# Shifting Stances:
# How French Bishops Defected from Support for the Anti-Semitic Vichy Regime to Save Jews During the Holocaust

by

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*For my Zaidy*

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computers. In fact, it is not even because, as Peter L. Berger (1963) so beautifully explains in *Invitation to Sociology*:

> There is… one traveler whose path the sociologist will cross more often than anyone else's on [her] journeys. This is the historian.… Suffice it to say here that the sociological journey will be much impoverished unless it is punctuated frequently by conversation with that other particular traveler.

With Jared, my favorite historian, I can confirm that Berger's quote is accurate. However, our relationship encompasses so much more. Jared, you are my tried and true, through and through, complete intellectual and emotional partner. You are passionate and compassionate; funny, serious, and sensitive all at once. I do not consider it coincidental in any way that the best work of my career to date has been since you entered my life — not to mention that with you, I laugh harder, think more critically about the world and my place in it, and strive constantly to be a better human being. Jared, I am profoundly appreciative of all you do to make our life together so intellectually and emotionally rich and fulfilling. I love you. I thank you.

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- All newspapers accessed from *Bibliothèque Nationale de France* (National Library of France). Often, copies of articles specifically related to Church issues and interests are also contained in the diocesan archives listed above. For example, article clippings from *La Croix* can be found in the archives of CNAEF, series Relations entre Église-État; clippings from *Je Suis Partout* and *La Pillori* can be found in the Archives diocésaines de Lyon, fonds Cardinal Gerlier, in the folder Attaque contre l'Église et le Cardinal Gerlier.
  - *La Croix*, January 1933 to January 1943
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  - *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien* (Série clandestine), 1941-1941[1]

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  - *Semaine Religieuse de l'Archidiocèse d'Aix-en-Provence*
  - *Semaine Religieuse de Cambrai*
  - *Semaine Religieuse de Paris*
  - *Semaine Paris du diocèse de Lyon*
  - *Semaine Religieuse de Marseille*
  - *Semaine Religieuse de Toulouse*

[1] Note: Although I first consulted the Bibliothèque Nationale de France for copies of Témoignage Chrétien, full copies are also contained in the diocesan archives of Toulouse, fonds du Mgr. Saliège, and herein I reference re-printed full copies of the journal contained in Bédarida, F., & Bédarida, R. (2001). *La résistance spirituelle: 1941-1944: Les cahiers clandestins du Témoignage Chrétien.* Paris: Albin Michel.

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## ABSTRACT

In August 1942, a group of bishops in the French Catholic Church defected from the episcopate's public support for the anti-Semitic Vichy regime to save Jews during the Holocaust. At that time, thousands of Jews were being rounded up by policemen organized by Vichy administrators with the tacit consent of the Church and sent to concentration camps as part of the Nazi plan to exterminate European Jewry. When French bishops deviated from their previous political stance, this was a dramatic change from two years prior when the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops had met and decided to formally endorse Vichy's anti-Semitic policies. "No one more than I recognizes the evil that Jews have done to France," proclaimed Cardinal Pierre-Marie Gerlier in autumn 1941. Ten months later, he along with four other French bishops, issued a protest that would come to be read from over 400 pulpits throughout France. "The Jews are our brothers. They belong to mankind," clergy declared. "No Christian dare forget that!"

My dissertation, *Shifting Stances: How French Bishops Defected from Support for the Anti-Semitic Vichy Regime to Save Jews During the Holocaust*, examines a case that altered the trajectory of World War II in France. When French bishops endorsed the Vichy regime, they legitimized discrimination by officially supporting anti-Semitic policies. Later, their deviation from this stance and protest of France's persecution of Jews contributed to the government's de-legitimization and mobilized Catholics on behalf of European Jewry. I analyze newly available historical sources written in French, English, and occasionally, Hebrew, collected from fourteen archives in France, USA, and Israel, to explain how individuals and institutions trade the benefits of stability for the risky behavior associated with collective action in violent contexts.

Chapter one of *Shifting Stances* investigates bishops' letters, diaries, and meeting minutes to explain how the episcopate in August 1940 decided to support the Vichy regime's initial anti-Semitic policy against Jews, the *Statut des Juifs*. Chapter two evaluates public statements and private correspondence between political and religious authorities in France to specify how, from the fall of 1940 to the start of 1942, changes in the relationship between the Vichy government and the Catholic episcopate led bishops to become key agents in the process of legitimization for the National Revolution. In so doing, they also contributed to the naturalization of the exclusion of Jews from the French nation. Chapter three analyzes post-war testimonies and published memoirs in addition to primary historical documents to analyze the motive, method, and makeup of a clandestine Christian resistance movement, *Témoignage Chrétien*, which was formed by lower clergy and laity with the goal of disrupting the words, actions, rituals, and symbols emanating from the hierarchy in support of the Vichy regime. Finally, chapter four examines a range of primary sources from mid-1941 to late 1942, including, again, bishops' private diaries, meeting minutes, and correspondence, to explain how *Témoignage Chrétien*'s tactics, the organizational circumstances of bishops' declining relationship with the Vichy government, and the external political context of the start of the Final Solution in France influenced bishops' decisions to protest on behalf of Jews.

More specifically, the sudden rise in arrest, internment, and deportation of Jews, including women, children, and the elderly, shifted bishops' frame of reference for deciding how to act. However, their ability to communicate these stances and coordinate a collective protest was made possible by bishops' use of clandestine Christian activists — through them, bishops were able to discreetly correspond. Secret meetings organized by the nuncio, who was wary of

the government, further facilitated this process. Finally, information that one archbishop — Jules-Géraud Saliège — received about plans for an upcoming, massive roundup, triggered his own decision not to wait any longer. The timing was apt: at Sunday mass, 23 August 1942, Saliège would speak out and change the course of history in France.

*"The bishops' very existence relies on projecting an image of unity, for what would the laity make of dissension and division in the ranks of its most powerful leaders? The appearance of unity is central to the bishops' fundamental raison d'être: to impose and inculcate a worldview."*

-Pierre Bourdieu & Monique de Saint Martin[2]

[2] Bourdieu, P., & Martin, M. D. (1982). La sainte famille [L'épiscopat français dans le champ du pouvoir]. Actes De La Recherche En Sciences Sociales, 44(1), 2-53; p. 23.

## Introduction

In August 1942, bishops in the French Catholic Church deviated from the episcopate's formal position of support for the Vichy government to protest its violence against Jews in France. Beginning in May 1941, Jews in France were routinely rounded up by French policemen and deported to transit, labor and detention camps throughout the country, and from there sent to Auschwitz starting in March 1942. At the time, French bishops remained silent concerning violence against Jews or otherwise publicly praised the Vichy regime and its goal of "National Revolution." Consequently, when French bishops defected from their political support for the Vichy government to protest on behalf of Jews, it marked a dramatic shift from two years prior when the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops (ACA) formally elected to endorse Vichy's anti-Semitic policies. "No one more than I recognizes the evil that Jews have done to France," proclaimed Cardinal Pierre-Marie Gerlier in autumn 1941. Ten months later, he along with four other French bishops, issued a protest that would come to be read from over 400 pulpits throughout France: "The Jews are our brothers. They belong to mankind," the clergy declared. "No Christian dare forget that!"

My dissertation, *Shifting Stances: How French Bishops Defected from Support for the Anti-Semitic Vichy Regime to Save Jews During the Holocaust*, seeks to uncover how individuals in organizations choose to endorse state violence at one point in time but then to withdraw their support in order to save victimized civilians at other moments. To explain this phenomenon, I analyze a case that altered the trajectory of the Holocaust in France. When French bishops endorsed the Vichy government, they legitimized discrimination by officially supporting anti-

Semitic policies. Later, their deviation from this stance and protest of the French state's persecution of Jews contributed to the Vichy regime's de-legitimization and mobilized Catholics on behalf of European Jewry. In the end, French civilians saved the second-largest number of Jews in any occupied country during the Holocaust. I analyze archival sources written in French, English, and Hebrew, collected from fourteen archives in ten cities and three countries — France, the United States, and Israel — to explain decision-making in high-risk contexts.

**Background**

The Holocaust is one of the most controversial and tragic events in recent French history. In May 1940, Germany invaded France. Within six weeks, the *Wehrmacht* had reached Paris and the French government had fled to Bordeaux. They eventually ended up in Vichy, a spa town in central France from which the new, authoritarian government would rule throughout World War II. Among the Vichy regime's first decrees was the *Statut des Juifs*, a legislative measure intended to exclude Jews in France from public life, thus limiting their influence. Between October 1940 and November 1941, eleven more exclusionary measures were passed restricting Jews' rights. By 1945, "some four hundred laws, decrees, and police measures" targeting Jews were introduced (Adler 2001, p. 1067). These laws facilitated the incarceration, forced deportation, and eventual mass murder of approximately 77,000 Jews from France. When the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops (ACA) met in August 1940 to decide on the *Statut*, their formal support for the Vichy regime's exclusionary polices toward Jews helped legitimize the regime for civilians who looked to their religious authorities as moral leaders.

Approximately eighty-five percent of France was Catholic in 1940 (Bédarida 1998, p. 7), and churches were flooded with civilians seeking guidance and meaning in the chaos following France's defeat at the hands of Nazi troops (Drapac 1998, p. 142). Under this regime, the Catholic Church became a "central player in the drama of public life" (Nord 2003, p. 11) and Catholicism became "the single most cohesive force in French society" (Drapac 1998, p. 28). Kselman (2000, p. 515) explains, "many French who previously had an attenuated relationship with the institutional Church were drawn into Catholic sanctuaries and shrines as a way to deal with the trauma of war and defeat." Marshal Pétain, Prime Minister of the new Vichy government, was well aware of the Church's influence on public opinion; he frequently sought bishops' guidance on "the Jewish problem" (Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 202). Similarly, in summer 1940, authors of the *Statut des Juifs* consulted bishops about whether the policy would violate Christian principles (Joly 2013, p. 281). Due to their considerable influence, it is possible that Vichy's initial anti-Jewish statute never would have passed without French bishops' consent. Instead, the Catholic Church endorsed it, Monsignor Saliège of Toulouse proclaiming Vichy's position "incontestable" from "the viewpoint of Catholic doctrine" (Paldiel 2006, p. 74). Through statements of support like this one, French bishops helped to legitimize the Vichy regime's anti-Semitic agenda and profoundly influenced public opinion towards Vichy's treatment of Jews during the war.

Two years later, a subset of the French Catholic hierarchy defected from the episcopate's formal position of support for the Vichy government and protested in defense of Jews. French bishops' decisions to publicly decry anti-Semitic state violence marked a dramatic change from their political stances from 1940 to 1942. Monsignor Saliège, cited above for claiming the *Statut*

*des Juifs* was "incontestable" from the perspective of the Church, sent a letter in August 1942 to all priests in his diocese, this time calling for the defense of Jews instead. The letter read:

> That children, that women, fathers and mothers be treated like cattle, that members of a family be separated from one another and dispatched to an unknown destination, it has been reserved for our own time to see such a sad spectacle. Why does the right of sanctuary no longer exist in our churches? .... The Jews are real men and women .... They cannot be abused without limit .... They are our brothers, like so many others.

Saliège's letter, copied and modified by four French bishops, came to be read from over 400 pulpits throughout France. Others would denounce anti-Semitism in their weekly diocesan publications and yet others would openly protest the *rafles* in their dioceses in the weeks and months that followed. Compared with the fact that at no time from summer 1940 until March 1941 did the episcopate even privately express its concerns about Vichy's anti-Semitic policies to the government, this public statement on behalf of Jews was dramatic.

French bishops' protest triggered a powerful reaction in France: members of the Church hierarchy now encouraged civil disobedience in response to ongoing arrests of Jews by the French police whereas before, they actively discouraged it. In recently formed Catholic resistance movements such as *Amitié Chrétienne*, bishops also helped to prepare false documents for Jews in hiding while offering religious institutions as safe havens for Jews in need. The French bishops' actions of protest and resistance marked a profound behavioral shift from one

year prior when the Church's silence inspired Catholic resistance member Germaine Ribière to write in her diary, "the Church, the hierarchy, remains silent. They let the truth be profaned." In response to the sudden change, Prime Minister Laval threatened to arrest priests who supported the resistance and to search cloisters to drag out Jews in hiding (Hilberg [1961] 1985, p. 641). An official in Toulouse that worked for the Commissioner-General for Jewish Questions called for the punishment of defectors by the nuncio, arguing that bishops had no business protesting because the Church itself counseled obedience to the Vichy regime (Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 201). Protest and saving behaviors were incredibly dangerous and bishops who defected from the episcopate's formal support for Vichy put themselves and their organization at great risk. This dissertation, motivated by the case of Catholic bishops' shifting stances in France during World War II, seeks to understand how individuals make decisions to support or resist discriminatory government policies throughout a violent conflict when the costs are high and potentially even deadly.

**Data**

Throughout 2011-2013, I spent twelve months doing archival research in France. The cornerstone of my research during this time was bishops' private papers from 8 diocesan archives in Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Montauban, Marseille, Nice, Annecy, Cambrai.[3] These archives contain bishops' notes, diaries, meetings minutes, correspondence with various religious and political authorities and laity, and sometimes drafts of — or fully published — speeches. Many of these archives had been closed to the public until 2010 and several, including the diocesan archives of

[3] I thank Ivan Ermakoff for providing me with data from the diocesan archive of Lille.

Toulouse and Marseille, required derogations from the French government and the French Catholic Church to access them. As a result, this dissertation provides an opportunity for truly new insights on the behaviors of French bishops' during the Holocaust.

In addition to work in diocesan archives, from 2011-2013, I also conducted research at the French National Archives, the Shoah Memorial Archives in Paris (Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine), Archives of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, and the National Archives of the French Catholic Church (CNAEF). Each of these is located in Paris. Some, like the French National Archives, also have substantial collections online which I accessed after returning from France to the United States (2014-2016) in order to bolster the reliability and validity of documents I had already obtained abroad. This was especially the case for my analysis of clandestine Christian resistance movements.

In March 2013, I visited the Leo Baeck Institute at the Center for Jewish History in New York City. This enabled me to access the France Concentration Camp Collection, which includes documents on various organizations that provided assistance to Jews during the war.

In June 2014, I traveled to the Yad Vashem World Center for Holocaust research in Jerusalem, Israel. This provided me with access to files on clergy who have been named *Righteous Among the Nations*.

Finally, published memoirs were examined whenever possible to inform my analysis, as were life histories of bishops published by their respective dioceses (Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Nice). I also regularly consulted the *Dictionnaire des Évêques de France au XX$^{e}$ Siècle* for biographical data where needed.[4]

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[4] Dictionary of Bishops of France in the Twentieth Century.

**Outline**

*Shifting Stances* is comprised of four chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion. Chapter one draws on critical decision-making theory and research on status and collective action to examine how French bishops during the Holocaust decided to support the Vichy regime's initial anti-Semitic policy against Jews, the *Statut des Juifs*.

Previous work on the French Catholic Church during the Holocaust argues that bishops' interests and ideological values motivated their support for the Vichy regime. However, chapter one complicates these assertions through process tracing analysis of original documents from France, including bishops' notes, letters, diaries, and correspondences. Findings suggest that transformations in the political context leading up to 1940 combined with organizational changes within the Church and key actors' personal experiences with Nazis preceding the bishops' vote. This confluence of influences at the macro, meso, and micro-level informed French bishops' decisions to endorse the *Statut des Juifs*. Specifically, the rupture caused by the event of the Nazi invasion, occupation, and resulting division of the Church powerfully impacted French bishops' abilities to coordinate and determine a course of action. This chaos, and the selective repression by Nazis of bishops who were once outspoken advocates of Jews, provided opportunities for some vocal, high-status, and pro-Statute bishops to set the trajectory of the Church in motion. Others remained quiet, and their silence was decisive: in a time of disarray when the Church was seeking to determine a common stance, bishops' silence appeared as a tacit signal in favor of endorsing legal anti-Semitism.

Chapter two examines how the French Catholic episcopate contributed to the Vichy

government's attempts to reconstruct the nation with its project of National Revolution. Timing is an important consideration: whereas chapter one demonstrated how some bishops were conflicted in July and August 1940 about whether or not to endorse the new regime and its anti-Semitic policies against Jews, chapter two explains how by mid-Autumn 1940 — especially after Pétain had confirmed his commitment to the Church by abrogating the 1901 Law on Associations[5] — the episcopate had consolidated around a position of support for the Vichy government that it would publicly maintain until August 1942. I draw on Bourdieu's idea that legitimate political domination depends on political capital accumulation and symbolic capital accumulation (i.e., Bourdieu 1990, p. 124; Bourdieu 1989, p. 20), and I develop two proxies for each form of capital to uncover the mechanisms that led the French episcopate to become "a key agent and go-between in the process of legitimation" for the Vichy government (Peschanski 2004, p. 409). The first two proxies are public endorsements and institutional embeddedness (these serve as proxies to evaluate political capital accumulation), and the second two proxies are shared worldviews and common symbols (these serve as proxies to evaluate symbolic capital accumulation). Through modification of the "relational ethnography" method (Desmond 2014) to the purposes of sociohistorical analysis, I then explain how transformations in the relationship between the government and the episcopate contributed to the legitimation of the Vichy government while the relationship between the episcopate with the rabbinate simultaneously declined. In the conclusion, I also demonstrate how the episcopate contributed to the Vichy government's efforts, via its project of National Revolution, to naturalize Jews as "others"

[5] The law of associations, promulgated in 1901 suppressed nearly all of the religious orders in France and confiscated their property. It also dictated that no religious order could teach in France without government permission.

deserving of special treatment, an attempt at symbolic violence that paved the way for the physical violence to come.

Chapter three, recognizing that "the holders of bureaucratic authority never entail an absolutely monopoly [of legitimate symbolic violence],"[6] examines responses among the lower clergy and laity to bishops' public alliance with the Vichy government (Bourdieu 1989, p. 22). Specifically, I analyze the origins of *Témoignage Chrétien*, a clandestine Christian resistance journal devoted to spiritual resistance against Nazism, including the Vichy government's policies of anti-Semitism and the complicity of the hierarchy, through its public endorsement of the regime's National Revolution, in supporting violence against Jews.

As with the first two chapters, in chapter three, I investigate archival documents that were collected in France. This time, the data comes primarily from materials contained in the National Archives, where records on internal resistance movements during World War II in France, including Christian resistance movements, are contained. I also examine published memoirs and post-war testimonies with key activists in *Témoignage Chrétien.* My analysis, which is informed by theories of social movements in organizations and high-risk mobilization, combines factual and theoretical claims to identify what motivated the organizers of *Témoignage Chrétien*, how it came to be, and who participated in its diffusion given the dual dangers of such activism — resistance to both the Vichy government and the dictates of the Catholic hierarchy.

Findings indicate that, while moral anger about state anti-Semitism and bishops' concomitant silence preceded the creation of *Témoignage Chrétien*, repression through the shuttering of magazines in which they could write, and calls by the hierarchy for clergy and laity

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[6] I thank Chad Goldberg for reminding me of this quote.

to obey the Vichy government, amplified their anger and motivated them to coordinate a clandestine form of spiritual resistance. The tactic of writing and distributing a journal was chosen because of organizer's desires to promote a counter-narrative in response to the praise, actions, symbols and rituals of support for the regime emanating from the hierarchy, as well as — of course — the need to remain discreet for fear of further punishment. Another reason for why the creators of *Témoignage Chrétien* decided to form a clandestine Christian resistance journal was because writing was already in these "first movers" repertoire of contention. Finally, by the time the first edition of *Témoignage Chrétien* was published in November 1941, these same actors had acquired the material resources needed to create and distribute a clandestine journal through direct ties forged before they were forced underground. I conclude chapter three concludes by identifying three micro-mobilization mechanisms that mediated the influence of social ties on individual's decisions to join in this dangerous venture. Although the small sample size (n = 14 testimonies) means that findings cannot be representative of activist's choices to participate in *Témoignage Chrétien*, results that should be evaluated with further research suggest that social network ties were influential because of participation identities developed through previous activism, affective ties to existing members, and ideology. These are three reasons for why individuals, when asked, responded to the call to join *Témoignage Chrétien*.

Chapter four brings the puzzle of French bishops' shifting stances throughout World War II in France full-circle. Drawing this time on historical analysis of documents from France (bishops' notes, letters, and diaries; correspondence between bishops with Jewish authorities; correspondence between bishops with government authorities), Israel (files on Righteous Among the Nations), and the United States (documents on Christian clandestine rescue activities), my

findings suggest that bishops' shift in stances was a *social movement outcome* triggered by the *movement tactics* of *Témoignage Chrétien*, the *organizational circumstances* of bishops' declining relationship with the Vichy government, and the external *political context* of increasing violence against Jews in France.

These three findings — that *Témoignage Chrétien*'s tactics, broader organizational circumstances, and the external political context motivated bishops' protest — link up with the political mediation model of research on the consequences of social movements. However, the classic formulation of the model argues that interactions between *movement tactics* (finding one) and *political circumstances* (findings two and three) shape the outcomes of social movements, whereas my findings suggest an important distinction between *organizational circumstances* (finding two) and the wider *political context* (finding three). I therefore propose an extension to the political mediation model for research on the outcomes of social movements in organizations by separating the category of "political circumstances" into two exogenous variables: organizational circumstances and political contexts.

*Témoignage Chrétien* disrupted the episcopate's status quo by repeatedly challenging the hierarchy's calls for obedience to the anti-Semitic Vichy regime. The disruptive impact is evident in bishops' reactions, both positive and negative, as well as the vast amount of support it received from the laity. Bishops who were hostile to *Témoignage Chrétien*'s message expressed their disapproval accordingly. Bishops who were sympathetic sought out ways to help Jews. They did this largely by connecting with activists in *Amitié Chrétienne* — the clandestine publication's "sister organization." These actions would save many Jews from internment, deportation, and death. But they remained publicly silent acts, indicating that *Témoignage Chrétien*'s tactics,

while important, were necessary but not sufficient to prompt bishops' first public protest in August 1942 on behalf of Jews. Rather, the evidence indicates that the episcopate's organizational circumstances — that is, bishops' declining relationship with the Vichy government — were also significant.

Beginning with Darlan's appointment to power (9 February 1941), and worsening with Laval's (18 April 1942), the Catholic Church in France lost many of the concessions it had gained in the early years of the war, particularly in the realm of education. Individual bishops were also repeatedly threatened by government authorities who began to critique the actions of Cardinals Gerlier and Saliège and complain about the bishops' attempts to secure political benefits for the Church. As a result, the episcopate found itself in a *lose-lose* situation: beholden to two constituencies — the lower clergy and the laity on the one hand, and Vichy government authorities on the other — it was clear to bishops that they had to respond to *Témoignage Chrétien*'s demands that the hierarchy take a public stand in support of Jews and against Vichy's anti-Semitic policies or risk losing support from future generations of Catholics (a threat that was repeated in the pages of the journal from its very beginning), *or* the hierarchy had to strengthen its commitment to the Vichy government by limiting its engagement in politics and continuing to promote obedience and loyalty to the established power or risk putting the institution of the Church in danger of repression. What tipped the balance in favor of the former was, I find, changes to the external political context.

The start of the Final Solution in France was marked by a sudden rise in arrests and deportations of Jews in March 1942. The inclusion of women and the elderly in these roundups negatively affected public opinion and it affected bishops' perceptions of how to respond to the

unfolding crisis as well. These events in the wider political context made the issue of state violence against Jews impossible to ignore; the *Vel' d'Hiv* roundups of 16 and 17 July were particularly horrifying, as approximately 4,000 children from the ages of two and up were arrested and forcibly confined with their parents in a stadium merely ten miles from the Eiffel Tower with no food, water, nor any kind of sanitation. Subsequently, bishops in Occupied France sent a private letter of protest to the Vichy government, while bishops in Unoccupied France began communicating through the clandestine networks that *Témoignage Chrétien* and *Amitié Chrétienne* had developed in order to organize a public protest. These plans were furthered on 15 August 1942, in a secret meeting organized by the Nuncio who had grown untrustworthy of Laval's intentions.

The final spark to protest was ignited when Archbishop Saliège in Toulouse, long sympathetic to the plight of Jews and one of the earliest supporters of clandestine Christian resistance movements in his diocese, learned on 20 and 21 August 1942 of a forthcoming roundup that was planned for the 26th. The arrests were expected to be massive in scope. One day later, on 22 August, the Nuncio received confirmation that Laval, indeed, was actively encouraging deportations of Jews rather than merely succumbing to German pressures. The episcopate could no longer remain silent. On 23 August 1942, Archbishop Jules-Géraud Saliège walked up to his pulpit and gave voice to the cries of lower clergy, the cries of the laity, and most of all, to the cries of Jews in France.

# Chapter 1: The Sounds of Silence
## Explaining French Bishops' Support for the *Statut des Juifs*

*"The words of the prophets are written on the subway walls. And tenement halls. And whispered in the sounds of silence."*

-Simon and Garfunkel

*"It is not just print that counts. Silence speaks. Dead silence. Dignified silence. Silence of maturity. Silence of meditation. Silence of caution. Silence of service. Silence is an act. What is the nature of your silence?"*

-Monsignor Jules-Géraud Saliège[7]

### Introduction

The Holocaust in France is widely viewed as the most tragic time in its recent past. In May 1940, Germany invaded France. Within six weeks, the *Wehrmacht* reached Paris and the French government fled to Bordeaux. They eventually ended up in Vichy, a spa town in central France where the new, authoritarian government would rule throughout World War II. Among the Vichy regime's first decrees was the *Statut des Juifs*, a legislative measure intended to exclude Jews from public life in France and limit their influence. Between October 1940 and November 1941, eleven more measures restricting Jews' rights would come to be passed. By 1945 "some four hundred laws, decrees, and police measures" targeting Jews were introduced (Adler 2001, p. 1067). These exclusionary laws facilitated the incarceration, forced deportation, and eventual mass murder of approximately 77,000 Jews from France. In the end, one-quarter of the Jews in France were killed during the Holocaust. As the first in a series of measures that legalized anti-Semitism, France's initial *Statut des Juifs* was critical in setting the stage for violence to follow.

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[7] *Semaine religieuse de Toulouse*, 16 March 1941.

This chapter relies on process-tracing analysis of archival documents to explain the French Catholic Church's support for the *Statut des Juifs* in fall 1940. Approximately eighty-five percent of France was Catholic in 1940 (Bédarida 1998, p. 7), and Churches were flooded with civilians seeking guidance in the chaos following France's defeat (Drapac 1998, p. 142). Under the new regime, the Catholic Church became a "central player in the drama of public life" (Nord 2003, p. 11) and Catholicism became "the single most cohesive force in French society after Germany defeated France" (Drapac 1998, p. 28). Kselman (2000, p. 515) explains, "many French who previously had an attenuated relationship with the institutional Church were drawn into Catholic sanctuaries and shrines as a way to deal with the trauma of war and defeat." Jackson (2003, p. 25) corroborates: "religion was not an epiphenomenal issue: Catholic and lay associations had networks of patronage and social organizations extending into almost every crevice of French associational life." Marshal Pétain, Chief of State of Vichy France, was well aware of the Church's influence on public opinion and frequently sought guidance from French bishops on what to do about the Jews (Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 202).

**Image 1.1: Crowd gathered on 27 August 1939, at the Basilica Church of the Sacred Heart in Montmartre, Paris. Source: AP Photo.**

Furthermore, in summer 1940, authors of the *Statut des Juifs* consulted French bishops about whether such a policy would violate Christian principles (Joly 2013, p. 281). Due to the episcopate's considerable influence, it could be argued that Vichy's initial anti-Jewish statute never would have passed without French bishops' consent. Instead, the Catholic Church endorsed the statute — Monsignor Saliège of Toulouse proclaimed Vichy's position "incontestable" from "the viewpoint of Catholic doctrine" (Paldiel 2006, p. 74). Through statements of support like this one, French bishops helped to legitimize the Vichy regime's anti-Semitic agenda and influenced public opinion toward Vichy's treatment of Jews during the war.

This chapter has two aims, one historical and one theoretical. First, it seeks to understand how French bishops endorsed the *Statut des Juifs*. Existing explanations by historians suggest that the Church endorsed Vichy anti-Semitism as a result of ideological convergence (anti-Semitism) and material interests (opportunism). These explanations, detailed below, also tend to assume shared motivations, common understandings, and group solidarity within the Church. However, the research here reveals that this is an inaccurate representation of the episcopate at the time. In fact, the Church was in disarray, shocked by the invasion and subsequent defeat of France by Germany, and unable to communicate through regular institutional channels as a result of the division of France into occupied and unoccupied zones. Some of the Church's most prominent leaders were subject to arrest, interrogation, and repression by Nazis prior to the meeting in which the *Statut* would be decided upon. Considering these events — and how they were subjectively perceived by bishops at the time — changes the dominant historical narrative from one rife with ideology and opportunism to one of heady confusion. In turn, understanding

how bishops determined a shared stance of support for the *Statut* requires precise attention to their decision-making processes: given the chaos posed by the dual crises of war and occupation, how did French bishops elect to endorse the *Statut des Juifs*?

The second contribution of this chapter is to the theoretical literature on critical decision-making and processes of tacit alignment in high-risk contexts. According to Ermakoff (2014, p. 237, 2012, 2008), critical decisions are defined by the fact that the decision is risky (material, moral, or physical) for the individual, will affect the welfare of others (and decision-makers are aware), and will significantly and durably modify the range of future possible options — again, something the decision-makers are aware of. French bishops' assignment by Vichy to decide on the *Statut des Juifs* was a critical decision indeed. To resist it would mean incurring the risk of inviting repression from Nazis, as had already happened to the Church elsewhere in Europe. But to accept it would legitimize anti-Semitism as state policy and set the Church on a trajectory of collaboration with Vichy and the Nazis in their anti-Semitic agenda. This chapter traces the emergence of French bishops' endorsement of the statute, and emphasizes the significance of silence among high-status, prominent authorities — important for shaping groups' collective outcomes (e.g. Simpson et al. 2012) — in a critical conjuncture that would then set the Church's position throughout the first half of World War II. In line with past work (Ermakoff 2008, p. 208; Gibson 2012, pp. 45-47; Mische 2014, pp. 446-7), I conceptualize silence as a statement, and I validate existing arguments on the specific power of "prominent silence" (Ermakoff 2008, p. 297) to influence alignment processes when critical decisions are being made. Sometimes, silence speaks volumes.

**Data and Analysis**

Documents analyzed in this chapter come from several diocesan archives in France, including the diocesan archives of Paris and Toulouse, as well as the diocesan archive of Cambrai where all meeting minutes of the ACA are located. Data was also collected from the French National Archives, the Shoah Memorial Archives in Paris (Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine), the Archives of the *Alliance Israelite Universelle* and the National Archives of the French Catholic Church (CNAEF). Much of this documentation has only recently been made available to the public, and derogations were required from the French Catholic Church to access sources in the diocesan archives of Marseille and Toulouse. Most materials are handwritten in French, though some were typed. Documents were photographed or scanned and their content summarized in detailed analytic narratives. This provides the empirical basis of the analysis presented herein.[8]

I analyze the data using process-tracing methods. In other words, I use evidence from within the case to make inferences about the case (Bennett and Checkel 2015, p. 4). According to Beach and Pedersen (2013), process-tracing can serve three functions: theory testing, which uses deductive reasoning; theory building, which uses inductive reasoning; and outcome explaining, which uses of both kinds of logic to causally explain outcomes. Since my goal is to explain how French bishops elected to endorse the *Statut des Juifs*, I follow the latter of these three logics. Given the kind and nature of data collected, I also adhere to Bennett and Checkel's (2015, pp. 20-31) "best practices" for process-tracing checklist (Table 1.1), combined with Lyall's (2015,

[8] All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Footnotes indicate primary sources, and parentheses indicate secondary sources and relevant literature.

pp. 186-209) potential outcomes framework for process-tracing with little (or no) data as well as security concerns and fluid processes (Table 1.2).

**Table 1.1: Process Tracing, Best Practices**

| | |
|---|---|
| **1.** | **Cast the net widely for alternative explanations** |
| **2.** | **Be equally tough on the alternative explanations** |
| **3.** | **Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources** |
| **4.** | **Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative explanations** |
| **5.** | **Make a justifiable decision on when to start** |
| **6.** | **Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable decision on when to stop** |
| **7.** | **Combine process-tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research goal and feasible** |
| **8.** | **Be open to inductive insights** |
| **9.** | **Use deduction to ask "if my explanation is true, what will be the specific process leading to the outcome?"** |
| **10.** | **Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process tracing is conclusive** |

Reproduced from Bennett and Checkel, eds. (2015).
*Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge University Press.

**Table 1.2: Process Tracing, Potential Outcomes Framework**

| | |
|---|---|
| **1.** | **Identify counter-factual ("control") observations to help isolate causal processes and effects** |
| **2.** | **Create "elaborate" theories where congruence across multiple primary indicators and auxiliary measures ("clues") is used to assess the relative performance of competing explanations** |
| **3.** | **Use process-tracing to understand the nature of treatment assignment and possible threats to causal inference** |
| **4.** | **Do out-of-sample testing** |

Generated from Lyall (2015). "Process Tracing, Causal Inference, and Civil War."
In: Bennett and Checkel, Eds. *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge University Press.

I use Lyall's "potential outcomes framework" for three reasons. First, the documents analyzed in this chapter include previously unavailable data due to the Statute of 3 January 1979 on archives, Article 7, which mandates that government-held archives relating to the security of

the State or national defense can only be made available to the public once 60 years has passed. This law guided many dioceses in their decisions to only recently make documents from the time of World War II publicly available. However, it is likely that some documents remain inaccessible or altogether destroyed, thus fitting Lyall's first criteria. For example, at the diocese of Marseille, I learned that many documents were intentionally disposed of towards the end of the war to protect Monsignor Archbishop Delay, who had by then become a rescuer of Jews in the region. The potential for missing data motivates my first interest in adhering to Lyall's potential outcomes framework.

Second, security concerns were rarely an issue for me, the researcher, in collecting data from diocesan archives and elsewhere throughout France decades after the end of World War II. However, security concerns *were* an issue for bishops "producing" the data in summer 1940, as I demonstrate further below. Many bishops were under careful watch by Nazis, especially after the start of the war in which French bishops' homes and archives were raided by German police. This matches Lyall's second criteria for the process-tracing potential outcomes framework: process-tracing when security concerns are an issue.

Finally, my third rationale for attending to Lyall's precepts in addition to Bennet and Checkel's, is the context of this study: the physical and metaphorical landscape of France was changing rapidly at the time data was being produced and this affected the Church greatly. In August 1940, the episcopate was divided in two as a result of the division of France itself, French priests were mobilized as Chaplains, and over one-third of clergy fought in the army (Bernay 2012, p. 115). Lyall (2015, p. 186) suggests that "fluid processes," especially contextual ones, should motivate adherence to the potential outcomes framework. As a result, Lyall's

approach to process-tracing combined with Bennett and Checkel's "best practices" checklist is the best methodological fit for my interest in explaining how French bishops endorsed the *Statut des Juifs* in August 1940. Below, I initiate the analysis analysis with best practices one and two: I cast the net widely for alternative explanations, and I am equally tough on them.[9]

**Existing explanations of French bishops' support for the *Statut des Juifs***

No sociologist has directly analyzed French Catholic support for Vichy's anti-Semitic legislation. However, explanations offered by historians who have studied the Holocaust in France tend to align with existing sociological theories of ideological values and material interests as influences on political positioning. In the following section, I consider each explanation and show why neither argument as presently formulated can account for why the Association of Cardinals and Archbishops (hereafter, ACA) endorsed the *Statut des Juifs* in August 1940.

*Ideology*

There are three strains in historians' arguments that assert ideology explained French bishops' support for early Vichy anti-Semitism. Each is a variant on the idea that ideological affinities brought the French episcopate and the state together against Jews. The first is that the

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[9] Mahoney (2000), who has also published widely on process-tracing methods, writes that there are three major categories of theoretical explanation in historical sociology. The first is explanation based on actors' material power, the second is explanation based on institutional constraints and opportunities, the third is explanation based on social norms or legitimacy. Bennett and Checkel (2015) propose another taxonomy: first, agent-based explanations; second, structural explanations. Both these suggestions are useful. However, since significant previous research has already suggested ideological and materialist reasons for why French bishops supported the *Statut*, I begin by reviewing past work (inductive analysis) and then proceed with deductive process-tracing analysis of the evidence in the archival documentation. This in turn makes the study one of "outcome explaining," à la Beach and Pedersen (2013), explained on p.X of this chapter.

French Catholic Church perceived German defeat as divine punishment for France, and the French people's vulgar abandonment of Catholic values. Caught in a religious fervor, French bishops' beliefs about decadence and dissipation under the Third Republic aligned with the notion that France's "sacred mission" could only be brought about through the creation of a new regime that placed Catholicism front and center, limiting Jews' rights. Gildea (2002, p. 193), for example, explains that the Bishop of Nantes believed "France had been defeated not by military inferiority nor even by social strife but by de-Christianization and sin." As a result, Gildea describes how the bishops of Nantes thought "the remedy to this disaster" was for France to pray, repent, and return to God. Gildea then writes, "in one way the defeat was already a start [because] it had cleared from power the republican politicians, manipulated by Freemasons and Jews, who for seventy years had pursued their work of de-Christianization." For Gildea, there is a direct relationship between the French bishops' belief in defeat as a punishment for sin and their support for policies that would restrict Jews' rights. This is one way in which historians conceive of an ideological narrative that would lead Catholic authorities to believe Jews could be allowed to suffer in the service of the Church and the greater good.

The second iteration of the ideology-based argument is that French bishops saw Nazism as the lesser evil to Communism in the pre-war and wartime periods, thus driving them to endorse the Vichy regime, including its stances toward Jews, and its policy of collaboration with Germany. Thus Halls (1995, p. 82) writes that Cardinal Suhard supported the German war effort due to his hatred for the Soviet Union, and Burrin (1996, p. 200) makes this point as well. Likewise, Paxton (1987, p. 81) declares, "important segments [of French Catholic opinion] were ready to consider some kind of accommodation with Hitler preferable to another exhausting long

war from which only Communism could benefit." Finally, Curtis (2002, p. 333) writes, "Both the Church and Vichy were equally happy about the end of the Third Republic … Both had as a high priority the fight against communism; for the Church the *Statut des Juifs* was of less importance than the struggle against the masons and communists." For these authors, anti-Communism was an ideology that motivated bishops to collude with Vichy and the Nazis, even as both political authorities made "solving" the "Jewish Problem" central to their platform.[10]

The third iteration of the ideology-based argument proposes that French bishops were privately anti-Semites, and so their personal value systems aligned with those of anti-Semitic policymakers in Vichy who saw Jews as the enemies of France. A classic example is Phillip Nord's (2003, p. 11) assertion that "The Church's enemies were also the regime's: liberalism, parliamentarism, Freemasonry, 'excessive' Jewish influence, and communism … Vichy beckoned to Catholics," he writes, "and few at the outset saw much reason not to respond." Similarly, Delpech (1983, p. 54) suggests that the episcopate supported Vichy in early years of the war because of long-held anti-Semitism among Catholics:

> Traditional Catholic circles were particularly exposed to the contagion of anti-Semitism because of the persistence of old anti-Judaism and religious ties that continued to unite Catholic and right-wing circles hostile to the Republic and

[10] The preamble to the *Statut des Juifs* demonstrates how solving the "Jewish Problem" was central to the National Revolution instituted by Vichy upon its ascension: "In its work of national reconstruction the government from the very beginning was bound to study the problem of Jews as well as that of certain aliens, who, after abusing our hospitality, contributed to our defeat in no small measure. In all fields and especially in the public service…the influence of Jews has made itself felt, insinuating and finally decomposing. All observers agree in noting the baneful effects of their activity in the course of recent years, during which they had a preponderant part in the direction of our affairs. The facts are there and they command the action of the government to which has fallen the pathetic task of French restoration." *Le Temps*, "Le Statut des juifs français." 19 October 19 1940, p. 3.

> secularism … this anti-Semitism, economic, social, and political, persisted and worsened during the crisis [of French defeat] and led to increasing xenophobia.

Finally, Rousso (1986, p. 7) and Pierrard (1997 [1970]) likewise insist on Catholic anti-Semitism above all in explaining the Church's stance. Combined, they highlight several currents of anti-Semitism prominent in France at the start of World War II, including counter-revolutionary anti-Semitism aimed at Jews who became citizens as a result of the French Revolution; xenophobic anti-Semitism aimed at naturalized citizens to limit Jewish autonomy; and segregationist anti-Semitism, aimed at limiting the influence of Jews in professional fields (Joly 2013, p. 278). They merge to form the thesis that Vichy's *Statut des Juifs* was a manifestation of "autochthonous" general French anti-Semitism (Joly 2013, p. 276; see also Aron 1958 [1954]; Caron 2001, 2005; Meyer 2010), as opposed to anti-Semitism that emerged in the wake of France's defeat by the Nazis or in response to the rise of Communism, as with the first and second ideological theses respectively.

*Interests*

A second explanation in much historical scholarship on French bishops' early support for Vichy anti-Semitism suggests that the Catholic hierarchy aligned with Vichy, including Vichy's anti-Semitic policies, because the new regime promised to reunite Church and State in ways unseen since the French Revolution. Here, the focus is explicitly on material interests and opportunism. In particular, this thesis proposes that French bishops were so pleased with Marshal

Pétain's public adoration of Catholicism that the situation of Jews in France was brushed aside. Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981], pp. 197-198), for example, write:

> The changes of summer 1940 seemed to offer Catholic France the prospects of deliverance … The main attraction was a change of tone, a new world view, in which the new regime took on the imprint of a moral order and made public expressions of deference to the Church … The Jews were easily forgotten in this atmosphere of reconquista … Religious euphoria was at its height as the first *Statut des Juifs* was being promulgated.

For these scholars, the situation of Jews was unimportant to bishops who exalted in, and felt exalted by, the new regime. Burrin (1996, p. 217) corroborates: "In the new France, the Church rediscovered the principles by which it was defined … In defeated France, the Church felt it had the wind in its sails, in the early days at least." By contrast, Burrin describes the Church's reaction to the Statute as "flaccid" (223) and explains, "silence [was] prompted by doctrinal reasons as well as by patriotism." Likewise, Jackson (2003, p. 370) writes that "The first Jewish Statute aroused little interest … Catholic leaders said nothing." On the other hand, Jackson suggests, the Catholic Church in France enthusiastically supported Vichy because its themes of "contrition, sacrifice, and suffering" resonated with the Church and "not since the 1870s had the Church seen a greater opportunity to advance its interests" (p. 269).

The historical position that emphasizes opportunism maps onto sociological debates regarding the role of interests in explaining religious support for authoritarianism. Such theories

suggest that in the presence of religious competition, churches will ally with the oppressed to prevent nominal Catholics from choosing competitors (even if this means opposing the state). By contrast, in settings where the Church monopolizes the religious field (or has the opportunity to do so by allying with the state), leaders are less pressured to "market" religion, and are more likely to ally with an authoritarian regime (i.e. Gill 1998; Trejo 2009). This argument is a variant on Religious Competition Theory (RCT), which dominates research in the social sciences on the political behavior of religious institutions (Bellin 2008; Grzymala-Busse 2012). At the core of RCT is the idea that religious organizations aim to minimize costs and maximize benefits — as any good market actor should — when making decisions about political positioning (Iannaccone 1991; Stark and Finke 2000). When applied to Vichy France, the material interest argument suggests that the new authoritarian state's public praise of Catholicism enabled the Church to feel secure in its status and membership, and to have little or no concern about religious minorities such as Jews. Hence, historians argue that French bishops' decisions to endorse the Vichy regime, including its anti-Semitic statutes, were based on the ways in which clergy perceived the Church would benefit from this position. Specifically, they propose that the Church's choice to ally with Pétain and applaud the new regime was a rational decision made in response to the National Revolution's reunification of Church and State. It had nothing to do with Jews, who were supposedly forgotten about in this atmosphere of *reconquista*, to recall Marrus and Paxton's (1995 [1981], pp. 197-198) description, above.

It is not surprising that historians have identified ideological and interest-based motivations to explain why the Church supported Vichy anti-Semitism in early years of the war. As with Ermakoff's (2008) study of the French National Assembly's vote to transfer

constitutional powers to Marshal Pétain on July 10, 1940 — which occurred one-and-a-half months prior to French bishops' vote on the *Statut des Juifs* — this time period in France was perceived as a "collective conjuncture" by those responsible for making major political (and subsequently, critical) decisions (Ermakoff 2010, p. 100). In such moments, both extremes of the "moral integrity spectrum" are often visible: "opportunistic ambitions, on the one hand, moral integrity cast in ideological terms, on the other" (p. 101). However (and much like Ermakoff's own research on French parliamentarians), in the middle of these two poles was considerable confusion for French bishops who comprised the episcopate and were thus responsible for deciding on the *Statut*. This matters because it indicates that although some bishops, like the bishop of Nantes identified by Gildea, might have held ideological dispositions that made them more inclined to support Vichy and its anti-Semitic legislation, while others, like Cardinal Gerlier of Lyon (whom I discuss further in this chapter), were also eager to support Vichy because of the ways in which they perceived the Church could benefit from such an alignment, neither of these perspectives explains *how the episcopate as a whole* came to endorse the *Statut* as Church policy. If confusion reigned supreme and coordination was disarrayed, then how did determinacy emerge days later? For this, we need to attend to the processes of alignment within the Church as bishops in both occupied and unoccupied France endeavored to determine a shared stance. The following section begins in 1933, when Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany (30 January) and the Enabling Act was passed (24 March), abolishing all political parties other than the Nazis.

**Hitler's rise to power and French bishops' responses, 1933-1939**

Analysis of French bishops' public statements as well as their private notes and reflections as indicated in their diaries and correspondence reveals repeat, unambiguous denunciations by important Church authorities against the Nazi belief system starting in 1933 and continuing until the invasion of France in 1940. Additionally, Cardinal Baudrillart notwithstanding[11], there is little evidence that French bishops were un-prepared or unwilling to support France's alliance with Britain on behalf of democracy prior to the invasion of France. In the months, weeks, and days leading up to Germany's invasion, many French clergy publicly stated that Nazis were the enemy and according to the Archbishops and Cardinals chiefly responsible for shaping the Church's positions, they believed that Nazism was the enemy of Christ. In September 1939, shortly after Germany invaded Poland and war was declared by Britain and France on Germany, French bishops publicly declared their support for "the rights of man, human morality, [and] freedom" in the words of the Archbishop of Cambrai, Monsignor Jean Chollet. Monsignor Chollet also described the war against the Nazis as a "crusade" in "defense of civilization."[12] At the same time, and as a result of increasing repressions of Catholics abroad, French bishops' outspokenness shifted in tone from outright support for Jews in 1933 to condemnations of Nazi racism with vague reference to suffering populations in 1940.

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[11] Often Cardinal Baudrillart is described as a willing collaborator with the Nazis and one of few extreme anti-Semites in the Catholic hierarchy during World War II. However, from analysis of his diaries, Baudrillart's attitude toward Jews from 1933 until his death in 1942 are more complex than the typical portrayal of him as pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic suggests. Certainly, Baudrillart saw communism as a major threat to France, even publishing a tract titled *Against Bolshevism* in 1941. He also eventually came to endorse the German war effort and encouraged French civilians to volunteer for the SS and Wehrmacht in fighting the Soviet Union — a stance that Suhard tried to mitigate for fear that Baudrillart's positions would appear to the public as if they were his own, by asking for an intervention from the Holy See (Actes et Documents du Saint Siège relatif à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, Vol. 5. 30 December 1941, Rap. nr. 4102/669, A.E.S. 491/42, *Le nonce en France Valeni au cardinal Maglione*). Yet in 1940 when Germany first invaded France, Baudrillart did not endorse Nazism nor did he support Vichy's anti-Semitic policies.

[12] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 6D 048; also in Guerry, Monsignor Émile (1947). *L'Église Catholique en France Sous l'Occupation*, p. 9. Flammarion: Paris.

Bishops were consistently vocal on the need to defend the rights of man, but from 1933-1940, they explicitly mention Jews in these protests less and less.

For example, with Hitler's 1933 rise to power, Cardinal Jean Verdier of Paris published a letter encouraging Catholics to pray for their Jewish brothers in Germany. The letter was published in the *Semaine Religieuse de Paris*[13] and *La Croix*[14], at a time when most Catholics were likely to pay attention: the holy week of the Jubilee Year of Redemption (which also coincided with Passover in 1933 for Jews). According to Bernay (2012, pp. 64-66), this letter motivated other Catholic authorities to speak on behalf of Jews throughout 1933, including Monsignor Gaillard in Tours, Cardinal Maurin in Lyon, Cardinal Andrieu of Bordeaux, and Monsignor Saliège, along with Monsignor Bruno de Solages, in Toulouse. The latter two participated in a meeting organized by the League for Human Rights at which the mayor of Toulouse, the Rabbi, pastor, and dean of the University were present. Finally, Monsignor Dubourg of Marseille, Cardinal Liénart of Lille (represented by his vicar, Monsignor Bouchandhomme), and the Bishop of Nancy, Monsignor Hurrault, spoke out on behalf of Jews in their communities. Monsignor Rémond made a public declaration in the diocese of Nice:

> Processes of intolerance, sectarianism, and persecution for religious reasons, no matter where they come from and the denomination they are against, should provoke a universal reprobation from all honest people … It is necessary that all men of righteous heart and loyal soul, with the cult of moral and spiritual forces,

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[13] *Semaine Religieuse de Paris*, 8 April 1933, p. 521.

[14] *La Croix*, no. 15, 8 April 1933, p. 2.

> unite to protest against such violations of freedom of conscience, against oppression, the victims of which today are Israelites from Germany.[15]

Such statements reached Nazi authorities in Germany; ambassador Adolf Köster sent a letter to the German government noting the powerful reactions of French clergy to anti-Semitic persecutions abroad (cited in Bernay 2012, p. 68). Köster feared the bishops' impact on French public opinion.

In contrast, as time passed and the Nazis began to target Catholics alongside Jews, the French bishops' protests became less explicitly about combating anti-Semitism, and more often about anti-racism and respect for the human person. Between 30 June and 2 July 1934, a series of political murders were carried out by Nazis in Germany. In this attack, famously known as *The Night of the Long Knives*, Hitler's henchmen targeted dissidents, including important figureheads of Catholic organizations who had expressed criticism of Nazis. The national director of Germany's Catholic youth sports association, the leader of Catholic Action in Germany, a lawyer who worked for Catholic Action, and the editor of Munich's Catholic weekly were all murdered by Nazi Stormtroopers (*Sturmabteilung*, or SA).[16] This shifted the coverage in French Catholic presses toward concerns about the Church, and away from concerns about Jews. Discourses proclaiming the equal rights of man were still pronounced, but specific mentions of Jews became less frequent.

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[15] Reprinted in *Univers Israelite*, no. 31. 28 April 1933, p. 93, and *Paix et Droit*, no. 4. April 1933, pp. 10-11.

[16] This repression of Catholic authorities who criticized Nazis in Germany should not overshadow the fact that many other Catholic authorities in Germany at the time were outspoken in their support of Hitler and anti-Semitism (Friedländer 1997, pp. 42-49).

Likewise, in March 1937, Pope Pius XI published two encyclicals, the first against Nazi racism and the second against Communism.[17] *Mit Brennender Sorge* ("With Burning Concern"), the first tract, warned that Nazi racism was fundamentally incompatible with Catholic doctrine. Given at the Vatican on Passion Sunday (though published four days prior), the encyclical proclaimed:

> Whoever exalts race, or the people, or the State, or a particular form of State, or the depositories of power, or any other fundamental value of the human community — however necessary and honorable be their function in worldly things — whoever raises these notions above their standard value and divinizes them to an idolatrous level, distorts and perverts an order of the world planned and created by God; he is far from the true faith in God and from the concept of life which that faith upholds.[18]

*Mit Brennender Sorge,* while explicitly defending baptized Jews, did not mention Jews in general. Only its indirect condemnation of racism protested Hitler's attacks on Jews and others

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[17] Some scholars (i.e., Delpech 1983; Falconi 1965) argue the power of *Mit Brennender Sorge* was diminished by *Divini Redemptoris*, the encyclical against Communism published just five days later. By contrast, Henri de Lubac (1990, pp. 31-32), a Jesuit priest who helped found the clandestine *Cahiers de Témoignage Chrétien* in the middle of the war, writes in his memoirs that this is a "systematic distortion of reality" and that *Mit Brennender Sorge* was tremendously impactful in both Germany and France, where the French ambassador the Vatican described it as "a crushing blow, in its release, a clap of thunder."

[18] *Mit Brennender Sorge.* "Encyclical of Pope Pius XI On the Church and the German Reich, to the venerable brethren, the Archbishops and Bishops of Germany and other ordinaries, in peace and communion with the Apostolic See." 14 March 1937.

deemed "inferior races." Still, this encyclical set the tone for many French bishops who once again sounded warnings against the dangers of racism.

The pope intended *Mit Brennender Sorge* to reach a wide readership. It was published in German rather than Latin, and it was smuggled into Germany to evade censorship. Thirty-thousand copies were made, and it was read from every German Catholic Church pulpit on Palm Sunday. Not unexpectedly, its publication led to severe reprisals against the Church in Germany, including Gestapo raids and the closing of the 12 presses that had published the tract. As the Nazis pressed on into Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in the years that followed, here, too, Church institutions were shuttered, dismantled, and destroyed.[19] These repressions had a profound impact on the Catholic Church in France, as did *Kristallnacht* eight months later.

On 7 November 1938, a German-born Jew named Herschel Grzynspan who had emigrated to France from Poland shot and killed German diplomat Ernst von Rath at the German embassy in Paris. Grzynspan's actions were used as a pretext for *Kristallnacht* in Germany and Austria. Also around this time, demonstrations against Jews and attacks on foreigners began occurring with regularity in the streets of Paris, Dijon, St. Etienne, Nancy, and in the region of Alsace-Lorraine (Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 40). For some French civilians, Jews were now seen as foreigners dragging them into a war they did not want (Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 39). Yet this did not stop some prominent French bishops from continuing to speak out against Nazi ideology, and — albeit in coded terms — on behalf of Jews. Following

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[19] For example, Immediately after the Nazi occupation of Austria, policies of *Kulturkampf* led to the total dissolution of Christian Youth organizations and all organs of the Catholic Press. Some Austrian priests were sent to Dachau and Buchenwald, and a Nazi mob broke into Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna's residence, stoning and ransacking his home. Even curate Father John Krawarik was thrown from a cathedral window in Vienna, sustaining severe injury ("Germany: The Vienna Riots," *The Tablet*. 22 October 1938. See also Mazower 2008, pp. 51-52). The news of these attacks reached France quickly, especially through Cardinal Verdier, who was in contact with the French resistance in Austria and elsewhere (Bernay 2012, p. 123).

*Kristallnacht,* and alongside Cardinal van Roey of Mechelen in Belgium and Cardinal Schuster of Milan, Italy, Cardinal Verdier of Paris proclaimed:

> Very close to us, in the name of racial rights, thousands and thousands of people were tracked down like wild beasts, stripped of their possessions, veritable pariahs who are seeking in vain in the heart of civilization for shelter and a piece of bread. There you have the result of this racial theory.[20]

Likewise, discussions about constructing an anti-Jewish statute in France bubbled up in April 1938 and throughout 1939 (Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 44), but the bishops continued to defend Jews in France. For example, on 24 September 1939, three weeks after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Archbishop Saliège of Toulouse expressed deep concern:

> [Youth are learning] there is one race that must dominate which, by extension, must advance humanity and destroy all other races. This is the German race. For its success all is permitted: murder, falsehood, frightful and total war. We must reflect on this. If we do not reflect on this … we degrade man, we kill man in a slow death. [This is] the hatred of Christ, of the Church, the hatred of all that is

[20] *L'Église contre le racisme, une hérésie antiromaine. D*éclarations des cardinaux et archevêques de Malines, Paris, et Milan et du patriarche de Lisbonne (1939). Paris: Bonne Presse. p. 37.

> not German, of all man that is not German and by consequence, of a degenerate race.[21]

Moreover, even as France entered the Phoney War with Great Britain against Germany, French bishops continued to remark on the need to defend France, and humanity, against the Nazis. As Cardinal Suhard, then the Archbishop of Reims, expressed in a pastoral letter to his congregation in September 1939:

> We feel as if we are marching not only to keep our word to an odiously attacked people, but also for the most precious value for all of France and mankind: the maintenance of justice, the right to freedom, and for peace among peoples, all those things without which the earth would be uninhabitable.[22]

He added:

> Many times, following the sovereign Pope Pie XI, we exposed to you Hitler's racist doctrines … we have seen how, in these last few years, this doctrine has imposed destruction and terror … we know, along with our allies, that we are defending not only ourselves but all that exists in the world of human value and true Christian values.

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[21] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 6D 048; also in Guerry, Monsignor Émile (1947). *L'Église Catholique en France Sous l'Occupation.* Flammarion: Paris. p. 10.

[22] Ibid., p. 7.

In these declarations, Catholic authorities protested Nazism, spoke explicitly against racism, and encouraged the laity to defend these values. Following the tone set by *Mit Brennender Sorge*, these declarations did not explicitly mention anti-Semitic persecution at home and abroad, yet these French bishops' denunciation of Hitlerian racism was unequivocal. This complicates past arguments that suggest bishops' ideologies or material interests motivated Catholic Church alignment with the *Statut des Juifs*. Without this critical background, it is more easily believable that bishops eagerly, discretely, or latently anticipated the rise of an anti-Semitic, authoritarian regime in France. Yet given that Hitler's rise to power only *strengthened* some bishops' commitments to anti-Nazism, anti-racism, and support for Jews, the French episcopate's endorsement of the *Statut des Juifs* during the ACA of August 1940 is all the more puzzling. Transformations in the political context leading to Germany's invasion of France resulted in less blatant protests on behalf of Jews, but the French episcopate's defense of anti-Nazism was still prevalent.

**The Meso Level: Crisis and Organizational Disarray**

To understand what motivated the bishops' vote in 1940, we need to consider the background above and also examine the impact of external events on local dynamics within the Church, as well as on the individual bishops responsible for shaping the Church's position toward the *Statut.* This section addresses the first of these two concerns.

On 15 May 1940, five days after Germany launched its first operation, the *Wehrmacht* was deep in France. Germany's second operation commenced on 5 June, and, by the 14th, Nazis

were marching down the Champs-Élysées, while the government fled first to Bordeaux, then to Vichy in Central France. German commanders and French officials met less than one week later, on 18 June in Compiègne, France — the same site where Germany surrendered in 1918. Only four days later, on 22 June 1940, France and Germany signed an armistice. The terms of the armistice stipulated that France be divided into an occupied zone in the north and west and a "free zone" in southern and eastern France. The former was under the control of a German *Militärbefehlshaber* (military commander), and the latter under the authority of Marshal Pétain. Germany also annexed Alsace-Lorraine, and German-allied Italian forces occupied France's southeastern corner.

For French civilians, Germany's invasion was a catastrophe. Reactions have been described as "a state of shock," "pain," and "grief" (Gildea 2003, p. 16); that the French were "traumatized" (Laborie 1990, p. 125); stunned "to their very depths;" and "stupefied" (Burrin 1996, p. 5). The shock was palpable. Laborie (1990, p. 203) describes the atmosphere as a "climate of catastrophe," and Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981], p. 14) write that "the world was turned upside down." Gildea (2003, p. 16) describes how "normal patterns of life were disrupted, moral certitudes were undermined, raw nerves were exposed." Suddenly France, so recently resistant and defiant, had to collaborate with the enemy and adhere to new laws and regulations (Burrin 1996; Jackson 2003). French civilians were required to adapt to public signage written in German, a curfew imposed every night, and even a new time zone (the German military switched France to "German time" at the start of occupation). French cities saw rationing, resulting in widespread hunger as Germans seized twenty percent of French food production (Collingham 2013).

In the occupied zone, Marshal Pétain proclaimed the armistice as an opportunity for renewal, and rapidly began institutionalizing the *Révolution Nationale*. Perceiving the disorder as an opening for change, Pétain implemented policies to construct a new France with few delays. On 22 June, an armistice between France and Germany was signed. Three days after the armistice was signed, "Pétain…announced the beginning of a new order and bade [his compatriots to] help him to set up a 'new France'" (Burrin 1996, p. 14).

Within the French Catholic Church, confusion, chaos and indecision also prevailed, despite efforts to present a unified front as the new regime rose to power. Two major organizational changes profoundly affected the Church's ability to communicate. First, the division of France  meant that French bishops' abilities to coordinate and determine a course of action were severely disrupted. Lines of demarcation made correspondence among bishops difficult without Nazi permission, thus limiting what could be said and to whom.

Additionally, on 10 February 1939, Pope Pius XI died. This meant that not only were bishops' direct networks shattered, but that high-status authorities who could serve as a "focal point" (Schelling 1960; Clark et al. 2006; Ermakoff 2008) for coordination were also suddenly gone, too. Of course, a new Pope — Pope Pius XII — rapidly took Pope Pius XI's place. However, Pius XII's approach to the "Jewish Problem" was decidedly different from that of his predecessor and some French bishops expressed concern.

For example, in the days before he passed away, the pope prepared yet another speech that would denounce Nazi racism and Mussolini's mounting embrace of Hitler. Aware of his increasingly fragile health, the pope also ordered the Vatican Press to make copies of the speech for every bishop that would attend his meeting. Pope Pius XI intended to read his speech to all of

Italy's bishops on the 11th at St. Peter's Basilica in Rome. Pope Pius XI died on 10 February 1939, unable to give his final remarks. Worse, Mussolini had heard about the Pope's intentions. Shortly after the Pope's death, Mussolini contacted Cardinal Pacelli (soon to be Pope Pius XII), and requested that Pacelli destroy all copies of the speech lest it turn public opinion against him. Pacelli acquiesced, and Pope Pius XI's final condemnation of Nazism was never read (Kertzer 2014, pp. xxix-xxxiii).

Three weeks later, Pacelli was nominated to the papacy, and would serve as Pope throughout World War II. Pope Pius XII (the name taken in deference to his predecessor) encouraged "human solidarity and charity" in his first encyclical, published on 20 October 1939, but did not outright address Nazism or anti-Semitism.[23] Later in the war, particularly insofar as France was concerned, Pope Pius XII would also refrain from commenting on restrictions against Jews. In some cases, he even encouraged accommodation and appeasement toward Nazis. On 11 July 1940, one month after the German invasion and a day after Italy declared war on France, Cardinal Tisserant (a senior in the Roman Curia) wrote to Cardinal Suhard in Paris expressing his concerns about the new Pope's reticence: "I'm afraid that history may be obliged in time to come to blame the Holy See for a policy accommodated to its own advantage and little more. And that is extremely sad, above all when one has lived under Pius XI" (quoted in Kent 1988, p. 589). According to Tisserant, who was asked about this exchange in an interview fourteen years

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[23] *Summi Pontificatus.* "Encyclical of Pope Pius XII on the unity of human society to our venerable brethren: the patriarchs, primates, archbishops, bishops, and other ordinaries in peace and communion with the apostolic see." 20 October 1939.

later, his letter was "violent" in tone because "There was extreme tension in the Vatican. We were all unsure of the future."[24]

The result of this shift in papal leadership meant that the most prominent leader in the Catholic Church had altered its stance. This was significant for Catholics everywhere, but especially in France, where the Church had also lost Cardinal Verdier of Paris on 9 April 1940. Cardinal Verdier was one of the most outspoken allies of Jews in the French episcopate prior to the invasion of France. His public stances against Nazism had influenced French bishops from 1933-1940, many of whom followed with declarations of their own in alignment with Verdier's protests. Cardinal Verdier's death was marked by tremendous sorrow among Catholic clergy and Jewish community leaders alike.[25] Cardinal Suhard took his place, and a politics of caution and accommodation — in line with Pope Pius XII — would eventually come to dominate the new archbishop of Paris' formal position toward the Nazi occupiers. This is not how Suhard began his bishopship: recall how with the start of World War II in September 1939, Suhard proclaimed that Nazi racism was incompatible with Christian doctrine (p. 34). He also, in his diary, describes feeling concerned that his tendency towards a "conciliatory temperament" might not serve him well in negotiations with the Nazis and instead lead him to make "undesirable accommodations" (12 June 1940), "distress" when the Germans arrive in Paris (14 June 1940), and a commitment to try and act with "great reservation" in all his dealings with them (15 June

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[24] "French Cardinal Condemned Nazis." *The New York Times*, 25 February 1964.

[25] For example, with Verdier's death, the World Jewish Congress sent the episcopate their condolences, writing "The Jews the world over mourn deeply the death of His Eminence, Cardinal Verdier, the great defender of civilization against racial barbarism." *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, "World Jewish Congress Lauds Verdier as 'Defender of Civilization.'" 12 April 1940.

1940).[26,27] Suhard attempted to practice this reservation on 24 July 1940, when he refused to permission to two German officers who requested, in the name of the *Führer*, to use Sacré-Coeur and Notre Dame for a funeral mass in commemoration of all those who had been killed in the German army.[28] Two days later, on 26 July 1940 in Paris, German police followed Cardinal Suhard home from mass in Montmartre and placed him under house arrest.

**The Micro Level: Personal Attacks, Private Negotiations, and Public Statements**

*Occupied France*

Cardinal Suhard was sequestered by the Nazis for two days, held captive in his kitchen, unable to leave or to accept visitors. His central telephone was ripped from its socket so that he could not alert others to his arrest. Furthermore, all those present in Suhard's home at the time were apprehended and detained in separate rooms. Gestapo roamed the buildings and exercised strict surveillance, day and night. "Torn from his apartment where he was not allowed to return until Monday night," Suhard's secretary describes, "the Cardinal was thus enclosed, without sleeping attire nor toiletries, in a room hardly prepared, where he did not have at his disposition

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[26] Archives historiques de l'Archevêché de Paris, fonds Suhard, 1D 14 18. Journal Suhard, June 12-16, pp. 38-39. Hereafter referred to as "Suhard's Diary."

[27] Suhard's insecurity about his new position as Archbishop of Paris in Verdier's staid and hesitance about how his disposition might not serve him well in this role were expressed also in an exchange with his former student, Humbert Boüessé, who recalls Suhard writing him on 11 May 1940 "There is an amount of apostolic work to be organized at Paris. My instinctive reaction is to be afraid" (p. 491). It is also worth noting that when Suhard was first proposed the position of Archbishop of Paris in 1930, before Cardinal Verdier, he declined the offer (p. 486).

[28] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 2D, 2_4. "Les événements du 26 au 29 Juillet 1940 a l'Archevêché de Paris." Compte-Rendu du Chanoine Pasteau, secrétaire du Cardinal Suhard.

neither a book, brochure, a lead of chapter, nor a pen. The torture of isolation and idleness continued!"[29]

However, it was much more than isolation that concerned Suhard. After interrogating, searching, and releasing those who had been at the archbishops' home, the Nazis then undertook a methodical inventory of all documents and dossiers found in Suhard's and his secretaries' offices. When Suhard inquired about the cause of his detention, he was only told that the Nazi officers "knew" of a plot being hatched by Suhard against the Reich. Yet the questions asked *by* Nazis tell us more. When searching his home and confiscating documents, the Gestapo turned to Suhard and asked, "What do you know about the Judaeo-Masonic activities of Cardinal Verdier?"[30] Ascertaining the Cardinal's stance toward Jews was critical for the Nazis: given the heavy influence of the Church on French public opinion, the Germans sought to prevent Suhard from following in Verdier's footsteps, limiting any outspokenness on behalf of the Jews or against collaboration by the newly positioned authority of the French Catholic Church.

In addition to Suhard's sequestration in Paris, Cardinal Liénart in Lille and Cardinal Rocques, in Rennes, were arrested and interrogated in late July. They, too, were accused of being "Jew-lovers," of planning actions to subvert the Nazis, and of attempts to plot against the Reich.[31] Suhard, Liénart, and Rocques were even accused of organizing to subvert French-German collaboration with immigrant German adversaries of the Nazi regime in France.

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 3, "Rapport Personnel de S. Em. Le Cardinal Liénart Evêque de Lille sur la perquisition allemande à l'Evêché le 27 juillet 1940."

Finally, in addition to these personal attacks, the Nazis targeted Catholic organizations. The Catholic Institute of Paris, run by Cardinal Baudrillart, was investigated; the headquarters of *La Croix,* a Catholic daily that discussed social problems and political issues*,* was raided and pillaged. Throughout Paris, archives of catholic organizations and newspapers were stolen, their pages strewn about. This experience was nothing short of terrifying for the Church in France. The Nazi intimidation and destruction was effective: Church leaders, without capitulation, began to quiet their rhetoric as they saw their compatriots questioned, arrested, and silenced.

However, and in contrast to the assumptions of some past research, this silence did not mean ideological collusion with Nazi ideology nor opportunistically-driven ignorance among all those in the episcopate motivated by the potential for the Church to achieve material gain. For example, in his diary on 6 August, Cardinal Baudrillart writes about the treatment of what he calls "petty concerns" in contrast to the lack of conversation surrounding the invasion of the Catholic Institute in Paris and describes feeling frustrated with unfolding events and the hierarchy's reactions: "rarely have there been more pressing issues to discuss; rarely have the discussions been so insignificant."[32] Additionally, on 9 August, Baudrillart details a conversation with Archbishop Feltin, visiting from Bordeaux, who describes Vichy as "our sad government."[33] And on the 13th, Baudrillart reflects on having read a letter written by Liénart after his arrest — a forceful protest with "violent accusations against Vichy, its spirit, its government."[34] Cardinal Liénart, after his arrest, was unwilling to declare a formal alliance with the Vichy regime. Two

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[32] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 2B 65, *Les Carnets du Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart du 10 Mai au 28 Août, 1940*. 6 August 1940.

[33] Ibid., 9 August 1940.

[34] Ibid., 13 August 1940.

days later, Baudrillart writes about meeting a man and a priest: “They are surprised, and even wonder, if Pétain is even worthy of the praise being heaped upon him in Paris.”[35] Liénart and Baudrillart remained cautious about, if not outright antagonistic toward, unfolding events in France.[36]

As for Cardinal Suhard, in response to the Nazis’ interrogation, he defended Verdier’s actions on behalf of Jews, but he also diminished their significance and sought to assuage the Nazis that they could expect nothing but compliance henceforth. Cardinal Suhard did not speak on how Verdier publicly allied with Jewish communities in France and abroad, nor how Verdier promised Jews that the Church would be by their side until these challenging times had passed. Rather, Cardinal Suhard claimed that Verdier interacted with Jews only inasmuch as he was required to as archbishop of Paris — after all, he explained, Verdier could not have avoided contact with Jewish representatives of the government.[37] In a sense, then, Suhard protected Verdier by minimizing his actions. However, Suhard also negated the significance of Verdier’s support for Jews, implicitly reassuring the Nazis that they needn’t worry about Church authorities’ protests. While Suhard *did* proclaim to the Nazis that, as a bishop, his duty was to defend “imprescriptible rights,”[38] under pressure of arrest and knowing full well what had happened to Catholic authorities and institutions elsewhere the Nazis occupied territory, Suhard

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[35] Ibid., 15 August 1940.

[36] Interestingly, Burrin (1996, p. 219) writes that when the men of the SD “investigated 13 episcopal offices in the north-east in autumn 1940... they discovered that a number of bishops approved their actions against freemasons, Jews, and communists.” Burrin does not include a source and I have been unable to validate it with my own research.

[37] Presumably, Suhard was referring to Léon Blum.

[38] Ibid.

began to shift his stance. Now, Cardinal Suhard — much as he had feared might happen — was playing the occupiers' game.

In turn, the consequences of Suhard's acquiescence to the Nazis followed almost immediately. After his arrest, the Nazis required Suhard to halt publication of his weekly *Semaine Religieuse* in Paris — the main form of communication between Suhard and his diocese.[39] In response, Suhard and Baudrillart began, like Liénart, to prepare a letter to the Vichy government that protested their treatment by the Germans and defended the Church's freedoms.[40] However, on 14 August 1940, Suhard details in his diary that he established a compromise with the Nazis that allowed him to publish his *Semaine Religieuse* on the condition that he travel throughout Paris and its suburbs to stop priests from speaking out against German authorities.[41] Finally, on 16 August, the German Dr. Kurt Becher, an SS lieutenant in the early years of the war, visited Suhard, brought him flowers, and explained the Germans' interest in working *with* the bishops instead of opposing and oppressing them.[42] Suhard acquiesced to this new arrangement, having learned that even the smallest resistance could put him and the institution of the Church at risk.[43] In order to protect the Church in occupied France, Suhard realized he would

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[39] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 2D, 2_4. "Les événements du 26 au 29 Juillet 1940 a l'Archevêché de Paris." Compte-Rendu du Chanoine Pasteau, secrétaire du Cardinal Suhard.

[40] Additionally, in his diary entry of 1 August 1940, Baudrillart writes of Suhard's arrest: "Indignation. Cardinal Suhard performed well. Fierce hatred against Cardinal Verdier, Jew, Freemason, and delivered to the government. Cardinal Suhard defended him well. After all the indignities they made our Archbishop suffer, the captain who commanded the group had the nerve to ask him, in the presence of rumors starting to circulate in Paris that risk provoking agitation, to sign an anodyne declaration, reducing the incident to practically nothing. The cardinal refused." Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 2B 65, *Les Carnets du Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart du 10 Mai au 28 Août, 1940*.

[41] Suhard's Diary, 14 August 1940.

[42] Suhard's Diary. 16 August 1940.

[43] Ibid.

have to refrain from politics, accommodate the Germans' demands, and break ties with the Jewish community (Bernay 2012, pp. 123-124). Cardinal Suhard's Secretary-General summarized the events a few days after his arrest:

> [The Nazis] pretended to give some semblance of justification for the odious measures taken against the Cardinal, that they knew of a plot hatched against the Reich in the archbishops' home in Paris. This allegation could fool no one, not even them. In reality, that which is most likely is that they doubted [a certain collision] between the French Catholic Hierarchy with the government, like that which happened in Austria and Poland. Maybe they believed there would be an interference from the hierarchy in political affairs, or in defiance, or even a state of passive resistance against the *Reich* and its intentions of domination. They do not believe that the French clergy, at different degrees of the hierarchy, remain loyal to the principle posed by its master: "My kingdom is not of this world."[44]

This quote marks a turning point. Certain members of the Catholic hierarchy, including Cardinal Suhard, were very active in French public affairs prior to Germany's invasion (this is further detailed in chapter two). They also saw religious intervention on behalf of Jews as necessary, even *righteous*, as the examples above testify. Yet now, Suhard's secretary was articulating a new stance: the Church would refrain from political interventions.

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[44] Ibid.

*Vichy France*

Simultaneously, in the Free Zone, Cardinal Gerlier individually sought opportunities to collaborate with the new regime. As the only Cardinal in unoccupied France, Gerlier served as the official representative of the Church to the Vichy government, but his efforts at negotiation were not unanimously supported by others in the episcopate. In fact, even when Gerlier received permission from the Nazis to cross the demarcation line and meet with bishops in occupied France, others expressed concerns and disagreement with Gerlier's approach. After signing a letter whose content Gerlier, Suhard, and Baudrillart claimed was "unanimous" from the Church on 10 July 1940[45], Suhard remarked in his diary that he had little faith in Gerlier's aspirations: "Many words … few ideas … and above all, few decisions that are truly serious … What is the point of this whole enterprise? I have little confidence."[46]

This letter included a list of recommendations for the new government: the introduction of catechism lessons in all schools, subsidies for parochial education, and that religious orders be allowed to teach. It concluded by declaring that the Church was prepared to take its place in the work of salvation for the country.[47] Gerlier, who traveled to Vichy on 11 July 1940 to personally

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[45] This letter, also signed by Cardinal Baudrillart and said to represent the desires of the ACA, was written and signed after a meeting in Paris that Cardinal Gerlier obtained special permission from General Weygand and foreign minister Paul Baudouin to join. The document included, among other things, provisions for religious education and protection for *Action Catholique.* It also added a provision concerning the "grave" social problems facing France, writing: "the French episcopate wishes to inform the government of the importance of considering moral aspects of this problem, and to safeguard at the same time ... all that might foster the harmony of classes, freedom, dignity, the well-being of workers as well as all that we have exposed many times in papal encyclicals." Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry 2B 54 1134, "Note remise [à Vichy] au nom de Cardinal Suhard, Baudrillart, et Gerlier remise à Paris le 10 Juliet 1940 et résumant les désirs unanime de l'Assemblée des Cardinal et Archevêques de France."

[46] Archives historiques de l'Archevêché de Paris, fonds Suhard, 1D XIV 13. Journal Suhard, 9-10 July 1940.

[47] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry 2B 54 1134, "Note remise [à Vichy] au nom de Cardinal Suhard, Baudrillart, et Gerlier remis à Paris le 10 Juliet 1940 et résumant les désirs unanime de l'Assemblée des Cardinal et Archevêques de France."

deliver the bishops' letter to the Pétain, had already begun promoting these ecclesiastical initiatives to journalists in the Free Zone (Amouroux 1992, p. 60, in Bernay 2012, p. 119). Yet on 16 July, Baudrillart wrote in his diary that Cardinal Suhard was discontented with Gerlier's indiscretions in the press.[48] On the 25th, Baudrillart again expressed frustration, along with Suhard, with Gerlier's attitude. They both felt that Gerlier was moving too hastily to work with the new regime. In August, Baudrillart wrote that he and Suhard felt "the Cardinal [Gerlier] is always a little too exuberant … he talks too much and speaks without caution. It is a shame!"[49]

Gerlier's positions are important because they have been interpreted by scholars as wholly indicative of the Church's attitude toward the Vichy regime in the early years of the war, thus discounting considerable backstage divisions and dissent among those in the occupied zone. For example, Nord (2003, p. 192) cites Gerlier's famous quote of 19 November 1940, "Pétain, c'est la France, et la France aujourd'hui c'est Pétain,"[50] adding, "the rest of the Church hierarchy did not differ much in its views." Jackson (2003, p. 268) writes of the same quote, "In the autumn of 1940... the Church succumbed totally to the cult of the providential leader. The tone was set by Cardinal Gerlier, welcoming Pétain to the city with the words: 'Pétain is France, and France, today, is Pétain.'" Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981], p. 199) similarly write:

> Cardinal Gerlier … perhaps best epitomizes the hesitation of much of the hierarchy, torn between charitable impulses and the pull of Pétainist loyalties and

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[48] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 2B 65, *Les Carnets du Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart du 10 Mai au 28 Août, 1940*.

[49] Ibid.

[50] "Pétain is France, and France today is Pétain!" *Semaine religieuse du diocèse de Lyon*, 29 November 1940.

> anti-Semitic stereotypes. Like many of his peers, Gerlier was ripe for *redressement* in 1940.

As the official spokesperson for the French episcopate, Gerlier had significant power to alter public understandings of the Church's opinion toward Vichy. However, by looking beyond public statements to Church officials' private notes and diaries, it is clear that the French episcopate was not in in total agreement with Gerlier's attitude and open praise for Maréchal Pétain.

Furthermore, and separate from frustration with Gerlier, there is also evidence that bishops in occupied France were not so easily swayed by Pétain's attempts to make concessions to the church. They were also hesitant to collaborate with the Nazis. As detailed earlier, Suhard remarked multiple times in his diary in the days following the German invasion how he was anxious about having to accommodate the Nazis and even outright refused them the use of sacred spaces in Paris in late July. Likewise, on 25 June 1940, Cardinal Baudrillart wrote in his diary about his concerns regarding the need to possibly enter into a rapport with German authorities. There is no enthusiasm in his statement. On 16 July 1940, Baudrillart describes a meeting of the Council of the Archdiocese as "a little more interesting and darker than usual." He also depicts Monsignors Courbe and Chaptal as very angry during this meeting and adds: "It is a frustrating situation as Pétain is not pulling us in with his concessions." In contrast to portrayals of the episcopate as unified in its eagerness to herald the start of a new regime, Suhard and Baudrillart's diaries depict a variety of perspectives among Catholic authorities in response to unfolding events. Church officials in both occupied and unoccupied France held diverse views in early August when they prepared to meet separately as the ACA for the first time since the Nazi

occupation. It was in this meeting that Church leaders were asked to decide on the new regime's interest in legislating formal anti-Semitism. What, then, explains the episcopate's ultimate decision to endorse the statute?

**French Bishops' Support for The *Statut des Juifs***

The *Statut des Juifs*, dated 3 October 1940, was the initial decree in what would eventually become a set of 12 French legislative measures against Jews. In July 1940, when the French government sought to enact the *Statut*, its authors asked the Church for guidance.[51] As the Church was divided by the demarcation line, the first episcopal conference took place in Paris on 28 August with Nazi permission and the requirement that the Church could only discuss its spiritual concerns.[52] The ACA in Paris was followed by the ACA in Lyon, organized by Cardinal Gerlier, three days later. Although the Church in occupied France was able to communicate its desires to those in the free zone before the latter met and determined a formal stance toward the *Statut*, the risk that the Church in occupied France would have its correspondence intercepted and read by Vichy officials was very high.

The desires of the ACA in the occupied zone, as transmitted from Suhard to Gerlier, were as follows: (1) to maintain French unity at all costs, avoiding the dangers caused by the division

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[51] For a useful overview on the origins of Vichy's *Statut des Juifs*, see Joly, L. (2013). "The Genesis of Vichy's Jewish Statute of October 1940," Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 27(2), pp. 276-298. With reference to the Church, Joly explains, "Beginning in the summer of 1940, supporters of the statute consulted Cardinal Gerlier, archbishop of Lyon and the Church's principal representative to the government, about the appropriateness of a "Jewish statute." Whereas Laval wanted to avoid upsetting the public, Baudouin [the Minister of Foreign Affairs] seemed concerned about not violating Christian principles."

[52] At this first meeting, there were three cardinals (Suhard, Liénart, and Baudrillart) and seven archbishops and bishops: Feltin (Bordeaux), Marmottin (Reims), Gaillard (Tours), Fillon (Bourges), Lamy (Sens), Louvard (Coutances), Audollent (Blois), and Mennechet (Soissons). Monsignor Courbe presided over the ACA as Secretary.

between two zones, above all for *Action Catholique*; (2) to be especially careful, in the unoccupied zone, concerning the needs of the Church in the occupied zone; and (3) for *Action Catholique*, all while observing the rules of prudence imposed by current situation, to try and reclaim the journals of the movements and ensure the formation of militants in case of any contingency.[53] Suhard specified the rules of prudence:

> Note: do not hold general meetings or grand assemblies, avoid all discussion of politics and international affairs, and do not forget: all that is done in the occupied zone has its repercussions for all those in the occupied zone.[54]

After being threatened by the Nazis, Suhard feared the consequences that would befall the Church if it did not adhere to the new laws of order, as well as his promise to German officials that the episcopate would avoid engaging in politics. Remarking on the caution that surrounded the ACA's deliberations, Baudrillart reviewed the meeting in his diary, writing: "we speak quietly, as we believe our masters left behind certain micros."[55] Not surprisingly, Baudrillart feared the ACA was being wiretapped by the Nazis. In Latin, he adds, "*In silencio et spe erit fortitudo nostra.*" The quote — which translates as "in silence and fortitude shall we maintain

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[53] It is possible that Suhard's reference to contingency was a nod to recent events in Paris, Lille, and Rennes, with the temporary shuttering of Catholic institutions and presses after Suhard, Liénart, and Rocques were arrested. He could also be referencing similar actions against the Church in other states recently occupied by Germany such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

[54] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 1B 23. "Vingt-troisième Assemblée Paris, 28 août 1940, et première Conférence épiscopale de Lyon, 31 aout 1940.

[55] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry, 2B 65, *Les Carnets du Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart du 10 Mai au 28 Août, 1940*.

our strength" — indicates that Baudrillart interpreted the episcopate's silence to mean resistance, not ideological collusion nor enthusiasm about collaboration as has commonly been argued in the past. Thus it was in this way that i the only two cardinals in Occupied France — Suhard and Baudrillart — shifted their stances from outspoken denunciation of Nazism and Hitlerian racism to public silence. They hadn't forgotten about their previous commitments but they feared the consequences. Silence to them meant fortitude: courage under fire.

In contrast, at the start of the meeting of the ACA in unoccupied France, on 31 August 1940, Gerlier specified that the goal of the conference was to study, together, the most urgent problems facing religious life and *Action Catholique* in the occupied zone.[56] He emphasized that they had not come together to criticize the government, but to "support and help the government, on our terrain, in its positive efforts to reconstruct the nation."[57] In this way, the agenda even prior to the start of discussion was framed as one of alignment with the new Vichy government rather than debate over whether or not the episcopate should take this stance. Gerlier, vocal as always, set the tone from the beginning.

Thirteen orders were on the list of issues to be discussed at the meeting; the "Jewish Question" was ninth.[58] When it came time to discuss the Jewish Question, Gerlier began: "Severe provisions will undoubtedly soon be decided against the Jews." He then said, "A brief

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[56] In attendance at the meeting were Archbishops Llobet (Avignon), Saliège (Toulouse), Béguin (Auch), Durieux (Chambéry), de la Villerabel (Aix), Moussaron (Albi) and the bishops Rodié (Agen), Maisonobe (Belley), Piguet (Clermont-Ferrand), and Heintz (Metz). Prior to the Nazi invasion of France, Saliège, Moussaron, and Delay (Marseille) were some of the most outspoken advocates of Jewish refugees. Delay, however, was only in attendance for the second half of the meeting.

[57] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Chollet, 2B.47, Procès-Verbal de la 1é Conférence Épiscopale de Lyon, 31 August 1940.

[58] Ibid.

report outlines the principles that must guide the Christian attitude."[59] We cannot be certain exactly how the discussion progressed, but Gerlier's summary of the report, combined with two other reports written in the weeks surrounding the decision on the *Statut des Juifs,* can provide insight into how Church officials thought about the Jewish problem in early fall 1940. Gerlier, for example, explained his position in the meeting minutes of the ACA:

> On the one hand, the fact of the existence of an international Jewish community to which the Jews of all nations are attached and that renders Jews not your ordinary foreigner welcomed in a country, but an unassimilable one, can oblige a state to take protective measures in the name of the common good. On the other hand, however, a state may not brutally hunt Jews regardless of their nativities, denying them their natural rights …. It can seem legitimate from a state to envisage a particular legal status for Jews (as did the papacy in Rome), but the statute must be guided by rules of justice and charity, not animated by a spirit of hatred or revenge, and sensitive to this double objective: to safeguard the rights of the human person, while preventing any mode of activity likely to harm the common good of the country.[60]

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

In a sense, we can see how Gerlier was torn between protecting human ("natural") rights and supporting the state in a time of crisis.[61] Gerlier endeavored to make the two compatible, suggesting it was possible to construct a separate legal status for Jews while also adhering to rules of justice and charity. What mattered, Gerlier implied, was the *intent* of constructing the statute, not its content.

On the other hand, Bernay (2012, p. 134) cites a report from around the same time in which Guerry, secretary of the ACA, states that the international Jewish community, in an effort to realize world domination, "are often the organizers of revolutions inside states: Lenin in Russia, Bela Kun in Hungary."[62] According to Bernay, this text was used by the Church to justify various discriminatory measures enacted toward Jews, including closing the borders to Jewish immigration, not granting citizenship to Jews in the countries in which they were born, and forbidding Jews from employment in certain professional sectors. Bernay argues that it is from Guerry's assertions that the episcopal conference in Lyon drew its conclusion.

Finally, in carton 3Z11, Inv. 9/6 in the diocesan archives of Cambrai, where all ACA meeting minutes are located, there is an anonymous, undated report of ten pages.[63] Titled "A note on anti-Semitism: Reflections on some themes to guide a Christian in the issues raised by the

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[61] A full discussion of what the Church meant by its use of the phrase "natural rights" is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, for a useful analysis of how modern human rights rhetoric and ideals stemmed from religious thought developed immediately before the war, which expanded during the war itself, see Moyn, S. (2015). *Christian Human Rights*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

[62] Bernay cites finding this report at the Maison-Mère des Petites Soeurs des Maternités Catholiques at Nivolas-Vermelle and that it has since been transferred to the archives of the CNAEF. During my own time at the CNAEF in 2012 and 2013, I was unable to locate this document.

[63] One possibility is that this report is from November 1940, shortly after the *Statut de Juifs* was decided on by the ACA and then passed on 3 October. In *Christian Resistance to Anti-Semitism: Memories from 1940-1944* (1990), Henri de Lubac (p. 215) suggests that Father Pierre Chaillet authored the report with the intention of forewarning Catholics in Lyon "against the mortal danger of Hitlerian racism and anti-Semitism." De Lubac adds that the demarcation line kept religious authorities in unoccupied France from knowing about this report. This is the only reference I have found to it in any document, published or otherwise.

recurrence of anti-Semitism in the contemporary world," it is likely the report was also published at around the same time as bishops in the occupied zone were deciding on the *Statut*.[64] The document provides yet another idea of how French Catholic authorities thought about the Jewish question in the early years of the war, and how they endeavored to inform public opinion on these issues.

In "A note on anti-Semitism," different sources are marshaled throughout the document to provide a strong case against some types of anti-Semitism from a Christian perspective and in support of others. For example, the first kind of anti-Semitism that is *not* allowed by Christians is Nietzschean anti-Semitism. According to the authors of this document, Nietzsche had a powerful influence on anti-Semitic ideology from a cultural perspective. For Nietzsche, Jews were responsible for bringing harmful ideas into the world, especially moral ideas about charity and kindness which contradicted his beliefs about Survival of the Fittest and the Übermensch. Thus, the authors explain that Nietzschean anti-Semitism is unacceptable because it affects Christianity at the same time as Judaism: "The moral values introduced by Judaism were repeated and raised to perfection by Christianity … they could not, therefore, be harmful for humanity." It then adds, "the patriarch of Jews, Abraham, is our patriarch, too."[65]

A second type of anti-Semitism the authors negate is that of Charles Maurras, leader and principal thinker of *Action Française*, a far-right monarchist political movement of early 20th-century France. "Maurrasianism" blamed Jews for French social disorder and called for a return

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[64] This is a likely possibility as first, the report does not reference any events after fall 1940, though several other reports in the folder do. Second, Gerlier's justification for the *Statut des Juifs* in the ACA's published meeting minutes mirror much of the discourse found in this report on anti-Semitism.

[65] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Monsignor Chollet, 3Z11, Inv. 9/6. *Note sur l'antisémitisme: Reflexions sur quelques thèmes pour s'orienter chrétiennement dans les problèmes soulevés par la recrudescence de l'A.S. dans le monde contemporain.*

to monarchy and state Catholicism (thus overturning the gains of the French Revolution). This, the authors explain, is a kind of political anti-Semitism that blames Jews for upending the social order. In turn, the document proposes that Maurras cannot accept the Church in its entirety if his corpus of writings reject Judaism, since "it is on the terrain of morals and religiosity that Judaism surpasses, without contest, all the people of antiquity." To reject these morals is to reject the full teachings of the church.[66]

The authors go on to detail further forms of anti-Semitism a "true Christian" cannot accept, including "hate-filled anti-Semitism," described as a "violent, passionate rage," and "vulgar anti-Semitism." Next, however, it turns to describe "the nature of the Jewish problem." The authors write, "and in the general interest, considered in all loyalty, might there not require, separate from all contempt, vengeance, or hate, measures concerning the Jews?"[67] They respond as follows.

First, the authors agree that there *is* a Jewish problem and this is evidenced by the presence of Jews "disseminated throughout the nations." Key issues as a result of this problem are that there exists a real Jewish community with which Jews across all nations identify and while they are not a biological race, nor a nation, nor a people, Jews are connected by a "spiritual order" that makes it impossible for Jews to ever assimilate. This, they explain, gives Jews a unique character. "No group in similar conditions has managed to resist total assimilation, even disappearance, and this surpasses all natural explanation." The result is that Jews constitute "a thorn in the flesh of nations" and while the authors are quick to add that "this feeling of

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[66] Ibid., p. 2.

[67] Ibid., p. 4.

community among Jews … is not in itself a problem," they conclude that "the state, guardian of general interest, has a right and a duty to ensure that it is not occurring to the detriment of the good of the country." Thus, the authors of this document agreed with the premise of the *Statut des Juifs,* though they were quick to distance themselves from prevailing forms of anti-Semitism at the time.

Second, the authors write that it is important to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate concerns regarding Jews — for example, they note, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* are known to be false. Other concerns include recognizing that the precise nature of the Jewish problem differs depending on the location since, in different countries, Jews occupy different positions (socially and economically) and also constitute a different percentage of the population. Moreover, the authors add, one must not confound the Jewish problem with the problem of foreign Jews: "there is a problem of Jewish foreigners itself and it must be resolved in the Christian spirit."[68] What, then, can we conclude from the differing perspectives presented in these three documents, as well as the lack of any discussion concerning Jews and the impending *Statut des Juifs* in the occupied zone?

**Analysis: The Sounds of Silence**

A significant amount of research in sociology seeks to discern how people solve problems in the organization of collective action (i.e. Heckathorn 1996; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Olson 1965). This includes scholarship on mobilization for high-risk collective action (i.e., della Porta 1998; Loveman 1998; McAdam 1986). In dangerous settings, such as those posed by

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[68] Ibid., p. 5.

the context of war, solving collective action problems becomes even more pressing because the nature of the decision is critical. That is to say, when actors collectively face a critical decision, not only does the decision, regardless of the position taken, entail significant risks for each individual involved, but the ultimate stance will affect the welfare of others and decision-makers know this. Furthermore, the decision is bound to determine the future by limiting the range of alternative options; something the decision-makers know, too (Ermakoff 2008, pp. xi, 332; 2012, p. 217; 2014, p. 236). In such risky and critical contexts, groups find themselves at a crossroads. Consider our bishops when faced with the *Statut des Juifs*: Should they challenge the authors of the statute? Should they seek to achieve some kind of mutual arrangement? Should they collaborate? Regardless of the position chosen, French bishops knew their actions would have significant consequences for the future trajectory of the Church and, of course, for Jews. How did they decide on a common stance?

In challenging moments of deliberation like these, the literature on critical decision-making suggests that three processes of alignment (mechanisms by which groups determine a collective position) are possible. The first, *sequential alignment*, occurs when actors observe how many others select an option before they claim their stance.[69] The second, *local knowledge*, emerges as a result of face-to-face interactions and communications in which preferences are directly exchanged. The third, *tacit coordination*, occurs when people infer group preferences from public events, including public statements, and assume others share the same inferences (Ermakoff 2008, pp. 181-211). This last process, tacit alignment, best explains how French

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[69] This alignment process depends on each actors' individual threshold: "the number or proportion of others who must make one decision before a given actor does so" (Granovetter 1978, p. 1420).

bishops' overcame the coordination dilemma posed by their need to decide on the *Statut des Juifs* in August 1940 when the episcopate was split and communication was hampered.

The concept of tacit alignment stems originally from Schelling (1960, p. 70), who described tacit alignment as coordination that occurs in circumstances of uncertainty where actors do not disclose their preferences. For Schelling, tacit coordination is often facilitated by adherence to shared norms — one of his main prerequisites for successful coordination is that people share a common understanding of the situation they encounter (p. 54). Yet in tacit coordination dilemmas where shared norms and common understandings are disarrayed or in flux — precisely the kind of situation that emerges in a critical juncture — the decision-making processes of group members who need to determine a collective position alters.

Numerous scholars note how critical conjunctures are defined by the fact that they call institutional and habitual practices into question (Bourdieu 2000, p. 160; Ermakoff 2010, pp. 530, 540; Laitin 1998, p. 105). Walder (2009, p. 12), for example, in writing about Beijing Red Guard factionalism in the first two years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, explains how "the shift from stable and repressive institutions to a situation where they are under challenge is not smooth or unproblematic. The process of institutional collapse is crucial." In this case, too, the context of organizational disarray was crucial. Patterns of communication that were once taken for granted no longer functioned; norms about how the Church ought to act in relation to the government, towards Germans, to the laity, and toward Jews, were unclear. Even the Vatican, as evidenced by Tisserant's complaint in a letter to Suhard, discussed earlier, had yet to determine a formal stance that could guide Catholics. Thus while bishops had to determine a collective stance on the *Statut* because the French government had asked them to, they could not rely on shared

norms or previous political positions for guidelines on how to act. Bishops could not openly communicate. And they certainly could not rely on the "common knowledge" that Schelling, above, requires for tacit coordination to take place. The institutional and organizational characteristics of the setting were rapidly changing in unpredictable ways. And so, in line with research that *builds* on Schelling's concept of tacit alignment, these bishops turned to high-status actors within the Catholic Church in France to discern behavioral cues and move forward.

In research on collective action, recent work finds that status helps group overcome the challenges that are posed by tacit coordination dilemmas in situations where common knowledge is lacking. For example, Clark et al. (2006) develop a rational choice model of coordination and argue that in cases where groups must overcome the dilemma of coordination, high-status individuals serve as a "coordination device" (p. 369) that enables groups to generate the common knowledge that Schelling deems necessary (p. 370). This is because their prominence yields influence and therefore, accepting a prominent individual's influence where coordination is sought is a rational strategy (p. 386). Similarly, Ermakoff (2008) finds that individuals in groups turn to prominent authorities when making critical decisions for clues about how to coordinate positions tacitly. Ermakoff (2008, pp. 203-208) propose that status matters in these circumstances because group leaders can serve as focal points for others seeking to determine a position in contexts of uncertainty and where other forms of coordination are not possible (i.e., sequential or local). Status equates with prominence, and prominence is a characteristic significant to all members of the group experiencing indeterminacy.[70] Finally, de Kwaadsteniet et al. (2006, 2007,

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[70] For a helpful review on Status Characteristics Theory (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972; Berger et al. 1977; Berger 1980), and recent work on how status matters for the organization of collective action as well as how much group members contribute once action has been decided on and when, see Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway (2012)

2008, 2010) have performed several experiments to test how tacit coordination emerges in social dilemma situations and here, too, the authors find that status helps groups solve problems of decision-making in situations of uncertainty. In particular, de Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk (2012, pp. 198-212) explain, status acts as "social information" (information about the characteristics of relevant actors) when environmental information is lacking (see also Abele and Stasser 2008; Abele, Stasser, and Chartier 2014). Thus when the characteristics of a setting are ambiguous or disarrayed, people use social cues for guidance, and status is one kind of "cue" that can facilitate the tacit coordination process.[71]

This consideration of status helps explain our puzzle. Although the institutional structure of the Church was undergoing rapid changes, and norms to guide bishops' actions were no longer salient, the fact that there *were* still positions of authority in the Church — even if the individuals occupying these positions were new to their roles, such as Suhard — provided some focal point for bishops in both occupied and unoccupied France to turn to for clues about alignment. As best as we can discern from the meeting minutes of the ACA in addition to the private notes of some bishops in attendance, prominent Church authorities within the episcopate held disproportionate sway over how deliberation unfolded in August 1940. This was because of their status. In occupied France, Cardinal Suhard encouraged silence and silence followed. In unoccupied France, Cardinal Gerlier marshaled a variety of perspectives toward the statute, summarized in a report, and he then declared that the principles of the report "*must* guide the christian attitude"[72]

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[71] de Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk (2012) articulate further that status matters in situations of environmental ambiguity because of the social norm that low-status people should defer to high-status people, i.e. Ridgeway 1988; Ridgeway and Walker 1995.

[72] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Chollet, 2B.47, Procès-Verbal de la 1é Conférence Épiscopale de Lyon, 31 August 1940. Referenced previously on p. 50.

(emphasis mine). Nobody, as far as we can tell, voiced dissent. However, here, too, we know from Baurdillart's diary as well as several bishops' previous positions of outspoken support for Jews from 1933-1939 that they were not in full agreement with Gerlier's eager commitment to support the Vichy government and its new policies. However, Cardinal Suhard in Paris and Cardinal Gerlier in Lyon held the most prominent positions possible within the episcopate on their respective sides of the demarcation line as the Church and State were undergoing rapid changes and communication across borders was limited. Close observation, then, of each bishops' cues, would prove critical for setting the position of the Church toward the statute (and toward Jews) in motion. Importantly, this included the silence of Suhard in occupied France as a kind of statement — and thus a powerful cue for how to align — and not only Gerlier's prominent declarations in the free zone.

In turn, the findings of this chapter suggest that the silence of high-status group members is as significant as their proclamations when groups face a critical decision. Building on previous research that argues "the public behavior of… prominent actors — whether verbal or not — becomes their statement" (Ermakoff 2008, p. 209), I find that here, too, silence is a statement. In risky and critical contexts in which group members seek to coordinate a common stance, silence by high-status members is interpreted as the decision *not* to go against other, emergent positions. In other words, silence is interpreted as endorsement, even when the motivation for this silence might be otherwise. Thus even though prominent group members might still be uncertain about what stance to take, or might even understand their silence to be a form of resistance (as was the case with Baudrillart in occupied France), this silence is perceived of as consent by lower-ranking members specifically because prominent authorities are expected to make statements in

support of, or against, a particular position. Such perceived consent can be highly consequential, committing the organization to the declarations of other prominent peers and stifling alternative outcomes.[73] If high-status actors choose not speak while others who are similarly situated to them claim to speak on their behalf, and especially if these prominent authorities have spoken out on similar issues in the past, then it is likely that their silence will mask as support for peers who are making prominent declarations in the name of the group. In contrast, when a single high-status individual speaks out against the stated positions of equally situated peers, this can be disruptive enough to stall the process of consensus formation overall.

This finding modifies past historical work that treats the episcopate's silence as guided by anti-Semitism or opportunism and subsequent forgetfulness, and it validates nascent theories of silence in research on critical decision-making and collective action. In particular, the research here finds that French bishops' silence was *deliberate* and that it had severe repercussions for the decision-making process of the episcopate as a whole. Silence in this context was the result of external political shocks combined with organizational disarray and individual threats of repression. However, this silence — prominent because of its "utterance" by high-status authorities who had spoken out on similar issues in the past — was perceived of as consent by lower-standing group members and, eventually, France as a whole as well as the dominant historical record. As the data demonstrates, people noticed French bishops' silence concerning Vichy's anti-Semitism, indicating that for them it was "prominent" and a clue for how to tacitly align their own positions. Additionally, the endorsement provided by high-status bishops' silence

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[73] Similarly, Mische (2014, p. 446) suggests that a performative approach to research on future-oriented deliberations (how people debate possible futures) ought to focus both on "what is said — and, perhaps more importantly, what is *not* said — in particular settings of interaction." (Emphasis in the original.)

contributed to the general perception that anti-Semitic persecution was acceptable, a stance that would come to anger several lower clergy and laity discussed in chapter three. In August 1940, prominent silence served as a statement that facilitated tacit coordination in favor of endorsing legal anti-Semitism.

**Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrates how deciding on the *Statut des Juifs* was a genuine problem for Catholic authorities facing an uncertain future in summer 1940. Far from ideological collusion with the new regime and its anti-Semitism, or a clear stance of support driven by material interest in how the church could benefit from Vichy policy, many in the French episcopate openly protested Nazi ideology from 1933-1940 and the new regime's "National Revolution," as well as its concessions to the Church, only excited a few; others were skeptical.

When the Germans invaded France and rapidly thereafter captured Paris, the rupture posed by the Nazi invasion, occupation, and the sudden division of France severely affected the episcopate, as did the deaths of the two most prominent religious authorities for the French Catholic Church: Pope Pius XI and Cardinal Verdier. This loss of leadership combined with the sudden division of France to cause an organizational crisis whereby bishops were unable to communicate with each other as they had in the past, and they had to determine a shared stance toward the *Statut des Juifs* despite these challenges.

In addition, the selective repression of prominent bishops by the Nazis in occupied France affected these bishops' willingness to discuss the Jewish problem or openly protest on behalf of Jews as they had in the past, and they were also prohibited to do so by the Nazis. As a

result, the Jewish question was not even on the meeting minutes of the ACA's agenda. In the free zone, the statute *was* on the ACA agenda and decisions about the statute were derived through analysis of research on the Jewish question and, presumably, deliberation.[74] However, although bishops in the free zone chose in the end to support the *Statut des Juifs* under conditions of Catholic charity explicated in their meeting minutes, the silence of bishops in occupied France powerfully affected the future trajectory of the church as a whole. In not speaking out against the statute when they were expected to explicitly express their ideas, and when they had so many times protested against Nazi anti-Semitism in the recent past, French bishops in occupied France powerfully legitimized the Vichy regime and Nazi occupation. In doing so, they lent their support, even if only implicitly, to the *Statut des Juifs.*

In recognizing the significance of silence for informing the Church's stance of support for the *Statut des Juifs*, this chapter improves past research on the positions of bishops in France at the start of the Holocaust. Clearly, previous work has not been wrong to emphasize the significance of the Church's public silence concerning the *Statut des Juifs*. However, this research complicates the motivations underlying bishops' silence, as well as their impact. In the occupied zone, silence was an active choice rather than passive neglect. Privately, some bishops remained concerned about the plight of Jews, and skeptical of Pétain's intentions. Others were hesitant to collaborate with the Nazis. Silence, then, was chosen in the face of increasing repression as a way to protect the Church by not waking the attention or anger of Nazis. After the sequestration of key bishops and the temporary shuttering of critical Catholic presses and

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[74] The meetings minutes of the ACA in Vichy France, as well as documents concerning the *Statut des Juifs* that were circulated at the same time and kept in a folder where all documents pertinent to this meeting are held, are analyzed later in this chapter. Unfortunately, I do not have notes on the conversations held during the ACA itself.

organizations, bishops were hesitant to speak out in ways that could cause further harm. Thus, public silence did not indicate a lack of concern about Jews; nor, in the early months after the armistice, did silence indicate alignment with the new regime or Nazi occupiers. It was an act of preservation. Interests mattered in this case, but not as they've been commonly theorized in previous research: support for an authoritarian regime and silence concerning the oppression of minorities had more to do with fear of what the Church in France had to lose than what it might gain.

At the same time, the *Statut des Juifs* was in the ACA meeting minutes, and discussions of Christian approaches to anti-Semitism were prominent among religious authorities in unoccupied France in fall 1940. French bishops were publicly silent, but had not forgotten about Jews as anti-Semitic measures were being enacted by the Vichy regime. To the contrary, these bishops were critical in keeping such discussion alive. In the free zone, arguments surrounding the episcopate's decision to endorse the statute highlight prominent themes among Catholic authorities, especially the idea of Jews as revolutionaries and the so-called "fact" of an international Jewish community that superseded nationalism and assimilation. For those who espoused this view, it was an argument for Christian justice and charity against Nazi racism, not an anti-Semitic stance as typically understood. That is, while the hierarchy in unoccupied France endorsed the statute, they did not endorse biological (Hitlerian) anti-Semitism, even though we would consider their own justifications for the statute to be anti-Semitic today. The finding matters because it indicates that French bishops' statements of support for Jews before the war can be understood as genuine. Hitler's racism was clearly and unequivocally denounced by the Church. The bishops' endorsement of the *Statut des Juifs* in the free zone did not, to them,

indicate that Jews were less than human or deserving of severe repression. It meant acknowledging that there might be certain circumstances under which a state can reasonably seek to limit the rights of a population within its territory. Thus, we can suggest that the second ideological argument is partially correct: private beliefs about Jews informed some French bishops' support for legal anti-Semitism, but the nature of these beliefs differs from common explanations in prominent historical works on France and the Holocaust.

Finally, the distinction between bishops' approaches to Vichy's *Statut des Juifs* in occupied and unoccupied France highlights an important element overlooked in much research discussing the Church during the Holocaust: the French episcopate was split in two shortly after Germany occupied France, limiting communication between the hierarchy in occupied and unoccupied France. In a sense, we can say that *part of the church* was silent (without forgetting the Jews), while *another part of the church* supported legal anti-Semitism but did not conceptualize it as such. Critically, the organizational field of the church was in disarray when Germany invaded France, and the chaos only worsened with occupation. In the year prior to invasion, both Pope Pius XI and Cardinal Jean Verdier of Paris died. Both men, experienced in speaking out on behalf of Jews and against Nazi racism, were leaders and reference points for those in the French episcopate seeking to determine a political stance. Pope Pius XII had a different perspective on how to handle increasing Nazi power in Europe at the time: he advocated caution and collaboration. Within France, no clear leader emerged in the church, and the episcopate was divided into two. Cardinal Suhard (who took Verdier's place) was arrested, and, forsaking resistance, decided on collaboration with the Nazis. Cardinal Gerlier, in the occupied zone, sought to negotiate with Vichy authorities, and as the public spokesperson for the

Church, his words were influential for how Church-State relationships would proceed. Scholars, though, have too often taken Gerlier's public statements as indicative of attitudinal homogeneity within the Church. Instead, research shows dissent, including frustration in occupied France toward Gerlier's outspokenness and indiscretions. Other key actors in the church had distinct preferences, concerns, and fears that are often ignored when Gerlier's public statements are treated as the word of the Church. In the end, then, this chapter contributes to theory on critical decision-making and processes of alignment in high-risk contexts by arguing that history is equally contingent on what people say, as well as what they do not say, when speaking is expected of them.

# Chapter 2: A New Commotion
## The Catholic Hierarchy and the French Vichy Government, Together

*"Since 1941, the man in the street, when talking about Vichy, calls it: the Regime of Clergy."*

-Consultation on a few cases of conscience posed to Catholics of France by the German occupation.[75]

### Introduction

Once the Vichy regime came to power, the new government undertook a massive effort to reorganize French social life. The "National Revolution" was central to this effort. Its principles of work, family, and fatherland represented a shift from Republicanism (with its civic virtues of liberty, equality, and fraternity) to an ethnic nationalism that privileged ancestry, tradition, and religion as if biologically transmitted.[76] In turn, the regime's first targets were perceived "others" considered external to the national, and *natural*, community; primarily, these were foreigners and Jews. The historian Phillipe Burrin explains how, three days after the armistice was signed, on 25 June, "Pétain addressed his compatriots to inform them of the implementation of the armistice and in the very same breath, he announced the beginning of a new order and bade them help him to set up a 'new France'" (1996, p. 14). This "new order" — the National Revolution — was among Pétain's chief priorities, and the exclusion and limitation of "non-French" individuals' rights were central to its philosophy.

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[75] Archives Nationales, 72AJ/73, Dossier n° 1, Résistance chrétienne, I. "Consultation sur quelques cas de conscience posés aux Catholiques de France par l'occupation Allemande." Non signés. s.d. Pièce 1.

[76] Ironically, the classic distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is of France with Germany, as neatly laid out in Brubaker's (1992) analysis of the immigration policies of both countries. Hence, I argue that one of the Vichy regime's main goals through its program of National Revolution was to transform France's political culture for thinking about national belonging.

Pétain, for his part, never spoke publicly about the "Jewish Problem." He did, however, help to prepare the *Statut des Juifs*, even broadening its initial provisions (as articulated by Minister of Justice Raphaël Alibert[77]) to increase its severity. Pétain regularly spoke in coded discourse, framing Jews as national outsiders, such as when he proclaimed that "true fraternity" in France was "possible only in natural groups such as the family, the ancient towns, the nation" (Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 17).[78] Further, according to several historians (e.g., Adler 2001; Bartov 1998; Bédarida 1998; Burrin 1996; Le Moigne 2005, 2013; Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981]; Paxton 1972; Rousso 1990; Vinen 2006; Wieviorka 2016), as well as the perspective taken here, whether state anti-Semitism was overtly promulgated or covertly advanced, Pétain's Vichy National Revolution was concomitant with political violence against Jews from its very beginnings.[79]

And yet, despite (or perhaps because of) the crisis of summer 1940,[80] it was not a *given* that Vichy would be able to reorganize social life in France as it wished. Pétain became Prime Minister of France under problematic circumstances[81]; to promote its political agenda, it needed to accumulate legitimacy. As a result, its ability to do so — to secure, more or less, adherence

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[77] Le Statut des Juifs annoté de la main de Pétain. Retrieved from: http://www.memorialdelashoah.org/index.php/fr/archives-et-documentations/les-archives/document-inedit-le-projet-de-loi-portant-sur-le-statut-des-juifs.

[78] The original copy of this discourse can be found in *Le Temps*, 20 September 1940.

[79] It is worth noting than in justifying the first *Statut des Juifs*, an official statement published by the regime the day before, on 17 October 1940, read as follows: "The government in its task of national reconstruction has, from the very first day, studied the problem of the Jews and of certain foreigners, who, having abused our hospitality, have contributed to a significant degree to that defeat. Although there are some notable exceptions, in the administration and everywhere else, the influence of the Jews has been undeniably corruptive and finally decaying." (As translated in Adler 1987, p. 16; original document published in *Le Temps*, 17 October 1940.)

[80] In chapter one, from pp. 35-39 and on p. 57, I explain what I mean by the term "crisis" and how the defeat of France and its subsequent division and occupation was perceived as a crisis both by bishops in the Catholic Church and by the general French population.

[81] A full discussion of the process by which the French government elected to transfer executive, legislative, and constitutional powers to Marshal Pétain is beyond the scope of this project. However, for a useful analysis see Ermakoff, Ivan (2008). *Ruling oneself out: A theory of collective abdications*. Durham: Duke University Press.

from a wide swath of a population in disarray to a new national ideology that involved restrictions against fellow citizens and recently arrived foreigners who had enjoyed more lenient policies just a few years prior — requires explanation.

This chapter analyzes how the Vichy government recruited the episcopate to accumulate legitimacy and how French bishops responded. It also analyzes how this shift in the relationship between the government and the episcopate impacted the relationship between the episcopate with the rabbinate in France. I draw on Bourdieusian theories of symbolic violence, state legitimacy, political capital, and symbolic capital, to develop four mechanisms of generating legitimate political domination. Using these mechanisms, I then analyze archival documents from relevant religious and political institutions in France to explain how transformations in the relationship between the government and the episcopate contributed to the legitimation of the Vichy government while the strength of the relationship between the episcopate with the rabbinate simultaneously declined. In the conclusion, I argue that French Catholic bishops' alliance with Pétain and the Vichy government played a central role in the government's attempts to legitimize its National Revolution philosophy. This included an effort to redefine who belonged to the nation and who did not, targeting, of course, first and foremost, Jews.

**Symbolic Violence, State Legitimacy, the Church hierarchy, and the Vichy government**

By mid-fall 1940, the issue of the *Statut des Juifs* had already been settled: the Church had decided to endorse it in August, and the law was published as official state policy on 18 October. From early October, when the first *Statut des Juifs* was promulgated, to 14 May 1941, when the first roundups of Jews by French police occurred, Vichy passed 26 more laws and 24

decrees concerning Jews (Jackson 2003, p. 356). Of course, it can be argued that none of these laws, including that which permitted prefects to intern foreign Jews at their own discretion[82] and that which eliminated the Crémieux Decree and stripped Jews from Algeria of their citizenship,[83] constituted state violence compared to the extreme brutality of what was yet to come.

Yet, it is my contention that there is nothing "small" and certainly nothing meaningless about the "drip, drip, drip" of these decrees (Rosbottom 2014, p. 244). Indeed, Jews were subject to a slow but steady violence, forced to register themselves and their property (which would then be confiscated) in a mandatory census in September 1940 (Occupied France)[84] and June 1941 (Unoccupied France),[85,86] then experiencing the sudden loss of employment, citizenship, possessions, and more – altogether, extremely violent indeed. How did this new order of affairs emerge from the crisis of summer 1940? Construction of the idea that there was a "Jewish Problem" in France that needed to be solved, as well as the implementation of strategies to "solve" this problem, was an *accomplishment*.

This chapter, seeking to explain that accomplishment, extends the definition of state violence to include symbolic violence. The approach is explicitly Bourdieusian: one of the most distinguishing aspects of Bourdieu's theory is his definition of the state as an institution that

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[82] "Loi relative aux ressortissants étrangers de race juive."*Journal officiel de la République française* (ou, *de l'Etat français*), published 18 October 1940, p. 5324.

[83] "Abolition du décret Crémieux par Marcel Peyrouton, ministre de l'intérieur." *Journal officiel de la République française* (ou, *de l'Etat français*), published 7 October 1940.

[84] "Ordonnance allemande définissant le Premier statut allemand des Juifs et dispositions concernant leurs biens; recensement des Juifs avec le fichier Tulard, écriteau « Juif » sur les devantures des magasins." Published 27 September, 1940.

[85] This law was a part of the second *Statut des Juifs*. "Loi du 2 juin 1941 remplaçant la loi du 3 octobre 1940 portant statut des juifs." *Journal officiel de la République française* (or, *de l'Etat français*), published 14 June 1941, p. 2475.

[86] "Loi du 22 juillet 1941 relative aux entreprises, biens et valeurs appartenant aux Juifs." *Journal officiel de la République française* (ou, *de l'Etat français*). Published 26 August 1941.

"successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical *and symbolic* violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population" (1994, p. 3; emphasis added). Bourdieu's attention to symbolic violence separates his view from Weber's (1978, p. 54) oft-cited definition, which references only physical violence. This matters, because especially during the years from 1940 to 1942, the Vichy National Revolution was an attempt at cultural (or in Bourdieusian terms, symbolic) revolution, not least in who it classified as rightful citizens and beneficiaries of government protection.[87] When applied to the case at hand, the classification of Jews as not belonging to the French nation, and the concomitant effort by the Vichy government to naturalize Jews as "others" deserving of special treatment, was a form of symbolic violence that paved the way for the physical violence to come.

In addition, there is another aspect of Bourdieu's definition (and here, he replicates Weber), and that is its focus on *legitimacy*. According to Weber (1978, p. 215), three kinds of political authority legitimate domination: charismatic, traditional, and rational. Bourdieu, on the other hand, argues that legitimate political domination depends on political capital accumulation and symbolic capital accumulation (Swartz 2013, pp. 106-111). The state is the end result of struggles in the political field to obtain positions of authority, and of struggles *by* those authorities to impose and naturalize their visions of the world as legitimate (Bourdieu 2000, pp. 63-64).[88] As a result, for Bourdieu, political power becomes legitimate (and political domination

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[87] In this sense, we can think of the National Revolution as a classification struggle. As Goldberg (2008, pp. 87-88) explains with reference to the development of the U.S. Welfare State, "conflicts over the citizenship status and rights of welfare state claimants are a particular instance of what Bourdieu calls classification struggles… they are struggles to class claimants as citizens or paupers." In the case of Vichy France, the struggle was to redefine the nation — who belonged and who didn't — and to classify once-citizens (Jews) as non-citizens or as a particular class of citizens deserving of lesser rights.

[88] Others who write about the exertion of symbolic power as a defining feature of the state include Adams 1994; Anderson 1991; Gorski 2003; Hobsbawm 1993; Gellner 1983; Loveman 2005, 2014; Scott 1998; Steinmetz 1999.

is obtained) when states (or state authorities) are able to impose symbolic divisions that represent social divisions. This can take two different forms:

> On the objective level, one may take action in the form of acts of representation, individual or collective, meant to show up and to show off, certain realities…. On the subjective level, one may act by trying to change the categories of perception and evaluation of the social world, the cognitive and evaluative structures. (Bourdieu 1990, p. 124; see also Bourdieu 1989, p. 20).

In this sense, the struggle for political domination entails *both* objective political power and symbolic power that legitimates domination through misrecognition. In turn, to obtain legitimate political domination, political capital and symbolic capital are required.

That legitimate political authority depends on successful accumulation of political and symbolic capital leads to the question of how it is that political authorities accumulate political and symbolic capital in the first place — how do they "[incarnate themselves] in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception of thought" (Bourdieu 1994, pp. 3-4)? This chapter aims to clarify these processes, focusing specifically on the Vichy government's attempts to achieve legitimacy by recruiting the French episcopate and the various ways in which bishops, through their responses, facilitated the accumulation of political and symbolic capital required to legitimize the "new" French State, its efforts at symbolic violence against Jews included.

French historian Denis Peschanski (2004, p. 409) wrote, "the history of France's defeat, occupation, and subsequent liberation may be read and written as a constant struggle for legitimacy…. one of the main actors and arbiters of this struggle was the Catholic Church." This chapter specifies precisely *how* Catholic religious authorities in France facilitated the legitimization of the Vichy regime and, in simultaneously remaining publicly silent concerning violence against Jews, helped to naturalize the idea that there was a "Jewish Problem" in France and justify the Vichy regime's "drip, drip, drip" of "solutions" to it.

The following section identifies two political and two symbolic mechanisms to analyze processes of political and symbolic capital accumulation in France from 1940-1942: the first two serve as proxies for political capital accumulation, the latter two as proxies for symbolic capital accumulation. Capital that Vichy obtained through its alliance with the Church provided legitimacy for the Vichy government and its various policies, including its policies of violence against Jews during this time-period.

*Political Capital Accumulation*

According to Bourdieu, political capital is a subtype of social capital (Swartz 2013, p. 37, 58; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119). Social capital is the ability to mobilize support through acquaintances and networks (Bourdieu 1986, pp. 21-24), and political capital is the objectification of this support in the form of institutionalized positions and alliances (Bourdieu 1991a, p. 196-197). Political capital is a "reputational capital… linked to the manner of being perceived" and it "takes on objectified forms when it becomes institutionalized" for example as patronage jobs (Bourdieu 2000, pp. 64, 65). It can thus be argued that a state accumulates

legitimacy to the extent that it is able to grow its political capital via the institutionalization of acquaintance and network support.

I propose two proxies with which to observe and examine the accumulation of political capital. First, *the process of political capital accumulation can be observed by evaluating whether there has been an increase in public endorsements for the government and its representatives among actors who did not speak out on its behalf with similar frequency prior to the time-period of interest.* This is a proxy for support through acquaintances and networks. Second, *the process of political capital accumulation can be observed by evaluating where by acquaintances and networks have become embedded in formal state structures.* This is a proxy for support through institutionalized positions and alliances. Each of these measures is an indicator of changing relational dynamics that can be used to observe political capital accumulation. The focus is on changing objective relations that indicate political support, measured by public endorsements and institutionalized arrangements.

*Symbolic Capital Accumulation*

Somewhat different from political capital, symbolic capital, according to Bourdieu, is "the authority to legitimately impose symbolic meanings and classifications as legitimate" (Swartz 2013, p. 39, referencing Bourdieu 1989, p. 23). In other words, it is the extent to which an individual, organization, or institution is able to legitimize other forms of capital such that it is perceived as natural, eternal, and self-evident. In this way, symbolic capital is unique in its emphasis on *mis*recognition. When considered in relation to political capital, symbolic capital doesn't just legitimate political authority (which is more like Weber's three

forms of domination), it *also* naturalizes it and by deflecting attention away from the power dynamics that it entails (Loveman 2005, p. 1655; Swartz 2013, p. 80).

Take, for example, race. Race is a "collective fiction" (Wacquant 1997) that works in and through categories, schemas, common-sense knowledge, symbols, discourse, institutional forms, and the like (Brubaker 2004, 2006). Race is a human creation and a social phenomenon (Bonilla-Silva 1999), frequently created for political intentions and with political consequences (Fields 1990). Yet often, race is *mis*perceived as biological, immutable, innate, natural, and essential (Desmond and Emirbayer 2010). The ability to create race is a result of *symbolic capital*; this capital may be derived from other forms of capital (i.e. political or economic), but the *misrecognition* of race as natural is what makes it symbolic. Swartz (2013) explains, symbolic capital is unique in how it "deflect(s) attention from the interested character of practices and thereby contribute(s) to their enactment as disinterested pursuits" (p. 102). He then clarifies further: "Symbolic capital is a form of power that is not perceived as power but as demands for recognition, deference, obedience, or the services of others" (p. 103; see also Bourdieu 1990, p. 118). How, then, might a state interested in imposing symbolic meanings on a population try and increase its symbolic capital?

According to Bourdieu (1982, 1991), religion is an especially good "resource" for states and state authorities interested in accumulating symbolic capital in an effort to legitimately impose symbolic meanings and classifications. This is because religion *qua* religion religion is a system of symbolic meaning that "dupes people" into believing their positions in society — and other's positions, too — are "somehow natural or, worse still, divinely sanctioned" (Rey 2007, p. 6). In this way, religion is a form of misrecognition *par excellence*. Religion is a symbolic

system that helps "create, legitimate, and reproduce unjust social orders" (p. 7). In turn, the Church, as there social institution responsible for "producing" religion, and bishops, as "specialists" of the (Catholic) religious field, plays a role in consecrating the social order as legitimate. Considered in relation to politics, Bourdieu (1991, p. 32) adds:

> The Church contributes to the maintenance of the political order, that is, to the symbolic reinforcement of the divisions of this order, in and by fulfilling its proper functions, which is to contribute to the maintenance of the symbolic order. It does this by imposing and indicating schemes of perception, thought, and action objectively agreeing with political structures and grants these structures the supreme legitimation of 'naturalization.'

Building, then, on the above, in this chapter, I propose two proxies for observing and examining the processes by which religion consecrates the political order through the production of misrecognition (and thereby enables the accumulation of symbolic capital in the political sphere). First, religion enables the accumulation of symbolic capital in the political sphere through the expression of common religious and political worldviews. Second, religion enables the accumulation of symbolic capital in the political sphere through the conflation of religious and political symbols. Combined, I argue, both the expression by religious and political authorities of a shared worldview and the use of common symbols serve to legitimize and naturalize political systems and agendas through misrecognition. In turn, both processes enable the accumulation of symbolic capital in the political sphere.

**Methods**

This chapter draws on a variety of sources on the French Catholic episcopate and the Vichy government. Among these are private notes and correspondences among bishops, with the Papal Nuncio Valerio Valeri, and with various representatives of the Vichy government, including Marshal Pétain. I also include sermon notes, mass announcements, and publications in official diocesan weekly newsletters, *Semaine Religieuse* (there is one specific to each diocese), as well as other local publications that gave voice to the Catholic Church in France during this period.[89] Finally, the chapter makes use of primary documents from chief rabbis in the French Rabbinate. A majority of the data comes from diocesan archives in Paris and Lyon, the National Center for Church Archives of France, and the archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. These documents were collected from 2011 to 2013 in France. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Secondary sources are specified in parentheses.

In analyzing these documents, I focus chiefly on processes that involve or indicate shifting patterns of relations among Vichy governmental authorities, the Catholic hierarchy, and the Jewish rabbinate. In other words, I take an explicitly relational approach, borrowing from Desmond's (2014) call for "relational ethnography." However, I adjust the framework of his argument to make it applicable for sociohistorical analysis.

In proposing a "relational ethnography," Desmond suggests that scholars ought to give "ontological primacy, not to groups or places, but to configurations of relations" (p. 554). Rather than examining individuals or groups as entities — whether they be "the Church," "the State,"

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[89] Though importantly, they were often subject to censorship, as with any other publication in France from 1940-1944.

"the Jews," et cetera — I focus explicitly on the *relationships* between them, particularly on the dynamics of interactions between religious and political authorities in France. Thus throughout this chapter, I do not seek to understand the characteristics of the Church as an organization nor the Vichy government nor "Jews in France." Rather, I am interested in the *changing patterns of relations* between religious authorities and political authorities in France during this time-period.

In the following section, I briefly review the background of Church-State relations in France prior to the rise of Vichy France. Then I turn to trace transformations in this relationship from 1940-1942.

**Background**

Prior to examining changing relations between religious and political authorities in France, it is necessary first to explain what these relationships were like before the war and the rise of the Vichy regime. The boundaries between religion and politics in France have had a long and contested history. Below, I summarize a few key moments and details.

*Separation of Church and State*

The French Law on the Separation of Church and State was passed on 9 December 1905 by the Chamber of Deputies, establishing state secularism in France. Catholic Church buildings were declared property of the state and almost all Church schools were closed as well. The law followed a series of changes that had already been taking place in France since the French Revolution in 1789. Among these was the proclamation of religious liberty in Article 10 of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, which eventually led to full emancipation for Jews

in 1791. This was the first time Jews were granted full equality anywhere in Europe. Yet at the same time that the new National Assembly was debating this policy, they also promulgated the Civic Constitution of Clergy (1790), which required catholic clergy to swear an oath of loyalty to the nation. The majority of clergy refused; only five bishops signed it.

In response, Pope Pius VI repudiated the regime and the few clergy who signed the oath, and he recalled the ambassador to the Vatican while the papal nuncio was recalled to Paris. Shortly after, the Reign of Terror, from 1793-1794, targeted "nonjuring priests" — those who still refused to sign the oath — and they were liable to death on sight often by the guillotine or mass execution by drowning (such as the *Noyades de Nantes*). Policies were implemented to remove all influence of Christian religiosity in the state, including Sundays, Holy Days, saints, ceremonies, public prayer, and ritual.

In 1801, a Concordat between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII was signed; its intention was to reconcile Church-State relations and restore much of the civil status of the Church. Church lands that had been sold during the revolution were not returned, but the Church was free to exercise its worship in public so long as it followed local government regulations. Sundays were returned as "festival" days and Catholicism was declared "the religion of the great majority of the French." Finally, clergy were still required to sign an oath of allegiance to the state, but the state in turn would at least be responsible for clerical salaries. The 1801 concordat restored some power to the Church. However, the majority was still tipped in favor of the state.

Under the Third Republic, which began in 1870, further national secularization programs were implemented by the French government. This included the removal of priests from hospital and charity boards (1879) and the replacement of nuns with lay women in hospitals (1880). Jules

Ferry Laws of 1881-1882 forbid religious instruction in all schools. Civil marriage became compulsory; divorce was made legal. During this period, Pope Leo XII embarked on a major effort to calm Church-State relations in France, also known as the "first *ralliement*" — the term itself originating in the encyclical *Au Milieu des Solicitudes* (1892). This encyclical encouraged French Catholics to rally to the Republic, but Leo XII's efforts failed. Conservative and royalists claimed that the Republican regime and the French Revolution that birthed it were hostile to the values of Christian social order.

The Dreyfus Affair, which took place from 1894-1906, further served to deepen the schism between reformed France on the left and conservative France on the right. The latter was pro-monarchy, pro-Church, and seized the opportunity provided by the Affair to publicize its anti-Republican and anti-Semitic values. *La Croix* often took the lead in these attacks and declared Dreyfus a traitor even after he was pardoned. In response, the French government closed the paper and the Roman Catholic Assumption Order that ran it.

The Dreyfus Affair also gave birth to *Action Française*, a social and political movement with its own journal that further nourished counter-revolutionary ideology among Catholics. Founded by Charles Maurras, *Action Française*, in addition to being monarchist, was also explicitly anti-Semitic and called for a return to Catholic domination over France. It was remarkably popular.

When the law on the Separation of Church and State formally abrogated the 1801 Napoleonic Concordat in 1905, the cleavage dividing politics from religion in France couldn't be greater. All remaining Church property was confiscated, religious personnel were removed from any state positions they might have held, and government funding of religious groups in any

capacity was stopped. The 1905 law was the final severance of institutionalized Church-State relations.

*Pope Pius XI*

The nomination of Pope Pius XI in 1922 gave birth to a "second *ralliement*" in France. Pius XI's first encyclical, *Ubi arcane Dei consilio* (1922) declared his goal of Christianizing secular societies through Catholic Action — social groups organized by bishops and priests for Catholic youth and their families. Catholic Action was intentionally geared *away* from political action and *towards* the re-evangelization of Christian society. Marking a dramatic break with the past, clergy were encouraged to avoid politics and to work instead towards involving the laity in social organizations that would spread Catholic values throughout France. Youth movements especially became a key focus of the Church.

Concerning conservative Catholics who favored a return to the monarchy and national Catholicism, Pope Pius XI was radical here, too. On 29 December 1926, only four years into his papacy, Pope Pius XI condemned *Action Française*. Three weeks later, on 9 January 1927, *Action Française* became the first newspaper to be placed on the Catholic Church's list of banned publications. It would not be revived until Pope Pius XII decided to end the condemnation in 1939. In rejecting Maurras' strategy of "politique d'abord,"[90] Pius XI once again stressed to Catholics the importance of spiritual regeneration over political activism.

*The French Episcopate*

[90] "Politics first."

Pope Pius XI's desire to promote social catholicism and to do away with movements like *Action Française* influenced how he approached episcopal nominations during his tenure. In fact, according to Le Moigne (2005), it is possible to distinguish within the French episcopate at this time a clear division between bishops nominated *prior* to the condemnation of *Action Française* under Pius X and Benoît XV, and bishops nominated *after* the condemnation by nuncio Luigi Maglione and Valerio Valeri under Pius XI (p. 19; see appendix A). The latter intentionally sought to purge the episcopate of the old guard, who were chosen during a time when fighting against secular republicanism was a top priority of the Church, and to replace them with bishops who would make social catholicism their primary focus — bishops who would reject political involvement by the church and disavow of any Maurassian or similarly nationalist tendencies (pp. 19, 25). Le Moigne describes this "new guard" as "the first generation [of bishops] to have truly 'digested' and accepted the Separation (p. 33)."[91]

Due to their assignments and also their individual desires to serve "among the people," bishops nominated under Pope Pius XI would become very well-known in France. Catholic associations pioneered by these bishops enabled the creation of widespread social networks and organizations, including *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française* (ACJF), *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne* (JOC), *Jeunesse Agricole Catholique* (JAC), *Jeunesse Indépendante Chrétienne* (JIC), and *Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne* (JEC), among others (see appendix B).[92] These movements' constituents refused to engage in political activism throughout the 1920s and

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[91] To be sure, as Le Moigne (2005) notes, there were some conflicts within the episcopate between this "new guard" of younger bishops who were nominated by Pope Pius XI after the condemnation of *Action Française* in 1926 and the older, more conservative generation of bishops. However, the new guard formed the majority of the episcopate and Pope Pius XI's dictates encouraged their progressivism against the conservatism of the past.

[92] Note: The leaders of JOC, JAC, JEC, JIC, and JMC all served on the General Committee of the ACJF. I will return to the importance of these youth organizations in chapter three.

1930s, encouraged by Pius XI's encyclicals and the new cohort of bishops that stressed, especially with the rise of Communism, Socialism, and authoritarian anti-parliamentary leagues in France such as the Croix de Feu (which had actually incorporated some former supporters of *Action Française*), the need for Catholics to abstain from interacting with political groups. Catholic Action was remarkably successful in refocusing French Catholic life away from politics and toward social change. Jackson (2003, p. 25) describes how social catholicism during this time-period extended "into almost every crevice of French associational life" and Le Moigne (2005, p. 24) writes how, as a result of Catholic Action, bishops nominated post-1926 had a "recognition without equivalent in the twentieth century."

Unfortunately, as we will see below, the events of 1940 would dramatically alter the social catholic focus on this episcopate. Their abstention from politics throughout Pius XIs reign meant that, despite their acceptance of the Third Republic, the hierarchy did not have significant personal or institutional ties with the interwar French governments, nor did they share common worldviews given the Church's emphasis on social catholicism and the Republic's emphasis on secularism. Finally, politics and religion were firmly separated in the realm of the symbolic as well: political authorities of the Third Republic did not engage in religious ceremonies or prayer at public events; they did not praise God or otherwise make public displays of deference to the Church. The antagonism of the past had dissipated, but the present was founded on acceptance, not integration.

Turning, then, to the rise of the Vichy regime — where the next section begins — we can understand what Maurras meant when he described the new Vichy government as a "divine

surprise."[93] This new cohort of bishops, as chapter one demonstrated, were far from the anti-Semitic, anti-Republican proponents of *Action Française* from the past. They were chosen specifically to *oppose* its values. But they also hadn't expected for there to ever be a return of the Church to the central stage of French politics. Suddenly, then, with the fall of the Third Republic and with "the coalition of anti-Republican forces gathered around Pétain, it was clear to all, and to the Catholic Church, that the country had entered a new phase in its history" (Adler 2001, p. 261). These new conservatives appealed to the episcopate to strengthen their legitimacy and French bishops responded with enthusiasm. Le Moigne (2005, p. 19) explains, "after the defeat of mid-June 1940, one does not need to find ways to divide the episcopate between ancient and modern prelates, conservatives or democrats… they were entirely *maréchaliste*."

The next section details what this "reconciling" of political and religious relationships looked like in France from 1940-1942. I also explain how this shift in relations contributed to the Vichy government's efforts to obtain legitimacy via the accumulation of political and symbolic capital. For an episcopate selected intentionally to avoid religious nationalism and political compromise, the objective and subjective transformations in their relationships with the State were dramatic. Public endorsements from one to the other and vice versa, structural embeddedness of religious authorities in state institutions, the consistent expression of common religious and political worldviews, and the joining together of religious and political symbolism: all this would have been unfathomable three decades prior.

**Analysis**

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[93] Charles Maurras, "La Divine Surprise." *Le Petit Marseillais*, 9 February 1941.

1. Public endorsements

There was no shortage of public claims of support from authorities in the Church for the Vichy government and vice versa. Best-known among these declarations is Cardinal Gerlier's famous declaration, on 19 November 1940, that "Pétain is France, and France today is Pétain."[94,95]

As noted in the previous chapter, this statement by the official spokesperson of the Church was *not* representative of all individual beliefs in the episcopate during the summer and prior to the bishops' decisions to support the *Statut des Juifs* in late August. Research that looks to this statement for an explanation of why the episcopate endorsed the statute misses the important process of decision-making that led to this result, detailed in chapter one.

However, historians have not been wrong to emphasize the significance of this statement altogether. It is simply that the timing matters. From 1933 to late August 1940, many in the French Catholic hierarchy openly allied with Jews (see chapter one, pp. 28-35). When Germany invaded France, resulting in the eventual signing of the armistice that begot the German Occupation, bishops were unsure of how to respond.[96] Choosing to support the *Statut des Juifs* was an outcome of chaos, selective repression, and processes of tacit alignment. Yet once the episcopate had consolidated its stance, and once the regime's positions toward the Church became clearer in the fall (especially with the annulment, on 3 September 1940, of a 1901 law that banned religious orders from teaching[97]), the Church rallied to the new regime and would

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[94] *Semaine religieuse du diocèse de Lyon*, 29 November 1940.

[95] For a detailed analysis of this famous speech, see Georges (2003).

[96] This is detailed in chapter one, pp. 35-39.

[97] The significance of Vichy's changes to policy on religious education is discussed in detail on pp. 97-99.

not speak out on behalf of Jews again until August 1942.[98] When Gerlier openly praised Pétain in front of a crowd of hundreds, the episcopate's position concerning Vichy's legislated anti-Semitism was already established. Adding to his famous sermon, Gerlier declared: "France needed a chief who would lead her to her eternal destiny, God has allowed for you to be here." This public statement contributed to the legitimization of the new head of state and his government in front of the many who filled the pews of the Fourvière basilica. Furthermore, in a shift over only a few short months, Gerlier was no longer alone in his praise for the Marshal. Cardinal Suhard in Paris and Monsignor Jean Delay, the bishop of Marseille, expressed their veneration for France's new leader, with the latter declaring in his cathedral on 2 December 1940, "God is using you, *monsieur le maréchal*, to awaken France."[99]

To allay concerns that these words of praise might have been naive and confined only to the beginnings of Pétain's reign, one need only to look at similar declarations of support for the Vichy government throughout 1941. In the Association of Cardinals and Archbishops (hereafter, ACA) meeting of 15 January 1941, bishops in the Occupied Zone professed their "total loyalty to the state and the government in France."[100] This position was endorsed by the ACA in Unoccupied France two weeks later.[101] In May 1941, bishop Piguet of Clermont-Ferrand claimed, "[Pétain] alleviates our misery and seeks to eradicate, through… himself and his glory of yesteryear, the costs of our misery."[102] In October, bishop Mennechet of Soissons wrote, in a

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[98] This protest is the subject of chapter four.

[99] *L'Écho de Notre-Dame-de-la-Garde*, 14 December 1940.

[100] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Chollet, 1B. 24. Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée des Cardinaux et Archevêques de France, Paris, 15 January 1941.

[101] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Chollet, 1B. 24. Conférence épiscopales de Lyon, 5 -6 February 1941.

[102] *La Croix d'Auvergne*, 4 May 1941.

letter to Pétain, that his congregation prayers for "the admirable *chef* that providence has bestowed upon France in your august person."[103] Yet at the same time, Jews were losing their rights to work and being stripped of their ability to claim an allegiance to France as *their* "fatherland." Already on 22 July 1940, the Vichy government had set up a Commission for the Revision of Naturalizations to review all grants of French Citizenship since 1927. Jews were disproportionately affected by these proceedings and deported from France (Marrus and Paxton 1995 [1981], p. 4).

In July 1941, one month after the first major roundup of Jews in Paris had transpired, the ACA in the occupied zone (but with Gerlier in attendance) proclaimed, the regime legitimate and called for "a sincere and complete loyalty to the established power. We venerate the head of state and urge the union of all French around him."[104] Although their statement called for Catholics to remain loyal "without enthrallment to the public order," a phrase several historians have highlighted as evidence of a call for moderation by French bishops (i.e., Clément 1999), others have critiqued this assessment, arguing first, that this message was so subtle that it could hardly be construed as meaningful tempering by the episcopate vis-à-vis the government's anti-Semitic policies, and second, that it did not even stop bishops from continuing to publicly revere the government (i.e., Fouilloux 2002). As Jackson (2003, p. 268) explains, "in practice the qualification 'without enthrallment' did not prevent delirious effusions of devotion to Pétain from individual prelates" throughout the summer and onwards.

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[103] Archives Nationales, 2AG 493, Letter from Mgr. Mennechet to Pétain. 24 October 1941, referenced in Halls (1991), eds. Tallet and Atkin, p. 169.

[104] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Chollet, 1B. 26. Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée des Cardinaux et Archevêques de France Paris, 24-25 July 1941.

Prominent declarations of support for the state from the Church were even evident as late as 1 September 1941, only slightly past a week after 4,232 French and foreign Jews were arrested in Paris and taken to Drancy internment camp, northeast of the city and where Jews would frequently be detained during the war prior to their deportation to death camps in Poland. On the day of this rafle, the secretary of the Catholic episcopate, Monsignor Jean Chollet, exhorted the faithful to follow the Marshal's plan for France:

> We have no right to criticize the leader himself or his orders. The subordinate obeys without question or inquiry…. in the name of our own religious conscious we will be the most united and the most disciplined of citizens.[105]

Last but not least, in October 1941, synagogues in Paris, Marseille, and Vichy were attacked and destroyed. In response, the Council of the Association of French Rabbis adopted a declaration for Chief Rabbi Isaïe Schwartz to transmit to Cardinal Gerlier.[106] The document describes the council's anguish and desperation for some kind of public support from non-Jewish religious authorities. The rabbis wrote: "As with human victims, the stones, sanctified by piety; the tabernacles, that cover our sacred scrolls; we… are anguished. When will this sacrilegious fury end?"[107] They concluded with a plea to their "colleagues who stand on guard around the Lord's sanctuary"[108]:

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[105] Cited in Pury 1978, p. 31.

[106] Archives de l'Archdiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier. Interventions de Cardinal en Faveur de Divers Juifs, 1940-1943. 26 November, 1941.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid.

> How comforting for us and for our anguished brothers it would be if we were to hear our sentiments echoed… invoked in the synagogues, the churches, the mosques, and if the faithful of other religions and their spiritual leaders showed their reprobation of these ungodly crimes?[109]

At the end of the letter, the president of the rabbinical council asked all in attendance to communicate this message to ecclesiastical authorities in their communities.[110] Gerlier, in response to Schwartz, expressed compassion for the rabbi's plight and promised to share the letter with the ACA in the free zone during his next meeting with the hierarchy.[111] It is clear in Gerlier's reply that he was beginning to feel anxious about the Church's silence concerning Jews, a point to which I will return in chapter three. However, at this time, Gerlier declined to make a public declaration on Jews' behalf.[112] In fact, at no time from summer 1940 until March 1941 did the episcopate even express its concerns about Vichy's anti-Semitic policies and its consequences to the government, and a public statement would not be issued until August 1942.[113] When compared with Autumn 1933, when Jewish buildings were first ransacked, the shift in relations is

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[109] Ibid.

[110] Of note, this was not the only letter the Cardinal received in December 1941 requesting that he speak on behalf of Jews. In addition to the correspondence and meeting with Helbronner, Gerlier received a letter from P. Dillard on 12 December 1941 asking that an official letter from the Church on racism and anti-Semitism be published in the free zone. In de Lubac, Henri. (1990). *Christian resistance to anti-Semitism: Memories from 1940-1944*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.

[111] Archives de l'Archdiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier, Interventions de Cardinal en Faveur de Divers Juifs, 1940-1943. 5 December 1941.

[112] Gerlier explains his rationale, as discussed in the previous section, in a letter to Chappoulie, contained in CNAEF, 3CE 23. Relations Cardinal Gerlier/Mgr. Chappoulie (1940-1944). 14 December 1941.

[113] Once again, this protest is the subject of chapter four.

glaring. Less than a decade prior, the Grand Rabbi Israël Levi invited all Christians to form a "front of defense for the bible," and bishops from the biggest cities throughout France, including Paris, Nice, Marseille, and Toulouse, responded, while those in Lyon, Bordeaux, Lille, and Tours sent ecclesiastics as representatives (Bernay 2012, p. 64-66).

2. Structural embeddedness

In addition to public declarations of support, another way in which the relationship between the Vichy government and the episcopate changes, the one legitimizing the other, is through the incorporation of religious officials and notable catholics into the structural machinery of the government. Once the new regime consolidated power, the Vatican officially appointed Archbishop Valerio Valeri to serve as the Papal Nuncio to Vichy. In return, Vichy France appointed its own ambassador, Léon Bérard, to serve as its representative to the Holy See. This confirmation of official positions validated the new regime, as did the introduction of over 200 clerics into communal leadership positions and departmental committees throughout France (Jackson 2003, p. 268; Cointet 1998, p. 140). In the highest levels of government, prominent Catholics came to serve in powerful roles.[114] Fouilloux (1997, pp. 194-196) notes how this was the first time since 1879 that so many Catholics had been appointed to high government

[114] For example, devout Catholics in the Vichy government included General Maxime Weygand, Minister of Defense; Raphaël Alibert, Minister of Justice (until January 1941), Pierre Caziot (Minister of Agriculture until April 1942); and André Lavagne, Pétain's Chef de Cabinet. The first four ministers of education were also religious Catholics, especially the last of this group, Jacques Chevalier (he was replaced but the more moderate Carcopino in February 1941), and so was Xavier Vallat, Commissioner-General for Jewish Questions until May 1942.

office.[115] In contrast, once the first *Statut des Juifs* was passed, the state council was purged of all Jews that had previously held a seat on it (Poznanski 2001, p. 43).[116]

Additionally, in an exemplary series of letters between Cardinal Gerlier of Lyon with Valeri in late February 1941, the cardinal weighed whether to accept an offer from Joseph Barthélemy, the Vichy minister of Justice, to serve on the council of ministers as an advisor (especially on religious issues).[117] Gerlier ultimately declined the invitation, but not because of any hesitation over whether the Church should partake in political affairs. In fact, Gerlier even offered the name of a bishop who might serve in his place, Archbishop of Cambrai and Secretary of the ACA, Émile-Maurice Guerry.[118]

In Occupied France, Suhard, who had already been nominated to the national council in January,[119] would eventually decline the nomination in March 1941[120], but not without sending his chief aide, Monsignor Roger Beaussart, in his stead. A devoted collaborationist,[121] Beaussart represented Suhard at the formal welcoming reception when Hermann Göring visited Paris in December (Burrin 1996, p. 221). In the same month, Cardinal Suhard assured German

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[115] These officials were not members of the French episcopate, but there were efforts from 1940-1942 to incorporate the higher clergy into the political administration.

[116] However, as Poznanski (2001, p. 43) notes, a few were able to obtain exemptions at first and then, with the passing of the second *Statut des Juifs* in June 1941, all public officials would lose their jobs with no exceptions.

[117] Archives de l'Archdiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier, Correspondence Cardinal Gerlier avec La Nonciature. 4 February 1941; 26 February 1941; 28 February 1941.

[118] Ibid., 4 February 1941.

[119] Suhard's Diary, January 15-27, p. 59.

[120] Suhard, on his decision to decline the nomination, details how he told Pétain that he had "great confidence in him" and would "love" to join the national council, but he worried that doing so would "reduce his influence in religious affairs to 80%" and he would better serve the Marshal by staying "on the religious plan." Suhard's Diary, p. 61.

[121] On November 1941, Beaussart stated, "Collaboration [is] the only reasonable course for France and for the Church."

ambassador Otto Abetz that "the clergy is fully disposed to make its influence felt in favor of collaboration."[122]

Furthermore, even the protestant leadership, as represented by Pastor Marc Boegner, was embedded in the machinery of the new French state. Boegner, president of the Protestant Federation of France and National Council of Reformed Churches of France, was appointed to the National Council in January 1941. The same month, he wrote a letter to Pétain assuring him of "his deferential admiration and his gratitude."[123] Similarly, in September 1941, Boegner gave a speech at the Grand Temple in Nîmes on the need for protestants to play a role in remaking the new France (Zaretsky 1995, p. 119, ff. 127).[124]

Finally, in the magazine *Informations Catholiques Français*, the episcopate summarized its "national role" in political affairs and described how, throughout the country, civil authorities and religious authorities were working together in a common effort.[125] Jackson (2003, p. 268) summarizes this aspect of the Catholic religious and French political relationship neatly: "prelates were present on most official occasions and bishops were frequent guests at Pétain's table." Rather quickly, the Vichy government was able to increase its political capital by embedding religious authorities into the administrative structures of the state.

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[122] Archives Nationales, 3W 347, Télégramme 1496. Abetz à Ribbentrop. 13 December 1941.

[123] Marc Boegner, letter to M. Pétain, 10 January 1941, quoted in Bolle (1979), "Rapport général," p. 331, and in Wieviorka (2016), p. 398.

[124] Importantly, Boegner also denounced Vichy's racist legislation and state anti-Semitism in two letters in late March 1941, the first to Rabbi Isaïe Schwartz, the second to Admiral Darlan. Unintentionally, Boegner's letter — which was meant to be private — was found by *Au Pillori*, a French collaborationist journal, that then printed and circulated the letter throughout the unoccupied zone. *Au Pillori*'s goal was to embarrass Boegner, but instead they embarrassed the regime (Zaretsky 1995, p. 119, ff 128; see also Bolle 1979, p. 294). As a result, Boegner's letter would become the first public protest against anti-Semitism by a religious authority in France during this time-period. The "Pomeyrol Theses," written by a small group of protestants that clarified the relationship between church and state and protested Vichy's anti-Semitic laws and violence, was published several months later, but Boegner was not a part of this group.

[125] CNAEF, 3CE 90. Relations entre Église et État. See, for example, edition of August 1940, no. 103.

By contrast, in the same period, French rabbinical authorities sought to affirm (but could not) their pre-war relationships with Catholic authorities by solidifying institutional alliances. In October 1940, Rabbi Julian Weill went to Cardinal Suhard hoping to join both religious organizations together in solidarity, as before the German invasion, and against what Weill perceived as German pressures that could strike them both.[126] Yet Suhard had rapidly overcome his initial resistance and discomfort with collaboration, and he was confident by as early as mid-September that making common cause with the German authorities would bolster the Church's status. In an entry recorded between 16 and 19 September, Suhard wrote:

> The occupying power proves correct, and even very correct, with me. What will it be tomorrow? I think the Catholic Church can emerge from this ordeal magnified and glorified by the position she held during this ordeal.[127]

Subsequently, when Rabbi Weill met with Cardinal Suhard in Paris two weeks later, Weill expressed his concerns about rising political anti-Semitism and his desire for the Church and the rabbinate to continue fighting Nazism together, but Suhard had no interest in working alongside him. Suhard was already convinced the Church could benefit from allying with Nazi occupation authorities. Weill was playing a fool's game.

Similarly, in December 1941, Jacques Helbronner, president of the *Consistoire Central des Israelites de France* (CCIF) and the most important Jewish personality in France at the time,

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[126] Suhard's Diary, p. 48.

[127] Suhard's Diary, p. 45.

wrote to Marshal Pétain, with a copy of the letter delivered to Cardinal Gerlier, deploring the terrible conditions of French Jews in the occupied zone.[128] Helbronner pleaded for support and begged the Marshal to "stop this campaign of hate"[129] in which Jews are "deprived of their rights as citizens, spoiled of the fruits of their labor, chased from the institutions that they and their families have created; these persecutions, will they ever end?"[130] Helbronner was obsequious: "you are, with his eminence Cardinal Gerlier… the only comfort, the only support that I can find."[131] He implored, "can we receive from you a word of hope?"[132]

Helbronner would write to Pétain 26 times in 1941 on behalf of his *coreligionnaires*. He often noted his ties to Cardinal Gerlier (also the subject of his many requests for intervention on behalf of Jews) in an effort to demonstrate his social capital. Unfortunately, these efforts had no real impact, possibly because at this time, Gerlier was frequently praising the regime and Pétain in his sermons, and he often encouraged the laity to work towards the government's National Revolution. Like Schwartz with Suhard, Helbronner's efforts to recruit Gerlier to publicly ally with Jews was futile. Likewise, his "name-dropping" of Gerlier in numerous letters to Pétain was to no avail. Pétain, when he did reply to Helbronner, wrote only curt and formal letters. In Marrus and Paxton's words, "Pétain's replies were polite but inconsequential" (1995 [1981], p. 86).

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[128] Archives de l'Archdiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier, Affaire Helbronner, 8 December 1941.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Ibid.

3. Shared Religious and Political Worldviews

According to Bourdieu (1991), one of the ways in which religious authorities can consecrate political orders is through the expression of worldviews that interpret political arrangements as divinely sanction. Thus while Jackson (2003) writes, "in the autumn of 1940, when the government's political orientation became clearer, the Church succumbed totally to the cult of the providential leader" (p. 268), the analysis below does not disagree with this argument but modifies it slightly: for a majority of bishops, the French government's expressed worldview reflected key ideals of Catholicism.[133] Bishops did not "succumb" to the government but rather they perceived that the new regime's values mirrored those of the Church and they regularly expressed this to the laity. In turn, religious and political worldviews in France became conflated to the extent that bishops in the Catholic hierarchy expressed the government's cultural agenda and belief systems as their own.

On 19 November 1940, Cardinal Gerlier declared in his famous speech, "Work, family, fatherland — these words are ours."[134] A month later, Gerlier praised Pétain's National Revolution philosophy in the *Journal des Débats*, a French weekly, stating: "The Marshal said one day: 'our fatherland must recover the beauty of its roots.' What is then the most beautiful of all the roots if not Christianity, which gave it birth?"[135] In doing so, he echoed not only Pétain's speeches but also the Marshal's essays which described a worldview in which Jews were not a

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[133] Again, in chapter three, I discuss dissent within the Church and the few bishops who were not in total agreement during this time-period with the Catholic hierarchy's formal stance of support for the Church and silence concerning violence against Jews.

[134] *Semaine religieuse du diocèse de Lyon*, 29 November 1940.

[135] "Dans un vibrant discours, Mgr. Gerlier engage tous les Français à s'unir autour du Maréchal." *Journal des Débats*, 28 December 1940.

part of the natural French community. As a result, Gerlier helped legitimize the government's exclusionary philosophy to the Church's membership.

Many in the Church hierarchy were also quick to praise the Vichy regime because they believed the groups shared common ideological enemies (Bartov 1998; Burrin 1996; Jackson 200). Not least among these was the *laïcité* of the past. In September 1940, Monsignor Florent Du Bois de Villerabel, archbishop of Aix, described the old republic's secularism as a "cancer" that had disfigured France.[136] The bishop of Viviers, Monsignor Couderc, similarly exclaimed that among all the reasons for France's defeat, the greatest, perhaps, was the former republic's "official ignorance of religion."[137] A belief that God was punishing France for her abandonment of Christian values predominated many bishops speeches and appeared regularly in *La Croix* — "the semi-official organ of [French] Catholicism" (Halls 1995, p. 170):

> *La Croix* offered readers a full menu of dissipating factors that had helped lead *La Belle France* down the road to perdition. These included the obvious Catholic complains of *laïcité* and *dénatalité*, as well as an unsparing critique of "Modernism's other errors," from women's liberation to rural flight, as well as the overconsumption of alcohol. (Crane 2004, pp. 51-52)

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[136] *Semaine Religieuse de l'Archdiocèse d'Aix*, 15 September 1940, no. 37, p. 37.

[137] *Semaine Religieuse de l'Archdiocèse de Viviers,* 28 February 1941, no. 9, p. 78.

The message couldn't be clearer: Catholics must flock to Pétain who promised to reverse trends the Church blamed for France's ruin. Redemption for past sins could only be achieved through the installation of a political system that promised to reverse them.

Significantly, not only did Catholic authorities turn to the government in support of their perceived common values, but also, the Vichy government actively courted the episcopate in its effort to align Catholics with its political goals. Political officials regularly imitated religious discourse by chastising France for her moral decline and called for a return to the social values of the Church. For example, a lengthy memo on Church-State relations authored by the Director of Cults and Associations at the Ministry of the Interior, Pierre Sauret, argued that it was necessary for the state to work with the Church in rebuilding France, because an absence or abandonment of spiritual values had been an important factor in her defeat.[138] Also, although Pétain himself was not personally religious, he regularly spoke of the need for self-chastisement — a constant value of the Church, according to Drapac (1998, p. 131). Jackson (2003, p. 268) writes that the Marshal was "was happy to embrace the Church as a bastion of social order whose objectives dovetailed with the national revolution."

In this vein, perhaps no single issue was of greater importance to the Catholic hierarchy than the republic's institutionalized secularism of state education. Within the first month after the armistice was signed, bishops Gerlier, Suhard, and Liénart had met twice to prepare a list of demands from the Church to Pétain. The issue of Catholic education was at the top.[139] The

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[138] CNAEF, 3 CE 31, Relations de Mgr. Chappoulie aver Monsieur B. Ménétrel, secrétaire particulier du maréchal Pétain.

[139] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Guerry 2B 54 1134, "Note remise [à Vichy] au nom de Cardinal Suhard, Baudrillart, et Gerlier remis à Paris le 10 Juliet 1940 et résumant les désirs unanime de l'Assemblée des Cardinal et Archevêques de France." This letter is also discussed briefly in chapter one on pp. 46.

regime, in turn, made an early homage to this priority of the Church by appointing to its ministry of education Albert Rivaud, Emile Mineaux, and Georges Ripert, who served in succession from 17 June to 13 December 1940. Each was an ardent, anti-republican, Catholic, eager to dismiss the secular education program that came before them (Halls 1981, pp. 16-20). Jacques Chevalier, the fourth minister of education in the Vichy government, was deeply religious as well, and he organized numerous concessions to the Church before being replaced by Jerome Carcopino, a more moderate figure, in February 1941.[140]

The episcopate's belief that Pétain would save France from *laïcité* by returning authority to the Church in the realm of education was powerfully validated when, in a famous article of 15 August 1940, the Marshal explained that a national regeneration of France would hinge on improving youth education.[141] Pétain wrote that he anticipated re-introducing French traditional values of "god, work, and family" into state schools.[142] General Weygand declared in fall of 1940 that "France deserved her defeat; she was beaten because her governments for half a century have chased god from school" (in Duquesne 1966, p. 27). Putting words into action, on 3 September 1940, the Vichy government rescinded the 1901 Law on Associations that had banned religious orders from teaching.[143] In October, the *écoles normales* were abolished; Suhard during this same month remarked in his diary how pleased he was about the changing laws on education.[144] In December, a law was passed that instructed "duties toward God" to be taught in

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[140] Carcopino and his policies are discussed further in chapter four on pp. 165.

[141] P. Pétain, "L'éducation Nationales," pp. 350-353 in *La Revue des Deux Mondes.* 15 August, 1940. Published in Barbas, J.C., ed., (1989). *Philippe Pétain. Discours aux français, 17 Juin 1940-20 Août 1944*. Paris: Albin Michel.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Vie sociale de l'Église: Documents et actes officiels: Années 1940-1942. (1942). Paris: Maison de la Bonne presse. p. 51.

[144] Suhard's Diary, p. 47.

public schools.[145] From its very beginnings, Vichy was prepared to work with the Church, motivated by common values and beliefs about how best to reconstruct the nation. Restoring the status of the Church (and especially Catholic religious education) was an early priority for both that sprang from their shared worldview.

Further indicators of conflation between the Vichy government's political philosophy and the Catholic Church's own expressed values is how, many times in fall 1940 and throughout 1941, Church authorities expressed their agreement with State officials that there was a "Jewish Problem" that needed to be dealt with. Political leaders would then use the Church's support to justify their anti-Semitic policies. For example, we know from the first chapter that the when episcopate decided to endorse the first *Statut des Juifs,* Jews were described as "not your ordinary foreigner welcomed in a country, but an unassimilable one."[146] On 25 October 1940, three weeks after the *Statut* was promulgated, Baudouin parroted the exact discourse provided by the church in response to a group of American newsmen: "we have decided to limit the action of a spiritual community that, whatever its qualities, has always remained outside the French intellectual community.... [no longer could the Jews] constitute an empire within an empire."[147] The modern "soundbite" was on display.

Later, as persecution against Jews in France intensified, Gerlier would remind ministers in the Vichy government of the episcopate's decided position toward Jews. In October 1941, he

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[145] Vie sociale de l'Église: Documents et actes officiels: Années 1940-1942. (1942). Paris: Maison de la Bonne presse. p. 54.

[146] Archives de diocèse de Cambrai, fonds Chollet, 2B. 47, Procès-Verbal de la Conférence épiscopale de Lyon, 31 August 1940.

[147] 25 October 1940. "M. Paul Baudouin Commente Les Mesures Prises à l'Egard des Juifs." *Journal des débats politiques et littéraires*. [online] Retrieved from: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5098512.langEN [Accessed: 10 October 2014].

told Commissioner General for Jewish Questions, Xavier Vallat, that the "law is not unjust… but it lacks justice and charity in its enforcement."[148] According to Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981], p. 200), Vallat also reported that Gerlier had told him, "the Jewish problem exists… it is indeed inescapable, and I approve [of the anti-Jewish measures] within the framework of justice and freedom." Thus *even when* religious authorities were growing concerned about anti-Semitic violence,[149] they still maintained that they were ideologically aligned with the notion that there was a Jewish problem. In other words, the issue was *how* to address the "Jewish Problem," not whether there was one.[150]

This "harmonization" of the episcopate and the state's worldviews is striking when considering how, numerous times, Jewish leaders sought to establish an alliance with the Church by calling attention to *their* presumed-to-be-common values. For example, after the first *Statut des Juifs* was passed, on 22 October, Rabbi Schwartz denounced the new laws in both occupied and unoccupied France in a letter to Pétain, writing with fervor that they were a form of "racial legislation, [with] principles born outside our borders, repudiated by Judaism, denied by consciousness and sentenced *ex cathedra* by the head of the Catholic Church and other Christian

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[148] Cited in Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981], p. 200); Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine: CIX-106.

[149] This concern was first expressed after the roundups of summer 1941, after the second *Statut* was passed, and after the destruction of synagogues in Paris, Marseille, and Vichy. I discuss this shift in detail in chapter four.

[150] In Gerlier's private collections, there is a letter from 16 July 1941 addressed to "Mon cher deputé." In it Pierre Masse, a former senator, jurist, and cabinet minister who was Jewish, requests the reader to recognize "there is no 'Jewish Question' in France." He blames propaganda for promoting ideas of Jews as inherently different and internally threatening. Masse concludes "there is no 'solution' for [the Jews] other than to return to them their common rights… any other solution is persecution." Archives de l'Archdiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier, Interventions de Cardinal en Faveur de Divers Juifs, 1940-1943. 16 July 1941. On 30 September 1942, Masse was deported to Auschwitz and gassed upon arrival (Klarsfeld 1983, p. 326).

churches."[151] Rabbi Weill followed suit one day later.[152] That the rabbis *could* write such letters indicates how misguided they were on the Church's "new" worldview. Rabbis Schwartz and Weill tried to appeal to Catholic values as a form of symbolic capital that could sway the Marshal's stance. Sadly, their letters instead revealed a growing schism between the episcopate with the rabbinate: neither rabbi knew the statute had been passed with Catholic authorities' moral justification.

In a later attempt to remind the Church of their religions' shared worldviews, Rabbi Schwartz's October 1941 letter to Gerlier included a comparison between attacks on synagogues in France and the ruins of Galilee, where Jesus prayed and preached.[153] According to scripture, Galilee was destroyed by the Romans during the Great Revolt. In referencing this site, Schwartz aimed to remind Gerlier of the habitual and ancient connection of Catholics with Jews. Gerlier, in response, sought to comfort Schwartz, but considering that Gerlier told Vallat in the same month that he agreed on the existence of a "Jewish Problem," clearly, this comfort could only go so far.

4. Common Religious and Political Symbols

Last but not least, the change in how religious and political authorities related to each other in France from 1940-1942 was manifest in the many symbols and ritual practices commonly expressed or displayed by both. This shared symbolism between Church and the State

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[151] Archives de Consistoire israélite de France, fonds Moch, bobine 3, Correspondence between Jacques Helbronner and Isaïe Schwartz, Letter of protest from the Grand Rabbi of France to Maréchal Pétain. 22 October 1940.

[152] Ibid., letter from the Grand Rabbi of Paris, Julian Weill, to Maréchal Pétain. 23 October 1940.

[153] Archives de l'Archdiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier, Interventions de Cardinal en Faveur de Divers Juifs, 1940-1943. 26 November 1941.

contributed to the production of legitimacy for the Vichy government from 1940-1942, nowhere perhaps more profoundly than the classification of Pétain as a savior. The Marshal identified himself with Christ's sacrifice and regularly framed his leadership position as that of a redeemer, prepared to deliver France from her sinful past into a glorious present and future. Remarking on how Pétain used religious symbolism to establish his authority and attract the support of the Church, Le Moigne (2005, p. 92) explains:

> In his own manner, Pétain could also be considered as the first bishop of the nation, who built his "acceptance speech" on a personal identification with Christ's sacrifice…. This appeal was understood by the Catholic hierarchy.

More to the point, in a radio message to the French people three days after signing the armistice with Germany, Pétain declared that he was prepared to give France "the gift of my person." Gerlier, welcoming Pétain to Lyon, exclaimed, "France needed a chief who would lead her to her eternal destiny. God has allowed for you to be here."[154] Nearly one year later, on 12 August 1941, the marshal declared to the French people, "In 1940, I put an end to the rout. Today, it is from yourselves that I wish to save you."[155] On 3 November 1941, Cardinal Suhard in Paris sent a letter to Pétain in which he wrote of his "profound conviction, that God in your person, will always protect France and renew her."[156] In December, at Christmas Mass in Notre

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[154] *Semaine religieuse du diocèse de Lyon*, 29 November 1940.

[155] *New York Times*, "Marshal Pétain's address to the French People." 13 August 1941.

[156] CNAEF, 3CE 22, Voyages de Cardinal Suhard archevêque de Paris à Vichy (1941-1943), Letter from Suhard to Pétain. 3 November 1941.

Dame, Suhard similarly spoke of the present as a "time of joy and hope" despite suffering, a time of "salvation," brought to France by a "unique savior," before turning to extend his Christmas greetings — in front of a crowd of hundreds — to Pétain.[157]

The Pétain as savior symbolism was profound. However, it was also through the co-optation of religious practices that that the Vichy regime could draw on symbolism from the Church to naturalize its authority. Marrus and Paxton (1995 [1981], p. 198) note how "no Vichy public ceremony was complete without some form of religious service." In response, members of the hierarchy furthered the state's legitimacy — especially its collaboration with Germany — when they attended the inaugurations of German institutes and officiated at the funerals of known collaborationists (Burrin 1996, p. 220), but carefully avoided such ceremonies involving members of the resistance. When Pétain went on his tour of the South in November 1940, his stop at the Cathedral of Notre-Dame-de-l'Assomption in Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-Dôme) included a service in which he walked "like a youth" up the steps of the stage, decorated with a simple military medal and matched by none other than the bishop, Monsignor Piguet, who likewise wore a military medal and the *Croix de Guerre* (Le Moigne 2005, p. 96). These are but a few examples of the ways in which the episcopate's rhetoric, symbolic practices, and incorporation of government officials and duties into religious ceremonies reinforced Vichy's legitimacy.

Additionally, the regime frequently adopted religious emblems in calling for the public to support its political agenda. One such figure was Joan of Arc, often enlisted to propagate anti-British, anti-Republican, and even anti-Semitic national values. Pinto (2012) describes a

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[157] *Semaine religieuse du Paris*, 10 January 1942.

propaganda poster used by the Vichy government that borrowed vocabulary and imagery from Joan of Arc to make a direct connection between her image and Pétain's (p. 18). In the poster, Pétain is seen in the likeness of Joan of Arc, fighting the *Légionnaires'* "crusade" against "the bolshevik peril." The poster links contemporary France to religious crusaders of the past, solidifying the connection between Vichy France and the Catholic Church at the same time that it promotes anti-Semitism (p. 18; referencing Tumarkin 1982, p. 46).

Likewise, in a propagandist stained-glass window in Orléans (Figure 2.1), there was an image of Joan of Arc alongside an image of "Orléans aux Juifs." The latter depicts Jews dominating French civil society — in the army, the legal professions, and in parliament, and states, "[the Jews] wrote the first page in the decadence of our history." The Joan of Arc window, in contrast, "proclaims that the figure that would embody France would be the one who would rid the country of foreigners such as the English and, especially, the Jews" (Pinto 2012, pp. 16-17). Additionally, there were frequent comparisons between Joan of Arc and Pétain heard on Vichy radio, such as in May 1941, when on the 510th anniversary of Joan of Arc, the Vichy radio described Pétain as "cast [like Joan of Arc] in the role to lead France" (Drapac 1998, p. 265). The contortion of Joan of Arc as religious and national symbolism was but one of the ways in which the state co-opted religious emblems to legitimize its goals and make them appear as legitimate features of the French social landscape.

**Image 2.1: Joan of Arc, "who personifies the French race and who kicked the foreigner out of France."**




Poster by Tellebo, n.d.; reprinted in Hirschfeld and Marsh, eds., (1989), *Collaboration in France: Politics and Culture During the Nazi Occupation, 1940-1944.* Oxford: Berg

Finally, through the involvement of religious authorities in practices once reserved only for members of the government, the Church also helped to constitute the Vichy regime as the natural French authority, as when parishioners in the tenth arrondissement of Paris were urged to pray with the Marshal for all workers and for the unity of France (Drapac 1998, p. 96). In Le Puy, the prayer for Pétain read:

> Glorious leader of our country,
>
> Father great of heart, we love you,
>
> Your children's soul has been shattered,
>
> Yet only command, and we will follow you.[158]

[158] Cited by Halls, in Tallet and Atkin (1991), p. 169.

These prayers, developed and promoted by religious authorities, of course also mirrored the "prayer to *Le Maréchal*," that the Vichy government itself exhorted the public to declare — a twist on the Catholic "Our Father" that ended with the injunction, "and deliver us from evil, oh Marshal!" By contrast, Grand Rabbi Isaïe Schwartz was ejected from an official ceremony of those killed in the war from 1939-1940, while patriotic commemorations of 14 July 1940 that took place in the Vichy synagogue were shunned by Vichy government representatives. No one would pray for Jews; Jewish authorities weren't even allowed to partake in joint political and religious ceremonies.

**Conclusion**

In the summer and fall of 1940, the Vichy government came to power in France through the problematic circumstances of "collective abdication" (Ermakoff 2008). Immediately, this new government endeavored to reconstruct the nation through a philosophy it called the National Revolution. However, due to the vexed conditions under which it was instituted, the Vichy government required legitimacy to promote its political agenda. As a result, it appealed to the episcopate to strengthen its legitimacy and in so doing, it reversed decades in which the government in France strengthened itself by breaking its ties to the Church.

A primary goal of Vichy's National Revolution was to reshape conceptions of who did and did not belong to the nation and thus who was and was not deserving of government protection. One of its first policies that was implemented was the *Statut des Juifs*. Chapter one explained how bishops decided to endorse the *Statut des Juifs*; chapter two explains what happened next.

Specifically, this chapter details how the French Catholic episcopate contributed to the Vichy government's attempts to achieve legitimacy for its project of National Revolution. I draw on Bourdieu's idea that legitimate political domination depends on political capital and symbolic capital accumulation, and I develop two proxies for each form of capital to examine the mechanisms that generated this process of legitimation. The first two proxies are public endorsements and institutional embeddedness (these serve as proxies to evaluate political capital accumulation), and the second two proxies are shared worldviews and common symbols (these serve as proxies to evaluate symbolic capital accumulation). Next, I trace changes to the relationship between political and religious authorities from 1940-1942, keeping in mind the profound cleavage between Church and State in France that stems all the way back to the French Revolution. Throughout the chapter, I also compare changes in the relationship between the French government and the Catholic episcopate with changes in the relationship between the government, the episcopate, and the rabbinate during this same time-period.

The findings of the chapter specify and clarify how French bishops' alliance with Pétain and the Vichy government led the episcopate to become a key "agent and go-between in the process of legitimation" for the National Revolution (Peschanski 2004, p. 409). In so doing, this chapter also elucidates how the Catholic hierarchy contributed to the Vichy government's efforts at symbolic violence against Jews in France from 1940-1942, which paved the way for the physical violence to come.

# Chapter 3: The Spirit of Resistance
## Lower Clergy and Laity Activism in the Creation of *Témoignage Chrétien*

*"The behavior of middle and lower clergy is… often hostile to Germany."*
-Weekly Sipo SD report, 2-11 February, 1941, p. 11[159]

*"For us, you are a much more dangerous threat than all the terrorists, all the maquis, and all the other partisans, because your action is moral and profound. It is that which arms the hands of those we must battle."*
-Gestapo officer to Fernand Bélot[160]

### Introduction

This chapter begins from the premise that in order for legitimate political domination to "succeed" — that is, for a government to be able to exert symbolic violence through the incarnation of itself "simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the form of mental structures and categories of perceptions of thought" — top down mechanisms of legitimation must be believed and practiced by those who are its targets (Bourdieu 1984, p. 4). Put more bluntly with reference to the case at hand: bishops' efforts to legitimize the Vichy government required acceptance by lower clergy and laity to succeed.[161] Yet as Catholic authorities facilitated the legitimization of the Vichy regime while remaining silent about its violence against Jews, lower-ranked clergy and laity began protesting bishops' stances and Vichy's anti-Semitism through the creation of a

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[159] Cited in Bernay, S. (2012). L'Église de France face à la persécution des Juifs, 1940-1944. Paris: CNRS éd. p. 213.

[160] Bélot, whose trajectory in *Témoignage Chrétien* is detailed later in this chapter on pp. 144-146, would come to be assassinated by the Gestapo on 9 June 1944. Archives Nationales, 72AJ/73, Dossier n° 6, Résistance chrétienne, V — Témoignage Chrétien. Témoignage sur l'activité clandestine de Fernand Bélot. Pièce 6.

[161] About this process, Bourdieu (2000, pp. 234-235) explains, "symbolic actions…can succeed only to the extent that they manage to reactivate dispositions which previous processes of inculcation have deposited in people's bodies." Bourdieu calls this "conditional freedom."

clandestinely distributed journal, *Cahiers de Témoignage Chrétien*.[162]

This chapter analyzes the origins of *Témoignage Chrétien*, why and how it was formed, and who participated in its production, simultaneously making an argument about intra-organizational mobilization in authoritarian settings. Although a variety of work has studied social movements in organizations and growing research examines mobilization in autocracies, rarely do the two coincide. However, authoritarian regimes present distinct challenges for individuals within organizations who seek to push for change: not least of all, mobilization places both the individual *and* the organization at risk. As a result, and drawing on primary sources collected from archives in France and post-War testimonies and memoirs written by key activists, this chapter seeks to explain intra-organizational mobilization by analyzing the case of *Témoignage Chrétien*. The findings suggest that *moral anger* motivated lower clergy's activism, *repression* triggered their desire to organize a clandestine resistance journal, *personal networks* facilitated the accumulation of resources necessary to create *Témoignage Chrétien,* and *social networks* enabled its diffusion throughout unoccupied France.[163]

First, I discuss intra-organizational mobilization and social movements in authoritarian regimes to introduce the various aspects of mobilization I investigate in this chapter. Second, I present the data. Third, I provide the historical background for my analysis of *Témoignage Chrétien*. Fourth, I analyze *Témoignage Chrétien*'s formation in light of three questions: why was it formed, how was it formed, and — remarkable given the high risk of mobilization — who

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[162] Literally translated to mean "Notebooks of Christian Witness," hereafter referred to simply as *Témoignage Chrétien.* Occasionally, when cited directly in quotations from memoirs or historians writing about *Témoignage Chrétien*, the journal is also colloquially termed "*Cahiers*."

[163] *Témoignage Chrétien* would only reach the Occupied Zone in 1943.

participated in its distribution? I conclude by summarizing results and making suggestions for future research.

**Social Movements in Organizations and Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes**

In a recent review of the literature on social movements in organizations, Arthur (2008) explains how "classical social movement theory tends to depict movements as outsider groups protesting the policies of a democratic state" (p. 1014). Referencing Binder (2002), she believes that this classic emphasis is insufficient; it has, of late, become more common to see struggles taking place "within institutions rather than 'in the streets'" and targeting "institutional power rather than what is ordinarily considered to be 'political power'" (p. 11). Similarly, Snow (2004) argues for the need to better include social movement activity that is "not tied directly to the government or the state" in research on collective action, and he proposes a conceptualization of movements as "collective challenges to systems of authority," including "collective challenges within and to institutional and cultural domains other than just the state or the polity" (p. 3). Both scholars emphasize the importance of considering intra-organizational conflict from a social movements perspective. Yet despite having been proposed by Zald and Berger in 1978, it is only in the past decade-and-a-half that a "market" of people studying processes of mobilization within organizations has crystallized (Zald 2005).

What about the second half of the "classical approach" to studying social movements, noted above? Arthur (2008) writes not only that classical social movement theory has historically studied movements that target the state, but also that it has tended to focus on movements that target "the policies of a *democratic* state" (emphasis added). Here, too, there is room for

innovation. In particular, there is a need for research on intra-organizational mobilization in non-democracies as well. Within the growth of scholarship on movements in authoritarian regimes (e.g., Alimi 2009; Almeida 2003; Chen 2012; Diamond 2002; Loveman 1998; Moss 2014; Osa and Schock 2007), especially on movements that trigger or aim to trigger democratic transitions (e.g., Boudreau 2004; Chang and Vitale 2013; Inclán 2008; Sandoval 1998; Slater 2010), research on intra-organizational movements in non-democracies requires analysis in its own right.

Social movements in organizations that take place in authoritarian regimes face a different set of challenges. First, in authoritarian regimes, political repression is ubiquitous. The kinds of organizations that help foster mobilization in democracies — parties, interest groups, etc. — are usually banned in or coopted by the state. Second, many of the resources that movement organizers or activists might use in a democracy are also hard to come by. For example, authoritarian regimes often restrict media use and accessibility. Third, risk and repression of movement activists is arguably greater: authoritarian governments are often unafraid of killing or torturing those opposed to the dictates of the regime. They are also unafraid of shuttering "deviant" organizations. Activists who mobilize against organizations in authoritarian regimes therefore risk harming themselves *and* their organization.[164]

Subsequently, in any case where there is a social movement within an organization that occurs in an authoritarian regime, research must explain what I call the "three Ms" — motive, method, and make-up — to account for what drives people to mobilize against an organization

[164] In a democracy, it is likely only activists will be targeted, not the entire organization against which they are mobilizing. For a more detailed review of the ways in which different political regime settings affect processes of contention and repression, see Ortiz (2013).

when the risks are so high, how people mobilize with scant resources, and who mobilizes altogether. Of course, questions of rationale, process, and participation are important for any study of mobilization, whether state- or organization-targeted, and whether in a democracy or an authoritarian regime. However, given that we know so little about how the latter occurs, this chapter aims to investigate these issues through an analysis of lower clergy's efforts to protest the Catholic hierarchy's support for the Vichy government and its silence concerning state anti-Semitism, as well as the violence of Vichy's anti-Semitism itself, through the creation of the clandestine resistance journal *Témoignage Chrétien*. Below, I introduce the data and analytical approach that undergirds this chapter's investigation before turning to provide a historical overview of *Témoignage Chrétien*.

**Data and Methods**

Like the first two chapters, chapter three draws on archival documents I collected in France from 2011 to 2013. Primarily, the documents in this analysis come from the National Archives, where records on internal resistance movements during World War II, including Christian resistance movements, are located. I also draw heavily on published memoirs and post-War testimonies written by key activists, including Father Henri de Lubac and Louis Cruvillier. Their narratives present a different methodological challenge from the use of contemporary data: in addition to the possibility of forgotten details or misremembered events, there is always the chance that actors have intentionally or unintentionally modified these accounts in light of evolving social, political, or cultural ideas about the past. Obviously, this is a big concern in evaluating memoirs and post-War testimonies about the Holocaust in France; people might be

especially motivated to reconstruct their narratives in a positive light. As a result, whenever possible, I compare testimonies against each other or memoirs against testimonies, to check for reliability.[165] I also use Skocpol's (1984, p. 383) "targeted primary" strategy by supplementing memoirs and post-War testimonies with carefully selected primary investigations and reinvestigations. This data helps validate published memoirs and post-War testimonies with contemporary historical evidence, resolving ambiguities when they arise.

To analyze these documents, I mix factual and theoretical claims in my analysis to identify what motivated the creators of *Témoignage Chrétien*, how it came to be, and who participated in its diffusion. Historical sources provide the conceptual starting points for my analysis, and I then examine the evidence in light of theory to reconstruct the process by which *Témoignage Chrétien* was created. In this way, both data and theory guide my assessments of the plausibility of the mechanisms that I advance as most appropriate for explaining the case.

**Antecedents of *Témoignage Chrétien***

The first roundups of Jews in France began in summer 1941, with the arrest of approximately 5,000 Jews on 14 May in the streets of Paris. All were men, mostly from Poland, but also some from Czechoslovakia and Austria. They had received a green ticket summoning them to the local police. Told that officials needed to "review their situation" as foreigners in France, the men were then taken by bus to the Austerlitz train station and shipped in four trains

[165] For example, in his published memoir, de Lubac (1990, p. 124) writes that Cardinal Saliège in Toulouse was was welcoming of *Témoignage Chrétien*. Likewise, Louis Cruvillier in his post-war testimony describes Saliège as especially welcoming of him and *Témoignage Chrétien* in Toulouse. Archives Nationales, 72AJ/73, Dossier n° 6, Résistance chrétienne, V — Témoignage Chrétien. Notes de Louis Cruvillier sur la fondation du Témoignage Chrétien. Pièce 8.

to two internment camps in the department of the Loiret: Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande. They had been arrested.

These arrests were followed by the passing of the second *Statut des Juifs* in unoccupied France on 2 June 1941. This act replaced the earlier statute and extended the definition of "Jew" to include any person with three grandparents of the "Jewish race" or anyone with two Jewish grandparents also married to a "half-Jew." It added that any convert with two Jewish grandparents who lacked a baptismal certificate prior to 25 June 1940 was Jewish, regardless of conversion or their spouse's classification. And it both ordered a census of Jews in the occupied zone and extended the list of occupations forbidden to Jews.[166]

The "green ticket" arrests and the second statute prompted several theology faculty at Fourvière in Lyon, organized under the leadership of Abbot Joseph Chaine, to denounce the rise in violence against Jews from an explicitly Catholic perspective. Their written declaration included unequivocal critiques and proclaimed the Church must speak out against them. They began:

> Faced with anti-Semitic propaganda that has been released today in our country and with legislative measures that have just been promulgated with respect to the Jews, we cannot remain silent. The Church has intervened more than once in recent years to condemn anti-Semitism, and the theology faculties have received from the Holy See the order to fight with all available means against the doctrinal errors and perversions that are threatening the purity of Christian moral doctrine.

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[166] "Loi du 2 juin 1941 remplaçant la loi du 3 octobre 1940 portant statut des juifs." *Journal officiel de la République française* (or, *de l'Etat français*), published 14 June 1941, p. 2475.

> It is for this reason that we make the following declaration, to which we give all publicity.[167]

In the conclusion, the "Chaine declaration," as it became known, reiterated the need for public dissent: "We do not at all wish to seem to approve, be it only through our silence, propaganda harmful to the Israelites."[168]

The Chaine declaration was originally intended as an official protest distributed from the faculty to the public in Lyon. However, the authors — Abbot Chaine and Fathers Henri de Lubac, Joseph Bonsirven, and Louis Richard — had no official organ through which to publish it, and, as a result, on 16 June 1941, they met with Cardinal Gerlier to ask his advice. Gerlier edited the declaration — in particular, he changed the beginning to conceal its origins[169] so that the protest did not appear to come from anyone in the Church — and he allowed its distribution, but only if its provenance were completely concealed and if it were distributed anonymously.

Since the authors had no resources with which to publish and transmit the material, the declaration had but a limited impact. In the words of one of its authors, Father Henri de Lubac, "we had at our disposal neither the experience, time, material, nor any sort of secret organization for that purpose."[170] Yet the process of drafting this letter would, in the end, contribute to the formation of a network among lower ranked clergy who disagreed with the government's policies toward Jews.

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[167] de Lubac, H. (1990). *Christian resistance to anti-Semitism: Memories from 1940-1944*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, p. 66 (hereafter, HDL).

[168] HDL, p. 68.

[169] HDL, p. 71.

[170] Ibid.

Having co-authored the Chaine declaration, for instance, de Lubac was prompted to write another article as arrests of Jews continued. Titled "A Christian Explanation of Our Times," the piece was based on a lecture he had given at the École des Cadres d'Uriage at the encouragement of Abbot de Naurois, the institute's chaplain (until his expulsion in June 1941). In it, de Lubac attempted to "summon French Christians to a deep spiritual resistance… particularly to the wedge forced between Christians and Jews by Vichy apologists" by calling attention to the affiliation of Jews with Christians through their shared faith in the Old Testament.[171] Father Desbuquois, a founder of the Jesuit social justice-oriented magazine, *Action Populaire* who had helped to create the massive youth movement *Action Catholique de Jeunesse Français* (ACJF) discussed in chapter two, secured its publication in the Jesuit review *Cité Nouvelle.*[172] Desbuquois was obviously sympathetic to de Lubac's cause — drawing Catholic attention to the plight of Jews — and sought to help him advance it.[173]

The publication of de Lubac's article in *Cité Nouvelle* helped to cement the connections among already-progressive Jesuits in the Free Zone. It also opened new networks for de Lubac's writing. After "A Christian Explanation of Our Times" was published in October, de Lubac received a letter from Father Victor Dillard:

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[171] Hughes (2015 p. 235); with reference to Henri de Lubac, "A Christian Explanation of Our Times," in de Lubac, H. (1996) *Theology and History*. Translated by Anne Englund Nash. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, pp. 445-456 (441-444).

[172] *Cité Nouvelle*, 25 October 1941, Cited in HDL, p. 103.

[173] Father Desbuquois along with German Jesuit Father Gundlach and American Jesuit Father LaFarge helped to draft the Pope's unpublished encyclical, *On the Unity of the Human Race*, described in chapter one (p. 38), prior to Pope Pius XI's death in February 1939.

> I was surprised… at all you were able to say…. It is necessary to fight at this moment, for we carry a crushing responsibility, and we must use all the freedom that remains to us in order to write and to cry out.[174]

Such encouragement motivated de Lubac to try yet another — in his own words — "slightly more ambitious project"[175] — a 14-page long essay accompanied by 6 pages of footnotes and titled "Defense of Christ and the Bible."[176] In this article, de Lubac made his most "overt and ardent appeal to his fellow Christians to defend both themselves and Jews" (Hughes 2015, p. 236). Stating clearly that attacks on Jews were attacks on Christ and Christianity, thus necessitating the former's defense, de Lubac wrote: "France was Christian, which comes back to saying that it was Jewish.… we maintain the indissoluble bond between our two Testaments."[177]

This time, the progressive social Catholic journal *La Chronique Sociale,* run by friends of de Lubac, requested to print the article, though a local censor insisted upon substantial modifications. In response, Fathers Desbuquois and Dillard appealed to the national censor of Vichy to allow the document to be published in its entirety. The appeal was a "total failure."[178] Father Dillard's reaction, written in a private note to de Lubac on 12 December 1941, is revelatory:

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[174] HDL, p. 103.

[175] Ibid.

[176] HDL, p. 104.

[177] de Lubac, H. "A Christian Explanation of Our Times," in *Theology and History*, translated by Anne Englund Nash (1996). San Francisco: Ignatius Press, pp. 458-487. p. 471.

[178] HDL, p. 104.

> I have the impression that we could have spoken about these questions several months ago, but the noose is tightening. "If we let this article go by," they said to me," we would immediately have a reaction from the occupying power." …I objected that the question was serious, that it was the very freedom of the Church that was at stake…. I pointed out that they nevertheless could not keep us from speaking in the pulpit. But I wonder if we will even be able to do that much longer.

He then added:

> It would be good to keep the Cardinal informed, and if it were possible to obtain an official declaration from him on the Jewish religious question, I believe that it could get by while things are still as they are. The future does not belong to us.[179]

Father Dillard still believed that it was possible for the Catholic hierarchy to take a stand, though for lower clergy, the time to protest had passed. The noose, indeed, was tightening. As de Lubac sought ways to publish his protests with help from Desbuquois and Dillard, other priests who were also at the Fourvière in Lyon also struggled against the rise in censorship and repression of voices that sought to challenge the status quo.

For instance, as de Lubac was drafting documents to decry anti-Semitic persecutions from a Catholic perspective, Fathers Gaston Fessard and Pierre Chaillet were likewise writing

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[179] HDL, pp. 104-105.

furiously against rising violence toward Jews. Father Fessard, had arrived in Lyon from Paris in fall 1940 and, as early as 27 December 1940, had produced a stunning "warning article" titled "*Custos, quid de nocte?*" This document was nothing short of radical. The introduction read:

> "Watchman, how far gone is the night?" Posed to the prophet Isaiah during the time of the great calamities befalling Israel, this question arises again today among all consciences that have maintained the courage not to withdraw into the oppressive darkness.[180]

Fessard begins by referencing a passage in the Old Testament (Isaiah 34), in which God promises to ruin a nation (Edom) that sought to destroy the house of Judah (Israel), Fessard then encouraged christians to risk death and martyrdom in the fight against Nazism. Among other, beautifully written appeals, he told his readers: "Have faith that, in the ugliness and dirt from the mud and the blood, your work can shape the features of a world infinitely more beautiful than the one whose loss you mourn."[181]

"*Custos, quid de nocte?*" was published in *Temps Nouveau* — heavily censored, of course.[182] *Temps Nouveau* was a popular weekly magazine that included articles from Christian Democrats, various academics, trade unionists, and members of christian youth movements, especially those in the ACJF.[183] Its editor was Stanislas Fumet, a well known Catholic journalist

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[180] "*Custos, quid de nocte?*" Reprinted in Fessard, Gaston, & Prévotat, Jacques (1989). Au temps du prince-esclave: Écrits clandestins, 1940-1945. Limoges: Critérion. pp. 56-60.

[181] Ibid.

[182] Ibid., pp. 55.

[183] Again, see pp. 82-83 in chapter two for discussion of these movements, including their origin and purpose.

who had fled to Lyon at the start of the war and who was deeply influenced by the social catholic movements promoted by the Church during the pre-War period under Pope Pius XI. Prior to beginning *Temps Nouveau*, Fumet was the editor of its precursor in Paris, *Temps Présent* (1937-1940). The forerunner of *that* magazine was *Sept*, a social catholic weekly founded at the behest of Pope Pius XI himself (1934-1937). *Temps Nouveau*'s roots in Catholic Action ran deep.

Throughout spring 1941, according to de Lubac, Fessard began to chafe under the censorship of his work and "noted that it was from then-on pointless to seek to enlighten minds by writing for publication."[184] As a result, "Fessard had begun a work in which he would set forth the truth without pointless precautions, but without yet knowing what precise use he could make of it."[185] That unrestricted labor of love and frustration would serve, eventually, as a draft of the first issue of *Témoignage Chrétien*.[186]

Meanwhile, Father Chaillet, also at Fourvière, was hard at work establishing contacts with various resistance movements in unoccupied France. Like Fessard, he had arrived in Lyon in December 1940 after having been ordained in France in 1931, then going to study in Austria, Rome, and Germany. With the *Anschluss* of Austria in 1938, Chaillet set to work publishing a

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[184] HDL, p. 41.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Significantly, Bédarida (1988, p. 145) tells a different story. According to him, Fessard wrote this document with help from Henri de Lubac since he had left most of his own notes and resources in Paris. In June, Fessard was asked by Fathers Varillon and Daniélou for a text specifically for youth. Daniélou wrote to him with concern: "The youth are passive, especially students. We need to put them on guard since little by little, the subtle voices of propaganda, Nazi ideas, will impregnate them. We need to show that these ideas are inadmissible, anti-Christian." Bédarida explains further that Daniélou needed something brief and strong. However, Fessard wanted to write a detailed and systematic analysis that would expose the flaws of Nazism and it was this document that would become the first publication of *Témoignage Chrétien*. Because de Lubac was present in the place and time that Fessard was writing this lengthy and important tract, I privilege his recounting of events in this chapter. Of note, de Lubac *does* discuss this encounter between Fessard and Daniélou in his memoirs, but he explains that most versions of the story are wrong and "Father Daniélou does not seem to have seen in that even anything worth particular mention (HDL, p. 47)." Concerning Bédarida's account specifically, de Lubac writes that "Bédarida saw very well about the visit or the request made of Fessard, that these were of only minor interest" (pp. 45-46). Wieviorka (2016, pp. 62-63) follows a similar narrative but includes no references to support his analysis.

tract in France based on his observations abroad. His was titled "Austria is Suffering" and was an early attempt to alert French civilians to the dangers of Nazism from a Catholic perspective.[187] After the invasion of France, Chaillet returned to Lyon to teach at the seminary of the Fourvière and to write for Fumet's *Temps Nouveau.* Fumet — incredibly well connected — would introduce Chaillet to Henry Frenay in April.

Frenay was a fascinating individual. After attending the Military School of Saint Cyr in 1935, Frenay was promoted to the rank of Captain at age 29 five years later. Also in 1935, he met Berty Albrecht, a former nurse who joined the Red Cross after World War I and who, having divorced her husband four years prior, had moved to Paris to campaign for the anti-fascist and sexual liberationist movements. Albrecht had even created her own feminist journal, *Le Problème Sexuel*[188], in which she advocated for abortion and contraception rights, and she was a friend to refugees in more ways than one. Albrecht was close with the president of the Human Rights League, Victor Basch, in Paris, and in the early 1930s she founded a welcome center for Jewish German exiles from Nazism. She even welcomed refugees into her own home. Once Frenay made her acquaintance, despite their very different backgrounds, the two rapidly kindled a relationship. In the words of one historian, "she gave him both a political education from the left and a passionate romance he had never encountered in his own straight-laced milieu" (Gildea 2015, p. 98). Frenay explained of his outlook prior to meeting Albrecht, "since my Father was an officer and I graduated from Saint-Cyr, I was steeped in the military world from my earliest

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[187] HDL, p. 41.

[188] "The Sexual Problem."

childhood…. I belonged to that traditional, poor, patriotic and patriarchal French right without even being aware of it."[189] Albrecht changed all that.

After the war broke out in 1940, Frenay became a Captain, escaped after being captured in the Vosges, and then quit the army in January 1941 only to return to Lyon and reconnect with Albrecht. Unable to accept the defeat of France by Germany, Albrecht had moved to Lyon in autumn 1940 to work for the Ministries of Industrial Production and Labor on issues concerning female employment.[190] Together, the two began to build a resistance network and newspapers in which Father Chaillet would publish. The first of these was called *Les Petites Ailes*[191], then *Vérités*[192], and its initial edition was launched in May to coincide with the feast of Joan of Arc.[193]

In writing the religious columns for Frenay and Albrecht's paper, Chaillet would frame his articles as heralding the voice of an anonymous "Catholic witness" — his pseudonym was "Testis." As Testis, Chaillet would regularly chastise the Catholic hierarchy in the pages of *Vérités*. For example, on 5 November 1941, Chaillet — as "Testis," of course — wrote: "The Church has been converted into a Nationalist Socialist Cult."[194] Two months prior, on 5 September 1941, after Cardinal Baudrillart published a tract titled *Against Bolshevism* that called for greater support from the Church for the German war effort, "Testis" warned him: "Eminence, so that this time of anger does not become a time of contempt, close your door and write [your]

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[189] Frenay, H. (1974). Mémoires de résistance: 1940-1943. Paris: Laffont. p. 42, Cited in Gildea (2015, p. 38).

[190] My grandmother, Berty Albrecht. Retrieved from http://www.chilina-hills.com/en/my_grandmother-24.html. See also Gildea 2015, pp. 38-40.

[191] "The Little Wings."

[192] "Truths."

[193] Like the Vichy government's attempts to frame the powerful symbolism of Joan of Arc in their favor, resistance movements such as Frenay's likewise sought to mobilize the history of Joan of Arc in their likeness.

[194] Cited in Bédarida and Bédarida 1966, p. 11.

memoirs from 1859-1940. It is enough."[195] Recall from chapter one that Baudrillart was concerned about rising anti-Semitism in France (p. X); his about-face was so stunning to some of the Catholic youth that, in 1941, they circulated their own clandestine tract: "Cardinal Baudrillart, does he have a double?"[196] Only Chaillet's superior, Father Décizier at the Fourvière, and de Lubac, who was Chaillet's close personal friend in addition to his colleague, knew about his writings as "Testis."[197]

On 15 August 1941, Fumet's *Temps Nouveau* was shuttered by the admiral François Darlan, prime minister of the Vichy government as of 9 February. At around the same time, from late summer and through fall 1941, Frenay focused on expanding the resistance network that he had built with Albrecht. Beginning in June, he started negotiating with leaders of other resistance movements in unoccupied France. Though his own network was popular in Provence and Cote d'Azur, Frenay met with Francois de Menthon in Grenoble in the fall. De Menthon was a former president of the ACJF, founder of Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC), and leader of the *Liberté* resistance network popular in Languedoc and the Massif Central. The men decided to join forces, and *Combat* was born. Many who had written for *Temps Nouveau* readily joined *Combat* and would help get it into the hands of readers. In time, *Combat* would become one of the largest French Resistance movements in Unoccupied France.

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[195] Cited in Bédarida 1998, p. 106.

[196] Ibid., p. 107.

[197] HDL, p. 37.

Still, Frenay did not abandon Chaillet. According to de Lubac, Chaillet asked Frenay to help him continue his writings as a "Catholic witness," but this time, with a different strategy.[198] In his memoirs, Frenay recalled that the two men had decided it would be wise to separate political propaganda from the spiritual domain moving forward,[199] so Chaillet developed *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, an underground journal devoted to exclusively to spiritual resistance against Nazism, including the Vichy government's policies of anti-Semitism and the complicity, through endorsement of the regime's National Revolution, of the hierarchy in supporting Nazism. *Témoignage Chrétien* would repeatedly assert this link in its pages.

Last but not least, in fall 1941, as Chaillet was preparing to launch *Témoignage Chrétien*, he connected with Louis Cruvillier through a mutual friend, Alexandre Marc. Cruvillier was the now-former director propaganda for *Temps Nouveau*. Due to this position, and also as a former member of the ACJF, Cruvillier had extensive networks throughout France. Upon connecting with Chaillet, Cruvillier learned about *Témoignage Chrétien* and began devoting "body and soul," in de Lubac's words, to this work.[200] In the end, Cruvillier joined together "the 'patron', the theologian-writers, the leaders in Lyon, and also the printers" (Bédarida 1998, p. 69). *Témoignage Chrétien* released its first issue on 16 November 1941.

The following section explains precisely why, how, and among whom *Témoignage Chrétien* was able to develop from the writings of a small group of lower clergy in Lyon into the

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[198] HDL, p. 42. This is also mentioned in Cruvillier's post-war testimony. Archives Nationales, 72AJ/73, Dossier n° 6, Résistance chrétienne, V — Témoignage chrétien. Notes de Louis Cruvillier sur la fondation du Témoignage chrétien. Pièce 8.

[199] Letter from Henri Frenay to Louis Cruvillier, 17 September 1947. Cited in Bédarida 1988, p. 119.

[200] HDL, p. 122.

most active and prolific anti-Semitic resistance publication during the war. In Jackson's (2003, p. 418) words: "No other resistance publication did more to condemn racism and anti-Semitism."

## Analysis

### 1. Motive: Moral Anger and the Power of Repression

The social psychology of movement participation distinguishes three "core motivations" for political action: identity, instrumentality, and ideology (Klandermans 2013). Identity-based theories stress identification with a group and attendant feelings of group-based obligation as a motivating force for mobilization (e.g., Simon et al. 1998; Snow and Oliver 1995; Stürmer et al. 2003; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Theories that focus on instrumentality posit that people participate in social movements because they expect that action will improve their situation and that the benefits of mobilization will outweigh the costs (e.g., Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977). And research on ideology suggests that individuals' values, beliefs, and goals drive their participation in social movements (e.g., Turner and Killian 1987; Wilson 1973; Zald 2000). The distinction between identity- and ideology-based theories is that the former emphasizes feelings of social obligation while the latter emphasizes feelings of personal obligation. Instrumental theories emphasize feelings of efficacy (Klandermans 2013). Not surprisingly, across all three motivations, *emotions* play a critical role, giving "ideas, ideologies, identities, and even interests their power to motivate" (Jasper 1997, p. 127).

Research on emotions, once relegated to the "back burner" of social movements research, now highlights the various ways in which feelings enable people to know and understand themselves and their contexts, their interests and commitments, and their needs and options in

securing those needs (Gould 2013, p. 3). In this way, emotions powerfully influence action (Fridja 1986, p. 71), informing how people perceive information and understand events (Lazarus 1991, p.168; Petersen 2011), how people define their interests (Petersen 2002, 2011), and how they choose to behave (Pearlman 2013). One such emotion, which has recently emerged as a renewed focus of study for sociologists, is *moral anger.*

*Moral Anger*

I define moral anger as core value violations that impact others more than oneself (Haidt 2013; Haidt and Graham 2007) and that prompt corrective behavior intended to improve the social condition of others (Lindebaum and Geddes 2015, p. 3). Sociologists have classified what I refer to as "moral anger" alternatively as "indignation" (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015; Gamson 1982; Jasper 2014), "moral shock" (Jasper 1997, 1999; Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Luker 1984; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), "moral outrage" (Nepstad and Smith 2001), and "righteous anger" (Tripp and Bies 2010). Here, I use the term "moral anger" to refer to an aroused emotional state informed by value-laden appraisals of perceived violations against others and that motivate actions intended to be corrective.[201] In this sense, "action readiness" is embedded in moral anger, but the action decision to act, and how people who are morally angry choose to

[201] According to Lindebaum and Geddes (2015), there are two key differences between indignation, righteous anger, moral outrage, and moral anger. First is the source of the trigger. Indignation and righteous anger tend to be self as opposed to other-oriented, reflecting emotional responses to personal violations rather than violations against others (Lindebaum and Geddes 2015; Solomon 1993; Weiner 2005). The second factor that distinguishes indignation, righteous anger, moral outrage, and moral anger, is the direction of the response. Lindebaum and Geddes (2015) suggest that moral anger is unique because it "prompts corrective behavior intended to improve the social condition" (p. 3). In other words, people motivated to act on the basis of moral anger must seek to correct past transgressions through efforts to right existing wrongs. This is distinguished by the authors from moral outrage, which, while also an emotional motivation triggered by value violations happening to others, seeks to redress these violations through targeted punishment (Baston et al. 2007). However, because these terms are often used interchangeably (e.g., Gamson 1995, Jasper 2014; Nepstad and Smith 2001; Pearlman 2013; Wood 2003), I simply note the distinctions here and use the term "moral anger" throughout.

act, is distinct (Lindebaum and Geddes 2015). Concurrently, I suggest that moral anger is a form of ideologically-motivated action, building on Oliver and Johnston's (2000, p. 43) definition of ideology as "a system of meaning that couples assertions and theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant to promoting or resisting social change."[202]

The historical record indicates that lower clergy's motivations for creating *Témoignage Chrétien* were anchored in moral anger. Consider Chaillet's tract, published following the *Anschluss*, *Austria is Suffering*:

> The triumph of Hitlerism in Germany was to mark an outburst of racist terror…. The Third Reich intends to resolve the problem of racial purity by the relentless extermination of those whom the Nuremberg laws leave defenseless in the face of the outburst of the basest instincts…. We know the *disgust* and *indignation* aroused in the civilized world by this shameful hunting down of people treated like unclean beasts. One need only have been a witness in Vienna to find it impossible to resign oneself to a complacent silence and complicity.[203]

As a result of his time in Austria, Chaillet was well aware of, and tried to alert others to, the horrors of Nazism. Hitler's actions aroused moral anger — "disgust and indignation," in his words. Moral anger drove him to write in protest.

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[202] This does not preclude the fact that moral anger can also overlap with identity and interest-driven mobilization (for example, through feelings of personal value violation or grievance due to relative deprivation).

[203] Cited in Bédarida (1981), pp. 214-215. In Wellers, G., Kaspi, A., & Klarsfeld, S. (Eds.). La France et la question juive: 1940-1944: Actes du colloque du Centre de documentation juive contemporaine (10 au 12 mars 1979). Paris: S. Messinger. Emphasis added.

Likewise, Fessard published a critique of the anti-Semitic film *Jud Süss* when the film premiered in May 1941 calling it "anti-Christian and anti-French," expressing the view that anti-Semitic propaganda was opposed to both Christian *and* French values and adding: "the subject of the film is idiotic."[204] He also, in *Cité Nouvelle* in 1941, wrote:

> Did history stop in June 1940? …. Surely, we must be astonished that an "examination of conscience," which our nation's moral leaders encourage along with their invitations to restore the unity of the nation… carefully omits through its silence any regard to moral and spiritual values drawn into the battle, therefore suggesting to its followers, as if it were the most natural thing in the world, for a victory to decide in the last resort the camp where consciousness should find its morals.[205]

This same anger at the hierarchy's silence, and its willingness to call for national unity while ignoring the explicit exclusion of a subset of the population from the nation, would re-emerge time and again in *Témoignage Chrétien*, as evidence will demonstrate below.

Finally, as the authors of the Chaine declaration made clear, the second *Statut des Juifs* violated "the purity of Christian moral doctrine" and, they explained, "it is for this reason that we make the following declaration, to which we wish to give all publicity."[206] These clergy felt their

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[204] ACIF, bobine 4, boîte 13. Extract of *Temps Nouveau*, 9 May 1941,

[205] *Cité Nouvelle*, 2é semestre 1941, p. 316-371. Reprinted in Fessard, Gaston, & Prévotat, Jacques (1989). Au temps du prince-esclave: Écrits clandestins, 1940-1945. Limoges: Critérion. p. 25. Exact date not specified.

[206] HDL, p. 66

group values — *Christian values* — were violated by state anti-Semitism and the only morally justifiable response was protest.

And yet, moral anger alone is insufficient in fully explaining why lower clergy decided to create *Témoignage Chrétien.* As the examples above in combination with the section on historical antecedents demonstrate, all those who would come to form the core group of *Témoignage Chrétien* had already begun writing and publishing protests in various magazines and journals—some well before the Nazis even invaded France. So what prompted the creation of an organized clandestine resistance magazine? For this, I turn to the research on political opportunity structures.

*The Power of Repression*

As nearly every review of social movement theory will explain, motivations are necessary but not sufficient in accounting for the emergence of collective action (e.g., Gamson 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1982, 1996; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). Features of the social structure matter for facilitating or constraining mobilization and also for shaping the forms that action takes. Meyer (2004, p. 128) writes: "the wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activists' choices… can only be understood and evaluated by looking to the political context and the rules of the games in which those choices are made." Understanding the interplay of emotional motivations and structural situations is thus necessary to make sense of the strategies that movement activists employ.

As a result, one of the key components in the classic "political process" model of social movement theory is the idea of *political opportunity structures*. Initially developed by Eisinger

(1973) and expanded upon by Tilly (1978), research on political opportunity structures holds that exogenous factors can facilitate or constrain prospects for mobilization (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, p. 1457). As a result, political opportunity theory emphasizes how motivational processes for political action are affected by the sociocultural and political contexts in which activists are embedded. In this way, emotions and political opportunity structures interact (Klandermans 1993; van Zomeren 2016).

Importantly, although the concept of "opportunity" in political opportunity theory can seem to imply the *opening* of state structures and other exogenous factors that facilitate mobilization, a significant body of work argues that, in fact, increasing repression and the *closing* of political access can be thought of as political opportunity as well (Ortiz 2013, p. 289).[207] This is because repression can often increase discontent and thereby influence the likelihood that people will strive to express their anger (Almeida 2003, 2008; Opp and Ruehl 1990). Such was the case for driving lower clergy in France to create the clandestine *Témoignage Chrétien*. Having individually expressed their moral anger, they desired to organize spiritual resistance through the creation of a clandestine journal because of official government censors' repression, including the forced closure of magazines in which they could write, and calls by the hierarchy for clergy and laity to obey the "established power" and "venerate the head of state."[208]

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[207] Research on how repression affects mobilization has had mixed results: in some cases, repression has been found to deter protest (McAdam 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 1996; Opp and Roehl 1990; Tarrow 1998); in others, repression has been found to escalate it (Alimi 2009; Almeida 2003; Araj 2008; Chang and Kim 2007; Francisco 2004, 2005; Goodwin 2001; Hess and Martin 2006; Ortiz 2007; White 1989). In response, several strands of research have emerged to improve understandings of repression's mixed effects (Moss 2014, p. 262). One such strand focuses on how repression changes movement's tactics (Lichbach 1987; McAdam 1983). This is the strand I focus on here.

[208] Archives diocésaines de Cambrai, fonds Chollet, 1B. 26. Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée des Cardinaux et Archevêques de France Paris, 24-25 July 1941.

In the ACA meeting of the Occupied Zone on 15 January 1941, for example, the hierarchy discussed the role of clergy in contributing to the National Revolution and demanded of priests "a sincere loyalty toward the established power of the French government.[209] It directed clergy to engage the laity in this mission and added: "it is important to… defend [the placement of faith] against all erroneous ideology, and also against certain deviations of the mind that are times… a real peril."[210] In July 1941, Father Norbert de Boynes, the Vicar General of the Society of Jesus (and thus the official leader of the Jesuits in Lyon), was more blunt: he sent a six-page memo to all those under his authority not only exhorting priests to abstain from politics and obey the established power, but also condemning their dissident writings. This amplified the anger of lower clergy who had been writing in moral protest of anti-Semitism. Father Fontoynont responded to de Boynes' letter by writing *yes*, clergy *should* abstain from politics, but it seemed to him that it was a political act to "impose politics on the faithful when we tell them to support a contested and fragile regime."[211] Furthermore, Fontoynont added:

> [The Church] must exercise its sovereign spiritual mission and affirm the demands of faith, charity, and justice — on the Jewish question, for example — without worrying about helping or interfering with the government.[212]

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[209] Ibid.

[210] Ibid.

[211] "Lettre au R.P. Recteur, qui peut être communiqué au R.P. Provincial et au R.P. Assistant." 13 July 1941. Cited in Comte 2005, pp. 202-203.

[212] Ibid.

These men, many of whom would come to form the core group of *Témoignage Chrétien*, were initially motivated to write against anti-Semitism because they felt it was morally necessary. However, dictates from the episcopate and other higher-ups to support Pétain and mobilize the laity in favor of the National Revolution amplified their moral anger. Thus rather than quieting their rhetoric, repression drove already-angry clergy to create a Christian resistance magazine to organize an alternative voice.

*Témoignage Chrétien* was clandestine because the various resistance magazines once in operation had been shuttered; lower clergy had no method by which to publicize their honest protests. Radio, of course, was not an option: most of the airwaves were controlled by Vichy and German authorities would often jam broadcasts that reached France from abroad. German orders also threatened punishments of hard labor, prison, and even death for anyone who might listen to English radio (Wieviorka 2016, p. 11).[213] The crushing weight of Vichy authoritarianism was rising, forcing morally angry clergy to seek out alternative ways with which to have their voices heard.

Consider Father de Bonchet, who wrote to de Lubac when his attempt to publish "Defense of Christ and the Bible" without censorship had failed: "We have just had a first failure; but I remain persuaded that the final word has not yet been spoken, and, one way or another, such truths must be heard."[214] De Bonchet was sensitive to the difficulties of publishing moral declarations under the new restrictions, but he was not prepared to concede.

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[213] Of course, as Wieviorka points out, these measures were often unable to prevent those who wanted to listen to English radio from finding ways to do so despite the risks.

[214] HDL, p. 107.

Similarly, when Father Dillard wrote to de Lubac about the pressures that Vichy censors had placed on him to eliminate de Lubac's references to the Jewish Question, he wrote: "conscience matters are cruel…. I have come away rather pessimistic about these processes."[215] Dillard recognized that to work with the Vichy censors was to play a losing game. Developing another alternative would be morally necessary.

Cruvillier, though not a member of the clergy but the director of propaganda for *Temps Nouveau* and a Christian Democrat active before the war in the ACJF, also cited repression as the reason for why he helped organize *Témoignage Chrétien*.[216] Describing his previous work for *Temps Nouveau* as "open resistance," Cruvillier explains that he contacted Chaillet and Frenay through his friend Alexandre Marc specifically because he wanted to organize a "clandestine religious journal" after *Temps Nouveau* was shut down.[217] Like his compatriots, continuing to engage in open resistance was no longer an option, but neither was silence.

Last but not least, we need only to look at *Témoignage Chrétien*'s *own* stated motivations, specified, for example, in its initial edition: Fessard's lengthy "France, prends garde de perdre ton âme!" The article issued a dire warning to its readers and a scathing critique of the Church:

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[215] Ibid., p. 105.

[216] Archives Nationales, 72AJ/73, Dossier n° 6, Résistance chrétienne, V — Témoignage chrétien. Notes de Louis Cruvillier sur la fondation du Témoignage chrétien. Pièce 8.

[217] Ibid.

> In subscribing to the ideals of *Travail, Famille, Patrie* — that which seemed the most natural in the world — the Church has compromised herself by working indirectly in the installation of a new order dictated by Nazis.[218]

Fessard did not mince words. No censor would hold sway, restricting his protest in this clandestine paper. Fessard wrote, capitalization in the original: "COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MARÉCHAL = COLLABORATION WITH THE NEW ORDER = COLLABORATION WITH THE TRIUMPH OF NAZI PRINCIPLES."[219] He damned the Church hierarchy for its "veneration" of the head of state and its abandonment of Jews.

Consider, also, the following stated motivation for *Témoignage Chrétien*, published in April-May 1942:

> Christians, we have the urgent duty to bear witness before all our brothers, following the imprescriptible principles of our faith, that anti-Semitism is incompatible with Christianity. In bearing witness against anti-Semitism and for truth and justice, we bear witness to Christ. No temporal authority can exempt us from that witnessing, no spiritual authority can reproach us.[220]

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[218] "France, prends garde de perdre ton âme." November 1941. In Bédarida, F., & Bédarida, R. (2001). La résistance spirituelle: 1941-1944: Les cahiers clandestins du Témoignage chrétien. Paris: Albin Michel. pp. 40-74.

[219] Ibid.

[220] "Antisémites." April-May 1942. In Bédarida, F., & Bédarida, R. (2001). La résistance spirituelle: 1941-1944: Les cahiers clandestins du Témoignage chrétien. Paris: Albin Michel. pp. 117-157.

Finally, the 10-11 edition, published in October-November 1942, proclaimed:

> The *Cahiers* give witness for those Christians who are fully conscious of their present responsibilities; who, caught up in the tragedy of their times, perceive the immense danger of seeing stifled that Christian spirit which formed them…. The danger of daily lies and camouflages by the press, radio and cinema. The danger of silences imposed by a censorship dominated by the occupying or controlling power…. Our *Cahiers* bear their witness where no voice can make itself heard publicly….. The duty is to oppose and to organize resistance to Nazism.[221]

The declaration went on to reference "the spinelessness of too great a number from whom one would expect more dignity." The reference, of course, was to clergy and the episcopate who remained silent in the face of anti-Semitic violence.

Each of these documents is indicative of the moral fury that the team behind *Témoignage Chrétien* felt about the hierarchy's willingness to collaborate with the Vichy government in its goal of National Revolution. To these activists, collaboration was complicity. They also demonstrate how increasing repression of lower clergy by Vichy governmental authorities only strengthened these activist's feelings that they had to find a way to protest without having their words minced by censors. Obstruction through repression amplified the moral anger that motivated clergy's protest behavior. It also forced them to "go underground" (Zwerman, Steinhoff, and della Porta 2000). As the censors prohibited any writings that could be read as

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[221] "Collaboration et fidélité." October-November 1942. In Bédarida, F., & Bédarida, R. (2001). La résistance spirituelle: 1941-1944: Les cahiers clandestins du Témoignage chrétien. Paris: Albin Michel. pp. 189-210.

critical of the Vichy government, and as Darlan shuttered the various journals for which some of the lower clergy had been writing, they found "no other way out" (Goodwin 2001) but to create their own.

## 2. Method: Mobilizing Resources through Direct Ties

*The Power of the Written Word*

The decision to organize clandestine resistance is useless without a strategy. In this case, the selection of writing as the method by which lower clergy would protest was made for several reasons: First, lower clergy chose to circulate a written journal as their method of protest partly because writing moral protests was something they already knew how to do. In other words, their experience naturally lent itself to this method and simply moved underground. In this way, the decision to start a clandestine journal as opposed to another method of protest can be thought of as a "repertoire of contention" — what Tilly (1986, p. 390) defines as knowledge concerning "what is to be done" when protest is desired, adding that "people tend to act within known limits, to innovate at the margins of the existing forms, and to miss many opportunities available to them in principle" (p. 390). Ideas about protest are rooted in the culture of activists, shaping the strategies they choose and constraining their imagined, alternative forms of activism.

Second, the selection of a written journal as the method by which to protest came because resistance during the early years of the war was concerned primarily with challenging Vichy's claim to legitimacy in the Free Zone. In the Occupied Zone, the priority was fighting German occupiers (Peschanski 2004; Wieviorka 2016, pp. 72-73). As a result, the emphasis in Unoccupied France was on propaganda through the circulation of underground papers; the fight

was for hearts and minds, not territory. Kedward (1978, p. 56) explains, "the status quo of 1940 had to be made to appear unnatural, irrational, and reversible, if opposition was to appear normal, rational, and practical." Lower clergy involved with *Témoignage Chrétien* specifically targeted the Catholic hierarchy in this effort because of the ways in which the episcopate, as detailed in chapter two, was engaged in numerous practices to legitimize the Vichy government. A clandestine journal provided the possibility of distributing an alternative message to that of the Catholic hierarchy, provided through its ACA declarations and other modes of support for the Vichy government. The existence of *Témoignage Chrétien* also provided physical, material evidence that an alternative approach was possible.

Finally, although the possibility of distributing clandestine writings in an organized fashion did not exist in late 1940 or early 1941 — recall, this is the reason the Chaine declaration was stopped in its tracks — by fall 1941, largely through the work of Father Chaillet, which connected him with Fumet, Frenay, and eventually, Louis Cruvillier, the idea of publishing a clandestine resistance journal had become a reality. "The material and cultural resources available for challengers contributes to determine when episodes of high repression are likely to determine waves of moral protest, and when instead they will demobilize movements," explain della Porta and Fillieule (2003, p. 234). Subsequently, I draw on resource mobilization theory below to explain how French lower clergy were able to organize their protest once they had decided on their method.

*Mobilizing Resources*

The classic formulation of resource mobilization theory identifies social-organizational, material, and human resources as necessary for mobilization. It proposes that without organizations to generate the mobilization of money and labor — resources that would otherwise remain individual — people would be unlikely to protest. The costs would be too high (Klandermans 1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1978; Olson 1968; Oberschall 1973). This classic emphasis on money and labor stems from a tendency to focus on movements in the context of Western democracies (Finkel 2015, p. 340). However, in a recent formulation, Edwards and McCarthy (2004) synthesized past work to create a fivefold typology of resource forms: moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources. They emphasize that various forms of resources are divided unequally among social groups. As a result, resources can come from within or outside a group, and there are myriad kinds of resources, all which vary historically (i.e., media and technology) and socially (groups with affluent members might have more access to material resources, whereas groups of the working class might have more access to human capital).

Of the five resource forms identified by Edwards and McCarthy (2004), lower clergy were teeming with moral resources in the form of moral authority, due to their positions as priests and faculty at the Fourvière in Lyon (widely known as the spiritual capital of France). Many priests were also popular among the laity as a result of their leadership in various social catholic movements before the war — Father Montcheuil, for example, was the chaplain of the JEC and JECF — or positions of authority at the Fourvière seminary, such as Fathers de Lubac and Chaillet, both professors. The moral power of those who wished to organize clandestine

spiritual resistance was well established; what they needed were resources to organize, produce, and distribute their message.

Fortunately, due to their individual efforts writing for popular resistance journals — especially Chaillet's writings as "Testis" for *Verités* — a network developed around the Fourvière that linked Chaillet and his confidantes with others who could provide access to the necessary resources. Additionally, as briefly detailed earlier, Louis Cruvillier held the "key" that would unlock reams of material and social-organizational resources for *Témoignage Chrétien*.

For example, when it came to the accumulation of material resources — specifically, paper and printers that the journal required for publication — Chaillet was able to draw on his connection to Frenay from his time writing for *Verités* and Cruvillier was able to ask friends through his networks to *Temps Nouveau* for help, too. Thus to publish its first edition, *Témoignage Chrétien* used the same printer for *Verités* that belonged to socialist Joseph Martinet, a wealthy friend of Frenay's who would also help finance *Combat*. Frenay asked Martinet to support Father Chaillet, and the first 5,000 copies of *Témoignage Chrétien* were published on Martinet's presses. By the time the second edition of *Témoignage Chrétien* was ready, 10,000 more copies would need to secret their way throughout the south of France (see appendix C).

Here, Cruvillier's personal network would prove vital. Cruvillier describes in his testimony how, when Chaillet asked him to find a printer, he "immediately" thought of Eugene "Papa" Pons — an old friend.[222] Aware of the danger of participating in this clandestine activity, Pons told Cruvillier: "The cause is worth the pain of risking one's life."[223] In a separate post-War

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[222] Archives Nationales, 72AJ/73, Dossier n° 6, Résistance chrétienne, V — Témoignage chrétien. Témoignage sur Eugène Pons. Pièce 4.

[223] Ibid.

testimony by Cruvillier about Eugene Pons (who was arrested in May 1944, deported to Montluc prison, then to Neuengamme where he died in 1945), Cruvillier describes how along with Charles Plachet, another printer, Zéno Curiotti and Germaine Dumet, both responsible for providing paper, Henri Vernier, the foreman for joining together composition and mechanical assembly, and Pierre Barnier, in charge of getting the papers to their requisite transports, Pons would work every Friday night to Sunday evening on preparing *Témoignage Chrétien*, in addition to *Combat* and several other resistance journals. "For three years," Cruvillier testified, "they knew no rest." The material resources that *Témoignage Chrétien* so desperately needed to function were provided by Cruvillier's direct ties and expanded from there. The only thing *Témoignage Chrétien* required now were human resources — people willing to discreetly distribute *Témoignage Chrétien* throughout unoccupied France.

3. Make-up: Social Networks and Mechanisms for Participation

Participating in the distribution of *Témoignage Chrétien* was risky, to say the least. In addition to the danger of severe punishment by government authorities, participation entailed violating the teachings of the hierarchy, which many Catholic youth had been trained to obey without question (Bédarida 1988, p. 13). That is, given that the episcopate and Vichy government were joined together in promoting the National Revolution, which implicitly as well as explicitly discriminated against Jews, participation in clandestine christian resistance required *two* acts of disobedience: one against the legal government of Vichy, the other against the dictates of the Catholic hierarchy (Bédarida 1988, p. 121). This second act of disobedience could also put the

Church at risk if the lower clergy and laity's clandestine dissent was interpreted by the Vichy government as representative of the episcopate in any way.

The fact that the episcopate appeared as one of the most solid pillars of the regime (Jackson 2003, p. 268) thus adds an additional challenge to this puzzle of clandestine resistance: most work that examines religious rescue of Jews during the Holocaust focuses on religious minorities and suggests they have unique advantages that facilitate clandestine behavior due to the strong social ties and "screening" that membership in a minority group provides (i.e., Braun 2014, p. 22). In this case, however, the resisters were part of the majority. For them, the challenge of participating in high-risk collective action was even greater because they were members of a majority dissenting in a high-stakes manner. What, then, explains how the leaders of *Témoignage Chrétien* were able to "accumulate" the network — what Edwards and McCarthy (2004) would term "human resources" — of individuals required for its distribution?

*Processes of Micro-Mobilization*

A large body of scholarship finds that social networks are important for the mobilization of high-risk collective action (i.e., Gould 1995; Loveman 1998; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Morris 1984; Wickham-Crowley 1998). However, a key difference between high-risk collective action in authoritarian settings versus democracies is that in the former, networks *initiate* mobilization and are essential for communication and resource flows, whereas in the latter, networks *facilitate* mobilization but so can other mechanisms (Osa and Schock 2007, p. 140). For example, diffusion of movement tactics and strategies through the media is one way in which mobilization is facilitated in democracies (i.e., Andrews and Biggs 2006; Givans, Roberts,

and Soule 2010; Koopmans 2004; Myers 2000; Strang and Soule 1998), but the repression and censorship of media in authoritarian regimes makes social networks necessary to prompt participation (Crabtree, Kern, and Pfaff, *working paper*).[224] Finally, in clandestine movements, social networks are especially important for recruitment into activism (della Porta 1988). Among the many reasons for why this is so (discussed below) is the simple fact that clandestine movements are discreet — even if one is aware they exist, joining depends on having a connection to a movement leader ("early riser") or someone who is already participating in the movement.

The fact that social networks matter for high-risk collective action does not tell us *how* they matter. In addition to connecting people with leaders and other activists, social ties are "conduits of processes affecting the likelihood individuals will support a movement, be motivated to participate, and/or actually participate" (Ward 2016, p. 7). In other words, it is not just about "structural availability" (McAdam 1986, p. 65; Schussman and Schule 2005, p. 1086), but participation in activism also depends on the social relationship between the person asking and the person answering (Campbell 2013, p. 39). The question, then, is what are the mechanisms through which social ties prompt people to join in high-risk activism?

Research on micro-mobilization — the processes by which different mechanisms prompt participation by different individuals at various stages in a movement — has identified numerous mechanisms that connect social ties to participation in high-risk activism. These include, but are

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[224] To be sure, social media has been significant for the mobilization of collective action in authoritarian regimes (most notably, with the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in 2010), but precisely because it is *social* media, which implies that social networks are being connected through media, it is best to think of this as a hybrid form of both mechanisms. Similarly, as Crabtree, Darmofal and Kern (2015); Kern (2011); Kim and Pfaff (2012); and Opp, Voss and Gern (1995) note, what often appears as a sudden outburst of protest triggered by mass media is often in fact the result of *relational diffusion* through social networks.

not limited to: pre-existing ideological affinities with a movement (what McAdam 1986, p. 68 calls "attitudinal availability"); identity, including participation identities generated through previous membership in voluntary or formal associations (Gould 1995; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Pfaff 1996; Viterna 2006, 2013; Wickham-Crowley 1992); trust in social ties that help to counteract the dangers of participation in risky activism (della Porta 1988; Loveman 1998; McAdam 1986; Morris 1984); and affective ties to other participants, including "quotidian social relationships" such as "kinship, marriage, friendship, and other community-based relationships" (Parkinson 2013, p. 418). People through this mechanism participate because they care about existing activists and therefore wish to align their behaviors with them (Gould 2003; Heise 1998; Jasper 2004; Passy 2003; Staniland 2012), or because they risk losing ties to people they care about, for example through social sanctions, if they choose not to participate (McAdam 1986, p. 68).[225]

In what follows, I demonstrate through three narratives reconstructed from the archives how particular individuals joined *Témoignage Chrétien*. Due to the present lack of available data beyond testimony contained in the archive (n = 14), I am unfortunately unable to reconstruct this network of activists with a representative sample.[226] As a result, I confine my analysis to a few observations that stand out as particularly significant given the data that does exist. I also reproduce findings from a survey of activists conducted after France was liberated in 1944 on the christian resistance movement in the Loire.

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[225] In contrast, Goodwin (1997) finds that affective ties weakened military discipline and solidarity in the Huk rebellion because love and erotic attraction pulled people away from collective action and back into their private lives.

[226] It is possible to consider a future project that would entail contacting former members of *Témoignage Chrétien* who are still alive and interviewing them to learn more about their motives for joining in the movement, or characteristics they shared in common. However, such a project is beyond the scope of this current one.

1. Participation identities

Cruvillier recounts in his testimony how, before the time *Temps Nouveau* had "disappeared," a group called "The Friends of *Temps Nouveau*" — which itself had previously been "The Friends of *Temps Present*" and connected with the magazine's precursor — had emerged. Cruvillier established this group in December 1940 through his old contacts in the ACJF as well as various professors, students, and other youth he knew. Many of them wondered, after *Temps Nouveau* was closed down, how they could mobilize next. Originally, Cruvillier's goal was to transform *Voix du Vatican* into the first Christian resistance journal with the help of these "Friends." But after Alexandre Marc introduced him to de Lubac and Chaillet — the latter of whom he had already "glimpsed" when working for *Temps Nouveau* — Cruvillier decided to mobilize the group and its expertise behalf of *Témoignage Chrétien* instead.[227]

One of the first people Cruvillier contacted was Fernand Bélot. Cruvillier describes Bélot as his "brother in arms" who had worked with him before the war to launch the "Eastern Federation of the Friends of *Temps Present*."[228] In a post-war testimony that Cruvillier wrote for Bélot, who was executed by the Nazis on 9 June 1944 for his clandestine resistance activities, he begins by explaining the in order to understand the activities of these "true resistance… one must first explain who they were before war was declared in order to understand why some had become resistants as early as June 1940." Bélot was one of these "early risers" for other resistance groups before *Témoignage Chrétien* was formed. In fact, it was on a tramway to Lyon

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[227] Archives Nationales, 72AJ/73, Dossier n° 6, Résistance chrétienne, V — Témoignage chrétien. Notes de Louis Cruvillier sur la fondation du Témoignage chrétien. Pièce 8.

[228] Ibid.

where he was traveling from Paris to pursue his medical degree that Bélot first bumped into François de Menthon, the man who would eventually link with Frenay to launch *Combat*, and former president of the ACJF, which is how Bélot knew him. After a long discussion on the train, de Menthon, before debarking, turned to Bélot and asked: "So, you are not in agreement [with the current situation]?" Bélot replied, "No." "In a few days, you will receive something. If it pleases you, come see me," de Menthon told him. Several days later, Bélot obtained his first copy of *Liberté*.[229,230]

Upon receiving *Liberté*, Bélot, enthusiastic about its contents, immediately joined de Menthon's network. It was initially a small group comprised of activists of all stripes and he, too, would often get pulled into printing and distributing other papers for different resistance movements. When *Liberté* fused with *Verités* to form *Combat*, Bélot became its director for couriers, which involved traveling to different regions, analyzing them for possible distribution networks, and distributing papers — he paid for all of this with his student budget, and yet continued to take his medical exams and would graduate in 1943.[231]

Louis Cruvillier reached out to Bélot at around the same time that *Combat* was taking off. By this point, Bélot already had a solidly formed participation identity. According to Gould (1995, p. 13), participation identity is "the social identification with respect to which an individual responds in *a given instance of social protest* to specific normative and instrumental appeals." In other words, people possess multiple identities; however, which one becomes salient and thus motivates people to participate in collective action depends on one's context, defined as

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[229] Ibid. Témoignage sur l'activité clandestine de Fernand Bélot. Pièce 6.

[230] "Freedom."

[231] Ibid.

the social networks that one is already embedded in (see also Kim and Bearman 1997; Viterna 2013). Bélot belonged to multiple resistance networks. He also had other identities: husband, son, medical student, to name a few. However, a fateful train ride in which he connected with de Menton, who he knew from his time in the ACJF, and through which he then connected to *Liberté* and various other resistance movements, meant that by the time Cruvillier contacted him in fall 1941 as a result of *their* previous ties in the Eastern Federation of the Friends of *Temps Present*, Bélot was already steeply involved in resistance. It wasn't a far stretch for Bélot to take the activities of *Témoignage Chrétien*. It was simply an extension of this already-existing, already-salient, part of himself. Bélot would come to organize the diffusion for all of *Témoignage Chrétien* in the Southern Zone before being arrested by the Gestapo on 27 March 1944 and executed on 9 June 1944. He was only 27 years old when he died.

2. Affect

Many who joined in *Témoignage Chrétien* did so because they loved and cared about those who asked them to participate. Two examples include the Guerin family and Raymonde Vallat, who was Bélot's girlfriend then wife. That these people joined because of their affectual ties to organizers does not negate the fact that they might have also been interested in participating for non-affective reasons; it simply demonstrates that in addition to other motives for joining, one reason for why they were pulled into mobilization has to do with their emotional ties to who asked them.

For example, Maurice Guérin was the chief editor of *Liberté*, a syndicalist, and secretary

general of the *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*,[232] which was founded by Catholic workers in 1919 who were inspired by Social Catholicism. Cruvillier, who knew Guérin was likely to be sympathetic to his cause as a result of his social catholic commitments, visited Guérin at his home shortly before the first edition of *Témoignage Chrétien* was distributed. He showed Guérin a draft of "France, prends garde de perdre ton âme!" and he right away expressed a desire to help out. But that is not all. Guérin then recruited his wife, his daughter and son-in-law, and his two children, the youngest of whom was only 16 years old, and they all participated in its clandestine diffusion.[233] Their affectual ties to one another helped pull them into the movement.

Raymonde Vallat was a member of the JEC and a student in Lyon when she met Fernand Bélot. At the time, he was already active in various resistance movements, as detailed above. She quickly joined him in his efforts, and together, they would travel throughout the south with copies of *Témoignage Chrétien* in their suitcases: from Lyon to Limoges, through Brive, Avignon, and Toulouse — in 1943, they also began to clandestinely distribute the journal in the Occupied Zone.[234]

A few days after Bélot graduated from medical school, on 29 June 1943, he and Vallat got married. Nine months later, a traitor who had infiltrated their group denounced both Vallat and her husband to the Gestapo. Subsequently, they were arrested, in addition to both her parents as well as Bélot's father. Vallat would be tortured for six days by the notorious Klaus Barbie, who

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[232] French Confederation of Christian Workers.

[233] Ibid., Historique de l'action de Maurice Guérin. Pièce 2.

[234] Ibid., Témoignage sur l'activité clandestine de Fernand Bélot. Pièce 6; Bockel, P., & Malraux, A. (1973). L'enfant du rire. Préface d'André Malraux. Paris: Bernard Grasset.

doused her in ice baths and flogged her repeatedly. Still, Vallat refused to provide any information about *Témoignage Chrétien*. Despite being pulled into the movement because of her love for Bélot, she was no less committed to its project. Vallat would be deported to the women's concentration camp Ravensbruck in Germany on 1 July 1944, and only upon her return to France a year later would she learn that her husband had been executed by the Nazis.

3. Ideology

Last but not least, some who participated in *Témoignage Chrétien* decided to join when asked because they were already ideologically aligned with its purpose. One such example is that of Marie-Rose Gineste. A devout Catholic, Gineste recounts in her post-war testimony how before the war, she had framed a copy of Pope Pius XI's encyclical, *Mit Brennender Sorge*, and place it on the wall in her office.[235] As early as August 1940, she had also begun to assemble false papers in order to help priests and seminarians in Arras cross the demarcation line. Gineste then joined a local Catholic Work of Assistance to Refugees. When Cruvillier visited her in October 1941 to ask if she would take responsibility for the diffusion of *Témoignage Chrétien* in Tarn-et-Garonne, Gineste immediately said yes. She already agreed with the goals of *Témoignage Chrétien*'s activities; she just needed someone to introduce her to the opportunity for mobilization.[236]

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[235] This encyclical and its significance is discussed in chapter one, on pp. 31.

[236] Archives Nationales, 72AJ/73, Dossier n° 6, Résistance chrétienne, V — Témoignage chrétien. Rapport d'activité de Marie-Rose Gineste. Pièce 1.

4. Finally, below is a table that summarizes the findings from a survey collected on the resistance movement in the Loire. Unfortunately, it is unclear from the survey, which is in the same parent folder that contains the post-war testimonies of *Témoignage Chrétien* activists, how respondents were contacted or how many of them there were, what questions respondents were asked (subheadings are simply: "organizers," "recruitment," etc.), or how responses were collected and recorded and by whom. It is also important to note that the survey is described as a "collective testimony," indicating it likely was compiled by a group of activists all together, resulting in other concerns about reliability such as the extent to which peers influenced respondents' willingness to reply one way or another. I simply include the table summarizing their responses below to illustrate the various complex network ties that pulled people into participation in *Témoignage Chrétien* and the other resistance activities they engaged in.[237]

**Table 3.1 Collective Testimony on Christian Resistance in the Loire**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Organizers** | Former Christian Democrats; friends from "l'Aube"; *Amis de Temps Present*. "They were all practicing Catholics." | From the beginning they said "no" to the armistice and "yes" to de Gaulle. | Connections made through friendships formed before 1939. | Stages of action followed (1) treason, then (2) efforts to increase capacity to act. |
| **Recruitment** | Religious and spiritual friends from before the war formed the base, then recruitment from "their environment, their neighborhood, their family, their friends." | Best links were developed through diffusion of the clandestine press. | Recruitment thrived especially among Social Catholics. | Unable to provide list. |
| **Organization** | Met in private homes and offices, rarely in cafés. | No secretary, "was contrary to our orders." Everything had to be done verbally. | Different services involves propaganda, diffusion of tracts and journals, false papers, social services, sabotage. | Action was departmental, beginning in 1942-1943 would start to print "Combat," "Liberation," and "Témoignage Chrétien" for the entire Southern Zone. |
| **Phases of Action** | Dec. 1940-June 1941: Diffusion of "Les Petites Ailes," "Verités," "Liberté." | June 1941-Nov. 1942: Printing and diffusion of "Combat" (2,000 copies), "Libération" (15,000 copies), "Témoignage Chrétien" (25,000 copies). | Nov. 1942-March 1943: Battle against propaganda and action against racism; diffusion of bishops letters; hiding Jews. | Development of the Maquis in the Loire; ongoing creation and diffusion of false papers. |

**Conclusion**

This chapter draws from research on social movements in organizations to explain how lower clergy and laity in France created the Catholic resistance journal, *Témoignage Chrétien* despite the challenges and high risks associated with mobilization in authoritarian regimes. I analyze primary sources from several archives in France, personal memoirs, post-war testimonies, and secondary sources, and I combine factual and theoretical claims throughout the analysis to identify what motivated the creators of *Témoignage Chrétien*, how the journal itself came to be, and who partook in its diffusion. In the chapter, these are termed the "three M's" — motive, method, and makeup.

The findings of the research indicate that although lower clergy and laity who would become the organizers of *Témoignage Chrétien* were morally angry before starting the journal, repression through the shuttering of various magazines in which they published combined with condemnation from episcopal authorities to amplify their anger and motivate them to coordinate a clandestine form of spiritual resistance. The tactic of writing was chosen because one, writing moral protests was already within their repertoire of contention; two, because *Témoignage Chrétien*'s primary goal was propaganda — a fight for hearts and minds, not territory; and three, because by November 1941, they had in fact accumulated the resources necessary to pursue this strategy.

Subsequently, the findings also suggest that the organizers of *Témoignage Chrétien* were able to accumulate the material resources required to create and distribute a clandestine journal through their direct ties. These ties were formed through connections that were forged before they went underground, while writing for publications that would eventually be forced to close.

In particular, Chaillet in his connection to Frenay and Cruvillier in his connection to Pons were able to access paper and printers for publication.

Last but not least, the findings of this research support existing scholarship on the significance of social ties for high-risk activism. However, in line with Osa and Schock (2007) and Crabtree, Kern, and Pfaff (*forthcoming*), I stipulate that social networks are in face *necessary* for initiating (and not simply facilitating) high-risk activism when this activism takes place in an authoritarian regime. I also examine post-war testimonies with activists in *Témoignage Chrétien* and propose that three mechanisms (among possible others) mediated the influence of networks in explaining how people joined. These are participation identity, affect, and ideology.

The following chapter explains the consequences of *Témoignage Chrétien*'s spiritual resistance on the Catholic hierarchy and what explains bishops' first public protest, in August 1942, on behalf of Jews.

# Chapter 4: Defection

## How Catholic Bishops Defected from their Public Support for the Anti-Semitic Vichy Government to Protest on Behalf of Jews

*"It is my duty to teach morals to the members of the diocese and when it is necessary to teach them also to government officials."*

-Archbishop Jules-Géraud Saliège[238]

### Introduction

In August 1942, a group of bishops in the French Catholic Church defected from the episcopate's stance of public silence toward state anti-Semitism. Their move to help save Jews in France was a dramatic change. Just two years prior, the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops had met and decided to formally support Vichy's anti-semitic policies. "No one more than I recognizes the evil that Jews have done to France," proclaimed Cardinal Pierre-Marie Gerlier in autumn 1941. Ten months later, he along with four other French bishops, issued a protest to be read from some 400 pulpits across France. "The Jews are our brothers. They belong to mankind," the clergy declared. "No Christian dare forget that!"

The fourth chapter of my dissertation examines how French bishops during the Holocaust deviated from their support for Vichy to help save Jews despite the high personal and institutional costs associated with defection. Drawing on historical analysis of bishops' private diaries, letters, notes, and correspondences, my findings suggest that pressure from the protest publication *Témoignage Chrétien* motivated bishops to offer support to Jews, if discreetly. Changes in the episcopate's relationship with the Vichy government increased bishops' willingness to reconsider their alignment with the regime, and events in the wider political

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[238] Marie-Rose Gineste and the Bishop's Letter. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2016, from http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/es/generales/marie-rose-gineste-and-the/

context — most significantly, the start of the Final Solution — made the issue of state violence impossible to ignore.

These three findings about what prompted bishops' first public protest on behalf of Jews in late August 1942 link up with the political mediation model of research on the outcomes of social movements in organizations with one exception: the model argues that interactions between *movement tactics* (finding one) and *political circumstances* (findings two and three) shape the outcomes of social movements, whereas my findings suggest an important distinction between *organizational circumstances* (finding two) and the wider *political context* (finding three). Put otherwise, the classic political mediation model *collapses* organizational and political factors into one explanatory mechanism, rather than separate organizational circumstances from the wider political context to seek an adequate explanation of how social movements in organizations motivate authorities to change their policies and practices.

Thus, this chapter also proposes an extension to the political mediation model of social movement outcomes. Specifically, I suggest that research on the consequences of social movements in organizations can be improved by dividing exogenous variables into *organizational circumstances* and *political context.* Often, though not always, the significance of organizational circumstances is mediated by events in the wider political context. Consequently, the ways in which extra-institutional tactics impact organizations is likewise affected by such events. In the French case, I conclude that bishops' shift in stances was a *social movement outcome* triggered by the *movement tactics* of *Témoignage Chrétien*, the *organizational circumstances* of bishops' declining relationship with the Vichy government, and the external *political context* of increasing violence against Jews in France.

First, I review the literature on the consequences of social movements within organizations. I briefly detail scholarship on movement tactics, exogenous factors, and the political mediation model. Second, I analyze archival documents in light of the revised model by demonstrating how *Témoignage Chrétien* disrupted the episcopate's status quo and how the relationship between the episcopate and the Vichy government deteriorated in late 1941 and early 1942. Third, I re-introduce the political mediation model and my proposed extension, explaining through historical analysis how a combination of movement tactics, organizational circumstances, and political contexts led to bishops' first public protest on behalf of Jews in France. In the conclusion, I argue that each factor was necessary but not sufficient to prompt this radical break. Only by distinguishing among the disruptive impacts of *Témoignage Chrétien*, the organizational circumstances of the Church after its fallout with the Vichy government, and the sheer horror of witnessing the Final Solution in France can a comprehensive explanation of bishops' shifting stances be obtained.

## 1. The Consequences of Social Movements within Organizations

The motivating question that guides research on social movement outcomes in organizations is "how do social movements convince organizational leaders to make changes to their policies and practices?" (King 2008, p. 395). Among this work, several factors have emerged as common themes in evaluating the likelihood of movement "success" — with success, of course, defined as changes to policy and practice within the organization under consideration.

First, scholars find that movements are more likely to succeed in changing organizational

agendas when they rely on *extra-institutional tactics* (Cress and Snow 2000; Gamson 1990; King 2009, 2011; Luders 2006; Piven and Cloward 1977; Rojas 2006). When social movement activists within organizations intentionally choose strategies of action that subvert conventional politics, they are more likely to force recognition of their concerns than when they rely on institutionalized channels of change. The fact that these tactics do not rely on routine practices is what makes them disruptive: they challenge authority through bypassing organizationally accepted modes of claims-making. In turn, this disruption is thought to be influential for two reasons: it pressures targets to pay attention to claimants' demands by impeding organizational routine and imposing costs through "market disruption" (King 2011, p. 492) such as the revenue lost from boycotts (see also Friedman 1999; Garret 1987; King 2008, 2011; Luders 2006), and it commands attention through "mediated disruption," a form of indirect influence that suggests the reputational harm caused by extra-institutional tactics can force concessions. This is more likely to occur when activists use media to draw attention to claims against their targets (King 2011, p. 492).

Second, scholars note that *exogenous factors* matter in social movements' effectiveness. The idea is similar to political opportunity theory described in chapter three, except here the emphasis is on organizations, not society writ large. Some organizations are more open to change at some moments than at others, and some organizations are more open to change than others during the same time-period. The challenge lies in parsing through issues of causality: it is possible that an "opening" in the political opportunity structure *both* influences activists' perceptions of when to mobilize for change *and* influences an organization's willingness to change (Amenta and Caren 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Research that argues that

exogenous factors increase the likelihood that an organization will modify its policies and practices when pressured by activist constituents must disentangle the factors that give rise to mobilization from those that give rise to political change (Amenta and Caren 2004; Amenta et al. 1992; Amenta and Young 1999; Earl 2000, 2004; Giugni 1998; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; King 2009; Kriesi et al. 1995).

Third, the political mediation model developed by Amenta and colleagues (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994; Amenta and Young 1999; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Amenta 2006) proposes that it is the *interaction* between movement tactics and exogenous factors (defined as political contexts) that affects whether or not activists will succeed in having their demands met. Developed to explain social movement outcomes when the target is the state, King (2009; see also King and Pearce 2010) modifies the political meditation model for the corporate setting, which he then extends to the organizational context,[239] with two alterations. One, King (2009, p. 402) writes, "a movement's threat may accentuate the immediacy and visibility of negative feedback." By this, he means that the attention an organization receives as a result of extra-institutional protest tactics can raise awareness of other organizational problems and thus intensify negative perceptions of the organization that might not have been as severe or as evident if protest were not occurring. Two, King suggests that these intensified negative perceptions "may sensitize managers" to activists' concerns more readily than if they did not already feel vulnerable to outside criticism due to other organizational difficulties (pp. 402-403). "Performance declines make movements' threats

[239] "Taking the corporation as a special kind of political entity, we may reasonably assume that politics in markets is often revealed in the politics of organizations (Morrill et al. 2003). Market contentiousness becomes manifest within organizations as unconventional opposition to dominant organizational elites and current organizational policy (Zald and Berger 1978)." (King and Pearce 2010, p. 253).

more threatening," King explains (p. 403). King's modification to Amenta and colleagues' political mediation model, in sum, maintains that the interaction between movement tactics and organizational characteristics affect whether activists will succeed in creating organizational change.

King's model is helpful for reframing the political mediation model to suit analyses of the consequences of social movements in organizations. However, it is unclear how this "tactical-organizational" nexus interacts with political contexts more broadly. For example, in Proposition 1, King posits that negative public perceptions of existing organizational problems can be intensified as a result of protest. However, what if the existing organizational problem is affecting *all* organizations of a similar kind? Might this not mitigate the intensity of negative public perceptions, leading the public to see the organization as simply another example of organizational failure rather than an exception worthy of attention and derision? Likewise, in Proposition 2, King posits that intensified negative perceptions among the public about an organization are more likely to sensitize managers to claimants' demands if the organization is already struggling. Yet here, too, it is possible for the broader political context to mediate this effect (consider contemporary arguments over "failing" schools and education funding). It seems movement tactics, organizational circumstances, *and* the larger political context all shape how authorities interpret and respond to claimants' demands. As a result, I seek in this chapter to extend Amenta and colleagues' political mediation model and to build on King's contributions by explicitly incorporating the *external political context* as a separate dimension of influence on a movement's success. The result is a tripartite model of political mediation. In parsing out factors that specifically affect organizational circumstances from factors that affect political contexts

more broadly, scholars may better distinguish among the various elements that mediate movement success (or failure). Below, I demonstrate the usefulness of this approach through the analysis of French bishops' decisions to "accept" *Témoignage Chrétien*'s demands that they publicly protest against state anti-Semitism.

The historical documents that form the basis of my analysis come from three different countries. From France, I examine French bishops' private notes, letters, and diaries as well as their public statements contained in four diocesan archives (Paris, Lyon, Lille, Toulouse), correspondence between French bishops and important Jewish authorities contained in the archives of the *Alliance Israelite Universelle* (Paris), correspondence between French bishops and various governmental authorities collected from the National Centre of Church Archives of France (Issy-les-Moulineaux), and general documentation on this time-period from the Shoah Memorial Archives (Paris). From Israel, I examine files from the Database of the Righteous Among the Nations, collected at the Yad Vashem Center for Holocaust Research (Jerusalem). Finally, from the United States, I examine documents in the "French Concentration Camp Collection" on Christian clandestine rescue activities in France from the Leo Baeck Institute at the Center for Jewish History (New York).

## 2. Movement Tactics, Organizational Circumstances, and Political Contexts in France

### *Movement Tactics*

Chapter three discussed the motivation, method, and makeup of *Témoignage Chrétien*, a clandestine Christian journal focused on spiritual resistance to Nazism. The publication repeatedly challenged the hierarchy's calls for obedience to the Vichy regime by linking the

government's goals of National Revolution with Nazi anti-Semitism and intended to subvert what had become the "conventional politics" of the Church under Vichy authoritarianism. To achieve its aim, the founders of *Témoignage Chrétien* prioritized writing against anti-Semitism and widespread diffusion of this message, causing a kind of hybrid "market-and-mediated" disruption of the Church in France. Recall that King (2011, p. 492) defines market disruption as what happens when activists disrupt "their target's accrual or use of market resources" while mediated disruption "indirectly pressures the target by shaping their reference public's views" through intermediaries such as the media. Because *Témoignage Chrétien* was a form of mass communication that condemned the episcopate's practices and policies, it did both: its writings shaped their reference public's views and increased criticism of the Church, which in turn threatened the Church's accrual of market resources (in the form of followers).

Evidence for both forms of disruption are evident in the historical documentation. For example, one indication that the activities of *Témoignage Chrétien* threatened the reputation of the hierarchy is evident in the backlash that activists who engaged in clandestine criticisms of the episcopate received. In but one example, on 6 September 1941, Bishop Piguet of Clermont-Ferrand declared:

> In the present time, all dissidence, on the inside as on the outside, whether camouflaged or declared… is a misfortune and a fault. It is an offense against the Christian spirit because Catholic morality teaches submission to the legitimate civil power.[240]

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[240] *Semaine Religieuse de Clermont*, 6 September 1941. Cited in Bédarida 1998, p. 122, ff. 10.

Likewise, Bishop Marmottin in Reims proclaimed: "It is a duty of conscience to obey the leader of our nation, to serve him, to support him, and a Catholic committees a sin if he takes the side of the rebels, those who revolt against the authority of the state!"[241] In a final example, on 23 November 1941, bishop du Bois de la Villerabel of Aix critiqued the *Voix du Vatican*, what de Lubac describes in his memoirs as "the true older brother"[242] of *Témoignage Chrétien*:

> Caution. Notice to Catholics. Recently, an underhanded propaganda is in Aix and probably elsewhere, anonymous leaflets, mailed or thrown into the boxes. We draw it to the attention of all Catholics. This is a printed sheet…which claims under the bold title of *Voix du Vatican*, to instruct Catholic opinion, during so-called Vatican emissions…. This anonymous sheet is devoid of authority. It is the work of opponents of the work of national restoration by the Marshal.[243]

These are but a few of the many rebukes Catholic bishops leveraged against resistance movements such as the distribution of *Témoignage Chrétien*. Yet the fact that several members of the hierarchy felt compelled to respond to the activism of lower clergy and laity demonstrates that the activism was perceived by some as a real threat to the status quo.[244]

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[241] Date unknown. Cited in Bédarida and Bédarida 2001, p. 30.

[242] HDL, p. 118.

[243] *Semaine Religieuse de l'Archdiocèse d'Aix-en-Provence,* 23 November 1941.

[244] An alternative possibility is that bishops who condemned *Témoignage Chrétien* and similar publications were merely trying to protect the Church from the wrath of government authorities. However, even here, this would indicate that *Témoignage Chrétien* was disruptive — in this case, disruptive because bishops felt they had to protect themselves from the potential consequences of its message.

A second way in which it is evident that *Témoignage Chrétien* threatened the reputation of the hierarchy *as well as* its accrual of "market resources" — defined here as followers — is seen in the high numbers of lower clergy and laity who participated in its diffusion and would become involved in *Amitié Chrétienne* — the publication's "sister organization." Although it is impossible to identify the precise number of clandestine activists the movements counted, we can estimate that many lower clergy and laity were involved by considering the high distribution numbers that *Témoignage Chrétien* enjoyed as indicative of an extensive network of diffusion and a presumably large sympathetic audience.

From an initial print run of 5,000 copies, the second edition of *Témoignage Chrétien* distributed in January 1942 counted 10,000 copies. For the fourth edition, titled *Antisémites*, 20,000 copies were printed (see appendix C). Copies were distributed in the Loire, Puy-de-Dôme, Limoges, Brive, Montauban, Toulouse, Montpellier, Marseille, Toulon, the Var, Nice, Avignon, Monaco, the Dauphiné, and Savoy within weeks of its instigation (Bédarida and Bédarida 1966, pp. 24-25) by distributors including members of various Catholic youth movements. The network, which included Louis Cruvillier and his many friends from the ACJF and Germaine Ribière and her friends from the JEC were the same people the hierarchy had so desperately courted through its Social Catholic activism under Pope Pius XI. The threat of losing ties with future generations of young Catholics was palpable: *Témoignage Chrétien* warned the hierarchy in its second edition that if it did not shift its public stance, condemned as an "equivocation of silence," it would "feel the effects" of these equivocations for a long time to come.[245]

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[245] "Notre Combat" December 1941-January 1942. In Bédarida, F., & Bédarida, R. (2001). La résistance spirituelle: 1941-1944: Les cahiers clandestins du Témoignage chrétien. Paris: Albin Michel. p. 63.

Finally, a third way in which it is evident that *Témoignage Chrétien* disrupted the status quo of the Church and compelled bishops to re-evaluate their political stances towards the government and towards anti-Semitism is in the *positive* reactions of some bishops to *Témoignage Chrétien*'s message. As detailed below, in the months following the release of *its* first edition, bishops in the Free Zone became increasingly concerned about the episcopate's silence and started deliberating about how to help Jews without putting the Church at risk. One organization that provided them with an opportunity to do so was *Amitié Chrétienne*. The organization shared members with *Témoignage Chrétien*,[246] but its goal was discreet physical and material assistant to Jews. For example, one of its primary tactics to protect Jews from internment and, eventually, deportation, was to issue false baptisms. Another tactic *Amitié Chrétienne* employed was the use of convents as hiding spots for Jews. Bédarida (1998, pp. 177-178) explains how, throughout the war, *Amitié Chrétienne* would provide "lodging, evasion, and above all else, false ID papers" for Jews desperate to flee Nazi — and Vichy — violence. These creative manipulations of Church resources allowed bishops to assist Jews through *Amitié Chrétienne* without extending themselves far beyond their existing activities. To be sure, they were consequential actions: while bishops remained publicly silent, seemingly going about their business, their efforts would save many Jews from internment, deportation, and death. But they remained publicly silent acts, indicating that *Témoignage Chrétien*'s tactics were necessary but not sufficient to prompt bishops' first *public* protest in August 1942 on behalf of Jews.

*Organizational Circumstances*

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[246] See quote on p. 171-172 by Germaine Ribière.

In addition to the kinds of tactics that activists employ, research on the consequences of social movements suggests that exogenous factors influence whether a movement is able to effect change (Andrews 2001; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Soule et al. 1999). Typically, these exogenous factors are conceptualized as political opportunities that wax and wane: "The opportunities for a challenger to engage in successful collective action… vary greatly over time. And it is these variations that are held to be related to the ebb and flow of movement activity," writes McAdam (1982 pp. 40-41). McAdam, of course, identifies "successful collective action" as the likelihood that people will join in and participate in social movement activities (see also pp. 129-130 in chapter three). In contrast, research on social movement *outcomes* proposes that external factors pertaining to the wider political context shape the likelihood of success as defined as changes in practices and policies. Hence, when applied to the analysis of social movements in organizations, King (2008) argues that some external contexts make an organization more or less open to change at different moments in time and these differences (openness or closeness to change) influences the likelihood that a movements will alter an organization's policies and practices. As a result, I classify exogenous factors as *organizational circumstances* to avoid confusion. The issue in question is how dimensions of the organizational environment facilitated the conditions for *Témoignage Chrétien* to impact the episcopate's practices and policies.

Tensions between the Catholic hierarchy and the Vichy government began when Darlan was appointed Prime Minister in February 1941. Strongly anti-clerical and unsympathetic to the hierarchy's efforts to re-Christianize France, Darlan often worked against the hierarchy's attempts at deepening its hold on politics (Kselman 2000). Consider the appointment of Jerome

Carcopino as Minister of National Education and Youth. Stepping into this position on the heels of Jacques Chevalier — "the high point of clerical influence at Vichy" (Atkin 1992, p. 158) — Carcopino reversed or limited many of the episcopate's gains in government influence. State schools were restored to their traditional neutrality, the catechism was returned to a voluntary subject, "duties toward God" were no longer taught in schools, and state subsidies to private schools were modified such that they became a temporary benefit, guaranteed only until the end of the war, rather than the permanent right that bishops desired (Atkin 1992; Cointet 1998). Even obtaining *these* subsidies was a battle: after rounds of negotiations to secure state subsidies for existing Catholic elementary schools (with the stipulation that these schools would be under the control of public administration), Darlan critiqued Gerlier in a meeting with Monsignor Chappoulie, who represented the archbishops and cardinals at Vichy, in no uncertain terms: "He is trying to do politics. He always comes here with a list of demands. I do not want the clergy to participate in politics…. They lack the information necessary to usefully mingle in political questions. I will not tolerate it."[247]

Similarly, under Darlan, the idea of creating a monolithic youth movement — *Jeunesse Unique* — was revived with intensity. It had been briefly discussed then dismissed in summer 1940, and the concept terrified bishops who were deeply attached to the various Catholic Action movements developed under Pope Pius XI. The threat was more sinister than competition: the goal of agitators for *Jeunesse Unique* was to create a solitary youth movement similar in form and function to the Hitler Youth movement in Germany. Cardinal Liénart expressed his concerns about *Jeunesse Unique* in a letter to Suhard in May 1941:

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[247] CNAEF, 3CE 98, fonds Chappoulie, "Notes ACA année 1941." Entretien de Mgr. Chappoulie avec l'Amiral Darlan. 20 November 1941.

> [I have] the very definite impression that… we are witnessing the first systematic accounts of gradually snatching young people away from the Church's influence, and of preparing for the advent of a single youth movement as it has been conceived and realized elsewhere.[248]

Conflicts over *Jeunesse Unique* continued into spring and summer 1942. Catholic bishops, Gerlier especially, would protest the idea and moves to bring more state oversight into education in letters and meetings with Vichy authorities. Gerlier incurred the anger of government officials such as Minister of Finances and Commerce Yves Bouthillier as early as November 1941[249] who also criticized Cardinal Saliège, Bishop Louis of Périgueux, and Bishop Solages, rector of the Catholic Institute in Toulouse, of being hostile to the Vichy government four months later, in March 1942.[250] Bouthillier even asked Chappoulie in a meeting between 10 and 16 of March 1942 if it might be possible to ask Saliège to resign — justifying the request by claiming the Cardinal must be "tired" due to his old age and ill health (Saliège was 72 years old in 1942 and had always suffered from health problems).[251] Chappoulie replied: "bishops are not functionaries." A day later, Chappoulie began recording his notes in code; he feared the Church

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[248] Archive diocésaines de Lille, 2B1, Letter from Liénart to Suhard. 18 May 1941.

[249] CNAEF, 3CE 98, fonds Chappoulie, "Notes ACA année 1941." Entretien de Mgr. Chappoulie avec le ministre des Finances, Yves Bouthillier. 19 November 1941.

[250] CNAEF 3CE 98, fonds Chappoulie, "Notes ACA année 1942." Notes 10-16 March 1942.

[251] Ibid. Because the notes are in groups of days (i.e. 10-16 March 1942), it is unclear exactly when during this six-day time period the meeting took place.

might not be as protected by the government as it had once been.[252]

With the appointment of Laval to take over Darlan's position on 18 April 1942, the episcopate was guarded about its privileged status. Laval was more anti-clerical than Darlan, prompting Chappoulie to counsel caution to the ACA in all its dealings with the new government (Halls 1995, p. 75).

Again, we can see that the relationship between the episcopate and the Vichy government was strained by examining changes to education policy. Under Laval, Abel Bonnard was appointed as the new Minister of Education and Youth; he was even more anti-clerical than Carcopino. Between Laval and Bonnard, "Vichy educational policy entered a new phase" (Atkin 1992, p. 163). The collaborationist paper *La France Socialiste* praised Bonnard's appointment as "the return to *laïcité*"[253] and claimed that Bonnard would help secure the creation of *Jeunesse Unique*.[254] On 11 May 1942, Bonnard's assistant chief of staff Serge Jeanneret, attacked Gerlier yet again.[255]

By summer 1942, the status of the Church was remarkably different from June 1940. The decline of state support for the Church — evident in its unwillingness to grant or even maintain concessions in the realm of education or to protect the Church's cherished youth movements — put the episcopate in a fragile position. When Gerlier met with Laval in June to try, once more, to

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[252] Chappoulie used a variety of pseudonyms and initials to replace the names of those he wrote about. A single print-out in the archive explains what each code means, which allowed me to decipher Chappoulie's writings. It is attached with a clip to a document titled "Entretien aver P.G. et A.C. le 14-3-42 - C.N. Jeunesses." In CNAEF 3CE 98, fonds Chappoulie, "Notes ACA année 1942."

[253] *La France Socialiste*, 29 April 1942, in Atkin 1992, p. 163.

[254] *La France Socialiste*, 23 April 1942.

[255] CNAEF, 3CE 98, fonds Chappoulie, "Notes ACA année 1942." Notes 11 May 1942.

negotiate an increase in subsidies for the Church, Laval was furious. According to Chappoulie, he said:

> To give Gerlier millions for the politics [Gerlier is] involved with would be to let me pass as a fool. Beware, if you want money and you ask me to give it to you, then I will be obliged to become more and more involved with the bishops; for example… to meddle in the nominations.[256]

The threat was far from empty. Already, the Vichy government had tried to convince Chappoulie to call for Saliège's resignation, or, at the very least, to assign a coadjutor to help the government monitor and control his actions. Now Laval was threatening to control episcopal nominations again, hearkening back to Napoleon's Concordat after the French Revolution. Clearly, government control over episcopal nominations would severely threaten the autonomy of the Church. It was evident to bishops in the hierarchy that their romance with the government was ending.

*Political Context*

In the political mediation model, it is the *interaction* of tactics and contexts that informs social movement consequences. Different movement strategies are likely to influence change in different political circumstances. Building on Amenta, King (2008, 2011; King and Pearce 2010) adjusted this model for the analysis of social movements in organizations, but, as I argued earlier,

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[256] CNAEF, 3CE 98, fonds Chappoulie, "Notes ACA année 1942." Note 22 June 1942.

in shifting from a politically mediated context to an organizationally mediated one, one can lose sight of the ways in which the broader political environment continues to interact with organizational circumstances and mobilization tactics to produce results. This is problematic since, even when social movements take place in organizations, external political contexts mediate outcomes. This is evident in the case of French bishops' first public protest on behalf of Jews in August 1942.

In late fall 1941 and up until summer 1942, there was a dramatic increase in violent persecutions against Jews in France. The previous two years had brought "small scale" violence against Jews — exclusions from various professions, arbitrary internment, and the expropriation of Jewish-owned enterprises, for instance. After the Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942, the Nazi Final Solution to exterminate Jews living in German-occupied territories began in earnest.[257] In France, this meant the start of systematic deportations to Auschwitz. These broader changes did not impact the Church as an organization directly — at least, they were not targeted at the Church — but pressures for bishops to speak out against Vichy anti-Semitism from *Témoignage Chrétien* pushed them into clandestine activism with *Amitié Chrétienne* and combined with a decline in the relationship between the episcopate with the Vichy government to affect how bishops *reacted* to events in the wider political environment.

### 3. The Extended Political Mediation Model: Considering Tactics, Organizational Circumstances, and Political Contexts All Together

[257] Significantly, since the onset of Operation Barbarossa that commenced 22 June 1941, mobile killing squads known as the *Einsatzgruppen* began mass shootings of Jews from the Baltic to the Black Sea numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Thus by the time of the Wannsee Conference, Jews throughout Europe were already being murdered for months.

On 26 November 1941, five weeks after synagogues in Paris, Marseille, and Vichy were destroyed, the Chief Rabbi of France, Issaïe Schwartz, sent a letter to Cardinal Gerlier in Lyon begging a public condemnation of the violence.[258] In his reply, sent on 5 December, Gerlier declined to make a declaration, but promised that he would share Schwartz's note in the next ACA meeting on 12 and 13 February, 1942.[259] Gerlier expressed his sympathy, and the bishops of Périgueux and Belley, as well as the Archbishops of Avignon, Montauban, and Marseille, wrote letters to rabbis in their respective dioceses.[260] In the same month, *Témoignage Chrétien* distributed its first 5,000 copies throughout Unoccupied France.

Shortly after Gerlier received Schwartz's letter, he also received a request from Jacques Helbronner pleading for "a word of hope" on behalf of Jews.[261] Helbronner detailed the rising violence in Occupied France.[262] Four days later, on 12 December 1941, massive arrests of Jews took place in Paris, specifically targeting French rather than foreign Jews for the first time. Many were well-known lawyers, political, and industrial men, earning this roundup the nickname "La Rafle des Notables."[263] As the arrests took place, Gerlier received yet *another* letter, this time from Father Dillard, discussed in chapter three (pp. 89, ff. 103; 116-119). He, too, would beg for an official Church public protest against anti-Semitism.

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[258] Archives de l'Archdiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier. Interventions de Cardinal en Faveur de Divers Juifs, 1940-1943. 26 November, 1941.

[259] ACIF, fonds Moch, bobine 2. Dioceses and dates as follows: Belley (2 December 1941); Montauban (5 December 1941); Marseille (6 December 1941); Perigueux (9 December 1941); Avignon (17 December 1941).

[260] Ibid.

[261] Archives de l'Archidiocèse de Lyon, fonds Gerlier. Affaire Helbronner. 8 December 1941.

[262] Ibid., See also p. 94, chapter two.

[263] "The roundup of notables."

On 22 December 1941, Chappoulie transmitted a message from Gerlier to Suhard that informed him about his meetings with Schwartz and Helbronner. According to the document, Gerlier told Helbronner there was nothing he could do — that the Vichy government had no choice but to act in concert with the Germans. Yet it seems as if this stance was beginning to gnaw at Gerlier's conscience: Gerlier told Suhard he was concerned the episcopate's silence might come back to haunt the Church.[264] In referencing the public's perception of Church inaction, it seems *Témoignage Chrétien* — based in Lyon — was already impacting how Gerlier perceived unfolding events. A day later, Suhard met with the Grand Rabbi of Paris, Julian Weill, and promised to help.[265]

On the first day of 1942, Cardinal Saliège sent his own sympathetic letter to Rabbi Schwartz, reiterating the words of Pope Pius XI's 1937 encyclical, *Mit Brennender Sorge*: "We cannot forget that… Catholics are spiritually semites."[266] It was the same phrase Saliège employed in a pre-war declaration of support for the Jews in his diocese of Toulouse. Later in the month, Gerlier would write to Schwartz, "If the child Jesus were to come back and live in France, it would be in the camp of Drancy, where he would stay with our unfortunate brothers."[267] Clearly, there was sympathy for the plight of Jews, but deciding whether and how to react was difficult. Any overt defense of Jews could put the Church at risk, and it was already losing government support.

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[264] CNAEF, 3CE 98, fonds Chappoulie, "Notes ACA année 1942." Note de rencontre avec PG. 12 December 1941.

[265] Suhard's Diary. 23 December at 15h; CNAEF, fonds Chappoulie, 3CE 67, "Juifs 1941-43." Note from Mgr. Chappoulie á Cardinal Gerlier. 23 December 1941.

[266] ACIF, fonds Moch, bobine 14. Letter from Archbishop Saliège to Rabbi Schwartz. 1 January 1942.

[267] Ibid., Significantly, the letter is "anonymous" in that it is not signed by Gerlier nor obviously from his diocese. However, it is in the same sub-folder where all other correspondence between Gerlier and the Central Consistory is maintained, indicating that it is likely Gerlier intentionally chose not to sign the letter because of the high risk of danger if he were to get caught.

As a result, when the ACA met in unoccupied France in February 1942, the archbishops and bishops again discussed the Jewish Question and, it seems, must have decided on a strategy to help Jews. I say "must" because of the actions that were to come, as well as the gratitude Jacques Helbronner's expressed in a speech at a meeting of the rabbinate on 13 May 1942:

> In the storm that has struck French judaism, and that is causing such terrible devastation, we feel particularly grateful for the fraternal aid that ministers and believers of the christian Churches have provided. Judaism never can be sufficiently grateful for everything you have done… prelates, priests, pastors and the faithful, Catholics and Protestants. And my gratitude is addressed especially to the Prince of the Church, who is compassionate and charitable to all the unfortunate, who exercises with so much magnanimity today his title of Primate of the Gauls, both in name and in deed.[268]

This meeting marks a turning point in how bishops dealt with the "Jewish Question" in the Free Zone. No longer could they idly sit back; it was clear now that French Jewish notables in Paris were being targeted that no Jew, foreign nor French, would be safe from harm. The question, then, was no longer *whether* bishops would help Jews, but *how*?

Helbronner's letter suggests that one strategy bishops employed was to work with *Amitié Chrétienne*, explicitly organized to be an inter-confessional organization of Catholics and

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[268] ACIF, fonds Moch, bobine 14. Discours de Jacques Helbronner. 13 May 1942. "Primate of the Gauls" is the official title given to the Archbishop of Lyon since 1079. An excerpt of this same speech is also referenced in HDL, p. 178.

Protestants, in its practical relief and assistance to suffering Jews. In the words of de Lubac, "it was a work of mercy, in the service of physical needs… [while] the *Cahiers* were in a parallel way a work of mercy, in the service of souls."[269] Germaine Ribière, active in both movements, explains: "If we really wanted to get to the bottom of things, we would find some very direct links between those responsible for … *Amitié Chrétienne* and *Témoignage Chrétien*."[270] Finally, the leaders of *Amitié Chrétienne* were Father Chaillet, Pastor Roland de Pury, and Abbot Glasberg. The first two, of course, were also pioneers of *Témoignage Chrétien*. We will learn more about Abbot Glasberg momentarily.

Additionally, the hypothesis that Helbronner was referencing the work of *Amitié Chrétienne* in his speech to the rabbinate is also borne out by the small bits of evidence found in Archbishop Saliège and Cardinal Gerlier's archives. In Lyon, Cardinal Gerlier became actively engaged in working with *Amitié Chrétienne* to help turn Glasberg's idea of creating hospitality centers for internees in France into a clandestine rescue network for Jews. These hospital centers were known colloquially as "DCA," officially for *Directions des Centres d'Accueil*, but Glasberg called them "Defense Contre les Allemands" (Defense against the Germans) to his confidantes (Fivaz-Silberman 2000, p. 93).

The DCA set out to open "centers which could each welcome between 50 and 60 persons [from internment camps in France], allowing the former internees to live in normal conditions

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[269] HDL, p. 131.

[270] Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, fonds Annie Latour, DLXI (4)-85. Témoignage de Germaine Ribière, non signé, 1974, p. 4. Cited in Bernay 2012, p. 289.

and to go back to work after having spent one or two years in the camps."[271] Glasberg, Dr. Weill from the Jewish Children's Aid Society[272] and Nîmes Committee,[273] Jean-Marie Soutou (a member of both *Témoignage Chrétien* and *Amitié Chrétienne*), and Nina Gourfinkel, a Russian Jewish immigrant who would become Glasberg's chief co-conspirator in a vast array of efforts to help Jews, were listed as the initiators of the DCA.[274] The founding documentation specified, "Our goal is to save the lives of healthy, socially active people endowed with moral dignity. We make no national or confessional distinction between them."[275] However, beginning in March 1942, with Gerlier's support, the DCA would, in fact, make a "confessional distinction" among those it aimed to serve.[276] In response, Director of the General Commissariat for Jewish Affairs

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[271] I have been unable to find this original document in the archives where the *compte-rendu* of the Nîmes Committee are held (France Concentration Camp Collection, Leo Baeck Institute at the Center for Jewish History, AR 3987/MF836). However, in her memoirs, Gourfinkel (1953) claims this wording comes from a report to the committee and on 3 December 1941, the first meeting where Glasberg joins Nîmes, the minutes report that Glasberg explained the details of a new organization he created, the notes of which are supposed to be in Annexe no. 2 but which are missing.

[272] The Jewish Children's Aid Society, known in France as the *Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants* (OSE), was originally created in Saint Petersburg, Russia, in 1912. In 1923, the OSE relocated to Berlin and a decade later, it moved to France and began running children's homes for Jewish refugees.

[273] The Nîmes Committee was founded on 20 November 1940 with the goal of tending to the hygiene, childcare, and education of camp internees. Donald A. Lowrie, a Protestant American delegate from the YMCA who had visited two internment camps that summer, founded the group to coordinate the various efforts of twenty-five different organizations that were already underway, not a single one of which was Catholic. In May 1941, Father Chaillet would be appointed to the Nîmes Committee as its first after complaining to Cardinal Gerlier about "the inactivity of the Catholic Church." Abbot Lagarde, Father Arnou, and Abbot Glasberg would join in June, October, and December, respectively. France Concentration Camp Collection, Leo Baeck Institute at the Center for Jewish History, AR 3987/MF836, Compte-Rendu 17 April 1941, 24 June 1941, 7 October 1941, 3 December 1941; Yad Vashem World Center for Holocaust Research, Database of Righteous Among the Nations. M.31.2/1770. Pierre Chaillet.

[274] Ibid.

[275] Ibid.

[276] In the archives of the Central Consistory, dated 23 March 1942, there is a letter from Father Chaillet to André Weill and Samy Lattés specifying the various ways in which the DCA would guarantee the ability for Jews under its protection to maintain their religious obligations (for example, by providing them with kosher food). The letter, combined with evidence in Gerlier's private archives on the rescue of Jewish children with Abbot Glasberg through the DCA beginning also in March 1942, demonstrate how despite the first DCA opening on 25 November 1941, which claimed to want to help internees without confessional distinction, by March 1942, the priority was saving Jews. ACIF, fonds Moch, bobine 14. Letter from RP Chaillet to MM André Weill and Samy Lattés. 23 March 1942.

(CGQJ) Xavier Vallat would complain that "the actions of the Archbishop of Lyon… seem like a roundabout way of protesting against the anti-Jewish laws."[277] To protect himself and the Church, Gerlier's involvement would thereafter be discreet; Glasberg would do the majority of the work as Gerlier's clandestine delegate.

In Toulouse, Saliège recruited activists from *Témoignage Chrétien* and *Amitié Chrétienne* in February and assigned them positions on a Catholic Committee helping Jews to escape internment (Bédarida 1977, p. 89; Bernay 2012, p. 293; Clément 1990, p. 206). Thérése Dauty, a history professor forced out of teaching because of her "anti-Nationalist" beliefs who became one of the primary diffusers of *Témoignage Chrétien* in Toulouse, became Cardinal Saliège's "right-hand woman" in the camps of Noé and Récébedou (Clément 1990, p. 181).[278] Others, such as Abbot Naurois and the auxiliary bishop of Toulouse, Monsignor de Courreges, were members of *Combat* and encouraged by Saliège to help rescue Jews.[279] Father de Lubac recounts how, when Cruvillier made his journey across the south to organize a distribution network for *Témoignage Chrétien*, he "found the warmest reception from Cardinal Saliège."[280] Saliège, of course, knew that these women and men were members of various clandestine resistance activities; he sought them out for this very reason (Clément 1990, p. 194).

On 27 March 1942, the first transport of Jews was sent from France to Auschwitz. It was the first convoy to arrive from all of Western Europe. The train departed at 5:00 pm from the *Gare du Bourget* bearing 565 Jews from Drancy. It traveled north, collecting another 557 Jews

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[277] Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine. LXV-73

[278] See also Archives diocésaines de Toulouse, fonds Cardinal Saliège_Archives de Courreges, Dauty, et de Naurois.

[279] Ibid.

[280] HDL, p. 124.

from Compiègne. According to Klarsfeld (1996, p. 31), of those dispatched with this first, fateful transport, only 22 survived. The rest were dead within five months.

Two weeks later, Laval rose to power. Monsignor Chappoulie was incredibly nervous about this change in the government. Laval was even more anti-Clerical than Darlan, and it was beginning to look more and more as if Pétain was losing his decision-making power. Laval was taking the reins and shaping the government into a dictatorship (Bernay 2012, p. 279). As a result, on 15 and 16 April 1942, when the ACA was being held in Paris, Cardinals Gerlier, Piguet (Clermont-Ferrand), and Liénart (Lille) met in Saint-Amand-Tallende, organized by the Nuncio, Valerio Valeri.[281] It's unclear what was said at this meeting since no notes or documents in the archives reference it. However, given the timing and the fact that it was undertaken in secret, we can assume, as Bernay (2012, p. 283) does, that its purpose was to organize the clergy in the face of this new threat.

Continuing into May, the authors of *Témoignage Chrétien* were composing "Antisémites" — the fourth edition of the journal, focused exclusively and entirely on the "Jewish Question." Throughout its pages, *Témoignage Chrétien* provided detailed analysis of Nazi ideology and informed its readers of Hitler's plans to exterminate the Jews of Europe. It specified the various anti-Semitic measures being put into place across Europe[282] and reviewed the French laws promulgated against Jews since the first *Statut* was passed: "From 8 October 1940 to 16 September 1941, the *Journal Officiel* has published 26 laws, 24 decrees, 6 orders and one regulation. So we have not been idle in France: 57 texts, in less than one year, is *une belle*

[281] HDL p. 162.

[282] The specific countries covered were Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Austria, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Italy, Holland, and Belgium.

*performance* of anti-Semitism!"[283] The publication once again derided the consequences of silence — "anti-Semites interpret the forced silence of our nation as an act of acquiescence. FRENCH AND CHRISTIANS, WE MUST SOLEMNLY DISRUPT THIS SILENCE."[284] It then explained:

> Christians, we have an urgent duty to testify in France for all of our brothers, following the imprescriptible principles of our faith, that *anti-Semitism is incompatible with Christianity*. In testifying against anti-Semitism and for truth and justice, we testify for Christ. In this testimony, no temporal authority can dispense of us, no spiritual authority can cause us grief.[285]

*Témoignage Chrétien* laid out an ultimatum: "Antisemitism or Christ? One must choose."[286] As 20,000 copies of the journal were secreted throughout unoccupied France, the question could not have been more pressing. On 5 June, 1,000 Jews were taken from Compiègne to Auschwitz. On 22 June, another 1,000 were deported from Drancy. Three days later, 999 Jews, interned at Pithiviers, went. Another 1,038 from Beaune-la-Rolande were ousted on the 28th. Women and the elderly were among those sent to the camps in that last week of June (Klarsfeld 1996, pp. 418-419), dispelling any notion the bishops might have had that Jews were merely being shipped to East to labor.

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[283] "Antisémites." April-May 1942. In Bédarida, F., & Bédarida, R. (2001). La résistance spirituelle: 1941-1944: Les cahiers clandestins du Témoignage chrétien. Paris: Albin Michel. pp. 134.

[284] Ibid., p. 118.

[285] Ibid., pp. 118-119.

[286] Ibid., p. 152.

As the roundups intensified and the fourth issue of *Témoignage Chrétien* was published, Laval and his government began to crack down on the episcopate in Unoccupied France and attempted as much as possible to control the episcopate in Occupied France.[287] This entailed playing a "double game" of sorts, nowhere more evident than in the *Vel' d'Hiv* roundups.

On 2 July 1942, the Vichy chief of National Police, René Bousquet, met with the SS and Gestapo chiefs in Paris to organize French and German police force cooperation for the upcoming roundup. On 4 July, they formalized the details. According to a telex that Dannecker sent Eichmann two days later, Laval "proposed that at the time of the evacuation of Jewish families from the Unoccupied Zone, their children be taken as well. As for the Jewish children who would remain in the Occupied Zone, the question does not interest him."[288] The Germans did not originally intend to deport children with their parents — only Jews between 16 and 55 years of age. Laval, according to Bernay (2012, pp. 316-322), believed deporting whole families might not only appease public opinion, which would otherwise be shocked by the breaking up of families, but also "short-circuit" the possibility of a public protest by the Archbishop of Paris.

Subsequently, on 5 July, the newly appointed Prefect of Police in Paris, Amédée Bussière, met with Cardinal Suhard. Bussière worked closely with Bousquet and knew about the German proposal to separate parents from their children and about Laval's proposed modification requesting the deportation of entire families.[289] According to Bernay (2012, p. 320), Bussière

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[287] For analysis of ways in which Laval sought to limit the power of the episcopate in the Free Zone, refer back to pp. 165-168.

[288] Cited in Klarsfeld 1996, p. 35.

[289] Bernay (2012, p. 320) provides additional evidence that this was the case: On 6 July, Bousquet organized a meeting with prefects in the Occupied Zone that Bussière attended. In this meeting, Bousquet told the prefects that the plan was to arrest entire families together on 16 and 17 July, but on the 20th, to separate the men from women and children: fathers would go to Drancy, women and children to Camps in the Loiret. And from there, the deportations would proceed.

likely met with Suhard to evoke the plight of Jewish children and prevent their separation from their parents. The plea worked, and Suhard became obsessed with finding a way to ensure that Jewish families would remain together. Yet to Bussière's surprise, at the first meeting of the Special Commission to prepare the *Vel' d'Hiv* roundups, it was announced that the plan was still to separate Jewish children under 16 from their parents. Thus Bussière once again met with Suhard to inform him of the status of the proposed roundups, and the next day, Suhard took matters into his own hands. On 9 July, Suhard met with Otto Abetz and warned: "Pay attention, if you [separate children from their parents], we will be talking about it still in 50 years, in 100 years. This would be a wound that we cannot heal. Must we not prepare for peace at some point or another?"[290]

On 10 July, the Special Commission to prepare the *Vel' d'Hiv* roundups met once more. Laval's plan to include children in the roundups had worked. The minimum age was lowered from 16 to 2, and approximately 4,000 children would be arrested. Though deliberations would follow over what to do with these children — should they be deported, as Laval and several police representatives wished, or should they be cared for in children's homes? — the plan was set.

On 16 and 17 July 1942, French police arrested 12,884 Jews in Paris and its suburbs and confined them to the *Vélodrome d'hiver* indoor cycling stadium before deporting them to Auschwitz. Enea Averbouh recounted: "On 16 July, in the morning at 6:00, I heard terrible cries. Through the window I saw trucks, cars, buses full of people and everyone was shouting: "Save

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[290] Archives historiques de l'Archevêché de Paris, fonds Suhard, 1 D XIV-15. Note manuscrite de l'abbé Le Sourd au sujet de l'entrevue entre le Cardinal Suhard et Otto Abetz. July 1942.

us, save us, do something!"[291] The sheer scale was devastating. More women and children were arrested than men.[292] There was no water in the velodrome, save a single fire hydrant that pumped water from the Seine. There were no sanitary facilities and hardly any food. Of the ten bathrooms available, five were sealed because their access to windows might provide an opportunity to escape, and five others were blocked. According to Lafitte (2008), those who tried escape were shot on sight.

A report from 17 July 1942 by the General Information department of the police remarked:

> The actions taken against Israelites have deeply upset public opinion […] The reasons for this upheaval are largely due to current information which suggests that families are being broken up with children under 10 years of age being assigned to the *Assistance Publique*. (Joly, 2006).

Within days, the children at *Vél d'Hiv* would be separated from their mothers by the French gendarmerie, taken to camps in the Loiret, and, at the end of August, deported unaccompanied to Auschwitz. Many would be gassed upon arrival. The rest of the Jews confined to *Vél d'Hiv* were eventually transported to Drancy, Beaune-la-Roland, and Pithiviers, then Auschwitz as well.

Bishops were outraged. In the ACA meeting in Occupied France on 20 and 21 July, they decided to send a joint letter to Laval:

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[291] Testimony cited by Jean Laloum (1985), *The Jews in the Resistance and Liberation*, Éditions du Scribe, Paris. Pp 109-110.

[292] According to Lafitte (2008), "out of the 12,844 arrested, 3,031 were adult men, meaning that the majority were either women or children (5,802 and 4,051 respectively)."

> Deeply moved by what we have heard reported of the massive arrests of Israelites last week, and the harsh treatment with which they were inflicted, notably in the *Vélodrome d'Hiver*, we cannot stifle the cry of our conscience. In the name of humanity and of Christian principles, our voice is raised in protest in favor of the inalienable rights of the human person.[293]

Ironically, the letter claimed to raise a cry of conscience, but no public protest was made. Further, according to the Nuncio, these bishops' protest was too platonic (Klarsfeld 2001, p. 612, in Bernay 2012, p. 327; see also HDL, pp. 146-7). Yet this was Laval's goal: in recruiting Suhard to ensure that children were deported with their parents, he sought to mitigate the possibility of public outrage from the Church. After Laval and Suhard met a week later, on 3 August 1942, Chappoulie — who met with Suhard that same evening[294] — wrote in his notes, "We must keep our relationship with [Laval] within bounds."[295] Chappoulie, always skeptical of Laval's anti-Clericalism, was sensitive to the fact that Laval might be using Suhard to achieve his own political aims and, given Laval's declaration in June 1942 that he "hoped for the victory of Germany" (Bédarida and Bédarida 2010, p. 115), Chappoulie suspected he might even be collaborating with the Germans on deportations of Jews willingly, rather than under German pressure, as the French government claimed.

On 6 August 1942, the first convoys of Jews from camps in the South to the North were

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[293] Archives historiques de l'Archevêché de Paris, fonds Suhard, 1D XIV-24, Relations avec le Pouvoir Français, lettre de protestation contre la rafle du Vel' d'Hiv, adressé par l'ACA au Maréshal Pétain. 22 July 1942.

[294] Suhard's Agenda, meeting with Chappoulie on 3 August at 6pm.

[295] CNAEF 3CE 98, fonds Chappoulie, "Notes ACA année 1942." Notes on the meeting between cardinal Suhard and Laval, 3 August 1942.

"crowded into sealed boxcars" and transferred to Drancy (Zucotti 1993, p. 119). From there, they were deported to Auschwitz. Thérèse Dauty, working in the camps of Noé and Récébedou for Archbishop Saliège's Catholic Committee, sent the archbishop a report.[296] The details were harrowing:

> The departure resulted in dismal scenes. There were several suicide attempts and a fit of madness. One of the unfortunates, who slashed his wrists, was shipped in a state of syncope. News continues to arrive… there is already at least one dead and one seriously ill at the first stop of the convoys. It is likely, given the number of sick among the starters, that the death toll will rise.[297]

On the exact same day, Cardinal Gerlier sent Chaillet to meet with de Lubac on 10 August and gave him the following assignments:[298]

1. To receive as quickly as possible news from the Southwest, where most of the camps of Jewish foreigners were located.
2. To consult with the Archbishop of Toulouse with a view to a joint intervention: the union of two archbishops would give more weight to their

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[296] Archives diocésaines de Toulouse, fonds Cardinal Saliège_Archives de Courreges, Dauty, et de Naurois.

[297] Thérèse Dauty, "Départ des hébergés des camps-hôpitaux de Noé et de Récébédou en date des 8 et 10 août 1942," in See also Archives diocésaines de Toulouse, fonds Cardinal Saliège_Archives de Courreges, Dauty, et de Naurois; Reprinted in *Le Monde Juif*, no. 94, pp. 52-58.

[298] That de Lubac met with Chaillet on 10 August indicates that Gerlier likely communicated with Chaillet in the days before, at around the same time that Saliège received updates from Thérèse Dauty from the camps in the Southwest.

public protest.[299]

According to de Lubac, this was where the plan for both prelates to publicly protest deportations of Jews from France was "sketched out."[300] To coordinate this process, Gerlier in Lyon relied on the organizers of *Témoignage Chrétien* and *Amitié Chrétienne* to communicate with Saliège in Toulouse, knowing full well that if he wished to contact him clandestinely, relying on these activists was his safest bet. Similarly, after the plan to protest was determined, the process these bishops chose to diffuse their protest involved working with both organizations' existing networks. De Lubac recounts how the plan was for a draft of the text to be written and then "transmitted secretly to the pastor of each parish in the diocese" so that "the police would be faced with a *fait accompli*; all censors would be caught unaware."[301] The only thing left to sort out was the timing.

On 11 August 1942, the papal Nuncio complained about the "inhuman arrests and deportations" of Jews in France to Pétain. Once again, Pétain, who met with Laval before responding, claimed that nothing could be done. The Nuncio was growing impatient and ever-more firm in his convictions that the Vichy government wasn't even trying to stop the deportations of Jews — it simply wanted to prevent the episcopate from meddling in its affairs (Bernay 2012, p. 335; Klarsfeld 2001, p. 772).[302] As a result, on 15 August, the Nuncio organized

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[299] HDL, p. 157.

[300] Ibid.

[301] Ibid., p. 158.

[302] According to Bernay (2012, p. 337), at some point during this time period, Gerlier learned that Laval, indeed, was instigating the *rafles*. However, Bernay provides no evidence for this assertion and I have been unable to find any validating documentation in the archives.

a secret meeting of bishops from the Free Zone in Puy-en-Velay.[303] They created a plan for bishops to protest deportations of Jews in their dioceses. To foil the likelihood that these protests would be censored, each bishop would draw on existing clandestine distribution networks in his diocese. The next day, Nuncio Valerio Valeri left for Rome to obtain confirmation from the Pope (Bernay 2012, p. 337).

While the nuncio was abroad, Rabbi Kaplan visited Cardinal Gerlier and pressured him to speak out sooner rather than later. Kaplan showed Gerlier evidence that Jews who were being deported to the East were in fact being exterminated. He informed Gerlier of rumors that the next great roundup in the Free Zone would be on 20 August.[304] Gerlier said he would meet with the regional prefect to intervene, and that a plan was in place, thanks to the meeting in Puy-en-Velay, for the diffusion of local protests in each diocese, but Kaplan insisted that a meeting with the prefect was insufficient. A public protest in the name of the Church was needed immediately. The two negotiated: Gerlier promised he would publicly protest from his pulpit in September and that he would send a letter to Pétain in the morning. He kept his word.[305]

Meanwhile, Rabbi Kapel learned on 19 and 20 August through a phone call with the Grand Rabbi Hirschler of impending deportations set for 26 August from the Free Zone. He reported this news to Saliège, who decided he couldn't hold off from publicly protesting the violence against Jews any longer. He began to draft his statement and was ready to act the moment the nuncio returned from Rome. The nuncio, for his part, tried to meet once more with

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[303] HDL, p. 161.

[304] In fact, it was planned for 26 August, while the first children's transport from Beaune-la-Rolande, where many from the *Vel' d'Hiv* roundups were subsequently places, left for Drancy on 19 August and they would be deported to Auschwitz on the 31st (Klarsfeld 1996, p. 52).

[305] ACIF, fonds Moch, bobine 8. Papiers de Grand Rabbin Kaplan. Notes on a meeting with Cardinal Gerlier, 17 August 1942.

Laval on 22 August to plead for a halt to the violence against Jews. This time, Laval didn't even try to conceal his own interest in deporting Jews from France: "From a political point of view, it is necessary to get rid of [the Jews], since these people are largely responsible for the current state of France."[306] It was confirmed: Laval was not being forced by the Germans to deport Jewish men, women, and children from France — he was actively encouraging it. Sunday, 23 August 1942, Saliège would proclaim from his pulpit:

> My very dear Brothers,
>
> There is a Christian morality, a human morality, that confers rights and imposes duties. These rights and duties stem from the nature of man. They come from God. They cannot be violated. No mortal has the power to suppress them.
>
> That children, women, men, fathers and mothers are treated like cattle; members of a family separated from one another and dispatched to an unknown destination — It has been reserved for our own time to see such a sad spectacle.
>
> Why does the right of sanctuary no longer exist in our churches?
>
> Why are we defeated?
>
> Lord, have pity on us.
>
> Our Lady, pray for France.
>
> In our diocese, moving scenes have occurred in the camps of Noé and Récébedou.
>
> The Jews are men. The Jews are women. The foreigners are men, the foreigners are women. They cannot be abused without limit, men, women, fathers and

[306] Klarsfeld (2001, p. 826). Report of the Nuncio, 24 August 1942.

> mothers of families. They are part of the human race; they are our brothers, like so many others. No Christian dares forget that![307]

All priests in Saliège's diocese were instructed to read the letter without commentary. As a result, it was read from some 400 pulpits at Sunday mass on 23 August, 1942. It was read for four days on Vatican Radio, and the BBC also aired news of Saliège's protest. The international Holocaust remembrance organization Yad Vashem, which would declare Saliège a Righteous among the Nations, describes how, "Overnight, the document became a manifesto; hundreds of thousands of copies were made and were circulated by members of the Resistance throughout France."[308]

In the days and weeks that followed, bishops Théas (Montauban), Gerlier (Lyon), Delay (Marseille), and Moussaron (Albi) would condemn Vichy's violence against Jews from their pulpits. Bishops Vansteenberghe (Bayonne), Petit de Julleville (Rouen), and Martin (Puy) would denounce anti-Semitism in their *Semaine Religieuse*. Bishops Pic (Valence) and Choquet (Lourdes) would publicly protest the *rafles* in their dioceses in September. Together, these coordinated protests made possible by social movement networks and spurred by the urgency of the political climate would trigger a sea-change in public attitudes toward the Vichy government (Laborie 2001, pp. 282-283) and would inflame French Catholics' sympathy for an action on behalf of their spiritual brethren, the Jews in France.

**Summary and Conclusion**

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[307] Archives diocésaines de Toulouse, Fonds de Mgr. Courrèges, Carton 1, Folder 1/3.

[308] Yad Vashem World Center for Holocaust Research, Database of Righteous Among the Nations. M.31.2/197. Archbishop Jules-Géraud Saliège.

The puzzle of this chapter begins in consideration of the three that came before: given that French bishops decided to support Vichy anti-Semitism in August 1940, and their many ways of publicly demonstrating alignment with the regime and its goals of national revolution until the end of 1941, what explains bishops' decisions to protest state anti-Semitism in August 1942? I begin with the assertion that *Témoignage Chrétien*, a clandestine christian resistance journal developed by lower clergy and laity, disrupted the episcopate's status quo by repeatedly challenging the hierarchy's calls for obedience to the anti-Semitic Vichy regime. I then explain the *consequences* of *Témoignage Chrétien*'s spiritual protest in combination with the organizational circumstances of bishops' declining relationship with the Vichy government and the external political context of rising violence against Jews in France.

These three findings — that *Témoignage Chrétien*'s tactics, broader organizational circumstances, and the external political context motivated bishops' protest — link up with the political mediation model of research on the consequences of social movements. However, my findings suggest a need to extend this model for research on the outcomes of social movements in organizations by separating the category of "political circumstances" into two exogenous variables: organizational circumstances and political contexts. I briefly summarize each finding and its impact on bishops' decisions to protest below.

First, the disruptive impact of *Témoignage Chrétien*'s tactics is evident in bishops' reactions, both positive and negative, as well as the vast amount of support it received from the laity. Bishops who were hostile to *Témoignage Chrétien*'s message expressed their disapproval accordingly. Bishops who were sympathetic sought out ways to help Jews. They did this largely by connecting with activists in the material branch of the clandestine Christian resistance

movement in France, *Amitié Chrétienne*, which, while founded in 1941, only truly "took off" in spring 1942. Although this latter group of bishops' empathy for the plight of Jews pre-existed the creation of these social movement organizations — evident in their correspondence with rabbis and Jewish political authorities towards the end of December — their decisions to begin *acting* on behalf of Jews was informed by *Témoignage Chrétien*'s tactics. In addition to pressuring bishops from a moral perspective, *Témoignage Chrétien*'s high distribution numbers indicate that the journal had a large diffusion network and a presumably sympathetic audience, which also pressured bishops to act due to the threat (stated clearly in *Témoignage Chrétien*'s first edition) that bishops' continued inactivity would have negative repercussions on their relationships with future generations of Catholics.

Second, *Témoignage Chrétien*'s tactics were necessary but not sufficient to prompt bishops' first public protest in August 1942. They disrupted the episcopate's status quo and compelled some bishops to work with *Amitié Chrétienne*, but bishops still remained publicly silent for months after their participation in *Amitié Chrétienne* began. Thus the findings of this chapter suggest that the episcopate's organizational circumstances — that is, bishops' declining relationship with the Vichy government — was also significant.

In particular, with Darlan's appointment to power and then Laval's, the Catholic Church in France lost many of the concessions it had originally gained. Additionally, towards the end of 1941 and in spring 1942, Darlan and his ministers began to critique the actions of Cardinals Gerlier and Saliège — the same two bishops who would eventually contact each other through their networks with clandestine Christian activists to organize a protest for Jews.

To be sure, the fact that French bishops were falling out of favor with the Vichy

government *increased* the risk that the Church could lose even more gains as well as the protection of its institutions (such as its cherished youth movements) if bishops decided to protest. As a result, the episcopate was beholden to two constituencies — the Vichy government, and the lower clergy and laity.[309] In this sense, the Catholic hierarchy was in a *lose-lose* situation. Bishops could risk further upsetting the government and putting the institution of the Church in danger of repression, or they could risk further upsetting the lower clergy and laity, leading the Church to lose a future generation of followers and more of its legitimacy. What tipped the balance in favor of the latter was, I find, changes to the external political context.

One point is worth mentioning here before moving forward. Significantly, the next part of my argument hinges on the assertion that the external political context shifted bishops' frame of reference for deciding how to act. The process by which frames of reference change for individuals depends on the decisions that people make about the dilemma they are confronting in relation to their peers (also known as their reference group; Ermakoff 2008, pp. xvi, 191-192, building on Merton 1968), in combination with the "built up meaning" of the dilemmas themselves (Reed, *forthcoming).* However, precisely *how* the external political context shaped bishops' decision-making with reference to their peers in something I am unable to explain with my data. In particular, the lack of notes on bishops' meeting at Le Puy-en-Velay (15 August 1942), likely not taken because of the high danger in getting caught, forces me to make assumptions based on the actions that followed as well as references to this meeting in other correspondences.

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[309] This is similar to Ermakoff's (2008, pp. 240-241) note in his study on German and French parliamentarian's decisions to surrender their full powers to Hitler and Pétain respectively, in which he writes: "parliamentary groups are amendable to their constituency and their peers. They can align preferences with one or the other." In this case, because bishops were meso-level authorities, in addition to each other they were also amendable to the government as well as the lower clergy and laity.

Third and finally, the start of the Final Solution in France was marked by a sudden rise in arrests and deportations of Jews in March 1942. The inclusion of women and children in these roundups negatively affected public opinion and it affected bishops' perceptions of the unfolding crisis as well. This is evident with the outcome of the ACA meeting in Occupied France on 20 and 21 July 1942, immediately after the Vel' d'Hiv roundups, which resulted in the first written protest by a group of bishops against anti-Semitism to the Vichy government. In the days and weeks that followed, the start of roundups in Occupied France similarly convinced bishops in the Free Zone that they could no longer remain silent concerning state anti-Semitism.

French bishops' decisions to *publicly* protest violence against Jews in France were decided on first, via correspondence between Gerlier and Saliège that was facilitated by each bishops' use of clandestine Christian activists to communicate their "verbal" correspondence; second, in a secret meeting in Puy-en-Velay where bishops' likely shared information, learned where their peers stood, and made decisions about how to act; and third, in the final instance, by Saliège's *own* decision not to wait any longer, having learned on 20 and 21 August, that the next great roundup of Jews was due, with Laval's support, to transpire on the 26th. The timing was apt: at Sunday mass, 23 August 1942, Saliège would finally speak and change the course of history in France.

## Conclusion

*Shifting Stances* examines a case that altered the trajectory of World War II in France. When French bishops endorsed the Vichy regime, they contributed to the legitimization of discrimination by officially supporting the government's anti-Semitic policies. Later, their deviation from this stance and protest of the Vichy regime's persecution of Jews facilitated the *de*-legitimization of the government and inflamed French Catholic's sympathy for action on behalf of European Jewry. In the end, French civilians saved the second-largest number of Jews in any occupied country during the Holocaust. *What explains how individuals who endorse state violence at one point in time decide to withdraw their support in order to save victimized civilians at other moments?* I analyze newly available historical sources written in French and Hebrew and collected from fourteen archives in ten cities and three countries — France, USA, Israel — to explain how individuals and institutions trade the benefits of stability for the risky behavior associated with collective action in violent contexts.

Chapter one explains how the French episcopate decided, in August 1940, to support the Vichy government's first anti-Semitic legislation, the *Statut des Juifs*. I investigate bishops' letters, diaries, and meeting minutes as first Hitler, then the Vichy regime came to power and promulgated Vichy's first anti-Semitic legislation, the *Statut des Juifs*. The findings debunk a simplistic interpretation of bishops' decisions to support this initial discriminatory policy. Rather than endorsing the *Statut des Juifs* because of ideological alignment with its aims or because of interests in what the Church might gain by discriminating against Jews, deciding on the *Statut des Juifs* was a genuine problem for Catholic authorities facing an uncertain future in summer 1940. In particular, the rupture caused by the event of the Nazi invasion, occupation, and

resulting division of the Church powerfully impacted French bishops' abilities to coordinate and determine a course of action. This chaos, and the selective repression by Nazis of bishops who were once outspoken advocates of Jews, provided opportunities for some vocal, high-status, and pro-Statute bishops to set the trajectory of the Church in motion. Others remained quiet, and their silence was decisive: in a time of disarray when the Church was seeking to determine a common stance, bishops' silence appeared as a tacit signal in favor of endorsing legal anti-Semitism. Thus, the episcopate's stance was set.

Chapter two analyzes how once a stance of support for the Vichy government had consolidated, the French Catholic episcopate contributed to the Vichy government's attempts to achieve legitimacy for its project of National Revolution. I draw on Bourdieu's idea that legitimate political domination depends on political capital accumulation and symbolic capital accumulation, and I develop two proxies for each form of capital to examine the mechanisms that generated this process of legitimation. The first two proxies are public endorsements and institutional embeddedness (these serve as proxies to evaluate political capital accumulation), and the second two proxies are shared worldviews and common symbols (these serve as proxies to evaluate symbolic capital accumulation). Using these mechanisms, I then evaluate how transformations in the relationship between the government and the episcopate contributed to the legitimation of the Vichy regime while the strength of the relationship between the episcopate with the rabbinate simultaneously declined. Concluding, I argue that French Catholic bishops' alliance with Pétain and the Vichy government played a central role in the government's attempts to legitimize its National Revolution philosophy. The National Revolution in part was an effort at reshaping conceptions of who did and did not belong to the nation and thus who was and was not

deserving of government protection. Jews were a primary target.

Chapter three begins with the argument that bishops' efforts to legitimize the Vichy government required acceptance by lower clergy and laity to succeed. Yet as Catholic authorities facilitated the legitimization of the Vichy regime while remaining silent about its violence against Jews, lower-ranked clergy and laity began to protest bishops' stances and Vichy's anti-Semitism through the creation of a clandestine Christian resistance journal, *Témoignage Chrétien.* The chapter examines post-war testimonies and memoirs written by key activists in *Témoignage Chrétien* in combination with primary sources collected from French archives to explain what generated this high-risk, "intra-organizational" social movement. I find that *moral anger* motivated lower clergy's activism, *repression* triggered their desire to organize a clandestine resistance journal, *personal networks* facilitated the accumulation of resources necessary to create *Témoignage Chrétien,* and *social networks* enabled its diffusion throughout unoccupied France. The mechanisms by which the latter prompted people to engage in this risky venture include participation identities, affect, and ideology.

Finally, chapter four returns to the heart of the puzzle that started this dissertation: given that French bishops decided to support Vichy anti-Semitism in August 1940, and their many ways of publicly demonstrating alignment with the regime and its goals of national revolution until the end of 1941, what explains bishops' decisions to protest state anti-Semitism in August 1942? I find that pressure from *Témoignage Chrétien* disrupted the episcopate's status quo and motivated sympathetic bishops to assist Jews, albeit discreetly. Changes in the episcopate's relationship with the Vichy government increased bishops' willingness to reconsider their alignment with the regime, but this could have compelled them to succumb even more to the

demands of political authorities. The Final Solution in France was marked by the deportation of Jews from Compiègne for Auschwitz on 27 March 1942, but the events of this roundup and deportation as well as the others that followed were in and of themselves insufficient to prompt a public protest. Rather, how French bishops elected to respond to violence against Jews in 1942 depended on the confluence of all three factors together. I therefore conclude that bishops' shift in stances was a *social movement outcome* insofar as a major influence on their decisions to protest was *Témoignage Chrétien*'s demand that bishops change their practices of support for the Vichy government, and I propose an extension to the political mediation model by suggesting that the outcomes of social movements in organizations can be explained by interactions between *movement tactics*, *organizational circumstances*, and the wider *political context.*

More specifically, *because* the tactics of *Témoignage Chrétien* motivated some bishops to offer discreet assistance to Jews through their "sister organization" *Amitié Chrétienne*, these bishops developed relationships with clandestine activists who they would then call on to help them coordinate a protest when other forms of communication were too risky. The activists that bishops worked with also had insider knowledge on what was happening to Jews in camps who were being deported to the East, and in communicating that information to bishops, they further compelled their protest.

At the same time, declining relations between the episcopate with the Vichy government threatened bishops' participation in political activities as well as triggered them to rethink their close relationship to the regime. The nuncio especially was wary of Laval and arranged two meetings, the first on 15 April 1942 to organize the episcopate in the face of this new threat, the second on 15 August 1942 to organize a plan for bishops to protest on behalf of Jews. However,

given the high risks that such a protest would entail, the nuncio first left for Rome on 16 August to obtain confirmation from the pope. In the following days, Rabbi Kaplan visiter Gerlier and begged for a public protest from his pulpit; Saliège learned the next great roundup was due to transpire in ten days, and, upon the nuncio's arrival, it was confirmed that Laval was encouraging it Nazis to deport Jewish men, women, and children from France. Saliège drafted his protest, he distributed it through the clandestine networks of *Témoignage Chrétien* and *Amitié Chrétienne* to all the priests in his diocese, and by the time he had walked up to his pulpit for Sunday mass on 23 August 1942 to protest on behalf of Jews, the document had become a manifesto that would change the course of the Holocaust in France.

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# Appendix A: Biographical List of Bishops, 1942-1945[310]

| Bishop 1942 | Diocèse | Archdiocèse | Appointments & Transitions | Bishop 1945 | End of Term & Cause | Consecrators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Audollent, Georges-Marie-Eugène* | BLOIS | Tours | 15/5/1925, 58 yrs. Died 9/11/1944, 77.5 yrs. | Replaced by *Louis-Sylvain Robin* 3/11/1945, 48.8 yrs. | Died 2/12/1963, 66.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Audollent: Louis-Ernest Cardinal Dubois, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Jean-Victor-Emile Chesnelong, Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin. Principal Consecrator Robin: Archbishop Louis-Joseph Gaillard, Principal Co-Consecrators: Joseph-Charles Cardinal Lefèbvre, Bishop Maurice-Paul-Jules Rousseau. |
| *Auvity, François-Louis* | MENDE | Montpellier | 14/8/1937, 63.6 yrs. | *François-Louis Auvity* | **Resigned** 11/9/1945, 71.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Martin-Jérome Izart, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean Castel, Archbishop Jean-Justin-Michel Girbeau |
| *Béguin, Virgile-Joseph* | AUCH | Toulouse | 24/12/1934, 57.3 yrs. Appointed Archbishop, Previously was Bishop of Belley | *Virgile-Joseph Béguin* | Died 2/3/1955, 82.6 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Louis-Henri-Joseph Cardinal Luçon, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Ernest Neveux, Bishop Emanuel-Anatole-Raphaël Chaptal de Chantelou |
| *Bernard, Henri-Marius* | PERPIGNAN-ELNE | Montpellier | 7/12/1933, 48.9 yrs. | *Henri-Marius Bernard* | Died 18/11/1959, 74.9 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Martin-Jérôme Izart, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Pierre Patau, Archbishop Pierre-Marie Durieux |
| *Blanchet, Emile-Arsène* | SAINT-DIÉ | Besançon | 6/10/1940, 54.0 yrs. | *Emile-Arsène Blanchet* | Resigned 10/10/1946, 60.1 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Blanchet: Pierre-André-Charles Cardinal Petit de Julleville, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Alphonse-Paul-Désiré Gaudron, Bishop Pierre-Armand-Albert-Lucien Fallaize |
| *Bonnabel, Auguste-Callixte-Jean* | GAP | Marseille | 16/8/1932, 45.7 yrs. | *Auguste-Callixte-Jean Bonnabel* | Retired 13/2/1961, 74.2 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Camille Pic, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Paul-Jules-Narcisse Rémond, Bishop Cosme-Benjamin Jorcin |
| *Brunhes, Gabriel* | MONTPELLIER | Montpellier | 20/5/1932, 57.7 yrs. | *Gabriel Burnhes* | Died 24/2/1949, 74.5 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Pierre-André-Charles Cardinal Petit de Julleville, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Jean Delay, Archbishop Louis-Joseph Fillon |
| *Caillot, Alexandre* | GRENOBLE | Lyon | 22/3/1917, 55.8 yrs. | *Alexandre Caillot* | Died 5/1/1957, 95.5 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Jean-Baptiste-Etienne0Honoré Penon, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Thomas-François Boutry, Bishop Désiré-Hyacinthe Berthoin |
| *Cazaux, Anotine-Marie* | LUÇON | Rennes | 11/10/1941, 44.3 yrs. | *Antoine-Marie Cazaux* | Died 1/7/1975, 78.1 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Clément Joseph Mathiey; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Cahrles Massé, Bishop Edmond Vansteenberghe |
| *Cesbron, August-Léon-Alexis* | ANNECY | Lyon | 20/9/1940, 52.8 yrs. | *August-Léon-Alexis-Cebron* | Died 13/7/1962, 74.6 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Jean-Camille Costes, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Edourard-Gabriel Mesguen, Bishop Jean-Joseph-Léonce Villepelet |
| *Challiol, Charles* | RODEZ | Toulouse | 15/5/1925, 53.4 yrs. | *Charles Challiol* | Died 11/3/1948, 76 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Jean-Augustin Germain, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Joseph-François-Ernest Ricard, Bishop Louis-Marie Ricard |

[310] Information compiled from the *Annuario Pontifico* of 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, contained in the Archives historiques du diocèse de Paris.

| Bishop 1942 | Diocèse | Archdiocèse | Appointments & Transitions | Bishop 1945 | End of Term & Cause | Consecrators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Chassaigne, Aimable* | TULLE | Poitiers | 6/2/1940, 55.1 yrs. | *Aimable Chassaigne* | Retired 23/1/1962, 76.8 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Gabriel-Emmanuel-Joseph Piguet, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Henri-Marius Bernard, Bishop Guillaume-Marius Sembel. |
| *Chevrier, Paul* | CAHORS | Toulouse | 24/9/1941, 54.9 yrs. | *Paul Chevrier* | Retired 21/8/1962, 75.8 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Jean-Baptiste-Auguste Gonon, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Alexandre Caillot, Bishop Jean-Baptiste Mégning. |
| *Chiron, Louis* | LANGRES | Reims | 6/10/1939, 54.5 yrs. | *Louis Chiron* | Died 10/9/1964 | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Gustave-Lazare Garnier, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean-Baptiste Mégnin, Bishop Charles Massé. |
| *Chollet, Jean-Arthur* | CAMBRAI | Lille | 21/11/1913, 51.6 yrs. (appointed Archbishop, previously Bishop of Verdun) | *Jean-Arthur Chollet* | Died 2/12/1952, 90.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Louis-Ernest Cardinal Dubois, Principal Co-Consecrator: Bishop Alphonse-Gabriel-Pierre Foucault, Bishop Phillipe Meunier |
| *Choquet, Georges-Eugène-Emile* | TARBES ET LOURDES | Toulouse | 11/2/1938, 59.3 yrs. Previously Bishop of Langres. | *Georges-Eugène-Emile Choquet* | Died 20/4/1946, 67.5 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Jean Cardinal Verdier, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Louis-Joseph Fillon, Pierre-André-Charles Cardinal Petit de Julleville |
| *Costes, Jean-Camille* | ANGERS | Rennes | 9/2/1940, 66.8 yrs. | *Jean-Camille Costes* | Died 14/2/1950, 76.9 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Joseph Rumeau, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Eugène-Jacques Grelier, Bishop Charles-Paul Sagot du Vauroux |
| *Couderc, Alfred* | VIVIERS | Lyon | 26/4/1937, 54.9 yrs. | *Alfred Couderc* | Retired 14/12/1965; 83.5 yrs. | Principal consecrator Bishop Chatles Challiol, Co-Consecrators Archbishop Joseph-Francois-Ernest Ricard & Bishop Charles-Marie-André Ginisty |
| *Courcoux, Jules-Marie-Victor* | ORLÉANS | Tours | 20/12/1926, 56.4 yrs. | *Jules-Marie-Victor Courcoux* | Died 28/3/1951; 80.7 yrs. old | Principal consecrator: Louis-Ernest Cardinal Dubois; Principal Co-consecrators: Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin & Alfred-Hrenri-Marie Cardinal Baudrillart |
| *Debray, Georges-Louis-Camille* (note: previous Bishop, Joseph Alphonse Marie Evrard, **resigned** 25/7/1942. Debray appointed Coadjustor Bishop 15/1/1941, succeeded to become Bishop of Meaux 25/7/1942) | MEAUX | Paris | 25/7/1942, 49.8 yrs. | *Georges-Louis-Camille Debray* | Died 29/4/1961, 68.6 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Evrard: Archbishop Henri-Edourard Dutoit; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Palmyre-Georges Jansoone, Bishop Gabriel-Emmanuel-Joseph Piguet. Debray Principal Consecrator: Emmanuel Célestin Cardinal Suhard, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Emanuel-Anatole-Raphäel Chaptal de Chanteloup, Archbishop Roger-Henri-Marie Beaussart |
| *Delay, Jean* | MARSEILLE | Marseille | 14/8/1937, 57.7 yrs. | *Jean Delay. Appointed Archbishop of Marseille 31/1/1948.* | Retired 5/9/1956; 76.7 yrs. | Principal consecrator: Louis-Joseph Cardinal Maurin; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean-Marie Bourchany & Bishop Jean-Francois-Etienne Marnas |

| Bishop 1942 | Diocèse | Archdiocèse | Appointments & Transitions | Bishop 1945 | End of Term & Cause | Consecrators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *de la Villerabel, Florent-Michel-Marie-Joseph du Bois* | AIX | Marseille | 11/5/1940, 62.6 yrs. | **Resigned** 13/12/1944, 67.2 yrs. Replaced by *Charles-Marie-Joseph-Henri de Provenchères* 3/11/1945 | Died 2/6/1984, 79.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Villerabel: Archbishop Pierre-Florent-André du Bois de la Villerabel, Principal Co-Consecrators: Gabriel-Roch de Llobet, Bishop Léon-Auguste-Marie-Joseph-Durand. Principal Consecrator Provenchères: Bishop Georges-Clément-Joseph-Edouard Jacquin, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean-Baptiste Mégnin, Bishop Paul Chevrier. |
| *Dubourg, Maurice-Louis* | BESANÇON | Besançon | 9/12/1936, 58.3 years. Previously Bishop of Marseille. | *Maurice-Louis Dubourg* | Died 31/1/1954, 75.5 yrs | Principal consecrator: Charles-Henri-Joseph Cardinal Binet; Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Paul-Jules-Narcisse Rémond & Maurice Cardinal Feltin |
| *Duparc, Adolphe-Yves-Marie* | QUIMPER [CORNOUAILLED][-LÉON] | Rennes | 11/2/1908, 51.0 yrs | *Adolphe-Yves-Marie Duparc* | Died 8/5/1946, 89.3 yrs. | Principal consecrator: Bishop Alcime-Armand-Pierre-Henri Gouraud; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Pierre-Emile Rouard, Bishop Marie-Prosper-Adolphe de Bonfils |
| *Durieux, Pierre-Marie* | CHAMBÉRY (-SAINT-JEAN-DE-MAURIENNE-TARENTAISE) | Lyon | 1/2/1937, 52.7 yrs. Previously Bishop of Viviers. | *Pierre-Marie Durieux* | Died 3/2/1947, 62.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Norbert-Georges-Pierre-Rousseau; Principal Co-Consecrators Hyacinthe-Jean Chassagnon, Bishop Etienne-Joseph Hurault |
| *Dutoit, Henri-Edouard* | ARRAS (-BOULOGNE-SAINT-OMER) | Lille | 23/12/1930, 57.5 yrs. | **Resigned** 11/9/1945 at 72.2 yrs. Replaced by *Victor-Jean Perrin* 3/4/1945, 51.2 yrs. | Resigned 26/11/1961 at 67.3 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Achille Cardinal Liènart; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Charles-Albert-Joseph Lecomte, Bishop Palmyre-Georges Jansoone |
| *Faure, Rambert-Irénée* | SAINT-CLAUDE | Besançon | 12/3/1926, 53.3 yrs. | *Rambert-Irénée Faure* | Died 27/5/1948, 75.5 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Louis-Joseph Cardinal Maurin; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean-Marie Bourchany, Bishop Etienne Irénée Faugier |
| *Feltin, Maurice* | BORDEAUX | Bordeaux | 16/12/1935, 52.6 yrs. Previously was Bishop of Toryes, then Archbishop of Sens. | *Maurice Feltin. Appointed Archbishop of Paris in 1949 and Bishop of France, Military. Elevated to Cardinal in 1953.* | Held a series of other positions before retiring in 1969. | Principal Consecrator: Charles-Henri-Joseph Cardinal Binet; Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Paul-Jules-Narcisse Rémond, Bishop Jean-Marchel Rodié |
| *Fillon, Louis-Joseph* | BOURGES | Tours | 24/12/1934, 57.4 yrs. Previously Bishop of Langres 1929-1934. Died 2/1/1943 at 65.4 yrs. | Replaced by *Joseph-Chatles Lefèbvre* 17/1/1943, 51.2 yrs. Previously Bishop of Troyes. | Retired 10/10/1969, 77.5 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Fillon: Louis-Joseph Cardinal Maurin; Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin, Bishop Georges-Marie-Eugène Audollent. Principal Consecrator Lefèbvre: Bishop Edouard-Gabriel Mesguen; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Joseph-Jean Heintz, Bishop Loius Liagre. |
| *Fleury, Marcel* | NANCY | Besançon | 24/12/1934, 50 yrs. | *Marcel Fleury* | Died 16/8/1949, 64.6 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin; Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Georges-Auguste Louis, Paul-Marie-André Cardinal Richaud |
| *Flynn, Patrice* | NEVERS | Dijon | 16/8/1932, 58 yrs. | *Patrice Flynn* | Retired 17/12/1963. | Principal Consecrator: Jean Cardinal Verdier; Principal Co-Consecrators: Alfred-Henri-Marie Cardinal Baudrillart; Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin. |

| Bishop 1942 | Diocèse | Archdiocèse | Appointments & Transitions | Bishop 1945 | End of Term & Cause | Consecrators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Gaillard, Louis-Joseph* | TOURS | Tours | 25/9/1931, 51.9 yrs. | *Louis-Joseph Gaillard. Appointed Apostolic Administrator of Nantes 19/1/1935.* | Died 28/10/1956 as Archbishop of Tours. | Principal Consecrator: Bishops Eugène-Stanislas Le Senne; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Ernest Neveux, Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin |
| *Gaudel, Auguste Joseph* | FRÉJUS-TOULON | Marseille | 24/9/1941, 61.5 yrs. | *Auguste Joseph Gaudel* | Retired 30/6/1960, 80.1 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Gabriel-Emmaneul-Joseph Piguet, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Joseph-Jean Heintz, Bishop Marcel Fleury. |
| *Gaudron, Alphonse-Paul-Désiré* | EVREUX | Rouen | 15/10/1930, 50.4 yrs. | *Alphonse-Paul-Désiré Gaudron* | Died 2/8/1967, 87.2 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Raoul-Octove-Marie-Jean Harscouët; Principal Co-Consecrators: Alfred-Henri-Marie Cardinal Baudrillart, Archbishop Joseph-Marie Tissier |
| *Gerlier, Pierre-Marie* | LYON | Lyon | 30/7/1937, 57.5 yrs. Was previously Bishop of Tarbes et Lourdes. | *Pierre-Marie Gerlier* | Died 17/1/1965, 85 yrs. | Principapl Consecrator: Louis-Ernest Cardinal Dubois, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin, Archbishop Maurice-Louis Dubourg. |
| *Ginisty, Charles-Marie-André* | VERDUN | Besançon | 11/3/1914, 49.8 yrs. | *Charles-Marie-André Ginisty* | Died 7/1/1946, 81.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Charles du Pont de Ligonnès, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Joseph-François-Ernest Ricard, Bishop Léon-Antoine-Augustin-Siméon Livinhac |
| *Girbeau, Jean-Justin-Michel* | NIMES | Montpellier | 8/1/1924, 54.7 yrs. | *Jean-Justin-Michel Girbeau* | Died 20/6/1963, 93.3 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Martin-Jérôme Izart; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jules-Louis-Marie de Carsalade du Pont, Archbishop Gabriel-Roch de Llobet. |
| *Grente, Georges-François-Xavier-Marie* | LE MANS | Rennes | 1/30/1918, 45.7 yrs. | Note: Appointed Archbishop (Personal Title) of Le Mans 3/1943 | Died 4/5/1959, 87 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Louis-Ernest Cardinal Dubois; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Claude Bardel, Bishop Joseph Guérard |
| *Grumel, Auguste* | SAINT-JEAN-DE-MAURIENNE | Chambéry | 3/2/1924, 61.1 yrs. | *Auguste Grumel* | Died 14/3/1946, 83.1 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Dominique Castellan, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Louis Termier, Archbishop Florent-Michel-Marie-Joseph du Bois de la Villerabel |
| *Harscouët, Raoul-Octove-Marie-Jean* | CHARTRES | Tours | 21/6/1926, 52 yrs. | *Raoul-Octove-Marie-Jean Harscouët* | Died 18/10/1954, 80.3 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Florent-Michel-Marie-Joseph la Villerable; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop François-Jean-Marie Serrand, Bishop Louis Termier |
| *Heintz, Jean-Joseph* | METZ | Immediately Subject to the Holy See | 15/2/1938, 52 yrs. Previously Bishop of Troyes,1933-1938. | *Joseph-Jean Heintz* | Died 30/11/1958, 72.8 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Emmanuel Célestin Cardinal Suhard; Principal Co-Consecrators: Maurice Cardinal Feltin, Bishop Ernest Neveux |
| *Jacquin, Georges-Clément-Joseph-Edourard (note: previous Bishop, Jean-Baptiste-Auguste Gonon, died 21/4/1942. Was replaced by Jacquin 7/10/1942)* | MOULINS | Clermont | 7/10/1942, 61.7 yrs. | *Georges-Clément-Joseph-Edourard Jacquin* | Died 25/4/1956, 75.1 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Gonon: Bishop Hyacinthe-Jean Chassagnon, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Adolph Manier, Bishop Alexandre Caillot. Principal Consecrator Jacquin: Bishop Guillaume-Marius Sembel, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Gabriel Brunhes, Bishop Lucien-Sidroine Lebrun. |

| Bishop 1942 | Diocèse | Archdiocèse | Appointments & Transitions | Bishop 1945 | End of Term & Cause | Consecrators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Jorcin, Cosme-Benjamin* | DIGNE | Marseille | 23/12/1923, 49.6 yrs. | *Cosme-Benjamin Jorcin* | Died 20/12/1958, 84.6 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Archbishop Domonique Castellan; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Louis Termier, Archbishop Florent-Michel-Marie-Joseph du Bois de la Villerabel |
| *Julleville, Pierre-André-Charles Petit de* | ROUEN | Rouen | 7/8/1936, 59.7 yrs. Was previously Bishop of Dijon. | *Pierre-André-Charles Petit de Julleville. Appointed Archbishop of Rouen in 1936, Apostolic Administrator of Dijon in 1936, resigned 1937. Elevated to Cardindal 18/2/1946.* | Died 10/12/1947, 71.1 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Louis-Ernest Cardinal Dubois, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Louis-Joseph Gaillard, Bishop Georges-Marie-Eugène Audollent |
| *Lamy, Frédéric Edouard Camille* | SENS | Dijon | 20/8/1936, 48.9 yrs. Previously Bishop of Meaux, 1932-1936. | *Frédéric Edouard Camille Lamy* | Retired 27/10/1962. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Charles-Albert-Joseph Lecomte, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Florent-Michel-Marie-Joseph du Bois de la Villerabel, Pierre-André-Charles Cardinal Petit de Julleville |
| *Le Bellec, Eugène-Joseph-Marie* | VANNES | Rennes | 11/10/1941, 51.6 yrs. | *Eugène-Joseph-Marie Le Bellec* | Retired 24/9/1964, 74.6 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop François-Jean-Marie Serrand, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Adolphe-Yves-Marie Duparc, Bishop Raoul-Octove-Marie-Jean Harscouët |
| *Lebrun, Lucien-Sidroine* | AUTUN | Dijon | 26/7/1940, 44.4 yrs. | *Lucien-Sidroine Lebrun* | Died 5/5/1985, 89.2 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Frédéric Edouard Camille Lamy, Principal Co-Consecrators: Maurice Cardinal Feltin, Joseph-Charles Cardinal Lefèbvre. |
| *Lecoeur, Paul-Augustin (note: Lecoeur died 18/3/1942. No replacement until 12/1/1943)* | SAINT-FLOUR | Clermont | 13/7/1906, 58.3 yrs. Died 18/3/1942, 94 yrs. | Replaced by *Henri-Marie-Joseph Pinson* 12/1/1943, 57.1 yrs. | Died 18/4/1951, 65.4 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Lecoeur: Archbishop Edmond-Frédéric Fuzet, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Claude Bardel, Bishop Phillipe Meunier. Principal Consecrator Pinson: Achille Cardinal Lienart, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean-Joseph-Léonce Villepelet, Bishop Louis Liagre. |
| *Lefèbvre, Joseph-Charles Cardinal* | TROYES | Reims | 27/7/1938, 46.3. yrs. Appointed Archbishop of Bourges 17/6/1943. | Replaced by *Julien François Le Couëdic* 4/11/1943, 53.8 yrs. | Retired 21/2/1967. | Principal Consecrator Lefèbvre: Bishop Edourad-Gabriel Mesguen, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Joseph-Jean Heintz, Bishop Louis Liagre; Principal Consecrator Le Couëdic: Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland Gosselin, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Marcel Fleury, Archbishop Henri Maurice Albert Audrain |
| *Liagre, Louis* | LA ROCHELLE | Poitiers | 7/3/1938, 54.5 yrs. | *Louis Liagre* | Died 10/8/1955. | Principal Consecrator: Achille Cardinal Lienart, Principal Co-Consecrators: Maurice Cardinal Feltin, Archbishop Henri-Edouard Dutoit |
| *Lienart, Achille* | LILLE | Lille | 6/10/1928, 44.8 yrs. Elevated to Cardinal 30/6/1930 | *Achille Lienart* | Retired 7/3/1968 | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Charles-Albert-Joseph Lecomte, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Palmyre-Georges Jansoone, Maurice Cardinal Feltin |
| *Llobet, Gabriel-Roch de* | AVIGNON | Marseille | 16/1/1925, 53 yrs. Coadjutor Archbishop of Avignon, was previously Bishop of Gap. | *Gabriel-Roch de Llobet* | Died 22/4/1957, 85.3 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: François-Marie-Anatole Cardinal de Rovérie de Cabrières, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jules-Louis-Marie de Carsalade du Pont, Bishop Adolphe-Casimir David |

| Bishop 1942 | Diocèse | Archdiocèse | Appointments & Transitions | Bishop 1945 | End of Term & Cause | Consecrators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Llosa, Jean-Baptiste-Adrien* | AJACCIO | Marseille | 14/9/1938, 54.3 yrs. | *Jean-Baptiste-Adrien Llosa* | Died 12/3/1975, 90.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Augustin-Joseph-Marie Simeone, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Cosme-Benjamin Jorcin, Bishop Jean-Marcel Rodié. |
| *Louis, Georges-Auguste* | PÉRIGUEUX | Bordeaux | 16/8/1932, 50.0 yrs. | *Georges-Auguste Louis* | Retired 3/8/1965, 82.8 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Emanuel-Anatole-Raphaël Chaptal de Chanteloup, Bishop Alphonse-Paul-Désiré Gaudron |
| *Louvard, Théophile-Marie* | COUTANCES | Rouen | 31/10/1924, 66.1 yrs | *Théophile-Marie Louvard* | Died 8/4/1950, 91.5 yrs. Was previously Bishop of Langres, 1919-1924. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Claude Bardel, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Alexandre-Louis-Victor-Aimé Le Roy, Georges-François-Xavier-Marie Cardinal Grente |
| *Maisonobe, Amédée-Marie-Alexis* | BELLEY-ARS | Lyon | 29/5/1935, 52.4 yrs. | *Amédée-Marie-Alexis Maisonobe* | Died 15/11/1954, 71.9 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Paul-Augustin Lecoeur, Principal Co-Consecrator: Bishop Gabriel Brunhes, Archbishop Georges-Auguste Louis |
| *Marceillac, Pierre* | PAMIERS | Toulouse | 19/8/1916, 53.1 yrs. | *Pierre Marceillac* | Died 10/6/1947, 83.9 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Arcbishop Jean-Augustin Germain, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Charles-Paul Sagot du Vauroux, Archbishop Peirre-Célestin Cézerac |
| *Marmottin, Louis-Augustin* | REIMS | Reims | 21/8/1940, 65.4 yrs. Appointed Archbishop. | *Louis-Augustin Marmottin* | Died 9/5/1960, 85.2 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Joseph-Marie Tissier, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Charles-Joseph-Eugène Ruch, Georges-François-Xavier-Marie Cardinal Grente. |
| *Martin, Joseph-Marie-Eugène* | LE PUY-EN-VELAY | Clermont | 6/2/1940, 48.5 yrs. | *Joseph-Marie-Eugène Martin* | Appointed Archbishop of Rouen 11/10/1948, Elevated to Cardinal in 1965, Retired 6/5/1968, 76.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Maurice Cardinal Feltin, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Clément Joseph Mathieu, Bishop Louis Liagre. |
| *Martin, Lucien-Louis-Claude* | AMIENS | Reims | 29/5/1935, 52.4 yrs. | *Lucien-Louis-Claude Martin* | Died 26/12/1945, 62.9 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Marcel Fleury, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Charles-Joseph-Eugène Ruch, Bishop Henri-Jean Houbaut |
| *Matthieu, Clément Joseph Mathieu* | AIRE ET DAX | Bordeaux | 12/9/1931, 49.5 yrs. | *Clément Joseph Mathieu* | Died 25/3/1963, 81 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop François-Xavier-Marie-Jules Gieure, Principal Co-Consecrators: Pierre-Marie Cardinal Gerlier, Bishop Jean Saint Pierre |
| *Mégnin, Jean-Baptiste* | ANGOULÊME | Poitiers | 7/12/1933, 50.9 yrs. | *Jean-Baptiste Mégnin* | Died 9/5/1965, 82.3 | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Jean-Baptiste-Auguste Gonong, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Alexandre Caillot, Archbishop Pierre-Marie Durieux |
| *Mennechet, Ernest-Victor* | SOISSONS | Reims | 2/3/1928, 50.7 yrs. | *Ernest-Victor Mennechet* | Died 2/6/1946, 69 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Charles-Henri-Joseph Cardinal Binet; Principal Co-Consecrators: Alfred-Henri-Marie Cardinal Baudrillart, Bishop Ernest Neveux |
| *Mesguen, Edouard-Gabriel* | POITIERS | Poitiers | 7/12/1933, 50.9 yrs. | *Edouard-Gabriel Mesguen* | Died 4/8/1956, 75.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Adolphe-Yves-Marie Duparc, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean-Baptiste-Marie Budes de Guébriant, Archbishop Marie-Augustin-Olivier de Durfort de Civbac de Lorge |

| Bishop 1942 | Diocèse | Archdiocèse | Appointments & Transitions | Bishop 1945 | End of Term & Cause | Consecrators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Moussaron, Jean-Joseph-Aimé* | ALBI | Toulouse | 11/5/1940, 62.7 yrs. Appointed Archbishop, previously Bishop of Cahors 1936-1940 and Auxiliary Bishop of Auch 1929. | *Jean-Joseph-Aimé Moussaron* | Died 10/43/1956, 78.5 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Joseph-François-Ernest Ricard, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Charles-Paul Sagot du Vauroux, Pierre-Marie Cardinal Gerlier |
| *Pasquet, Octave-Louis* | SÉES | Rouen | 21/6/1926, 56.8 yrs. | *Octave-Louis Pacquet* | Retired 31/3/1961, 91.4 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Théophile-Marie Louvard, Principal Co-Consecrators: Georges-François-Xavier-Marie Cardinal Grente, Bishop Raymon-René Lerouge |
| *Pays, Jean-Joseph* | CARCASSONNE ET NARBONNE | Montpellier | 16/8/1932, 50.6 yrs. | *Jean-Joseph Pays* | Died 18/6/1951, 69.4 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Pierre-Marie Cardinal Gerlier, Principal Co-Consecrators: Clément-Emile Cardinal Roques, Bishop Clément Joseph Mathieu |
| *Pic, Camille* | VALENCE | Lyon | 16/8/1932, 55.7 yrs. Previously Bishop of Gap. | *Camille Pic* | Died 25/11/1951, 75 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Désiré-Marie-Joseph-Antelne-Martin Paget, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop René-Pierre Mignen, Bishop Jean-Baptiste-Auguste Gonon |
| *Picaud, François-Marie* | BAYEUX | Rouen | 12/9/1931, 53.6 yrs. Was previously Auxiliary Bishop of Vannes. | *François-Marie Picaud* | Retired 5/8/1954, 76.5 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Adolphe-Yves-Marie Duparc, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Eugène-Satnislas Le Senne, Archbishop Louis Le Hunsec |
| *Piguet, Gabriel-Emmanuel-Joseph* | CLERMONT | Clermont | 7/12/1933, 46.8 yrs. | *Gabriel-Emmanuel-Joseph Piguet* | Died 3/7/1952, 65.4 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Hyacinthe-Jean Chassagnon, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean-Baptiste-Auguste Gonon, Bishop Jean-Marcel Rodié |
| *Rastouil, Louis-Paul* | LIMOGES | Poitiers | Appointed 21/10/1938, 54.6 yrs. | *Louis-Paul Rastouil* | Died 7/4/1966, 81.9 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Jean Delay, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Maurice-Louis Dubourg, Bishop Augustin-Joseph-Marie Simeone. |
| *Rémond, Paul-Jules-Narcisse* | NICE | Marseille | 20/5/1930, 56.7 yrs. | *Paul-Jules-Narcisse Rémond. Appointed Archbishop (Personal Title) of Nice 23/1/1950.* | Died 24/4/1963, 89.6 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Louis Humbrecht, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Gabriel-Roch de Llobet, Archbishop Florent-Michel-Marie-Joseph du Bois de la Villerabel |
| *Richaud, Paul-Marie-André* | LAVAL | Rennes | 27/7/1938, 51.3 yrs. | *Paul-Marie-André Richaud*, | Richaud appointed Archbishop of Bordeaux in 1950, elevated to Cardinal 1958. Died 5/2/1968, 80.8 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin, Principal Co-Consecrators: Pierre-Marie Cardinal Gerlie, Archbishop Goreges-Auguste Louis. |
| *Rocques, Clément-Emile* | RENNES | Rennes | 11/5/1940, 59.4 yrs. Previously Bishop of Montauban (1929-1934) and Archbishop of Aix (1934-1940). | *Clément-Emile Roques*. Elevated to Cardinal 18/2/1946. | Died 4/9/1964, 83.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishp Pierre-Célestin Cézerac, Principal Co-Consecrators: Jules-Géraud Cardinal Saliège, Bishop Charles Challiol |
| *Rodié, Jean-Marcel* | AGEN | Bordeaux | 7/3/1938, 58.6 yrs.. Was previously Bishop of Ajaccio. | *Jean-Marcel Rodié* | Died 10/4/1968, 88.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Augustin-Joseph-Marie Simeone, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Louis-Marie Ricard, Bishop Cosem-Benjamin Jorcin. |
| *Roeder, Félix* | BEAUVAIS | Reims | 14/8/1937, 57.0 yrs. | *Félix Roeder* | Retired 21/2/1955, 74.3 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Roeder: Bishop Charles-Marie-André Ginisty, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Marcel Fleury, Bishop Lucien-Louis-Claude Martin. |

| Bishop 1942 | Diocèse | Archdiocèse | Appointments & Transitions | Bishop 1945 | End of Term & Cause | Consecrators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Roland-Gosselin, Benjamin-Octave* | VERSAILLES | Paris | 12/3/1926, 55.2 yrs. Previously Coadjutor Bishop, Succeeded as Bishop 3/4/1931. Was formerly Auxiliary Bishop of Paris. | *Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin* | Retired 12/4/1952, 81.3 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Léon-Adolphe Cardinal Ametter, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Jean-Victor-Emile Chesnelong, Bishop Charles-Henri-Célestin Gibier |
| *Ruch, Charles-Joseph-Eugène* | STRASBOURG | Immediately Subject to the Holy See | 23/4/1919, 45.6 yrs. Previously Bishop of Nancy 1918-1919. | *Charles-Joseph-Eugène Ruch* | Died 29/8/1945, 71.9 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop François-Léon Gauthey, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Henri-Victor Altamayer, Bishop Alphonse-Gabriel-Pierre Foucault |
| *Saliège, Jules-Géraud* | TOULOUSE | Toulouse | 6/12/1928, 58.8 yrs. Appointed Archbishop. Was previously Bishop of Gap 1925-1928. | *Jules-Géraud Saliège. Elevated to Cardinal 18/2/1946.* | Died 5/11/1956, 86.7 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Paul-Augustin Lecoeur, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Benjamin-Octave Roland-Gosselin, Bishop Hippolyte-Marie de La Celle |
| *Sembel, Guillaume-Marius* | DIJON | Dijon | 15/3/1937, 53.3 yrs. | *Guillaume-Marius Sembel* | Died 11/4/1964, 80.4 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Sembel: Bishop Gabriel-Emmanuel-Joseph Piguet, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean-Baptiste-Auguste Gonon, Archbishop Georges-Auguste Louis. |
| *Serrand, François-Jean-Marie* | SAINT-BRIEUC | Rennes | 4/6/1923, 48.5 yrs. | *François-Jean-Marie-Serrand* | Died 20/3/1949, 74.3 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Alexis-Armand Cardinal Charost, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Pierre-Florent-André du Bois de la Villerable, Bishop Alcime-Armand-Pierre-Henri Guraud |
| *Suhard, Emmanuel Célestin* | PARIS | Paris | 11/5/1940, 66.1 yrs. Previously Archbishop of Reims, Elevated to Cardinal 16/12/1935. | *Emmanuel Célestin Suhard* | Died 30/5/1949, 75.2 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Suhard: Archbishop Eugène-Jacques Grellier, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Florent-Michel-Marie-Joseph du Bois de la Villerabel, Bishop Constantin-Marie-Joseph Chauvin. |
| *Termier, Louis* | TARENTAISE | Chambéry | 14/9/1938, 45.2 yrs. Appointed Bishop of Bayonne 24/7/1944. | Replaced by *Auguste Jauffrés* 28/8/1944, 58.3 yrs. | Retired 7/12/1961, 75.5 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Terrier: Archbishop Florent-Micehl-Marie-Joseph du Bois de la Villerabel, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Joseph-Tobie Mariétan, Bishop Auguste Grumel. Principal Consecrator Jauffres: Bishop Alfred Couderc, Principal Co-Consecrators: Archbishop Pierre-Marie Durieux, Bishop Etienne Bornet. |
| *Théas, Pierre-Marie* | MONTAUBAN | Toulouse | 26/7/1940, 45.9 yrs. | *Pierre-Marie Théas* | Retired 12/2/1970, 75.4 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Edmond Vansteenberghe; Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Jean Saint-Pierre, Bishop Clément Joseph Mathieu |
| *Tissier, Joseph-Marie* | CHÂLONS | Reims | 20/12/1912, 55.3 yrs. | *Joseph-Marie Tissier* | Appointed Archbishop (Personal Title) of Châlons 16/5/1947, Died 9/1/1948 | Principal Consecrator: Bishop Henri-Louis-Alfred Bouquet, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Alphonse-Gabriel-Pierre Foucault, Archbishop Alfred-Jules Mélisson |
| *Vansteenberghe, Edmond* | BAYONNE | Bordeaux | 6/10/1939, 58.4 yrs. Died 10/12/1943 at 62.6 yrs. | Replaced by *Léon-Albert Terrier* 24/7/1944, 51 yrs. Previously was Bishop of Tarentaise, appointed 14/9/1938. | Died 12/5/1957, 63.8 yrs. | Principal Consecrator Vansteenberghe: Archille Cardinal Liénart, Principal Co-Consecrators: Charles-Joseph-Eugène Ruch, Archbishop Henri-Edourard Dutoit. Principal Consecrator Terrier: Archbishop Florent-Michel-Marie-Joseph la Villerabel, Principal Co-Consecrators: Bishop Joseph-Tobie Mariétan, Bishop Auguste Grumel |
| *Villepelet, Jean-Joseph-Léonce* | NANTES | Rennes | 20/81936, 43.9 yrs. | *Jean-Joseph-Léonce Villepelet* | Retired 2/7/1966, 73.8 yrs. | Principal Consecrator: Archbishop Louis-Joseph Fillon, Principal Co-Consecrators: Pierre-Marie Cardinal Gerlier, Bishop François-Louis Auvity |

## Appendix B:
## Catholic Action Specialized Youth Movements, Membership Numbers and Publications

| Movement | Date founded | Members (date) | Sections affiliated | Publications & Circulation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACJF | 1886-1956 | 100,000 (1925)<br>200,000 (1936)<br>600-700,000 (1941) | 100 (1900)<br>3,000 (1914) | *La Vie nouvelle* (1901)<br>*Annales de la Jeunesse Catholique* (1925-1939)<br>*Cahiers de Notre Jeunesse* (1941-1943)<br>*Positions ACJF* (1946-1956)<br>*Confrontations* (1956) |
| JOC | 1927 | 22,000 adherents (1933)<br>12,000 militants (1939)<br>45,000 adherents<br>150,000 (1943)<br>60,000 adherents (1950)<br>25,000 adherents (1956) | 2,700 | *Jeunesse ouvrière* 100,000 (1937)<br>30,000 (1953)<br>JOC Calendar 180,000 (1937)<br>220,000 (1942) |
| JOCF | 1928-<br>1968 | 50,000 adherents (1939)<br>10,000 militants<br>25,000 JOC-JOCF MERGER | 1,250 (1939) | *Jeunesse ouvrière féminine* 100,000 (1937)<br>190,000 (1939)<br>*Sillage* |
| JEC | 1929 | 20,000 (1956) | 50 (1930)<br>150 (1934)<br>250 (1936)<br>480 (1938)<br>500 (1939) | *Messages* 1,000 (1934)<br>7,000 (1938)<br>(suspended by Vichy - 1943)<br>*Messages Étudiant* 3,000 (1950)<br>*Messages* 4,600 (1958)<br>*Rallye-Jeunesse* (1959-65) 264,000 (1964) |
| JECF | 1930-1965 | 40,000 (1962)<br>JEC-JECF MERGER | 216 lycées (1936) | |
| JAC | 1929-1965 | 1,250 (1931)<br>6,216 (1934)<br>11,864 (1935)<br>28,000 (1938)<br>29,000 (1939)<br>200,000 (1950) | 80<br>345<br>878<br>1,485 | *Jeunesse Agricole* 8,000 (1931)<br>20,000 (1934)<br>35,000 (1935)<br>60,000 (1938)<br>*Jeunes Forces Rurales* 85,000 (1948)<br>70,000 (1956)<br>JAC-JACF Calendar |
| JACF | 1933-1965 | 12,000 (1938) | 900 (1939) | *Jeunesse agricole féminine* 86,000 (1939)<br>*Promesses* |

Source: Plaza (2008).

# Appendix C:
# *Témoignage Chrétien*: Titles, Authors, and Distribution Amounts

| Numéro (a) | Titre | Auteurs (b) | Date (c) | Lieu d'impression | Nbre de pages | Tirage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I | **France, prends garde de perdre ton âme** | R.P. FESSARD<br>R.P. Chaillet | Nov. 1941 | Lyon | 17 | 5 000 |
| II-III | **Notre combat** | R.P. CHAILLET<br>S. Fumet | Déc. 1941-<br>janv. 1942 | Saint-Étienne | 39 | 10 000 |
| IV-V | **Les racistes peints par eux-mêmes** | R.P. CHAILLET<br>Pasteur de Pury | Févr.-mars 1942<br>*Avril 1942* | Lyon | 31 | 10 000 |
| VI-VII | **Antisémites** | R.P. CHAILLET<br>R.P. Ganne<br>J. Hours<br>R.P. de Lubac | Avril-mai 1942<br>*Juin 1942* | Lyon | 32 | 20 000 |
| VIII-IX | **Droits de l'homme et du chrétien** | R.P. CHAILLET<br>R.P. de LUBAC | Juin-juillet 1942<br>*Août 1942* | Lyon | 32 | 25 000 |
| X-XI | **Collaboration et fidélité** | R.P. CHAILLET<br>R.P. FESSARD<br>R.P. de LUBAC | Oct.-nov. 1942 | Lyon | 32 | 30 000 |
| XII | Première édition :<br>**Les voiles se déchirent**<br>(saisie et détruite par la police) | | | Lyon | | |
| XIII-XIV | **Défi** | Cardinal HLOND<br>R.P. Chaillet | Janv.-févr. 1943<br>*Août 1943* | Lyon<br>Paris | 30 | 35 000<br>? |
| XV-XVI | **Les voiles se déchirent** | J. VIALATOUX<br>R.P. Chaillet<br>R.P. de Lubac | Août 1943<br>*Déc. 1943* | Lyon<br>Paris | 32 | 20 000<br>30 000 |

| Numéro (a) | Titre | Auteurs (b) | Date (c) | Lieu d'impression | Nbre de pages | Tirage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XVII | **Déportation** | A. MANDOUZE | Juin 1943<br>*Août 1943* | Lyon<br>Paris | 16 | 25 000<br>? |
| XVIII-XIX | **Où allons-nous ?**<br>**Message de Bernanos** | (G. BERNANOS)<br>R.P. Chaillet | Août-sept. 1943<br>*Mars 1944* | Lyon<br><br>Paris | 31 | 55 000<br><br>30 000 |
| XX-XXI-<br>XXII-XXIII | **Alsace et Lorraine, terres françaises** | Abbé P. BOCKEL<br>E. Baas<br>R.P. Chaillet<br>Abbé Held | Oct.-déc. 1943 | Lyon | 64 | 60 000 |
| XXIV-XXV | **Puissance des ténèbres** | R. D'HARCOURT<br>R.P. Chaillet | Mars 1944<br>*Mai 1944* | Lyon<br>Paris | 30 | 45 000<br>30 000 |
| XXVI-XXVII | **Exigences de la Libération** | A. MANDOUZE<br>R.P. Chaillet<br>R.P. Chambre<br>R. d'Harcourt<br>R.P. de Montcheuil | Mai 1944<br>*Juin 1944* | Lyon<br>Paris | 31 | 30 000<br>30 000 |
| XXVIII-<br>XXIX | **Espoir de France** | A. MANDOUZE<br>J. Hours<br>J. Lacroix<br>H. Marrou | Juillet 1944<br>*Juillet 1944* | Lyon<br>Paris | 31 | 40 000<br>20 000 |

Source: Bédarida, F., & Bédarida, R. (2001). *La résistance spirituelle: 1941-1944: Les cahiers clandestins du Témoignage chrétien*. Paris: Albin Michel.

# Appendix D:
## Declaration of Repentance by the Roman Catholic Bishops of France
## September 30, 1997

The Roman Catholic Bishops of France issued the following declaration at Drancy on September 30, 1997, seeking forgiveness for the failings of their Church during the Holocaust period.

A major event in the history of the 20th century, the Nazi Endeavor to destroy the Jewish people raises formidable questions that no human being can sweep aside. The Catholic Church knows that conscience is stirred by remembrance and that no society or individual can be at peace if their past has been repressed or wrongly represented.

The Church of France is examining her record. With the rest of the Church she has been summoned to do so by Pope John Paul II at the approach of the third millennium. It is good for the Church to approach this transition by being clearly conscious of what she has undergone. To recognize the stumblings of yesterday is an act of loyalty and courage that helps us reinforce our faith, making us aware of today's temptations and difficulties and preparing us to confront them.

After the celebration this year of the 50th anniversary of the declaration of Seelisberg (August 5, 1947), the small village in Switzerland where just after the war Jews and Christians took the first steps toward a new teaching about Judaism, the Bishops of France, in view of the presence of internment camps in their dioceses and just before the anniversary of the first statute regarding Jews promulgated by Marshall Philippe Pétain's regime (October 3, 1940), desire to take a new step.

**Demands of Conscience**

They do so in response to the demands of their conscience as informed by the light of Christ. The time has come for the church to submit its own history, during this period in particular, to a critical reading, without hesitating to acknowledge the sins committed by its sons, and to ask forgiveness from God and from men.

In France violent persecution did not begin immediately. During the months following the defeat of 1940, state anti-Semitism became rife, depriving French Jews of their rights and foreign Jews of their freedom, as a result of decrees which were incorporated into the body of the nation's constitution.

In February 1941, approximately 40,000 Jews were in French internment camps. At a time when the country was partially occupied, demoralized and prostrate, the hierarchy considered the protection of its faithful and the assurance of the life of its institutions its primary obligation. Assigning top priority to these objectives, legitimate in themselves, they unfortunately neglected the biblical demand to respect every human being created in the image of God.

**Global Tragedy**

In addition to this departure from a right understanding of the mission of the Church, the hierarchy also lacked understanding of the immense global tragedy which was taking place threatening even the future of Christianity. Yet, Catholics and many non-Catholics were longing for the word of the Church to remind confused minds and hearts of the message of Jesus Christ.

The vast majority of Church officials responded with loyalism and docility that went far beyond traditional obedience to the established powers. Their reaction was coloured by conformism, caution and abstention, dictated in part by fear of reprisals against charitable works and Catholic youth movements. They did not realize that they had considerable power and influence, and that given the silence of other institutions, the impact of a public statement might have forestalled an irreparable catastrophe.

It is important to remember that, at the time of the Occupation, there was a lack of awareness of the actual scope of Hitler's genocide. While it is true that many gestures of solidarity can be cited, it is necessary to ask if these gestures of charity and international aid were sufficient in light of the demands of justice and respect for human rights.

Anti-Semitic legislation enacted by the French government deprived a French social group of their rights as citizens, ruining them and imposing upon them an inferior status within the nation. Decisions were taken to inter in camps foreign Jews who believed they could count on the right to asylum and on the hospitality of France. Therefore, there is no choice but to admit that the Bishops of France did not speak out, acquiescing through their silence in these flagrant violations of the rights of man and leaving an open field for the spiral of death.

We are not passing judgment on the consciences nor the persons of that time. We ourselves are not responsible for what happened, but we must assess the attitudes and actions of the past. It is our Church and as demands of conscience were swept away by perceptions excessively restricted by ecclesiastical interests we must ask why.

**Religious Origins**

Beyond the historical circumstances we have just recalled, we must ask ourselves in particular about the religious origins of this blindness. Why was secular anti-Judaism so influential? In the context of the debate which we know took place, why did the Church not hear its best voices? On several occasions before the war, through articles and public lectures, Jacques Maritain endeavored to show Christians another way of perceiving the Jewish people. He also vigorously warned them about the perversity of the anti-Semitism which was developing. From the eve of the war Mgr Saliège recommended that Catholics of the 20th century find guidance in the teaching of Pius XI rather than in the edict of Innocent III of the 13th century. During the war theologians and exegetes in Lyons and Paris prophetically emphasized the Jewish roots of Christianity, highlighting that the root of Jesse blossomed in Israel, that the two Testaments were

inseparable, that the Virgin, Christ and the Apostles were Jews, and that Christianity is linked to Judaism like a branch to the trunk which bore it. Why was so little attention paid to these words?

Certainly, on the doctrinal level the Church was fundamentally opposed to racism for both theological and spiritual reasons which were strongly expressed by Pius XI in the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge, where he condemned the underlying principles of National Socialism and warned Christians about the dangers of the myth of race and of the absolute power of the State. Since 1928 the Holy Office had condemned anti-Semitism. In 1938 Pius XI forcefully declared, "Spiritually we are Semites". But what weight could be given to such condemnations, what weight could be given to the thought of the above mentioned theologians in the context of constantly repeated anti-Jewish stereotypes that were present, even after 1942, in declarations which otherwise were not lacking in courage?

**Anti-Jewish Stereotypes**

It is important to admit the primary role, if not direct, then indirect, played by the constantly repeated anti-Jewish stereotypes wrongly perpetuated among Christians in the historical process that led to the Holocaust. Indeed, in spite of (and in part because of) the Jewish roots of Christianity, and the fidelity of the Jewish people to the One God throughout their history, the "original parting of the ways" begun in the second half of the 1st century lead to separation, then to animosity and multi-faceted hostility between Christians and Jews. While not denying the social, political cultural and economic influences in the long history of misunderstanding and antagonism between Jews and Christians, religion was a main cause of the conflict. That is not to say that a direct line of cause and effect can be drawn between these expressions of anti-Judaism and the Shoah, because the Nazi plan to annihilate the Jewish people had other sources.

According to theologians it is a well-attested fact that a tradition of anti-Judaism affected Christian doctrine and teachings, theology and apologetics, preaching and liturgy in various degrees and prevailed among Christians throughout the centuries until Vatican Council II. This soil nurtured the poisonous plant of contempt for Jews with its legacy of serious consequences, which until our century, have been difficult to remove. Wounds resulting from this contempt are still open and unhealed.

To the extent that the priests and leaders of the Church for so long allowed the teaching of contempt to develop and fostered in Christian communities a collective religious culture which permanently affected and deformed mentalities, they bear a serious responsibility. One can conclude that even though they condemned the pagan roots of anti-Semitic theories, they failed to challenge these secular thoughts and attitudes by not clarifying understandings as they should have.

As a result consciences were often lethargic, their capacity considerably weakened in face of the sudden appearance of national socialist anti-Semitism's criminal violence, a diabolic and extreme form of contempt for Jews based in categories of race and blood, openly directed at the physical

elimination of the Jewish people - "an unconditional extermination... implemented with premeditation" according to the words of Pope John Paul II.

**Courageous Actions**

Later, when the persecution increased and the Vichy authorities put the service of the police at the disposition of the occupying forces, some courageous Bishops knew that they had to speak up and forcefully protest the rounding up of Jews in the name of human rights. These public words, though few in number, were heard by many Christians. One must not forget the many initiatives by ecclesiastical authorities to rescue men, women and children in danger of death, nor the generous multi-faceted outpourings of Christian charity by the rank and file while facing the greatest risks in order to rescue thousands and thousands of Jews.

On their part and well before these interventions, without hesitation to use clandestine means, religious, priests and laity saved the honor of the Church often in an unassuming and anonymous manner. They also did it, particularly in Christian historical writings, by forcefully denouncing the Nazi poison which was threatening souls and spirits with all its neo-pagan, racist and anti-Semitic virulence and by recalling on every occasion the words of Pius XI: "Spiritually we are Semites". It is an established historical fact that due to these acts of rescue in Catholic milieu as well as in the Protestant world and through Jewish organizations, the survival of a large number of Jews was assured.

**Indifference Prevailed**

However, the fact remains that, although courageous actions in defense of persons were not lacking, we must acknowledge that indifference largely prevailed and, in the face of the persecution of Jews, especially the multi-faceted anti-Semitic laws passed by Vichy, silence was the rule and words in favor of the victims the exception.

As Francois Mauriac wrote, "a crime of this proportion redounds in no small part on all the witnesses who did not protest and on those who were responsible for their silence."

The result was that the attempt to destroy the Jewish people, instead of being perceived as a central concern on the human and spiritual level, remained a secondary issue. In the face of the magnitude of the tragedy and the unprecedented nature of the crime, too many of the Church's priests, through their silence, offended the Church itself and its mission.

Today we confess that silence was a mistake. We also acknowledge that the Church of France at that time failed in its mission of educating consciences and that she thus bears with the Christian people the responsibility of not having helped rescue in the early stages when protest and protection were possible and necessary, even though there were numerous acts of courage later on.

We acknowledge this reality today because this failure of the Church of France and its responsibility toward the Jewish people are part of its history. We confess this sin. We beg God's forgiveness and ask the Jewish people to hear our words of repentance.

This act of remembrance calls us to increase vigilance on behalf of humanity in the present and for the future.[311]

[311] Declaration of Repentance by the Roman Catholic Bishops of France. (1997, September 30). Retrieved April 10, 2016, from http://www.ccjr.us/dialogika-resources/documents-and-statements/roman-catholic/other-conferences-of-catholic-bishops/484-cefr1997