, in the presence of Harry Hopkins, on October 22, 1942. No record of this meeting has been found in Department files, or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. The Ambassador's own description of this conversation is printed in his book, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, pages 306-310.]

740.0011 European War 1939/25722½ : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 15, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received November 16—7: 54 a. m.]

464. Personal for the President from Hurley. I have had conferences with Molotov and Stalin. (Syllabus).

1. Stalin expressed his understanding of the desire for an all out attack against Japan now. He definitely disapproved that strategy at this time as it would divert matériel and force from this theater. He denied Japan's ability to exploit within the ensuing year or 18 months the war resources of the territories she has occupied.

⁹² Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator, was informed of this proposal by Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long in a letter of October 27, 1942, and his opinion of this arrangement requested. The letter had been shown to Ambassador Standley, who was in Washington, and who concurred.

2. Stalin stressed the paramount importance of the defeat of Hitler first, and maintained that the defeat of Japan would be logical consequence. He completely agreed with strategy indicated in your letter and amplified to him by me.

3. Stalin made clear the necessity of accumulating in Russia as quickly as possible the matériel essential to enable Russia to assume the offensive. Such an offensive, he considered, a proper implementation of the strategy outlined by you.

4. Stalin stated that eventually we would need an additional front in Asia from which to attack Japan simultaneously with an attack from the Pacific.

5. Stalin repeated his commendation already expressed through the press of the operations in North Africa.

6. Stalin agreed to afford me the means of a complete understanding of Russian strategy in Russia. He proposed that this be done through contact with proper military authorities and personal reconnaissance of the vital fighting front. (End syllabus).

My discussion with Stalin of the foregoing subjects began at 11 p. m. on November 14 and continued to 12:30 a. m. on November 15. Molotov, whom I had visited several days before, but with whom I had not discussed the purpose of my mission, sat through the entire conference. He did not participate in the discussions. Pavlov interpreted.

I opened the conference by extending your greetings and expressing your admiration for the fortitude and the intelligence with which Russia is conducting her great fight. I then assured Stalin that any statement he might make to me would be transmitted directly and secretly to President Roosevelt alone. I handed him your letter of October 5 addressed to him.⁹³ On his direction it was read and interpreted to him at once. Before commenting on the letter he asked if I had anything to say in regard to the subject matter or if I wished to amplify the contents.

I reviewed briefly my recent service in the Pacific area, explained the present situation in that theater, and presented the argument that has heretofore been made by Australians, New Zealanders, and some Americans—including myself—to the effect that we should attack, defeat and destroy the autocracy of Japan before she had time to exploit the great resources of the territory she had occupied. I concluded by pointing out that the defeat of Japan would remove a formidable enemy from our rear and would permit the full utilization of our resources in the Western theater; that likewise, the defeat of Japan would release the war resources of Russia now in the Asiatic

⁹³ *Infra.*

area. This would enable the United States and Russia to bring their full force to bear on the paramount objective—the defeat of Hitler.

I then told him that contrary to these views you had decided that the most effective plan in which the United Nations could join for defeating Hitler was through rendering all possible support to the Russian armies and that the defeat of Japan would naturally follow the defeat of Germany. I told Stalin that it was now my purpose to help make your strategy effective.

Mr. Stalin then began talking—slowly, quietly, deliberately. He expressed his greetings to you and his appreciation of your splendid leadership. His first sentence on the subject under discussion was to the effect that you had adopted the correct and the most effective strategy. He stressed the imperative need of creating a reserve in Russia to justify Russia in assuming the offensive. He referred again to the necessity for a second front in Europe eventually, but agreed fully on the effectiveness of the opening of what he referred to as another front in Africa.

Up to this time he had made no reference to Japan. I then referred to his recent anniversary address⁹⁴ and expressed appreciation for his outline of the objectives of the Soviet-American-Anglo coalition. I referred with commendation to his letter to Mr. Cassidy of the Associated Press⁹⁵ on the American-British achievements in North Africa.⁹⁶ I then started to suggest that in all his public discussion he had made no mention of the Eastern theater. Before I completed the sentence he laughed and interrupted me to say, “I know. You are going to say that I failed to mention your enemy—Japan.”

In this statement I cheerfully acquiesced. He then began a clear analysis of what he termed the war in Asia. His first comment was that I had placed too much stress on Japan’s ability to exploit the war resources now within her line. He said that Japan had only such tooling as she had received from the United States before the war and was now receiving from Germany. He described this as absolutely insufficient.

He said that Japan did not possess trained workers in sufficient numbers in Japan or in the area she had occupied. His whole argument on this subject led to the conclusion that there was no danger whatever of Japan being able to exploit the captured resources to any appreciable extent within the next year or 18 months. At one point

⁹⁴ See telegram No. 438, November 8, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 475.

⁹⁵ Henry Cassidy, correspondent of the Associated Press in Moscow.

⁹⁶ See telegram No. 459, November 14, from the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, p. 478.

this discussion indicated that Russia intended in due course to cooperate in the establishment of a mainland front against Japan, but further discussion of that subject so modified his statement that it should not be taken as a commitment.

I asked him if it were not a fact that Japan's role was not that of a selfish opportunist, watching Germany's progress and holding herself in position to take advantage of any success that might come to Germany in the Western theater. This he answered in the negative. He said that the cooperation between Japan and Germany was complete. He knew that recently Japan had made increased demands on Germany for surface ships and airplane engines. He said that Japan was incapable of constructing first class airplanes without the aid of Germany. Great traffic was taking place between Germany and Japan at the present.

The surface craft and the airplanes which Japan had lost were irreplaceable by Japan alone. The number of Japanese seacraft sunk by the United States and airplanes destroyed had greatly increased Japan's demands upon Germany. He was positive in his conclusion that Japan would be unable to sustain herself in the war without the aid of Germany.

All of this led him to agree completely with you that the defeat of Japan would be a logical consequence of the defeat of Germany.

At this point Stalin stopped me to ask if he had made clear his position on all the questions I had presented. I told him he had, but he had not yet given me a clear statement of Russia's strategy in Russia and that I would like to know, for instance, what Russia now had between her enemy and her oil, how much matériel Russia would require before she could take the offensive, and where, how, and when she contemplated the offensive. Here I expected to be thrown out of the Kremlin.

He replied that heretofore he had steadfastly declined to permit any but Russians to have the opportunity of seeing and understanding Russia's manner of contact with the enemy and her present and future strategy. Much to my surprise he then said it would take about 3 days for him to make arrangements for proper officers to consult with me on strategy, and a personal reconnaissance trip by me to the vital fighting areas.

Stalin's attitude was uniformly good-natured, his expressions were always clear, direct and concise. His attitude toward you and the United States was always friendly and respectful. [Hurley.]

HENDERSON

740.0011 Pacific War/2873a

*President Roosevelt to the President of the Council of People's
Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*⁹⁷

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. STALIN: I am giving this letter of presentation to you to General Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War and at present United States Minister to New Zealand.

General Hurley is returning to his post in New Zealand and I have felt it to be of the highest importance that, prior to his return, he should be afforded the opportunity of visiting Moscow and of learning, so far as may be possible, through his own eyes the most significant aspects of our present world strategy. I wish him in this way, as a result of his personal experiences, to be able to assure the Government of New Zealand and likewise the Government of Australia that the most effective manner in which the United Nations can join in defeating Hitler is through the rendering of all possible assistance to the gallant Russian armies, who have so brilliantly withstood the attacks of Hitler's armies.

I have requested General Hurley likewise to visit Egypt, as well as Iran and Iraq, in order that he might thus personally familiarize himself with that portion of the Middle East and see for himself the campaign which is being carried on in that area.

As you know, the Governments of Australia and of New Zealand have been inclined to believe that it was imperative that an immediate and all-out attack should be made by the United Nations against Japan. What I wish General Hurley to be able to say to those two Governments after his visit to the Soviet Union is that the best strategy for the United Nations to pursue is for them first to join in making possible the defeat of Hitler and that this is the best and surest way of insuring the defeat of Japan.

I send you my heartiest congratulations on the magnificent achievements of the Soviet armies and my best wishes for your continued welfare.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

⁹⁷ Handed to Stalin by General Hurley on November 14; see p. 656.

740:0011 European War 1939/25741;

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
((Molotov) to the American Chargé in the Soviet Union
((Henderson) ⁹⁸*

Moscow, November 15, 1942.

ESTEEMED MR. HENDERSON: I herewith communicate to you the following message of Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt:

"To President Roosevelt from Premier Stalin:

Esteemed Mr. President:

I thank you very much for your letter delivered to me today by General Hurley. I had with General Hurley a long conversation regarding questions of strategy. It seemed to me that he understood me and was convinced regarding the correctness of the strategy now followed by the Allies. He asked regarding the possibility of visiting one of our fronts and, in particular, of visiting the Caucasus. This possibility will be assured him.

No serious change has taken place during the last week on the Soviet-German front. In the nearest future we expect to begin our winter campaign. Preparation for it is now going on. I shall inform you regarding the course of the campaign.

All of us here are glad of the brilliant successes of the American and English armed forces in North Africa. Permit me to congratulate you on the victory. I heartily wish you further successes.

With sincere respect.

Stalin

November 14, 1942"

The message indicated I have telegraphed to Mr. Litvinov for delivery to Franklin D. Roosevelt.

I wish you, Mr. Henderson, to accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson) to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson), at Kuibyshev

Moscow, November 21, 1942.

MR. HENDERSON: When General Bradley saw Mr. Molotov on October 26 he left a copy of the attached *Aide-Mémoire* but explained that it had been prepared for his, General Bradley's, use and he was leaving it as of possible assistance to the interpreter.

In addition to the report of the conversation contained in Moscow's telegram number 353, October 27, 12 noon, I should inform you that

⁹⁸ This translation was forwarded in a letter of November 16, 1942, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State.

when General Bradley informed Molotov that General Adler⁹⁹ would make the Caucasus survey, Molotov pointed out that the question of air assistance in the Caucasus had been discussed a long time ago and what was now wanted was the arrival of the planes and crews.¹ It was disappointing that instead of planes a survey was now to be made. He said that everything necessary would be waiting at the fields regardless of the survey.

The foregoing remarks were made in a pleasant manner and Molotov did not give the impression that he was opposed to a survey but simply that the assistance was needed quickly and that the Soviet Government was disappointed at the delay.

In reply Bradley said that he realized the need for speed and was sure that the matter was now being pushed but he pointed out that this was not under his jurisdiction and he could not comment on it officially.

Inasmuch as the Caucasus survey had not been mentioned in any Department telegrams I did not include this report in my telegram to you.

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON

[Annex]

Moscow, October 26, 1942.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In his report to Washington of his conference with Premier Stalin of October 6, 1942, General Bradley informed the United States authorities that permission to make surveys of Soviet air bases in the Caucasus and Eastern Siberia had been granted.² He has now been informed that the Caucasus survey will be made by a joint United States-British mission on which Brigadier General E. E. Adler will represent the United States.

With respect to the survey of Eastern Siberian bases, General Bradley has been instructed to return to the United States via China and Alaska for consultation on the Far Eastern situation as it might mutually affect the United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and to defer making the survey until his return to the Soviet

⁹⁹ Brig. Gen. Elmer E. Adler, who arrived on November 21, 1942, in Moscow with his party, and departed on December 26, 1942.

¹ For a message from President Roosevelt to Stalin on October 12 regarding aviation assistance to the Soviet Union, see note No. L-15 from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, p. 733.

² General Bradley's report has not been found in Department files. For Ambassador Standley's comments on the meeting with Stalin on October 6, see footnote 88, p. 653. He also reported in telegram No. 869 of October 10, that "General Bradley has informed me that negotiations regarding the use of the Siberian ferry service have been resumed." (861.248/250)

Union following his conferences in Washington.⁸ He would therefore be grateful if an officer could be designated with whom he could discuss the details of his flight into China and from China through Siberia into Alaska.

General Bradley also suggests that an officer be designated with whom he might discuss in detail the Far Eastern situation in order that he may be in a position to inform the authorities in Washington with respect to the Soviet Union's facilities and possible needs for air force cooperation in the Far East. In this connection General Bradley would be glad to call at the headquarters of the Soviet Armies in the Far East should this be considered desirable to supplement the discussions in Moscow.

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-18

Moscow, November 21, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message dated November 19, 1942, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.

"I am glad you have been so kind to General Hurley. As you can well recognize, I have had a problem in persuading the people of Australia and New Zealand that the menace of Japan can be most effectively met by destroying the Nazis first. General Hurley will be able to tell them at first hand how you and Churchill and I are in complete agreement on this.

"Our recent battles in the Southwest Pacific make the position there more secure even though we have not yet eliminated attempts by the Japanese to extend their southward drive."

"The American and British staffs are now studying further moves in the event that we secure the whole south shore of the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Syria. Before any further step is taken, both

⁸ General Bradley had been ordered home for consultation late in October by way of China and Siberia. By November 5, 1942, he had received permission from the Chinese and Soviet Governments for this flight, and he left Kuibyshev on November 13, for Tashkent and Chungking. In *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, pp. 255, 256, Standley relates that "on October 24, the Soviet delegation told General Bradley that, since ALSIB matters were progressing so satisfactorily, their government felt that there was no further need to continue discussions; they had been ordered to dissolve the mission." It was through the efforts of General Bradley that this air route "was opened and kept open; hundreds of Lend-Lease combat aircraft were flown to Russia for use on the Eastern Front, when the Russians badly needed all the help they could get."

⁹ Another letter, No. L-19, of November 26, 1942, from President Roosevelt told Stalin that the Japanese had been hit very hard in the Solomons, and that "we are going to press our advantages." There was hope that the Germans would soon be driven out of Africa, "and then we will give the Italians a taste of some real bombing, and I am quite sure they will never stand up under that kind of pressure." (Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96.)

Churchill and I want to consult with you and your staff, because whatever we do next in the Mediterranean will have a definite bearing on your magnificent campaign and your proposed moves this coming winter.

"I do not have to tell you to keep up the good work. You are doing that, and I honestly feel that things everywhere look brighter.

"With my warm regards,
Roosevelt"

Accept [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov) to the American Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Henderson)*

[Translation]

Moscow, November 27, 1942.

ESTEEMED MR. HENDERSON: I inform you herewith of the following message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt:

"Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt.

"I thank you for your message which I received on November 21. I understand well your desire to explain the complicated military situation to the people of Australia and New Zealand and also your attention to operations in the Southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean. As concerns operations in the Mediterranean Sea, which are developing so auspiciously and which are significant in that they may change the whole military situation in Europe, I now share your opinion that appropriate consultations between the Staffs of the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are desirable.

"I send you sincere greetings and best wishes for new successes in the matter of a further offensive."

The message indicated I have telegraphed to Mr. Litvinov for delivery to President Franklin D. Roosevelt:

I beg you [etc.]

V. Molotov

740.0011 European War 1939/260841: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 28, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 10:01 p. m.]

503. Reference my 464, November 15, 7 p. m. General Hurley, who has been held up here by non-flying weather, departed by Soviet plane with his aide, Major Henry⁵ and Acting Military Attaché, Lieutenant

⁵ John C. Henry, Air Transport Command, Army Air Corps.

Colonel Park,⁶ for the Voronezh-Stalingrad front. He expects to be on this front about 4 days and then to spend several days on the Caucasian front. He does not know as yet whether he will return to Moscow or proceed from the Caucasus direct to Tehran.

HENDERSON

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the American Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson)

Moscow, November 29, 1942.

ESTEEMED MR. HENDERSON : I inform you herewith of the message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt set forth below :

"Personal and Secret message from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt.

"I thank you for your message received November 27.⁷ Your successes in the area of the Solomon Islands and such a powerful growth of your forces in the Southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean please me.

"Being convinced that the Germans will be quickly driven out of North Africa, I hope that this will serve for the development of offensive operations of the Allies in Europe. The intensive bombardments of Italy referred to by you will certainly be of great importance.

"In the Stalingrad operations we have obtained significant successes and it should be taken into consideration that the snowfall and clouds which have prevented the German Aviation from developing its forces have aided not a little.

"We have decided also to undertake operations on the Central Front in order to prevent the enemy from transferring his forces to the South.

"Accept my hearty greetings and best wishes for the American armed forces."

I have telegraphed the message indicated to Mr. Litvinov for transmittal to Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

I beg you [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

740.00114A P. W./242 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 30, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

508. Major McCabe, Assistant Military Attaché, and Commander Lang, naval physician, have just returned from a visit to the interned American bomber crew at Okhansk. McCabe's report is as follows :

⁶ Richard Park, Jr.

⁷ See footnote 4, p. 662.

"Based on Soviet standards the food, housing and heating conditions are excellent. Winter clothing issued by the Soviets was not adequate but the military commander at Okhansk has promised the immediate issue of better clothing from Molotov.⁸ Except for moderate vitamin deficiencies the health of the crew is satisfactory. All members of the crew were examined by Dr. Lang. Morale is still excellent due to outstanding leadership displayed by Major York, although continued inactivity, especially during the winter, is causing a decline. The Soviet attitude toward the crew is very friendly."

McCabe makes the informal suggestion that in the interest of the maintenance of morale and in order to prevent any embarrassing incident which might conceivably develop in case the men should endeavor to escape, it would be desirable if some way could be found for the internees to be assigned some useful work. He also states that they have expressed the desire for a transfer to a more southerly climate since all of them are from the southern part of the United States.

It might be possible during some of the conversations which are taking place between American and Soviet military authorities for the American representatives to propose that the internees be released on parole for work with the Soviet Air Force in the Caucasus.

HENDERSON

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-20

Moscow, December 5, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message dated December 2, 1942, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.

"The more I consider our mutual military situation and the necessity for reaching early strategic decisions, the more persuaded I am that you, Churchill and I should have an early meeting.

"It seems to me that a conference of our military leaders alone will not be sufficient, first, because they could come to no ultimate decisions without our approval and secondly, because I think we should come to some tentative understanding about the procedures which should be adopted in event of a German collapse.

"My most compelling reason is that I am very anxious to have a talk with you. My suggestion would be that we meet secretly in some secure place in Africa that is convenient to all three of us. The time, about January 15th to 20th.

"We would each of us bring a very small staff of our top army, air and naval commanders.

⁸ The city formerly called Perm is meant.

"I hope that you will consider this proposal favorably because I can see no other way of reaching the vital strategic decisions which should be made soon by all of us together. If the right decision is reached, we may, and I believe will, knock Germany out of the war much sooner than we anticipated.

"I can readily fly, but I consider Iceland or Alaska out of the question at this time of the year. Some place can, I think, be found in southern Algeria or at or near Khartoum where all visitors and press can be kept out. As a mere suggestion as to date would you think of sometime around January 15."

Accept [etc.]

For the Chargé d'Affaires a. i.:

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.

Secretary of Embassy

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the Second Secretary of the American Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

[Translation]

Moscow, 5 December, 1942.

ESTEEMED MR. THOMPSON: I inform you herewith of the following message of Premier I. V. Stalin for President Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt:

"Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt.

"I have received your message of December 5. I welcome the idea of a meeting of the leaders of the governments of the three States for the establishment of the general lines of strategy for the war. However, to my great regret, I cannot leave the Soviet Union. I must say that things are now so hot that it is impossible for me to absent myself for even a single day. Just at present important military operations of our winter campaign are developing and they will not diminish in January. More probably the contrary will be true.

"The battle is developing on the Central Front as well as at Stalingrad. At Stalingrad we have surrounded a large group of German armies and we hope to achieve their final liquidation."

I have cabled this message to Mr. Litvinov for transmission to Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

With sincere esteem,

V. MOLOTOV

740.0011 European War 1939/26333c: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 8, 1942—noon.

[Received December 9—4:07 p.m.]

[Unnumbered.] Personal for the Secretary.

1. I venture to suggest that before Admiral Standley's departure¹¹ it might be helpful in case you have not already done so if you could discuss with him the extent to which you desire the Embassy to keep you informed, so far as it is able to do so, regarding the activities in the Soviet Union of various special missions composed of or including American officials. Since some of these missions are operating under instructions which have not been issued through the State Department and are reporting through channels other than the State Department, we have hesitated fully to report to you regarding such of their activities as have been made known to us. We have not, for instance, attempted to pass on to you all of the information which has come to our attention regarding the Bradley, Hurley, and Adler visits. Similarly, it was not easy for the Ambassador to determine the extent to which he should report to you his impressions regarding the Churchill-Hariman Mission and the Willkie visit. Since some of these missions negotiate or discuss matters which may vitally affect present and future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, it would appear that unless [you are?] informed of what they are doing the Department may have difficulty in making decisions with regard to current problems of American-Soviet relations in full consonance with the activities in which some of these special missions are engaged. The situation therefore, is that the Embassy is reporting to you all important developments which come to its attention in relations between other countries and the Soviet Union but is not reporting fully all that it learns regarding certain activities here which affect American-Soviet relations.

2. As you are aware, the President and Stalin are exchanging messages regarding matters affecting American relations. At this end the messages from the President are received through the channels of the Naval Attaché who turns paraphrases of them over to the Embassy for transmission under cover of personal and secret notes to Molotov for delivery to Stalin. Stalin's replies are sent through Molotov to Litvinov for transmission to the President. Molotov uniformly furnishes the American Ambassador or Chargé d'Affaires copies of all messages to the President sent through Litvinov. Thus both Molotov

¹¹ The Ambassador left Washington on his return flight on December 19, 1942, and finally landed at Kuibyshev on January 8, 1943.

and the American Ambassador are kept fully informed regarding these exchanges. It is not clear whether you and Litvinov are also in possession of full sets of these extremely important messages.¹²

HENDERSON

740.0011 European War 1939/26333d : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union
(Thompson) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 8, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received December 9—2: 55 p. m.]

523. From General Hurley for the President.¹³ I returned to Moscow last night after 10 days at the front in the Stalingrad area. On my tour of this front I was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Park, Jr., United States Army, Acting Military Attaché at Moscow, and Major John C. Henry of the Air Corps, United States Army, as aides.

All of the officials both political and military of the Red Army with whom we came in contact were uniformly courteous and cooperative. They seemed eager to give us the information we desired pertaining to their operations, their supply logistics and their strategy.

We have been told that we were the first officers of any foreign army to see actual combat operations on the Russian front from the Russian side. I am asking Lieutenant Colonel Park and Major Henry to prepare a detailed narrative report on our inspection and our observations for submission directly to G-2¹⁴ of the Army unless you direct otherwise.

We entered the area reconquered in the present Russian offensive by which the city of Stalingrad and an enemy force estimated at 20 divisions is now completely encircled by crossing the Don River at Serafimovich.

At that point Soviet officers designated to accompany us, Colonel Alexander Rogov and Lieutenant Colonel Onmotinov, gave us the general outline of the area in which five Red armies made their initial attacks across the Don and the objectives of this first phase of their offensive. The offensive opened and has maintained a southward

¹² The files of the Department did not contain a full set of the correspondence exchanged between the President and Stalin.

¹³ The President telegraphed the following message to Moscow on December 11, 1942, for General Hurley, who received a paraphrase of it on December 14: "I am delighted with your excellent report and with all that you tell of the magnificent operations and fine morale of the Russian Armies. If you see Mr. Stalin again, please tell him how happy I have been in receiving your report and give him my renewed congratulations." (861.20/570a) General Hurley did not see Stalin after receiving this message.

¹⁴ Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

encircling corridor or salient from 60 to 120 kilometers in width. We followed this corridor southward inspecting each point of major battle operations and stopping for the first night at Zakharov.

We next proceeded in a southeasterly direction to the headquarters of the 21st Red Army spearhead of the attacking armies at Golubinskaya. At these headquarters General Chistyakov, Commander, and his staff gave us our first view of the maps of the battle area, details of the battle plan and a description of the engagements which had been fought in the area.

General Chistyakov detailed for us the precautions that were being taken and the armies which were being employed in protecting the flanks of his salient. He gave us also considerable information regarding his transportation and supply problem. Because of unfavorable weather conditions he said that air strength had not taken any important part in the battle up to that time. He made clear, however, the important part which air strength was expected to play in the subsequent phase of destroying encircled enemy troops.

While we were at General Chistyakov's headquarters a flight of 26 Junkers transport planes passed over in the direction of Stalingrad with the apparent mission of supplying the encircled German troops. Anti-aircraft fire was directed at them but at that point they appeared to be out of range.

Our next stop was at the headquarters of the 51st Guard Division, spearhead of the 21st Red Army attack, located at Sokarevka.

This division is commanded by Major General Tovartkaledze, 34 years old, who was a colonel when the attack was launched and had been promoted as a reward for the aggressiveness and skill he had demonstrated in handling his troops in battle. He has since been decorated.

In operating as the advance striking force of the 21st Army, the 51st Division had engaged in 12 days and nights of almost continuous fighting and had driven a distance of 120 kilometers into enemy occupied territory.

Generally speaking, this division drove past the enemy strong points, encircled them and attacked from the rear while the elements of the 21st Army attacked from in front. These tactics were employed successfully again and again throughout the entire distance of the advance.

In the vicinity of Selyoni and Marinovka, units of this division made contact with the two Russian Armies of General Trufanov and General Tolbukhin which formed the southern arm of the pincer starting at Krasnoarmeisk, just south of Stalingrad. The meeting of the Red forces at Selyoni and Marinovka completed the encirclement of Stalingrad and of all enemy troops within and in the immediate vicinity of the city.

Establishing his headquarters at nearby Sokarevka, Major General Tovartkaledze then faced his division eastward and attacked the enemy in the direction of Stalingrad. It was engaged in this attack when we were with him.

General Tovartkaledze showed us maps and details on the engagements which his troops had fought in the past 12 days, and pointed out their further objectives. In their positions of that date—December 1, they were about 51 kilometers west of Stalingrad.

General Tovartkaledze reported that his anti-aircraft batteries had shot down two of the Junkers transports which we had seen heading eastward earlier in the morning over Golubinskaya.

The 51st Division was designated a guard division as a reward for its conduct during the offensive. We were impressed by the spirit, the morale and physical strength of the troops then in combat with the enemy and which in so many desperately fought engagements had suffered surprisingly few casualties.

After a second stop at the headquarters of General Chistyakov of the 21st Army we proceeded northward to Kletskaya for another crossing of the Don River and the return to Serafimovich by a different route than was followed going down. On arrival there we were taken to the headquarters of Lieutenant General Vatutin, Commander of the armies operating southward in the encircling movement. In addition to the army of General Chistyakov, these included an army on the west flank commanded by Lieutenant General Romanyenko, one on the east flank commanded by Major General Batov, and other forces further to the east.

General Vatutin and members of his staff showed us more maps, outlining fully the plans of the entire offensive and the manner in which these plans were executed. The actual achievements in battle coincided to a remarkable degree with those plans.

The General also described in detail the plan for liquidation of the Axis forces then surrounded in the Stalingrad area.

After completing his exposition the General submitted himself and his staff to any questions which we desired to ask. Our inquiries were directed principally to the problems of flank protection, transport supplies and manpower. They frankly stated that their transport and supply problems are admittedly difficult and complicated. They did not hesitate to explain clearly to us their difficulties.

General Vatutin expressed the conviction, however, that his present operation will be successfully concluded and that with proper supplies and transport the Red Army possesses manpower for the final defeat of the Axis in Russia.

As near as we could determine all enemy troops within the salient visited by us were Rumanian. We were told, however, that two German divisions had been present but we saw no German dead and no

German prisoners. We were also told by one Russian division commander that he had taken 575 German prisoners. Russian officers always referred to the encircled enemy troops as being German, but we have no definite information on that point.

The Rumanian troops, judging by the dead we saw on the field and by the appearance of the prisoners, were far below the standard of the Soviet troops. The Rumanians were equipped for the most part with second-rate arms and horse-drawn artillery, although we saw a few modern German tanks and guns. We also saw destroyed German Focke-Wolfe, Heinkel and Junkers airplanes.

While the Russian equipment was not in every respect modern it was superior to that of the Rumanians.

Throughout the entire salient we were hardly ever out of view of dead horses and dead Rumanian soldiers.

One of the battles reviewed was that fought in the vicinity of Verkhne-Buzinovka. In this battle Russian tanks, the Russian 51st Guard Division and Russian cavalry participated. The Rumanian forces in this area were constituted almost entirely of cavalry and horse-draw artillery. From the best information we could obtain the Russian cavalry outnumbered the Rumanian. The Russian cavalry was better mounted, better armed, better equipped and in every way superior to the Rumanian.

Literally thousands of horses were left dead on this field. Interspersed among the carcasses of the horses were the bodies of dead Rumanian soldiers. The field had been swept by artillery; first cold rain, then snow, then bitter freezing weather. The frozen remains of the horses and Rumanian soldiers in grotesque postures made a weird and hideous impression. This battlefield formed a superb and ghastly picture of the horrors of war.

Russian officers told us that the Rumanian horses had been so weakened by water and food shortage that they could hardly run. About 8,000 Rumanian horses were reported captured. We saw several herds being taken to the rear.

Although the Russians usually refer in their news releases and in conversation to the enemy in this area as being German, the commanding officers pointed out that they had chosen this sector for their offensive because it was held by Rumanian troops.

We were also told that both the Italian and Rumanian troops in Russia showed a lack of ardor for the cause for which they were supposed to fight and usually surrendered whenever opportunity presented itself.

Details of the number killed, the number of prisoners taken and equipment captured have all been published by the Russians.

The Red Army is at present being led largely by officers whose military capacity has been developed in the present war. We were told

that the leadership is much superior to what it was at beginning of this war. The general officers are for the most part young men and are quick to adopt new strategies and advanced tactics. The drive which we have been describing indicates that they have availed themselves to a great extent of both German strategy and German tactics.

We saw numerous mobile machine shops, transport pools and other evidences of resourcefulness behind their lines.

Heretofore every unit in the Red Army had attached to it a political representative of the Communist Party called a Military Commissar.¹⁶ The system was established originally because of distrust in the political inclinations of the Red Army. The execution of any plan by a Military Commander that did not have the approval of the Commissar was at the risk of the Commander. If the plan of the Military Commander failed, it made him liable to being relieved from duty or worse. This situation, we were advised, made many Military Commanders extremely cautious. Fear of the consequences of failure of a military plan made Commanders over-conservative to the point of actual timidity. The result was that Military Commanders seldom took the chances that are always a concomitance of bold and successful military operations.

The Commissars were in many instances almost completely without military training or experience. The system resulted in the control of the Red Army by Commissars and the weakening of essential military leadership.

All this has recently been changed. The Military Commissar system was abolished as of October 10, 1942.¹⁷ The need for single command has always been recognized, but a slow transition was necessary.

The Commissars are now subordinate to the Military Commanders. Although they are being given military rank they are designated assistants to the Military Commanders. The Military Commanders now exercise final authority in the execution of military missions.

We were told that the unification of command has contributed greatly to the efficiency of the military leadership of the Red Army. Many of the former Military Commissars have had experience in battle, had become effective military leaders, and have been commissioned as officers in the Army. In these cases the political duties have been transferred to newly appointed Commissars, all of whom are subordinate to Military Commanders.

During our conversations we were frequently asked by Generals when the United States and Great Britain would open a second front

¹⁶ Concerning the system of military, or political, commissars, see footnote 35, p. 461.

¹⁷ See telegrams No. 874, October 10, and No. 885, October 14, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, pp. 461 and 463, respectively.

in Europe. Almost invariably they expressed the opinion that a second front in France would more effectively divide German forces than one in Italy.

Another angle of my discussions with the generals that may be of interest to you concerned German air power. One Soviet officer asked where the German Air Force had gone; another asked what the Germans were preparing to do with their air power.

In the resultant discussions the Russians said the Germans have been using far less air force than previously employed on the Russian front. They expressed the opinion likewise that the Germans are now using less air force in Africa and comparatively none over the British Isles.

These discussions led to two conclusions: (1), That the Germans are conserving their air power and petroleum for an attack or, (2), that the Germans are building interior defense lines and have decided to conserve their air power for defensive action.

Both of these conclusions left unanswered in the minds of the generals the question expressed in army slang, "What's cooking?"

Invariably the generals were interested in the amount of war supplies—especially planes, tanks and trucks—that the United States can furnish Russia. Without exception they were of the opinion that time is now running in favor of the Axis and that supplies should be furnished to Russia and a second front opened at the earliest possible date.

Conversations with these officers made it evident that they were not familiar with our transport problems. They discussed their own transport shortage in great detail but expressed surprise that United States and Britain were having difficulties in getting supplies to North Russia by way of the North Atlantic and to South Russia by way of the Persian Gulf.

The average Russian general knows little or nothing about the sea battles of the Atlantic and the Pacific. These subjects have not been publicized in Russia.

It is my conclusion that the Red Army is a far better fighting force and is distinctly better led than it was at the beginning of the war. Its supply and transportation problems however are becoming and will become more acute. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the defeat of the Axis Armies within Russia must depend more and more on supply assistance from the United States.

Arrangements have been made with President [*sic*] Stalin for us to see the Red Army in the Caucasus. Our departure from here awaits flying weather. [Hurley.]

THOMPSON

196.6/1454: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 9, 1942—5 p. m.
[Received December 11—2: 20 p. m.]

1070. My 881, October 13, 8 [3] p. m.

1. Zarubin has asked on several occasions whether the American Government has made any decision with regard to his informal proposal. He stated again yesterday that the Soviet authorities would appreciate an early reply.

2. We have learned from the British Embassy that on November 13 the Soviet Foreign Office made a similar tentative and informal proposal to it.

3. The British Government has instructed the Embassy as follows:

(a) The British Government has always been opposed in principle to the giving of spending money or other gratuities to British crews, particularly by foreign governments. It would be willing, nevertheless, to give due consideration to such proposals if they were advanced officially.

(b) The British Embassy should not take the matter up with the Foreign Office before discussing it with us since it is believed preferable for the two Governments to coordinate their replies.

4. The British Foreign Office has also informed the Embassy here that the matter is being discussed both in London and Washington by British and American shipping authorities.

5. The British Embassy has also been instructed that, in case it should discuss the matter with the Soviet authorities along the lines suggested, it should point out that no reply of any sort has ever been received from the Commissariat for Foreign Trade to formal proposals made by the Embassy in September to the effect that crews of British ships in Soviet northern ports be provided with spending money at the diplomatic rate of exchange. Under these proposals, the masters of British vessels would receive rubles against a simple receipt from the British Embassy and the actual exchange transaction would be effected through an Embassy bank account.

6. The British Embassy is temporarily refraining from taking this matter up with the Foreign Office pending the receipt of instructions to us from the Department.

7. It is obviously desirable that care should be taken lest the discussions which apparently are taking place simultaneously among various organizations both in London and Washington lead up to divergent conclusions and the consequent misunderstandings.

HENDERSON

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

*The American Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov)*

No. L-21

Moscow, December 10, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message dated December 8, 1942 from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.

"I am deeply disappointed you feel you cannot get away for a conference in January. There are many matters of vital importance to be discussed between us. These relate not only to vital strategic decisions, but also to things we should talk over in a tentative way in regard to emergency policies which we should be ready with, if, and when, conditions in Germany permit.

"These would also include other matters relating to future policies about North Africa and the Far East which cannot be discussed by our military people alone.

"I fully realize your strenuous situation now and in the immediate future and the necessity of your presence close to the fighting front. Therefore I want to suggest that we set a tentative date for meeting in North Africa about March 1."

Accept [etc.]

For the Chargé d'Affaires a. i.:
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

*The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet
Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*¹³

[Translation]

I must express also my deep regret that it is impossible for me to leave the Soviet Union either in the immediate future or in the beginning of March. Affairs connected with the front do not permit it. On the contrary, they require my constant presence near our forces.

I am not yet aware exactly what questions, Mr. President, you and Mr. Churchill desire to consider at our common meeting. Would it not be possible to give consideration to these questions through an exchange of correspondence between us so long as there is no possibility of our arranging to meet? I presume that there would be no disagreements among us.

¹³ This message was sent on December 13, 1942, to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States to deliver to the President. Copy was handed to the American Chargé, Loy W. Henderson, by Foreign Commissar Molotov in Moscow on the evening of December 15, 1942.

Permit me also to express confidence that time will not be wasted and the promises with regard to the opening of the second front in Europe which were given by you, Mr. President, and by Mr. Churchill in relation to the year 1942, and now in any case with respect to the spring of 1943, will be fulfilled and the second front in Europe will actually be opened by the joint forces of Great Britain and the United States in the Spring of the coming year.

In view of widespread rumors of all sorts with respect to the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to the question of making use of Darlan¹⁹ and figures like him, it might be useful to inform you that in my opinion and in the opinion of my colleagues the policy of Eisenhower²⁰ with respect to Darlan, Boisson,²¹ Giraud,²² and others—absolutely correct.²³ I consider it a great accomplishment that you succeeded in bringing Darlan and others into the orbit of the Allies against Hitler. I informed Mr. Churchill about that at the time.

196.6/1454: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Henderson)*

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1942—8 p. m.

414. Your 1070, December 9, 5 p. m. The proposal to furnish gratuities of rubles to American crews is acceptable to the War Shipping Administration which recommends that the gratuities be limited to 1,000 rubles for each officer and 400 rubles for each seaman, with further recommendation that officers and seamen in need of additional funds be permitted to purchase such funds at the official rate of exchange.

The Department believes it desirable that your reply be coordinated with that of the British.

HULL

¹⁹ Adm. Jean François Darlan, High Commissioner of French North and West Africa.

²⁰ Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa.

²¹ Pierre Boisson, Governor General of French West Africa, under Vichy régime, which he brought over to the Allies on November 24, 1942.

²² Henri Giraud, French General who had escaped from a German prison camp and had been brought by the Allies to North Africa with the intention of placing him in charge of all of the French military and naval forces there.

²³ For the explanations of the policy adopted toward French leaders in North Africa given to the Soviet Government, see pp. 482-485, *passim*.

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

*The American Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov)*

No. L-22

Moscow, December 17, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message dated December 16, 1942, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.

"I am not clear as to just what has happened in regard to our offer of American air assistance in the Caucasus. I am fully willing to send units with American pilots and crews. I think they should operate by units under their American commanders, but each group would, of course, be under overall Russian command as to tactical objectives.

"Please let me know your desires as soon as possible, as I truly want to help all I can.

"Pursuit plane program would not be affected. What I refer to is essentially the bombing plane type which can be flown to the Caucasus."

Accept [etc.]

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a. i.:

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.

Secretary of Embassy

*The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet
Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*²⁴

[Translation]

[Moscow,] December 18, 1942.

I am very grateful to you for your readiness to help us. As to Anglo-American air-squadrons with personnel, at the present moment the necessity of having them sent to the Transcaucasia has passed. Now the major battles are and will be developing at the central front and in the Voronezh area. I shall be very grateful to you, if you expedite the delivery of planes, especially fighter planes—without the personnel which is now extremely necessary to yourself—to be used in the above-mentioned areas.

The peculiar state of Soviet aviation is that we have more than enough fliers, but not enough planes.

²⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

196.6/1458 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 21, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received December 22—12:05 p. m.]

1121. Department's 414, December 15, 8 p. m., to Moscow. The sense of the Department's telegram under reference has been conveyed to the British Embassy here which believes and has so informed London that its own instructions as set forth in my 1070, December 9, 5 p. m., preclude it from coordinating with ours its reply to the informal proposal offered by the Soviet authorities along the lines apparently found acceptable by the War Shipping Administration. The British Embassy has telegraphed London that it continues to believe the best course for it to follow is that set forth in my 1070 and it has expressed the hope that the British Foreign Office will approach our Government further in the matter. The British Embassy has suggested that we defer informing the Soviet authorities of the contents of the Department's 414 until it can receive a response and we have agreed to postpone at least for several days our approach to the Foreign Office.²⁵

HENDERSON

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Chargé in the Soviet Union (Dooman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-23

Moscow, December 23, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message from President Roosevelt, dated December 21, 1942, to Premier Stalin.

"I am very sorry arrangements for conference could not be made but I can well understand your position. This will acknowledge your note about the Anglo-American squadrons.²⁶ We will expedite delivery of planes to the utmost. I have arranged to get you ten transport planes in January.

"I am writing you in regard to certain post war activities."

Accept [etc.]

EUGENE H. DOOMAN

²⁵ The Department approved the postponement of action in this matter by telegram No. 657, December 26, 1942, and stated that the War Shipping Administration was soon to discuss it with British representatives.

²⁶ Note of December 18, p. 677.

740.0011 European War 1939/26811½ : Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 29, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received December 30—4 : 05 a. m.]

464. For President Roosevelt from General Hurley:

PART ONE

Arrived at Tehran from Caucasus last night. During a 10-day reconnaissance trip to this Southern Russian front I was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Park, Jr., United States Army, Acting Military Attaché at Moscow, and Major John C. Henry of the Air Corps, United States Army, as aides. As in the case of earliest trip to Don-Stalingrad front I am asking Colonel Park and Major Henry to prepare a detailed report for submission directly to G-2 of the War Department.²⁷

For our trip the Soviets furnished us with a plane and crew from Moscow to the Caucasus²⁸ and thence to Tehran. While in air combat areas we were provided with a fighter escort of 4 to 8 planes. Officers of the Red Army and civilian officials were uniformly courteous, frank and helpful.

We entered the Caucasus by plane at Baku and flew up the Kura River Valley to Tiflis. General Tulanyev, commanding all the Soviet forces in the Caucasus, has his headquarters in Tiflis.

We were told by General Rozhdestvyenski, Chief of General Tulanyev's staff that there are 7 Russian Armies, between 56 and 60 divisions, in this area. The enemy we were told consists of 28 divisions, about 7 of these being Rumanian, 1 a motorized Italian division, 1 a Slovak division and the remainder German. Three tank divisions and two motorized divisions are included in this total.

We were advised by General Rozhdestvyenski that Russian air superiority is complete and overwhelming. He said that the Soviet air command could order 1,000 flights daily as compared to 50 German flights. On our flight from Baku to Tiflis, about 300 miles, we passed nine operating Soviet air fields. American A-20s were seen on several and two B-25s were on the field at Tiflis.

By automobile we traveled the Georgian military road through the Caucasus Mountains from Tiflis to Ordzhonikidze.

The Germans had recently attacked Ordzhonikidze and had succeeded in destroying or forcing evacuation of manufacturing estab-

²⁷ General Hurley had informed General Marshall through telegram No. 1105, December 16, 1942, sent by the Chargé from Kuibyshev, that "on coming here I received no directive from the War Department. . . . It is clear that this reconnaissance, together with all information being furnished by Soviet staff and Field Commanders, is more military than diplomatic. I have reported regularly to the President." (740.0011 European War 1939/26577)

²⁸ The Hurley Mission had left Moscow by plane on December 17.

lishments in that city that had been producing trench mortars and grenades. The attackers were driven back before we arrived and Soviet forces were conducting a counter-offensive. We were permitted to accompany units of the Red Army in the attack on the Germans in the town of Alagir. The Red Army occupied the town during the attack and drove units of the German Army westward.

The town of Ordzhonikidze had been poorly fortified at the time of the German attack. While we were there, the entire civilian population, both men and women, was engaged in digging tank traps by hand and constructing artillery emplacements and machine gun pill-boxes. We were astonished by the amount and the nature of the work being done by the civilians. The entire civilian population of the area was as much engaged in defense work as the Army itself.

The town of Ordzhonikidze was formerly named Vladikavkaz, which means "Ruler of the Caucasus". It is situated in a commanding position near the entrance to the pass through which runs the Georgian military road. The town is now well fortified, but all its fortifications are not well armed. The Russians are short of all classes of weapons except rifles. The pass likewise is well fortified but there are fortifications and emplacements along the military road that are not equipped with weapons. Both for the defense of Ordzhonikidze and the pass through the Caucasus, weapons have to be moved from emplacement to emplacement according to the direction and the nature of the attack.

We did not see the Armavir-Tuapse Pass but we were shown the situation on the map and were advised that it is as fully fortified and as amply defended as the Georgian military road. We were likewise assured that ample precautions have been taken to forestall any Axis effort to land forces from the Black Sea south of the Caucasus mountain range.

Eastward the Germans have launched a number of raids from bases at Yashkul and Mookh toward the Caspian Sea. These raids apparently were conducted by small parties which were driven back after succeeding in cutting the Kizlyar-Astrakhan Railroad briefly in two or three places.

The German line now extends roughly from the middle of Novorossisk southeastward to the vicinity of Alagir, then northward to the Kuma River. From that point there is a broken line northward through Yashkul to Ketcheneri. As of this date, the line was about 50 kilometers northeast of Tuapse. Mozdok was still in German hands. We were told that a Russian garrison has been holding out in the factory area of Novorossisk since the Germans occupied the remainder of the town. This garrison provides a pivotal point for the Russian left flank.

It should be understood that the line described is not completely covered by Axis troops. The Red Army occupied areas through the full length of the line.

The burden of every Soviet officer's comment was to the effect that the Russians now have a superiority in every element over the Axis in the Caucasus. The Red Army, they say, has sufficient manpower to drive the Axis from the Caucasus. They are short only of equipment. Continuously, Soviet officers told us that the Russians do not want any foreign military elements in the Caucasus area. Without hesitation they gave the Russian reasons for this attitude, all of which pointed to the same conclusion—the Russians do not trust any foreign power close to their oil resources. The Army officers explained to us with considerable detail and logic Russia's experiences which have created this distrust of foreign powers in connection with her oil resources.

Soviet spokesmen did make clear that they consider it of utmost importance to their protection of the Caucasus oil: (1), That the Dardanelles remain closed to Axis naval transport movements; and (2), that the United Nations achieve and maintain air and naval superiority in the Mediterranean.

We were impressed by the Soviet defensive strength and preparations. We are of the opinion that Axis forces will not be able to force their way through the Caucasus mountains. The Grozny oil-fields north of the mountains are more accessible to attack, however, and might still be endangered despite present Soviet counter-offensive successes.

General Rozhdestvyenski said that the Red forces in the Caucasus will drive the enemy northward to where they can be destroyed by Soviet Armies moving down from the Don-Stalingrad area, or will force them to the hazardous alternative of retreating into the Crimea by way of the Kerch Straits.

From our observations, however, we reached the conclusion that the Germans are not now operating in great force in the Caucasus. In fact, we saw little indication that there are as many as 28 Axis divisions there, nor were we convinced there are as many as 56 or 60 Russian divisions in that area.

Nevertheless, the initiative is clearly on the side of the Russians. Here, as on the Stalingrad front, there is the same feeling that the Axis is conserving its resources. The officers here, however, did not express the opinion that Germany is strengthening her inner defense lines or conserving her power for an attack. Their opinions led always to the conclusion that Germany no longer possesses the equipment nor manpower for a great offensive.

Notwithstanding this, there is still prevalent in the Caucasus the

same question in regard to the enemy's intention as we found on the other front, expressed in the same soldier slang "What's cooking?"

Some Russian officers expressed apprehension that the Germans would use poison gas in the Caucasus in the near future. As a basis for this fear they stated that the Germans were manufacturing poison gas at Russian plant captured at Stalino in the Don Basin.

We heretofore reported to you that the Axis prisoners we saw on the Stalingrad front were Rumanians and others, not German. We were permitted to visit a prisoner evacuation station southeast of Tiflis. There were at this camp approximately 500 prisoners. Most of them were Rumanians. There were some Italian, Hungarian and Slovaks. About 125 were Germans, including a number of junior officers. We were permitted to converse freely with these prisoners. From all the circumstances relating to prisoners we felt that possibly claims as to the number captured are somewhat overstated.

We reached the following conclusions during our trip :

1. We agree with Russian opinion that they leave in the Caucasus sufficient manpower for defense of their oil resources.

2. We were also convinced that the Russians do not possess sufficient equipment to guarantee safety of the Caucasus against an all-out Axis assault by way of the Caspian or Black Sea approaches.

3. Equipment must come from the United States. It cannot be supplied in adequate quantities by Russia's own productive facilities.

4. It should not be overlooked that with the Russian Armies on the offensive without adequate reserve equipment the attrition factor in men and material may still be operating to Soviet disadvantage.

5. The morale, the physical strength and the general attitude of the officers and soldiers of the Red Army under every condition was excellent.

6. In coming out of the Caucasus, the overtone led to the conclusion already evident to many, namely, that this war is reaching a critical phase in this area in the struggle for control of petroleum.

PART TWO

As I have heretofore wired you,²⁹ Iraq and Iran are in my opinion, sore spots in Anglo-Soviet relations. The conflicts are grave but not insurmountable. Instead of cabling reports on this situation I think it more advisable to assemble the facts and present them to you verbally.

I request therefore, that instead of proceeding to India, Australia and New Zealand I be directed by you to return to Washington. Because of irregularity of transportation services on the Indian Ocean, I can go to Australia and New Zealand more quickly via the United States than by way of India. This latter schedule would give me opportunity of reporting to you in detail in person.

²⁹ Telegram No. 1104, December 16, 11 p. m. ; not printed.

May I suggest that it would be appropriate to thank Premier Stalin for the courtesy, helpfulness and facilities extended to me by him. [Hurley.]

DREYFUS

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Chargé in the Soviet Union (Dooman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-26

Moscow, January 1, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to deliver the following message dated December 30, 1942, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.

"In the event that Japan should attack Russia in the Far East, I am prepared to assist you in that theater with an American air force of approximately one hundred four-engined bombardment airplanes as early as practicable, provided that certain items of supply and equipment are furnished by Soviet authorities and that suitable operation facilities are prepared in advance.

"Supply of our units must be entirely by air transport, hence it will be necessary for the Soviet Government to furnish such items as bombs, fuel, lubricants, transportation, shelter, heat and other minor items to be determined.

"Although we have no positive information that Japan will attack Russia, it does appear to be an eventual probability. Therefore, in order that we may be prepared for this contingency, I propose that the survey of air force facilities in the Far East, authorized by you to General Bradley on October 6 be made now, and that the discussions initiated on November 11 on your authority between General Bradley and General Korolenko be continued.

"It is my intention to appoint General Bradley, who has my full confidence, to continue these discussions for the United States if you so agree. He will be empowered to explore for the United States every phase of combined Russo-American operations in the Far East theater and based upon his survey to recommend the composition and strength of our air forces, which will be allocated to assist you should the necessity arise.

"He will also determine the extent of advance preparations practicable and necessary to ensure effective participation of our units promptly on initiation of hostilities. The party will not exceed twenty persons to fly into Russia in two American Douglas DC-3 type airplanes.

"If this meets with your approval, I would suggest that they proceed from Alaska along the ferry route into Siberia, thence, under Russian direction, to the headquarters of the Soviet armies in the Far East, and thence to such other places in Russia as may be necessary to make their quiet survey and discuss operating plans.

"It would be very helpful if an English speaking Russian officer such as Captain Vladimir Ovnowin, Washington, or Captain Smol-yarov in Moscow be detailed to accompany General Bradley as adjutant and liaison officer.

"I seize this opportunity of expressing my admiration for the courage, stamina and military prowess of your great Russian armies as reported to me by General Bradley and as demonstrated in your great victories of the past month."

Accept [etc.]

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a. i.:

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.

Secretary of Embassy

THE CONTINUATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF WARTIME ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOVIET UNION ³⁰

861.248/174 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary
of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), ³¹ January 3, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received January 4—5:45 p. m.]

7. I handed to Vyshinski ³² last night an *aide-mémoire* containing in paraphrase the text of the Department's 1317 of December 30, 8 p. m. ³³ I informed him that I had given a copy of the *aide-mémoire* to the Military Attaché ³⁴ who would discuss it with the appropriate Soviet military authorities. Vyshinski replied that he would inform his Government of the matter and advise me of its response as quickly as possible.

Colonel Michela today submitted to me memorandum stating that when he called at the War Office last night he was shown an air radio facility chart furnished by the British covering the route to Basra;

³⁰ For previous correspondence on the beginnings of assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union after its invasion by Germany, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 768 ff.

³¹ For correspondence concerning the necessity for the removal of the American Embassy from Moscow to Kuibyshev in October 1941, with a reduced staff remaining in Moscow, see *ibid.*, pp. 907-911.

³² Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

³³ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, p. 484. This telegram related to plans to deliver aircraft to the Soviet Government by sea to the Persian Gulf for assembly and flight to the Soviet Union.

³⁴ Lt. Col., later Brig. Gen., Joseph A. Michela.

that both Colonel Faymonville³⁵ and Colonel Griffiss³⁶ had been informed that British policy was opposed to Soviet fliers flying over Iran, but that on December 28 the Air Attaché of the British Embassy³⁷ advised Colonel Griffiss that this policy has been reversed; that our Government may not be aware of this change of policy, in as much as the instruction under acknowledgment refers to an agreement with the British concerning a delivery point in Iran; and suggesting that if Soviet fliers are to be permitted to fly over Iran with either British or American planes assembled by the British it would appear to be in our interest to adopt a similar policy and thus avoid the need for establishing an intermediate delivery point.³⁸

Colonel Griffiss has also handed me a memorandum on the subject based on a conversation today (prior to his impending return to London) with the British Air Attaché. This confirms the arrangements proposed in the Department's instruction cited above, as well as Colonel Michela's statement regarding the change of British policy. Colonel Griffiss further states in his memorandum that while in Iran and on his flight to Kuibyshev he was impressed by its mountainous nature, the lack of proper facilities, and the adverse winter weather conditions which will prevail for some time, and that it is his opinion that more planes will reach the front if Soviet pilots who are familiar with this type of weather and their own facilities fly them not only in Russia but across Iran as well. He accordingly recommends that we adopt the new British policy and arrange to have Soviet flyers take delivery at Abadan³⁹ of planes assembled by us at that point.⁴⁰ January 4, noon.

THURSTON

³⁵ Col., later Brig. Gen., Philip R. Faymonville, head of the United States Supply Mission in the Soviet Union, Lend-Lease representative.

³⁶ Lt. Col. Townsend Griffiss was on a mission between November 1941 and February 1942 to coordinate American training and supply efforts in the Soviet Union, to secure maximum effectiveness from U. S. airplanes there, and to insure that sufficient trained personnel would be there to carry out these activities. He was killed in an airplane accident at Plymouth, England, on February 15, 1942.

³⁷ Group Captain W. G. Cheshire.

³⁸ By telegram No. 28, January 8, 1942, the Chargé in the Soviet Union advised that Colonel Michela had been told by the Soviet War Office that Kazvin had been rejected as a delivery point for airplanes; that "the Soviet Government considers the establishment of an intermediate delivery point both unnecessary and wasteful of time", since Soviet pilots and technicians could proceed directly to Abadan and there take over assembled planes to be ferried to the Soviet Union. (861.248/178)

³⁹ The text of a note to the American Embassy in London from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regarding the establishment of the American assembly plant at Abadan was transmitted to the Department in the Embassy's telegram No. 70, January 6, 1942, 5 p. m. The British Government was willing to accept this arrangement in principle subject to certain conditions. (861.248/176)

⁴⁰ Vyshinsky's response was an *aide-memoire* handed on the night of January 16 to the Chargé who reported in his telegram No. 57, January 17, that it confirmed "in general terms, the statements made by the Soviet military authorities to Colonel Michela." (861.248/183)

861.24/799

Memorandum by Mr. Edward Page, Jr., of the Division of European Affairs to the Assistant Chief of the Division (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1942.

MR. ATHERTON: I telephoned General Spalding ⁴¹ this morning regarding Colonel Faymonville's telegram no. 10 of January 14 ⁴² with reference to the unsatisfactory deliveries of American supplies to the Soviet Union. General Spalding stated that he had drafted a telegram to Faymonville ⁴³ explaining in general and in detail the entire matter, that although his telegram would be sent to me during the course of the day it might be necessary to hold it up until Mr. Harry Hopkins ⁴⁴ had had a chance to go over it.

General Spalding added that the key to the Russian supply question was the shipping problem. He stated that on December 1 the general picture was excellent. However, upon our entry into the war it became impossible to obtain sufficient shipping. At the present time, he stated, there is a great amount of cargo ready to go forward to the Soviet Union if ships can be found. This problem is now being discussed in detail by the Strategic Shipping Board. He concluded that the aforementioned telegram would give the entire picture.

I may add that Mr. Batt ⁴⁵ whom I saw yesterday evening stated that a part of the blame for the unfulfilled deliveries was due to the delay of the Soviet authorities in not furnishing their specifications for various types of equipment until after the first of the year. Mr. Batt added that the Soviet Government had now agreed to accept American specifications if he so recommended. Mr. Batt also commented on increased shortages here and the difficulties of obtaining various types of equipment.

E[DWARD] P[AGE], JR.

⁴¹ Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, Office of Lend-Lease Administration; later, in February 1942, member of Munitions Assignments Board, United States-Great Britain.

⁴² Not printed.

⁴³ Telegram No. 9, January 21, 1942, to the Embassy in the Soviet Union; not printed.

⁴⁴ Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, with responsibility for Lend-Lease administration and policy.

⁴⁵ William L. Batt, Director, Materials Division, Office of Production Management.

861.24/808: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow*⁴⁶

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1942—5 p. m.

17. For Premier Stalin⁴⁷ from Harriman.⁴⁸

"While in America during the last few weeks I have reviewed the program for the supply by my Government of the Moscow Protocol⁴⁹ items. I am satisfied that the matériel will be made available substantially as promised except as modified in a few items due to our entry in the war, details of which have been cabled to your Government.

Every effort is being made to fill the additional requests. Shipping, however, is increasingly difficult on account of increased demands for transport of our troops and air forces to the Far East and other theatres of war. My Government is, however, determined to make available all the ships possible and it is my hope that you will be satisfied with the increased number of ships placed in your service during the next month.

In spite of the disappointing results during the past 4 months I find all concerned endeavoring to ship what has been promised and to increase the quantities as soon as practicable.

I find at the present time in the United States an ever-increasing sympathy for and understanding of the people of the Soviet Union. The American people listen hourly with intense interest to the reports of the continued advances of your gallant troops.

I am now returning to England but will continue to follow closely the progress of your shipments.

May I add my personal good wishes to you."

HULL

⁴⁶ On January 31 a paraphrased copy of this telegram was handed by the Second Secretary of Embassy at Moscow, Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., to the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov.

⁴⁷ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Prime Minister).

⁴⁸ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, and Chairman of the Special Mission to the Soviet Union, with a British counterpart led by Lord Beaverbrook, held conferences in Moscow, September 29–October 1, 1941. For correspondence concerning the Harriman–Beaverbrook Mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 825–851, *passim*.

⁴⁹ For text of the First (Moscow) Protocol, October 1, 1941, see Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, p. 3; see also *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 841–851, *passim*.

861.24/815: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 3, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 5:17 p. m.]

102. Department's 40, January 30 [31], 5 p. m.⁵⁰

1. Thompson states that he forwarded Harriman's message to Stalin in a note addressed to Molotov.

2. I have read Michela's telegrams to the War Department. He says that the opinions as reported by him were based upon the attitude and statements of Soviet officials following (a) the shipment to Russia of defective Tomahawk planes, (b) the failure to expedite the supply of urgently requested spare parts for those planes, (c) the confusing and obstructive division of responsibility as between the British and ourselves with regard to those planes, (d) the failure to profit by experience as reflected in the later shipment of Aircobras without spare parts, and (e) the Kazvin⁵¹ question (discussed below). While no statement or obvious insinuation was made that these deficiencies were the result of political considerations it is not improbable that such an interpretation may have been placed upon them by the Russians.

3. It has been regarded as axiomatic in Soviet doctrine that the capitalist world desires the destruction of the Soviet State. American newspapers since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war contain much to substantiate the opinion that some part of American public opinion cherishes the hope that it will result in the reciprocal destruction of the two participants. It is, therefore, an easy assumption on the part of a Soviet official that the capitalist states finding themselves fortuitous associates of the Soviet Union in the war against Germany will supply only enough aid to keep the Soviet Union fighting Germany as long as possible.

4. With respect to the Department's statement that it is hoped that steps can be taken to eliminate suspicions of this kind, I venture to comment as follows trusting that in doing so, I am not transgressing:

If we have made our own vital decision to help the Soviet Union defeat Germany without reservations based upon fear of a victorious and powerful Russia, it should be possible to reduce the suspicions mentioned by the following two processes: First—positively—by exerting convincing efforts to supply the war needs

⁵⁰ Not printed; the Chargé was informed in this telegram that the War Department had obtained the impression, based upon certain reports made to it by Lt. Col. Joseph A. Michela, Military Attaché in the Soviet Union, that certain Soviet officials suspected that political considerations were hampering American deliveries to the Soviet Union (861.24/808).

⁵¹ Kazvin (Qazvin) is an important communications center about 90 miles northwest of Tehran.

of the Soviet Union to the satisfaction of the Soviet military observers and purchasing agents in the United States, who presumably should be given status and facilities comparable to those enjoyed by their British counterparts in so far as access to information is concerned; and second—negatively—by avoiding action which might be construed by the Russians to indicate that we are holding back, or are seeking some ulterior advantage. As examples of perhaps unwitting actions of the latter sort, I may say that it is probable that the Soviets believe we really wanted information that would be of use to us in a war with Japan when we made such persistent efforts to obtain data regarding flying routes (Department's 1193, November 6⁵²) although we alleged that the information was for use in connection with the delivery of American planes; that we were either reluctant to provide oil refinery equipment to the Soviet Union or desired to introduce observers into the hinterland Soviet oil areas when we said (Department's 1189, November 5⁵³) that such equipment could not be supplied until American experts had actually visited the sites of the proposed plants; and that we either wanted to establish a foothold for ourselves in northern Iran or were supporting British efforts to keep the Russians out of southern Iran, when we proposed (Department's 1317, December 30⁵⁴) the establishment of an intermediate delivery point for American planes at Kazvin.

5. It is to be assumed that provided adequate American and British aid is forthcoming Russia will continue to exert every effort of which it is capable to encompass the defeat of the German armies, and that it will eventually enter the war against Japan—especially should the Japanese succeed in their present operations at Singapore and at Burma and thus not only stop the flow of supplies into China but threaten the supply routes through the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Should we, however, permit suspicion of the sincerity of our promises of aid to arise and be maintained it would not be beyond the realm of possibility (although I have neither seen nor heard anything that would support any such supposition at this time) that the Soviet Government would consider that it had served the major purpose of survival should it succeed in driving the German forces sufficiently far to the westward to convince Hitler that he would not be warranted in undertaking the spring offensive which at the moment appears to be contemplated.

THURSTON

⁵² Not printed.

⁵³ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 853.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 484.

861.24/819a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1942—11 p. m.

26. "Personal from the President to Stalin. Our shipments for January and February have included and will include 244 fighter planes, 24 B-25's, 233 A-20's, 408 medium tanks and 449 light tanks.

The reports here indicate you are getting on well in pushing the Nazis back.

While we are having our immediate troubles in the Far East, I believe we will have that area reinforced in the near future to such an extent that we can stop the Japs but we are prepared for some further setbacks.

I realize the importance of getting our supplies to you at the earliest possible date and every effort is being made to get shipments off. Roosevelt." ⁵⁵

HULL

861.24/827 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston)

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1942—2 p. m.

68. Personal for Thurston. Please transmit to Stalin the following message from the President: ⁵⁶

"I am much pleased that your Government has expressed its willingness to receive as the Ambassador of the United States my old and trusted friend, Admiral Standley.⁵⁷ The Ambassador and I have been closely associated for many years. I have complete confidence in him and recommend him to you not only as a man of energy and integrity but also as one who is appreciative of and an admirer of the accomplishments of the Soviet Union, which, you will recall, he visited with Mr. Harriman last year. Since his return from Moscow Admiral Standley has already done much to further understanding in the United States of the situation in the Soviet Union and with his rich background and his knowledge of the problems which are facing our respective countries I am sure that with your cooperation he will meet with success in his efforts to bring them still more closely together.

"It has just been brought to my attention that the Soviet Government has placed with us requisitions for munitions and supplies of a

⁵⁵ The Chargé in the Soviet Union reported in his telegram No. 129, February 11, 1942, midnight, that he had that evening handed a note to Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, addressed to Molotov, containing a paraphrase of the President's message to Stalin (861.24/-825).

⁵⁶ The Chargé in the Soviet Union reported in his telegram No. 136, February 13, 1942, 11 a. m., that he had handed to Lozovsky a note addressed to Molotov containing a paraphrase of the President's message to Stalin (861.24/828).

⁵⁷ Rear Adm. William H. Standley.

value which will exceed the billion dollars which last autumn were placed at its disposal under the Lend-Lease Act⁵⁸ following an exchange of letters between us.⁵⁹ I propose, therefore, that under this same Act a second billion dollars be placed at the disposal of your Government upon the same conditions as those upon which the first billion were allocated. In case you have any counter-suggestions to offer with regard to the terms under which the second billion dollars should be made available, you may be sure that they will be given careful and sympathetic consideration. In any event it may prove mutually desirable later, in order to meet changing conditions, to review such financial arrangements as we may enter into now." Roosevelt.

HULL

861.24/855b

*The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁰

FEBRUARY 19, 1942.

I have received your message informing me of consignments of armaments from the United States for January and February.

I would like to emphasise the fact that at the present moment, when the peoples of the Soviet Union and its army are exerting all their powers to thrust back, by their determined offensive, Hitler's troops, the fulfilment of American deliveries, including tanks and aeroplanes, is of the utmost importance for our common cause, for our further successes.

861.24/855b

*The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁰

FEBRUARY 20, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Acknowledging the receipt of your message of 13th February,⁶¹ I would like first to say that I share your confidence that the efforts of the newly-appointed Ambassador of the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Admiral Standley, of whom you speak so highly and in such warm terms, to

⁵⁸ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

⁵⁹ Regarding the first loan of one billion dollars to the Soviet Union, see telegrams No. 1867, November 2, 1941, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and No. 1890, November 6, 1941, from the Ambassador, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 852 and 855, respectively. On the authorization of the immediate transfer of defense supplies to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Act, see the letter from President Roosevelt to the Lend-Lease Administrator, November 7, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 857.

⁶⁰ Left with the Acting Secretary of State by the Soviet Ambassador, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, on February 21.

⁶¹ See footnote 56, p. 690.

bring our two countries still closer to one another, will be crowned with success.

Your decision, Mr. President, to place at the disposal of the Soviet Government another billion dollars, in accordance with the law for the supply of armaments under the Lend-Lease Act, on the same conditions which applied to the first billion, is accepted by the Soviet Government with sincere gratitude. With regard to your enquiry I have to inform you that, at the present moment, in order not to delay matters, the Soviet Government is not raising the question of the modification of the conditions attaching to the granting by your Cabinet of the above-mentioned second billion dollars or of taking into consideration the extremely strained state of the resources of the U. S. S. R. in the war against our common foe. At the same time I entirely agree with you and should like to express the hope that at a later date we shall be able jointly to fix a time when it will appear desirable to both of us to revise the financial agreements now concluded in order to pay special attention to the above mentioned circumstances.

I should like to take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fact that the Soviet organizations when realizing the loan granted to the U. S. S. R. are at present experiencing great difficulties with regard to the transport of armaments and materials purchased in the United States to U. S. S. R. ports. We would consider the most suitable arrangement for the transport of armaments from America, in the circumstances, would be that which is successfully adopted for the transport of armaments from England to Archangel, but which heretofore has not been possible to apply to deliveries from the United States. According to this arrangement, the British military authorities delivering armaments and materials, designate the ships themselves, as well as organizing their loading in the port, and their convoy to the port of destination. The Soviet Government would be extremely grateful if the same arrangements for the delivery of armaments and the convoying of ships to the U. S. S. R. ports, could be adopted by the United States Government also.

With sincere respect, I remain,

J. STALIN

861.51/2932 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 21, 1942—noon.

[Received 5 : 40 p. m.]

153. The Moscow press of February 19 published without comment a Tass ⁶³ despatch from Washington dated February 17 and reporting

⁶³ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communications agency of the Soviet Government.

the remarks made by the President at a press conference concerning the extension of a further loan to the Soviet Union. The President is quoted as having stated that a second loan is necessary in order to ensure an uninterrupted flow of war materials to Russia, inasmuch as the first loan has been entirely allocated; that delivery of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union lagged behind plan in December and January but will be on schedule by the first of March; and that after March 1 the Soviet Union will receive regularly many materials in accordance with the first agreement based upon the Lease-Lend across the Atlantic.

THURSTON

861.24/845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 23, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon, at my request. I told the Ambassador that at my request the President had prepared a reply to the two messages from Stalin which the Ambassador had left with me last Saturday.⁶⁴ I told the Ambassador that I believed this message would reach Stalin more promptly if the Ambassador were kind enough to transmit it since I feared that if it went by our Embassy in Kuibyshev three or four days would necessarily elapse before Stalin could receive it.

Mr. Litvinov said that that was quite true and that he would very gladly transmit it for this Government.

I told the Ambassador that I was very glad to emphasize the second paragraph in the President's message in as much as I had signed with the British Ambassador ⁶⁵ this morning a temporary Lease-Lend Agreement between the United States and Great Britain.⁶⁶ I said the text would be made public tomorrow morning. I also said that I wished to make it clear that in my judgment the terms of this temporary agreement between the British and ourselves were a matter of the utmost significance. I said that this agreement implied that when a suitable time arose the British Government and ourselves would be prepared to lay all of our cards face up on the table and reach a definite settlement which I believed held the promise for a better world economy and that, of course, in such an agreement we would welcome the participation of all other nations associated with us including the Soviet Union.

⁶⁴ February 21.

⁶⁵ Viscount Halifax.

⁶⁶ For text of the British Lend-Lease Agreement of February 23, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

Mr. Litvinov appeared to be greatly interested and said that as I knew, he had for many years been hoping and working for such an ultimate objective.

The text of the President's message is as follows:

"This will acknowledge your message of February 20.

"I want you to know that at the appropriate time we shall be glad to reconsider with you our agreement relative to the funds we are advancing under the Lend-Lease Act. At the moment the all important problem is to get the supplies to you.

"I am having canvassed at once your suggestion relative to centralizing control here of munitions being sent to Russia.

"The further news of the successes of your Army heartens us very much.

"I wish to send you my warm congratulations on the Twenty-fourth Anniversary of the founding of the Red Army."⁶⁷

Mr. Litvinov then said that he was somewhat surprised to have received an inquiry from Secretary Morgenthau⁶⁸ as to why the Soviet Government had not today announced its new gains and victories against Germany. Mr. Litvinov said he did not know where this kind of idea had started but that it certainly had not emanated from Russia. He said there was no reason why the Soviet Government should not announce every day or every few days the gains and advances it had made, and that there was certainly no reason whatever for holding up information of this kind in order to make a spectacular announcement upon the anniversary of the founding of the Red Army.

The Ambassador then went on to say that they of course were making progress but that he did not believe that the Soviet Armies by themselves would be able to crush the German Armies. He said that in his judgment it was imperative that a new front be created. He felt that the British were wasting valuable time by refusing to consider the creation of a new front in western Europe.

I said I wondered whether the Soviet Government would not wish to consider at the same moment, if this matter were coming up again for discussion with the British and with ourselves, the creation of a new front in the Pacific. I said it was obvious that one of the chief problems at the present moment was the fact that Japan was able to concentrate all of her strength in one area in the Pacific and that on account of the tremendous distances involved a great percentage of available American shipping was required for transportation of matériel, et cetera. I said it seemed to me that if a new front were created in the Pacific against Japan, particularly that front which Japan dreaded most of all, namely, the possibility of air attacks from Siberia against her naval bases and her munitions factories, a very

⁶⁷ The celebration of the anniversary of the creation of the Red Army in 1918 was held on February 23.

⁶⁸ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

great deal of strain would be taken off the British and American forces in the Pacific and consequently make it far easier for them to consider favorably the undertaking of some other front in Europe.

The Ambassador said that he believed that the creation of a new front in Siberia would not prove of much value to the Americans and British against Japan. He said that he believed that Japan had at least one million men now fighting in southwestern Pacific regions, one million men between China and the Siberian front, and one million men mobilized in Japan.

I asked him if he believed that Japan actually had sufficient military matériel and equipment to keep so large a force actively engaged in hostilities.

He said he was not sure. But he added that when he came through Singapore the British Admiral, Admiral Layton, had given him figures as to the Japanese air strength which alleged that Japan had altogether not more than between 2000 and 3000 planes available for combat duty and he said it was very clear that Japan had had available an infinitely greater number than these. He said it was his belief that Japanese military equipment was far greater than that which the United States believed she had.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

861.24/841 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 27, 1942—5 p. m.
[Received February 27—1:47 p. m.]

48. For Stettinius from Faymonville. Reference paragraph 5 of your cablegram 35, February 14, 3 p. m.⁶⁹ In principle Soviet Government approves reciprocal action on synthetic rubber. On this basis will exchange products of synthetic rubber industry, or information on technological processes, or formulas or actual experience by sending and receiving technical personnel in agreed numbers and with agreed qualifications. I recommend that you ship me 50 tires for various military vehicles, produced in the United States by synthetic rubber industry for exchange for similar Soviet products. If you are willing to carry the exchange relationship further, please indicate basis on which I may extend the proposal.⁷⁰ [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

⁶⁹ Not printed; in this telegram, General Spalding informed Colonel Faymonville that American synthetic rubber specialists were extremely interested in Soviet experience in that field (861.24/823).

⁷⁰ By telegram No. 140 of March 25, 1942, the Department instructed the Embassy at Kuibyshev to endeavor to obtain seeds of a Russian rubber producing plant (102.73/2969a).

861.24/1136

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. Mr. Litvinov stated that he wished to inform me that as a result of preliminary conversations held between the Lease Lend authority and the Soviet Embassy, the Russian Government had decided to appoint a staff in Washington headed by Major General Belyaev and Rear Admiral Akulin which as a commission would deal directly with the Lease Lend authority in all matters relating to military and naval assistance to be received from the United States.⁷¹ The Ambassador said that the Amtorg would continue to function as a purely commercial organization but that this type of work which up to now had been entrusted to Amtorg would now be entrusted to this new commission.

He stated that it was the desire of his government to function vis-à-vis the United States in exactly the same way as the British commission was functioning. He said he trusted that his people would now be accorded the same rights and privileges as the members of the British mission particularly with regard to the sending of code messages directly to their opposite numbers in Moscow. He said that the staff of his Embassy was not sufficient to make it possible for them to take care of the encoding of all messages of this character and he therefore hoped that this arrangement could be carried out.

I said I would look into the matter immediately but that in principle I was glad to tell him that this Government would, of course, be glad to make arrangements for his mission such as had been made for the British and other United Nations in Washington. I stated that I would confirm this by means of a letter.⁷² The Ambassador seemed to be very much pleased. He said he thought probably Mr. Lukashev⁷³ would be transferred from Amtorg to this new commission since he was so fully familiar with the questions involved.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁷¹ This Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union was appointed by the Soviet Government on February 27, 1942. Maj. Gen. Alexander Ivanovich Belyaev was Chairman, and Rear Adm. Mikhail Ivanovich Akulin was Vice Chairman. According to a note of November 2, 1942, from Ambassador Litvinov the official full title of this purchasing agency was thenceforth to be "The Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States." (861.24/1152)

⁷² The Soviet Ambassador confirmed the details of this conversation in a letter of March 4, 1942. The Acting Secretary of State, in his acknowledgment of March 5, declared: "This Commission will enjoy a status similar to that of the British Purchasing Commission. It will be afforded the privilege of using confidential codes and such other facilities as are necessary to carry on its activities." (861.24/1137)

⁷³ Konstantin Ignatyevich Lukashev, Chairman of the Board and President of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, became a Vice Chairman of this Commission.

861.24/855a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1942—1 p. m.

66. "From Harry L. Hopkins to General Faymonville. In view of the approaching termination of the period of the Moscow Protocol, it seems desirable that steps be taken to arrange for a definite program of munitions and raw materials aid to provide for the continuance of supply after June. While the shipments under the Protocol have not been as great as we would have wished, our desire to be of the greatest possible help has been most sincere. The shipments this month should be very important. Every possible effort will be made to meet all Protocol commitments at the earliest possible date. The United States remains firm in the belief that material aid to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is of the highest strategical importance. We think it might be wise to hold a conference in Washington with representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States in order to develop in the most effective way a realistic future aid program. Your personal views are requested as to the desirability for such a conference and as to where and when it should be held. Please feel perfectly free to express your personal opinions."

WELLES

861.24/859 : Telegram

The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 16, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received March 17—8:36 a. m.]

72. For Hopkins from Faymonville. Continuation of material assistance to Soviet Union after expiration of protocol, is essential to successful prosecution of the war. Munitions, food and raw materials must be included. Exact munitions items needed by Russians could be determined by general military staff conference of all nations concerned, or if such a conference is impracticable then Russians' own estimates of needs could be accepted as final for requirements in Eastern Europe. Full military staff conference on Allied strategy would be a desirable preliminary to a supply conference but in my opinion military staff conference on strategy is still impracticable. Reasons: Russian confidence in ability of Red Army to regain occupied territory if adequate munitions arrive from abroad; Russian lack of esteem for Allied operations, especially in Malaya; Russian reluctance to accept foreign guidance or suggestions on strategy; lack of confidence

in the ultimate British and American attitude toward the Soviet Union, which attitude, the Russians fear, is foreshadowed by failure to accept Russia's basic war aim—restoration of her 1941 frontiers.⁷⁴ At any supply conference which may be held, it will therefore be desirable to accept without question lists of munitions requirements presented by Russians as representing the needs on their front. It would be particularly undesirable to adopt an intermediate course in which military strategy conference is omitted, but Russians are nevertheless required to submit their munitions lists to analysis in relation to strategy and possible disapproval by British and Americans at a supply conference.

2. Requests for raw materials need not [be?] similarly accepted without argument, since Russians have faith in our industrial skill and will not accept suggestions⁷⁵ in this field which they will not similarly accept in the field of strategy. Our attempt to assist in the industrial field must, however, avoid all resemblance of industrial espionage, and must be obviously and demonstrably related to improved processes, substitute materials or more available items.

At Moscow Conference in September, our willingness [not?] to pry out economic information, because of its sharp contrast with British methods, established the integrity of our motives and built up a good will which should not be dissipated by inquiry into matters not germane to the purposes of supply conference.

3. Subject to above conditions, recommend that you invite Russian and British representatives to meet with you at a supply conference in Washington to project future deliveries of munitions, food and raw materials. Immediate action desirable and I suggest that conference convene first week of April.

Repeated to Kuibyshev. [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.24/893a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1942—noon.

1116. For Harriman from Hopkins. "President ordering ships be made available to meet full Russian Protocol regardless of any other shipping commitments.

He has also ordered raw materials and semi-finished materials released to Russia at the earliest possible moment. The difficulties involved in these instructions are very substantial and in effect mean

⁷⁴ For correspondence concerning negotiations involving the demands of the Soviet Union to be assured of its 1941 frontiers, see pp. 490-566, *passim*.

⁷⁵ The wording undoubtedly intended is "will accept suggestions".

the Russian Protocol must be completed in preference to any other phase of our war program."⁷⁶

WELLES

861.24/871½

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements (Hawkins) ⁷⁷

[WASHINGTON,] March 18, 1942.

LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

In our memorandum of March 5, 1942 (copy attached) ⁷⁸ we suggested, for the reasons stated therein, that all lend-lease agreements be substantially similar to the agreement recently concluded with the United Kingdom.

It is believed of particular importance, for the following reasons, that a lend-lease agreement basically similar to the British agreement be concluded with the U. S. S. R. at the earliest possible moment.

1. It is understood that the lend-lease arrangements with the U. S. S. R., as they now stand, envisage the repayment by the U. S. S. R. to this country of two billion dollars, such repayment to begin five years after the war and extend over a period of ten years. These arrangements, in comparison with the terms of the agreement with Britain, appear to constitute a clear discrimination against the U. S. S. R. Removal of this discrimination should have the effect of avoiding Soviet resentment and of greatly strengthening our relations with the U. S. S. R. in the war effort.

2. Repayment by the U. S. S. R. of even one billion, the amount covered by the first lend-lease arrangement with that country, would constitute a very heavy war debt in terms of Russia's capacity to pay. A war debt of two billion and possibly more would place an unbearable burden on the commerce between the two nations in the postwar period. Normally, Russian purchases exceed considerably our imports from that country. In 1938, our exports to the U. S. S. R. were over \$45,000,000 greater than imports. Our imports of goods and gold from the U. S. S. R. would have to be increased tremendously in order to permit the repayment of a debt of such large proportions. Even if they could squeeze out enough goods and gold to meet their payments, it would not be in our interest to have them do so since the goods and gold sent here would provide no purchasing power for American exports during the 10-year repayment period,

⁷⁶ An identical message for Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville was sent to the Embassy at Moscow at the same time (861.24/893b).

⁷⁷ This memorandum was prepared by James C. Sappington, 3d, of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements. It was addressed to Charles Bunn, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Acting Chief of the Division of Exports and Defense Aid; Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs; and James Clement Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

⁷⁸ Not printed; filed separately under 800.24/273.

with the result that American exports to Russia in that period might dwindle to practically nothing. Furthermore, commercial relations between Russia and other countries would be seriously affected. Gold which otherwise would be used to help pay for imports from third countries would have to be sent to this country. An agreement along the lines of the United Kingdom agreement would avoid a settlement which would severely burden commerce if lived up to, and set the stage for repudiation, with all that would mean in terms of bitterness and recriminations, if not lived up to.

3. There is strong reason to believe that the U. S. S. R. would welcome an agreement similar to the agreement with Britain since (a) it would remove the above-mentioned discrimination in favor of the British, (b) while not precluding cash payment if later deemed advisable, it would provide a basis for easing or eliminating the burden of an extremely heavy war debt, and (c) it would embody assurances concerning the application of principles which the U. S. S. R. has consistently sought.

4. From our viewpoint the conclusion of such an agreement would achieve a major objective: it would commit the Soviet Government to cooperate in regard to current and future economic action in line with principles advocated by us.

The attached draft of a proposed lend-lease agreement with the U. S. S. R.⁷⁹ is virtually identical with the agreement with the United Kingdom. Only the second paragraph of the preamble, which is intended further to identify the U. S. S. R. with the principles of the Atlantic Charter,⁸⁰ has been added.

I would be glad to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.

HARRY C. HAWKINS

861.248/204 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 17, 1942—noon.

[Received 11 : 35 p. m.]

110. For McCabe⁸¹ from Faymonville. Reference your paragraphs 2 and 3, cablegram 39 February 18,⁸² Chief of Soviet Air Forces⁸³ understands that effort to obtain spare parts is not producing satisfactory results. His most urgent immediate requirement is to recondition P-40s. For these and other types he must have at once 100 spare Allison engines and at least 100 spare propellers. During past

⁷⁹ Not attached to file copy of this document.

⁸⁰ For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. For correspondence on the Atlantic Conference meeting between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, see *ibid.*, pp. 341 ff.

⁸¹ Thomas B. McCabe, Deputy Lend-Lease Administrator.

⁸² Not printed.

⁸³ Lt. Gen. Ya. V. Smushkevich.

months British Mission has received similar urgent requests for tank spares and airplane spares and has thereupon attempted to show Russians how to be more economical with spare parts and more careful in use of tanks and planes. This British advice has not been welcomed and has not resulted in noticeable change in Russian practice or modification of Russian requests. Russians have commendable and increasing confidence in their own ability to fight and their own knowledge of methods of warfare. They are proud of Russian fighting records as compared with records of advisors. A group of British technical advisors is being withdrawn from the Soviet Union. I see no prospect of success in attempting to convince the Russians that they do not need what they say they need. I recommend concentration of effort on producing the spare parts requested by Russians. Please cable estimated date of delivery of 100 propellers and engines. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/905: Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 7, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 9:41 p. m.]

144. For McCabe from Faymonville.

1. Russians emphatically object to proposal to cease loading ships for northern ports until ice conditions improve and enemy threats decrease.⁸⁴ Russians have had much experience in northern navigation. They state that in skirting ice pack in spring and summer, hazards of navigation increase relatively more for submarines than they increase for surface vessels. Russians reason that menace from enemy submarines on account of ice hazards and narrowing of channel is therefore relatively less now than it was during winter. Russian opinion holds that other reasons than narrowing of channel must exist for request to the American Government to cease loading ships, and I have been asked the direct question whether we will escort convoys from Iceland to North Russia if the British are afraid to do so.

⁸⁴ In a telegram drafted on April 30, 1942, for the information of Ambassador Standley in the Soviet Union, but which finally was not sent, the difficulties encountered in shipping on the northern route, about which the Soviet Government had been informed, were in part explained: "During recent weeks the Arctic ice drifts have come so unusually far south that between them and the northern coast of Norway the open sea lane is more narrow than it has been for many years. The Germans apparently through the use of planes and sea craft based on Norway have been able to police this lane and inflict severe losses. The risks involved in present conditions in sending through large convoys or ships without adequately armed escorts are out of proportion to the aid which such convoys or ships could render the Soviet Union. . . ."

2. It is desirable to overcome suspicion that the British, using ice conditions as a pretext, may have persuaded us to use elsewhere supplies needed by the Soviet Union. If new strategic plans actually require reallocation of munitions, suspicion here can best be overcome by taking Russians into consultation on general strategy. Please give me all facts which I may use in this connection.

3. Commissar of Foreign Trade⁸⁵ makes following three requests:

First, do not cease loading for northern ports.

Second, send sufficient ships to permit 3 convoys of 30 ships each to arrive at northern ports during May, instead of only 2 convoys as desired by British.

Third, by all means send more ships also Iranian ports but increase number to 20 instead of to 12 and do so without decreasing number of American ships to northern ports.

[Faymonville]

THOMPSON

861.24/909a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1942—9 p. m.

220. We are particularly pleased that you found an opportunity in your talk of April 23⁸⁶ to impress upon Stalin the importance ascribed by us to the early opening of the Alaskan-Siberian route. We note that Stalin finally agreed that he would look into the possibility of such a route being opened for the delivery of planes and for use as a channel of communication.

The War Department has informed us that it is anxious to obtain from the Soviet Government as soon as possible full and detailed information of a character which would assist it in making plans for the movement of all types of combat aircraft from the United States through Alaska and Eastern Siberia to the Western front or to points in Siberia. Similar information is also urgently needed which might be helpful in connection with the movement of long-range bombers across the Polar cap to the western part of the Soviet Union.

It is particularly important that this information be received as far as possible in advance of any operations which might be undertaken so that the necessary facilities could be made available and the necessary equipment and supplies could be prepared or earmarked. It is hoped, therefore, that you take advantage of every opportunity

⁸⁵ Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan.

⁸⁶ See telegram No. 126, April 24, 2 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 545.

to impress upon the Soviet Government our views regarding the importance both to the Soviet Union and to the United States of these routes and to press it for all information which might assist us in connection with our preparations to make use of them. A situation might develop at any moment in which the use of these routes would become immediately imperative.

HULL

861.248/212 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 13, 1942—noon.

[Received 10:10 p. m.]

154. McCabe from Faymonville. Reference paragraph 1 my 152.⁸⁷ Commissar⁸⁸ has just received from Persian Gulf ports information on arrival of more planes. Because turnover process is slow these additional planes still further increase to more than 130 the number awaiting assembly and turnover to Soviet representatives. Commissar again points out urgent necessity of having these planes on battle front immediately. Commissar has satisfied himself that principal trouble is insufficient number of skilled personnel for assembly. He considers necessary to remedy immediately without waiting for additional American personnel to arrive. Contingent on your approval he therefore proposed to send at once to Persian Gulf ports 50 Soviet engineers and mechanics to assist in assembly and speed up turnover of planes. Soviet personnel can either act as assistants to American in charge or can set separate assembly shop. Commissar prefers second alternative. Upon arrival of sufficient American engineers to insure prompt turnover Soviet engineers if no longer needed can be withdrawn.

Proposal to send Soviet personnel originated with highest authority. It is clearly for purpose of getting fighting strength into battle at earliest possible moment. It is regarded here as urgent. I believe proposal should have your immediate approval and that you must thereafter take necessary steps to overcome British veto against

⁸⁷ Not printed; it reported the Soviet Government's request that efforts be made to expedite delivery of planes arriving at Persian Gulf ports of Abadan and Basra because of urgent need of them at the front (861.248/210).

⁸⁸ A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

sending additional Soviet personnel to Persian Gulf.⁸⁹ Please let me have favorable reply in shortest possible time.⁹⁰

Repeated to Kuibyshev and to General Greely,⁹¹ Tehran. [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.248/218 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), May 26, 1942—3 p. m.
[Received 5:05 p. m.]

447. Department's 220, May 1 [11], 10 [9] p. m. In addition to my own personal approach on the subject to Stalin, Molotov, Mikoyan, Vyshinsky and Lozovsky, I have been at pains to have the matter of air routes taken up on every possible opportunity by the Military and Naval Attachés and by General Faymonville. Michela has sent the War Department today a personal message (his No. 93, May 26⁹²) from me to General Marshall⁹³ outlining the efforts made and the difficulties encountered, and informing him that concrete proposals must be offered if Soviet doubts and suspicions are to be overcome.

STANDLEY

861.24/962 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 26, 1942—midnight.
[Received May 26—8:45 a. m.]

2937. Personal for the President from Harriman. I am sure you will be glad to hear that Molotov⁹⁴ told me today Admiral Standley was highly appreciated, to use his words, "for his simplicity, directness and fighting spirit".

⁸⁹ In telegram No. 2168, May 14, McCabe requested Harriman at London to obtain British consent to the Soviet proposal; the consent was granted, as reported in telegram No. 2883, May 23, from London. (861.248/217a, 217)

⁹⁰ McCabe replied in telegram No. 134, May 16, midnight, that Soviet officials were to some extent responsible for the delay, since a number of planes had been at Basra at least a month awaiting Soviet acceptance. He said that the United States Government was inclined to permit Soviet mechanics to come to the assembly points as a convenient method of training them and speeding up acceptance. (861.248/210)

⁹¹ Maj. Gen. John N. Greely, Chief of the United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.

⁹² No copy found in Department files.

⁹³ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

⁹⁴ Molotov was in London at this time.

Molotov indicated satisfaction with the progress made in protocol shipments and understands the reasons for the early delays. He is however disturbed over the present convoy difficulties and hopes that with the receding of the ice to the north the British can expand the operation.

He emphasized the critical importance of maximum shipments of two items, tanks and pursuit planes. [Harriman.]

WINANT

861.24/924

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called at my request. I proceeded to speak to him concerning a draft of a lend-lease agreement⁹⁵ which I later handed him, substantially along the following lines:

1. The proposed agreement is practically identical with the Lend-Lease Agreement entered into several months ago with Great Britain.⁹⁶ The American Government hopes that it will be able to enter into agreements almost identical in nature with a number of the United Nations.

2. The Government of the United States hopes that it might be possible to conclude an agreement of the type proposed with the Soviet Government in the near future so that Article VII of the Agreement which provides for conversations between the two Governments on subjects of economic nature would become immediately effective.

3. It would be helpful if the Soviet decision with regard to the proposal of the Government of the United States could be reached while the Commissar for Foreign Affairs is in Washington.⁹⁷

4. The proposed agreement would of course supersede any Lease-Lend Agreements which have hitherto been entered into between the United States and the Soviet Union by exchanges of notes.

The Ambassador seemed interested, but said that it would be necessary to send it to the Foreign Office as a first step and, therefore, it could not be agreed upon while the Soviet Foreign Minister is here this week.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁹⁵ Not printed; a copy of the draft is filed under 861.24/923.

⁹⁶ Signed on February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

⁹⁷ Molotov visited Washington between May 29 and June 4, 1942. For correspondence concerning negotiations carried on during this visit, see pp. 566-596, *passim*.

861.24/928a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1942—5 p. m.

254. On May 26 I handed to Litvinoff a draft copy of a master Lend-Lease Agreement which we propose to enter into with the Soviet Union. This draft Agreement is practically identical with the Agreement into which we entered with the British several months ago. The proposed Agreement and accompanying exchange of notes would supersede all Lend-Lease arrangements which have been effected by exchange of notes. If you will refer to article 7 of the British Agreement you will note that if the Soviet Government agrees to our proposal it will be obligating itself to enter into economic collaboration with the United States and other countries.

HULL

861.24/1121a

*President Roosevelt to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the Soviet Union (Molotov)*⁹⁸

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: The heroic contribution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the common cause of civilization will forever be an inspiration to all free peoples. Your presence in the United States is a symbol of the unity of our cause and of our purpose.

The governments of the United States and of Great Britain desire further to cooperate with your nation in its valiant effort. In cooperation with the people of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the other United Nations, we are determined to eradicate for all time those forces which may at any time threaten the future peace of the world. We are most anxious to provide the maximum assistance possible in the form of military supplies, raw materials, equipment and food.

With the concurrence of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, I have the honor to submit to you herewith a statement of the resources our governments are in a position to make available to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the year July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943.⁹⁹

Cordially and sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

⁹⁸ The Department's copy of this communication is filed as Annex I to instruction No. 59 to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, October 13, 1942, p. 734.

⁹⁹ The text of the Proposed Second Protocol between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States and Great Britain is published in Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, p. 17. A copy of this proposed protocol was sent to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in instruction No. 18 of June 18, 1942 (861.24/962a).

Memorandum by Major General James H. Burns¹ to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt²

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1942.

In accordance with your instructions, I visited Mr. Molotov last evening and gave him information substantially as follows:

After today's conversation at the Soviet Embassy between Mr. Molotov, Mr. Litvinov and myself, I got in touch with the President with reference to the four requests submitted by Mr. Molotov to Mr. Harry Hopkins and the President, stated in substance as follows:³

Reference Request No. 1

"Sending of one caravan of ships monthly from the ports of America directly to Archangel under escort of U. S. naval ships."

Every effort will be made by the joint forces of the United Kingdom and the United States to get supplies into Russia. The President is most anxious to move maximum amount of supplies, but does not feel that more specific commitments as to convoys can be made at this time.

The President hopes the U. S. S. R. will give effective air support to the northern convoy route, and feels this will have a very important influence upon the amount of supplies that can be delivered by this route.⁴

Reference Request No. 2

"Monthly supplies of 50 bombers B-25 by flight through Africa with their delivery at Basra or Teheran."

The new protocol provides 12 B-25's per month through October next. These will be flown by way of Africa and delivered at Basra or Teheran.

In view of the commitments involved in the air offensive over Western Europe, no commitment can now be made to increase this number at this time. The number is subject to further consideration as the progress of the war develops, and in any event a decision will be made in due course as to the number of these bombers to be made available after next October.

Reference Request No. 3

"Delivery of 150 bombers Boston-3 to the ports of the Persian Gulf and their assembly there."

¹ Executive, Munitions Assignments Board, United States-Great Britain.

² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

³ These requests for information were first made by Molotov and submitted to Hopkins for President Roosevelt on June 1. Answers were next pressed for at the luncheon held in the Embassy of the Soviet Union on June 3. The replies here printed were given orally to Molotov during the evening of the same day, after verbal instructions had been received from Hopkins.

⁴ The difficulties besetting the northern convoy route were described in detail to Molotov during his visit to Washington. See memorandum of conference held at the White House, May 30, p. 575, the two paragraphs beginning "The President observed that sending each convoy", pp. 577-578.

This Government will continue to provide 100 A-20's per month through October next. These will be delivered to ports of the Persian Gulf and assembled there.

The A-20's are the equivalent of the Boston-3's and are the same type as those now being furnished to the U. S. S. R. by the United States.

The same general comments made with reference to future commitments of the B-25 bombers under Request No. 2 also apply to the A-20's under this request.

Reference Request No. 4

"Delivery of 3000 trucks monthly to the ports of the Persian Gulf and their assembly there."

The President believes that this request can be met in full.

Mr. Molotov made no comment with reference to the rendering of more effective Soviet air support to the northern convoy route.

He seemed to desire a more definite answer to Request No. 1 (Monthly U. S. convoy from America to Archangel). I repeated that my understanding is that while the President is most anxious to move the maximum amount of supplies to Russia, he does not feel that more specific commitments as to convoys can be made at this time.

Mr. Molotov asked me to thank the President for his prompt consideration of these four requests and for his decisions thereon. He said that while he had hoped they would be granted in full, he was deeply grateful for the help offered. He stated we could rest assured that all munitions supplied to the U. S. S. R. would be put to work against the Germans as promptly and effectively as possible, and that Russia could be relied upon to continue the war until victory is won. I told him I was sure the President and the country had that same feeling about Russia. He seemed to be very friendly and very appreciative of the efforts being made to assist his country.

J. H. BURNS

[The master Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed in Washington at 4:15 p. m. on June 11, 1942, by Secretary of State Hull and Soviet Ambassador Litvinov. It was nearly identical with the agreement signed with Great Britain on February 23, 1942. For the text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500. The text, together with statement by the Department of State issued to the press on June 12, 1942, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1942, pages 531-535.]

861.24/912: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1942—midnight.

160. From McCabe for Faymonville. Refer your telegram 157.⁵ On May 29, 1942 Foreign Affairs Commissar was given joint proposal by United States and British Governments for second protocol. Schedule of supplies from the American Government is in response to request filed in early April with this Government. Schedule of the British is based on assumption that supplies from Britain are desired at levels approximately as at present. Offer is made in present proposal to make available at centers of production in United Kingdom between 800,000 and 1,000,000 tons and at centers of production in the United States approximately 7,000,000 tons of goods. American goods broken down as follows: 1,800,000 tons of machinery materials and industrial equipment; 1,110,000 tons of naval and military equipment, ammunition and armament; and 4,300,000 tons of food. Possible limitations on shipment is reviewed in the proposal. Limiting factor shipment by southern route is inland transportation from ports on Persian Gulf. Controlling factor governing deliveries by northern route is the amount of shipping that can be convoyed. In view of the factors limiting shipping United Kingdom and the United States request that the Soviets select approximately 4,400,000 tons of supplies from the total joint offering. Selected supplies would then become the basic program for shipments from both United States and the United Kingdom via the northern and southern ports.⁶ In the event that items not listed in the second protocol are later requested, other promised items must of course be relinquished in order that the shipping limitation will not be surpassed. In the event that the Soviets desire to furnish their own vessels for shipments from Pacific ports, additional supplies may be had up to total amounts listed in the offer. Shipping necessary to lift that part of the 4,400,000 tons for which the Soviets are unable to supply vessels will be transported by the United States and the United Kingdom. New Lend-Lease agreement signed by the Soviets on June 11, 1942, and replacing previous credit arrangements, will form basis of financial arrangements to cover American portion of the proposed new protocol and any adjustments thereof.

Non-protocol items as well as items from the first protocol not shipped by the 30th of June will be included automatically in the new protocol and quantities of new material to be ordered thereunder will

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ For the arguments advanced by President Roosevelt to Molotov at the White House on June 1 in this connection, see memorandum by Samuel H. Cross, June 1, p. 578, paragraph beginning "The President then went on to say" and the two subsequent paragraphs, p. 582.

be reduced proportionately. In order to reduce the carry over every effort will be made to transport as many of the items as possible and as are available in June. Selection of the items to be included in the 4,400,000 tons is now awaited by this Government. In the meantime, in order to avoid possible hiatus because of delays in Soviets response to offers, a priority list for July is being prepared by General Belyaev.

In view of the necessity of planning production of items such as trucks, it is requested that you urge prompt action in selection of items desired within the 4,400,000 ton program. Belyaev and Burns have informally agreed that in connection with the Pacific Ocean shipments there shall be no increase in the Pacific of the number of Soviet vessels over present number through diversion of Soviet vessels now operating in the Atlantic. Total shipments to both northern and southern ports will continue to be restricted by limitations on available shipping to 4,400,000 ton figure even should capacity of inland routes in the south be increased and convoy difficulties in the north simplified. [McCabe.]

HULL

861.24/964a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1942—2 p. m.

172. "For Faymonville from McCabe. The following formula has been proposed by this Government and accepted by the Soviet Government through General Belyaev in determining allocations of items as between the First and Second Protocol:

a. That the cargoes of all ships allocated for June will be considered as under the First Protocol, regardless of the dates on which the ships may sail.

b. That the cargoes of all ships allocated for July and thereafter will be considered as under the Second Protocol.

c. That the cargoes of all Soviet vessels which are berthed for loading prior to July 1st will be considered as pertaining to the First Protocol and cargoes of ships so berthed after July 1st be considered as under the Second Protocol."

HULL

861.24/973 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), July 1, 1942.

[Received July 1—8: 15 p. m.]

573. Today's local paper publishes an announcement of the signing in Moscow on June 27 by the British Ambassador⁷ and Mikoyan

⁷ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

of an agreement concerning the financing of war deliveries and of other military assistance from the British Government to the Soviet Government. This agreement guarantees (1) deliveries of war materials and other military aid to the Soviet Government by the British Government (2) deliveries of armaments of Empire manufacture free of charge and (3) further improvement in British war deliveries to the Soviet Union. The agreement also states that it is the wish of the Soviet Government that any assistance from the one party to the other be rendered on the basis of reciprocity. It contains a retroactive clause to the effect that it shall be considered to have entered into force on June 22, 1941.

The announcement points out that this agreement does not in any way affect British deliveries of raw materials and equipment of a general nature which are regulated by the agreement of August 16, 1941^a concerning mutual deliveries, credit and payments "which created all the prerequisites for the constant expansion observed in the delivery of English goods to the Soviet Union and of certain Soviet goods to Great Britain". It is also announced that as the 10,000,000 pound credit extended to the Soviet Government by the British Government under the agreement of August 16, 1941 is nearly exhausted a further credit of 25,000,000 pounds was made available a few days ago by the British Government on the basis of the same agreement.

The announcement concludes with the statement that "the new agreement and the new credit provide a wide financial base for economic and military assistance from Great Britain to the Soviet Union".

THURSTON

861.248/222 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 5, 1942—9 p. m.
[Received July 5—8:30 p. m.]

243. For the President. One of the items on the list submitted to the Harriman Mission in September [1941] by the Soviet Naval authorities was a request for PBY Navy planes. These planes could not be spared at that time. The Navy Commissar^b now informs me that he has again requested 60 PBY planes for use in the Vladivostok and Murmansk-Archangel areas, and I am convinced that if these

^a For text of the British-Soviet agreement signed at Moscow, August 16, 1941, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLVII, p. 1040, or *British Treaty Series* No. 34 (1948), Appendix No. 1.

^b Adm. Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov.

planes could be spared they would be of great value in protecting convoys in those areas and thus prevent sinkings of many cargo ships. It would be of great help in my work here if your answer were delivered through me.¹⁰

STANDLEY

861.24/987

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Litvinov) to the Secretary of State*¹¹

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am instructed by my Government to inform you as follows:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accepts with satisfaction the Second Protocol proposed by the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, for the period of July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943.

The Soviet Government wishes to express its hope that:

A. The monthly delivery of airplanes from the United Kingdom after the first six months of 1942, i. e. in the first half-year of 1943, if it cannot be increased then in no way will be decreased, and the delivery of airplanes from the United States after October, 1942 will be increased to the possible limit.

B. The Government of the United Kingdom will find a way to maintain the monthly deliveries of aluminum ingots fixed for July–September 1942, during the entire period of the Second Protocol and that the Government of the United Kingdom will be able to arrange for the monthly supply of cobalt metal at the rate of ten tons per month, as it was provided under the Moscow Protocol.

C. Taking into consideration the increased demand of the United States and the United Kingdom for nickel and also the acute need for this metal in the U. S. S. R., it will be possible to arrange a monthly supply of nickel at the rate of 400 tons per month, over the quantities necessary for the production of manufactured goods offered in the Second Protocol.

The Soviet Government considers that the proposed limitation of Soviet requirements to 4,400,000 net tons, shipments of which will be provided for to the U. S. S. R. northern ports and to the Persian Gulf, shall be made at the expense of flour, wheat, sugar and petroleum products. The Soviet Government trusts that the Government of the United Kingdom will provide for the delivery of different kinds of equipment, ordered up to July 1, 1942 by the Trade Delegation of

¹⁰ No reply to this communication has been found in Department files.

¹¹ An identic note was addressed by the Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, on the same day.

the U. S. S. R. in the United Kingdom and will find the further possibility of accepting new Soviet orders for industrial equipment for delivery during the Second Protocol.

The Soviet Government takes note of the U. S. Government's statement regarding the impossibility, at the present time of satisfying the U. S. S. R. Government's request for machinery and equipment for the U. S. S. R. Iron and Steel Industry, Petroleum Industry and Railroads. At the same time, the U. S. S. R. Government expresses its hope that, in the future, the U. S. Government may find it possible to satisfy the needs of the U. S. S. R. for the above mentioned equipment.

The Soviet Government expresses its satisfaction at the statement of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to the effect that they will be glad to reconsider, from time to time, the second program with the intention of finding out the possibilities of increasing the supply to the U. S. S. R. of military items and equipment which can be made available and delivered.

The Soviet Government authorizes its Purchasing Commission in Washington to adjust and clarify those items in the new Protocol which are in need of further adjustment and clarification.

It is presumed that the Second Protocol, like the Moscow Protocol, will be signed by the representatives of the three Governments concerned.

I am authorized to sign the Protocol on behalf of my Government.

My Government would like to have included in the Protocol the desiderata, expressed in paragraphs "a", "b" and "c".¹²

Sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF

861.24/988a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1942—4 a. m.

188. From McCabe for Faymonville. Mr. Hopkins has directed Brigadier General S. P. Spalding to undertake a survey of the supply route to Russia by way of the Persian Gulf for the purpose of ascertaining whether everything possible is being done to improve transport facilities and to make certain that material to be delivered under the second Protocol will be forwarded as promptly and as efficiently as possible. General Spalding has been instructed to make recommendations for improvement and to make full report after return to United States. It is desirable that General Spalding confer in Iran with Soviet authorities there and inspect those portions of the route

¹² The decisions taken with respect to these requests of the Soviet Government are printed as Annex III to instruction No. 59 to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, October 13, p. 734.

under Soviet control, including port, road and rail facilities, in order that he will be able to make certain that the project is synchronized in all its phases and be in a position to recommend the furnishing by the United States of necessary facilities and equipment.

It would be most helpful if you could arrange to meet General Spalding at some convenient location, possibly at Tehran, in order that you may be mutually informed regarding the situation. We are requesting General Belyaev's cooperation in facilitating the mission of General Spalding. [McCabe.]

HULL

861.24/999 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 15, 1942—2 p. m.

[Received July 15—9:20 a. m.]

3908. Personal for the President. Maisky just came in to see me. He told me he had had a conference with the Prime Minister and Admiral Pound¹³ last night. Pound explained to him the losses suffered by the northern convoy and said he was opposed to continuing shipments over the northern route to Russia at this time. Maisky said he objected vigorously to this decision and was told by the Prime Minister and Pound that since many of our ships were involved the final decision would rest with us.

Maisky further told me that both he and his naval adviser do not feel that the last convoy was adequately protected or skillfully handled. Maisky was critical of Pound as an aggressive naval officer.

Maisky stated that he felt, at this time when Russia was under the greatest pressure and no apparent effort was being made here to establish a second front in time, that to discontinue the northern supply line would not be understood by his country and would be a serious mistake.

I have reported Maisky's conversation as accurately as I have been able to record it immediately after his leaving the room. I felt that it should be forwarded to you at once without further checking by me because of other messages which have been cabled to you by the Prime Minister and because of Maisky's statement to me that the Prime Minister and Pound told him that the final decision on the continuance or discontinuance of the convoys would be made by us.

WINANT

¹³ British Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley P. R. Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt*¹⁴

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1942.

I told General Bradley,¹⁵ on the eve of his departure for Moscow, the important thing to impress on the Russians is that we are wholly realistic about shipments to Russia and that he must impress this fact on the Russian authorities.

The one essential criterion is not pages and pages listing commitments under the Moscow Protocol.

The real criterion is the ability to deliver matériels into Russia.

We must make every effort to make deliveries by any and all practicable means.

Therefore, our position should be to say to the Russians, in effect, that we can let them have almost anything they want, but they must list these items in an order of priority and that we will fill them in the order chosen by them.

I am, of course, referring to matériels carried on shipboard or by transport plane. Bombers which can be delivered under their own power constitute the only exception and in this case these bombers must, of course, be allocated from the general pool.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

861.24/1017: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 29, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received July 30—1:30 a. m.]

4243. To General Burns and McCabe from Harriman. Referring your cable of July 22 to Hopkins.¹⁶

1. In view of decision to suspend for the present convoys to North Russia¹⁷ I made following proposals at meeting of Allied Supplies Executive, Mr. Eden presiding, regarding arrangements for shipping supplies to Russia under Second Protocol.

¹⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

Sent to the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, the Special Assistant to the President with responsibility for Lend-Lease administration, Harry L. Hopkins, the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, and the Lend-Lease Administrator, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

¹⁵ Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, leader of a special Air Mission to the Soviet Union, with personal rank of Minister; he arrived at Moscow on August 4, 1942.

¹⁶ No copy of this message has been found in Department files.

¹⁷ This decision had been made known to the Embassy in the Soviet Union by telegram No. 199, July 19, 1942, to Moscow (861.24/1018a).

(a) That everything shipped to the Persian Gulf for Russia should so far as possible come from the United States rather than from the United Kingdom.

(b) That supplies from the United Kingdom should have priority in any future convoys to Northern Russia.

(c) The only exceptions to these principles would be goods irreplaceable from United States or goods urgently required which could not immediately be delivered in sufficient quantities from the United States.

2. It was agreed that these proposals had great practical advantages. Sufficient cargo is available in United States to fill capacity of Persian Gulf route. Substantial shipping would be saved as a result of elimination of exports from United Kingdom to Persian Gulf of goods similar to those being imported from United States. British production would then be available to supply European theatre. Supplies from United Kingdom if forwarded in September convoy to North Russia will arrive at the front approximately same date as if sent via Persian Gulf.

3. Political objection was raised to acceptance of proposed principles on ground that it would give Russians impression that United Kingdom was ceasing to provide aid to Russia and therefore it was decided that proposal would be placed before War Cabinet.

4. At my request it was agreed to prepare an estimate of number of United States ships that might be convoyed to North Russia so as to permit United States to plan its production of supplies for Russia.

5. British propose to send four British ships with high priority cargo including over 100 Hurricanes to Persian Gulf immediately in next convoy. They have not received reply from Russians regarding their ability to maintain and operate these planes on Southern Front.

6. British now drawing up list of Second Protocol supplies for delivery via Persian Gulf with estimated Russian priorities on assumption principles set forth in paragraph 1 are adopted.

7. Will forward further information as available. [Harriman.]

WINANT

861.24/1032a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1942—midnight.

230. From McCabe for Faymonville.

1. We have reviewed requisitions which have been filed under Second Protocol categories for forging equipment and presses, machine tools, electric furnaces, industrial equipment, testing and measuring equipment, hard alloy and cutting tools and find that quantity which

has been requested is greatly in excess of Protocol commitment and also that Protocol commitment is exceeded by quantity expected to become available during Protocol period. We have advised Belyaev that further requisitions for items to be delivered under enumerated categories during Protocol period cannot be accepted by Lend-Lease. If instructions are given to provide for withdrawal of items of equivalent value exception will be made for unforeseeable requirements of highly critical nature. In such instances it will be necessary in order to minimize waste to take into consideration the stage of production of the items withdrawn. Consideration will be given to individual cases as they arise if it should become necessary to place in production an item requiring considerable length of time to produce.

2. We have been told by Belyaev that his government should understand that Pacific shipments are in addition to and not included in the 4,400,000 ton figure. The 60,000 ton figure used during recent conversations for Pacific is not a limitation but was used as planning objective based upon experience. Up to whatever quantity can be moved on the Soviet's ships goods will be made available for Pacific in accordance with Protocol. Please correct the Commissar's¹⁸ misunderstanding on this point.

3. The policy which has been enunciated in connection with procurement of items under Second Protocol is to assure that there shall be suitable and ample cargoes with which to load ships and at the same time to avoid wasting fabricating capacities or materials through creation of stocks which cannot be delivered. Arrangements will therefore be made for production within Protocol limitations of U. S. schedule and also within limit of overall tonnage for which U. S. is responsible pursuant to program to be materially agreed upon. However, should stocks ready for shipment plus expected deliveries exceed shipping possibilities we shall arrange to control or divert production so as to maintain reasonable maximum cargo accumulation. The Soviets will be consulted should such action become necessary and in special cases exceptions to this rule will be made. In order to establish the importance for procurement needs we plan this week to review with the Soviets all non-military requisitions. Pursuant to recently revised policy which includes three northern convoys before the end of October cargoes are now being loaded and future cargoes are being prepared.

[Remainder of telegram deals with (1) corrosion of ammunition salvaged from a vessel; (2) review of Soviet requests for spare parts which were obsolete; (3) administrative details.]

[McCabe]
HULL

¹⁸ A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

861.24/1033 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 14, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 6:19 p. m.]

297. Spalding to Burns. At a meeting with Mikoyan, he expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of northern convoys and felt that much more could be done to safe-guard their arrival. While stressing the necessity of increased supply from the north, he urged the full development of Persian Gulf routes. He stated that given about 4 months to develop port, road and sail [rail?] facilities, 150,000 to 200,000 tons per month could be brought in over this route. It is my belief that this quantity can be forwarded provided increased British military requirements do not interfere. A recommended monthly tonnage schedule and program of development of route should be agreed upon at a meeting to be held in Tehran or Cairo in the near future at which I will be present. Proposed increase by British military requirements may interfere seriously in the quantity that can be forwarded. Mikoyan has learned that only four ships have been allocated for the Persian Gulf. This is a serious reduction. Request verification to Faymonville and repeat to me at Tehran. Mikoyan also would like to have assembled at Karachi and used on the Meshed route 1,000 United States trucks provided my recent recommendation for 3,500 cargo trucks for Shingler¹⁰ is approved.

It is requested that this possibility be investigated by Washington. It is my recommendation that his request be met if practicable. Mikoyan desires in general to use the Persian Gulf routes to supply the military needs of the Caucasus including food for the army, and to ship raw materials to the Urals. He also pointed out that material could also be shipped via the Caspian to Astrakhan and by rail through Baku and over new railroad now operating from Makhach Kala to Astrakhan. He made no reservation as to any possible interruption of these routes. In the future it is planned by the Soviets to use Persian Gulf ports exclusively for shipments from the United States with the single exception of 2,500 tons of rubber per month from Ceylon. Imports of jute and sisal will be suspended and such items as tea, sugar and shellac will be imported over the Meshed route. [Spalding.]

STANDLEY

¹⁰ Col. Don Gilmore Shingler, Chief of Staff, United States Military Mission to Iran and Iraq, 1941-42; Chief, Iranian Mission (Basra, Iraq), 1942.

881.24/1041 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 19, 1942—6 p. m.
[Received August 20—4:09 p. m.]

317. To McCabe from Faymonville.

1. Commissar had already learned from General Belyaev your views as explained in paragraph 1, your cable 230, August 13, midnight. In extended discussion, the Commissar was most interested in your shift to money value as basis for substitutions in list of requisitioned items. Heretofore, it has been understood that exceptions in lists may be made for three reasons: first, special military requirement here; second, production possibilities in America considering time and availability of raw materials; third, transport limitations affecting gross totals and size, weight or handleability. Russians understand these reasons and concede that they must influence substitutions. Your unexpected decision that money value is to be the basis of substitutions introduces a new limitation which will both hamper supply and put Soviet requests in a false light. The Soviet Government is asking for items necessary to win the war, first, by direct supply of munitions from America; and, second, by supporting munitions industry in Soviet Russia. Physical difficulties which may require substitutions are understood but any attempt on our part to haggle over prices of substitutes appears inappropriate. In authorizing substitutions in protocol list, I recommend that you cease to use money value as basis for authorization and revert to the three principles of military necessity, production possibilities and transport limitations. General S. P. Spalding concurs.

2. Reference paragraph 3 your cable 230, August 13, noon [*midnight*]. Commissar states that he has already instructed General Belyaev as to what articles may be deferred if necessary to meet shipping limitations. He repeats that foodstuffs, especially wheat and flour, will be first subtractions. All industrial items are highly necessary to meet critical needs. All such items go to munitions industry immediately. Commissar specifically includes presses for aviation industry and measuring and testing instruments, electric furnaces and machine tools for munitions industry as critically needed now. Commissar reminds that although this industrial equipment for war industry has been urgently needed for a year, and although delivery was expected during the life of the first protocol, none of the highly necessary industrial equipment was received except for a few machine tools. The extremity of the need is magnified today after a year of war in which Soviet munitions industry has suffered severe reverses. Commissar further notes that types ordered are in practically all particulars

identical with American models and standards. He feels that items on his requisitions would be useful in the United States in case shipping difficulties prevent their delivery to the Soviet Union. He therefore sees no reason to fear the accumulation of munitions above "reasonable cargo accumulations" and hopes that attention will be focused on maximum production. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.248/231 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 22, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received August 23—10:35 a. m.]

323. My 290, August 10, 9 p. m.²⁰

1. A representative of the Foreign Office telephoned the Embassy on August 19 and stated that the Soviet Government desired to send to Alaska on August 20 and 21 eighty Soviet airmen to ferry aircraft to the Soviet Union and requested that arrangements be made so that those men would be permitted to enter United States territory without American visas.²¹ He stated that General Bradley had suggested the immediate dispatch of the airmen in question.

In view of the urgency of the request the Embassy stated that it would endeavor to arrange with the Department for the waiving of the visa requirements on condition that the Foreign Office send a note advising the Embassy of the names of the airmen. This note was received on August 20. Unless instructed to do so, the Embassy will not transmit the names to the Department. It is hoped, however, that the Department will make the necessary arrangements for the airmen to enter Alaska.

2. As the Department is aware, negotiations are now in progress in Moscow with regard to the ferrying of aircraft from Alaska to the Soviet Union and I am informed by General Bradley that it is likely that the Soviet Government will soon be sending to Alaska over 300 Soviet airmen a month for this purpose. Since undue complications and serious delays in our planned aircraft delivery schedules are sure to arise if the Embassy adheres to the standing visa regulations insofar as these ferry crews are concerned, I strongly recommend that members of Soviet armed forces proceeding to United States territory in uniform for the purpose of taking over aircraft be considered as Allied forces proceeding to zones of military opera-

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ For correspondence concerning the desirability of the delivery of American airplanes to the Soviet Union over a new route through Alaska and Siberia, see pp. 597-662, *passim*.

tions and as such be permitted to enter and leave military zones in United States territory without American visas but in accordance with such regulations as the American military authorities may prescribe.

General Bradley has suggested to the Soviet Government that a Soviet Military Mission be established in Alaska to supervise and coordinate Soviet activities there. Among its functions the Mission would be responsible for the identity, movements and activities of Soviet ferry crews and it would keep the American authorities advised in this respect.

It is suggested that the Department discuss the question of the entrance of Soviet ferry crews into American territory with the appropriate agencies of the Government and issue instructions in regard to the visa policy to be followed in this respect.²²

STANDLEY

861.24/1041 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1942—8 a. m.

241. "Reference paragraph 1 of your 317.²³ The sole reason for using the money value as the basis for authorization of substitution is because it furnishes the most convenient common denominator in the measurement of industrial equipment as to tonnage, complexity of manufacturing process and raw materials needed in manufacture. Commitment in Second Protocol was for this reason expressed in terms of dollar value and same terms were used in the suggestion as to basis for determining substitution. Please assure the Commissar that we used the dollar sign here not because of any limitation on available Lend-Lease credit but only as a means of computing production capacity and raw materials required. The dollar value is likewise used here as a means of estimating tonnage for shipment since it has been found that this measure bears a close relation to tonnage of types of equipment concerned."

Foregoing is from Stettinius for Faymonville.

HULL

²² The Ambassador in the Soviet Union advised in his telegram No. 712, August 25, that the Commissariat for Foreign Trade was sending 21 technical personnel by airplane, to arrive in Fairbanks, Alaska, early in September. These individuals, not in possession of American visas, were to be in the nature of a permanent staff to take delivery of aircraft, and permission for their entry into United States territory for this purpose was requested. In Department's telegram No. 514, October 15, permission was granted in general for entry and departure for this purpose to Soviet personnel without passports and visas, but only in Alaska. (861.248/235)

²³ Telegram dated August 19, 6 p. m., p. 719.

861.24/1110

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 19, 1942.

Participants: Major General J. H. Burns, Secretary [*Executive*] of Munitions Assignments Board; Brigadier General Sidney Spalding, Assistant to General Burns; Mr. Arthur Van Buskirk, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Lend-Lease Administration; and Mr. G. F. Reinhardt, Division of European Affairs, State Department.

The meeting was called by General Burns who discussed the signature of the Second Protocol between the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain on the subject of aid to the Soviet Union.

After some discussion it was the consensus that in as much as some time had elapsed since the proposed Second Protocol was presented to the Soviet Government and because of the change in the general situation particularly with respect to the problem of shipping, a brief Protocol should be drawn up for signature by the three Governments to which the original Anglo-American proposal and the Soviet acceptance would be attached as annexes. It was further agreed that the substance of this Protocol would consist of a statement of Anglo-American policy on the subject of aid to the Soviet Union, an affirmation of the original Second Protocol including the fact that it was deemed to have been in effect since July 1, 1942, and a paragraph on the subject of the three Soviet desiderata contained in the Soviet Ambassador's note of July 7, 1942. With regard to the Soviet desiderata it would probably be impossible to record more than an expression of Anglo-American intention to make every effort as far as the military situation would permit to meet the Soviet requests.

During the course of the conversation General Burns explained that the principal reasons why the Protocol had not been signed to date were (1) the difficulties involved in the effort to meet the Soviet requests contained in the Ambassador's note of July 7 which were still insoluble and would delay the signing of the Protocol another six months unless treated in the manner mentioned above, and (2) the changes in the general situation of Soviet supply brought about by the convoy difficulties encountered this summer in the north Atlantic. General Burns said that after the experience encountered by the June convoy a letter had been sent to the Soviet Purchasing Commission on July 29 proposing a readjustment of the shipping schedules because of the shipping problem and a readjustment of production schedules in order to avoid the accumulation of large stocks of material which could not be moved. He said that the Soviet reaction was

very violent and that the Soviet representatives energetically opposed any readjustment of production schedules. On August 13 another letter was addressed to the Soviet officials in which it was agreed that the production schedules would not be modified but that the American Government reserved the right to divert products when necessary in order to avoid undesirable accumulation of stocks. General Burns stated that in as much as there had been no reply to this last letter it was assumed that the Soviet representatives were agreeable to this procedure. At this point General Burns emphasized the importance of drawing up for signature a Protocol which did not reopen these problems which were not susceptible of final solution.

Mr. Reinhardt stated that the Department had been informed by the British Embassy that Lord Halifax had received full powers to sign the Protocol for the United Kingdom. General Burns added that he felt sure the British Ambassador would be agreeable to such a document as was proposed.

General Burns stated that the next round-table meeting on Lend-Lease matters with the Soviet representatives was to be held on Friday, September 25, and that it was, therefore, desirable that the Protocol be signed not later than the proceeding [*preceding*] Thursday.

General Burns requested Mr. Van Buskirk to make a draft protocol along the lines discussed in the meeting and it was agreed to meet in General Burns' office for the purpose of studying the draft at 9 o'clock on Monday morning, September 21, 1942.

It was agreed that when the text of the Protocol was in its final form and had both British and Soviet approval it would be given to the Department for final typing for signature. In order that the preparation of the documents might be started without delay Mr. Reinhardt was given a copy of the proposed Second Protocol which was handed to the Soviet Government.

741.6111/64

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1942.

Both yesterday and the day before the Russian Ambassador telephoned me to inquire when he might expect to receive a draft of the second protocol. On each occasion I told him that we were awaiting a reply from London as to whether the language used regarding the British commitments was satisfactory to the British Government and were expecting the answer at any moment.

Today, after a meeting with General Burns and British representatives, I telephoned to the Ambassador. I told him that I thought we had located the source of the delay. It appeared that some of the language which had been used in the draft, due to haste of drafting, had not been so clear as it might have been. The British had asked for clarification, which had been made and which we confidently expected would produce an early reply. The Ambassador asked when he might expect to receive a copy of the draft. I told him that our hope was that this might occur tomorrow, but in any event within a very short time. I assured him that both the British and we were doing everything possible to expedite the matter.

The Ambassador inquired why we had not used the language of the first protocol, which had already been approved on all sides. I replied that we had a different situation to deal with in that we had been acting under the second proposed protocol for some months and in that Mr. Molotov had asked that his request for additional materials be made a part of the protocol.²⁵ The Ambassador acquiesced that this was a different situation.

DEAN ACHESON

861.24/1080: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 26, 1942—2 p. m.
[Received September 26—10: 11 a. m.]

5363. To the Secretary and the Under Secretary. I received your message 4665, September 25, 1 p. m.²⁶ last evening. I was not able to reach Eden until after midnight. I saw him again at 1:00 o'clock today. He still wants to stand on the message which was despatched from the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington at 9:30 last night and which crossed your message to me.

Eden is very much opposed to making any promises to the Russians that the British cannot fulfill. Maisky is constantly pressing here on supply quotas and on second front action. I am sure Eden feels that Russian pressure to force a signature on Second Soviet Protocol is related to the Russian convoy situation of which Harry Hopkins has full knowledge.

WINANT

²⁵ See the note of July 7, from the Soviet Ambassador, p. 712, and the enclosure to instruction No. 59, October 13, to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 734.

²⁶ Not printed; this telegram informed Ambassador Winant that Ambassador Litvinov had been pressing the Department very strongly for formal signature of the Second Soviet Protocol, and instructed Winant to communicate immediately with Foreign Secretary Eden to urge him to make available as soon as possible the accepted British draft of articles of the Protocol still under consideration (816.24/1079b).

861.248/244a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1942—6 p. m.

278. In confirmation of third paragraph, Section 3, your 371, September 25 [23], midnight.²⁷ For your strictly confidential information Department on inquiry has just learned from War Department that on September 19 General Belyaev, President Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, informed authorities here that on orders from his Government delivery of planes via Alaska had been stopped.²⁸ No reasons were given for this decision.

In regard to Molotov's statement that the Soviets would fly out any planes we made available in Alaska Department has learned from same source that a consignment of fighter planes for Soviets is in Alaska ready for delivery and only await Soviet arrangements for travel through Siberia. Department further understands that it is not feasible to send these fighter planes through Siberia unless they are escorted during the journey by bombers or transport planes which could carry necessary extra equipment and fuel for the fighters. None of these larger planes is now available in Alaska.

Because of the stop order of Soviet Government all deliveries of Soviet earmarked planes for Alaska already en route have been stopped.

HULL

861.24/1084 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 28, 1942—noon.

[Received September 29—9:25 a. m.]

384. From Faymonville for Stettinius. At Kremlin dinner for Wendell Willkie²⁹ September 25 [26] Stalin expressed great dissatisfaction over Lend-Lease shipments of older types of munitions from the United States and United Kingdom in place of newer types which he said are needed on Russian front. Stalin especially angry that United Kingdom is shipping Hurricane type planes instead of

²⁷ *Ante*, p. 648; see paragraph beginning "I remarked", p. 649.

²⁸ In a later telegram, No. 869, October 10, 1942, from Kuibyshev, Ambassador Standley stated that "General Bradley has informed me that negotiations regarding the use of the Siberian ferry service have been resumed and that 12 planes have already landed in Siberia." (861.248/250)

Ambassador Standley gives his account of the Alaska-Siberia airplane ferry route in his book *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, pp. 248-256, 300-301.

²⁹ Wendell L. Willkie, Special Representative of President Roosevelt. A description of this dinner conversation appears in a portion of the undated memorandum by Ambassador Standley, p. 637. For reports on his visit to the Soviet Union during September, see pp. 637-650, *passim*.

Spitfires and that United States is shipping P-40's instead of Aircobras desired. He also bluntly stated his indignation at British diversion of over 100 Aircobras previously promised to Soviet Union for British quota. British Ambassador was present and replied that diversion of Aircobras would eventually be recognized as a step for the common good. Stalin later remarked to me that need for shipment munitions here remains extreme. He indicated that he was unconvinced by the British Ambassador's reply and persisted that diversion of planes intended for Soviet Union was unjustifiable.

Repeated to Kuibyshev. [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.248/243 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1942—midnight.

4725. From Hopkins. Personal for Harriman. Your 5355 of September 25.³⁰ After the departure of aircraft now in Alaska the movement of planes via Alaska and Siberia will be suspended, as a result of request from the Russians. Russians claim route is not now feasible. This is not in accord with Bradley's views. Bradley attempting to clear difficulty with Moscow. Future of Alaskan route in grave doubt.

Deliveries of fighter planes will probably be made via North Atlantic convoys, or by water to West Africa or Basra, flying to destination. A-20's and B-25's will likely be delivered by flight from United States to destination via Africa. Whole delivery question under discussion. Will advise when definite decision reached.

Our understanding here agrees with yours that deliveries of Aircobras are replacements for those given us by British and that other British and American commitments to the Russians are not altered by this transaction. [Hopkins.]

HULL

861.24/1128 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 3, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received October 6—12:45 a. m.]

390. To Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. In very strong terms Krutikov³¹ explained disappointment of Soviet Government over shipping situation. Mikoyan understood

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ Alexey Dmitriyevich Krutikov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

that 35 ships were scheduled for Soviet Union from American ports in August but in fact only 15 sailed. Commissar thinks September loadings in United States also regrettably small and says best shipping months wasted. Meanwhile military commanders are demanding from Commissar munitions which would have been available under expected shipping schedule. Commissar states that shortage of munitions is having a disastrous effect on strategic plans of Red Army. He insists that immediate steps must be taken to push shipping up to maximum before winter.

2. In September, Commissar directed Soviet Purchasing Commission to investigate why so few ships had been assigned for transportation United States to Russia. In reply Commission says one reason is that Washington authorities wanted to wait for arrival of convoy 18 before releasing ships for loading at American ports. Commissar comments that although convoy 18 long ago finished a comparatively successful voyage, still no adequate number of ships assigned for loading.

3. Commission additionally reported to Commissar that source of decisions on Russia-bound shipping is still unclear and Washington answers to Commission are intended only to soothe and not to enlighten. Many promises are made and various explanations of delay are given to the Commission, the most usual being that it is necessary to consult the British, that it all depends on General Burns, that it all depends on the White House.

4. Commissar is especially anxious about truck shipments and recalls that General Spalding told him recommended August truck shipments would be 4000 for Soviet delivery plus 3500 for American use in Iran for Soviet supply lines. Commissar says that in fact only 512 trucks despatched in August and only 2870 in September.

5. Commissar fears a repetition of last fall's delays. He thinks supplies may arrive too late for effective distribution and use. I emphasized seriousness of difficulties caused by ship sinkings and also increase in American fighting fronts. Commissar insisted with great emphasis that all fronts constitute a single theater of operations; that it is shortsighted not to recognize American interests are being defended on the Russian front; that the urgency of need and the seriousness of the military situation are greater on the Russian front than elsewhere; and furthermore that Russian military plans are intimately involved with supplies promised by United States and that United States is expected to keep its promises. Commissar urges that supreme effort necessary in next few weeks to load maximum number ships and despatch before unfavorable winter conditions intervene.

Repeated to Kuibyshev. [Faymonville.]

861.24/1092a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1942—midnight.

289. From Hopkins for Faymonville. In order to make possible the forwarding into the U. S. S. R. of increased supplies, the project for improvement of the Persian Corridor has been approved and in this country organization is well advanced. Included in the project will be operation by United States of that section of the railroad which is now controlled by the British³² and operation of ports serving the railroad to include Bandar Shahpur, Khorramshahr and Tenuma³³ as well as Bushire. A freighting service by motor transport will also be operated by the United States. It should be realized, of course, that because of shipping and other factors involved it will be some time before this organization can become really effective.

To command the expanded Persian Gulf Service Command General Donald H. Connolly has been selected and will leave for his new station in the near future. Recently General Connolly has been Military Director of Civilian Aviation, Army Air Forces. General Connolly has, as you know, made a great success of his work with C. W. A.³⁴ and W. P. A.³⁵ as well as in the capacity of Administrator of Civil Aeronautics in the Department of Commerce.

In order to help in the coordination of General Connolly's work, it is suggested that you make contact with him soon after his arrival.

With reference to your telegram to Stettinius, no. 392,³⁶ we are arranging on the following United States delivery schedule repayment of the 176 Aircobras which have been diverted to United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom: 60 in October, 70 in November and 46 in December.

With reference to your telegram no. 390,³⁷ it is the President's policy to make ships and cargoes available to the limit of the port and inland clearance of the Persian Corridor and to the limit of the convoy schedules to North Russia. To the limit of the ability of the U. S. S. R. to lift cargo by way of the Pacific, cargo is also to be made available.

There are at the present time some 25 United States ships which prior to September left this country to fill our quota of convoy PQ-19 and which are now available for such convoy. In order to fill our

³² See vol. IV, section under Iran entitled "Consent of the Iranian Government for American operation of the southern section of Trans-Iranian Railroad."

³³ Tanuma, Basra.

³⁴ Federal Civil Works Administration.

³⁵ Work Projects Administration.

³⁶ Not printed.

³⁷ Dated October 3, 10 a. m., p. 726.

quota of any additional convoys, additional ships will be loaded and dispatched. The basic decisions pertaining to convoys to North Russia must rest with Great Britain for, as you know, such convoys are conducted by Great Britain under extremely difficult conditions.

By way of the Persian Gulf route we are sending cargo in excess of the total which in the opinion of local officials can be unloaded at ports and cleared therefrom. As a matter of fact, at the ports in this region there is already considerable congestion.

We are in agreement that truck deliveries should be substantially increased on the Persian Gulf route because of the value of the cargo they can clear as well as for the value of the trucks themselves. The low August figure was due to the fact that in large part the capacity of the route was utilized by a number of ships which had been diverted from the north convoy route. Cargo of those ships did not include any appreciable number of trucks. For September loading it is anticipated that 3550 trucks will be lifted on the ships made available. You will understand that this does not indicate that loading had been completed by October 1. In corresponding October ships it is hoped that this number may be increased by an appreciable amount. [Hopkins.]

WELLES

861.24/1096 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 6, 1942—noon.

[Received October 7—12:55 p. m.]

399. My 398, October 5, 10 p. m.³⁸ During my talk with Molotov yesterday I inquired regarding the food situation in the Soviet Union. He said that Willkie had asked Stalin regarding Soviet food needs and that Stalin had replied substantially as follows:

"The Germans had taken all of the Ukraine and the North Caucasus and much of the black soil region, which were among the richest food producing areas of the country. The food situation therefore would be bad during the winter. The Soviet Union would need 2,000,000 tons of wheat and a correspondingly large quantity of concentrated foodstuffs such as butter, condensed milk, lard, meat products, and so forth. If Great Britain and the United States could transfer ships to operate under the Soviet flag these products could be imported through Pacific ports."

Mr. Willkie had replied that there were huge surpluses of foodstuffs, particularly of grain in the United States. The only difficulty to be considered in connection with the supply of food was that of shipping. The situation in that regard was improving so rapidly

³⁸ Not printed.

in the United States that he was sure, however, that the necessary ships could be made available in the near future.

I asked whether this matter had been discussed with the American and British authorities responsible for the furnishing of supplies and materials to the Soviet Union. Molotov said that not only had Stalin outlined Soviet needs in this respect to Mr. Willkie, the President's personal representative, but the problem of food had been discussed in connection with the protocol for 1942-43, which for some reason had not been signed. In reply to my query, he added that the fault for the delay in signature did not rest on "our side". A copy of the protocol had been handed him in May. The Harriman protocol, which had been drafted and signed in a few days, had expired on June 30, and since that date no protocol had been in force. He understood that the British and Americans were still discussing various points in the draft which had been prepared.

Mr. Molotov asked what had been the effect in the United States of Mr. Willkie's visit. I replied that Mr. Willkie was very much pleased with his visit and I was sure that the report with regard to it, which he would make to the President, would have great weight and effect. I added that the American Government was deeply appreciative of the courtesies and hospitality extended to Mr. Willkie while he was in the Soviet Union. I said that there could be no doubt that his visit would yield results most beneficial to Soviet-American relations and to our war effort.

STANDLEY

*The President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*³⁹

[Translation]

[Moscow,] October 7, 1942.

Availing myself of the opportunity to send you a personal message afforded by Mr. Standley proceeding to Washington, I would like to express a few considerations on the military supplies from the United States to the U. S. S. R.

It is reported that the difficulties with supplies are caused primarily by the shortage of shipping. In order to ease the shipping situation, the Soviet Government would agree to certain cuts in the American supplies of armaments to the Soviet Union. We should be prepared temporarily to have discontinued the supplies of tanks, artillery, am-

³⁹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. This letter was sent by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Standley, who was returning to Washington for consultation, for delivery to President Roosevelt. Another copy had been sent for transmission through Ambassador Litvinov, and this translation was given to the White House Map Room to file by Harry Hopkins at 4:40 p. m., October 11, 1942.

munition, revolvers and such like. At the same time we are in extreme need of an increase in the supply of fighter planes of modern types (such as for instance Aircobras) and in getting under all circumstances certain kinds of other supplies. It should be borne in mind that Kittyhawk planes are not up to the mark in the fight against modern German fighter planes.

It would be good, if the U. S. A. could in any case insure our getting every month the following supplies:

500 fighter planes
8 to 10 thousand trucks
5000 tons of aluminum
4 to 5 thousand tons of explosives.

In addition to this it is important to get the supply during 12 months of two million tons of grain (wheat), and also as much as possible of fats, food concentrates and canned meat. A considerable amount of these foodstuffs could be shipped via Vladivostok on Soviet ships, if the U. S. consented to concede to the U. S. S. R. at least 20 to 30 ships. I have already spoken to Mr. Willkie about all this and am sure that he will communicate it to you.

As regards the situation at the front, you are of course aware that during the last few months the situation grew worse in the south, especially in the Stalingrad sector, due to the shortage of planes, particularly fighter planes. The Germans turned out to have a large reserve of planes. In the South the Germans have at least a double supremacy in the air, which prevents us from giving our troops cover. The practice of the war has shown that the most gallant troops become powerless if they are not shielded from the air.

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-14

Moscow, October 9, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been directed to transmit the following message from the President of the United States to Mr. Stalin:

"I have received a copy of the Prime Minister's message to you.⁴⁰ We are going to move as rapidly as possible to place an air force under your strategic command in the Caucasus. I am now trying to find additional planes for you immediately and will advise you soon.

⁴⁰ For text, see Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. iv, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 579.

I am also trying to arrange to have some of our merchant ships transferred to your flag to increase your flow of materials in the Pacific. I have just ordered an automobile tire plant to be made available to you. We are sending very substantial reinforcements to the Persian Gulf to increase the flow of supplies over that route and are confident that this can be done. We are sending a large number of engines and other equipment as well as personnel. I am confident that our contemplated operation will be successful.

"The gallant defense of Stalingrad has thrilled everyone in America and we are confident of its success."

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

861.24/1097 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 9, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received October 10—10:27 a. m.]

407. From Faymonville for Hopkins.

1. Reference your cable 289 October 5, midnight; limiting factors of various routes were explained to Commissar Foreign Trade. He requested following comments be transmitted to you. First, Persian Gulf route has proved disappointing. A year ago plans for extensive increases were approved at Moscow conference. Inadequate railroad direction and insufficient measure for road improvement and for port facilities have restricted traffic. Commissar also believes labor has not been used efficiently. Commissar says potential capacity of trans-Iranian route is great and he hopes General Connolly will be more successful than Brigadier Rhodes⁴¹ in increasing traffic. In Commissar's opinion "little time left to make good past deficits" and he strongly urges that Americans get results. Second, Commissar believes shipments to North Russian ports can be greatly increased. He urges that ships be sent whether or not escorting vessels available for convoy. He stated that difficulties in northern convoys were "occasioned more by fear than by danger". He added that he had no doubt that if American naval authorities insisted on action they could get it from British Admirals. Third, Far Eastern route is being used to maximum by Soviet ships. Commissar states that Far Eastern shipments in past 3 months equal amounts received through northern route and Iran by British and American ships. Even small Soviet fishing boats have been made into cargo carriers for trans-

⁴¹ Brig. Sir Godfrey Dean Rhodes, British Director of Transportation and Deputy Quartermaster General; head of the Anglo-Iranian-Soviet Transportation Board.

Pacific runs, and aggregate imports through Far East are considerable. Commissar states that he is still accepting all lend-lease freight offered at American west coast ports but that his ships have been held up awaiting arrival of cargo and even when cargo arrives at port, loading proceeds very slowly. Unfortunately, cargo offered is seldom of high priority categories and Commissar believes adequate planning would include a greater proportion of essential items in west coast cargoes.

2. Commissar states that no insuperable difficulties exist in removing freight inland from Soviet ports. All necessary munition items are immediately sent westward from Siberian Pacific ports. In North Russia Soviet agencies have had conspicuous success in sending inward 90,000 tons of freight from Archangel in past 12 days. This latter shipment includes much light freight occupying much cubic space. The carrying capacity of the railroads is even greater when heavier materials make up inbound shipments. Commissar adds that in some cases munition items were in the hands of Soviet units on the battle front within 3 days of docking at Archangel. [Faymonville.]

Repeated to Kuibyshev.

THOMPSON

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-15

Moscow, October 12, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been directed to transmit the following message from the President of the United States to Mr. Stalin dated October 12, 1942:⁴²

"I am examining every possibility of increasing the number of fighter planes to be sent to the Soviet Union. The fact of the matter is that all Aircobra production is now going to fighting fronts immediately. While these urgent combat requirements make it impossible to increase the number of Aircobras for you at the moment, nevertheless I am hoping to increase our production of this type at the expense of other types in order to give you more planes. Also if our forthcoming operations⁴³ which you know about turn out as successfully as they promise, we would then be in a position to release fighters.

"Our heavy bombardment group has been ordered mobilized immediately for the purpose of operating on your southern flank. This

⁴² The reply of October 14, 1942, from Premier Stalin, merely thanking President Roosevelt for his communication, was sent by Molotov to Ambassador Litvinov for delivery to the President, and a copy was sent to Secretary of Embassy Thompson at Moscow.

⁴³ The invasion of French North Africa.

movement will not be contingent on any other operation or commitment and these planes and sufficient transports will go to the Caucasus at an early date.

"I shall telegraph you in a day or so in reference to explosives, aluminium and trucks.

"Twenty merchant ships for use in the Pacific are being made available to you.

"In October we will ship to you 276 combat planes and everything possible is being done to expedite these deliveries."

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.

Secretary of Embassy

861.24/1121a

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson)

No. 59

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1942.

The Secretary of State encloses a certified copy of the protocol in regard to providing the Soviet Union with military supplies, raw materials, equipment and food, signed on October 6, 1942, by Mr. Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, Sir Ronald Campbell, British Minister in Washington, and Mr. Maxim Litvinoff, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington.⁴⁴

Photostats of Annexes II⁴⁵ and III⁴⁶ are also enclosed and the covering page of Annex I.⁴⁷ It is understood that the Embassy has a copy of the body of Annex I.⁴⁸

The texts of the protocol and Annexes are Strictly Confidential and will not be published. Information in regard to their contents should be limited to officials who have duties in relation to their administration.

[Enclosure—Annex III]

DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST⁴⁹
FOR SUPPLIES OF AIRCRAFT, ALUMINUM, COBALT AND NICKEL BEYOND
THOSE PROVIDED IN THE PROPOSED SECOND PROTOCOL

1) The Government of the United Kingdom will before termination of their present commitment give further consideration to the question of continuing or increasing supplies of aircraft after the end of 1942.

⁴⁴ For the text of the Second (Washington) Protocol signed on October 6, 1942, see Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, p. 15.

⁴⁵ *Ante*, p. 712.

⁴⁶ The enclosure printed below.

⁴⁷ *Ante*, p. 706.

⁴⁸ i. e., the Proposed Second Protocol; see footnote 99, p. 706.

⁴⁹ The requests of the Soviet Government are contained in the note of July 7 from the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, p. 712.

They can at present give no undertaking in the matter. The Government of the United States is earnestly examining the request of the Soviet Government and will reach a decision as promptly as possible in consultation with representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2) The Government of the United Kingdom agree to continue to supply aluminum at the approximate monthly rate of 2,000 tons until the end of 1942.

3) The Government of the United States undertakes to make available ten tons of cobalt per month during the period covered by the Second Protocol.

4) The Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom agree to increase the amount of nickel to be provided to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in all forms, except finished military stores, to 700 short tons per month for the fourth quarter of 1942.

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-16

Moscow, October 16, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been directed to transmit the following message from the President of the United States to Premier Stalin:

"I am glad to inform you, in response to your request, that the items involved can be made available for shipment as follows:

"Wheat; two million short tons during the remainder of the protocol year at approximately equal monthly rates.

"Trucks; 8000 to 10000 per month.

"Explosives; 4000 short tons in November and 5000 tons per month thereafter.

"Meat; 15000 tons per month.

"Canned Meat; 10000 tons per month.

"Lard; 12000 tons per month.

"Soap Stock; 5000 tons per month.

"Vegetable Oil; 10000 tons per month.

"I will advise you at an early date of the aluminum shipments which I am still exploring.

"I have given orders that no effort be spared to keep our routes fully supplied with ships and cargo in conformity with your desires as to priorities on our commitments to you."

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

861.24/1141

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Litvinov) to the Secretary of State*⁵⁰

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to refer to the agreement dated as of September 12, 1941 entered into between the Defense Supplies Corporation and the Amtorg Trading Corporation of New York, for the sale to the Defense Supplies Corporation of strategic materials, the performance of which Agreement was duly guaranteed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This agreement was made in a spirit of mutual assistance and in harmony with the desire of the two Governments to meet the military and economic requirements of the respective countries at the time of its execution.

Taking into consideration the fact that the supply of materials under the agreement depends entirely upon organizations under the control and supervision of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade in the U. S. S. R., and in the light of the military situation and the difficulties of transportation and shipment in both countries, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has reached the conclusion that the purpose of the agreement would be better served if the Commissariat of Foreign Trade of the U. S. S. R. be substituted as the principal and assume the obligations of the Amtorg Trading Corporation under the agreement and the said Corporation act in the future, in connection with the agreement, as the agent of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade in the United States.

The above has been the subject of direct negotiations between officials of the Defense Supplies Corporation and Amtorg Trading Corporation, but it has been suggested by the Secretary of Commerce that the matter be presented through the State Department.

Trusting that this proposal of my Government will meet with the full approval of the Government of the United States, I shall appreciate an early reply.

Sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF

⁵⁰ Handed to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson on October 16.

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the Second Secretary of the American Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)

[Translation]

Moscow, 19 October, 1942.

ESTEEMED MR. THOMPSON: I inform you herewith of the following message from Premier I. V. Stalin for President Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt:

"From Premier Stalin to the President of the U. S. A. Roosevelt.

"I have received your message of October 16. My answer has been delayed since matters concerning the front have distracted my attention. Now the only thing that matters is that the cargoes which you have promised should arrive in the U. S. S. R. within the prescribed period.

19 October 1942."

This message has been cabled to Mr. Litvinov for transmission to Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

I beg you [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

861.24/1134a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1942—3 p. m.

319. For Faymonville from Stettinius. Reference Moscow's 48, February 27, 5 p. m., regarding Soviet agreement in principle for exchange of technical information regarding synthetic rubber.

The War Production Board proposes to send a group of technical experts not expected to exceed five in number to confer with experts of the Soviet synthetic rubber industry and to exchange technical information on a reciprocal basis with Soviet technicians in relation to the manufacture of Buna-S synthetic rubber and its constituent materials.

As the War Production Board is most anxious to send this group as soon as possible please ascertain from the interested Soviet authorities who initiated the suggestion whether or not such a mission would still be agreeable and practicable in which case necessary approach can be made by Embassy to Foreign Office.

Repeated to Kuibyshev. [Stettinius.]

HULL

Moscow Embassy Files: Lot F-96

The American Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-17

Moscow, October 26, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to transmit the following message dated October 24, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.⁵¹

"I have just received from Admiral Standley your personal note, a copy of which you had previously sent me. The Ambassador has also given me a very full report of his views on the situation in the Soviet Union. He confirms reports we have already received of the fighting qualities and strength of the Soviet Army and the urgent need of the supplies which you have indicated. These needs I fully recognize."

Accept [etc.]

For the Chargé d'Affaires:
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

841.54261/1

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

No. 6107

LONDON, October 28, 1942.

[Received November 14.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit copies of two letters with enclosures, addressed to Mr. W. Averell Harriman, by Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, dated respectively September 9 and October 7, 1942,⁵² concerning the conclusion between the British and Soviet governments of an agreement for the interchange of information respecting warlike inventions. With the first of these letters Sir Alexander Cadogan enclosed the draft text of such an agreement and mentioned that he would be interested in knowing should the American Government decide at some future date to conclude an agreement of a similar nature with the Soviet Government. In his second letter of October 7, 1942, Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that the British draft had been accepted by the Soviet Government and that notes had been exchanged between the two Governments on September 29, 1942.

There is also enclosed a copy of a memorandum given me by Mr. Harriman explaining the circumstances under which this question developed in the course of his trip to Moscow with the Prime Min-

⁵¹ Stalin thanked the President for this message through the Secretary of Embassy at Moscow on October 28.

⁵² Neither printed.

ister,⁵³ and suggesting the utility of the conclusion of a similar agreement between the United States and Soviet Russia. After talking with Mr. Harriman, I am taking up this question with the Department and both he and I would be grateful for an early indication of the Department's views and suggestions as to what steps, if any, might appropriately be taken in this matter.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Counselor of Embassy

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

LONDON, October 20, 1942.

Last week I gave you Sir Alexander Cadogan's letters of September 9 and October 7 regarding the British-Soviet agreement to interchange information about warlike inventions and agreed to give you a memorandum on the background.

This subject came up rather informally in one of the meetings in Moscow between the Prime Minister and Stalin in which I participated. The Prime Minister explained to Stalin the reasons for withholding from the Soviet Government information about certain radio inventions. This explanation satisfied Stalin as the Prime Minister had made it clear that this secrecy was in the mutual interest. The Prime Minister said however that all other information on inventions and developments, except for a few cases similar to the one under discussion, would be made available to the Russians if they so desired.

Stalin replied that he would be glad to furnish the British with any of the Soviet developments and specifically offered to show the military members of the party on the following day a new type projectile which he said had proved of great value.

The Prime Minister then suggested to Stalin that these mutual offers might be formalized into an agreement. It was thereupon arranged that Cadogan would meet with Molotov to draft such an agreement.

At this juncture I suggested that the President might well wish to make a similar agreement with the Soviet Government.

It was agreed that Cadogan would advise me of the understanding reached between Molotov and himself and that I would take the matter up with the President. We rather expected that the language would be agreed upon while we were in Moscow and that I would

⁵³ For reports concerning Prime Minister Churchill's conversations with Stalin in Moscow in August, which Mr. Harriman attended, see pp. 618-625, *passim*.

cable to Washington. As you see, however, the discussions have lasted for many weeks and it is only recently that an understanding has been reached.

It seems clear to me that an agreement should be reached promptly between the Government of the United States and the Soviet Government for the following reasons:

(a) That the information will be of mutual value in the prosecution of the war;

(b) That such agreement will be another link between the two Governments;

(c) That as we interchange information freely with the British it would be embarrassing to the British if we did not have a similar agreement with the Russians.

W. A. HARRIMAN

861.24/1146 : Telegram

The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 31, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received November 2—2: 15 a. m.]

424. From Faymonville for Stettinius.

1. Refer to *Time* magazine for October 19, quoting Admiral Standley on Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ Mr. Thompson who was present at the press interview on which the *Time* article was based informs me that it does not accurately reflect the sense of the Ambassador's remarks but for your information please note that my knowledge of contents of Second Protocol came from draft copy loaned to me by Admiral Standley. My knowledge of general shipments comes from cargo lists shown to me by the Ambassador's Naval Attaché⁵⁵ who receives lists, by agreement, from Chief of British Military Mission. My knowledge of special shipments comes from your cables which in all cases pass through State Department hands, and when Admiral Standley is in Moscow, cables reach him before they reach me. When the Ambassador is in Kuibyshev inbound cables and my answers thereto are repeated to him. Even when the Ambassador is absent my Lend-Lease cables inbound and outbound are repeated to

⁵⁴ During this interview with the correspondents, held just before his return to Washington for consultations, among other comments Ambassador Standley was reported to have made "the astounding admission that he did not know what commitments the U. S. had made to Russia, or to what degree they had been met. He said he believed that Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, head of the U. S. Supply Mission in Moscow, had such information." (*Time*, October 19, 1942, p. 32.)

⁵⁵ Capt., later Rear Adm., Jack Harlan Duncan, Naval Attaché in the Soviet Union.

Kuibyshev so that he may have a complete file upon his return. Please assure Harry Hopkins that his instructions to me to cooperate with other Government officials, have been fully complied with. [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.24/1155 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 5, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received November 6—6 : 30 a. m.]

431. From Faymonville for Stettinius.

1. On the following two subjects concerning shipping, Commissar⁵⁶ states that Soviet Government is anxious and alarmed. He asks your immediate help on remedial measures.

2. First: The Soviet Government is very appreciative of the President's offer to transfer ships for North Pacific runs.⁵⁷ However, the help thus offered will be of little effect unless some ships can be made available immediately to counterbalance the regrettably low shipping figures to north Russian ports. The Soviet Government hopes to secure from the President's offer 20 additional ships which could make two runs from our west coast to Vladivostok before ice conditions close the Straits of La Pérouse. Last winter ships attempting the Straits of La Pérouse about January 15 were seriously damaged by ice and Commissar hopes that the last of the additional ships now offered will have been dispatched from our west coast by December 15. If inconvenient to deliver ships on west coast Soviet Government would be glad to accept some or all on east coast. Soviet crews are available to be sent at once to receive ships. At least 150,000 tons of cargo in approximately 20 ships is highly necessary as a minimum on this route before mid-winter.

3. Second: Commissar states that Soviet Government is extremely dissatisfied with shipping situation at Portland, Oregon. He considers that port facilities at Portland are inadequate for the volume of Soviet freight offered and that stevedores are less skilled than at other ports and are fewer than required. Furthermore, large ships are not practicable on the Portland run. Commissar understands that only about 50,000 tons can be handled at one time in port and in the surrounding approaches. But since Soviet cargoes of various kinds from various eastern points must be assembled at Portland before appropriate cargoes can be selected for the medium and small size ships used

⁵⁶ A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

⁵⁷ President Roosevelt had assured Stalin in his message of October 12 (p. 733) that "20 merchant ships for use in the Pacific are being made available to you."

from Portland it is necessary to warehouse temporarily at Portland many thousand tons of Soviet freight awaiting shipment. Commissar understands that embargo has been imposed on future shipments to Portland and protests that unless additional Soviet freight, amounting to about 100,000 tons to accomplish normal loading, is shipped to Portland, urgently needed cargoes, especially spare parts, aluminum, and certain food products, cannot be selected properly from sorting yards. Commissar considers that about 50% reserve freight tonnage must be available as [at?] port at all times awaiting arrival of ships in order to prevent delays in loading. As a remedy Commissar hopes you can secure at least partial use of an additional west coast port and suggests Seattle. This need will be especially acute if the President makes available the additional ships for north Pacific Soviet shipments. Request you cable me what steps will be taken to assist. [Faymonville.]

HENDERSON

861.24/1165

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. Mr. Litvinov stated that in the last two or three weeks the merchant ships already loaded with military supplies for Murmansk were tied up either at Atlantic ports or at northern British ports and that he had learned that orders had been received by the masters of some of these ships to unload their cargoes. These orders had been issued, he was informed, on the ground that the escorting vessels would not be available for convoy duty in the near future. He stated that he wished to enter the most vigorous protest against these orders which he claimed were altogether counter to the agreements reached between the Soviet Government and the British and the United States Governments.

I told the Ambassador that I would be very glad to look into the matter immediately, but that I was aware of the fact that he knew the urgent duties upon which the naval vessels which otherwise might have been available for such convoy duty were now engaged upon.⁵⁸

He said that he had been informed of this necessary delay over a month ago and that he was beginning to wonder how long this delay would continue.

⁵⁸ These naval vessels were at that moment providing protection for the convoys which had sailed from American and British ports on October 24 and 25, for the North African landings of November 8.

I told him that I trusted that the delay would not continue much longer, but that I would request that a reply to his protest should be made to him by the competent authorities of this Government.

The Ambassador once more seemed to be in an increasingly optimistic frame of mind with regard to the general war situation. He stated that he believed that if the Germans and Italians could be completely driven out of North Africa and a consistent bombing campaign undertaken against Italy, Italian morale would in all probability collapse during the coming winter months. I added that the news of the past few days was exceptionally encouraging and that I hoped that our common objectives might soon be found.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

861.24/1227

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1942.

I have asked Mr. Hopkins to organize a Soviet Protocol Committee to be responsible for the overall coordination of the Russian Protocol through action by appropriate existing agencies and in conformity with policies approved by me.

The membership to be:

Chairman—Mr. Harry Hopkins or alternate to be designated by him.

Members—Representatives of the various interested operating departments and agencies or alternates designated by such representatives.

Secretary—To be provided by Lend-Lease.

Will you please let me have the name of the representative of the State Department?⁵⁹

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

861.24/1161 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 11, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 10:43 p. m.]

447. For Stettinius from Faymonville. Urgent need for ships was again explained by Commissar in special interview. He again covered points reported in my 431, November 5, 4 p. m., and stated

⁵⁹ By letter of November 17, 1942, the Secretary of State designated Dean Acheson to represent the State Department on this committee.

that he was confident ships would be provided if the urgency of the need were explained to the President. He added that the President probably was not aware that his offer of ships would not be of great effectiveness unless ships could be made available immediately. Please keep me informed of efforts to improve this special shipping situation.

2. Reference your 319, October 24, 3 p. m. Commissar stated that proposal for exchange of information on synthetic rubber processes is still acceptable to the Soviet Government. American committee will be welcomed in Soviet Union. Commissar stated that conferences can be held in either Moscow or Kuibyshev or both, followed by visits to plants.

[Here follow certain inquiries for technical details.]

[Faymonville]

HENDERSON

861.24/1155: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1942—5 p. m.

342. "From Stettinius for Faymonville.

1. Concerning 2nd paragraph your no. 431,⁶⁰ the requirements of ships are now heavy both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific for our own forces, owing to urgent operational demands. Acting on your cable, we have reviewed the shipping situation but find we can only promise the advancement of one of the proposed December ships to the November schedule, which makes a total of six for November. About 50,000 deadweight tons are represented by these. At the beginning of next month another review of the situation will be made.

2. Regarding 3rd paragraph of same telegram, we realize fully the importance of prompt loading of Russian ships on the Pacific Coast and we are trying to provide adequate arrangements for this. Port space which we believe to be ample for the loading schedules has been assigned in Seattle, San Francisco, Portland, Olympia and Tacoma. Also, we are endeavoring to supply adequate storage space, loading equipment and labor. Only to the extent necessary to avoid congestion are we controlling railroad freight shipments. Despite all efforts, however, the many troubles incident to the rapid expansion of the Soviet Pacific route and to the greatly increased shipments to our own forces in the Pacific cannot fully be corrected right away."

HULL

⁶⁰ Dated November 5, 4 p. m., p. 741.

711.61/8681

*Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page), Temporarily in Washington*⁶¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 12, 1942.

MR. ATHERTON: With respect to the remarks exchanged at the Kremlin banquet, the following section from Ambassador Standley's report on the occasion may be pertinent:

"Stalin rose and stated that the Soviet Government questioned why the British and American Governments supplied the Soviet Government with inferior material. He stated that the American Government has furnished the Soviets with P-40's instead of Aircobras and that the British had supplied Hurricanes instead of Spitfires, both of which were inferior to German planes; that when 150 Aircobras were allocated to the Soviet Union the British intercepted them and sent them somewhere else. He stated that the Russian people knew that both the Americans and the British had planes which were equal to or better than the German planes and could not see why some of these planes were not supplied to the Russians. This statement brought a reply from the British Ambassador in which he stated that he had full knowledge of the Aircobra diversion, that he could only say that he believed that the disposition made of these 150 Aircobras was of far greater value to the Allied cause than would have been the case had they been delivered to Russia."

It would appear from telegrams recently exchanged between Hopkins and Harriman (see attached),⁶² and from remarks made by the British Ambassador in Moscow to Admiral Standley, that the facts as presented in Lord Halifax's memorandum⁶³ in respect to the diversion of the Aircobras are substantially correct. However, since the actual diversion took place in England, and since the records now available in the Department do not include all the details of the transaction, it is probable that the exact story can only be obtained from Mr. Harriman, who is now in Washington. I will undertake to do this if you so desire.

⁶¹ Addressed to Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs. Mr. Page had accompanied Ambassador Standley on his return to Washington for consultation.

⁶² Not attached to file copy of this document.

⁶³ Memorandum of November 9, 1942, not printed. Lord Halifax referred to the diversion to United States authorities in September 1942 of certain Aircobras manufactured in the United States, which were being sent through the United Kingdom as part of the British Government's commitment to supply the Soviet Government with fighter aircraft. These Aircobras were urgently needed by the United States as part of the preparation for the pending operations in North Africa. Lord Halifax declared that these arrangements had been made with the knowledge of the Russian representative in London, and were subsequently regularized by an agreement in Washington with the concurrence of the Russian representative in Washington, which provided for replacement of the diverted aircraft. (711.61/8641)

In view of the friendly nature of Stalin's speech of November 7⁶⁴—Stalin referred to the progressive improvement in Anglo-Soviet-American relations—it is doubted that any useful purpose would be served if the Secretary were to make a specific reference to the matter or attempted to "kill" Pearson's story,⁶⁵ as suggested by Lord Halifax, which has large essence of truth in it. To stir up a matter that is now presumably dead would only place this Government in a defensive position of trying to justify itself for an action that has ultimately served the best interests of the United [Nations] cause, and concerning the facts of which Stalin must certainly be fully aware.

As will be noted from telegram no. 5616 of November 9 (attached),⁶⁶ sixty of the diverted Aircobras have already been delivered to the Soviet Union, and it is estimated that seventy will be delivered in November and forty-nine in December.

EDWARD PAGE, JR.

861.24/1170 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 18, 1942—3 p. m.
[Received November 19—9: 14 a. m.]

474. For Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. Commissar is pleased that port space will be made available at American west coast ports. He believes, however, that freight shipments can be controlled and congestion can be avoided "without recourse to such sharp measures as total embargo" as at Portland and hopes that total embargo will not be used in future.

2. Commissar asks that when you review shipping situation on December 1, you realize the extreme need for additional ships on Soviet Pacific run and make every effort to assign maximum number for Dec[ember] quota. Commissar observes that in view of successful operations in North Africa less shipping will be required for Atlantic transport and he believes that shipping thus released should be assigned to Soviet Pacific run. Commissar used exactly the same phraseology as British Broadcasting Company, which in a London

⁶⁴ See telegram No. 438, November 8, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 475.

⁶⁵ The reference is to an article headed "Strained Russo-British Relations" by columnist Drew Pearson, which appeared in the *Washington Post* for October 29, 1942. In the margin, Mr. Page has written and underlined in red: "Admiral Standley concurs."

⁶⁶ Not printed; but see the fourth paragraph of telegram No. 289 of October 5, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 728.

broadcast stated that the success of the American effort in North Africa would release large numbers of ships for other purposes.

[Remainder of telegram concerns the question of supply of electrical equipment for furnaces.]

[Faymonville]

HENDERSON

861.24/1171 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 20, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received November 20—6 : 15 p. m.]

478. For Hopkins from Faymonville.

1. Mikoyan has reconsidered his position and now states that he agrees to the unloading of 11 ships in United Kingdom. He still desires information on three questions transmitted in paragraph 2 of my 473, November 18, noon.⁶⁷

2. Commissar strongly recommends that season from December 15 to February 15 be utilized to maximum for shipping through Barents Sea since combination of Arctic night and ice conditions assure almost complete protection from enemy air and submarine attack. He believes that during this season ships should be sent both singly and in convoy. He believes that if reloading operations are undertaken they should be hastened so that a large number of ships can leave Iceland by December 15. [Faymonville.]

HENDERSON

861.24/1162 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson)

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1942—8 p. m.

588. Your 452, November 11, 9 p. m.⁶⁸ The interested Soviet authorities have through the Soviet Purchasing Commission here in-

⁶⁷ Not printed. The three questions concerned: (1) The names of the ships bearing Soviet cargoes for north Russian ports which it was proposed to unload in the United Kingdom; (2) what items were being held in the United Kingdom for later shipment to Soviet ports which might be used to replace low priority freight if the ships were unloaded; and (3) exactly what items in the Soviet cargoes had deteriorated. (861.24/1635)

⁶⁸ Not printed; it stated that the Embassy would not broach the matter of exchange of information regarding synthetic rubber with the Soviet Foreign Office until further instructions had been received from the Department, since it was assumed that the War Production Board, in cooperation with the Department of State, might desire to formulate the formal proposal.

formed the War Production Board that they will be glad to receive a technical commission for the exchange of information concerning the manufacture of synthetic rubber and have suggested that a similar Soviet commission be sent to the United States to which War Production Board agreed.

War Production Board has designated the following members of the commission who are expected to proceed as soon as possible to the Soviet Union: E. W. Pittman, who will head the commission; Dr. A. V. Grosse; Dr. Willis A. Gibbons; and Irvin L. Murray.

After consultation with Admiral Standley it has been decided to designate Mr. Pittman attaché of the Embassy during his stay in the Soviet Union and the other members of the commission as his assistants. All will bear diplomatic passports. Please convey the foregoing to the Commissariat For Foreign Affairs. Request them to expedite the authorization of visas to the above mentioned members of the commission for which application is being made at the Soviet Embassy here. The commission hopes to depart in the very near future.

HULL

861.24/1192a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Henderson)*

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1942—7 p. m.

400. From Stettinius for Faymonville. You are informed that it has been necessary to review all steel programs, including protocol production, because of the shortage of steel here. At the present time we have 450,000 tons of steel available while the shipping rate over all routes has never been more than 80,000 tons monthly. It is anticipated that in December this rate will be slightly lower. In view of these large stocks which have been analyzed as to each protocol item, we have considered reducing or stopping production and in certain instances diverting from stocks of those protocol items which are extremely large. On various occasions we have enunciated our policy that we can not permit wastage of materials in production when there are adequate supplies for many months ahead. Belyaev has been informed by us that we intend to reduce or stop production. We have also told them that diversion of approximately 250,000 tons of existing stocks will be made but that we prefer to act on his recommendations as to each protocol item based upon his shipping priority list. Belyaev tells us that Moscow protests strongly either stopping production or diverting from present stocks and fears that we are attempting to evade protocol commitments. Will you kindly indicate

to the appropriate Soviet authorities that nothing of the kind is contemplated but that the steel situation here is tight and that our action is accompanied by the promise to maintain sufficient stocks at all times to meet anticipated shipping programs. We will continue alloy steel production at the present rates in view of the fact that all alloy steels are shipped. Our plans concern only carbon steels and particularly rails of which there are on hand 53,000 tons and oil pipe and tubing of which there are on hand 111,000 tons with only very minor shipments planned. You are advised that it only takes from 4 to 6 weeks to put back into production all of the steel items concerned. [Stettinius.]

HULL

861.24/1197: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), December 10, 1942—midnight.
[Received December 12—1:25 p. m.]

1079. For Ambassador Standley. Before leaving Washington, you may desire to acquaint yourself by an examination of reports in the Navy Department with regard to the unsatisfactory relations which appear to be developing between Americans and British in north Russia. It is my understanding that Roullard⁶⁹ has reported confidentially that one of the chief causes of these differences is British insistence upon loading American ships with British cargoes with the result that the Russians are unable to fulfill commitments to us. Thompson tells me that Faymonville, in discussing the matter personally with him appears to feel that the whole general question of the setup in north Russia, particularly the relationship between the British and Americans, should be reconsidered.

HENDERSON

861.24/1188½

Memorandum by Mr. Addison E. Southard of the Division of Defense Materials to the Assistant Chief of the Division (Merchant)

[WASHINGTON,] December 15, 1942.

MR. MERCHANT: The following is a résumé of the more practical and ponderable aspects of information and impressions about delivery of Russian Lend-Lease supplies, gleaned from informal conversations with various informed officials in the Department and in the Office of

⁶⁹ Lt. Comdr. George D. Roullard, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the Soviet Union.

Lend-Lease, and from the examination of certain files made available to me.

1. Supplies under Lend-Lease for Russia have been provided for by an agreement and list designated as a "Protocol". The first Protocol was for the year ended June 30, 1942. The so-called "Second Protocol" is for the current year of July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943. It lists a large number of items including planes, tanks, trucks, ammunition, chemicals, foodstuffs, etc., etc., amounting to a total approaching eight million tons of which the main categories are more briefly grouped as follows: 1,100,000 tons of armament and ammunition; 1,800,000 tons of machinery and industrial equipment and "materials"; and 4,300,000 tons of foodstuffs. This "Second Protocol" has been confirmed by letters exchanged between the U. S. and U. S. S. R. Governments, but provision is made for changes or readjustments as to items, quantities and priorities. Subsequent to the original confirmation of the Second Protocol the Russian Ambassador sent in an amended list of supplies which possibly changes the original schedules in such manner as to lead to confusion not only in production but in rail shipment to the ports of loading. This first and so far most important list of readjustments was allegedly sent directly to Mr. Harry Hopkins and not through anticipated channels. This Department apparently learned of the changes only in an informal manner, and it has been suggested that further readjustments may have been asked by the Russians which also by-passed the Department, and perhaps other interested agencies, thus making uncertain the extent to which the whole picture is plain to all officials and agencies (both U. S. and U. S. S. R.) concerned.

2. In addition to changes or readjustments directly requested here by the Russian Ambassador, or by members of the SGPC (Soviet Government Purchasing Commission) it is understood that our Army and Navy receive direct requests, either for readjustments or for entirely new items, from their Attachés in Moscow, and many of these apparently become known to the Department of State only when noted by our Ambassador and reported by him. There are said also to be in this and similar ways more or less direct communications on the general subject from the Army and Navy to Mr. Harry Hopkins, as well as to the Lend-Lease authorities, modifying and elaborating or otherwise changing the original of the "Second Protocol". These communications bypass this Department, I understand to the extent that it never sees some of them and learns only indirectly or informally of others. This is said to be confusing and makes difficult consistent and complete knowledge by the Department of State.

The Russians are also said too often to change their minds as to priorities. This confuses production, storage, and rail shipping schedules in particular. And then again delays or disappointments

in the availability of ships provoke somewhat troublesome and involved readjustments in production and rail transportation schedules.

In some of my conversations it was also suggested that the Russian expectations, on the basis of established schedules for armament and ammunition in particular, were on occasion considerably upset by an emergency change of mind or plan on the part of our Munitions Assignments Board as to the release of items in these categories. It was, however, remarked that General Burns, Secretary of the MAB, has been able to effect considerable improvement in this situation although it might at any moment change as the tempo and breadth of our war participation, and our consequently greater needs for these items, increased. This appears to be a situation of many potential difficulties regardless of good will on the part of those executing the Protocol schedules, and there is probably little of definite or permanent nature that can be done about it.

3. From the information made available to me, which was often more general than specific, I am convinced that the U. S. agencies and officials concerned in the fulfillment of the program, and particularly Lend-Lease have accomplished all that could *reasonably* be expected from practicable or ponderable angles. Some of those with whom I talked were quite positive that supplies under all the categories, with the one important exception of pharmaceuticals, were being produced in ample quantities (although less than Protocol schedules in some instances at least) promptly to fill shipping space as fast as it has been made available.

However, because of rail and port congestion and delay in arrival of vessels, either actual or threatened, there has been some easement in actual production activities which has brought output below the monthly or other periodical quotas based on the annual total to be delivered. Apparently the Russians learn promptly of some of these reductions in output and immediately present objections to the Lend-Lease and other authorities. The latter in turn explain to the Russians why output has for the moment been eased. The Russian Purchasing Agents appear themselves to be satisfied. But complaints on the same basis then originate in Moscow or other sources to whom the Purchasing Agents have presumably failed to forward the explanations given them by U. S. officials. It appears that the SGPC merely report their endeavors, without success, to have output maintained on full schedule and forget to mention restrictions on storing or shipping the goods. This apparently somewhat peculiar procedure on the part of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission is presumably to save their face in Moscow and to impress their superiors there that they are leaving no stone unturned to have output kept up to the mark necessary for ensuring completion within the year of all items in the Protocol and its amendments. Shortage, and irregulari-

ties in the availability, of shipping are possibly ignored in Moscow as reasons of any special weight in slowing down production to conform to actual conditions.

4. The failure to supply pharmaceuticals in proportion to other items in the Protocol was not definitely explained to me but it was suggested that the fault lay in the Surgeon General's⁷⁰ office for the more efficient functioning of which steps were being taken.

5. Inadequate shipping facilities appear to be by far the biggest obstacle to a smoother and fuller functioning of the production and delivery of supplies under the Protocol. Briefly, three main routes are provided for: one via the North Cape, one via the Persian Gulf, and one via our West Coast to Vladivostok. The Second Protocol scheduled 3,300,000 tons by the North Cape and 1,100,000 via the Persian Gulf. These two routes have been beset with obvious and, for the moment at least, partially insurmountable difficulties. These difficulties include both shortage of shipping and shortage of naval escort for indispensable protection. Losses have been considerable, particularly on the North Cape route. In addition to sea perils there are inland transportation difficulties on the Persian Gulf route. The West Coast route has therefore been of very practical value. However, the Russians here presented in October several specific complaints regarding West Coast facilities.

[Here follows a description of some of these facilities, existing conditions in ports, labor shortages, and certain local deficiencies.]

In summary the following would seem to be the *immediately* important and outstanding obstacles to progress in more effective delivery of Lend-Lease supplies to Russia. At least the first two of the following four obstacles are in the way of being surmounted:

Shipping. As discussed in preceding pages the North Cape and Persian Gulf routes are handicapped by a temporary insufficiency of cargo ships and by an as yet insufficient number of naval vessels to provide indispensable escort. These handicaps should be overcome by forces already in motion. Some attention is presumably being given to ironing out transportation difficulties inland from the Persian Gulf. The West Coast-Vladivostok route is being actively and effectively used and its facilities are being satisfactorily expanded as detailed in the foregoing pages.

Pharmaceuticals. These are understood to represent the only important supply item in which production has unduly lagged. Supplies in the quantities considered desirable, and reasonable on the basis of transportation facilities, appear to depend primarily on a reorganization of the Surgeon General's office for which there is said to exist reason for hope.

Russian Temperament. Detailed comment is probably unnecessary on this perhaps insurmountable obstacle. In the preceding pages are suggested some lines which thought on the subject might follow.

⁷⁰ Maj. Gen. J. C. Magee.

Difficulties which inevitably arise from the difference between American and Russian temperaments are probably obvious even to observers of limited experience.

Effectiveness of American Personnel and Agencies concerned in execution of Russian supply program. There seems to be at least a possibility that an authoritative investigation might develop various instances of ineptitude to be expected in the handling of so vast and complex an undertaking as speeding supplies to Russia by officials and offices who must have time to overcome an initial amateurishness in combining governmental and business procedures to fit emergency conditions.

On the basis of the information available to me there do not seem to be any other *outstanding* problems requiring near-term pressure. When the North Cape and Persian Gulf shipping situations improve there will undoubtedly arise questions of speeding up production to provide prompt cargoes. But the many potential minor difficulties should solve themselves as the production, delivery and shipping procedures ripen and function more smoothly with the benefit of accumulative practice.

Detailed statistics of production, of deliveries here and there, of shipping losses, etc., etc., are prepared monthly by OLLA.⁷¹ These reports are completed usually about three weeks after the end of the month which they cover. Copies are, I understand, placed as promptly as possible in the hands of interested officials including the Honorable Dean Acheson of the Department of State. A definite step for procuring more prompt or workable solution of difficulties as they arise is provided for in the Committee which I understand has been formed to meet periodically for the purpose. This Committee appears to include a broad representation covering all agencies responsible for the efficient operation of the Russian supply Protocol—a list of those attending the September meeting gave the names of the Russian Ambassador and seven other Russian officials, and of eighteen U. S. officials including Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Acheson, and various officials of WPB,⁷² WSA,⁷³ and OLLA.

A. E. SOUTHARD

861.24/1369

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Acting Chief of the Division (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1942.

MR. ATHERTON: The following are the developments in the question of a proposed agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the exchange of information concerning inventions of war

⁷¹ Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

⁷² War Production Board.

⁷³ War Shipping Administration.

weapons similar to that concluded between the British and Soviet Governments last September.

As you are aware the War Department objected on various grounds to the conclusion of such an agreement⁷⁴ and the matter was held in abeyance pending Admiral Standley's return to Washington. I have taken up the question with Admiral Standley and he agrees that it would be desirable for us to have an agreement similar to that of the British and he asked General Michela, his Military Attaché, to discuss the question further with G-2. General Michela subsequently informed me that although G-2 is not convinced that such an agreement would be desirable, nevertheless, in order to comply with Admiral Standley's wishes they would agree in principle but not to an agreement similar in wording to the British one as it was felt that this agreement did not contain sufficient specific waivers in the event that the War Department felt that a particular invention or information relating thereto should not be given to the Russians.

I communicated with Colonel Yeaton and suggested that under the circumstances he send me a draft of the agreement that would be agreeable to G-2 since the Department and Admiral Standley were satisfied with the wording of the British Agreement. Colonel Yeaton has now sent over a suggested draft a copy of which is attached.⁷⁵ Admiral Standley feels strongly and I concur that the draft suggested by G-2 would make a very bad impression on the Soviet Government particularly in comparison with the Soviet-British Agreement on this subject and would be regarded by the Soviets as an attempt to find out exactly what inventions, processes, et cetera, the Soviet Government might have. Admiral Standley believes that it would be better not to raise the subject at all than to suggest an agreement along the lines proposed by the War Department. He does not wish, however, to attempt to overrule the War Department in their opposition to the type of agreement concluded by the British and Soviet Governments since he feels that in the last analysis any such agreement would be implemented by the War Department and not by the State Department.

If you concur I shall call Colonel Yeaton and explain to him the Admiral's position.⁷⁶

C. E. BOHLEN

⁷⁴ This opposition was expressed by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on the grounds that it would be better to continue to give information to the Soviet authorities as a free gift without any attempt to make it reciprocal. Mr. Bohlen noted on December 29, 1942, that he had informed the Ambassador to the United Kingdom, John G. Winant, concerning the objections of the War Department to the conclusion of such an agreement, and that the Ambassador had communicated these views to W. Averell Harriman.

⁷⁵ Not printed.

⁷⁶ Mr. Atherton agreed, and Bohlen explained Ambassador Standley's views on December 19, 1942, to Colonel Yeaton, who believed that "if the Admiral felt very strongly about the necessity and desirability on general grounds of such an agreement, he was sure that the War Department might be willing to accept the British-Soviet Agreement as a basis but that it would only be for this reason and 'G-2 would not be happy about the matter'."

861.24/1204: Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 20, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received December 21—1:42 a. m.]

548. For Stettinius from Faymonville. Vice Commissar of Foreign Trade Krutikov, who is Soviet official responsible for coordinating transportation of lend-lease supplies, has requested me to transmit to you his comments on Persian Gulf supply and to ask your assistance in improving a situation which he regards intolerable.⁷⁷ Krutikov's words spoken with great bitterness and some anger, were as follows:

"British and American authorities in Iran have adopted a decision contrary to Soviet interests, and in spite of Soviet protests and disapproval. United States and British military commanders have decided to send to Karachi by December 31 more than 20 ships, some of which are already leaving gulf ports for India. Upon arrival at Karachi the ships are to unload some 48,000 tons of cargo, among other items rails and pipe. It is entirely impracticable to transport rails and pipe from Karachi to the Soviet Union by the Baluchistan route and the attempt to send rails and pipe overland from Karachi will merely result in a still greater delay in obtaining from Karachi other goods which are urgently needed, but which will now have to wait in warehouses in Karachi for an indefinite time. This entire procedure of the British and American military authorities was begun without consultation with Soviet representatives. When Soviet representatives received information of General Connolly's decision they protested but received from General Connolly the reply that he was running his affairs under direct orders from Washington and would proceed with his plans without the agreement of the Soviet Government, and he has further stated that he will continue to act without consultation with Soviet authorities. The 20 ships in the Persian Gulf should have been unloaded there. To divert Soviet property to a British port without Soviet consent is wrong and not permissible. It is quite possible that port administration in the Persian Gulf, especially at Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur is not progressing satisfactorily, but in spite of this the Soviet Government desires that ships with Soviet goods be unloaded at Gulf ports and not sent east."

Krutikov requests you to issue instructions which will assure that Soviet goods arriving at ports, or over delivery routes, approved by the Soviet Government, are not diverted to other routes without the

⁷⁷ Assistant Commissar Krutikov had already expressed himself in strong terms which were reported in telegram No. 534 of December 14, from Moscow (not printed). Among other criticisms, "Krutikov states that Soviet views on shipping matters have been disregarded in the past; that when British and Soviet views differed in the past, Americans have uniformly supported the British view; and that material improvement in shipping situation would result if American shipping authorities in Washington and London would give weight to Soviet recommendations." (861.24/1200)

consent of the Soviet Government. Krutikov stated twice during the interview that he was expressing the protest of the Soviet Government.

Repeat to Kuibyshev. [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.24/1217 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 28, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received December 29—9:45 a. m.]

557. 1. I discussed with Roullard (Assistant Naval Attaché) who returned recently to Archangel from Moscow, conditions at the several northern Soviet ports relating to the discharging of cargo from American vessels. Although mindful of the probability that such conditions were given special consideration during the recent visit to the United States of the Ambassador, I feel that it may be helpful to the Department to know of impressions received by me from Roullard along with other American officials who have been at the northern ports.

2. The Soviet authorities express themselves as being not satisfied with the rate at which cargo is discharged and with the condition of much of the cargo when delivered to them. The British personnel stationed at the ports and the Soviet port authorities jointly arrange for the berthing of American vessels, while the preparing of such vessels for unloading devolves upon their masters, the actual unloading being carried out by the port authorities. Thus the responsibility for delay in unloading and for any damage to cargo is shared in varying degrees by all three parties. As the Department is aware, Commander Frankel⁷⁸ was sent to Archangel in the first instance for naval intelligence work and subsequently to render assistance to naval ratings assigned to American merchant vessels. I understand that it was after consultation with the Embassy and General Faymonville that he (and later Roullard) has occupied himself with facilitating and expediting the discharge of cargoes from American vessels. Delay frequently arises through failure on the part of ship's personnel to complete preparations for unloading (such as putting the ship's winches in order) or work customarily done by ship's crew and not by the stevedores. Our naval officers intervene in such cases for the purpose of alleviating difficulties raised by refractory seamen which impede the expeditious transfer of cargo from ship to dock. General

⁷⁸ Comdr. Samuel B. Frankel, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the Soviet Union.

Faymonville has expressed to me in unqualified terms his high appreciation of the invaluable assistance which has been and is being rendered by these officers.

3. These naval officers are not of course trained and experienced in the unloading of vessels. In order that their presence at the northern ports can be used to the utmost advantage I recommend that the representative at the Persian Gulf ports of the War Shipping Administration be requested at his earliest convenience to visit the northern Soviet ports for the purpose of inspecting shipping conditions there and advising the naval officers on shipping matters. If affirmative decision is taken I suggest that we be informed as far in advance of his contemplated departure as possible to give us sufficient time to procure authorization for visa and for travel to the ports.

4. One matter which is giving us concern is the friction which exists between the Soviet authorities and the British shore personnel. Our officers have been scrupulous to avoid becoming involved in issues between the British and Russians but the desire of each of the two parties for American support and understanding inevitably affects the relations of the officers with both. Information at hand indicates that the friction is in large measure caused by the failure of the British personnel to study to avoid unnecessarily injuring Soviet susceptibilities. Cases cited to me are the habitual failure of British personnel arriving at Soviet port for shore duty to register, as required, with the local authorities, and the bringing of mail ashore without conforming to prescribed procedure. Apart from the fact that such friction is undesirable and generally unnecessary and avoidable its presence prejudices the speedy handling of American vessels for the same reason that the berthing of such vessels lies solely with the British and the Russians. I have not broached the subject even informally to Admiral Miles,⁷⁹ head of the British Mission at Moscow, largely because of the return shortly of the Ambassador, but I trust that the Department will agree with me that conditions, especially friction over trivialities, which prejudice complete cooperation essential to the speedy delivery of materials to the Soviet Government should be eliminated.

5. It is highly desirable, in line with the Ambassador's endorsement (see Embassy's 221, June 30, 8 p. m.⁸⁰) of the recommendation of the Naval Attaché that additional naval personnel be sent to the northern ports for the handling and caring of [*for*] American merchant seamen, that at least two junior naval officers be assigned as soon as practicable. The Acting Naval Attaché concurs.

DOOMAN

⁷⁹ Rear Adm. G. J. A. Miles, head of the British Naval Mission in the Soviet Union.

⁸⁰ *Ante*, p. 601.

TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION; RENEWAL OF COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED JULY 31, 1942⁸¹

861.24/903

Mr. John N. Hazard of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration to the Acting Chief of the Division of Exports and Defense Aid (Bunn)

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1942.

DEAR MR. BUNN: When Mr. Schley⁸² and I discussed with you the possible matters which would be desirable for inclusion in a master agreement to be negotiated with the U. S. S. R., reference was made to the Soviet Government's purchasing policy to be anticipated after the War. The matter was suggested by the very large requests which have been received from the Soviet Government for industrial plant equipment.

Our industrial experts have estimated that these requests total the entire industrial plant equipment production of the United States for a year such as 1932. It may readily be supposed that orders of this magnitude would play an important part in post war American industrial activity, if they can be anticipated. My attention has recently been directed to the question of whether orders of this magnitude can be anticipated from the Soviet Government after the War. Of course, I am not in a position to make any authoritative prognostication, but some factors have come to my mind, and it occurs to me that you, who are fortunate enough to have available a staff with sufficient time to consider these matters, might be interested in exploring them.

On the assumption that the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain will win the War, and that the industrial centers of Central Europe will be impoverished, but not devastated, the following interesting possibility arises: Workmen of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, and to some extent, Eastern Belgium and France, and Northern Italy will be poor and discouraged. If the Soviet Government wishes to encourage these discouraged populations, it could go far, if it were to place in the factories of this area orders of the magnitude of those recently requested of the United States. To make possible the production of such large orders and to facilitate payment therefor, the Soviet Government would be in a position to supply considerable quantities of the requisite raw materials. The result, which present Soviet leaders are likely to anticipate, might be the persuasion of the workmen of Central Europe that membership within the Soviet Union is the surest way to regain economic freedom.

⁸¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 914-925. For text of the exchange of notes signed on August 2, 1941, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 215, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1316.

⁸² Reeve Schley, Special Assistant to the Administrator, in charge of the Soviet Division, Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

No armies, no militant activities of the Comintern,⁸³ would ever be as forceful an argument for union with the Soviet Union as the tangible evidence of plenty of work and restored purchasing power.

There are those, of course, who believe that the Soviet leaders have returned to the old pre-revolutionary principles of nationalism. There are others who believe that men, who have been trained in the rigorous principles enunciated by Marx and his subsequent interpreters, will not forget the international aspects of those principles and the ultimate goal of an economic and political union of all peoples. If one agrees with those who feel that the spirit of nationalism has not conquered the spirit of internationalism, one can see that a program of purchases in Central Europe might be interpreted as coinciding with the political theories of the present Soviet leadership.

The United States, of course, has unusual capacity for making specialized types of items. There is no reason to suppose that the Soviet Union, in its desire to obtain the best, would not continue to place orders for such items in the United States. Of recent years, however, these orders have been in the neighborhood of an average of some \$40,000,000 per year, if not slightly more, but in comparison with the possible future Soviet requirements, having a value of some \$4,000,000,000 or \$5,000,000,000, if not more, such specialized orders would not be large nor would they aid extensively in our post war problem or restoration of peacetime industry.

The Soviet Government has welcomed in the past trade agreements which called for the placing of orders in the United States up to certain fixed figures. It may be that one of the important guarantees to be obtained from current Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union⁸⁴ is an agreement by the Soviet Union to place orders in the United States after the War to such and such a value or for such and such a proportion of its industrial equipment requirements.

The point that has occurred to me is that the Soviet Union will probably not place orders in large quantities in the United States after the War unless there is some contractual obligation to do so. If our economic system can be expected to require large foreign orders to permit it to thrive after the War, this may be a good time to take measures to insure the satisfaction of this requirement.

Very truly yours,

JOHN N. HAZARD
Chief Liaison Officer
Section for Soviet Supply

⁸³ The Third (Communist) International founded by the Bolsheviks at Moscow in March 1919.

⁸⁴ For correspondence on the continuation and enlargement of wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see pp. 684 ff.

861.24/903

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Exports and Defense Aid (Bunn)

[WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1942.

MR. BUNN: I fully agree with you.⁸⁵

In any event I do not believe it would be practicable at the present time to obligate the Russians to make purchases from us during the post war period. We cannot know now what we shall be in a position to buy or sell during the post war period and the Russians are in precisely the same position. Any commitments, therefore, which we might be able to give or accept would be of no real value. It seems to me that, therefore, if we should follow the suggestions advanced in Mr. Hazard's letter we would be demanding from the Russians certain concessions which we have not demanded from the British with little prospect of obtaining any practical value from such concessions if made.

R[AY] A[THERTON]

611.6131/638a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON; July 9, 1942—noon.

338. Unless renewed, the present commercial agreement with the Soviet Union will expire on August 5, 1942. Please ascertain whether the Soviet Government wishes to continue the present agreement in force for another year.⁸⁶

HULL

⁸⁵ Charles Bunn had referred Mr. Hazard's letter, *supra*, to Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, who wrote this memorandum which Ray Atherton initialled. Mr. Bunn had declared in his covering memorandum: "This is not a new proposal. So far I have been inclined to resist it, on the ground that we should not put special & onerous terms on Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. Perhaps I have been wrong. What do you think?"

⁸⁶ By telegram No. 612, July 16, 1942, Ambassador Standley reported that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had replied in a note dated July 15 that appropriate instructions had been sent to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov (611.6131/639).

611.6131/646

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1942.

The Soviet Counselor, Mr. Gromyko, came in to see me today. He said that the Soviet Embassy had been instructed by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to inform the Department of State that:

1. The Soviet Government agrees to extend the Soviet-American Commercial Agreement which expires in August either for another period of one year or for an indefinite period with a provision that it may be terminated within six months after either party thereto should give notice of a desire for such termination.

2. The Counselor said that the Soviet Government would appreciate being informed with regard to the alternative which the American Government may choose to adopt.

611.6131/646

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements (Hawkins)⁸⁸

[WASHINGTON,] July 17, 1942.

There is attached a draft of a proposed exchange of notes⁸⁹ with the Soviet Union continuing in force the Commercial Agreement of 1937⁹⁰ until August 6, 1942 [1943] and thereafter, unless superseded by a more comprehensive commercial agreement, subject to termination on six months' written notice by either Government.

The attached draft combines both alternatives put forward by Mr. Gromyko in his conversation of July 10, 1942 with Mr. Henderson (memorandum of conversation is attached),⁹¹ and in addition the phrase "unless superseded by a more comprehensive commercial agree-

⁸⁸ This memorandum was sent, together with proposed draft of Commercial Agreement, to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson) and to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, both of whom approved the proposed draft. The proposal was also called to the attention of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on July 22, 1942, who likewise agreed to it before the draft was to be presented to a member of the Soviet Embassy at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of this same day.

⁸⁹ Not attached to this memorandum; for text as finally formulated, see note of July 31, 1942, to the Soviet Ambassador, p. 763.

⁹⁰ For the exchange of notes signed August 4, 1937, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 105, or 50 Stat. (pt. 2) 1619.

⁹¹ *Supra*.

ment" has been inserted. This seems particularly appropriate because of the possibilities suggested by Article VII of our master lend-lease agreement with the Soviet Union.⁹²

If this meets with approval, at the earliest possible moment we will call in Mr. Gromyko and submit the attached draft exchange of notes for his consideration.

HARRY C. HAWKINS

611.6131/640

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt ⁹³

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Unless renewed, the present commercial agreement with the Soviet Union will expire on August 5. We propose to extend it for another year and have it continue in force indefinitely thereafter, "unless superseded by a more comprehensive commercial agreement", or until terminated on six months' notice. In view of the possibilities suggested by Article VII of our master lend-lease agreement with the Soviet Union, it is believed that it would be desirable to include in the renewal notes the words quoted above.

I should appreciate being informed whether you approve renewal of the agreement in this form.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

611.6131/644

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements (Hawkins)

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1942.

For the Information of the Secretary of State:

The exchange of notes continuing in force the Commercial Agreement of 1937, for which an appointment has been made for you and the Russian Ambassador at 10 a. m. July 31, provides that the agreement shall remain in force until August 6, 1943 and thereafter, unless superseded by a more comprehensive commercial agreement, subject to termination on six months' notice by either Government.

At that time you will hand the Ambassador an *aide-mémoire*, similar to the one given him last year with respect to coal.⁹⁴ This *aide-*

⁹² Signed at Washington on June 11, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500.

⁹³ Memorandum returned by the President with the notation: "CH OK FDR".

⁹⁴ The text of the *aide-mémoire* of July 31, 1942, regarding imports of coal from the Soviet Union, is identical with the *aide-mémoire* of August 2, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 924.

mémoire states that if at any time during the life of the agreement it should appear that imports of Soviet coal into the United States would exceed in any calendar year the figure of 400,000 tons mentioned in the Soviet note of August 6, 1940 limiting exports of coal to the United States, the Government of the United States would feel free to consult with the Soviet Government with a view to arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the matter.

HARRY C. HAWKINS

Executive Agreement Series No. 265
611.6131/646a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
(Litvinov)*⁹⁵

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1942.

EXCELLENCY: In accordance with the conversations which have taken place, I have the honor to confirm on behalf of my Government the agreement which has been reached between the Governments of our respective countries that the agreement regarding commercial relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recorded in the exchange of notes of August 4, 1937, which came into force on August 6, 1937, and which was renewed on August 5, 1938,⁹⁶ August 2, 1939,⁹⁷ August 6, 1940,⁹⁸ and August 2, 1941⁹⁹ shall remain in force until August 6, 1943. It shall continue in force thereafter, unless superseded by a more comprehensive commercial agreement, subject to termination on six months' written notice by either Government.

The present agreement shall be proclaimed by the President of the United States of America¹ and approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.²

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

⁹⁵ The same note, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent at the same time to the Secretary of State by the Soviet Ambassador (611.6131/647). This exchange of notes constituted an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, printed in Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 265, and 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1575. For text of press release issued by the Department on July 31, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1942, p. 662.

⁹⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 601 ff.

⁹⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 809 ff.

⁹⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 441 ff.

⁹⁹ See *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 914 ff.

¹ This was done on August 1, 1942.

² This approval was given on August 1, 1942.

611.6131/649½

Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1942.

DISCUSSION OF INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION—OCTOBER 23, 1942

The entire meeting which lasted over two and one-half hours was devoted to minor criticism of the proposed draft progress report to be submitted to the Trade Agreements Committee. A copy of this draft, which was drawn up by the chairman of the Committee,³ is attached.⁴

Most of the discussion dealt with minor suggested changes in the wording and a basic discussion of whether an effort should not be made to negotiate a new type of trade agreement with the Soviet Union more in line with the trade agreements with capitalist countries.⁵

During the discussion of the latter point it was brought out that because of the unusual economic system in the Soviet Union and because of the monopoly of foreign trade it would be difficult if not impossible to negotiate a treaty based upon a "representative period" or other criteria used in trade agreements with capitalist countries.

In view of this conclusion the question was raised as to whether, in view of the very small concessions which the United States could offer to the Soviet Union, it would be advisable to attempt at this time to negotiate a new agreement with that country. In this regard it was pointed out that since no one could predict at this time the economic and financial situation which would obtain after the conclusion of hostilities, it might be to the disadvantage of the United States if it should tie itself down in a trade agreement with the Soviet Union now.

I concurred that because of the very few concessions which might be accorded to the Soviet Government at this time it might not be advisable to endeavor to negotiate a new treaty. I pointed out, however, that it might be advisable from the point of view of expressing our good will and determination to foster Soviet-American trade by all means possible, but that because of the small concessions which could

³ Charles Bunn.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ In the tentative final draft progress report of this committee, dated October 29, 1942, the observation was made that in the commercial agreements reached with the Soviet Union to 1941, generally an accompanying note from the Soviet Government specified in terms of dollar values the minimum amount of American goods and products which it intended to purchase during the year covered by the agreement. "Between 1935 and 1937 consideration was given by this Government to another type of commitment on the part of the Soviet Union, namely, that it should agree to purchase in the United States each year not less than a stated percentage of its total imports. Such a proposal was never made to the Soviet Government."

be granted to the Soviet Government the latter might not fully understand why the United States was so anxious to negotiate a new treaty at this time. Furthermore, since by far the largest amount of trade with the Soviet Union at this time is purely war-time trade, the Soviet authorities might feel that it would not be worthwhile to try to enlarge upon the present agreement which would have little effect on the actual present trade and might tend to obscure the issue of all out aid to the Soviet Union.

In connection with the possibilities of substantially increasing Soviet-American trade, considerable discussion took place on the question of credits. It was agreed that one of the principal means by which the Soviet Government could pay for increased imports from the United States would be credits, and that since the Committee was not primarily charged with the duty of working out a credit system, it was agreed that further importance in the progress report should be given to this point in order that the Trade Agreements Committee could judge more accurately the basic problem confronting any attempt to increase substantially trade between the two countries.

It was agreed that the chairman should incorporate the principal suggested changes in a new proposed progress report and that the recommendation of the Trade Agreements Committee should still be to the effect that an attempt should be made to negotiate a new trade agreement with the USSR.

ARREST AND DETENTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UNDERTAKING OF NOVEMBER 16, 1933⁶

361.1121/35 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1942—11 p. m.

327. Your 538, June 16, 1 p. m.⁷ Please take up this case⁸ in-

⁶ For previous correspondence on the arrest and detention of American citizens in the Soviet Union, and arrangements for their return, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 926 ff. The text of the undertaking of November 16, 1933, is in the exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 33-34.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Isaiah Oggins was born in Connecticut, on July 22, 1898. He had married on April 24, 1924, and one son was born in 1931 in France. Following residence in China (1935-1937) and France (1937-1938), Isaiah Oggins entered the Soviet Union on a false passport on June 1, 1938, and went to Moscow. He was arrested in February 1939, and was sentenced on January 5, 1940, to 8 years in prison for espionage. He had had no counsel at the interrogation which had constituted his trial. At the time when the American Embassy in the Soviet Union first had learned about him, Oggins was in the prison camp Norillag, at Norilsk, in poor physical condition.

formally with the Soviet authorities and since Oggins is an American citizen request permission for an American Foreign Service Officer to visit him as provided for in the 1933 agreement, or that Oggins be allowed to appear at the Embassy.⁹

Without at this time giving emphasis to the failure of the Soviet authorities, from the standpoint of commitments of the Soviet Government, to notify the Embassy of Oggins' arrest, you may, however, express some surprise at such failure and may mention that your Government hopes that steps will be taken to prevent failures of a similar nature from taking place in the future.

The Department is concerned as to the disposition made of Oggins' passport.

HULL

361.1121 Ludaich, Mikolo/2

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

No. 48

KUIBYSHEV, August 3, 1942.

[Received September 9.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram number 357 of July 21, 1942, 7 p. m.,¹⁰ directing the Embassy to submit by mail a report of the available details concerning the arrest by the Soviet authorities of Micolo Ludaich and Leo Weckman, both dual nationals.

On June 17, 1942, Mrs. Alli Irene Halme, an American citizen who is residing at Gorki, U. S. S. R., called at the Embassy for the purpose of having her passport validated and brought with her a letter addressed to the Embassy by Mrs. Barbara Ludaich, the mother of Micolo Ludaich. Mrs. Ludaich stated that her son had been arrested by the Soviet authorities at Gorki two days after the outbreak of the present Soviet-German war. She stated further that all her efforts to determine the cause of his arrest had been futile. She was finally told that only through the American Embassy could she learn the reasons for his detention.

Mrs. Halme was questioned concerning the arrest and reported that Ludaich and Leo Weckman were taken into custody by the militia

⁹ In telegram No. 173, April 15, 1942, the Department had indicated to the Embassy that "It is possible that he [Oggins] has been acting for years as an agent of a foreign power or of an international revolutionary organization. Nevertheless it is believed that in view of his American citizenship and of the Soviet agreement in 1933 to inform this Government of the arrest of American citizens, the failure to report his detention should not be ignored." (361.1121/34)

¹⁰ Not printed.

at Gorki along with other persons of Finnish descent during the first week of hostilities. No charges have as yet been preferred against them and they are still being detained in the local prison at Gorki.

It is believed that the Finnish descent of these persons caused their arrest by the Soviet authorities as persons of doubtful loyalty, and that they will be interned for the duration of the war. Under the circumstances the Embassy does not feel that it is in a position to intervene with the Soviet authorities with a view to effecting the prisoners' release, and Mrs. Ludaich has been informed accordingly.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

ALDEN M. HAUPT

Acting Chief of Consular Section

361.1121/36 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), September 15, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received September 16—1:45 p. m.]

780. Department's 327, June 30, 11 p. m. The Embassy communicated the sense of the Department's telegram under reference to the Foreign Office in a note dated July 3, 1942, to which, after a follow up note dated September 11, had been written a reply dated September 13 has now been received. This note merely states that Oggins is now in Moscow,¹¹ that no objection is perceived to his being visited by a representative of the Embassy, and that the Foreign Office desires to know who will visit him and when. I have instructed Thompson¹² to seek an appointment with Oggins through the appropriate authorities in Moscow and have so informed the Foreign Office advising it that Thompson has been designated the American Foreign Service Officer to visit Oggins.

STANDLEY

¹¹ Despite the statement that Oggins was now in Moscow, the Department received information in telegram No. 807, September 20, 1942, from Kuibyshev that in fact Oggins had not arrived and was not expected for several days. (361.1121/37) Eventually, however, American consular officials visited Oggins in Moscow in the presence of members of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs on December 8, 1942, and January 9, 1943. At these meetings Oggins completed application for a passport for return to the United States whenever he should be released from jail.

¹² Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul, in charge of the staff remaining in Moscow after the removal of the Embassy to Kuibyshev in October 1941.

361.1121 Speier, Edward Henry/14

*Memorandum by Mr. Bartley P. Gordon of the Division of
European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1943.

In the case of Edward Henry Speier, an American citizen, the Soviet authorities in a note dated November 22, 1941, informed the American Embassy at Kuibyshev of Speier's arrest in Vladivostok for illegal entry into the Soviet Union. (See Embassy's telegram 1971, November 24, 1941).¹³ At that time the Soviet authorities indicated they were prepared to hand Speier over to the American authorities should the United States Government so wish.

The Consul General at Vladivostok¹⁴ reported (telegram 125 of December 20, 1941) that he had visited Speier and had taken his passport application which Speier declined to execute, however, until oath of allegiance was stricken therefrom. This application shows that Speier was born at Detroit in 1907 and that it was his intention never to return to the United States. He had gone to the Soviet Union without a passport as a stowaway on the Soviet steamer *Mayakovsky*.

During this interview Speier spoke admiringly of the Soviet Union and in disparaging terms of the United States. He expressed a strong desire to work in or fight for the Soviet Union but was bitter over the treatment he had received in his home country and emphasized his unwillingness to bear arms for the United States. In a subsequent interview (see despatch 116 of March 26, 1942 from Vladivostok) Speier denied that he really felt these expressed sentiments and explained that his pro-Soviet and anti-American statements were made because of his uncertainty of the true identity of the American representatives and his secret suspicion that they were masquerading agents of the Soviet Secret Police who might do him harm.

The Department's records indicate that Speier had long been interested in communist ideology and had made several unsuccessful attempts since 1940 to go to the Soviet Union as a stowaway. He also admitted to a police record in Michigan for grand larceny and in California for stowaway attempts.

The Soviet authorities inquired (telegram 2121, December 31, 1941 from Moscow) whether in view of Speier's refusal to return to the United States, the Embassy were still interested in his case and stated that if the American Government were no longer interested Soviet law would be applied since Speier had illegally crossed the Soviet

¹³ The documents to which reference is made in this summary memorandum are not printed.

¹⁴ Angus Ivan Ward.

frontier. The Department indicated that investigations were being continued to verify Speier's birth in Detroit.

The Consul General at Vladivostok reported (telegram no. 10, January 10, 1942) that he had been informed by the diplomatic agent¹⁵ there that Speier would be tried on the charge of having crossed the Soviet frontier illegally and that neither his birth certificate nor photographs for his passport application could be furnished the Consulate General pending the decision of the court. Although the Consul General had as yet received no instructions as to what protection should be accorded to Speier, he requested permission of the diplomatic agent to attend the trial at the suggestion of the Embassy. Meanwhile the Department's investigations to determine Speier's origin were continued.

The Consul General at Vladivostok reported (telegram no. 31, February 19, 1942) that he had just been informed orally by the diplomatic agent that Speier had been tried on February 9 and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. The Consulate General had not been given an opportunity to have an observer at the trial.

The Consul General was allowed to visit Speier on March 20, 1942 (telegram 46, March 20) to obtain his signature and thumb prints on passport application photographs. At that time Speier stated he desired to return to the United States and to execute a new registration application with oath of allegiance.

The Department's instruction of August 6, 1942 authorized the Consulate General at Vladivostok to issue a passport to Edward Henry Speier upon his release from prison.¹⁶ This instruction was sent by pouch, not by telegram, so it was not received until two months later. The Consulate General requested the diplomatic agent to arrange for an interview between an officer of the Consulate General and Speier and was informed that perhaps Speier was no longer in Vladivostok. The diplomatic agent stated (telegram 109, November 10, 1942 from Vladivostok) that he could not ascertain Speier's whereabouts for the reason that the appropriate authorities refused to disclose it and therefore he could not arrange an interview but would accept anything for transmission to Speier.

The Department instructed the Embassy at Kuibyshev (telegram 597, November 19, 1942) to make direct inquiry of the Soviet authorities concerning Speier's present whereabouts and welfare, since his American birth and identity had been established, and to request

¹⁵ Alexander Andreyevich Ankudinov, representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Vladivostok.

¹⁶ This passport was to be valid only for immediate return to the United States.

permission for an American consular representative to visit Speier or for him to appear personally before such representative in order to facilitate the issuance of his American passport.

The Embassy reported (telegram 1132, December 23, 1942) that the Soviet Foreign Office in a note to the Embassy stated that Speier's new address was "Station Karabazh, Camp of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, Kazakhskaya S. S. R." The note added that there was no objection to Speier's being visited by a representative of the Embassy and that the Foreign Office would inform the Embassy later regarding the date and place of such visit.

The latest communication received from the Soviet Union in connection with this case is telegram no. 119 of February 6, 1943 from the Embassy at Kuibyshev stating that on February 6 the Foreign Office had informed the Embassy that Speier had died of pneumonia on January 3, 1943. This information was communicated by the Special Division of the Department in a telegram to Mr. Speier's mother in the United States.¹⁷

BARTLEY P. GORDON

361.1121/41: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 10, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 3:40 p. m.]

639. Department's 263, April 28, 7 p. m.¹⁸ and 269, April 30,¹⁹ re Isaiah Oggins. Embassy has been refused permission to see Oggins again and is informed that the competent Soviet authorities find it impossible to reconsider his case. Funds released for refund depositor.²⁰

STANDLEY

¹⁷ The Department records do not show whether this telegram was actually delivered, because the addressee had moved.

¹⁸ Not printed. Mrs. Nerma Oggins of New York City had deposited the sum of \$400 towards the expense of the return of her husband. The Department of State had authorized on April 20, 1943, the issuance of a passport valid only for return to the United States. (361.1121/40a)

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ The deposited money was returned to Mrs. Oggins on June 22, 1943.

361.1121/34

*The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)
to Mrs. Nerma Oggins*

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1943.

MY DEAR MRS. OGGINS: The Department has received your letter of October 6, 1943 ²¹ with further reference to your husband, Mr. Isaiah Oggins, who is detained in the Soviet Union.

As you will recall the Department informed you in its letter of August 2, 1943 ²¹ that all appropriate measures had been taken on your husband's behalf both by the Department and by the American Embassy in the Soviet Union but that the Soviet authorities recently indicated that they found it impossible to reconsider his case. It appears, therefore that the Soviet authorities are not disposed to release Mr. Oggins from the obligation of serving the sentence which they state was imposed upon him for violation of Soviet laws, and the Department does not believe that at the present time any action can be taken which would cause the Soviet authorities to revoke their decision.²²

Sincerely yours,

JOHN D. HICKERSON

²¹ Not printed.

²² After the failure to obtain Oggins' release in 1943, there is no record of any subsequent developments until, after receipt of a letter of July 17, 1944, from Mrs. Oggins, the Department again requested the Embassy in Moscow, in its instruction No. 259 of August 14, 1944, if possible to "approach the proper Soviet authorities concerning the release of Mr. Oggins." (361.1121/7-1744)

VATICAN

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE THE POPE PROTEST PUBLICLY AGAINST NAZI ATROCITIES IN GERMAN-OCCUPIED AREAS

740.00116 European War 1939/527½ : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 3, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 10:12 p. m.]

3576. From Tittmann.¹ No. 128, July 30. In recent reports to the Department (my despatches Nos. 79, 85, 86, 87, and 88,² and my letter to Dunn of July 17³), I have called attention to the opinion that the failure of the Holy See to protest publicly against Nazi atrocities is endangering its moral prestige and is undermining faith both in the church and in the Holy Father himself. I have on a number of occasions informally reminded the Vatican of this danger and so have certain of my colleagues but without result. The answer is invariably that the Pope in his speeches has already condemned offenses against morality in wartime and that to be specific now would only make matters worse.

Yesterday the Brazilian Ambassador to the Holy See⁴ called on me to inquire whether I would be prepared to join in a concerted (not collective but rather simultaneous) *démarche* to persuade the Pope to condemn publicly and in specific terms the Nazi atrocities in German-occupied areas. Monsieur Accioly said that he had already received the necessary instructions from his Government for him to take part in such a *démarche* and was endeavoring to enlist the cooperation of the representatives of Great Britain, Poland, Belgium, Yugoslavia and as many Latin American countries as possible. The Belgian Ambassador has already agreed and the British Minister and Polish Ambassador are telegraphing for instructions. The Polish Ambassador tells me furthermore that he is under the impression that his Government may have recently made soundings in the above sense among certain Allied Governments.

While I doubt very much that the Pope can be moved to take the

¹ Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to Myron C. Taylor, President Roosevelt's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII. Mr. Tittmann was in charge of affairs while Mr. Taylor was in the United States.

² None printed.

³ Not printed; James Clement Dunn was Adviser on Political Relations.

⁴ Hildebrando Pompeu Accioly.

desired action I cannot see that the *démarche* could do any harm and I believe it would serve to reinforce the individual reminders that have heretofore been made.

If the Department feels that it is desirable that I take part in such a *démarche* I would appreciate receiving instructions at an early date. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.00116 European War 1939/527½ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1942—10 p. m.

1911. For Tittmann. Your 128, July 30. In the event the Brazilian Ambassador endeavors to have the Pope publicly condemn the Nazi atrocities in German-occupied areas, and you are informed of such action, you are authorized to make an independent but simultaneous approach to the Vatican Foreign Office and to point out the universal condemnation of these cruel and inhuman actions by the Hitler forces and the universal condemnation which has been reflected in the expressions of all free peoples at these incredible horrors. You may also point out the helpful effect of a similar condemnation on the part of the Pope in bringing about some check on the unbridled and uncalled for actions of the Nazi forces.

HULL

740.00116 European War 1939/524

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1942.

Sir Ronald Campbell⁵ called to see me this morning at his request.

The Minister stated that the British Minister at the Vatican had been authorized to make simultaneous approaches to the Cardinal Secretary of State⁶ with other representatives of the United Nations, upon the initiative of the Brazilian Ambassador, to urge that the Vatican do what might be possible publicly to condemn the assassination and abuse by Germany of innocent persons in occupied territories. I told the Minister that the American representative, Mr. Tittmann, had already been authorized to the same effect.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁵ British Minister in the United States.

⁶ Cardinal Luigi Maglione.

740.00116 European War 1939/590

*Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the President's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII, to the Cardinal Secretary of State (Maglione)*⁷

MEMORANDUM

In accordance with instructions received from his Government, the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States to the Holy See⁸ has the honor to call the attention of His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State to the cruel and inhuman treatment by the Hitler forces of the civil populations in areas occupied by the Germans. He desires to point out that these incredible horrors have been universally condemned and that this universal condemnation has been reflected in the expressions of all free peoples.

The Chargé d'Affaires has also been authorized by his Government to point out the helpful effect that a similar condemnation of these atrocities by the Holy Father would have in bringing about some check on the unbridled and uncalled-for actions of the forces of the Nazi regime.

VATICAN CITY, September 14, 1942.

740.00116 European War 1939/584: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 18, 1942—2 p. m.
[Received September 18—12:29 p. m.]

4261. From Tittmann. No. 156, September 14. My 153, September 8.⁹ Upon learning that the Brazilian Ambassador to the Holy See made his approach to the Vatican this morning by sending to the Secretariat of State a memorandum addressed to the Cardinal Secretary of State, I took similar action later on in the day by sending in a memorandum¹⁰ in the sense of the Department's telegram No. 1911, August 4. My British and Uruguayan colleagues also sent in their communications today, Mr. Osborne's¹¹ in the form of a first person note.

A *démarche* in the same sense on behalf of eight occupied countries but unrelated to the Accioly proposal was made by the Polish and

⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by Mr. Tittmann in his despatch No. 114, September 15; received October 14.

⁸ Myron Taylor, the Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, was absent from the Vatican. In his absence, Mr. Tittmann was Chargé at the Vatican, but he was not accredited to the Holy See.

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ *Supra*.

¹¹ Francis D. G. Osborne, British Minister to the Vatican.

Belgian Ambassadors when they handed a joint note to Monsignor Tardini¹² (in the absence of the Cardinal) on September 12. It is not expected, after all, that the Yugoslav representative here will make a separate *démarche* since his country is included in the joint note. The texts of the communications cited above are being forwarded by air mail.¹³ [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

121.866A/302

*The President's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII (Taylor)
to the Cardinal Secretary of State (Maglione)*

VATICAN CITY, September 26, 1942.

MY DEAR CARDINAL MAGLIONE: I have the honor to bring to the attention of Your Eminence the following memorandum which has been received from my Government:

"The following was received from the Geneva Office of the Jewish Agency for Palestine in a letter dated August 30th, 1942. That office received the report from two reliable eye-witnesses (Aryans), one of whom came on August 14th from Poland.

"(1) Liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto is taking place. Without any distinction all Jews, irrespective of age or sex, are being removed from the Ghetto in groups and shot. Their corpses are utilized for making fats and their bones for the manufacture of fertilizer. Corpses are even being exhumed for these purposes.

"(2) These mass executions take place, not in Warsaw, but in especially prepared camps for the purpose, one of which is stated to be in Belzek. About 50,000 Jews have been executed in Lemberg itself on the spot during the past month. According to another report, 100,000 have been massacred in Warsaw. There is not one Jew left in the entire district east of Poland, including occupied Russia. It is also reported, in this connection, that the entire non-Jewish population of Sebastopol was murdered. So as not to attract the attention of foreign countries, the butchering of the Jewish population in Poland was not done at one single time.

"(3) Jews deported from Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, and Slovakia are sent to be butchered, while Aryans deported to the East from Holland and France are genuinely used for work.

"(4) Inasmuch as butcherings of this kind would attract great attention in the west, they must first of all deport them to the East, where less opportunity is afforded to outsiders of knowing what is going on. During the last few weeks a large part of the Jewish population deported to Lithuania and Lublin has already been executed. That is probably the reason why the deportees were not permitted to have correspondence with any one. A great number of the German refugees were taken to Theresienstadt. This place, however, is only an interim station and the people there await the same fate.

¹² Domenico Tardini, Papal Under Secretary of State.

¹³ Despatch No. 114, September 15, 1942, not printed.

"(5) Arrangements are made for new deportations as soon as space is made by executions. Caravans of such deportees being transported in cattle cars are often seen. There are about forty people in each cattle car. It is especially significant to note that Lithuanian non-Jews are entrusted with fetching the candidates from the death Ghetto in Warsaw.

"(6) It is a tragedy that the Polish population is being incited by the Germans against the Jews and the relationship between the Poles and the Jews has been aggravated to the last degree. In Lemberg this is particularly true."

I should much appreciate it if Your Eminence could inform me whether the Vatican has any information that would tend to confirm the reports contained in this memorandum. If so, I should like to know whether the Holy Father has any suggestions as to any practical manner in which the forces of civilized public opinion could be utilized in order to prevent a continuation of these barbarities.

I avail [etc.]

[TAYLOR]

740.00116 European War 1939/642

Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the President's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State

No. 117

VATICAN CITY, October 6, 1942.

[Received November 2.]

SIR: With reference to my telegrams nos. 161 of September 29 and 166 of October 6,¹⁶ as well as to my despatch no. 114 of September 15,¹⁷ reporting the progress of the initiative of the Brazilian Ambassador to the Holy See in endeavoring to persuade the Pope to condemn publicly Nazi atrocities against the civil populations in the areas occupied by the Germans, I have the honor to transmit herewith the texts,¹⁷ in the Spanish language, of the first person Notes on the subject which were addressed to the Cardinal Secretary of State by the Peruvian Ambassador and the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires on September 17 and 23, respectively.

It would appear that M. Accioly's efforts are having the full and active support of the Jesuits. . . .

I understand that the Pope is giving careful consideration to the matter and the general impression is that he will say something at an opportune moment. Opinion in the Vatican seems to be divided as to the wisdom of the Accioly *démarche*. . . .

¹⁶ Neither printed.

¹⁷ Not printed.

The Holy See is still apparently convinced that a forthright denunciation by the Pope of Nazi atrocities, at least in so far as Poland is concerned, would only result in the violent deaths of many more people. Mgr. Montini,¹⁸ however, stated to me that the time may come when, in spite of such a grievous prospect, the Holy Father will feel himself obliged to speak out.

In addition to the reasons enumerated in my despatch no. 109 of September 8, 1942,¹⁹ another motive, possibly the controlling one, behind the Pope's disinclination to denounce Nazi atrocities is his fear that if he does so now, the German people, in the bitterness of their defeat, will reproach him later on for having contributed, if only indirectly, to this defeat. It has been pointed out to me that just such an accusation was directed against the Holy See by the Germans after the last war, because of certain phrases spoken and attitudes adopted by Benedict XV while hostilities were in progress. When it is borne in mind that Pius XII had many years of conditioning in Germany, it will not seem unnatural that he should be particularly sensible to this particular argument.

Respectfully yours,

HAROLD H. TITTMANN

7400.00116 European War 1939/605 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 16, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 10:14 a. m.]

4675. From Tittmann. 169, October 10. Department's telegram 2235, September 23, and my 163, September 29.²⁰ For the Under Secretary. Holy See replied today to Mr. Taylor's letter²¹ regarding the predicament of the Jews in Poland in an informal and unsigned statement handed me by the Cardinal Secretary of State. After thanking Ambassador Taylor for bringing the matter to the attention of the Holy See the statement says that reports of severe measures taken against non-Aryans have also reached the Holy See from other sources but that up to the present time it has not been possible to verify the accuracy thereof. However, the statement adds it is well known that the Holy See is taking advantage of every opportunity offered in order to mitigate the suffering of non-Aryans.

I regret that Holy See could not have been more helpful but it was evident from the attitude of the Cardinal that it has no practical suggestions to make. I think it is perhaps likely that the belief is held

¹⁸ Giovanni Montini, Papal Under Secretary of State.

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ Neither printed.

²¹ Letter of September 26, p. 775.

that there is little hope of checking Nazi barbarities by any method except that of physical force coming from without. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE VATICAN WITH RESPECT TO THE VATICAN'S RECEIVING A DIPLOMATIC MISSION FROM JAPAN

701.9466A/2 : Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 9, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 3: 13 p. m.]

460. Following from Tittmann.²² No. 20, February 6. The Cardinal Secretary of State²³ called me to his office on February 4 to inform me that Japan had decided upon the immediate establishment of a diplomatic mission near the Holy See and that the latter had agreed. He said that the agreement [*agrément?*] for the Chief of Mission had not yet been requested but thought that the request would be made any day now [apparent omission] long considered such a step; that they had apparently decided that this was the opportune moment; but that decision at this time had been entirely unexpected by the Holy See. Cardinal Maglione added that he wanted me to have this information before it was announced publicly but asked me to keep it to myself as he was not informing other members of the Diplomatic Corps with the exception of the British Minister.

When I heard the news I could not help making a wry face and said that I did not think it would go down well at home. The Cardinal replied that he naturally could understand our reaction but that the Holy See had not been in a position to refuse. He pointed out that there was a Papal Delegate in Tokyo, an Archbishopric and a number of Bishoprics throughout Japan.

When I saw the Cardinal again later I remarked that it was obviously a war move on Japan's part and that I wondered whether by the same token the Holy See was prepared to see representatives of other countries accredited here, for example the Russians. He laughed and said "At any rate those gentlemen have not asked so far".

Monsignor Montini²⁴ said that the Japanese request had fallen on the Holy See like a *coup de foudre*. Nevertheless, he could see how closer diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Japan might prove beneficial to the interests of the Church, since an increasing number of Catholics were coming under the domination of that country. Incidentally, he remarked that Roman Catholic interests in

²² Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to Myron C. Taylor, President Roosevelt's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII. Mr. Tittmann was in charge of affairs while Mr. Taylor was in the United States.

²³ Luigi Maglione.

²⁴ Giovanni Montini, Papal Under Secretary of State.

Japan and Japanese-occupied territories were more important than in Russia at the present time. Furthermore, the Church had been attacked in Russia, while in Japan it had been tolerated so far. [Tittmann.]

HUDDLE

701.9466A/2 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1942—8 p. m.

469. Your 460, February 9, 1 p. m. For Tittmann. It is apparent to us that one of the principal objectives which the Japanese hope to accomplish by the establishment of a mission to the Holy See is to influence Catholic sentiment, particularly in the American Republics and to some extent in China and the Philippines.

In your conversations with Vatican officials you may wish to bring this to their attention.

HULL

701.9466A/41

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1942.

Monsignor Vagnozzi,²⁵ Auditor of the Apostolic Delegation, called upon me this afternoon at his request.

Monsignor Vagnozzi informed me that the Apostolic Delegate²⁶ had been obliged to leave the city and had requested Monsignor Vagnozzi to see me in his stead.

Monsignor Vagnozzi handed me the attached memorandum.²⁷ When I had read the memorandum I said that I felt it necessary to state with all of the emphasis of which I was capable and with the utmost sincerity that I felt that this decision on the part of the Holy See was deplorable in as much as, in my judgment, it would create a profound reaction on the part of the people of the United States and a similar reaction on the part of the people in many other countries including all of the United Nations.

I said that at the very moment when the Japanese were committing unspeakable atrocities on the civilian populations throughout the regions they were now ravaging, when in the Philippines they had desecrated and violated churches and Catholic communities, and when the announced purpose of Japan's military leaders was to drive the

²⁵ Egidio Vagnozzi.

²⁶ Archbishop Amleto Giovanni Cicognani.

²⁷ *Infra*.

influence of the white race from the Far East, including, obviously and principally, the influence of Christianity among the populations of Asia, for the Holy See for the first time in its history to receive a diplomatic mission from Japan seemed to me an incredible step.

Monsignor Vagnozzi evidently agreed with me *in toto*. He said he feared a disastrous effect on public opinion in this country.

I said he was by no means understating the case. I said that I hoped, if it was not already too late, that the Holy Father and the Cardinal Secretary of State would reconsider this matter.

Monsignor Vagnozzi went on to say that the step had been taken by the Vatican upon the urgent recommendations of the Apostolic Delegate in Tokyo and members of the hierarchy in occupied China who insisted that if the agreement of the Vatican was not given, Catholic Japanese and particularly Catholic Chinese would be massacred by the thousands and missions and churches would be destroyed.

I said I had no evidence, judging from the history of the past few years, that measures of appeasement of this character would have the slightest effect.

I said that I would like to have an opportunity of talking with the Apostolic Delegate after his return to Washington and that as soon as he was well enough, I would be glad to call upon him.

Monsignor Vagnozzi told me that he would communicate to the Vatican by telegram the views which I had expressed to him.

S[UMNER]. W[ELLES]

701.9466A/43

The Apostolic Delegation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

Prompted by the recent reports of the press in the United States that Japan was about to send a diplomatic mission to the Holy See, the Apostolic Delegation requested information on the matter from the Secretariate of State.

A reply has now been received from His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, and he has directed that its content be communicated confidentially to the Government of the United States.

The Government of Japan as early as 1922 had indicated to the Holy See its desire to send there a diplomatic mission. In view of the vast missionary interests of the Catholic Church in the Japanese Empire the Holy See gave its approval to this project. However, no conclusion was ever reached in the matter due to the marked opposition of Japanese Buddhists.

Notwithstanding this opposition the Government of Japan did not relinquish the plan, and on various occasions expressed its desire to

send a diplomatic mission to the Holy See. In August, 1939 and again very recently, through the Apostolic Delegation in Tokyo, the same desire was repeated, and the Government of Japan proposed to send an Envoy Extraordinary to the Holy See, to be replaced at a later date by a regular mission.

The Holy See confirmed its previously given approval, but up to the present no name has been presented by the Japanese Government for the *agrément* of the Vatican.

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1942.

701.9466A/6 : Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 6, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received 11:07 p. m.]

927. Following from Tittmann. 35, March 5. Department's telegram No. 469, February 17. In discussing the subject matter of the Department's telegram with Monsignor Tardini²⁸ he began by saying that as a general rule countries established missions at the Holy See because it was in their interest to do so and for no other reason. He agreed that it was not unlikely that among the motives behind the Japanese decision was the desire to influence Catholic sentiment in their favor wherever their interests might be involved. He added, however, that the reverse of the [apparent omission] was that the establishment of the Japanese mission would provide the Holy See with additional machinery through which attempts could be made to exert a moderating influence on the Japanese in areas under their control especially where occidentals were residing.

Incidentally I understand that the Holy See has heard nothing more so far of Japanese intentions regarding the mission. [Tittmann.]

HUDDLE

701.9466A/8½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1942.

The Apostolic Delegate called this evening to see me at his request.

Archbishop Cicognani said that immediately after his return to Washington he had been informed by Monsignor Vagnozzi of my conversation with him regarding the report that the Vatican had agreed to accept a diplomatic mission from Japan. The Delegate stated that he had immediately sent a very full report by telegram to

²⁸ Domenico Tardini, Papal Under Secretary of State.

the Holy See and added that he had expressed in the strongest and most vigorous terms his complete agreement with the opinions and statements which I had expressed.

I went over with the Delegate the considerations which I had mentioned in my conversation with Monsignor Vagnozzi. I then said I wished the Delegate to know that I had discussed this whole question with the President only today. The President had asked me to let the Delegate know that when he had read this report he had found it completely impossible to credit it. He said that knowing the Holy Father personally as he did, and having had the opportunity of knowing the views, the policies, and the beliefs of the Holy Father as he did, it was to him completely incredible that the Vatican at this time could agree to receive an Ambassador from Japan.

Archbishop Cicognani said that he was very happy indeed to have this message from the President which he would also transmit by urgent cable to the Holy See.

The Archbishop asked that his name not be used in this connection, but that Mr. Tittmann be instructed to make as forceful and emphatic representations as possible to the Cardinal Secretary of State. He stressed particularly the importance of Tittmann speaking with Monsignor Tardini in this light. The Archbishop said he was profoundly disturbed and utterly unable to comprehend any justifiable reason for the step which apparently had been agreed upon by the Vatican.

The Archbishop took occasion to say that in his recent trip to the west he had personally conferred with Archbishop Beckmann of Dubuque, Iowa, the Bishop of Fort Wayne, and Archbishop Curley of Baltimore, for the purpose of making it clear to them that in the opinion of the Holy See they should immediately refrain from making any further public utterances which tended to create disunity in the United States and to lessen in any way popular support of the policies of the Administration.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

701.9466A/16

Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the President's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State

No. 57

VATICAN CITY, March 6, 1942.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch dated March 2, 1942,²⁹ which my British Colleague³⁰ sent to his Government. The reaction of the latter (of which, I believe, the Department is aware) to the report that the Holy See had agreed to the

²⁹ Not printed.

³⁰ Francis D. G. Osborne, British Minister to the Vatican.

appointment of a Japanese Representative here has prompted Mr. Osborne to explain briefly some of the difficulties with which the Vatican is faced in endeavoring to maintain "a precarious equilibrium outside of and above the war." In this I believe Mr. Osborne has succeeded admirably.

The impression seems to have prevailed in London that this was another instance in which the Holy See yielded to pressure from the Axis powers. Mr. Osborne states in his despatch that he is satisfied that the Axis powers had nothing to do with the Japanese initiative. It is clear to me that, in any event, the German Embassy to the Holy See must have been uninformed with regard thereto. (See my telegram No. 35 of March 5th.)³¹ Such evidence as there is, therefore, points to Japan's having played a lone hand.

It is difficult to see how the Holy See could have refused the Japanese request. By virtue of its acknowledged universality and its mission of peace and good will toward all alike, the door cannot very well be closed to any particular State seeking to establish diplomatic relations with it. Although the Cardinal Secretary of State did not say so in so many words, I gathered the impression during my informal conversations with him that the establishment of a Soviet diplomatic mission to the Holy See would not be unwelcome here at this time. Perhaps it is felt that with the addition of Japan the weight of Axis representation would tip the scales too far in one direction and that in the interests of the Holy See itself an Allied counterbalance would be desirable. I remember also that Monsignor Montini, one of the Under Secretaries of State, told me recently that he personally thought that Soviet representation might be acceptable, especially if Stalin could thereby be persuaded to adopt a more moderate attitude toward religion.

The difficulty, I suppose, would be to interest the Soviet Government in such a proposition. My British Colleague suggests China instead as a more practicable possibility and an obvious answer to the Japanese initiative, although, of course, not nearly so effective at the present time.

Very respectfully yours,

HAROLD H. TITTMANN

701.9466A/8a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle)

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1942—9 p. m.

640. Following for Tittmann. The whole question of a Japanese Embassy to the Holy See has been discussed with the President who

³¹ See telegram No. 927, March 6, 10 p. m., from the Chargé in Switzerland, p. 781.

found the report difficult to credit, knowing the Holy Father, as he does, and having had the opportunity of knowing his views, policies and beliefs. You should immediately seek an interview with the Cardinal Secretary of State to inform him of the President's views and to make the most emphatic and forceful representations, if you have not already done so, along the lines of the Department's No. 609 of March 6, 2 p. m. to Bern.³²

WELLES

701.9466A/9½

The Apostolic Delegation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

In further reference to the matter of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Japan, this Apostolic Delegation has been directed by His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, to furnish the Government of the United States with more detailed explanation of the principles and particular reasons that have induced the Holy See to take such steps.

As was intimated in the Memorandum of March 3, 1942, the present attitude of the Holy See is nothing more than a confirmation of the answer regarding diplomatic relations with Japan given as far back as 1922. If no conclusion was reached at that time it was due to opposition in Japan. The project was again seriously discussed in 1939. Now the Japanese Government, enjoying special powers, has renewed such request, and the Holy See could not contradict its previous adherence to the plan, especially lest a negative reply be interpreted as a mark of political partiality.

The presence in the Vatican of missions of various belligerent countries which are at war with each other, does not diminish but rather emphasizes the strictest impartiality of the Holy See. In fact during the first World War, in the year 1914, a diplomatic mission of Great Britain was accepted by the Holy See after the outbreak of hostilities, and no difficulties were occasioned by this act.

It is obvious moreover, both in the present time of war, as in time of peace, that the presence of diplomatic missions in the Vatican from various nations of the world, does not signify approval by the Holy See of every action or attitude of the Nations sending such missions. Certainly the acceptance of these missions cannot legitimately be interpreted as an adherence of the Holy See to one or the other of the groups of nations engaged in the present conflict.

³² Not printed (701.9466A/6a); it gave the substance of Mr. Welles' conversation with Monsignor Vagnozzi covered in memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, March 3, p. 779.

From the practical point of view it must be admitted that the Holy See has vast interests in the Far East, and these she has the right and duty to safeguard by every available means. The missionary enterprises of the Catholic Church in the Far East are the fruits of centuries of sacrifice and blood of martyrs, and in the present circumstances the Holy See is faced with the alternative of either completely abandoning these fields or continuing by every legitimate means to foster these undertakings for the good of souls.

The relations of the Holy See with belligerent nations, as with those at peace, are most useful for its works of charity, and particularly for its constant efforts for peace, especially in seeking the collaboration of all nations for charitable enterprises and for the return of international concord.

The Holy See confidentially and as a mark of courtesy communicated to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States the answer given to the Government of Japan. To the great surprise of the Holy See this news appeared in the press of Switzerland on February 23, and again on March 3, the Reuter Agency published that the British Government would protest. In view of this publicity, any change in the attitude of the Holy See would certainly be interpreted as an adherence to the will of one of the belligerent groups, with the consequent lessening of her complete impartiality.

In presenting these further clarifications to the Government of the United States, the Holy See expresses the hope that both the general and particular motives above expressed will be fully appreciated, and if the occasion arises, made known to the authorities concerned, and also to the general public if need be, in the interest of truth, justice and harmony.

[WASHINGTON,] March 13, 1942.

701.9466A/10 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 19, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received March 19—6:21 p. m.]

1130. Following from Tittmann. 43, March 16. Department's 609, March 6, received March 10.³² In order that there might be no misunderstanding of our position regarding the matter of the Japanese mission to the Holy See, I thought it best to give the Cardinal Secretary of State in writing the substance of the statements made by the Acting Secretary to the Auditor of the Apostolic Delegation. I have also given him in writing the substance of the first sentence of Depart-

³² See footnote 32, p. 784.

ment's 640, March 10 (received March 14). At the same time in my conversation with him I left no doubt in his mind that we felt very strongly on the subject.

Cardinal said that he had already received much the same reports from the Delegation in Washington and that he was obliged to say frankly that he was unable to understand the lack of comprehension on our part of the position of the Holy See. He accordingly prepared for me a memorandum dated March 14 explaining this at some length.

I am forwarding the memorandum by air mail³⁴ since I understand that the Apostolic Delegate in Washington has already been instructed by telegraph to present most of the arguments contained therein. However, the last paragraph of memorandum states that the Vatican's reply to the proposals of the Japanese Government was communicated to the representatives of the United States and England confidentially and as a matter of courtesy; that it was made public in Switzerland February 23 last and by Reuter's Agency March 3, the latter adding that the Governments of London and Washington had protested to the Holy See. The memorandum concludes that as a result of this publicity which was certainly not due to Holy See a change in the attitude assumed by the Holy See with regard to diplomatic relations with Japan could be interpreted as yielding to the pressure of one group of countries now at war.

The following points were brought out in informal conversations with the Cardinal.

(1) On the subject of Japanese wartime atrocities the Cardinal stated that as much as he deplored them he did not have so far sufficient elements of proof at hand to enable him to pass judgment thereon or allow them to influence Holy See in the formulation of policy. In any event, he said, acceptance of a Japanese mission did not imply in any way approval of everything the Japanese are doing.

(2) The question as to whether efforts on the part of the Holy See to protect Catholic interests on Japanese territory which were purely spiritual were worthwhile or not, should, he thought, be left to judgment of Holy See which has had long experience in spiritual affairs.

(3) The Cardinal also referred with some heat to the publicity given in London to the Japanese initiative. He said that the initiative could not be scotched through publicity; on the contrary it was now more than ever out of the question to refuse the Japanese request since it had been generally taken for granted by the public that the British and American representatives to the Holy See had protested.

(4) I noticed some stiffening, possibly as a result of publicity, in the Cardinal's attitude since my telegram No. 20 of February 6³⁵

³⁴ Despatch No. 61, March 18, 1942, not printed.

³⁵ See telegram No. 460, February 9, 1 p. m., from the Chargé in Switzerland, p. 778.

and my despatch No. 57 of March 6 toward the suggestion that the Soviet Government might wish to be represented at the Holy See to offset the Japanese initiative. He now states that such representation would be acceptable only if and when the Holy See were satisfied that Soviet doctrine and methods in religious matters had been revised.

(5) The Cardinal stated to me that it was his opinion that Germany had not been forewarned of Japanese intentions and that there was every indication that Japan had played a lone hand. Another highly placed Vatican official expressed his conviction that Germany was definitely opposed to Japanese representation here and that the Germans were inventing and circulating all sorts of stories some of which they were [apparent omission] specially to the press with a view to preventing it. According to this official, Germany was for one thing apprehensive lest Japan learn too much at the Vatican regarding Nazi religious policy.

(6) The Cardinal said that he had heard nothing more from the Japanese with regard to their intentions and that personally he earnestly hoped that he would not. The Holy See he said certainly would not solicit further action. I have learned indirectly that the Japanese Ambassador to Vichy had been designated as the first Japanese representative to the Holy See but that he died before his *agrément* had been formally requested. The difficulty in finding an available successor may have something to do with the continued silence on the part of the Japanese.

[Tittmann];
HARRISON

701.5666A/7

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1942.

The Minister of the Netherlands³⁶ called to see me this morning at his request.

I told the Minister that I had a matter of great urgency which I wished to take up with him. I explained to the Minister the background of the situation which had arisen as a result of the decision reached by the Vatican to accept a diplomatic mission from Japan. I stated that the President had asked me to let the Netherlands Government know that he hoped both the Netherlands and Chinese as well as the Australian Governments would agree to enter into diplomatic relations with the Vatican immediately so that the acceptance by the Vatican of the Japanese diplomatic mission would be counterbalanced by the diplomatic representation of the United Nations mentioned. Furthermore, the President believed that it was highly probable that if this were done promptly, the Japanese in disgust would abandon the idea of sending a diplomatic mission to the Vatican. I added that in my judgment there was great urgency in the matter since I had

³⁶ Alexander Loudon.

reason to believe that the Japanese were preparing immediately to nominate one of their diplomats now in Europe as ambassador to the Vatican.

The Minister said that he himself favored the proposal and would transmit it urgently by cable to his Foreign Minister. He reminded me that in 1934 the Colijn Government in the Netherlands had been thrown out by the Netherlands Parliament on this very issue, namely, the Dutch people had refused to approve the idea of appointing a diplomatic mission to the Vatican. He said that up to the present moment the Netherlands Government had taken the position that it could not create new diplomatic missions since this step legitimately required the approval of the Netherlands Parliament.

I told the Minister that in my judgment the war situation necessarily changed considerations of this character. I said that in this country until three months ago there had been no representation of the United States at the Vatican since 1868.³⁷ I doubted if two years ago the Congress would have been willing to appropriate the amounts necessary for the expenses of a diplomatic mission to the Vatican. But I was equally sure that if the question were now put before the Congress the feeling in this country would be quite different. I expressed my earnest hope that the Netherlands Government would find it possible to adopt the suggestion made.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

701.5668A/2

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 25, 1942.

The Minister of the Netherlands called to see me this morning. The Minister informed me of the reply he had had from his Government with regard to the suggestion which I had made in our previous interview that the Netherlands undertake diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The Minister said that his Foreign Minister³⁸ had informed him that about a year ago the Netherlands Government had, of its own initiative, suggested to the Vatican the desirability of diplomatic relations and that at that time the Vatican had refused on some nominal pretext, apparently operating under the influence of the Italian Government. For these reasons the Netherlands Government is not willing to take any initiative in the matter at this time because of its belief that it cannot do so in view of this recent refusal on the part of the Vatican. Dr. van Kleffens stated, however, that if the United States Government ascertained informally that the Vatican

³⁷ For correspondence regarding the discontinuance of the American Legation in the Papal States, see *Foreign Relations*, 1867, pt. I, pp. 703-708.

³⁸ Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens.

would acquiesce in such a suggestion, the Netherlands Government would then be very glad to make a formal and official approach. I told the Minister that I should be very glad to take this matter up informally and find out what the reaction of the Vatican would be. I added that it had been my clear understanding that the Vatican would gladly accept a suggestion to this effect from the Netherlands Government.³⁹

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

121.866A/224 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1942—10 p. m.

804. For Tittmann. Your 48, March 23.⁴⁰ In the event of a private audience with the Pope in the near future, the President desires that you take the opportunity to reemphasize our deep-rooted objection to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan at this time for the reasons expressed in the Department's 609 and 640 of March 6 and March 10, respectively, to Bern.⁴¹ Moreover you should express to the Holy Father the hope of this Government that diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Governments of China and the Netherlands will be established as promptly as possible. For your information, I have had an opportunity during the last week to speak to representatives of these two Governments who agreed that such a step would be desirable at this time and who made recommendations in that sense to their respective Governments.

Is there any truth in report that Matsuoka ⁴² will be first Japanese Ambassador to the Vatican?

WELLES

701.9466A/21 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 30, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

1820. From Tittmann. 75, April 27. My 51, March 30.⁴⁰

1. The Japanese representative to the Holy See, Ken Harada, and Secretary of Legation, Kanayama, arrived in Rome April 24 and have

³⁹ Arrangements for establishing diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Netherlands Government were finally completed in August 1943, but because of the entry of German troops into Rome at about this time the appointment of a Netherlands Minister to the Vatican did not occur until June 1944.

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ Telegram No. 609 not printed.

⁴² Yosuke Matsuoka, former Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

already made informal calls. I understand from Vatican sources that although he holds rank of Minister and regards himself as an envoy extraordinary he is still awaiting indications from his Government as to the precise nature of his mission here. These he expects to receive within a few days after which he will be in a position to be received officially by the Holy Father. I am told under no circumstances will speeches be exchanged at the Papal audience.

2. Monsignor Montini tells me that Harada inquired of him whether there were any representatives here of a temporary character and that he replied in the affirmative pointing to my own case.

3. I took this occasion to reiterate to Monsignor Montini our profound displeasure that the Holy See should have accepted a Japanese Mission here just at this time and told him that in spite of reports to the contrary that he might have received from Washington I did not believe that this feeling had in the least abated. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

701.9466A/22 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 15, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received May 15—7:09 p. m.]

2103. From Tittmann. 86, May 12. My No. 75, April 27. Having heard from his Government with respect to his rank, Harada presented his credentials on May 9 to the Pope as Special Delegate of Japan with the rank of Ambassador. He was received with the honors due an Ambassador but without the usual formal discourses.

I understand Harada's wife and Kanayama, the secretary, are Catholics. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

701.9466A/25

Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the President's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State

No. 74

VATICAN CITY, May 22, 1942.

[Received June 15.]

SIR: In connection with the presentation by the Japanese Ambassador of his letters of credence (see my despatch no. 72 of May 15, 1942⁴⁴), I have the honor to inform the Department that I notice from the official account of the ceremony that he was received by the Pope in the Throne Room. I remembered that Ambassador

⁴⁴ Not printed.

Myron Taylor, on the contrary, was received in the Little Throne Room and thought it strange that this distinction should have been made, since both hold the rank of Ambassador and since their missions are similar in character in that they are regarded as temporary. I found an occasion to bring the matter informally to the attention of the Secretariat of State and asked for an explanation.

I have now received a reply from the Secretariat of State. It was explained that, while the protocol calls for the reception of Ambassadors in the Throne Room, the ceremonial authorities decided that some variation in procedure was appropriate in Ambassador Taylor's case since, unlike other Ambassadors, he does not represent his country, but rather the person of the President of the United States. Consequently the Little Throne Room was used. On the other hand, the Japanese Ambassador, although a Special Delegate, does represent the Japanese Empire and normal procedure was therefore followed in his case.

Monsignor Montini, in giving me this explanation, added that in other respects the honors shown Ambassador Taylor at the presentation of his credentials were "much more important" than those shown to the Japanese Ambassador. The Holy Father, he said, wished to have this made clear.

Respectfully yours,

HAROLD H. TITTMANN

APPEALS OF THE VATICAN TO THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY REFRAIN FROM BOMBING ROME

740.0011 European War 1939/19710

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1942.

The British Ambassador ⁴⁵ called to see me at his request.

The Ambassador said he had been instructed by his Government to give it his opinion of the effect which would be created in the United States were the British to undertake to bomb Rome. The Ambassador said that some correspondence had been proceeding between the British Government and the Pope and that the British Government had informed the Vatican that in as much as Rome was an Axis capital, and in as much as the Axis powers had mercilessly bombed the capital of England, the British would hold themselves free to bomb Rome at any time they saw fit. They had stated, however, that the Vatican would in no event be harmed and they sug-

⁴⁵ Viscount Halifax.

gested that the Vatican be marked in such a way as to make bombing from the air by mishap or mistake less likely.

The Ambassador said that he was going to reply to his Government that he feared the effect upon public opinion in the United States would be unfortunate in its results.

I told the Ambassador that it would most decidedly be unfortunate if through some mistake the Vatican were harmed or any of the outstanding churches in Rome were destroyed. I said that if by luck Rome were bombed, however, and no damage was done to objects of peculiar veneration on the part of Catholics in this country, I did not believe the effect would be harmful.

The Ambassador also told me that the British Government had protested strongly to the Vatican with regard to the expressed willingness of the latter to receive an emissary from Japan.⁴⁶

I told the Ambassador that the views of this Government on that subject had likewise been communicated informally to the Vatican by the American Chargé d'Affaires.

The Ambassador handed me the memorandum containing an instruction sent by the British Government to their representative at the Vatican with regard to Japanese representation at the Holy See. This is attached herewith.⁴⁷

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/26292

*Memorandum for President Roosevelt of a Telephone Message From the President's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII (Taylor)*⁴⁸

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1942.

Mr. Myron Taylor telephoned the following message from Palm Beach, Florida:

"In our last discussion regarding the bombing of Rome and the civilian population outside of military and munitions centers, you suggested an independent course of action subject to your consultation with our own military command. If you could now instruct me to make that clear to the Pope, in confidence, it would have a far-reaching effect and would prevent embarrassment for continuing uncertainty. It would further improve the position we now have with the Vatican, with the Italian people, and with those segments of the

⁴⁶ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 778 ff.

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ President Roosevelt in a memorandum dated December 1 requested the Secretary of State to prepare a reply to Mr. Taylor.

Italian Government, and there are many who would welcome a change of Government.

It is obvious to me that time is essential in this matter and that we should reinforce our efforts in parallel action with the Pope and that the ties between Italy, Spain and Portugal will be strengthened in our favor."

740.0011 European War 1939/26292

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of December 1, 1942, I enclose a draft letter to Mr. Myron Taylor⁴⁹ for your signature in response to his message of November 30 in which he suggested that you instruct him to let His Holiness the Pope know, in confidence, that the United States will follow an independent course regarding the bombing of Rome and the civilian population outside of military and munitions centers.

Mr. Taylor refers in his message to consultation on this subject between you and our Military Command. I have not felt myself in a position to discuss his message in any way with the War Department and I do not know whether you have discussed the question with our Military Command. I invite your particular attention to this draft reply which expresses my own view that it would be inadvisable for us to adopt an independent course from that of our principal associate in the war. It seems to me that if we disagree with the policy of the British Government in regard to the bombing in Italy, we should communicate with them and endeavor to reach a meeting of minds and a common policy.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/26326a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1942.

6119. From Myron Taylor. Please telegraph care of the Under Secretary as full a statement as possible from your recollection of my conversation with the Prime Minister⁵⁰ with respect to bombings and my request that he make a statement concerning Rome and non-combatant civilians. [Myron Taylor.]

HULL

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Winston Churchill.

740.0011 European War 1939/26324 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 8, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received December 8—6:20 p. m.]

6952. To the Under Secretary. — Your telegram number 6119 December 3. In this message addressed to me Ambassador Taylor asked me to reply to you with as full a statement as possible from my recollection of his conversation with the Prime Minister regarding bombing and his request that the Prime Minister issue a statement concerning the bombing of non-combatant civilians and the bombing of Rome.

These conversations took place at a dinner on October 5th at which Mr. and Mrs. Churchill, their oldest and youngest daughters, Mr. Taylor and myself were present. Part of the conversation took place when I was out of the room. I took no notes at the time and am therefore dependent on my memory as to what was said on this occasion.

We were discussing Mr. Taylor's trip to the Vatican and I felt that he convinced the Prime Minister of the genuine friendliness of the Vatican to the United Nations cause. Mr. Taylor will remember that because of the personal character of the information he brought from the Vatican he asked that the conversation be kept confidential. During the conversation Mr. Taylor asked the Prime Minister to exclude Rome from bombing. The Prime Minister said that he felt unable to commit himself on this issue. Mr. Taylor then tried to persuade the Prime Minister to make a public statement limiting bombing to military objectives. This again Mr. Churchill seemed to feel it impossible to do. Mr. Churchill explained that he recognized that night bombing does not lend itself to accurate bombing of military objectives only and he did not therefore feel it would be honest to state that night bombing would be confined to military objectives only. He felt that he could not order the discontinuance of night bombing. Both men argued their points eloquently and with great sincerity. Sitting listening to them I could not help thinking of General Sherman's statement that "war is hell".

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/26787½

Memorandum by the President's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII (Taylor) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1942.

The Apostolic Delegate⁵¹ telephoned me this morning and I called upon him. He has a further inquiry from the Vatican in respect to the question of bombing Rome, indicating impatience at the Vatican because we have not definitely communicated to the Holy See the suggestions which you and Archbishop Spellman⁵² and myself have discussed with the President. He is indicating in his reply that the matter is receiving active attention requiring consultation with the Allied Command and the British. I made no definite statement but did express the hope that some policy might be evolved, but whatever it is, future conduct would have to be governed by the eventualities of the war, and further that Italy should not provoke such an attack by any act of her own.

M[YRON] C. T[AYLOR]

740.0011 European War 1939/26517 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 14, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received December 15—9:40 a. m.]

5874. From Tittmann.⁵³ No. 208, December 11. Cardinal Secretary of State⁵⁴ told me today that in view of the Holy Father's concern regarding the possibility that the city of Rome might be bombed he had formally recommended to the Italian Government that military objectives within the city limits be transferred elsewhere in order to remove pretexts for bombing. Cardinal Maglione added that while he had not yet received written assurances from the Italian Government that his recommendations would be followed, there nevertheless were indications that the transfer was actually in the process of being carried out. When I asked him whether he thought that this meant that Rome might eventually be declared an "open city" he replied rather vaguely "perhaps something to that effect".

Cardinal said that he wished to communicate the foregoing to myself and my British colleague only and asked that it be kept confidential for the time being. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

⁵¹ Archbishop Amleto Giovanni Cicognani.⁵² Francis Joseph Spellman, Archbishop of New York.⁵³ Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to Myron C. Taylor, President Roosevelt's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII. Mr. Tittmann was in charge of affairs while Mr. Taylor was in the United States.⁵⁴ Cardinal Luigi Maglione.

740.0011 European War 1939/26591: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 18, 1942—noon.

[Received December 18—3:48 p. m.]

5984. From Tittmann. No. 209, December 14. My 208, December 11. Cardinal Secretary of State called me to his office this morning to say that the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See⁵⁵ had yesterday given him orally the official assurances of the Italian Government that the Italian Supreme Command together with Mussolini and the General Staff will leave Rome and transfer their residence elsewhere. Cardinal Maglione then asked the Italian Ambassador where [whether?] there were any German commands in Rome because if there were, these, he said, would have to leave as well. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but that he would make the necessary inquiries and inform the Cardinal of the results. Cardinal said he would advise me as soon as he heard from the Italian Ambassador on this point. Cardinal asked me to transmit the foregoing information, which he had also given to my British colleague,⁵⁶ to my Government. With regard to railway station and yards in Rome through which German troops and material were continually passing on their way south, Cardinal said that rail communications could be as, if not more, effectively interrupted outside the city.

The purpose of Holy See's approach to the Italian Government, the Cardinal said, was to save its own property in Rome and also many churches and religious monuments and institutions by the removal from the city of military objectives which might offer pretexts for its bombardment.

I asked the Cardinal again whether this step meant that Rome would come to be regarded as an "open city". He replied that he did not know but what he could say was that the Italians had given no assurances that Rome would not be defended if the Allies were to [effect?] a landing, say at Ostia. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/26772

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] December 21 [20?], 1942.

I informed Mr. Hayter⁵⁷ with reference to the attached conditions relating to the proposal to refrain from bombing Rome that I had had

⁵⁵ Raffaele Guariglia.⁵⁶ Francis D. G. Osborne, British Minister to the Vatican.⁵⁷ W. G. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

an extensive conversation with the Secretary of State who made the following points:

1. The question had been personally handled by the President, but in his interpretation of the President's position the Secretary was not prepared to agree to anything in the nature of an ultimatum. It was doubtful whether the Italians had the power to agree and force the Germans to leave. If the ultimatum was not accepted we would then be in a position either of having made an empty threat or being forced to bomb Rome. The implications of the latter and its effect upon the war effort might be serious in the extreme.

2. I reminded Mr. Hayter that at the request of the British Government we issued a statement concerning Albania,⁵⁸ which as a result of such Greek pressure had to be so emasculated that it would have been better if no statement at all had been issued.

3. In summarizing the American Government's position it might be stated in brief that it would say nothing that gave the appearance of an ultimatum but felt that if this aspect were removed we should like an opportunity of discussing certain phases of the problems with the British.

Following are proposed conditions in return for which His Majesty's Government will be prepared to give an undertaking to refrain from bombing Rome:

[Here follow five conditions listed in memorandum by the Secretary of State, printed *infra*.]

740.0011 European War 1939/26908

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request and took up the question of the proposed or possible bombardment of Rome by the United Nations, especially Great Britain and the United States. The Ambassador went over the following points raised by the British Government in conversation with Mr. Atherton yesterday;⁵⁹ that if the following conditions were acceded to and carried out accordingly, Rome would not be bombed:

1. The King of Italy, the head of the Government, the Government officers, Italian High Command and Military Staff must leave Rome.

2. All German organizations including military mission, Naval Liaison Staff, airmen, civilian officials, members of German air transport company (Italuft), German staff at Rome air fields must leave Rome.

3. Area of Rome for this purpose will have to be defined exactly.

⁵⁸ See statement by the Secretary of State, Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1942, p. 998.

⁵⁹ See memorandum *supra*.

4. Evacuation will have to be verified by Swiss officials who must be given facilities to see that the undertakings are fully carried out and kept.

5. A time limit will have to be set for the completion of the evacuation.

The Ambassador offered some comment in support of the British position in this regard.

I thereupon said that this Government has been approaching this matter the other way around, so to speak. Instead of presenting what is really an ultimatum as to the evacuation from Rome of all military agencies, including the King, the German officials and others, this Government feels and has so indicated to the Vatican and others that we do not want to bomb Rome or see it bombed. We have at the same time inquired why Italians and those at the Vatican who do not want Rome bombed are not proceeding to cause objectionable military agencies, properties and interests cleared out from Rome before making pointed and unqualified requests that Rome be not bombed. Attention is then called to the fact that the United Nations are moving along the Mediterranean coast of the African continent from the east and west; and that many of them, like Great Britain, have been and are being bombed to the limit of endurance in the most inhuman, uncivilized and unauthorized manner, and so the United Nations must fight to make certain their supreme purpose to win the war. I said that instead of an ultimatum in effect, this Government prefers to keep alive all of its rights with respect to the possible bombing of Rome and in the meantime from week to week inquire of those opposing such bombing why they are not more fully and more actively paving the way for their objective by causing a removal from Rome of objectionable agencies and interests, as heretofore stated.

740.0011 European War 1939/26648

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have now received from the Foreign Office their reactions to the message which you sent to me through Mr. Atherton on Sunday⁶⁰ on the subject of the bombing of Rome. When sending off this telegram the Foreign Office had not yet received my report of our conversation of yesterday morning.

The Foreign Office do not altogether agree with what they understood to be your feeling that if the Italians, whether or not as a result of German pressure, refused the terms which we propose to them it would then be logically necessary for us to bomb Rome. In their

⁶⁰ December 20.

opinion we should, in the case of such refusal, be in exactly the same position that we were in before the Vatican approached us in the matter. That is to say, we should be free to bomb Rome if and when we considered it militarily advisable.

The British Government's view has all along been that while maintaining our right to bomb Rome at any time we should in fact carefully choose our moment for such action. This, they have always thought if they did it, would probably be when the collapse of Italian resistance seemed imminent. Even then they might undertake it only if it was felt that the effect would be decisive in breaking Italian morale and resistance.

If the Italians themselves refused our terms we should explain the position to the world, laying the blame for any future bombing of Rome squarely on the shoulders of the Fascist Government. If the Italians refused under German pressure, most effective play could be made of the fact that the Germans alone were responsible and to blame for the breakdown of negotiations.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that there is much to gain and nothing to lose by putting forward to the Italian authorities the conditions which they had previously suggested.

They suggest that the area of Rome for this purpose should be defined as being within a radius of three miles of the Palazzo Venezia. We should also have to stipulate that this area should not be used as a base or channel of military supplies in connexion with operations.

I pass on to you this expression of the thought of His Majesty's Government to which you will no doubt give consideration.⁶¹ But it is, as I have already said, prior to their receiving my report of our talk yesterday morning, in regard to which you were good enough to promise me a short note for transmission to London.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

740.0011 European War 1939/26724: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 26, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 4:50 p. m.]

6143. From Tittmann. 211, December 22. My 209, December 14.⁶² Cardinal Secretary of State informed me today that the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See on December 18 gave him verbal assur-

⁶¹ On December 26 the Secretary of State sent a note to Ambassador Halifax in which he quoted his memorandum of December 21, printed *supra*, and added that his attitude remained the same.

⁶² See telegram No. 5984, December 18, noon, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 796.

ances that the German Headquarters Staffs would also leave Rome and transfer their residence elsewhere. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/26811 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 29, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 6:14 p. m.]

6198. From Tittmann. 213, December 25. Reference my 208, December 11, 209, December 14, and 211, December 20 [22]. My British colleague has informed me that he has received a telegram from London which has announced the Apostolic Delegate in London has approached the Foreign Office with a proposition from the Holy See to the effect that the Italians would be willing to remove military objectives from Rome in return for assurances on the part of the Allies that the city would not be bombed. Since both Osborne and myself had understood from the Cardinal Secretary of State that the action of the Italian Government to favor unilateral parity involved no proposition, that no reply was even expected, and that the removal was in fact already taking place, Osborne took the matter up again with the Cardinal yesterday and received confirmation that our understanding of the matter was the correct one. The Cardinal told Osborne that further instructions would be sent to Apostolic Delegate in London to rectify misapprehension upon which the Foreign Office telegram was apparently based. I am reporting the foregoing because I understand that the telegram in question was repeated to the British Ambassador in Washington with instructions to discuss the matter with the Department with a view to formulating a reply.

My own impression is that in approaching the Italian Government and ourselves the Holy See wished to do everything possible to protect Rome as the seat of the Church from devastation and to prepare way for a solemn protest on the part of the Pope in case the city is bombed. I hardly believe there was any intention of opening negotiations on the subject of bombing between Italy and the Allies through the intermediary of the Holy See. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

YUGOSLAVIA

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING DISUNITY AMONG YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE FORCES

701.60H11/252a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister to the Yugoslav Government
in Exile (Biddle), at London*

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1942—4 p. m.

9. From the Under Secretary. Your Yugoslav Series 4, December 31, 11 p. m.¹ Increasingly frequent reports have come to me of intrigues for the removal of Fotitch² from Washington. I hope you will make it clear in every appropriate way that Fotitch has an exceptional position in Washington where he has gained the confidence and respect of all of us. From the standpoint of the best interests of Yugoslavia, I believe that his replacement at this time would be highly prejudicial. [Welles.]

HULL

701.60H11/253 : Telegram

*The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 5, 1942—10 p. m.

[Received January 5—7:30 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series [No.] 1. For the Under Secretary. Your No. 9, January 2, 4 p. m. Foreign Minister Nintitch³ tells me intrigues for Fotitch's removal are traceable mainly to Croatian extremists in the United States and considerable pressure even by open cables has been brought to bear on Croat element in the Yugoslav Government. He therefore welcomed your confirmation of his own high opinion of Fotitch and said he would see to it that Fotitch was not removed.

[BIDDLE]

¹ Not printed.

² Constantin Fotitch, Yugoslav Minister.

³ Momčilo Ninčić.

860H.01/379

The Secretary of State to the Yugoslav Minister (Fotitch)

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1942.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of February 9, 1942 ⁴ referring to a case ⁵ now pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York involving the establishment of certain facts regarding the status of the relations between the United States and the Government of Yugoslavia.

In compliance with your request, I confirm to you herewith that the Government of the United States continues to recognize the Royal Government of Yugoslavia, now temporarily established at London, as the legal Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and that the diplomatic and consular officers of Yugoslavia in the United States are recognized by this Government in the full exercise of their functions in this country; further, that you, Constantin Fotitch, are duly accredited as the representative of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the United States, with the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
SUMNER WELLES

740.00116 European War 1939/492

The Yugoslav Minister (Fotitch) to the Secretary of State

No. 271

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1942.

MR. SECRETARY: I am instructed by the Royal Yugoslav Government to invite your attention to an order issued by the authorities of German-occupied Belgrade on April 2, 1942 demanding that General Draža Mihajlović ⁶ and the officers of his staff commanding the Yugoslav armed forces fighting in Serbia surrender at the nearest police station within five days and warning that non-compliance with this order will result in the apprehension of members of their families who will be held as hostages and responsible for any activity of the persons mentioned in the order.

This warning applies also to all other persons having any contact with, or assisting the campaign of General Mihajlović. The families of such persons are to be held in reprisal and their property is to be confiscated.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ *Fields vs. Predionica I Tkanica A. D.*, vol. 31, N. Y. Supplement, 2d series, p. 739.

⁶ Yugoslav Minister of War and leader of the Chetnik forces of resistance in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government in London is aware of the cruel fate which awaits the families and friends of the gallant men who are courageously fighting for the liberation of their country and for the victory of the Allied cause. In these already devastated and blood-drenched regions of Europe Germany is trying once more to perpetrate cruel crimes against a freedom-loving people and to break their spirit by ruthless terror. Our people are thus to suffer another tragic blow which cannot be justified by any law known to civilized humanity or excused by the bitterness of war.

My Government respectfully asks that these inhuman methods so ruthlessly applied by our common enemy and the invader of our homeland be publicly condemned by the Government and people of the United States.

In protesting with the strongest indignation against this new outburst of German brutality, the Yugoslav Government would welcome it if the allied Government of the United States, fighting together for the cause of freedom, were to declare, in response to these orders by German and German-controlled authorities, that any persons issuing or executing such orders will be considered as outlaws and judged and condemned as such after the successful conclusion of the war.

I am enclosing the list,⁷ so far published, of the officers who have been asked to surrender.

Please accept [etc.]

CONSTANTIN FOTITCH

740.00116 European War 1939/492

The Secretary of State to the Yugoslav Minister (Fotitch)

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1942.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of April 13 in which you place on record the protest of the Royal Yugoslav Government with respect to the order of the authorities now in control at Belgrade, demanding the surrender of General Draža Mihajlović and his staff, and announcing, in the event of non-compliance, that their families will be taken as hostages, and further that the families of other persons having contact with, or rendering assistance to the campaign of General Mihajlović will be held in reprisal, and their property held subject to confiscation.

The position of this Government with respect to the taking of hostages has already been made known. This barbarous practice as a German method of warfare was stigmatized in a declaration made public by the President of the United States on October 25, 1941,⁸

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ For text of declaration, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1941, p. 317.

which in turn was cited, as your Government is aware, in the joint declaration recently signed at London by the representatives of nations whose territory is now under German tyranny, proclaiming to the world the resolve of outraged peoples that retribution would be exacted.

The Government and people of the United States have watched with admiration the resourceful and heroic operations of General Mihajlović and his men and are proud to acknowledge the contribution of Yugoslav patriots in the common struggle against the forces bent on the destruction of free nations throughout the world. The shocking proclamation to which your note has reference is but another of a series of savage and ruthless measures whereby German terrorism has sought to break the spirit of brave men.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
SUMNER WELLES

860H.00/1404½

*King Peter II of Yugoslavia to President Roosevelt*⁹

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1942.

MR. PRESIDENT: It is with a feeling of distress that I am transmitting to you the latest reports on conditions in Yugoslavia which have reached me from my Minister of War, General Draža Mihailovich. The duty of acquainting you with this tragic account of cruelties and persecutions perpetrated on my country is the more painful since it coincides with my departure from the United States where you, Mr. President, the Government and the people have extended to me the warmest hospitality and generous kindness which will for long remain in my grateful memory.

General Mihailovich reports on the crimes and massacres committed on the Serb population by Hungarians and Pavelić's¹⁰ regime. This report says that these crimes have now reached the point where the city authorities of Belgrade have officially forbidden swimming in the Sava and Danube rivers, because their waters, flowing through regions occupied by Hungary and Pavelić's government have become contaminated and infected by the massacred human bodies floating in their course. In Belgrade alone during the month of May 760 persons have been executed by the Germans without trial, explanation, or any apparent cause.

⁹ King Peter II was a visitor in the United States and Canada June 22-July 29, 1942.

¹⁰ Ante Pavelić, head of the "Independent State of Croatia", a puppet government of the Axis forces.

The Bulgarians, perhaps not entirely convinced of the final success of Axis arms, seemed at first more restrained in committing wholesale brutalities against the Serbs. Recently, however, they have embarked on a campaign of such indescribable crimes, especially in the valleys of Morava and Toplica, and these crimes are of such nature and are committed in such wholesale fashion that it seems impossible to believe that any group of human beings can endure them much longer.

General Mihailovich states that the people of those regions fail to understand why no reprisals against Bulgaria have been made by the air forces of the United Nations, and they urgently request that more effective action to this end be undertaken forthwith by my Government in London and by the Governments of our Allies.

At present the Hungarians, Bulgarians and Pavelić's regime, headed by the Germans are well on their way to exterminating an entire population whose only fault was that it desired to defend its freedom and independence at all cost.

During my visit to the United States I found in you, Mr. President, and in every American I met in every walk of life, not only a deep humanitarian sympathy toward all who have suffered in the defense of freedom, but a firm resolve to defeat the brutal forces of evil wherever they may be raging in the world. The final victory of the democratic arms will assure a secure life for all men and women who resisted and survived. Meanwhile, my people are submitted to such persecutions that their national survival is in doubt, unless measures are taken to stop the cruel and systematic destruction of their vital forces. I appeal to you, Mr. President, to examine and adopt all such methods as might compel the enemy to discontinue this ruthless slaughter. I beg you to find a way to strengthen my people in their continued resistance to the enemy and in their bitter struggle for survival.

Nothing that the enemy has done or will yet do can shake the confidence of myself and of my people in the ultimate result of this war and in the future of Yugoslavia. Our country will be free. I know that those responsible for the crimes committed will be punished and I know that the inseparable unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will also be an element of strength which will serve to create a just world order, as you yourself had defined it, and which will save the peoples from blindness of the past.

Believe me, Mr. President,

Yours respectfully,

PETER II R.

860H.00/404

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1942.

The Yugoslav Minister called at his request. He handed me a copy of a letter which King Peter II gave to President Roosevelt on July twenty-second,¹¹ when taking leave, with certain additional data attached, in relation to inhuman persecution of peoples in his country by the Germans and their associates. He urged most earnestly that the President issue a statement as requested in the letter he handed me. I said to him that for some time the State Department has been giving every attention to this entire question of inhuman activities on the part of Hitler throughout Europe, to say nothing of the Japanese in particular. I said we would continue our examination of this matter and that we expected to reach an early conclusion.

The Minister seemed well pleased.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

860H.001 Peter II/61a : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to King Peter II of Yugoslavia*¹²

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1942.

Your Majesty's visit was a personal pleasure which I shall long remember. It gave also to the American people an opportunity to do honor to the valiant Yugoslav people in their noble and unceasing fight for the liberation of their country.

I noted with pleasure the energy and thoroughness with which you entered into the daily life of America at war, seeking out the men at work and studying the conversion of our great industries to the sole purpose of providing the armaments with which the war shall be won. I am glad that you carried with you the conviction of America's determination to press on to victory with everything we have.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

860H.00/1408

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1942.

The Minister of Yugoslavia called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Minister gave me a series of telegrams, which are attached herewith, sent by General Mihajlović to the Prime Minister

¹¹ *Supra.*¹² Residing in London with the Yugoslav Government in Exile.

of Yugoslavia.¹³ The Minister said he believed that these telegrams would be of interest to this Government and even to the President. I said I would be very glad to transmit a copy of these messages to the President for his information.

The Minister spoke briefly with regard to the difficulties which he was constantly encountering in the United States from Communist sympathizers among the Slovene and Croatian elements in the United States. He called my attention specifically to the fact that the *Daily Worker*¹⁴ in New York a few days ago had published an article asserting that the Yugoslav free radio station (which the Minister stated did not exist) had proclaimed that the Yugoslavs desired to identify themselves with the Soviet Union and that General Mihajlović was a Fascist and a traitor. The Minister said this article had immediately been republished in the Communist inclined portions of the Croatian press in the United States. The Minister stated that these facts were all the more remarkable inasmuch as up to ten days ago the *Daily Worker* had almost daily published a photograph of General Mihajlović under headlines proclaiming him as the great leader of the southern Slav forces of resistance against Hitler. The Minister said the telegrams he had handed me would give further indications of the campaign being conducted within Serbia by Communist elements against General Mihajlović.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Annex]

MAY 26, No. 209.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT:

Last fall I received the communication from the British Government that we have to fight for Yugoslavia and not to allow a Communist uprising for Soviet Russia. I repeat the Communists are hated by the people on account of the terror placed on their people. The people are against them and soon we will see their end. Serbia, Sandjak and Eastern Bosnia have been liberated from them and now in Montenegro there is a general uprising against them. I repeat the people themselves have taken care to liquidate the Communists and now Montenegro does the same. Last fall Captain Hudson¹⁵ has prevented the sending of supplies which brought us to a very difficult crisis and I am afraid that this will be repeated on account of the incomprehension of my situation. I cannot give a serious blow to the enemy unless I receive arms and munitions. You may be sure that all the people here stand with me and the Yugoslav Army.

MIHAJLOVIĆ

¹³ Slobodan Jovanovich.

¹⁴ Communist newspaper.

¹⁵ Presumably Capt. Austin U. M. Hudson, British Civil Lord of Admiralty, 1939-42.

JUNE 6.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT:

The people in Montenegro and Sandjak in their general uprising against the Communists have entirely cleaned two regions. The people have been provoked by the incredible terror of the Communists who have killed thousands of Nationalists. I have received photographs and documents of their atrocities. I am proceeding now to the reorganization of those regions.

MIHAJLOVIĆ

JUNE 6.

Serbia has been completely organized. All the commanders are at their respective posts. Have developed radio network for communication. From the region of Leskovac and Vranje our organizations are pushing towards South Serbia where young recruits are fleeing the Bulgarian army and joining my detachments.

MIHAJLOVIĆ

JUNE 6.

In Bosnia, mountain of Majovica, my detachments have beaten the ustashis and captured four guns. The ustashis have fled towards Serbia but they have been supported by the Germans. In the region of Bosnia the action of chetniks is going on. Hercegovina is now, unfortunately, subjected to a Communistic terror. It seems that all our provinces have to go through this terror which brings the revolt and finally the liberation. You may be sure that we will be united for the final hour but we need arms and munition.

MIHAJLOVIĆ

[Other telegrams, not printed, related to matters other than Communist activities.]

 124.60H/73 : Telegram

The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 24, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received August 24—8:45 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series [No.] 4. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Your 2, August 15, 4 p. m.¹⁶ In conversation with King Peter, Prime Minister Jovanovitch and Foreign Minister Nintchitch, they joined in warmly expressing their sense of gratification over your proposal to raise our respective Legations to Embassies,

¹⁶ Not printed.

and stated that they were heartily in accord therewith; they were deeply touched by this added mark of friendship for their country.

Nintchitch subsequently said he could tell me unofficially that the King and his Government had already approved my *agrément* and that the delay in replying officially to the request contained in your No. 2, August 15, 4 p. m., was due to disagreement which he termed "bargaining", on part of certain factions in his Government in connection with the appointment of Fotitch as Ambassador. Existence of this opposition required a full Cabinet meeting which could not be called until August 26 due to current absence of two Ministers. He felt confident, however, he would overcome this opposition and greatly regretted that these circumstances were delaying his communication acceptance of my *agrément* which he wanted to couple with request for that of Fotitch.

In connection with the latter's appointment, Vice Premier Krnjevitch (Croat) later divulged that as Fotitch had long represented a Pan-Serb policy he was still undecided as to what position to adopt in regard to Fotitch's appointment. He, Krnjevitch, earnestly hoped that policy was ended for all time and had taken a strong stand in urging the Government to declare a forward looking policy of equality of rights but without positive results thus far. To vote approval now of Fotitch's appointment would be inconsistent with this stand in that it would amount to endorsing all that the latter had stood for.

[BIDDLE]

701.60H11/286

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*¹⁷

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Minister of Yugoslavia recently called upon the Under Secretary and informed him by instruction of his Government that the Government of Yugoslavia was happy to give its *agrément* to the appointment of Mr. Biddle as Ambassador to Yugoslavia. At the time of the Yugoslav Minister's call, he requested the *agrément* of this Government to his appointment as Ambassador.

Since it has been agreed to raise the respective Legations to Embassies, there would seem to be no reason why the appointment of Mr. Constantin Fotitch as Ambassador of Yugoslavia would not be acceptable. If you concur in this opinion, I shall inform the Yugoslav Government of your approval.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

¹⁷ Returned to the Secretary of State by President Roosevelt with the notation in the margin, "OK, F. D. R."

740.00116 European War 1939/559

The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 22

LONDON, September 9, 1942.

[Received September 22.]

SIR: Referring to my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 20, dated August 20, 1942,¹⁹ I have the honor to report that in further conversation with Foreign Minister Nincić the subject of continued Guerilla resistance inside Yugoslavia, he said that reports from the "inside" indicated that in May, June and July about fifteen hundred Italians were killed and more than 2,500 were wounded in Yugoslavia; that the Yugoslav Guerillas had immobilised a number of enemy divisions. Unfortunately, however, the patriots of Yugoslavia had not been acting in unison. Among the various causes responsible for these conditions, Communist influences represented, as he had previously pointed out, an important factor. There had been two Partisan groups: one recognising General Draža Mihailović as its leader, the other Lebedev* in Belgrade.

Dr. Nincić went on to say that the Yugoslav Government had full confidence in the leadership and loyalty of General Mihailović and his forces. As an expression of their confidence, they had, in early June, appointed him Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces resisting the enemy on Yugoslav soil. Moreover, the Government was maintaining constant contact with him (even though it was through British channels). The General, Nincić said; commanded an organised force composed, according to the nature of guerilla warfare, of between 80 and 150,000 Četniks; furthermore, these forces were under the direction of regular officers of the Yugoslav Army. The number of men to join Mihailović's ranks daily was ever increasing. Indeed, it was only General Mihailović who had, under his command, a regular organised army in occupied Europe.

In consequence, it was not astonishing that enemies of Yugoslavia: the Germans, the Italians and all their satellites did their utmost to destroy General Mihailović and his army. The Germans had seized the wife and children of General Mihailović; they had condemned the

¹⁹ Not printed.

*My reports from all available channels leading into Yugoslavia indicate that while both Mihailović and Lebedev are opposed to the puppet governments of Pavelić in Zagreb and of Nedić in Belgrade they are in bitter conflict with each other. I understand, moreover, that the Soviet Radio Broadcasting Station "Free Yugoslavia" in a broadcast of July 16, accused Mihailović of "treason". In this connection, the Yugoslav Government discreetly takes the position that the General is engaged in combatting the invader for the independence of his country. He was, moreover, equally bent upon seeing to it that his country not become a Soviet Republic incorporated in the U. S. S. R. [Footnote in the original.]

General to death and promised a large reward to anyone who would kill him. By means of his strong and well organised army, General Mihailović was inflicting considerable losses on the common enemy. He had kept about 30 Axis Divisions pinned down for more than a year in occupied Yugoslavia: 17 Italian Divisions, 7 Bulgarian, 4 German, 4 Hungarian and four divisions of Pavelić's troops, as well as 15 battalions of Ustashi. Thus General Mihailović was rendering a great service not only to his fatherland, but also to the Allies, and, at this moment especially to his Russian ally.

Minister Nincić went on to say that (a) in late July-early August, the *Daily Worker* in the United States had started a campaign against General Mihailović; (b) that on August 12, the *Soviet War News*, published by the Russian Embassy here, had carried in its edition No. 332, an article entitled "Who is leading Yugoslavia's Guerilla Army?"; that the contents of this article declared that reports from Yugoslavia confirmed that the struggle against the Germans and Italians was being waged under the High Command of the Guerilla Army—and that not a single report indicated that the struggle was being led by Mihailović, or that he was even taking part in it; (for full text of this article see attached Memorandum No. 1);²⁰ that (c) the same *Soviet War News* had published in its edition No. 337 of August 18, an article entitled "Yugoslav Četniks desert to Guerillas" wherein it was pointed out that every day saw an increase in the number of Četniks who passed over to the side of the Guerilla army, having convinced themselves of the treachery of their leaders, who had openly sold out to the Germans and Italians. (For full text see Memorandum 2).

Dr. Nincić said, furthermore, that in connection with the aforementioned articles, the Yugoslav Minister at Kuibyshev²¹ had made a strong representation on August 3 to Monsieur Lozovski, Commissar for Foreign Affairs,²² setting forth certain details illustrating the relations between General Mihailović and the Partisans. In this representation, the Yugoslav Minister had pointed out that on October 19, 1941, General Mihailović had asked the Yugoslav Premier to approach the competent authorities with a view to bringing about arrangements whereby the fighting initiated by the Communists in Montenegro might be coordinated with the efforts of the Nationalist Forces. The General asked that the necessary instructions be given for united action.

The Yugoslav Minister had gone on to cite to M. Lozovski numerous dates since October 19, 1941, whereon General Mihailović had

²⁰ Enclosures mentioned in this despatch not printed.

²¹ Stanoje Simich.

²² Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

communicated to his Government here his concern regarding the actions of the Communists in Yugoslavia, and his desire to bring them into united action with his forces against the common enemy. At the same time, the Yugoslav Minister had pointed out various steps taken by the Yugoslav Government in urging the Russian Embassy here and the Russian authorities in Kuibyshev, that Moscow exercise influence towards bringing the Communists in behind General Mihailović's banners. In stating his case, the Yugoslav Minister had quoted the contents of the telegraphic communications between the General and his Government. The Minister had wound up his case, Minister Nincić said, by stating the following conclusions:—that all the evidence he had presented clearly pointed to the following conclusions: (a) that General Mihailović, through the Yugoslav Government in London had, since October 1941, continually requested that London and Moscow bring pressure to bear on the Partisans in Yugoslavia with a view to securing the united action of all patriotic forces against the common enemy and the traitors who served him; (b) that all the efforts made by the Yugoslav Government in London and Moscow and by General Mihailović on the spot, to secure united action in Yugoslavia had been unsuccessful; (c) that the Yugoslav Government had made every effort to stop the fratricidal warfare and had continually broadcast appeals to all the insurgent parties to work together under General Mihailović against their common enemy the invader; (d) that incompetent leadership and the atrocities committed by them upon the Serbian people had produced a popular reaction against the Communists, so that they had been persecuted and annihilated wherever they were found; that in the middle of the war, the Communists had forced a social war, had killed over 10,000 patriots, had brought about a revolt among the people, who had arisen against them entirely on their own initiative and without any encouragement from General Mihailović; (e) that Mihailović's alleged collaboration with Nedić and with the other traitors was the malicious invention of those very traitors and servants of Germany, whom he had caused to be deprived of their rank, and to be branded as traitors by the B. B. C.,²³ asking that the letter "Z" be applied to them; that the entire energies of General Mihailović and of the Yugoslav Government had been directed against the traitors Nedić, Ljotić and Pecanać; (f) that the bandit Pavelić's Ustashi Press had spread the news concerning General Mihailović's alleged collaboration with the Italians, because the leader had protected the Serbians from the Ustashis in the coastal districts; that no telegram from General Mihailović, nor any evidence from a reliable source pointed to his collaboration with the Italians; (g) that the General's collaboration with the Ustashis had been made altogether impossible by the atro-

²³ British Broadcasting Company.

cious massacres of Serbians in the so-called Croatian Free State, where, according to information which had been confirmed, about 600,000 Serbian men, women and children had been killed; that, as a consequence, moreover, of these Ustashis' atrocities, more than 300,000 refugees had fled into Serbia; that the Ustashis were still carrying on with their massacres of the Serbians and with the destruction of everything Serbian in Bosnia; (h) that General Mihailović's struggle against the Ustashis in Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav Government's activities directed against them from London clearly proved that this alleged collaboration was altogether impossible. (For full text of the Yugoslav Minister's representation of August 3 to Monsieur Lozovski see attached Memorandum 3).

Minister Nincić thereupon drew my attention to copies of extracts from the Yugoslav Military Broadcasts from early March to middle of July, directed towards the union of all patriotic forces in Yugoslavia. (For the full text of these see attached Memorandum 4).

The Minister, furthermore, drew my attention (a) to the contents of a broadcast from London at 20.45 hours on May 25 and 29—a similar appeal to the people of Yugoslavia; (for full text see attached Memorandum No. 5); (b) to contents of a reply to Milan Nedić's broadcast from London on April 15 at 22 hours, by the Chief of the Military Section of the Yugoslav Prime Minister's Office; (for full text set attached Memorandum 6); (c) to extracts from the military Broadcasts denouncing Ustashis activities, ranging from mid-March to late July. (For full text see attached Memorandum 7).

In concluding his conversation on the foregoing, Minister Nincić said that until very recently Russian Ambassador Bogomolov had shown a lack of comprehension when discussing the situation with him, and when receiving his formal protests in the matter. In the past few days, however, he had gained the impression that Bogomolov was facing the problem with a greater degree of understanding. He, therefore, earnestly hoped that this might prove a turn for the better; that it might lead to some move by Moscow towards a consolidation of patriotic forces behind Mihailović.

Respectfully yours

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

740.00116 European War 1939/560

The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 23

LONDON, September 10, 1942.

[Received September 21.]

SIR: Supplementing my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 22 of September 9, 1942, I have the honor to forward hereto attached copy of a

formal note²⁵ which Yugoslav Prime Minister Jovanović sent to Russian Ambassador Bogomolov on September 2, in connection with accusations made against General Mihailović, and setting forth certain information concerning the fratricidal struggle in Yugoslavia. In his note Prime Minister Jovanović quotes a message of August 11, from General Mihailović stating that more than 10,000 Yugoslav citizens had become victims of crimes against the Serbians; that because of these crimes the Serbian people regarded the Partisan units as a collection of international criminals, most of them brought in from abroad; that the people had risen up and had cleared the Partisans out of Serbia, Sandzak, Montenegro, Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Lika and Bosnia. The General, moreover, urged that an inquiry be held concerning the numerous and unprecedented crimes. The Serbian people, he emphasised, desired a Russian victory, but were opposed to these atrocities which were in no way connected with the Russian people.

Prime Minister Jovanović subsequently quotes another message of August 23, from General Mihailović, wherein the General gave the names of prominent patriots killed by the Partisans. (See attached enclosure 1)²⁵ The General emphasised that these people had not been killed on the battlefield but as peaceful citizens.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

740.00116 European War 1939/561

The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 24

LONDON, September 11, 1942.

[Received September 21.]

SIR: Referring to Despatches Yugoslav Series Nos. 22 and 23 of September 9 and 10 respectively, I have the honor to report that in very recent conversation with Alexander Bogomolov, Russian Ambassador to the Allied Governments established here, concerning continued resistance against the invaders inside Yugoslavia, he said he wanted to make his Government's views clear in regard to these activities. Accordingly, he continued, it was felt that under conditions, such as existed in Yugoslavia today, it was useless to attempt to "appoint heroes"; that they created themselves; that they came to the fore by the sheer weight of their own qualities of leadership. Hence, if Mihailović himself failed to rally the forces of resistance behind his own banners, attempts from the outside to build him up as a leader would hardly be effectual. The very fact that he was not

²⁵ Not printed.

able to consolidate the various factions behind him would seem to be ample proof that he did not enjoy the full support of the Yugoslav people. Thus, consequently, other leaders were coming to the fore to direct the energies of those who were reluctant to follow his leadership.

He went on to say that he wanted me to know these views, since the Yugoslav Government had adopted the position that Moscow should take steps to urge all the forces in Yugoslavia to get in behind Mihailović. While there was little doubt as to the wisdom and advantages of consolidated action on the part of the resistant forces, attempts from the outside to influence people in the question as to who or who should not lead them, could hardly be expected to prove effective.

While Nincić seems to have gained the impression that Moscow is showing more comprehension, and that Russian authorities might be more than hitherto ready to lend a helping hand, I did not gain the same impression from Bogomolov's foregoing statements to me. It is conceivable that Moscow has come to feel that Mihailović's forces have gained the upper hand vis-à-vis the Communist leaders of Guerilla bands in Yugoslavia, and it would be useless for the latter to continue their independent efforts; that it would, therefore, be wiser to join forces with Mihailović. In this case, Russian authorities might possibly have instructed Bogomolov to appease the Yugoslav Government by holding out hope that they might take some positive steps towards effecting a consolidation of resistant forces. In this case, I should be inclined to interpret Bogomolov's remarks to me in the nature of an explanation of Moscow's past refusal to cooperate with Mihailović. Were this not the case, however, I should then be inclined to take Bogomolov's remarks as an indication of Moscow's decision to continue encouraging the Communist leaders.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

711.60H/27

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1942.

MR. SECRETARY: At Mr. Elmer Davis'²⁶ invitation I attended a meeting of the editors of the Serbian, Croatian and Yugoslav foreign language press in the United States. As you know, there are three sets of rows going on: (1) The Serbians are making trouble for the Croats—probably with some help from Fotitch; (2) the Com-

²⁶ Director of the Office of War Information.

munists are having a row with General Mihailovicz; and (3) there is a minor row going on which involves the Slovenes.

Being asked to make a statement, I said:

(1) That we had no interest in these various controversies since we believed that the war had to be won by united American effort, and that these people ought to get together as Americans and leave their European differences over. What happened to Yugoslavia was a matter to be determined by a free Yugoslavia when the war was won;

(2) That we recognized Yugoslavia and continued to recognize that country, and that that was the only nation with which we maintained any contact;

(3) That in tribute to certain invaded countries which had carried on gallant resistance we had raised their legations to the status of embassies, commencing with Norway and running on through the list. We were just in process of doing so with Yugoslavia. This was not a recognition of the Minister or of any particular group within Yugoslavia. It was a tribute to the whole country and nothing else; and it would be a complete perversion of our policy if it were interpreted as a personal tribute to the Pan Serbs or to the individual politics of the Yugoslav Minister, or of any faction in the Government;

(4) That while we had no interest in the politics of General Mihailovicz, so long as he was fighting the Germans we were for him, and that up to date we had had no information leading us to believe that he was doing anything but fight Germans. This had nothing whatever to do with his political views or possible later aspirations.

I said the thing to do was to forget differences and get together as Americans or intending Americans, fight the war and let European differences alone.

Elmer Davis spoke in the same sense.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/24536

The Minister to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 27

LONDON, September 19, 1942.

[Received September 28.]

SIR: I have the honor herein to report the following substance of my recent conversation with Dr. Juraj Krnjević, Vice Prime Minister (Croat):

He said that on all previous occasions when he had talked with me he had emphasised the particular esteem in which the Croat people held our country and their belief in our institutions and in our leaders.

This esteem and this belief had special reasons; nearly a sixth part of the Croat people were living in the United States and were continuously maintaining close contact with their country of extraction and of origin. Especially in Dalmatia and the other Croat coastal areas, it would be difficult to find a single family of which at least one member had not become a citizen of the United States. Consequently there was a great knowledge of the United States, and a great enthusiasm for its institutions throughout all Croat countries. Our leaders, moreover, enjoyed a very great authority among his people.

Our participation in the world conflict was unanimously considered by his people as the greatest and most secure guarantee of a just and sound organization of post-war Europe. Every American action in this direction was followed closely; every statement by a leader in the United States—especially President Roosevelt's speeches—were taken as guidance and consolation in the present sufferings.

President Roosevelt, in several of his statements made since the outbreak of this war, had honored the Croat people by mentioning them expressly among the peoples suffering from Axis oppression and resisting the common enemy in spite of the creation of the so-called "Independent State of Croatia". The latter was, in reality, nothing but a means of holding down and exploiting the Croat people for Nazi and Fascist purposes. According to direct information from Croatia, the President's words had evoked great repercussions among the Croat people, strengthening their resistance and comforting them in their present affliction.

Dr. Krnjević had just read the full text of the President's address to the International Students' Assembly in Washington on September 3.²⁷ In reading the particular paragraph wherein the President spoke of the fighting spirit in Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Serbia and Greece, that defied the harsh oppression, the barbarous cruelty and terrorism of the Nazi; Dr. Krnjević was very regretful not to see, among the suffering and resistant peoples, mention of the Croats. He regretted this all the more for just at present the Croat resistance was growing daily in spite of brutal reprisals. The Croat national leader, Dr. Vladko Maček, who had been resisting the aggressors ever since the invasion, had been recently subjected even to more severe treatment, in order to prevent any contact between him and the people. Resistance was particularly intense in the regions wherefrom the greatest number of Croat immigrants to the United States had come (Dalmatia, the Upper Croatian Littoral and Northern Croatia), where a permanent warfare was being waged between the entire population and the Italian aggressors. He was afraid that this resistance and the tribulations entailed were

²⁷ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1942, p. 729.

not sufficiently known in Washington. Dr. Krnjević thereupon quoted the following examples:

In concluding his conversation, Dr. Krnjević said he very much feared that the omission of the Croats from the list of peoples mentioned in President Roosevelt's aforementioned address would prove a great disappointment both to his suffering compatriots at home and to their relatives in the United States. He was convinced that this omission had occurred only in consequence of the lack of news from Croatia in the Western countries. He would, therefore, greatly appreciate my communicating the substance of his remarks to you.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.00/1417

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary
of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1942.

The Yugoslav Minister came in, at his request.

Although he nominally wished to talk about the Slovene question, his real purpose was to discuss the meeting that Elmer Davis had called with the Yugoslav editors some days ago.²⁸ That meeting had been called for the purpose of telling the various parties to the squabbles between the Serbs and the Croats and the Communists that they must cease quarreling. The Minister really wished to thresh over the problem a little.

I told him that he was well aware of what had happened and I thought would hardly disagree with it. These were not foreigners. They were Americans. They had been indulging quarrels which might have a historic basis, but were certainly of no help in the prevailing war effort. The *Srbobran*²⁹ had tried to justify their violence by blaming the Communists—which of course did not assist matters. Both Elmer Davis and I had said impartially to all hands that we had not the remotest interest in this kind of quarrel and that it was a danger to the American war effort.

I said that, as he knew, I had made it perfectly clear that the elevation of the Yugoslav Legation to an Embassy was not a personal tribute to an individual, and still less to any political party within Yugoslavia, but was a tribute to the nation in its gallant resistance. The Minister said that this was their point of view, likewise, and that

²⁸ See memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State, September 18, p. 815.

²⁹ *American Srbobran*, a Serbo-American daily published in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

he would resent any other significance being given to it. He said that he hoped to be of use in the situation.

I did not comment on this; but said that while we had a free press here, plainly, if it began to interfere with the war effort or give aid and comfort to the enemy, something had to be done about it, and for that reason I hoped the warning given by Mr. Davis would be heeded.

I pointed out that while we had been rather pointed in our observations about the *Srbobran*, we had been equally pointed in saying that we wanted attacks on General Mihailovich to stop.

The Minister observed that the Communists had not stopped their attacks on General Mihailovich.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/24630 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the
Secretary of State*

KUIBYSHEV (MOSCOW), October 1, 1942—noon.

[Received October 4—10:20 a. m.]

835. Your 448, September 14, 6 p. m.⁸⁰

1. During the last 3 months the Soviet press has published numerous news items and articles regarding guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia. They contain, however, no reference to Mikhailovich. They discuss the activities only of the "Partisans" as the Communist guerillas are called here and do not mention the "Chetniks", the term applied to the followers of Mikhailovich.

2. It would appear from conversations with the Yugoslav Minister and members of his staff that Soviet hostility to Mikhailovich is based primarily on the Soviet desire that the leadership of the guerillas remain in the hands of the Communists or at least of persons who look to the Soviet Union for direction and inspiration. The Soviet Government apparently desires to be in a position to direct the strategy of the guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia so that this warfare will be conducted in a manner which will facilitate the success of Soviet strategic military and foreign policy during the period of the war and will insure that on the conclusion of the war Communists or persons sympathetic to communism will have dominating positions in Yugoslavia.

The strategy of Mikhailovich, which has been approved by his Government, is to organize and conserve men and to accumulate supplies until it appears that an all-out attack on the occupying forces might yield important results. Both Mikhailovich and his Govern-

⁸⁰ Not printed.

ment feel that it would be wasteful of men and material and would lead to useless bloodshed and destruction of property if active and aggressive guerilla warfare should be carried on in present circumstances. The Partisans, however, as well as the Soviet Government, insist that now is the time for an all-out effort and are extremely bitter that Mikhailovich with his great influence is holding back large sections of the population who are willing to engage in guerilla warfare whenever called upon by him to do so. The difference in views between the Chetniks and the Partisans appears to compare somewhat to the difference in views between Allied leaders who do not think that now is the time for the second front and certain Communist-dominated groups who insist that regardless of other considerations a second front must be established at once in order to aid the Soviet Union. Mikhailovich apparently has been opposed to tendencies on the part of some of the Partisan groups to introduce a species of class warfare into the struggle against the foreign enemy. It would seem that some of Mikhailovich's followers, on the other hand, have taken an active part in opposing various Partisan groups on the ground that they are Communists.

3. The Yugoslav Government has sent messages to Mikhailovich asking him to cooperate with the Partisans and he has expressed a desire so to do. The Yugoslav Government has informally suggested that the Soviet Government use its influence in order to prevail upon the Partisans to cooperate with Mikhailovich. According to a member of the Yugoslav Legation the Soviet Government has taken the attitude that the exertion of such influence would be an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.

4. Under date of August 5 the Soviet Foreign Office presented to the Yugoslav Legation in Kuibyshev a detailed memorandum charging that Mikhailovich and the Chetniks have been cooperating with the Italians against the Partisans in Yugoslavia and that documents have fallen into the hands of the Partisans which would prove these charges.

On August 19 the Yugoslav Legation delivered a memorandum to the Soviet Foreign Office repudiating these charges. The memorandum stated that the lack of cooperation between the Partisans and the Chetniks was due to the leaders of the Partisans who "not only refused to agree upon the action to be taken in the country, but also began to struggle against the forces of General Mikhailovich at the very moment when he asked London to intervene in order to bring about united action". The memorandum further stated that General Mikhailovich had informed the Yugoslav Government that, "He had clear proof that the occupying troops were aiding the Partisans because they wished to see the two camps engage in mutual struggle

in the spring." Translations of these two memoranda will be sent to the Department under cover of despatch.³¹

The Soviet Government has not as yet replied to the Yugoslav memorandum. The Yugoslav Legation, however, has been informed that the secret organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has since August 19 carried an article denouncing General Mikhailovich as an ally of the Axis Powers.

STANDLEY

740.00116 European War 1939/559 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador³² to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1942—10 p. m.

Yugoslav Series No. 3. Reports indicate that the conflict between the Mihajlović forces and the communist partisans in Yugoslavia may become a matter of serious concern in the general conduct of the war. It would be particularly useful to know the attitude of the British Government on this question. With the background supplied by your despatch no. 22 of September 9 could you report by telegraph (1) whether the British Government has taken any steps toward promoting an understanding between these factions; (2) whether, as had been confidentially reported, certain British circles have become mistrustful of Mihajlović and tolerant of the partisan faction; and (3) whether there is prospect of an early settlement of the personal differences within the Yugoslav Government which by their continuance serve only to promote discord among Yugoslavs everywhere.

WELLES

860H.00/1421½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1942.

The Soviet Ambassador³³ called to see me this afternoon. The Ambassador read to me a memorandum which he had compiled as a result of our conversation of yesterday, setting forth certain alleged facts with regard to reciprocal assistance which was going on between

³¹ Despatch No. 109, October 2, not printed.

³² The Legation near the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London was raised to the status of Embassy, September 29, 1942.

³³ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov.

the forces in Yugoslavia under the command of General Mihajlović and the Italian Fascist forces.

According to this memorandum the following instances were cited by the Soviet Government in its recent official communication to the Yugoslav Minister in Moscow:

On March 2 at Vizygrad, Italian troops were defeated by Partizan forces and the latter captured part of the staff of General Nedić as well as 120 Chetnik prisoners. Correspondence seized at that time showed clearly that cooperation was going on between General Mihajlović and the Italian leaders.

On March 27 near Vanitch, the 56th Italian Regiment was defeated by Partizan forces and this Regiment had Chetniks as guides.

Again in April in the vicinity of Novo-Bazar in a fight between Italians and Partizans, the Chetniks were fighting on the side of the Italians and the same situation obtained in an encounter at Nichić.

On May 13 at Mosta, Chetnik troops under the command of Staučić were fighting on the side of the Italians near the Albanian frontier.

Definite information was obtained by the Soviet Government that General Mihajlović was cooperating with the Italian forces in Herzegovina, mobilizing Chetniks against the Partizans.

Finally, it was claimed that in Herzegovina, General Mihajlović had issued an appeal to the Serbs in Bosnia to fight on the side of the Italians against the Partizans.

I thanked the Ambassador for the information he had given me which I said would be carefully considered by the Department. I concluded by reiterating what I had said to the Ambassador yesterday, namely, that it seemed to me in the highest interests of our two governments that Yugoslav forces should not be fighting each other nor assisting the enemy against the other but should be united in fighting the enemy and that it was to be hoped that some way might be found in which this result could be obtained.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00116 European War 1939/578: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 7, 1942—midnight.

[Received October 8—7:20 a. m.]

Yugoslav Series [No.] 64. Your 3, October 2, 10 p. m. Replying your questions in corresponding order:

(1) I understand that in course of past month Mr. Eden³⁴ told Russian Ambassador Maisky³⁵ he earnestly hoped his and the Yugo-

³⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³⁵ Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

slav Governments could reach an early agreement in connection with the conflict between Mihailović and the "Partisans". Moreover, in Mr. Eden's address at the opening of Yugoslav house September 24, he significantly emphasized his and his Government's admiration of Mihailović's patriotic and courageous struggle.

(2) Neither Yugoslav circles nor I know of any British circles who have become either tolerant of the "Partisan" faction or mistrustful of Mihailović. Fotitch just wired his Government that British censor in Washington had received instructions from here to give as little as possible mention to Mihailović's name. Yugoslavs, however, are inclined to mark this down to British Government's desire to avoid offending Russians. In this connection, the Russians are, to my mind, aware that Mihailović shares his Government's strong opposition to communism and its desire to lean westwards after the war, rather than to be included in Russia's orbit. This question is, in my opinion, the root of Moscow's antagonism toward Mihailović and includes the Balkans as a whole. Regarding Mihailović's position vis-à-vis "Partisans", my inquiries among Russian as well as Yugoslav circles, discloses that situation as of August boiled down to following:

In Serbia, Mihailović's control undisputed; in Montenegro, "Partisans" control undisputed. (More recent reports, however, show Mihailović rapidly gaining control of Montenegrin situation.) In western Bosnia, "Partisans" had upper hand; in Eastern Bosnia, Mihailović had upper hand; in Slovenia, "Partisans" had upper hand; both in Croatia and Dalmatia, situation not clear. As regards the Communists, I understand that, aside from their leaders (whose ultimate purpose is hitherto unknown), the feelings of the Communists are more emotional (in terms of traditional affection for "grandmother Russia"), than ideological.

(3) A series of Cabinet meetings is currently taking place, in an attempt to elevate intragovernmental differences from question of personal disagreements to that of state policy. In this connection, there are a number of important issues with which present Cabinet has not hitherto treated. (See page 5 my despatch No. 21, September 4, 1942.)³⁶ While not very optimistic, I am hopeful that this attempt may serve to allay present intragovernmental misunderstandings and tension. Moreover, certain Government officials have indicated their intention to consult me in course of their Cabinet meetings.

[BIDDLE]

³⁶ Not printed.

740.00116 European War 1939/633

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

No. 29

LONDON, October 13, 1942.

[Received November 2.]

SIR: Referring to my cable Yugoslav Series No. 6 [64], of October 7, 1942, (12 midnight), and my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 22, of September 9, 1942, I have the honor herein to report the substance of my very recent conversation with Monsignor Kuhar (Slovene), Yugoslav Envoy to the Polish Government. In my frequent contacts with him I have found him objective, clear-thinking and well-informed. It was he who first informed me in November 1941 concerning M. Stalin's³⁷ post-war frontier aspirations in general, and in particular M. Stalin's ambitions to move Russia's economic and military frontiers to the Adriatic. (See my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 6, January 7, 1942).³⁸

In my recent talk with him, Monsignor Kuhar emphasised his opinion that Moscow's attitude toward Mihailović extended beyond personal considerations, to the larger question: Russia's post-war aims in the whole of the Balkans. (This concurs with my views expressed in cable Yugoslav Series No. 6 [64], of October 7, 1942). He said, moreover, that he interpreted the activities of the Communist bands in Yugoslavia as a Moscow directed move in the interests of Russia's post-war plans; that the Communists aimed to rid the horizon of those who might stand in their way of linking up with Russia after the war. In support of his opinion on this score, he cited the following among other points: (a) In Slovenia the Communist bands had systematically killed off most of the leading economists and outstanding political figures; these were men whom he had known well, and with whom he had long collaborated. Their loss was irreparable; (b) the long record of ambush shootings by Communist bands of isolated individual Germans and Italian soldiers in villages and towns indicated a deliberate effort by the Communists to provoke severe reprisals against the community. It was always the leading figures in the communities who suffered most from these reprisals.

In connection with the foregoing, Monsignor Kuhar went on to say that Ambassador Bogomolov's³⁹ denials as to Moscow's connection with and control over the Communist leaders in Yugoslavia were inconsistent with the fact, that usually three days after a given conflict had taken place, the Moscow Radio not only reported what

³⁷ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier).

³⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 337.

³⁹ Alexander Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Allied Governments in Exile at London.

had taken place, but also gave the names of the village and leading individuals involved. On the other hand, reports of the same conflict did not reach the Yugoslav Government for about three weeks. It was interesting to note, however, that his Government's reports in most cases were similar in substance to those previously given out over the Moscow Radio.

In further connection with Communist activities in his country, he said that in late March a leading Italian Communist had been brought in a Gestapo automobile to Ljubinja for a Communist meeting. When he had first read this report he could not make up his mind whether this indicated a joint German-Italian plot to stir up further internal strife in Yugoslavia, or whether it was a conspiracy between Italian and German Communists and Communist elements inside Yugoslavia. In view of recent reports, he was inclined now to mark it down to a Communist conspiracy.

The question had now arisen in his mind, moreover, as to whether Russia was not already in the process of setting up her machinery preparatory to bringing all or the greater part of the Continent into her post-war orbit. He had made discreet inquiries among a number of our mutual friends in Allied Governmental circles in an effort to ascertain their trend of thought in this respect. Most of those with whom he had talked had discreetly admitted that continued reports on Communist activities in Yugoslavia, together with reports regarding Moscow's contact with the Communist organization in France, had aroused their suspicions as to Moscow's long range motives. Several had gained the impression that a *mot d'ordre* had gone out from Moscow to the Communist centres in Europe to exploit for Russia's long range benefit whatever antagonisms the continental peoples might respectively have for the English and German speaking nations.

By way of drawing him out further, I reminded Mgr. Kuhar that M. Molotov⁴⁰ had remarked during his last visit here that Russia would want to see a strong France after the war; that Russia's experience in Spain had shown her that attempts to introduce Communism into Latin countries only served to stir up internal strife; that, therefore, efforts to introduce it into France would only serve to defeat Russia's own ends; i. e. a strong united France. Monsignor Kuhar said he seriously doubted the sincerity of these remarks. Unless and until the Comintern⁴¹ were liquidated there could be no real assurance as to an end of the drive for "world revolution." He understood, moreover, that the Russian authorities only recently indicated to the Fighting French Mission in Kuibyshev that unless a strong

⁴⁰ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁴¹ The Third (Communist) International founded by the Bolsheviks in Moscow in March 1919.

and durable understanding were eventually concluded between Russia and France, Russia would have to resort to the alternative of Bolshevizing Germany as a bulwark against a potential western pressure. Mgr. Kuhar added that, while this alternative was undoubtedly aimed as an instrument of pressure, there were many well informed and objective Continental authorities here who suspected that Moscow would, in any case, like to Bolshevise Germany as a Westward-pointed Communist spearhead.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.00/1419½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1942.

The Ambassador of Yugoslavia called to see me at his request.

The Ambassador spoke at very great length and in considerable detail with regard to the continuing difficulties between the Serbs and the Croats in the United States. He said that the propaganda originally directed solely against General Mihajlović had now engulfed himself and that he was now the general target for attack from Communist sources within the United States. He said that an attempt was being made to depict him, the Ambassador, as a Nazi agent and as an Axis sympathizer. The Ambassador seemed to feel the attacks very deeply and he became quite emotional with regard to them.

He said he felt that he should let me know frankly that certain officials of the Office of War Information, and he mentioned in particular Mr. Cranston, not through any deliberate intent but largely because of lack of real knowledge of the situation, were lending themselves to this propaganda. He stated that as a result of it important elements among the Serb population in the United States were becoming considerably embittered and that the result of the present agitation was very definitely giving rise to a state of affairs where the Croats and Serbs were becoming rapidly involved in an open antagonism which boded no good for the interests of the two groups in the post-war period. He stated that the Yugoslav propaganda organization in the United States was almost entirely staffed by Croats, that the Yugoslav Minister of Finance in London was a Croat, and that certain other key positions in the Yugoslav Government were filled by Croats. He said that this situation made it difficult for the Serb elements to be able to defend their own interests.

I told the Ambassador that one of the things which this Government most desired to avoid was internecine disputes of this character, particularly within the United States at a time when it is obvious that all elements opposed to the Axis should be banded together in fighting

the Axis, and not be engaged in fighting each other. I said that I would look into some of the facts he had brought to my attention with the desire to be as helpful as I could.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

860H.00/1421c

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 32

LONDON, October 19, 1942.

[Received November 2.]

SIR: Referring to my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 31 of October 16, 1942⁴² and my Cable Yugoslav Series No. 64 of October 7, 1942 (12 midnight), I have the honor to report my following observations on the trend of political developments within the Yugoslav Government.

As to the prospect of the Cabinet's ironing out its differences in regard to the main issues currently under consideration, I personally am, as I reported in my Cable Yugoslav Series No. 64 of October 7, 1942, more hopeful than optimistic.

Grounds for hopefulness:

(1) I gained the impression at the outset of my recent talk with Foreign Minister Nincić that he had had some message (possibly from the Yugoslav Mission in the United States; he avoided my efforts to pin him down either as to the contents or the source) indicating growing displeasure in Washington over the unfavorable repercussions which the Yugoslav Cabinet's continued differences of opinion were effecting among the American citizens of Yugoslav descent. Sensing his agitation, I took occasion to "drive home" the importance of his Government's ironing out its differences, and coming to an agreement on a liberal forward-looking policy. Perceiving the Minister's unfeigned interest in my remarks, I reiterated my view (one, which I had previously expressed to him, and subsequently reported in my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 25 of September 16, 1942,⁴² page 4) as to the desirability of a declaration of post-war policy envisaging equal economic, social and political opportunity for all. In response to his request for my ideas on procedure, I suggested, that in order to render such a declaration the maximum importance and effectiveness, (a) it should be issued by the King, and following its endorsement by all elements in the Cabinet, it should be announced publicly by the Prime Minister, here, and simultaneously by the Minister in Washington; (b) It should be announced on some appropriate date, for example December 1, the anniversary of Yugoslavia's creation.

⁴² Not printed.

I emphasized my opinion that, provided the Government united in seeing through the application of the principles involved, such a declaration might be made to serve a constructive purpose.

In thanking me for my suggestions, the Minister said he favored the idea, and would keep me posted as to the reactions of his associates.

(2) Increasing concern of Serb Democrats in Cabinet over continued governmental differences and their unfavorable repercussions in the United States. Minister Grol, one of their number, recently told me that he and his fellow-democrats were exercised over the situation and that they were bent upon bringing about a just and constructive settlement of issues now before the Cabinet.

(3) Minister Nincić, in reiterating an expression of the King's and his deep appreciation of the welcome accorded them in Washington by the President and by other members of our Government, said that the King was profoundly impressed by the President. The King had told Nincić that he had never met a man who had to such an extent as the President, instantly inspired his confidence, esteem and affection.

Nincić added significantly, that he believed the President was the only man the King had ever met who could give him advice and from whom the King would gladly take that advice. This, to my mind, is well to bear in mind in event the present situation in the Cabinet reaches an unsurmountable impasse.

Unfavorable factors:

(1) The impression in Croat and Slovene quarters that Minister Nincić is first and foremost a Pan-Serbian at heart who cannot be shaken loose from his dream of a post-war Greater Serbia; that at the crucial moment Nincić would be reluctant that the Government should commit itself to any form of post-war program envisaging federation or any system which would not render the Serbs the preponderance of power. Monsignor Kuhar has the same impression.

(2) The opinion of Minister Grol (Serb Democrat) that a declaration along the lines I suggested, would be effective in terms of the long-pull outlook, provided the Government, as a whole, agreed to put the principles involved into practical application. He was not optimistic, moreover, either as to the Government's making such a declaration, or as to its enforcing the practical application of the principles involved, unless pressure were brought upon the Government from the outside. He conscientiously felt, moreover, that this pressure should be brought by us. In fact, he went so far as to appeal to me in strongest terms to urge my government to bring appropriate pressure to bear on his Government in this connection. When I told him that it was against the principles of my Government to become involved in the internal affairs of another government, he said he

could assure me in this case that all that was needed was the moral "push" in the right direction from us. He added, that even if Nincić and the rest of the Government would come around to accept my suggestion (which he only wished I would make again, but this time in insistent terms) he could not be optimistic as to the prospects of the government's agreeing on the application of the principles involved in the declaration.

(3) Although the Serb Democrats as a group: Ministers Grol, Vlajić and Marković, are strongly in favor of a post-war Yugoslavia, based on liberal lines, and in this respect, parallel to the forward-looking hopes of the Croatian and Slovene elements, they have not yet given me any grounds to be optimistic as to the effectiveness of their stand. Either it is a case of a lack of "punch" in seeing through their aims, or a case of apprehension lest in pressing their case too strongly, they provoke suspicion, as to their Serb patriotism, on part of the Serb Extremists. Their tendency to look for support from us as illustrated by Minister Grol's aforementioned appeal to me, would seem to point to the latter case.

(4) The tendency on part of the aggressive elements among the Serb Extremists to exploit to the advantage of their own ends, the division of opinion among the Cabinet members. This element is composed of a group of army officers around King Peter. Assuming credit for a large part of the responsibility for the March 27 *coup d'état*,⁴⁴ these officers have "muscled in" to the political arena and are attempting to take things into their own hands. This group consists of Major Knezević, Chief of Prime Minister Jovanović's War Cabinet, and brother of Minister Knezević, Master of the King's Household; Major Rozdjalovski and Major Vohoska, both Aides-de-Camp to the King. These officers, moreover, throw their support behind the activities of the Serbian Extremists: the Agrarians under the direction of the Minister of Justice Gavrilović, and the Radicals under the direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nincić.

Against these elements are the following Serbian elements which favor a post-war Yugoslavia, based on liberal lines: Serb Democrats: Minister Grol, Minister Vlajić and Minister Marković; Serbian Independent Democrats: Minister Budisavljević; Minister Vilder; Yugoslav Nationalists: Ministers Jeftić and Banjanin.

(4) The tendency on the part of Prime Minister Jovanović to stand aloof from these quarrels. Jovanović is a man of long experience in the study, practice and teaching of international law. A man of charming personality and brilliant intellect, he usually gives me the impression of possessing a clear grasp not only of the affairs of his government, but also of the activities of his associates. I have the

⁴⁴ For correspondence concerning the *coup d'état* of March 27, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 968-973.

impression, however, that he tends to stand aloof from the quarrels, and that he avoids taking a positive position in regard thereto.

At this writing, I am of the opinion that if the King were willing to issue a declaration, such as I have outlined above, and if the Government were to endorse it as well as to agree as to the form of its practical application, an important step forward would have been accomplished towards solving outstanding difficulties. However, I am apprehensive lest the matter of a declaration be permitted to drift indefinitely, unless it were indicated from friendly outside sources that such a move was considered of great importance in the interest of Yugoslavia's future.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.01/421c

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

No. 33

LONDON, November 3, 1942.

[Received November 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that in very recent conversation with Foreign Minister Nincić he stated that for him it was a source of great regret that Ban Subashić, Croat member of the Yugoslav Special Mission in the United States, had formally severed his relations with Yugoslav Government. In his letter on this score, to Prime Minister Jovanović, Ban Subashić had also stated his intention to notify the British, Russian and our governments of his action. He thus aimed, he had added, to bring the question of Croatia's future relations in connection with the Yugoslav state into international consideration.

In imparting the foregoing, Minister Nincić admitted that he was agitated. On the one hand, he was not in a position to appraise the effect of Ban Subashić's action; on the other hand he regarded the latter's action on this score as an ominous sign.

Sensing the Minister's concern, I ventured to refer to my former suggestion that his Government issue a declaration by the King on an appropriate date, for example December 1, the anniversary of the creation of Yugoslavia. In response the Minister said that he had already thought of this and that both he and the King had given my suggestion a great deal of thought. In fact, they were both in favor of the idea. He thereupon brought me over to his desk, whereupon he opened his drawer and showed me the paper upon which I had written my suggestion. He had already shown this writing to the King, who had expressed his concurrence with the Minister's feeling that it was a constructive move. He, therefore, felt optimistic about its being

carried out. I, thereupon, emphasized that my suggestion was a personal one and had not been prompted by any word from my Government; that I hoped that the King and he and his Government would accept it in the friendly spirit which had prompted it. He assured me that this had been the case and that both the Government and he felt that it would prove a highly constructive move.

I thereupon emphasized that in my opinion that the degree of constructiveness of a declaration along these lines would be dependent upon the degree of agreement amongst the various elements in his Government as to the practical application of the principles involved. In response, he said he thought that once it had been agreed to make the declaration, that an agreement could be obtained as to the application of the principles.

I personally believe that, notwithstanding the Minister's expressed belief on this score, it will be necessary that benevolent outside influences be brought to bear upon the various factions in the Yugoslav Government towards an agreement upon the practical application of these principles.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.01/424 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 2, 1942.

[Received December 2—4: 55 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series [No.] 8. My despatch No. 33, November 3. In a radio address broadcast last night on anniversary of foundation of Yugoslavia, King Peter included following passage:

"The Yugoslav State as a whole will be revived, for this is required by the permanent and vital interests of all of us, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and the peaceful future of Europe.

It goes without saying that the new Yugoslavia will, by the will of her people, have a constitution which will sufficiently protect the particular interests of narrower communities and also secure the unhindered strengthening of the common foundations. Freely and with full knowledge of what they are doing, our people will pronounce in full sovereignty on all the problems which confront them. One thing is already certain, without regard to the manner in which our community will be organized: all citizens, whatever their religion or nationality, will be guaranteed the same political, economic and spiritual opportunities of life and action, grounded on an equality of rights for all."

Full text by airmail.⁴⁵

[BIDDLE]

⁴⁵ Despatch No. 35, December 2, not printed.

860H.00/1421½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1942.

The Ambassador of Yugoslavia called to see me this morning and left with me the documents attached herewith,⁴⁶ which are self-explanatory. They all have to do with the present status of General Mihailovich and the increasing evidences of Soviet-inspired propaganda for the purpose of diminishing the prestige of General Mihailovich and in order to make it appear that the real resistance now going on in Yugoslavia is due to the "Partisans" and not to the forces under the command of General Mihailovich.

The Ambassador alleges that the immediate purpose of this propaganda is to try to force the Allied Governments, when the time comes to undertake an invasion of Yugoslavia, to deal with the commanding forces of the Partisans rather than with the legitimate authorities under the control of General Mihailovich.

The Ambassador stated that the British Eighth Army, under the command of General Alexander,⁴⁷ has five liaison officers directly in daily contact with General Mihailovich who are reporting every day to the British high command the resistance movements undertaken by General Mihailovich. He also stated that the British are in continuous contact with these forces by submarine and that the supplies in the possession of General Mihailovich's forces come in part from North Africa by means of submarine. He insists that this Government must be in full possession of these facts and that it would, therefore, be in the highest degree useful, from the standpoint of the Government of Yugoslavia, if the President or the Secretary of State, at a press conference, could make some statement with regard to the effective military resistance kept up for so long a time and under such desperately difficult circumstances by General Mihailovich—a statement along the lines of those recently made by Mr. Eden in London and by General Alexander through a message which he sent to General Mihailovich.

I told the Ambassador we would give the most friendly consideration to the points which he had raised.

S[UMNER]. W[ELLES]

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ Gen. Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, Commander in Chief of the British Forces in the Middle East.

860H.20/93

The Yugoslav Embassy to the Department of State

The Yugoslav Government issued today the following statement in regard to the campaign which is being carried on against the Yugoslav Minister of War and Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, General Dragoljub Mihailovich, with the purpose of presenting the units of the Yugoslav Army under his command as inactive and General Mihailovich as cooperating with the Axis. According to reliable information, the Royal Yugoslav Government reports the following:

The units of General Mihailovich are organized throughout the whole country. They are well-organized, cooperating together and excellently commanded. The units of General Mihailovich are carrying on activities on a large scale in all of Yugoslavia, from Slovenia down to the Greek border. Other fighting forces apart from those of General Mihailovich are insignificant in number and activity in comparison to the army of General Mihailovich. The activities of the units of the Yugoslav Army under the command of General Mihailovich have not ceased for a moment although misinformed and misleading sources claim the contrary. The theater of fighting shifted from one part to another according to necessity and possibility, but in all that time represented and is still representing a continuous and uninterrupted action. The activities of the forces of General Mihailovich alone are tying up thirty to forty Axis divisions in Yugoslavia. Last Fall and Winter the center of activity was in Serbia, in the Spring of this year in Bosnia and Montenegro, and this Fall in western Bosnia and Croatia. It is necessary to stress the fact that the units of General Mihailovich here, too, play a decisive part. Even now they are in the course of operations in Serbia and in the valley of the Sava from Zagreb to Belgrade according to the general Allied war plan. These operations brought two more German divisions to Serbia in addition to the previous five, after which the Germans, Bulgarians and Pavelich's troops undertook a thorough "cleaning up" in Serbia, committing appalling atrocities. During the month of November the sympathizers of General Mihailovich were persecuted in Serbia to the utmost. Near Belgrade, in the village of Jajinci alone, a thousand Serbs were executed and several thousands arrested. No details can be given regarding these operations which are being carried out in accordance with the Allied war plan. It can be said that the entire fighting activity in Yugoslavia is linked with General Mihailovich except in the western part of Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia where there are no other forces who are fighting against the

Axis apart from General Mihailovich. In the above mentioned parts of Yugoslavia, there are the so-called Partisan detachments which are inspired with a certain political ideology and under the name of the Partisan Army of Croatia, Western Bosnia or the national liberation movement of Slovenia. There are also certain formations of Serbian nationalists outside the command of General Mihailovich, under the leadership of Birchanin and Jevdjevich, whose aim is to fight against Pavelich's Ustashis in order to prevent to a certain extent the annihilation of the Serbs which is being carried out according to plan in Pavelich's State. But in those parts with the various fighting movements, the troops of General Mihailovich represent the principal Yugoslav force and are giving the greatest and most advantageous resistance to the Axis.

Many of Mihailovich's activities are falsely attributed to other fighting movements. The action of the forces of General Mihailovich, spread throughout the entire territory of Yugoslavia is being carried out clearly and in detail according to the general Allied war plan by Mihailovich. General Mihailovich has never before rendered such invaluable service as in these past several months. Recognition of his invaluable service to the Allied cause was accorded him by the British Imperial General Staff who sent congratulations to him recently.

All allegations of the inactivity of General Mihailovich and the defamation of his reputation in the country, that he is indirectly cooperating with the Axis, are the makings of an extremely ill-intentioned campaign. That this is true is proved by the fact, in addition to the telegram of congratulations from the British Imperial General Staff, that for the past three months the Yugoslav Press in Belgrade and Zagreb, under German control, has launched a very strong campaign against those suspected as being in contact with the organization of General Mihailovich. Thousands of persons suspected of such were arrested or executed.

Reports which have appeared in connection with a certain Constitutional Assembly in Bihach, whose work would conflict with the action of General Mihailovich, come from the same ill-purposed sources and were given publicity by the secret radio station "Free Yugoslavia".

But, the realities in Yugoslavia, full of blood and struggle, will show to the whole world the baselessness and ill-intentions of the campaign led today by certain newspapers against one of the greatest heroes and organizers, who, with his numerous units is the central figure of Yugoslav resistance and of the entire struggle against the Axis in Yugoslavia.

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1942.

860H.20/94

The Yugoslav Embassy to the Department of State

The following message was received from General Mihailovich:

"Zdenko Reich (Veljko Rajić) left for Switzerland to become chief correspondent for the Swiss and Swedish Communist press. Rajić is spreading all false rumours about the fighting of the Partisans and Croats against the Ustashis, Germans and Italians. In as much as there is any Partisan fighting against the occupational forces and the Ustashis in Croatia, it is carried on only by units under my command."

A series of articles published in the British and American press on the Partisan fighting in Croatia claim that the units of General Mihailovich were either annihilated or had left him. These reports are completely fabricated. In two-thirds of our country the forces of General Mihailovich are masters of the situation. They are leading the campaign in Yugoslavia in accordance with the instructions of the British Supreme Command in the Middle East. The forces of General Mihailovich are carrying on the fighting chiefly in western Bosnia. A large part of the Partisan units who have not committed atrocities against the people and who are continuing the struggle against the occupation forces have joined General Mihailovich. Much of the fighting carried on by units under the command of Mihailovich are attributed to the Croatian Partisans. The British Supreme Command is well-acquainted with the real situation in Yugoslavia and also with the operations of General Mihailovich's forces which will not be made public according to the wish of General Mihailovich. Recently, several Axis divisions have been brought to Yugoslavia in addition to the 30 to 40 divisions which the forces of General Mihailovich have tied up.

There is still a small number of Partisans in western Bosnia outside the command of General Mihailovich. All reports of any large Partisan army or Partisan government in which all national groups are supposed to be represented are all utterly unfounded and misleading.

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1942.

860H.00/1421 5/6

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1942.

The Yugoslav Ambassador called at his request and protested against the continuing attacks being made in this country against General Mihailovitch.

I said that, of course, this Government, during the time his King was here as well as since, has shown the deepest sympathy for and interest in the welfare of the Yugoslav people and their struggle for the restoration of their liberties. I added that it might be well for him to speak with the officer in the European Division on this matter and I would confer with this officer later today and bring myself up to the minute on every detail.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

860H.00/1421%

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1942.

The Yugoslav Ambassador called and renewed his request for a statement to be issued in support of General Mihailovich.

I replied, as I had stated to him on his previous visit for this purpose, that the Department had taken the matter up sympathetically and I hoped to see a statement issued through some source within another day or two that would be in line with our original position, as expressed while his King was in this country.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

860H.01/434

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 37

LONDON, December 28, 1942.

[Received January 13, 1943.]

SIR: Referring to my cable Yugoslav Series No. 9, December 23, 12 midnight,⁴⁸ concerning the current Cabinet crisis, pending Cabinet changes, and the reopening of the question of Ambassador Fotić's position, I have the honor herein to report the following:

In conversation several weeks ago with King Peter, he confidentially remarked that he only wished he could "get rid of a number of old fossils" in his Government who constantly obstructed the formulation of constructive forward-looking policy. Most of this element, he said, continued to think in terms of the pre-Great-War period and seemed unable to adjust their minds to the current world trend. They were continuously quarrelling with each other, and if they were any younger they would probably end up by killing each other. The King went on to say that had it not been for these obstructionists, he would have gone further in his declaration of post-war policy on December

⁴⁸ Not printed.

1 (see my cable Yugoslav Series No. 8, December 2, and my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 36, December 5⁴⁰). He sincerely hoped that reaction in the United States had been favorable to what he had said on that occasion. Now he wanted to get on with the framing of a very definite policy. What was more, he wanted his Government to frame a definite formula for the practical application of this policy. He was, therefore, determined that the members of his Government iron out differences amongst themselves and get down to some very definite policy in favor of the nation as a whole. He would like, he said, to talk to me further about the best means of bringing this about. In response, I said I should, of course, be delighted to discuss informally with him, at any time, any and all aspects of his problems. However, I wanted him to know that neither my Government nor I would ever care to have either himself or the members of his Government gain the impression that we wished to intervene in strictly Yugoslav affairs. The King said he thoroughly appreciated this point, and would have it in mind during any discussions which we might have in future.

[Here follows detailed information on possible changes in Yugoslav Cabinet.]

I feel that the chances favor the appointment of Minister Grol.⁵⁰ At the same time I believe that his candidacy will be warmly contested by the Pan-Serb element. Moreover, I feel that if the opposition becomes unduly vigorous, Prime Minister Jovanović may possibly feel called upon to make a compromise in the form of taking the portfolio of the Foreign Ministry himself. This, in my opinion, would be a great mistake as his great value is his independence of thought and action, hence his ability to throw his weight in the right direction at the crucial moment.

I personally believe that Minister Grol's appointment would prove a constructive move, at least in the next phase of developments, for the following reasons: (a) he feels very strongly that his Government has neglected to give General Mihailović the proper political directive; that it should have impressed upon the General the importance of coordinating the efforts of the resistance forces in Yugoslavia. In this connection Grol feels that the civil strife in Yugoslavia is assuming the aspect of an international conflict: in terms of the extreme elements, the communists against the Mihailovićists. He therefore feels that the power to consolidate these forces rests in the hands of London and Moscow. Accordingly he proposes that these two capitals settle their differences in the matter and define a clear cut policy which in turn Grol would impart to Mihailović as a directive;

⁴⁰ Latter not printed.

⁵⁰ As Foreign Minister. Dr. Milan Grol was Minister of Education and head of Serb-Democratic Party.

(b) he is none the less opposed than the Croat and Slovene elements to Ambassador Fotić's machinations in the United States; however he is of the opinion that Fotić's eventual withdrawal should be handled as gracefully as possible through gradual steps; (c) in connection with the Ministerial Mission in the United States, Grol would be inclined to include several of that group in the proposed withdrawals from the Cabinet.

In connection with this Ministerial Mission, I find that behind the proposal on part of the Pan-Serb element to completely withdraw it, is an aim of reducing the number of parties represented in the Cabinet. As opposed to this idea the Croat and Slovene and Serb-Democratic elements favor each party (except the Croats) withdrawing one of its two representatives from the Cabinet. If the latter gain their point it is not unlikely that several of the Ministers of the Mission in the United States may be withdrawn (these four Ministers are included as Cabinet Ministers in the total of 17). As regards the position of this Mission in the United States, it is felt by the Croat and Slovene elements here that Ambassador Fotić has been exerting vigorous efforts to liquidate it. Hence, since the Croat, Slovene and Serb-Democratic elements in the Government have energetically striven to have Fotić removed, and since these efforts have the blessings of the majority of the Mission in the United States, relations between the Ambassador and the Mission have become delicate, to say the least, and their respective positions vis-à-vis each other have become a matter of prestige. This situation in turn reflects itself in the present conflict within the Cabinet.

The foregoing are the main points in the developments which have led to the current Cabinet crisis. In the background there are, among other problems, the question of consolidating the resistance forces in Yugoslavia which, over a period of the past few months, have served to increase the conflict of opinion and emotions amongst the Cabinet members. It therefore took but a pretext to bring matters to a head.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.01/430 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1942—6 p. m.

Yugoslav Series No. 4. Your 9, December 23.⁵¹ Your informal efforts to assist in bringing about a better understanding among the elements constituting the Yugoslav Government have the Depart-

⁵¹ Not printed.

ment's full approval. You are authorized to continue these conversations and to express the friendly interest of the Department in the general Yugoslav question, some aspects of which are of direct concern to a considerable element of the American people. For your guidance in this connection the following points may be kept in mind as background.

(1) The disputes between the Serb and Croatian elements in the United States have had a deplorable effect on our national unity, extending even into groups of other national background. In the lack of authoritative guidance from the Government in London Yugoslav official representatives and refugee personalities have contributed and still continue to contribute to this disunity. The public spectacle of discord within Yugoslav official circles here has nullified the efforts of American Government agencies to restore harmony among the foreign language newspapers and the foreign-born groups.

(2) It is generally felt in this country that Mr. Fotitch through his apparent support of the Pan-Serb element is to a considerable degree responsible for this situation. Nevertheless his official actions have been correct and the Department would prefer that he remain here provided the Yugoslav Government can agree on some definite policy and require his adherence to it. One of the difficulties hitherto has been that the Embassy and other Yugoslav officials here have expected this Government to promote the idea of Yugoslav unity which their own actions have tended to destroy.

(3) The Ministers resident in New York are considered to be more representative of the Yugoslav element here than is the Embassy, but lack of teamwork here and lack of sympathy with some of their colleagues at London have made them something of a burden. If they are to remain in this country and their informal activities tolerated they must be brought into line with whatever unified policy their Government may adopt. Particularly the Information Center at New York should be responsible in reality as well as in theory to the Embassy.

Among these Ministers Mr. Yevtitch⁵² has shown the broadest views and the best understanding of the problems arising in the course of the war. It might be well to inquire whether he would not be useful for consultation at London from time to time.

(4) The . . . and . . . have been definitely objectionable in their influence on American citizens of Yugoslav origin. The Department would be relieved to have . . . transferred to some other field of activities. The . . . would probably conform to firm instructions from the Embassy.

(5) The Mihailovich-Partisan dispute has gained some prominence in the American press. This Government has full confidence in Mihailovich and statements about to be made will probably restore somewhat the prestige lost largely as a result of the disputes referred to above. One of the most effective charges against him has been that he too has lost respect for his own Government's belief in Yugoslav unity.

⁵² Bogoljub Jevtić, Minister without Portfolio on special mission to the United States, 1942-43.

The Department realizes of course that some of the problems suggested above are inherent in any government deprived of contact with its people. Because of America's deep interest in the future of Yugoslavia it is hoped that the few leaders available will rise to the responsibilities of these times.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/26979a

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I think it would be appropriate if an American message on New Year's Day could be sent to General Draža Mihailovich, the leader of the patriot forces operating within Yugoslavia. This message would be most effective if it could be conveyed in the form of a personal telegram of greeting to General Mihailovich from General Eisenhower as the commander of the American forces in the European area. If you agree, may I suggest something like the following as a suitable text?

General Draža Mihailovich
Commanding General of
the Yugoslav Forces
in Yugoslavia

The American forces in Europe and Africa send greetings to their comrades in arms the resourceful and gallant Yugoslav military units under your splendid leadership. These brave men banded together on their native soil to drive the invader from their country are serving with full devotion the cause of the United Nations.

May the New Year bring them full success.⁵³

In this connection I think it is worth mentioning that although the President and other officials of the Government have referred to the fine achievements of the Yugoslav patriots in various statements, there has not been any communication with General Mihailovich from American sources. Two messages from British military authorities have recently been sent to him, one from General Alexander, and the other from Brigadier Vale on behalf of the General Staff.

It is my understanding that a telegram such as that suggested above could be transmitted to General Mihailovich through the system of communications now operated by the Yugoslav military authorities in Egypt.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

⁵³ On January 1, 1943, the War Department dispatched a message to General Eisenhower suggesting that he send a congratulatory message of this kind to General Mihailovich.

860H.20/94

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Yugoslav Ambassador
(Fotitch)*

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have given further attention to the memorandum which you left with me on December 19, in which you quoted the text of a report recently made by General Mihailovich concerning the military action against the Ustashis, Germans, and Italians in Croatia, and have noted particularly General Mihailovich's statement that whatever Partisan fighting is now in progress against the forces of occupation and the Ustashis in Croatia is carried on by units under General Mihailovich's command. The series of newspaper articles to which you referred have also come to my attention. In this connection I have also given further study to your memorandum of December 16, which contained related information.

As I have repeatedly assured you, the Government of the United States has complete confidence in the patriotism of General Mihailovich, and full admiration for the skill, endurance, and valor with which he and the Yugoslav patriots associated with him have continued their noble struggle for the liberation of their country. We consider that the military actions in Yugoslavia to which you refer constitute an important element in the general conduct of the war of the United Nations against the Axis powers.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

SUMNER WELLES

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES BY THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE POSTWAR FRONTIERS OF YUGOSLAVIA

860H.01/385

The Yugoslav Minister (Fotitch) to the Secretary of State

Pov. No. 140

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1942.

MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the Royal Yugoslav Government I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency a Memorandum concerning certain matters regarding frontiers and international relations in post-war Europe after the Allied victory.

At the same time I should like to inform Your Excellency that a similar Memorandum has been submitted to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Please accept [etc.]

CONSTANTIN FOTITCH

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

In view of the fact that problems of Europe after the war concerning certain territories have been brought into discussions by Yugoslavia's neighbors to the detriment of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Government considers it necessary to inform the United States Government with regard to the present state of these questions, as it appears to the Yugoslav Government, in order that the Yugoslav point of view may be an object of the studies of all institutions which are concerned with matters regarding frontiers and international relations in post-war Europe after an Allied victory.

In principle, the matter concerns the territory on which live compact masses of the Slovene and Croat people. Since 1848, the Slovenes and Croats have carried on their struggle and have organised a resistance against the German-Habsburg regime, because in that period the Slovenes were subjects of Austria. The first part of about 56,000 Slovenes who were in the district of Udine (Beneski Slovenci) came under the Italians in 1866. The rest of the Slovenes remained in Austria-Hungary till 1920.

Already in 1872, the Slovenes, in agreement with the Serbs and Croats, formulated a Yugoslav Programme. The programme gained in reality especially during the Balkan Wars of 1912-14. The Yugoslav efforts were particularly developed during the last war, when the whole Slovene and Croat delegation in the Vienna parliament declared for Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, other Slovenes, Croats and Serbs actively participated in the Yugoslav Committee in London. In 1917, i. e. at the time when Germany and Austria were strong on all fronts, all the Slovenes and Croats were carrying out their national plebiscite for Yugoslavia. The Peace Conference after the last world war did not bring the Slovene people a complete national liberation. Owing to the Italian insistence, because of the promise given to Italy by the secret Treaty of London in 1915⁵⁴ and because of the Italian promise that she would be the principal guardian of Western democratic interests in Central Europe, with the promise to consider the national character of the Slovene people who remained within the Italian frontiers, it was decided after many difficulties in the Peace Conference to draw the frontiers between Italy and Yugoslavia in such a manner that in the Kingdom of Italy there would remain about 600,000 Slovenes and Croats. In such a manner also were drawn the frontiers between Austria and Yugoslavia so that in Austria there remained about 120,000 Slovenes and in Hungary about 10,000. All

⁵⁴ Agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain, and Italy, signed at London, April 26, 1915; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 497.

these parts of the Slovene and Croat people, comprising the Slovenes in the Italian district of Udine, live in compact masses on that territory and form with the rest of the Slovene parts which are within the frontiers of Yugoslavia a national unity in the geographical and economic sense. They are, especially: the districts of Trst,⁵⁵ Istra, Gorica and Videm (Idine) in Italy; Koruska in Austria (Germany) and the small district of Rabskih Slovenac, near Monostra, in Hungary.

These partitions of the Slovene people between three foreign States is considered as a national disaster and injustice which is all the greater and more noticeable inasmuch as the Slovene people number scarcely 2,000,000 souls, who, by their culture, solidity and diligence, are to be considered among the most progressive people in Europe.

In the present war, after the occupation of Yugoslavia, Germany, Italy and Hungary have partitioned between them all the parts of Slovenia in Yugoslavia and annexed them to their respective countries.

Italy, Austria—and, since the occupation of Austria, Germany—and Hungary have, for these twenty years during which they had the Slovenes under their rule, brutally over-ridden all international obligations towards the Slovene minorities in their respective States. They have forbidden the use of the Slovene language in the schools, churches, courts and all public departments; they have forbidden Slovene literature and newspapers; they have destroyed the economic, cultural and humanitarian and even religious institutions and organisations of the Slovene people. The Slovene intelligentsia has been expelled or put in prisons and concentration camps or rendered materially destitute. Many of those engaged in the Slovene national struggle have been condemned to this, or to many years' imprisonment. Slovene Christian and surnames and the names of districts, villages, rivers, towns, forests and so on have been forbidden and changed. In the politics of denationalization, the Italian, Austrian, German and Hungarian regimes have been equal. The Croat people had the same fate in Istria.

The present rounding-up and expulsion of the Slovenes is similar only to what has been done in Poland.

In spite of the fact that Italy, Austria (or Germany) and Hungary are on the side of the Axis Powers, the Royal Yugoslav Government fears that the Slovenes and Croats may find themselves, after this war, again outside the Yugoslav frontiers and exposed to the injustice of foreign regimes. Because of this, the question is constantly under consideration in the Slovene emigrant press in America.

⁵⁵ Trieste.

By this communication, the Royal Yugoslav Government does not suggest that the questions raised above must be decided now, or that any definite point of view must be formulated. It is only intended to inform the U. S. A. Government of the Yugoslav point of view and to put forward its hope that, at the time when the questions come to be settled, there will be taken into account the reasons which merit a just decision. This will mean that all the abovementioned Slovene and Croat territory will come within the frontiers of Yugoslavia, in conformity with the principles of the Churchill-Roosevelt Atlantic Declaration,⁵⁶ and in accordance with the self-determination of peoples. The last-named principles were in 1920 very seriously injured as regards the Slovene people.

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1942.

**PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
YUGOSLAVIA REGARDING MUTUAL AID IN THE PROSECUTION OF
THE WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION, SIGNED JULY 24, 1942**

[For text of agreement signed at Washington, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 263, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1570.]

**MILITARY SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND YUGOSLAVIA**

[Effected by exchanges of notes dated at Washington March 31, May 14, June 25, and September 30, 1942. For texts of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 309, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1917.]

⁵⁶ Joint statement of August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

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